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OF

CONNOP THIRLWALL

LATE LORD BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S

EDITED

By J. J. STEWART PEROWNE, D.D.

CANON OF LLANDAFF; HULSEAN PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, CAMBRIDGE; AND
HONORARY CHAPLAIN TO THE QUEEN

VOL. III.

ESSAYS—SPEECHES—SERMONS, ETC.

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PREFACE.

THIS volume contains a selection from the Essays, Sermons, Speeches, Addresses, and miscellaneous writings of Bishop Thirlwall.

The bulk of the Essays consists of those originally published in the *Philological Museum*, a journal which was started by him and his friend Julius Charles Hare, and intended, as the latter informs us in his Preface, to forward "the knowledge and the love of ancient literature," the main attention of the Editors being directed "toward the two colossal edifices that stand forth amid the ruins of the ancient world;" and their main object being "to illustrate the language, the literature, the philosophy, the history, the manners, the institutions, the mythology, and the religion of Greece and Rome." Foremost among these Essays is that on the Irony of Sophocles, a masterpiece of philosophical criticism. To these I have added two Essays read before the Royal Society of Literature, of which the Bishop was for many years President. They are now reprinted from its Transactions, by the kind permission of the Council of that Society.

Of occasional Pamphlets I have selected those that seemed to be of most permanent interest, or which, like that on "The Pan-Anglican Synod," were characteristic of the author.

The Sermons collected in this volume have, with two or three exceptions, already appeared in print. I should have been glad to publish more out of the large number placed in my hands, and

especially some of the Ordination Sermons, together with the Addresses delivered to the Candidates for Orders at Abergwili, which the Bishop himself had selected as most suitable for publication; but to have added these to the present volume would have unduly swelled its size, and they would only have been inserted by the sacrifice of other matter, which the world, I believe, "would not willingly let die."

The Speeches on the admission of Jews into Parliament and on the Disestablishment of the Irish Church were printed by the Bishop; those on the Revision of the Bible and the Athanasian Creed are taken from the Chronicle of Convocation.

Two volumes of the Bishop's Letters will, I hope, appear in the course of next year, one edited by the Dean of Westminster, and the other by myself.

J. J. S. P.

CAMBRIDGE: 23rd October, 1877.

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ON THE IRONY OF SOPHOCLES.

SOME readers may be a little surprised to see *irony* attributed to a tragic poet: and it may therefore be proper, before we proceed to illustrate the nature of the thing as it appears in the works of Sophocles, to explain and justify our application of the term. We must begin with a remark or two on the more ordinary use of the word, on that which, to distinguish it from the subject of our present inquiry, we will call *verbal irony*. This most familiar species of irony may be described as a figure which enables the speaker to convey his meaning with greater force by means of a contrast between his thought and his expression, or, to speak more accurately, between the thought which he evidently designs to express, and that which his words properly signify. The cases in which this figure may be advantageously employed are so various as to include some directly opposite in their nature. For it will serve to express assent and approbation as well as the contrary. Still as a friend cannot be defended unless against an enemy who attacks him, the use of verbal irony must in all cases be either directly or indirectly polemical. It is a weapon properly belonging to the armoury of controversy, and not fitted to any entirely peaceable occasion. This is not the less true because, as the enginery of war is often brought out, and sham fights exhibited, for the public amusement in time of peace, so there is a sportive irony, which instead of indicating any contrariety of opinion or animosity of feeling, is the surest sign of perfect harmony and goodwill. And as there is a mode of

expressing sentiments of the utmost esteem and unanimity by an ironical reproof or contradiction, so there is an ironical self-commendation, by which a man may playfully confess his own failings. In the former case the speaker feigns the existence of adversaries whose language he pretends to adopt: in the latter he supposes himself surrounded, not as he really is by indulgent friends, but by severe judges of his actions, before whom it is necessary for him to disguise the imperfections of his character. But where irony is not merely jocular, it is not simply serious, but earnest. With respect to opinion, it implies a conviction so deep, as to disdain a direct refutation of the opposite party: with respect to feeling, it implies an emotion so strong, as to be able to command itself, and to suppress its natural tone, in order to vent itself with greater force.

Irony is so inviting an instrument of literary warfare, that there are perhaps few eminent controversial writers who have wholly abstained from the use of it. But in general even those who employ it most freely reserve it for particular occasions, to add weight and point to the gravest part of the argument. There is however an irony which deserves to be distinguished from the ordinary species by a different name, and which may be properly called *dialectic irony*. This, instead of being concentrated in insulated passages, and rendered prominent by its contrast with the prevailing tone of the composition, pervades every part, and is spread over the whole like a transparent vesture closely fitted to every limb of the body. The writer effects his purpose by placing the opinion of his adversary in the foreground, and saluting it with every demonstration of respect, while he is busied in withdrawing one by one all the supports on which it rests: and he never ceases to approach it with an air of deference, until he has completely undermined it, when he leaves it to sink by the weight of its own absurdity. Examples of this species are as rare as those of the other are common. The most perfect ever produced are those which occur in Plato's dialogues. In modern literature the finest specimens may be found in the works of Pascal, and of Plato's German translator, who has imbibed the peculiar spirit of the

Platonic irony in a degree which has perhaps never been equalled. One of the most unfortunate attempts ever made at imitating this character of the Platonic dialogue is Bishop Berkeley's Minute Philosopher. Examples of a more superficial kind, where the object is rather ridicule than argument, will readily present themselves to the reader's recollection. The highest triumph of irony consists not in refutation and demolition. It requires that, while the fallacy is exposed and overthrown by the admissions which it has itself demanded, the truth should be set in the clearest light, and on the most solid ground, by the attempts made to suppress and overwhelm it.

Without departing from the analogy that pervades the various kinds of verbal irony, we may speak of a *practical irony*, which is independent of all forms of speech, and needs not the aid of words. Life affords as many illustrations of this, as conversation and books of the other. But here we must carefully distinguish between two totally different kinds, which, though they may often outwardly coincide, spring from directly contrary feelings. There is a malignant, or at least a wanton irony, in the practical sense, by which a man humours the folly of another, for the purpose of rendering it more extravagant and incorrigible, whether it be with the further aim of extracting materials for ridicule from it, or of turning it to some still less liberal use. Specimens of this kind are perpetually occurring in society, and ancient and modern comedy is full of them. But this same irony has a darker side, which can excite only detestation and horror, as something belonging rather to the nature of a fiend than of a man. Such is the flattery which, under the mask of friendship, deliberately cherishes passions, and panders to wishes, which are hurrying their unconscious slave into ruin. Such is the spirit in which Timon gives his gold to Alcibiades and his companions, and afterwards to the thieves: though in the latter case he is near defeating his own purpose by the irony of his language, which compels one of the thieves to say: "He has almost charmed me from my profession by persuading me to it." Such is the irony with which the weird women feed the ambitious hopes of Macbeth, and afterward

lull him into a false "security, mortals' chiefest enemy," when they have been commanded to

"raise such artificial sprites
As by the strength of their illusion
Shall draw him on to his confusion,"

till

"He shall spurn fate, scorn death, and bear
His hopes 'bove wisdom, grace, and fear."

Such, but more truly diabolical, is the irony with which in *Faust* the Spirit of Evil accompanies his victim on his fatal career, and with which, by way of interlude, he receives the visit of the young scholar.

But there is also a practical irony which is not inconsistent with the highest degree of wisdom and benevolence. A man of superior understanding may often find himself compelled to assent to propositions which he knows, though true in themselves, will lead to very erroneous inferences in the mind of the speaker, because either circumstances prevent him from subjoining the proper limitations, or the person he is addressing is incapable of comprehending them. So again a friend may comply with the wishes of one who is dear to him, though he foresees that they will probably end in disappointment and vexation, either because he conceives that he has no right to decide for another, or because he thinks it probable that the disappointment itself will prove more salutary than the privation. Such is the conduct of the affectionate father in the parable, which is a type of universal application: for in every transgression there is a concurrence of a depraved will, which is the vice of the agent, with certain outward conditions, which may be considered as a boon graciously bestowed, but capable of being perverted into an instrument of evil, and a cause of misery. It must have occurred to most men, more especially to those of sanguine temperament, and whose lives have been chequered with many vicissitudes, now and then to reflect how little the good and ill of their lot have corresponded with their hopes and fears. All who have lived long enough in the world must be able to remember objects coveted with impatient eagerness, and pursued with long and unremitting toil,

which in possession have proved tasteless and worthless : hours embittered with anxiety and dread by the prospect of changes which brought with them the fulfilment of the most ardent wishes : events anticipated with trembling expectation which arrived, passed, and left no sensible trace behind them ; while things of which they scarcely heeded the existence, persons whom they met with indifference, exerted the most important influence on their character and fortunes. When, at a sufficient interval and with altered mood, we review such instances of the mockery of fate, we can scarcely refrain from a melancholy smile. And such, we conceive, though without any of the feelings that sometimes sadden our retrospect, must have been the look which a superior intelligence, exempt from our passions, and capable of surveying all our relations, and foreseeing the consequences of all our actions, would at the time have cast upon the tumultuous workings of our blind ambition and our groundless apprehensions, upon the phantoms we raised to chase us, or to be chased, while the substance of good and evil presented itself to our view, and was utterly disregarded.

But it is not only in the lives of individuals that man's short-sighted impatience and temerity are thus tacitly rebuked by the course of events : examples still more striking are furnished by the history of states and institutions. The moment of the highest prosperity is often that which immediately precedes the most ruinous disaster, and (as in the case not only of a Xerxes, a Charles the Bold, a Philip the Second, and a Napoleon, but of Athens, and Sparta, and Carthage, and Venice,) it is the sense of security that constitutes the danger, it is the consciousness of power and the desire of exerting it that cause the downfall. It is not however these sudden and signal reverses, the fruit of overweening arrogance and insatiable ambition, that we have here principally to observe : but rather an universal law, which manifests itself, no less in the moral world than in the physical, according to which the period of inward languor, corruption, and decay, which follows that of maturity, presents an aspect more dazzling and commanding, and to those who look only at the

surface inspires greater confidence and respect, than the season of youthful health, of growing but unripened strength. The power of the Persians was most truly formidable when they first issued from their comparatively narrow territory to overspread Asia with their arms. But at what epoch in their history does the Great King appear invested with such majesty, as when he dictated the peace of Antalcidas to the Greeks? And yet at this very time the throne on which he sate with so lofty a port was so insecurely based, that a slight shock would have been sufficient, as was soon proved, to level it with the dust.

It was nearly at the same juncture that Sparta seemed to have attained the summit of her power; her old enemy had been reduced to insignificance; her two most formidable rivals converted into useful dependants; her refractory allies chastised and cowed: in no quarter of the political horizon, neither in nor out of Greece, did it seem possible for the keenest eye to discover any prognostics of danger; her empire, says the contemporary historian, appeared in every respect to have been now established on a glorious and solid base. Yet in a few years the Spartan women saw for the first time the smoke of the flames with which a hostile army ravaged their country in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital; and a Spartan embassy implored the pity of the Athenians, and pleaded the magnanimity with which Sparta in her day of victory had preserved Athens from annihilation, as a motive for the exercise of similar generosity toward a fallen enemy. The historian sees in this reverse the judgment of the gods against treachery and impiety. But when we inquire about the steps by which the change was effected, we find that the mistress of Greece had lost nearly a thousand of her subjects, and about four hundred of her citizens, at the battle of Leuctra.

It would be impertinent to accumulate illustrations which will present themselves uncalled to every reader's mind: we might otherwise find some amusement in comparing the history of great cities with that of their respective states, and in observing how often the splendour of the one has increased in proportion to the

weakness and rottenness of the other. The ages of conquest and of glory had passed before Rome began to exhibit a marble front; and the old consuls who in the wars of a century scarcely quelled the Sannite hydra, and who brought army after army into the field to be destroyed by Hannibal, would have gazed with wonder on the magnificence in the midst of which the master of the empire, in anguish and dismay, called upon Varns to restore his three legions. Yet Rome under Augustus was probably less gorgeous than Byzantium under Constantine, whose city was no unapt image of the ill which Dante deplored, as the consequence, though not the effect, of his conversion.* But instead of dwelling on the numerous contrasts of this kind which history suggests in illustrating the fragile and transitory nature of all mortal greatness, we shall draw nearer to our main point, and shall at the same time be taking a more cheering view of our subject, if we observe, that, as all things human are subject to dissolution, so and for the same reason it is the moment of their destruction that to the best and noblest of them is the beginning of a higher being, the dawn of a brighter period of action. When we reflect on the colossal monarchies that have succeeded one another on the face of the earth, we readily acknowledge that they fulfilled the best purpose of their proud existence, when they were broken up in order that their fragments might serve as materials for new structures. We confess with a sigh that the wonders of Egypt were not a mere waste of human labour, if the sight of them inspired the genius of the Greeks. But we should have been more reluctant to admit that this nation itself, which stands so solitary and unapproachable in its peculiar excellence, attained its highest glory, when, by the loss of its freedom and its power, it was enabled to diffuse a small portion of its spirit through the Roman world: had it not been that it was the destiny of this Roman world to crumble into dust, and to be trampled by hordes of barbarians, strangers to arts and letters. Yet we can believe this, and things much more wonderful, when we contemplate that

* *Inf.* xix. 115—117. *Ahi, Costantin, di quanto mal fu madre, Non la tua conversion, ma quella dote Che da te prese il primo ricco Patre.*

new order of things, which followed what seemed so frightful a darkness, and such ir retrievable ruin.

We must add one other general remark before we proceed to apply the preceding. There is always a slight cast of irony in the grave, calm, respectful attention impartially bestowed by an intelligent judge on two contending parties, who are pleading their causes before him with all the earnestness of deep conviction, and of excited feeling. What makes the contrast interesting is, that the right and the truth lie on neither side exclusively: that there is no fraudulent purpose, no gross imbecility of intellect, on either: but both have plausible claims and specious reasons to allege, though each is too much blinded by prejudice or passion to do justice to the views of his adversary. For here the irony lies not in the demeanour of the judge, but is deeply seated in the case itself, which seems to favour each of the litigants, but really eludes them both. And this too it is that lends the highest degree of interest to the conflicts of religious and political parties. For when we believe that no principle, no sentiment, is involved in the contest, but that each of the rival factions is equally selfish, and equally insincere, we must look on with indifference or disgust, unless some other interests are likely to be affected by the issue. Our attention is indeed more anxiously fixed on a struggle in which right and wrong, truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, are manifestly arrayed in deliberate opposition against each other. But still this case, if it ever occurs, is not that on which the mind dwells with the most intense anxiety. For it seems to carry its own final decision in itself. But the liveliest interest arises when by inevitable circumstances characters, motives, and principles are brought into hostile collision, in which good and evil are so inextricably blended on each side, that we are compelled to give an equal share of our sympathy to each, while we perceive that no earthly power can reconcile them; that the strife must last until it is extinguished with at least one of the parties, and yet that this cannot happen without the sacrifice of something which we should wish to preserve. Such spectacles often occur in human affairs, and agitate the bystanders with painful perplexity. But a

review of history tends to allay this uneasiness, by affording us on many such occasions, a glimpse of the balance held by an invisible hand, which so nicely adjusts the claims of the antagonists, that neither is wholly triumphant, nor absolutely defeated: each perhaps loses the object he aimed at, but in exchange gains something far beyond his hopes.

The dramatic poet is the creator of a little world, in which he rules with absolute sway, and may shape the destinies of the imaginary beings to whom he gives life and breath according to any plan that he may choose. Since however they are men whose actions he represents, and since it is human sympathy that he claims, he will, if he understands his art, make his administration conform to the laws by which he conceives the course of mortal life to be really governed. Nothing that rouses the feelings in the history of mankind is foreign to his scene, but as he is confined by artificial limits, he must hasten the march of events, and compress within a narrow compass what is commonly found diffused over a large space, so that a faithful image of human existence may be concentrated in his mimic sphere. From this sphere however he himself stands aloof. The eye with which he views his microcosm and the creatures who move in it, will not be one of human friendship, nor of brotherly kindness, nor of parental love; it will be that with which he imagines that the invisible power who orders the destiny of man might regard the world and its doings. The essential character therefore of all dramatic poetry must depend on the poet's religious or philosophical sentiments, on the light in which he contemplates history and life, on the belief he entertains as to the unseen hand that regulates their events.

If any of these remarks should appear questionable as a general proposition, we may at least safely assume their truth as beyond doubt, when they are applied to Sophocles. Not even the most superficial reader of his works can fail to observe, that they are all impressed with a deep religious character, that he takes every opportunity of directing the attention of his audience to an overruling Power, and appears to consider his own most important

function to be that of interpreting its decrees. What then was the religion of Sophocles? what was his conception of this Power whom he himself represents in conducting the affairs of his ideal world? On the answer we give to this question must evidently depend our apprehension of the poet's main design, and our enjoyment of the art he has exerted in its execution. Unquestionably the religion of Sophocles was not the religion of Homer, and the light in which he viewed destiny and providence was not that in which they are exhibited by the Homeric poems. In the interval which separated the maturity of epic and dramatic poetry, the human mind had taken some great strides: and men of a vigorous and cultivated intellect could no longer acquiesce in the simple theology of the Homeric age. The dogma which to the hearers of the old bard seemed perhaps the best solution that could be found for their moral difficulties, that the father of gods and men was, like the humblest of his children, subject to the sway of an irresistible fate, against which he often might murmur in vain: this dogma was suppressed or kept in the background, and on the other hand the paramount supremacy of Jupiter was brought prominently forward.* The popular mythology indeed still claimed unabated reverence, even from the most enlightened Greeks. But the quarrels of the gods, which had afforded so much entertainment to their simple-hearted forefathers, were hushed on the tragic scene: and a unity of will was tacitly supposed to exist among the members of the Olympian family, which would have deprived Homer of his best machinery. The tendency of these changes was to transfer the functions of Destiny to Jupiter, and to represent all events as issuing from his will, and the good and evil that fall to the lot of mortals as dispensed by his hand. It is evident that, so far as this notion prevailed, the character of destiny was materially altered. It could no

* See *Antigon*. 604. *τεάν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάσχοι, τὰν οὐθ' ἔπιρος αἰρεῖ ποθ' ὁ παντογῆρωσ κ. τ. λ.* *Cœd. C.* 1035. *ὶὸ Ζεῦ θεῶν παντάρχε, παντόπτα.* *El.* 174. *ἔτι μέγας οὐρανῷ Ζεῦς, ὃς ἐφορᾷ πάντα καὶ κρατύνει.* *Cœd. T.* 903. *ἀλλ' ὁ κρατύνων, ἔπιερ ὄρθ' ἀκούεις, Ζεῦ πάντ' ἀνάσσων.* [*Herm.* reads, *ε. ὁ ἀκούεις πάντων ἀνάσσων.*] The thought is still more forcibly expressed in *Philoct.* 939. *Ζεὺς ἔσθ', ἴν' εἰδῆς; Ζεὺς ὁ τῆσδε γῆς κρατῶν, Ζεὺς, ᾧ εἰδοκται ταῦθ'.*

longer be considered as a mere brute force, a blind necessity working without consciousness of its means or its ends. The power indeed still remained, and was still mysterious in its nature, inevitable and irresistible in its operation; but it is now conceived to be under the direction of a sovereign mind, acting according to the rules of unerring justice. This being the case, though its proceedings might often be inscrutable to man, they would never be accidental or capricious.

How far these ideas had acquired clearness and consistency in the mind of Sophocles, it is impossible precisely and certainly to determine. But it seems indisputable that indications of them appear in his works, and it is interesting to observe the traces of their influence on his poetry. It has indeed been often supposed that some of his greatest masterpieces were founded on a totally different view of the subject from that just described: on the supposition that mankind were either subject to an iron destiny, which without design or forethought steadily pursued its immutable track, insensible of the victims which in its progress it crushed beneath its ear: or else that they were at the mercy of reckless and wayward deities, who sported with their happiness, and sometimes destroyed it merely to display their power. We do not deny that the former at least of these suppositions may be adapted to the purpose of dramatic poetry, and that the contrast between man with his hopes, fears, wishes, and undertakings, and a dark, inflexible fate, affords abundant room for the exhibition of tragic irony: but we conceive that this is not the loftiest kind, and that Sophocles really aimed at something higher. To investigate this subject thoroughly, so as to point out the various shades and gradations of irony in his tragedies, would require much more than the space which can here be devoted to it. We shall content ourselves with selecting some features in his compositions which appear most strikingly to illustrate the foregoing remarks. One observation however must be premised, without which the works of Sophocles can scarcely be viewed in a proper light. That absolute power which we have attributed to the dramatic poet over his creatures may be limited by circumstances: and in the

Greek theatre it was in fact restricted by peculiar causes. None but gods or heroes could act any prominent part in the Attic tragedy: and as the principal persons were all celebrated in the national poetry, their deeds and sufferings were in general familiar to the audience. The poet indeed enjoyed full liberty of choice among the manifold forms which almost every tradition assumed: and he was allowed to introduce considerable variations in subordinate points. But still he was confined within a definite range of subjects, and even in that he could not expatiate with uncontrolled freedom. Now the legends from which his scenes were to be drawn were the fictitious, at least the tales, of a simple but rude age: the characters of his principal persons were such as had struck the vigorous but unrefined imagination of a race who were still children of nature: their actions were such as exhibited the qualities most esteemed in the infancy of society; and their fate corresponded to the view then entertained of the manner in which the affairs of the world are directed by natural or supernatural agency. While the poet's materials were thus prescribed for him, it was scarcely possible that he should infuse his spirit equally into all, and so mould and organize them, as never to betray the coarseness of their original texture. Duly to estimate the art of Sophocles, and rightly to understand his designs, we must take into account the resistance of the elements which he had to transform and fashion to his purposes. When we consider their nature we shall not perhaps be surprised to find that he sometimes contents himself with slight indications of his meaning, and that everything does not appear exactly to harmonize with it. We shall rather admire the unity that pervades works framed out of such a chaos, and the genius which could stamp the ancient legends with a character so foreign to their original import.

The irony in which Sophocles appears to us to have displayed the highest powers of his art is not equally conspicuous in all his remaining plays, though we believe the perception of it to be indispensable for the full enjoyment of every one of them. We shall for this reason be led to dwell less upon some of his greatest

masterpieces, than upon works which are commonly deemed of inferior value. But we shall begin with those in which the poet's intention is most apparent, and shall thus perhaps be enabled to find a clue to it where it is less clearly disclosed. We are thus led in the first place to consider two of those founded on the Theban legends.

Though it is not certain whether *Œdipus King* and *Œdipus at Colonus* were parts of one original design, it is at least probable that the contrast by which the effect of each is so much heightened entered into the poet's plan. Each indeed is complete in itself, and contains everything requisite for the full understanding and enjoyment of it; and yet each acquires a new force and beauty from a comparison with the other. We shall therefore consider them successively.

The opening scene of the first *Œdipus* exhibits the people of Cadmus bowed down under the weight of a terrible calamity. A devouring pestilence is ravaging its fields, and desolating its city. The art of man has hitherto availed nothing to check its progress: the aid of the gods has been implored in vain. The altars have blazed, and the temples reeked with incense: yet the victims of the Destroying Power continue to fall on every side, frequent as ever. The streets are constantly resounding with the pæan; but its strains are still interrupted by the voice of wailing. In this extremity of affliction however a gleam of hope shoots from one quarter through the general gloom. The royal house has been hitherto exempt from the overwhelming evil. The king, happy in the affection of his consort, and surrounded by a flourishing family, seems alone to stand erect above the flood of evils with which his people are struggling, and under which they are ready to sink. To his fortune and wisdom the afflicted city now looks for deliverance. It has not been forgotten that, on a former occasion, when Thebes was smitten with a scourge almost equally grievous, the marvellous sagacity of *Œdipus* solved the enigma on which its fate depended. There is therefore good ground for hoping that his tried prudence, aided by the favour of the gods, may once more succeed in penetrating to the mysterious cause of

the present calamity, and may contrive means of relief. With this belief a throng of suppliants of all ages, headed by the ministers of the temples, has come in solemn procession to the royal palace, and has seated itself on the steps of the altars before its vestibule, bearing the sacred ensigns with which the miserable are wont to implore succour from the powerful. Informed of their approach, the king himself comes forth to hear their complaints, and receive their requests. His generous nature is touched by the piteous spectacle, and though himself unhurt, he feels for the stroke under which his people suffers. The public distress has long been the object of his paternal cares; already he has taken measures for relieving it; he has sent a messenger to the oracle which had guided his steps in other momentous junctures by its timely warnings, and had brought him to his present state of greatness and glory; the answer of the Delphic god is hourly expected, without which even the wisdom of *Œdipus* himself can devise no remedy.

At the moment the envoy arrives with joyful tidings. *Apollo* has revealed to him the cause of the evil and the means of removing it. The land labours under a curse drawn upon it by the guilt of man; it is the stain of blood that has poisoned all the sources of life; the crime must be expiated, the pollution purged. Yet the oracle which declares the nature of the deed is silent as to the name of the criminal; he is denounced as the object of divine and human vengeance; but his person is not described, his abode is not disclosed, except by the intimation that the land is cursed by his presence. The sagacity of *Œdipus* is still required to detect the secret on which the safety of his people depends; and he confidently undertakes to bring it to light. The suppliant multitude, their worst fears quieted, better hopes revived, withdraw in calm reliance on the king and their god; and the Chorus appearing at the summons of *Œdipus*, cheered yet perplexed by the mysterious oracle, partially soothed by its promises, but still trembling with timid suspense, pours forth a plaintive strain, in which it describes the horrors of its present condition, and implores the succour of its tutelary deities.

During this pause the spectator has leisure to reflect, how different all is from what it seems. The wrath of heaven has been pointed against the afflicted city, only that it might fall with concentrated force on the head of a single man; and he who is its object stands alone calm and secure; unconscious of his own misery, he can afford pity for the unfortunate: to him all look up for succour; and, as in the plenitude of wisdom and power, he undertakes to trace the evil, of which he is himself the sole author, to its secret source.

In the meanwhile the king has deliberated with his kinsman Creon, and now appears to proclaim his will and publish his measures. To the criminal, if he shall voluntarily discover himself, he offers leave to retire from the country with impunity: to whoever shall make him known, whether citizen or stranger, large reward and royal favour: but should this gracious invitation prove ineffectual, then he threatens the guilty with the utmost rigour of justice; and finally, should man's arm be too short, he consigns the offender by a solemn imprecation to the vengeance of the gods. The same curse he denounces against himself, if he knowingly harbours the man of blood under his roof, and a like one against all who refuse to aid him in his search. The Chorus, after protesting its innocence, offers advice. Next to Apollo the blind seer Tiresias is reputed to possess the largest share of supernatural knowledge. From him the truth which the oracle has withheld may be best ascertained. But Œdipus has anticipated this prudent counsel, and on Creon's suggestion has already sent for Tiresias, and is surprised that he has not yet arrived. At length the venerable man appears. His orbs of outward sight have long been quenched: but so much the clearer and stronger is the light which shines inward, and enables him to discern the hidden things of heaven and earth. The king conjures him to exert his prophetic power for the deliverance of his country and its ruler. But instead of a ready compliance, the request is received with expressions of grief and despondency: it is first evaded, and at length peremptorily refused. The indignation of Œdipus is roused by the unfeeling denial, and at length he is provoked to declare

his suspicion that Tiresias has been himself, so far as his blindness permitted, an accessory to the regicide. The charge kindles in its turn the anger of the seer, and extorts from him the dreadful secret which he had resolved to suppress. He bids his accuser obey his own recent proclamation, and thenceforward as the perpetrator of the deed which had polluted the land, to seal his unhallowed lips. Enraged at the audacious recrimination, Œdipus taunts Tiresias with his blindness: a darkness, not of the eyes only, but of the mind; he is a child of night, whose puny malice can do no hurt to one whose eyes are open to the light of day. Yet who can have prompted the old man to the impudent calumny? Who but the counsellor at whose suggestion he had been consulted, the man who, when Œdipus and his children are removed, stands nearest to the throne? It is a conspiracy—a plot laid by Creon, and hatched by Tiresias. The suspicion once admitted becomes a settled conviction, and the king deploras the condition of royalty, which he finds thus exposed to the assault of envy and ambition. But his resentment, vehement as it is, at Creon's ingratitude, is almost forgotten in his abhorrence and contempt of the hoary impostor who has sold himself to the traitor. Even his boasted art is a juggle and a lie. Else, why was it not exerted when the Sphinx propounded her fatal riddle? The seer then was not Tiresias, but Œdipus. The lips then closed by the consciousness of ignorance have now been opened by the love of gold. His age alone screens him from immediate punishment: the partner of his guilt will not escape so easily. Tiresias answers by repeating his declaration in still plainer terms; but as at the king's indignant command he is about to retire, he drops an allusion to his birth, which reminds Œdipus of a secret which he has not yet unriddled. Instead however of satisfying his curiosity, the prophet once again, in language still more distinct than before, describes his present condition and predicts his fate.

This scene completes the exposition that was begun in the preceding one. The contrast between the real blindness and wretchedness of Œdipus and his fancied wisdom and greatness

can be carried no further, than when he contemptuously rejects the truth which he is seeking and has found, and makes it a ground of quarrel with a faithful friend. The Chorus, in its next song, only interprets the irony of the action, when it asks, Who is the guilty wretch against whom the oracle has let loose the ministers of vengeance? Where can be his lurking-place? It must surely be in some savage forest, in some dark cave, or rocky glen, among the haunts of wild beasts, that the miserable fugitive hides himself from his pursuers. Who can believe that he is dwelling in the heart of the city, in the royal palace? that he is seated on the throne?

It does not belong to our present purpose to dwell on the following scenes, in which the fearful mystery is gradually unfolded. The art with which the poet has contrived to sustain the interest of the spectator, by retarding the discovery, has been always deservedly admired. It has indeed been too often considered as the great excellence of this sublime poem, the real beauty of which, as we hope to show, is of a very different kind, and infinitely more profound and heart-stirring than mere ingenuity can produce. But the attentive reader who shall examine this part of the play from the point of view that has been here taken, will not fail to observe, among numberless finer touches of irony with which the dialogue is inlaid, that the poet has so constructed his plot, as always to evolve the successive steps of the disclosure out of incidents which either exhibit the delusive security of Oedipus in the strongest light, or tend to cherish his confidence, and allay his fears. Thus the scene with Jocasta in which his apprehensions are first awakened, arises out of the suspicion he has conceived of Creon, which, unjust and arbitrary as it is, is the only refuge he has been able to find from the necessity of believing Tiresias. The tidings from Corinth, by which he and Jocasta are so elated as to question the prescience of the gods, leads to the discovery which fixes her doom. Still more remarkable is the mode in which this is connected with the following and final stage of the solution. Oedipus has reason to dread that the arrival of the herdsman may confirm his worst fears as to the death of

Laius. Yet he forgets this as a slight care in his impatience to ascertain his parentage : hence the Chorus bursts out into a strain of joy at the prospect of the festive rites with which Cithæron—a spot to be henceforth so dear to the royal family—will be honoured, when the happy discovery shall be made : and Œdipus presses the herdsman on this subject with sanguine eagerness, which will bear not evasion or delay, and never ceases to hope for the best, until he has extorted the truth which shows him the whole extent of his calamity.

No sooner has the film dropped from his eyes than he condemns himself to perpetual darkness, to the state which, but a short time before, had been the subject of his taunts on Tiresias. The feeling by which he is urged thus to verify the seer's prediction is not the horror of the light and of all the objects it can present to him, but indignation at his own previous blindness. The eyes which have served him so ill, which have seen without discerning what it was most important for him to know, shall be for ever extinguished.* And in this condition, most wretched, most helpless, he enters once more, to exhibit a perfect contrast to his appearance in the opening scene, and thus to reverse that irony, of which we have hitherto seen but one side. While he saw the light of day, he had been ignorant, infatuated, incapable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, friend from foe. Now he clearly perceives all that concerns him ; he is conscious of the difference between his own shrewdness and the divine intelligence : he is cured of his rash presumption, of his hasty suspicions, of his doubts and cares : he has now a sure test of Creon's sincerity, and he finds that it will stand the trial. Creon's moderation, discretion, and equanimity, are beautifully contrasted in this scene, as in that of the altercation, with the vehement passion of Œdipus. The mutual relation of the two characters so exactly resembles that between Tasso and Antonio in Goethe's *Tasso*, that the German play may serve as a commentary on this part of the Greek one. And here it may

* Hermann's correction and interpretation of the passage here alluded to, v. 1271—1274, seem indispensably necessary, and restore one of the most beautiful touches in the play.—[See note on page 57.]

be proper to remark that Sophocles has rendered sufficiently clear for an attentive reader, what has nevertheless been too commonly overlooked, and has greatly disturbed many in the enjoyment of this play: that Œdipus, though unfortunate enough to excite our sympathy, is not so perfectly innocent as to appear the victim of a cruel and malignant power. The particular acts indeed which constitute his calamity were involuntarily committed: and hence in the sequel he can vindicate himself from the attack of Creon, and represent himself to the villagers of Colonus as a man more sinned against than sinning.* But still it is no less evident that all the events of his life have arisen out of his headstrong, impetuous character, and could not have happened if he had not neglected the warning of the god. His blindness, both the inward and the outward, has been self-inflicted! Now, as soon as the first paroxysm of grief has subsided, he appears chastened, sobered, humbled: the first and most painful step to true knowledge and inward peace has been taken; and he already feels an assurance, that he is henceforward an especial object of divine protection, which will shield him from all ordinary ills and dangers.

Here, where the main theme of the poet's irony is the contrast between the appearance of good and the reality of evil, these intimations of the opposite contrast are sufficient. But in *Œdipus at Colonus* this new aspect of the subject becomes the groundwork of the play. It is not indeed so strikingly exhibited as the former, because the fate of Œdipus is not the sole, not even the principal object of attention, but is subordinate to another half political, half religious interest, arising out of the legends which connect it with the ancient glories and future prospects of Attica, and with the sanctuary of Colonus. Still the same conception which is partially unfolded in the first play is here steadily pursued, and, so far as the Theban hero is concerned, is the ruling idea. In the first scene the appearance of Œdipus presents a complete reverse of that which we witnessed at the opening of the preceding play. We now see him stripped of all that then seemed

* Œd. Col. 266. τὰ γ' ἔργα μου Πεπονθῶτ' ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ διδρακότα.

to render his lot so enviable, and suffering the worst miseries to which human nature is liable. He is blind, old, destitute: an outcast from his home, an exile from his country, a wanderer in a foreign land: reduced to depend on the guidance and support of his daughter, who herself needs protection, and to subsist on the scanty pittance afforded him by the compassion of strangers, who, whenever they recognize him, view him with horror. But a change has likewise taken place within him, which compensates even for this load of affliction. In the school of adversity he has learnt patience, resignation, and content. The storm of passion has subsided, and has left him calm and firm. The cloud has rolled away from his mental vision, and nothing disturbs the clearness and serenity of his views. He not only contemplates the past in the light of truth, but feels himself instinct with prophetic powers. He is conscious of a charmed life, safe from the malice of man and the accidents of nature, and reserved by the gods for the accomplishment of high purposes. The first incident that occurs to him marks in the most signal manner the elevation to which he has been raised by his apparent fall, and the privilege he has gained by the calamity which separates him from the rest of mankind. He has been driven out of Thebes as a wretch polluted, and polluting the land. Yet he finds a resting-place in the sanctuary of the awful goddesses, the avengers of crime, whose unutterable name fills every heart with horror, whose ground is too holy for any human foot to tread. For him there is no terror in the thought of them: he shrinks not from their presence, but greets them as friends and ministers of blessing. He is, as he describes himself, not only a pious but a sacred person.* But the arrival of Ismene exhibits him in a still more august character. Feeble and helpless as he appears, he is destined to be one of Attica's tutelary heroes: and two powerful states are to dispute with one another the possession of his person and the right of paying honours to his tomb. The poet on this occasion expresses the whole force of the contrast, which is the subject of the play, in a few emphatic lines. *Oed. How speaks the oracle, my child?*

* 287. ἦκω γὰρ ἱερός ἐὺσεβής τε.

Ism. *Thou shalt be sought by them that banished thee, Living and dead, to aid the common weal.* Œd. *Why, who may prosper with such aid as mine?* Ism. *On thee 'tis said, the might of Thebes depends.* Œd. *Now, when all's lost, I am a man indeed.* Ism. *The gods now raise the head they once laid low.** In the following scenes the most prominent object is undoubtedly the glory of Attica and of Theseus. The contest indeed between the two rivals for the possession or the friendship of the outcast, the violence of Creon and the earnest supplication of Polynices, serve to heighten our impression of the dignity with which Œdipus is now invested by the favour of the gods. But still, if the poet had not had a different purpose in view, he would probably have contented himself with a less elaborate picture of the struggle. As it is, Creon's arrogance and meanness place the magnanimity of the Attic hero in the strongest relief. It is not quite so evident what was the motive for introducing the interview with Polynices, which seems at first sight to have very little connexion either with the fate and character of Œdipus, or with the renown of Theseus. In this scene Œdipus appears to modern eyes in a somewhat unamiable aspect: and at all events it is one which will effectually prevent us from confounding his piety and resignation with a spirit of Christian meekness and charity. But to the ears of the ancients there was probably nothing grating in this vindictive sternness, while it contributes a very important service to the poet's main design. That the resolution of Œdipus should not be shaken by the solicitations of Creon, backed by threats and force, was to be expected; we now see that his anger is not to be softened by the appeal which Polynices makes to his pity and his parental affection. He is for ever alienated from his unnatural sons and from Thebes, and unalterably devoted to the generous strangers who have sheltered him. Their land shall retain him a willing sojourner, and in his tomb they shall possess a pledge of victory and of deliverance in danger. Nothing now remains but

* 388. ΟΙΔ. τί δὲ τεθέσπισται τέκνον; ΙΣΜ. Σὲ τοῖς ἐκεί ζήτητὸν ἀνθρώποις ποτὲ θανόντ' ἔσεισθαι ζῶντά τ' εὐσσίας χάριν. ΟΙΔ. Τίς δ' ἄν τι τοιοῦδ' ἀνὴρὸς εὐπράξιεν ἄν; ΙΣΜ. Ἐν σοὶ τὰ κείνων φασὶ γίγνεσθαι κράτη. ΟΙΔ. Ὅτ' οὐκ ἔτ' εἰμί, τηλικαῦτ' ἄρ' εἶμ' ἀνὴρ. ΙΣΜ. Νῦν γὰρ θεοὶ σ' ὀρθοῦσι, πρόσθε δ' ὤλλυσαν.

that he should descend into his last resting-place, honoured by the express summons of the gods, and yielding a joyful obedience to their pleasure. His orphan daughters indeed drop some natural tears over the loss they have sustained: but even their grief is soon soothed by the thought of an end so peaceful and happy in itself, and so full of blessing to the hospitable land where the hero reposes.

We have already remarked that the irony we have been illustrating is not equally conspicuous in all the plays of Sophocles. In the two *Œdipuses* we conceive it is the main feature in the treatment of the subject, and is both clearly indicated by their structure, and unequivocally expressed in numberless passages. On the other hand, in the *Electra* it may appear doubtful whether anything is gained by considering the plot from this point of view, and whether we are justified in attributing it to Sophocles. The poet's object may seem to have been merely to exhibit the heroine in a series of situations, which successively call forth the fortitude, the energy, the unconquerable will, and the feminine tenderness, which compose her character. This object however may not be inconsistent with others: and the arrangement of the action seems to point to an ulterior design; which we shall very briefly suggest, as there are no marks which absolutely compel the reader to recognize it. The lamentations of *Electra* at her first appearance are protracted to a length which can scarcely be considered necessary for the purpose of an exposition of her character and situation, and we are therefore rather led to connect them with the scene which precedes them: and so regarded they certainly assume an ironical aspect. In the former our attention was directed to the blood-stained house of the Pelopids, the scene of so many crimes, where guilt has been so long triumphant, where all is still hushed in secure unsuspecting repose. But already the Avenger is standing near its threshold, ready to execute his errand of retributive justice, his success ensured by all the aids of human prudence, and by the sanction of the god. The friends concert their plan in a manner which leaves no doubt in the mind of the spectator that the righteous cause will speedily

prevail. After this Electra's inconsolable grief, her despondency, and complaints, are less suited to excite our sympathy, than to suggest a reflection on the contrast between that apparent prosperity and security of the guilty which she in her ignorance deplores, and the imminent danger with which we see them threatened by the divine vengeance. And this contrast becomes still stronger when, by the device of Orestes, the last fear which restrained the insolence of the criminals is removed, the last hope which cheered Electra's drooping spirit is extinguished; at the same time that the punishment of the one, and the deliverance of the other, are on the point of accomplishment.* Clytemnestra's sophistical vindication of her own conduct also assumes a tone of self-mockery, which is deeply tragical, when we remember that, while she is pleading, her doom is sealed, and that the hand which is about to execute it is already lifted above her head. Finally, it is in the moment of their highest exultation and confidence, that each of the offenders discovers the inevitable certainty of their impending ruin.†

Of all our poet's remaining works, that which stands lowest in general estimation appears to be *The Trachinian Virgins*. Its merit has been commonly supposed to consist in the beauty of detached scenes or passages: but so inferior has it been thought, as a whole, to the other plays of Sophocles, that a celebrated critic has not scrupled to express a doubt as to its genuineness, and to conjecture that it ought to be ascribed to the poet's son Iophon. This conjecture Hermann (Præf.) rejects with great confidence, founded on his long and intimate acquaintance with the poetical

* This scene affords a very happy illustration of the difference between practical and verbal irony. The poet makes Clytemnestra use what she conceives to be language of bitter irony, while she is really uttering simple truth: 795. ΗΑ. ἔβριζε. νῦν γὰρ ἐύτυχοῦσα τυγχάνεις. ΚΑ. οὐκ οὖν Ὀρίστης καὶ σὺ παύσειτον τὰδε; ΗΑ. πεπαύμεθ' ἡμεῖς, οὐχ ὅπως σε παύσομεν. According to the punctuation and accentuation adopted by Brunck and Hermann, in l. 796 [785. Herm.], Clytemnestra only taunts Electra without any irony. For the purpose of an illustration, it is not material how Sophocles meant the line to be spoken; but in spite of Triclinius we prefer either οὐκ οὖν with an interrogation (as Aj. 79) or οὐκοῦν, without one (as Antig. 91): and of these the former.

† This is the meaning of the taunt, 1481: καὶ μάντις ὦν ἄριστος ἐσφάλλον πάλαι; see Hermann's note.—[He explains: Qui fit, ut qui nunc recte coniectes, non id dudum feceris?]

character of Sophocles. It would seem however as if his opinion was formed in consideration rather of the particular features of the play, in which he recognizes the master's hand, than of the entire composition, which, according to his view of it, is defective in some very important points. The interest, he conceives, is so unfortunately divided between Hercules and Dejanira, that though the fate of the hero was intended by the poet to be the main spring of the spectator's fear and pity, his sympathy is insensibly transferred to the unhappy victim of conjugal affection, who thus becomes in reality the principal personage. Hence when her fate is decided, the spectator's suspense is at an end: the last act appears superfluous; and the sufferings of Hercules, now that the heroine is gone to whom all his vicissitudes had been referred, can no longer excite any deep concern. This defect, Hermann thinks, would have been remedied, if the hero's sufferings had been exhibited in the presence of Dejanira, so as to aggravate her affliction: and he can scarcely understand what could have led Sophocles to neglect an arrangement so clearly preferable to that which he has adopted, unless it may have been the wish to introduce a little variation in the treatment of a somewhat hackneyed argument.

To Hermann's judgment on the genuineness of the piece we most cordially assent; but for this very reason we cannot embrace his opinion of its supposed imperfections, and at the risk of being thought superstitious admirers of a great name, we are inclined to infer from his objections to the composition, not that Sophocles was on this occasion either deficient in invention, or willing to sacrifice beauty to the affectation of originality—a species of vanity which his other works afford no ground for imputing to him: but that his design was not exactly such as the critic conceives. It appears to us that in fact Hermann has overlooked one of the most important features of the subject, which, if duly considered, satisfactorily accounts for all that according to his view disturbs the unity and symmetry of the drama. The fate of Hercules is undoubtedly the point on which the interest of the play was meant to turn. To it our attention is directed from beginning to end. Compared with Hercules, Dejanira is a very

insignificant person: not indeed in the eyes of a modern reader, of whom Hermann's remark may be perfectly true, that the sympathy of the spectators is directed more to her than to the hero. In her we find much to admire, to love, and to pity: in him we see nothing but a great spirit almost overpowered by the intensity of bodily suffering. But the question is, was this the light in which they were viewed by the spectators for whom Sophocles wrote? Now it seems clear that to them Hercules was more than a suffering or struggling hero: he was a deified person, who had assumed a blessed and immortal nature,* had become an object of religious adoration, and was frequently invoked for aid and protection in seasons of difficulty and danger. It was from the funeral pile on the top of Ceta that he ascended, as Sophocles elsewhere describes,† all radiant with fire divine, to enjoy the company of the gods above. The image of his earthly career could never be contemplated by his worshippers without reference to this, its happy and glorious termination. And therefore it cannot be contended that the poet did not take this feeling into account, because in the play itself he has introduced no allusion to the apotheosis. It does not follow because there Hercules himself, according to Hermann's observation, is described as quitting life with reluctance, like one of Homer's heroes, whose soul descends to Orcus bewailing its fate, and the vigour and youth which it leaves behind,‡ that therefore the spectators were expected to forget all their religious notions of him, or to consider him abstracted from the associations with which he was habitually connected in their thoughts. But in fact his blissful immortality is manifestly implied in that consummation of his labours, that final release from toil and hardship, which was announced to him by the oracle, the meaning of which he did not understand till he was experiencing its fulfilment. This mysterious prediction it is,

* Od. A. 602. αὐτὸς μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν Τέρεται ἐν θαλίῃς, καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην.

† Phil. 726. Ἴν' ὁ χάλκασπις ἀνήρ θεοῖς πλάθει πᾶσιν, θείῃ πυρὶ παμφαίης, οἴτας ὑπὲρ ὕχθων.

‡ Trach. 1262. ὡς ἐπιχαρτον τελέουσ' ἀκούσιον ἔργον. "Quamvis enim fortis anima, tamen invita ad Orcum abit, ὃν πότμον γέωσα, λιποῦσ' ἀδρότητα καὶ Ἥβην." Herm.

which at the beginning of the play calls up Dejanira's hopes and fears into conflict, and the marvellous mode of its accomplishment is the subject of the ensuing scenes.

The opening scene, which, though less artificial than those of the other plays of Sophocles, ought not to be confounded with the prologues of Euripides, while it unfolds to us the anxiety and gloomy forebodings of Dejanira, places her character in the point of view which is necessary to the unity of the piece. Her happiness, her very being, are bound up in that of Hercules. The most fortunate event of her life had once seemed to her the issue of the struggle by which Hercules won her for his bride. Now indeed, on looking back to the past, she is struck with the melancholy reflection, that this union, the object of her most ardent wishes, had hitherto been productive of scarcely anything but disappointment and vexation. The hero, for whom alone she lived, had been almost perpetually separated from her by a series of hazardous adventures, which kept her a prey to constant alarm and disquietude. Short and rare as his visits had always been, the interval which had elapsed since the last had been unusually long; she had been kept in more than ordinary ignorance of his situation: she begins to dread the worst, and is inclined to interpret the ambiguous tablet, which he left in her hands at parting, in the most unfavourable manner. The information she receives from her son, while it relieves her most painful fears, convinces her that the momentous crisis has arrived, which will either secure, or for ever destroy her happiness with that of her hero. A last labour remains for him to achieve, in which he is destined either to fall, or to reap the reward of his toils in a life unembittered by pain or sorrow. Soon however she hears that the crisis has ended happily, and for a moment joy takes undivided possession of her breast. But the glad tidings are quickly followed by the announcement of a new calamity, the danger of losing the affections of Hercules, or of sharing them with another. He has reached the goal: but by the same turn of fortune she is removed farther than ever from the object of her desires: the same gale which has wafted him into the haven of rest, has wellnigh wrecked

her hopes. Still even against this evil she has long had a remedy in store, which, if it succeeds, will unite her lot to that of Hercules by indissoluble bonds: no woman shall again dispute his love with her. But now the irony of fate displays itself in the cruellest manner: all her wishes shall be granted, but only to verify her worst fears. The labours of Hercules are at an end: she herself has disabled him from ever undertaking another. No rival will henceforward divert his love from her: his eyes will soon be closed upon all earthly forms. But all this is but a bitter mockery: in truth she has made him in whose wellbeing her own was wrapped up, supremely wretched; she has converted his affection for herself into deadly hatred. She, who was able to ruin him, has no means of saving him: the only proof she can give of her fidelity and love is, to die.

That the death of Dejanira is indispensably necessary, every one will acknowledge; but those who think, as Hermann, that with it the play really ends, will perhaps agree with him in his opinion, that it ought to have been reserved to a later period in the action. According to the view we have here taken of the poet's design, he could not have chosen a more seasonable time for it. Had it been longer postponed, it would merely have disturbed the effect of the last scene without any compensating advantage. This scene, if we are not mistaken, is so far from a superfluous and cumbrous appendage, that it contains the solution of the whole enigma, and places all that goes before in its true light. Hercules appears distracted not only by his bodily torments, but also by furious passions: by the sense of an unmerited evil, perfidiously inflicted by a hand which he had loved and trusted. The discovery of Dejanira's innocence likewise reveals to him the real nature and causes of his situation: it exhibits his fate, though outwardly hard and terrible, as the fulfilment of a gracious and cheering prediction. Henceforth his murmurs cease, his angry passions subside. He himself indeed does not yet penetrate into the depth of the mystery; but when, as by a prophetic impulse, he directs Hyllus to transport him to the summit of *Œta*, and there, without tear or groan, to apply the torch to his funeral pile, he leads the

spectators to the reflection which solves all difficulties, and melts all discords into the clearest harmony. Dejanira's wishes have been fulfilled, not indeed in her own sense, but in an infinitely higher one. The gods have decreed to bestow on Hercules not merely length of days, but immortality; not merely ease and quiet, but celestial bliss. She indeed has lost him, but only as she must have done in any case sooner or later; and instead of forfeiting his affection, she has been enabled to put the most unequivocal seal upon her faith and devotedness.

That this last scene should appear tedious to a modern reader, is not surprising: but this may be owing to causes which have nothing to do with its dramatic merits. We are accustomed to view Hercules either through the medium of the arts, as a strong man, or through that of some system of mythology, as a political or ethical personification, or it may be as a mundane genius, a god of light. But it is probable that a very different impression was produced by his appearance on the Athenian stage, and that a representation of the last incidents of his mortal state was there witnessed with lively sympathy. This interest may have extended to details which in us cannot produce the slightest emotion, and hence the introduction of the concluding injunction about Iole, which is the most obscure as well as repulsive passage in the whole piece, may have had an adequate motive, which we cannot fully comprehend. It certainly ought not to prevent us from enjoying the beauty of the whole composition, which though perhaps inferior to the other works of Sophocles, is not unworthy of the author of the greatest among them.

In the *Ajax* the poet may seem to have made a singular exception to his own practice as well as to that of all other great dramatic writers, by distinctly expounding the moral of his play, and that not at the end, but at the beginning of it. If we should suppose him to have done so, we must also believe that he at the same time determined the point of view from which he meant the whole to be considered. The irony of Minerva first draws Ajax into a terrible exhibition of his miserable frenzy, and she then takes occasion from it to pronounce a solemn warning against the

arrogance which had involved so great a hero in so dreadful a calamity. The following scenes, down to the death of Ajax, might appear to have been intended merely to enforce this impression, by representing the language and the effects of his despair when restored to the consciousness of his real situation. The concluding part, that which follows the main catastrophe, would according to this view have been introduced with as little necessity as the part corresponding to it in the play last examined, though it might be allowed possible to find some excuse for the addition in national opinions and feelings foreign to our own. If however this were the correct view of the tragedy, it would certainly deserve to be considered as the most faulty in its composition of all the remaining works of Sophocles. The fault would lie not merely in the want of unity between the two portions, which would be only accidentally connected with one another and would have no interest in common, but also in the dramatic anticlimax, in the gradual abatement of the terror and pity which the opening of the play so powerfully inspires. For Ajax has no sooner recovered his senses than the thought of death occurs to him as absolutely necessary. But he contemplates it, not as an evil, but as a certain remedy and refuge. He finds consolation in the consciousness of his unalterable resolution not to survive his shame, and in the conviction that no human power can prevent the execution of his purpose. The nearer his end approaches, the more collected and tranquil he becomes: so that we are led to view him in a new light, and forget the awful lesson inculcated by the goddess in the opening scene.

It would perhaps be presumptuous to assert that the taste of Sophocles was too pure to admit an episode at the end of a play such as that of *Johannes Parricida* which disfigures Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell*. But on the other hand we ought not to impute such a defect to any of his compositions, without carefully examining whether the parts which seem to hang loosely together, may not be more intimately united under the surface. On the other point we may venture to speak more confidently, and to maintain that Sophocles could never have meant to concentrate the

whole moral effect of a tragedy in the first scene, so that it should be gradually softened and weakened as the action proceeded, and that a construction of any of his works which implies such a conclusion must have mistaken his design. In the present instance it seems possible to show that the poet's thought, when rightly conceived, leads to a point of view from which nothing appears either superfluous or misplaced in the piece.

The hero's first appearance exhibits him in the lowest depth of his humiliation. The love of glory is his ruling passion, and disappointment in the pursuit of honour has goaded him to frenzy. Through the interposition of the gods his vengeance has been baffled in a manner that must for ever expose him to the derision of his enemies. The delight and exultation which he expresses at his imaginary triumph serve to measure the greatness of his defeat, and the bitterness of the anguish which awaits him with the return of reason. Ulysses himself cannot witness so tremendous a reverse, so complete a prostration, even of a rival, without pity. But the reflections which the spectacle suggests to him and Minerva tend to divert our thoughts from what is peculiar and extraordinary in the situation of Ajax, and to fix them on the common lot of human nature. All mortal strength is weakness, all mortal prosperity vain and transient, and consequently all mortal pride is delusion and madness. When man is most elated with the gifts of fortune, most confident in his security, then is his fall most certain: he is safe and strong only while he feels and acknowledges his own nothingness. Ajax, in the contrast between his fancied success and his real calamity, is only a signal example of a very common blindness. The design of these reflections was probably not to extract a moral from the scene, which needed not the aid of language to convey its lesson, but to prepare us for the contemplation of the other side of the subject, which is immediately presented to us. For in the next scene the hero's position is totally changed. The past indeed is immutable, the future affords not a glimpse of hope; but now he has awoken from his dream, he is healed of his frenzy: he knows the worst that has befallen him, and that can befall. The discovery, it is

true, is attended, as Tecmessa says, with a new pain, one from which his madness had till now protected him : but it is likewise a medicine which restores him to new health, and the pain itself a symptom of his recovery from the long disease, of which his late frenzy had been only the last and most violent paroxysm : it gives him a treasure which he never possessed before, that self-knowledge and self-control which Minerva's last words declared to be the condition and earnest of the favour of the gods.

It is possible that many readers will think this a very exaggerated, if not a totally false description of the state of mind and feeling which Ajax discloses in the progress of the play. It has been very commonly supposed that the poet's aim was to exhibit in his character untamable pride and inflexible obstinacy, hardened and strained to the utmost by despair : a spirit which will not yield even to the gods, and instead of bowing beneath the stroke of their displeasure, rises the higher by the recoil, and asserts its own freedom and dignity by a voluntary death. If this be so, the first scene must present a totally different aspect from that in which we have hitherto considered it ; it will be nothing more than the occasion which enables the hero to display this unconquerable energy of soul ; and the more we sympathize with his stern and lofty nature, the less can we be affected by the moral reflections of Ulysses and the goddess, which would thus appear to be either unmeaning commonplace, or to be designed not to indicate, but to counteract the impression which the whole action is calculated to produce. This however may be looked upon as a slight objection : the main question is, whether the language and demeanour of Ajax after his recovery justify the common view of the temper and sentiments attributed to him by the poet, and the inferences that have been drawn from them as to the general design of the play. And on this it must be observed, that though it soon becomes apparent that the purpose of self-destruction is irrevocably fixed in the mind of Ajax ; though he steadily resists both the friendly counsels of the Chorus, and the pathetic entreaties of Tecmessa ; and though that which determines his resolve is his quick sense of honour, and his impatience of a

degrading submission, still there is nothing in his words or conduct, either in the scenes with Tecmessa and the Chorus, or in his concluding soliloquy, that indicates a hard, cold, sullen mood. On the contrary, when he has learnt from Tecmessa the whole extent of his calamity, he breaks out for the first time of his life into wailings which express the keenness of his grief: and again the sight of the Chorus draws from him a strain of piteous exclamations on the cruelty of his fate. After this transient burst of passion indeed he recovers his firmness and composure, gives directions for the fulfilment of his last wishes with calmness, and though inflexibly adhering to his purpose, repels all the attempts made to divert him from it without heat or violence. But so far is he from having retired into the stronghold of a selfish pride, and shut himself up from all human sympathy, that in the midst of his unalterable resolution his thoughts are more occupied with care for others than with his own fate. His parental affection rushes in a full stream into his heart, as he contemplates his approaching separation from its object, and expresses itself in that tender address, in which, while he provides for the security of his child, and rejoices in the prospect of leaving behind him an heir worthy of his shield and of his fame, who shall avenge his wrongs, he dwells with delight on the image of its early years, when the young plant, sheltered from every rude blast,* shall enjoy its careless existence, and gladden the heart of the widowed mother, and on the consolation and support it will afford to the declining age of his own parents, so soon to be bereft of their natural stay. Throughout the whole of this speech, though two occasions occur which lead him to mention his enemies, all angry and revengeful feelings are absorbed by the softer emotions of the parent and the son: † and even the appearance of harshness with

* An image ludicrously disguised in Francklin's translation: "May the breath of life meantime nourish thy tender frame," as if Eurysaces could grow up to manhood unless it did.

† Even the lines (556) ὕταν δ' ἴκη πρὸς τοῦτο, δέϊ σ' ὕπως πατρός Δείξεις ἐν ἔχθροῖς οἶος ἐξ οἴου τράφης, on which the Scholiast remarks, ἀντὶ τοῦ δέϊ σε ἐκδικῆσαι τὸν πατέρα, do not seem to imply any definite prospect of revenge, so much as a hope that the glory of Eurysaces might in time silence and confound his father's enemies.

which at the close of this scene he cuts short the importunity of Tecmessa is a sign of anything rather than coldness and insensibility. Again, when the fatal sword is already fixed in the ground, his last thoughts are turned to Salamis, to the grief of his father and mother, which alone he bewails, to the beloved scenes and friends of his youth : even the parting look which he casts on the Trojan plains, and their familiar springs and streams, is one of tenderness : his last words an affectionate farewell.

All this is so evident, that it must have been at least partially felt by every intelligent reader, and it would probably have produced a greater effect than it seems to have done on the judgments that have been formed on the play, if a strong impression of an opposite kind had not been made on most minds by the intermediate scene, in which, after the Chorus has deplored the inflexible stubbornness with which Ajax has rejected the entreaties of Tecmessa, the hero in a single speech announces the intention with which he finally quits the camp to seek a solitary spot on the seashore. Till within a few years all critics, from the Greek scholiast downwards, had agreed in their general view of the object of this speech, which they have supposed to be an artifice by which Ajax dissembles his real feelings and purpose. They have been equally unanimous on another point, of no great importance in itself, but interesting from its bearing on the former : they imagine that, after the scene with the child, both Ajax and Tecmessa retire from the stage, and that the former comes out of the tent after the Chorus has ended its mournful strain. And now, according to the common opinion, in order to pacify his friends, and to secure himself from interruption in the deed he is about to perform, he affects to have been softened by the prayers of Tecmessa, and to have consented to spare his life : in signifying this change of mind, he at the same time declares his resolution of proceeding to purify himself from the stain of his frantic slaughter, and to make his peace, if possible, with the offended goddess, and of paying due homage in future to the Atridae, whom he acknowledges as his legitimate superiors. He then dismisses Tecmessa into the tent, and leaves the Chorus to give vent to its delight in a

strain of rapturous joy. This speech, if considered as ironical, undoubtedly indicates not merely immovable firmness of resolution, but a spirit of haughty defiance, a bitter disdain of all restraints, human or divine, which would prove that, if any change had taken place in his sentiments, it was only one by which his pride had been raised, and his ferocity hardened: and such appears to have been the inference which has been almost universally drawn from it.

But a few years back this portion of the play was placed in an entirely new light by Professor Welcker, who has made the Ajax the subject of an elaborate essay in the *Rheinisches Museum*, 1829; which, after all that has been written on this branch of literature, may be considered as one of the most valuable contributions that have yet been made to the study of the Greek drama. Beside a most learned discussion on the sources from which Sophocles drew his materials, and on the peculiar motives which guided him in the selection of them, it contains the author's reasons for rejecting the current opinion on the two points just mentioned. He conceives, in the first place, that Ajax remains on the stage during the song of the Chorus which follows his dialogue with Tecmessa, inwardly absorbed in thought, and together with her and the child presenting to the spectators what they would perhaps have looked upon as a group of sculpture, and we should call a living picture. The strongest argument for this supposition is, that no sufficient motive appears or can be assigned, which should have induced Ajax to re-enter the tent, after he had bidden Tecmessa retire into it and withdraw her grief from the public eye. As little should we be able to understand why, if she had once obeyed his injunction, she should have come out again with him. On the other hand, dumb show, exhibiting the principal person of a piece in an expressive attitude, was a contrivance by no means unusual in the Greek theatre, as is proved not only by the celebrated examples of the Niobe and the Achilles of Æschylus, but also by the practice of Sophocles himself, who for instance allows Antigone to remain silent on the stage during a choral song of considerable length;*

* Welcker therefore conceives that Creon's command (*Antig.* 760) is obeyed forthwith: and certainly this opinion seems to be confirmed by v. 769, τὰ δ' οὖν κόρα τὰδ'

and in this very play keeps Tecmessa and the child for a long time in a studied posture near the corpse. The difficulty that may seem to arise from the Chorus in our play, which according to this hypothesis speaks of Ajax in his presence without addressing him, disappears if we imagine that the silent group occupied the background, which would in itself be the most natural position for it; nor is the language of the song itself such as called for any answer. But the more important question is, whether the subsequent speech of Ajax is designed to conceal his real sentiments and to deceive the hearers. Welcker contends that though couched in language which is here and there ambiguous, it merely expresses the speaker's feelings, and that it is only through the eagerness with which men usually interpret all they see and hear according to their wishes, that Tecmessa and the Chorus misunderstand its meaning. He thinks that the artifice which the common construction attributes to Ajax is inconsistent, not only with the generosity but with the strength of his character, and that none of his purposes which have been supposed to explain it are sufficient to account for it; and that it involves consequences which destroy all the unity of the play, and render the poet's design unintelligible.

In order to understand the points on which this question hinges, we must observe that both Tecmessa and the Chorus are actually deceived by the speech of Ajax, and consequently that the ambiguity which deceives them was undoubtedly designed on the part of the poet. And this fact not only renders the occasion of the prevailing opinion, independently of its truth, very conceivable, but raises a strong prejudice in its favour, and throws the burden of the argument on those who reject it. It does not, however, necessarily follow that the deception produced by the speech was intentional on the part of the speaker; and to determine whether the poet meant it to be so considered, we must

ὄκ ἀπαλλάξει μόρον. But perhaps it is not necessary to imagine the sisters present, and both the last words of the Chorus, 804, and those of Antigone at the beginning of her next speech, rather indicate that she had just made her appearance. He also refers to the silence of Pylades in the *Electra*, and to that of Tecmessa when deceived by the speech of Ajax.

examine the speech both by itself, and in connexion with the rest of the play. The first inquiry is, whether it contains any expressions which Ajax could not have used without intending to mislead his friends. But it would not be a fair way of trying this question, to consider whether he speaks exactly as he might have done if he had not been conscious of their presence. It might be admitted that he purposely avoids the use of direct and unequivocal terms in announcing what he knew to be dreadful and afflicting to them, without granting that he wished to disguise his intentions from them. Natural and common humanity would have forbidden him to shock the feelings of persons to whom his life was so dear, by a distinct declaration of his final resolution. On the other hand, to ask why then he touches on the painful subject at all, would be unfairly to call in question the undoubted conventional privileges of the dramatic poet. Ajax must give vent to the thoughts and feelings under which he is about to act; but he may be expected to do so with a considerate reserve dictated by his situation. If after making this necessary allowance we proceed to examine his language, we shall perhaps find that though it is certainly adapted to raise hopes that he has abandoned his design of self-destruction, it implies nothing but what he may be believed really to have thought and felt. The beginning indeed speaks of a marvellous change which has taken place within him: his iron soul has been unmanned by pity for Tecmessa. This change would seem to have been wrought during the interval occupied by the song of the Chorus; for at the close of the preceding scene he had resisted all the attempts to soften him with an obstinacy which appeared to be only exasperated by her importunity. Hence most critics have imagined that Tecmessa is supposed to have renewed her entreaties within the tent, and that Ajax, instead of silencing them as before with a peremptory refusal, now affects to be overcome by them. This however is a mere conjecture, and we are equally at liberty to suppose that during the pause in which he has remained silently wrapt in thought, the workings of conjugal affection have made themselves felt so as to cost him a painful struggle, though without being able to move him

from his purpose. It does not however seem necessary to consider this in the light of an abrupt and almost præternatural inward revolution. It would be very consistent with human nature, of which Sophocles everywhere shows a fine and intimate knowledge, to interpret those replies to the supplications of Tecmessa, which sound so rough and hard, as signs of awakened sympathy, which Ajax had endeavoured to suppress by assuming a harsher tone, but which, after it ceased to be enforced from without, had gained new strength in his heart. Welcker regards the change as more sudden, though perfectly natural, as the excitement of a feeling which had hitherto slept in the hero's breast, and had at length been roused by the shock with which the gods had humbled his pride, and had finally been called into distinct action by the contagion of female tenderness. He compares it to the effect produced on the temper of Achilles by the loss of his friend. The prayers of Tecmessa are not indeed the cause, but the occasion: yet they decide the mood in which Ajax henceforth contemplates his relations to the gods and to mankind, and in which he ends his life. He considers his blood as a libation with which he is about to appease the wrath of the offended goddess, and to atone for the violence he had meditated against legitimate authority. The hearers naturally mistake the nature of this purifying bath. The mode in which he mentions his purpose of burying his sword may perhaps seem more difficult to reconcile with this view, and Welcker's remark, that the alleged motive, the calamitous operation of an enemy's gifts, was a current opinion which Ajax again expresses in his last speech, seems hardly sufficient to remove the appearance which this passage at first sight presents of a deliberate intention to mislead. Ajax, designing to fall upon his sword, speaks only of hiding it as an ill-fated weapon in the ground. Could he, it may be asked, but for the sake of deception, have raised an image so different from the act which he was meditating? The sword might indeed be said to be concealed, when the hilt was fixed in the ground and the blade lodged in his body: but since this hiding produced the most fatal consequences instead of averting them, would he have selected this mode of

describing his intended deed, if he had not foreseen that it would be misunderstood? This seems scarcely possible if it had been only the fatality of the weapon that he had in his thoughts. But perhaps it may be more easily conceived, if we suppose him to have reflected on it rather as having been once the object of his pride, a tribute of respect to his valour from a respected enemy, and afterward the instrument of his shame. He was now about to expiate his pride, and to wipe off his shame: in both respects he might be truly said to hide his sword in the most emphatic sense, when he sheathed it in his own body. The last objection that the speech suggests to the view proposed by Welcker arises from the professions which Ajax appears to make of his intention in future to yield to the gods and pay due reverence to the Atridæ, and in general to regulate his conduct by maxims of moderation and discretion. These professions would certainly be mere dissimulation if they referred to anything but the approaching termination of his career, whereas they seem to imply a prospect of its continuance. Yet, if Ajax contemplated his death as a satisfaction both to divine and human justice, his manner of describing the lesson he had learnt, and which he would thenceforth practise, is not unnatural, but strongly emphatic.

On the other hand, the objections which the speech raises to the common opinion are very difficult to remove. If the aim of Ajax is to deceive his friends, admitting the contrivance to be worthy of his character, and consistent with his previous conduct, he cannot reasonably be supposed more in earnest in one part of the speech than another. It would imply in himself and would create in the reader an intolerable confusion of ideas and feelings, to imagine that he really pitied the condition of Tecmessa, and nevertheless only expressed his sentiments for the purpose of deceiving her. And yet who that has witnessed the scene of the parting from his child can believe that he felt no pity for the mother? If so, since he couples her widowhood with its orphanhood, we should be forced to infer that he was equally indifferent to both. On the same principle, if the passages relating to the

anger of the goddess and the submission due to the gods are to be taken as ironical, we must consider Ajax in the light of a Capaneus or a Mezentius, who not only disregards but insults the gods. That he should be sincere in his professions of reverence for them, and yet use his piety for a cloak, would be a contradiction not to be endured. But in no part of the play is Ajax represented as an audacious blasphemer and contemner of the gods, though in the pride of his heart he sometimes has forgotten what was due to them. His last speech, where his sentiments continue the same and are expressed without disguise, breathes not only piety but confidence in the divine favour, grounded on the consciousness not indeed of perfect innocence, but of great wrongs suffered, and of ample reparation made for a slight transgression. So though it may seem natural that he should speak with bitter disdain of the Atridae, against whom we find him retaining his resentment to the last, it would be incredible that he should have made his profession of respect for their station, if it was insincere, an occasion of introducing such a series of general reflections as that which follows, in which he appears to be reconciling himself to the thought of obedience, by considering it as a universal law of nature. All this evidently proceeds from the depth of his heart, and so viewed is beautiful and touching: whereas if it be taken as a trick, to make his assumed change of mood more credible, nothing can easily be conceived more repulsive in itself, and less appropriate to the character of Ajax. Finally, his parting directions to Tecmessa and the Chorus are so little like those of a person who was anxious to conceal his design, that as Welcker truly observes, one might rather be disposed to complain of the improbability that their meaning should have been mistaken, if it were not that a prejudice once caught is known to be capable of blinding us to the clearest intimations of the truth.

On the whole then we adopt with entire conviction Welcker's general view of this speech, which indeed harmonizes so well with that which has here been taken of one great feature in the poetical character of Sophocles, that we have thought it necessary to weigh the arguments on each side as cautiously as possible. Still, if any

one should find it impossible to believe that Ajax could be unconscious of the effect that his words were producing, we should not be unwilling to admit that he perceived the ambiguity of those expressions which bear a double meaning, so long as we are not called upon to give up the opinion that he is throughout and thoroughly in earnest. Before we quit the subject we will notice one or two passages which either appear to contradict this conclusion, or have been so interpreted. The curse which Ajax, when on the point of death, pronounces against the Atridae and the whole army, may at first sight seem to be inconsistent with those sentiments of reverence for their authority which he expresses in the former scene, and thus to prove that they were not genuine. It seems however no more difficult to conceive that Ajax, while he acknowledged the debt which he owed to justice for a breach of social order, might still consider himself as an injured man, and invoke the Furies to avenge his wrongs, than that he might believe himself an object of divine favour, notwithstanding the offences against the gods which he was about to expiate. The curse itself, after the example of Oedipus, will not be thought an indication of peculiar ferocity. Only that it should have been extended to the whole army, may seem an excess of vindictive cruelty, and in fact this has proved a stumbling-block to several critics. But it must be remembered, in the first place, that the army had sanctioned and shared the iniquity of its chiefs, in withholding from Ajax the honours he had earned in their service; and next, that the ruin of the king involves the calamity of the people. So Achilles cannot distinguish between Agamemnon and the Greeks.* With the exception of this curse, which

* These considerations seem sufficient to remove the difficulty which Hermann finds in the common construction of the words (844) *γέεσθε, μὴ φείδεσθε πανδήμου στρατοῦ*, which, if *γέεσθε* is referred to *στρατοῦ*, appear to him to breathe the most atrocious inhumanity. The construction he proposes, referring *γέεσθε* to the Atridae, is so harsh that one is glad to dispense with it, and yet is of very little use in softening the alleged atrocity of the imprecation. Another difficulty which has perplexed the commentators in this passage is less connected with our present subject. The curse manifestly contains a prediction which was meant to conform to the event: yet the words *πρὸς τῶν φιλόστων ἐγγόνων ὀλοίατο* [842], cannot be reconciled with history without great violence, as by distinguishing between *φιλόστων* and *ἐγγόνων*, in the manner proposed by Musgrave. Hermann's interpretation is intolerably strained

however answers the purpose of recalling the hero's wrongs to our recollection, and thus strengthening our sympathy with his sufferings, the whole speech is highly pathetic, so that any expression of arrogant impiety would jar most offensively with its general tenor. And hence it is of some importance to observe, that there is nothing at all savouring of such a character in the address to Jupiter, where Ajax speaks of his petition as requesting no great boon (*αἰτήσομαι ἐέ σ' οὐ μακρὸν γέρας λαχέιν* [825]). Mr. Campbell, in his Lectures on Poetry, has entirely mistaken the force of this expression, where he says that *we recognize the self-dependence and stubbornness of his pride, when he tells the chief of the gods that he had but a slight boon to implore of him*. Not to mention how unseasonable such pride would have been, when Ajax was actually supplicating a favour to which, though little for Jupiter to grant, he himself attached great importance, and how inconsistent with the reverence expressed for Jupiter's majesty in the address: "Thou first, O Jove"—it is clear that the words in question contain nothing more than a touching allusion to the extremity in which he was now placed, when the only thing left for him to desire of Jupiter was that his body might not be deprived of the rites of burial. Mr. Campbell could scarcely have overlooked this, if he had not been prepossessed with the common opinion about the character of Ajax, as exhibited in the previous speech, which he too considers as a *feint*, and endeavours to explain, but without perceiving the main difficulties which the supposition involves. He sees nothing in the tragedy but an exhibition of "the despair and suicide of a proud soldier, who has lived but for martial honour, and cannot survive the loss of it." Though we think this conception of the subject so inadequate as to miss what is most essential in the poet's design, we must do Mr. C. the justice to observe, that he has shown a lively sense of some of the beauties of the play, which is the more meritorious,

and perplexed. There is no necessity for supposing that Ajax has Ulysses in view at all. From him he had received a provocation indeed, but no peculiar *wrong*, which he should call upon the Furies to avenge. Welcker thinks that the easiest solution of the difficulty is to suppose that a line has dropped out after *αἰτοσφαγείε*, containing an allusion to Clytemnæstra's crime and punishment.

as we learn from him that the English translators have been insensible to them. He complains with great reason that Sophocles should have fallen into the hands of persons so little capable of relishing him, as not even to be struck with the sublimity of the opening scene of the Ajax: though, since such perceptions are the gift of nature, we do not understand why they are called *illiberal critics*. We collect however one rather melancholy inference from this fact, and from Mr. Campbell's lectures: that the study of the poet's works with a view to the pleasures of the imagination has not kept pace with the diligence bestowed on them as objects of philological criticism.

Most critics have felt a great difficulty in explaining the reasons which induced Sophocles to protract the action after the death of Ajax, with which, according to modern notions, the interest expires. What has been said on this subject has for the most part been proposed in the language of apology, and in a tone which now and then raises a suspicion that the advocate is not thoroughly convinced of the goodness of his cause. Thus Hermann faintly defends the concluding scenes with arguments which in substance condemn them: and though Mr. Campbell assures us that "the interest does not at all flag in the remainder of the tragedy," we want some better explanation of the grounds of this opinion than is to be found in the remark: "that the Greeks attached an awfully religious importance to the rites of burial," which would apply equally to many other tragedies which do not end in like manner: or in the assertion: that "we feel the hero's virtues to be told with the deepest effect when his widow and child kneel as suppliants to heaven and human mercy, beside his corpse; when his spirited brother defies the threats of the Atridae to deny him sepulchral honours; and when Ulysses with politic magnanimity interposes to prevent the mean insult being offered to his fallen enemy." The celebration of a hero's virtues after his death is surely not a legitimate object of tragedy: nor is it true that those of Ajax are more effectually told by his widow and child when they kneel beside his corpse, than when they cling to him during his life: or by Teucer and Ulysses when they inter-

pose in his behalf, than they had previously been in the first scene by the admission of an enemy, and afterward by the attachment and admiration expressed by his friends. Still less can the conclusion of the piece be defended on the ground that "it leaves our sympathies calmed and elevated by the triumph of Ulysses in assuaging the vindictiveness of Agamemnon, and attaching the gratitude of Teucer." Our sympathies with Ajax have already been calmed and elevated by the serenity and majesty of his departure: with Ulysses we have none sufficiently powerful to keep up our interest during the following scenes: if we had, this would imply a want of unity, which would be as great a defect as that which has been made the subject of complaint. In order to justify the poet by showing the connexion between these scenes and the preceding part of the play, it is absolutely necessary to take into account a circumstance which Welcker, though not the first to notice it, has placed in a clearer light than any former writer: that Ajax was an object, not merely of human interest, but of religious veneration, with the audience for whom Sophocles wrote. The Athenians were proud of him as one of their heroes, who, since Clisthenes, gave his name to a tribe which was distinguished by some peculiar privileges.* They claimed his sons as their adopted citizens, the ancestors of their noblest families and some of their most illustrious men. But the hero's title to those religious honours which were paid to him in the time of Sophocles commenced only from his interment: and hence no subject could be more interesting to the Athenians in general, and more particularly to the tribe which bore his name,† than the contest on

* See the honours of the Æantidæ in Plut. Symp. 1, 10, 2, 3. They were peculiarly connected with the glory of Marathon. Marathon itself belonged to them: they occupied the right wing in the battle: they numbered the polemarch Callimachus among their citizens: Miltiades was a descendant of Ajax (Marcellin. Vit. Thuc.): the decree for the expedition was made under their presidency. At Platea too they acquitted themselves so nobly, that they were appointed to conduct the sacrifice to the Sphragitides on Cithæron. Their choruses were never to take the last place. Plutarch thinks that this was not so much the reward of merit, as a propitiation of the hero, who could not brook defeat. One may compare the use made of this topic by the rhetorician whose funeral oration is printed among the works of Demosthenes: οὐκ ἐλάνθανεν Διαντίδας, ὅτι τῶν ἀριστείων στερηθεὶς Αἴας ἀβίωτον ἐαυτῷ ἠγήσατο τὸν βίον.

† To which Welcker with great probability refers the allusion in the line (861),

the issue of which his heroic sanctity depended. Welcker very happily remarks that Menelaus and his brother fill the part of an *Advocatus Diaboli* at a process of canonization. On the other hand, the injury which Ajax had planned against the army and its chiefs was one which according to primitive usage, in ordinary cases, would have justified the extreme of hostility on their part, and consequently the privation of funeral rites. This was not in the eyes of the Greeks a *mean insult*, but a natural and legitimate mode of vengeance; though the violence and arrogance with which it is prosecuted by the Spartan king are exhibited in an odious light, undoubtedly for the sake of suggesting to the Athenian audience a political application to their rivals, which was especially happy in a piece dedicated to the honour of an Attic hero, and which they would not fail to seize and enjoy. But this strenuous opposition serves to exalt the character of Ajax, and to enhance the glory of his triumph. And thus the contrast between the appearance and the reality is completed, as in the second *Œdipus*. At the beginning we saw the hero in the depth of degradation, an object of mockery and of pity: this was the effect of his inordinate self-esteem, of his overweening confidence in his own strength. But out of his humiliation, his anguish, and despair, issues a higher degree of happiness and renown than he had ever hoped to attain. He closes his career at peace with the gods: his incomparable merit is acknowledged by the rival whose success had wounded his pride: he leaves a name behind him which shall be remembered and revered to the latest generations.

We have already observed that the length of our remarks would not be regulated by the value of the pieces to be examined. The *Antigone* and the *Philoctetes*, though perhaps neither of them is inferior in beauty to the Ajax, will detain us a much shorter time.

In the *Antigone* the irony on which the interest depends is of a kind totally different from that which has been illustrated by the preceding examples. It belongs to that head which we have endeavoured to describe as accompanying the administration of

κλειναί τ' Ἀθηναίαι καὶ τὸ σύντροφον γένος. If the tribe furnished the chorus, the local application would be still more pointed.

justice human and divine, of that which decides not merely the quarrels of individuals, but the contests of parties and of principles, so far as they are clothed in flesh and blood, and wield the weapons of earthly warfare. The subject of the tragedy is a struggle between Creon and Antigone, not however as private persons maintaining their selfish interests, but as each asserting a cause which its advocate holds to be just and sacred. Each partially succeeds in the struggle, but perishes through the success itself: while their destruction preserves the sanctity of the principles for which they contend. In order to perceive this, we must guard ourselves against being carried away by the impression which the beauty of the heroine's character naturally makes upon our feelings, but which tends to divert us from the right view of Creon's character and conduct: a partiality to which modern readers are not the less liable, on account of the difficulty they find in entering into the train of religious feeling from which the contest derives its chief importance. In our admiration for Antigone we may be very apt to mistake the poet's irony, and to adopt the sentiments which he puts into her mouth, as his own view of the question and the parties, while he is holding the balance perfectly even. But to consider the case impartially, it is necessary to observe, in the first place, that Creon is a legitimate ruler, and next, that he acts in the exercise of his legitimate authority. He had received the supreme power by the right of succession, and with the full consent of his subjects, whom he had preserved from their foreign invaders.* Hæmon does not mean to dispute his sovereignty, but only to signify the conditions under which it ought to be exercised, when in reply to Creon's question, whether any but himself is governor of the realm, he says, that it is no city which belongs to one man (737). Creon's decree is the law of the land. Ismene, remonstrating with Antigone on her resolution, declares herself incapable of acting in opposition to the will of her fellow-citizens.† And

* 1162. σώσας μὲν ἐχθρῶν τήνδε Καδμείαν χθόνα Λαβίων τε χώρας παντελεῖ μοναρχίαν: that is, as he himself says (174), γένους κατ' ἀγχιστέια τῶν ὀλωλότων.

† 79. τὸ δὲ Βία πολιτῶν ἔρᾶν, ἔφυν ἀμήχανος.

Antigone herself in her concluding appeal admits that she has so acted (907). Nor was the decree a wanton or tyrannical exertion of power. Creon himself professes to consider it as indispensable to the wellbeing of the state, which is the sole object of his care (188—193), as a just punishment for the parricidal enterprise of Polynices. And this is not merely Creon's language, whom however we have no reason to suspect of insincerity: it is also evidently the judgment of the Chorus, whose first song, which presents so lively a picture of the imminent danger from which Thebes has just been rescued, seems to justify the vengeance taken on its author. The reflections contained in the next song, on the craft and ingenuity of man, are pointed at the secret violation of Creon's ordinance, as an instance in which the skill of contrivance has not been coupled with due respect for the laws and obligations of society: and the Chorus deprecates all communion with persons capable of such criminal daring.* Antigone herself does not vindicate her action on the ground that Creon has overstepped the bounds of his prerogative, but only claims an extraordinary exemption from its operation, on account of her connexion with the deceased. She even declares that she would not have undertaken such a resistance to the will of the state, for the sake either of children or husband (905): it was only the peculiar relation in which she stood to Polynices that justified and demanded it. This too is the only ground which Hæmon alleges for the general sympathy expressed by the people with Antigone: and in relying on this, he tacitly admits that the same action would have deserved punishment in any other person. His general warnings against excessive pertinacity are intended to induce his father to give up his private judgment to the popular opinion. Creon on the other hand is bent on vindicating and maintaining the majesty of the throne and of the laws. No state can subsist, if that which has been enacted by the magistrate, on mature deliberation, is to be set aside because it thwarts a woman's wishes (672—678), or because

* [365—375] σοφόν τι τὸ μηχανόειν τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ' ἔχων, ποτὲ μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἰσθλὸν ἔρπει· νόμους παρείρων χθονὸς θεῶν τ' ἐνορκοῦν εἰκαν, ὑψίπολις· ἄπολις ὅτφ τὸ μὴ καλὸν ξύνεστι, τόλμας χάριν· μήτ' ἐμοὶ παρέστιος γένοιτο, μήτ' ἴσον φρονῶν, ὅς τὰδ' ἔρδει.

it is condemned by the multitude (734). Obedience on the part of the governed, firmness on the part of the ruler, are essential to the good of the commonwealth. These sentiments appear to be adopted by the Chorus. Notwithstanding its goodwill toward Antigone, and its pity for her fate, it considers her as having incurred the penalty that had been inflicted on her by an act which, though sufficiently fair and specious to attract the praises of men and to render her death glorious, was still a violation of duty, and brought her into a fatal conflict with eternal Justice; a headstrong defiance of the sovereign power, sure to end in her destruction.* It has appeared to several learned men, not without a considerable show of probability, that the numerous passages in this play which inculcate the necessity of order, and submission to established authority, may have had great weight in disposing the Athenians to reward the poet with the dignity of strategus, which we know did not necessarily involve any military duties, though Sophocles happened to be so employed, but which would still have been a singular recompense for mere poetical merit.†

Nevertheless the right is not wholly on the side of Creon. So far indeed as Polynices is concerned, he has only shown a just severity sanctioned by public opinion, and perhaps required by the interest of the state. Early however in the action we have an intimation that in his zeal for the commonwealth, and for the maintenance of his royal authority, he has overlooked the claims of some other parties whose interests were affected by his conduct. The rights and duties of kindred, though they might not be permitted to alter the course prescribed by policy and justice, were still entitled to respect. If Antigone had forfeited her life to the rigour of the law, equity would have interposed, at least to mitigate the punishment of an act prompted by such laudable

* The Chorus first attempts to console Antigone by reminding her of her fame (817): οὐκοῦν κλεινὴ καὶ ἔπαινον ἔχουσα Ἐς τόδ' ἀπέρχει κεύθος νεκύων: and then answers her complaints by suggesting her fault (853): προβαῖσ' ἐπ' ἔσχατον θράσους ὑψηλὸν ἐς Δίκας βάθρον προσέπεσες, ὦ τέκνον, πολὺ: and again (872) σίβειν μὲν εὐσέβειά τις· κράτος δ' ὕψω κράτος μέλει, παραβατὸν οὐδαμῆ πέλει, σὲ δ' αὐτόγνωτος ὤλεσ' ὀργά.

† Mr. Campbell very needlessly and groundlessly conjectures that Sophocles possessed considerable military experience when he was elected to the office.

motives. The mode in which the penalty originally denounced against her offence was transmuted, so as to subject her to a death of lingering torture, added mockery to cruelty. But the rites of burial concerned not only the deceased, and his surviving relatives; they might also be considered as a tribute due to the awful Power who ruled in the nether world; as such they could not commonly be withheld without impiety. Hence Antigone, in her first altercation with Creon, urges that her deed, though forbidden by human laws, was required by those of Hades, and might be deemed holy in the realms below.* Hæmon touches on the same topic when he charges his father with trampling on the honours due to the gods, and says that he pleads not on behalf of Antigone alone, but of the infernal deities (745—749). Creon, in pronouncing his final sentence on Antigone, notices this plea, but only to treat it with contempt [777]: “Let her implore the aid of Hades, the only power whom she reveres: he will perhaps deliver her from her tomb; or at least she will learn by experience, that her reverence has been ill bestowed.” We must not however construe these passages into a proof that Creon, in his decree, had committed an act of flagrant impiety, and that his contest with Antigone was in effect a struggle between policy and religion. It is clear that his prohibition was consistent with the customary law, and with the religious opinions of the heroic ages, as they are represented not only by Homer, but in other works of Sophocles himself. The determination of Achilles to prevent Hector's burial, and his treatment of the corpse, are related as extraordinary proofs of his affection for Patroclus, but still as a legitimate exercise of the rights of war. In the deliberation of the gods on the subject, the only motive assigned for the interference of Jupiter is Hector's merit and piety. Juno, Neptune, and Minerva, are so far from finding anything impious in the conduct of Achilles, that they oppose the intervention of the powers friendly to Troy on behalf of the deceased. So the dispute about the burial in the *Ajax* turns entirely on the merits of the hero, without any reference to the

* 519. AN. "Ὁμῶς ὃ γ' Ἀιδῆς τοῦς νόμους τούτους ποθεῖ. ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' οὐχ ὃ χρηστός τῷ κακῷ λαχεῖν ἴσος. AN. Τίς οἶδεν, εἰ κάτωθεν εὐαγὴ τάδε;

claims of the infernal gods. And as little does Electra seem to know anything of them, when she desires Orestes, after killing Ægisthus, to expose him to such interrers as befit a wretch like him, that is, as the Scholiast explains it, to the birds and hounds.* Hence in the *Antigone* it must not be supposed that any of the speakers assume as a general proposition, that to refuse burial to a corpse is absolutely and in all cases an impious violation of divine laws, though they contend that the honours paid to the dead are grateful, and therefore in general due to the infernal gods. Hitherto therefore Creon can only be charged with having pursued a laudable aim somewhat intemperately and inconsiderately, without sufficient indulgence for the natural feelings of mankind, or sufficient respect for the Powers to whom Polynices now properly belonged. He has one principle of action, which he knows to be right; but he does not reflect that there may be others of equal value, which ought not to be sacrificed to it. It is not however before the arrival of Tiresias that the effects of this inflexible and indiscriminate consistency become manifest. The seer declares that the gods have made known by the clearest signs that Creon's obstinacy excites their displeasure. He has reversed the order of nature, has entombed the living, and disinterred the dead. But still all may be well: nothing is yet irretrievably lost; if he will only acknowledge that he has gone too far, he may retrace his steps. The gods below claim Polynices, the gods above *Antigone*: it is not yet too late to restore them. But Creon, engrossed by his single object, rejects the prophet's counsel, defies his threats, and declares that no respect even for the holiest of things shall induce him to swerve from his resolution. Far from regarding the pollution of the altars, he cares not though it should reach the throne of Jove himself; and glosses over his profaneness with the sophistical plea, that he knows no man has power to pollute the gods. The calamity which now befalls him is an appropriate chastisement. Already the event had proved his wisdom to be folly. The measures he had taken for the good of the state had involved it in distress and danger. His boasted firmness now gives

* El.1487. *καταρων πρόθεε Ταφεῦσιν, ὧν τόντ' εἰκόε ἔστι τυγχάνειν.*

way, and on a sudden he is ready to abandon his purpose, to revoke his decrees. But they are executed, in spite of himself, and in a manner which for ever destroys his own happiness. Antigone dies, the victim whom he had vowed to law and justice; but as in her he had sacrificed the domestic affections to his state-policy, her death deprives him of the last hope of his family, and makes his hearth desolate. She, on the other hand, who had been drawn into an involuntary conflict with social order by the simple impulse of discharging a private duty, pays indeed the price which, she had foreseen, her undertaking would cost; but she succeeds in her design, and triumphs over the power of Creon, who himself becomes the minister of her wishes.

The character and situation of the parties in this play rendered it almost necessary that the contest should be terminated by a tragical catastrophe, even if the poet had not been governed by the tradition on which his argument was founded: though to the last room is left open for a reconciliation which would have prevented the calamity. In the *Philoctetes* the struggle is brought to a happy issue, after all hopes of such a result appeared to have been extinguished: and this is not merely conformable to tradition, but required by the nature of the subject. Our present object is only to exhibit the works of Sophocles in a particular point of view, and we therefore abstain from entering into discussions which, though very important for the full understanding of them, are foreign to our immediate purpose. We cannot however help observing, that the *Philoctetes* is a remarkable instance of the danger of trusting to a first impression in forming a judgment on the design of an ancient author; and that it ought at the same time to check the rashness of those who think that in such subjects all is to be discovered at the first glance, and to raise the confidence of those who may be apt to despair that study and investigation can ever ascertain anything in them that has once been controverted. The *Philoctetes* engaged the attention of some of the most eminent German critics, a Winkelmann, a Lessing, a Herder, for a long time in an extraordinary degree. Yet there are probably few points on which intelligent judges of such matters are more

unanimous than that these celebrated men were all mistaken on the question which they agitated, and that it is only in later times that it has been placed on a right footing and clearly understood. The bodily sufferings of Philoctetes are exhibited by the poet for no other purpose than to afford a measure of the indignation with which he is inspired by his wrongs, and of the energy of his will. It is no ordinary pain that torments him, but of a kind similar to that which extorted groans and tears from Hercules himself. Yet in his eagerness to escape from the scene of his long wretchedness, he makes an almost superhuman effort to master it, and conceal it from the observation of the bystanders. The difficulty of the exertion proves the strength of the motive: yet the motive, strong as it is, is unable to bear him up against the violence of the pain. He loses his self-command, and gives vent to his agony in loud and piteous exclamations. But all he had hoped for from Neoptolemus, when he strove to stifle his sensations, was not to be cured of his sore, but to be transported to a place where his sufferings might be mitigated by the presence and aid of compassionate friends. When he discovers the fraud that had been played upon him, he is at the same time invited to return to Troy, by the prospect of recovering health and strength, and of using them in the most glorious of fields. But long as he had sighed for deliverance from his miserable solitude, intolerable as are the torments he endures, ambitious as he is of martial renown, and impatient of wasting the arrows of Hercules on birds and beasts, there is a feeling stronger than any of these which impels him to reject the proffered good with disdain and even loathing, and to prefer pining to his life's end in lonely, helpless, continually aggravated wretchedness. This is the feeling of the atrocious wrong that has been inflicted on him: a feeling which acquires new force with every fresh throb of pain, with every hour of melancholy musing, and renders the thought of being reconciled to those who have so deeply injured him, and of lending his aid to promote their interest and exalt their glory, one from which he recoils with abhorrence. At the time when his situation appears most utterly desperate, when he sees himself on the point of being abandoned to an

extremity of distress compared with which his past sufferings were light, while he is tracing the sad features of the dreary prospect that lies immediately before him, and owns himself overcome by its horrors, the suggestion of the Chorus, that his resolution is shaken, and their exhortation that he would comply with their wishes, rekindle all the fury of his indignation, which breaks forth in a strain of vehemence, such as had never before escaped him : * a passage only inferior in sublimity to the similar one in the *Prometheus* (1040), inasmuch as Prometheus is perfectly calm, Philoctetes transported by passion.

The resentment of Philoctetes is so just and natural, and his character so noble and amiable, he is so open and unsuspecting after all his experience of human treachery, so warm and kindly in the midst of all his sternness and impatience, that it would seem as if Sophocles had intended that he should be the object of our unqualified sympathy. Yet it is not so: the poet himself preserves an ironical composure, and while he excites our esteem and pity for the suffering hero, guards us against sharing the detestation Philoctetes feels for the authors of his calamity. The character of Ulysses is contrasted indeed most forcibly with that of his frank, generous, impetuous enemy: but the contrast is not one between light and darkness, good and evil, between all that we love and admire on the one hand, and what we most hate and loathe on the other. The character of Ulysses, though not amiable, is far from being odious or despicable. He is one of those persons whom we cannot help viewing with respect, even when we disapprove of their principles and conduct. He is a sober, experienced, politic statesman, who keeps the public good steadily in view, and devotes himself entirely to the pursuit of it. Throughout the whole of his proceedings, with regard to Philoctetes, he maintains this dignity, and expresses his consciousness of it. He is always ready to avow and justify the grounds on which he acts. From the beginning he has been impelled by no base or selfish motive; but, on the contrary, has exposed himself to personal danger for the public service. He had never borne any ill-will to

* 1197. οὐδέποτε, οὐδέποτε, ἴσθι τόδ' ἔμπεδον, κ. τ. λ.

Philoctetes ; but when his presence was detrimental to the army, he advised his removal : now that it is discovered to be necessary for the success of the expedition, he exerts his utmost endeavours to bring him back to Troy. He knows the character of Philoctetes too well to suppose that his resentment will ever give way to persuasion (103), and the arrows of Hercules are a safeguard against open force. He therefore finds himself compelled to resort to artifice, which on this occasion appears the more defensible, because it is employed for the benefit not only of the Grecian army, but of Philoctetes himself, who, once deprived of his weapons, will probably consent to listen to reason. Neoptolemus, though his natural feelings are shocked by the proposal of Ulysses, is unable to resist the force of his arguments, and suffers himself to be persuaded that, by the step he is about to take, he shall earn the reputation not only of a wise, but a good man.* It is true that he retains some misgivings, which, when strengthened by pity for Philoctetes, ripen into a complete change of purpose. But Ulysses never repents of his counsels, but considers the young man's abandonment of the enterprise as a culpable weakness, a breach of his duty to the common cause. In his own judgment this cause hallows the undertaking, and renders the fraud he has practised pious and laudable.† And hence when assailed by Philoctetes with the most virulent invectives, he preserves his temper, and replies to them in a tone of conscious rectitude. "He could easily refute them, if this were a season for argument ; but he will confine himself to one plea : where the public weal demands such expedients, he scruples not to use them ; with this exception, he may boast that no one surpasses him in justice and piety." Such language accords so well with the spirit of the Greek institutions, according to which the individual lived only in and for the state, that from the lips of Ulysses it can raise no

* 117. ΟΔ. ὡς τοῦτό γ' ἔρξας, δύο φέρει δωρήματα. ΝΕ. Ποίω ; μαθῶν γάρ, οὐκ ἂν ἀρνοίμην τὸ εἶρᾶν. ΟΔ. Σοφός τ' ἂν αὐτὸς κάγαθός κεκλή' ἄμα.

† Hence with the god of craft he invokes the goddess of political prudence, his peculiar patroness : (133) "Ερμης δ' ὁ πέμπων Δόλιος ἠγγήσαιτο νῆν, Νίκη τ' Ἀθάνα Πολιάς, ἣ σώζει μ' αἰεί.

doubt of his sincerity. We see that he has adopted his principles deliberately, and acts upon them consistently.

But the doctrine that the end sanctifies the means, though in every age it has found men to embrace it, has never been universally and absolutely admitted. Ulysses has convinced himself by his own sophistry, but he cannot pervert the ingenuous nature of Neoptolemus, whose unprejudiced decision turns the scale on the side of truth. The intervention of Neoptolemus is not more requisite for the complication of the action, than for the purpose of placing the two other characters in the strongest light. He cannot answer the fallacies of Ulysses, but he more effectually refutes them by his actions. The wily statesman has foreseen and provided against all the obstacles that might interfere with the execution of his plan—except one: he has not reckoned on the resistance he might find in the love of truth, natural to uncorrupted minds, and which, in his young companion, has never been stifled by the practice of deceit. He had calculated on using Neoptolemus as an instrument, and he finds him a man. And hence the unexpected issue of the struggle renders full justice to all. Philoctetes is brought to embrace that which he had spurned as ignominy worse than death; but by means which render it the most glorious event of his life, and compensate for the sufferings inflicted on him by the anger of the gods. The end of Ulysses is attained, but not until all his arts have been baffled, and he has been compelled to retire from the contest, defeated and scorned. Neoptolemus, who has sacrificed everything to truth and honour, succeeds in every object of his ambition to the utmost extent of his desires. The machinery by which all this is effected is indeed an arbitrary symbol, but that which it represents may not be the less true.

We are aware how open the subjects discussed in the foregoing pages are to a variety of views, and how little any one of these can be expected to obtain general assent. We can even anticipate some of the objections that may be made to the one here proposed. According to the opinion of a great modern critic, it will perhaps appear to want the most decisive test of truth, the sanction of

Aristotle. And undoubtedly if it is once admitted that no design or train of thought can be attributed to the Greek tragic poets which has not been noticed by Aristotle,* this little essay must be content to share the fate of the greater part of the works written in modern times on Greek tragedy, and to pass for an idle dream. We would however fain hope either that the critic's sentence, investing Aristotle as it does with a degree of infallibility and omniscience which, in this particular province, we should be least of all disposed to concede to him, may bear a milder construction, or that we may venture to appeal from it to a higher tribunal. Another more specific objection may possibly be, that the idea of tragic irony which we have attempted to illustrate by the preceding examples is a modern one, and that instead of finding it in Sophocles, we have forced it upon him. So far as this objection relates to our conception of the poet's theology, we trust that it may have been in some measure counteracted by the distinction above drawn between the religious sentiments of Sophocles, and those of an earlier age. This distinction seems to have been entirely overlooked by a German author, who has written an essay of considerable merit on the *Ajta*, and who in speaking of the attributes of Minerva, as she appears in that play, observes: "The idea that the higher powers can only

* "Hodie plerisque fati usus in Græcorum tragœdia necessarius videtur: de quo quum nihil ab Aristotele traditum sit, apparet, quamvis in plerisque tragœdiis Græcorum fato suæ sint partes, tamen scriptores illarum fabularum non cogitavisse de fato." Hermann, Præf. ad Trachinias, p. 7. A little further on he observes: "Qua in re autem illi tragœdiæ naturam positam esse statuerint optime ex Aristotele cognosci potest, qui et ætate iis proximus fuerit, et, ut ipse Græcus, Græcorum more philosophatus est." And so again in the Preface to *Philoctetes*, p. 11. "Tragici Græcorum eam habebant animo informatam notionem tragœdiæ, quæ est ab Aristotele in libro de arte poetica proposita." Had they then all the same notion of it, and was there no difference between that of Æschylus and those of Sophocles and of Euripides? And if they had, was it sufficient, in order to comprehend it, to be a Greek of nearly the same age, and a philosopher? How many contradictory theories have been proposed on Goethe's poetry by contemporary German metaphysicians! Even Hermann himself has not been universally understood in his own day. Many persons are still persuaded that his treatise *De Mythologia Græcorum antiquissima* is mere poetry, while the author himself protests that it is plain prose. But, joking apart, if Lord Bacon had written a treatise on the art of poetry, who would now think his judgment conclusive on Shakespeare's notion of tragedy, or on the design and spirit of any of his plays?

interpose in the affairs of mankind for the purpose of making men wiser and better, is purely modern."* That which he conceives to be repugnant to modern ideas in the theology of Sophocles is, that Minerva is represented as inspiring the phrenzy of Ajax : an agency which appears to him inconsistent with the functions of the goddess of wisdom. According to the view we have taken of the play, this inconsistency would be merely nominal. But even according to his own, it is an inconsistency which need not shock a modern reader more than an ancient one. We are familiar with a magnificent passage, in which it is said of "our living Dread, who dwells In Silo, his bright sanctuary," that, when about to punish the Philistines, "Among them he a spirit of phrenzy sent, Who hurt their minds." Minerva at all events does no more, and according to our view she interposes for a purely benevolent, not a vindictive purpose. Whether Sophocles would have scrupled to introduce her as an author of absolute uncompensated evils, is a question with which we are not here concerned. But the idea of a humbling and chastening Power, who extracts moral good out of physical evil, does not seem too refined for the age and country of Sophocles, however difficult it may have been to reconcile with the popular mythology.

As we have had occasion to refer to the *Samson Agonistes*, we are tempted to remark that few plays afford a finer specimen of tragic irony ; and that it may be very usefully compared with the *Ajæc* and the second *Œdipus*. We leave it to the reader to consider whether the poet, who was so deeply imbued with the spirit of Greek tragedy, was only imitating the outward form of the ancient drama, or designed to transfer one of its most essential elements to his work.

On the other hand, we admit that it is a most difficult and delicate task to determine the precise degree in which a dramatic poet is conscious of certain bearings of his works, and of the ideas which they suggest to the reader, and hence to draw an inference

* Immermann, *Ueber den rasenden Ajax des Sophocles*, p. 23 : at p. 18 he observes : "The way in which a superior Being steps in, and determines the hero's destiny, is irreconcilable with our presumptions (Ahnungen) about the supreme government of human affairs."

as to his design. The only safe method of proceeding for this purpose, so as to avoid the danger of going very far astray, and at the same time to ensure some gain, is in each particular case to institute an accurate examination of the whole and of every part, such as Welcker's of the *Ajæc*, which may be considered as a model of such investigations. We are conscious how far this essay falls short of such a standard: and if we are willing to hope that it may not be entirely useless, it is only so far as it may serve to indicate the right road, and to stimulate the curiosity of others to prosecute it in new directions.

Note referred to on p. 18.

[Hermann reads: *ὀθούνηκ' οὐκ ὄψαιτό νιν*, instead of *ὄψοιντο*, or *ὄψοιτο*, the reading of the old editions. He defends the plural as referring to *ὄφθαλμοι*, which is in the mind of the messenger, and gives the general sense of the whole passage as follows: "Quia non vidissent nec quæ perpeteretur, nec quæ faceret mala, at in posterum in tenebris (*i.e.* non) viderent quos non oportuisset videre, neque cognoscerent, quos cupivisset cognoscere."—Ed.]

MEMNON.

AMONG the celebrated names which strike the attention of every one who has been led to stray in the twilight of mythical history, few perhaps rouse a livelier curiosity, or present a more enticing and perplexing problem, than that of Memnon. The oftener it occurs to us the more we feel inclined to ask: Who is this rosy son of the morning, whose image towered above the banks of the Nile, but, while it saluted the beams of the rising sun, pointed toward Meroe and the Ethiopian ocean? this founder of palaces and citadels in Susa and Ecbatana, whose home lay in Cerne, the farthest island of the East? this conquering hero, who cut a road through the heart of Asia, to find his grave or to leave his monuments on the coast of Syria and the shores of the Propontis? Without hoping to furnish a satisfactory answer to this question, I feel tempted to review the legends relating to this renowned person, for the purpose of inquiring in what manner they may be best connected and reconciled. The subject has already employed the pens of so many learned and ingenious men, that little, if anything, can remain to be done for the collection of materials: but it also presents so many sides, that it may not be useless to consider it from one which, though it has not been entirely overlooked, seems not to have been sufficiently noticed.

The immediate object of the inquiry proposed is to trace the Greek tradition about Memnon to its source, or at least so far as to ascertain the nature, historical or imaginary, of the ground from which it sprang. It will therefore be necessary to begin

by mentioning the earliest form in which it appears to us among the Greeks, and the new features which it gradually assumes or discloses under the hands through which it successively passed.

We have reason to congratulate ourselves on the preservation of the few lines in which Memnon is named or alluded to in the *Odyssey* (IV. 188; XI. 521). But for this lucky chance some critics would probably have asserted that the legend was wholly unknown in the age of Homer, and it would have been impossible to refute them. That it does not occur in the *Iliad*, where there would have been some difficulty in introducing it, cannot raise a reasonable doubt. Eustathius indeed informs us that there were persons who instead of *μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπιῆας*, II. A. 423, read *μετὰ Μέμνονας Αἰθιοπιῆας*, imagining that the hero had given his name to an Ethiopian tribe!* But we may very well dispense with this conceit, and still believe that the exploits of Memnon before Troy were as familiar to the poet of the *Iliad* as those of Achilles. The *Odyssey* however only speaks of Memnon as the son of Eos, as the most beautiful of mortals, and as the vanquisher of Antilochus. Hesiod, who calls him king of the Ethiopians (*Th.* 985), adds the name of his father Tithonus, whose history is related in the Homeric hymn (*Ad Venerem*, 218—240). It may have been about the same time that Arctianus made the adventures of the Ethiopian warrior the most prominent subject of an epic poem, the *Æthiopis*, of which we only know that it described the combat in which Memnon was slain by Achilles, and how his mother obtained Jupiter's leave to endow her son, as she had his father, with immortality. But as there is good reason for believing that Quintus Calaber in the first five books of his poem followed the *Æthiopis* very closely, it is highly probable that most of the features of his narrative were drawn from Arctianus, and formed a part of the earliest tradition. In his second book, after the hopes of the Trojans have been dashed to the ground by the death of Penthesilea and her Amazons, Memnon arrives to the

* Steph. Byz. [*De Urbibus*, ed. Berkel, 1688, p. 549]. *Μέμνονες ἔθνος Αἰθιοπικὸν ὃ ἰρμηνεύεται, ὡς ὁ Πολύτωρ φησὶν, ἀργίους τινὰς ἢ μαχίμους, καὶ χαλεπούς.*

relief of the city with a countless host of Ethiopians. In his first interview with Priam he describes the immortal life of his father, and his mother Eos, the floods of Tethys, the uttermost bounds of the earth on the east, and the whole of his progress from the verge of Oceanus to Troy, in the course of which he had broken a vast army of the Solymi who attempted to impede his march. The next morning he slays Antilochus, and then meets Achilles, with whom he maintains a long and doubtful combat. After his fall the air is darkened, and at his mother's bidding the winds lift his corpse stripped of his armour above the ground. The blood which drops from it on the plain forms a stream called by those who dwell at the foot of Ida the Paphlagonian, which every year on the return of the fatal day again runs blood, and sends forth a loathsome stench, as of a putrefying sore. The body is borne to the banks of the Æsepus, where is a grove sacred to the Nymphs, who mourn over the hero. His faithful Ethiopians are likewise gifted with supernatural vigour, and enabled to follow their king through the air to his resting-place. Eos descends with the Months and the Pleiads in her train to bewail her son. At first she threatens to withhold her presence from Olympus, and for a whole day she keeps the world wrapped in darkness. But the thunder of Jupiter shakes her resolution. The Ethiopians bury their king, and are changed into birds which bear the name of Memnon, and once a year flock to his tomb, sprinkle it with dust, and contend with one another in pairs till at least one of each has fallen. Memnon himself, whether in Hades or in Elysium, rejoices in these funeral honours. His tomb on the banks of the Æsepus was shown in the time of Strabo, and near it was a village called by his name.*

If Quintus took this account of Memnon's burial from Arctinus, Æschylus must have drawn the legend which he worked up into his *Ψυχοστασία* from a different source. For there can scarcely be a doubt that in that tragedy he represented Eos as carrying her son's corpse away, not to the banks of the Æsepus, but to those either of the Nile or of the Choaspes. And the latter seems the

* Strabo, XIII. [cap. i. § 11], p. 587.

more probable supposition, especially if Dr. Butler (Fragmm. Æsch. 169) is right in his conjecture that Strabo is alluding to this play, where he says that Æschylus had spoken of Memnon's Cissian parentage.* Æschylus was perhaps the first Greek poet who brought the hero to Troy from Susa; and it is manifest enough why a dramatic poet should have adopted this legend, which gave a new and deeper interest to the combat between Memnon and his Greek antagonist, in preference to any others that he might have heard of. The connexion between Memnon and Susa was so celebrated in the time of Herodotus, probably by means of the drama, that the historian speaks of the royal palace at Susa simply as τὰ βασιλήϊα τὰ Μεμνόνια καλεόμενα (v. 53), which he explains in the following chapter by saying Σούσων, τοῦτο γὰρ Μεμνόنيον ἄστν καλέεται. In vii. 151 the same epithet is used, as if the city had been known principally through this legend. In what manner Æschylus explained the origin of this connexion we have no means of guessing. But it is not probable that he knew much about the history related by Diodorus (ii. 22), who informs us, that at the time of the Trojan war Tithonus governed Persia as viceroy of the Assyrian king Teutamus, who was then master of Asia (which agrees with the language of Plato, De Legg. iii. p. 296 Bek.), and that his son Memnon, then in the prime of life, built the palace on the citadel at Susa, which remained standing till the days of the Persian monarchy, and was called from him Memnonia, and likewise made

* I use this general expression because the meaning of Strabo's words is not quite clear. He says (xv. [cap. iii. § 2], p. 720) Λέγονται δὲ καὶ Κίσσιοι οἱ Σούσιοι· φησὶ δὲ καὶ Αἰσχυλὸς τὴν μητέρα Μέμνονος Κισσίαν. Professor Welcker (Æsch. Trilogie, p. 435) understands by this that Æschylus had somewhere or other called Cissia (the land of the Cissians) the mother of Memnon: and he thinks it improbable that this should have been in the Ψυχόστασια, because to have spoken of Cissia as Memnon's mother in the same play which represented him as the son of Eos or Hemera would have bred confusion. But this must depend on the context which is lost. On the other hand, I doubt whether Strabo's words will bear the construction Professor Welcker puts on them. The more obvious sense of them seems to be, that Æschylus had applied the epithet Cissian to the mother of Memnon. And this he might have done, using it with a poetical latitude which would not surprise us in Æschylus, even if the lines quoted by Athenæus (B. § 87, vol. i. p. 165, Dind.) referred to Memnon, and were taken (as Professor Welcker believes) from the Ψυχόστασια. All that they say of him (if he is the subject of them) is: Γένος μὲν αἰνεῖν ἐκμαθῶν ἐπίσταμαι Λίθιοπίδος γῆς.

a highway through the country which retained the same name. Diodorus adds that the Ethiopians likewise claimed Memnon as a native of their country, and showed there ancient palaces which to that day were called Memnonia. At all events the Ethiopians who followed Memnon to Troy carried his bones back to Tithonus.*

Pausanias, in describing the painting of Polygnotus in the Lesche at Delphi (x. 31, 6), combines the two accounts we have been hitherto considering. Birds, he says, were seen wrought in Memnon's chlamys, and these were the birds called Memnonides, which, as was generally believed near the Hellespont, were used to go on certain days to the tomb of Memnon, and sweep it with their wings, where it was not covered with trees or herbage, and sprinkle it with the water of the Æsepus. Polygnotus had represented a naked Ethiopian boy standing by the side of Memnon. This, Pausanias observes, was because Memnon was king of the Ethiopians. Yet he had come to Troy, not from Ethiopia, but from the Persian city of Susa and the river Choaspes, having subdued all the nations that lay in his way. And the Phrygians still show the road by which he led his army, for which he had chosen the shortest cuts: it was the same along which the state-couriers travelled. This tradition he repeats i. 42, 3.

What is thus put together by Diodorus and Pausanias was torn asunder by other writers, as Philostratus (V. Apoll. vi. 4, Heroic. p. 672 [cap. iv. p. 699, ed. Olear. 1709], Ic. i. 7), Eudocia, p. 46, who distinguish between an Ethiopian Memnon who reigned at the time of the Trojan war, and a Trojan of the same name on whom Achilles avenged the death of the blooming Antilochus. On the other hand, there was a legend which ascribed the foundation of the palace at Ecbatana to Memnon; † and beside the Memnonium on the Æsepus there was one near Paltus in Syria on the river Badas, which had

* Ælian, Hist. An. v. 1, thus notices both legends: *λέγονσιν οἱ τὴν Τρωάδα ἐπι οἰκοῦντες ἠρίον εἶναι τι τῷ τῆς Ἥους Μίμμωνι εἰς τμῶν ἄνετον. καὶ αὐτὸν μὲν τὸν νεκρὸν εἰς τὰ Σοῦσα, τὰ οὕτω Μειμόνια ἰμνοῦμενα, ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς κομισθέντα μετέωρον ἐκ τῶν φόνων τυχεῖν κηδέουσας τῆς προσηκούσης αὐτῷ, ὀνομάζεσθαι δὲ οἱ τὴν στήλην τὴν ἐνταῦθα ἄλλως.*

† By which Simonides is uncertain. Strabo says, *ταφῆναι λέγεται Μίμμων περι Πάλτον τῆς Συρίας παρὰ Βαδῶν ποταμόν, ὡς εἶρηκε Σιμωνίδης ἐν Μίμμωνι ἐθιυράμβω τῶν Δηλιακῶν.* A younger Simonides had visited Meroe, and had written on Ethiopia:

been spoken of by Simonides in a poem called Memnon (Strabo xv. [iii. § 2], p. 728*), and another on the river Belaeos two stadia distant from Ptolemais (Joseph. Bell. Jud. ii. 10, 2).

The great majority of voices however agree in tracing the origin of Memnon to Ethiopia. The only notion attached to this word in the Homeric age seems to have been that it was a region extending to the utmost verge of the earth, bounded by the Ocean stream, and that its inhabitants, blessed with the immediate presence of the rising and the setting sun, were the most innocent and the happiest of mortals. All that Homer could have had to relate about the march of Memnon was that he came from a far country in the East. The Homeric distinction between the eastern and western Ethiopians (Od. i. 24), which was grounded on a view of geography that had long ceased to be understood in the age of Herodotus, was nevertheless probably the occasion of that which this historian adopted between the Asiatic Ethiopians on the borders of India and those of Africa (vii. 70). The name of Ethiopia however was gradually confined to Africa, and there to the upper course of the Nile; and the Greek travellers who were curious about the history of Memnon expected to find the fullest and surest information about him in Egypt, which appeared to have been either the country of his birth, or the scene of his earliest adventures.

The Egyptians were probably consulted very early on this subject; and their learned priests can have found no difficulty in satisfying the Greeks who inquired of them. But their answers would vary according to the nature of the questions proposed. If Memnon was described as a royal conqueror who had traversed Asia and subdued all the nations he passed through, he would naturally be compared with some one or other of the mighty kings of Egypt, the fame of whose exploits had once resounded through the habitable world, and might have been preserved by the faint

Plin. N. H. vi. 35. One of these Syrian Memnonia is alluded to by Oppian, *Cyneg.* ii. 152. Πάντη δ' ἔργα βοῶν θαλιεράς βέβριθεν ἄλωας Μειμόνιον περὶ ναόν ὄθ' Ἀσσύριοι ναετήρες Μέμνονα κοκκοῦσι κλυτὸν γόνον Ἰοριγενείης.

* Hygin. [Fab.] 223. Domus Cyri regis in Ecbatanis, quam fecit Memnon lapidibus variis et candidis vinctis auro.

and confused echo of the Greek tradition. He might have been that Sesostris whose invincible arms had penetrated eastward as far as the Ganges, and westward to the extremity of Thrace: or that Osymandyas whose Bactrian expedition was recorded in the sculptures of his sepulchral palace at Thebes (Diodor. i. 47, 55). On the other hand, if the Ethiopian hero was to be considered as the son of Aurora, as a youth of more than mortal beauty, whose untimely death had clouded the face of nature with sadness, and was commemorated every year with mournful rites, the Egyptian mythology could produce a being of similar character and fate. Such was the mysterious person who was revered as the guardian of Thebes, and whose statue, in the Roman period, was often heard to utter a plaintive strain.* The Egyptian title by which he was known at Thebes was Phamenoph or Amenophis,† which came near enough to the Greek name of Memnon to confirm the supposition of their identity.

The name of this Amenophis appears among the kings of Egypt:‡ but there is every reason to believe that he was a merely ideal being, though his character and attributes have been the subject of much dispute among the learned. Our present purpose does not require that we should enter very deeply into this question, though we must not entirely pass over it. Jablonski was, I believe, the first writer who expressed the opinion that the famous vocal statue did not represent any historical personage, but was merely symbolical and mystical. This he thought was plain from the legends concerning Amenophis, as well as from his being called the son of Aurora; and he conjectures that this statue, as well

* An inscription on the colossus, as corrected by Jacobs (Transactions of the Munich Academy, t. ii. p. 42). *φωνή δ' ὀνυρμὸς ἦν πάλαι μοι Μέμνονος τὰ πάθη γωῶσα.*

† Paus. i. 41, 3. *ἔστι [εἶδον] καθήμενον ἄγαλμα ἠχῆεν* (according to Scaliger's correction [*ἠχοῦν*, Dind.]), *Μέμνονα ὀνομάζουσιν οἱ πολλοί. τοῦτον γὰρ φασιν ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας ὀρηθῆναι ἐς Αἴγυπτον καὶ τὴν ἄχρι Σούσων. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐ Μέμνονα οἱ Θηβαῖοι λέγουσι, Φαμένωφ δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἐγχωρίων οὐ τοῦτο τὸ ἄγαλμα ἦν. ἤκουσα δὲ ἠδῆ καὶ Σέσωστριν φαμένων εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ ἄγαλμα ὃ Καμβύσης εἰέκοψε.* [See the discussion of this passage in Creuzer, *Symbolik*, ii. p. 176, note 2, 3rd edit.]

‡ Syneccllus, i. p. 286, ed. Bonn. *Αἴγυπτον μ. ἐβασίλευσεν Ἀμενώφθις. Οὗτος δ' Ἀμενώφθις ἔστιν ὁ Μέμνων εἶναι νομιζόμενος καὶ φεγγόμενος λίθος. ὃν λίθον χρόνοις ὕστερον Καμβύσης ὁ Περσῶν τέμνει νομίζων εἶναι γοητεῖαν ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς Πολύαιρος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ἰστορεῖ.*

as the pyramids, were destined by the priests to the purpose of astronomical observations (Opusc. i. p. 27). The name Amenophis he interprets either *guardian of the city of Thebes*,* or *announcer of good tidings*, quasi dicas εὐαγγελιστής, and he refers this meaning as well as the other to the astronomical observations of which he conceives the statue to have been an instrument. Creuzer, as might be supposed, takes a different view of the subject, though he is perfectly willing to adopt Jablonski's first explanation of the word, to which, as he remarks, the etymology of the Greek name corresponds so closely that it might be taken not for a corruption, but for a translation of the Egyptian.† This Phamenophis-Memnon is, according to Creuzer, identical with Osymandyas, and closely resembles the Persian Mithras. All his attributes and legends point to the vicissitudes of light and darkness, the changes of the seasons, the courses of the planets. He is himself of dazzling beauty, but his followers who bring their offerings to his tomb show the complexion of night. He answers the greeting of his worshippers with a joyful strain when he is touched by the first rays of the rising sun, but in the evening his voice is plaintive like the tone of a broken chord. He is Horus in the prime of his strength and beauty; but again he is doomed to an untimely death, and is bewailed as Maneros, and corresponds to Linus and Adonis and the other heroes of this numerous class. Another German writer‡ has proposed a very singular hypothesis about the Egyptian Memnon, which perhaps deserves to be noticed, though it is very difficult to describe it with the necessary brevity, without making it appear more fanciful and arbitrary than it really is. He compares Memnon, not with the young victorious god Horus, but with his vanquished adversary Typhon, who though overpowered still retains a feeble and lingering existence, and from time to time sends forth a faint note of lamentation over his own

* In one of the inscriptions Μέμνων Θεβαίων πρόμαχος.

† Symbolik, i. p. 453 [ii. 177, 3^e Ausg.]. He refers to Plato, Cratylus, p. 395, who says of Agamemnon ὅτι οὖν ἀγαστός κατὰ τὴν ἐπιμονὴν οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐνσημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων—the most essential quality, Creuzer observes, of a guardian and champion.

‡ Wilhelm von Schütz in the Wiener Jahrbücher, xxi. p. 107.

sufferings. He represents however no physical object or event, but is the symbol of a period in the history of the nation, one of primitive simplicity, which had passed away and lived only in memory, having been replaced by one of strife and conquest, power and pomp, a calculating and oppressive rule. "Sesostris, whose name according to Jablonski means the prince who gazes on or adores the sun, probably represents a new dynasty. He is a conqueror, and the destroyer of the earlier principle; with him too begin new buildings; obelisks and pyramids succeed to the colossal images of former times. These ancient statues continue to exist, but the legend describes them as mourning over the glories of the past, and as fostering a languid hope of a future revival."*

The reader will perceive from this specimen, which is perhaps but a scanty one, how copious a harvest of conjecture the subject is capable of yielding. But the question we are at present mainly concerned with is not what notions the Egyptians attached to their Memnon, but in what manner he became known to the Greeks so as to fill a conspicuous part in their heroic poetry. This question has been profoundly investigated by Mr. Jacobs, in a very learned and instructive essay published in the "Memoirs of the Royal Academy of Munich," vol. ii., and reprinted among his miscellaneous works. But as it may probably not be found in many libraries in this country, it may be doing a service to those of our readers who take an interest in such researches, to lay before them the substance of his opinions and arguments in some detail.

The essay begins with an enumeration of the monuments of Memnon scattered over Asia, for the knowledge of which, it is observed, we are indebted chiefly to incidental allusions. One of

* He conjectures that the sounds heard proceeded not from the statue itself, but from some local cause that operated in its vicinity (as Humboldt speaks of subterraneous sounds that issue at sunrise from the rocks on the Oronoko), and that this phenomenon was either applied by the adherents of the ancient system to an existing statue, or that a statue was erected there to take advantage of it. It is to be regretted that so ingenious a hypothesis should not have the minutest particle of historical ground to stand upon. See however Plutarch, De Is. et Os. c. 30.

these, which I have not yet mentioned, is found in Dictys (*De Bello Trojano*, vi. 10), where after the death of Memnon his sister Hemera goes in search of his body. At Paphus* she meets with the Phœnicians whom Memnon had sent by sea, while he himself led the main body of his army over Mount Caucasus to Troy. From them she receives an urn containing his remains, with which she sails to Phœnicia, and there buries them in a region called Palliochis. Mr. Jacobs places this story in a new light by comparing it with the legend of the search made by Isis after the body of Osiris, which she finds in Phœnicia (*Plutarch, De Is. et Os. c. 15*). He proceeds to notice the various hypotheses that have been formed about these monuments. Are they the works of a conqueror who traversed Asia? If so, how is it that we find so many sepulchres erected in honour of him? Are we to suppose that one really contained his remains, and that the others were cenotaphs? Or will the difficulty be solved if we separate the Trojan from the Egyptian Memnon, and each of these from the Assyrian? This method Mr. J. justly pronounces an arbitrary expedient: and it may be added that it merely multiplies the questions instead of answering them. But on the other hand, with equal judgment he rejects the vain attempt of Diodorus to connect the various legends by a historical thread. "This mode of interpretation," he remarks, "being that which is most agreeable to the most vulgar understanding, has for this very reason always found many partisans, and even now, though its defects have been long perceived, it has not yet lost all its influence. Imaginary personages in human form, and mostly decked with crowns and robes of state, still continue to play a usurped part on the theatre of ancient history." It is indeed much easier and safer to laugh at these phantoms than to attempt to dethrone them.

Mr. J. then addresses himself to a different class of critics, and

* There is a confusion in the narrative between Paphus and Rhodes, as the reader may see by looking back to iv. c. 4. And yet it must be owing to the author, not, as one of the commentators seems to have suspected, to the transcribers: for Hemera would naturally begin her search in Cyprus. Palliochis is probably connected either with Paltus or the Belæus.

asks whether there is any better reason for considering Memnon as a king and conqueror, than for viewing Thoth or Osymandyas or Dionysus in that light. The fables relating to the last of these mythical persons have likewise been forced into the shape of a political history. Yet no one believes that they have any other kind of historical foundation than the propagation of a certain worship from the remote East to the shores of the Ægean. And such Mr. J. conceives to be the real import of the various legends concerning Memnon. He too was a god, whose rites were carried from Ethiopia through Egypt and Asia to the coast of the Propontis.

To clear the way for his hypothesis Mr. J. combats the opinion of Marsham and Jablonski, who imagined that Ethiopia in the fable of Memnon included Upper Egypt. He contends that according to the greater part of the ancient authors this name was applied to the country of which Meroe was the capital. Philostratus asserted that Memnon was worshipped at Meroe as well as at Memphis by Ethiopians as well as by Egyptians,* and that he cherished his hair in honour of the Nile, which rose in Ethiopia; † and Agatharchides mentions that the Memnonia at Thebes were built by Ethiopians.‡ The descriptions of Lycophron§ and Quintus Calaber,|| which speak of Cerné and the Southern Ocean,

* Heroica [c. iv.], p. 699. *Θούουσιν αὐτῶν κατὰ Μερῶν καὶ Μέμφιν Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ Αἰθίοπες, ἐπειδὴν ἀκτίνα πρώτην ὁ ἥλιος ἐκβάλλη.*

† Imag. i. 7. *ὁ τῶν βοστρύχων ἀσταχυς, οὗς οἶμαι Νεῖλον ἔτρεφε· Νεῖλου γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι μὲν ἔχουσι τὰς ἐκβολὰς, Αἰθίοπες δὲ τὰς πηγὰς.* There is a curious misprint in the German, which is not noticed in the *corrigenda*: *dass er sein Heer dem äthiopischen Nil genähert habe.*

‡ Ap. Phot. p. 448, Bek. These Ethiopians however are here represented as comparatively recent invaders: he is speaking of the gold mines on the Red Sea: *εὔρηται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πρώτων τοῦ τόπου βασιλείων τῶν μετάλλων ἢ φύσις, διέλιπε δὲ ἐνεργούσα ποτὲ μὲν Αἰθιοπίων ἐπὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον πλήθους συνελθόντος καὶ πολλὰ τὰς πόλεις ἐτη φρουρήσαντος (ἔφ' ὧν καὶ τὰ Μεμνόνεια συντετελέσθαι φασί), ποτὲ δὲ Μήδων καὶ Περσῶν ἐπικρατησάντων.*

§ Cass. 18. Aurora goes forth *Τιθωνὸν ἐν κοίτρῃ τῆς Κέρνης πέλας Λειποῦσα.* On the other positions of this fabulous island the reader may consult Eustath. ad. Dionys. Perieg. 218, who speaks of the *πανύστατοι Αἰθιοπιῆες Αὐτῶν ἐπ' Ὀκεάνῳ πυμάτης παρὰ τέρπεια Κέρνης.* There is a learned and luminous dissertation on this subject in Völcker's *Mythische Geographie*, pp. 56—81.

|| B. 118. Memnon describes *ἀκαμάτου πέρατα χθονός, ἀντολίας τε Ἡελίου καὶ πῦσαν ἀπ' ὠκεανοῦ κέλευθον Μέχρις ἐπὶ Πριάμοιο πόλιν καὶ πρόωνας Ἴδης.*

point the same way: and the exceeding beauty for which Homer praises the hero is a characteristic not of the Egyptians but of the Ethiopians, who, Herodotus says, were the finest men in the world.* All these indications favour the supposition that the Egyptians became acquainted with Memnon in the same way and through the same channel as that by which they acquired their knowledge of Ammon. The latter god came from the Ethiopian Meroe,† the central seat of his worship, to his still more renowned sanctuaries in Egypt and Libya. Thebes in Upper Egypt was a colony of Meroe, and its Egyptian name, *Amoun-noh*, the city of Ammon, shows that the worship of that god was the basis on which the colonists founded their new state. Memnon too originally belonged to Meroe, which was deemed the place of his birth, because it was the earliest seat of his worship. In Thebes he was revered as Phamenophis, Guardian of the city of Ammon, that is, as a ministering god, one of the class which the Greeks designated by the names of *Θεοὶ πάρεδροι* and *ὀπαῖοί*. So in the Egyptian mythology Thoth is the servant of Isis and Osiris, and Anubis the guardian of Osiris and the attendant of Isis. And thus, as Ammon himself migrated with his priesthood from Ethiopia to Egypt, the guardian of his sanctuary accompanied

* III. 114. *ἄνδρας μεγίστους καὶ καλλίστους καὶ μακροβιωτάτους*. To this we may add the fact mentioned by Athenæus (p. 566), *καθίστων δὲ καὶ πολλοὶ τοὺς καλλίστους βασιλείας, ὡς μέχρι νῦν οἱ Ἀθάνατοι καλούμενοι Αἰθίοπες, ὡς φησὶ Βίων ἐν Αἰθιοπικοῖς*, to which Aristotle also alludes, *Pol. IV. 4, εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμονται τὰς ἀρχὰς ὡσπερ ἐν Αἰθιοπία φασὶ τινες*. This may be probably considered as a historical fact, and is perfectly consistent with what Diodorus says (III. 5) about the election of the kings by the priests: *οἱ ἱερεῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους προκρίνουσιν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν καταλεχθέντων ὃν ἂν ὁ θεὸς κομᾶζων κατὰ τινα συνήθειαν περιφερόμενος λάβῃ, τοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος αἰρεῖται βασιλεία*. Another Ethiopian custom reported by Diodorus (III. 7) deserves to be mentioned here: *φασὶ σύνθητες εἶναι καὶ τὸ συντελευτῶν ἑκουσίως τοὺς ἐταίρους τοῖς βασιλεῦσι*. So that the honours which Memnon's companions pay to his tomb are quite in keeping with the national character. Mr. Jacobs has not noticed Quintus Curtius IV. 8, Alexander—Memphim petit. Cupido, haud injusta quidem, ceterum intempestiva, incesserat, non interiora modo Aegypti, sed etiam Aethiopiam invisere. Memnonis Tithonique celebrata regia cognoscendae vetustatis avidum trahebat paene extra terminos solis. Demetrius ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν κατ' Αἴγυπτον (ap. Athen. xv. p. 680): *λέγεται δὲ τις μῦθος ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, ὅτι οἱ Αἰθίοπες στελλόμενοι εἰς Τροίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Τιθωνοῦ, ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν τὸν Μέμνονα τετελευτηκέναι, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τοὺς στεφάνους ἀνίβαλον ἐπὶ τὰς ἀκάνθας*.

† See Heeren, *Ideen*, II. p. 441 and foll.

him in his wanderings, and, when his origin was forgotten, was honoured at Thebes as a native hero.

In the ancient world religion and commerce were intimately connected together. The gods accompanied their worshippers into the foreign lands to which they were led by the pursuit of gain, and their successive stations were marked by new temples, altars, and rites. "The Indian commerce carried the worship of Bacchus from the Ganges to Thrace and thence farther southward: so Serapis was transported from Egypt to Colchis, and thence to Sinopé, whence he returned to his native home: so the Phœnician Hercules travelled to Gades, and the Astaroth of the same people was introduced by them into all the islands and countries visited by their fleets and caravans." And as the numerous birthplaces of Bacchus, his Nysas, in Ethiopia and India, Arabia and Thrace, plainly indicate so many seats of his worship, so the Memnonia may be regarded as traces of the progress of the Ethiopian god. We find his sway permanently established in several cities: and it may be fairly conjectured that it was not confined to the comparatively few spots in which we happen to have heard of it.

The chief difficulty that stands in the way of a historical interpretation of the legend of Memnon arises from the great number of sepulchral monuments that laid claim to his remains from Meroe to the Æsepus. But the hypothesis now proposed affords a complete explanation of this singular fact, which is in perfect accordance with the oriental genius, and especially with that of Egyptian antiquity. The religion of Egypt was as gloomy and melancholy, as that of the Greeks was cheerful and gay. It filled life with images of death, and even dashed the pleasures of the banquet with recollections of the grave. The gods themselves die and are buried and bewailed. Many cities in the valley of the Nile contested the possession of the remains of Osiris; and the sepulchre of Isis was shown at Memphis, and at Phike, near the borders of Ethiopia. Her festival was celebrated with mourning, like many others in the East. And there can be no doubt that Amenophis was honoured with similar rites. We learn from

Philostratus that the Ethiopians mourned over Memnon's untimely death (*Vit. Apoll.* vi. 4); and Oppian (*Cyneget.* ii. 152) says the same of the Assyrians. This agrees perfectly with the Greek legend about the yearly contests of the birds at the Memnonian barrow. Hence it appears that according to all analogy Memnon must be admitted into the ranks of the Egyptian and Ethiopian gods. His graves are his sanctuaries, and his palaces are like many in Egypt, which were mansions not of the living, but of the dead. Foreign as such buildings are to our usages and notions, they were familiar to those of the Egyptians, in whose eyes life had no import but that of a transition into the realm of death. Hence the magnificence of the sepulchral palace of Osymandyas; and the Labyrinth was destined to a similar purpose. We meet with instances of the same usage in other parts of the East. The temple of Belus was sometimes called his palace, sometimes his grave. Semiramis buried Ninus in her palace (*Diodor.* ii. 7); and Persepolis was at once the residence and the burial-place of the Persian kings: such therefore we may conclude was the character of the Asiatic Memmonia.

I am conscious that this slight sketch has not done full justice to the arguments of a writer who is no less distinguished by his eloquence than by his learning: yet I hope it will have enabled the reader to understand and enter into his opinions. I must now proceed to assign some reasons which prevent me from assenting to his hypothesis, and lead me to prefer a different view of the subject. The sum of his reasoning amounts to this: the supposition that the Greek legend of Memnon was founded on a historical basis leaves the most essential of its features, the death of the hero, and the rites with which he was honoured, wholly unexplained; whereas the hypothesis just stated accounts satisfactorily for these and all the other circumstances of the case. I shall first say why I am not satisfied with this explanation, and shall then attempt to show that the one I adopt is consistent with all the conditions of the question.

And in the first place I must express my doubts as to the extent which Mr. Jacobs attributes to the worship of the Ethio-

pian god or hero in Asia, as indicated by the Memnonia. Instead of presuming that these monuments once existed in far greater numbers than the fragments of ancient history disclose to us, I am inclined to suspect that we hear of more than ever existed. I collect from a passage in Mr. J.'s essay that Jablonski entertained the same opinion: but as I have not been able to meet with that author's *Syntagma de Memnone*, I do not know on what arguments he founded it. To me the Memnonia reported to exist at Ecbatana and at Susa seem very extraordinary, even on Mr. J.'s hypothesis; and the closer they are examined the more suspicious do they appear. As to the former of these capitals, what Hyginus attributes to Memnon is the same work which Herodotus ascribes to Deioeces. From the notice this historian takes of the Memnonian Susa, it seems fair to conclude that he had never heard of any connexion between Memnon and Ecbatana; and it is not very probable that such a report, if it had existed in his day, should have escaped him and have reached Hyginus. On the other hand, when it was once known that Memnon had founded Susa, or at least built the palace there, it was quite in the spirit of Greek invention to extend the story to the Median metropolis. I do not therefore even think it necessary to have recourse to the Syrian Ecbatana, though this, which lay near the river Belæus and the Memnonium mentioned by Josephus, and, as it would seem, alluded to by Oppian, might certainly, as Mr. Jacobs himself admits, have been confounded with the Median.* On the other hand, the legend that Memnon dwelt at Susa appears to be confirmed by the authority of Herodotus, who repeatedly adds the epithet Memnonian to the name of the city or the palace. But it is still very questionable whether we ought to look upon this as the record of an ancient tradition. I lay no stress on the fact that Susa was founded by Darius Hystaspis,† because this statement, though probably authentic, needs not to

* Plin. N. H. v. 19. Promontorium Carmelum et in monte oppidum eodem nomine quondam Ecbatana dictum. Juxta Getta, Jebba: rivus Pagida sive Belus. It was the residence of the Babylonian Jews. Joseph. Vit. 6.

† Plin. N. H. vi. 27. In Susiana vetus regia Persarum Susa a Dario Hystaspis filio condita.

be taken so literally as to exclude the previous existence of a town or a temple on the same site. But Diodorus (i. 46) relates that the Persians were said to have built or adorned the famous palaces in Persepolis, and Susa, and Media, with the treasures which they carried away from Egypt, and with the aid of Egyptian artists. I see no reason for questioning this fact, except with regard to the treasure; and I conceive that this is not only the most probable explanation of the Egyptian character, which, as Mr. Jacobs infers from the report of Diodorus, was visible in the buildings at Susa and Persepolis, but that it also satisfactorily accounts for the legend which had become prevalent among the Greeks in the time of Herodotus, that Susa was the abode of Memnon. I am therefore strongly inclined to strike both Ecbatana and Susa out of the list of the original Memnonia.

This however is but a secondary question. My chief objection to Mr. Jacobs's hypothesis is, that it implies either a state of things which is not only attested by no evidence, but at variance with all that we know of ancient history, or else a particular fact equally unattested and intrinsically improbable. If Memnon was an Egyptian god whose worship passed from his own country into Asia, it was undoubtedly spread by human means: and the question is, Who were its carriers? It is to be regretted that Mr. Jacobs has not been so explicit on this point as was necessary to secure the reader from the danger of misunderstanding him. For it is not from a direct assertion, but from rather vague allusions and comparisons, that we collect the precise nature of his opinion. After mentioning that the ancient religions migrated with mankind from the east toward the west, and remarking the connexion between ancient commerce and devotion, that "the merchant journeyed from one sea to another under the guidance and protection of his gods," he proceeds to illustrate his meaning, in the passage above quoted, by the examples of Bacchus and Serapis, Hercules and Astarte, which he immediately applies to the worship of Amenophis, but without expressly saying that it was propagated by commerce or by any other means. Since however he alludes to commercial intercourse, and to no other channel

of communication, and at the outset combats the opinion that Memnon was a conqueror, and the Memnonia trophies of his victories, we must conclude that he conceives the Egyptian worship to have been diffused over Asia, like that of Hercules and Venus, by a peaceable traffic. But which was the people that took the active part in this traffic? This is the question on which everything seems to me to depend, and for which nevertheless I can find no distinct answer in Mr. J.'s essay. Still there are only two suppositions that can be made on this subject: and each of them raises a difficulty in my mind which appears to me insurmountable. The nation whose commerce this form of religion followed in its progress, was either the Egyptians themselves, or some other. Nothing certainly can be imagined more likely than that Egyptians should have planted the worship of one of their tutelary gods in the countries they traversed. But in what period do we hear of a commerce in which the Egyptians were active? of fleets and caravans conducted by Egyptian merchants? This is something which must be proved before it can ever be made the foundation of a tenable hypothesis. It implies a state of things not only attested by no evidence, but at variance with all that we know of ancient history, which informs us that except for some temporary conquests, or in consequence of a forced migration, the Egyptians before the age of the Ptolemies never left their native land. On the other hand, notwithstanding our uncertainty about the dates of the Phœnician colonies and of their commercial expeditions, their high antiquity is sufficiently probable and well attested to be readily admitted in the discussion of any hypothesis. But we have the strongest proof of which any negative assertion is capable, that they did not spread the worship of Amenophis over Asia, because we meet with no trace of that worship in any of their known settlements, but with others apparently differing from it both in nature and in name. If there was ever room for such a being as Amenophis in the Phœnician mythology, it seems to have been very early filled up by another person of kindred attributes, by their Thammuz or Adonis. Which of these two suppositions expresses Mr. J.'s meaning, I

cannot even conjecture : but that he must adopt one or the other, and cannot have had any third people in his view, as the instruments of diffusing the worship of Amenophis, seems certain : but in neither case can I reconcile his hypothesis with history or analogy : it implies a fact wholly unattested, and intrinsically improbable.

For these reasons I must at least suspend my assent to it until the difficulties I have stated shall have been removed.

The hypothesis I am about to propose can scarcely claim the merit of originality ; for the steps which led me to it had been already taken, all but the last. Among others Buttman, in the second volume of his *Mythologus*,* has brought together a number of facts and observations, which might have been expected to have led him to the same conclusion ; and perhaps they would have done so, if he had not been dazzled by the captivating form into which Mr. Jacobs has wrought his hypothesis, so that in another place† he thinks it scarcely possible to withhold assent from it. In the essay on the Minyæ Buttman's object is to render it probable that Minyas, the ancient king of Orchomenus, is a person of exactly the same mythical character with the Indian Menu, the Egyptian Menes, the Phrygian Men or Manes, and the Cretan Minos, with whom the history of their respective countries begins, and he compares the Mannus of the Germans (*Tacit. Germ. 2*), the son of the god Tuisco, who was celebrated in the ancient songs of the nation. To this list I would add the conquering hero Memnon. I scarcely imagine that any reader will be startled by the slight variation in the form of his name from that of the above-mentioned persons : but should this be the case, it will be sufficient to remember that Memnon is only a dilatation of Menon, and then to remark that in a Greek author quoted by Pliny the old king of Egypt occurs under the latter name.‡ Indeed in this respect my

* Vol. ii. Ueber die Minyæ der ältesten Zeit, pp. 232—241.

† i. p. 199.

‡ There can be no doubt, I should think, about the person meant. N. H. vii. 56. Anticlides in Aegypto invenisse (litteras) quemdam nomine Menona tradit xv. annis ante Phoroneum antiquissimum Græciæ regem.—Anticlides might well conclude that Menes was the inventor of letters, since his son Athothis wrote books on anatomy.

hypothesis seems to have a considerable advantage over Mr. J.'s. For the real audible name of the Egyptian god or hero whom he seeks to identify with Memnon was not Amenophis, but Phame-noph,* though the first letter is only the article: and the corruption of this word into Memnon is certainly much less simple and natural than the other. Beside this there is a resemblance between the character of Memnon and some of the persons with whom I compare him, sufficiently close at least to raise a presumption in favour of my conjecture. The Phrygians, as we read in Pausanias, viewed Memnon as a great conqueror, and as the maker of the highway that passed through their country. On the other hand, Plutarch observes that among the Phrygians all brilliant and wonderful works are called Manie, because Manis, one of their ancient kings, whom some name Masdes, was a brave and powerful man in his day: and Plutarch himself compares this hero with Semiramis and Sesostris.† So too what is reported of the first king of Egypt agrees extremely well with the general outline of Memnon's history. I lay no stress on the coincidence between Menes and Osiris, though it seems very clear that the actions of the one are attributed to the other.‡ But Menes is represented

Syneell. i. 101. Ἄθωθις—οὗ φέρονται βίβλοι ἀνατομικαί, ἰατρὸς γὰρ ἦν. He also built the palace at Memphis. It is proper to observe that the same character and similar actions are attributed to the second king of the third dynasty, p. 106. Σέσορ-θος ὅς Ἀσκληπίος παρὰ Αἰγυπτίοις ἐκλήθη διὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν. οὗτος καὶ τὴν ἐνὰ ξιστῶν λίθων οἰκοδομήν εὐρατο. ἀλλὰ καὶ γραφῆς ἐπεμελήθη. Again the second king of the fourth dynasty, Suphis, emulates his predecessors by building a pyramid and writing a book: Pliny, N. H. vi.: Aethiopia clara et potens, etiam usque ad Trojana bella Memnone regnante.

* One of the inscriptions begins ἐκλυον ἀδῆσαντος ἐγὼ Πόπλιος Βαλβίνος φωνιάς τὰς θείας Μέμνονος ἢ Φαμένωφ.

† De Is. et Os. 24. μεγάλα μὲν ὑμνοῦνται πράξεις ἐν Ἀσσυρίοις Σεμιράμιος, μεγάλα δὲ αἱ Σεσώστριος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. Φρύγες δὲ μέχρι τῶν τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ θαυμαστὰ τῶν ἔργων Μανικά καλοῦσι, ἐνὰ τὸ Μάνιν τινα τῶν πάλαι βασιλείων ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ἔννατον γενέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὅν ἐπινοῦν Μάσδην καλοῦσι. The latter name reminds us of the Persian Ormuzd or Oromasdes, which is written by oriental scholars, Ahurō Mazdâ: the last word is an epithet signifying *great*.

‡ Plutarch, De Is. et Os. c. 8, mentions the story of the curses recorded at Thebes, κατὰ Μείνιος τοῦ βασιλέως ὅς πρῶτος Αἰγυπτίους τῆς ἀπλούτου καὶ ἀχρημάτου καὶ λιτῆς ἀπὸ πλάξε διαίτης. c. 13 he says, βασιλεύοντα δ' Ὅσιον Αἰγυπτίους μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπόρου βιον καὶ θηριώδους ἀπαλλάξαι, καρπούς τε δειξάντα καὶ νόμους θέμενον αὐτοῖς καὶ θεοὺς δειξάντα [δειδάξαντα] τιμᾶν· ἕστερον δὲ γῆν πᾶσαν ἡμεροῦμενον ἐπελθεῖν Diodorus, i. 45, relates of Menas, καταδείξει τοῖς λαοῖς θεοὺς τε σίβεσθαι καὶ θυσίας

not merely as a founder of religious institutions, and the author of a higher degree of civilization, but also as a conqueror, who gained great renown by an expedition which he led into foreign lands.* It may therefore be fairly assumed that a name which a Greek would naturally form into Memnon was long before the time of Homer celebrated in the west of Asia as that of a hero who had come from the East, and had achieved many glorious exploits; and this very simple supposition, if it may not rather be termed a well-attested fact, appears to me quite sufficient to explain every feature in the Greek legend of Memnon. This I shall proceed to show by analysing the legend and successively examining its elements. These are, the parentage of Memnon, his extraordinary beauty, his premature death, his funeral honours.

As to the first point I may be very brief, because it raises no difficulty, at least none that is peculiar to my hypothesis. To say that Memnon came out of the distant East was equivalent to calling him an Ethiopian, and no parent could be assigned to him more befitting his beauty and his illustrious deeds than the goddess of the morning. It was not an arbitrary fiction, but a mythological deduction, as legitimate as that which determined the lineage of Achilles and Æneas. The beauty of Memnon may at first sight appear a necessary result of his birth: since the rosy-fingered goddess could bear none but comely children. It is however quite as probable that the beauty of the hero was the earlier feature, and contributed to fix the story of his birth. The sense of beauty, which gradually developed itself among the Greeks in

ἐπιτελεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις παρατίθεσθαι τραπέζας καὶ κλίνας, καὶ στρωμνῇ πολυτελεῖ χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὸ σύνολον τρυφήν καὶ πολυτελεῖ βίον εἰσηγήσασθαι. When we compare these descriptions, and remember the *ὑπερόριος στρατεία* of Menes, it is difficult to approve of Wyttenbach's criticism, who objects to Squire's opinion that Menes and Osiris were one and the same person. "Atqui diversae sunt res, diversae traditiones. Menes Aegyptios primus a simplici et frugali victu ad lautiores delicatiorumque convertit, at Osiris a vita inopi et ferina ad frugum agrisque culturam ac Deorum cultum eos traduxit." As if luxury and frugality were not relative terms. Then he adds a chronological argument: *et omnino hic illo antiquior celebratur.*

* Syncell. p. 102 (Bonn). *Μετὰ νέκυας καὶ τοὺς ἡμιθεοὺς πρώτην δυναστείαν καταριθμοῦσι βασιλέων ὀκτώ. ὧν γέγονε Μήνης, ὃς διασήμως αὐτῶν ἠγήσατο—Μήνης, ὃν Ἡρόδοτος Μῆνα ὠνόμασεν.—οὗτος ὑπερόριον στρατείαν ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐνδοξος ἐκρίθη. ὑπὸ δὲ ἵπποποτάμου ἠρπάσθη.* It is remarkable that he too comes to an untimely end.

so many directions, manifested itself in the attention paid to the human form, perhaps before they had begun to attempt even the rudest imitation of it. It is a characteristic tradition, even if it should not be literally true, that Cypselus, the ancient king of Arcadia, instituted a contest for the palm of female beauty on the Alpheus.* The antiquity of similar contests at Tenedos and Lesbos was probably very great.† The scholiast on Il. ix. 129 imagined that the poet alluded to that in the latter island, which was held in the precincts of the temple of Juno.‡ And I am inclined to suspect that the legend of the rival goddesses may have owed its origin to this local usage. The Homeric poems contain abundant evidence that beauty and valour were attributes equally essential to the idea of a perfect hero. Achilles surpasses all the other Greeks equally in both.§ At the same time it is necessary to distinguish this from other cases, in which the beauty ascribed to a mythical person was probably connected with a totally different train of associations. The beauty of Hylas and Hyacinthus, and perhaps that of Pelops and Endymion,|| belongs to a separate head, and has nothing in common with that of Achilles. But that of Pelus, of Bellerophon, of Jason, and Theseus,¶ and other similar heroes, may be properly considered as an early indication of the national turn of mind. And this is confirmed by the importance which the Lacedæmonians, who retained the old Greek character with so few refinements, attached to this quality.** If the Ethiopians paid exclusive regard to it in the election of their

* Nieſias ἐν τοῖς Ἀρκαδικοῖς, Athen. xiii. p. 609. The contest took place at the festival of the Eleusinian Ceres. Another is mentioned in the same page, on the authority of Theophrastus, among the Eleans for the other sex. On comparing this passage with what is said of the Elean contest in p. 565, F., we are led to suspect that the object in all these contests was to select the most comely persons for the service of the deity.

† Theophrastus ap. Athen. xiii. p. 610.

‡ παρὰ Λεσβίοις ἀγὼν ἄγεται κάλλους γυναικῶν ἐν τῷ τῆς Ἥρας τιμένει λεγόμενος Καλλιστεία.

§ Il. ii. 674.

|| Athen. xiii. p. 564.

¶ About Theseus, see Athen. xiii. p. 601.

** Heraclides Lembus ap. Athen. p. 566. [κατὰ τὴν Σπάρτην θαυμάζεται μᾶλλον ὁ κάλλιστος, καὶ γυνὴ ἢ καλλίστη.

kings, we read that Archidamus was fined by the ephors for preferring a rich wife to one who was more likely to bear princes worthy of Sparta,* and we know what a difficulty the oracle threw into the way of Agesilaus in mounting the throne. If therefore Memnon was a great warrior, it followed almost of course that he was a person of surpassing beauty.

But the third feature in the legend of Memnon seems to be that which Mr. J. found most difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that he was a real conqueror; and as this objection would apply with equal force to the supposition of his having been an imaginary one, I must endeavour to remove it. The premature death of Memnon may I conceive be satisfactorily accounted for by two causes, which, though distinct from each other, may have had an equal share in the formation of the legend. In the first place it must be remarked, that it is not owing to a merely accidental association of ideas that all the qualities of an accomplished hero, the highest fulness of strength, fleetness, beauty, and courage, meet to adorn the character of Achilles, who is to be cut off in his prime. This cannot be denied, even by one who should contend that Homer was only relating a fact, and that Achilles may be considered as much a historical person as Brasidas. For still it will be certain that it could be only by the choice and design of the poet that the hero's untimely death is represented as the price which he has to pay for his glory.† Hence it is clear that his fate is nothing more than the appropriate epical expression for the same feeling which afterwards breaks out in the plaintive strains of the lyric muse, the feeling of sadness produced by the shortness and uncertainty of life, by the inflexible destiny which contracted all human enjoyments within a narrow span, and often embittered it with sorrow, often snatched away the most precious gifts of nature and fortune, almost before the possessor had time to taste them. That this motive entered into the compo-

* ἐπιλέγοντας ὅτι βασιλίσκουσ ἀντι βασιλέων τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις γεννᾶν προαιρεῖται.

† II. XVIII. 95—121. ὡς καὶ ἐγὼν, εἰ δὴ μοι ὁμοίη μοῖρα τέτυκται, Κείσομ', ἔπει κε θάνω· νῦν δὲ κλέεσ ἐσθλὸν ἀροίμην.

sition of the legend of Memnon seems the more probable, because he is slain by Achilles, and because it is by his hand that Nestor is bereaved of the youthful Antilochus.

It was not however only the high degree of beauty and valour attributed to Memnon that may have given this turn to the legend; it might be very naturally suggested by his character as a conqueror. For he was a conqueror of ancient times: his greatness had passed away; his name was preserved only by a faint echo of his old renown; a new generation had sprung up to occupy the scene of his exploits; what monument of him could be found there but his tomb? That this was a natural train of thought appears to me sufficiently proved by what Sallust says of the African legend about Hercules, who was believed, after leading a vast army out of the East to the conquest of the Western world, to have died in Spain.* I shall presently have occasion to mention what I conceive to be another parallel instance. But without dwelling on this point, it might be enough to say that, as there can be no doubt that from the earliest times the plains of Asia were covered with numberless barrows, raised by the various tribes who had contended for the possession of the country, if the name of Memnon was celebrated there, it would have been scarcely possible that it should not have been connected with some of these monuments even before the Trojan war. Wherever a nameless sepulchre was found, there was probably a tale to account for it: just as in all parts of Peloponnesus, but especially in Laconia, the people showed great barrows which they called the graves of the Phrygians who accompanied Pelops on his famous expedition.† Yet those Phrygians were conquerors. And must we here have recourse to the hypothesis of an Egyptian worship? It would surely not be a very extravagant conjecture, that among those

* Jug. 18—postquam in Hispania Hercules, sicut Afri putant, interiit, exercitus ejus compositus ex variis gentibus, amisso duce ac passim multis, sibi quisque, imperium petentibus, brevi dilabitur. Ex eo numero Medi, Persae, et Armeni, navibus in Africam transvecti proximos nostro mari locos occupavere. So that Hercules must have come from Susa and Ecbatana. Pliny, N. H. v. 8: Pharusii quondam Persae comites fuisse dicuntur Herculis ad Hesperidas tendentis.

† Athen. p. 625, F. ἴδους ἂν καὶ τῆς Πελοποννήσου πανταχοῦ, μάλιστα δ' ἐν Λακεδαίμονι χόματα μεγάλα ἃ καλοῦσι τάφους τῶν μετὰ Πέλοπος Φρυγῶν.

numerous barrows which, as Strabo informs us,* were in his day shown almost all over Asia, and called by the name of Semiramis, some at least passed among the natives for her tombs. This however, I must acknowledge, is an argument which would drop out of my hands, if any one should choose to deny that Semiramis had anything to do with the Assyrian dominion, and should contend that she is only another representative of the Egyptian worship, which Mr. J. supposes to have prevailed throughout Asia until it was compelled to give way to the Persian arms.† The barrow on the Æsepus was apparently distinguished by the neighbourhood of Troy, and by being embosomed in a grove sacred to the River Nymphs.‡ As to the story of the birds, by which Mr. J. thinks his hypothesis is confirmed, I can only say that I can discover no ground for assuming that the Memnonides were the original type after which all the other animals of the same class, the birds of Diomedæ, of Meleager, of Achilles,§ were invented, or that any of these legends were founded on anything more than observations more or less correct on the habits of birds in particular places, which were naturally connected with local legends. Any one who reads the stories Pliny has collected in the tenth book of his history about birds of passage will very easily understand what ample materials the popular imagination might find in them.||

* xvi. p. 737. *καὶ τῆς Σεμιράμιδος, χωρὶς τῶν ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἔργων, πολλά ἐὲ καὶ ἀλλὰ κατὰ πᾶσαν γῆν σχεδὸν εἰκνυται, ὅση τῆς ἠπείρου ταύτης ἐστὶ, τὰ τε χώματα, ἃ δὲ καλοῦσι Σεμιράμιδος, καὶ τείχη, κ. τ. λ.*

† Note, p. 27. "The triumph of the Persian arms put an end to the Egyptian worship in Asia, and the sepulchral palaces of Memnon were converted into residences of kings."

‡ Quint. Calab. ii. 588. *ἤχι τε Νυμφῶν καλλιπλομένων πέλει ἄλσος Καλὸν, ὃ δὲ μετόπισθε μακρὸν περὶ σῆμ' ἐβάλλοντο Αἰσηποῖο θύγατραι, ἄδην πεπυκασμένον ἕλγ Παντοίγ*

§ On the transformation of Diomedæ's companions into birds, Strab. vi. p. 284. On the Meleagridæ, Pliny, N. H. x. 38. *Simili modo pugnanti Meleagrides in Bœotia.*—Meleagri tumulus nobilis. Ælian, H. A. iv. 42. In Philostratus, Heroic. p. 746, the birds perform the same office at the temple of Achilles as at the tomb of Memnon: *κοσμοῦντας αὐτῷ τὸ ἄλσος τῷ τε ἀνέμῳ τῶν πτερῶν, καὶ ταῖς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ράνισι.*

|| To select one specimen: c. 31. *Pythonos comen vocant in Asia patentibus campis, ubi congregatæ (ciconiæ) inter se commurmurant, eamque quæ novissime advenit, lacerant.* Such congregations would most frequently take place, or at least would attract most attention, on solitary hillocks. The Seleucides mentioned in c. 39 seem to have owed their name to Greek flattery.

It will not be irrelevant, before we quit this part of the subject, to remark that, though Mr. J.'s reflections on the gloomy character of the Egyptian worship, and the contrast between it and the Greek are in general very just, still there is a very important branch of the Greek religion to which they are not applicable, and this is, the rites celebrated in honour of the dead. These rites were necessarily of a funereal character, and all festivals of which they formed a part presented a dark as well as a light side.* The original distinction between the worship of the gods and that of the heroes was never effaced, though it was sometimes difficult to ascertain which was most properly due, as in the cases of Hercules, Achilles, Diomedes, and others.† Though I should hesitate very

* See the description of the Hyacinthia in Athen. p. 139. Philostratus, Heroic. p. 740, observes, τὰ μὲν Κορινθίων ἐπὶ Μελικέρτῃ . . . καὶ ὑπόσα οἱ αὐτοὶ ἑρῶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς Μηδείας παισίν—θρήνην εἰκασται τελεστικῶν τε καὶ ἐνθέων.

† Paus. ii. 10, 1. Φαῖστον ἐν Σικυωνίᾳ λέγουσιν ἰλθόντα καταλαβεῖν Πρακλεῖ σφᾶς ὡς ἥρωι ἐναγίζοντας· οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο δρᾶν οὐδὲν ὁ Φ. τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς θεῶν ἴθύνειν.—Achilles received divine honours at Olbia (at least if Dion. Chr. ii. p. 80, ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεός, is to be taken literally) and at Astypalæa: Cic. De N. D. iii. 18, Achillem Astypalæenses insulam sanctissime colunt; qui si deus est, et Orpheus et Rhesus dii sunt, Musa matre nati. At Ilium he seems to have received the honours both of a god and a hero: Philostr. Her. [20] p. 741. The passage is worth transcribing, because it illustrates better perhaps than any other the distinction between the two rites, and is in this respect equally valuable, whatever opinion we may hold as to the writer's authority. He relates that in ancient times before the Persian invasion, in compliance with the injunction of the oracle of Dodona, Θεσσαλοὺς ἐς Τροίαν πλέοντας θύειν ὅσα ἔτη τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ καὶ σφάττειν τὰ μὲν ὡς θεῶν, τὰ δὲ ὡς ἐν μοίρᾳ τῶν κειμένων. The Thessalians had every year sent a ship to Troy, with black sails, having on board fourteen θεῶροι and two bulls, one white and the other black. The messengers on their arrival at the tomb of Achilles ἐρόμοις ἐρρυθμισμένοις ξυνηλάαζον, ἀνακαλυπνύοντες τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα, στεφανιάσαντες δὲ τὴν κορυφὴν τοῦ κολωνοῦ, καὶ βόθρους ἐπ' αὐτῇ ὀρύξαντες, τὸν ταύρον τὸν μέλανα ὡς τεθνεῶτι ἔσφαττον· ἐκάλουν δὲ καὶ τὸν Πάτροκλον ἐπὶ τὴν δαῖτα . . . ἐντεμόντες δὲ καὶ ἐναγίσαντες κατέβαινον ἐπὶ τὴν ναῦν ἠδῆ, καὶ θύσαντες ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ τὸν ἕτερον τῶν ταύρων Ἀχιλλεῖ πάλιν, κανοῦ τ' ἐναρξάμενοι καὶ σπλάγγων ἐπ' ἐκείνῃ τῇ θυσίᾳ, ἔθουον γὰρ τὴν θυσίαν ταύτην ὡς θεῶν, πρὶ ὄρθρον ἀπέπλεον ἀπάγοντες τὸ ἱερεῖον, ὡς μὴ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ ἐνοχλοῦντο. He then proceeds to relate that these rites have been neglected, and Thessaly in consequence having been afflicted with a drought, and an oracle bidding them τιμᾶν τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα ὡς θεῖμι, ἃ μὲν ὡς θεῶν ἐνόμιζον, ἀφείλον τῶν ἐρωμένων ἐξηγοῦμενοι ταύτην τὸ ὡς θεῖμις, ἐνόμιζον δ' ὡς τεθνεῶτι. Compare Heroic. p. 707 and the descriptions of Pausanias, x. 4, 10, iii. 19, 3; Plutarch, Qu. Rom. 34. Xenophanes is said to have been consulted by the people of Elea whether they ought to sacrifice to Leucothea and to bewail her: the philosopher advised them εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δ' ἄνθρωπον μὴ θύειν. Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23. Plutarch (De Is. et Os. c. 70) places the scene of the story in Egypt, and gives the speech of X. a different turn: εἰ θεοὺς νομίζουσι μὴ θρηνεῖν, εἰ δὲ θρηνοῦσι θεοὺς μὴ νομίζουσι.—The origin of the confusion above exem-

much to deduce the whole of the Greek religion, as some ancient and modern writers have done, from this source, still I as little see the necessity of attributing an oriental origin to such rites, when we meet with them among the Greeks. Homer's description of the obsequies of Patroclus, though the poet strives to soften the ferocity of the act, by leading us to view it as a measure of the love of the hero for his deceased friend, when combined with other ancient legends, seems to imply that the Scythian practice described by Herodotus, of sacrificing human victims together with other animals at the tombs of their dead kings, was not unknown to the Greeks of the heroic age.* The inference I draw from this remark

plified between divine and heroic honours may in general be accounted for by the well-known fact, that in numberless instances a god was transformed by a legend, which laid hold of one of his epithets as the name of a distinct person, into a mortal hero. (See Mueller, *Prolegomena* z. e. w. M. p. 271, foll.) Whether a hero (before the Macedonian period) was ever really sublimated by the mere enthusiasm of his adorers into a god is very doubtful; so that a great part of Cotta's argumentation becomes a mere sciomachy. It must however be admitted that we find the belief in the general possibility of such an apotheosis prevailing very early among the Greeks. It was perhaps partly founded on the language of the *Odyssey* (xi. 601 and iv. 561), which however admits of a different construction, and partly on the fact that in different places (and sometimes it would seem in the same place) both kinds of rites were actually performed in honour of the same person. Pindar, *Nem.* x. 11, says: *Διομήδεα δ' ἄμβροτον ξανθά ποτε Γλαυκῶπις ἔθηκε θεόν* (Compare the quotation from Polemo in the Schol.). This was after the example of Menelaus. Hesiod (*Pausan.* 1. 43, 1), among his other innovations, reported *Ἰφίγείαν οὐκ ἀποθανεῖν, γνῶμη δὲ Ἀρτέμιδος Ἐκάτην εἶναι*. Empedocles indeed speaks of a change from the human to the divine nature as the ordinary effect of certain religious observances. But this was manifestly a philosophical or mystic doctrine wholly unknown to the ancient Greeks, though Professor Disson (*Pindar, Comm.* p. 653) seems to view it in a different light. "Ne Empedocles quidem philosophus deos ex his animabus fieri dicens plane inania finxit." Yet in the very passage he refers to, the distinction between the doctrine of Emp. and the old Greek theology appears very clearly, when we consider how Pindar expresses the same thing. Emp. (*Sturz.* v. 407—9) says: *εἰς δὲ τέλος μάντιες τε καὶ ὕμνοπόλοι καὶ ἰητροί, Καὶ πρόμοι ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισι πέλονται, Ἐνθεν ἀναβλάστωσι θεοὶ τιμῆσι φέριστοι*. Pindar merely says: *Οἴσι δὲ Φερσεφόνα ποινὰν παλαιοῦ πένθεος δέξεται, ἐς τὸν ὑπερθεὸν ἄλιον κείνων ἐνάτην ἔτει ἀντιδοῖ ψυχὰς πάλιν. ἐκ τῶν βασιλῆς ἀγανοὶ καὶ σθένη κραιπνοὶ σοφία τε μέγιστοι ἄνδρες αὖξοντ'· ἐς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἥρωες ἀγνοὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων καλεῦνται*. *Thren.* 4. Indeed it can scarcely be imagined that Empedocles meant to express any commonly-received doctrine, since he spoke of himself as a god in his life-time: *ἐγὼ δ' ἡμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκ ἔτι θνητὸς Πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετμήνος, ὡσπερ ἔοικε.* v. 367. Aristotle, or some one for him, says in his apology (*Athen.* p. 697), *οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε Ἐρμεία θύειν ὡς ἀθανάτω προαιρούμενος ὡς θνήτῳ μνήμα κατεσκεύαζον, καὶ ἀθανατίζειν τὴν φύσιν βουλόμενος ἐπιταφίους ἂν τιμαῖς ἐκόσμησα*.

* Quintus, iii. 680, describes a similar sacrifice at the funeral of Achilles, which he probably took from Arctinus.

is, that, even if it could be proved that mournful rites had once been performed at the grave of Memnon on the Δ eseopus, Mr. J.'s hypothesis would gain nothing by the admission.

I must here digress for a moment to meet an objection which may possibly occur to some readers, who have been led to consider it as an unquestionable truth, that hero-worship was unknown to Homer, and may therefore have been startled by the foregoing observation. Mr. Mitford says (Chap. II. Sect. 1), "Nor is there found in Homer any mention of hero-worship, or divine honours paid to men deceased, which became afterward so common." This is an unfortunate mode of expression, since it must in general have the effect of preventing the reader from suspecting the real state of the case. It is as if one should say: Saint-worship, or divine honours paid to men deceased, is a practice of which we find no mention in the writings of the Apostles. A Greek theologian would not only have denied that hero-worship was the same thing with divine honours paid to men deceased, but would have been able to point out a broad visible distinction between the honours paid to heroes and those paid to the gods, which must have prevented even the vulgar from confounding them. Hero-worship consisted in the repetition of certain funeral ceremonies, and may be said to have existed as soon as such repetitions began to be practised. At what period this practice arose is certainly a disputable question. Homer does not expressly mention it; nor does the word *hero* with him signify a person who was the object of it. But since his poems exhibit the feelings and opinions on which the practice was grounded in full force, there is strong reason, independently of those which might be deduced from the old Italian religion, to believe that it existed in the age they refer to, though it undoubtedly underwent many modifications both as to its form and its objects, before it became the hero-worship which we find prevailing in the historical period.

But to return to the subject. I find all the leading features in the Greek legend of Memnon intimately connected together, and all springing naturally out of a single cause, the tradition of the presence of a great eastern warrior and conqueror in the west of

Asia. If I should have succeeded in establishing this point, my inquiry would be here properly at an end. For this conclusion cannot be at all affected by the aspect which the legend presents among a different people, and least of all by the allusions made by ancient writers to the honours which Memnon received in Syria. In the first place, considering the proximity of Egypt and Syria, and the early and frequent intercourse between the two countries, we might admit the probability of the supposition that the Egyptian Memnon was really worshipped in the places of which Josephus and Simonides spoke, and to which Oppian alludes, without being led to any further conclusion about the Memnonium on the Æsepus. But on the other hand, as we do not know what was the Syrian name of the person whose monument and worship the Greeks found there, we may with equal probability suppose that they applied the name of Memnon, with which they were familiar, to some object of Syrian devotion which was foreign to them, but which suggested the comparison by its history, attributes, or rites. And more particularly I conceive that the Egyptian Maneros, who presents many points of resemblance, on the one side to Memnon, and on the other to the Syrian Adonis, might have served as the middle term in such a comparison.* At all events these instances cannot suffice to establish that gigantic system of Memnonian worship, by which Mr. J.'s imagination connects Ilium with Susa and Ecbatana.

As it was the resemblance already pointed out by others between the names and characters of Menu, Menes, Minos, &c. that led me to the view here taken of the Greek Memnon, so it may perhaps receive some additional recommendation from a comparison between the latter and one of the most celebrated of the former

* He was the only son of old Menes (Herod. ii. 79), as, according to Jablonski, Opusc. i. p. 178, his name imports. He was cut off like his father by an untimely death: though Herodotus does not say that he was swallowed by a hippopotamus. In Hesychius, *Μανέρως*, Jablonski proposes to read *θεολογήσαι*. But since Hesych. adds *καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πᾶσιν ἀνά στόμα γενέσθαι*, and Pollux says, iv. 54, *Αἰγυπτίοις μὲν ὁ Μανέρως γεωργίας εὐρετής, Μουσῶν μαθητής, Λιτυέρσης δὲ Φρυζίν*, and again, i. 38, *λίνοσ καὶ λιτυέρσης σκαπανέων ὄδαὶ καὶ γεωργῶν*, I am led to conjecture *γεωργῆσαι*. At all events Wytttenbach should have considered this before he joined in the outcry against the luxury introduced by Menes.

personages, the Cretan lawgiver. As such Minos certainly reminds us much more of the Indian and Egyptian sages. Indeed his connexion with the latter appears much closer than it really was, in the legends of the Egyptian priesthood or their Greek admirers. For like the Egyptian Memnon he is made to build a labyrinth, which has now vanished again into air:* and on the other hand, Sesostris, not content with conquering all Asia, subdues the greater part of the Cyclades, like Minos, and concludes his expedition in the Minoan period of nine years.† But Minos also resembles Memnon in two main points, which are not like the former of late invention: in the beauty of his person, and in his violent death, which snatches him away at the height of his power and glory. As to the beauty of Minos, I need only mention his adventure with the traitress Scylla.‡ But what renders this legend remarkable is, that it occurs again in a different scene, and with different persons. In the expedition of Amphitryon against the Taphians, Comætho is seduced, like Scylla, to cut off the fated golden hair from the head of her father Pterelaus.§ According to Apollodorus the seducer on this occasion was Amphitryon himself: but according to another version it was his ally Cephalus.|| And Cephalus is beloved by Aurora, as his wife Procris must have been by Minos, since he gave her the hound which was alone capable of overtaking the Cadmean fox.¶ These coincidences are singular, though they may possibly be accidental. The death of Minos in Sicily seems to be a legend of similar import with that of the death of Hercules in Spain, though perhaps it admits of a more precise interpretation, into which however it would be unseasonable to enter here.

* Hoeck, Kreta, i. p. 62, has shown very satisfactorily that the Cretan labyrinth is a late fabrication.

† Diodor. i. 55. *τὴν λοιπὴν Ἀσίαν ἅπασαν ὑπήκοον ἐποιήσατο καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων τὰς πλείστας, — συντελείσας τὴν στρατείαν ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐννέα.*

‡ Hence Nomus, xxv. 165, surrounds Minos with a host of Cupids, and adds, *Μίνως μὲν πολίπορθος ἐψ̄ ποτε κάλλει γυμνῷ Ὑσμίνης τέλος εἶρε, καὶ οὐ νίκησε σιδήρω, Ἄλλα πόθῳ καὶ ἔρωτι.*

§ Apollod. ii. 4, 7. The hair of Pterelaus is of gold, that of Nisus purple (Pausan. i. 19, 4). It is the same variation which occurs about the golden fleece: see Mueller, Orchom. p. 172.

|| Tzetz. ad Lyc. 934.

¶ Apollod. ii. 4, 7.

It now only remains to add a few remarks on the origin of the tradition on which, according to the hypothesis here proposed, the legend of Memnon was founded. Buttmann has endeavoured to show that the names Menu, Menes, Minos, &c. originally signified nothing more than our word *man*, and that these mythical persons were at first only representatives of their several nations, or of mankind in general, who afterwards became kings and lawgivers.* To this view of the subject I have no objection, and would only observe that it is perfectly consistent with the early existence of a tradition, that one of these kings was a mighty conqueror who came out of the East. By what means such a tradition was connected with the name of Memnon it is scarcely possible to ascertain, and is therefore of very little use to inquire, except for the purpose of showing how such a connexion might have arisen. There are three ways in which this may be conceived to have happened. One, which would perhaps be the simplest explanation of the fact, is a migration by which the people to which the legend belonged had exchanged its earlier seats for a new country in the West. In this case the hero who represented it would assume the character of a conqueror, who had led a victorious army out of the East. And there can be no doubt that such migrations very often changed the face of Western Asia, as we are led to believe in particular with regard to the Phrygians, from the fact mentioned by Herodotus, that they were related to the Armenians; for though he expresses this by saying that the Armenians were a colony of the Phrygians,† historical analogy renders it much more probable that the latter race originally sprang from Armenia. It would however be also possible that the exploits of a foreign conqueror, who had passed through the land in ancient times, should have been transferred to a native hero. And thus the legend of Memnon may appear to attest the expedition of Osymandyas or Sesostris. But this explanation can only be adopted by

* Mythologus, ii. p. 239.

† vii. 73. See Hoeck's Kreta, i. p. 125. He produces several strong arguments, drawn partly from history and partly from geography, for his opinion that the Armenians were the ancestors of the Phrygians.

those who are satisfied as to the reality of the enterprises attributed to these conquerors, which of late has begun to be vehemently questioned. Indeed it appears that even in the last century suspicions had arisen among the learned on the subject. Marsham, in the spirit of criticism which prevailed in his age, distinguishes between the expeditions of Sesostris and Osymandyas, by what appears to him a decisive mark. He observes (Canon, p. 404) that the Bactrians are not numbered among the nations conquered by Sesostris, whereas they formed a part of the empire of Rameses, as described in the monument shown to Germanicus, or at least by the priests who interpreted it, and having afterwards rebelled were reduced to submission by the victorious arms of Osymandyas, who on this occasion made a progress through the extensive dominions acquired by Sesostris. Perizonius (*Ægypt. Orig.* p. 301) is so far from admitting the force of this argument, that on the contrary he believes the conquests of Sesostris or Rameses (whom he considers as the same person) to have been greatly exaggerated both in Diodorus and Tacitus: and he suspects (p. 306) that Sesostris was no other than Osymandyas. He is however willing to receive his expedition as a historical fact, provided it be confined within reasonable limits, and considered merely as a transient inroad into the heart of Asia, not as the beginning of a long period during which a great part of Asia was subject to the kings of Egypt: a state of things as to which Lipsius had already expressed his incredulity.* Freret observes "that it is impossible to doubt that Sesostris conquered a part of Asia Minor, and even carried his arms into Thrace. In all these countries he left monuments of his conquests: Herodotus assures us that he saw two of these monuments in Ionia: and he speaks of those in Thrace as one who was certain of their existence (ii. 103). The same historian informs us that Sesostris left a body of troops in Colchis, to secure this frontier of his new empire.† It is scarcely pos-

* Ad Tacit. Annal. ii. 60. De hac tanta potentia Aegyptiorum nihil legi, nec facile credam. He was perhaps equally ignorant of the vast extent of their ancient commerce.

† This is not a correct statement of what Herodotus says. He assigns no such

sible to doubt that he posted another with the same motive in Asia Minor."*

The progress of critical caution now renders it necessary to modify Freret's proposition, and will only permit us to say, that it is impossible to demonstrate that the expedition of Sesostris never took place. The authority on which it rests appears to a modern critic far from conclusive. He observes "that no really historical traces have yet been found of the expedition of Sesostris. For it is to be hoped that those strange monuments of it which the ancients saw in Palestine and Scythia, though their existence is satisfactorily proved by the testimony of Herodotus, will not be pronounced such, until some of them shall have been brought under our inspection, so that modern as well as ancient criticism may attempt to decide whether they are memorials which really demonstrate the fact, or whether the observers of those days accepted as such without suspicion an interpretation given to certain hieroglyphics by an ancient legend, or even inscriptions by which a later generation attested its belief in a legendary fact."† It must be allowed that these doubts are not arbitrary and groundless suspicions. The arguments adduced by Herodotus in favour of his conjecture about the Colehians excite our curiosity with respect to the particulars which he has passed over,‡ but cannot convince us that he did not misconstrue them; more especially as here we do not even hear of any such monuments as were said to have marked the bounds of the conqueror's march in Thrace.§ As to those which the historian himself saw in Palestine and in Ionia, besides the general objections thrown out by

motive to Sesostris, and does not even make up his mind about the cause which led the Egyptians to settle there; see II. 103.

* Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscip. vol. xlvii. p. 131.

† Buttmann, Mythologus, i. 198.

‡ How desirable would it be to know the precise grounds of the remark, *καὶ ἡ ζοὴ πᾶσα καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα ἐμπερήεις ἐστὶν ἀλλήλοισι*, and whether with respect to the latter point they were more cogent than from the specimen given they seem to have been as to the former!

§ It is not clear whether we must add, *and in Scythia*, as Buttmann appears to do in the passage quoted above. But it seems better in II. 103 to refer *τούτους* and *τούτων* to the Thracians only, since it is probable that Herodotus was speaking with reference to Greece.

Buttmann, they seem liable to doubt on some more special grounds. The relations between Egypt and Syria, which arose in an early historical period, render it impossible to draw any safe inference from Egyptian monuments in the latter country, as to events assigned to the mythical ages. And a similar objection is applicable to the authority of those sculptures seen by Herodotus in Ionia, of which he pronounces, with a confidence which we cannot share without knowing something more of his reasons, that they were monuments, not of Memnon, but of Sesostris. We learn from Xenophon that Cyrus planted some colonies of Egyptians in Asia Minor. And though this statement is suspicious from the place in which it appears, it is in substance at least confirmed by a more historical testimony.* Whether those Egyptians were, as Xenophon represents them, auxiliaries of Cræsus, or on the contrary of Cyrus himself, which would be quite consistent with the relation in which, according to Herodotus, the Persian conqueror stood to Egypt,† and even with the main fact related by Xenophon himself, in either case, if the fact of the Egyptian settlements be admitted, they seem to afford an easy explanation of the monuments seen by Herodotus in Ionia. If on any of their marches the Egyptian troops found themselves at leisure in a station near a rock, which struck them by its remarkable appearance, the thought of carving on it the image of one of their ancient heroes, who had perhaps passed by that very road, and had unquestionably conquered the country, would not be very unlikely to occur to them.

It is to be regretted that Mr. Jacobs has not thought it necessary, in discussing the legend of Memnon, to state more explicitly his opinion on this disputed question. He assumes the existence of the Colchian colony, but he seems to consider it as a

* *Cyropæd.* vii. 1, 45. The Egyptians receive several cities from Cyrus, τὰς μὲν ἄνω αἱ ἔτι καὶ νῦν πόλεις Αἰγυπτίων καλοῦνται, Λάρισσαν δὲ καὶ Κυλλήνην παρὰ Κέρην πλησίον θαλάσσης, ἃς ἔτι καὶ νῦν οἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνων ἔχουσι. This Egyptian Larissa is again mentioned in *Hell.* iii. 1, 7.

† It seems to result from *Herod.* ii. 1 and 2 that Cyrus treated Amasis as his vassal: the only argument he can produce against the assertion of the Egyptians, that Cyrus demanded their princess for his harem, is that Cambyses was not her son.

commercial, not a military one, and leaves us in doubt whether he acknowledges Sesostris as a historical person, or regards him as no less fabulous than the equally celebrated Osymandyas, whose wars he treats with as little respect as his library. But the argument on which he appears to ground his belief in this Colchian colony, whatever was its origin, is too remarkable to be passed over in silence. "Serapis was carried by Egyptians to Colchis, whence he migrated to Sinopé, and thence back to his original country." This manner of alluding to the well-known affair of Serapis strongly excited my curiosity as to the reasons which had led the author to such a conclusion. But the reference which accompanies it is merely this: *Fontenu Mémoir. de l'Acad. des inscript. t. x. Galliot, Dissert. sur le dieu Sérapis. Amsterd. 1760.* The latter work I have not yet met with; and indeed my curiosity was so fully satisfied by the perusal of the former, that perhaps I have not done all that I might to gain a sight of it. The essay of the Abbé de Fontenu is a dissertation on a medal of the younger Gordian, struck at Sinopé, and on the history of that city. It contains some observations on the medal, which are not uninteresting, beside a mixture of fable and history about the city itself, in the usual style of the French Academicians, who in treating of a place or a person seem always to proceed on the supposition that their learned colleagues never heard of the name before. But as to the main point, the matter of Serapis, all that I could find proved by the dissertation is, that, wherever an opinion has been firmly embraced, everything will be sure to make for it. The opinion which Mr. J. adopts about the deity of Sinopé is so far from being established by the Abbé, that it is only one among a great number of conjectures which he proposes as about equally probable, and is not even that which he himself prefers. All that is disputable in the question we are now considering he takes for granted. The difficulty with him is not where to find Egyptians out of Egypt, but to choose between the numerous points from which an Egyptian deity might have been brought to Sinopé. He observes that Sinopé might have received the worship of Serapis, if not immediately from the inhabitants of

the neighbouring provinces, who had it from the Syrians and Phœnicians, among whom it had been introduced from Egypt, at least from the Colchians, an Egyptian colony, with whom Sinopé was closely connected by commerce, or perhaps from the Milesians, whose colony it was, and who, having kept up an intimate connexion with Egypt ever since the time of Psammetichus, could not fail to be thoroughly versed in the Egyptian religion. This last is in fact the conjecture he prefers, so that he really lends no support whatever to Mr. J.'s hypothesis: and to remove all difficulties he subjoins: "I might add that the Athenians, whose colony the Milesians themselves were, had too great a veneration for Isis and Serapis, the knowledge of whom they had received from Egypt through Cecrops and Erechtheus, two of their kings who were natives of that country, not to have established or promoted the worship of those two Divinities on the coasts of the Euxine, where they were so powerful during a long period, and where they founded so many celebrated colonies." (p. 500.)

In the meanwhile the main point on which Mr. J.'s argument depends—that the god of Sinopé had ever been an Egyptian deity before he was introduced into the temple at Alexandria—is left by the Abbé in equal uncertainty with the road by which he reached Sinopé. "Would we know," he asks, "to what country the worship of Jupiter Plutus originally belonged? It is very probable that it was Egypt. Even if Plutarch (*De Is. et Os.*) did not assure us that this god was no other than the Egyptian Serapis, it would be impossible to mistake him from the modius on his head, his Egyptian dress, his attitude, his demeanour, and his hands raised toward heaven." How far a mistake on this subject is possible may be partly inferred from a previous remark of the Abbé's on the same figure, which he says is dressed *in the Greek or rather in the Egyptian fashion*,* but will become much clearer from an inspection of the figure itself, which could certainly never have suggested such a thought to one who did not view it through the glass of a favourite hypothesis. The good

* La figure de Sérapis est ici vêtue à la Grecque, ou plutôt à l'Égyptienne. (p. 497.)

Abbé has the truly astonishing simplicity to add: "We need only compare several medals of Egyptian cities on which Serapis is represented, with the reverse of this of Gordian and several other medals of Greek towns, which exhibit the Jupiter Plutus of the Greeks, to perceive at once that it is one and the same deity."

After this we could not have been surprised to find that he received the whole story told by Plutarch and Tacitus as a matter of fact. But since Mr. J. certainly does not, it would have been more to his purpose to have assigned some reason for thinking that the Pluto of Sinopé was an Egyptian god, than to have appealed to the Abbé, on whose dissertation I should not have dwelt so long, if it had not afforded a signal example of the danger of trusting to references, even in the writings of the most learned and candid men. It would carry us to a great distance from our subject, and would be of little use to discuss this question: but I may be allowed to remark that the accounts we have of the transaction raise no presumption whatever in favour of Mr. J.'s opinion. It seems very clear that Ptolemy's object in the juggle he concocted with the aid of his Greek and Egyptian theologians (one of whom was the Manetho on whose veracity so much of what sometimes passes for history depends) was to promote the trade of Alexandria, and to unite his Greek and Egyptian subjects, by the introduction of a new deity, who might be considered as belonging equally to both. The god of Sinopé was recommended by the variety and ambiguity of his attributes and ensigns, which, with the help of a little pious fraud, rendered him peculiarly fit for the purpose. If the neighbourhood of Colchis had influenced the king's choice, that circumstance would probably have been mentioned among the proofs by which Manetho and Timotheus convinced him of the identity of Pluto and Serapis.*

* The nature of the transaction will be best understood by comparing the pagan writers Tacitus, H. iv. 83; Plutarch, De Is. et Os. 28, to whom may be added Eustath. ad Dionys. 255, with two of the fathers, Clemens Al. Protrept. c. 4, and Cyril contra Jul. p. 13. Lest I should appear to dismiss the subject too hastily, I will transcribe the remark of a modern critic, Bernhardt on Eustathius: Serapis

But to return from this digression, it appears that we cannot rely on the expedition of Sesostris as a historical ground for the legend of Memnon, even though we may admit it to be highly probable that he, or some other king of Egypt, really gained those naval victories which are represented in the sculptures of Medinat-Abou;* for we shall not look for the scene of these exploits among the Cyclades, but in the Arabian Gulf, where the monuments mentioned by Strabo may certainly be genuine.† There is however still a third supposition which I will venture to hint, with the diffidence that belongs both to the obscurity of the subject and to my own very imperfect means of forming an opinion on it. The relation between the Egyptians and the Indians is a question that has long exercised the curiosity of the learned. That the former were an Ethiopian colony seems now to be placed almost beyond dispute by the concurrence of tradition with arguments drawn from the nature and history of the two countries. But the origin of the Ethiopians themselves has long appeared to be buried in impenetrable darkness. They claimed, like many other nations, the honour of being autochthons.‡ When the Macedonians became masters of Egypt, and

cultum, quem Jovem Ditem fuere qui interpretarentur, a Ptolemaeo Sotere, prudentissimo consilio, ne sacra peregrina videretur Aegyptiis invitis obtrusisse, monitu scilicet insomnii, Sinope (eujus nummos effigiem dei exhibere docet Eckhel D. N. P. I. vol. ii. p. 391, eique accedit Diogenis facetia ap. Diog. Laert. vi. 63) fuisse depromptum exposuit Tacitus. Nam G. I. Vossii hariolatio huic deo per Aegyptum priscam adjudicatis venerationem, nititur conjecturis et argumentationibus incertis: quamquam proxime abest sententia Jacobsio (de Memnon. p. 19) probata, ut Serapis ab Aegyptiis mereatoribus in Colchidem sit translatus posteaque patria in jura restitutus.

* Ritter, Afrika, p. 744, remarks: "What Herodotus and Diodorus, following Hecateus and the accounts of the priests, relate of Sesostris, seems to be confirmed by these sculptures." This however depends on the question whether the hostile navy and crews are really Indian.

† Strab. xvi. p. 769. At Deira, on the Straits of Babelmandeb, it was said *στίλγν εἶνα Σεσώστριος τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου μνηύουσαν ἱεροῖς γράμμασι τὴν εὐάβασιν αὐτοῦ. Φαίνεται γὰρ τὴν Λίθιοπίδα καὶ τὴν Τρωγλοδυτικὴν πρῶτος καταστρεψάμενος οὗτος· εἶτα διαβάς εἰς τὴν Ἀραβίαν, καρτεῦθεν τὴν Ἀσίαν ἐπελθὼν τὴν σύμπασαν· διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῦ Σεσώστριος χάρακες προσαγορεύονται καὶ ἀφιδρύματα ἐστὶν Αἰγυπτίων θεῶν ἱερῶν.* This must be compared with the passage above quoted about Semiramis. Pliny, N. H. vi. 34, says, *Hucusque Sesostris exercitum duxit.*

‡ Diodor. iii. 2. *ὅτι οὐκ ἐπήλυδες ἐλθόντες, ἀλλ' ἐγγενεῖς ὄντες τῆς χώρας, δικαίως ἀτόχθονες ὀνομάζονται, σχεδὸν παρὰ πᾶσι συμφωνεῖται.*

Greek travellers began to explore Ethiopia, and sometimes made a long stay at Meroe,* it is probable that many conjectures were formed on this point. But it is scarcely before the Roman period that we hear of a tradition that the Ethiopians were of Indian origin: and the writers who report it are not of the highest authority. Philostratus introduces an Indian Bramin Iarchas, relating that the Ethiopians of Meroe were once inhabitants of India; but having killed their King Ganges, they were pursued by his spectre, and could find no resting-place (before, we are to suppose, they quitted the country).† Elsewhere he brings in an Egyptian saying, that he had heard from his father that the Indians were the wisest of men, and the Ethiopians a colony of the Indians, who preserved many of the institutions of their ancestors.‡ It seems evident that, beside the suspicious character of the author, these accounts deserve not the slightest attention as an Indian tradition, and that they cannot have been an Ethiopian one. We find however the same fact more simply stated by Africanus, in a passage abruptly inserted after the mention of Amenophthis-Memnon in a list of Egyptian kings, under a title: “concerning the Ethiopians, whence they were, and where they settled;” which is explained as follows: “The Ethiopians migrated from the river Indus, and settled on the frontiers of Egypt.”§ It is unnecessary to dwell on the extreme uncertainty of such statements, and I will only point out two causes which may explain their origin, and which do not appear to have been sufficiently noticed by those who, having been inclined to adopt

* Pliny, N. H. vi. Primus Dalion ultra Meroen longe subvectus: mox Aristocreon et Bion et Basilis: Simonides minor etiam quinquennio in Meroe moratus cum de Aethiopia scriberet.

† Vit. Apoll. iii. 6.

‡ vi. 8.

§ Syncell. i. p. 286. Περὶ Αἰθιοπῶν, πόθεν ἦσαν, καὶ ποῦ ᾤκησαν. Αἰθιοπεῖς ἀπὸ Ἰνδοῦ ποταμοῦ ἀναστάντες πρὸς τῆ Λιγύπτῳ ᾤκησαν. Parthey, De Philis Insula, p. 6, thinks this passage spurious as to the form, though not, if I understand him, as to the substance. He says, after mentioning one of the passages of Philostratus: Alia coloniae Indicae mentio apud Syncellum spuria nobis videtur, cum res Aethiopum toto libro non amplius commemorentur. Duo versus: περὶ Αἰθιοπῶν—ᾤκησαν inter quadragesimum et quadragesimum primum Aegypti regem intempestive interjecti (?), pro capitis amissi initio argumentove margini adscripto habemus.

them on other grounds, have attributed a higher value to them than they can fairly claim.* In the first place we find that early after the Macedonian conquests attempts began to be made to deduce the Egyptian mythology from the Indian. Plutarch censures Phylarchus for having said that Dionysus first brought two oxen into Egypt from India, and that the one was named Apis, the other Osiris.† It is clear enough to what historical inferences these mythological conjectures were likely to lead. In the next place we read in Procopius as an acknowledged fact, that the Nile flows from India.‡ When this hypothesis was first started we do not know, but whenever it was received, the conclusion that the Ethiopians came from the same land in which the river took its rise might naturally follow.

But however unworthy of regard may be the scanty testimony of the ancients on this question, there are other sources of information still open, from which it may not be too sanguine to hope for a solution of it. This can only be looked for from a comparison of the ancient systems of religion and polity in the two countries: but it seems by no means improbable that such an investigation may finally ascertain the degree of connexion between them, and their relative antiquity. In the meanwhile the author of an excellent work on Indian antiquities has produced a number of very strong arguments to prove that the religion of Egypt must have been transplanted from India.§ That he has decided the point would perhaps be too much for any one, certainly for one who is not familiar with the literature of both countries, to pronounce. But if upon continued examination this opinion should be as generally received as that of the Ethiopian origin of the Egyptian priesthood, which not long ago was

* v. Bohlen, *Das alte Indien*, &c. i. p. 119: "The attacks on these testimonies may be parried with no less ease than it may be shown on the other hand that they are not conclusive."

† De Is. et Os. c. 29.

‡ De Edif. vi. near the beginning. Νεῖλος μὲν ὁ ποταμὸς ἐξ Ἰνδῶν ἐπ' Αἰγύπτου φερόμενος. Perhaps we may attribute something to the distinction made by Herodotus, and seemingly confirmed by Homer, between the Eastern and Southern Ethiopians.

§ v. Bohlen, *Das Alte Indien mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Aegypten*.

as generally rejected,* we should then have another key to the mysterious legend we have been discussing. For as it would then be clear that there was a historical connexion between the Indian Menu and the Egyptian Menes, so it would not be an extravagant conjecture, that the movements which transported an Indian colony into Africa vibrated through the heart to the extremities of Asia, and that the same shock which agitated the nations carried the name of Memnon on the wave of conquest and migration from the Indus to the Æsepus. As however I do not wish the reader to strain his eyes upon this distant retrospect, I will conclude with reminding him that the hypothesis here proposed is quite independent of all these conjectures, though perhaps if it were to be tried by their merits it might bear to be confronted with its rival; but that the advantage it claims over its antagonist is, that it gets rid of a cumbrous load of hypothetical machinery, which though it cost the ingenious author little trouble to raise, his readers cannot so easily support, and that it preserves the essence of an ancient tradition, while it illustrates the character of the people which interwove the foreign legend with their national poetry.

* Wesseling on Diodor. III. 2 (vol. i. p. 175) observes: Quod si tamen Aegyptiis respondendi locus esset, dubium non est quin iisdem rationibus pugnarent, et Aethiopas suos esse colonos pertenderent: manebit ergo lis sub iudice, donec aliunde, utri antiquitate praesent, probabitur: quod Aegyptiis fortasse in facili erit.

[In a MS. note in his own copy of the *Philological Museum*, Bishop Thirlwall says, at the end of this essay :

“It may interest some readers to compare this view of Memnon with Mr. Gladstone’s in the *Contemporary Review* of July, 1874.”]

ON THE POSITION OF SUSA.

AMONG the many illustrations history affords of the instability of human greatness, one not the least remarkable is that the site of the "Memnonian city" should have become a subject of controversy. Many of our readers are probably acquainted with the difference of opinions that has arisen on this question, who do not know that it has been at length, if not completely decided, at least brought so near to that point as scarcely to admit of any farther doubt. This is one of the services rendered to Oriental geography by the celebrated Orientalist, Joseph von Hammer. But the discovery by which he threw a new light on the subject was first published in a German review, which I believe has but a very narrow circulation in this country, the *Vienna Jahrbücher der Literatur*, vol. viii., and there is reason to believe that few even of the persons who take an interest in eastern geography are yet informed of it. At least in a popular work, the author of which has paid more than ordinary attention to eastern geography, the opinion which Von Hammer has refuted, or at least shaken to its foundation, is adopted and stated in a manner which clearly implies that the writer was not aware of the strongest arguments that have been brought against it. In the life of Alexander the Great in Mr. Murray's Cabinet Library, pp. 168, 169, *Susa* is described as situate on the *Choaspes*, the modern *Kerah*, and as corresponding to *Shus*, "where a small temple still commemorates the burial-place of Daniel." The proposition which Von Hammer maintains is that the *Kerah* is not the *Choaspes*, nor *Shus*, *Susa*,

but that the modern *Schuster* or *Tostar* occupies the site of the ancient city of Memnon, and that the *Choaspes* is the modern *Karoon*. A glance at a good map of Asia will show that the distance between the two places is so considerable as to render the question of some importance to ancient history: and I may therefore hope that my labour will not be wasted if I make Von Hammer's discovery more generally known. For this purpose I subjoin a translation of that part of his article which relates to this point. But for the sake of readers to whom the subject may not be familiar, I will first briefly state the principal arguments which had been previously adduced on each side of the controversy. This I shall do with the assistance, and partly in the words, of Mr. Kinneir, who in his Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire (pp. 101—106) has reviewed the conflicting reasonings of Major Rennel and Dr. Vincent, and has declared himself, though not with absolute confidence, in favour of the former, who places *Susa* on the site of *Shus* and on the banks of the *Kerah*, or *Haweesa*, or *Karassu*, against the latter, who contends that *Susa* is *Shuster*, and the *Karoon* the *Choaspes*.

Mr. Kinneir, as an eye-witness, informs us (p. 99), that “about seven or eight miles to the west of *Dezphoul* (a town on the eastern bank of the *Abzal*, twenty-eight miles west of *Shuster*) commence the ruins of *Shus*, stretching not less perhaps than twelve miles from one extremity to the other. They extend as far as the eastern bank of the *Kerah*, occupy an immense space between that river and the *Abzal*, and like the ruins of *Ctesiphon*, *Babylon*, and *Kufa*, consist of hillocks of earth and rubbish covered with broken pieces of bricks and coloured tile. These mounds bear some resemblance to the pyramids of *Babylon*, with this difference, that instead of being entirely made of brick, many are formed of clay and pieces of tile, with irregular layers of brick and mortar five or six feet in thickness, to serve, it should seem, as a kind of prop to the mass. Large blocks of marble, covered with hieroglyphics, are not unfrequently here discovered by the Arabs, when digging in search of hidden treasure; and at the foot of the most elevated of the pyramids stands *the Tomb of*

Daniel, a small and apparently a modern building, erected on the spot where the relics of that prophet were believed to rest."

Major Rennel's arguments in favour of *Shus* are three in number. "First (as Mr. Kinneir states them), the similarity of name; and the situation, which agrees better with the distance between *Sardis* and *Susa* mentioned in the tablets of Aristagoras than that of *Shuster*. Secondly, the legend of the Prophet Daniel, whose coffin was found at *Shus*; and thirdly, that *Susa* ought to be placed on a river which has its sources in *Media*." I pass over Dr. Vincent's reply to the first and second of these arguments, since the reader will easily guess them, as well as his own mistake, which Mr. Kinneir corrects, about the name *Kuzistan* (which he confounds with *Kuhistan*, and derives from the mountains which surround the province). But as to the river of *Susa*, Dr. V. observes that it was the *Euleus*: that *Nearchus* sailed up to *Susa* without entering the *Shat-ul-Arab*; which he could not have done, had that city stood on the *Kerah*: and that, when Alexander descended the *Euleus*, he sent his disabled ships through the cut of the *Hafar* into the *Shat-ul-Arab*. And finally, that a strong reason for placing *Susa* at *Shuster* occurs in *Ibu Haukul*, who says that *there is not in all Kuzistan any mountain except at Shuster, Jondi Shapour, and Ardz*: and as it is evident that the castle at *Susa* was a place of strength, it is reasonable to suppose that it stood upon a hill.

The words in Italics contain the strength of Dr. V.'s reasoning, which however does not convince Mr. Kinneir, who fortifies Major Rennel's position with an additional argument derived from the ruins of *Shus* above described, which is certainly very striking. He remarks, "Strabo tells us, that the Persian capital was entirely built of brick, there not being a stone in the province. Now the quarries of *Shuster* are very celebrated, and almost the whole of the town is built of stone: but there is no such thing in the environs of *Shus*, which was evidently formed of brick, as will appear from my description of the pyramids that now remain."

I must here stop to observe that Mr. K. makes Strabo say

something which I cannot find in his Greek text, and which materially affects the question. Strabo says of *Susa*, "The walls of the city, and the temples and the palace likewise, were built, as those of *Babylon*, of brick and bitumen, according to some authors."* But he does not add here, nor anywhere else in his description of *Susiana*, that there was not a stone in the province, unless Mr. K. collects this from what he says of the rugged mountains that separate *Susiana* from *Persis*.†

Still, after all the abatement which must be made on account of the manner in which Strabo expresses himself, which implies that all his authorities were not agreed on the subject, it may be admitted that Mr. Kinneir has strengthened Major Rennel's case by this observation. But on the other hand, he has nothing to oppose to Dr. Vincent's argument about the citadel of *Susa*, which Strabo and others speak of, and of which there seems to be no trace at *Shus*: and to meet the objection drawn from the voyage of Nearchus, he is forced to contend that the *Euleus* and the *Choaspes* were two different rivers. He says: "If we admit the ruins of *Shus* to be those of ancient *Susa*, the *Kerah* will correspond to the description of the *Choaspes*, but not to that of the *Euleus*: for the latter entered the gulf by a channel of its own, whilst the *Kerah* flows into the *Shat-ul-Arab*. As it is not however ascertained that the *Choaspes* and *Euleus* were the same," &c. Hence the sense in which he understands the statement that Nearchus sailed up to *Susa* is this: "Nearchus might have ascended either the *Abzal* or the *Karoon*, without entering the *Shat-ul-Arab*; and certainly could not have done so by the *Kerah*, which meets that stream between *Bassora* and *Korna*.‡ But this

* καθάπερ εἰρήκασί τινες.

† παρεμπίπτει ὄρεινῇ τραχεῖα καὶ ἀπότομος μεταξὺ τῶν Σουσίων καὶ τῆς Περσίδος.

‡ In the "Life of Alexander the Great," the *Euleus* is spoken of as the same river with the *Choaspes*, the modern *Kerah* (p. 352), and yet Alexander is made to enter the Persian Gulf by the main channel of the *Karoon* (p. 350); which is meant for a translation of Arrian's account that Alexander κατέπλει κατὰ τὸν Εὐλαῖον ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ θάλασσαν, vii. 7. How the author reconciles these two statements I am at a loss to imagine. As to Mr. Kinneir's explanation, it should be compared with the expressions of Arrian, Ind. c. 36. καταστήσαι τὸ ναυτικὸν ἐς Σοῦσα—ἔστε σοι σῶας καταστήσω ἐς Σοῦσα τὰς νέας.

circumstance will not be much in favour of Dr. V.'s assumption; *for the ruins of Shus approach within a few miles of the Abzal: and we are uncertain whether the Euleus flowed to the east or west of Susa.*" These few miles, it must be remembered, according to the passage above quoted from Mr. K., are as many as seven or eight.

The reader will now be prepared to hear the observations of the learned writer who has since taken up the subject, which Mr. K. was compelled to own he left, as he found it, *perplexed*.

After observing that "Mr. Kinneir has very superfluously made the *Euleus* and the *Choaspes* two distinct rivers in his map,* though D'Anville, Vincent, Mannert, and after them Hoeck (in a Latin prize essay entitled *Veteris Medicæ et Persiæ Monumenta*), have placed the identity of the *Euleus* and the *Choaspes* beyond all doubt," he proceeds to say, "Arrian, Pliny, and the Bible place *Susa* on the *Euleus*; Herodotus, Strabo, and Curtius, on the *Choaspes*; and what some relate of the *Euleus*, others mention with regard to the *Choaspes*, that it was famed for its exceedingly light and excellent water, that the Persian kings drank of no other, and carried it with them on their journeys." Then after mentioning the difference of opinions as to the position of *Susa*, and Dr. Vincent's argument drawn from the voyage of Nearchus, he adds, "Without dwelling on the force of this and the other reasons adduced by Vincent for the identity of *Susa* and *Shuster*, we hasten to communicate a passage from the original sources of Persian geography, which decides the question, and fixes the site of the ancient *Susa* at *Shuster*. This passage occurs in the valu-

* The distinction however is not altogether superfluous for Mr. Kinneir's argument: the epithet would be more applicable to Mr. Mitford's distinction between the *Euleus* and the *Pasitigris*, which, he imagines, both fell by separate mouths into the Persian Gulf, having their courses nearly parallel and not very distant for a considerable way before reaching the gulf. He adds, "*Susa* stood on the *Euleus*. But this river was, towards its mouth, so inconvenient for navigation, that the preferable course for vessels from the gulf to *Susa* was up the *Pasitigris* to a canal communicating with the *Euleus*." (Ch. lv. sect. v.) No authority is cited for this assertion, but it seems to be founded on the description of Alexander's voyage down the *Euleus*, Arrian, vii. 7, combined with Ind. 42, in neither of which passages however is there any allusion to such a canal. The only one mentioned is the *Hafar* Cut.

able Manuscript, No. 433 of the Imperial library, which seems to be a portion of the Nushetol-Kulub.”

“The *Tigris* of *Shuster* rises in the yellow mountain (*Kuhiserd*) and the (other) mountains of Great *Louristan*, and after a course of thirty and odd parasangs reaches *Shuster*. It is always cool, and digests food, so that in the hot weather the people of the country rely on its digestive quality, and eat coarse food, and it is digested.”*

“In this passage the excellent quality, on account of which the water of the *Euleus* or *Choaspes* was drunk by the kings of Persia, is sufficiently marked: this property of the river, which the lapse of centuries has not changed, at once unties the knot, and would of itself suffice to determine the identity of the two streams, if the name *Tigris* of *Shuster* did not expressly testify that this river united with the *Pasitigris* is the same which Nearchus sailed up with his fleet from the sea, and down which Alexander sailed from *Susa* to meet him. The *Pasitigris*, the modern *Jerahi*, flowed into the *Euleus*, the modern *Karoon*, from the east, and since the river of *Shuster* is likewise called the *Tigris* of *Shuster*, the modern Persian geography has preserved the name of the *Pasitigris* which was used by Nearchus. So the *Simois* toward its mouth is called the *Mendere* after the *Scamander* which falls into it.”

In a subsequent passage, after remarking on the want of an eminence at *Shus* corresponding to the citadel at *Susa*, he adds: “Our authorities enable us completely to demolish one of the strongest arguments of our opponents founded on *Daniel's Tomb*, which is shown at *Shus*, and not at *Shuster*. The following extract from the valuable list of cities by Achmed of Tus proves that *Daniel's tomb* was originally at *Shuster*, and not at *Shus*, and that the prophet's body was transported from *Shuster* to *Shus* in consequence of a great famine.

* اب دجله تستر از کوه زرده و جبال لور بزرگت بر میخیزد و بعد از سی و چند فرسنگ تا تستر می رسد و چون قریب المسافة است هنوز سرد می باشد و هاضم طعام چندانکه در آن گرما اهل آن دیار اعتماد بر دهنم آن ماکولات غلیظا خورند و دهنم شود

“*Shuster* is a good city on the banks of the river *Meshrikan*,* in the district of *Kusistan*. This is the river on which Sapor built the *Shadrewan* before the gate of the city, because it lies on a hill, and the water does not come up to it. He built *Shuster* with stone and iron pillars. The body of Daniel (peace be with him) was formerly at *Shuster*. The people of *Shus*, who were afflicted with a famine, desired the body of Daniel (peace be with him) to turn away the famine. The body was sent to them to *Shus*, to turn away the famine. They hid the coffin in the river, and the elders of *Shus* swore that the coffin was not in their city. After this they asked the boys: the boys said that the coffin was in such a place. Wherefore it is the custom to hear the testimony of boys. The glory of this city is the dyke *Shadrewan* on the river *Meshrikan*: its wares are rich stuffs and rice.”

To this is added an extract from a Turkish geographical work, the *Jehannuma*, which, though it does not mention the transfer, yet on the whole confirms the statement of the Persian author. “*Daniel's Tomb* is on the west side of the city (*Shus*): they say it has remained there ever since the captivity in the time of Nebuchadnezzar. At the time of the (Moslem) conquest a coffin was found which was taken for that of Daniel, and was brought out in time of dearth and honoured with prayers. Abu Musa Elashari made a vaulted chamber of stone under ground by the bank of the river that flows by the city, in which he deposited the coffin, and turned the river of *Shus* over it, out of reverence, that the body of a prophet might not lie in the hands of the people.” The same Turkish author in mentioning *Shuster* notices the excellent quality of the water in digesting the coarsest food.

Two observations of Von Hammer seem after this to set the question completely at rest: “In the first place, the river of *Susa* can only be that which flows under the walls of the city, and not another flowing several miles off (as the *Ab-zal*), because Daniel

* This is the name of the artificial canal, occasioned, as Mr. Kinneir says (p. 99), by the construction of the dyke called by the Persian author the *Shadrewan*: it discharges its waters into the *Abzal*, half a mile from the place called *Bundekeel* by Mr. K., which Von Hammer takes to be the same with one called *Asher Mokerrem* by the Eastern geographers.

stood at the gate of the city (VIII. 2) by the river of Ulai. In the second place, it is by no means uncertain whether *Susa* stood on the eastern or western bank of the *Euleus* (as Mr. Kinneir supposes), because Alexander on his march toward the east arrives first at the *Choaspes*, and then at *Susa*. This circumstance has been clearly pointed out by Hoeck, to prove the position of *Susa* on the eastern bank of the *Euleus* or *Choaspes*, only he is quite wrong in looking for this river in the *Kerah* or *Karasu*."

Lastly, we are indebted to the ingenious author for a happy conjecture, which removes the only remaining difficulty that might seem to leave a doubt on the subject. With this we shall conclude our extracts.

"The five authors who maintain the identity of *Susa* and *Shus* (Rennel, Barbié du Bocage, Sir William Ouseley, Kinneir, and Hoeck) may ask their five opponents (D'Anville, Herbelot, Vincent, Mannert, and the writer) to what place the vast ruins of *Shus* correspond, if it be not the ancient *Susa*? We will meet this question with another which involves an answer to it. Where are the ruins of the great city of *Elymais*, the capital of the province of the same name, which contained the great temple Azara, mentioned by Strabo, Josephus, and Zonaras,* dedicated to Venus or Diana (Zaratis, Sohra, or Anaitis, Anahid)? where are they to be looked for but here in the centre of the province of *Elymais*, which the river of *Shuster* separated from *Susiana*? *Elymais* was the capital of the province *Elymais*, and *Susa* that of the province *Susiana*; the former lay on the eastern bank of the *Kerah*, the latter on the eastern bank of the *Karoon*. Both were celebrated for their temple of Anaitis, which in the former city was called after the other name of the goddess (Zaratis) τὰ Ζάρα or τὰ Ἀζαπα. By an oversight which has never before been noticed, the party who maintain the identity of *Susa* and *Shus* have entirely forgotten the capital of *Elymais*, and have attempted to transfer the capital of *Susiana* into the heart of *Elymais*."

* Strabo, xvi. [p. 744] 1, 18; Joseph. Antiq. ix. 1; Zonaras, iv. 20.

A N C Æ U S.

It is the peculiar advantage of a Literary Miscellany like the present, that it affords room for the discussion of minute questions, in themselves of little or no moment, and only interesting so far as they may appear to be connected with subjects of higher importance; while, on the other hand, the historical or philosophical views to which such details owe all their real value may not admit of a full development in the same place, and may with more propriety be briefly hinted. The writer trusts that this remark will be sufficient to justify him, if starting from a seemingly inconsiderable point in mythical history he proceeds to show its bearing on questions that embrace a wide field, and that can never be indifferent to a historical inquirer, without dwelling on them at a length exactly proportioned to their relative dignity.

Several of our readers perhaps are familiar with the proverb which suggests the uncertainty that intervenes between the cup and the lip, who are not acquainted with its high antiquity and its supposed origin. According to the Greek mythologers the person who first experienced a truth which after him became proverbial was a king named Ancaeus. Lycophrone, who has expressed the proverb with his usual simplicity and perspicuity : (v. 489.)

*ὡς πολλὰ χεῖλες καὶ ἑπαστραίων ποτῶν
μέσῃ κνλίνχει Μοῖρα παμμήστωρ βροτῶν·*

refers it to an Arcadian hero, Ancaeus of Tegea, who was killed by the Calydonian boar. His valour and untimely fate were

subjects of lively interest in his native city; and the artist who adorned one of the pediments in the great temple of Minerva Alea at Tegea with the principal figures belonging to the Calydonian chase, had represented Ancæus in the act of sinking under his wounds, after the hatchet, with which he had ineffectually assailed the boar, had dropped out of his hand (Pausan. viii. 45, 7). But Lycophron's Greek commentator censures the poet for confounding two perfectly distinct personages, the one just mentioned and Ancæus a son of Neptune and Astypalæa, and king of the Leleges.* This people, according to Pherecydes (Strabo, xiv. p. 632), was in possession of the coast of Asia between Ephesus and Phocæa, and of the islands Chios and Samos, before the Ionian migration, and a legend reported by Tzetzes on the authority of an Aristotle who had written a book entitled *πέπλοι*, placed the scene of the event which gave rise to the proverb in Samos. There Ancæus had planted the vine: but a seer or an oracle had predicted that he should never drink wine from its fruit. When the grapes were ripe, the king pressed a bunch into a cup, and as he raised it to his lips scoffed at the idle prophecy: the seer replied, *ποὺλὸν μεταξὺ πέλει κύλικος καὶ χείλεος ἄκρον*: at the same moment a shout was heard, and tidings came that a boar was ravaging the fields. Laying aside the untasted must, Ancæus rushed forth to encounter the invader, and perished in the conflict.

With regard to the proverb, it can scarcely be doubted that it belongs to the Samian Ancæus, whose son Samos was said to have given his name to the island: for the prediction which is the basis of the story had most probably some connexion with that peculiar defect in the quality of the Samian soil which rendered it unfavourable to the growth of the vine, while the neighbouring islands, as well as the adjacent coast of the continent, were celebrated for the

* So he is described by Asius (in Pausan. vii. 4, 1), who does not mention the Carians, as is incorrectly stated by Panofka (*Res Samiorum*, p. 11). Strabo himself speaks of the Carians as having inhabited Samos while it was called Parthenia (xiv. p. 637 [c. 1, § 15]), but perhaps he only uses the name of Carians according to a commonly received notion, as equivalent to that of Leleges, without at all meaning to contradict Pherecydes.

excellence of their wines.* But even if we suppose Lycophron to have been mistaken in referring the occasion of the proverb to the Arcadian, there still remains a resemblance between the fates of these two Ancauses, close enough to startle the curious reader. The coincidence however extends much further; for we find both the heroes taking a share in the Argonautic expedition. Both appear in the catalogue of Apollonius, who describes Ancaeus of Tegea as clothed in the skin of a Mænalian bear, and wielding a great double hatchet in his right hand; his namesake of Samos (Parthenia) is simply described as the comrade of the Milesian Erginus, and like him skilled in navigation and in war; he is marked however by the epithet *ὑπέρβιος*, which reminds us of his ungovernable temper. The armour of the Tegean would naturally excite the surprise of any one who was familiar with that of the Homeric heroes, and its singularity is even more striking on board the Argo than in the Calydonian forest. The poet therefore adds a few lines to explain this strange garb and weapon: and we learn that Aleus, the grandfather of Ancaeus, desirous of keeping him at home, had taken the unavailing precaution of locking up his accustomed armour: a satisfactory explanation perhaps, so long as the closing scene of his life is kept out of view, but one which cannot be reconciled with that by any but a very forced and artificial construction.

Some of our readers who are not strangers to the way in which all mythical legends, and above all the Greek, are apt to shift their phases, will probably by this time have been led to ask themselves whether according to the rules of sound criticism it is allowable to imagine that two stories, in which two heroes of the same name both embark in the Argo and both come to their death in fighting with a boar, can have had two essentially distinct foundations; and whether it is not sufficiently clear that Ancaeus of Tegea and Ancaeus king of the Leleges were originally one and the same person, and that the slight variations which occur in the description of his character and adventures must have arisen from

* Strabo, xiv. p. 637 [c. 1, § 15]. *ἔστι δ' οὐκ εὐοινος, καίπερ εὐοινουσῶν τῶν κύκλω νήσων, καὶ τῆς ἠπείρου σχεδὸν τι τῆς προσεχούσης πάσης τοῦς ἀρίστους ἐκφερούσης οἴνου.*

the legend having been transplanted to a foreign soil. Should this be granted, it seems no more than a natural conclusion, which may be drawn independently of any opinion as to the original seat and form of the myth, that its transmission from the one place to the other implies some degree of affinity between the two tribes who claimed possession of it, and that we may fairly regard it as an additional ground for believing that the Leleges of the Asiatic coast and the neighbouring islands were nearly related to the old Arcadians, whom the ancient writers unanimously represent as a Pelasgian race. A very early connexion between Arcadia and the part of Asia adjacent to the territory of the Leleges is implied in the legend of Telephus, who like Anceus is a grandson of Aleus, and whose combat with Achilles in the plain of the Caius was the subject that filled the other pediment in the above-mentioned temple at Tegea.

The chief difficulty that perplexes all inquiries into the character of the Leleges is the combination in which we find them placed with some Hellenic tribes on the one hand, and on the other hand with the Carians. The ancients themselves were divided in their opinions on the question whether the Leleges and the Carians were the same or different races, and they seem generally to have inclined to the former side, with Herodotus, who looked upon the name of Leleges merely as one by which the Carians had been known while they occupied the islands of the Ægean in the reign of Minos. This however is a case in which we may certainly venture to decide with great confidence even against this high authority. For it is perfectly clear from the accounts transmitted to us of these two nations that their histories were quite distinct, and that at all events they were not connected together by any closer affinity than subsisted between the Greeks and the Thracians. The principal, and apparently the earliest settlements of the Leleges were on the continent of Greece, where there are only a very few traces of the Carians, and those confined to the eastern coast. The latter themselves maintained that they were from the beginning an Asiatic people, and claimed the Lydians and Mysians for their brethren. It is not at all surprising that

the manifold contact into which they were brought with the Leleges on the coast of Asia should have led many of the ancients to overlook these broad distinctions between them, as it may here and there have effaced all the marks by which they could have been discriminated. Yet even there they were far from being completely mingled or confounded by tradition. Pherecydes, in the passage of Strabo above referred to, distinguishes the territory of the Leleges from that of the Carians, who were masters of the coast toward the south. In many parts of Caria itself monuments remained even to the latest times of Greece, that preserved the name of the Leleges. A Carian writer, Philip of Theangela (*Athen.* vi. c. 101), the author of a treatise on the two nations, compared the condition in which the Leleges were placed by the Carians to that of the Laconian helots and the Thessalian Penestæ. Strabo himself adopted the same view, though not perhaps on very critical grounds; for he appeals to the authority of Homer, who mentions both Carians and Leleges as distinct bands in the Trojan army. He conceives these Leleges, whom the poet describes as occupying a small territory at the foot of Ida, to have been the original stock from which all the other tribes of the same name were descended. According to his view they had migrated southward after their towns had been sacked by Achilles, and had founded some new ones in Caria, where Pedasa preserved the recollection of the Pedasus which they had left on the banks of the Satnioeis. Another body of them took possession of a part of Pisidia, and became blended with the ancient inhabitants. Finally they joined the Carians in their expeditions, spread over all parts of Greece, and gradually disappeared. It is however pretty clear that in forming this theory the geographer has been biassed by the same superstitious reverence for Homer which on other occasions perverted his naturally sound judgment. It is at least equally probable that the Leleges had once covered the whole coast between the Hellespont and Caria, and if we may lay any stress on the evidence of Philip of Theangela, we shall be inclined to believe that they had preceded the Carians in the possession of that country. It is rather remarkable that Pedasa was the only

town in Caria that held out against the troops of Cyrus: it was taken after a long siege, which cost the Persian general much trouble. Yet after the fall of Miletus we find the Carians of Pedasa receiving from the Persians a portion of the Milesian territory (compare Her. I. 175 and VI. 20). Does this singular mark of apparently unmerited favour, combined with the strange mode of divination practised by the priestess of Minerva, warrant a suspicion that so late as the reign of Cyrus the population of Pedasa remained distinct from that of the surrounding country, and was then exterminated after its gallant struggle, and replaced by the submissive Carians?

If this conjecture be well founded, the Carians may be supposed to have stood in the same relation to the Leleges as their brothers the Lydians to the Maonians, and like them to have advanced from the interior toward the coast. This movement however must have taken place long before the conquest by which the name of the Maonians was merged in that of the Lydians; for the latter people was unknown to Homer: as it seems also to have preceded, though perhaps not by so long an interval, the migration of the Mysians, whom Jupiter in the Iliad sees still far from Ida on the banks of the Danube.* That of the Phrygians was also believed by some of the ancients to have taken place after the Trojan war; and there seems to be sufficient evidence that at a period subsequent to that event some unknown cause, connected perhaps with that which produced the Thessalian and Dorian migrations, threw a number of tribes previously settled in Thrace and the adjacent countries upon Asia. The Lydians and Carians however are not mentioned among them: and this might raise a doubt as to the reality of that mutual affinity which was recognised by these two nations and the Mysians, and seemingly confirmed by their exclusive admission to the temple at Mylasa (Her. I. 171). And perhaps it was not a nearer one than existed between the Mysians and many other branches of the Thracian family: and the belief in it may have arisen chiefly out of the accidental juxtaposition in which after many changes the fortunes of the three

* Posidonius ap. Strab. VII. p. 295 [c. 3, § 2], and Niebuhr, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 371.

nations finally placed them: as it was probably this cause that occasioned the popular legend which we learn from the native historian Xanthus to have been commonly received among the Lydians:* that the Mysians were an offset of the same root, descended from a sacred title, which had once been exposed on Mount Olympus: as according to Myrsilus of Lesbos (Dionys. i. 23) the Tyrrhenians of the Ægean had sprung from a similar portion of the Italian Tyrrhenians, which had been consecrated by a vow. But the well-attested community of language among these three tribes furnishes a stronger argument of the fact than tradition or popular belief: and if we adopt what appears to be the most probable view of their origin, and suppose that the Phrygian and other kindred races came down from the tablelands of Armenia,† that some of them remained in Asia, while others crossed over into Europe and were afterwards driven back toward the east, we shall have no difficulty in conceiving that tribes which had not shared all one another's wanderings might nevertheless retain many decisive marks of their original affinity.

There are two other questions, one of them highly interesting, connected with this subject, which ought to be noticed here, but which we must not attempt to discuss in the space to which we confine ourselves. As to the first we only wish to observe, that although the Phrygians, Mysians, and several other nations that finally settled in the same part of Asia, are described by the ancients as Thracians, this name must be understood in a geographical, not an ethnographical sense, and that their relation to the various tribes which in the days of Thucydides occupied the same part of Europe whence they had migrated, may notwithstanding have been extremely remote.‡ The second question is, how far the early population of Western Asia was allied to that of Greece. According to a view which has hitherto been very prevalent among writers on this subject, the distinction we have drawn in a preceding page between the Carians and Leleges would be trifling and unsubstantial. It has been commonly supposed

* Strab. xii. p. 572 [c. 8, § 3].

† See Hoeck's Kreta, i. p. 125 and foll.

‡ See a note on this subject in the French translation of Strabo, tom. iii. p. 23.

that in the period when the history of Greece first begins to dawn, an intimate connexion subsisted among its inhabitants and those of Thrace, and of Asia Minor. The traditions concerning the most ancient poetry of Greece, which represent it as cultivated by Thracian and Lycian bards, seemed to imply that one language was spoken or understood throughout those countries, and that the wide difference that was observed between them in this respect at a later period, was a change that had been gradually introduced by time and accident. Now however that the researches of Niebuhr have enabled us to form a more exact notion of the limits within which the early inhabitants of Asia Minor and Greece may be regarded as the same people, this argument has lost all its force, and until some other can be found, we may reasonably doubt that there was ever any closer resemblance between the Greek language, in any of its forms and stages, and that of the Lydians and their kinsmen, than appeared after these races had been formally distinguished from the Greeks as barbarians, or than now strikes a common reader in the specimens collected by Jablonski. We may admit, and indeed it seems scarcely possible to deny, an affinity between the Carians and Leleges for instance, such as connects together the most distant members of a widely propagated race, including the numberless varieties of the Indo-Germanic family, but we have no ground for concluding that, after their first separation from their parent stock, they had ever been brought into contact before we find them neighbours on the coast of Asia, or that there was any peculiar resemblance between them, except what arose out of this fortuitous intercourse. That a considerable interchange however of language and ideas was likely to take place between two nations so situate cannot be denied; and we are now about to point out an instance in which we conceive the influence of this mixture may be traced.

It is no other than that from which we set out, to which we now return from this digression, to examine more closely the character and attributes of the mythical hero Anceæus. We have pointed out what appear to us sufficient reasons for believing that in this instance two persons of the same name have grown out of

one; and as this division is itself a fiction, it may the more readily be imagined that features which properly belonged to one of them might easily be transferred to the other. This we conceive to have happened with regard to the double hatchet, with which we have seen the Arcadian Ancæus accompanying the Argonauts and attacking the Calydonian bear. We have already observed that the legend alluded to by Apollonius can only serve to mark the singularity of the weapon, without explaining the cause that made it the inseparable badge of a Grecian hero. But in the hands of the Samian Ancæus it would have excited no surprise, for we should see in it nothing but an ancient religious symbol, which from the earliest times of which we have any historical notices appears to have been familiar to the inhabitants of the western coast of Asia, and especially of the part nearest to Samos, where it is visible among the wrecks of antiquity at this day. Chandler at least saw it not only on the keystone of the arch at Mylasa,* but also on two marbles inserted in the wall of a church built on an islet in the lake of Myûs, and under it, as he says, the name of the proprietor, Jupiter of Labranda (Travels, c. 51, p. 169). To persons conversant with this subject, it would be unnecessary to say anything more on the wide diffusion of this symbol; but for the sake of readers to whom it may be new or not very familiar, we will add a few remarks to illustrate this point. Plutarch (Qu. Græcæ, 45) answers the question: why the statue of Jupiter Labradeus † in Caria wields a hatchet, and not a sceptre or a thunderbolt: by relating a legend, according to which the weapon in the hand of the god represented one which had once belonged to the Amazon Hippolita, had been taken from her by Hercules, and by him presented to Omphale, whose successors the kings of Lydia had worn it as a sacred ornament till the time of Candaules,

* A view of this arch is engraved in the *Ionian Antiquities*, vol. ii. pl. xxii. See also the vignette on the opposite page. If circumstances should ever render it possible to explore the ruins of Asia Minor with the attention they deserve, other specimens might probably be found. They would be still more interesting if they were discovered further to the north.

† The word should probably be written *Λαβρανδεύς*, but the mistake may have been made by Plutarch himself: or he may have conceived that the name of the village was not directly derived from the epithet of the god.

who disdaining the relic had consigned it to one of his attendants. When Gyges revolted from his master, he was assisted by a Carian chief, who received the hatchet as the reward of his services, and on his return to Caria, dedicated a statue to Jupiter, which he adorned with it. Hence the god received the title Labradeus, *labrys* being the name for a hatchet in the Lydian language. This story traces the use of the hatchet to the Amazons: and accordingly we find it not only on the Carian coins, but on those of a great number of cities in Asia Minor, which claimed Amazons as their founders. The reader may see many of these collected in the work of Petitus *De Amazonibus*: the hatchet appears sometimes by itself, sometimes in the hand of the Amazon: and in those of a later period it is wielded by the Roman emperors. The Greek traditions not only spoke of Amazons as founders of many towns in Æolis and Ionia, but related that they were among the inhabitants of the country whom the Ionian colonists found on their arrival. It was disputed whether they or a son of the river Caystrus had built the temple of the great goddess at Ephesus, but it was universally admitted that when Androclus landed there with his followers, Leleges and Lydians (that is Mæonians) were in possession of the upper part of the town, and Amazons were dwelling within the precincts of the sanctuary: the Ionians forcibly expelled the former, but the latter were permitted to remain in peace (Pausan. vii. 2, 8). As the double hatchet was the constant badge of the Amazons, these traditions seem sufficiently to prove the antiquity and the extensive diffusion of the symbol, which, by the light afforded by these monuments, we trace from the south-west of Asia Minor to the neighbourhood of Themiscyra.

It may not however be equally clear that we are justified in terming it a religious symbol. And undoubtedly if there were no other ground for calling it so than that it was carried by the Carian god, its claim to this title would be doubtful; for it might easily be conceived that a piece of armour which had once been worn by a race of warlike kings might become the peculiar distinction of a god of war, such as the Carian Jupiter seems to have

been. But its association with the Amazons places it in a different light, and may be considered as a sufficient proof that it was a sign originally connected with some religious meaning. We venture to assert this, on the supposition that scarcely any one will now be found to embrace any other view of that celebrated race, than that which regards them as the ministers of some kind of religious worship. On this point we believe almost all mythologers are now agreed, though the explanation of their various attributes and of the legends relating to them is a problem that will always afford room for difference of opinion. We do not mean to discuss these questions, but we may observe that according to one view of the Amazons, the badge which uniformly distinguishes them is not an unmeaning ornament, but is in perfect unison with their character, while it is very difficult to perceive its connexion with any other that has yet been proposed.

The religions that prevailed in Asia Minor from the earliest times of which we have any tradition down to the propagation of Christianity, so far as they were not introduced or modified by the Hellenic settlers, exhibit a remarkable simplicity and conformity in their general outlines, which presents a striking contrast to the inexhaustible variety, the endless ramifications of the Indian, Grecian, and Egyptian systems. Their common basis appears to have been the same on which the latter were raised; but either the genius of the people was deficient in that quickness of invention which moulded these into such a multiplicity of forms, or the numerous sacerdotal dynasties which united religious and political authority, and, from sanctuaries which were at once centres of commerce and of devotion, spread their sway over large surrounding tracts, checked every tendency either to vary or to refine and spiritualize the established objects and modes of worship. These temples, with their subject principalities and consecrated serfs, flourished with little interruption or diminution of their power and lustre under the shelter of the Lydian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Monarchies, and during the successive revolutions that took place around them, the religion of which they were the seats underwent as little alteration in its essential

character as in its outward forms. It was the adoration of nature contemplated as the great sensible whole, but under two or three different aspects, determined by the disposition of each people, and regulating its modes of worship. The earliest and simplest conception of nature perhaps entertained by the human mind is that of a merely passive productive power: and this the imagination of almost every people has figured to itself in the shape of a female deity. The next step has been to distinguish an active vivifying principle: and this must then be represented by a person of the other sex. A third stage ascends to the union of these two powers; which may be exhibited in various ways, either by simply combining their mythical forms in some prodigious mixture, or by transferring some of the attributes of the one to the other. Specimens of the former process are said to occur in Indian works of art; and a very lively and exact description of such a compound figure is preserved in a fragment of Porphyrius, who had extracted it from an account given by the Babylonian Bardesanes of an interview he had with some Indian envoys in the reign of Heliogabalus.* Among other things they told him of a large natural cave in a very lofty mountain, containing a colossal statue. It was erect, with its arms stretched out in the form of a cross. The right side of the face, the right arm and foot, and the whole of the right side of the body were male, the other half female. The sun was carved on its right breast, the moon on the left: and on other parts various other natural objects. Its head supported the image of a god. It was conjectured by Payne Knight † that some such androgynous figure had given rise to the legend of the Amazons wanting the right breast. Whether we adopt this opinion or not, it seems at all events in the highest degree probable that it was to their connexion with some such worship that they owed their legendary character: and that on

* Stobæus, ed. Heeren, vol. i. p. 144. Compare Heeren's *Ideen*, xii. p. 29.

† The writer of this article only learnt Mr. Knight's conjecture from a note in Creuzer's *Symbolik*, ii. p. 175 [575, 3rd edit.]. He does not possess the work in which it was proposed (*Inq. into the Symbol. Lang.*), and though he read it a year ago, yet as his attention was not then directed to the subject, he had entirely forgotten that the subject of the Amazons was discussed there, and does not now know whether Mr. Knight takes any notice of the hatchet.

precisely the same principle on which among an effeminate and luxurious people the Babylonian Mylitta was honoured by the prostitution of her female devotees, the priestesses of a masculine goddess, such as the Cappadocian Enyo, represented her by assuming the garb of the other sex. And it is easy to conceive that wherever a train of religious ideas prevailed, such as suggested the image described by Bardesanes, there they may have been compendiously expressed by such a symbol as the Amazonian hatchet. The very mode in which it probably originated seems to be pointed out in a fragment of Heraclides Ponticus on the state of Tenedos (Pol. vii.) He relates that King Tennes, from whom the island, before called Leucophrys,* derived its name, was the author of a law by which an adulterer was to be put to death with a hatchet, and that his own son afterwards incurred the penalty; for a memorial of this act of justice the Tenedian coins bore on the one side a hatchet, and on the other two faces, male and female, growing out of one neck. We know however that a totally different explanation of the Tenedian hatchet was given in another legend reported by Pausanias (x. 14), and also that Apollo himself was represented at Tenedos, like the Carian Jupiter, with the hatchet in his hand:† and we may therefore pretty safely conclude that both the stories are only instances of the facility with which the Greek mythology could account for usages the origin of which had been forgotten.

We fear we may already have ventured too far on this dangerous ground, and would not abuse the freedom it offers; we cannot however refrain from adding another remark on the adventure of the double Aeneas. Eudocia (Viol. p. 24), without assigning any locality to the story, relates that Aeneas was a

* This name recalls to mind the Artemis Leucophryne or Leucophryene of Magnesia on the Mæander (Strab. xiv. p. 647). Amazons appear with Cybele on the coins of the other Magnesia, and Petitus, p. 285, is probably right in explaining the introduction of the hatchet in a medal of Demetrias from this circumstance; Beger (Thesaurus, i. 250) has a similar medal with the hatchet, which he does not attempt to explain.

† Steph. Byz. (who mentions both the legends) *Τένειδος*. *Καί φησιν Ἀριστείδης, καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ἐν Τενείδῳ, Ἀπόλλωνα πέλεκυν κρατεῖν διὰ τὰ συμβάντα τοῖς περὶ Τέννην.*

lover of husbandry, who planted a vineyard and tasked his labourers hardly:* so that one of them was provoked to make the prediction which we have seen in another version attributed to an oracle or a seer. The rest of this narrative agrees with the former, and the writer adds that Pherecydes had said Anceæus died of a wound in the thigh, which he received from the Calydonian boar. The severity of Anceæus toward his labourers reminds us of the son of Midas, Lityerses, whose untimely fate was the subject of a plaintive ditty sung in the summer among the Phrygian husbandmen. He had been wont to challenge men to vie with him in reaping, and to scourge those whose strength flagged in the contest: till at length he met with one more robust than himself, and died by his hands (Pollux, iv. 7, 54). This single coincidence indeed would not be a sufficient argument for referring Anceæus to the same class of mythical persons to which Lityerses belongs. The latter, it is well known, corresponded to the Egyptian Maneros, the Phœnician Adonis, and the Mariandynian Borimus, inasmuch as each of them was a hero whose tragical fate was the theme of periodical wailings and mournful lays. Most mythological writers have believed that all these legends and usages had a common origin, and that although they may have been sometimes adopted where their meaning was not known, or retained after it had been forgotten, they were grounded on a natural sympathy with the changes of the seasons, and that the vicissitudes of the sun in his yearly course had been transformed by the popular imagination into a tale of human suffering. This view was not unknown to the ancients; and of the Phrygians and Paphlagonians in particular Plutarch observes, that the former conceived the god as sleeping in winter, and awake in the summer, and that they solemnized his slumber and his uprising with enthusiastic rites; while the Paphlagonians described him as fettered and imprisoned during the gloomy season, and restored to motion and liberty in the spring.† We are not now concerned to vindicate this opinion, though we are far from being convinced by the arguments with

* βαρὺς ἐπέκειτο τοῖς οἰκέταις.

† De Is. et Os. c. 69.

which it has lately been attacked by a writer of consummate learning and ingenuity.* It is sufficient for our present purpose to remark, that as the Anæus of Eudocia coincides in his general character with the Phrygian Lityerses, so in his fate he resembles Attes, Adonis, and the Paphlagonian Borimus: the latter was the son of King Upis, and was killed in his youth while hunting on a summer's day,† whether also by a boar is not mentioned: but perhaps the extent to which religious abstinence from swine's flesh had spread over Asia Minor‡ may justify us in supposing that this was the original and proper form of the story. And if we are allowed to transfer a part of the Arcadian legend to the Samian Anæus, and to think that he may also have been described as a stripling too young for feats of arms, the resemblance between him and the three last-mentioned mythical personages will become still more striking.

To some of our readers these conjectures will probably appear too bold and fanciful: yet before we conclude we must run the risk of still further forfeiting their good opinion, by confessing a suspicion which we have long harboured, that the sacred legend we have just been considering was the real foundation of a narrative which has hitherto been received as a piece of true history. We mean the beautiful tale in the first book of Herodotus, concerning the son of Cræsus, whom his father, after having long used the same precaution as old Aleus with his grandson, of locking up his arms, at last reluctantly sent out against the enormous

* Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 687—692.

† This is the story told by Pollux, iv. 7, 54. Nymphis in Athenæus, p. 619 f., gives a different version, according to which Borimus was the son of a noble and wealthy man, a youth of exceeding beauty: he was inspecting the labours of the harvest, and going to draw water for the reapers disappeared.

‡ At Comana (Strabo, xii. p. 575) τὸ τίμενος . . . διαφανέστατα τῆς τῶν ἰεῖων κρεῶν βρώσεως καθαρεύει, ὅπου γε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις: οὐδ' εἰσάγεται εἰς αὐτὴν ἕς. Pausan. vii. 17, 10. "Ἀττης ἀπέθανεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵός: (in Lydia) καὶ τι ἐπόμενον τοῦτοις Γαλατῶν ἱρῶσιν οἱ Πεσσινοῦντα ἔχοντες, ἰῶν οὐχ ἀπτόμενοι. The same superstition prevailed in Crete; a vestige probably of Phœnician influence; and a curious legend was invented to connect it with the Cretan mythology. A sow was said to have suckled the infant Jupiter, and to have drowned his cries with her grunting: εἰὼ (says Agathocles in Athen. p. 376, a) πάντες τὸ ζῶον τοῦτο περισεπτὸν ἠγοῦνται, καὶ οὐ τῶν κρεῶν δαΐσαντ' ἄν. See also Dion. Perieg. 852, and the Scholiast about Aspendus.

boar that was wasting the Mysian fields, to perish like Anceæus in the chase. We need scarcely remark that the whole story is much more like one in the Arabian Nights than any series of events that ever happened in the world ; that the adventure of Adrastus has no necessary connexion with it ; and finally that the life and character of Cræsus afforded large room and strong temptation for the introduction of fictitious episodes. A tragical tale which the Greeks found current, about the son of a king or a wealthy man who had been cut off in his youth, might very easily be applied to Cræsus. It is undoubtedly true that the adventure related by Herodotus might have had at least a historical foundation : yet when we consider the name of Atys, the scene and the circumstances of his death, we feel strongly inclined to believe that it belongs altogether to the domain of mythology.

PHILIP OF THEANGELA.

IN the first number of the Philological Museum (p. 110) [see above, p. 110], I had occasion to quote a passage of Athenæus which refers to a work of Philip of Theangela: ὁ Θεαγγελεύς. A town of so little note as Theangela might have been thought tolerably fortunate if it had produced only one writer whose name has come down to us. Some critics however have been disposed to add a second. The name of Philip occurs in a passage of Plutarch (Alex. c. 46), with the addition of ὁ εἰσαγγελεύς. Harduin (on Pliny, N. H. v. 29) perceived that this must be the same writer who is quoted by Athenæus. But in the same chapter of Plutarch another author is mentioned with the same addition, Χάρης ὁ εἰσαγγελεύς: and Harduin, meaning of course that his correction should be applied to both cases, proposes to read X. ὁ Θεαγγελεύς. Dacier in a note on the passage of Plutarch (ed. Reiske) approves of the change in both instances: and in that of Philip it has been since received into the text: whether first by Schaefer I do not know. On the other hand, Sainte-Croix, *Examen critique des historiens d'Alexandre-le-Grand* (p. 39, n. 3), objects to both alterations; and, instead of making Plutarch's description of Philip conform to that of Athenæus, is for correcting the text of the latter. I shall give his reasons in his own words. After observing that among the institutions of the Persian court adopted by Alexander was the office of the εἰσαγγελεύς, and that this post was filled by Chares of Mitylené, and enabled him to collect the materials of his work entitled *ἱστορίαι τῶν περὶ Ἀλέξανδρον*, he subjoins the following note: “Χάρης ὁ εἰσαγγελεύς. Plut. Alex. c. 46. Quelques savans

n'ayant pas fait attention au sens de ce dernier mot ont voulu mal à propos le changer. Plutarque ajoute ensuite au nom de Chares celui de Mitylène sa patrie, *ibid.* c. 54. Il parle d'un autre *isangèle*, appelé Philippe, qui avoit aussi écrit quelque chose sur Alexandre. Cet *isangèle* est indubitablement celui dont on avoit un ouvrage historique sur les Léleges et les Cariens (*Strab.* xiv. p. 455. *Athen.* vi. p. 271). Dans ce dernier il faut lire *εἰσαγγελεύς* au lieu de *Θεωγγελεύς*."

In the passage of Strabo (p. 661) our author is described as *Φίλιππος ὁ τὰ Καρικὰ γράψας*. In Plutarch he is mentioned among a crowd of writers who had discussed the subject of the Amazon's visit to Alexander. The story, Plutarch says, was adopted by most of them, *ὦν καὶ Κλείταρχός ἐστι, καὶ Πολύκριτος, καὶ Ὀνησίκριτος, καὶ Ἀντιγένης, καὶ Ἴστρος. Ἀριστόβουλος ἐξ, καὶ Χάρης ὁ εἰσαγγελεύς, καὶ Πτολεμαῖος, καὶ Ἀντικλείης, καὶ Φίλων ὁ Θηβῆαιος, καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ εἰσαγγελεύς, πρὸς ἐξ τούτοις Ἐκκαταῖος ὁ Ερετριεύς, καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, καὶ Δούρις ὁ Σάμιος, πλάσμα φασὶ γεγονέναι τούτο*. It was necessary to transcribe this passage that the reader might be enabled to appreciate the merit of the correction proposed by Sainte-Croix. It will, I think, be evident to every one on a little reflection, that, independently of the authority of manuscripts, his change in the text of Athenæus is quite inadmissible, and that the second *εἰσαγγελεύς* in Plutarch requires some alteration. Plutarch himself was on the side of the minority in the controversy, and for the satisfaction of those readers who might not be convinced either by the nature of the case or by the names opposed to Onesicritus and his fellows, he proceeds to mention that Alexander himself, in a letter to Antipater, gave a full account, *πάντα γράφων ἀκριβῶς*, of the proposal which the king of the Scythians had made to him, at the time when he was supposed to have had his interview with Thalestris, to give him his daughter in marriage, but said nothing about the Amazon. And he adds an anecdote tending almost equally to shake the credit of the story: when Lysimachus had become king of Thrace, he one day heard Onesicritus read the fourth book of his *True History*, which contained the particulars of the

Amazon's visit to the Macedonian hero : *and where, asked the king with a smile, was I at the time?* The same question might have been asked by Chares, if he filled the office of *εἰσαγγελεὺς* at the time to which Onesicritus referred the occurrence. And it can scarcely be doubted that it was for this reason that Plutarch here described him by his office, and not by his birthplace, as in c. 54, and also placed his name between those of Aristobulus and Ptolemy, of whom Arrian (vii. 13) says on the same occasion : *ταῦτα δὲ οὔτε Ἀριστόβουλος, οὔτε Πτολεμαῖος, οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἀνέγραψεν, ὅστις ἴκανος ὑπὲρ τῶν τηλικούτων τεκμηριῶσαι.* If the Philip of Strabo and Athenæus had held the same office, and enjoyed the same means of information as Chares, they would surely have been described together as *οἱ εἰσαγγελεῖς* : if otherwise, Philip would have been described like the other historians by his birthplace.

But whatever may be thought of the true reading in Plutarch, one is at a loss to conceive why Sainte-Croix should have proposed his correction of Athenæus. For even if Plutarch had reasons for calling Philip by his title, Athenæus might still have described him in the usual way, as Plutarch himself does Chares in another chapter. It is scarcely credible that he should have forgotten the passages of Pliny and Stephanus Byzantinus, in which Philip's native town is mentioned, and he does not throw out any suspicion against the text as it now stands there. So that he can hardly be acquitted from the charge of rashness, similar to that of which he has certainly convicted Harduin. Yet the note of this critic on the passage of Pliny raises a doubt of a different kind, which, as it is connected with some historical questions, may deserve to be stated. I must first transcribe the words of Pliny and his commentator. "Dein Cariæ oppida Pitaium, Eutane, Halicarnassus. Sex oppida contributa ei sunt a Magno Alexandro, Theangela, Sibde, Medmassa, Eurenium, Pedasum, Telmissum." On this Harduin remarks : "Theangela, Θεάγγελα πόλις Καρίας Stephano. Apud Athen. vi. p. 271. Philippus Θεαγγελεὺς historicus. Apud Plutarch, Alex. p. 691. Χάρης Εἰσαγγελεὺς pro Θεαγγελεὺς. Et apud Strab. xiii. p. 611. Συνάγελα pro Θεάγγελα." This

proposed emendation of Strabo is perhaps still more *mal à propos* than the one which Sainte-Croix censures. The reading *Συνάγελα* is indeed incorrect, but it required no other change than the slight one suggested by an article in Steph. Byz., who gives not only the name of *Σουάγελα*, which is what Strabo probably wrote, but its etymology. *Σουάγελα πόλις Καρίας ἔνθα ὁ τάφος ἦν τοῦ Κάρου, ὡς ἐηλοῖ καὶ τοῦνομα. Καλοῦσι γὰρ οἱ Κάρου σοῦαν τὸν τάφον, γέλαν ἰὲ τὸν βασιλεία. Ὁ πολίτης Σουαγελεύς.* This seems sufficient to place the reading in Strabo beyond dispute. The doubt it suggests is, whether beside this town of *Σουάγελα* there was another in Caria called *Θεάγελα*. And it must, I think, be admitted that the latter name, wonderful enough in itself, is rendered doubly suspicious by the large portion it has in common with one of barbarian derivation. It would be less surprising if a word of better omen than *σοῦα* had been compounded with *γέλα*, and I should therefore at any rate be inclined to prefer *Θεάγελα* and *Θεαγελεύς*. But Pliny's words raise another question. None of his commentators, so far as I know, has expressed any doubt about the accuracy of his statement; yet to a reader who is familiar with the history of Alexander it must appear on several grounds extremely suspicious. Alexander, according to Arrian, Strabo, and Diodorus, after razing Halicarnassus to the ground, left Ada, as queen or satrapess of Caria, to effect the reduction of the two fortresses, and afterward to rule over the whole province. Pliny is, I believe, the only author who has related that the Conqueror ever concerned himself about the restoration of the city which had cost him so much valuable time; and during his life there seems to have been no motive to induce Ada to transfer her residence thither from Alinda. But if Pliny has made a mistake in this passage, which he may very easily have done by mixing together two extracts, one relating to the destruction of the city by Alexander, and the other to its enlargement or restoration by some other person, it remains to be considered what the fact was which he meant to have recorded. And here we seem to be forced to halt between two opinions almost equally plausible. The first is, that the six towns which he describes as *contributa* were

the same of which Strabo spoke, when, after mentioning that the Leleges had occupied eight towns in Caria, he adds: τῶν δ' ὀκτὼ πόλεων τὰς ἕξ Μάσσωλος εἰς μίαν τὴν Ἀλικαρνασσὸν συνήγαγεν, ὡς Καλλισθένης ἱστορεῖ. Σουάγελα δὲ καὶ Μίνδον ἐπιφύλαξε (XIII. p. 611). If this were so, then Harduin's emendation of Strabo would be false on a new ground: for there must have been a town answering to Pliny's Theangela, different from Strabo's Σουάγελα. But on the other hand, it would not be a very extraordinary coincidence if, when Halicarnassus was rebuilt and repopled, the same number of Carian towns had been made to contribute their inhabitants to it; and this at all events I take to be the sense of Pliny's *contributa*, and not as Harduin explains it, *jura petere Halicarnassum coacta*. But in this case they were probably not the same six which had been incorporated with it by Mausolus; for these, we may conclude from Strabo's ἐπιφύλαξε, had shrunk into insignificant hamlets; and therefore Σουάγελα may have been one of them, and have been miswritten in Pliny or his author, and so may be concealed under the name of Theangela. The name of Pedasum in Pliny's list of the six towns may at first sight seem to determine the question; for if it was the same town with the Πήγασα of Strabo, it must have been one of the six consolidated by Mausolus. But on closer inspection this argument fails; for it is not only possible that one or more of them may have risen again into importance, but it is also uncertain whether Pliny's Pedasum is really identical with Strabo's Πήγασα; since Strabo also mentions a Πήγασον in Caria, Πήγασον δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ νῦν Στρατονικέων πολίχνιόν ἴστιν (l. c.); and Pliny himself had met with the names of two towns differing only in their termination: the Pedasum in the list we are considering, and a Pedasus: for I think there can be no doubt that this is the true reading, v. 36, where at present the text stands: *Nec procul ab Halicarnasso Pidosus*. If these are indeed two different towns, of which I must confess I entertain great doubt, then Pliny's Pedasus is Strabo's Πήγασα, and his Pedasum was not one of those that Mausolus used for the enlargement of his capital.

The restoration of Halicarnassus was probably the work of the

powerful chief who was invested with the government of Caria, on the death of the conqueror, by Perdiccas, and confirmed in it at the second partition by Antipater. The name of this person is written sometimes *Κάσσανῆρος* or *Κάσανῆρος*, sometimes *Ἄσανῆρος*. Wesseling on Diodor. XVIII. 39 observes very truly, that the *Κάσσανῆρος* first mentioned in that chapter cannot be the son of Antipater, though the argument he draws from the words of Diodorus, *παρέξευξε ἐὲ τῷ Ἀντιγόνῳ χιλίαρχον τὸν υἱὸν Κάσσανῆρον*, seems to me of very little weight, and it would have been better simply to have referred to Diodorus, XIX. 62, which is decisive on that point. But this does not seem a sufficient reason for preferring the reading *Ἄσανῆρος*, though this satrap of Caria is probably the same person who is mentioned by Arrian, IV. 7, as *Ἄσανῆρος*. For the latter does not appear to have been the son of Philotas spoken of by Arrian, I. 17, since Diodorus does not describe the satrap by this relation. And on the other hand, he seems studiously to distinguish between the two Cassanders, by some adjunct to the name of one of them, as in XVIII. 39, by *τὸν υἱὸν*, in XIX. 62, *τὸν τῆς Καρίας σατράπην*, and XIX. 75, *ὁ τῆς Ἀσίας κυριεύων*. Compare Justin, XIII. 4. And I am also inclined to suspect that Wesseling is mistaken in considering the Cassander, who is mentioned (XIX. 68) as the colleague of Prepe-laus, as the same person with the satrap of Caria. Odd as it may sound, I think it follows from the words of Diodorus, that Cassander, son of Antipater, sent his forces to the aid of Cassander the satrap of Caria, under the command of a General Cassander. And I conceive there is the less reason for holding the Cassander, whose forces were engaged in the siege of Amisus (Diod. XIX. 57, 60), to be the Carian, as the son of Antipater had demanded Cappadocia from Antigonus as the price of peace (Diod. XIX. 57). But the most unfortunate of all conjectures on this subject is that of Sainte-Croix, in his very valuable *Mémoire sur la Chronologie des Dynastes ou Princes de Carie et sur le Tombeau de Mausole* (*Mémoires de l'Institut Royal*, tom. ii. p. 524). He observes on the name of *Ἄσανῆρος*, “ ce nom me paroît être une altération de celui d'*Alexandre*, plutôt que de celui de *Cassandre*, comme on

pourroit le penser d'après le témoignage de quelques écrivains. Si Cassandre a eu la Carie dans le premier partage, il l'aura perdue dans le second, puisqu'Antipater son père le nomma chiliarque, adjoint d'Antigone, pour surveiller de près la conduite de ce général. Ce fut donc alors qu'Alexandre, ou plutôt Alexandre, fils d'Ada, fut rétabli dans son patrimoine, soit en qualité de dynaste, soit comme satrape, et en lui auroit fini la race d'Hécatombe." The whole of this passage is a tissue of errors. The son of Antipater was most clearly not the person whom Perdiceas appointed to the government of Caria, as Wesseling perceived (note to Diod. xviii. 3), though by some mistake he is so described in the index. If he had been satrap at the time of the second partition, he needed not to have resigned that office when he was made *χιλίαρχος* to Antigonus, any more than the latter found the post of *στράτηγος* incompatible with his government of Lycia. Sainte-Croix's notion, that the name of the satrap of Caria was Alexander, and that he was the son of Ada, is grounded on a strange misconception, which he explains in a note, where he says, "Cette conjecture auroit encore plus de probabilité, si nous pouvions compter sur le témoignage de l'abréviateur de Strabon. Cet écrivain dit qu'Ada s'étant réfugiée auprès d'Alexandre, ce prince adopta son fils et le déclara héritier du trône de Carie. *ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ Ἀλεξιάνδρου, κατέφυγεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἡ Ἄδα, καὶ υἱὸν θετὸν ἐποίησεν καὶ κληρονόμον, καὶ οὕτως τὴν Καρῶν ἀρχὴν ἀνέλαβεν* (Geog. Vet. Hudson, ii. p. 190). Cette phrase est très-obscuré; mais je crois avoir saisi la pensée de l'auteur, qui n'a pu dire qu'Ada adopta son propre fils. Du reste, le fait de l'hérédité ne se trouve ni dans Strabon, ni dans Arrien." How useful a knowledge of grammar may often be to a historian! I shall not insult the reader by translating the Greek words which Sainte-Croix finds so obscure, but shall just remark that Ada's adoption of Alexander the Great is most distinctly mentioned by Arrian, i. 23.

It must depend on the opinion we form about the list of Pliny, containing the name of Theangela, whether we can oppose any direct authority to another assertion of Sainte-Croix, in the same Mémoire (p. 546), that Halicarnassus never entirely recovered

from its last fall (in the time of Alexander). Strabo however, whom he quotes (xiv. p. 656), says nothing to bear him out. Caria, from its situation, probably suffered less than most other provinces of Asia Minor in the wars of the successors of Alexander. The satrap Cassander was a powerful prince, and assuredly did not neglect the advantageous site of Halicarnassus. But after the battle of Ipsus Caria fell into the hands of Lysimachus,* who, as he transplanted Ephesus to the seaside, and peopled it at the expense of Colophon and Lebedos, may have adopted a similar course for the restoration of the capital of Mausolus.

I must add an observation or two on the word *εἰσαγγελεύς*, which has had so great a share in suggesting the preceding discussion. Saintè-Croix (Examen, p. 39) has explained it in a way which, when it is considered as the title of the historian Chares, tends I think to perplex or mislead the reader. He says: "Diodore, en parlant du Perse Aristazane, dit: οὗτος ὁ ἦν εἰσαγγελεύς τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ πιστότατος τῶν φίλων μετὰ Βαγῶαν. xvi. 47. Hesychius nous a conservé le nom Perse de cette charge: Ἀζαραπατεῖς, οἱ εἰσαγγελεῖς παρὰ Πέρσαις: vid. Wesseling ad Diodor. t. ii. p. 118." Now though Chares is called ὁ εἰσαγγελεύς by Plutarch, I doubt very much whether he held the office which was described by the Persian word explained by Hesychius. His gloss has occasioned much controversy, as may be seen by the note in Albertus. But ἀζαραπατεῖς seems to be one Greek way of writing a word which occurs in Daniel iii. 2, and is there rendered in our translation *princes* (See Gesenius' Lexicon, p. 29 [Thes. p. 74], and Bertholdt on Daniel, p. 823). According to these learned orientalists it is equivalent to arch-satrap, or governor-general. The title *εἰσαγγελεύς* does not indeed correspond to it in meaning; but yet it is so far equivalent to it, that either might be properly used to

* See Niebuhr, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 291. [The Bishop adds in his own copy a reference to Droysen, *Hellen.* ii. 423.] In a discussion relating to the geography of Caria it may not be impertinent to remark that the Choloe, near which Attalus defeated the Gauls, and which Niebuhr (p. 284) says he has searched for in vain, and therefore suspects to be the scene of the last battle which Antiochus Hierax lost in Caria, seems clearly to be the *Χολόη* mentioned by Ptolemy among the towns of the Galatian Pontus. See Harduin on Pliny, vi. 3, where the true reading is probably Coloene

describe the same officer. But there was another Greek name for this officer, expressive of other functions, and probably translated from the Persian: this was *χιλίαρχος*. The passages of Ælian, Cornelius Nepos, and Arrian which show the power and dignity of the *χιλίαρχος*, and the identity of his office with that of the *εισαγγελεύς*, are collected by Wesseling on Diod. vol. ii. p. 293.; but he makes a remark on the words of Arrian which seems to me to be unfounded, and leads me to suspect that he did not understand the origin and history of the title. I am not aware that it has ever been distinctly explained; but I believe the following account of it will not be far from the truth. The Persian general who was entrusted with the command of the thousand horse guards, the flower of the Persian cavalry (Herod. vii. 40, viii. 113. *τήν ἵππον τήν χιλίην*), was the king's most confidential servant, and as such presented petitions, or in the Oriental style carried messages to him, and received his answers, and also introduced strangers into the royal presence. His functions were probably not confined to ceremonies, but answered partly to those of a grand vizier, and partly to those from which the office of chancellor took its rise in the states of modern Europe. But there can be little doubt that he had under him a number of officers, who without any trust or power assisted him in the performance of his ceremonial functions: among these were some who might be properly described as *εισαγγελεῖς*. In the court of Alexander, as appears from a comparison of Diodor. xviii. 3, 48, with Arrian, in Photius Bibl. 92, the commander of the companion cavalry stepped into the place of the Persian *χιλίαρχος*. This Wesseling half perceived, and yet, after quoting Ælian and Nepos, he remarks on the words of Arrian, *Περδίκκων χιλιαρχεῖν χιλιαρχίας, ἧς ἤρχεν Ἐφαιστίων· τὸ ἐκ τῆν ἐπιτροπή τῆς ὀδῆς βασιλείας, Putes de eodem munere Arrianum loqui. At secus est. Pheraestio praefectus erat alae equitum, quos ἐταίρους Μακεδόνες vocabant, quae dein praefectura Perdicae fuit mandata, Nostro indice hujus lib. b. 3.* But if the office of *χιλίαρχος* was associated, as it seems to have been in the court of Persia, with that of prime minister, it might well be described in the terms used by Arrian. After the death of Alex-

ander it sank a step, or rather changed its character. The person who held it was second in rank, not to the king, but to the commander-in-chief: as Cassander to Antigonus, and again to Polyperchon. (Diod. xviii. 39, 48.) But though the Persian *χιλῖαρχοι* who filled this station (which is perhaps what Æschylus meant in the case of the *χιλῖαρχος Δαΐάκης*, Persæ, 309) were not only *εἰσαγγελεῖς*, or ushers, but *ἄζαραπατεῖς*, or princes, I need scarcely remark that the latter title might not apply to all persons who bore the former, and that Chares of Mitylené assuredly never held the same office with Hephæstion and Perdicas. Between his and theirs there was probably at least as wide a difference as between a gold stick and the *bâton* of a commander-in-chief: though the same hand which has wielded the latter in the field may carry the former at court without detriment to the public, the converse would have been as false in the days of Alexander, had there been such things then, as it is in our own.

DEATH OF PACHES.

IN Niebuhr's essay on Xenophon's Hellenics, translated in the last number of this Museum,* there is an allusion to the fate of Paches (p. 495), which I would have explained to the reader if I had remembered from what source it was drawn. But the manner in which it was mentioned led me to imagine that what Niebuhr had found was something till then undiscovered, and thus deterred me from searching for it in any of the books to which I have access, and still more from attempting to recollect whether I had before seen or heard of it. Otherwise it might possibly have occurred to me that the anecdote is mentioned by Schneider in a note to Aristotle's Polit. v. 3. My attention was accidentally drawn to this fact by a remark in an excellent little book, Plehn's *Lesbiaca*, where Schneider is censured for giving too much credit to the story. Perhaps I cannot better make amends for my oversight than by laying before the reader the original authorities and some of the opinions which modern critics have expressed upon them. The passage to which Niebuhr evidently refers, and which his edition of the Byzantine Historians had recently brought under his notice, is an epigram of Agathias (57 in Niebuhr's ed. Anthol. Gr. Jacobs, tom. iv. p. 34).

Ἑλληνὶς τριμάκαιρα, καὶ ἡ χαρίεσσα Λάμαξις
ἦσπιν μὲν πάτρας φέγγεα Λεσβιάδος.
ὄκκα δ' Αθηναίησι σὺν ὀλκάσιν ἐνθάδε κέλσας
τὰν Μιτυληναίων γὰν ἀλάπαξε Πάχις,
τὰν κοινῶν ἀέλικως ἠρύσσατο, τὼς ἐξ̄ συνένων
ἔκτανεν, ὡς τήνας τῆ̄ε βιησόμενος.

* Philological Museum, i. 485.

ταῖ δὲ κατ' Αἰγαίοιο ῥόου πλατὸν λαῖτμα φερέσθην,
 καὶ ποτὶ τὰν κραναὰν Μοῦσπίαν ἐραμέτιν·
 εἰάμω δ' ἀγγελέτιν ἀλιτήμονος ἔργα Πάχιτος,
 μέσφα μιν εἰς ὄλοϊν κῆρα συνήλασάτιν.
 τοῖα μὲν, ὦ κόρα, πεπονθήκατον· ἄψ δ' ἐπὶ πάτραν
 ἦκετον, ἐν ἑ' αὐτῇ κείσθον ἀποφθιμένοι·
 εἴ δὲ πόνων ἀπόνασθον, ἐπεὶ ποτὶ σᾶμα συνένων
 εὔχετον, ἐς κλεινᾶς μνᾶμα σαοφροσύνας·
 ὑμνέουσιν δ' ἔτι πάντες ὁμόφρονας ἠρωῶνας,
 πάτρας καὶ ποσίων πῆματα τισαμένας.

Mr. Jacobs remarks on this epigram (*Animadv.* vol. iii. 1, p. 112), Paches, ejus amores et supplicium in hoc epigr. enarrantur, missus est adversus Mitylenaeos anno quinto belli Peloponnesiaci Ol. 88. 2. Ejus in Mitylenaeis tractandis lenitatem et moderationem laudat Thueyd. III. 28. Cf. Diodor. Sic. t. i. p. 515 (XII. 55). Nec omnino quidquam est apud historicos quod historiae in hoc epig. narratae fidem faciat, nisi fortasse quod Aristoteles tradit Polit. v. 4. (Schneid. 3.) bellum illud Mitylenaeorum adversus Athenienses a mulieribus ἐπικλήροις originem cepisse. Recte igitur Reiskius, p. 220. hanc historiam ad veteres fabellas amatorias, quas Milesias appellant, referendam esse censet. In the passage referred to Aristotle says: καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην ἐξ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχὴ κακῶν, καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ᾧ Πάχις ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν· Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος ἕξο θηγατέρως, ὁ περὶσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβὼν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ Δόξανδρος ἠρξεν τῆς στάσεως, καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρώξενε, πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως. Schneider's note is: "Thuecydides III. 2, ubi narrat bellum a Pachete gestum et Mitylenen captam originem referens obiter haec posuit: καὶ αὐτῶν Μιτυληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων μνηστῆρ γίγνονται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. In Agathiae Epigr. *Analectorum* III. p. 64. narratur Pachetem in amorem incidisse duarum Mitylanaearum mulierum, Lamaxidis et Hellenidis, quarum

maritos cum occidisset, eos secum abduxit, deinde ipse ab iis occisus. Forte hae sunt illae ipsae duae ἐπίκλησται virgines de quibus noster narrat." Mr. Plehn, in the work above quoted, p. 61, observes: "Schneiderus Agathiae narrationi plus quam par est tribuere videtur. Merito Reiskius et Jacobsius historiam illam ad veteres fabellas amatorias, Milesiarum nomine appellatas, referendam esse existimant."

If I venture to interpose a word in this discussion, it is certainly not because I attach any importance to the question, whether the story in Agathias is anything more than an idle fiction arbitrarily connected with a historical name. Few unprejudiced persons will think either much better of the Athenians, if they condemned their general for an atrocious crime committed for his own private ends, or much worse of them, if they did not accept his public services as a sufficient defence against a charge of misconduct which appeared to them clearly proved. But still, as the behaviour of the Athenians towards Paches has been made a ground of severe censure on them by some writers, both ancient and modern, the question deserves to be placed on a right footing, which, it seems to me, none of the critics whose remarks I have quoted have done.

In the first place, the story in Agathias certainly does not gain the slightest degree of credibility by being compared with the fact mentioned by Aristotle; for that the two daughters of Timophanes should have been the same women who became the victims of the lust of Paches, would be a most extraordinary coincidence, which it would be arbitrary beyond measure to assume without any authority; so that I can scarcely believe that this was Schneider's meaning. On the contrary, it would be very easy to conceive how the incident mentioned by Aristotle might in the course of ages be combined with the violent death of the conqueror Paches, and so worked up into the tale on which the epigram is founded, which would not be a stranger perversion of history than we find frequently occurring in Malalas. But this bare possibility is not in itself an argument sufficient even to raise a presumption, and surely will not justify us in pronouncing the Lesbian legend to be no better than a Milesian story. The reasons given by Mr. Jacobs

for treating it with contempt are such as I should not have expected from an intelligent critic. I lay no stress on the public conduct of Paches, whom Mr. Mitford, not certainly without reason, brands with the reproach of treachery and cruelty; because it does not follow, though he looked upon all means as indifferent in the service of the state, that he was equally reckless in his private capacity. But, on the other hand, we should be as little at liberty to presume that, if he was capable of being transported by the heat of his passions into an outrage against humanity, he must therefore have been a monster of cruelty, who could find pleasure in executing a commission to massacre the population of a whole city in cold blood. We do not want the light of Profane History to assure us that this would be a very erroneous inference. No conclusion therefore can be drawn as to this point from the character of Paches, so far as it is known to us from history. The story of Agathias, considered by itself, contains no improbable circumstance, unless it be that Paches committed two crimes of the same kind. Otherwise there is nothing in it that presents any appearance even of exaggeration. It sounds like a simple unvarnished narrative of a fact which was likely to live long in the recollection of the Lesbians. The legitimate course therefore would seem to be, to inquire whether this fact is inconsistent with any other which has been transmitted to us on better authority. Mr. Mitford's description of the end of Paches would lead the reader to suppose that we have only to choose between Agathias and Plutarch; and this would certainly reduce us to a painful perplexity. But the passages to which Mr. Mitford refers in his margin do not contain quite so much as he has stated in his text. Neither in the life of Aristides, c. 26, nor in that of Nicias, c. 6, where he alludes to the death of Paches, does Plutarch mention the specific charge brought against him. This deficiency Mr. Mitford has supplied by relating that Paches was "called upon to answer a charge of peculation." This term is undoubtedly well adapted to raise a strong suspicion of sycophancy on the part of the accusers, and of levity and ingratitude on the part of the judges, who, perhaps, on very slight evidence, were excited by

“the virulent orators who conducted the accusation” against the honest, plain-speaking soldier, and by their credulity “so raised his indignation” that he stabbed himself to the heart in their presence. Plutarch however only relates the issue of the cause; the rest of the scene is from the hand of Mr. Mitford. I do not mean by this to impute to him a wilful fabrication, but only an oversight, into which he was betrayed by the natural desire of producing an additional illustration of his favourite thesis. But when a history is written for the sake of a certain theory, there is always a danger that the theory will every now and then become the foundation of the history.

A different, but perhaps an equally instructive way of writing a romance on the subject, would have been to suppose that in the intoxication of his military success Paches had given way to a strong temptation, and had been led to tarnish the honour of a glorious life by a base and cruel murder; that he returned to Athens to receive the reward of his services, but was followed by the unhappy women whose peace he had destroyed; that in the presence of the assembled people they disclosed and proved his guilt; and that when, instead of congratulation and applause, he heard nothing but the accents of horror and indignation from all around him, shame and remorse and the avenging Furies stung him to madness, and he turned his victorious sword against his own breast.

This would indeed have been a romantic adventure for an Athenian or any other court of justice. Yet it must be remembered that the circumstance which sounds most romantic in it is that which belongs equally to the other version of the story; and I will only add, that if the latter be the true one, if an Athenian officer in the Peloponnesian war was unable to support a verdict given against him on a charge of peculation, and was excited by it to fall on his own sword, the case affords a new illustration of a common remark, that things sometimes happen in the world which would be thought too improbable for a romance.

HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OVER THE ALPS.

THE celebrated question of Hannibal's passage across the Alps has now for some years been suffered to sleep in this country, and it appears to be a pretty general persuasion that it has been finally set at rest. The result of General Melville's personal observations, illustrated by De Luc's learning, and confirmed by the investigations of an English traveller (the author of the Oxford *Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal across the Alps*), was in 1825 repeated in the Edinburgh Review, and by the last writer (p. 182) is supposed to be placed beyond the reach of controversy. It is probable that the Reviewer, though he has certainly contributed less of argument to the cause than any of his predecessors, has produced more effect on the mind of the public than all of them put together, and that he has the chief merit in establishing the general conviction which seems at present to prevail, that Hannibal crossed the Alps by the passage of the Little St. Bernard. If the repose into which the controversy has subsided had been merely the result of weariness on the part of the disputants or of the public, we should have scrupled to add even a scrap to the enormous mass of literature which has been already piled upon this theme. But as those who have taken an interest in the question, and who are not wedded to the opinion they may have embraced, may like to know on what grounds arguments which to themselves had appeared decisive have not satisfied others, and by what means later inquirers have attempted to remove objections which they

had thought fatal to a different view of the subject, we make no apology for reviving the discussion. Our design however is not to pursue the history of the controversy through the various works in which it has been carried on abroad since it has been dropped at home: an attempt for which we have neither space, means, nor inclination: we shall confine ourselves to a brief notice of two hypotheses different from that which now enjoys the monopoly of public favour. One of these we are tempted to mention, rather by its singularity than by its intrinsic merit, or by the force of the arguments employed in supporting it. The other deserves to be reconsidered, because it has been very lately defended with great ability by a writer whose opinion on the subject carries with it high authority, and in a work dedicated to the illustration of ancient geography. We must presume the reader to be sufficiently familiar with the principal points of the controversy to dispense with a great deal of preliminary explanation which may be found in a multitude of books, and which would detain us from the essential features of the question on which alone we have here room to dwell.

The first of the two hypotheses we are about to consider was proposed, we believe for the first time, in the *Wiener Jahrbuecher* for 1823, by a writer named Arneth, who at the same time examines at considerable length the opinions and arguments of the principal authors who had discussed the question before him. He recognises the authority of Polybius as supreme in this inquiry, but contends that we cannot rely on the numbers which express the distances in stadia according to the present text. He quotes with approbation the remarks of the Oxford writer, who to get rid of the objection raised by Strabo's enumeration of the passes of the Alps according to Polybius, supposes, as Cluverius had done before, that the words ἡν' Ἀννίβας ἐπιήλθεν, which follow the mention of the pass ἐν τῷ Ταυρίνων, belong not to Polybius, but to Strabo, and only express an opinion of the latter, which he had probably adopted from Livy. But he rejects the argument which De Luc draws from the later Roman roads across the Alps as fallacious. He observes that De Luc himself appears to acknow-

ledge its weakness, when he admits that most of these roads were made in the time of the emperors. What inference, he asks, can be drawn, as to an event about the circumstances of which authors disagreed even at the time, from the existence of roads made some centuries later? The Edinburgh Reviewer rests his whole argument on this ground: for after mentioning the four roads which Strabo enumerates from Polybius, though without noticing the existence of the words, ἢν Ἀννίβας ἐπιήλθεν, he concludes that, as no one maintains that Hannibal crossed either by the Maritime or the Rhaetian Alps, "the object of our search must ultimately be found to coincide either with Mont Genevre or the Little St. Bernard." It might have been asked: but why not with the Mont Cenis? De Luc replies that this is out of the question, because no Roman road passed over it. On which Arneth remarks, that by similar reasoning it might be shown that it probably continues untrodden to the present day: for why should the ancients have adhered more constantly to the beaten tracks than the moderns? As Charlemagne led his armies across the Mont Cenis, without inquiring about the Roman roads, so the Romans might carry a road over the Little St. Bernard, without troubling themselves about Hannibal's route.

According to Arneth himself Hannibal crossed the Rhone near Pont St. Esprit, and with the exception of the distance between Vienne and Yenne, where he took the shortest cut, never quitted the banks of that river till he reached the foot of the Simplon, by which passage he crossed the Alps, and descended into the territory of the Insubres near Milan. As this hypothesis diverges from General Melville's still more widely than any that had preceded it, we are naturally curious to hear the grounds on which it rests. The author conceives that no other can be reconciled either with the circumstances of Hannibal, or with the statements of Polybius: in other words, the course it points out was the most natural for Hannibal to take, and answers best to that which Polybius describes. The first of these assertions depends chiefly on a remark which had been made by the author of the *Dissertation*, but which Arneth thinks he has not consistently pursued to

its legitimate consequences. The English writer observes: "The most rational and easy way to penetrate through a very extended chain of mountains is to trace the rivers which flow from them up to their sources, for subsistence and population are generally to be found on their banks, and the road is usually more easy and the ascent more gradual," &c. True! exclaims the German reviewer, but why did not this remark lead the author to follow the course of the Rhone? Here he conceives is an insurmountable objection to the hypothesis which leads Hannibal across the Little St. Bernard. It assigns no motive that should have induced him to quit the basin of the Rhone: and hence he considers the route of the Great St. Bernard as one step nearer to the truth. The former however labours under some other difficulties: as, the silence of Polybius about the Isere, the names of the tribes into whose territories it leads, which were not the Insubres, but either the Salassi, or the Lai and Lebecæ (Polyb. 11. 17). In the description of Polybius there are two features which strike him as the most important, and as affording a decisive criterion which no other hypothesis but his own will bear. In the first place, Polybius describes the valley of the Rhone, and remarks that the plains of the Po are separated from it by the chain of the Alps, and adds that these were the mountains which Hannibal crossed from the country on the Rhone to enter into Italy (*ἀκρόρεια, ἃς τόθ' ὑπεράρας Ἄννίβας ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ῥοῦανὸν τόπων ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Ἰταλίαν*). Hence it must have been from some point in the Valais that Hannibal effected his passage. This might indeed have been Martigny, if there had been no other objection to the Great St. Bernard. But beside that the distances and features of the road do not correspond to the account of Polybius, and that Strabo informs us that this track was impassable for beasts of burden before the time of Augustus (Strabo says, IV. p. 205, *ἡ εἰς τοῦ Πουίμου λεγομένου ζεύγσειν οὐ βατή κατὰ τὰ ἄκρα τῶν Ἰαλλεων*), it would have brought Hannibal down into a different region from that which he sought, and found according to Polybius, who expressly states that after having accomplished the passage of the Alps in fifteen days, he came boldly down to

the plains on the Po, and to the nation of the Insubres. This points to the neighbourhood of Milan, and thus confirms the conclusion already drawn from the direction in which the nature of the Transalpine regions tended to determine Hannibal's march.

But now the intelligent reader will naturally be tempted to inquire, as the author takes Polybius for his guide, how he reconciles his hypothesis with some other statements of the historian no less precise than those just adduced, and apparently very difficult to accommodate to the route here proposed. Polybius, after relating the assistance which Hannibal gave to the elder of the two brothers whom he found at war in the *Island*, proceeds to say that he marched eight hundred stadia in ten days by the side of the river, and then began the ascent of the Alps (III. 50. Ἀννίβας ἐν ἡμέραις δέκα πορευθεὶς παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν εἰς ὀκτακοσίους σταδίους ἤρξατο τῆς πρὸς τὰς Ἄλπεις ἀναβολῆς). The German critic measures this ten days' march from Vienne, where he conceives Hannibal arrived in four days after having crossed the Rhone (Polybius, III. 49, says that he came in that time to the *Island*), and he makes it terminate somewhere near Thonon on the Lake of Geneva. But unfortunately, satisfied with attempting to show that on these suppositions the time occupied by the passage of the Simplon would agree with the numbers in Polybius, he has neglected to explain some other difficulties. For instance, it seems extraordinary that Polybius should assign ten days as the duration of Hannibal's march along the Rhone, if at the end of that time he still continued for several days to keep by the side of that river. And it is no less difficult to conceive why any point on the Lake of Geneva should have been selected as a limit between the first and the last part of this march. If however the historian had wished to mark a difference in the nature of the country, without meaning to imply that the road now quitted the Rhone, one should rather have expected to be brought at the end of the ten days to St. Jean Gingoulph, and to find a description of the entrance of the Valais. Polybius (III. 50) contrasts the march along the plain with the ascent of the mountains in a manner which clearly implies that the latter begins at the end of the ten

days' march. How can his description be adapted to the road between Thonon and Bryg? Arnoeth has neglected to answer this question, and though he objects to General Melville's hypothesis, that Polybius does not a second time mention the Isere, by the side of which the road mounts toward the pass of the Little St. Bernard, he has not thought it necessary himself to explain the historian's silence as to the Lake of Geneva, which, if Hannibal skirted its eastern shore, it would at any rate have been natural to mention, and which, if the ten days' march ended there, it was scarcely possible to omit noticing. Until these difficulties and several others which we need not here point out are removed, this hypothesis will probably gain few adherents; and certainly the objections which the author has raised to some of those which he rejects are not so formidable that they need drive us to such desperate expedients. If indeed Hannibal had been without guides or information about the country, there might be room to ask why he did not follow the valley of the Rhone till he heard of a pass which would lead him into the part of Italy which he desired to reach. But if he had means of learning that by quitting the Rhone at Yenne he could effect his object with less difficulty and danger, the motive required is supplied. Still less weight can be attached to the argument drawn from the words of Polybius which describe Hannibal as crossing from the countries on the Rhone into Italy. This description will surely apply to any one point in the basin of the Rhone between its source and its mouth, or, as Polybius describes it, from the head of the Adriatic to Marseilles (III. 47), as to another. The advantage which the pass of the Simplon possesses, of bringing Hannibal immediately into the territory of the Insubres, is of no moment until it is proved that no other answers the same condition; while the distance between Milan and the capital of the Taurini renders the expedition which he undertook against them less intelligible than if he descended and rested his army on the borders of their territory.

But we turn to another view of the subject, which has much higher claims to our attention, both in the name of the author and in the arguments with which he has supported his opinions.

It is contained in an appendix which Ueckert has annexed to the third volume of his elaborate work (*Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, 1832). He has there defended a hypothesis which had been adopted by many learned men, and within these few years by a French author (Laranza, *Histoire critique du Passage des Alpes par Annibal*, 1826) whose book I have not been able to meet with : that Hannibal crossed the Mont Cenis. Ueckert has the advantage of coming last to the discussion of this question, with a thorough knowledge of all that has been done by his predecessors, and with all the light that profound geographical learning can throw upon it ; so that a review of his arguments may exhibit, though not the history of the controversy, yet the latest stage which it has reached.

There are, it is well known, four main points on which the whole controversy depends. 1. The passage of the Rhone. 2. The position of the *Island* and Hannibal's movements in it. 3. His march to the foot of the mountains. 4. The passage of the Alps. These we will consider in their order. We must however premise that Ueckert takes a different view of the relative authority of Polybius and Livy from that which has been adopted by many, perhaps by most, preceding writers, and particularly by the advocates of General Melville's hypothesis. He observes that though the zeal with which Polybius laboured to ascertain the truth is indisputable, his means were not exactly proportioned to his good-will. As the Alps in his time were inhabited by fierce and unconquered tribes, it was not in his power to explore them with the same calmness and undivided attention as the modern travellers who have visited them with his book in their hands. The dangers and difficulties which these regions opposed to such researches in early times are alluded to by Polybius himself, III. 59, and are indicated by Strabo, IV. c. 6, where he mentions repeatedly the ferocious character and predatory habits of the Alpine tribes. Amongst the rest he says of the Salassi, who inhabited the valley of Aosta, that till lately they had maintained their independence against the Romans, and had been in the habit of doing much harm to those who crossed the mountains through their country. Πολλὰ

κατέβλαπτον τοὺς εἰ αὐτῶν ὑπερβάλλοντας τὰ ὄρη, κατὰ τὸ ληστρικὸν ἔθος. Notwithstanding his travels, the geographical knowledge which Polybius had acquired was very imperfect; his conception of the direction of the Alps, and the course of the Rhone, erroneous; and his errors in this respect led him to say that Hannibal, after crossing the Rhone, marched away from the sea eastward, as if he had been making for the midland parts of Europe (III. 47); when, if he had been correctly informed, he would have spoken of the north. With regard to Livy's relation to Polybius, Uckert observes, that though the Roman frequently took the Greek author's description as the foundation of his own, yet, as the countries of which Polybius wrote were much better known in the time of Augustus, he also drew more accurate accounts from other sources, with which he supplied the defects of his predecessor, but sometimes without perceiving that he was framing his narrative out of statements which were irreconcilably discordant. We now proceed to notice the author's views on the four above-mentioned questions.

1. The Passage of the Rhone. Instead of Pont St. Esprit, or Roquemaure, the point selected by De Luc and his followers, Uckert conceives that Hannibal crossed the river considerably lower down, near Beaucaire. Polybius indeed says that the passage took place at about the distance of four days' journey from the sea. (III. 42. *σχέδὸν ἡμερῶν τεττάρων ὅσον ἀπέχων στρατοπέδῳ τῆς θαλάσσης.* There is no reason for rendering this four days' *march*. According to the other meaning the distance will be somewhat greater; but this will suit the actual distance between Roquemaure and the mouth of the river perhaps better than the four days' march.) Still this agreement can afford no safe criterion until we have ascertained the point from which Polybius began his measurement of the distance from the sea, which, as the mouths of the Rhone have experienced great changes, cannot now be determined, and also the direction in which he measured it; and this may have depended on the road which the state of the waters near the mouth of the river left practicable. When allowance is made for these considerations,

Uckert thinks that Beaucaire might not be too near the sea to be so described. The motive for preferring it to other points higher up is, that it lay on the Roman road from Spain, which passed through Ruscino and Illiberis, two points, as we learn from Livy, in Hannibal's march. (Strabo, iv. p. 187. Νέμανσος . . . ἕρπυται κατὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἰβηρίας εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν . . . διέχει δ' ἡ Νέμανσος τοῦ μὲν Ῥοδανοῦ περὶ ἑκατὸν σταδίους καθὼ ἐν τῇ περαίᾳ πολίχνην ἐστὶ Ταράσκων.) According to the present text of Polybius (iii. 39), there was already in his time a measured and marked Roman road from Carthagera, or even from Gades, to the passage of the Rhone; for after stating the distance, he adds: ταῦτα γὰρ νῦν βεβημάτισται καὶ σεσημείωται κατὰ σταδίου ὀκτῶ ἑὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐπιμελῶς. But Uckert gives some strong reasons for suspecting that these words are a marginal note, which has been introduced into the text. The fact they state is itself, for the time of Polybius, highly improbable; and if it had been so he would not have qualified his account of the distance, as he does in two instances, with the particle *περί*. But moreover, the length assigned in this remark to the Roman mile is not the same as which, as Strabo informs us, Polybius estimated it. (vii. p. 322. Πολύβιος προστιθεὶς τῷ ὀκτασταδίῳ ἑίπλεθρον, ὃ ἐστὶ τρίτον σταδίου.) Hence there is no reason to suppose that in the time of Polybius the distances he mentions had been precisely ascertained, nor can we safely draw any inference from them as to the point at which Hannibal reached the river. But on the other hand, it is highly probable that the track which Hannibal pursued was the same along which the Roman road was afterwards carried. If so, he had no motive for deviating from it. As the arrival of the Roman army was unexpected, he could not alter his course for the purpose of avoiding the enemy. Nor is it likely that he should have been influenced by the passage of the Durance, which in the dry season presents no difficulties. The Roman road to Lyons always crossed this river, because the inconvenience it might sometimes occasion was compensated by the advantage of passing the Rhone lower down where its stream was less rapid. That the distance of the place, where Hannibal

crossed, from the sea was not so great as has been supposed by De Luc, seems to follow from Scipio's march to the Carthaginian camp from the mouth of the river. He reached it in three days, if indeed this is not the time spent both in going and returning to his ships, as the language both of Polybius and Livy might be construed. (Pol. III. 49; Liv. XXI. 32.) We are not told that *he* crossed the Durance, which proves either that it did not lie in his way, or that it was not dangerous. Uckert also raises a question whether the vessels (λέμβοι) in which Hannibal transported his troops, and which were such as the natives used for sea voyages, could have ascended the river as high as Roquemaure. Polybius indeed remarks that Hannibal selected a part of the river which was not broken by islands for his passage. (III. 42. ἐνεχίρει ποιῆσθαι τὴν λιβάσιν κατὰ τὴν ἀπλὴν ῥύσιν.) But it is not necessary on this account to seek for a place distant from every island, nor to reject Beaucaire because it lies opposite one. All that is implied by the description is that Hannibal crossed either above or below the island, most probably the former. The description in Zonaras (VIII. 23) implies that some islands were near.

2. The *Island*. From the place where he passed the Rhone, Hannibal marched in four days to the *Island*. Livy explains the direction he thus took by his wish to avoid the enemy. Polybius does not seem to be aware that it was a circuitous route: this Uckert ascribes to his incorrect conception of the course of the Rhone. The real motive he supposes to have been the wish to avoid the territories of hostile Ligurian tribes: the road was the same which the Celtic envoys had taken for the same reason. With respect to the position of the *Island*, Uckert admits it to be the tract which is bounded by the Rhone, the Isere, and the intervening mountains; but on almost every other point he is completely at variance with the partisans of General Melville. He does not allow that any alteration is required in the text either of Polybius or Livy where they describe the *Island*. As to the former, the assertion which the Edinburgh Reviewer (p. 182) repeats after De Luc—that General Melville read Ἰσάρας for Σκάρας or Σκώρας in a Vatican MS. of Polybius—has been con-

tradicted by Maio, who assured Laranza that he had examined all the manuscripts of Polybius in that library, and had found no such reading. Uckert thinks the change unnecessary, because he believes that Polybius did not know the true name of the Isere, and that he mistook it for the Rhone, and applied the name of Scaras or Scoras to the real Rhone. Neither Livy nor Polybius requires us to suppose that Hannibal *entered* the *Island*; at least with his whole army: he might have settled the dispute between the brothers which was referred to his arbitration (Liv. XXI. 31. *Hujus seditionis disceptatio quum ad Hannibalem rejecta esset, arbiter regni factus, quod ea senatus principumque sententia fuerat, imperium majori restituit*), either by his authority, or by sending a small detachment of his army. (His personal presence certainly seems to be implied by the words of Polybius, III. 49. *συνεπιθέμενος καὶ συνεκβαλὼν τὸν ἕτερον*.) Hence it is not necessary to infer, from the expression *ἦκε πρὸς τὴν Νῆσον* (ibid.), that in this four days' march the Carthaginian army even reached the banks of the Isere; and consequently the six hundred stadia, which according to Polybius were traversed in this march, do not compel us to fix the passage of the Rhone north of the Durance, though there were seven hundred stadia from that river to the Isere.

Polybius distinguishes the inhabitants of the *Island*, whom he merely terms barbarians without naming them, from the Allobriges, through whose territory Hannibal marched to the foot of the Alps, and from whose hostility the barbarians of the *Island* protected him (c. 50). The Allobriges or Allobroges appear to have been driven northward from their original seats, in which they were known to Apollodorus as a most powerful nation (Steph. Byz. Ἀλλόβρωγες), and in the time of Livy to have been confined to the country north of the Isere. This state of things he has transferred to the time of Hannibal. *His* Allobroges inhabit the *Island* of the barbarians of Polybius, which is south of his own *Island*: *incolunt prope Allobroges*. Livy's *Island*, formed by the Rhone and the Saône (Arar), is described in a manner which will not apply to that of Polybius, even if the name Arar is altered to

Isara. It is not a tract resembling the Delta of the Nile, but only a considerable district (*agri aliquantum*). But the kingdom about which the contest decided by Hannibal has arisen is that of the Allobroges: *they* become Hannibal's friends and allies. It is not however said that he marches through their territory: after he has composed their dissensions, he turns to the left toward the Tricastini, and meets with no obstacle until he reaches the Druentia: a description which, except with regard to the Druentia, agrees with that of Polybius, on the supposition that Hannibal did not cross the Isere, and that Polybius took this river for the Rhone. As an additional proof that Polybius did not conceive Hannibal to have marched through the Island, Uekert very sagaciously refers to the description of those difficult and almost inaccessible mountains (*ὄρη ἐνσπρόσοδα καὶ ἐνσέμβολα καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπρόσιτα*) which formed its third side; and compares this with the vindication of Hannibal's prudence against those who exaggerated the difficulties of his passage: (*τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας, ἔτι δ' ἐρμυνότιτος καὶ ἐνσχωρίας τῶν τόπων, ἔκκηλον ποιεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν*, c. 48.)

3. According to Polybius, Hannibal is conducted through the territory of the Allobroges by the barbarians of the *Island* to the foot of the Alps. He performs this march, a distance of eight hundred stadia, in ten days, during which he kept by the side of the river. On the supposition we are now explaining, as the river is the Isere, there is no necessity for doing any violence to the words *παρὰ τὸν ποταμόν*, whereas De Luc and his followers are forced to suppose a deviation of several hundred stadia from the Rhone between Vienne and Yenne. In the direction of the march, Livy coincides with Polybius, when he makes Hannibal bend his course to the left toward the Tricastini, and then skirt the borders of the Vocontii toward the Tricorii. It is the same road as Bellovesus and his Gauls had formerly taken (Liv. v. 34). The expression, *ad levam in Tricastinos flexit*, must be understood with reference to the previous words, *cum jam Alpes peteret*: when Hannibal had turned his front toward the Alps, the Tricastini and the Isere lay on his left. We have therefore only to measure the eight hundred

stadia along the Isere: they will bring us to Montmeillan, and here, on leaving the river, we enter the mountains. But if this is the road by which Livy also leads us, how do we come to the Durance? It is the mention of this river which has subjected Livy to the charge of ignorance and carelessness from those who believed that he led Hannibal across the Mont Genevre, and yet adopted a description from Polybius which is only applicable to a different part of the Alps. Uckert thinks that this imputation is unfounded, and that Livy's Druentia is not the Durance. He observes that Druentia, like Doria, may have been the name of several Alpine streams, and that the Drac, which Hannibal would have to cross on the road to Montmeillan, answers perfectly to Livy's description of the Druentia. After this the road follows the valley of the Arc toward Mont Cenis. It has been urged that the valley of the Isere could alone supply the Carthaginian army with the means of subsistence. To this objection Uckert replies, that the Carthaginians in fact suffered from the want of provisions (Pol. III. 60. *κακῶς ἀπήλλαττε τῆ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων σπάνει*), that according to Livy (c. 31) they brought a stock with them, to which Polybius also alludes (III. 60), supplied themselves for three days from the plunder of the town (c. 33), and afterwards received a fresh supply from the natives (c. 34). The motive for quitting the Isere at Montmeillan is sufficiently indicated by the map, which shows that the road from hence to Turin, compared with that by the Little St. Bernard, is the chord of a great curve.

The combat with the mountaineers would take place in the defile between Aiguebelle and Argenti; the army encamped in the plain by Argenti, and hereabouts lay the captured town. On the fifth day it would encamp near St. Jean de Maurienne, in a fruitful valley. But as our object is not to describe the march, but to explain the nature of the arguments by which Uckert supports his hypothesis, we need not enter into any further details on this part of the subject, and will only add one or two remarks on

4. The Passage of the Alps. The *λευκόπετρον*, which General Melville believed he had discovered on the road of the

Little St. Bernard, appears to be still more strikingly represented on that of the Mont Cenis, or rather, according to one of the latest travellers who has visited the country with a view to this question (Laranza), it is nowhere else to be found. Saussure had remarked it as one of the most singular features in this passage: *Le Mont Cenis présente quelques singularités que je ne dois pas omettre de faire remarquer. D'abord ce grand amas de gypse du côté de la Savoie, &c.* It is known by the name of *Rocher blanc*, or *le plan de roche blanche*. Its form and its position, for it overhangs the Arc on the right, while on the left the road passes by the foot of the precipices down which the natives may have rolled great stones on the Carthaginian army, exactly correspond to the historian's description.

The *plateau* of the Mont Cenis, where Hannibal would arrive between the 25th and 30th of October, and where, if he passed over it, he remained two days, is excellently suited for an encampment: it is sheltered by the surrounding ridges, and affords good pasture on the margin of its little lake. Snow had by this time fallen for some weeks, and having been turned into ice by the heat of the sun and the frost of the nights, might be taken for the remains of the former winter. (Polyb. III. 55; Liv. XXI. 36.) From the top of the ridge which encloses the basin of the Hospice, Hannibal might have pointed out the plains of Piedmont to a part of his troops.

It was not to be expected that Livy should omit the opportunity which his subject supplied of a rhetorical description of the horrors of the Alps. Accordingly he has painted them (XXI. 32) in terms which as they are not applicable to the Mont Genevre, which it has been supposed he meant to describe, have subjected him to the reproach of ignorance or inconsistency. Uekert, on the other hand, observes that it is Polybius who has exaggerated the rigour of the climate at the top of the Alps, and that Livy, more accurately informed, has softened those features in his description which are too highly charged. The former, after mentioning that the elephants had suffered greatly from hunger before the road was opened for them in that part of the descent which

detained the army for three days, adds, that the summits and the topmost sides of the Alps are all utterly destitute of wood and herbage (τελέως ἄενετρα καὶ ψιλὰ), because the snow remains upon them constantly both summer and winter. Livy, in describing the descent, notices the existence of at least a scanty vegetation (c. 36, *virgulta ac stirpes circa eminentes*—c. 37, *nuda fere cacumina sunt, et, si quid est pabuli, obruunt nives*). With respect also to the celebrated expedient by which Livy represents Hannibal to have opened a road down the precipice which stopped his march, Uckert vindicates the Roman historian from the charge of gross credulity which has frequently been brought against him; by none more confidently, or perhaps with less knowledge of the subject, than the Edinburgh Reviewer (p. 168), who in general throughout the article seems to have thought it necessary to make up for the want of originality by the dogmatical tone with which he asserts the opinion he adopts, and the asperity with which he censures those who either contradict it, or involuntarily give evidence against it. The real foundation of the account about the fire and vinegar is still matter of controversy among competent judges. The Reviewer, who does not seem to know that it was even thought to have had any, has certainly not entitled himself to pronounce that it was “doubtless intended as an embellishment.”

Still less is he justified, so far as Livy is concerned, in his remark (p. 169), that “the radical error which has infected the speculations of all those who have turned their attention to this question, from the time of Livy to that of Mr. Whitaker, appears to have consisted in their first adopting some hypothesis as to the shortest and most practicable road from Gaul into Italy, and *then* betaking themselves to the ancient writers—not to ascertain what road they fix upon, or, if they differ, to decide between them on the best evidence that the case admits of, but—to hunt for authorities in support of the hypotheses they had determined to maintain.” Whoever else may be liable to this charge, we cannot lay it upon Livy without imputing wilful falsehood to him. He professes to have been governed by the unanimous authority of all preceding

writers, who admitted that Hannibal came down into Italy among the Taurini (In Taurinis in Italiam degressum quum inter omnes constet, c. 38), and from this he infers that Hannibal's road cannot have crossed either the Great or the Little St. Bernard, since in each case he would have come down not among the Taurini, but first among the Salassi, and then among the Libui. If Strabo has not interposed his own opinion among the words of Polybius, which is a mere suspicion raised by the interest of a hypothesis, Polybius coincided with Livy's other authors on this point. But it would not follow, as the Edinburgh Reviewer assumes (p. 171), that he led Hannibal over Mont Genevre, nor, as we have seen, is it certain that this was Livy's meaning.

Still there is some difficulty in reconciling the statement which Strabo seems to attribute to Polybius, τὴν εἰς Ταυρίνων ἦν Ἀννίβας εἰσῆλθεν, with his extant words in the passage where, after mentioning that Hannibal had spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, he adds, that he descended boldly upon the plains near the Po, and among the nation of the Insubres (κατήγε τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάειον πέειά καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἰσόμβρων ἔθνος). Uckert supposes Polybius to have been considerably mistaken about the course of the Po, to have placed it too far south, and to have assigned the country at the foot of the Alps almost from its sources for a great extent eastward to the Insubres. Through their territories Hannibal had to march into those of the Taurini, who are said to be πρὸς τῇ παρωρέῃ κατοικοῦντες, where on his descent from the mountains he encamped (ὑπ' αὐτῆν τὴν παρῶρειον τῶν Ἀλπεων). This may be the correct view of the case; but it seems also possible that the mention of the Insubres was meant in a less exact sense, and is to be qualified by the description of the Taurini, so that in fact the latter intervened for a short distance between the foot of the Alps and the Insubres, though these are named as Hannibal's most powerful ally.

A table of posts along the road between Montmeillan and Rivoli gives very nearly the distance of 1,200 stadia, at which Polybius vaguely estimates the march across the Alps (περὶ χιλίους ἑακοσίους, c. 39).

This short sketch will, we hope, be sufficient to put the reader in possession of the author's views, and it will scarcely be denied that they deserve attention, and show that General Melville's hypothesis has not yet been placed beyond the reach of controversy. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they involve some propositions which are rather startling, and which ought not to be admitted without great circumspection. If Livy's Druentia is the Drae, was he acquainted with the Durance, or did he think it unnecessary to notice it? This however is a slight difficulty, compared with the mistake attributed to Polybius about the Isere and the Rhone. Was he led into this error by the information he received, or by the sight of the two rivers? Must it not have been corrected if he had followed either of them up toward its source? These are some of the questions which will no doubt suggest themselves to the reader, and which we must leave to better judges to decide.

ON THE
ALLEGED CONNEXION BETWEEN THE
EARLY HISTORY OF GREECE AND
ASSYRIA.*

THE value of the discoveries which have already unlocked so many authentic records of early Assyrian history can hardly be overrated, though it will probably be long before it can be fully appreciated, as we may now be witnessing no more than the dawn of that light which those discoveries are destined to shed in their future progress on objects and epochs which have not yet been brought within their range. It was to be expected that, even at their present stage, they should give rise to manifold systems, sometimes perhaps prematurely, or to an extent which will not stand the test of critical investigation. The lively interest which the Royal Society of Literature has taken in the subject induces me to draw its attention to an attempt which has been recently made in Germany, and in a great measure grounded on those discoveries, to connect the early history of Greece with that of Assyria, and to establish the strictly historical character of events which have been considered by some eminent modern critics as purely mythical.

The work to which I refer is entitled, *Geschichte der Assyrier und Iranier vom 13ten bis zum 5ten Jahrhundert vor Christus von Jacob Kruger*. The author belongs to that school of historical criticism which maintains that an intercourse between Greece and Asia may be traced through authentic records to the period


* Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature, vol. vi. (second series), p. 170.

in which his history begins; and in his preface he speaks with some asperity of those who take a different view, as deficient either in knowledge or judgment, and is specially severe on the late Karl Otfried Müller, as guilty of what he calls the "colossal Folly" of attempting to enclose Greece with a "Chinese Wall," so as to exclude the influence of Eastern civilization on the early development of the Hellenic mind. One who so pronounces upon others, challenges the strictest examination of his own conclusions; and if they should not prove satisfactory, those who reject them will at least have had the benefit of all the light which he has been able to throw upon them, and cannot be charged with ignorance of the premises on which they rest. I should not be doing justice to the hypothesis which I propose to discuss if I did not first of all exhibit it in its broad outlines, so that it may have the benefit of whatever speciousness it may claim on the score of intrinsic coherency and compactness. But it will be seen that, although I shall find myself obliged to cast a glance over a very wide field of historical and chronological inquiry, the matters with which this Paper is properly concerned, and on which alone I desire to be considered as expressing a decided opinion, lie within a comparatively narrow compass. I am not able to say whether M. Kruger's work, which was only published last year [1856], has met with a favourable reception in Germany. I have reason to believe that the subject itself is there regarded with some degree of aversion in many philological circles; and there is much in his book as to which I should be surprised if it obtained the assent of any whose judgment is of much weight. But this is of the less importance, as on one material point he has had the good fortune unconsciously to coincide with an author for whose learning and genius I entertain most profound respect; and there are other points in which his views appear to be in accordance with some which once prevailed very extensively among English scholars, and as to which I do not know how far they have yet been abandoned. It is not, then, the importance, either as to celebrity or intrinsic merit, of the work itself that has induced me to select it as a subject for criticism. Nor, indeed, is it my intention to deal

with it controversially, any further than may be absolutely necessary for my main object, which is neither polemical nor dogmatical, but is simply to inquire into the present limits of our knowledge with regard to a certain period and field of ancient history; and for such an inquiry the statements which I am about to consider may, perhaps, by their breadth and boldness, afford a more convenient occasion than might have been the case if the subject had been treated by some more distinguished author.

Among all the events related in the great Persian epos, the *Shah-nameh*, none is more memorable, or attended with more momentous and far-reaching consequences, than the partition made by Feridun. This powerful monarch, after having overcome the monstrous tyrant Zohak, and chained him to a rock in the deepest cavern of Mount Demawend, was still reigning in peace and prosperity when he thought fit to divide his vast dominions, extending from India to the Mediterranean, among his three sons, Tur, Selm, and Iredsh. To Tur he assigned the provinces on the Oxus; to Selm, those of the extreme west; but the fairest, richest, noblest portion, the land of heroes, Iran and Yemen, he bestowed on his favourite youngest son, the virtuous and gentle Iredsh. The two elder brothers, burning with envy and hatred, conspired against the younger, slew him, and sent his head to Feridun. But an avenger sprang up in the person of Minutshahr, the son of a posthumous daughter of the murdered prince.* Minutshahr, when he came to man's estate, successively vanquished the two guilty brothers, slew each of them with his own hand, and sent each of their heads to Feridun, who, sated but grieved with the vengeance which he had sought, sank into the grave, leaving his great-grandson lord of the whole realm.†

So far, it must seem doubtful whether we have anything before us but materials for poetry, as to which, judging from their own

* The name  occurs again, more than 2,000 years later, as that of the son of Kabus, who, after the extinction of the Samanid dynasty, reigned in Ghilan, Tabristan, and Kirkan (Hyrcania), and married a daughter of Mahmud of Ghazni.—Mirchond, *App. ad Hist. Saman.* ed. Wilken, c. 20. His dominions thus appear to have been the very theatre of the campaigns of the ancient Minutshahr.

appearance, we could not say whether they contain any real facts, or are purely fictitious. We now come to our author's view of them. M. Kruger believes that he can identify Firdusi's hero, Minutshehr, with the founder of that Assyrian dynasty which is stated by Herodotus to have borne rule in Upper Asia for five hundred and twenty years before the revolt of the Medes. He believes this to be the same personage who elsewhere appears under the name of Ninus, of Calah (as founder of the capital so called), and of Ashur-da-pal-il, or Sandapal, in Sir H. Rawlinson's newly-discovered list of Assyrian kings. On the other hand, he has satisfied himself that the land of Selm is no other than the kingdom of Tantalus, comprising not only the whole of Asia Minor, but Syria and part of Northern Africa, with the ancient Sipylus for its capital. But the sovereignty of this Selm dynasty extended (as he undertakes to show) much further west, if not to Italy, at all events to Greece, which acknowledged a kind of feudal dependence on the House of Tantalus. The victorious arms of Minutshehr forced the son of Tantalus to evacuate his Asiatic provinces and retire to Greece, where, by a series of conquests, he established his direct dominion not only in the peninsula to which he gave his name, but in the north. But this new settlement of Pelops gave rise to fresh contests between his descendants and their old Assyrian enemies. The Assyrians, still bent on aggression, not content with the stronghold in which they had placed a governor called Dardanus, built the new town of Ilium, an "Assyrian Sebastopol," and "standing menace" to the Pelopid princes. From this point they continued to infest the coasts of Greece by piratical excursions, until the common sense of insult and danger united all the Grecian chiefs, under the command of Agamemnon, in the expedition against Ilium. The auxiliaries sent by the court of Assyria enabled the city to sustain a long siege, and would, perhaps, have finally triumphed, if the Greek stratagem of a feigned retreat had not induced them to withdraw; and, before they could be reassembled, the besiegers had left the "Assyrian Sebastopol" a smoking ruin.

It can hardly be denied that, if the absence of poetry were

equivalent to the presence of historical truth, this narrative of the causes which led to the Trojan War would have a fairer claim to credit than the preceding summary, dry as it is, from the *Shah-nameh*. But while in this respect they really stand on exactly the same level, the one offering no better internal evidence than the other, it will have been seen that they are most intimately connected with one another in our author's view, and with respect to that must stand or fall together. And we have to consider, first, the process by which he identifies the Shah Minutshehr with the founder of the Assyrian dynasty in the thirteenth century B.C., and then the nature of the superstructure which he rears upon this basis. But it may not be out of place here to observe, that nothing can be less warranted by the language of Firdusi himself, nothing more clearly foreign to his conception of the events which he relates, than the combination just described between his personages and those of the heroic age of Greece. If indeed his language was to be pressed into a literal construction, the empire of Feridun would have reached from the shores of the Pacific to the heart of Europe; for the share assigned to Tur is described by the names of Tshin and Turkestan; oftener simply as Tshin. That of Selm is said to have been composed of Roum and Khawer, and there is no doubt that the former of these names comprises the territories subject to the Roman or Byzantine Empire. Khawer, though properly signifying the west, is thought to comprehend some of the regions to the south, including part of Northern Africa. But the Persian poet, writing, it must be remembered, at the court of the Ghaznevide Sultan, about one thousand years after the Christian era, though he has been praised for his comparative sobriety of fancy, has never been asserted, even by his warmest admirers, to have been wholly free from the Oriental spirit of exaggeration, which indeed is sufficiently conspicuous in all his narratives and descriptions. No doubt he did not trouble himself much about the precise geographical limits within which his story moves. It was enough for his purpose to leave ample scope in every direction for the imagination of his public. But it is certain that he no more thought of Roum as comprising the

whole Roman territory than of Tshin as the whole of China. With what latitude the latter of these names was used by the poet may be inferred from the fact, that when the forces of Tur and Selm have crossed the Oxus and Minutshehr advances from Ternish, the imperial residence, as it is supposed, in Tabristan, his army is said to have extended its front from the forest of Narve as far as Tshin, certainly very far west of the modern frontier of China. Again, after the death of Tur, we hear of a stronghold in Alan-land, a castle of castles, standing in the sea, containing great treasures, where Selm is expected to take refuge. It is taken by a stratagem before he reaches it, and when he comes to the seashore, he finds no vessel to escape in, but is overtaken and slain by Minutshehr. This sea is not the Mediterranean, but the Caspian; for when the conqueror returns in triumph to Ternish, he is expressly said to come from the Sea of Ghilân. And there is nothing to suggest a surmise that the poet himself entertained even the faintest suspicion that Asia Minor was the real theatre of events which he places near the southern shores of the Caspian. But it must be admitted that his omission is amply supplied, or his mistake—if such it be—clearly corrected, by one of the Mahometan annalists in D'Ohsson's *Tableau de l'Orient*, by whom the partition is described as follows:—"Thus Feridun gave to Selm Asia Minor, called Khawer, and Khorasan to Toor. He bestowed on Iredsh the throne of Istakhar, with all Persia, and with the rights of suzerainty over the other two thrones. Selm established himself at Sarsan or Sardis in Lydia." I must leave it to competent judges to decide whether this witness does not prove too much, and whether his account, or that of Firdusi, bears the plainer marks of a genuine native tradition. But it must be added that, according to the same historian, Minutshehr, after the conquest of Asia Minor, divided it into several departments, some of which he disposed of in favour of the children of Selm, a statement quite as much at variance with M. Kruger's view as those of Firdusi, which, however, I believe to be much nearer the truth. I now find myself confirmed in this view by some high authorities, to which I had not access when the preceding remarks

were written. Sir H. Rawlinson, in his "Memoir on the Early History of Babylonia,"* observes that "the relationship of the Aryans, after their establishment in Central Persia, to the great nations on their western frontier, is represented by the division of the empire of Feridun between his three sons, Selm, Toor, and Erij." Dr. Haug, in an Appendix on the Vendidad, inserted in the last volume of Chevalier Bunsen's great work on Egypt, published this year, considers Selm as representing the land of the Sarmatians, and believes that the partition, as described in the Shah-nameh, points to an ancient historical groundwork. Sir H. Rawlinson indeed identifies the name of Selm with a Semitic word, which he says, in the Assyrian and Babylonian cuneiform inscriptions, everywhere expresses the "west," or the "setting sun;" and he even believes that the name of Jerusalem signifies nothing more than the "city of the west," and hence he concludes that the name Selm denotes the geographical position of the Semites in regard to the Aryans. All that I would venture to remark upon this is that Dr. Haug's combination of Selm with the land of the Sarmatians is much more in accordance with all the indications to which I have referred in the Shah-nameh as to the proper country of Selm. Chevalier Bunsen observes (vol. vi. p. 97) that the provinces of Ghilân and Mazenderân, with the Caspian (Hyrcanian) passes, formed the core of the Aryan possessions, which subsequently comprehended the whole of Media and Farsistan.

It remains to be seen whether Firdusi can be made to serve as an unconscious witness to the fact for which he is cited; and this will mainly depend on the possibility of ascertaining the historical personality, and above all, the time of Minutshchr.

The difficulties which beset this subject are, I believe, best known to those who have paid most attention to it, and have endeavoured to make their way through them. The late eminent orientalist, Von Hammer-Purgstall, who, in his own department of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish literature, has perhaps hardly left a superior, and probably very few equals—discussed this

* *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1855, p. 252.

question in an elaborate article on the Shah-nameh in the *Vienna Jahrbücher der Literatur*, vol. ix. 1820, and he arrived at a result widely different from that of M. Kruger. He conceived that the line of sovereigns enumerated in the Shah-nameh is in striking accordance, as to names and events, with the list of Median kings preserved by Ctesias on the one hand, and with the part of the same succession which has been reported by Herodotus on the other. He identifies Deioces with Djemshid, and supposes that Herodotus passed over Zohak in silence, as only representing a period of foreign, that is Assyrian, oppression, from which the nation was delivered by Phraortes, who thus corresponds in all respects with Feridun, and in name with the Arbaces of Ctesias. Minutshahr indeed, according to this comparison of the lists, sinks from the conspicuous position which he occupies in the Shah-nameh, into a very obscure and insignificant personage, the Mandaucos of Ctesias, and, as well as his successors, down to Kei-Kawus, is entirely unnoticed by Herodotus. But as the Shah-nameh relates that, in the reign of Kei-Kawus, Iran was for eight-and-twenty years under the yoke of Turan, this coincidence with the period of the Scythian rule, in the time of Cyaxares I., seemed to Von Hammer to establish the identity of this Cyaxares with Kei-Kawus, and with the Artibarnas of Ctesias, beyond a doubt. It is remarkable that, though he lays so much stress on this coincidence, he does not take the slightest notice of any other chronological datum of Shah-nameh. He evidently regarded those of the earlier period as hopelessly unavailable for historical purposes. And at first sight they certainly seem so. When we find a reign of 700 years attributed to Djemshid, 1000 to Zohak, 500 to Feridun, and 120 to Minutshahr, it is natural enough to conclude that such a chronology can afford no materials for historical investigation. But M. Kruger, following D'Ohsson, Anquetil du Perron, and others, points out that this is a hasty inference, and that these portentous-looking numbers may very well be supposed to express the duration of dynasties, which are represented each by the name of a single sovereign; and he undertakes to show that the lists of Assyrian kings fit in so exactly to the chronological

framework of the Shah-nameh as to afford means of recovering particulars in the corresponding portion of Assyrian history.

It would only lead me away from my present object if I were to enter into the details of M. Kruger's computations. It will be sufficient to mention that, starting from the death of Alexander, in 323 B.C., he is brought, by the term of 732 years, uniformly assigned to the Keianian dynasty in all the Persian systems of chronology, to 1055 B.C., as the beginning of that series, or of the reign of Kei-Kobad. In the preceding dynasty, the Pishdadian, which has commonly been considered as almost fabulous, there is a discrepancy in the sum of all the numbers between the chronology of the Shah-nameh and of the sacred books, and that of the annalists in D'Ohsson's *Tableau de l'Orient*, amounting to exactly 1200 years. The lower figures of what may be called the profane chronology place the beginning of this dynasty, with Keiomors, in 2308 B.C., and this epoch corresponds with a remarkably close approximation both to the Chinese, and the received Mosaic date of the Deluge. The difference of 1200 years falls almost entirely in the periods assigned to Zohak and to Feridun; the 1000 years of Zohak being reduced by the annalists to 130, and the 500 of Feridun to 220. Thus, the reign of Djemshid ends B.C. 1594, that of Feridun B.C. 1244. According to all the systems, sacred and profane, 120 years are assigned to Minutshehr, or the line represented by his name, and thus the beginning of his reign exactly coincides with the epoch fixed by Herodotus for that of the Assyrian dominion in Upper Asia. (On this I would only observe, by the way, that the exactness of this coincidence depends on a calculation which differs by nine-and-twenty years from that of Niebuhr, Bunsen, and Rawlinson, which the comparison with Berossus seems to render very nearly certain, and according to which Herodotus conceived the beginning of the Assyrian supremacy to date from 1273 B.C. This, however, is, for our present purpose, of little moment.) If then the conquests of Minutshehr comprehended the territory subject to the Assyrian monarchy, there could be no doubt that he must be regarded as its founder or restorer. The synchronism is, at all events, remarkable, and

must be allowed naturally and strongly to suggest the surmise of personal identity. But whether it is sufficient of itself to establish that fact, without any other connecting link between Minutshahr and Sandapal, is another question. Such a link, however, M. Kruger conceives to be supplied by the Greek lists of Assyrian and Median kings. This is one of the most prominent and peculiar features in his system.

We have already seen something of Von Hammer's attempt to reconcile the Median list of Ctesias with Herodotus and the Shah-nameh. That attempt can hardly be considered as satisfactory with regard to either. A more probable opinion, which seems to have been first proposed by Volney, supposes the list of Ctesias to contain that of Herodotus twice over. For the whole sum of the reigns in Ctesias is only a little more than double of that in Herodotus, and the numbers given by Herodotus very nearly coincide with those which are repeated, with very slight variations, by Ctesias. This opinion has been adopted by Karl Mueller, in his edition of the fragments of Ctesias, in the *Paris Scriptorum Græcorum Bibliotheca*, vol. xix. p. 43, and, with some modifications, by Von Gumpach, in his instructive work on the "Chronology of the Babylonians and Assyrians,"* where he observes (p. 143):—"The repetitions in Ctesias are evidently derived from two different sources, which enumerated the Median kings under different names." And he exhibits the correspondence of the three lists as follows:—

Herodotus.		Ctesias.	
Deioces .	53 yrs.	Mandaucæ 50 yrs.	Artyras . 50 yrs.
Phraortes .	22 „	Arbaecæ . 28 „	Arbianes . 22 „
Cyaxares .	40 „	Artæus . 40 „	Astibaras . 40 „
Astyages .	35 „	Artyne (‡) 22 „	Sosarmus (‡) 30 „
	<hr/>		<hr/>
	150 yrs.	140 yrs.	142 yrs.

M. Kruger takes an entirely different course, in which, as far as I know, he has at least the merit of originality. He imagines that the list of Ctesias belongs, not to the period immediately preceding the fall of the Assyrian Empire, but to one earlier by many centuries, anterior to the establishment of that empire in the thir-

* *Die Zeitrechnung der Babylonier und Assyrier.* Heidelberg. 1852.

teenth century B.C., and intervening between this event and the downfall of the old Assyrian monarchy, founded by the ancient Ninus, and enlarged by Semiramis. And it may be right to observe, by the way, that the existence of this ancient monarchy appears now to have been placed beyond a doubt by the discovery of the names of Assyria and of Nineveh on Egyptian monuments of the eighteenth dynasty.* The catastrophe by which it was overthrown M. Kruger refers to the year B.C. 1580, when, as he states, "according to the chronographers, a revolution took place in the Assyrian Empire, in which Belochus (who was then reigning) was dethroned by one Balatoras." This is the revolution of which Sir H. Rawlinson observes, in *The Outline of Assyrian History*, p. 14, that "it appears almost certain that the catastrophe described by Ctesias, and also noticed by Polyhistor in Agathias, refers to the revolt of an officer of the court named Sargon, who captured Nineveh and drove out the old family in B.C. 747—this memorable epoch being accordingly adopted by the Babylonians as the basis of their astronomical canon." According to this view, Pul would be the Assyrian monarch who is represented in the list of Ctesias under the name of Belochus. I find another allusion to the same event in Moses of Chorene, who observes (I. c. 19) of the Armenian King Aigag, that he is said to have lived in the reign of Belochus, and to have died in the insurrection which he foolishly excited.† In the Armenian list given by Moses Chor., this Aigag is followed by an Ambag, who is contemporary with Balatoras, the successor of Belochus. M. Kruger appears to have found one of these names elsewhere written Arpag, which he identifies with the Median Arbaces of Ctesias. He considers this Arbaces as the founder of a dynasty which was long predominant in Upper Asia, though engaged in a fierce contest with the Egyptian invaders, who are symbolized (as he thinks) by the Zohak (Sevek) of the Persian tradition, as well as with an Aryan race which gained the ascendancy, until both were reduced

* See Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, p. 630.

† In the Italian translation of the Armenian monks, "Aigag, il quale viveva, dicesi, sotto Beloco, morì nella sommosa stoltemente da lui sollevata."

under the dominion of Minutshehr. It was remarked some time ago by Mr. Birch, in a paper with which he favoured the society,* that no reliance can be placed on the names of the Assyrian monarchs of the first line. "What credence, for example," he asks, "can we give to successions into which are introduced such names as Xerxes (Persian), Sethos (Egyptian), Lamprides and Laosthenes (Greek)? It is in vain that we should endeavour to detach from such a mass the true elements of Assyrian history." Observations to the same effect are made by Sir H. Rawlinson in the *Outline*. M. Kruger however has not been deterred from such an attempt. He has an explanation for everything. The list of Syncellus, beginning with Balatoras, was (according to him) drawn up in Babylon by the priests; and hence the name of Balatoras (the Græcized form of Belasis, the ally of Arbaces in the war against Nineveh) has been substituted for that of Arbaces. The Greek names, Lamprides and Lamprœus—both nearly equivalent to *illustrious* or *glorious*—have also taken the place of the genuine Median names, Mandauces and Artyees. Otherwise, he finds a sufficient resemblance to prove the identity of this list with that of Ctesias; and he believes that, by culling from the various lists—from Ctesias, Syncellus, and Eusebius in the canon—he can restore the true succession of the kings who intervened between the end of the first Assyrian monarchy and the beginning of the second. And thus he arrives at a result which is certainly curious; for the period filled by these reigns exactly covers the interval between 1580 B.C. (the fall of Belochus) and 1244 B.C. (the date of the accession of Minutshehr); and this seems to introduce another not less striking coincidence. Syncellus has inserted in his Assyrian list four names—Arbelus, Chalaus, Anebus, and Babius—which were placed by Abydemus in the inverted order, at the head of the whole line. M. Kruger finds that the reign of Arabelus ended exactly in 1244 B.C., and that the sum of the years of his three successors ($45 + 38 + 37 = 120$) precisely equals the duration assigned by all the systems of Persian chronology to the reign or dynasty of Minutshehr.

* *Transactions of the Royal Society of Literature*, vol. iii. p. 162.

And this is not all. For as the Minutshehr period ends 1124 B.C., the sixty-nine years remaining to the beginning of the Keianian line in 1055 B.C. are exactly filled up by the reigns of the four immediate successors of Minutshehr, enumerated in the Shah-nameh :—

Nuder	.	.	7	.	.	.	1124—1117	B.C.
Afrasiab	.	.	12	.	.	.	1117—1105	„
Sab	.	.	30	.	.	.	1105—1075	„
Kershasp	.	.	20	.	.	.	1075—1055	„

Finally, M. Kruger institutes a comparison between the lists thus obtained and the six names which, according to the latest discoveries of the cuneiform inscriptions, begin the series of Assyrian kings :—

Sandapal.		Ashur-rish-ipan.
Ashur-da-pal-il.		Tiglath-Pileser I.
Mussaghil-Nebo.		Ashur-bani-pal I.

and he shows that the third of these, Mussaghil-Nebo, corresponds, both in form and in date, with the Greek Anebus, or, as he may be called, Minutshehr II., leaving the two names Sandapal and Ashur-da-pal-il, to be accounted for, either on the supposition that both are represented by the single name of Chalaus, or that the first may answer to his predecessor, Arbelus.

I am quite aware how very imperfect an appreciation can have been conveyed, by so brief a notice as that to which I have felt it necessary to confine myself, of the merits of this chronological scheme. I should wish it to be believed that, if in any point it has appeared obscure or defective, this appearance is the effect of that brevity, and would not be found in the author's own statements. But to persons conversant with such inquiries, all such chronological adjustments are apt to create a misgiving, nearly in proportion to the nicety of the results. And Sir H. Rawlinson has observed: "It is an ungracious task to attempt to extract dates from barren catalogues of kings, or to quote the results obtained from such catalogues by professed chronologers; for even when the numbers come out satisfactorily, we have the consciousness that much is due to manipulation and systematic arrangement. This

remark applies especially to the Assyrian canon of Ctesias, and to the use that has been made of it by his followers."* I am however content to assume that they have been satisfactorily established, and I only wish to inquire how far they are capable of supporting the historical superstructure which the author has attempted to rear upon them.

It may seem a concession larger than would be sanctioned by a rigorous criticism, if it is admitted that the synchronism which M. Kruger has laboured to establish between Minutshehr and the founder or restorer of the Assyrian monarchy in the thirteenth century B.C., would imply the identity of the two persons. But the question is, how far, when this identity is assumed, it may be allowed to throw any new light on the extent of the new Assyrian Empire, or warrants the belief that the Assyrian arms were carried to the extreme verge of Western Asia. I need hardly observe how feeble and precarious an argument for such a proposition is afforded by the language of Firdusi, when he speaks of Roum as included in the portion of Selm. But M. Kruger lays great stress on a passage in which he makes Selm complain that his father had cast him into the sea, an expression which Görres supposes to signify that the tribes subject to his rule would be forced, when they required more room for their increased population, to migrate to the other side of the Euxine and the Mediterranean. Here however I have lighted upon a rather curious example of the importance of verifying quotations. M. Kruger appears to have placed too much reliance on the authority of Görres and Von Schack, who do indeed—the one in his prose abridgment, the other in his excellent metrical version of the *Shah-nameh*—give the above-mentioned sense to the words of Firdusi. But M. Mohl's translation, which keeps as close to the original as French prose can be expected to adhere to Persian poetry, exhibits one totally different. The words which they render, "One thou didst bind to the dragon's tail," he translates, "One thou hast overwhelmed with the dragon's breath;" and the line which, according to Görres and Von Schack, means "One thou hast cast into

* *Journal of the Asiat. Soc.*, vol. xv. p. 224.

the sea," Mohl interprets, "One thou hast exalted to the clouds." Now, it is true that the sense given by Mohl's version of the passage is not satisfactory; for whereas the complaint of Selm and Tur is, that three brothers of equal merit have received unequal portions, that version only describes the manner in which two out of the three have been treated by their father; though, as the three successive lines begin with the same word, "One, one, one," it is quite clear that the poet meant to designate the lot of each of the brothers. Also, it happens that the same Persian word, *dm*, signifies either breath (*dem*), or tail (*dum*); and *abr* (cloud) has two letters out of three in common with *ahr* (sea). This shows what might have been the origin of this remarkable variation. But I have nowhere met with any intimation of a various reading in the MSS., and Mohl's text throughout this passage exactly agrees, as I have ascertained, with that of Turner Macan's edition.

It seems clear, however, that even if the interpretation of Görres and Von Schack is correct, it would prove nothing as to the extent of territory immediately occupied. It appears to me that the statements of the chroniclers cited by D'Herbelot (*Bibliothèque Orientale*), under the word "Feridoun," are entitled to quite as much credit as those of the poet, or rather may be properly admitted to explain the ambiguity of his language. D'Herbelot takes no notice of the Shah-nameh, but he first reports the account given of Feridun's partition by the author of the chronicle called the *Lebtarikh*. It is this:—Feridun gave to Selm the western part of his territories, which territories extended as far as Africa. The second son, Tur, had the eastern part as far as the Gihon; and the third, Iredsh, was put in possession of the central provinces, with the prerogative of the royal throne and the treasures amassed by his father. Another writer, the author of the chronicle called the *Tarikh Cozideh*, related the transaction, with some variation of the circumstances; and this variation, as reported by D'Herbelot, chiefly affected the geographical question. Feridun, this author said, made a magnificent distribution among his sons; for to Selm he gave the country named Magreb, that is, all the provinces of the

west, whether already conquered or yet to be conquered, with the title of Kaiser.* To his second son, Tur, he gave Eastern Turkey, comprehending the country of the Turks, Tartars, and Moguls, and all the vast extent of the country of Cathay and China, with the title of Fagfour. The younger was left master of Persia, the two Iraks, Syria, Arabia, and Khorasan, with their dependencies, and took the title of Shah. The third author, Khondemir, related that the smith, Kaweh, or Gao, after having recovered for Feridun all the adjacent provinces which had revolted from Persia under the reign of Zohak, pushed his conquests very far to the West, where he subdued all the nations which did not acknowledge the majesty and power of the Persian monarch, who then resided in Azerbeidjan; a statement, by the way, which agrees better with the descriptions of the Shah-nameh, as to the situation of Temish, than the conjecture of Görres, who supposes it to have stood on the Tigris, perhaps at Nineveh itself.

It is hard to believe that one of these writers was really better informed on the subject than another. It was as easy to include the whole of Western Asia in the dominions of Feridun as the whole of China; and the second chronicler, who so greatly enlarges the modest description given by the first, still leaves us in doubt which were the provinces actually subjected to Selm, and those over which he received a title which he had yet to make good with his sword. I suspect, indeed, that M. Kruger himself would not have placed any very confident reliance on the Persian tradition if it had not been confirmed, as he believes, by the concurrent testimony of Greek history and legend. For with regard to every other point of the story, except the general geographical outline, he supposes Firdusi to have used the largest poetical license. He does not believe any such relation to have existed between Minutshehr and Feridun as the poem describes,—or even as that which is stated in the Bundeshesh, where nine generations are interposed, with the names of the successive princes, between

* D'Herbelot. "SAR. (query, Mar?) Titre que portoient autrefois les Princes de Georgian. C'est un diminutif de Caissar."

Feridun and Minutshehr,—but supposes it to have been a fiction, analogous to that by which Alexander the Great was connected with the Persian dynasty which he overthrew. He does not believe in the personality of Selm; the name of Selm, he says, probably denotes a geographical relation. All that he insists upon is the dry fact, that the fragments into which the old Assyrian Empire had been broken up were reunited about the middle of the thirteenth century B.C., under the sceptre of Minutshehr,—the same conqueror who founded the new capital on the Tigris,—and that the countries designated by the name of Selm included not only Asia Minor, but dependencies lying beyond the Ægean, and even the Adriatic; and for these facts he appeals to Greek authority. I am thus at length enabled to meet him on more familiar ground; and, on a general survey of the evidence which he has alleged, I am struck with one observation not favourable to his conclusions. The evidence appears to grow more definite and explicit as it is further removed from the time to which it relates. But the only express testimony to the supposed political connexion between Assyria and the states on the north-west coast of Asia Minor is that of Ctesias. I must endeavour briefly to explain and justify this assertion. I would premise one remark.

The name of Homer does not occur among M. Kruger's Greek authorities, and for an obvious reason. The *Iliad* recognises Pelops as the ancestor of Agamemnon, but makes no allusion to his Asiatic origin. I do not wish to lay any stress on this silence; for though it may seem to afford room for a conjecture that the name of Pelops was first carried over from Greece into Asia by the Greek colonists, and then connected with the legends about Tantalus, I am quite convinced that this would be an erroneous view, and that Pelops originally belonged to Sipylus as much as Tantalus and Niobe. And though Homer is silent as to their mutual relations, the last book of the *Iliad* does allude to one part of the legend in a passage on which a very unexpected and most interesting light has been thrown by recent discoveries; for the stone Niobe, on Mount Sipylus, which Achilles describes to Priam,

turns out to be not a poetical fiction, but a real sculpture, which is still visible as it was seen by Pausanias (i. 21, 3). It has now been brought before our eyes by the plate published by Mr. Stewart (*Travels in Asia Minor*). There still sits Niobe, enthroned in a niche hewn out of the rocky side of Sipylus, one hand folded over the other in the lap, and the head leaning on the right shoulder. The whole conception, which is perfectly intelligible, seems worthy of a great artist; and, as the most ancient monument of Ionian art, it appears to Chevalier Bunsen (*Gott in der Geschichte*, i. p. 283) to confirm his opinion, that the spirit and freedom in which the Assyrian sculptures exhibit such a marked superiority over those of Egypt were derived from the Ionian school. This Niobe is still "all tears," for the water trickles, as of old, over the face of the rock,* from the springs of Achelous, by the couches of the Nymphs. And hence there is the less room to doubt the parallel antiquity of the other local monuments connected with the story, seen by Pausanias, the sepulchre of Tantalus, which he emphatically terms "worth beholding," and the throne of Pelops on the mountain-top. Among these local traces none is more remarkable than the lake, called by Pausanias the Lake of Tantalus, the origin of which he refers to one of those subterraneous convulsions to which the adjacent region of Asia Minor has been at all times subject, and on account of which the houses of Sardis, as Herodotus relates, were mostly built of reeds, and all thatched with that material. The report of the country was, that the ruins of a city which had been swallowed up by the earthquake had once been visible in the lake (7, 24, 13). Writers cited by Strabo (i. c. 3) expressly stated that this was the city of Sipylus, which was thus overthrown in the reign of Tantalus. Its overthrow is ascribed by the

* Νῦν δὲ που ἐν πέτρῳσιν, ἐν οὖρεσιν οἰοπόλοισιν
 Ἐν Σιπύλῳ, ὅθι φασὶ θεῶν ἔμμεναι εὐνάς
 Νυμφάων αἴτ' ἀμφ' Ἀχελῷον ἰρρώσαντο
 Ἐνθα, λίθος περ εἶουσα, θεῶν ἐκ κήδεα πῖσσει.
 (Ω. 614.)

These lines are indeed, as appears from the Villoison Scholiast, an interpolation, but clearly a very ancient one. The Scholiast observes that they have the Hesiodic character.

Scholiast on the *Odyssey* (xi. 581, Buttmann) to the wrath of Zeus. It was one of the numberless legends to be found in all parts of the world, from Ireland to Abyssinia, one of which still lingers in the mouths of the peasantry round Albano, about ancient cities covered by lakes, and commonly, as there, connected with some story of divine retribution for impious pride, such as was imputed to Tantalus. It remains to be seen whether there is any better authority for referring the ruin of the House of Tantalus to a political than to a physical convulsion.

The earliest author however cited by M. Kruger in support of his hypothesis is Herodotus. That in the time of Herodotus the migration of Pelops into Greece was a universally received fact is unquestionable; but as to the causes of that event Herodotus is silent: he only alludes to it in a speech which he put into the mouth of Xerxes, whom he makes to speak of Pelops as the subject of his ancestors; on which Mr. Blakesley remarks that, "in the mind of the authority followed by Herodotus, Xerxes was regarded as the lineal descendant of the Assyrian dynasties." I doubt very much that Herodotus was here following any authority. I suspect he is only giving a little touch of character. It was natural for Xerxes to treat all the countries which he actually ruled as having been from time immemorial subject to his predecessors. Another passage of Herodotus, in which not only M. Kruger but other writers have found an indication that the kingdom of Pelops was once a province of Assyria, is that in which he gives an account of the three dynasties which had reigned in Lydia. The first descended from Lydus, son of Atys, who gave his name to the nation; the second had traced its origin to Hercules, through Ninus and Belus, Agron, son of Ninus, having been the first king of this line. M. Kruger says it is clear that the kingdom of Atys means that of Pelops and Tantalus, because, according to Herodotus, Ninus appointed his son Agron as his viceroy or feudatory king in Lydia.* Nevertheless Herodotus really says no such thing; and

* The same statement is made by Röth, *Geschichte unserer abendländischen Philosophie*, i. p. 97, where the name of Ninyas is substituted, apparently through an oversight, for Agron.

not only does he not say this, but what he does say is directly at variance with it. For, according to him (i. 7), the government was committed to the Heracleid princes by those of the preceding dynasty themselves, in compliance with an oracle. Neither in this passage nor anywhere else does Herodotus give any intimation that he had ever heard of Assyrian intervention in the affairs of Lydia. He afterwards (i. 95) speaks of the Assyrians as having ruled for five hundred and twenty years in Upper Asia. He may have known much more than he has said. He may have reserved the fuller information which he possessed on the subject for his lost or unexecuted work on Assyrian history.* M. Kruger's account of the change of dynasty may be more accurate, but certainly it is not that of Herodotus.

I need hardly observe that it would be vain to look for more distinct evidence of the fact in Thucydides, who, while he assumes the migration of Pelops from Asia as notorious and indisputable, only adds, as a probable opinion of the best authorities, that he had established his power in Greece chiefly by means of the treasures which he brought over with him. It is Ctesias who first speaks plainly to the point. He had discovered, during his residence at the Persian court, that the war of Troy took place in the reign of Tentamus, the twentieth in succession from Ninyas; that Priam, being a vassal of the King of Assyria, applied to him for succour; and that Memnon was sent with an army composed of ten thousand Ethiopians and as many Susians, or, according to the reading of the Armenian Eusebius (i. p. 88), Nusians, to his aid. Nothing can be clearer or more to the purpose, and the only question is, how far it is to be believed.

Opinions have been much divided, both in ancient and modern times, on the qualifications of Ctesias as a reporter of historical

* It has sometimes been supposed that an allusion to this work is to be found in Aristotle, *Hist. An.* viii. 18. But the reading 'Ἡρόδοτος is very uncertain. Some MSS. give 'Ἡσιόδος, and Bekker has admitted this into his text. Yet it is difficult to believe that Hesiod described the siege of Nineveh. Schöll (*Ueber Herodots Lebenszeit, in Philologus*, 1854, p. 209) conjectures that Κρησίας was the original reading, which, having been partly effaced in the earliest MS., was exchanged by one transcriber for 'Ἡρόδοτος, by another for 'Ἡσιόδος.

facts, on the character of the sources of information to which he had access, and on the degree of judgment and fidelity with which he drew from them. Not to speak of Henry Stevens, who vindicated his credit in an express apology, both the modern editors of his fragments, Baehr and C. Mueller, maintain that with regard to Persian history he is more trustworthy than Herodotus. Mueller (p. 5), admitting that in both writers there is much that is fabulous, thinks that there is more of it in Herodotus than in Ctesias. And, as to Assyrian matters, Baehr contends (p. 35) that Ctesias is entitled to at least as much credit as Berossus, or any of the other writers who differ from him in their accounts of the same transactions. In the affairs of Persia and India he might (Baehr thinks) have had motives for exaggeration. But what temptation could he have found to indulge in it as to the early history of Assyria? On the other hand, a later critic, Von Gumpach (*u. s.* p. 84), entirely dissents from this view, and observes that, although Ctesias certainly drew from Persian authorities, the very nature of this source required an eminent degree of circumspection and critical sagacity for a proper use of it,—qualities in which, he observes, Ctesias was signally deficient. But Mueller himself cannot go along with Baehr in putting Ctesias on a level with Berossus. In his opinion the Persian annals consulted by Ctesias were not very ancient, nor translated, as some have supposed, from the Assyrian into the Persian language. And the reason which Mueller assigns for questioning their authenticity is the mixture of Greek with Assyrian fables which appears to have been contained in them. And in the instance which he cites, as the most palpable he could produce of such a mixture, is no other than the very story, which is a main prop of M. Kruger's hypothesis, about the famous expedition sent by Teutamus, under the command of Memnon, for the relief of Troy. Sir H. Rawlinson* goes still farther. He declares that he puts no faith either in the Median history of Ctesias, or in that of Herodotus, so far as regards the Median revolt and the first two kings, Dejoces and Phraortes. He doubts (p. 226) whether Ctesias, “independently

* *Journal of the Asiat. Soc.*, xv. p. 244.

of all adjustment of his numbers to the first Olympiad, really placed the era of Ninus at an interval of one thousand years above the Trojan expedition." And he believes "that the many relative dates in the canon of Ctesias, which connect Greek and Assyrian history, were obtained by Ctesias or his copyists from the simple calculation of the numbers arbitrarily assigned to the reigns of the kings of Nineveh, as compared with the standard epochal dates of Greece."

But even this opinion is not more damaging to the authority of Ctesias than M. Kruger's own. It should be observed that, if we analyze the statement in question, we find it to contain two distinct elements. There is the synchronism between the reign of Teutamus and the siege of Troy; and there is the event recorded under this date. It seems to me that if Ctesias had satisfied himself about the synchronism, he might with perfect good faith have subjoined the historical statement, though he had not found a syllable about it in the Persian archives. He knew from other sources of the expedition led by Memnon to Troy. How (he would reason) could this have been done without the orders of the Great King? And why should he have taken part in the war, if Priam had not been one of his vassals? It was interesting to a Greek thus to point out the real magnitude of the struggle, which Homer himself never seemed to have suspected. The feeling which must have animated Ctesias is curiously illustrated by Moses of Chorene, who, at the end of his first book, having previously passed very hastily over the affairs of Ilion, repeats and enlarges his former statement in these words: "Which can be the most notable of these events, but those which are related by Homer about the Trojan War under the reign of Teutamus, King of Assyria: specially that our Zarmair, who was subject to Assyria, went with a little band along with the Ethiopian army to the aid of Priam? And there he died, wounded by the valiant Greeks. But by Achilles himself, I say, and not by any other hero" (*ma da Achille stesso, voglio io, e non da altro eroe*). The not less patriotic Armenian translator—a monk of the Mechitarist community of S. Lazzaro, at Venice—remarks in his note: "And who

knows that Zarmair is not the famous Memnon, who came from the East, to the aid of Priam, at the head of the Ethiopian army of Teutamus, King of Assyria? supposing that by the Ethiopians we ought to understand the inhabitants of Colchis, or the Chaldeans of the Caucasus." On the other hand, I should be quite ready to admit that Ctesias had found the whole story in the Persian chronicles, without believing it at all the more on that account. Ctesias was not the first Greek physician who had practised at the court of Persia. Democedes was probably not less versed in the Homeric poems, and in those of the epic Cycelus, and might well have furnished such a supplement to the royal annals as that which Mueller calls a mixture of Greek with Assyrian fables. But M. Kruger, as I have said, damages the credit of his own witness. For the synchronism, which is at least as credible as the narrative, he utterly rejects. Teutamus, according to his system, was not the king in whose reign the Trojan War took place; and represents, not the Minutshehr, but the Feridun of Shah-nameh. This seems to me a very arbitrary apportionment of credit; and if I was obliged to choose between the two, I would rather retain the synchronism, and reject the narrative.

Whatever may be the authority of Ctesias, it is, I believe, the sole foundation which the story has to rest upon. M. Kruger, indeed, adds what he considers as, if possible, a still graver testimony, proceeding, as he says, from a man who, for his critical judgment and his familiarity with Oriental antiquity, must be acknowledged as an authority of the first order,—in short, no less a writer than Plato. Plato confirms the evidence of Ctesias to the fullest extent. One of the speakers in the Dialogues on the Laws observes, that the settlement of Peloponnesus made by Heracleid conquerors was designed by them as a security against any such aggression of the barbarians as had been committed by the Trojans, when, relying on the power of the Assyrians established by Ninus, they provoked the war against Troy. For as, at the time of the return of the Heracleids, the Assyrian Empire still presented an imposing aspect, it then excited like apprehensions to those which, in Plato's day, were felt of the power of the

Great King. For, he adds, there had been given great matters of complaint in the repeated capture of Troy, inasmuch as it was a part of the Assyrian Empire. I do not wish to dispute Plato's title to the qualities which M. Kruger ascribes to him, though they are not those which appear to me so conspicuous as to elevate him into an authority of the first order on such points. But what I question in this case is, the right to produce him as an independent witness. There can be little doubt that he was acquainted with the writings of Ctesias, who probably returned to Greece about 398 B.C., not, as Mr. Clinton supposes, so late as seventeen years after the battle of Cunaxa; and I think it far more likely that he was availing himself of the information supplied by Ctesias, than that he was stating the result of his own researches.

Here however the direct evidence, such as it is, comes to an end. To M. Kruger's mind indeed it is strongly confirmed by the ancient names of Ilus, Assaracus, and Dardanus. For the name of Dardanus he considers as an official title, the Tartan of the Old Testament; Il, or, in the Greek form, Ilus, he regards as the representative of the Assyrian monarchy, and thus is enabled to interpret the building of Ilion and the expulsion of Pelops, both of which are ascribed to Ilus, according to his system, as signifying the Assyrian conquest of Asia Minor, and the founding of a city for the purpose of securing and extending that conquest. I do not feel convinced even that Ilus and Dardanus are Assyrian names; still less that, if so, they would warrant such a large inference. The hostility between the Houses of Ilus and of Tantalus, reported by so many of the later Greek writers, was very naturally supposed to have arisen in Asia, before the migration of Pelops. But the name of Assaracus I fully admit to present a very decided appearance of an Assyrian origin, carrying us to some kind of connexion between Assyria and the western coast of Asia Minor long before the time of Homer. I do not profess to explain the nature of that connexion; to say whether it was political or religious, or had only a purely imaginary ground. I leave it to every one to make what he will and can of the fact. But I cannot accept any surmise founded upon it as a portion of real history.

It will have been seen that the Assyrian conquest of the kingdom of Pelops is an integral part of M. Kruger's hypothesis. Without it, his whole story of the Trojan War must fall to pieces. But that conquest might very well be admitted, and yet afford no basis for such a structure as he has piled upon it. In his view, the siege of Troy, provoked by the Assyrian aggressions, was undertaken by the Greeks, as the invasion of the Crimea by the Allies, in self-defence. But the Assyrian conqueror was bent upon the subjection of Greece, because it had been a dependency of the realm of Pelops, who, when expelled from his Asiatic dominions, had established his direct authority in the states which had before only acknowledged his suzerainty, perhaps with little diminution of their practical independence. But if we ask for evidence of this supposed vassalage, we are transported altogether from historical to mythical ground, and are required to believe that this is the real meaning of the suit and service which Hercules is fabled to have paid to the Lydian queen, Omphale. The wanderings of the Tyrrhenian Pelasgians in Greece, and the Lydian colony in Etruria, are also alleged as indications of the same fact. Such conjectures are alike incapable of refutation and of proof. M. Kruger, in his Preface, speaks of a peculiar organ as needed for the reception of certain ideas; it may be the want of this organ which prevents me from perceiving the slightest force in this part of his argument.

Authority of a much higher order than that of either Ctesias or Plato seems to me, if not absolutely irreconcilable with this hypothesis, to be at least apparently adverse to it. Whatever else may be surmised with regard to the history of this period, we know of one event which took place in it, and which throws some light on the relations in which the states of Western Asia stood to the Assyrian Empire. The first potentate who established his dominion over the Israelites after their settlement in Palestine was Chushan-Rishathaim, King of Mesopotamia. The eight years of his rule over them are placed by M. Kruger between 1231 and 1223 B.C. The Israelites shook off his yoke, and for many centuries, notwithstanding their internal weakness, suffered no fresh

molestations from the same quarter. Chushan is termed by Josephus (*Ant.* v. 3, 2)—who writes his name Chusarthus—king of the Assyrians, as Ewald observes,* only according to a usage prevalent in the age of the Jewish historian; but the language of Scripture would lead us to suppose that he reigned in the western part of Mesopotamia. M. Kruger feels that the existence of such an independent sovereign in that part of Asia, at the period when he represents the King of Assyria as master of Asia Minor, and as aiming at the conquest of Greece and Italy, would be fatal to his hypothesis. Yet he does not venture to identify Chushan with the victorious founder of the Assyrian Empire, but thinks that he may have been a vassal of the Great King, and hints at a resemblance between the name Rishathaim and that of the Persian hero Rustem. I would only observe that even this supposition, arbitrary as it seems, will only shift the difficulty, and not remove it. If it is incredible that the Assyrian conqueror should have carried his arms to the western coast of Asia, leaving an independent and powerful state in Mesopotamia, it is not less hard to believe that the same conqueror, whose successor sent the great army to the relief of Ilium, should have made no attempt to re-establish his dominion in Palestine. This is the point to which I alluded, as one in which M. Kruger has the good fortune to coincide with a much higher authority. Chevalier Bunsen, as I became aware after the preceding remarks were written, has arrived, by a totally different process, at the same conclusion. The depressed state of Egypt in the thirteenth century B.C. appears to him only to admit of explanation as the effect of the Assyrian ascendancy, and to warrant the belief that the conquest of Egypt and Ethiopia, attributed to Semiramis, actually took place at this period. To the same cause he ascribes the reverses which followed the first rapid conquests of the Israelites in Palestine; and hence he infers that Chushan-Rishathaim can only have been an Assyrian satrap of Mesopotamia, which indeed, according to his ingenious derivation, is the exact meaning of the puzzling name. And he further believes that it could have been only under the shelter of the

* *Gesch. des Volkes Israel*, ii. p. 311.

Assyrian power that the various neighbouring nations were enabled, from time to time, to reduce Israel under their yoke. Here, no doubt, we have a clear and coherent sequence of events. Still I must own that I cannot feel the same confidence in these conclusions as is expressed by the author. Speaking generally, I cannot repress a little misgiving about the possibility of reconstructing the history of a remote period out of logical inferences; and in the present case I find it difficult to conceive that such an event as the passage of Semiramis through Palestine should have left no deeper trace in Jewish history. Nor am I satisfied as to the probability that the Assyrian power would have been so kept in the background, and that no attempt should have been made to avenge the defeat of Chushan-Rishathaim, and to restore the direct sovereignty of the Assyrian crown. Altogether, the impression left on my mind by the whole tenor of the Sacred History during the period of the Judges is one which I cannot easily reconcile with the supposition of such a state of things as Chevalier Bunsen describes; and I think it will be safer to wait for some further documentary or monumental evidence before we consider it as sufficiently ascertained.

It may be disagreeable to remain in darkness broken by such very faint rays of uncertain light as now fall on the history of Europe and Asia, in their political relations with one another during the period which has come under our review; but I hold it better that we should resign ourselves to the consciousness of our ignorance than trust to the guidance offered by such a hypothesis as that of M. Kruger. If we are destined to know anything more than we now do on the subject, I believe that it must be by the discovery of new data, not by any new combinations of those which we already possess.

I fully agree with most of what has lately been so admirably said by one of the most eloquent of living statesmen, who has devoted his leisure to one of the noblest of literary studies, as to the paramount and peculiar authority of Homer as the exponent of the Greek heroic life. In substance, indeed, it is what I endeavoured, according to the measure of my far inferior ability, to express and

illustrate long ago. But I must leave it to others who are gifted with a faculty, or organ, which has been denied to me, to undertake the operation—one, I must own, scarcely more beyond my powers than it is uncongenial to my taste—of disentangling the golden thread of historic truth, which they believe to run through the poet's web. Be it curtain, or be it picture, I must be content with admiring its brilliant hues and glorious groups of figures as they present themselves to my eye. I cannot pretend to analyze the contents of his magic cup; I can only enjoy the richness of their flavour, as it strikes my unscientific sense, without distinguishing the elements of which they are composed. I leave it to Mr. Gladstone and M. Kruger to settle their respective differences with Chevalier Bunsen, who, on the other hand, while he believes in the reality of the Trojan War, is no less firmly convinced that the earliest date assigned by the Greek chronologers to that event is some centuries too late; and that this, its hitherto unsuspected remoteness, is proved by the character of the Homeric poems,* in which Mr. Gladstone sees the clearest evidence both of its reality and of its proximity to the poet's lifetime; and who, on the other hand, asserting with M. Kruger,—though, as far as I can see, only on the authority of Herodotus,—that the Assyrian dominion was established over the whole of Asia Minor, in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries before our era, infers from this fact that the Trojan War could not have taken place within the same period. When this dispute shall have been composed, it will be time for me, who am at present unhappily embroiled with all three, to consider how I may best make my peace with them.

In the meanwhile I may perhaps be permitted to take this opportunity of observing, that Mr. Gladstone's criticism, in the *Oxford Essay*, on some remarks which I made in my *History of Greece* on the personality of Helen, appears to me to miss the point of the question. Homer (Il. III. 144) introduces Æthra, the daughter of Pittheus, among the attendants of Helen at Troy. I had assumed the identity of this Æthra with the mother of Theseus, and thence inferred that the abduction of Helen attributed

* *Æg.* vi. p. 446.

to Theseus was known to Homer. No doubt it would have been extremely illogical to assume that identity as a ground for impugning Homer's historical accuracy. But *primâ facie* the presumption is in favour of that identity; nor has it ever been questioned, but on account of the difficulty of reconciling it with the received chronology of the heroic ages. Mr. Gladstone has a right to reject it as inconsistent with his theory, but, according to my view of the authority of Homer as a historian, there is nothing to rebut the presumption, and I am therefore bound to admit it. But my argument, drawn from the Attic and Messenian legends of the abduction of Helen, does not depend on that identity, and would be just as strong if the line containing the name of Æthra was struck out of the Iliad. I should still be able to claim the authority of Homer for the antiquity of those legends which Mr. Gladstone is constrained by his theory to treat as of late invention. For just in proportion to the weight of that authority appears to me the improbability that a story which it is so hard to reconcile, even by the wildest fictions, with that which Homer had made universally current, should have been forged at a later period; whereas, if, as I believe, it sprang up out of the religions of a remote antiquity, it would be easy to conceive that, though keeping its ground in its native soil, it should have remained comparatively obscure and unheeded. How, "as a late invention," it can be "regarded," according to Mr. Gladstone's surmises, "as a witness to the fame of the Homeric personages," I am quite unable to understand. The natural effect of that fame would have been, as it appears to me, to prevent such an invention from occurring to any one's mind.

But to return from this digression. It is possible that future researches among Assyrian or Persian monuments may throw some light even on the historical nucleus of the tale of Troy. Who knows that some yet buried stone may not be found to contain a copy of the letter preserved by Cephalion, in which Priam, after the death of Hector, implored succour from his liege lord, King Teutamus? I should not need it to satisfy me as to the real groundwork of the Iliad. I am convinced that there must have

been more than one Trojan war before the earliest Greek colonists gained a permanent footing on the coast of Asia Minor. For I believe that Strabo correctly describes the state of things which preceded that event, when he says that “the earlier period was one of continual flux and reflux, of invasions and migrations, between Europe and Asia.”*

That statement, as I believe, contains pretty nearly the sum of all our present knowledge on that head, and it affords an ample framework for that whole world of poetical creations with which it has been filled up. I am not sure that we should be great gainers if their place was to be supplied by more authentic details. But the most unfortunate of all exchanges would be, to substitute for them something which is neither history nor poetry, which can neither charm nor instruct, but wearies only to mislead. Still, I must own that I am not sanguine about the discovery of any monumental evidence which will ascertain the western limits of the Assyrian Empire in the thirteenth century before our era. Whenever any such shall have been brought to light, it will need to be very cautiously examined. The material on which events are recorded affords no sure warrant of the accuracy with which they are related. We know of a city where at least one inscribed pillar, “like a tall bully, lifts its head and lies.” Rosellini and Bunsen acknowledge and deplore the pompous inanity of the Egyptian monumental style, in which the few grains of real information lie thinly scattered in a vast mass of what is better expressed by a French than an English word—*verbiage*. And Colonel Mure remarks: †—“Much of the amplification that might otherwise have formed the advantage of the Asiatic records consists of hyperbolical, and probably in great part fabulous, eulogies of the virtues and exploits of the vain-glorious despots who ruled those countries, and who, in furtherance of the same object of personal glorification, were in the habit of expunging or correcting

* XIII. p. 572. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα γενέσθαι τὰς ἐφόδους καὶ τὰς μεταναστάσεις συνέβη, τῶν τε βαρβάρων ἕμα καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁρμῇ τινι χρησαμένων πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀλλοτρίας κατάκτησίν· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν ἦν ταῦτα.

† *Hist. of the Lit. of Anc. Greece*, iv. p. 331.

the annals of their predecessors." The Assyrian monarchs, who took such pains to transmit their achievements to posterity, might easily be tempted to indulge in a little exaggeration about them. As an *argumentum ad hominem* against M. Kruger, I might not unfairly refer to a passage which he himself cites from the Shah-nameh, in which Kei-Khosreu—whom he identifies with the Tiglath-Pileser of the Bible—is made to speak of his kingdom as extending from China and India to distant Roum, and is addressed by one of his grandees as the most powerful of all the princes who had filled the throne, from Minutshehr to Kei-Kobad. This must be quite as authentic as the description of Minutshehr's conquests in the same poem, only we are better able to appreciate the accuracy of the statement. Sennacherib may not have been at all exceeding the bounds of truth when he boasted (according to Sir H. Rawlinson, *Outline*, p. 18) of having "reduced under his yoke all the kings of Asia from the upper forest, which is under the setting sun (Lebanon), to the lower ocean, which is under the rising sun (the Persian Gulf)." Indeed, when we remember his campaign in Cilicia, signalized by the building or restoration of Tarsus, this appears to be hardly an adequate account of his achievements. But this language certainly suggests the belief that he meant to claim the glory of having extended the empire in these directions beyond the limits which it had ever before reached; and I find it difficult to conceive that he would have expressed himself in such terms if there had been inscriptions extant in any of his palaces from which it appeared that one of his predecessors had ruled from the Indus to the Ægean. M. Kruger thinks that the provinces west of the Halys were lost to Assyria toward the beginning of the twelfth century B.C. (1119—1105), when the great Lydian monarchy with which Agron had been invested was enabled, through the weakness of the prince (the Nuder of the Shah-nameh) who followed the last Minutshehr, to assert its independence. But if so, this Lydian kingdom must itself shortly after have undergone some great loss of territory, through causes no trace of which has been preserved in history; for it seems clear that the Greek colonists in Asia Minor did not

find it occupying the coast on which they settled; and according to Herodotus their independence was first threatened by Gyges. That the Lydian power had previously suffered any check which compelled it to tolerate the encroachments of the Greeks, appears to have been wholly unknown to Herodotus. His idea plainly was, that it had been constantly growing. I must, however, observe, in justice to M. Kruger, that in Castor's epochs of the maritime states, as they have now been elucidated and determined with admirable learning and acuteness by Chevalier Bunsen (*Æg.* VI. p. 439), the naval power of the Lydians, or as it would seem more properly the Mæonians, dates from 1150 B.C., a date which might very well coincide with the supposed recovery of the national independence.

I will only add two remarks, which may be necessary to guard against misapprehension.

The object of the foregoing observations has been simply to examine the evidence which has lately been adduced to prove the existence of a political connexion between Greece and Assyria in the thirteenth century B.C. The result to my own conviction has been to show that the evidence is quite inconclusive. I have also pointed out that there is evidence—quite as well entitled to credit as any that has been produced on the other side—which apparently tends to the opposite conclusion. But I do not mean to deny the fact. I am quite ready to admit it, as soon as it shall be established by satisfactory proof. I only contend that at present it is no more than matter of very questionable surmise. A negative dogmatism on such a subject would be still more presumptuous than a positive assertion resting on insufficient grounds. Mr. Layard has observed,* with judicious caution: “To the west the Assyrians may have penetrated into Syria, and perhaps Lydia.” If indeed we were speaking, not of a permanent establishment, but of a mere temporary inroad, it would be rash to assign any limit to their advance in this or any other direction. There is even what has been accepted by very eminent critics as satisfactory evidence, that the Assyrian arms were carried still farther westward in the

* *Nineveh and Babylon*, p. 633.

later times of the monarchy. For in a fragment of Abydenus, preserved in the Armenian Eusebius (i. p. 53), we are informed that the avenger of Sennacherib, Assarhaddon—there called Axerdis—after slaying the assassin Adrammelech, pursued his army and shut it up, or forced it to take refuge, in the city of the Byzantians. Niebuhr, in his celebrated disquisition, “On the Gain which has accrued to History from the Armenian Translation of Eusebius,” takes no offence at this statement, and reports it as if Abydenus had said that Axerdis had “marched through Western Asia as far as Byzantium, with an army of mercenaries.” But this is not quite correct. The fragment first relates the pursuit of Adrammelech’s army, and then states that Axerdis was the first (of the Assyrian kings) who collected mercenary troops. But as to the march of Axerdis to Byzantium, in the first place, this seems to be more than is distinctly affirmed in the Armenian text,* the Latin translation being “*Exercitum persecutus in Byzantinorum urbem includit.*” The term of the retreat might have exceeded that of the pursuit. But I must own that I cannot help suspecting some mistake in the name of the Byzantians, not on account of the strangeness of the occurrence, or the absence of all confirmative and illustrative testimony, but because the whole account seems to be at variance with the Scripture narrative. Abydenus appears not to have been correctly informed as to the death of Adrammelech, who in the Bible is related to have escaped, together with his brother Sharezer (of whom Abydenus takes no notice) into Armenia. And the Armenian historian, Moses of Chorene, describes (i. 23) the districts of Armenia which were allotted by the king Sgaiorti for the residence of the two brothers. It would seem to follow that the pursuit must have taken place, and have been arrested, somewhere or other in that direction.

The other remark which I have to make refers to a point on which I touched at the outset. The author of the work which has given occasion to these observations speaks as if one of his main objects was to help to break down the partition by which the school to which he is opposed has endeavoured to exclude the influence of

* *Kl. Schr.*, p. 206.

Oriental culture on the development of the Hellenic mind. But I think it must be evident that the questions which I have been discussing have scarcely any bearing on that controversy. Whether he has succeeded or failed in his attempt to restore a chapter in the political history of Greece in the thirteenth century B.C., the result will not affect any views that may be entertained as to the original character of the earliest population of Greece, or the degree in which it was subjected to foreign influences. These are questions which manifestly go back into a far higher antiquity than he himself assigns to the migration of Pelops. According to all accounts, that event affected the relations of the ruling families in Greece, rather than the condition of the people; but it can reflect no light whatever on their previous history. It may be admitted or rejected, without the compromise of any opinion as to the nature of the elements which composed the Greek nationality, or the processes by which they were fused together. The author has enriched the controversy about the name of the Pelasgians with a new hypothesis, by which it is derived from the god Bel. But whether we adopt this, or prefer that of a different Semitic root, which connects it more immediately with Palestine, or that which traces it to the Slavonic, more particularly the Polish branch of the family, or fall back upon a Greek derivation—all which hypotheses have been recently maintained with a great show of erudition*—we shall not be the more tied to any conclusion as to the fortunes of Pelops or the history of the Trojan War. And though every serious attempt to let in a

* The Semitic origin of the name and people is strenuously asserted by Röhth (*Gesch. unserer Abendländischen Philosophie*, i. p. 91, and Notes 17 and 25). His opinion as to the connexion between the Philistines and the Egyptian shepherd Philitis is shared by Bunsen (*Ägypten's Stelle*, i. d. *W.* iii. p. 49, and v. p. 21), and by Lepsius, to the surprise of Gutschmid (*De Rer. Æg. Scrip. II. Græcis*, in *Philologus*, 1855, p. 651), who thinks the conjecture both philologically and chronologically untenable. The Slavonic hypothesis, which was advocated in very general terms by Dr. Donaldson (*New Cratylus*, p. 90 f.), has been since reproduced, with special reference to the Poles, in a little essay by Jocher, entitled *Pelasgia*. A paper in the same number of the *Philologus*, by Moritz Crain, contains an elaborate proof that the name Πελασγοί is formed by correct analogy out of purely Greek elements, though not exactly in the way commonly supposed. And see, above all, the Appendix (2) in Bunsen, *Ägypten*, vi. p. 444; *Die Ionische Urzeit in Kleinasien*, and *Die Ionier vor der Ionischen Wanderung*, von Ernst Curtius (Berlin, 1855).

beam of the dry light of historical truth on the heroic age of Greece may awaken a natural and reasonable curiosity, the chief interest of the whole inquiry in which we have been engaged belongs rather to Asia than to Europe, as it is, I believe, only to the East that we can look with a well-grounded hope, however faint, of such an accession to our knowledge of that period as would enable us in a single point to distinguish with certainty between fiction and reality.

ON SOME
TRADITIONS RELATING TO THE SUB-
MERSION OF ANCIENT CITIES.*

I do not think it necessary to offer any apology for the character of the stories which will be considered in this paper, as if they might appear beneath the notice of a learned society. No doubt, if they were to be looked upon as the invention of individuals, they would be quite unworthy of any serious attention, but when viewed as the spontaneous utterances of the impression made on the popular imagination, in a rude state of society, by certain natural phenomena, they rank among the facts which have always been justly regarded as materials of no slight value for the history of the human mind, and which, as such, have been carefully preserved by intelligent travellers and brought together, under various aspects, by writers on mythology. Such legends acquire a peculiar interest when we find a resemblance, even in very minute features, between those which have sprung up at long intervals of time, and which belong to regions very remote from one another, so that it is hardly conceivable that there should have been a traditional connexion between them. I think I shall be able to produce some rather curious instances of such resemblance, and this will, I trust, be a sufficient excuse for bringing them before the Society. But to myself the chief attraction of the subject has consisted in the affinity which I thought I could perceive among the legends of one very large class, and which appeared sufficiently to account for that resemblance where otherwise it might seem to countenance the hypothesis of a historical transmission.

* Transactions of the Royal Soc. of Literature, vol. vi. (second series) p. 387.

Even an unsuccessful attempt at such an explanation, as it may suggest one more satisfactory, may not be wholly worthless.

In a Paper which I read to the Society last year, I remarked on one of the accounts given of the destruction of Sipylyus, that "it was one of the numberless legends to be found in all parts of the world, from Ireland to Abyssinia, one of which still lingers in the mouths of the peasantry round Albano, about ancient cities covered by lakes, and commonly, as there, connected with some story of divine retribution for impious pride, such as was imputed to Tantalus." I will now give some of the examples to which I alluded; but before I bring forward the Italian, African, and Irish legends, I will notice some which belong to Greece, and which, though they do not illustrate exactly the same side of the subject to which that remark referred, are important for the more general view which I am about to take of it.

It is well known that in several places of Greece, especially in Bœotia and Arcadia, where there are plains entirely surrounded by hills without any opening on the surface, the cultivation of the ground, and even the safety of the inhabitants, depend on the subterraneous passages by which the waters, which would otherwise rise to a great height, find an issue. Whenever these passages are choked, a more or less disastrous inundation is the inevitable consequence. I will only mention the lake Copais as perhaps the most signal and familiar example of the physical phenomenon. But I must dwell for a few moments on the legends of Pheneus and Stymphalus. From time immemorial the little valley of Pheneus has been subject to inundations, which convert the lower part into a lake. The height to which the waters have risen appears to be marked by the colour of the rocks, "along which," according to Colonel Leake's description (*Morœa*, iii. 147), "at a height of about fifty feet above the level of the plain, there is a line, seeming to mark the depth of the water when all this plain was a lake; all below the mark being of a lighter colour than the rest of the mountain." Most travellers, ancient and modern, have adopted this explanation of the appearance of the rocks. Colonel Leake, who in 1806 found the plain drained and

well cultivated, thought the indication doubtful, and believed that it might be better accounted for as the effect of evaporation, conceiving that "all the waters which flow into the Pheneatic basin would be insufficient to raise the water to half the height of the discoloured line." But fifteen years after Colonel Leake's visit, as I learn from the work of Curtius on the Peloponnesus (i. 189), some obstruction occurred in the Katàbothra through which the waters find their way into the Alpheus, and, in 1828, caused an inundation which covered the whole plain, in some places to the depth of 150 feet. Had the waters continued to rise, Curtius observes, they would have overflowed the ridge of Guiozo, and have poured down into the vale of Orchomenus. But the obstruction suddenly gave way; a happy omen, it was thought, as the King of Greece was just mounting the throne; and the flood subsided as rapidly as it had risen. The consequence, however, was that while the valley of Pheneus was restored to cultivation, though in the lower part covered with a deep deposit of fresh soil, the plain of Olympia was laid under water by the swelling of the Ladon and the Alpheus.

There can be no doubt that similar events took place from time to time in remote ages, and they have left their trace, if not on the rocks, in the legends of the country. The subjugation of Elis, effected by Hercules in an expedition which he made from Pheneus, is considered by Curtius as the mythical expression for an occurrence like that of 1828, and to the like origin he would refer the story of Ulysses finding his stray horses—the horse being the familiar symbol of a gushing spring or rapid stream—at Pheneus, through the help of Artemis, to whom, in gratitude for this favour and for the excellent pasture which his horses found in the valley, he dedicated a temple with the title *Heurippé*, the Finder of Horses. What is certain is that in the ancient local legends Hercules was represented as the author, not only of the canal which confined the course of the Aroanius through the plain, but of the subterraneous passage, while the inundation was attributed to the wrath of Apollo for the loss of the tripod which the hero had carried from Delphi to Pheneus. The chasm itself

was viewed with awe by the ancient inhabitants of the valley as one of the avenues to the realm of Hades; and I am strongly inclined to believe that the grotesque story which Colonel Leake found current among the modern peasantry of a conflict between two demons who possessed the lake, in which the one who was worsted made his escape through the mountain, and thus opened a passage for the waters, is merely the modern version of the highly significant classical fable preserved by Conon (*Narr.* 15) of Pluto's carrying off Proserpine by the same way, and of Demeter's rewarding the people of Pheneus, who showed her the chasm, with manifold blessings.

At Stymphalus we find exactly similar physical phenomena, a lake which discharges its waters through a like subterraneous channel, only in the opposite direction, so as to reappear in the Erasinus, and be carried into the Gulf of Argolis. Curtius states that in ordinary seasons the water rises and falls periodically, and after a rainy winter usually covers about a third of the lower plain; while, as it has but one outlet, any obstruction causes an inundation. Such a calamity befell the Stymphalians in the time of Pausanias. It was attributed to the wrath of the Stymphalian Artemis, provoked by some neglect of her rites. The obstruction was removed when a deer pursued by a hunter took to the water, and both man and beast went down into the chasm. Curtius interprets this story as founded on a human sacrifice offered to propitiate the goddess, and would explain the deer as a symbol equivalent to the horse in the legend of Ulysses at Pheneus. I doubt about this. But the material point is that we have here another Artemis, who is distinctly connected with the lake, as the power to whom it was immediately subject, and to whom it belonged to regulate its level for the weal or woe of Stymphalus. The image of the famous Stymphalian birds—a symbol of the noxious exhalations which arose from the stagnant waters, so as to call for a labour of Hercules similar to that which he accomplished at Pheneus—in wood and in marble, were among the ornaments of her ancient temple in Stymphalus. Welcker observes (*Griechische Götterlehre*, i. 586), that the Stymphalian

Artemis was probably worshipped as an Artemis Limnæa, or Limnatis, though not expressly designated by that epithet. For she was the goddess of fountains, rivers, and lakes, considered as supplying nourishment to vegetable and animal life ; and this, as we have seen, was probably the meaning of her title, Heurippe, at Pheneus.

I now pass on to Albano, and I must transcribe a few sentences from Niebuhr's *History*, with a note which I append to the translation. "The surface of the lake," Niebuhr says (i. p. 197), "now lies far below the ancient city: when Alba was standing, and before the waters swelled to a ruinous height in consequence of some obstructions in the outlets, it must have lain much lower; for in the age of Diodorus and Dionysius, during extraordinary droughts, the remains of some spacious buildings might be seen at the bottom, and the common people took them for the palace of an impious king, which had been swallowed up." I must here observe that I very much doubt that this supposed original Alba ever existed, or that any such remains of buildings were ever visible. The grounds of this doubt will be assigned by-and-by. But the passage reminded me of a legend which I had heard a few years before from my young guide at Albano, and which I recorded in the note. "Where the lake now lies there once stood a great city. Here, when Jesus Christ came into Italy, he begged alms. None took compassion on Him but an old woman, who gave Him two handfuls of meal. He bade her leave the city: she obeyed; the city instantly sank, and the lake rose in its place." Here again, as at Pheneus, I venture to believe that we have the Christian version of a Pagan legend, but I do not believe that there is a particle more of historical truth in the one form of it than in the other.

Let us now compare the modern legend with one which is recorded by Major Harris in the following passage of his *Travels in the Highlands of Ethiopia* (ii. p. 343). "Of yore, when the spot now inundated (by the lake Alobár) was *terra firma*, the Virgin Mary is said to have appeared in the house of the wealthiest cultivator residing in the many flourishing villages that then

existed, and to have addressed herself to the mistress, saying, 'I am hungry, and have nothing to eat; give me corn, and I will grind for wages.' A vast heap of grain was pointed out, sufficient for a week's labour, but no sooner had the Virgin touched it, than it was miraculously converted into meal. The inhospitable master of the house now refused the pittance claimed, nor would the 'Four Chairs,' before whom the complaint was carried, give redress, until a poor shepherd had become mediator. As a mark of the displeasure of Heaven, the scene of this offence against the Mother of Christ was forthwith converted into a lake, which has since formed the abode of the lord of all the gins and evil spirits in the land."

The coincidence between the Ethiopian and the Italian legend would be curious enough in itself, but it becomes still more interesting if we compare them both with a third, which is related by Dr. Livingstone in his travels, being the account which he heard from the natives of the origin of Lake Dilólo. The lake itself is so remarkable that it will be worth while to quote a few of the particulars reported by Dr. Livingstone, of its physical configuration. It is situate between the 11th and 12th degree of south latitude, and is between seven and eight miles in length, and about three in breadth. It is the watershed between the river systems that flow to the east and west. The river Lotembwa flows out of it in opposite directions. "We forded," he says, "the southern branch of Lake Dilólo. We found it a mile and a quarter broad, and as it flows into the Lotembwa, the lake would seem to be a drain of the surrounding flats, and to partake of the character of a fountain. Going to the eastward about three miles, we came to the southern Lotembwa itself, running in a valley two miles broad. It is here eighty or ninety yards wide, and contains numerous islands covered with dense sylvan vegetation. In the rainy season the valley is flooded, and as the waters dry up, great multitudes of fish are caught. This happens very extensively over the country, and fishing-weirs are met with everywhere." These facts will be found to have a material bearing on the character of the legend which I now give in the author's words. "When asked

the meaning of the name Dilólo, Shakatwala gave the following account of the formation of the lake. A female chief, called Moéna (lord) Monénga, came one evening to the village of Mosógo, a man who lived in the vicinity, but who had gone to hunt with his dogs. She asked for a supply of food, and Mosógo's wife gave her a sufficient quantity. Proceeding to another village, standing on the spot now occupied by the water, she preferred the same demand, but when she uttered a threat for their niggardliness, was taunted with the question, 'What could she do, though she were thus treated?' In order to show what she could do, she began a song in slow time, and uttered her own name, Monénga wōō. As she prolonged the last note, the village, people, fowls, and dogs sank into the space now called Dilólo. When Kasimakata, the head man of the village, came home, and found out the catastrophe, he cast himself into the lake, and is supposed to be in it still. The name is derived from Dilólo, *despair*, because this man gave up all hope when his family was destroyed. Monénga was put to death. This may be a faint tradition of the Deluge, and it is remarkable as the only one I have met with in this country."

On this last conjecture I will only observe that it does not seem to me more needed, or more available for the explanation of the South African than of the Ethiopian or the Italian legend. But it deserves to be noted, that although the origin of Lake Dilólo is referred to the agency of a hostile enchantress, I was informed by Dr. Livingstone, in a conversation which I had the pleasure of enjoying with him a short time before his departure on his present expedition, that the lake is decidedly a blessing to the country, which without it would be a barren desert; and even the occasional inundations are, as we have seen, attended with some substantial advantages. I note this fact because it marks the essential differences between this legend and those of Arcadia, which we have just had before us. In them the rising of the waters was attributed to the wrath of Artemis; but this was because it was justly regarded as a sure cause of a public calamity. As to the signification of the name, Dr. Livingstone himself con-

sidered it as purely conjectural; and I think it must be evident to any one who will look at the names of the rivers in the circumjacent region, that the coincidence is quite as likely to have been accidental: but the meaning of the word may have had something to do with the peculiar form of the legend.

The prominent feature which is common to all those which we have been considering, is a supernatural visitation, incurred through some transgression: pride, impiety, injustice, or inhumanity. This, however, is a feature which they have in common with a vast mass of mediæval traditions, several of which are collected in the twelfth volume of Scheible's curious compilation entitled *Das Kloster*. It is true that for the most part they simply relate the disappearance of a city, village, castle, convent, or church, which once stood where the lake or pool is now seen, without assigning any cause for the event.* But that, in the popular feeling, it was always connected with some moral ground, and was regarded as a judgment, may, where the general probability is so strong, be pretty safely inferred from the instances in which such a cause is expressly mentioned. Thus we are informed that near the village of Heiligensee on the Havel, is a little lake, from which the village took its name. The legend runs, that a castle once stood on the same site, inhabited by a princess who lay under a curse. The castle sank, and the lake rose in its place.

Elsewhere, in East Prussia, in the first struggle between the Wendish Paganism and Christianity, a convent was built by pious monks; but the half-converted natives were instigated by a heathen priest to attack it. The assault was made on a Midsummer's-day, as the convent bell rang for matins, which was the preconcerted signal. The building was set on fire, and the monks massacred; when a fearful tempest arose, accompanied with lightning, which ran along the ground, so as to prevent the escape of the murderers. They sank into the earth along with the ruins of the convent, and its place was filled by a lake, which, from the fatal signal

* So in the legend of the Arendsee, Grimm, *D. S.* 111, and the Ochsenberg, *ibid.* 112.

(*Loosung*), was called the Loossee. And out of its depths the sound of a bell is supposed to be still audible every Midsummer's-day.

A still better sample of this class of legends occurs in a book where one would hardly have looked for it; the Danish poet Andersen's *O. T.* It belongs to the little Danish township of Vissenberg, and is thus reported, I have no doubt quite faithfully, by the author:—"Where we now see a reedy pond once stood a church; but it sank when profaned by ungodly men, and their sighs and penitential psalms are still heard at midnight."* This may remind us that Kasimakata is supposed to be still living in Lake Dilólo. Our own ecclesiastical annals furnish a similar example. When the Bishops Germanus and Lupus came over to combat the Pelagian heresy, they were resisted and reviled by a wealthy man in the neighbourhood of Oswestry. But shortly after his stately mansion was swallowed up in a pool, which preserved a record of the event in its name.† Nork, the author of the twelfth volume in Scheible's Collection, which treats of the "manners and customs of the Germans and their neighbours, with reference to the popular traditions which have sprung out of their ecclesiastical superstitions and forensic usages,"—finds the clue to all these legends of preternatural submersions in the custom of offering human sacrifices at certain critical seasons of the year, such as Midsummer, by the drowning of the victims in lakes or pools. He believes, and certainly not without strong evidence of facts pointing that way, that the custom kept its ground after the introduction of Christianity, and intimates, what I should be loath to admit without clearer proof, that it was sanctioned at least by the passive connivance, if not by the active concurrence, of the clergy. The legends would then have taken their present shape, after the horrible superstition had been completely abolished.

It would be foreign to my purpose to dwell on the offerings,

* Førsta Deel, p. 104:—"Hvor vi nu see en Dam med Siv og Rædder, laae engang en Kirke, men den sank, da Ugudelige, vanhelligede den; endnu høre vi ved Midnat deres Suk og Pœnitence-Psalmer."

† Llynclys. Theophilus Evans, *Drych y Prif Oesoedd*, p. 144.

whether of this or any other kind, which have been paid to standing or flowing waters most probably in every part of the world. The ancient prevalence of the usage in the East is indicated by the sacrifice of a white horse, with which the Magians sought to propitiate the Strymon at the passage of Xerxes. And, for my own part, I am strongly persuaded that it is to a like propitiatory offering that Achilles alludes in the Twenty-first Iliad (v. 132), where he speaks of the horses which, besides the sacrifice of bulls, the Trojans were used to throw alive into the Scamander. Mr. Gladstone indeed (*Studies on Homer*, iii. p. 155) thinks it possible that the true explanation may be, that the river "carried away, in sudden *spates*, many of the horses that were pastured on its banks."* I must own that I am quite unable to reconcile this explanation either with the language of the verse itself or with the context. I do not understand how the ravages of the river could be described as the act of the Trojans themselves, nor how the loss of their horses, which they suffered on such occasions, could be represented as one of the grounds on which they might hope that the river-god would protect them from the wrath of Achilles. We have already seen, when we were considering the Arcadian legends, that the symbolical character of the horse rendered this animal, even more than the bull,—which we know is similarly significant of the might of rushing streams,†—an appropriate sacrifice for such a purpose. But to return to the Magians. Their sacrifice of the nine boys and as many girls, whom they buried alive in the Nine Ways (*ἐννέα ὄδοι*), an island formed by the branches of the river, was probably intended for it, no less than for the land. And I am inclined to surmise that the lock of the hair of Achilles which Peleus vowed to the Spercheus on the event of his son's return from Troy, and which was to be accompanied with a hecatomb, and the sacrifice of fifty rams, at the spring where the river-god had his grove and altar, was, no less than the hair with which the corpse of Patroclus was covered by his comrades, the symbol

* οὐδ' ὑμῖν ποταμὸς ἰθὺροὺς ἀργυροδίνης
ἀρκέσει, ᾧ δὲ δηθὰ πολέας ἱερεύσατε ταύρους
ζώους δ' ἐν δίνῃσι καθίετε μώνυχας ἵππους.

† Soph. *Trach.* 11, and the Scholiast.

of a dedication which at an earlier period was sometimes accomplished in a more real and less innocent manner. It may not be uninteresting to compare the form which this worship took among the aboriginal inhabitants of Spanish America, as it appears in a very curious Spanish work, published for the first time last year at Vienna, from a manuscript found by the editor, Dr. Scherzer, in the library of the University of Guatemala, being a translation of an ancient chronicle of Guatemala out of the Quiche language into the Castilian, together with some scholia or notes (*escolios*) by the translator, Father Ximenez, relating to the social condition of the primitive race.* One of these scholia is headed, "Of the places where they of Guatemala used to sacrifice, as at fountains, rocks, caves, and under trees." There we read, among other things — "Likewise they used to sacrifice under trees of very thick foliage, under which it was their custom to shed blood from various parts of their bodies; likewise they used to sacrifice at fountains, especially when they were seeking to obtain children; and if they found any very thick-headed tree that had a fountain under it, they held that place to be divine, because there two deities met, he of the tree, and he of the fountain."†

When we hear that the first cuttings of the child's hair were burnt with incense, we may be reminded partly of the vow of Peleus, and partly of the obsequies of Patroclus. But when it is added that they used to sacrifice in caves and dark places, and in the meetings of roads, and on the peaks of rocky hills; and farther, that in any great danger or strait, they were used sometimes to

* *Las Historias del Origen de los Indios de esta Provincia de Guatemala; traducidas de la lengua Quiche al Castellano, para mas comodidad de los ministros del S. Evangelio, por el R. P. F. Francisco Ximenez, Cura Doctrinero por el real patronato del Pueblo de S. Thomas Chuela. Esactamente segun el Texto Español del Manuscrito original que se halla en la Biblioteca de la Universidad de Guatemala, publicado por la primera vez, y aumentado con una Introduccion y Anotaciones por el Dr. C. Scherzer, Viena, 1857).*

† P. 189. "Si hallaban algun árbol muy espeso, que tuviese debajo alguna fuente, tenian por lugar divino aquel tal, porque concurrían dos divinidades, así en el árbol como en la fuente." So in the *Iliad*, II. 305, the Greeks at Aulis offered their sacrifices at a fountain which was overshadowed by a beautiful plane-tree:—

ἡμεῖς δ' ἀμφὶ περὶ κρηνην ἱεροῦς κατὰ βωμῶν
ἔρδομεν ἀθανάτοισι τελέεσσας ἑκατόμβας
καλῇ ὑπὸ πλατανίστῳ, ὕθεν ῥίεν ἄγλαον ὕδωρ.

vow the sacrifice of a son or a daughter, one cannot but remember the prophet's description:—"Enflaming yourselves with idols under every green tree, slaying the children in the valleys under the cliffs of the rocks. Among the smooth stones of the stream is thy portion; they, they are thy lot: even to them hast thou poured a drink offering, thou hast offered a meat offering. Upon a lofty and high mountain hast thou set thy bed."

But returning from this little digression, in which, however, I have not altogether lost sight of my main subject, to the point from which I turned aside, I would observe, that the system of what, in the largest sense of the word, may be termed water-worship, in all the endless varieties of its forms, springs from one root—the universal experience of the value of water. But this root sends out two branches, each of which bears its several fruit, in a distinct set of usages and legends. On the one hand there is the experience of the purifying, strengthening, refreshing, and wholesome properties of water, in its immediate application to the human frame; and on the other hand, the sense of dependence upon it for the fruits of the earth, and the first conditions of private and public well-being. Examples of both may be found, though mixed up together under the one head of water, in Grimm's *Deutsche Mythologie*. To the first division belongs the Heilawag-water, drawn from a spring at certain seasons—more especially at Christmas, Easter, and Midsummer (St. John Baptist's day)—which was supposed to remain fresh all the year round, and to possess wonderful medicinal virtues. Also the numberless Heilbronns and Holywells, some of which were believed to restore not only health, but youth to the bathers, and even to reunite severed limbs to the mutilated body, and to change the sex. The eve of St. John Baptist was, and is to this day at Copenhagen, the season specially appropriated to such ablutions. On that day Petrarch found a great concourse of women at Cologne, bathing in the Rhine, and on inquiry was informed that it was a very ancient usage, and, according to the vulgar belief, a safeguard against all calamity impending for the year to come. Petrarch was not aware that any such custom existed in Italy. But Grimm

produces an example from an Italian work of the sixteenth century, where it is related that at Naples there was an ancient usage, which even then was not wholly abandoned, for men and women to bathe in the sea on the eve of St. John Baptist, under the persuasion that they were thereby purified from their sins; and he quotes passages from St. Augustine, in which that father speaks of the very same custom as prevailing in his day in Africa, and condemns it as an unhappy remnant of Pagan superstition. Peculiar efficacy for the like purpose was attributed to water collected from the droppings of mill-wheels.

To the other head must be referred the popular belief, that seasons of plenty or scarcity were foreshown, not only by ebbing springs, but by the rise or fall of water kept in a vessel for that purpose; the horn in the right hand of the Slavonic god, Swantovit, in the Isle of Rügen, which was used as an instrument of like predictions; the custom, once prevalent in many parts of Germany, and still subsisting in Servia, and among the modern Greeks, of wrapping up a young maiden in grass, herbs, and flowers, leading her about, and pouring a bucketful of water over her, while her companions sang a supplication for rain; the singular Esthonian legend of Lake Eim, which removed from a district in which the savage inhabitants neglected agriculture and were given to robbery and bloodshed, and lifting itself with all its fish into the air, came down among an industrious and orderly people, who prized its gifts, and made their whole land fruitful. Both elements appear in the legend of Frau Holle, whom we may compare with the Greek Artemis Limnæa, the lady of a small pool or tarn, the Hollenteich in Mount Meissner, in Hesse. Women seek health and fecundity in her waters, and she herself goes round the land every year, bestowing fertility on the fields.

But I now turn to another side of the subject, which is that to which I most wish to invite attention. There appears to be sufficient evidence, if indeed any is needed for a fact which might be safely assumed as an inevitable result of the constitution of the human mind, that, independently of the material benefits derived

from the aqueous element, its various aspects, whether in springs or rivers, sea or lakes, have made a deep impression on the popular imagination.

Mr. Atkinson, in his *Travels in Siberia*, visited several sacred lakes; but is quite silent as to any explanation of the sanctity attributed to them, except that which is afforded by their outward aspect. On the Aoush-Kool, he observes (p. 141):—"This Holy Lake of the Bashkirs is beautifully situated; . . . on its north-west side rises a conical hill, named Aoushton, or Holy Mount." Of the Baikal itself he can only report (p. 596):—"The Baikal, or as the natives call it, the Holy Sea, is said by them to be unfathomable, and subject to terrific storms." In both these cases, the name is the only indication of the feeling it expresses. But of the small and picturesque lake of Skeongoun, in the mountains of Mongolia, he writes:—"It is held in great veneration by the Kalkas. They have erected a small wooden temple on the shore, and here they come to sacrifice; offering up milk, butter, and the fat of the animals, which they burn on the little altars. The large rock in the lake is with them a sacred stone, on which some rude figures are traced; and on the bank opposite, they place rods with small silk flags, having inscriptions printed on them." The only legend connected with any of the lakes, which reached his ears, was, that at the small lake Oulounjour Shaitán has his dwelling: and in that instance it is not clear whether the abode of the Evil One is to be referred to the lake (as in the Ethiopian Alobár), or to the caverns on its shore.

On the whole, the practical barrenness of these lakes exhibits a strong contrast to the wealth of legendary lore, which has been gathered from similar objects among tribes, either gifted with a larger measure of the imaginative faculty, or placed in more favourable conditions than those which have occupied or ranged over the vast tracts of Siberia and Mongolia. The Greeks and Romans, the Teutonic, Scandinavian, Slavonic, and Celtic races, peopled the depths of their waters with Nereids, Tritons, Naiads, River-gods, Nixes, Elves, Water-sprites, and the like: beings not devoid of human sympathies, but mostly taking an interest in the affairs of

men, and, though quick to resent affronts, often connecting themselves with mankind, both by domestic ties and by an interchange of good offices. Their subaqueous abodes are described as beautiful, splendid, abounding in all kinds of good things. Homer paints the glorious mansion of Neptune in the depths of the gulf near Ægæ, as “golden, glittering, ever exempt from decay.”* And I wish it to be noticed how the whole description in that passage glistens with gold. The god himself dons a suit of gold.† Of gold are the manes of his horses, their reins, and even the fetters with which he secures their feet when he leaves them in the submarine cave to await his return from the Grecian camp. Virgil’s conception of a central abyss, the common head of all the rivers of the earth, is no doubt a mere poetical invention. But his description of the shining palace there, in which Aristæus found his mother, Cyrene, enjoying the society of her sister nymphs, and that of the banquet at which he was entertained by them, is the classical expression of a popular belief, which re-appears with substantial identity, though in less elegant forms, in numberless legends. Even Frau Hollenteich—though she properly belongs to a different order of ideas—not only regales her favourites with flowers, fruit, cakes, and the produce of her incomparable garden,—a paradise at the bottom of her pool,—but has her pieces of silver for active and cleanly servants, who find them at the bottom of their pails, if they take them, well rinsed, to draw water betimes in the morning. The prevailing notion of the sublaeustrine domains is, that they are full of countless treasures, especially in gold. In one of Grimm’s German legends,‡ the water-spirit takes a peasant who lived near his lake, and was on friendly terms with him, down below. There the visitor found all like a magnificent palace on the earth, with rooms full of manifold riches and ornaments: and in one small cabinet, many earthen pots standing upside down, within which, as he was informed, were confined the souls of

* Il. XIII. 21:—

ἔνθα τέ οἱ κλυτὰ δώματα βένθεσι λίμνης
 χρύσεια, μαρμαίροντα τετεύχεται, ἄφθιτα αἰεὶ.

† χρυσὸν δ’ αὐτὸς ἔδυνε περὶ χρῶς.

‡ No. 52. *Der Wassermann und der Bauer.*

those who had been drowned in the lake. On the Mummelsee, near Baden, a sportsman, as he passed, saw a dwarf sitting on the surface of the water, with his lap full of money, with which he was playing. The sportsman fired at him, and he dived under; but was heard to declare that, if he had been requested, he could easily have made the aggressor rich, whereas now he and his descendants were doomed to poverty.* A woman is taken by night down into the Dönges lake (in Hesse), to aid the Queen of the Lake in childbirth. She sees many wonderful things, great treasures and riches, but must swear not to say anything of them to any man, and is conducted back again the next night, richly rewarded for her services.† It was not, however, generally thought safe to carry away any of these treasures, beyond at least a moderate remuneration for any service rendered to the owners. This is the point of two other legends, in each of which a spiteful Nix offers a heap of gold with a malignant purpose.

The story of the priest Elidor, in Giraldus Cambrensis, illustrates the same feeling. The schoolboy goes down into the water, and finds a beautiful region, abounding in gold, and a king's palace. But when he attempts to carry away the golden ball, which was the plaything of the king's son, it slips from him just as he reaches home, and is taken away by two dwarfs, who jeer him as they depart, and he is never again able to find the way into the happy land. Giraldus also relates of Llyn Safadwy, in Brecknockshire, that it is sometimes seen by the inhabitants covered and adorned with buildings, pastures, gardens, and orchards: and we learn from Sir Richard Hoare, in his annotations on the chapter, that this lake is to be added to the list of those in which ancient cities have been submerged. "The ridiculous idea," he says, "of its having swallowed up an ancient city, is not yet quite exploded by the natives." The legend of the Cantref y Gwaelod belongs to the same class and is more generally known.

Another, which I have not seen in any book, is connected with the town of Carmarthen, and to this day retains its hold on the popular belief. Among the prophecies of Merlin, one which is

* Grimm, *D. S.* 59.

† *Ibid.* 65, 69.

still in the mouth of the Welsh peasantry is, “Caerfyrddin a sudd, Abergwili a saif” (Carmarthen shall sink, Abergwili shall stand). So familiar is this prediction to the popular mind, that the day on which it is to be fulfilled is generally understood to be a 12th of August: and so deeply rooted is the belief, that not long back, when that day happened to be a market-day at Carmarthen, and a storm of wind and rain came on, many of the country-people hurried out of the town, under the persuasion that the catastrophe was at hand.

This information I have only received orally, though upon very good authority, and I have not been able to ascertain the connexion of this prophecy with the history of Merlin; but I have doubt that the key must be sought in the legend reported by Spenser in the *Faery Queen*, book iii. c. 3. The cave in the heart of the rock there described, from which issued strange noises of iron chains and brazen cauldrons, great groans and grievous sounds, and oftentimes loud strokes and ringing sounds, as of laborious sprites—audible, indeed, only to persons of very quick ear—is believed in the neighbourhood of Carmarthen to lie in a hill called Merlin’s Hill, close to the village of Abergwili; and the poet says:—

“The cause some say is this : A little while
 Before that Merlin died, he did intend
 A brazen-wall in compass to compile
 About Cayr-Merdin, and did it commend
 Unto those sprights to bring to perfect end.
 During which work the Lady of the Lake,
 Whom long he loved, for him in haste did tend,
 Who thereby forced his workmen to foresake,
 Them bound, till his return, their labour not to slake.
 In the meanwhile, through that false lady’s train,
 He was surprised, and buried under bare,
 Never to his work returned again.
 Nathless those fiends may not their work forbear,
 So greatly his commandement they fear ;
 But there do toil and travel day and night,
 Until that brazen wall they up do rear.”

It must be observed that, although Merlin is here said to be dead and buried, he is found alive, though underground, by Glauce and Britomart, to whom he reveals the future history of Britain :

and it is well known that some day or other both he and Arthur are to appear again. I suspect that the submersion of Carmarthen is to be regarded as the prelude to this return.

But the most significant and instructive of all such legends are Irish. The Irish peasant would have no difficulty in believing all that Pausanias relates about the ruins of Sipylus, once visible in the Lake of Tantalus, and Dionysius about the submersion of Old Alba. Has not his own poet sung:—

“On Lough Neagh’s bank, as the fisherman strays,
When the clear cold eve’s declining,
He sees the round towers of other days
In the wave beneath him shining.”—*Moore*.

At the bottom of the Lough, near Cork, are buildings and gardens (as at Llyn Safadwy), far more beautiful than any now to be seen. Long before Saxon foot pressed Irish ground, where the Lough now is once stood the palace of the great King Core. In the middle of the courtyard was a spring of fair water, wonderfully pure and clear. As crowds of people came to draw from it, the king began to fear lest it should become dry, and had a high wall built round it, with a door of which he kept the key. One night, at a great banquet which he gave to his lords, he was told that his guests wanted water, and sent his daughter (Fior Usge = Spring-water) to draw from the spring with a golden vessel, which he had caused to be made for the purpose. But the princess, as she stooped over the spring, found the vessel so heavy that she fell in, and the water rose until it filled the whole valley in which the palace stood, and so was formed the present Lough of Cork. Yet the king and his guests were not drowned, nor was the princess: and the feasting and dancing still go on at the bottom of the Lough, and are to do so until some one brings up the golden vessel again.

The words with which Mr. Crofton Croker—from whose *Fairy Legends and Traditions of the South of Ireland* I have extracted the pith of the story—concludes his narrative are so apposite to my purpose, that I must simply transcribe them. “Nobody can doubt that it was a judgment upon the king for his shutting up

the well in the court-yard from the poor people; and if there be any who do not credit my story, they may go and see the Lough at Cork, for there it is to be seen at this day: the road to Kinsale passes at one side of it; and, when its waters are low and clear, the tops of towers and stately buildings may be plainly viewed in the bottom by those who have good eyesight, without the help of spectacles."

Nobody will be taken in by the gravity of this assurance; but at least as good eyesight was probably required for those who would see the remains of Old Alba in the days of Dionysius.

Still more remarkable is the legend of Linn-na-Payshtha, which belongs to the lovely Lough Gill, near Sligo, though the scene is laid not exactly in the lake itself, but in a deep pool (Linn-na-Payshtha) in the river which flows out of it. Close by this pool are the remains of the old hall of the O'Rourke, and at the bottom of the pool is the abode of a sprite, who keeps guard over the gold and silver of the old family buried there in the wars. Manus O'Rourke dives into the pool and obtains a view of the treasure, the vessels of gold and silver, the sword set with diamonds, and the ivory staff set with rubies and gold, which the chief had been used to hold as he administered the Brehon laws to his clan, together with the title-deeds of the family, which are all carefully guarded against the time when the old stock shall reign in glory again.

In general, according to Irish belief, there is under water a land of perpetual youth, of uninterrupted delight, of perfect happiness.

It seems to me evident that there must be some thread which runs through these legends, that they rest upon some common basis; and, further, that this basis is not either physical or historical, but ideal, though it may well have happened in some cases that physical or historical facts were combined and amalgamated with it. A German writer, who has collected largely and speculated much on popular legends, finds in those which relate to the submersion of cities and castles the trace of a mystical dogma, which he enunciates thus: "The uprising of the present world of sense was the downgoing of a higher ideal world,

and this downgoing, in the symbolical language of antiquity, was a downgoing in water."* Now I should not deny that this dogma is of considerable antiquity in oriental philosophy; nor that it may have been at an early period clothed in a fabulous form; nor that the fable might have travelled from east to west, leaving behind it the thought from which it was originally intended to illustrate. But I am not even satisfied that there is any warrant for the assumption on which this explanation rests,—that the system to which the dogma belongs was really prior to the great mass of the legends which are supposed to have sprung from it. I must also consider it as a very unsatisfactory incident of this hypothesis that, according to it, there would be no connexion between the legend and any train of thought which was familiar to the popular mind, and to which it might unconsciously have given this kind of utterance. And I think it must be admitted that we should have a somewhat firmer ground to rest upon if we could find such a train of thought, especially if it was universally blended with a deep current of strong feeling, for which the legends in question furnish an apt and natural expression. It should be one which does not belong to one land, or clime, or people more than to another, though there may be historical circumstances which tend to call it forth, and to set it at work more powerfully in one period than another. And such I conceive to be the idea—whether derived from tradition or the projection of an inward consciousness—of a good old time, a better order of things, a golden age, which has disappeared from the face of the earth, yet not so as to leave no hope of its return. It still exists, but out of sight, beneath the water. There lies the happy land, the realm of youth, beauty, and joy; there dwells the golden race (*gens aurea*); there are preserved the treasures and glories of the past. If it be asked, What was the cause of the disappearance? the answer is everywhere the same in substance, though varying in form. It was the penalty of an offence which provoked the

* Daumer, *Philosophie, Religion, und Alterthum*, 1 Heft, p. 47:—"Die Entstehung dieser Sinnenwelt war der Untergang einer idealen höhern, welcher Untergang der Symbolik des Alterthums ein Untergang im Wasser war."

divine wrath. It was impious arrogance, or profanation of sacred things, or wrongful dealing, or hardhearted selfishness. Still that which has vanished is only hidden, not lost. Even now occasional glimpses of it are vouchsafed to some favoured mortals; and sooner or later it shall be brought to light again. There is yet a good time coming; when is it to be? When might shall cease to trample upon right, and men shall learn to love one another as children of a Father in heaven. Then heroes and sages shall again find a home upon earth. Arthur and Merlin shall be released from their dark prison. Even in Lake Despair Monéga's spell shall be broken, and Kasimakata shall come forth, to find a renovated land, purged from the curse of slavery and war, of tyranny and superstition; an open field of beneficent enterprise, of secure and friendly intercourse, enriched by the arts of peace, transfigured in the light of a pure religion, the abode of a free, civilised, industrious, and happy people.

Another example of legendary submersion, which only fell in my way after the reading of this paper, occurs in Sir W. H. Sleeman's *Journey through the Kingdom of Oude*, vol. i. p. 126. "The Rajah of Bulrampoor, and Ramdut Pandee, the banker, rode with me and related the popular tradition regarding the head of the Kulhuns family of Rajpoots, Achul Sing, who, about a century and a quarter ago, reigned over the district intervening between Gonda and Wuzeer Gunge, and resided at his capital of Koorassa. The rajah had a dispute with one of his landholders, whom he could not get into his power. He requested Rutun Pandee, the banker, to mediate a reconciliation, and invite the landholder to an amicable adjustment of accounts, on a pledge of personal security. The banker consented, but made the rajah swear by the *River Sarjoo*, which flowed near the town, that he should be received with courtesy and escorted back safely. The landholder relied on the banker's pledge, and came; but the rajah no sooner got him into his power than he caused him to be put to death. The banker could not consent to live under the dishonour of a violated pledge, and, abstaining from food, died in twenty-

one days, invoking the vengeance of the *River Sarjoo* on the head of the perfidious prince. In his last hours the banker was visited by one of the rajah's wives, who was then pregnant, and implored him to desist from his purpose, in mercy to the child in her womb; but she was told by the dying man that he could not consent to survive the dishonour brought upon him by her perjured husband, and that she had better quit the place and save herself and child, since the incensed *River Sarjoo* would certainly not spare any one who remained with the rajah. She did so. The banker died, and his death was followed by a sudden rise of the river and tempest. *The town was submerged, and the rajah, with all who remained with him, perished. The ruins of the old town are said to be occasionally visible, though at a great depth under the water, in the bed of the Sarjoo, which forms a fine lake, near the present village of Koorassa, midway between Gouda and Wuzzer Gunge."*

I must yet add another legend, as reported by Mr. Carlyle in his *History of Frederick the Great*, i. p. 101. He is speaking of the Emperor Frederic Barbarossa. "German tradition thinks he is not yet dead, but only sleeping; till the bad world reach its worst, when he will re-appear. He sits within the hill near Saltzburg yonder, says German tradition, its fancy kindled by the strange noises in that hill (Limestone Hill) *from hidden waters*, and by the grand rocky look of the place:—A peasant once, stumbling into the interior, saw the Kaiser in his stone cavern. Kaiser sat at a marble table, leaning on his elbow, winking, only half asleep: beard had grown through the table, and streamed out on the floor: he looked at the peasant one moment, asked him something about the time it was, then drooped his eyelids again. Not yet time, but will be soon! He is winking, as if to awake. To awake, and set his shield aloft by the Roncalic Fields again, with: 'Ho, every one that is suffering wrong, or that has strayed guideless, devilward, and done wrong, which is far fataler.'"

SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES.

THE DISABILITIES OF THE JEWS :

A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON MAY 25TH, 1848.

MY LORDS,

If I should seem to have shown too strong a desire to take precedence in the debate over the noble Earl (the Earl of Winchelsea), who in every other respect is so fully entitled to it, I am sure that your Lordships will have done me the justice to attribute this apparent forwardness to the true motive. As I had reason to believe that the noble Earl was about to take the same side of the question with the Most Reverend Prelate, I thought it might be more convenient, both for your Lordships and for the noble Earl himself, if he had an opportunity of answering a few arguments which I shall have to offer on the opposite side of the question. But I do not at all regret that I gave way to the noble Earl. I am glad that I had not spoken before I had listened to the denunciations which he has thought proper to pour forth. It has been my fate, on a former occasion, to accept a similar challenge thrown out by the noble Earl, and I shall not now shrink from a like course. I am not blind to the dangers with which we have been threatened by the noble Earl; and I do not know to what extent it may be in his power to verify his own predictions. But I can only say, in the language of an infinitely greater man, on a far more momentous occasion: "The Lord's will be done; I must do my duty." My Lords, I should have felt it necessary to say a few words on the subject of this debate, if it had been only for the sake of a single remark; and it is this: Though the vote I am about to give will be in perfect harmony

with that which I gave several years ago when a similar question was brought under your Lordships' deliberation, and though I have never looked back upon that vote—which happened to be the first I had the honour of giving in your Lordships' House—with any feeling bordering upon regret, still I wish it to be understood that I do not consider myself as bound in the slightest degree by the course which I then felt it my duty to pursue. As on that occasion I did not conceive that by the vote I then gave, I was pledging myself to take a step farther in the same direction, so now I conceive that I might, without any breach of consistency, have adopted a different conclusion from that at which I have actually arrived. And the same is probably the case with many of your Lordships. And as your Lordships are unfettered in this respect, so it gives me pleasure to think that you are under no external pressure or bias, to prevent you from exercising your judgment upon this question with perfect freedom. I rejoice that the sense of the country, so far as it has been expressed by the petitions which have been laid on the table of your Lordships' House, has been expressed in such a manner as to remove all possibility of an appeal to any motives foreign to your own convictions. I am aware that this has been treated by some of the adversaries of this measure as a ground of hope; but, with the view which I take of the subject, I cannot permit myself to consider it as a just cause for fear. But I must confess that I do not feel quite so sure that your Lordships are equally free from every other kind of bias. It has been asserted—as I think, very rashly and groundlessly, but, at all events, without a possibility of verifying the assertion—that the present measure proceeded from indifference to religion in those who proposed and sanctioned it. As to that I will only say, that, if such was the case, we should be led to some singular results. Looking at the petitions which have emanated from various quarters on both sides of the question, we should be obliged to conclude that the spirit of religion was very unequally diffused over the surface of the land: that it was at boiling heat in one congregation, and at freezing point in another in the same neighbourhood. I must

confess, my Lords, I have no confidence in the indications of such a religious thermometer as this. But I am not hazarding a mere surmise, or a rash or ungrounded assertion, when I say that the class of persons for whose relief this measure is proposed, have not yet ceased to be the objects of a very general, hereditary, unreasoning prejudice, aversion, and contempt. Looking at the history of past times, I think it is morally impossible that this should not have been the case. Looking at the persecution and oppression which that people suffered in past ages, I hold it to be absolutely certain that, although that state of things has passed away, it must have left deep traces in the habits and modes of thinking prevailing among the people of this country. Now, my Lords, I do not presume to say that any of your Lordships are under the influence of such a prejudice. All I will venture to say is, that if such be the case, if none of your Lordships are, or ever have been, affected by such a feeling, then I must acknowledge that I am the most prejudiced and the most bigoted person in your Lordships' House. For I must own that I have experienced it, and that I have had some difficulty in resisting it. But it is one which I have felt it to be my duty to resist, and which I should have been sorry to have allowed to have any weight, so as to overpower my conviction in favour of the conclusion I have come to. My Lords, I have made this remark, not so much for its own sake, as by way of introducing one of much greater importance, for which I would bespeak your Lordships' indulgent attention. For, ample as is the discussion which the subject has undergone, much as it has been debated in print and speech, I have not observed that any notice has been taken of the point I am now about to propose for your consideration.

It has been constantly assumed, and hitherto without contradiction, that it belongs to the very essence of the Jewish religion to inspire feelings of the utmost aversion and abhorrence towards that Person, who to us as Christians is the object of supreme love and veneration. This opinion, your Lordships will recollect, was the main point put forward in the petition presented by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Galloway) from the General Assembly

of the Church of Scotland, and it has furnished the strongest argument upon which the adversaries of the measure have founded their opposition to it. It was adverted to by the Most Reverend Prelate, and it was urged by the Most Reverend Prelate's lamented predecessor, as the main ground on which he felt it impossible to consent to any such measure as that which is now proposed. Now, my Lords, I may seem to be advancing a paradox; but I am stating my earnest and sincere opinion, when I express my belief that there is no adequate foundation for that assertion. I say *no adequate foundation*, for I do not mean to say that it has absolutely no foundation at all. As a matter of fact, I am ready to admit, that such bitter feelings may, and probably do exist, and even prevail extensively among persons of the Jewish persuasion. But then I wish to call your Lordships' attention to a most important distinction. The question which I would beg your Lordships to put to yourselves is, whether this feeling, or this doctrine, is essentially connected with the Jewish religion, or not: whether it is of the essence of that religion, or only an accident which might be separated from it, so that the one might exist, and probably has existed, and does exist, without the other. I will state some of the reasons which strongly incline my own mind in favour of the latter view of the subject. Let it be supposed for a moment that this was the true view, and that there was no necessary connexion between the Jewish creed and that feeling of bitter hostility towards our Saviour. Still the actual prevalence of such a feeling, if it does prevail, might most easily be accounted for. It would be nothing more than the natural and inevitable consequence of those long ages, first of fierce controversy, and then of oppression and persecution, through which it has been the lot of the Jewish people to pass. However foreign such an opinion may originally have been to their religion, it was next to impossible that under such circumstances it should not have grown up and clung to it. Then if it were inquired upon what ground such feelings are attributed to the Jews as something essential to their orthodox theology, I know of none but this—that they deny the claim which that Divine Person put forward with regard to his own character

and office. But where, in this respect, is the difference between the case of the Jew and the Unitarian? Is it not equally true of the Unitarian that he denies that which we conceive to be, according to the plain sense of Scripture, the undoubted assertion of that Divine Person with regard to his own character and mission? And yet we know that the Unitarian is so far from regarding Him with any feeling of such a nature as that which on this ground we impute to the Jew, that he looks upon Him with a veneration similar in kind, if not equal in degree to our own. I do not wish to be understood to deny that there is in other respects a very great difference between the Jew and the Unitarian; all that I am concerned to maintain is, that, in this respect, which is the main ground on which the privilege which has been granted to the one has been withheld from the other, they stand upon the same footing. Still I am aware that these arguments may appear to be rather of a negative than a positive nature, and to rest rather upon conjecture than on evidence of the fact; and therefore I proceed to another consideration, which has weighed most with my own mind, and was what first led me to doubt the truth of the assertion to which I have referred. And this is, that I find a Jewish historian* speaking of our Blessed LORD, not in terms of the slightest disrespect, but describing him as a teacher of a pure morality, and as the victim of a cabal and a popular outcry, raised by the influence of the Jewish priests and rulers, and as condemned by them to an unjust punishment. I find a Jewish philosopher † who was most devoutly attached to the principles of his faith, representing Him as one who asserted the claims of a spiritual religion in opposition to the hypocrisy and formality which prevailed in high places in His time. I find the same philosopher assuming the possibility that a Jew might become a Christian, and arguing that he would still remain bound as much as ever by the Mosaic law. From all this I think I am justified in drawing the inference, that feelings of aversion and abhorrence toward our Blessed Redeemer are not universal among the Jewish people, and that Jews who strenuously uphold their own creed

* Note (A), p. 229.

† Note (A), p. 230.

may nevertheless regard Christianity without bitterness and hatred: and I would remind your Lordships that there are differences of opinion on religious matters among the Jews as among ourselves.

I have perhaps dwelt too long on this part of the question, but I considered it as one of so much importance as to deserve your Lordships' special attention. If I have fallen into error on this point, I have no doubt that I shall be followed by those who are able to correct it. Fortunately, however, the present question does not depend on the correctness or incorrectness of the opinion I have ventured to propose. Indeed, had it not been for the discussion which the question has undergone, and the variety of arguments which have been raised upon it, I should have thought it one of the simplest and plainest that could have been brought before you. The measure now proposed is one of a remedial and relieving character.* It is a measure for the removal of disabilities under which a certain class of Her Majesty's subjects are labouring. It is therefore one of a kind which is at all times entitled to your Lordships' favour; and, if you are called upon to reject it, I apprehend it must be on some very plain, clear, and solid grounds. You will not be contented with any fine airy speculations, which we know may easily be invested with a show of substance and solidity by ingenious sophistry, and eloquent declamation. This your Lordships would feel in any case. But the present measure comes before you under very peculiar circumstances. As we have already been reminded, a great constituency has made choice of a representative from among the Jewish persuasion, and the House of Commons has declared its willingness to remove the only bar which prevents that choice from being ratified and carried into effect. It now remains therefore for your Lordships to say, whether you will tell that great constituency that they shall not have the representative of their choice, and whether you will tell the House of Commons that they shall not have the member whom they desire to see among them. Being called upon to do that, I conceive that it behoves your Lordships to be quite sure

* Note (B), p. 232.

that there are some strong substantial grounds of public expediency which require you to reject such a measure as this, or some clear inconvenience or danger which you would incur by adopting it. For my own part, the more I inquire what the danger or inconvenience is, the more I am at a loss to discover it. We have been told, indeed, that this measure is inconsistent with the safety of Christianity, and that it will be dangerous, and possibly ruinous, to the interests of the Church. Now, when your Lordships are desired to reject this measure as injurious to Christianity, I should be glad to know wherein the danger with which it is supposed to threaten the welfare of Christianity consists. Is it that it belongs to the functions of the Legislature to regulate the doctrines, or to guide the destinies of the Christian religion? Or is it that there is ground to apprehend that, through the new influence which this measure may be the means of introducing into the Legislature, Christianity may come to be persecuted and proscribed? I need only mention such a notion for your Lordships at once to repudiate it as utterly absurd; and I cannot conceive how any one can have seriously entertained it. But it has been intimated that the effect of this measure may be to expose Christianity to the danger, though not of any serious injury, yet of insult and dishonour: as if it was likely that the persons who may, through the operation of this Bill, be introduced into the other House of Parliament, would be so forgetful of the common decencies of life, so indifferent to the feelings of those among whom they sat, and also, I beg your Lordships to observe, to the feelings of the constituencies whom they would represent, and therefore so unmindful of their own interests, as to be willing, when opportunity served, to offer an insult to the Christian religion. There is indeed another kind of danger which has been represented as likely to arise from this measure: that we may be exposing ourselves to the Divine displeasure by such a mark of respect for a people whom the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Winchelsea) would have your Lordships consider as only fit to remain as a monument of Divine wrath. My Lords, I am very loth to touch upon this topic, lest the feelings with which I regard

it as an argument, should by possibility appear to be transferred to the sacred subject to which it relates; and I will only venture to observe, that if there is any reason to dread that the Divine vengeance may be impending over us, it would be rather on account of the crimes of which this nation was guilty towards the ancestors of this people in times past, than of any indulgence which we may show to them in future. At all events, I am sure, that by our conduct in times past a heavy debt of guilt was incurred, and I am by no means so sure that it has ever been duly acquitted. Then as to the dangers with which this measure has been supposed to threaten the Church of England, I may dismiss that part of the subject with a single remark. It is true, that although it does not belong to the Legislature to deal with Christianity as a spiritual religion, it has to deal with the temporal interests and the social relations of the professors of that religion; and though a Jew, when admitted to be a member of Parliament, would not have a voice on any subject really affecting the interests of Christianity, he certainly might be called upon to vote on questions of very great importance to the interests of the Church of England. But the question is, not whether there is any anomaly or incongruity, or danger, in that, but whether any new danger is introduced by this Bill which did not exist before and without it. And as to this I entirely concur with the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), to whose speech we have listened with so much pleasure. I must say, that if any question affecting the interests of the Church of England is to be discussed in the other House of Parliament, I for one should greatly prefer that it should be submitted to the decision of a Jew rather than to that of a Dissenter. I do not mean by this to imply the slightest disrespect towards any Dissenting body which may have one of its members seated in the House of Commons; but, on the common principles of human nature, I conceive that a Dissenter must be subject to a much stronger bias on such questions, and must be much more hostilely disposed towards the Church of England, than a Jew can possibly be.*

* Note (C), p. 233.

My Lords, I shall not dwell any longer on the question of expediency, the rather as I have scarcely ever seen a pamphlet on the subject—and I have read a great many, especially on the opposite side of the question—or a speech, in which it was not stated that this is not so much a question of expediency as of principle. I readily admit that it is a question of principle, and I am the last man in the world to undervalue the importance of principle. But if I am to estimate the value of principle by the kind of arguments to which that name has been given in the discussion of this measure, I should be inclined to suppose that by principle was meant something opposed to facts and experience. If this is so, if principle is a thing of such a nature, that the more you shut your eyes on the real circumstances of the case, the firmer the grasp by which you lay hold on principle, then I must admit that the weight of principle lies all on the other side of the question. But, my Lords, I cannot attribute the dignity of a principle to any of the arguments which I have seen adduced in opposition to this measure. With the utmost respect for the persons who have used them, I cannot consider them as anything more than a tissue of sophisms and fallacies which have already been so ably exposed that I am almost ashamed to advert to them again. Some of them have been already repeated in the course of the present debate, and I have no doubt that, as it proceeds, your Lordships will hear a great many more. One of those arguments, which has been produced in a great variety of forms, is, that this measure tends to unchristianize the Legislature. How often has this objection been confuted by the simple observation, that the Legislature, after this measure shall have been passed, and shall have been carried into actual operation, will remain Christian, exactly in the same sense, and precisely in the same proportion, as the country itself is Christian! Your Lordships are not now, for the first time, about to unchristianize the country. That was done some two hundred years ago. It was done when the Jewish element was introduced into the population of this country. And I would beg your Lordships to recollect by whom that was done. Perhaps I may be permitted to mention an anecdote which occurs

in a book with which it is possible that some of your Lordships may not be familiar. It is related in Spence's "Anecdotes of Books and Men,"* and it rests on the authority of an eye-witness, Sir Paul Rycant, who was present at a conference which took place at Whitehall, between the Protector and a body of the clergy of London, whom he had called together to deliberate on the question, whether the Jews should be permitted to build a synagogue in London. I have an extract with me, but your lordships will probably be satisfied with the substance. It is stated that on that occasion the clergy inveighed against the Jews, as a cruel and cursed race. The Protector did not deny it; but he asked them, in the first place, whether they did not hold the belief, that the Jews were one day to be brought within the pale of the Christian Church? and next, whether they did not think that it was the duty of every Christian to promote so desirable an end by all the means in his power? The clergy, it may easily be supposed, answered both these questions in the affirmative; and then he proceeded to ask if there was not a greater likelihood of such an object being attained, if the Jews were brought into a country where they would have the advantage of seeing the Christian religion professed and practised in its purest form, than if they were suffered to remain in other countries where it was disfigured by numberless corruptions? It is added that this silenced the clergy. Now, I do not expect that it will have the same effect at this day with the opponents of this measure, nor have I quoted the anecdote with any such view; but I wished to point out to your Lordships, how little it can have entered into the mind of that great man, that in the measure which he was then desirous of introducing, though he must have known that he was about to settle in this country a body of persons who would remain to all time a constituent portion of its population, he was taking a step which would have the effect of unchristianizing the country. Perhaps it may be said—But what would Cromwell have thought if it had been proposed to admit Jews into the Legislature? My Lords, I answer, that he never thought of that at all. Considering

* Note (D), p. 234.

the difficulty which Cromwell found in persuading the clergy, and it may be added, the merchants also, to consent to what he then proposed in favour of the Jews, it was morally impossible that the idea of their admission into the Legislature could have entered into his mind. That was a question which he left for posterity to solve.

But there is another point of view in which this argument has sometimes been brought forward. It has been said that when we admit into the Legislature persons who profess a different religion from our own, we are parting with the only security we possess for the conscientious discharge of the duties of a legislator. It is admitted that there can be no such security without a sense of religion; and it is assumed that religious principles must be wanting in the Jew. Now, I wish your Lordships to see what is the real point involved in that multiplicity of phrases in which this argument has been wrapt up. Nobody disputes the importance of a sense of religion in a member of the Legislature; nobody denies the influence of religion upon a man's views of morality, and consequently upon his practice. I readily admit not only that the professor of one religion will differ in most important particulars, as to his moral sentiments, from the professor of another: I even go further, and say that, within the circle of Christianity itself, religious differences—as those of Catholic and Protestant—will give a distinctive tinge and shape to a man's notions of morality. But still it is clear that, after all, there remains a large common ground, on which it would be an absurd refinement to pretend that there is any difference between them in their sense of right and wrong. Is it possible to contend that a conscientious Jew would be prevented by his peculiar feelings of religion from doing his duty to the public in the capacity of a legislator? Do any of your Lordships consider it possible to draw such a refined distinction as to say, that you could trace in the vote that man would give upon any great public question the effects of his particular views of religion? I will only say that I shall be content if your Lordships will only suspend your assent to such a proposition as that, until you are sure that you thoroughly understand it.

Another objection equally fallacious and sophistical, which has been brought against this measure, is that it is an innovation upon the Constitution, because Christianity is *part and parcel* of the Constitution. But I would ask, What kind of Christianity is that in which this *part and parcel* consists? And what is that principle of the Constitution to which this measure is opposed? I freely admit that the old principle of the Constitution was one of absolute exclusiveness. It proscribed and excluded from all places of trust and authority, not only Jews, Turks, and infidels, but heretics and schismatics. It was only at a late period that this principle has been relaxed. But the innovation took place when that relaxation was admitted, and the principle which this Bill is said to oppose ceased to form part of the British Constitution. The principle has been gradually relaxed, and at length absolutely discarded. It is, therefore, not consistent with the real state of the case to represent this measure as an innovation on the Constitution; on the contrary, if there is one thing which has been more clearly proved than another on this question, it is that the barrier which now happens to impede the admission of Jews into the Legislature is the mere creature of accident—that it was not raised by the Legislature for that purpose, but for one totally different—and it now remains for your Lordships to decide whether it shall have an effect which it was never intended to produce. And therefore if your Lordships should reject this measure, it will be you who will be making an innovation upon the Constitution, and introducing a principle which does not now exist in it. The principle of this measure is in perfect harmony with the most essential principle of the Constitution. It is an indication of that elastic vigour, flexibility, and expansiveness, which are its glory and its strength. And it is to this very quality—by virtue of which the Constitution is not a thing which must be broken to pieces before it will admit of any change—that this country is indebted for the immunity which it enjoys, and, I hope, notwithstanding the denunciations of the noble Earl, will long continue to enjoy, from those convulsions by which elsewhere society has been shaken to its centre.

There is still another branch of the subject on which I wish to offer a few remarks before I sit down, more especially as it is one on which I happen to find myself opposed to a person for whose opinions I entertain the highest respect. I mean the nationality of the Jews. It has been contended that the Jew is essentially an alien, and, consequently, disqualified for a participation in the privileges enjoyed by other subjects in this country. This opinion is strongly asserted in the writings of Dr. Arnold, the author to whom I have just alluded. It is there maintained that a Jew has no more right to take a part in legislation for the people of this country, than a lodger has to interfere in the management of a house in which he happens to live.* Perhaps I might except to the illustration; for cases may be conceived in which a lodger would have a right to interfere in the affairs of the house in which he lodged, according to the interest he might have in it. But the justice of the comparison is a point of little importance. There are other and stronger grounds on which I am obliged here to dissent from Dr. Arnold. In the first place, his opinion was evidently formed on the analogy of the Greek and Roman States, rather than on the existing circumstances of this country. In the history of those States he found a class which seemed to correspond to the condition of the Jews; and thus he was naturally led to adopt the views taken by the ancient writers of the position and relations of that class, and to apply them to the case of the Jews. But there was another cause which operated still more strongly on the mind of Dr. Arnold to give this direction to his opinions, and it is one which I think should prevent your Lordships from being much swayed by his authority on this question. Your Lordships are probably aware of the extreme opinions held by Dr. Arnold on the identity of Church and State. The admission of Jews to the Legislature appeared to him entirely irreconcilable with his favourite theory, and he was, consequently, strongly opposed to it. This I believe to be the ground to which his opinions on the subject may be most distinctly traced. And not only did they spring from a theory which few of your Lordships

* Note (E), p. 235.

will be inclined to adopt, but they are carried to a length to which you would hardly be prepared to go along with him ; for, in his opinion, it would not be inconsistent with justice or humanity, if the Government of this country should think proper to transport all the Jews settled among us—as was done with the Moriscos in Spain—to some other region. I do not know, if such a maxim was generally admitted, where this unhappy race would find a resting place for the soles of their feet, on the surface of the globe. But I think your Lordships will allow that an opinion derived from such an origin, and leading to such consequences, is not entitled to all the weight which would otherwise belong to that great and venerated name.

But this objection has been pushed still further. It has been said that the Jew is not only an alien by descent, but that he is incapable of those ties by which the feelings and interests of Englishmen are bound up with the prosperity of their country. It is alleged that here he must always feel as in a foreign land : that his heart must be in the birthplace of his religion, in Palestine. Now, there is so far a foundation in fact for this opinion, that the Jewish religion is a religion of hope. It encourages the Jews to look forward to a period more or less remote, when he shall be restored to the land of his forefathers. But, I must own, I cannot understand why on this account he should in the meanwhile be less attached to the interests of his adopted country, or should less faithfully discharge his social duties, than any other citizen.

Then it has been contended that no truly religious Jew can feel any desire for the object of this measure. It is asserted that the Jews, as a body, are indifferent to it, and do not regard it as a boon. There may be some truth in this ; but in no other sense than a similar remark would apply to many bodies of Christians. For many such there are who consider the Apostle's language, "Here have we no continuing city, but we seek one to come," as still applicable to their own circumstances, and who are prevented by their religious scruples from taking an active part in public life.

But, on the whole of this subject, I would observe, that the argument from nationality reduces itself to the question of religion.* It is clear that nothing but the difference of religion has prevented the fusion of races from taking place in the case of the Jews, as in that of the refugees who settled in this country after the Edict of Nantes. Take away the religious difference, and there would be no more reason for treating the Jews as aliens, than any of the other races which compose the elements of our mixed population. The people among whom I habitually reside is separated from us by as great a difference, and one not only of blood, but of language; and in both respects feels itself to be more closely connected with its brethren on the other side of the Channel, than with its fellow-citizens to the east of Offa's Dyke. But this has not prevented them from being admitted to share all the benefits of the British Constitution, and, I believe, that nowhere in the kingdom are there to be found more loyal subjects.

My Lords, I am too thankful for the degree of attention with which your Lordships have listened to me, to trespass any longer on your time. The interest I feel in the subject has led me, perhaps, to dwell upon it at an excessive length. But I cannot say that I look forward to the result of this discussion with any great anxiety. I am a believer in the force of truth, in the power of justice, and in the ultimate triumph of Christianity, and I am firmly convinced that by passing this measure, as you will be consulting the interests of justice, so you will not be impairing those of the Christian faith, that you will not be retarding, but rather hastening, the period of its final triumph. I believe that by giving your assent to this Bill, you will be hastening the approach of the time when the veil shall be taken away from the eyes of the people for whose relief it is designed; because I believe that every exclusion by which they are deprived of the rights enjoyed by their fellow-subjects, lays an additional fold to the veil which prevents them from discerning the truth. I am persuaded that by such means you are weakening the strength and degrading the dignity of Christianity. You are depriving it of its most essential

* Note (F), p. 235.

character ; you are robbing it of its brightest attributes ; you are identifying it with invidious and irritating distinctions, and preventing it from accomplishing its great mission—that of promoting the glory of God by diffusing peace and good-will among men.

The Bishop of St. David's afterwards observed, in explanation of a part of his speech, which had been commented on by the Bishop of Oxford, that he was aware he had been treading on delicate and dangerous ground, and that he might be subjecting himself to misrepresentation, but still he was surprised at the use which the right rev. prelate who had just sat down had made of his observations, and the construction he had put upon them. After all that his right reverend friend had said, he was unable to conceive how his right reverend friend could have been led to such a conclusion from his words : and the only explanation he could offer, which, however, he believed would be sufficient, was to state again what he had already said. He had ventured to say that, in the possible case which he had supposed, the feeling with which a Jew, such as he had described, might regard the Founder of our religion, might not essentially differ from the feeling with which He was contemplated by the Unitarian. He could not understand how it could be inferred from this that he meant to diminish the amount of difference between Judaism and Christianity. But certainly he had not said that he considered Unitarianism as a fair sample of Christianity.

NOTES.

(A.)—P. 217.

THE following passage is translated from Jost's "History of the Jews" (*Geschichte des Israelitischen Volkes*, Berlin, 1832).

For the full understanding of it, it must be observed that the author had been speaking, a few pages before, of a party which had been gaining ground among the Jews in the reign of Herod, especially among the Essenes, and which was alike opposed to the bigoted legalists, the party of the Pharisees and doctors of the Law, and to the political fanatics who were eager to restore the national independence by violent means. This third party, consisting of persons who led a quiet, devout, contemplative life, cherished hopes of a spiritual deliverance which should comprehend both Jews and Gentiles. It was chiefly from this party that the first converts were gained to Christianity. After a short summary of the earlier part of the Gospel history, as to which, however, he observes that he does not pretend to form a judgment on the infinite variety of different interpretations of the extant accounts and traditions, which would lead him into the field of theological controversy, he proceeds as follows:—

“The Pharisees, who represented the Law as orally taught and traditionally enlarged, and especially the hope of a glorious appearance of a future Restorer of the kingdom, regarded his impugning the sanctity of particular laws and their expiatory virtue, and his announcement of the principle that redemption is to be sought in spiritual conversion, as a complete destruction of their doctrinal system. Though none of the celebrated Jewish teachers engaged in controversy with him, he was forced to answer many captious questions, and to see his doctrines often taxed with heresy. This was especially the case in Jerusalem, where his adversaries took occasion, from certain expressions, to charge him with treason, for which the circumstances of the times afforded ready means. A Sanhedrim, assembled under the Roman Governor, Pontius Pilate, found him guilty. Pilate, urged by the excited populace, against

his own conviction, caused him to be crucified. But the execution of the decree of the Sanhedrim had an effect quite different from that which its authors designed. This precipitate measure, which was not warranted by the form of the procedure, gave vigour and unity to the disciples of Jesus. They looked upon it not as the execution of an innocent man, but as an outrage against the Godhead, which had filled him, and animated by whose Spirit he had given up his body, for the salvation of all men, to tortures and even to insult. With the crucifixion of Christ his followers cease to be Jews, and pass out of the field of history into that of the Church of Christ."

MOSES MENDELSSOHN: *Jerusalem*, Wien, 1838, p. 287.

"Even if one of us goes over to the Christian religion, still I do not understand how he can believe that by this step he sets his conscience at liberty, and releases himself from the yoke of the Law. Jesus of Nazareth never intimated that he was come to unbind the house of Jacob from the Law. Indeed, so far from this, that he declared the contrary in express words, and, what is more, he did the contrary himself. Jesus of Nazareth observed, not only the law of Moses, but the injunctions of the Rabbis; and whatever appears to contradict this in his record of discourses and actions, wear this appearance only at first sight. When closely examined, all is perfectly in harmony, not only with Scripture but with Tradition. If he came to stem the tide of hypocrisy and sanctimoniousness, he will surely not have set the example of sanctimoniousness, and have sanctioned, by his own example, a law which was to be repealed and abolished. On the contrary, his whole conduct, as well as that of his primitive disciples, evidently exhibits the Rabbinical axiom:—*One who is not born in the Law need not bind himself to the Law; but whosoever is born in the Law must live and die according to the Law.* If his followers in later times thought otherwise, and believed that they could also release the Jews who adopted their doctrine, this was certainly done without his sanction.

"And you, dear brothers and fellow-men, who follow the doctrine of Jesus, can you take it amiss, if we do that which the founder of your religion himself did and approved by his authority? Are you to believe it impossible that you can return the affection we feel for you as our fellow-citizens, or unite yourselves with us by the ties of citizenship, so long as we distinguish ourselves outwardly by the ceremonial law, and do not eat or intermarry with you, which, so far as we can see, the founder of your religion neither did himself nor would have permitted us to do?"

Should this—a thing which we cannot suppose of men imbued with Christian sentiments—be your genuine and abiding persuasion, if we may not be admitted into political union with you on any other terms than deviation from the law which we hold to be still binding upon us, then we are heartily sorry to be obliged to make such a declaration, but we must rather renounce that political union. It does not rest with us to give way on this point; but it does rest with us, if we are right-minded men, to love you nevertheless as brothers, and as brothers to implore you to make our burdens as tolerable as you can. Consider us, if not as brothers and fellow-citizens, at least as fellow-men and fellow-inhabitants of the land. Show us ways, and supply us with means, of becoming better as such; and allow us, as far as time and circumstances permit, to enjoy a share of the rights of humanity. From the Law we cannot depart with a good conscience, and what would you gain by fellow-citizens without a conscience? ”

I will not say that these extracts are decisive, though I do not see how it is possible fairly to resist the inference I draw from them; but I would invite the reader's attention to two remarks. In the first place, one passage of this kind appears to me to outweigh any number of such as testify merely to the fact, or even to the opinion of Jews as to its connexion with the essential doctrines of their faith. The other remark is this: though I believe no one at all familiar with Mendelssohn's life and writings would question his sincerity, still even this is not material for my purpose. It is enough to see how a Jew, professedly orthodox, might write on the subject without fear of being taxed with inconsistency.

It seems to have been thought that the preceding comparison between Jews and Unitarians favours the former at the expense of the latter; though I could not collect at the time, from the manner in which it was received, whether I was supposed to have expressed myself too strongly for or against the Unitarians; and my uncertainty as to the precise nature of the objection prevented me from meeting it with a satisfactory explanation. When the nature of my argument is considered, it will be seen that the comparison was limited to a single point of coincidence, about which there is no dispute, and was, therefore, perfectly inoffensive. The pith of the argument was simply this: from the denial of the same doctrine we are not at liberty, in the case of the Jew, to draw an inference which is manifestly contradicted by experience, in the case of the Unitarian. I did not overlook the distinction, which is, no doubt, very important in other respects, that the Unitarian grounds his denial of a doctrine which,

to the great body of the Christian Church, is a main article of faith, on his peculiar interpretation of Scripture, and rejects no claim which he acknowledges to have been put forward by our Lord himself; whereas the Jew would reject the doctrine, whether he admitted it to be contained in our Scriptures or not. But the Jew is certainly still less bound than the Unitarian to any particular interpretation of the New Testament: and in general it seems clear that Judaism, in its relation to Christianity, is simply negative, and independent of any hypothesis as to the human character of our Lord, and, consequently, of any feelings which a particular hypothesis might be likely to suggest. If any evidence was required for such a proposition, I might refer to an exposition of the Jewish faith contained in a Sermon recently published by Dr. Adler, Chief Rabbi of the united congregations of the British Empire. (*the Jewish Faith*,) which, professing to give an account of the fundamental articles of that faith, makes no allusion whatever to Christianity or its Author. It is, therefore, only by implication and construction that the views and feelings which are commonly attributed to the Jews with regard to our religion, can be shown to be inseparably connected with the essence of the Jewish faith. I think that experience, within the history of Christianity itself, ought to render us exceedingly cautious about such processes of construction. The reader will not fail to observe that whatever is said on this head in the Speech goes no further than an attempt to show that the commonly received opinion—though seemingly justified by appearances which, however, admit, as was pointed out, of a different explanation—is liable to serious doubt. I have, therefore, been somewhat surprised to see that in certain quarters the mere raising of this question has been solemnly denounced as not only an erroneous, but a highly dangerous novelty. It is hard to understand, and does not seem very desirable to establish, that a certain view of the Jewish view of Christianity belongs to the fundamentals of our belief.

(B.)—P. 218.

THE QUESTION OF RIGHT.

The claim of the Jews to admission into the Legislature has never, I believe, been represented as standing on the footing of absolute, unconditional right, so as to involve—as was emphatically asserted—the principle of Chartism in its highest announcement. Any statements which may seem to go that length must in fairness be construed with

such a qualification as common sense requires and the argument itself admits. Yet it has been constantly assumed that, unless the claim rests on that ground, it can have no validity at all. And so it has been met by a comparison with the case of clergymen, of females, of minors, and of persons wanting the pecuniary qualification at present required by the law. But the fallacy of such a comparison is so glaring, as to be characteristic of the spirit in which the question has been discussed. The exclusion of clergymen and females, however it may be justified, depends on reasons which are evidently quite inapplicable to the Jews. On the other hand, the qualification of age and property is not an absolute exclusion, but only a condition which every British subject, in the one case must attain if he lives, and in the other may always hope to attain. The religious impediment is a bar which no effort of honest industry can surmount.

It has been very justly observed, that a seat in Parliament is a trust, conferred for the benefit, not of the representative, but of his constituents. It is no less true that the elective franchise ought to be considered as designed for the public good, not for the private advantage of the person invested with it. But to infer that either is on this account the less an object of legitimate ambition—which is nevertheless the point on which the whole argument hinges—seems a strange oversight, not at all indicating a higher tone of morality than is implied in the common notions and practice, but rather one which is really far lower.

(C.)—P. 220.

EFFECT OF THE ADMISSION OF JEWS ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE
LEGISLATURE.

Some pains have been taken to show that untoward consequences are to be apprehended from the admission of Jews into Parliament, independently of the mode in which they may influence legislation by their votes. So far as these attempts have succeeded in pointing out any real practical inconvenience, it has been of so trifling a nature as hardly to bear a serious discussion. But the argument from this topic was presented in a more attenuated and refined form by some speakers in the House of Lords, who expressed their dread that the introduction of a Jewish member would *lower the tone* of debate. There is an advantage, or, as it may be reckoned, a disadvantage attending such phrases: that they are not capable of being strictly analyzed, and produce a deeper impression as they are less distinctly understood. If the objection is, that after a

Jew has been admitted into the Legislature, it will be impossible any longer to appeal to it as a body exclusively Christian, the fact cannot be denied. But if we may judge from experience, a Christian will be no more restrained from avowing his own religious convictions in the presence of Jews, than Protestants in the presence of Roman Catholics. And I cannot sympathize with the regret which was intimated by some speakers at the kind of check which has been imposed on the expression of religious opinions in Parliament, by the presence of members whose religious views differ from those of the majority. I doubt whether anything would be gained, if such explosions of religious zeal as this check tends to repress were more frequent or more violent than they actually are. To a calm and temperate, but frank and manly avowal of every man's religious convictions, it certainly opposes no restraint whatsoever. And perhaps it is as well always to speak on disputable matters as if in the hearing of those who differ from us. But the main point is, that a Christian member of the House of Commons, even if he had a Jew by his side, would be able, with as much truth and propriety as ever, to address that House as representing a Christian people.

(D.)—P. 221.

SPENCE, p. 77.

“The Jews had better success with Oliver Cromwell, when they desired leave to have a synagogue in London. They offered him, when Protector, sixty thousand pounds for that privilege. Cromwell appointed them a day for his giving them an answer. He then sent to some of the most powerful among the clergy, and some of the chief merchants in the city, to be present at their meeting. It was in the long gallery at Whitehall. Sir Paul Rycant, who was then a young man, pressed in among the crowd, and said he never heard a man speak so well in his life, as Cromwell did on this occasion. When they were all met, he ordered the Jews to speak for themselves. After that he turned to the clergy, who inveighed much against the Jews as a cruel and cursed people. Cromwell, in his answer to the clergy, called them ‘Men of God,’ and desired to be informed by them whether it was not their opinion that the Jews were one day to be called into the church? He then desired to know, whether it was not every Christian man's duty to forward that good end all he could? Then he flourished a good deal on the religion prevailing in this nation, the only place in the world where religion was

taught in its full purity: was it not then our duty, in particular, to encourage them to settle here, where alone they could be taught the truth; and not to exclude them from the sight, and leave them among idolaters? This silenced the clergy."

(E.)—P. 225.

Stanley's Life of Arnold, ii. p. 32.

"The Jews are strangers in England, and have no more claim to legislate for it than a lodger has to share with the landlord in the management of his house. If we had brought them here by violence, and then kept them in an inferior condition, they would have just cause to complain: though even then, I think, we might lawfully deal with them on the Liberia system, and remove them to a land where they might live by themselves independent; for England is the land of Englishmen, not of Jews."

(F.)—P. 226.

QUESTION OF NATIONALITY.

This is perhaps as rich a vein of fallacies as is to be found in the whole field of the discussion; and it has been very diligently worked. Vehement astonishment—implying that I had fallen into an egregious logical oversight—was excited by my remark, that the argument from nationality reduces itself to the question of religion, and by itself has no more weight than in the case of other foreign races which share the soil of our island with us. It seems to have been forgotten that I had previously dwelt at considerable length on the question of religion, and therefore might think that I had a right to examine the question of nationality by itself, to see whether it afforded any solid ground of objection apart from the other. The peculiarity of the case of the Jews is, that there is a difference of blood as well as of religion; and no doubt it is the difference of religion that has preserved the distinction of race. But if neither constitutes a valid objection by itself, it would remain to prove, that nevertheless both combined do so; which, however, nobody attempted to show. Great stress was laid

on the term *nation*, and it seems to have been thought it could not be applied to the Jews by the advocates of the Bill, without virtually admitting the position of its opponents. But this was an advantage taken—no doubt in perfect good faith, but without sufficient attention—of the ambiguity of the term. So far as *nation* is equivalent to *race*, it may be said that the Jews scattered over the world are still a nation. But then this would be of no avail for the purpose of the argument. That requires that the further notion of political unity should be connected with the word. But in this sense it is wholly untrue, and never was admitted by any advocate of the Bill, that the Jews are still a nation. There is no more political unity between the English Jews and French Jews than between the natives of Wales and of Brittany. Nor is there any closer religious connexion between English and foreign Jews than between English and foreign Roman Catholics; nor any better reason in the one case than in the other, to suspect that the ties of religion are so much stronger than those which bind the citizen to his country, as to render these insecure. It may be added, that the Jews are scarcely separated from the rest of the community more rigidly than are the Quakers by their religious peculiarities, and hardly more distinguished by a peculiar physiognomy, the result of that separation. The admirable qualities and conduct of the Society of Friends make us overlook the great anomalies in their social position created by their religious opinions, and the extraordinary degree of independence which they maintain, though it is such as on principle might have afforded as forcible arguments against their admission to political privileges as any that have been advanced in the case of the Jews.

THE IRISH CHURCH:

A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON JUNE 15TH, 1869.

THE Bishop of St. David's :—I wish to say a few words on this great question, as it is one on which it would be impossible for me to give a silent vote, because the vote which I shall feel it my duty to give would inevitably be exposed to very grave misconstruction if it were not preceded by some explanation of its meaning; and I am the more anxious to avail myself of this opportunity of addressing your Lordships, because I was not present at the debate of last year on the Suspensory Bill. My Lords, I was very much afraid that the view which I take of this subject is one that was not likely to find much favour on either side of this House. But the noble earl who moved the rejection of this Bill assured your Lordships that there really was a very general unanimity among your Lordships upon this subject, which, I believe, no one had before suspected to exist to such a degree. And therefore I cherish the hope that I may be destined to the agreeable surprise of finding myself in not quite so small a minority as I had at first expected I should be. My Lords, before I state, as I intend to do very briefly indeed, my position with regard to this Bill, I feel myself bound to advert for a few moments to one or two points which lie at the threshold of the whole subject, and to which I believe persons who are entitled to the highest respect, both inside and outside of your Lordships' House, attach very great importance; and I feel, occupying the place which I do in your Lordships' House, that I can hardly, consistently with the respect which I owe to those persons and to many of my Right Rev. brethren who

share their view, pass them over in silence. To those persons the measure now proposed for our approval seems so plainly stamped with the character of a sacrilegious spoliation as to supersede the necessity, and even to preclude the right, of entering upon the discussion of the subject on any other grounds. The noble duke who took part in the debate last night said: The property of the Irish Church is not the property of the Roman Catholic Church; it is not the property of the Protestant Church; it is the property of God. I do not attempt to bring over any one to my own way of thinking on this point; but I must own that I am inclined to envy those who are able to satisfy themselves with this summary way of settling the question. Of course there is a sense in which the proposition of the noble duke is unquestionable. We know that the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof. But it was not in that sense he meant the phrase, "the property of God," to be understood. He used it as involving an argument which he conceived to bear with great weight on the present question. And I must own that in this sense the phrase, "robbery of God," grates upon my ear. It seems to me to correspond to a view of the Deity which is neither Christian nor even Judaical, but heathenish. When I open the Old Testament I find several passages, familiar I have no doubt to your Lordships, in which the Jewish people are severely reprov'd for cherishing the vain and superstitious notion, common to the heathen nations around them, that material offerings might be accepted by the Most High as supplying some want of the Divine nature. My Lords, when I read those passages, when I read others in the New Testament in which the sacrifices with which God is well pleased are described, together with the nature of a pure religion or worship, I am led to the conclusion that no material offerings are so acceptable to the Almighty as those which are most beneficial to man. Let me suppose a case not wholly imaginary to illustrate my meaning. A wealthy and munificent gentleman builds a magnificent cathedral in Dublin. A wealthy and munificent lady builds a public market in London. My Lords, I believe that each of those acts was in the intention of the donor an offering to God,

and I believe each of them to be an equally acceptable offering to Him. But let me suppose that a fund had been bequeathed to be appropriated at the discretion of a trustee to one or the other of those purposes, I should like to know on what principle the decision of that trustee—if he were worthy to exercise so important a trust—ought to depend. I think I shall have the assent of your Lordships when I say that his decision ought to depend not on the superior sanctity of the destination, but on the local need or the general usefulness. It is not a question between God and man, but between one kind of gift beneficial to society and another.

My Lords, the word “sacrilege” has been heard very often of late in this House; and I must say its use reminds me of some instructive pages in the history of the early Christian Church. The cry of “sacrilege” was raised against St. Ambrose; and it was raised by a party with which I am sure neither any of my Right Rev. brethren nor the Noble Lord the chairman of committees (Lord Redesdale) feel the slightest sympathy—the Arians. And on what ground was this cry raised? Why, because St. Ambrose had sold the sacred vessels of the Church of Milan in order to apply the proceeds to the profane purpose of ransoming prisoners who had fallen into the hands of the Goths. My Lords, in my opinion that was not the least meritorious or the least holy act of that holy man’s life. And observe, what does it imply? It implies that, in the opinion of one who was undoubtedly a very sincere Christian and not at all a Low Churchman, circumstances might arise in which Church property, even while it continued to be capable of serving its original purpose, might be rightly and fitly diverted to another and a wholly different use. I am not saying that in this case such circumstances have arisen, but what I say is that the possibility of such circumstances arising, if that be admitted, at once transfers the question to the broad ground of general expediency and common utility. It shows that such expressions as “sacrilege” and “robbery of God” applied to this subject are as irrelevant and misapplied as they are irritating and offensive. There may be an error of judgment in the estimate of the circumstances, in the calculation of results, in the

comparison of advantages, but there is no fair room for the imputation of a sin or a crime.

My Lords, next to the reluctance I should feel to consent to anything that in my opinion deserved the name of sacrilege, would be that with which I should shrink from consenting to any measure which in my opinion tended to strengthen the power of the Pope or the influence of the Roman Catholic clergy, more especially in Ireland. My Lords, I venture to say that none of your Lordships feel more strongly than I do on this subject. It is true, I do not sympathize with all the demonstrations of Protestant zeal which are now so rife. I do not like, I utterly dislike and condemn, those itinerant lecturers who kindle evil passions, provoke breaches of the peace, and turn the streets of our great towns into scenes of tumult and even bloodshed. And why do I dislike them? Not because they are adverse to Rome, but because I think that they bring disgrace and damage on the cause which they profess to serve. I also very much question the judgment of continually holding up the Pope as a scarecrow. A scarecrow, my Lords, is most effective at first, but in course of time, I believe, it is often found, if it holds its place too long, the birds it was meant to frighten learn to perch on its shoulder, and even to build their nests in its hat. But still I venture to say that not one of these Protestant agitators is more strenuously opposed to the power of the Pope—none more deeply convinced that that power is in direct antagonism to the best interests of mankind—none more ready to contend against it by all weapons of legitimate warfare than I am. But, my Lords, I must say with regard to myself, it is not enough to say that I am a friend of Protestant ascendancy—I am a great deal more than that. I am what some of its friends, I fear, are not in an equal degree with myself, I am a believer in it. But the ascendancy I mean is an intellectual, moral, and religious ascendancy, the ascendancy of reason and truth over superstition and error. That ascendancy is so different from the physical ascendancy which is maintained by the cannon and the bayonet, that they are almost incompatible with one another. Of that true ascendancy, I hope and trust the Irish

Church never will be deprived, as no act of the Legislature can take it away.

It seems to me that there are persons and Protestants who believe in the Pope, while they hate and fear him. I neither hate nor fear him, but I utterly disbelieve in him. And their error is that they measure the extent of his power by the arrogance and extravagance of his pretensions, as if hectoring and swaggering were sure proofs of strength and valour. I think the very extravagance of his pretensions is not only a sign but a cause of his weakness. Of this I feel sure, that the Papal power is everywhere on the wane. When I look at Austria, Italy, Spain, countries once the most devoted to the authority of the See of Rome, I find that in all these countries the power of the Pope is in a condition of rapid decline. But if I needed to be reassured against the visionary terrors of Papal supremacy, it would be enough for me to turn to the annals of our own history. The Parliament of this country was more than a match for the Pope even when this island was subject to his spiritual dominion; and can it be supposed that as the Parliament of a Protestant nation it will not be too strong for him now?

But as one exception to the universal decline of the power of the Pope, I admit that in Ireland he has a very formidable stronghold, from which I should most earnestly wish to see him dislodged. In that country the Roman Catholic priesthood possess a power which I think is enormous and excessive independently of the manner in which it is employed. It is greater than in any other country in Europe; it is so great that it hardly admits of an increase; it is such as ought not to belong to any priesthood in any well regulated State. I think that no priest ought to possess the power of condemning a person to death at his pleasure by denouncing him at the altar, and I quite agree with the Right Rev. Prelate (the Bishop of Derry), who addressed us with so much energy last night, that the system on which the Roman Catholic priesthood live in Ireland is not really a voluntary system but entirely the reverse. They levy the means of their subsistence by a kind of spiritual distraint, which is quite as effectual as any

legal process would be, but is attended, I believe, with most mischievous and calamitous consequences. But that is a peculiarity of Ireland, which is in so many respects an exceptional country, and it has been found side by side with another exceptional phenomenon, which is the Established Church of Ireland; and I must say when I see these two singular phenomena in such close juxtaposition, I cannot think it an unfair or unreasonable conclusion to draw that they stand to one another in the relation of cause and effect. I really think it hardly admits of a doubt that this pernicious system has been the result of that false Protestant ascendancy which it is the object of the Bill now before your Lordships to abolish; and I think there is room for hope that the effect may not very long survive the extinction of the cause, and that before long the time may come when the Irish peasant will recover or gain his rightful freedom of thought and action; that he will become accessible to the pure light of the Gospel; that he will be able, without danger of insult or outrage, to avow and act upon his convictions; and that then it may turn out that the Irish Protestant Church may find itself, for the first time, standing on a really broad and firm basis of popular sympathy and affection.

Having thus cleared the way for that which was my main object in rising, I will now state very briefly the position I hold in regard to the Bill; and I think it will be most convenient if I state first how far I am able to agree with the authors of the measure, and then where and why I feel myself obliged to part company with them. I have long been of opinion that the Irish Established Church was not an institution well suited to the circumstances of Ireland; and I have always believed that from the moment the British Government changed its policy towards Ireland, and entered on a course of concession and conciliation, the settlement of the Irish Church question on an entirely new basis became logically and practically inevitable, and that it was only a question of time when that settlement would be effected. I conceive that the course of events since the close of the American Civil War has decided that question. It has brought the subject of the settlement of the Irish Church to a prominence which it

never before occupied, and has caused it to become, to use a common expression, the question of the day. I must say that I cannot admire the equanimity of a statesman who, contemplating the state of things since the American Civil War, can look on it with composure, and can be content to trace it to the influences of the stars or of the ocean, and to leave it to the chapter of accidents. My Lords, the policy of *laissez aller* and the *statu quo* does not seem to me to belong to a very high order of statesmanship at any time. But in such a state of things as that through which we have been passing, it amounts, in my opinion, to a positive abdication of the duties of government. But it is said that we have allowed ourselves to be needlessly frightened by a wretched and contemptible conspiracy. My Lords, I am surprised it should not have been observed that just because the Fenian conspiracy was in itself so contemptible, did the sympathy it found among the masses of the Irish people constitute a just ground of anxiety and even of alarm. It is also said that it is vain to hope that this measure will effect the pacification of Ireland. I quite agree that this is not likely to be the immediate or very speedy result of the measure; but I would ask what right have we to expect that any measure we may adopt will either immediately or speedily produce the result of effacing the memory of centuries of misrule, and of causing brotherly friendship at once to spring up in the room of animosity, rancour, and revenge?

I agree then with the authors of the present measure in thinking that the object they had in view was a right one, and that it was one of urgent necessity; but there my entire agreement with them ceases. The solution of the great problem which I find embodied in the Bill before your Lordships is not the solution which I have been used to consider as the best or the right one. I have been in the habit of thinking that it is necessary that the Irish Church should cease to be *the* Established Church, but not that it should cease to be *an* Established Church. I think that it ought not to engross the whole provision made for the religious instruction of the people of Ireland, but that it ought not to be totally disendowed. The eloquent argument we heard last night

from the Right Rev. Prelate [the Bishop of Peterborough] was not needed to satisfy my mind on that point. I should be very sorry to see the Irish Church, or any Church, thrown on the voluntary system, and launched in a boat on a troubled sea without any provision for the voyage.

From this simple statement your Lordships will be able to see in what respect and how far I differ from that which in one sense may be called the general principle of the Bill. But there is an important practical consideration which ought not to be kept out of view. I apprehend that the first and most indispensable condition of a good Bill on any subject of legislation, is, that it can be carried. A measure which does not fulfil that condition, however admirably it may be framed in all other respects, can never be worth more than waste paper. I cannot be a judge of the political necessity which may have induced the authors of this measure to believe that it not only justified but required them to take the course they have done, and, therefore, though it is one which differs widely from that which I should have thought desirable, I do not reproach or condemn them on that account. Had they taken a different course, they would, no doubt, have had to contend with many obstacles. I find that at a conference of archbishops, bishops, and representatives of the clergy and laity, of the Irish branch of the Established Church, held at Dublin last April, it was declared that they protested against this measure of disestablishment and disendowment; and then they proceeded to say that they distinctly repudiated what is commonly known as the "levelling up" system. If that language is to be considered as a legitimate exponent of the general feeling, what hope could remain, I should like to know, of passing a measure of a totally different kind from the present? I, therefore, think that no course is left open but that recommended by the Most Rev. Primate in the powerful speech he delivered yesterday—namely, to make the most of what we have, and to get as much as we can. I believe that in the details of this Bill there are many things open to most serious objection and capable of great improvement, but all this is an argument, not for rejecting but

for accepting the measure, and making the best of it. I am thankful to the noble Earl (Carnarvon) who addressed the House last but one yesterday for relieving me from the necessity of touching on another topic, which I should otherwise have been bound to advert to—I mean the argument founded on the fancied analogy of the case of Wales to that of Ireland. Far from there being an analogy, there is the strongest contrast between the two, not only in the fact that there is no broad channel flowing between England and Wales, but also in the circumstance that the whole population of Wales are of one way of thinking on religion, and do not differ from the Established Church in any essential point, in a greater degree than the members of the Established Church differ from one another.

Entertaining these mixed views, I have anxiously considered whether it might be consistent with my duty to abstain from voting on this question. There were several motives which would have inclined me to adopt this course. But I remembered the place and the doom assigned by the great Italian poet to that “*Setta dei cattivi*” who, on momentous occasions, when great questions were debated and high interests were at stake, sided with neither party, but kept aloof and by themselves in a selfish neutrality. I did not like to join myself to that company; and I felt that it was my duty to consider my vote as if it were the casting vote on which the issue of the debate would depend. Viewing it in that light, I could not hesitate as to the side on which my vote must be given. My Lords, for my own part I cannot accept the responsibility of the consequences which in my opinion would inevitably ensue, even on the least unhappy contingency, if your Lordships were to fling this Bill at the face of the country. This Bill will be as sure to come back to your Lordships’ House as a stone thrown up into the air is sure to come down to the ground. It will return, itself unaltered, but it will not find your Lordships as it left you. You will receive it again, but not without a serious diminution to your dignity, your reputation, and your legitimate influence in the country. These are precious things. They are parts of a national treasure of which your

Lordships are the trustees, and it behoves you to watch over them with a most jealous care. It is because I could not consent by any act of mine to impair or to imperil them, that I shall feel myself compelled—not indeed without reluctance, but without the slightest misgiving as to the propriety of the course I am taking—to record my vote for the second reading of the Bill.

SPEECH ON THE ATHANASIAN CREED,

DELIVERED IN THE UPPER HOUSE OF CONVOCATION, FEBRUARY 9TH, 1872.

I HOPE I shall not stand very long in the way of my Right Rev. brother.* I cannot say that I was impatient to begin the discussion, but I believe that what I have to say will not be affected by anything on the face of the report—that there will be no reason for delaying it,—and that it will be rather more convenient that I should now begin. There are some considerations which appear to me of great importance which I wish to put before your Grace and my Right Rev. brethren, and my only anxiety is that I shall not be able to do justice to the subject.

The speech which we heard yesterday afternoon from my Right Rev. brother the Bishop of Lincoln, whom I am extremely sorry not to see in his place, although in itself, as might be expected from such a person, very instructive, very interesting, very learned, and one which we may hope hereafter to see in another form, still seemed to me to furnish an additional example of that which I have observed in the case of many who have written on the subject—that the question, the practical question, has been entirely overlooked. I do not mean in the slightest degree to disparage the value of the labours of Waterland, or of Mr. Harvey,

* The Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, who had moved the adjournment on the previous day, and said he wished to waive his right in favour of the Bishop of St. David's.

or of Mr. Ffoulkes, or of Mr. Brewer, or of the many other eminent and respectable persons who have been discussing the vexed question of the authorship; but I do say that if we keep in view that which appears to me to be the real practical question before us, it will be immediately seen that the inquiry, however interesting and important in itself, is in this point of view utterly irrelevant, and cannot affect our conclusions in the slightest degree. The single practical question is this,—whether we are or are not to continue the use of the Athanasian Creed in the public services of the Church; and I hold that with regard to this it is almost absurdly irrelevant to dwell on the authorship of the Creed. For my own part, I would say that if I were as firmly convinced that every syllable came from the pen of St. Athanasius as I am persuaded of the contrary, that would not in the slightest degree affect my objection to the continued use of the Creed in the services of the Church. Then, again, a great deal has been said, and I think in rather an invidious manner, something savouring of the disingenuousness of controversy, on the truth of the Creed, or the soundness of the doctrine,—suggesting that any one who disapproved of its continued use could only do so because of his disbelief in the doctrines of the Creed. I think this a very unfair suggestion. If the question was, whether we were to retain or repudiate the Creed, no doubt that would be an inquiry of supreme and vital importance; but I am not aware that any one has suggested its removal, or that any one wishes to see it removed from the monuments of the Church, or that it should not be held in as much veneration and respect as ever. All that is desired is that it should not form part of the public services of the Church. The question before us is as to the value, the character—the intrinsic value of the contents of this document; and with regard to that I am painfully conscious that I have the great misfortune of differing from many eminent persons—from those who were described by the Bishop of Lincoln as the flower and ornament of the Church of England; and I am afraid I may be also found to differ from some of my Right Rev. brethren here present. I really don't know whether that be so or not. But I have one ground of com-

fort, and that is that I know I have the countenance and support of another very eminent person, who, although not living, yet speaketh in his works and writings—I mean no less a man than Bishop Jeremy Taylor; and I must say with regard to him that however eminent may be the persons who hold the contrary opinion, I cannot believe they are so immeasurably superior to Jeremy Taylor, either in learning, or in judgment, or in piety, or in any quality of mind or character as to warrant their looking down upon him with contempt, and either scouting, or ignoring, or forgetting that which he has written on this subject. Whether if Jeremy Taylor was now living he would be considered as behind or in advance of his age I really do not know. If he was to be considered as behind it, I can only say that I for my own part am content to be found lagging behind our present light and progress in his company. I shall never be ashamed of it. No doubt he was benighted or simple-minded enough to fall into what are now considered great errors with regard to the sense of the Creed as it now stands. He was simple enough to take the words of what have hitherto been called the Damnable Clauses, but which it appears under our new light to be improper so to call without the qualification of “so-called” or “miscalled,” in their plain natural sense. He understood them to mean what they actually appear to say. Then, again, I find in the writings of Jeremy Taylor a very wide discrepancy of opinion between his view of the value of the contents of this Creed from those which are put forward by the representatives of another school, in the memorial of the English Church Union, which says—“We believe that any such change would be dangerous to the best interests of the Church of England, and a grave injury to the maintenance of dogmatic principles, as to the most central truths of the faith.” Jeremy Taylor was so far from considering these truths in the light of great central truths that he described them as speculative opinions, curiosities of explication, minute particularities, with regard to which he said—“If it were considered concerning Athanasius’s Creed how many people understand it not, how contrary to natural reason it seems, how little the Scripture says of these curiosities

of explication, and how tradition was not clear on his side"—he thinks that "considering all this it had not been amiss if the final judgment had been left to Jesus Christ." * Now, my Lords, the views of Jeremy Taylor on this subject are very remarkable in this respect. If he had been now living and in this room, and had taken part in the discussion of this question on which we are now engaged, he could have said nothing more directly to the purpose than he has said in his treatise on the *Liberty of Prophesying*: and I would venture to beg your Lordships to bear with me for a few moments while I read two or three sentences. He says, "I am much pleased with the enlarging of the Creed which the Council of Nice made, because they enlarged it to my sense." † Your Lordships will observe that in Jeremy Taylor's view it was a matter open to very grave doubt whether the Council of Nicea was justified in point of discretion in framing any new creed at all. He goes on to say—"But I am not sure that others are satisfied with it. While we look upon the articles they did determine, we see all things well enough; but there are some wise personages who consider it in all circumstances, and think the Church had been more happy if she had not been in some sense constrained to alter the simplicity of her faith, and make it more curious and articulate, so much that he had need be a subtle man to understand the very words of the new determinations." I would observe that in this treatise of Jeremy Taylor—which, as your Lordships know, is comprised in three sections—it will be found on examination that the headings of these sections are direct contradictions of much that has been advanced on this subject, and that their contents afford a satisfactory refutation of those opinions, one at least of which I have never yet seen answered. I will read two or three sentences more, my Lords:—"Since," he says, "it is necessary to rest somewhere, lest we should run to an infinity, it is best to rest there where the Apostles and the Churches apostolical rested, where not only they who are able to judge, but others who are not, are equally satisfied of the certainty and of the

* Works (Eden's ed.), vol. v. p. 406, § 36.

† *Ib.*, p. 398, § 25.

sufficiency of its explication. This I say, not that I believe it to be unlawful or unsafe for the Church, or any wise man to extend his own Creed to anything which may certainly follow from any one of the Articles; but I say that no such deduction is fit to be pressed upon others as an article of faith.* A little later he observes, with something of a touch of pathos—"Indeed, if the Church, by declaring an article, can make that to be necessary which before was not necessary, I do not see how it can stand with the charity of the Church so to do."† In the second section he deals, as I was remarking, explicitly with the Athanasian Creed, though I think there is not a word throughout the treatise which does not apply to it. And here I must again be permitted to read a sentence or two:—"Now, if I should be questioned concerning the symbol of Athanasius (for we see that the Nicene symbol was the father of many more, some twelve or thirteen, in the space of a hundred years), I confess I cannot see that moderate sentence and gentleness of charity in his preface and conclusion that there was in the Nicene Creed. Nothing there but damnation and perishing everlastingly, unless the Article of the Trinity be believed, as it is there with curiosity and minute particularities explained."‡ Then, in answer to those who think that such opinions cannot be held by any who believe the contents of the Creed, let me call your Lordships' attention to what follows:—"For the Articles themselves, I am most heartily persuaded of the truth of them; and yet I dare not say all that are not so are irrevocably damned." And he says, If it were considered how many persons understand it not,—perhaps we should rather say, how few understand it, how contrary to natural reason it seems—he thinks that it would not be amiss if the final judgment were left to Jesus Christ. I will only trouble your Lordships with one passage more, which is the sum of this discourse upon heresy:—"The sum of this discourse is this: if we take an estimate of the nature of things from the dictates and promises evangelical and from the practice apostolical, the nature of faith and its integrity consist in such propositions

* *U. s.*, p. 374, § 11.† *P.* 376, § 12.‡ *P.* 405, § 36.

which make the foundation of hope and charity, that which is sufficient to make us do honour to Christ, and to obey Him, and to encourage us in both. And this is completed in the Apostles' Creed." * These, then, are Jeremy Taylor's views on this matter.

Now, my Lords, I am far from setting up Jeremy Taylor or any other person as an infallible authority; but I do think that he is a person whose opinions, being so decided, and supported with such a weight of argument and reasoning, are entitled to very considerable respect. Still we must come to the question, which is independent of his authority or any other—the intrinsic value of this document, and that with reference to the question on which I have endeavoured to fix your attention, as to the propriety of retaining it as a part of the public services of the Church. Now, I submit that this is not a question that depends upon sentiment or imagination, or on the effect of long association and usage, or anything of that kind; but that it is a thing which admits of being very precisely determined by a simple, sober process of analysis; and I would respectfully invite all my Right Rev. brethren to perform that little operation of analyzing the contents of the Creed each for himself. I have on my part endeavoured so to do, and I will very briefly state the conclusion to which I have been led. In the first place, on trying to ascertain what might be the amount of loss with respect to dogmatical teaching that the Church would sustain, or would have sustained, if the Athanasian Creed had never been composed, I was struck by the fact that the longest series of propositions contained in the Creed are in that respect a mere rhetorical amplification. They begin with the proposition, "Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost; the Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, the Holy Ghost uncreate, yet not three uncreated, but one uncreated, and one incomprehensible," and so on. The plan, your Lordships see, is to enumerate a variety of divine attributes, and then to make the assertion that the Father is such, the Son is such, the Holy Ghost is such, and yet they are not three, but one. I know of no reason whatever in the nature of things why this should not have been prolonged to the extent

* P. 409, § 41.

of the whole Creed ; because it seems to have been by pure accident that the author, whoever he was, confined himself to these particular illustrations. He might have gone through the whole range of the divine attributes : God is holy, God is wise, God is just, God is light, God is love. He might have gone through the whole of them, and left us in point of doctrine exactly where we were before ; and if the whole of this were struck out of the Creed, it would, as far as I see, make absolutely no more difference with regard to the amount of the dogmatical loss that the Church would have sustained than if it had never existed. This fills some thirteen or fourteen verses out of the forty or forty-one of the Creed, and that is a very considerable portion indeed. Well, deduct these passages and those which are rightly or wrongly called Damnatory or Minatory Clauses ; deduct all that is mere introduction and recapitulation ; deduct all that it has simply in common with the preceding creeds, and I think your Lordships will mostly find that what remains of the Athanasian Creed, and which must be considered as its essence, will be reduced to some seven or eight verses ; not much more. There may be some little difference of opinion, but, at any rate, it is not much more than that. Then observe that these portions, which are the very essence of the Creed, are just those to which the language of Bishop Jeremy Taylor most directly and properly applies, as opinions speculative, curiosities of explication, and minute particularities, things which ought never to have been made articles of faith. Every objection that he has urged against such teaching applies, above all, to those portions of the Creed which will remain after that process has been performed.

My Lords, I will not dwell any longer upon that point ; but there is still another point upon which I must trouble you with a remark or two, because I see that great stress has been laid by the English Church Union and by others on our Eighth Article. What are we to do with that ? That the Creeds ought to be thoroughly received and believed, as proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture. Now, my Lords, on that point I venture to make three observations. The first is, that this must clearly be taken with the necessary qualification arising from the profound mysterious-

ness of the subject, and the inevitable limitation of the faculties of the human mind. When the word "certain" is used here, it is used in a qualified sense; not as the certainty of a mathematical demonstration, but as that which may satisfy a reasonable mind. Next, I would observe, as a general remark, that the more profoundly mysterious is the subject of a proposition to be proved from Holy Writ the greater is the likelihood that it will be found possible to prove by most certain warrant of Holy Scripture two propositions which are in direct conflict one with the other. I think we have sufficient examples of that in several doctrines. I would ask—Can anything be capable of proof by more certain warrant of Holy Scripture than the doctrine of human free will? I think not. Can anything be more clearly proved by warrant of Holy Scripture than the doctrine of divine foreknowledge and predestination? I trow not. Has any human intellect ever been found capable of reconciling those two doctrines with one another, or do we wait for the future state to solve that great mystery? That is one illustration of the likelihood of our being brought to opposite conclusions, derived from the language of Holy Scripture, on a subject so profoundly mysterious; and the practical lesson which I should draw from that fact is that it would be much wiser, much safer, much better not to pry into those mysteries at all, but to keep ourselves in an attitude of faith and expectation until we shall receive that light which we may hope hereafter to have. I might make the same remark, I believe, with regard to the doctrine of Transubstantiation. I do not believe that I should be advancing a paradox if I say that it may be most clearly proved by certain warrant of Holy Scripture. Yet I utterly disbelieve it, because I believe that the contrary also may be proved by most certain warrant of Holy Scripture. But I know that different minds take different views of the subject. Luther thought the text of Scripture so plain and certain that the difficulty could only be solved by adopting the theory of Consubstantiation. That, I think, is another example of the facility with which we may find proofs of directly opposite propositions in the language of Scripture; but I am not sure whether it was necessary even to dwell on

this point, because there is another, a third, observation which I would submit to your Lordships. Although it were the fact that, by this Eighth Article, the clergy are bound to the adoption of certain views on this subject, it must be remembered that the laity are not bound by the Thirty-nine Articles. They are at perfect liberty to hold an entirely different opinion with regard to the warrant of Scripture, and the necessity of believing those things. They are not bound to admit that they have any need of the excuse so charitably provided for their ignorance and infirmity by the English Church Union—that the clauses in question can only apply to those whom God knows to be misbelievers through their own wilful ignorance, neglect, or default. They may say, Speak for yourselves. We do not admit that we are guilty of wilful ignorance, neglect, or default. We are of opinion with a highly-respected bishop of our own Church, that these are matters which it is much better for us not to pry into at all, and that it is an error, bordering on sinful presumption, for any one to pry into those mysteries, and above all to pretend to impose them as matters of faith upon others who refuse so to pry into them. That, I think, may be, and probably will be, the language or thought of a very large majority of the enlightened and educated laity of the Church of England. I regret having had to detain your Lordships so long, and will only add one other remark as to the value of this document. As I understand, its value is supposed to consist in its being an instrument for ensuring unanimity of belief among those who accept it, and for preserving their rigid orthodoxy. Now, I wish to ask whether it has really answered that purpose? I very much doubt it, and for this reason:—It appears to me, on such reflection as I have been able to give to the subject, that there is at this moment in the Church of England a very large amount of heresy, quite latent and involuntary, and without the consciousness of those who are affected by it; but still not the less real, and in my opinion pernicious Apollinarian and Eutychian heresy, and that this heresy is most rife among the most enthusiastic admirers of the Athanasian Creed, and those who contend most earnestly for its continued use in the public services of the Church. I could

not enter into my reasons for holding this opinion without saying something that might savour of personal application, and I prefer leaving the remark and its application to your Lordships' judgment. My Lords, I do not feel any great anxiety on this subject, because I am a strong believer in the ultimate triumph of truth and justice; and my firm belief is that the more light is thrown on the origin and the contents of the Athanasian Creed, the fewer will be found to be its claims to that place which it now occupies in the public services of the Church. And to that I must add my conviction that, whenever the laity of the Church come to have a voice in this matter, from that time the use of this Creed in the public services of the Church will become more and more rare; and my hearty wish and hope is that that may soon be the case. I have heard with great sorrow and concern a report of a movement said to be on foot in America for the reintroduction of the Creed in the public services of the Church. I cannot say how deeply I should deplore any such measure as a lamentable retrograde movement; but I feel convinced that it is one which will not be imitated by the Church of England.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS
TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL INSTITUTION,
EDINBURGH, 1861.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,—

IT is with much misgiving that I appear before you this evening. I am aware, indeed, that whatever responsibility I incur in so doing is shared by those respected friends of your Institution who did me the honour of inviting me to address you on this occasion. But their good opinion, however gratifying to myself, would not suffice to acquit me of extreme presumption, if I was confident that anything I have to impart was worth bringing so far to set before such an audience as I see here assembled. I am conscious that, as a stranger, left very much to my own conjectures with regard to your intellectual tastes and habits, I may not be happy in my selection of topics to suit them, or may only remind you of that which you have heard better said by others. But in this same character, and on this very account, I feel sure that I may all the more safely reckon on your kindness, in accepting that which I have to offer, as at least a token of my goodwill.

I must, however, at the outset, disclaim any pretension of increasing your stock of knowledge in any particular province of thought. Wherever else I might be induced to present myself with that view, it would not be in this renowned seat of science and literature. That attempt I leave to those who will address you in the course of the session we are now opening. My aim is

more immediately practical. I do not propose to go in search of a subject beyond the bounds of your Institution itself. I believe that its objects, uses, and—may I add—its possible misuses will furnish matter sufficient to occupy us during the time for which you may favour me with your attention.

Though I have the honour of addressing the Members of a Philosophical Institution, few of them probably are ambitious of the title of philosophers, or would care to hear it applied to themselves individually. But the name chosen for the Institution may not be the less appropriate, and it may be worth while to consider what is really implied in it. The dignity of a philosopher impresses common minds with awe, as of something transcendent and unapproachable. But it must not be forgotten that every man is a philosopher, or has the philosopher in him, though he may be as little conscious of it as was M. Jourdain that he had been speaking prose all his life; for, whether we look at the origin of the word, or the nature of the thing, philosophy is not an attainment, but a pursuit; not a success, but an endeavour; not a fruition, but a craving. Of course I do not mean that it is a pursuit by which nothing is attained, an endeavour which never succeeds, a craving which is in no degree gratified; but the essence of the thing is the pursuit, the endeavour, the craving—for wisdom, knowledge, truth; and this craving is a universal characteristic of our race. You see it bursting forth in the curiosity of the child and the savage; and if there are races or individuals in whom it appears to be lacking, that is a sign of morbid imperfection or degeneracy. There is indeed an immense difference between that childish inquisitiveness and the spirit of philosophical research, but the greatest philosophical genius has its root in this common human element, and is but the development of it under peculiarly favourable inward and outward conditions. It is often hard to say which class of conditions has contributed most to the final result. If Newton ascribed his scientific conquests not to any special gift, but to the exercise of the simple faculty of attention, that was no doubt an exaggeration; the exaggeration, however, I think, not of a false modesty, but rather of a noble pride. He claimed the largest

share in his work for that which, though within the reach of all, was most properly his own, the energy and constancy of his will; and though no effort of attention could have enabled an inferior mind to accomplish the like achievements, the saying is full of instruction and encouragement for those who are engaged in any intellectual pursuit. At all events, it is only by nurture and discipline that the instinct, which is philosophy in embryo, can be brought to maturity. That culture is the main intellectual business of education, and such is apparently the object of your Institution; but this is not sufficient to mark its precise character.

While to many ears the word *philosophy* is so high-sounding as to check all aspirations after the thing, the word *education*, on the contrary, too commonly suggests the notion of something which is acknowledged indeed to be exceedingly useful, and for several purposes indispensable, but which most persons who have reached a certain age regard as belonging to their past, and as a subject in which they would be ashamed to own that they have any present personal concern. So it is that one hears of an education received, or perhaps finished, at a school or a college. The time at which this consummation is usually said to take place is just that at which the highest kind of education, that which is the most truly liberal and manly, the only one which can ever yield any really precious fruits, may more properly be said to begin; for this is that self-culture, the first condition of which is perfect freedom. In that preparatory stage of education, which is so often spoken and thought of as the whole, the youthful mind is necessarily subject to guidance and constraint, which may not be the less useful, as a part of moral discipline, because it is occasionally irksome. But the preparation has failed in its most important end unless it has awakened the desire as well as furnished the instruments for that self-culture which is the great business of a well-spent life; and the highest end of your Institution—that which is alone worthy of its name—is, I conceive, to supply means and aids for this self-culture.

Perhaps I might very safely have taken it for granted that all

this is familiar and present to the mind of every one who hears me. My only apology for thus adverting to it is, on the one hand, that things which are constantly before our eyes are commonly those on which we reflect the least, and on the other hand that the benefit derived from such an Institution as this must depend very much on the light in which it is viewed by its members. And therefore I will venture to invite your attention to another of its aspects, which is perhaps somewhat less obvious, and very important for a right estimate of its value—I mean the relation in which it stands to other agencies, which are co-operating simultaneously toward the same end. I was speaking just now of school education as a beginning, a preparation for that which is to be afterwards carried on by the student himself, when he is released from all restraint in the choice and prosecution of his intellectual pursuits. In his state of pupilage he must be always more or less dependent on the impulse and direction which he receives from without: at first entirely so, afterwards perhaps less and less as his faculties ripen. He will then become more and more accessible to motives of a higher order, which have their spring in his better nature, a generous emulation, a noble ambition, the desire to stand well in the judgment of those whom he respects. Motives, no doubt, fine and liberal, and full of promise, but yet entirely distinct from an interest in the study itself, and quite consistent with a real indifference and even distaste for it. It is only when all such motives are withdrawn, when he is subject to no attraction but that of the pursuit itself, disengaged from those which had been combined with it, if they did not supply its place; only when his exertions are animated by this purely spontaneous and truly philosophical motive, can it be known, either by himself or others, what is really in him. How often has it happened that those who had won the most brilliant distinction in a competitive career have sunk into inaction and obscurity when the immediate object was attained, while noiseless steps, sustained by the pure love of knowledge, and in the face of the greatest difficulties and discouragements, have unheedingly and almost unconsciously gained a summit of enduring fame!

But what I wish further to remark is, that when the student has passed out of the cloister into the world, he still finds himself in a school. It was the wish of a philosopher that he might die learning. A familiar proverb tells us that we *must* be learning as long as we live. "*Live,*" it says, "*and learn.*" This indeed is a very different kind of learning from that which was the object of the philosopher's wish. His desire was that he might never cease to be employing his faculties in their noblest work. The learning to which the proverb refers is that which is gained from the lessons of experience; but the proverb admits of a larger application. The learning it speaks of may be considered as comprising the results of all the teaching and training received in the High School of Life, a school indeed of manifold instruction and of severe discipline, holding out splendid prizes, imposing hard tasks, exacting strict obedience to its rules under rigorous penalties. Not only have all men to pass through this school, but it is that to which the great mass of mankind are indebted for their whole stock of intellectual acquirements. Among races of backward civilization this is manifestly the case without exception or qualification. It is not through any course of systematic study, but in the commerce of daily life, that the savage unconsciously amasses his whole fund of knowledge; that knowledge is in fact the common property of the whole community. Every member of the community enters into full possession of it as his birthright. Whatever distinctions of rank there may be in the tribe, all in this respect are on the same level. If there is one who pretends to the possession of secrets into which the rest are not initiated, there is commonly ground for a shrewd suspicion that this is no real knowledge, and that the best thing that could be said of it is that it is something utterly useless.

But the state of things in this respect was not materially different in the seats of the highest ancient civilization. In the great Asiatic empires, in the Indian and Egyptian theocracies, the individual was altogether reared and moulded by the State, and drew his intellectual nourishment from the society in which he lived, insensibly, as the plant the materials of its growth from the soil

and the atmosphere. And it was not far otherwise with the most cultivated people of the ancient world. The Athenian's school-education consisted mainly in what we should call elegant accomplishments, some of which appeared to the hard practical Roman unmanly, and would perhaps be looked upon as frivolous by the graver students at a ladies' college in our day. It was when, as we should say, he had finished his education, that he began to acquire what we should call useful knowledge. It was in the debates of the public assembly, in the proceedings of the law courts, where he had not merely to listen as an unconcerned spectator, but to give his vote or his verdict; in the military or naval expedition, where he knew that the officers under whom he served would, on their return, be responsible to him as a judge. And when, in the decline of the commonwealth, he was no longer summoned to the field, when political discussion was silenced, and litigation had lost almost all its interest, one school still remained open, which he never failed to frequent. That was the public newsroom, which they called the Agora or Gathering Place. I think it may be properly described as the newsroom, though it was not lighted with gas, but open to the bluest of skies and the purest of atmospheres; and the news was not spread on a table, but passed from mouth to ear, while the eye, whichever way it might turn, could not fail to light on some masterpiece of art, some monument of ancient glory; but, abstracted from the circumstances, the essence of the thing was the same. From the time of Demosthenes to that of St. Paul, the chief business of those who resorted to this place of concourse was to say and hear something new. There was no doubt a great deal of idle gossip, much of the talk turned on the scandal of the day, food for a curiosity not more refined than that which revels in the reports of the police or divorce courts. But the successive arrivals in the Piræus frequently brought up to the city, intelligence, commercial and political, not perhaps inferior in interest to the advices of our special correspondents. And though there arose no second Socrates, he was probably not the last who gathered a group around him on the same spot, to discuss questions of like import to those which

he used to moot at the stalls of the artizans. This I repeat, and not that which you see represented in Raphael's Fresco, was the real school of Athens—for the people. It is true the teaching was very unmethodical, casual and fragmentary ; the object of the scholars was not so much to learn as to be amused, to speed the passage of the leaden-footed hours. Few, I am afraid, went with any purpose of improving their minds ; but yet the result was as if they had. Intelligence was quickened ; new ideas were constantly imbibed ; the circle of their knowledge, the range of their thought, was enlarged.

It is by an analogous process, one equally indirect and undesigned, that the greatest, if not the best, part of English education is carried on at this day. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts which have been made for the general diffusion of knowledge, it is very unequally distributed among the various classes of society ; but the inequality is due, I believe, far more to differences in position and occupations, than in the advantages of early instruction. The intellectual horizon of an illiterate Englishman may be much larger than that of an educated Greek. I was speaking just now of that Athenian newsroom ; it was adorned with manifold objects, exquisitely fitted to gratify a refined taste ; but what source of knowledge did it open comparable to the dingy wall of a mechanics' institute, hung with a map of the world ?

I am not, as may be perceived, at all disposed to undervalue this kind of insensible education ; it suffices for many very useful purposes ; it enables many a one to fill a respectable station, to attain the ends of an honourable ambition, to contribute to the welfare of the community ; but, whatever else it may be or do, it is not the same thing with self-culture, and can never supply its place. The two things are so far from necessarily concurring, that the tendency of the one is rather to obstruct and exclude the other. That is the ground of the poet's complaint : "The world is too much with us ; late and soon, getting and spending, we lay waste our powers." The more the faculties are absorbed in the exercises of this world-school, however they may be sharpened and strengthened for the work assigned to them, they become in

the same degree stiffened and disabled for any free play. Is it possible to overrate the preciousness of the intervals of leisure, which afford a temporary release from the daily task, and restore the mind to its self-possession, and to the consciousness of its noblest powers and its highest aims? To one who is capable of appreciating its uses, every such pause is an emerging out of the grosser element in which one is carried on blindly by the current, into the pure air and clear light, where the feet find a firm resting place. It is an indispensable condition of every large outlook on the world without, and of all true insight into the world within. A condition:—it is that, but nothing more; a golden opportunity, but one which may prove worse than useless. In many cases it would be, not wisdom but imprudence, not kindness but cruelty, to multiply such opportunities, unaccompanied by a provision against the abuse to which they are exposed. But in general, and on the whole, it is their scarcity that there seems to be most reason to lament. This is an inevitable incident of our social development, which has an important bearing on our subject. However one may be prepossessed with the superiority of the present over the past, one can hardly think, without a sigh of regret, of the greater amount of leisure enjoyed by former generations, when there was no crowding or hurry in any of the paths of life, and they were rather like the green lanes through which the London citizen sauntered toward one of the neighbouring villages, which are now some of the most densely peopled quarters of the metropolis. Every one felt at liberty to take his time, to stop every now and then, to pick a flower and look about him. Compare the duration and the business of a modern Session of Parliament with one in those leisurely times. Think of the Courts at Westminster habitually rising about noon, and the sages of the law recreating themselves after their early meal, as by way of dessert, with the mootings of imaginary cases, or executing a solemn minuet in the hall of Lincoln's Inn, on the elevation of some learned brother to the honours of the cof. Fit pastime for an age when a shelf of very moderate length would hold both the statutes at large, and a complete collection of the reports.

One cannot dwell without a certain sense of refreshment on these images of an almost Arcadian legislation and jurisprudence, and on the state of society which they imply. I should be loth to be betrayed, and still more to betray others, into a sentimental exaggeration of the advantages of the past. Undoubtedly, labour—that is, a well-regulated and useful activity—is not only the wealth of nations, but the happiness of individuals. Ages and countries in which it has been dreaded as an evil, will be found to have suffered under some social disease, which tended to stifle the healthy energies of individual life. I venture to augur that in the regenerated Italy the sweetness of doing nothing, or of having nothing to do, will be less and less commonly enjoyed, and that, as the exponent of an ordinary habitual feeling, the phrase, *il dolce far niente*, will ere long become obsolete. But it cannot be denied that there is ground for the complaint which meets us from so many quarters, not only in the lower but in the higher spheres of life, and sometimes in tones of bitter anguish, that society is overtasked, or rather is too hard a task-master, and that the gain which results to it from the excess of labour, is too dearly purchased by the sacrifices it exacts of private freedom and happiness. I have nothing now to do with the causes or the remedies of this evil; I am noticing this character and tendency of our time, only as enhancing the value of the privilege enjoyed by the members of this Institution. That privilege is twofold; it is composed of the intervals of leisure which they have at their command, and of the means which the Institution affords of employing that leisure to the greatest advantage. It is of these means that I have now to speak.

I shall confine myself to those which are most ordinary and permanent; I trust that I shall not be suspected of a wish to depreciate the value of the lectures delivered in this place, if I consider them as subordinate and supplemental to the use of the library; as mainly serving to suggest, or to aid, some course of study which is to be followed out through the medium of books. Even if they were more than this, it would be foreign to my purpose to touch on them; for I have all along been viewing this

Institution as an instrument of self-culture, with regard to which the student's pursuit of knowledge is entirely independent and spontaneous; and this is the case with one who takes up a book in a much higher degree than with one who listens to a lecture.

This library is one which, considered in itself, and perhaps in comparison with others, the members of this Institution may regard with a just complacency. It is at all events, both with respect to its compass and its destination—that is, the kind of want which it is designed to supply—a very remarkable index of the progress of modern civilization. Four centuries ago no European sovereign possessed so large a collection of books. Mr. Hallam observes that the Vatican library was left by its founder—that munificent patron of learning and the arts—Pope Nicholas V., “enriched with 5,000 volumes, a treasure far exceeding that of any other collection in Europe.” Other accounts raise the number to 9,000, still short by several thousands of that which is already to be found on your shelves. We are expressly informed by the contemporary biographer of Pope Nicholas, that he intended his library for the use of his court. It was justly supposed that none but the great and learned were capable of feeling an interest in such an undertaking. Few, indeed, of those who had the means of amassing such treasures were qualified to appreciate their value. Nicholas, it is said, was severely censured by his successor for wasting the revenues of the Church on such useless objects. It was much that they had begun to be regarded as a princely luxury. A book indeed was at that time so rare a thing that it might well be prized, almost irrespectively of its contents, as like curiosities by bibliomaniacs now. This is strikingly illustrated in the Ducal Library at Urbino, which was founded about the same time with that of the Vatican, and rivalled it in extent, and surpassed it in contemporaneous celebrity. It is related, in a description which fills some interesting pages in Mr. Dennistoun's *Memoirs of the Dukes of Urbino*, that the founder “made a rule that every book should be bound in crimson, ornamented with silver.” This uniformity of splendour seems to mark the value which he set on each, for its own sake, simply as a book.

Certainly, we have reason to congratulate ourselves on the state of things in which our lot has been cast. The art which preserves and multiplies the records of human thought has also both stimulated its activity and contributed largely toward the levelling of the social barriers which obstructed the propagation of its utterances. When we compare the literary dearth and monopoly of the fifteenth century with the wealth of our own, and its more equable diffusion among all classes of society, we feel that the advantage is decidedly on our side. Yet the gain is not quite unalloyed; and it cannot surprise us that this intellectual wealth should not be exempt from some of the embarrassment incident to what is more commonly called riches. This is one of the cases in which there may be room for the application of the old Greek saw—*half is more*—that is, better, more to be desired—*than the whole*.

Let us take a memorable example. Karl Otfried Müller's History of Greek Literature—of which you possess a translation begun by our learned minister of war—opens with a reflection which we should hardly have expected from a German professor, an insatiable reader, who devoted his whole life to the study of classical antiquity. He dissents from those who consider the destruction of the Alexandrian library, and the consequent loss of the works of some hundreds of Greek authors, as a calamity. He is inclined to regard it rather as a happy event, which protected the European mind from an incubus that might have stifled its energies just as they were waking into new life. He thinks that “the inheritance of so vast a collection of writings from antiquity would, by engrossing all the leisure and attention of the moderns, have diminished their zeal and their opportunities for original productions.”

Let me remark, by the way, that I cannot adopt this view of the subject, though I am content to admit, with Niebuhr—who recognised a special interposition of Providence in the fact—that what has been preserved to us from the works of classical antiquity is sufficient for all our most important purposes. But I cannot believe that if the Greek emigrants, who took refuge in Italy after the fall of Constantinople, had brought with them some hundreds

of additional manuscripts, containing all the works of their forefathers which were deemed worthy of a place in the museum of Alexandria, the effect would have been to retard the progress of European civilization, or to check the productiveness of modern literature. That productiveness, as it appears to me, arises from causes too manifold and too mighty to be counteracted or materially affected by any such influence. Such an importation of Greek books would indeed have increased the labours of the learned who devoted themselves to this pursuit; but it could hardly have engrossed their attention more than the ancient works which were actually brought to light, or have heightened the fervour of their admiration for the Greek and Roman world, which, as it was, they carried so near to idolatry. If it would have provided some fresh occupation which might perhaps have been as well spared, it would also have saved much time which has been spent in laborious and often fruitless efforts to fill up gaps, to piece fragments, to gather the truth from scanty data, and to supply the place of evidence by conjecture. "Manetho," Max Müller observes in his Lectures on Language, "if preserved complete, would have saved us volumes of controversy on Egyptian chronology." The knowledge of antiquity would have been not only larger and surer, but more easily acquired. The veneration with which it was regarded at the revival of learning would have been not indeed less enthusiastic, but more enlightened and discriminating. The possession of so large a body of Greek literature would, I conceive, necessarily have rendered the taste more fastidious, the judgment more severe, as to the relative value of its various productions. Instead of the providential selection, by which a few samples of the best in each kind have been preserved to us, there would have been a sifting of the mass, by which the masterpieces would have been separated for familiar enjoyment, while the bulk was laid aside for occasional consultation.

But is it in Greek literature alone that there is a possibility of an excessive and cumbrous superfluity, which may lead one to prefer half, or even a much smaller part, to the whole? Consider the question merely with respect to quantity.

If the whole body of classical literature had come down to us, its bulk would probably have been inconsiderable in comparison with the literary produce of even only the last four centuries. And however vast that bulk might have been, it would have been a definite and fixed magnitude, incapable of any increase. But modern literature is constantly growing, and with a progressive rapidity. The stream is ever widening and deepening as it lengthens its course. That old library at Urbino, with its crimson glow and silver sheen, must, I should think, have made a very different impression on the mind of a spectator from that which is produced by the new reading-room of the British Museum, with its receptacles for a million of volumes. The one may be likened to an Italian garden, laid out with a symmetrical plan, which the eye can take in at a single glance; the other to a tropical forest, where the traveller may roam, without ceasing, in the enjoyment of ever-shifting vistas of a luxuriant vegetation, but cannot hope to make his way to any given point without the aid of a guide or a compass.

One conviction must be impressed on the mind of every one who enters one of these great storehouses of learning, and the more forcibly in proportion to the extent of his knowledge; that is, the conviction of the sheer physical impossibility that any human being should ever master more than a small portion of the whole.

But should there be any one to whom there is something overwhelming and depressing in this thought—and I will own that I have experienced such a feeling myself—it may be a consolation to such a one to reflect that a very large part even of modern literature belongs so completely to the past, as to have lost almost all use and worth for the present: retaining, at the utmost, only a historical value, as possibly capable of serving the purpose of some special investigation. “Libraries,” Lord Bacon observes, “are as the shrines, where all the relics of the ancient saints, full of true virtue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserved and reposed.” But this is a description of an ideal rather than of an actual library. We might, indeed, not inaptly compare such a

collection as our national library to a vast catacomb, but not in the belief that all the remains deposited in it are alike sacred and precious, or worth bringing to light for any higher purpose than the satisfaction of an antiquarian curiosity. Not that this is an object to be despised, for it may become fruitful in useful results; and this is enough to establish the right even of all such remains to a prolonged existence, and to earn for them the room they fill. But, apart from such casual and special uses, who would lament, on his own account, that life is not long enough for re-opening controversies on which reason and experience have passed an irrevocable judgment; for retracing the course of laborious investigations which have been finally brought to a satisfactory issue; for exploring the mazes of abandoned error; or even for reviewing the forms in which various minds have conceived, and represented the same truth; and yet, if all that ministered to none but such ends was to disappear from our libraries, who could calculate to what extent their dimensions would shrink? As it is, the process of elimination must be wrought mentally by every one for himself, according to his own taste and judgment. It is one absolutely necessary, especially for persons of limited leisure, even in a library which fully realizes Bacon's idea; and the gravest consequences depend on the mode in which the process is conducted.

I ventured at the outset to hint at the possibility of a misuse of the resources of your institution. The word might appear too strong if I did not explain, that all I mean by it is, a kind of use which is less judicious and profitable than some other. And I would not be supposed to deny, that even that which I regard as such, is yet incomparably more rational and wholesome than many ways, equally harmless, of filling up a leisure hour. But I wish to point more specially to some of the cases which I have in view.

A well-stored library holds out a strong temptation to miscellaneous, indiscriminate, desultory reading, in which it can hardly be said that there is any principle of selection, the choice being determined by the casual impulse of the moment. That is a kind of reading from which, on the face of it, we should not expect any great amount of benefit. It may seem scarcely to deserve the

name of study; yet we should be liable to be deceived by our anticipations, if we pronounced upon it without reference to the circumstances under which the taste for reading is so indulged. All depends on the character of the reader. There have been numerous instances in which the intellectual growth of eminent men has been mainly derived from such an irregular and seemingly capricious course of study. They were gifted with a keen and indiscriminating appetite for knowledge. They were thrown upon the means of gratifying it without stint, but without guidance. But the strength of the craving itself more than compensated the absence of any outward rule. It fastened instinctively upon that which was suited to its wants. It converted everything it touched into the nourishment it required. Nothing was wasted; all was digested and assimilated, and passed into the life-blood of the man's intellectual system. But there is the widest possible difference between such a passion for reading and a taste for literary enjoyment, to which it appears simply in the light of a refined amusement, a pleasant and healthy relaxation from the toils and cares of life, and to which, therefore, provided this end is attained, one book is as welcome as another. And this is, probably, a very common habit of mind. Similar as it is to the other in its outward effects, it is separated from that in its inward principle by the whole interval between earnestness and indifference.

Now, so far as this latter mode of using a library is simply a fact, the actual result of the individual's disposition and circumstances, it would be both useless and impertinent to find fault with it, or to speak of it otherwise than with approbation and respect. Every one who is gifted with a relish for so pure and perennial a source of enjoyment has reason to be thankful, as for a privilege, which is not only precious in itself, but much more rare than appears to be commonly supposed. But if it was to be considered as not merely a fact of individual experience, but an opinion, with regard to that which is in general not only most natural, but fittest and best, I would take the liberty of entering my protest against it, as a mischievous error. I do not believe that the kind of tension to which the mind is subject in the active

pursuits of life, even in affairs of the most absorbing interest, at all unfits it for application to studies which demand close and sustained attention ; or, which is the main point, that it may not find in such application all the relaxation and refreshment which it needs. I fear that it may seem to savour of garrulity—but I cannot forbear mentioning two instances, one known to me immediately, the other less directly, but with equal certainty. The one was that of a lawyer, whose day was commonly occupied with his professional duties until late in the evening. He told me that it was his habit, when his work was over, to sit up reading until two o'clock in the morning. And he was one who took little pleasure in any kind of reading which did not afford exercise for earnest thought. The other instance was reported to me by Baron Bunsen, as heard by himself from the late Sir Robert Peel. After the excitement of a long debate, Sir Robert never retired to rest until he had tranquillized his mind by sitting down to some serious book. I would not, however, lay any stress on examples which may be looked upon as exceptional, or otherwise irrelevant ; but I would appeal to one broad and patent fact, I mean the amount and the quality of that part of our literature which has been produced in the intervals of business, and in departments totally foreign to the habitual occupations of the authors. How many distinguished names will be at once recalled to your recollection by that remark. I have no means of calculating the numerical proportion which this class of writers bears to those who have made literature a profession. But no one will say that their works are in general less plainly stamped with traces of patient inquiry and earnest thought, or careful execution. They might perhaps not unreasonably lead us to the conclusion, that the most favourable of all conditions of study is that of limited leisure. I have myself no doubt that such is the case ; and I think it is not difficult to understand why it should be so. Here again the old paradox is verified, half is more than the whole. It is likely to be more highly prized, more carefully husbanded, more actively employed. But at least the condition is not more unfavourable for readers than for writers, and cannot of itself incapacitate any

one for following a train of thought which another in the like circumstances was able to produce.

I must repeat that if I am not content that reading should be regarded simply as a pastime, it is only in the case of those to whom it may be something more and better. But the danger of such a view of the subject appears to me to be very much heightened by one of the most prominent features of our modern literature—the enormous and progressive multiplication of works of fiction. If the value of a book is measured by its power of beguiling our leisure, what kind of writing will be entitled to preference over a clever novel? And how vast and inexhaustible is the yet continually increasing supply? Literary statistics record the appearance of 3000 works of this class, amounting to 7000 volumes, since the publication of *Waverley*. The year 1858 yielded an addition of 200 new productions to the list. It would be idle to deplore a phenomenon which depends on causes completely beyond any one's control, even if it had not its good as well as its bad side. Who would stand up in this place and lament that Scott exchanged the field in which he gathered his early laurels, for one in which his genius found full scope, because it is mainly through the impulse of his example that so many brilliant talents have since been dedicated to the like employment? Is it not rather ground for just pride, that we should have the honour of being the chief purveyors of this entertainment for the greater part of the civilized world? It is true, the parentage of the romance does not raise any strong prepossession in its favour. We can trace it no farther back than to an epoch in Greek literature, in the decline of the Roman empire, when poetry was utterly effete, and all the powers of the national mind were miserably enfeebled. It may, however, fairly stand on its own merits, as a legitimate, though not a very high, form of art. I would neither dispute that claim, nor another which is frequently set up in its behalf, as the vehicle of important instruction in social science, or the conduct of life. But what makes me a little uneasy, when I observe the vast dimensions and growing exuberance of this branch of literature, notwithstanding the beauty and lusciousness of its fruit, is the apprehension that

there are many, and an increasing number of persons, to whom it furnishes the main part, if not the whole, of their intellectual food. There is a strong tendency, in the nature of things, to favour this monopoly. The craving for an agreeable excitement, obtained without any mental exertion, is apt to grow on every one who indulges it, and to dull the edge of every other, while it becomes itself less and less nice as to the means by which the gratification is procured. How largely does the attraction of simple curiosity, quite apart from the exhibition of passion, or the development of character, enter into the success of every popular story.

It would be needless, and, before the audience which I have the honour of addressing, it might be almost unseemly, to dwell on the evil and unhappiness of such a habit of mind, or to point out how directly it is opposed to that which it is the object of a philosophical institution to cultivate. Though, as a general fact, I believe the danger to be real and serious, I have no special reason for supposing that it is one against which even the younger members of this institution need to be put on their guard. But, even if such was the case, I should not wish any one to pledge himself to total abstinence from these stimulants, nor should I expect that it would be of much avail to counsel temperance in the enjoyment of them. The only effectual counteractive to the mischievous indulgence, is the relish for finer, nobler, manlier, and therefore more satisfactory and enduring intellectual delights. Whoever has learnt that relish will be in no danger of injuring his mental constitution by excess in pleasures of a lower order. None will be absolutely excluded; all will find their right place and their due measure. I have spoken of this relish as a thing to be *learnt*. It is indeed a gift of nature, but one which needs to be developed and cultivated; and it is capable of being indefinitely purified and strengthened. It is almost a truism to say, that intellectual enjoyment depends on the exercise of thought. But it may be important to a young man to be convinced, that the intensity of the enjoyment is proportioned to the activity of the exercise, while the exercise itself is a gain, independent both of the enjoyment and of the immediate

result. So long as the mind remains merely passive and receptive, it matters little what passes through it from without. It will draw no more solid instruction from the most exact reasoning than from the most phantastic imagery; from the best-attested facts of history than from the wildest fictions of romance. On the other hand, when the mind puts forth its energies, it finds, that in the realm of thought as in the realm of nature, no spot is utterly barren or lifeless, no object without its meaning and value.

There have been many earnest conscientious persons—there are probably many now—who cannot hear the name of *fiction*, though taken in the literary sense, apart from all notion of wilful deception, without a certain inward recoil. Their principles, if logically carried out, would lead them to proscribe almost all imaginative literature. What are commonly called works of fiction fall most directly under their ban, as, if not more positively mischievous, an abuse of talent in the authors, and of time in the readers. I think that their feeling, worthy as it is of all respect, has its root in a misconception. Though they do not confound fiction with falsehood, they confound truth with reality, so as to suppose that fiction is opposed to reality, as falsehood to truth. But no such contrast exists. Fiction is perfectly consistent with the highest truth and with the soberest reality. If it were not so, it would be unable either to create illusion or to excite sympathy. It was the severest thinker, the greatest master of all the science and learning of the ancient world, who made the memorable observation, “poetry is a more philosophical and a more serious thing than history.” And the reason he assigns is, in substance, that history relates particular events of human life, while poetry illustrates the general laws of human nature. That, indeed, is a narrow view of history, but it rests the dignity of poetry on ground broad enough to comprehend every province of fiction.

Many, however, who might be content—whether on the authority of Aristotle or of Mr. Thackeray—to admit such a claim on behalf of a well-written novel, would be apt to reject it, with some degree of scornful indignation, if it was extended to tales, extravagantly incredible in their contents, repulsively rude in their form, appa-

rently fit only for the gross amusement of ignorant boors at their winter firesides. And yet this long despised and neglected refuse of the mine of fiction, when submitted to the tests of philosophical criticism, has been found full of the most precious ore. No one who has read Dr. Dasent's introduction to his "Norse Tales"—to say nothing of the continental scholars who have laboured in the same field—no one, I say, who has been enabled by these researches to gain a clear view of the subject, can doubt that this popular mythology, in its origin, its transmission, and the manifold transformations it has undergone, through the genius of different races, in its passage from the banks of the Ganges to those of the Shannon, from the tent of the Bedouin to the hut of the Highland shepherd, from an African palm-grove to an Arctic snow-cabin, is one of the most interesting and instructive chapters in the history of mankind. Who that is capable of an enlightened sympathy with his fellow-men would turn contemptuously away from these many-voiced utterances of thought and feeling, gushing up from the inmost depths of the human soul? or is not thankful to Mr. Campbell for the pains he has taken to preserve those of the Western Highlands in their native freshness?

On the other hand, I should expect that persons who regard the common novel as frivolous reading, because purely fictitious, would think more favourably of the historical romance. If the name of Scott was not sufficient to vindicate the dignity of this kind of composition, it would be abundantly established by the authority of Macaulay. You remember how Scott helped, if not to form, to illustrate Macaulay's conception of "the perfect historian." "Sir Walter Scott," he says, "has used those fragments of truth which historians have scornfully thrown behind them, in a manner which may well excite their envy. He has constructed, out of their gleanings, works which, even considered as histories, are scarcely less valuable than theirs." I do not mean for a moment to dispute the justice of this eulogy, or that of the perhaps still more glorious homage paid to Scott's genius by the great masters of the modern French historical school, who revere him as its founder. But yet it is just on the score of truth and of historical reality that I con-

sider the familiar domestic novel, in which all the personages are imaginary and all the incidents fictitious, as entitled to the preference over the historical romance. Lest this should sound strange, let me explain my meaning by an example which will, I trust, at the same time justify my opinion. A year or two before Macaulay wrote his Essay on History for the Edinburgh Review, M. Abel-Rémusat published a translation of a Chinese novel, "Les deux Cousines." In the valuable preface which he prefixed to his translation, he observes that he had selected this work, though Chinese literature possesses many historical romances, because, being a contemporary exhibition of a state of things familiar to all its readers, it could not fail to be a faithful picture of Chinese society, and to convey more authentic information as to Chinese life and manners than could be found in the works of all the European travellers and missionaries. Nothing, it appears to me, can be more evident than the correctness of this view. And so, if that celebrated New Zealander—whose ancestors are already beginning to give us a good deal of trouble—when he pitches his tent in the ruins of London, should carry his researches into English history so far back as the nineteenth century, and should wish to lay open to his countrymen the interior of English society in that period, by the translation of some English work into the Maori language, none would be so well adapted to his purpose as a popular novel of that day; and, if he is as judicious as M. Abel-Rémusat, he will certainly prefer it to the most powerful historical romance, in which an author who may flourish five or six centuries later, had endeavoured, by laborious study, with the aid of a vivid imagination, to restore the faded features of English life in the reign of Victoria the First.

I shall not say a word to dissuade any one from studying any period of English history in a romance of Scott or of Bulwer, until I know that some one has actually done so. I am afraid that the danger lies another way. I have a suspicion that many readers are so little disturbed in the enjoyment of such works by critical misgivings, that they rather tolerate that which approximates most nearly to historical accuracy, for the sake of that which

diverges most widely from it. M. Guizot observes, in his Lectures on the History of Civilization in Europe, that the portly, unwarlike burgomaster of Liége depicted by Scott in *Quentin Durward*, is an anachronism and an impossibility, in an age when every burgher needed to be constantly wearing his coat of mail and carrying his pike. Few readers, I should think, have noticed the incongruity, fewer still been the less amused with the misplaced character on account of it. But yet, even the least successful of these attempts bears witness to the truth on which Lord Macaulay so justly insists, that the office of history is not completely fulfilled by a mere narrative of public events; that such a narrative, however faithful and orderly, may leave the reader in the dark on points of the greatest importance for a right appreciation of the period to which it relates, while it altogether fails to stir those human sympathies, which dry, cold, pale abstractions can never reach. The picturesque, poetical, romantic details, which mark the peculiar physiognomy and complexion of every period, and which fill so large a space in the romance, also belong to the completeness of history. It is not enough for me to know of my fellow-men, especially of my fellow-countrymen, what they did, or how they were governed in time past; I want, as far as possible, to see them as they lived and moved, in their daily pursuits of business or pleasure, in peace and in war, in public and private, in the country and in the city, at home and on their journeys, the modes in which they provided for the common wants of human nature, the forms in which they manifested their inner life, and embodied their social relations. It is only when I have become thus familiar with them that they impress me with a full sense of our common humanity. Without this they are not creatures of my own flesh and blood, but dim spectral shapes, with which I can have no fellow-feeling, and which I cannot view in the same light as the men among whom I am myself living.

But while we recognise the charm and the value of such distinctive features of national life, wherever they appear, we must beware of supposing that the exhibition of them is either a measure or an indispensable condition of the highest excellence in

historical composition; that is, either that the best history is that in which it abounds most, or that none in which it is wanting can possess merit of the highest order. That is an opinion which would lead us unjustly to depreciate some of the greatest authors who have written the history of their own time. If they designed their works for the benefit of posterity, they addressed themselves in the first instance to their contemporaries, and it was not to be expected that they should enter into descriptive details familiar to every reader of their own day, because a time might come when such details would be devoured with eager curiosity by those to whom they would otherwise have been unknown. Lord Macaulay would have had Clarendon enliven his narrative with some passages which would have brought out in strong vivid relief the contrast between the austerity—sometimes genuine, sometimes conventional—of the Puritans, and the reckless, often ribald gaiety of the Cavaliers. No doubt the outward expression of the spirit which animated the two parties is not only striking and interesting in itself, but historically important, inasmuch as it not only indicated, but tended most powerfully to widen the breach between them, and it is well for us that we have abundant means of supplying Clarendon's omission from other sources. But I conceive that he passed it over, not through any false notion of the dignity of history, but simply because, if the thought had occurred to him, it would have appeared to him superfluous, and almost absurd, to exemplify that which every one of his readers had constantly before his eyes. It is apparently to a like cause that we have to ascribe the silence of Thucydides on so many interesting points in the state and progress of society at Athens and throughout Greece, on which he could have furnished the most ample and authentic information. But even the modern History of Greece, which will always occupy the foremost rank among the historical productions of all ages, has not aimed at greater completeness in this respect, nor has it probably been ever very much missed by readers capable of appreciating that admirable work. On the other hand a contemporary chronicle, like that of Gregory of Tours, may be rich to overflowing in scenes and figures which cast the strongest light on the

manners of its age, and the general condition of society—it may likewise bear the clearest marks of perfect good faith and conscientious diligence in the author, and yet it may betray the grossest deficiency in all the higher intellectual qualities of a historian, and may only serve to bewilder and mislead a reader who is not capable of placing himself above the writer's point of view.

To our modern habits of thought, the condition most indispensably required of a historian is that he should satisfy the understanding by a clear exhibition of the course of events, not merely in their chronological sequence, and their outward aspect, but in their real nature, and their intrinsic relations. The most exact register of actual occurrences would only burden the memory, the liveliest picture of the face of society would but amuse the imagination, without some insight into the laws which regulate the visible movement, the moral forces which are at work underneath the surface, the various currents of thought and feeling which, by their combination and their adverse tendencies, determine the ultimate direction and character of the main stream of social progress. Whether it is possible to blend these three elements in an unbroken and harmonious whole must remain doubtful, until it has been accomplished. If Macaulay himself did not fully realise his fine vision of “a perfect history,” in which “the changes of manners would be indicated, not merely by a few general phrases, or a few extracts from statistical documents, but by appropriate images presented in every line;” if that splendid panorama in which he exhibited the England of 1685, remained insulated and stationary, and did not unroll itself in a continual succession of pictures as the history proceeded, few will be disposed to attribute the failure to lack of power in the author, for that which some one else might have done, rather than to the insurmountable difficulty of the undertaking. But it is quite possible for every one who would master any period of history for his own benefit, to bear in mind that the amount of instruction and pleasure which he may reap from it depends on the degree in which this threefold condition is fulfilled.

I can hardly be deceived by a natural partiality for a favourite

pursuit, in the belief, that the study so conducted is at once an exercise which cultivates our noblest faculties, a source of exquisite enjoyment, and intimately connected with the highest practical purposes of life. Professor Tyndall, speaking of the measurement by which the motion of a glacier is detected, remarks,—“We may well realise the interest of the man who first engaged in this experiment, and the pleasure which he felt on finding that the block moved, for even now, after hundreds of observations on the motion of glaciers have been made, the actual observance of this motion for the first time is always accompanied with a thrill of delight. Such pleasure the direct perception of natural truth always imparts.” There may be not a few of my hearers who have tasted a like pleasure in the observation of natural phenomena, though not in the presence of so sublime an object. But it must not be supposed that this is a privilege confined to the student of physical science. Niebuhr speaks of the delight which he had experienced from a similar intuition in his historical researches, of “an immediate action upon our minds, whereby the muses are revealed to our view, awakening joy and strength.” The language is more poetical, but there seems to be little difference in the nature of the feeling described. How should it be otherwise? The movement of the mighty frozen mass which descends from the bosom of the everlasting snows, is no doubt all the more impressive, when it has been brought home to the mind, because it is not directly perceptible to the eye. But is the progress of mankind, or that of any great community, a less majestic or less interesting spectacle, though it likewise can only be discerned by the mental vision? And if it cannot be measured with that scientific accuracy which enabled Professor Forbes to predict that the remains of the three guides who perished on Mont Blanc in 1820 would come to light about forty years later, as they have this year, are its indications less certain, or less worthy of notice? Do they call for a less active exertion of thought, or do they reward it with a less vivid perception of truth, or with less important practical results? In one respect, indeed, there is a very great difference between the two kinds of investigation. The

scientific observer stands aloof from the object which he submits to his experiments. He is entirely unaffected by the motion of the glacier, and is utterly unable to produce any effect upon it. The progress of society is something in which the student of history has a deep personal concern. He is himself a part of that which he sees. He is carried along by the movement which he scans, and contributes in some measure to modify it by his presence. His actual position and prospects have been determined by the past, and it is only by the light of the past that he can discern their real nature and bearings. But that light would be of no practical avail, it could serve neither as a guide, nor as a beacon, if the movement was the result of mechanical forces, and his own share in it purely passive. The belief that the course of events and the agency of man are subject to the laws of a Divine order, which it is alike impossible for any one either fully to comprehend, or effectually to resist—this belief is the ground of all our hope for the future destinies of mankind. But the equally firm conviction that within the range of this Divine economy there is ample room for the free play of individual intelligence and will, and that not like the ineffectual gesticulation of a man in a dream, but accompanied with the certainty that no honest endeavour for a noble end shall ever be utterly wasted, or pass away without leaving some fruitful trace behind it; such a conviction is the spring of all generous aspirations, the condition of all arduous and persevering effort. If both are not paralyzed and crushed by a so-called philosophy of history, which represents all the actors as so many wheels of a huge engine, it is only because men are so often better than their opinions, and the practice of philosophers themselves gloriously inconsistent with their theories. But if the main tendency of the social movement, in the midst of which we are living, is to limit the power of individual caprice or propensity to evil, while it multiplies and enlarges the means and opportunities of good, who is there that has not reason to be thankful for the restraint, no less than for the encouragement, and to regard this character of our time as a privilege, which should animate him in the discharge of the corresponding duty?

The provision made by this Institution for the satisfaction of every kind of intellectual craving, corresponds to the variety of avenues which society opens—with a growing preference of real merit over all conventional claims—to every honourable ambition. There may be some who value it chiefly on this account, as an auxiliary capable of promoting the success of their worldly career. I have been viewing it in a different light, as yielding a benefit less dependent on contingencies which are beyond human control; but I venture to express a strong assurance that those who may look no farther than to this immediate gain, will not therefore be in danger of missing any other object which they might otherwise have attained. It is true, the enlargement of our knowledge—whether in the sphere of nature or of history—the development of our intellect, the refinement of our taste, a keen sense and ardent love of truth, beauty, goodness, are things so precious in themselves, that they would be degraded by a comparison with any earthly possession. Their value reaches beyond the limits of our earthly existence. But they are not on that account the less available for the common purposes, as well as for the highest interests, of our earthly life. It was as a scientific toy that Archimedes—descending from the heights of abstract speculation—constructed the engines which were to defend his country against the Romans; but they did not serve their end the less effectually. There has never been a time when personal worth was more sure to find its fit place, and to wield its rightful influence. And the independence of character which it imparts is no selfish or unsocial pride. Its elevation of thought does not estrange it from any human sympathy. The purer atmosphere of that upper region, in which it breathes most freely, also braces it for its daily task, and inspires it with a more fervent desire to raise all who come within reach of its attraction into the same element, to share the dignity and happiness which it regards as the common birthright of humanity.

THE PRESENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN SCIENCE AND LITERATURE.

AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE ROYAL INSTITUTION OF SOUTH WALES,
DECEMBER 6TH, 1866.

WHEN I was invited to accept the office of President of the Royal Institution of South Wales, I was anxious in the first place to ascertain whether the acceptance would involve any duties which it might be inconvenient for me to undertake. When I learned that the office was merely titular and honorary, and would leave me at perfect liberty, I gladly acceded to a proposal in which the advantage was so clearly all on my side, and which combined the attractions of dignity and ease. The more conscious I was that I had no kind of claim to such an honour, the more I valued it, as an additional token of that kindness which has been shown to me at Swansea, throughout the long period of my official connection with it.

This serene view of my own happiness was, I must confess, a little overcast, when I received an intimation from our worthy Secretary that it was hoped I would deliver an Address, or a Lecture, at one of your evening meetings. Certainly the request in itself was not only perfectly natural and reasonable, but obliging and flattering. Perhaps it was my own fault that I had not foreseen it. But the fact is, that it took me by surprise, and considerably altered the agreeable view I had been taking of my own position. The dignity remained the same; but the ease, or leisure, with which it had been associated in my thoughts, appeared to be

threatened with an interruption which I had not anticipated. Apart from this, however, there was a difficulty through which I did not clearly see my way. If I was to deliver an Address or a Lecture, it was necessary first of all to find a subject; and the circumstances of the case were such as to render this far from easy.

It is true, whatever facility could be afforded by the amplest range, and the fullest liberty of choice that the heart of man could desire, was set before me without reserve. The realms both of Science and of Literature were laid open to me in their widest extent, and I was invited to expatiate in either, and select whatever topic might strike my fancy as best fitted for your entertainment. Unhappily for myself, I was unable to take advantage of this invitation with regard to the larger part of the ground, where, instead of serving as a guide to others, I should at every turn have needed one to show me the way, and explain the nature of the objects presented to my view. On the other hand, I was aware that those belonging to the other portion of the field, with which my pursuits had made me in some degree familiar, are foreign to the general design of your Institution, and to the ordinary studies of its members. Like its illustrious namesake in London, this Institution is chiefly dedicated to the cultivation, not of Literature, but of Science. Let me say at once, that in my judgment this is quite as it ought to be. Considering the situation of your town, the sources of its wealth, the conditions of its prosperity, I think it would have been a mistake, if the efforts made for the intellectual culture of your townsmen had not taken this direction, and been in the main concentrated upon scientific pursuits. Still I know that the lectures delivered in this place are not limited to one class of subjects, and may be quite unconnected with science. So it is likewise with the London Royal Institution, where a lecture may be occasionally heard on some purely literary topic. But as I have the honour of being a member of that Institution also, I have had some opportunities, much less frequent than I could have wished, of observing the effect which appeared to be produced on the audience by the different kinds of lectures. And

it seemed to me that those which had no bearing on scientific truth,—with the exception of extraordinary occasions, such as when Speke or Palgrave give an account of their explorations, or when Dean Stanley tells the story of Westminster Abbey,—notwithstanding the advantage of rarity, excite comparatively little interest, at least among the regular frequenters of the place, and are rather patiently endured than heartily enjoyed. I venture to say that, as a general rule, the theatre is never so crowded, and that the audience never looks forward so confidently and with such eager expectation, to passing an agreeable and profitable hour, as when the table is spread with some scientific apparatus, even if Faraday or Tyndall are not standing behind it. And if on such occasions eyes are sometimes turned to the clock, it is always to find that its hands have moved too fast, not, as may happen under other circumstances, too slow. If on this point I may not rely on the accuracy of my observation, I can appeal to my own experience, which is not likely to have been bent by prejudice on this side, and may pass as a fair sample of the impression produced in the greater number of cases. And so it has happened, that, though the portals of two vast regions, each of inexhaustible wealth, were thrown wide open to me, with a hospitable invitation to range over them at my pleasure, and to carry away what I would, I was withheld by different motives from attempting to make any excursion into either, and preferred letting my thoughts dwell a little on some of the aspects which they present to one standing on the outside. If I venture to offer you the result of these musings, in the room of that substantial entertainment which you are used to expect from your lecturers, I am conscious that I am exercising, and perhaps abusing, the privilege of my office. But though my reflections may be of very little value, I believe the subject to which they relate to be one of very great and growing importance; in fact, one of the gravest questions of our day. And if they should only lead others to meditate upon it more deeply and profitably, neither my time nor yours will have been utterly wasted.

No one, I think, who has paid much heed to the signs of the

times which mark the tendencies of our social progress, can regard the state of the relations at present subsisting between Science and Literature, I do not mean as they are in themselves, or, as some would say objectively, but according to the views taken of them and the claims set up in their behalf, as perfectly healthy and satisfactory. It is not a state of peaceful, friendly co-operation, but one either of open conflict, or of ill-concealed hostility, at least of mutual jealousy and distrust. From time to time utterances are heard from men of science, which, though they may not take the form of direct complaint, plainly indicate that they are dissatisfied with their position; not, it may be, as regards themselves personally, but with the position of Science itself, in comparison with the pursuits which may be classed under the name of Literature. If we go to the ground of this feeling, we find that it resolves itself into two main causes of discontent. One is, that the dignity of Science is not duly recognised, nor its freedom sufficiently secured. The other is, that Science is debarred its rightful share of influence in the education of the national mind. As to the first point, the complaint is, not that there is any unwillingness to acknowledge the vast amount of material benefits which Science has conferred and is continually conferring on mankind, or that any one grudges a tribute of just and warm admiration to the marvellous rapidity of its progress, the growing multiplicity and fruitfulness of its discoveries. But some of its professors appear to feel that, in the midst of this general admiration and applause, Science is really degraded in common estimation to a servile position, and its merit and value measured by the services it renders in supplying the wants of the household: but that when, in the consciousness of its native dignity and its higher destination, it seeks to enlarge the bounds of human knowledge by speculative researches which have no immediate bearing on the material interests of society, it becomes an object of suspicion and dislike, and finds its rights questioned, its freedom restrained, its movements checked and discouraged. And as the opposition arises chiefly from men of literary pursuits, it creates the appearance of an unhappy division between Science and Literature.

And this division becomes actual strife, when men of science press their claim to a higher rank, and a larger influence than they have hitherto enjoyed in the direction of the studies of youth, particularly among the middle and higher classes, to whom the government of the nation actually belongs and on whom its destiny mainly depends. And the sense of wrong, the feeling that Literature is exercising an unjust usurpation, is embittered by a sense of indignity in the minds of those who assert the claims of Science, through the notion which they commonly form of the relation in which the two branches of study stand to one another. It is in their eyes the difference between words and things, between shadows and realities. They resent the partiality by which that which they consider as immeasurably superior in dignity and importance, is, in the work of education, either treated with utter neglect, or thrust down into a place of disparaging subordination to that which they deem so far beneath it in real worth. Perhaps it will be best to let Science utter her own feelings, through the mouth of one of her most eminent living teachers. And I will therefore read a sentence or two from a lecture "On the Study of Physics" delivered by Professor Tyndall, at the Royal Institution, being one of a series of Lectures on Education given by several distinguished men:—"When I saw your Lecturer (the Oxford Professor of Chemistry) reduced to the necessity of pleading for Science, and meekly claiming for it, from the Institution which we are accustomed to regard as the highest in this land (the University of Oxford), a recognition equal to that accorded to Philology, I confess that the effect on me was to excite a certain revolutionary tendency in a mind which is usually tranquil almost to apathy in these matters. Science behind Philology! The knowledge of the laws by which God's universe is sustained, and the perpetual advancement of humanity secured, inferior to that of the manner in which ancient and savage tribes put their syllables together, and express the varieties of mood, tense, and case." I must observe in explanation, that one Lecture of the series was "On the Study of Language." You will own that the extract I have read illustrates and justifies my description of

the feeling. Those words were spoken twelve years ago: but, as the state of things has not been materially altered, the words may be considered as expressing a feeling, which the progress of Science in the interval has probably rendered still more intense.

A state of things which gives room for such a feeling, much more which naturally excites it, is, I repeat, one to be very deeply deplored. We may indeed believe that it cannot be permanent; that whatever is out of its proper place in such matters will be sure to find its level; and that a difference of views, arising, not from the nature of the objects themselves, but from the different appreciations conceived of them in various minds, will sooner or later be amicably adjusted. But there is no saying how long the interval of discord and uneasiness may last; and in the meanwhile the latent grudge, even when it does not break out into open conflict, is a serious evil. It would be the height of presumption in me to pretend to interpose as a judge or a mediator between such parties. But as it appears to me that the right does not lie absolutely on either side, and that this may be shown by one who makes no pretension to scientific knowledge, I venture to offer a few thoughts on this subject for your consideration, in the hope that they may tend to promote a better understanding between those who take opposite sides in the dispute. I will begin with a few remarks, which may at least serve to show that I do not approach the subject with any disposition to contest or underrate the legitimate claims of Science.

It is in my opinion highly desirable that the study of Science should be more widely diffused, and should occupy a larger and a higher place than it has yet done in the ordinary course of education in schools and colleges among us. I am aware that great progress has been already made in this direction: in some of our educational institutions, perhaps as much as can be reasonably wished. And this movement is so conformable to the general current of public opinion, and the spirit of the age, that it may be confidently expected to be making continual advances. In this I can see nothing but matter for congratulation: nor do I

perceive any danger of the favour shown to this branch of education being carried too far, to the exclusion of any others which may be justly deemed of equal importance. It must, however, be remembered, that a scientific education, properly so termed, that is, one resting on an adequate basis of mathematical knowledge, must always remain a privilege of the few who can command the means and opportunities requisite for such a course of study. But we must also make due allowance for the manifold diversities of capacity and inclination among those who possess such means and opportunities. It is vain to deny the existence of these natural diversities: though this has been done by persons too much wedded to a theory to listen to the witness of experience; among others, by Dr. Johnson and Sir Joshua Reynolds: though it might have been thought that such an abstraction from the realities of life was least of all likely to occur to a biographer and a portrait-painter. There are minds in which science seems to spring up by instinct—like that which guides the bee in the construction of her cell—and on which scientific truths which are only mastered by others through a process of laborious reasoning, flash with the rapidity of spontaneous intuition. One of the most remarkable examples of this scientific instinct is afforded by the celebrated Blaise Pascal, who was also the writer who brought French prose to the highest perfection it has ever reached. His father was distinguished both as a man of letters and as a man of science. He very early discerned the character of his son's mind, and fearing that the study of mathematics, once begun, would so engross all his time and attention as to prevent him from acquiring any other kind of learning, determined to keep him ignorant of the first rudiments of geometry until he had gained a competent knowledge of Greek and Latin. But nature proved too strong for education. The boy's curiosity had been roused by a few words which fell from his father on the general object of geometry. Presently, in his hours of recreation, he began to cover the walls of his room with diagrams, though without knowing even the technical names of his figures, but calling a line a bar, and a circle a round; and was at last surprised by his father engaged in the

demonstration of the 32nd Proposition of the First Book of Euclid, which he had never seen. He was then only twelve; and at the same age, having been struck by a phenomenon with which we are all familiar, though perhaps not all able to account for it—namely, that the ringing of a vessel ceased as soon as it was touched by the hand, he set about investigating the cause, and made a number of experiments upon sounds, and composed a treatise on the subject. And this precocity of genius was hardly more surprising than that which he showed at the age of nineteen, when he forestalled the idea of Professor Babbage by the invention of a calculating machine. On the other hand, there are minds, not otherwise particularly weak, which are incapable of grasping the sequence of mathematical reasoning; and persons have been known—I knew one instance myself—to commit to memory a large mass of mathematics, and to pass an examination with some degree of credit and success, though they had never really comprehended their own demonstrations. Still greater, no doubt, is the number of those, who, though not afflicted with such incapacity, feel either a difficulty in the pursuit, or a distaste for the object, which amounts to a practical disqualification.

But most valuable scientific results, which could only have been reached by means of very abstruse mathematical investigations, or through a series of very delicate and arduous experiments, may be communicated to persons who are quite unable to repeat or to understand the processes by which they were obtained. And men of the very highest scientific eminence do not disdain to impart the ripest fruits of their laborious researches, in lectures and books, to popular audiences, and to readers wholly ignorant of mathematics; as believing the task to deserve all the skill and pains which it requires, and that they are contributing to the glory of Science, when they make its truths accessible to a greater number of minds. But whatever may be the intrinsic value of the information diffused, the actual benefit which it yields must depend on the quality of the minds which receive it, and must be proportioned to the energy which they exert upon it. To some it may afford no more than a fugitive enjoyment in the agreeable

occupation of a leisure hour. There may be others on whom it leaves a more abiding impression, but who only possess it as an addition to their stock of knowledge, which, though they keep it safe, brings them no interest or increase. Others there are to whom it renders a far more important service, not merely storing their memory with a pile of facts, but awakening or strengthening their faculties of observation or reasoning on physical subjects, and training them for an intelligent contemplation of the outer world around them.

It would ill become me to attempt to enlarge on the manifold advantages accruing from such a habit, both to the individual and to society. But I may be allowed to express my belief that they can hardly be overrated. Considered simply as a mental discipline, it is probably a not less efficacious instrument of intellectual culture than the study of mathematics itself. I am inclined to think that it may be even more beneficial, as calling higher powers into action. Regarded as a source of enjoyment, it is unfailing and inexhaustible; and the pleasure it affords is at once pure and wholesome, noble and refined, animating and invigorating; not unfrequently, perhaps, associated with deeper emotions of admiration and delight, such as were never suggested by a mathematical formula. And when we would estimate its value in this respect, we must remember not only the healthy and elevating enjoyment which it yields, but the pernicious and debasing pleasures which it most effectually excludes, not only by filling their place, but by transforming them into objects of contempt and disgust. If again we consider such a habit in its practical applications, who could pretend to enumerate or describe them? Who can calculate the multiplicity of occasions which are constantly arising to call them into use, for purposes of most momentous interest in the gravest concerns of life? I am not indeed prepared to go to quite the same length as Professor Tyndall, who in his most natural and honourable enthusiasm in behalf of the science which he has so successfully cultivated, would require every member of parliament to pass an examination in Natural Philosophy before he is admitted to take his seat. I do not care to inquire, though in this room I

should be in no danger of suggesting invidious comparisons, how many members of the present parliament would be able to stand this test. My difficulty is, that if the principle were once established, as the professors of all other branches of Science would no doubt put in a like claim in behalf of their several studies, there might be danger of a long interruption of public business for want of a sufficient number of gentlemen to make a house. When indeed we had got the full tale of a House of Commons which had fulfilled this condition—I say nothing of “the other place”—we should no doubt have a legislative assembly such as the world has never yet seen, a parliament of philosophers, a flock of phœnixes. I only question whether it might not prove rather more like an Academy or an Institute than our old-fashioned House of Commons, and whether this would be an unalloyed gain. But I have no doubt whatever as to the general truth which lies at the root of Professor Tyndall’s suggestion; the immense advantage which the country might derive from the more general diffusion of such knowledge among those who by their social position are enabled to exercise a salutary influence over their poorer neighbours, to enlighten and to guide them in matters most deeply affecting both their physical and their moral well-being. I am afraid the time is still far off, when such knowledge shall have filtered through the upper strata of society to the lower, to such an extent as to render that enlightening and guiding influence superfluous.

I must also observe, though at the risk of seeming to take too gloomy a view of our prospects, that I believe the power of accurate observation and reasoning on physical subjects to be rather in the nature of a somewhat rare talent, than a faculty common to all, and which needs only to be properly educated. It must at least, I think, be admitted that it does not exist in all in an equal degree. How many boys—may I not say how many men—have stopped the ringing of a glass by a touch, without ever reflecting like Pascal on the cause of the phenomenon, to say nothing of writing a treatise on the subject. There is a work, well known probably to many here, which I read, not only with lively pleasure but with warm admiration, Darwin’s *Journal of his Voyage round*

the *World in the Beagle*. The pleasure arose, not merely from the great variety of interesting scenes described in the book, but from the evidence it affords of the author's power of observation and interpretation of nature, which no object worthy of notice seems ever to escape or mislead. Such mastery appears to me to require the union and co-operation of three distinct and rare endowments: keenness of scientific interest, and curiosity; that concentration of the attention to which Newton ascribed his intellectual achievements; and a facility of combination which has some affinity to wit. But the rarer, at least in this degree, the gift, the more desirable must it be that no means which education affords of eliciting and furthering its development should be neglected.

But now let me say that my recognition of the claims of Science is not limited to those which, however imperfectly they may yet be admitted in practice, are scarcely any longer disputed in theory. I am not one who desires that the wings of Science should be clipped, to prevent her from soaring too high, or escaping out of bounds, and that she should be confined to a useful and comfortable, but an inglorious and ignoble domestic service. I fully sympathize with those who indignantly repudiate such a condition for Science and for themselves—who demand an absolutely unrestricted freedom, as the very air which they must breathe, even to enable them to perform those services which by some are regarded as their highest merit. If we only consider what Science really is, we can hardly fail at once to see the absurdity, and I may even say the impiety, of such an attempt. What is Science? Is it not the reflection of nature or the outward world in the mind of man, which has been so constituted as not only to perceive the phenomena presented to the senses, but to comprehend their mutual relations and the laws to which they are subject? Is it then possible to prescribe an arbitrary limit (if it was a natural limit it would not need to be prescribed), to the operations of this mental faculty? There is, I think, only one way in which it can even seem to be possible, and that one which experience has shown to be serviceable only as a temporary, and yet a very perilous and

costly expedient. It is possible to impose silence on the mental faculty, to prevent it from divulging its discoveries, to compel it to gainsay its own deepest convictions. We know how this was done in the case of Galileo, and with what success: that it would have been almost as easy to stop the motion of the earth as permanently to suppress the knowledge of the fact. But as long as the communication of scientific truth is subject to such restraint, the intellectual movement itself will be checked. Science will languish as a plant withdrawn from the light. It is too little to speak of such coercion as a wrongful encroachment on human freedom. It also implies the highest degree of irreverence toward the Power by which both the outward and the inner world, the Cosmos and the mind of man, were framed in such marvellous correspondence to one another. When He has said to every rational being, "Feel, think, learn, know," who shall presume to interpose a prohibition, and to mark the point at which learning and knowledge are to cease, though more remains to be learnt and known! Is not this virtually to tax the All-seeing with shortsightedness, and to charge the noblest instinct of our higher nature with a tendency to evil?

But here I must ask you to observe a very important distinction. All that is true as to Science in the abstract, or the idea, may not always hold with regard to its professors; any more than every thing which may be truly said of religion, can be invariably applied to its ministers. The priests of Science are still men, subject even in the exercise of their ministry to human error and weakness. And, if I am not mistaken, they are exposed in our day to some peculiar temptations, which it requires great strength, not only of mind, but of character, to resist. The growing rapidity of the recent progress of Science, the surprising discoveries by which its boundaries have been enlarged, the vast power which it has acquired, and the splendid achievements by which it has changed the face of the earth, tend to inspire a confidence which may become overweening, and to nourish an ambition which may be carried to excess. Those who have taken a part in this series of victories and triumphs, may naturally find it difficult to

reconcile themselves to the acknowledgment of any intellectual barrier, which in their present state of being must for them remain insurmountable, and to acquiesce in the consciousness of helpless and hopeless ignorance. And yet in how many cases is such resignation to the Inevitable and the Irremediable man's best wisdom ?

In the infancy of Greek philosophy, when, if Science might be said to exist, it was only in the germ of a blind, instinctive craving for truth, and in the utter absence of all the conditions necessary for taking a step toward the satisfaction of that craving with safety, we find a series of philosophers, each of whom flattered himself with the belief that he had discovered the whole secret of nature, the one principle which, in its manifold manifestations, produced and maintained the order of the world—a world indeed which in their conceptions was bounded by a very narrow compass, as even in a later age it was considered as a liberal allowance for the size of the sun, which had previously been held not to exceed the width of a man's foot, when it was asserted to be larger than Peloponnesus, the little peninsula at the southern extremity of Greece. One philosopher detected his universal principle in water, another in air, another in fire, another in a combination of water and earth: thus completing the number of the elements which maintained their dignity in the common belief even of educated men, during such a long succession of after-ages. Others anticipated our latest theory of the universe, which represents all space as filled with atoms, "seething and surging like the waves of an angry sea," but which somehow contrive to be continually evolving out of chaos, not only forms of exquisite beauty, but intelligences capable of perceiving, comprehending, admiring, and imitating them. All these philosophers were animated by the like generous ambition, of building a system of nature, and were sustained by the like unhesitating confidence in their own ability, not only to found or rear their edifice, but to finish it and roof it in, as a compact and perfect whole.

We smile at these premature attempts to accomplish so great an undertaking, without any of the means or instruments which

would have been needed for making even a right beginning, though I hope we can also sympathize with such noble and lofty, though misguided aspirations, and can admire the genius of the people which was capable of falling into such glorious errors. There needs, perhaps, no extraordinary amount of knowledge to enable one rightly, even if not quite fully, to estimate the mental interval which separates those rude guesses of the early Greeks from the scientific researches and constructions of our own day. It is a gulf which I do not pretend exactly to measure; but I am persuaded that my imagination does not far underrate the vastness of its breadth and depth. Still I trust that I shall be thought to be uttering a truism rather than a paradox, when I express my belief that, immense as this difference is, it is as nothing when compared with that which lies, and will always subsist, between the known and the unknown; that is, not only between the knowledge actually attained, but between that which is attainable by the human mind, and that which will, in its present state of being, be ever beyond its reach.

I should indeed be surprised to see this proposition, which to me seems self-evident, formally questioned. But I cannot help observing language used by some of our men of science, which appears to me to savour rather of the venturesome spirit of those old Greek system-builders, than of that caution, if I may not say humility, which has been the general characteristic of modern physical philosophy and the most essential condition of its success. They would not indeed pretend, like them of old, that the building has been quite roofed in, they would not deny that there are many open spaces to be filled up at the top, and that in the inner compartments an infinity of work remains to be done. But they seem to betray a strong confidence that the necessary scaffolding has reached its full height, that the framework at least is complete, and that what is still wanting is only something subsidiary and supplementary, and not only within human capacity, but probably the easiest part of the task. I would not say that those who do so are not exercising an unquestionable right, but I think they are exercising it in a way which naturally tends to excite

those feelings of distrust and ill-will of which we sometimes hear them complain.

Outside of that vast realm which has been conquered by Science, and where she holds undisputed sway, lie large tracts of debateable ground, stretching into endless space, over which her dominion has not extended. It is a region of comparative obscurity, which her most brilliant torch-light has proved quite unable to illuminate. But this outer region is that in which questions spring up of the deepest interest to mankind, involving nothing less than the existence of the Divine Personality, and the spirituality of the human soul. It is certainly not surprising that any one who conceives that these fundamental truths are threatened by the progress of Science, should view it with distress and alarm. And I must own that there are scientific writings, in which both appear to me to be either denied or ignored. But I am no less sure that Science itself is not in the least responsible for these conclusions, and that, if they are adopted by men of science, it is wholly at their own individual charge and risk. They belong to a domain in which men of science have indeed full right to make excursions at their pleasure, but where they possess no property, private or corporate, and no privileged right of way, no right to warn others off the ground, no authority to direct their course over it. Some thirteen or fourteen years ago, very lively and general interest was excited by a controversy about the plurality of inhabited worlds. It was stirred by one who had perhaps as good claim as ever man had to the name of a living cyclopædia, the late Dr. Whewell. It was carried on, and with a warmth which, in a purely scientific question, would have been hardly possible, between him and another eminent physical philosopher, Sir David Brewster. The late Professor Powell interposed to hold the balance, and arbitrate between the disputants, though not certainly as pretending to be superior to either in scientific attainments. I am not aware that any unscientific person took part in the discussion. And yet it was evidently one in which Science had no exclusive or decisive voice. It turned quite as much upon moral and theological as upon physical considerations. And I

believe that it left the question precisely where it was at the beginning, and the opinions of the parties entirely unchanged.

There is another fact of literary history, which seems to me still more aptly to illustrate the distinction which I wish to point out. At the beginning of the present century there was a French writer of considerable eminence, named Cabanis, a disciple of the school in which the principles of Locke had been developed in all their logical consequences, and even carried still farther by Condillac, which admitted no source of knowledge but sensation, no object of knowledge but the various modifications of matter. Cabanis published a work on the relations between *Physics and Morals*, in which he propounded a system of the universe founded on these principles. It was very elaborate and complete; and it seemed to leave no room either for God in the world, or for the soul in man. Nobody could doubt that it was thoroughly mechanical, materialistic, atheistical. And as the current then still set that way in France, it had the greater vogue on that account. But in a subsequent publication he announced his belief in an intelligent First Cause, and in a spiritual principle of thought and action in man. But he did not profess this doctrine as a retraction or correction of his earlier views, but as a supplement and complement to his system. It was not clear whether this important addition was originally reserved in his mind, or only occurred to him as an after-thought. But this example may serve to temper the feeling with which we might otherwise recoil from modern treatises of *Physiology*, which appear to deny or ignore man's spiritual nature, and to describe him as a machine whose movements are all pre-determined by an inflexible necessity, while he cheats himself with a delusive consciousness of an imaginary free-will. This will not alarm or perplex any one who bears in mind the distinction between the positive and the negative side of this doctrine, and the different degrees of success which are due to each. I listen with the utmost deference to the physiologist, when he explains the mechanism of the human frame, and the physical conditions which are attached to the various affections and operations of the mind and will. I am lost in admiration and awe at

the fresh discoveries with which he illustrates the old truth, that we are "fearfully and wonderfully made." I thankfully acknowledge the manifold practical benefits which may flow from this enlarged knowledge of our physical constitution. It would indeed sound to me a little strange, if he should describe my emotions and volitions in *terms* (as mathematicians say) of tissues and currents. But I am willing to put the best construction on his language, and to attribute it to nothing worse than a little harmless pedantry. But if he should proceed from positive to negative teaching: if he should assure me that he has now furnished me with a key to the whole mystery of my being; that there is nothing beyond, nothing of a different and a higher order, which either has not, or may not be accounted for by his theory; then I can no longer retain the attitude of a confiding disciple. I know, with the most intimate conviction, with regard to myself, that his assertion is untrue; that he has not in fact brought me a single step nearer to the understanding of what I have been used to call my moral and spiritual nature; and I no longer bow to his authority, because I perceive that he is no longer speaking in the name of Science, but in his own, and that, if I ask him for his credentials, he has none to produce. He is not now demanding my assent to the well-ascertained results of observation and experiment, but to a mere private metaphysical speculation. He has no claim to my submission; for we are on ground where, to use the lawyer's phrase, the writ of Science does not run.

And so I can, at a very humble distance, admire, and so far as I find that men of science are agreed on the subject, can implicitly, at least provisionally, accept, those magnificent generalisations which culminate in the theory of the continuity and unity of force. But I reserve my right to reject any negative inferences which may be drawn from that theory, even by men of science, on the supposition of a universal empire of a blind force. And I am not afraid of being reproached with the presumption of setting up my own ignorance in opposition to the decrees of Science. For whatever degree of unanimity (and I believe it is far from perfect) may prevail among men of science as to these generalisations, I

am very sure there is none such with regard to that supposition. The philosopher who of all perhaps in our day best deserves to be styled a lineal intellectual descendant of Newton, I mean Sir John Herschel, concludes his pregnant little essay on the Origin of Force with the remark: "The first and great question which Philosophy has to resolve in its attempts to make out a Cosmos, is, whether we can derive any light from our internal consciousness of thought, reason, power, will, motive, design—or not: whether, that is to say, nature is or is not more *interpretable*, by supposing these things (be they what they may) to have had or to have to do with its arrangements. But if these attributes of mind are not consentaneous, they are useless in the way of explanation. Will without Motive, Power without Design, Thought opposed to Reason, would be admirable in explaining a chaos, but would render little aid in accounting for anything else."

To this let me only add the sentence with which Mr. Grove, the great expounder, if he may not be called the author of the recent theory, closes his work on the "Correlation of Physical Forces." "In all phenomena, the more closely they are investigated, the more are we convinced that, humanly speaking, neither matter nor force can be created or annihilated, and that an essential cause is unattainable. Causation is the will, creation the act, of God."

I have unwarily left myself very little time for any remarks on the other side of the subject—the claims of Literature—though it is that in which I may be supposed to feel the strongest interest; and it may seem doubtful whether it is worth while to say what must be said so briefly. There is, however, on this side the advantage, that I have less occasion for distinctions and qualifications, which on the other were indispensable to guard against misunderstanding; and also that some things which have been already said may have served in some measure to prepare for that which I have yet to say. As, for the reasons I have assigned, I fear nothing from Science, so I have no fear for Literature. I should indeed deem it a great calamity, if, through any revolution in public opinion, Literature, either on the whole or in any of its main

branches, should be less actively cultivated, or made to occupy a lower place in education than at present. On the whole, I can see no danger of such an event. Science was probably never more awake to the value of the study of man, as indeed "the noblest," the most complicated and difficult, as well as the most useful; that to which all the rest naturally converge, and in which they fulfil their highest destination. And for this study the written monuments of human thought supply by far the largest part of the materials and instruments. Never also, perhaps, has there been a greater number of distinguished men who have cultivated both Science and Literature with equal interest. The prospects of Literature do not depend on the force of habit, or the tenacity of traditional associations. It can show as good title to the esteem it enjoys, as any branch of Science, apart from the low utilitarian ground of practical applications, which men of science, as we have seen, regard with so much contempt as a measure of value.

But there is a question which, though subordinate, is of considerable importance, and very deeply interesting to the rising generation, on which public opinion has undergone a change, and cannot be said to be finally settled. It is whether the share of time and attention which has hitherto been commonly devoted in our schools to the study of the Greek and Latin languages is not excessive, and out of proportion to their real value. Let me observe that if I fully admitted this to be the case, it would not be because I think it easily possible to overrate either the value of those languages either for the study of Greek and Roman antiquity, or the importance of that study as a branch of liberal education. I shall, I think, not inaptly illustrate my view of the relation in which the languages stand to that study, if I say that it appears to me to correspond to that in which mathematics stand to physical philosophy. But as I before observed that, even without a knowledge of mathematics, it is possible to acquire a very valuable stock of useful information in physics, so it is possible for one who knows neither Greek nor Latin, to gain much profitable knowledge of Greek and Roman antiquity. I have no doubt that a person, in that sense illiterate, but endowed with

the requisite natural aptitude and capacity, who should study the ancient monuments preserved in the British Museum, with no other aid than he may find in English writers, might form a livelier and truer image of the ancient world, in some of its most interesting aspects, than ever dawned on many a scholar who spent his whole life among the Greek and Latin authors. And it may be added that most of their masterpieces have been brought within the reach of the English reader, by translations, some of which are among our most precious literary treasures, and represent the originals with a fidelity which often leaves little to desire, beside the native colour, and, so to speak, the aroma which is unavoidably lost in the passage from one language to another, especially one of entirely different structure and genius.

But to return to our question. Many at this day would agree with Montaigne, who observes in one of his Essays, but with special reference to the mode of education then prevalent, "Greek and Latin is no doubt a fine and great accomplishment, but it costs too dear." And he contrasts the method of teaching then in use with his own experience. His father wished him to become a classical scholar, but without the smallest constraint on his liberty or inclinations. For this purpose the child, as soon as he could speak, was placed in the charge of a German, who was a perfect master of Latin, but did not know a word of French. Great pains were taken to prevent the young gentleman from hearing the sound of his native tongue; and with such success, that, as he relates, at the age of six, "he knew no more either of French, or even of the provincial patois of Perigord, than of Arabic;" but Latin he could speak with all the fluency and purity, he does not say of Cicero, but of his German master; and though he was afterwards assisted in his studies by the greatest latinists in Europe, such as Muretus and Buchanan, they all expressed their admiration of a promptitude and facility of utterance which they had never been able to acquire in the language of their erudition. Few boys can, fewer do, enjoy such an advantage. The foundations of a solid knowledge of Greek and Latin cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be laid without much hard labour.

And there is this difference between the labour so spent, and that which is bestowed on mathematical and physical learning, that the return comes in much more slowly. A boy may feel some inward satisfaction at the successful working of a sum, or the solution of an equation; he may be thrilled with a glow of delight when he has mastered the scientific explanation of some familiar natural phenomenon; but where is the ingenuous student of the Latin Primer, even in its latest form, who would testify on oath, that the pleasure he had derived from its contents, when engraved in his memory, made full amends for the pain, whether mental or physical, which the acquisition had cost!

This difference has sometimes been urged as an argument in favour of the study which is more immediately and evidently remunerative. But it seems clear that a mental discipline may not be the less profitable, because at the outset it is merely irksome; and the ultimate reward may be in due proportion to the length and slowness of the process. Still, when I consider how few among the vast number of boys who have spent years in the learning of Latin and Greek, ever attain that degree of proficiency in either which would enable them to use it freely and securely, either as a source of enjoyment or as an instrument of mental culture, or of independent research; how many, within a few years after leaving school, remember nothing but the tediousness of the work, and never taste its proper fruits; I must frankly admit that this looks very much like a case in which there has been a great expenditure of a teaching force which has been lost and annihilated. But is it not possible, notwithstanding superficial appearances—and will not every man of science be disposed to receive the suggestion with favour—that it has only undergone a series of transformations, which has not interrupted its persistency, but only changed its mode of action? Who could venture to say how deeply, though by an invisible and inscrutable process, it may have affected the mental and moral constitution, and have produced effects which may be sensible and beneficial, though as unlike to that for which it was designed as heat to motion? But, without pressing a questionable analogy, I will say, that I am loth

to believe that any instruction honestly given is ever absolutely wasted, and does not deposit some germ which, though long dormant, may at last burst into flower, and ripen into fruit.

I think it possible that something may be done toward the solution of this difficulty, by a more careful discrimination between the various aptitudes and tendencies of different natures, which I have already noticed. Some minds are repelled, not only by the abstruseness, but by the aridity of exact Science. Others feel an equal antipathy to what seems to them the frivolity of unscientific Literature. I remember that in my early College days I heard an anecdote, which I believe was more than a joke, of a Cambridge Professor who was induced by a friend to read the *Æneid*. When he was asked what he thought of it, he said it was very well, but he did not see what it proved. His was a mind which could see no Line of Beauty where he could not find the equation to its curvature. There is at least one practical point on which this observation has a direct bearing. The possession of a favourite language has, I believe, always been found to prompt an effort to use it as a vehicle of thought, either in prose or verse. This has been pre-eminently the case with the Greek and Latin languages. But it appears to me a cruel absurdity to attempt to forestall the natural working of this imitative instinct, which has beguiled the leisure of some of our most eminent statesmen, by forcing young boys, through the hardest drudgery, and at a great expense of time, to wrap the vacancy of thought in Ciceronian phrases and to hammer nonsense into Horatian metres.

I will only trespass on your patience with one reflection more. The cause, if I may so speak, of Classical Literature has suffered much less, and has much less to fear, from adversaries and detractors, than from injudicious friends and admirers; and it is these who have provoked, and in a measure justified, the reproaches with which it has been assailed. If by some that Literature is considered as good for little more than to enable members of parliament to point a sentence with a quotation from Virgil or Horace; if in many minds the name is associated with the idea of forms of speech, in contrast to real knowledge; how many of

those who have devoted themselves to it with the most passionate enthusiasm, have shown that they viewed it in the same light! It is not merely that so many of the great scholars of the sixteenth century, the most active promoters of that revival of letters which gave so powerful an impulse to the course of our modern civilization, aimed at nothing higher than the formation of an elegant Latin style, and did not hesitate to speak of it, in sober earnest, without the slightest consciousness of absurdity or extravagance, but, on the contrary, with the fullest assurance of universal sympathy, as the highest glory that man could achieve, an object worthy of incessant exertion, while they treated the diversion of attention from this to the cultivation of their mother tongue as a deplorable mistake,—it is not merely this, but it is that there was a general inversion of the right subordination between means and ends; and it is literally true, that things were studied for the sake of words, not words for the sake of things. The knowledge of antiquity was valued for the light it reflected on the works of the ancient authors, not those works for the help they gave toward the knowledge of antiquity. This unhappy perversion of ideas continued for many generations to be the fundamental principle of classical education throughout Europe. It can hardly be said to have been effectually shaken before the present century. I wish it could be truly said to be altogether a thing of the past among ourselves. This divorce between words and things, with a preference of words to things, this predominance of rhetoric over reality, was attended by many evil consequences, which were by no means confined within the walls of schools and colleges. Let me cite an example from the history of France, which, while it illustrates my remark, is in itself not a little interesting and instructive.

M. de Tocqueville, in his great, though unhappily unfinished work, "The Old Régime and the Revolution," has unfolded the web of that truly tragical destiny by which Louis XIV., while believing that he was establishing his despotic power on an immovable basis, by the overthrow of every local barrier of ancient right and privilege that limited the exercise of the royal authority,

was really depriving it of its firmest supports, and paving the way down which, in the next century, his throne and dynasty rolled into the abyss in which they were finally engulfed. Little as he could foresee this result of the policy by which he identified himself with the State, he was still farther from suspecting that one of the instruments which contributed to the most refined amusement of his leisure, to the splendour of his court, and to the glory of his reign, was unconsciously co-operating in the preparation for that catastrophe. All Frenchmen, we know, whatever may be their political sentiments, look back upon his Age, in the intellectual point of view, with admiration and pride, as one only rivalled by those of Pericles and Augustus. Among the literary productions to which it owes a large share of its renown, were the masterpieces of its dramatic poetry, which was brought to its highest perfection by his great court-poet Racine. I am not going to criticize their literary merit, which is no doubt very great, if due allowance is made for the very peculiar artificial conditions to which they were subject, though of a kind which does not suit the taste of the countrymen of Shakespeare. But I wish you to observe this fact: not one of them was founded on a subject connected with the history of France. All the plots, with two or three exceptions, were drawn from the history or the mythology of Greece and Rome. But though this was the source from which the chief characters and incidents were derived, the dramas in fact belonged to no period of history, and to no real state of things that had ever been seen in the world. They were ideal abstractions, which served as a vehicle for much fine rhetoric and impassioned eloquence. They were at least as much at home at Versailles as at Athens or Rome; and if the heroes or heroines appeared, as I believe they did, on the stage, in the full dress of the French Court, there was in this no real incongruity, nor anything to disturb the illusion or weaken the interest of the scene.

But such a limitation of dramatic subjects was a very significant fact, and one pregnant not only with meaning, but with consequences. What did it signify? It was an indication of a

feeling that was constantly gaining strength down to the time of the Revolution, when it reached its climax. The national history and the ancient institutions were regarded, first with indifference, then with contempt, then with aversion, and at last with a bitter fanatical hatred; and this, while a spurious admiration for classical antiquity, which was only known as affording topics for rhetorical declamation, kept making a parallel progress. We know the grotesque forms which this admiration took during the paroxysm of the Revolutionary fever, in the adoption of Greek and Roman names and titles, and the mimicry of the costume and usages of ancient life, which as a whole was utterly unknown or misunderstood. One example of this mania is so ludicrous, especially in contrast with the gravity of the occasion to which it relates, that it would be hardly credible if it was not attested by documentary evidence. After the fall of the Girondist party, its opponents thought it expedient to follow up their victory by the fabrication of a new Paper Constitution. Very little time was allowed to the legislators for this work; and that it might, nevertheless, be as perfect as possible, the leading member of the legislative commission, Hérault de Séchelles, addressed a letter to a literary friend, which I translate from a work containing a facsimile of the original:—

“My dear fellow-citizen, having been entrusted, in concert with my four colleagues, to prepare a draft of a Constitution for next Monday, I beg you, in their name and my own, immediately to procure for us the laws of Minos, which should be found in a collection of Greek Laws. We have urgent need of it.”

If the issue of the Revolution grieved and disappointed the friends of liberty throughout the world; if the remedy it applied to the disease of the State so shattered the patient's constitution as to leave him under a chronic oscillation between the extremes of anarchy and despotism; this was due no doubt to the co-operation of various causes, among which the foremost was an overweening confidence in the infallibility and omnipotence of human reason, and in the all-sufficiency of abstract principles

for the business of legislation and the government of mankind; but that abuse of Classical Literature, which is itself only one example of the danger of substituting words for things, was not without its share in the origin, as well as in the aggravation of the calamity.

I leave it to others to draw the moral.

NOTES.

P. 290.—See “Vie de Pascal,” par Madame Perier, ed. Faugère, p. 4.

P. 303.—Essais, i. c. 25. “C'est un bel et grand adgencement, sans doute, que la grec et latin, mais on l'achete, trop cher. . . . Quant à moi, j'avoy plus de six ans avant que j'entendisse non plus de françois ou de perigordin que d'arabesque : et sans art, sans livre, sans grammair, ou precepte, sans fouet, et sans larmes, j'avois apprins du latin tout aussi pur que mon maître d'eschole le savait. . . . Et Nicolas Grouchey, qui a escript *de Comitibus Romanorum*, Guillaume Guerente, qui a commenté Aristote, George Bucanan, ce grand poëte Escossois, Marc Antoine Muret, que la France, et l'Italie recognoist pour le meilleur orateur du temps, mes precepteurs domestiques, m'ont diet souvent que j'avois ce langage en mon enfance si prest et si à main, qu'ils craignaient à m'accoster.”

P. 306.—“Attende, mi Paule, et tuam caussam, a qua mea disjuncta non est, si placet, mecum considera. Ille (Cicero) sibi, homo Romanus, latinæ orationis inopiam metuebat ; cum tamen omnibus in hoc genere divitiis abundaret ; nos, quibus latina lingua peregrina est, qui in optima scribendi aut dicendi ratione rudes et infantes pene sumus, de summa eloquentia sine summo studio cogitabimus ? et unam omnium difficillimam rem, eandemque omnium gloriiosissimam, ludibundi consequemur ? Vides me ipsum, qui quid sim ego quidem non statuo ; sed sunt quibus non esse nihil videar ; nullum pene diem intermittere, quin aliquid latine scribam ? Cum tamen, ex quo lapidem hunc volvo, annus jam vigesimus abierit. Est adolescens in vestra nobilitate, tibi non ignotus, mihi admodum familiaris : quem, excellenti præditum ingenio, gloriæ cupiditate flagrantem, nisi a Romanæ eloquentiæ laude ad hujus maternæ linguæ studium falsa quædam opinio traduxisset, erat cur de illo sperarem ea quæ summa sunt : tantam enim operam in scribendo ponit quantum tu videlicet in legendo : Sed neque illi in summa industria judicii satis est, qui de latinæ linguæ dignitate non optime sentire videatur : neque tibi, rectissime judicanti, ad id ipsum, quod probas, obtinendum suppetit industria.” Pauli Manutii Epistolæ, 1558. Paulo Contareno, p. 25.

P. 308.—“Histoire-Musée de la République Française,” par Augustin Challamel, i. p. 316.

APPENDIX.

LETTER FROM PROFESSOR TYNDALL IN REFERENCE TO THE FOREGOING
ADDRESS.

7th February, 1867.

MY DEAR LORD,

A letter lies before me, dated a long time back, thanking you for the copy of your excellent address which you were good enough to send me.

The case of Science could hardly be stated with greater fairness, and you have said nothing regarding the limits of scientific research to which any true philosopher could take objection.

With regard to a somewhat amusing passage which you quote from my earlier writings, I may say that a dozen years have made me a sadder and a wiser man. In a late reprint of that lecture by Macmillan, the passage to which you have referred is omitted.

Pray accept this tardy acknowledgment of your kindness, and excuse the accident which rendered it tardy.

Yours very faithfully,

JOHN TYNDALL.

SERMONS

WORKS WHICH REMAIN, AND WORKS WHICH FOLLOW US.

A SERMON PREACHED AT THE CHARTERHOUSE ON FOUNDER'S DAY,
DECEMBER 12TH, 1845.

“*Their works do follow them.*”—REV. XIV. 13.

THIS, it is clear, is not a description of a privilege peculiar to *the dead who die in the Lord*, but of something that must be common to all who have departed out of this life, whatever may have been the manner of their deaths or the quality of their works. In whatever sense the words are to be understood, there can be no doubt that it may be said with equal truth of all who have ever laboured under the sun, when they are removed out of the world: *their works follow them*. And without farther inquiry into the meaning of the expression, we may venture to conclude that this inevitable sequel of our earthly existence must aggravate the misery of the wicked in like manner, and in the same degree, as it heightens the blessedness of the just. But while we are informed by Revelation of this truth, which we could not otherwise have ascertained, we know, from the evidence of our senses, it is no less true that men, when they finally rest from their labours, leave their works behind them on earth. This too is unavoidable, whether it be matter of satisfaction or of regret. Whichever way we turn our eyes among the haunts of men, we find ourselves surrounded by such works. Every long-established society subsists in and upon the monuments of the past, reared and transmitted by successive generations. Without this inheritance

the face of the globe would never cease to be a dreary wilderness. Here then is at first sight the appearance of a contradiction between the testimony of our senses and the language of Scripture. But if we consider a little more attentively what it is in the works of men that remains behind them, we shall perhaps more readily understand what it is that follows them. At the dissolution of our bodily frame, *the dust returns to the earth as it was : and the spirit returns unto God who gave it.* And as a distinction exactly corresponding to this holds good with regard to our works, a similar separation may be said to take place between the parts of which they are composed. That which remains of them is the earthly, material substance : that by which they are subject to the apprehension of the senses, and become capable of affecting the condition of human society. But their spiritual essence—that which determines their real quality, and constitutes their intrinsic worth—consists in the intelligence and the will that produced them ; and these belong to another sphere, beyond the reach of our senses and of our natural knowledge, into which they have followed the departed spirit. The material work may indeed indicate and attest the creative thought to which it owes its being ; but is something so distinct from it, that the one does not always by any means adequately represent the other.

Now, as to the works of men thus considered in their spiritual essence, there are two senses in which they may be said to follow their authors when removed from the earth. They follow them as the subjects of retribution to the tribunal of Divine Justice. For there no account will be taken of the outward result, of the visible success or failure ; nor will the question be whether the materials and instruments, or even the skill employed upon the work, were sufficient to embody the conception. It is the design alone that will then be accepted or condemned. And there is another sense in which they follow their makers still more closely. For they are elements in the character by which every one at the close of his earthly probation is fitted for his allotted place in the world of spirits. For those however who come after, there are no means of forming a judgment on the men who have passed away

before them from their earthly scene of action but the works which each has left behind him. And so it is that which we here behold, and the benefits derived from it, that afford the ground and motive for our present commemoration. Still the place in which we are met for this purpose reminds us that we ought to look at these objects in the light cast upon them by religion, and therefore not without reference to the important truth intimated by the text. We could not otherwise be sure that the pleasure we feel on this occasion is rational and wholesome, nor that the solemnity we are engaged in is consistent with Christian principles. It may not then be an unsuitable employment for our thoughts if we first consider generally the legitimate purposes of such commemorations, and afterwards what belongs more peculiarly to the character of that which we are now celebrating.

I. There are few men who profess to be indifferent to the estimation in which they are held by their contemporaries ; and it may be doubted whether any really are so. That is a singularly lofty station in which the opinion of others with regard to us may be safely despised ; a most degraded condition that which is too low to be affected by it. And those who have nothing to hope or to fear from its influence on their worldly interests may not be insensible to the natural want of human sympathy, or able contentedly to resign themselves to a state of moral solitude. The desire of notoriety, which so often seems utterly regardless of the quality of the distinction it covets, is perhaps only a vicious perversion of that social instinct. But the case is not exactly the same with regard to posthumous reputation. The great mass of mankind are occupied with necessary cares, which leave them no leisure to bestow a thought on it ; and even if the reflection occurred to them, it would only suggest the conviction that their names are destined to be forgotten almost as soon as they shall have sunk into the grave. Many too who might have been capable of better things suffer the love of pleasure or grovelling pursuits to extinguish every spark of generous ambition. But among those who are encouraged, either by advantages of station or by the consciousness of intellectual power, to hope that they

may live in the remembrance of posterity, the desire of an enduring renown has been one of the mightiest impulses and a spring of the greatest enterprises. It may indeed take a wrong direction, by which it is rendered useless, or even hurtful, to society; and this will always be more or less the case whenever the shadow, not the substance, false glory, not the true—which, as even heathen philosophy taught, is inseparable from virtue—is the mark at which it aims. But still the most generous spirits, those who have dedicated their energies to the good of mankind, have felt this spur, and without it might have been less ready to *scorn delights and live laborious days*: an infirmity indeed, as it has been justly called, but still one to which noble minds alone are subject: one intimately connected with what is purest and best in human nature: an infirmity, the absence of which implies some far worse defect in the moral constitution: one which it is the highest strain of magnanimity to overcome, but which can be overcome only by those who have experienced it. But yet, however active this principle may have been, even in the bosoms of the wise and good during their stay on earth, we cannot suppose that it retains its hold on them when they have passed into another state of existence. We would not presume to intrude into the secrets of the spiritual world. Between us and the abode—if we may use the term—of disembodied spirits, is stretched an impassable gulf, across which the most vigorous imagination strives in vain to sustain its flight, and where the only light which could guide us safely has been vouchsafed in such scanty measure for the satisfaction of mere curiosity, that it serves for little else than to make the darkness visible. So much the less have we ground for believing that any report of what takes place on earth penetrates into that unknown region, or that the voice of human praise or censure reaches any of its inhabitants. But we may venture with reasonable confidence to hold it certain, that if they were permitted to receive such a communication, they would listen to it without emotion. Viewed from that distance, the earth must appear small, and its concerns of little moment. Least of all can we conceive that, in the intermediate state, any take an interest in the opinions formed

by their fellow-men on them and their works. The witness of their own conscience is too clear to require or admit of an appeal to any human authority ; and it awaits its final confirmation from the sentence of an infallible Judge. Whatever may have been the nature of their ambition here, the purified longings of souls ripe for heaven can only be satisfied with solid glory, true honour, and real immortality.

But what then, it may be asked, is the meaning and the value of such a tribute as we are now paying to our departed Benefactor ? What purpose may it answer ? Is it one that concerns the dead or the living ? Are we to view it in the light of a grateful return for benefits received ? But what can such honours avail those who, so far as we know, are neither capable of perceiving them, nor, if they were, could derive the slightest pleasure from them ? Or is it designed nominally for them, but really for our own sakes ? And if so, can the act be considered as altogether pure from every alloy of selfishness, and likewise from every tinge of a false colour ? These are questions which we must be able to answer, if we would understand what we are doing.

It may be said that the object of this Commemoration is to testify our gratitude ; not however to man, but to God : that it is a festival of thanksgiving, in which we only point to our earthly benefactor as the instrument by which the blessings of Providence were conveyed to us. But this would be hardly a correct, surely not an adequate description of the nature and objects of such a solemnity as this. No doubt it admonishes us not to forget the Author and Giver of all good things, while we fix our eyes on the hand which dispensed a portion of them for our benefit. But such a feeling of pious gratitude, though it should hallow and regulate, needs not to supersede that which is due to our fellow-men, who were not mere passive unconscious vehicles, but intelligent and benevolent agents, faithful and wise stewards of the Divine bounty. And it does not follow that we ought to suppress the declaration of our gratitude toward them, because it cannot reach their ears. It is not on that account an empty sound, or an idle ceremony. If the feeling is a right one, it deserves to be cherished. But it

would be in great danger of being quenched if it was to be always pent up in our own bosoms. At best it would be, like every thought which has not been shaped in words, a mere embryo, of which we could give no account either to others or to ourselves. On the other hand, we need not hesitate to own that this Commemoration is not simply the performance of a pious office, nor the utterance of a natural and becoming sentiment, but that it answers other purposes, which are indeed very important to us, but yet perfectly free from all taint of selfishness. Indeed, if the sense of benefits received were the only right motive for such a celebration, or the true measure of the interest which we may fitly take in it, there might be something to perplex us in the indulgence of the feelings belonging to this occasion. There would be some reason to fear that while we expressed our thankfulness—whether to God or to man—we might be, like the Pharisee in the Temple, betraying our ignorance of ourselves, or else might find our gratitude chilled by the recollection that we have profited much less than we might have done by the opportunities we have enjoyed. But if we consider ourselves as assembled for the contemplation of a beneficent work, and look at it simply as it is in itself, there will be nothing to suggest any uneasy scruples or unavailing regrets, but much to afford matter for cheering, elevating, and profitable reflections. While we contemplate such an object, we are transported for the moment out of ourselves, and united in spirit with its author. We enjoy a communion which is independent of time and place, and of all the conditions of personal intercourse, but is nevertheless real and living and fruitful. It is the action of mind upon mind, which no interval of ages or of worlds can obstruct or weaken. It is that by which a thought, consigned perhaps by an unknown hand to a foreign language, may, to the end of time, awaken admiration and sympathy in numberless hearts for the genius which produced it. But the contemplation of a work which furnishes motives for thankfulness to the Most High, and will bear to be considered as in His immediate presence, cannot be barren of practical effects, or merely a source of intellectual or sentimental enjoyment. This,

however refined, would be a species of indolent gratification, which, even though innocent and wholesome, is foreign to the service of the sanctuary, and in which within its walls we can never be at liberty to rest. But wherever there is a real communion of spirit with those who have been in any way useful to mankind, there must be not merely veneration for their memory, but likewise an earnest desire to resemble them in that which most attracts our love and esteem toward them, and therefore a wish, so far as lies in our power, to imitate what they have achieved, and to prosecute what they have begun. In no other way can we connect ourselves with them more closely than when we are striving to carry forward the torch which passed through their hands, to continue the labours from which they have rested, and to build on the foundations which they have laid. The spiritual relations which we thus contract are more ennobling than any privilege of birth, and hardly less endearing than the ties of nature. And thus alone—not by the warmest glow of enthusiasm, nor by the most eloquent strains of panegyric—can we acquit ourselves of the debt we owe to them. They cannot indeed receive any portion of it directly at our hands; but we may transfer the obligation to posterity, and so help to accumulate a treasure which shall form a part of their future reward.

II. But that we may perceive this more clearly, and with a livelier sense of the truth, let us proceed, as was proposed, to consider what belongs more peculiarly to our present Commemoration, or, in other words, to fix our thoughts on the work which we have now before our eyes. I do not intend however to point your attention to the minuter features which distinguish it from others of the same kind, much less to endeavour to exalt its merits by comparison with theirs, nor even to dwell upon the positive evidences of its fruitfulness and worth. It was indeed a noble and a happy thought, and betokening a spirit of considerate and comprehensive benevolence, that which planned this goodly harbour, where some, after having long been tossed and shattered by the storms of life, might seek shelter and repose, while others, with eager spirits, and bright prospects, and boundless hopes, are preparing to launch out

into the untried deep. I say it was a happy thought, because it paid a graceful tribute to a venerable antiquity, reconciling the traditions of the place with the altered condition of the times, reviving so much as was safe and wholesome, and avoiding all that experience had proved to be dangerous or hurtful, so that here memory might dwell on the past without regret, while hope felt no check to its visions of the future; an example of wise charity worthy of all praise, and too rarely imitated. I shall however confine myself to that which is most prominent in the character of the work, and which, for its transcendent importance, deserves that our attention should be concentrated on it. It is the dedication of this site to the purposes of liberal learning and religious education that constitutes its founder's chief claim to the gratitude of posterity. And when I consider it in this point of view, I am struck not only by the importance of the results which have flowed from his pious munificence, but likewise by the simplicity of the means by which they have been effected. And each of these points seems to merit a share of our notice.

When however I speak of results, I do not mean, as I have already intimated, to touch upon the proofs which experience has supplied of the value of this work in the sensible effects of its beneficial operation. This, if it were possible to exhibit them, would be foreign to my present purpose; and it would evidently be among the most hopeless of all undertakings to attempt to collect them. For who would presume to form an estimate, even in the rudest outline, of the influence which such an institution exerts on the whole community? That is manifestly something which no subtlety of calculation could measure, nor any power of language express. It must be left to the imagination, after the widest range it can take through the various walks of life, dimly to conceive it. Or rather, we must be content to say that we are as little able to assign its limits as to trace its course. And therefore I shall only endeavour to explain the grounds which, on the most general view of the nature of this work, seem to entitle it to a high rank in our estimation. But as it is only by comparison that its relative merit can be determined, we must cast a glance

at some other works of a different kind, which have often procured a more wide-spread renown and warmer admiration for their authors. We are speaking however of services rendered to mankind; and therefore many names must at once be excluded from this competition, which occupy a very large and conspicuous room in the annals of our race: names of warriors and conquerors, the great and mighty of the earth, but whose career was like that of the hurricane or the thunderbolt—which has been so often the title bestowed upon them by their contemporaries—and their work—if work it may be called—not to build, but to overthrow; not to plant or to cultivate, but to exterminate and lay waste; not to gladden, and beautify, and enrich the fields of their exploits, but to convert the fruitful garden into a wilderness, and the populous city into a heap of ruins and a lair of wild beasts. Such achievements we must here pass over in mournful silence. And again we should be disparaging the dignity of the object we are now contemplating, if we were to compare it with any of those gigantic monuments of human power and pride which have been so often celebrated as the foremost wonders of the world. We ask not how many hands have been employed, or how many years consumed upon them: we care not for the vastness of their dimensions, or the costliness of their materials, nor even for the beauty of their proportions, or the majesty of their forms. We look to the end and the design; and if this has been only to mark an epoch, to record a triumph, or to perpetuate a name, then, even should the object have been attained—and we know how often it has been forgotten, while the monument stands—these ponderous fabrics, though they have cost the treasure of kingdoms and the toil of millions for many generations, will appear to us only as elaborate trifles, memorable chiefly as lessons and warnings to illustrate the ambition, the littleness, and the vanity of man.

But there are works in which we recognise a nearer affinity to this which we are surveying, and which therefore are fit subjects of comparison, while at first sight there may seem room for a reasonable doubt whether they are not entitled to a preference on the highest ground which they have in common with it. Produc-

tions, I mean, of extraordinary intellectual power, applied not to frivolous but to noble purposes: the instruments of mighty but innocent and useful conquests; of those which have extended the dominion of man over nature, the ascendancy of truth over error, the triumph of light over darkness: monuments of genius, science, and art—whether in breathing marble, or on glowing canvas, or in words more vivid than the one, and more durable than the other—records, in whatever form, of great thoughts destined for the perpetual delight and instruction of succeeding generations. The authors of such works must undoubtedly be numbered among the most illustrious benefactors of mankind, and while in an enlightened age artificial distinctions sink in public estimation, these intellectual advantages are more and more prized and admired. Nor would any one in this place seek to depreciate their value, or to tear a single leaf from the wreath of fame they have earned for their possessors. But still there are some points in which even the greatest works of this class must be allowed to fall short of the excellence of that which we are now comparing with them. One of these points is that it is more durable in its nature. Not that it is exempt from the universal condition of mortality, which belongs to all human works and institutions; or enjoys any special security against the convulsions of nature, or the revolutions of society. But what I mean is that it contains no germ of corruption or decay, which by its necessary operation fixes the end of its existence and prosperity within a certain, known or unknown, period; but that it is instinct with a principle of life, so far as we are able to perceive, of imperishable energy, as well as inexhaustible fruitfulness; so that our foresight at least can assign no limit to its duration or to its activity. Now it is not so with those other works which we were just considering. Not that they are more liable to perish through unforeseen contingencies, or more subject to the vicissitudes of time and fortune. But the difference is this: that even while they last their value is inevitably more or less impaired by the lapse of time. For every such work, when it has finally passed out of its maker's hand, must remain unalterably the same, while all things around

it are undergoing continual change. The relation therefore in which it stands to them is no longer that for which its author originally designed it. To the men of a later generation, who have grown up under the influence of laws and institutions, of habits and principles, widely different from those of his contemporaries, it speaks—perhaps literally—a strange language; and even if they comprehend its meaning, the farther they are removed from his age, the less will it be able to command their assent, excite their interest, or touch their sympathy. Every ancient library affords abundant illustrations of this truth. How much ability and intellectual labour have been expended on works which, having survived the ideas and sentiments and manners that gave birth to them, are doomed to rest on neglected shelves, in a slumber which is only disturbed at long intervals by antiquarian research or accidental curiosity! This is no doubt most frequently the case with the productions of learning and science, which are sure to be superseded sooner or later by the progress of speculation and discovery. But it also holds, though in an inferior degree, of those rare works of genius which will indeed be the delight and admiration of all ages, because their immortal conceptions can never be entirely concealed or disfigured by the peculiarity of the form in which they are moulded, but which can only be supposed to retain their original freshness by those who deceive themselves with the belief that they are able, by dint of learned toil, or by an effort of imagination, to transport themselves into the life of remote antiquity. This then is one point of contrast between such works and this which we are now surveying: a work which can never become antiquated or effete, because there is nothing to prevent it from continually adapting itself to the wants and the progress of society; nothing to connect it with the past rather than with the future; nothing to forbid the hope that its best days, its highest honours, and its richest increase are yet to come. It is not a failing, mouldering cistern, but a spring of living waters, flowing not the less freely because it has flowed long.

But there is another distinction between this and those, which

may help us still better to appreciate their relative worth. Take the productions of the greatest intellects: take them as they come from the master's hand: take them under the most favourable circumstances, and while their influence is most potent; and consider what is the highest end, the best purpose they can ever answer. We know that each—however perfect in itself—addresses itself only to one side of human nature, exercises but one or a few among the manifold capacities of the mind, cultivates only a small tract of the boundless domain of human knowledge. And therefore it is clear that they can only claim to rank as materials or instruments of a more comprehensive work: of an education which aims at the training of the whole man, unfolding all his faculties, and regulating their employment with a view to his supreme good. They are subordinate to it, just as the arts which minister to the particular wants of society must yield precedence to the wisdom of the legislator by whose institutions they are fostered, set in action, and made to co-operate for the common weal. And in the hierarchy of Teachers and Benefactors of mankind, the Founder of this House, though he would perhaps hardly have deemed himself worthy of a place at the feet of the great masters of human learning, may be one of those who shall hear the summons, *Friend, go up higher.*

Finally, let us notice the simplicity of the means by which these results have been accomplished. Let us observe that what became thus fruitful of intellectual and spiritual produce, so rich and varied, was not any of the rarer gifts of Providence, not extraordinary genius, or brilliant talents, nor even any peculiar acuteness of sagacity, or energy of character; it was nothing more than a share of God's commonest blessings, coupled indeed with a charitable mind, a will to apply them to a good use. It may indeed be said that charity itself is a gift more excellent than the best of those I have just named. But it is not a gift in the same sense: not one that is bestowed once for all in a certain measure, which no effect of the owner can materially enlarge; not bestowed on some, and wholly withheld from others. In all there is a spark of it at least, which may be fanned and cherished and fed,

until it mounts up into a flame. But looking at the outward means and conditions of the work, we find that they consisted simply in a moderate portion of that which thousands are daily getting and spending in a greater amount: which many amass only that their pile may be the highest, and which others scatter, that they may crowd as much as possible of fugitive enjoyment within the narrowest compass: that it is which, under the control of a benevolent spirit, has here yielded so many precious and lasting fruits. And this is a reflection which might be profitable at all times, but which is eminently worthy of being laid to heart in ours. Never was it more to be wished that a spirit might go forth from these walls congenial to that which animated their Founder than in an age when the thirst of gain and the love of pleasure are threatening to eat into the heart's core of this nation, so as to fill thoughtful lovers of their country with gloomy forebodings, while they reflect that the time may not be distant when its honour and safety may depend on generous sacrifices, manly patience, and Christian self-denial.

We would not however, on such an occasion, end with language of sinister omen. Let us not overlook the fair side of the age we live in: its tendency to voluntary association for beneficent purposes. It is a privilege in which we have reason to rejoice, that opportunities were never more abundant of taking part in the noblest works of charity, and contributing to confer incalculable benefits on the most remote posterity. And let it not be forgotten that although in the works which remain—the material results—the share of each contributor may be very small, yet, if only his will have been heartily in it, the work which follows him shall be altogether his, in that day when the royal builder of the Temple shall not be accounted to have done more—perhaps far less—than she who *cast in of her penury*, and when many names long lost in oblivion on earth shall be found *written in heaven*, and be embalmed in the *everlasting remembrance of the righteous*.

THE LOVE OF GOD THE GROUNDWORK OF TRUE KNOWLEDGE.

A SERMON PREACHED IN THE PARISH CHURCH OF SWANSEA, ON BEHALF OF
THE SWANSEA NATIONAL SCHOOLS, AUGUST 13TH, 1848.*



“If any man think that he knoweth anything, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know. But if any man love God, the same is known of Him.”—1 CORINTHIANS viii. 2, 3.

THE subject, my brethren, which I have to bring before you this morning is one which has been rendered so familiar to all of us by the frequent and ample discussion it has undergone of late years, that it is scarcely possible to present it under any new aspect; though it is so closely connected with almost all the topics belonging to a place dedicated to the worship of God, that there are few which may not serve as a suitable introduction to it. It is also one as to which there exists so little doubt among those who are qualified to form a judgment on it, that it will hardly bear to be reasoned, without danger of wearying the hearer by arguments both stale and superfluous. So great is the change which has taken place in public opinion on this head within a comparatively short period—one within the memory of most of us—that we are now at some loss to conceive the state of mind which could entertain such views with regard to popular education as were once all but universally prevalent. And if we ever happen to hear its importance or necessity called in question, we are apt to ascribe such language to love of paradox, indifference

* This Sermon, having been preached during the meeting of the British Association at Swansea, was printed at the request of the President (the Marquis of Northampton) and some other members of the Association.

to truth, or carelessness about the welfare of mankind. Nor are the circumstances of the present case such as suggest any special claim to your attention. All that is new or peculiar in this appeal consists in the occasion on which it is put forward: that it is made at a time when a great number of persons the most eminent in the highest walks of science have come together in this town, to interchange and make public the results of their meditations and researches, in the presence of a still larger assemblage of such as take an interest in their pursuits. On such an occasion we are almost unavoidably led to draw some comparison between the objects of that meeting, and those in behalf of which I am now addressing you. And it may not be clear, at first sight, what is the exact and true relation between them: whether it is one of contrast or resemblance: whether it would be more proper to endeavour to excite your compassion for those who, through the limited cultivation of their faculties, are excluded from that rich intellectual banquet which has been here spread before the friends of science, or to claim your sympathy on the ground of an affinity between the highest and the lowest manifestations of human intelligence, such as connect the first questionings of the child with the most curious and elaborate investigations of the philosopher.

There is however another point of view, which may bring us nearer to the truth, and which is suggested by the words of St. Paul which I have read. It is true that they relate immediately to a question which for us has long lost all practical moment. But the Apostle, as usual, takes advantage of the temporary dispute to lay down principles of perpetual and universal application. He points to a distinction between different kinds and modes of knowledge, which may serve to guide us in the comparison we have been led to institute, and may help us to arrive at some profitable conclusion. It is evident that he does not intend either to depreciate the value of knowledge, or to question the possibility of attaining it, though some of his words may sound so. But when he says, "If any man think that he knoweth anything, he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to

know," though undoubtedly it is intimated that in a certain sense—one in which the assertion is amply confirmed both by reason and by authority—the highest wisdom of man consists in the consciousness of his ignorance, it is no less plainly implied in the very terms, that there is a way in which something may and ought to be known; and consequently that the hindrance to knowledge arises not from the inadequacy, but from the misapplication of the human faculties. And, on the other hand, when he contrasts the knowledge which puffeth up with that charity which finds its highest function in the love of God, he certainly does not mean to represent knowledge as essentially adverse to charity, or the love of God as nothing more than a blind instinct. And therefore I believe I shall be following out a train of thought which is indicated in this passage of Scripture, if I endeavour to show that a very high estimate of the dignity of science is consistent with an acknowledgment of its insufficiency for the most important purposes of life, and to point out the peculiar value of the provision which is made for the supply of that deficiency in schools such as I am now recommending to your support.

And to begin with that which, as it is most obvious to common apprehension, occupies the foremost place in the popular appreciation of the merits of science, so as too often to seem to stand alone: we are bound to acknowledge—and with a tribute of grateful admiration—the vast amount of material benefits which it has conferred upon mankind. On every side we are surrounded by monuments of the gigantic powers which it has wielded for the most beneficent purposes. Our dwellings are hung with trophies of its pacific conquests. The store which supplies our most urgent wants is enriched with the treasures it has won from regions previously unexplored and otherwise inaccessible to human industry. And it requires no little attention, and no slender stock of information, to understand the full extent of the debt we owe to it even on this score. There needs an effort of abstraction of which few are capable, to conceive what our condition would have been without it, and would speedily become if its aid were withdrawn: how poor and naked, and rude and miserable, our life

must have remained without the appliances it has furnished : how few steps man could have taken without its succour toward the accomplishment of his divinely appointed task of subduing the earth : how little he could have comprehended the greatness of the work, and, in proportion as he perceived it, how soon he must have been overpowered by the sense of its insurmountable difficulty.

There is however no need that we should carry our thoughts back to the past, or let them range abroad in contemplation of the mighty changes which science has wrought on the face of the globe. Every day brings with it fresh and more wonderful displays of the same agency, which throw all its former achievements into the shade, and excite boundless expectation of still more glorious triumphs yet to come. And it is not merely the charm of novelty, or the love of the marvellous, or the pleasures of gratified curiosity, or the self-complacency with which each individual assumes a share in whatever seems to reflect honour on his country and his generation,—there is a much more powerful motive which lends an interest to the quickened progress of science in our day. We must rejoice to think that it keeps pace with the rapidly growing wants of the community ; and if we placed less confidence in its productive energy and its inexhaustible resources, we should feel a still more painful anxiety about the prospects of our native land.

And yet this application of its discoveries to the enlargement of man's dominion over nature, and to the increase of national wealth and private well-being, dazzling and valuable as it is, and often as it is taken for the whole, scarcely rises above the very lowest ground on which science rests its claim to public respect and gratitude. It scatters benefits of a higher order along its track. For as the results of the severest studies and the most abstruse speculations become public property, and pass into the fund of general knowledge, they not only supply a basis for the steps of those who come after, which abridges their labour, and enables them with greater ease to make larger strides in the same field of inquiry, but they serve to elevate the whole intellectual condition and character of the people, to dissipate vulgar prejudices and

errors, to multiply the sources of refined and wholesome enjoyment, and the objects of delightful and soul-enlarging contemplation. And it is a cheering token of the spirit in which scientific pursuits are carried on in our day, that the most eminent of those who are engaged in them are so far from affecting a stately reserve, and from desiring to keep aloof from all contact with popular ignorance, and to screen their studies behind a veil of mystery from the eyes of the uninitiated, that they do not disdain themselves to lend their aid toward diffusing their knowledge as widely as possible, and frequently descend from the heights of speculation on which they habitually move, to undertake the humble office of guides and pioneers, to clear and smooth the avenues to truth, and to exhibit it in forms best adapted to attract and encourage all to a nearer approach. And this communicative spirit is confined within no narrower bounds than those allotted to the habitation of mankind itself. It knows of no local or national partialities or interdictions. It is equally ready to impart its best gifts wherever it finds a capacity to receive them. It is anxious to promote the freest intercourse and exchange of intellectual productions among all the members of the human family : for science itself must gain by that commerce. Among the most glorious enterprises which mark its history are those by which it has laboured, and is still labouring with growing success, to surmount the barriers, and abridge the intervals, interposed by nature between the different nations of the earth, so that none may remain apart from the rest, or independent of a mutual influence which is the first condition of a common higher civilization. And thus in its ultimate tendency it appears invested with the august character of a harbinger and minister of universal peace, and the mediator of a perpetual alliance among all the kindreds of the human race.

And yet the dignity of science is not to be measured by the advantages which it yields to society. The satisfaction it affords to one who has been admitted into its sanctuary does not depend on the power it enables him to exert, which must always be limited by the instruments and materials which may be placed at

his command. Even the insight which it opens into the structure and laws of the visible universe is only an acquisition, not belonging to the essence of the thing itself. That which he chiefly values in it is the witness it bears to the inward faculty, which is truly his own: to the living oracle which qualifies him to interpret the language of nature, and to detect her secrets; which reveals his affinity to the supreme Intelligence, and his immeasurable superiority over all orders of being which do not partake of the same inestimable gift.

My brethren, these few remarks, little as they can pretend to do justice to the subject, will perhaps suffice to show that I have approached it without any unwillingness to recognise its claims, or any wish to detract from its importance, for the sake of exalting that with which we are more immediately concerned on the present occasion. But a reflection is suggested by what has just been observed, which may lead us to the point we have next to consider. It must be evident that whatever is entitled to so high a place in the estimation of mankind, and exercises so vast an influence over its destinies, as has been just described, is no vulgar and common thing. And in fact not only the genius of science—that which enlarges its domain by new discoveries—but the capacity for scientific pursuits in that inferior degree which is sufficient, though not for original research, yet for following as far as others have opened the way—this, but more especially the first, is the rare privilege of a few gifted minds; and neither can be matured nor exercised without laborious cultivation, involving the need of leisure and manifold aids, which can never be within the reach of many. This indeed is no reason for slighting or for withholding from any the first rudiments of intellectual culture. It is rather a motive for diffusing them as widely as possible, since the genius which is destined to achieve the most glorious conquests in the field of science must begin its career from the same starting-point of utter ignorance and sheer vacuity with the rest of its fellows. But, for the great mass of mankind, such pursuits must always be foreign to the habitual occupations of life. Even where their beneficial effects are experienced most

largely, the benefit will be commonly regarded, as men receive the rain and the light of heaven, as descending from a region far removed both from their control and their observation. They are things with which none but a few here and there have any need or occasion to intermeddle. Even the most serious and thoughtful feel that they are perfectly at liberty to take up or lay aside such subjects at their pleasure.

But there *are* questions which concern all men alike, which force themselves into the way of all, and which none can altogether shut out, without foregoing the main distinction of a rational nature, and sinking to the level of the lower creatures. Every man has an interest—the deepest possible interest—in the inquiry, whence he came, whither he is going, why and to what purpose he is here. He may evade or put it by for a season; he may cheat himself into the persuasion that it is needless and useless. But *there* is the thought still lurking in the depths of his consciousness, and ever ready to start up afresh, and harass him. If he strives to drown it in stupefying and reckless sensuality, its revival will be not the less inevitable, but the more disquieting; while whatever fills up his life more worthily, whatever gives it more value and meaning, lifts him above the immediate present, and turns his view either towards the past or the future, must be the more likely to recall one or other of those solemn questions: and there is so close a connexion between them, that it is impossible to move one without stirring the rest. He must find some answer to them, unless his life is to pass away, without aim or import, as a feverish, half-waking dream. And this answer is contained in the knowledge he may acquire of God and of himself. Now this is a knowledge which science can neither give nor supersede. The sphere in which it lives and moves and has its being is not that in which such knowledge is to be won. Undoubtedly it ministers abundant food for pious contemplation. The evidences which it affords of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness are amply sufficient for those who are willing to receive them. Less by far would satisfy a lively faith. But much more would be unavailing to subdue the evil heart of unbelief. It opens

to our wondering view a spectacle of stupendous and bewildering grandeur, but it brings us not a step nearer to the conception of any outline or ground-plan of creation. It speaks familiarly of systems, but can say nothing of a whole. At the farthest verge of its latest discoveries it finds itself still but on the edge of an unfathomable abyss; and when with the aid of more powerful instruments it has cleared away the mist which overhung a part of the heavenly masses, it has only penetrated into a new wilderness of worlds. And of these how little can it report, with any degree of trustworthiness, beyond the mere relations of form and bulk and motion! It must descend to its native earth before it can gain any more distinct view of the qualities of things. Here alone it is able to apprehend a few of the minuter links in the chain of being, and learns to surmise something of the incalculable riches of nature. Yet here too it can advance but a little way in any direction before it reaches a limit beyond which all is darkness. It is true this limit is not immovably fixed. It may be carried forward to an indefinite extent. *There* is the ground of confidence which animates each successive adventurer with the hope of a continual progress. But it is no less true that every enlargement of his horizon opens the prospect of a more vast and difficult field, one to which there are no absolute bounds, and where all that he is permitted partially to explore is but an islet in the midst of a shoreless ocean. Even in the lesser world of man's own nature, which might seem most accessible to his observation, there is spread an infinite depth of unsearchable mystery. To be conscious of these limitations, and of the inability of any finite mind to comprehend more than a very minute portion of the universe, is indeed a main part of human knowledge. The wisest will own with the Preacher of old, "that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end;" and with the Apostle, "that if any man think that he knoweth anything"—so as to grasp it in its inmost nature, and in the entire range of its outward relations, without which it can never be completely understood—"he knoweth nothing yet as he ought to know;" not even his own ignorance.

And still less can we look to science for practical guidance or safeguards. On the relation between God and His creatures, on the means by which that relation may be modified, on the laws of the Divine government, on the final destination of man—the points on which the regulation of life mainly depends—it throws not a ray of light. And this is true, not only of physical but of moral science, so far as it is merely a product of human reason. The systematical connexion of moral truths is a purely intellectual process, in itself totally ineffectual for any practical end, and commonly carried to its highest perfection, like the theory of art, in periods when practice has begun to decline, and perhaps has sunk into the grossest corruption. But all experience witnesses that the progress of science and civilization does not ensure either individuals or communities from the most fatal aberrations of conduct, from the vilest excesses of sensual lusts, and the most fearful outbreaks of tumultuous passions. Even the right use and cultivation of science itself depend upon principles which it cannot supply, but must borrow elsewhere. They are always liable to be marred and perverted by vanity and presumption, by prejudice and passion, by indolence and carelessness, by the want of a genuine reverence for truth, and of a conscientious adherence to legitimate methods of inquiry. The deviations which have most retarded its progress may almost invariably be traced to some moral obliquity rather than to a merely intellectual defect.

In the latter clause of our text the Apostle evidently means to contrast that imperfect and fallacious and intoxicating knowledge, of which he had spoken in the former verse, with one of a different kind. “If any man love God, the same is known of Him.” The contrast is not distinctly expressed, but somewhat obscurely intimated. It is however clear enough, both from the context and from the terms themselves, that to be known of God implies a certain knowledge of Him. For as it is a privilege of those who love Him, and as He cannot know more of them, in the common sense, than He does of all his other creatures, if there is less of strangeness between Him and any man, it can only be because that man is admitted to learn something more of God. And if it

should be said that to be known signifies only the being distinguished by a peculiar favour, still this will bring us to the same conclusion; for we cannot conceive God's loving-kindness apart from all communication of His enlightening grace. And as a right fear and a right love of God are only two different aspects of the same thing, what the Apostle here teaches is in substance nothing else than the truth declared by the Psalmist, when he says, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom: a good understanding have all they that do thereafter." It is the truth which is still more emphatically inculcated by the Royal Preacher as the sum of all his teaching—"the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God and keep His commandments, for this is the whole duty of man." And this is the truth which we take for the groundwork for that Christian education which the Schools I am now pleading for are designed to impart. It is an education which reaches to the whole of man: to every part of his nature; which neglects none of its faculties and functions, but observes a just discrimination between the higher and the lower.

The searcher of nature, in the widest range of his excursions into the visible universe, finds among created beings none of equal dignity with his own kind. He cannot be so amazed by the vastness or the splendour of the heavenly bodies as to doubt for a moment that the mind which contemplates them, which measures their orbits and their distances, and calculates their dimensions and their movements, is something of an incomparably higher order than they. But still even the intelligence which enables him to make these discoveries is not the faculty which lies nearest to the centre of his being. It is not there, but in the seat of the affections and the will, that he must seek for his very inmost self. Here alone he finds the springs of action, the consciousness of a responsible agency, the stamp of his essential character. It is the capacity for an intelligent love, a love which grows with the worthiness of its objects, which knows no limits of time or space, which embraces every form of good, and rests only in the eternal fountain of all goodness—this is the noblest attribute of man's nature, that which marks his place in the scale of creation, and

fits him to receive the impress of his Maker's image. Such a love, to whatever degree it may have attained, is essentially the love of God, and of all things in Him. And the proper aim and main business of all sound Christian education is to awaken and cherish, to regulate and purify, to train and exercise that love. The discipline and instruction of the Christian school is to be regarded as all either directly or indirectly subservient to this end. This it is that gives unity to all its teaching, however multifarious may be its immediate subjects. All the knowledge it imparts tends either to strengthen, direct, and enlighten that love of God, or to furnish it with means and instruments of action suited to the station which the learner is apparently destined to fill. And it is only so far as this end is attained that any kind of knowledge can be really useful, either to the individual or to society. Without this, the highest acquirements which a human mind can grasp leave a miserable void. With this, the first rudiments of the simplest learning convey a treasure of priceless worth. Deem it not a matter of slight moment whether you give or deny this to the children of the poor. Grudge not the little cost of enriching them with such an inestimable benefit. Their ideas may be pent within a narrow circle—narrow as the widest range of human science may appear to a seraphic intelligence—and yet may all be referred to the same centre in which the highest of created natures finds at once the place of its most blessed rest and the spring of its most vigorous action. They may advance but a few steps along the path which opens to their view the wonders of the universe around them, and yet they may have been enabled not only to desery, but to reach the true end of an immortal being. Small as their proficiency may appear when measured by a lower standard, if they have been grounded in the love of God, so as to be known of Him, they will be masters in that wisdom which comprehends the whole of man, that by which “his whole spirit and body and soul are preserved blameless,” as a temple of the Holy Ghost, fitted for all the work allotted to him here, and for all the glory which God hath prepared to be enjoyed hereafter by them that love Him.

THE EXCELLENCE OF WISDOM.

A SERMON PREACHED AT LLANDINGAD CHURCH, LLANDOVERY, ON THE OCCASION OF LAYING THE FOUNDATION STONE OF THE WELSH EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE, DECEMBER 13TH, 1849.

“Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light excelleth darkness.”

ECCLESIASTES ii. 13.

IF rising in this place, on such an occasion as the present, I might consider it as part of my office to interpret the feelings which may be properly supposed to be uppermost in the breasts of all who view this day's proceedings with a friendly interest, I would say that the foremost among them must be one of thankful joy. Motives enough for joy and thankfulness there must always be, whenever a great and difficult undertaking, one which has been the object of ardent desires, of anxious doubts, and laborious struggles, has at length been brought to a stage in its progress at which the chief obstacles appear to have been overcome, and little or nothing to remain but to carry on with persevering activity a work which has been happily begun. But in our case there are some special reasons for gratitude. Only a very short time back, what has now been accomplished must have seemed beyond all reasonable hope. So little could it have been foreseen or expected, that it could scarcely have been contemplated by any one otherwise than as a mere possible contingency, hidden deep in the womb of futurity; something too remote for calculation or conjecture—a floating thought perhaps, a pious wish, a pleasing vision; but waiting, to be realised, for a combination of circumstances wholly beyond the reach of human forecast or control, and entirely depending on

the Supreme Disposer of events. And therefore our first, most natural, and fitting impulse on this occasion must lead us to prostrate ourselves in grateful adoration before the Sovereign Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, which has ordered all things, so as to bring about the result which we are now witnessing ; which has so suddenly and marvellously changed the scene, has cleared away the mist, and levelled the ground ; has opened a bright and broad prospect to our view, and has set us in a road in which, if we only pursue it with calm circumspection and zealous diligence, we may confidently look forward to the attainment of the most glorious ends.

But while in this retrospect we thus acknowledge the hand of Providence, we cannot, and would not, overlook its human instruments, or forget our debt of gratitude to them. That obligation is indeed one source of our joy, one of the main grounds of the satisfaction with which we contemplate their work. It is not a matter of indifference, or of slight importance, how such an institution has originated ; whether in a half-mercantile adventure, or in an association for a common benefit, or, as in this case, in an act of noble disinterested munificence. There may be a close resemblance between the two cases in outward form, in the object proposed, and in the methods employed to attain it, and yet a wide difference in the general spirit and character of the result. The Founder of this Institution has conferred on it perhaps no less a benefit by his example than by his bounty itself. It is no trifling advantage that it owes its being to one whose name will never cease to be pronounced within its walls with affectionate reverence ; who may be held up to its inmates, not only as an object of gratitude, but as a pattern for imitation ; who, though silent and unseen, will be himself their teacher, in the best learning and the noblest of arts ; who will point to the highest end of all their studies, to the proper mark of a generous emulation and a virtuous ambition ; from whom they may learn the nature and measure of true greatness, of solid glory, and enduring fame ; one who has entitled himself to a high place among the benefactors of mankind ; to a place among those who have ministered to the deepest wants, and have promoted the highest interests of their generation

and of posterity: not by any of those brilliant achievements which fill the most prominent place in the records of history with a dazzling, but too often false and baleful lustre; not even by any conquests in the realm of science; not by any surprising discoveries or felicitous inventions; not by any productions of original genius; in a word, not by means of any of those rare and splendid gifts which Providence has dispensed with a wise parsimony among the children of men; but simply by the strength of a right purpose, of a warm and enlightened benevolence; by a wise and liberal use of means which thousands possess, but which they mostly apply to frivolous and selfish ends. Among these I say our Founder has earned a distinguished place; he has reared for himself a monument, of materials more precious and durable than stone or metal, in the minds, and hearts, and souls of his fellow-creatures; and that this has been accomplished by means so simple and common is just what renders the lesson most instructive, the example most animating and persuasive.

But, on an occasion like the present, the largest room in our thoughts and feelings must be occupied not by the past, but by the future. Our retrospect is confined within very narrow limits; but the space which lies before us is boundless, and stretches far beyond the utmost range of our vision. As far as we can look forward, all seems promising and cheering; but we are conscious how little it is given to man to penetrate into the future; and therefore, in proportion to the liveliness of our interest and the earnestness of our wishes, must our hope be tempered by anxiety. We are standing at the fountain-head, it may be, of a mighty stream. We see it leaping into the daylight with a vigour and fulness which seem to augur a long and majestic course. We can observe its apparent direction at the outset. But how it may hereafter wind, and shift its bed; whether it is to glide along with a calm and even flow, still widening as it rolls through broad valleys and open plains, or shall have to force its way through chasms and over precipices, disfigured by rapids, and falls, and whirlpools; and whether in the end it shall mix its waters with the ocean, a highway for the commerce of distant

lands, or shall be lost in the sands of the desert : all this is hidden from our view. We are about laying the first stone of an edifice dedicated to the most important of human works, the education of the young ; destined, we trust, to gather under its roof the ardent and aspiring youth of many generations. We rejoice that the scale and design of the building are not unworthy of the dignity of the object ; that, in its solid structure and goodly proportions, it will be a visible witness to the spirit and aim, to the faith, and hope, and love, in which it was reared. But as often as we turn our eyes or our mind to such a seat of study, thronged with its youthful tenants, interesting and pleasing as the scene may be, a thought will be apt to strike us, which may excite feelings more nearly akin to sadness than to hope. It is indeed one which is familiar to many of us, as a celebrated theme of poetical meditation. And when we reflect how often the brightest prospects that gladden the morning of life are overcast long before the day is over, and the vista, which at its opening seemed to promise a long succession of delights, becomes wrapped, as it lengthens, in deeper and deeper gloom, till it terminates in sorrow and despair, it requires no great effort of imagination to sympathize with the poet, when he sets before us the joyous sports and light cares of sprightly boyhood, happily unconscious of its future lot,—

“The thoughtless day, the easy night,

The spirits pure, the slumbers light,”—

in melancholy contrast with the dark train of evils, physical and moral—misfortunes and distresses, furious or heart-gnawing passions, crime and remorse, racking pains and wasting sicknesses, neglected poverty and comfortless age—which he pictures as lying in ambush, waiting to seize their prey, when “the little victims” shall have quitted their paradise, and begun to tread the rugged and intricate road of their journey through this weary and treacherous world.

These, however, are not images which I should wish now to conjure up in your minds ; nor is this superficial and partial view of the subject either suited to the occasion, or likely to lead us into any profitable train of thought. It is right indeed that we

should never shut our eyes to the dark side of our earthly condition; that we should not forget the evils to which our mortal existence is exposed, the snares and dangers with which our path is beset at every stage. Such a remembrance may at times be needed, to chastise our natural giddiness and presumption, and to impress us with a due sense of the truth, that life is a serious thing. But it is not desirable that it should occupy the foreground in our habitual meditations, and this not merely because it is the gloomy and painful aspect of the case, which, if it were allowed to engross our chief attention, would needlessly and uselessly depress our spirits, and embitter all our enjoyments, but rather because it tends to divert our thoughts from things on which they may dwell with far more both of pleasure and of profit: things which enable us to avert many of the ills of life, to remedy or mitigate others, and to bear up under those which are unavoidable, or to rise above them; from the consideration of our station and our work, of our aims and purposes, of our means and capacities, our privileges and our duties. It is not fit that the young, after thought and conscience have been sufficiently awakened in them, should either be permitted to remain heedless of the future, or to picture it to their fancy as a prospect of uninterrupted enjoyment. It is not as a scene either of pleasure or of suffering that they should learn to contemplate the world they have to live in, but principally as a field of action, and to regard their present business as a preparation for that.

It is assuredly in this light—not as a paradise of blissful ignorance, not as a place of childish sports, nor as an arena for youthful competition, but as a training-ground for exercising and unfolding the noblest energies of our spiritual nature—that we all view the Institution which is now occupying our gravest thoughts. It is because we view it in this, the true light, and therefore see and feel its measureless importance, that our hope is unavoidably tinged with some shade of anxiety. For we know there will be committed to it the rearing of many ardent and gifted spirits, formed to act no obscure part, and to exert no slight influence, in the affairs of men. On the instruction they will receive, and the

impressions which will be made upon them here, will depend far more, even for themselves, than wealth or honours or power, or any of the glittering prizes of a successful worldly career—things which, in the estimation of a higher and purer intelligence, must appear of no greater intrinsic worth than the little triumphs of their childish games, or of their youthful rivalry. The true end of such an Institution as this is not to stimulate their natural desires for such objects, nor to furnish the means of more readily attaining them, but rather to control and regulate those impulses, and to direct them to loftier aims. Those who are to have their minds nourished, and their characters moulded in this place, belong to that middle class which, in its numbers, prosperity, intelligence, and virtue, affords the surest index of the national strength, and the firmest bulwark of the national safety. The education of that class must always and everywhere be a matter of the greatest moment to the state; but never to any more so than to us in our times. It could never have been neglected with impunity; but in our present circumstances it demands a larger share of attention than at any previous epoch in our history.

We may in some respects not improperly compare our national experience with that of the Royal Preacher, recorded in my text. He had never, we know, been destitute of wisdom: but there was a time when he did not duly prize its worth. He turned aside from the Fountain of light and life, and gave up his darkened heart to vain pursuits, to the amassing of riches, to the pride of imperial dominion and of regal state, to the refinements of art and the pleasures of luxury. “I gathered me silver and gold, and the peculiar treasure of kings and of the provinces: I gat me men-singers and women-singers, and the delights of the sons of men. So I was great, and increased more than all that were before me in Jerusalem: and whatsoever mine eyes desired I kept not from them.” But at last he “turned himself to behold wisdom, and madness, and folly;” and then he “saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light excelleth darkness.” We too, notwithstanding our ample means of knowledge, and our spiritual privileges, have too long bowed at the shrines of Mammon and Moloch and Belial.

We have exulted in the vast extent of our empire, in the overflowing of our wealth, in the growing bulk and magnificence of our chief city, in the new devices of our luxury, and the witcheries of the arts which minister to our amusements. But now it would seem as if a change had come over our spirit, and we had become a soberer and wiser generation. We have begun to turn, and consider our ways, and to ask ourselves what fruit we have had in many things of which we were once so proud. And we are beginning to discover that we have spent much upon things which have profited us little, on wars and conquests, on wild speculations of mercantile cupidity, and on works of ostentatious grandeur; while we have omitted to make any adequate provision for things of real use and urgent necessity; even for "the principal thing," that which is "more precious than rubies," and "for the lack of which a people is destroyed." Now we acknowledge our error, and see "that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light excelleth darkness."

There may be a question whether we have a right to call ours an enlightened age, as if claiming superiority over those which have gone by. But it can hardly be denied that it is a light-loving and a light-seeking age; one in which there is a general disposition to spread light everywhere, and to bring all things to the light, that they may be seen as they are. It is an age of restless curiosity and searching inquiry. If we fail to come at the truth, it is not because we ever shrink from approaching it; not because we let ourselves be stopped by any conventional barriers of usage or authority. We admit no right in any one to judge for us on subjects of which we are able to judge for ourselves. We take no opinion upon trust, because it has come down to us with the stamp of an honoured name. We adopt it only after we have made it our own by a rigid scrutiny of its intrinsic claims to our assent. It is an age in which all pretensions to respect and deference are jealously examined, and in which it is more difficult than ever for any false pretences long to elude detection. If the age has its peculiar prejudices, they are rather in favour of innovation and experiment than of tenacious adherence to ancient opinions or practices. The comparative excellence of the various branches

of knowledge is itself subjected to a like unsparing scrutiny and free discussion, and their value is estimated, not by the abundance of the leaves, or the beauty of the flowers, but by the fulness and richness and wholesomeness of the fruits: and those which are or seem to be found wanting, when tried by this practical test, sink in public esteem, and are accounted little better than a frivolous entertainment, fit only for the amusement of leisure hours, and the satisfaction of a capricious taste and an idle curiosity. Again, the temper of this age is irreconcilably hostile to all privileges of caste, and to all monopolies of things which may and should be common: but more especially to such as tend to appropriate the light of knowledge to one class or portion of the community, and to prevent it from reaching the great mass of the people. It is agreed on all hands that this is as much their birthright as the light of day; and that it not only ought not to be kept from them, but that it is a national duty to diffuse it as widely as possible among them. Whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the means, there is none worth noticing as to the end. In some way or other the people must be educated. And it is not meant that their instruction should be limited to the first rudiments of learning, or that after they have been so put in the way of knowledge they should be left to struggle with its difficulties as best they may. They are to be furnished with all possible helps and encouragements to speed their progress. The finest and most richly stored intellects of our time willingly apply themselves to this task, and deem it a worthy, if not the noblest employment of their powers, to communicate the results of the most arduous researches in the most popular form, and to make them familiar and attractive to the multitude.

When such efforts are being made to elevate the intellectual condition of the lower classes, the higher cannot fitly or safely remain stationary. If they are to keep their vantage-ground, if they are to be looked up to with respect and confidence, if they are to be qualified to enlighten and direct those who are below them in station, then they must not lag behind in the general progress: their attainments must rise with the advancing standard

of the age. And there are some other considerations which point to the like conclusion. We live in eventful, changeful, critical times. We have just witnessed the revolution of a hurricane which has swept round the greater part of the civilized world, levelling ancient thrones and dynasties, uprooting time-honoured institutions, and shaking the foundations of civil society. We have watched its desolating circuit, first with fear, and then with wonder at our own singular felicity in having escaped being drawn into its eddy. But, as the slightest shock of an earthquake weakens our sense of stability, by revealing the presence of tremendous powers, to whose action we can neither see nor set any limits, so it is hardly possible for those who have been spectators of such convulsions, so close at hand as at least to have felt the reverberation of their movements, to retain all their confidence in their own security. And without indulging in fanciful and gloomy forebodings, we see ground enough, in the aspect of our times, for believing that the course of this world was never more exposed to the danger of violent perturbations, and that those who are now growing up to manhood are probably destined to severer trials and harder struggles than this generation has yet passed through; and that both with a view to their own success and safety and to the service of the commonwealth, they must learn to rely, not on any accidents of rank or fortune, but on that which is most truly their own; that which is their own by nature, or which they have made their own by labour and study; on their energies and principles, on their ability and intrinsic worth.

When all this is so, it is evident that the education of the class on which rests the main part of our hopes for the future, must be a work of still greater importance than in ordinary times; and it must be more difficult for the institutions which undertake this task to rise to the height of the exigency. And from one which is newly founded for this object, even more may not unreasonably be expected and required than from those which have been long established. For it enters upon its career with all the advantage of their experience, and yet free from the trammels of ancient rules and traditions. It can plead no prescription for any methods

which will not bear the strictest examination upon general principles. It can allege no excuse for blindly following a beaten track. The auspices under which this Institution has been opened warrant us in trusting that it will prove itself worthy of the opportunities it enjoys, and equal to the weight of the responsibility it incurs. The less can it be needful that I should attempt to offer any advice on the means by which it may best accomplish its end: nor, if I were disposed to do so, would this be the proper place or time for the discussion of such a subject. But it may not be unsuitable to this occasion if I venture to make a few remarks on the general character and spirit of that education which seems to me to be called for from an Institution planted under such circumstances, that it may satisfy the real wants of our age and people.

And first I should say that the instruction which it imparts should be *sound*. *Sound learning* is a phrase with which we are familiar, as denoting something on the value of which all are agreed, and which moreover it is at least the professed aim of every place of education, in its measure and degree, to communicate. But it is a phrase which admits of some latitude of interpretation, and there has been no little difference of opinion as to what kind of learning it is that deserves the epithet. Soundness in learning may be opposed to error: for that may be taught as well as truth. Or it may be opposed to what is light and trifling; for there is such a thing as a strenuous idleness, and there are laborious trifles, things not the less utterly worthless, because they cannot be mastered without infinite pains. Or again it may be opposed to empty show: to that which is slight, loose, and superficial, without depth, heart, or substance. And this was noted long ago by a great thinker, as "the first distemper of learning, when men study words, and not matter." And though these different modes of unsoundness are closely related to one another—for error most commonly springs from the want either of earnestness or of diligence, and is almost inseparable from shallow and imperfect knowledge—it is this last-mentioned distemper that is most immediately to be dreaded in every such seat of learning as this, and that has thrown most discredit upon such institutions,

and upon learning itself. For it cannot be denied that their ordinary teaching is chiefly conversant with words, and that there is a constant tendency in men, but especially in youth, to "study words, and not matter;" to make language a substitute for thinking, instead of an instrument or vehicle of thought. And there is perhaps especial danger from this temptation when the language they have to deal with is foreign, and has been long extinct as a living speech, and is only to be acquired through the medium of books. Hence the value of such studies has often been called in question, especially in our day. It is however to be hoped that the occasional abuse will never be permitted to drive out their legitimate use, but rather will give way to it more and more. If the written monuments of ancient wisdom and genius which have been spared to us were no way superior to those of later times; if they were not inestimably precious in themselves both as records and as models, both for the purpose of informing the mind and of cultivating the taste; still they would have acquired a value which they can never lose, and for which no equivalent can ever be found in the productions of modern intellects, from the fact that the noblest spirits of Christendom have been quickened and moulded by their influence, and that the greatest works of our modern civilization itself, to which they have so largely contributed, would, without the light which they throw on it, be in a great degree unintelligible to us. To depose these studies from the place which they have hitherto occupied in every system of liberal education would be virtually to sever the past from the present, and so to lose all sure guidance for the future, and to throw society back into a state of barbarism, in which all thoughts are engrossed by the concerns of the passing day. And, among its other more particular consequences, one would be to lock up the fountains of revealed truth, and to reduce the sacred oracles to a sealed book and a dead letter.

The question, therefore, is not, or at least ought not to be, as to any change in the kind of learning required, but as to the quality which constitutes it *sound* learning. And such it will be where due care is taken that language is applied to its proper use; that

it serves as an instrument, not only for expressing thought, but for shaping it into distinct well-defined forms, fit for the reasoning faculties to work upon; that all the notions it conveys are subjected to the test of exact weight and measure; that the learner is trained to regard truth as the fountain of all intellectual beauty; to examine the most splendid creations of poetry and eloquence in her pure *dry* light; to seek for and aim at clear conceptions before brilliant display; never to rest content with any partial glimpses, any vague, dim, shadowy outlines, but to gaze upon the images of the remote past, until they are brought home to his mind with the vividness and force of a present reality.

And then I would add that the instruction he receives should likewise be *large*. But here too it is necessary to explain and distinguish; for the term is relative, and will convey no clear meaning, unless it is referred to some standard of comparison. The soundest learning may be confined within a very narrow compass; but so long as it retains its quality, it will be the more valuable the wider the range over which it is diffused. On the other hand, the field of knowledge is boundless, and the attention is distracted, and time and faculties are wasted, if they are employed upon a too multifarious variety of objects. To find a just mean between such a pernicious dispersion and an excessive concentration of the youthful energies is one of the great problems of modern education. But there is a growing disposition to believe that the circle traced by the usage of former times for the objects of learning may be profitably extended; and that a system which only opens a few pages of the volume of History, without unrolling any portion of the book of Nature, is not sufficiently large. And this is an opinion which it would not be wise or safe for us to disregard. The extent to which it may be beneficially carried into practice is a question which must be left to the judgment and experience of those with whom the responsibility rests. But I venture to think that a course of education will not long be commonly accounted large or liberal which confines itself, even in its early stage, to a single branch of knowledge, and which does not at least open an access to the rest, by embracing

such studies as are preparatory to them, by exercising the faculties which are especially employed upon them, and by giving such an insight into their nature as may awaken an intelligent curiosity, and a desire for farther proficiency in them.

And once more, and above all, I would say that the education afforded by such an Institution as this should be *practical*. And by this I mean neither to include nor to exclude that which often passes under the name, as if alone entitled to it; the knowledge which is applicable to the supply of the material wants of society. I could not admit that the sciences which are connected with this object are either eminently practical or eminently progressive, unless I believed that historical knowledge has no bearing upon action, or that it admits of no enlargement from future observations and discoveries. But when I speak of *practical* education, I am speaking of that quality without which no education deserves the name, and which involves the highest end of all learning. What that end is I may express in a few words better and weightier than my own. Our great sacred poet, whose learning was only inferior to his genius, when he was about to sketch a scheme of education so large and comprehensive, that it would seem as if our age must have degenerated from one in which so vast a thought could be conceived, prefaces his proposal with this description of its ultimate object. "The end," he says, "of learning is to repair the ruins of our first parents, by regaining to know God aright, and out of that knowledge to love Him, to imitate Him, to be like Him, as we may the nearest, by possessing our souls of true virtue, which, being united to the heavenly grace of faith, makes up the highest perfection."* And it is evident that this is an end which must be kept constantly in view, and that the providing for it is not a business for which particular seasons are to be set apart, so that it may take its turn with the others, but one which should be going on at all times. The discipline of the mind should be kept subservient to the discipline of the heart and of the will. Truth should be exhibited in its eternal triune being, as inseparably united with Beauty and Goodness. I have

* Milton, *Of Education*. Works (Pickering), vol. iv. p. 381.

said that Truth is the fountain of beauty ; and the Father of modern philosophy observes, "Certain it is that truth and goodness differ but as the seal and the print ; for truth prints goodness." This is the impression which we would have continually made on the learner's mind by all his studies, whether they relate to the works or to the ways of God, to nature or to history. In all he should be led to seek, and to love, wherever it is found, the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Where such is the prevailing spirit of the place, the School becomes holy ground ; a temple ever ringing with the exhortation : "SURSUM CORDA." UPWARD, HEARTS—upward, above all paltry, sordid, grovelling aims and desires : upward, to a level with the dignity of your calling, the privileges and duties of your station, the importance and arduousness of your work : upward, to a fellowship with the wise and good of all ages and all nations : upward, to the Father of Lights, the Fountain of all Goodness : LIFT UP YOUR HEARTS. And from the inmost depth of many devoted wills there rises the clear response : WE LIFT THEM UP UNTO THE LORD.

It is only when it has been thus purified and hallowed by charity and piety that knowledge is sublimated into that wisdom of which such excellent things are spoken, and to which such glorious promises are made, in the word of God. The Royal Preacher indeed, immediately after that commendation of wisdom which has furnished a theme for our present meditations, subjoins a reflection which, like many in this singular and difficult book, has a perplexing and a saddening sound, as if it came from another voice than that which had just declared : "Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly, as far as light excelleth darkness." For he proceeds to say : "The wise man's eyes are in his head ; but the fool walketh in darkness ; and I myself perceived also that one event happeneth to them all." To the wise man and to the fool ; but that one event which happens to them, as to all mankind, is the only point in their history that is common to both. To the wise man and to the fool ; but not to wisdom and to folly, any more than to light and to darkness. For light and wisdom spring from the same Divine perennial Source, and can never be

quenched or pass away. To the wise man and to the fool—to him who devotes his laborious days to the cause of truth and goodness, and to him who wastes his time and faculties upon selfish, frivolous, or mischievous pursuits—there happeneth one event: one in its nature; but how different its consequences for the one, from those which attend it for the other! The one closes a misspent life in an unblest unhonoured grave, with shame behind, and terrors before him. The other rests from his labours: but his works follow him. His memorial has not perished with him. Even upon earth he lives on in the remembrance of the wise and good. The torch he carried is not reversed, but handed down to give light to future generations. His hope is full of immortality. That for which, and in which, he lived, can never die. His name is enrolled among those who stood on the side of light against darkness, of good against evil. He will share their triumph. When all the powers of evil shall have been put to flight, when the last shades of darkness shall have melted into the perfect day, he will still be found amid that glorious company, beaming with the light of heavenly Wisdom, glowing with the warmth of infinite Love.

THE APOSTOLICAL COMMISSION.

AN ORDINATION SERMON PREACHED AT ABERGWILI CHURCH, DECEMBER 21ST, 1845.

“Then said Jesus to them again, Peace be unto you : as my Father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when He had said this, He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost : whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them ; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained.”—JOHN XX. 21—23.

THERE can be no difference of opinion among Christians as to the importance of this passage ; and it would be superfluous to point out the various circumstances which invest it with a peculiar weight and solemnity. It would not be too much to say that, next to what was said and done upon the Cross, the transaction here recorded is the most momentous to be found in the whole of the Gospel history. If, on the Cross, our Lord gave Himself for His Church, it may be said that, in the act and the words related in the text, He gave Himself to her, with a solemn formal investiture, which stands quite alone in her annals, as it is indeed the very basis of her constitution, and the origin of her visible existence. Nor need I remind any one who has attended to the Service in which we have been engaged, that this passage is specially connected with that work, both as the foundation of the whole, and as our warrant for the most essential part of it. While for these reasons it might be presumed that this portion of Scripture has already received much attentive consideration from those who are most immediately concerned in it, it must be added that it is one which involves questions of no slight difficulty, which have given rise to much variety of opinion. This would perhaps be sufficient to recommend it as a subject for our meditations on this

occasion. Another motive for the selection is, that the passage of our Ordination Service, which is immediately derived from the words of our text, is one which has, I believe, given much offence to many persons who have been used to attach a particular sense to the words, without suspecting that they admit of any other. It may therefore be profitable for all of us to inquire—though it must be with a brevity ill proportioned to the vastness and importance of the subject—what may be gathered from the text with regard to the character, powers, privileges, and duties of the Christian ministry. You will have observed that each of the verses I have read presents a distinct topic for investigation. The first describes a mission, or commission, accompanied by a solemn benediction: “Peace be unto you: as my Father hath sent me, even so send I you.” The next expresses a mysterious endowment, visibly represented by a symbolical act: “He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost.” The last contains the terms of the authority annexed to the commission, and the end for which the endowment was bestowed: “Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained.” Though these sayings are evidently most closely connected with one another, as parts of one solemn act, it will be necessary to consider them severally, in order to comprehend the import of the whole. And first the description of the commission given in the words, “As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you.”

I. There is a question which often occurs, and which sometimes raises a difficulty in the interpretation of language addressed by our Lord to the Apostles; that is, in what capacity they are addressed. For the Apostles, we know, stood in three distinct relations to their Divine Master. They might be considered simply as believers in His doctrine, a character which they bore in common with Christians of all ages; or as preachers of His Gospel, just as others were, both in their day and ever since; or, finally, as exercising a ministry peculiar to themselves, which was specially designated by their distinguishing title of Apostles of the Lord. What is said may be applicable to them either in all or only

in some of these characters. And on this hangs another very important question, namely, whether the subject of the discourse is something merely temporary and occasional, or of perpetual and universal application.

Now, in the case before us there can be no doubt that the Apostles are addressed, not in a private and personal, but in a public and official capacity. This is evident, not only from the original selection and appointment of the Twelve, to which there is a manifest reference in the terms used on this occasion, but from the very nature of a commission. Individual Christians, as such, have a calling, duties, privileges, which separate them from the unbelieving world, but they are not described as sent, as bearing a commission, in that sense in which it is said, "How shall they preach except they be sent?" and again, "He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers." And that is, if possible, still plainer from what is added in the last part of the text, as to the authority which accompanied the commission, which is manifestly such as could not be exercised by private persons.

There may seem, at first sight, more room to doubt whether the commission was given to the Apostles as such, or in their more common character of pastors and teachers. If the commission was one peculiar to them, it must have been intended to terminate with their lives; if otherwise, it was to be continued by a succession. And this furnishes us at once with a satisfactory answer to this part of the question. For it is clear that the commission was to last throughout all ages. This would be sufficiently proved by the declaration, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world," since that declaration was made to the same persons, with reference to the same commission. But it is also abundantly manifest from the nature of the authority with which they are invested in this passage itself. For the remitting or retaining of sins, however it may be understood, is something which equally concerns the Church in all ages, and which cannot be supposed to have been limited to the personal ministry of the Apostles. They must therefore be considered here as addressed in a representative

character; as the beginning of a line, which was to run down to the end of time. One thing indeed still remained peculiar to them, even with regard to this commission: that it was given to them immediately; that they stood next to the Fountain-head of all authority and power; that they were the beginners of the line, and therefore may very well be believed to have been distinguished from all who followed them, not indeed as to the commission itself, but as to their qualifications and means of executing it.

Proceeding then to consider what is here declared as to the quality of the commission, we find that it is described, not directly and explicitly, but by a comparison with that which Christ Himself had received from the Father: "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you." And certainly no language could convey a more awful idea of the importance, the dignity, the sublimity of the commission than this. But the language is very large, and some caution may be required to avoid both unduly narrowing and straining it by an inadequate or an extravagant sense. Let us see then what may be safely inferred from that comparison. And, in the first place, it clearly imports a firm and complete assurance, and so very naturally followed the gracious benediction, "Peace be with you." It was as much as to say, "Whatever certainty you have that I came forth from God, the same you have that you have been sent by me. As surely as he that hath seen me hath seen the Father, even so surely he that hath seen you hath seen me: he that heareth you heareth me. He that receiveth you receiveth me. As my Father hath taught me, even so have I taught you. As I have borne witness to the Father, even so shall ye bear witness to me. As the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you. The words which the Father gave me, I have given unto you. The glory which the Father gave me, I have given you." These, I need not remind you, are in part the very expressions of our Lord Himself, and all that is implied in these and others to the same effect is summed up in the emphatic words, "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you." But, beside this identity of assurance, by which the Apostles were enabled to feel exactly the same confidence in the validity of their

own commission as in that of their Lord's, the comparison in the text suggests either an identity or at least a close resemblance of character and object between their commission and His. If they were sent by Him, even as He had been by the Father, it must have been for the same end, and, so far as was possible and needful, in the same manner; that is, in the same capacity, and with the same or like functions. But here we must be very careful not to refer this identity or resemblance to points which do not admit of such a comparison, so that we may not in any degree derogate from our blessed Lord's supreme and unapproachable dignity, by confounding things which He was graciously pleased to communicate, with those which were necessarily reserved and peculiar to Himself. Our Lord's commission included the three offices of Prophet, Priest, and King, and there can be no doubt that in a certain sense these offices have ever been exercised in the Church under the commission received by Him: the prophetic office in the various forms of preaching and teaching; the priestly, in the administration of Sacraments, in intercessory prayer and benediction; the kingly, in pastoral rule, discipline, and superintendence. And yet it is no less certain that, in another sense, He is the only Prophet, as the Author of that revelation which was afterwards propagated by His witnesses and messengers, who could only deliver to others that which they had received of Him, without any power to alter or add to its contents. He is the only High Priest, who once for all offered one sacrifice for sin, even the body which was prepared Him by the Father, and then for ever sat down on the right hand of God; and that which remained to be done by His ministers upon earth was not to repeat or renew this sacrifice, but only to show it forth, to commemorate it, to plead its merits, to dispense its fruits, and "by Him to offer the sacrifice of praise to God continually." And once more, He is the only King, the sovereign Lord and chief Shepherd of His Church, and those who fill the highest stations in it bear only a delegated rule, to be exercised within the limits, and in conformity to the laws, which He established for them. All are but his vicegerents, and no one of them is more so than the rest. But that they are this, seems to

follow by most direct and certain inference from the words of the text. For as one of the powers which He received from the Father was that of sending the Apostles in His name and stead, so there can be no doubt that their commission was one which they were empowered and obliged to transmit to others, that it might be handed down to the remotest generations.

II. We have next to consider that portion of the text which is of peculiar interest to us on the present occasion, as containing words of our Lord which the Church has seen fit to put into the mouth of her chief pastors for the admission of candidates to the ministry. These words form one undivided saying, which however falls into two parts, so distinct from each other as to require that they should be discussed each by itself. The first describes the endowment annexed to the commission: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." And the solemnity of the words, when first uttered, was heightened by a symbolical act, which is not recorded to have been used by our Lord on any other occasion, and which, if it produced no other effect on the Apostles, must at least have deepened the impression which the whole transaction left upon their minds. "He breathed upon them," and thus sealed the awful and mysterious grant by a sensible token. "Receive the Holy Ghost." These words sound as if it were impossible to doubt about their meaning, and yet they give room for some grave and difficult questions. The first is, whether they are to be considered as signifying an immediate conveyance of something to be presently received by those to whom they were addressed, or only a promise to be fulfilled at a future time. The form of the expression no doubt appears to imply a gift which was to come into immediate possession of the receivers. But there are circumstances related elsewhere which point to a different construction of this passage. We know that a great and memorable effusion of the Holy Ghost did take place shortly after, on the day of Pentecost; and we find more than one intimation that this was the occasion on which the Holy Ghost was first given. On the occasion of the Feast of Tabernacles, when our Lord stood and cried, "If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink. He that

believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water," the Evangelist adds, "(but this spake he of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive: for the Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified,)" which most probably refers to our Lord's glorious ascension. Again, He Himself, when He consoles His disciples with the promise of the Comforter, distinctly announces that the Comforter was to come only after His own visible presence should have been withdrawn: "If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send Him unto you." And after His resurrection He commanded them that they should not depart from Jerusalem, but wait for the promise of the Father, which He proceeds to explain by the words, "ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence:" and "ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you;" expressions manifestly signifying the great outpouring of the day of Pentecost. And there is another important fact which tends toward the same conclusion. At the time when our Lord spoke the words, "Receive the Holy Ghost," only ten out of the eleven Apostles were present. And not only was Thomas then absent, but he had not yet seen or believed in the risen Saviour. Yet it is clear that the gift was intended alike for all of them, and there can be no doubt that Thomas shared it in equal measure with his colleagues.

But yet, before we can come to any satisfactory conclusion on this question, it will be necessary that we should notice another, which is closely connected with it: that is, as to the particular purpose and object for which this gift of the Holy Ghost was designed. We know that the descent of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost was manifested by an extraordinary influx of light and power into the infant Church, by which it was prepared to meet the impending conflict with its fleshly and spiritual enemies. But it does not appear that on the occasion described in the text the Apostles received any such illuminating and enabling influence: and, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that the gift of sanctifying grace had already been bestowed upon them in

some good measure, as this was a blessing which our Lord had expressly implored for them after the Last Supper: "Sanctify them through thy truth." "For their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also might be sanctified through the truth." If then the gift was not to answer any of these purposes, for what end was it given? The end appears to be very clearly indicated by the words which immediately follow in our text, and which describe the authority conferred on the Apostles, and on those to whom it should be delegated by them. The gift was undoubtedly bestowed with a view to the exercise of that authority, and the amount and compass of the endowment adapted to that object. And then we see in the first place how, being designed for the Apostles in a representative capacity, it might be conveyed to all, though one of them was absent at the time; and further, that it matters little whether it be considered as immediate or prospective. It was, in fact, both, inasmuch as it was made by a declaration that, so far as was needful for the administration of the authority with which they were invested, the presence and aid of the Holy Ghost should never fail them. It only remains then to consider the nature of that authority to which the gift was annexed, which will at the same time help us to form a more exact notion of the endowment itself, and to understand the mind of the Church, when she repeats the words on such occasions as the present.

III. "Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained." Here we enter upon ground which has been the field of much controversy. Questions have arisen, and are still agitated, as to the nature and the extent of the authority described by these words. According to one interpretation they import nothing more than is implied in the preaching of the Gospel: that is, a declaration of the terms on which, under the Gospel dispensation, remission of sins is to be obtained. According to another view they signify an authority to apply this declaration to particular cases, in the form of an absolution, by which it is pronounced that the sins of individuals are remitted unto them, with an assurance that the sentence pronounced on earth is ratified in heaven.

It may appear at first sight that there is a very wide difference between these two interpretations; and, in fact, there are many persons who would admit and contend that the first kind of authority was given, not only to the Apostles, but to all Christians, according to the measure of their light and knowledge; while they would either deny that the other kind of authority was ever given to any one, or would maintain, that if at all, it was given only by way of special privilege to the Apostles, but not to be transmitted by them to any others. Now it cannot be denied that the doctrine of priestly absolution has been so abused in the unreformed Church as to sanction and foster the grossest and foulest superstition. But if we only look to what is properly implied in the two interpretations above stated, we may find that the difference between them is by no means so great as is commonly supposed. This will be evident from the consideration of one unquestionable truth. It is certain that none can forgive sins but God only. This is not denied in theory even by those whose language and practice appear to trench most upon this Divine prerogative. And from this it follows, that no absolution given by man can be anything more than a declaration, either general or particular, that sin has been forgiven by God. Now such a declaration is made in general terms whenever the Gospel is faithfully preached. Such preaching is in substance a statement of the conditions on which forgiveness is bestowed. But if the declaration relates to a particular case, it is evident that, without a special Divine revelation, it can only be a conditional declaration of forgiveness, made on the supposition that the required conditions have been fulfilled. Every Christian has a warrant to say to his brother, "Repent and believe, and thy sins shall be forgiven thee;" but before he can say with certainty, "Thy sins are forgiven thee," he must either have received some supernatural assurance of the fact, or he must qualify the declaration with the condition, "if thou repentest and believest;" and this condition must always be understood to be implied where it is not expressed. So that absolution, in whatever form it may be pronounced, can effect no real change in the state of any man before God. It can only convey the same kind of comfort as is

imparted by every proclamation of the Gospel, when it is brought home to a truly penitent and believing soul.

But then, if this is the whole amount of the authority conferred by the words of the text, what, it may be asked, was the purpose of the gift of the Holy Ghost, bestowed or promised immediately before with such extraordinary solemnity? And why should it be needed for this exercise of the Christian ministry more than for any of its other functions? I must own that I am unable to find a satisfactory answer to this question, and yet this is only one reason which induces me to take a different view of the subject. I believe both the interpretations we have been considering to be faulty; not as being positively wrong, but as falling short of the truth, and unduly narrowing the scope of our Lord's words. And I hold it to be a sound and very important principle in the exposition of Scripture, always to prefer the most comprehensive sense which its language will fairly admit, to one of more partial application. Consider for a moment the object to which the authority in question relates—the remission of sins—and recollect that it is nothing less than the object of the whole Gospel Dispensation. In the remission of sins every blessing of the Christian covenant is virtually included; because, through the riches of the Divine mercy, all others both depend upon it and are annexed to it. The procuring therefore of this highest good of fallen man is the one great end of all the institutions and ordinances of the Church of Christ. The preaching of the Word, the administration of the Sacraments, the services of the sanctuary, the ghostly counsel and advice, the rules and exercise of holy discipline, are all designed to be instrumental to the remission of sins. All, in their various degrees and proportions, are parts of the ministry of reconciliation; and there seems to be no reason for supposing that the words we are considering apply to one more than to another. The authority given may well be considered as an authority to dispense these manifold means of grace, coupled with an assurance that whenever they are rightly received, they shall be effectual for the purpose for which they were appointed,—the remission of sins; while those by whom they are wilfully and obstinately rejected

shall forfeit the proffered benefit, shall find the gate of mercy closed against them, shall remain unreconciled, unpardoned,— shall die in their sins. And then the gift of the Holy Ghost, which accompanies this authority, is a promise that this Divine Agent, on whose operation the efficacy of all the means of grace entirely depends, shall never cease to abide in the Church where they are ministered, shall be ever ready to impart His gracious influence, and to shower down upon them the quickening dew of His blessing.

Now from this view of the subject we may gather several important inferences. In the first place, it enables us clearly to understand the meaning with which these words of our Lord are used in our Ordination Service. This is no vain and bold assumption of any power which belongs solely to Him; but, on the contrary, it is a humble and faithful repetition of His own gracious promise: it is a solemn declaration that the persons to whom these words are addressed are hereby invested with this office and ministry of reconciliation, and with all the rights and privileges pertaining to it, are authorized dispensers of the means of grace committed to His Church. But it does not imply that they receive any new measure of spiritual illumination, or any increase of personal holiness.

And hence it is that you, my brethren, over whom these words have been pronounced, may derive from them at once the amplest encouragement for the exercise of your ministry, and the most awful warning against the neglect and abuse of it. On the one hand you are assured by them that if, according to the vows which you have made, you devote yourself with your whole heart to your Master's service, there is no kind or amount of blessing and success which you may not reasonably look for to attend your ministrations. You may confidently plead His gracious promise when you implore from Him a larger and larger measure of light and strength to aid you in your work. And even if the means of grace which you dispense should fail to produce the effect for which they were ordained, you will have the comfort of knowing that the fault does not rest with you, and you will be able to

render such an account of your stewardship that, though you must do it with grief and not with joy, you will receive the reward of the good and faithful servant, and be admitted to enter into the joy of your Lord.

But then, on the other hand, you will be led to feel the more deeply the weight of the responsibility which rests upon you. Remember that the gift which you receive on this occasion is given with respect to your office, "for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God," and not to your persons; that it is given primarily and mainly for the benefit of those who are committed to your charge, and that you have no special security that it will personally profit you. The means of grace which you dispense, while to others they are a savour of life unto life, may to yourselves be a savour of death unto death. But as this perversion of them from their proper use will in you, more than in any others, be a sin against light and knowledge, against mercies and warnings, against opportunities and advantages peculiar to yourselves, so to you the forfeiture and the penalty will be doubly bitter, grievous, and shameful.

And yet this is not the worst. For the measure of your own sin will be pressed down and heaped with the sins of others which lie at your door. It is true the efficacy of the ordinances which you administer does not depend upon any power or holiness of yours, but on the sure promise of your Lord: and to as many as receive them with an honest and good heart, they will not yield the less fruit on account of your defects or unworthiness. But you can never know—never before the Day of Judgment—to what extent, not only your worldliness and evil example, but your sins of omission, your coldness, your carelessness, your indolence and timidity, may chill and stifle the germs of the dispositions required for profiting by the means of grace; how often your unfaithfulness may intercept the blessing which would otherwise have attended them.

Go forth then to your work, as from the personal presence of your risen Lord: as if you had seen the prints of His wounds, had heard His words from His own lips, had felt the movement of

His sacred breath. Consider yourselves as sent by Him, to return before long with an account of your commission, which He will receive sitting on the throne of His glory. In all the labours and trials of your ministry, let His blessed image be still before your eyes, and His gracious salutation ever sounding in your ears, "Peace be unto you." If you faithfully "keep that which is committed to your trust," if you diligently "stir up the gift of God," if you patiently "endure hardness as good soldiers of Jesus Christ," then that peace, a peace which the world can neither give nor take from you, will surely be yours, and will abide with you, until it greets you again at His second coming, as a joyful welcome to His everlasting rest.

ENGLISH EDUCATION FOR THE MIDDLE CLASSES.

A SERMON PREACHED AT THE OPENING OF ST. JOHN'S SCHOOL, HURSTPIERPOINT,
JUNE 21ST, 1853.

[DEDICATION.]

TO CHARLES JULIUS HARE,

ARCHDEACON OF LEWES.

MY DEAR HARE,

THIS Sermon belongs to you by more titles than one: as it would neither have been preached nor published but in compliance with your wishes, and in deference to your judgment. When I was, most unexpectedly, requested to undertake it, I at first shrank from the task, because I thought that it required a more intimate knowledge of things and persons connected with the subject than I could bring to it. Indeed, if I had been fully aware at the time of the extent to which difference of opinion had arisen with regard to the Institution to which the Sermon relates, I am not sure that I should ever have consented to take such a part in the proceedings of the Inauguration. My reluctance however was overcome by the warm interest which you expressed in the success of the undertaking, and the entire confidence you placed in the character and principles of its Founder and Director, with whom I had not previously the slightest personal acquaintance. When I considered your means of information, your official responsibility, and the well-known bent of your theological views, it appeared to me that I might safely accept your

testimony as a sufficient warrant for believing all that it was needful for me to be assured of in such a case. I remembered also that I should not be pledging myself to an approval of anything more than had been publicly declared, as to the general design and character of the Institution, and that I should have an opportunity of guarding myself, as far as might be necessary, against any misconception of my own views on the subject. And it was no doubt with this object that you so strongly urged me to send the Sermon to the press: and in so doing I have the satisfaction of following your example as well as your advice.

This little explanation seemed due to myself, but I should hardly have troubled you with it, if I had not wished to add a word or two more.

The case which has called forth these remarks is one of a kind which must be continually recurring in days when religious and ecclesiastical controversy is so rife as in ours. If in such times an institution, having any bearing on the interests of religion or the Church, is set on foot with the unanimous approbation of all parties, it is pretty sure that it must be one utterly worthless and insignificant. In general, the amount of opposition which it will have to encounter will be nearly in proportion to its value and importance. In such cases it may often seem doubtful where sanction and encouragement may be rightly bestowed. Zealous partisans will look first of all to the quarter from which a new project proceeds, and will view all which do not wear their own colours with incurable jealousy and distrust. There is another class of persons—I fear not a small one—who make it a rule to keep aloof from every undertaking which is anywhere spoken against. That is no doubt for themselves the safest, easiest, and, above all, the most economical course; though, if universally adopted, it must paralyze all healthy action in the Church. But for those who are averse to such partisanship, and to such neutrality, there are two maxims on which I should myself always wish to act, and by which, if I am not mistaken, you have been guided throughout the affair now under our consideration. One is, that persons who make great sacrifices for public objects are

entitled to large credit for the sincerity of their professions, and deserve to have the most favourable construction put upon their proceedings. It is no doubt very satisfactory to find that the charges which had been brought against the management of the Hurstpierpoint School have, after a strict investigation, turned out to be unfounded. But I can well believe that, while they were pending, you never for a moment allowed them to shake your confidence in the Provost of St. Nicolas College, and I think that such trust was no more than he had fairly earned. The other maxim is, that when we are satisfied with the general spirit and tendency of an institution, we should not take offence at matters of detail which may appear to us questionable, or even clearly injudicious, but should be ready to concede the greatest possible latitude to the judgment and taste of those who are responsible for them, short of a direct violation of principles. It would be vain and unreasonable to expect that any man should be found willing to devote all his energies to a great work, if he is denied such freedom in the choice of the methods and instruments with which he is to carry it on.

Certainly some very strong grounds should be assigned to justify any one in deliberately withholding his support from any earnest attempt to better the education of the middle classes. It is not however the importance of the object alone that has interested me in the undertaking of which the Hurstpierpoint School forms a part. It appears to me no less worthy of attention and of sympathy as an example of the mode in which the principle of association may be applied to meet the wants and to speed the work of the Reformed Church. I am not indeed surprised that every such application should be viewed by many with jealousy and uneasiness. I will not deny that, even when conducted by the most trustworthy hands, they will always stand in need of watchful superintendence to guard them from abuse. But I am not the less convinced that it would be not only matter of reproach to our Church, but an alarming symptom of constitutional weakness if she was forced to renounce the use of this powerful instrument, from inability to wield it without hurting

herself. You know with what happy results the principle, disengaged from the corruptions of monasticism, was applied to the work of education by the *Fratres vite communis*, in the latter half of the fourteenth century, in the Netherlands; what a wholesome influence they exerted on the whole frame of society; and that in their schools the germs of the Reformation were fostered by the light of sound learning, and the warmth of that genuine practical piety which glows in the *Imitatio Christi*, the work of one of their disciples. It was, you know, the silent, but emphatic protest of their life and practice against the fundamental errors and actual abuses of monastic institutions, that exposed them to the hostility of a part of the clergy, but especially of the monks and friars, against which they had to struggle, and which threatened their communities with premature extinction, from which they were saved partly by the noble advocacy of Gerson and one or two other eminent men who were in advance of their age, and partly by the happy short-sightedness of the rulers of the Church, who did not perceive the extent of their own danger. It is, I think, to be regretted that this memorable and instructive chapter of Church history is much less generally known in this country than it deserves to be. I believe that it might not only be found highly suggestive and encouraging to many kindred spirits, but might serve to counteract an impression which seems to be widely prevalent among us, that there is something of a Romanizing tendency essentially inherent in all similar attempts. The time, I hope, is not far distant when this prejudice will be dispelled by our own larger experience, and I trust that you will long have the pleasure of seeing the plan in which you have taken so lively an interest contribute every year more and more toward this most desirable end.

I am, my dear Hare,

Yours faithfully,

C. ST. DAVID'S.

ABERGWILL. July, 1853.

[THE SERMON.]

“Commit thy works unto the Lord, and thy thoughts shall be established.”
 PROVERBS xvi. 3.

WE have come together to implore the blessing of the Most High on the outset of a new Institution, to place it under His safeguard, and to dedicate it to His service. Though the Church does not specially adapt her language to this occasion, the thought which is uppermost in every mind has no doubt given the key to all our praises and prayers. The work has just reached that stage at which men, in all their undertakings, most readily acknowledge their need of the Divine aid for a prosperous issue. It is when a long course of laborious preparation has been completed; when the precious seed has been carefully deposited in the well-tilled soil; when the gallant ship, strongly built and richly freighted, is about to leave the port on her first voyage for a distant shore; when the child of many earnest prayers and anxious watchings and long and patient training is on the point of quitting the parental roof to go forth into the world,—at such junctures, if ever, it is that men realise their dependence on the Divine favour, and feel how inadequate are all the provisions of human pains and foresight to ensure the fulfilment of their wishes. And so on this occasion, in proportion to the interest we take in the success of the design which is embodied in the new place of learning to be this day opened, shall we be disposed to join in the Psalmist’s strain of pious humility, “Except the Lord build the house, their labour is but lost that build it.”

But still we know that it would be an idle and a sinful presumption to rely on God’s help as a substitute for our own endeavours. If the house be ill-planned, if it be constructed of unsound materials, or built upon the sand, we have no right to expect that an arm will be outstretched from heaven to stay it from falling. On the contrary, we could not consistently call upon God for His blessing on any of our works, unless we were convinced that, in its own nature, it is such as He may regard with a favourable eye. We could not reasonably commend it to His keeping, unless we

had taken every precaution in our power to secure its stability. We could not piously consecrate it to His service, unless we were conscious that nothing had been wanting on our part to make it capable of ministering to His holy will. And therefore, in this solemn pause of anxious hope, when, if we looked into ourselves, we might be disheartened by the sense of our own weakness, and, if we looked out to the future, we might be disturbed by the remembrance of the numberless crosses which may baffle the calculations of the most far-sighted prudence, it may be not unseasonable or useless to fix our minds for awhile on the undertaking itself, to contemplate it as in the Divine presence, and to satisfy ourselves that our newly finished work is one which we may commit unto the Lord, with a well-grounded though humble confidence that He will establish our thoughts. If we would assure our hearts before Him, we must be able to give an account to ourselves, as in His sight, of the *end* we have in view, of the *means* by which we propose to attain it, and of the *principles* on which we proceed.

I. It is necessary above all things that we should take a clear view of the *end* we have set before us, so as to be convinced that it is worthy of the efforts and the intercessions we make in its behalf. And surely, if we only regard it in its true light, we can hardly overrate its importance or its sacredness. For, if we look far enough, I think we must see that it is nothing less than this—to fit our people for filling the place, and for doing the work, which God has appointed for them. What these are, is a point at which we need but glance very slightly here. We have had assigned to us a place in some respects the foremost among the families of the earth: the most conspicuous, the most envied, the most exposed to danger, the most difficult to maintain; the foremost in wealth, in power, in extent of influence, in opportunities of action, whether for good or evil. And when we look back at the small beginnings of this amazing greatness, when we note how minute a speck on the face of the globe is occupied by the imperial seat of this vast dominion, we can hardly help feeling, what nothing but a foolish pride could lead us to forget, that our place has been

fixed by the counsels of Divine Providence, in immediate connexion with the very highest of His purposes in His dealings with mankind. For, as the place, so is the work manifestly entrusted to us; the greatest and noblest with which people was ever charged—to be the pioneers of God's way through the desert regions of the earth; to be the carriers of His truth, and of all the social blessings which spring from it, to the rudest and most degraded tribes of our race. It is the office claimed long ago for England by one of the greatest of her sons, *to teach the nations how to live*, but enlarged far beyond any bounds which it is possible for his experience or even his imagination to trace.

But the fact that we have been placed in this eminent station, and have been invested with this glorious mission, is no proof that we are worthy of so great a trust, or that we have come up to the mark of so high a calling; still less is it a guarantee that we shall always remain where we stand, and keep that which we possess. The history of God's chosen people of old time, which the Apostle made the ground of his warning, "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall," might suffice to admonish us that privileges can never be secure where the duties incident to them are neglected. And it may teach us this further lesson: that no ruin is so fearful as that which awaits those who have forfeited the highest privileges through unfaithfulness to the most important duties. Indeed it needs no such signal example, nor any special revelation, to assure us that whenever a high post is unworthily filled, a weighty task consigned to incapable hands, there is a violation of the eternal laws of Providence, a derangement of the natural order of things, which must be disastrous in its consequences, just in proportion to its extent and to the magnitude of the interests involved. And so we shall not be stretching our view too far, even if it takes in all the manifold relations by which the welfare of our country is bound up with the destinies of the world. It may be said with truth, in more than one sense, that nothing human is foreign to us. Not a pulse beats in the heart of England that is not felt to the extremities of the earth. And there stands not on English ground a home so lowly that it

may not be shaken by the recoil of events which come to pass in the opposite hemisphere.

But perhaps it will be said, all this may be true enough, but it does not seem to have any direct bearing on the occasion which has now brought us together. It does not prove that we have need of anything more than to move steadily on in the same track by which we have reached our present prosperous condition. It may be a reason why we should not slacken our watchfulness and diligence, but it furnishes no apparent motive for embarking in any new undertaking. What has succeeded so well in time past may surely suffice for the future. But we can hardly wrap ourselves in this persuasion, unless we both overlook the most evident signs of the times, and shut our eyes to all that is passing immediately around us. If there is one thing that every day's experience teaches more plainly than another, it is that the past is no sure index or adequate measure of the future. It is that we are living on the eve of mighty changes in the state of the world. It is that we have need to be prepared for many new and strange emergencies; to gird ourselves for trials and struggles such as our nation never passed through before. So that even if it were true that hitherto we had no shortcomings to reproach ourselves with, this would be no just ground of confidence in the sufficiency of the provision we have made for the time to come. But how little does even the most superficial, if it be but an honest review of our past doings warrant such a self-complacency! Alas! every day brings fresh disclosures to shame us out of it, to show how carelessly, how slothfully, how selfishly, how unfaithfully we have dealt with much, if not with most, of what has been entrusted to us. It is perhaps the most hopeful symptom of our present state, that we do not shrink from the inquiries which lead to this humiliating result; that we do not refuse to confess our omissions and misdoings; and that we are making some earnest endeavours to redeem past neglects, to repair present deficiencies, to husband our means more thriftily, to turn our opportunities to better account.

And in no point has this consciousness of unsupplied wants and unfulfilled duties been more widely and more deeply awakened

than with regard to the very subject which is now occupying our attention—the teaching and training of the young. It would seem as if we had just begun to open our eyes to the evident truth, that this is indeed the most momentous of all national concerns, the condition of all social well-being, stability, and healthy development; that the strength and wealth of a nation consist, not in extent of territory, not in forts and arsenals, not in well-filled coffers, not in the variety and abundance of its material resources, but in the quality of its men, in the quality of their manhood; not merely their thews and sinews, but their minds, and hearts, and souls; and that this again depends, partly indeed on their natural gifts, but still more on the way in which they have been reared. And then, when we set ourselves seriously to inquire how we had been conducting this great affair, it appeared that we had left it in a great measure to take care of itself; that we had been trusting, if to anything, not to any efforts of our own for securing the desired result, but to the operation of causes which had been working almost in spite of us, to mitigate the evil consequences of our apathy and improvidence.

Now however we see the fruits of this newly roused interest in the subject springing up all around us, not only in schemes and discussions, but in institutions for extending the benefits of education to the children of the poorest in the land. It was indeed natural and praiseworthy that the movement should in the first instance take this direction, that it should be drawn toward the largest and most destitute class. And it would be difficult to overrate the importance of elevating the moral and spiritual condition of that class which is the basis of the whole social edifice. But it would not have been right or safe that public attention should have been so concentrated on this object as to overlook the claims of those classes which stand higher in the social scale, or that it should have been assumed that for them there was no need of any like exertions. Doubtless it is the glory of a Christian State that it regards all its children with an eye of equal love; that it recognises their title to an equal share in every benefit which it belongs to the State to dispense; that it abhors the distinction by which,

in the most enlightened communities of the ancient world, the great bulk of the population was doomed to ignorance and debasement, while the highest intellectual and moral culture was jealously reserved for the privileged few. It is the especial glory of our own institutions that they place no impassable barrier between different degrees of men; that they open a broad road, which passes by every cottage door, for honest industry and honourable ambition to make their way from the lowest rank to the very front of the throne. But still parity of rights does not imply equality of powers or capacities, of natural or accidental advantages. And common sense forbids that we should lavish our care on those who are least able to profit by it, while we withhold it from those by whom it would be most largely repaid. The class which is compelled, from an early age to the close of life, to devote the greater part of every day to the toilsome earning of its daily bread, may be endowed with no scantier portion of the common heritage of humanity than that which is exempt from this necessity. But it is manifest that those who are subject to such a pressure must, as a body, remain behind those who enjoy larger opportunities of cultivating and exercising their natural endowments. Every one who has had anything to do with the education of the poor has had painful experience of this fact. And it brings us to the conclusion, that the class so providentially privileged is that which affords the true measure of the national intelligence, which exhibits the genuine stamp of the national character, and is the legitimate organ of the national mind and will: and consequently, that on the intellectual and moral condition of this class must mainly depend the degree in which our people is fitted to fill the place and to execute the work appointed for it among the nations of the earth.

II. And then comes the question, whether all has been done that lies in our power for the accomplishment of this great object. But it would be a waste of our time to discuss this question. If it admitted of a doubt, if the inadequacy of the *means* previously employed had not been deeply impressed on many thoughtful and earnest minds, the building to be this day inaugurated would never have arisen. The plan which it embodies was grounded on the

conviction, suggested by most palpable facts, that the work of education for the middle classes had on the whole been grossly neglected; that there had been a deplorable waste of the time and resources dedicated to it, or available for it; that it had been allowed in numberless cases, if not in the great majority of the whole, to fall into incompetent hands, and had been degraded into a mere instrument of sordid gain. It was felt to be desirable that it should be taken out of such hands, and committed to those who would conduct it in a spirit of devoted zeal, befitting its weightiness and sanctity, and not in a mechanical routine, but with a clear apprehension of its nature and its objects. It was thought possible at once to raise the average standard of education, and to bring it within the reach of a larger part of the community. It was believed that private endeavours, supported by the voluntary aid of those whose hearts were stirred by the undertaking, would suffice for the purpose. It was confidently hoped that the plan, as soon as it had begun to be partially carried into effect, would work its own way, and propagate itself by the simple attraction of its influence, and the example of its success.

It is indeed clear that in this way only it could be reasonably either expected or desired that such an undertaking should advance and establish itself. It must carry the pledge of its prosperity and permanence in itself. It must stand—if it is to stand—by virtue of its own inherent vigour, and not lean upon any outward stay. It must recommend itself to general acceptance by its own efficiency, and by the benefits which mark its progress, or it will soon pass into the number of well-meant, but unsuccessful experiments. But when we consider the class for which it is designed, we find good reason to trust that the hope in which it was conceived will not be disappointed. Institutions for the education of the poor have, as we well know, frequently to contend not only with the indigence, but with the apathy of parents, who have not knowledge sufficient to appreciate the advantages offered to their children, and cannot be persuaded that they outweigh even the most trifling addition to the weekly earnings of the family. In those of a higher grade, such ignorance and indifference are probably rare exceptions to

the general rule. It is commonly not from want of due anxiety for their children's welfare, nor because they are blind to the value of education, that they rest satisfied with the poorest makeshift that may be offered to them in its name, but only because nothing better has been placed within their reach. When they are convinced that it rests with themselves to obtain for their children a training which will fit them for all the relations of life, will enable them to make the best use of all the talents with which they have been gifted, and of all the opportunities which Providence may put in their way; in a word, will lay the firmest foundation for their temporal and eternal welfare—when they are once assured of this, we need not doubt that they will eagerly avail themselves of this inestimable privilege, and will not readily take up with anything short of it.

All therefore depends on the intrinsic merit of the system which is to supersede the imperfect provision before made for this object; and the consideration of the means to be employed ultimately resolves itself into that of the principles on which the work is to be carried on. It is indeed a great point gained to be sure that here *are* principles in action; to know that they have been the spring, and will be the life of the whole undertaking, and will set their stamp on every part of it; that those who are engaged in it are labouring both earnestly and thoughtfully, not from blind impulse, but from a deep conviction, which they feel to be worthy of all their toils and sacrifices. This indeed is no security against errors of judgment, but it is a ground of reasonable trust that they will not affect the main design, and will be amended as soon as they are discovered, and that the principles on which it is worked out will be in unison with the spirit in which it was formed. I should indeed hesitate to touch on this part of the subject, if I was to speak as one who was either competent to bear witness, or entitled to tender advice. But it will be sufficient to advert to a few points, which seem to me indispensable conditions of real and lasting success in such an undertaking, and which are more or less directly involved in what has been already said of its character and aim.

III. The *principles* which should guide its course are implied in the nature of its destination. They are not arbitrary rules, but conditions necessary for making it that which it professes to be. It is designed for the education of English youth in the middle of the nineteenth century. And this simple description marks its place in the present, and its relation to the past and the future. Unless it answered to this description, it would not be a real living thing, and would have no right to take up room in God's world, and no power to occupy it long. Its business is not with human nature in the abstract, it is not to bring up citizens of the world, but it is the fashioning of English minds and hearts, to fit them for such work as belongs to English men. Those who are to come under its training are heirs to as rich a patrimony as people ever handed down to its posterity. Of them it may be truly said that "the lines are fallen to them in a fair ground; yea, they have a goodly heritage." They number some of the most illustrious of earthly names among their ancestors. They claim a share, by virtue of their birthright, in a countless store of spiritual wealth, amassed by the patient thought, and hard struggles, and persevering labour, and generous sacrifices of many generations, deposited in their national laws and institutions, in their language and literature, in the opinions, feelings, and habits of society. The history of their native land, the lesson of the nations, enriches them with an inexhaustible treasure of heart-stirring recollections and heroic examples. Among all its vicissitudes there is none from which they need turn away with shame, or with unmitigated regret; none which does not reflect the image of the national character; none in which there has not been an earnest, and not a fruitless seeking and striving for truth and right; none which has not contributed its share to the attaining or securing of some invaluable blessing, not only for their country, but for mankind. It must therefore be the highest aim of the education to be given to those who have been so signally favoured, to prepare them for entering on this noble inheritance, to qualify them for the exercise of the privileges to which they are entitled by their birth, and to render them worthy of the name they bear. And for this end it

is plainly needful that they should learn to prize the good which has fallen to their lot, and to feel the vantage-ground on which they stand; that they should be used to cherish the ties which bind them to the past; to love and venerate the wise and good of former generations, and, drawing the chief nourishment of their own spirits from the same sources as they, to grow up in communion of thought, and feeling, and principle with them.

Every sound system of education—above all of English education—must be thus rooted in the past. It can only thrive as long as this connexion is preserved, and must wither and die if that be severed. But the conviction of this truth, especially if it should seem to have been overlooked or to be impugned, may lead to an opposite extreme, equally dangerous. It may suggest a futile and mischievous attempt to offer violence to the eternal order of things, to the law of continuity and progress, by which God works and reveals Himself in the history of mankind. It may so exaggerate the claims of the past as to withhold what is due to the present and the future. A well-meaning but short-sighted zeal, in the warmth of its admiration for some bygone period, may be tempted to think it desirable, and to fancy it possible, to transport the rising generation into that happy region, and to keep it immured there, shut out from all communication with the views, and wants, and strivings of a degenerate age. But all such schemes are not only visionary and idle, but also self-contradicting, faithless, and godless: they inevitably issue not simply in failure and disappointment, but in a reinforcement of all the influences which they are meant to counteract, and an aggravation of all the evils which they pretend to remedy. How can we consistently profess to look back with veneration and love to the past, while we deny our sympathy and regard to that which has sprung from its loins? How can we view it with an intelligent admiration, if we believe that it has been barren of all wholesome and abiding fruits? How can we heartily rejoice in it as a dispensation of God's Providence, when we shrink with dread and loathing from its divinely appointed sequel? How can we trust in Him as one who brings good out of evil, while we represent Him as evolving evil out of

good? And how, without an excess of presumptuous folly, can we think to set any human device in the way of His chariot wheels, and not expect that they will grind it to dust? Such a system of retrograde movement and unnatural constraint, so far as it succeeded in working upon the minds of the young, would mar the fairest features of that character which it is the proper object of English education to unfold and ripen: its manliness, its truthfulness, its freedom, its love of the real and the practical. For those on whom under God rest the best hopes of England for the next generation, we must desire that they should go forth to their allotted tasks, not only with all the aids of knowledge suited to the times in which they live and to their place in society with which we can furnish them, but also with a due sense of the happiness and the dignity of their calling. We would not have them boast that they are better than their fathers; but we would wish them to feel, with humility and thankfulness, that they have been in many things more highly favoured, more richly endowed: that they have a broader field open to their endeavours, larger rewards to stimulate their industry, more abundant helps to smooth their way: though it may be also with peculiar trials, snares, and difficulties besetting it. And so we would have them set their faces toward the future with fresh spirits, and brave hearts, and elastic hopes, and generous aspirations, and a firm trust in God, yet with a solemn consciousness of dependence and responsibility, and a deep conviction of their need of energy and watchfulness for a prosperous and honourable career.

There may be room for much difference of opinion as to the specific nature of the preparation best adapted to these ends. It may not be easy to decide between the competing claims of different branches of mental culture, or to light upon the right mean between a course of study which concentrates the faculties within too narrow a circle, and one which disperses them among too great a multiplicity of objects. Happily however these are not the points of gravest moment, and on those which are most material the nature of the Institution itself will still suffice to guide us to a safe conclusion. A system of education adapted to the genius of our

people must be sound, solid, and practical. It will strive to do its work thoroughly. It will not rest in any outward show, but will try to go below the surface, and to reach to the core and essence of the thing it has to deal with. It will set less value on the amount or kind of knowledge it imparts than on the exercise of the intellectual faculties, and the degree in which they are trained for the business of life. But neither will it be satisfied with the furnishing of means and the preparation of instruments, but will aim at taking possession of the central seat of government, and of the powers by which the instruments are to be wielded, and the means employed for the purposes of the agent. That is to say, it will bestow its chief care on that habitual direction of the affections and the will which constitutes the character, and which determines the real worth and usefulness, of the man. In other words, it will regard religion—not religious knowledge, or the employment of the memory and the understanding, or the imagination, upon religious subjects, but religion in its application to the heart and the conscience—as its great concern, that to which all others are to be kept constantly subordinate.

Here indeed it may seem that we have come upon ground where all reference to national distinctions must be dropped as common and profane: where “there is neither Jew nor Greek; neither bond nor free.” And no doubt this is true, so far as regards the history and fundamental doctrines of our faith. But in another point of view there is no subject in which we have more need to remember our national traditions, attributes, and privileges: none in which it more behoves us to be on our guard against what is foreign, no less to the broad lines of the English character than to the first principles of Christian truth. We ought never to forget, and we have now special occasion to bear in mind, on the one hand, that our reformed religion was planted by the wisdom of a gracious Providence in our land, as in a congenial soil, where it would strike deep root, and send forth mighty branches, and yield fruit abundantly for the nourishment and the healing of the nations: that it satisfied both the earnest searchings of the English mind, and the instinctive cravings of the English spirit, and so inter-

twined itself with the fibres of the English heart. And on the other hand, we are bound thankfully to acknowledge that it is to this best of God's gifts we owe not only our national greatness, but our social happiness: the noblest passages of our history, and the richest blessings of our homes. And therefore we have reason to believe that on the faithfulness with which we preserve this sacred deposit unimpaired, on the steadfastness with which we guard it against open aggression and insidious encroachments, on the care and diligence with which we hand it down to the next generation — on this depend our prospects, not merely of power and glory, but of well-being, honour, and safety for the time to come.

The plan of this Institution affords, as we trust, the best warrant that could be devised to assure us that here this great object will be kept steadily in view, that its rightful supremacy will be fully recognised, and that it will be realised as far as human infirmity permits. For the work will be carried on by those who have been already dedicated to a ministry which comprehends the maintenance and transmission of pure religion among its most essential functions, and who are bound by the most solemn vows "to draw all their cares and studies this way." And therefore we may venture to commit this work unto the Lord, and humbly to claim a share in the promise that our thoughts shall be established: as believing that this work falls in with that which He is bringing about for the education of this portion of His family, and through it of those who are farther removed from the knowledge and obedience of Him and of His Son: and that our thoughts are in their measure in accordance with His own, as revealed to us in His word and in His ways. But we would beseech Him so to take this matter into His hand, that whatever there is in this work that is not of Him, but of ourselves, may be purged away and disappear in the light of His countenance, and that all of it that is indeed His may grow and prosper under His mighty protection, and may never go to decay or suffer hurt through the feebleness or unsteadiness of the human hands to which it may be committed. We would pray Him so to establish our thoughts that they may be less and less liable to waver and be carried about by any gust of passion,

any breath of worldly favour, any blast of vain doctrine, but may be more and more firmly grounded in the unchangeable counsels of His infinite wisdom: that our judgments may more surely approve that which is true, that our affections may be more constantly drawn toward that which is divinely beautiful, our wills be more steadfastly fixed on that which is supremely good: that if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, we may think more earnestly, more lovingly, more devotedly, on these things. And we would implore Him without whom nothing is strong, nothing is holy, that He would vouchsafe so to fill the house which we are about to open with His presence, and to pour His blessing on its inmates, that they may walk in it, as in His sanctuary, with a perfect heart, and with minds stayed on Him; that all their works may conduce to His glory; that their thoughts may be ever bent on His service, and that He would help and govern them as those whom He would bring up in the steadfast fear and love of His holy name.

THE SPIRIT OF TRUTH, THE HOLY SPIRIT.

A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, MAY 16TH, 1869.

“When He, the Spirit of Truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth.”

JOHN xvi. 13.

THE event which the present Festival brings before our minds marks the culminating epoch in the Gospel history, and the date of a new era, which may be fitly termed the Nativity of the Church. This is the last of our historical Festivals. That of next Sunday is the consecration of a dogma, not the commemoration of an event. This is not a mere ecclesiological fact; it is one of the deepest practical meaning. What does it imply? It implies that the Church neither knows of, nor looks for, any event which shall constitute a like epoch,—like in kind, and not merely in the degree of its importance,—until the “times of restitution of all things,” when her warfare shall be accomplished, her labour ended, her work finished: that the state of things in which we are now living is the last dispensation of Christ’s Church militant here in earth; that the gift which she received as on this day is the whole of the portion with which she was endowed for the term of her earthly career. And from this it may be inferred, that nothing essential was wanting to the Pentecostal Church, and that whatever it possessed that was not to be permanently retained was not essential. To find what was essential, and therefore to endure throughout all ages, to survive all changes, outward and inward, in her condition, we must ask, How did the Holy Spirit manifest His Presence?

That the advent of the Paraclete was ushered in by some extraordinary sensible signs is so evident, that it has not been denied, even by those who treat the whole as an outbreak of vulgar, credulous fanaticism. These signs served the purpose of convincing the brethren that their Lord's promise was fulfilled, that the expected Comforter had come. They passed at once out of that state of quiet, prayerful waiting, in which they had remained, without attempting any act but that of completing their number, into a full assurance of faith. If we cannot by any effort of imagination form a perfectly distinct idea of the sensible phenomena which were, not indeed the groundwork, but the occasion of this belief, we may console ourselves with the reflection, that here, as in Horeb of old, the Lord was not in the rushing mighty wind, nor in the tongues of fire, in which His operation could be recognised by none but those who already believed; but rather, with regard to those who were yet outside the Church, in the still small voice which echoed the appeal of Peter, when they were pricked to the heart by his discourse, and, having come to mock, remained to ask, "What shall we do?" To the Apostles themselves His Presence was attested by the consciousness of a new power, by which they were armed alike for suffering and for action, with indomitable courage, immovable confidence, and unquenchable hope. This was an effect which they had been led to expect by their Lord's parting words: "Ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you." And the fulfilment consisted, not merely in the strengthening of that which was before weak in them, but in a new creation, a hitherto unfelt, intellectual, moral, and spiritual life.

It is not however to this aspect of the event that the Church directs our attention to the Collect of the day, in which she may be thought to trace the line of meditation which she deems most appropriate to the Festival. There she insists on the "teaching of the heart," which the faithful had received by "the light of God's Holy Spirit," and treats "a right judgment in all things" as the chief blessing we have to desire from Him, or at least as the condition required to the end that we may "rejoice

evermore in His holy comfort." This again is a function which holds a prominent place in our Lord's description of the character and work of the Paraclete. He was "the Spirit of Truth" to be sent to "guide" those to whom He should come "into all truth."

We are obliged indeed to limit the breadth of this promise, as well by the nature of the case as by the facts of our experience. We know that the truth into which the Apostles were to be led by the guidance of the Holy Spirit was not even to include any part of that which is held by some to be all the truth that man is capable of learning; that it was not to reveal any secrets which are the objects of scientific research; not to deepen our insight into the physical constitution of the universe, or to sharpen the faculties by which we explore its various regions, whether for the satisfaction of a noble curiosity, or to win fresh gain to the material interests of society.

It is not surprising, however much to be deplored, that some of those who—as so many in this place—are engaged in rearing or in surveying that vast and majestic fabric of purely human knowledge, so beautiful in its structure, so rich in its contents, so manifold in its uses, should find in it enough to satisfy all their intellectual cravings; and, as they carry it on, or mark its continual upgrowth, should persuade themselves, like those workers of old, that they are building them a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven, and command an unobstructed view of all things visible in heaven and earth. It is no wonder that those who are so occupied should be disposed to look down with a feeling akin to contempt on other spheres of knowledge, and to question the reality or the value of all truth which is foreign to their system. But, at whatever cost, we must frankly admit that the truth which is the substance of our Lord's promise, and which it was a main end of the mission of the Holy Spirit to impart, is such as does not at all concern the results of scientific inquiry, and contributes nothing to its discoveries. We may believe it to be of a higher order, of larger application, of infinitely greater value; but we admit, or rather we earnestly contend, that it belongs to an entirely different field; and we only desire not to be drawn

into the error of either confounding the one with the other, or of seeking to depreciate the value, or to circumscribe the compass, of that in which our own work does not lie.

But even after we have thus separated the kind of truth which it is the province of the Holy Spirit to teach faithful hearts, from that which man acquires by the spontaneous exercise of his natural faculties, we find that even in that order of things to which the promise of a supernatural guidance unquestionably belongs, its fulfilment can only be understood under considerable limitation. If it was to be taken in the fulness of its literal sense, there would be no mystery in our religion that has not been unveiled, no depth in our theology that has not been fathomed. The scope of the promise must evidently be restricted by the object and design of the teaching. And there was no danger of any mistake in this respect on the part of those to whom the promise was made. They were familiar with the sense in which the terms *knowledge*, *wisdom*, *understanding*, *instruction*, and the like, are used in the Old Testament, especially in the Book of Proverbs; and when they were admonished by their Lord just before His departure, that "it was not for them to know the times or the seasons which the Father had put in His own power," He plainly indicated the character and the measure of that truth into which they were to be guided. It was truth needful and profitable for them; such as would make them wise unto salvation, and fit them for the work they had to do in His service. It was that which Timothy was led to expect by St. Paul when he wrote, "The Lord shall give thee understanding in all things." It is in the same sense that the Apostle describes *doctrine* as the *profit* to be reaped from the study of the Scriptures;* for when he elsewhere speaks of things "contrary to sound doctrine," the things which he enumerates are all gross transgressions of the moral law.† This is the sense in which the Church on this day teaches us to pray that we may have a "right judgment in all things." It is not an illumination of the speculative intellect, but a quickening and guiding of the moral sense, and for practical

* 2 Tim. iii. 16.

† 1 Tim. i. 10.

purposes; enabling us to discern between good and evil, not as they are presented to us in the abstract formulas of ethical systems, but as they appear to us in the realities of life, where they are often so blended together as to lose their proper shape and colour, and to render it one of the most difficult of problems to distinguish one from the other, though issues of infinite moment may hang upon our choice.

Accordingly we find that the terms on which the new converts were admitted into the Church on the day of Pentecost, though, in the moral point of view, so hard, that nothing short of the mightiest operation of the Holy Spirit could have enabled any one to accept them, were, in their demands on the intellect, so light and simple, that they would now hardly seem sufficient for very tender years. St. Peter's answer to the question, "What shall we do?" was, "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins." To repent and be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ,—to pass out of one inward state into its opposite, to transfer their affections from the objects toward which they had been habitually drawn, to others by which they had been constantly repelled; to fix their faith and hope on One whom they had hitherto scorned and hated;—this was indeed a great thing, too great for man's unassisted strength. But the truth proposed for their assent, though it required a strenuous effort in the surrender of the will, was open to the capacity of the most unlearned and ignorant. The only confession of faith exacted from the three thousand neophytes who were converted by the preaching of St. Peter appears to have been that contained in the Baptismal Formula prescribed by Christ Himself; and St. Peter's language seems to imply that he used a still more compendious form, treating the three Sacred Names as virtually included in that of Jesus Christ: which was also deemed sufficient in the case of the Samaritan converts,* of the Ethiopian eunuch,† and of the disciples whom St. Paul found at Ephesus, baptized only "unto John's baptism."‡ It is true that in this Baptismal Form lay the germ of a vast theology. There is no

* Acts viii. 16.

† Acts viii. 37.

‡ Acts xix. 5.

question in the Sum of Aquinas that may not be said to be wrapped up in it. But as to such, the mental state of those primitive believers was one of implicit, inarticulate faith, which was only to be developed in other minds, in the course of ages, into systems of which they had no consciousness or foreboding.

If, after having contemplated the picture exhibited in the Acts of the little household of faith which was gathered round the Apostles at Jerusalem, we let our thoughts drift down the stream of time, and observe the change which has taken place, when the grain of mustard seed has waxed a great tree, we feel as if we were transported out of a patriarchal tent into the court of David or Solomon; and it is not without difficulty that we recognise the identity of the mediæval with the primitive Church under such widely altered circumstances. And the difference consists not merely in the enlargement of local area, in the increase of numbers, in the elevation of worldly position, or in the manifold visible consequences of this outward aggrandisement. We find it accompanied with a doctrinal development bearing a like proportion to the simplicity of the original creed. The question arises—and it is warmly debated in our day—What view are we to take of this development? Is it to be regarded as a gain, or as a burden and a yoke to the Church? And how far is it to be ascribed to the promised agency of the Spirit of Truth?

This question may and should be kept apart from the historical circumstances under which the development took place. It is not a decisive answer to the question, to point—as may easily be done—to the wildernesses of arid unfruitful speculation, to the arenas of strenuously idle controversy, to the battle-fields of theological rancour armed with the weapons of a carnal warfare, or the still more dreadful fields of blood shed on the scaffold and at the stake, in the name of religion, and to the greater glory of God, through which the stream of Ecclesiastical History so often winds its mournful course. There is no necessary connexion between such scenes and the unfolding of religious dogmas. But irrespectively of these accidents, the general tendency of modern thought is apparently indifferent or adverse to that precision of ecclesiastical

definitions which was once universally regarded as the noblest employment of a Divinely enlightened intellect. Nor does the question turn on the accuracy of the definitions, or on the character of the development, as genuine or spurious, healthy or morbid. The objection is not taken from a Protestant point of view, or confined to what in this place I may still venture to call the aberrations of the Mediæval Church, which are still proceeding before our eyes to ever-lengthening degrees of extravagance. It includes much that is not denied to be true, but is not admitted to have contributed to the well-being of the Church.

We cannot do justice to this question unless we bear in mind that the attitude of the Church, in the evolution of her theology, was at first, and in the main throughout, one of self-defence. She did not advance, by a spontaneous impulse, to the conquest of new realms of thought. She only resisted aggressions which threatened her freedom and her peace. And many of the errors which she was early compelled to combat were not only unauthorized additions to her simple creed, not only wild fantastic dreams of disordered imaginations, but were intimately connected with principles which tended to subvert the whole moral law, and which would have deformed her character, and have poisoned the very springs of her life. The doctrinal writings of the Apostles are mostly polemical, forced from them by the need of guarding their flocks against such dangers: and the controversial element is ever subordinate and introductory to the weightier matters of holy living, on which they felt the real interest and importance of the controversy to depend.

It was impossible indeed to contradict error without the assertion of the opposite truth. But it may be admitted that the positive teaching was never strictly confined within the bounds of the occasional necessity, and that it was constantly tending to reach farther and farther beyond them. This it is that we sometimes hear deplored as a cumbrous superfluity and morbid excrescence, which wasted the strength of the Church, and diverted her activity from the proper work of her heavenly calling. Probably however none would dispute the right of minds which feel the

attraction of the study, to devote their faculties to such speculations, in which so many powerful thinkers and holy men have found the highest and happiest employment of their lives. Few would deny that they are supplying a real need of kindred minds when they bring logical sequence, light, and harmony into spheres of thought which were previously dark and confused. But here we must distinguish, as we do in many secular studies, between common and special uses. The public safety may require that some should dedicate themselves to the art of war. They may be no braver, may not love their country better, or be more willing to sacrifice themselves to its service, than those who are occupied with civil pursuits. But courage and patriotism might be of no avail in the hour of need, without military science and skill. These are a common good, though it is not necessary that all should possess them. And so we do not undervalue the work of the theologian, or deny its usefulness, though to the mass of Christians it remains an inaccessible mystery. But still we hold that the best thing he has, if he is indeed a Christian, is that which he has in common with the most unlearned and ignorant of those who "have been with Jesus." It is that which it has seemed good to the Father "to hide from the wise and prudent, and to reveal unto babes."

The Spirit of Truth is also and above all the Holy Spirit. It is as such that he appears throughout the Bible, from the first page of Genesis to the last of Revelation. No doubt we must resign ourselves to the consciousness of our utter inability to trace His working through the successive stages of nature and of history. We must reconcile ourselves to the admission that "God's ways are not our ways, nor His thoughts our thoughts." Is that so hard a confession for a creature whose dwelling-place is as a grain of sand on the seashore? But yet it is given to us to see, in the light of experience, that the result of that brooding of the Spirit of God over the seething chaos has been an ever-clearer manifestation of a loving will, presiding over its development, of a reign of law, order, beauty, and goodness, gradually prevailing in the midst of seeming planlessness and confusion, and culminating in a

kingdom of God upon earth. The Spirit of Truth is essentially one with the Spirit of Holiness. We can indeed distinguish, in theory, between the operations which belong to the one and to the other of these characters, but we cannot conceive them as really apart from each other; and, without supposing such a separation, it is hard to believe that His light ever illuminates the intellect, without, in some measure, purifying the heart. We are at least bound to require the clearest evidence in each alleged instance, before we admit the fact of a mechanical, unmoral action, exerted by the Holy Spirit on the mental faculties. We would not indeed presume to lay down a groove for an agency which is likened by our Lord to "the wind blowing where it listeth." We can well imagine that the Spirit does not always proceed by the same method. It may be that sometimes He enlightens the heart through the mind, by dispelling prejudices which prevent us from exercising a right judgment in practical severance between good and evil, though his ordinary course is in the opposite direction—from the heart to the head—overcoming the resistance of a perverse will, to open the way for the reception of unwelcome truth. But in every case we must believe that the final object of the whole process is the assimilation of the human soul to His own nature, by that sanctification which is the supreme "will of God," and the proper working of His truth. Therefore our Lord prayed, "Sanctify them by Thy truth: Thy Word is truth." Whether it be reduced to its simplest expression, or elaborated into a technical system, this truth is equally precious in itself. But to those who receive it, it is so only in the degree in which it is felt, loved, and lived.

It is not indeed conclusive against the soundness of the doctrinal development, that the work of sanctification did not keep pace with it; that, on the contrary, progress on the one side ran parallel to decline and degeneracy on the other; that the growth of intellectual activity concurred with that of sluggishness and inertness in the moral sense; that the sharpened rigour of theological definitions was accompanied by the relaxation of godly discipline; that the assemblies in which those definitions were framed fell

more and more under the influence of personal interests and unholy passions; that the ascendancy of orthodox doctrine was simultaneous with the outpouring of the spirit—not of grace, but—of religious persecution; that it was when the doctrinal system had reached a degree of fulness which left room for little subsequent addition, that the Church adopted the maxims and the instruments of the False Prophet, and sheathed the sword of the Spirit, to draw that of Charlemagne and of Godfrey; to drive herds of conquered heathen to the waters of Baptism; and to expel the Infidel from the Holy Places, which were to become scenes and nurseries of a debasing superstition. All this, I repeat, proves nothing against the soundness of the development. But it may suggest a doubt as to the absolute necessity and the supreme importance of acquisitions which, if not purchased at this cost, were counterbalanced by such loss and hurt. It may lead us to ask ourselves what spirit we are of: it may moderate our expectations as to the results of methods of instruction founded on principles which have borne fruits so unlike those of the Spirit.

It is hardly possible to meditate on the import of the present Festival without having our thoughts turned to those awful words of our Lord, "Whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come." It was characteristic of a period when the love of the Church was waxing cold, while controversial zeal was blazing with sevenfold fierceness, that the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, so stamped with the doom of irremissible guilt, was interpreted to consist in an error with regard to the position to be assigned to Him in His relation to the other persons of the Blessed Trinity; that is, in the failing to comprehend clearly, or to enunciate correctly, a mystery hidden from the ken of man in the profoundest abysses of the Divine Being.* Few perhaps in our day carry their deference to antiquity so far as to adopt this exposition of our Lord's meaning. The context indeed in which the words stand shows plainly enough, that what He had in view was not a mere

* Basil, *De Sp. Sancto*, c. 28. Cyril Hierosol., *Cat.* xvi. 1. Ambros., *De Sp. Sancto*, i. c. 3, 46, 47.

speculative opinion, which, however erroneous, might be held with a sincere conviction of its truth. We may well doubt whether, in the sight of God, any such conviction can be a sin. But we may be sure that it is not a sin beyond the reach of forgiveness. The difficulty is rather to conceive how there can be such a state—one into which Divine mercy cannot find entrance—on this side the grave.

It would be usurpation of the Divine prerogative to attempt to single out any particular form of sin as that which was designated by Christ. But we may venture to say that, if there be a sin which, by the immediate effect of its commission, cuts off the possibility of repentance, that is unpardonable sin. Such may be the sin of deliberate suicide. And if there is—as we cannot doubt—a sin against the Holy Ghost which cannot be forgiven, that is, because it is a moral suicide. But we must remember that suicide has its stages and degrees. There is an interval between the thought and the resolution: between the resolution and the deed: between the commencement of the deed and its consummation: and in each of these intervals there is room for repentance. The man who has inflicted on himself what he meant to be a mortal wound has been guilty of the sin, but not in the same degree as if, having failed in his attempt, he was afterwards to tear away the bandages by which friendly hands would have saved his life, and so to complete his self-murder.

The contemplation of the finished act, whether of physical or of moral suicide, is in itself simply saddening and perplexing. It carries us into regions where we find no guidance for thought, no footing for action. But the consideration of the steps which lead, sometimes from a very remote point, and by a very gradual approach, to this fearful catastrophe, may be full of instructive warning.

This warning is applicable to Churches as well as to individuals. The Church of Sardis had a name to live, and was dead: that is, death was stealing through her whole frame: the parts which it had not yet reached were ready to die. This was not a calamity which befell her from without, but was a process of corruption

arising from her own fault, but still capable of being arrested by a timely repentance. The condition of the Church of Laodicea was not less deplorable, and in one respect far more dangerous: for her real misery was aggravated by an infatuation, under which she imagined herself to be in full possession of every good which she most lacked. But this delusion was not an involuntary, innocent error. It was no doubt the fruit of pride and self-complacency, fostered by a habit of self-exaltation in which all communities, civil and religious, are too apt to indulge. It may be also that in one sense she really possessed the advantages which she attributed to herself: that her condition was outwardly flourishing, but that she was destitute of the one thing needful, and that so the things which should have been for her wealth became unto her an occasion of falling. This ignorant self-conceit was no doubt a great obstacle in the way of her repentance; but it was not an insurmountable bar. She was not yet struck with judicial blindness. She had not yet sinned against the Holy Ghost beyond the reach of forgiveness. Being poor, she had said, "I am rich, and increased with goods." Being blind and naked, she had said, "I have need of nothing." But it does not appear that, having wandered far away from the truth, and having led multitudes astray, she had said, "I am infallible." It was reserved for the Angel of another Church to advance that pretension, as the ground of an absolute dominion over the reason and conscience of mankind.

A charge was brought against Manes and Montanus, and other old heresiarchs, that they pretended the Paraclete had become incarnate in their persons. Impartial inquiry, however, has shown that their language was misunderstood or misrepresented, and that the privilege of which they boasted, however groundlessly and presumptuously, was not of such a kind as to dishonour the Majesty of the Holy Ghost. Can so much be said of pretensions which not only imprison Him in a human mind, but inseparably annex the exercise of His very highest function, as the Spirit of Truth, to an official succession of men? Manes and Montanus might have given some colour to their claims by the eminent

sanctity—at least austerity—of their lives. That would not have established the fact, but it would have made it possible to conceive that the Holy Spirit might vouchsafe to dwell in vessels so fitted for His reception. But it is hard to say whether it derogates more from His dignity to suppose that He freely chooses to pour the most precious of His Charismata through the most polluted channels, or that He is constrained to do so by some magical spell ; that He always stands ready to await the result of the most corrupt worldly intrigues, and to set His seal to their success : giving the clearest light of His truth to those whom He leaves in the grossest moral darkness : enabling them to decide the subtlest questions of metaphysical theology with unerring tact, while they stumble against what St. Paul calls “ sound doctrine,” in the first rudiments of godly life. It would be unjust to reproach the Church of Rome with the misfortune of having been not unfrequently governed by some of the worst of men. But when we recollect the character which she claims for them all, we cannot lament that a fiction which so degrades and blasphemes the Holy Ghost, and divorces orthodoxy from morality at the very fountain-head of both, should so often have been put to a crucial test. Her apologists are anxious, as in a question of life or death, to vindicate Liberius from the charge of Arianism, and Honorius from the suspicion of having favoured Monothelite error. They seem unconcerned when Borgia is placed upon the altar, and condemns Savonarola to the stake.

These reflections are, unhappily, not foreign to questions which are now agitating our own Church. But there is one practical inference which seems indisputable. That claim to personal infallibility, which has been advanced of late with growing boldness, and may perhaps be affirmed by a new definition of the Council which is to supplement the decrees of Trent, is either rightful or wrongful. If it is valid, it is the duty of our Church and of every other now separate from Rome to humble themselves before her in the dust, and to seek to be admitted as reconciled penitents within her pale. But as long as we repudiate this claim, it seems hardly consistent with either reason or charity to encourage the delusion of those

who maintain it by importunate sighings and strivings after a union which to them can only mean unconditional submission. And when we mourn over the old division between the East and the West, are we sure that we have not rather reason to be deeply thankful for a Providential mercy, which preserved the Universal Church from a more oppressive spiritual despotism than any branch of it has yet suffered ?

But the occasion seems to call for a more special application to the case of individuals. Those Ephesian disciples who had not so much as heard whether there was a Holy Ghost had, no doubt, much to learn. But though they knew so little of His nature and office, as expounded in our treatises of Divinity, still, inasmuch as they were already disciples, fit to be baptized in the name of Jesus, we cannot doubt that they had been, in a measure, and for the most important practical purposes, unconscious subjects of the Spirit's gracious influence. And need we be untrue to our own convictions, if we cherish a hope that the like may be the case with some in our own day, who, though apparently alien from the Church, uninitiated in her ordinances, unable to reconcile their speculations with her doctrine, as it has been presented to their minds, nevertheless, by the blamelessness of their lives, by the earnestness of their search after such truth as they are able to grasp, and by their active efforts for the benefit of their fellow-men, show that they are not altogether strangers to the Spirit of Truth and Love ? But yet the great intellectual and religious struggle of our day turns mainly on this question, Whether there is a Holy Ghost ? And for those who are engaged in the studies of this place, it is necessary above all things that they should make up their minds, and not halt between two opinions on this vital point.

What is most important is, that they should clearly understand the alternative of that belief which is now on their lips, though they may not yet have grasped it with the energy of a personal conviction. That alternative is really the substitution of the creed of Baal and Ashtaroth ; that is, of the active and passive powers of Nature, not indeed under the same names which they bore in the

old mythologies, but under the philosophical titles of Force and Matter. There is indeed a wide difference between the two beliefs in outward form. The modern does not personify its objects; it does not address itself to the imagination; it excludes every kind of worship and all devotional feeling. But it is equally founded on a myth, which speaks only to the ear, and leaves a void in the brain, no less than in the heart. It affords no more satisfaction to the unquenchable craving of the human mind after an origin and an Author of being. It is not indeed polluted by foul and cruel rites; but its clear tendency, however often counteracted in particular cases by an honourable inconsistency, is to stifle every generous impulse, to check every noble aspiration, to chill every unselfish affection, to make virtue a dream, self-sacrifice an amiable hallucination, moral responsibility an empty sound.

But to those who cling to the belief in a Holy Ghost, and acknowledge His power, there is the danger of a correspondingly enhanced responsibility. If there is an unpardonable sin against the Holy Ghost which may still be committed, it must be one to which those are most liable who most earnestly recognise Him with an intelligent faith. It is only such who can grieve, quench, or do despite to Him. But this they may do in two ways. They may place themselves out of the reach of His agency, and block up the avenues through which He would enter to dwell in their hearts, by wilful, indulged, unrepented sin; they may also expel Him, when He has taken up His abode there, by the admission of evil spirits, which cannot endure His presence, and with which He cannot share His habitation. This is that "falling away after the tasting of the heavenly gift," which in the Epistle to the Hebrews is said to make renewal impossible. That may refer to an act of irrevocable apostasy; but viewed as a state of mind, every such lapse, the longer it lasts, becomes more and more hopeless.

Let us beware of applying a false test to our spiritual condition. The amiable, pious, I might almost say saintly Cowper, under the influence of a remorseless theology, was haunted by the delusion that he was the victim of a horrible decree, predestinated to glorify

God by his eternal reprobation : that his state was that of a wretch struggling with the waves in a dark night, while by the glare of the angry lightning he sees the vessel out of which he had fallen at an ever-widening distance. He woke, we trust, from that ghastly nightmare to find himself in the light of a Father's countenance, and to hear his Saviour's voice saying, "Friend, come up higher!" May none here have to pass through such agony into the joy of their Lord!

But there is a comfort far worse than such despair, and one which far more easily gains admission into human breasts. We read that Cromwell, on his death-bed, under the influence of the same theological system, found repose in the thought that once, in a time long past, he had been the subject of Divine grace. As to the change which had since then passed on him, he appears to have been conscious that it was not for the better, but for the worse; and therefore he was glad to look across the interval to the brighter phase of his inner life. A like experience, my brethren, may be reserved for some of you, who are at the outset of your career full of ardour and of hope. A time may come when a long retrospect may show that you have been unfaithful to the light which was once in you; that you have let the tenderness of your conscience be seared by sensual indulgence; that you have exchanged the fine enthusiasm which warmed your youthful bosoms with pure affections and noble resolves, for the maxims of a hard, cold, greedy worldliness; that you have renounced that devotion to truth which was once your dearest treasure, for some paltry bribe. So it has been with others; so it may be with you. But at least may the Divine mercy preserve you from finding comfort in, or, which is more to be feared, notwithstanding such a consciousness. Rather may the contrast, should it unhappily arise, between the present and the past, be so brought home to your minds as to pierce your souls, before it is too late, with a bitter but wholesome anguish, the harbinger of a true repentance, a holy comfort, an abiding peace!

THE TWO MALEFACTORS CRUCIFIED WITH CHRIST.

A SERMON PREACHED IN ST. DAVID'S, CARMARTHEN, ON GOOD FRIDAY.

“Then were there two thieves crucified with Him, one on the right hand, and another on the left.”—ST. MATTHEW xxvii. 38.

“There were also two other, malefactors, led with him to be put to death. And when they were come to the place, which is called Calvary, there they crucified Him, and the malefactors, one on the right hand, and the other on the left.”—ST. LUKE xxiii. 32, 33.

THE SON of Man has been lifted up in exact fulfilment of His own prediction, “as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness.” That was in fact the first stage of His exaltation to a throne of glorious majesty. But to the eye of man it was simply the consummation of a cruel torture, and exposure to the foulest ignominy. One of the circumstances which aggravated the seeming disgrace of the public execution was that which is recorded in our text. And it was probably contrived by our Lord’s enemies for that purpose: it was at least an additional gratification of their malice. If His cross had stood alone on the top of Calvary, there might have been many among the bystanders who, though knowing little of His life or doctrine, yet, from their general recollections, or from the report they had heard of His public appearance and habitual occupations, would have been ready to believe that He was only paying the penalty of the (possibly just) offence which He had given to the priests and rulers by His new teaching. He might—they would think—have deserved death, even such a death; but His guilt was only that of a fanatic or enthusiast—well-meaning perhaps, though on that account the more dangerous. And so, even though they abhorred that which was imputed to Him, they

would not be able to look on Him without a certain kind of respect, which we cannot withhold from any one who suffers for opinions which, however erroneous, he sincerely entertains. They could not regard Him as, in our sense of the word, a criminal. But when they saw Him associated in His punishment with two ordinary malefactors, they would naturally suppose that He had in some way resembled them in their crime; that He likewise had been convicted of some flagrant breach of human and Divine laws, and had forfeited all title both to respect and to pity. Whether with this purpose or not, His murderers unwittingly fulfilled the Scripture, which had described the Man of Sorrows as "numbered with the transgressors." And this is an aspect of the great scene which the Church at this season sets before us, that deserves our most earnest attention. These three figures reflect a very interesting and instructive light on one another. How marvellous—independently of the fulfilment of prophecy—were the dealings of Divine Providence with the two men who thus shared our Lord's sufferings! For the last three years during which He had been going about in the exercise of His ministry through all parts of Palestine, they had most probably been living in the same country. There may have been times when they were not far from the very place in which He was engaged in His work of mercy. Yet it was morally impossible that they should ever have joined the crowds who flocked to hear the Word of God from His lips. There may or may not have been an outward hindrance, such as fear of the risk of being recognised and detected. But there was a moral obstacle which, without some Divine interposition, was quite insuperable. They were evil-doers, who "neither feared God nor regarded man." They did not even outwardly submit to the laws of society, but lived in open, continual war against it; and thus they were distinguished from all the classes who attended the preaching of John the Baptist, who, however sinful in their lives, all followed some lawful, and more or less respectable, calling. But these men belonged to the utterly disreputable criminal, dangerous class. They were familiar with deeds of violence, and probably with bloodshed. They were at home only in the haunts of wickedness

and infamy. For them and their like, no circle of which Christ was the centre could have any attraction, any more than our churches for highwaymen or housebreakers. On the contrary, every such gathering would be sure to repel and scare them from it, as if it had been girt with a wall of flame. Humanly speaking, the only way by which they could be brought near to Jesus was that which actually came to pass: that their end should coincide with His; that they, the wild, reckless enemies of law and order, should be placed side by side with the Just and Holy One, as His fellows in guilt, to witness and share His dying agony: so close that they could observe every change of His countenance, and hear every word that He uttered as He hung on the accursed tree. But that which it most concerns us to consider in this astonishing spectacle is, that it is the first example presented to us in history to illustrate the power of the cross of Christ. Our Lord had declared, "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." And the Evangelist who records this prediction adds, "This he said, signifying what death He should die." To His disciples at the time this saying was no doubt, like many others which they heard from Him, very mysterious and perplexing; they could not have understood in what sense He was to be lifted up; still less how He was then to draw all men unto Him. Well, now He *has* been lifted up, as He had signified. Now the time has come that He should begin to draw all men unto Him. And on whom should this power be exerted, but on those who were nearest to Him? The Marys, and the beloved disciple, hardly needed or could be drawn closer to Him. It was by the tenderest love that they had been brought to the foot of His cross. But the two malefactors presented a subject every way suited for the display of its attractive virtue. None could need it more; none could put it to a harder or a surer test. "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." The words did indeed need to be interpreted by the event, before it could be ascertained either what was the meaning, or whether, whatever it might be, it was to hold to the full extent of the literal acceptation, or only with some qualification and restriction. There are two points which might

seem open to doubt : the effect of the drawing, and the persons to be drawn. Antecedently to experience, it might have been not unreasonably supposed that the effect of the "drawing" would be to bring all who were so attracted to the uplifted Saviour into the most intimate union with Him. And the word "all," as it stands without any express limitation, might seem to admit of no exception to include the whole race of mankind, past, present, and to come ; so that every child of man should sooner or later be adopted into the family of Christ. But this construction, however probable in itself, however conformable to the best feelings and the noblest yearnings of the human heart, has not been borne out by the facts which have hitherto come within our knowledge. It does not appear that all have been drawn—have been brought under the influence of the cross in any sense ; and even among those who have, there is the greatest possible inequality and diversity in the measure and the mode of its apparent operation. Of this diversity the two malefactors afford a most lively and instructive example. We must observe that the circumstances of these two men were to all appearance exactly similar. All that we know of them is, that they were malefactors, partners in crime ; by their own confession and admission justly condemned to the severest penalty of the outraged law. These, it may well be thought, were not circumstances very favourable to the reception of any moral or religious impression. In this respect it might be said that they must put the efficacy of the cross to the hardest possible test. If *they* yielded to its power, who could ever resist it ? On the other hand, it is no less evident that they enjoyed some singular advantages. St. Paul considered it as a great aggravation of the fault of the Galatians that "before their eyes Jesus Christ had been evidently set forth, crucified among them." But what was that in comparison with the privilege vouchsafed to the companions of the Saviour's sufferings, who beheld Him, not as in a glass, not through the medium of sign or figure, but had His living person literally set forth before their eyes, crucified between them ? Who have ever since been placed in a situation where the virtue of the cross has been brought to bear so directly and so fully

on their whole being? If they were insensible to its influence, what certainty can there be in any case that it will prevail over the obstacles opposed to it? And we may add another spiritual advantage which arose out of their unhappy condition. They were on their death-beds, with the full consciousness that their last hour was inevitably near at hand; but at the same time in full possession of all their faculties. And experience proves that this is a state peculiarly fitted for the admission of religious truth into the mind, and, above all, into the conscience. Ears that have been most resolutely closed against it during life have been known to open to it at the felt approach of death. Hearts that had seemed to be cased in adamant have at such seasons been found to break, and gush out in tears of godly sorrow. It is sometimes argued that man can have no right to take away his brother's life, however it may have been forfeited to penal justice, because the life so taken may involve the loss of an immortal soul, which might be saved if time were allowed for repentance. But experience does not seem to show that the prolongation of life is more likely to produce this effect than its sudden shortening. In truth, this is a work which depends entirely on the agency of Divine grace. The utmost that any human means can accomplish in it is to remove obstacles out of the way. But for this end, can any means be more efficacious than a summons, ringing through the depths of the guilty soul, "Set thine house in order, for thou shalt die, and not live?" Such was the call which these two men had received: a stern but wholesome shock, which snapped every tie that had bound them to the world, chased away the illusions of appetite, the dreams of hope, roused them to a sense of the great realities of their being, awakened the long-silent voice of the inward monitor. Could any preparation be better suited to make room for the attraction of the cross? Well, my brethren, we know what was the issue: one was taken, the other left. That which succeeded completely with the one, utterly failed with the other. The one embraced, the other spurned, the crucified Redeemer. In the one, short as was the time, narrow as was the space, left to him for action, we perceive what, even if they had not been stamped with our Lord's approval, would

have seemed most promising tokens of a true conversion : the lively, though undeveloped germs of faith, hope, and charity ; the self-abasement of a penitent confession ; the entire surrender of himself to One who seemed to be reduced to the same level of misery and helplessness with himself, and whose only visible title to kingship was the halo of truth and holiness which encircled His bleeding brow ; but in whose behalf he found boldness to remonstrate with his guilty associate.

But that which so humbled, softened, and transformed the one, not only wrought no such effect on the other ; it rather served to exasperate and envenom the ferocity and cruelty of his character ; to steel him against pity and remorse ; to make him forget his own suffering in the fiendish pleasure of embittering the agony of One who at all events had never offended him. So far was he from being drawn to the dying Saviour, that the original spiritual distance between them was widened by the temporary bodily nearness. So far was he from being lifted up with Christ from the earth, that, through Christ's uplifting, he sank to a still lower depth of inhuman devilish wickedness. Then, my brethren, what are we to say as to the power of the cross ? How was it exerted in this first trial, which was in many respects so decisive ? How, with His example before us, are we to interpret our Lord's prophecy, " I will draw all men unto me ? " Confining ourselves to this one case, and waiving all larger questions as to great masses of mankind, are we to conclude that the virtue which went out of the crucified Redeemer was directed only to one of the two malefactors, and acted on him with irresistible energy, while the other was left in his previous natural condition ? That would not only be dreadful to believe, but presumptuous to think, unless we had been expressly assured of it. Let us not imagine that the difference in the result proceeded from any arbitrary variation in the will either of the Son or of the Father. Let us not doubt that the love of Jesus was drawn out uniformly and equally toward all who came within its reach ; toward Judas, as toward John ; toward the impenitent, as toward the penitent malefactor. The virtue of the magnet is in itself always one and the same ; but its operation depends on the

quality of the objects which are set before it. And this illustration applies not only with equal, but with far greater, force to things spiritual; for otherwise they would not be spiritual at all, but material and mechanical. Whenever we reason about a power, like Divine grace, which acts upon the souls of men, we shall be liable to fall into the most fatal errors, unless we take into account the awful freedom of the human will. This, and this alone, sufficiently explains the contrast which strikes us in the case before us, and reconciles it with the essential truth of Christ's word, "I will draw all men unto me." We observed that the two malefactors were placed in exactly similar circumstances, which were partly favourable, partly unfavourable, with regard to the impression which the nearness of the crucified Saviour was in itself adapted to make on them. But we see from the event that they possessed no advantage common to both which might not be rendered fruitless, and that they laboured under no common disadvantage which might not be overcome. And we may fairly conclude that it is not on such circumstances that the success or failure of any movement of a Divine converting influence in the soul ultimately depends. But we must remember that the similarity of situation was merely outward. We know a little of them as they appeared to the eyes of men, but nothing whatever of their inward history, and their condition in the sight of God. And in this there may have been the widest possible difference between them. To God alone is it known what were their several temptations and trials; how they were led into their evil courses, and how each of them followed the course into which he had been led. The career of the one may have been a continual progress in wickedness. A riotous youth, in which he cast off the yoke of parental authority, along with the fear of the Lord; hated knowledge, despised reproof, and made a mock of sin; may have steadily ripened—as it usually does—into an utterly corrupted and hardened manhood, in which he worked all iniquity with greediness, pursued his wicked work, not more for the gain which it brought than for its own sake; delighted in corrupting others, and seducing them into his own ungodly ways; grew at length to make evil his good, and good

his evil, so that when he met perfect goodness face to face, it only kindled his fiercest hatred, and became to him an object of scorn and mockery. The course of his fellow, though seemingly parallel, may have been indeed directly contrary. It may have been rather through weakness than through wilfulness that he had turned aside from the right way; rather by the force of adverse circumstances than by his own depravity that he was impelled to cast in his lot among the evil doers. He may have been, as the poet says, "more sinned against than sinning." And he may have been growing more and more weary of the chain which bound him to his lawless trade and his criminal companions; more and more deeply loathing them and himself, and inwardly groaning for deliverance from that bondage of corruption, and from the body of his living death, until he found himself in the presence of the Deliverer, in whom he at once recognised the object of his secret, earnest, though hopeless desires; was renewed in the spirit of his mind, became again as a little child, received the kingdom of God, saw and heard, believed and adored.

Does it seem to any of you, my brethren, that the history of these two men, whatever it may have been, can be nothing to *you*, because it is so unlike your own that it can serve no purpose, either of example or of warning, in which you are or can be concerned? My brethren, there is at least one point of resemblance between their case and ours; and it is the most important of all. However manifold, and however widely diverging from one another, the courses of our lives, they must all come to one end—"we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ;" and then each of us must take his place on the right hand or on the left of the Judge, to hear his final doom. But that place will be the same which we may have already made and taken for ourselves upon earth. That sentence will be only the solemn publication of the great issue of our earthly trial, as it may already have been registered in our own consciences here below. If we are then either accepted or rejected by Christ, it will be only because we had first accepted or rejected Him. And then, along with this awful fact, take another, which is not less certain, though not equally familiar

to all of us; which to some of us may be quite new. And this is, that at every moment of our lives we are either accepting or rejecting Christ, turning either toward Him or away from Him. This bent of our spirits is not the less real, or the less fraught with the gravest consequences, because we are not always conscious of it. If we are rejecting Christ, the thoughtlessness which prevents us from being aware of our true condition is not so much the cause as the effect of a deep-seated alienation of the will. It is true, God be thanked, that in our case, as long as we live, the rejection is not necessarily final. *There* is the great difference which separates our case from that of the two who first tested the virtue of the cross. Through God's mercy, we are not called upon at present to make a choice which is to determine our eternal destiny, and which, if made amiss, will leave no room for repentance. The offer of salvation through Christ, the invitation to come, to entrust and surrender ourselves to Him, is repeated to all of us over and over again. Many of those who consciously reject it now are emboldened by the thought that it will not be too late to accept it hereafter; perhaps draw a delusive comfort from the example of the penitent malefactor, to whom it was made, not throughout a long life, but once for all at the point of death. Be assured, my brethren, that the rejection, the oftener it is repeated or the longer it is continued, renders the final acceptance more and more difficult, more and more unlikely. It is continually increasing the danger, and in the same degree aggravating the guilt, of final impenitence. But more especially is this the case with regard to every fresh occasion on which the offer is pressed upon us with peculiar urgency: as when, in the sacrament of His dying love, "Jesus Christ is evidently set forth crucified among us;" or when, as at the present season, the Church endeavours to occupy our meditations with the history of His death and passion. Every such occasion, if it does not draw us nearer to Christ, keeps us farther from Him; it is a new link in the chain which is binding our will in more and more hopeless bondage; it is a fresh pledge which we give to the enemy of our souls, that his, not Christ's, we will be in the hour of death and in the day of judg-

ment. Let none so waste the present opportunity, so abuse the riches of God's long-suffering. Open your hearts to the call which is now resounding in your ears. Take your stand now where you would wish to be found in the end; not among them that perish, to whom the preaching of the cross is foolishness, but among them which are saved, to whom it is the power of God.

THE RESURRECTION NOT INCREDIBLE.

A SERMON PREACHED AT CARMARTHEN ON EASTER DAY.

“Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the dead?”—ACTS xxvi. 8.

THE question which St. Paul here asks may at first sight appear abrupt and unconnected with the context. But when we consider the occasion on which the Apostle was speaking, we shall soon see that it was perfectly natural and pertinent, being intended to meet an objection which, if admitted, would have been fatal to the cause which he was pleading. He was vindicating himself in the presence of an illustrious and splendid audience—composed partly of heathens, and partly of Jews—before the Roman Governor Festus and the Jewish King Agrippa, together with the chief captains and principal men of the city, from the charges which had been brought against him by the Jews of teaching a false and pernicious doctrine. But all these charges turned upon one point: it was, as the Roman Governor stated it, the question of “one Jesus, which was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive.” This fact—the resurrection of Jesus—was the warrant of his mission, the groundwork of his ministry. Unless this was a real fact, his conversion was an illusion or an imposture; his innovations on the religion of the fathers were unauthorized and profane; his teaching could only pervert and mislead those who listened to him. But if it was a thing incredible that God should raise the dead, then there was an end of the question; it followed at once that the fact on which he relied was a dream or a fable, the ground on which he stood sank from under him, the keystone of his theological system fell to the

ground, the practical application of his doctrine was visionary and fruitless. If the dead rise not, it was in vain for him to allege the history of his own experience; it was vain for him to preach a risen Saviour; it was vain for him to reason of righteousness, temperance, and a judgment to come; his preaching was vain; and the faith of those who were persuaded by it was also vain—beginning in error, and ending in vacancy. Therefore he regards this as the point on which his whole defence rests. And on a previous occasion, when he was brought before the Council of his own nation, he declared that it was touching the resurrection of the dead that he was called in question. Here however it may be asked, Does this correctly represent the real state of the controversy between the Apostle and his adversaries? Might they not deny the resurrection of Jesus without questioning the power of God to raise from the dead? Doubtless in the abstract they might do so; the general doctrine did not by necessary inference involve the particular fact. But it is therefore the more worthy of observation how closely they appear to have been connected together in the Apostle's mind. He speaks as fully convinced that nothing but a general prejudice against the credibility of the thing could prevent any one from yielding to the force of the evidence furnished by the history of his own conversion. And this shows that, with regard to himself, that event, with all its marvellous circumstances, was as deeply impressed upon his consciousness as the reality of his own existence; he had no more doubt about the one than the other, and he was therefore as sure that Jesus had risen as that he himself was alive. And he believed that his testimony must carry conviction to every mind which was not closed by prejudice against the truth. We must also notice the form in which he meets the objection. It is merely in the words of our text. He does not follow them up with any train of reasoning to prove the credibility of a resurrection. He merely appeals to his hearers themselves to consider whether they have anything to urge against it that could outweigh such proof as he had received of it. He takes it for granted that, though they might not actually believe the doctrine, they would not venture to

maintain that it was in itself incredible. And this he did without reference to their peculiar opinions as Jews or heathens. He was addressing himself indeed immediately to King Agrippa, and through him to the Jewish part of his audience. And among the Jews there was the sect of the Sadducees, which said there was no resurrection. But they said so, not because it was even with them a thing incredible that God should raise the dead, but only because the doctrine did not appear to them to be clearly revealed in that portion of Scripture to which alone they attributed a Divine authority. And so, when he preached to the philosophers at Athens, some indeed "mocked when they heard of the resurrection of the dead;" they mocked, as actually unbelieving, and requiring perhaps some more philosophical kind of proof to satisfy them. But "others said, We will hear thee again of this matter." It was not one of which any could undertake to say that it was in itself impossible and absurd.

It may seem perhaps that if the question in the text was even in that age so nearly superfluous, both with regard to Jews and Gentiles, that it might be considered as little more than a mode of reminding the hearers of an acknowledged truth, it cannot be more needed for Christians at this day. But it may be no less useful in the way of admonition now than it was then. And it is a question which may be asked in more senses than one, and which will admit of different answers accordingly, which it may not be unprofitable or unseasonable for us to consider. When it is asked why a thing should seem incredible to men, the question may relate either to the nature of the thing itself, or to the persons to whom it is proposed for their belief; and if it is incredible to them, that may be either because it plainly contradicts the common sense and reason of mankind, or because there is something in the state of their minds or dispositions which prevents them from believing it, though to others it may appear highly probable or even certain. In other words, the proposition may be either absolutely incredible according to the constitution of the human mind, or only relatively incredible with regard to the intellectual and moral condition of particular persons. Now let us apply this distinction to the doc-

trine of the resurrection from the dead, and inquire, first, whether it is absolutely incredible, or even hard to believe; and next, by what classes of persons it is likely to be thought incredible, or at all events to be treated as if it was so.

I. And first as to the absolute incredibility. And here we may observe that when it is asked, why should it be thought a thing incredible that God should raise the dead? the question is not simply whether the thing is beyond God's power to effect. There would be such an extravagance of presumption and absurdity in pretending to set such a limit to the Divine omnipotence as no one could fall into who was worth reasoning with at all. None of the adversaries whom the Apostle had to deal with would have denied God's ability to raise the dead. The Sadducees themselves would no doubt have considered such a denial as blasphemous folly. It is implied in our very notion of the Divine nature that with God all things are possible, unless we choose to consider contradictions—intellectual or moral—as exceptions which qualify this truth. But things which are acknowledged to be possible may, nevertheless, be rejected as incredible on various grounds. They may be within God's power, but not in His will. They may be inconsistent with that which He has made known of Himself; they may be at variance with His laws, and with the established order of His natural or His providential government. Objections of this kind, whether well grounded or not, may seem at least to be free from the charge of arrogance and profaneness. But yet, when we consider them a little more closely, we find that there are very few cases in which they keep within the bounds of reasonable caution, and still less of pious humility. For they commonly proceed upon some false estimate of our own faculties or on our own knowledge, implying that if we are acquainted with a very minute part of God's works or ways we are able to comprehend the whole; that we may form safe conclusions as to the deep things of God from that which lies at the surface, much as if any one should pretend, from the appearance of the soil in his field, to describe the contents of the globe thousands of miles under ground, or should deny that any form of being which is not suited to the

condition of our planet can exist in any of the heavenly bodies. It is true this is not exactly the same thing as circumscribing the Divine power, but it is something nearly as foolish and irreverent. It is in effect to limit the Divine wisdom. It is making our thoughts the measure of God's thoughts, and our ways of God's ways, and thus restricting the range of the Divine operations within the narrow compass of our understanding. Many do this who would shrink from following up their own reasoning as far as it would lead them, and still more from expressing the result in plain words. For this would be as much as to say that God will never do what they are unable to comprehend or imagine. These remarks apply with full force to the doctrine of the resurrection from the dead. It is not pretended by any one that this doctrine contradicts anything that we know with regard to the course of God's dealings with His creatures. On the contrary, it affords an explanation of many things which would be otherwise obscure and perplexing in His moral government. All the arguments against it turn in the end on man's ignorance, and are only good if that be taken as the standard and limit of God's knowledge. Such was the reasoning which St. Paul refutes in the first Epistle to the Corinthians: "Some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" which is the same thing as saying, I will not believe the effect unless I can understand the process by which it is wrought. The Apostle shows, in answer to this cavil, that the doctrine involves no greater difficulty than arises in every change from one state of being to one another, and that the like objection would compel us to deny the reality of numberless things which are familiar to our experience, but equally mysterious and inexplicable to our reason. The process by which the body is restored—whatever it may be—cannot be more wonderful than the transformation of the seed into the flower and the fruit. The successive stages of vegetable and animal life are miracles which are constantly taking place before our eyes—and they imply one which still more surpasses the power of man to conceive—the original act of creative will by which the first elements of the material universe were brought into being. The

discoveries of modern science throw no new light on this subject ; they leave it just as it was ; they neither magnify the apparent difficulty, nor show any new way of getting over it. The Apostle's question remains as unanswerable as ever with respect to any argument that can be drawn from the appearance of nature, "Why should it be thought incredible that God should raise the dead ?" Not certainly because there would be anything more surprising, or (if one may so speak) less to be looked for, in such an exertion of His power than in that by which He first called them into being. Some persons indeed have needlessly perplexed themselves and others by curious speculations as to the changes which bodies may undergo after they have been committed to the earth, so as to render it, as they think, physically impossible for the same particles to be all restored to their original place, as in case they should have entered into the composition of more bodies than one. Now, it is true we might, if it was necessary, safely leave it to the Divine wisdom to provide means for preventing such mixture and confusion. But the whole question might better have been avoided, for it is wholly foreign to the doctrine of Scripture and the teaching of the Church on the subject. We know that "we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in the body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." And in conformity to this, and many other declarations of Scripture, the resurrection of the body is one article of our creed. But Scripture does not inform us that the body which shall appear before the judgment-seat is to be composed of the identical particles which crumbled away in the grave. This would be quite unnecessary for any purpose of retributive justice. We know that throughout life the substance of our bodies is undergoing continual change, which does not at all affect that consciousness of personal identity on which moral responsibility entirely depends ; and the body itself is not the subject, but merely the instrument of reward and punishment. St. Paul himself speaks of the resurrection as accompanied with some great change in the very texture of our bodily frame. It would appear, therefore, that both the language of

Scripture and the ends of the resurrection, so far as they have been revealed to us, may be fully satisfied without the supposition of an absolute material identity. We confess that "all men shall rise again with their bodies," with bodies for all practical purposes the same as those which had been dissolved in the dust; the same in their outward aspect, so as to distinguish one person from another; the same in their structure, so as to be equally capable of ministering to every spiritual operation—of giving an account of their works, and of receiving their consequences, whether good or evil. This is enough for our faith; it is enough for our reason, and it ought to be enough for our curiosity. We might inquire farther, whether there is any reason why it should be thought incredible that God should raise the dead, as being a thing inconsistent with His attributes and dispensations as the moral Governor of the universe. But here the difficulty is all on the other side. The question is rather whether the doctrine of the resurrection is not required to vindicate God's wisdom and holiness, justice and mercy, in His dealings with mankind; and this has been ever felt as a most powerful argument in favour of the doctrine, even by those to whom it had not been revealed as an article of faith. And therefore we may proceed at once to the second head of our inquiry. A proposition, we observed, may be incredible either in its own nature or in relation to those who are called upon to admit it. So that God should raise the dead may not be incredible in itself—it may be actually believed by many—and yet it may be thought incredible with others, and we were to consider how and with whom this is likely to be the case.

II. And here we must observe, that the less a doctrine is capable of being proved by strict demonstration, the more its acceptance will depend on the disposition of those to whom it is proposed. And again, when it relates to matters which very closely concern the interests and feelings of mankind, there will be the less likelihood that it should be adopted or rejected on an impartial view of the arguments which may be brought for or against it. Now the doctrine of the resurrection is one as to which it is impossible for any thinking man to be indifferent. It must excite hope or

fear in every one who is not sunk into a savage apathy. It must set men a-thinking what they may expect to gain or lose by it. It is a question which concerns every man much more than the duration of his own earthly life, or the continuance of the world he lives in. For this can only make the difference of a few years to him, whereas there is no one who does not feel that a resurrection implies a state of existence to which no possible term can be assigned. Then, again, if we were only informed that the dead shall live again, that might mean nothing more than another life like the present—whether longer or shorter—one chequered in like manner with good and evil, but, no more than this, subject to any known rule or law by which any one could foresee or forebode his future destiny. But if we believe that God shall raise the dead, we cannot help believing at the same time that this is to be done for some determinate purpose, involving our future happiness or misery, and intimately connected with our present condition and character. No one dreams of a resurrection which is not associated with the idea of this life as a state of probation. And so the doctrine is one which affects not only our future prospects, but our present conduct, habits, and pursuits. We cannot seriously embrace it without feeling ourselves strongly moved to the things which we should otherwise prefer to leave undone, and to leave undone what otherwise we should wish to do. It is not only a deeply stirring, but an immediately practical question, and therefore one on which every man's judgment is sure to be more or less influenced by his inclination.

And suppose a man—and you will not need to go far to find such a character—sunk, I do not say in vice, or even in what is commonly called sensuality, but in sense; that is to say, one who has no conception of any enjoyment which he does not receive from or immediately through the senses; who, as the Apostle says, “minds earthly things,” is wrapped up in them with all his mind, and heart, and soul; never felt a longing for any other kind of happiness than such as he finds here below; has no fault to find with the present life except that it is too short, thinks it good for him to be here, and only laments that his earthly tabernacle is not

an everlasting habitation ; when we meet with such a man as this, can we be at a loss to understand why it should be “thought a thing incredible with *him* that God should raise the dead ?” He knows with certainty of one change, which will strip him of everything he possesses here. He cannot believe that there shall be another to take place merely for the purpose of restoring to him what he has lost, and enabling him to begin some new round of sensuous delight. This he *cannot* believe ; and a change of any other kind, with any other object, he is so loath to believe, that it embitters all his present comfort seriously to think of it. Having been always content with something very little raised above a mere animal existence, it is hard for him to look beyond a close such as awaits the beasts that perish.

Again, those who, though they may not make a mock at sin, yet think lightly of the difference between sin and holiness ; who are very well content with the state and character of the world, in a moral point of view, as it is ; who do not believe that there is much to choose between one man and another ; who are slow to give credit to any examples of eminent virtue, and ready to find an excuse, on the score of natural constitution or defective education, for the worst offenders ; who look coldly and incredulously on all schemes for the moral improvement of mankind, neither believing, nor in their heart wishing, that they should succeed in effecting any material change—persons who entertain such views will be apt to think it a thing incredible that God should raise the dead. The only ground which is assigned, either by reason or revelation, for such a proceeding—the calling men to account for their works—is one which directly contradicts their whole theory of human life. And it must be remembered this is not a merely speculative theory ; it is one which regulates the whole course of their own conduct, even to its minutest details. If they abandoned it, they would lose all the comfort of their present easy, careless, reckless way of treating things and persons ; they would have to try not only the dealings of others, but their own, by a different standard ; by one as to which they are conscious that, whoever else may come up to it, they themselves fall fearfully short of it.

And so we may see how some, who set out from quite an opposite starting point, may be brought to the same conclusion of practical unbelief. Where there is a strong sense of the evil and guilt of sin, yet without any earnest effort or desire to be delivered from it, and consequently its dominion is confirmed from day to day, there will be the strongest of all motives for shutting out of the mind the doctrine of the resurrection from the dead. When Felix had been made to tremble at Paul's reasoning of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, he would have listened gladly to any Sadducee or Epicurean who should have undertaken to prove to him that there was no resurrection. So, when Festus heard of a risen Christ, in whose name Paul preached repentance, and works meet for repentance, to Jews and Gentiles, he easily persuaded himself that the preacher was mad. The most frivolous arguments will satisfy men when they want to believe a lie, or to reject an unwelcome truth. Indeed, when truth is on one side, and passion and appetite and corrupt habit on the other, there will be no great need for sophistry and false teaching. There will be a shorter and easier way of reaching the same end. The truth having been long neglected and despised, held in unrighteousness, and treated as if it were no better than an idle tale, comes at last of itself to appear as such to the man's own darkened understanding. That is the judicial blindness which is the most fearful penalty of long-continued unfaithfulness to the light. To persons in such a state it matters little whom or what they hear. They would not be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.

Thus, then, we have seen with whom and from what causes it may be thought a thing incredible that God should raise the dead. But it will not appear incredible to those who think highly of the intellectual and moral capacities of human nature; who believe that they have never yet been unfolded to their utmost extent, and that they are not to be measured by the most eminent display which has yet been, or ever will be, made of them, under the limitations of our present condition. It will not appear incredible to those who not only believe man to be capable of a continual progress in holiness, but feel in themselves a longing after it, a

hunger and thirst, not to be satisfied with any righteousness short of that of the kingdom of heaven; and who regard the Church on earth as an image, however faint, of a blessed society, in which, through an immediate connexion with its Divine Head, such desires will be constantly quickened, nourished, and strengthened—fulfilled to the utmost, and yet never palled or satiated. It will not appear incredible to those who regard the glory of God as the supreme end of all His works and ways, and who earnestly wish to see it shown forth in the final triumph of truth and goodness over falsehood and evil. And therefore, even before life and immortality were brought to light through the Gospel, it did not appear incredible to the wisest and best among the heathen. On the contrary, in the grossest darkness of ignorance and superstition, they still clung to this belief as the mainstay of all their hopes, their chief comfort and guide, amidst all the troubles and perplexities of this mortal life. Will they not rise up in the judgment against many of the men of this generation, yea, against many professed members of the Church of Christ, and condemn them?

I must confine myself to a very few brief remarks by way of practical conclusion.

There is, as we have seen, a very striking contrast between the class of persons who accept the doctrine of the resurrection, and those with whom it is thought a thing incredible. We would not urge this contrast as a decisive argument in favour of the doctrine; but we would observe that it supplies an answer to those who would demand stronger evidence of its truth. If the evidence was in itself more convincing, it would not so well serve the purpose of a moral test, or be so well adapted to all the ends of a state of probation. As it is, it is strong enough for those who are prepared to receive it; and none are unprepared, save through their own fault. However sufficient it might be to satisfy every reasonable mind, it would never of itself overpower an evil heart of unbelief.

Again, if those who, trusting to their own fallible reason, have *argued* themselves into a speculative disbelief of this doctrine,

will nevertheless stand condemned by their own consciences, how shall it fare with those who, while they profess to hold it, have *lived* themselves in a practical unbelief of it? Those who now, like Felix, tremble at the thought, but yet turn not from their evil ways, may learn in time to scoff at it like Festus. But the hardness of an impenitent heart will not screen them from the righteous judgment of God; it will only be the means of treasuring up unto themselves wrath against the day of wrath. Whether believed or not, the truth will remain the same; and if they wilfully put it from them, though they will have made it powerless for their good, it will be so much the more effectual to their endless ruin.

We may further observe, that the comfort which this doctrine imparts to those who embrace it with an efficacious and practical conviction depends not so much on the prospects which it opens, and the hopes which it ministers, as on the principles out of which their belief springs, and the effects which it works in them. And therefore it is deep and steady, abiding and progressive. They have the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come; and in the immediate partial fulfilment they find an assurance of the final perfect consummation. Their present strivings after holiness are an earnest of their future mastery over sin; their present peace a foretaste of their future joy. Whatever haze of doubt and fear may gather round them, whatever changes and chances may betide them in this mortal life, they have this hope as an anchor of the soul, sure and steadfast, on which they will ride secure, however tossed by the waves of this troublesome world.

And therefore—as more especially befits this high solemnity—all thanks and praise be rendered to Him who has brought life and immortality to light through His glorious Gospel; who has not only overcome death in our nature, but opened unto us the gate of everlasting life; who not only, in His own victory over the grave, gives us a sure pledge of our resurrection, but, by His word and His Spirit, dispels the mists of error and prejudice which arise out of the corrupt heart to darken the truth, and makes it to

shine, not only upon our minds, but upon our hearts, with a healing and purifying light, so as to fill both our hearts and minds with a peace which passes all understanding, and which keeps them in the knowledge and love of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.

MISCELLANEOUS

DIOCESAN SYNODS.

A LETTER TO THE REV. CANON SEYMOUR, WITH SOME REMARKS ON A LETTER OF
THE REV. J. W. JOYCE.

ABERGWILI PALACE, CARMARTHEN,
March 14th, 1867.

REVEREND SIR,

I TAKE the earliest opportunity of redeeming my promise, that I would answer your letter as soon as I should be able to make some necessary references to books which I had left behind in the country. Let me however first of all assure you that no apology whatever was needed for your animadverting on any part of my Charge.* You are quite right in believing that it was intended to be submitted to the judgment of the Church and the Public. And I will add that, if I had considered an Episcopal Charge as a document like a Papal Allocution, too sacred for criticism, none of mine would ever have been delivered; I should have confined myself on such occasions to matters of fact established by documentary evidence, and not open to dispute, and should have reserved the expression of my opinion on debatable questions for some mode of publication which would entitle them to the benefit of free discussion. At the same time, I hope I have never forgotten that the circumstances of a Visitation Charge impose an obligation on the Bishop to weigh all his statements of opinion with more than ordinary care and caution.

I did not hesitate to undertake to answer your Letter, not merely as coming from one who is entitled to much respect as a distin-

* [Charge of 1866.]

guished member of the Lower House of Convocation, but as containing a complaint of injustice alleged to have been done by me, not to himself alone, but to many others. I believe indeed that I might very safely have left this complaint to the judgment of those who would take the trouble to compare your Letter with my Charge. But this is so much more than could be expected, if from any, from more than a very few readers of your Letter, that my silence would probably have been construed as evidence of my inability to meet a charge which yet I had not the candour to admit. I believe that I shall be able to clear myself from it with little more trouble to myself or to the reader than the making of a few extracts which will need but very brief comment.

The gist of your complaint lies in two passages of my Charge. The first is contained in the paragraph beginning near the bottom of page 43,* and I am forced to transcribe it.

“ If the promoters of this movement had any ground for congratulating themselves on its success, as indicated by the number of signatures attached to the Declaration, it could only be with a view to some ulterior object, for which it might prepare the way, and though no such aim was openly avowed, subsequent proceedings appeared to show what it either was or might have been. Such was the chief, if not the sole motive, of the wish which was expressed in both Houses of Convocation and elsewhere for the renewal of Diocesan Synods. It was hoped that these assemblies might be made available for the promulgation of ‘some declaration of faith as to matters which were thought then to be in danger.’ They might serve other purposes, but this was evidently foremost in the minds of those who conceived the project.”

You are willing to waive the question as to the object of those who promoted or signed the Declaration, as being able only to answer for your own. But I cannot pass over the account you give of it without a word of remark, because, while you evidently consider your account as contradicting my statements, it appears to me to be in perfect accordance with them. I believed, and still believe, that the object of the Declaration was to prepare the way for an “ulterior object,” and I thought I had sufficiently described

* [Vol. ii. p. 123, Collected Edition.]

that object when I said that it was "to counteract the effect of the Judgment in the case of 'Essays and Reviews.'" You state that the object was "simply to save the Church, so far as such a protest could do so, from the imputation of accepting Judgments which they (the signers) believed to be contrary to the faith of the Church." But after due allowance for the looseness of the expressions, which you would hardly maintain to be strictly accurate, this is quite consistent with my statement. You could not mean that any aggregate of individuals could be so identified with the Church, that an expression of their private belief could overrule or reverse a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, or contract the latitude of opinion among the Clergy which that decision had sanctioned. For this purpose the Declaration in itself, even if it had been clearly and candidly worded, and if the methods employed for obtaining signatures had been less open to just censure, would evidently have been utterly futile. But it might contribute to prepare the way for the attainment of that object; and I endeavoured to point out the connexion in which the Declaration stood to other movements, which seemed to me to have been set on foot in the same direction and with the same view. On this point however, so far as regards Diocesan Synods, you "very positively assure me that I am mistaken." Here we are fairly at issue, and the decision must depend on the evidence which each is able to produce.

At page 5 you write as if I had given only two references in support of my position. At page 12 you add a third; but to my great surprise you appear to have overlooked a fourth, which occurs in the same page (53) * of my Charge, and which is in some respects more important than any of the others. To this I will advert presently. But I must premise a general remark. Whenever we find "a declaration of faith" expressly assigned as an object, for the sake of which the restoration of Diocesan Synods was desired, we are sure that this was present, if not uppermost, in the minds of those who gave it utterance. But there is no reason why it might not be present, and even uppermost, in the

* [Vol. ii. p. 130, Collected Edition.]

minds of persons who did not express it. On the contrary, the presumption is, that it existed where it was not expressly disavowed. Does this appear to you too bold an assertion? You yourself, with a candour which I cannot sufficiently admire, and for which I am the more thankful, as I had less right to expect such a proof of it, have furnished me with the strongest possible ground for my position. After citing the Resolution of the Archdeacons and Rural Deans of the Diocese of Oxford, to which I refer at page 53* of my Charge—

“That the circumstances of the present times peculiarly call for such a gathering (Diocesan Synods) for the guardianship of faith,”

you observe—

“Your Lordship's allusion is especially to this last resolution. Framed at a time when the mind of the Church of England was pained and harassed by the publications of Dr. Colenso, and the Judgments respecting two authors of ‘Essays and Reviews,’ no one can be surprised that such a resolution as this was adopted in connexion with the two first. And there can be no doubt that at such periods, if Diocesan Synods were sitting, the particular trouble which agitated the Church would come under their notice.”

Nothing can be more clearly true. But, as I fully admit the fact, I claim the benefit of the irresistible inference. And indeed your observation seems to me almost to supersede the necessity for any other evidence in support of my assertion, both as to the close connexion between the object of the Oxford Declaration and that of the proposed restoration of Diocesan Synods, and as to the importance attached to this object, in comparison with others, in the minds of those who desired to see Diocesan Synods restored.

At page 7 however you direct my attention to what you consider as the real “starting-point” of the movement in behalf of Diocesan Synods. You think you have found it in “a memorable paper drawn up by certain members of the Lower House of Convocation,” including my revered friend Archdeacon Hare and the

* [Vol. ii. p. 130, Collected Edition.]

present Bishop of Ely, in November, 1852, with a view to promote "the revival of the long-suspended functions of Convocation." One does not at the first glance very readily see how this subject was connected with the renewal of Diocesan Synods. But you supply the missing link, by an extract from that paper, which may be considered as containing the germ of a proposal for the admission of the Laity into Convocation, which was actually made there, but without success. And thus those who desired to "procure some means by which the Laity may join in counsel with the Clergy for furthering the efficiency of the Church" were led to resort to the revival of Diocesan Synods for that purpose.

I do not at all question the accuracy of this historical statement: but when you imagine that it convicts me of a mistake, with regard to the motives which I attribute to the advocates of Diocesan Synods, it appears to me that you have yourself been misled, partly by a misconception of my position, and partly by the ambiguity of the term, *Diocesan Synods*. I have not denied, but on the contrary expressly admitted, in the passage which you cited from my Charge, that Diocesan Synods might serve other purposes besides that of a "declaration of faith." On the other hand, I have not asserted that all the friends of Diocesan Synods wished to use them, either solely or above all, for the purpose of such a declaration, and I accept with entire confidence what you state as to your own motives. I cannot feel quite equal confidence—notwithstanding your assurance—as to the motives of others who have not expressed them: and I observe that, even with regard to yourself, you do not absolutely disclaim the doctrinal object, but only deny that it was *foremost* in the minds of those who have been "active in endeavouring to obtain the renewal of Diocesan Synods." I find it indeed very difficult to reconcile this disclaimer with the above-cited Resolution of the Oxford Archdeacons and Rural Deans, who consider the "guardianship of the faith" as the object which *peculiarly* calls for the proposed "gathering," or even with your own subsequent candid admission, already noticed, that "no doubt, if Diocesan Synods were sitting, the particular trouble which agitated the Church would come

under their notice." It is hard to believe that, if it occupied any place at all in the "notice" of the Synod, it would not be the very foremost place, and that, by the Clergy at least, it would not be considered as the subject of incomparably greatest importance.

Your historical statement therefore does not seem to me conclusive against my view, though I readily admit that it is not decisive in my favour. But it certainly does not exhaust the history of the movement; and I think you have hardly done justice to my argument, when you entirely ignore my account of the "starting-point" to which I refer the origin of the movement. This is the more surprising, because it occurs in one of the pages of my Charge (p. 53) from which you have made an extract. I am obliged to reproduce the passage, as without it my view of the history, which you have placed in so different a light, cannot be understood, much less fairly judged. Having observed that "there is a purpose for which the Diocesan Synod, in its primitive form, is eminently well fitted—that is, the purpose of proclaiming any foregone conclusion, and of passing resolutions by acclamation, without a dissentient voice"—I proceed as follows:—

"This function of the Diocesan Synod is recognised by a highly esteemed writer on the subject, whose work appeared when the Church was deeply agitated by the Judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Gorham case, as one main ground for recommending the revival of those Synods with 'a close adherence to the primitive model.' (Joyce's *England's Sacred Synods*, p. 36.) It would serve 'for the plain assertion of any article of the faith which may have been notoriously impugned.' And in the Diocese in which an article of faith was supposed to have been impugned by the decision of the Judicial Committee in the Gorham case, such a Diocesan Synod was assembled, and did make 'a plain assertion' of the article. This example has not been forgotten."

In proof of this last assertion, I referred to the Resolution of the Oxford Archdeacons and Rural Deans; and you have cited this reference, but without any notice of the statement which it was intended to prove or illustrate. I cannot but think that my account of the starting-point of the movement is more accurate

than yours. It seems to me at least to establish beyond a doubt that the idea of a revival of Diocesan Synods was not derived, by a remote filiation, from the "paper" of November, 1852, but had been previously not only conceived, but realised in visible actuality. I know of no reason for supposing that Mr. Joyce was singular in his opinions or wishes, or that his views as to the most important business of a Diocesan Synod have ever ceased to be those of a majority of the Clergy both in and outside of Convocation. The movement for promoting co-operation between the Clergy and the Laity, stimulated by the exertions of Mr. Henry Hoare, ran in a parallel direction, neither opposing nor superseding the other. But their proximity appears to have created some confusion, to which perhaps I am mainly indebted for your Letter. For the two "projects"—that of lay co-operation, and that of declaration of faith—do not exclude one another, either in the nature of things or in the minds of those who take an interest in either of them. My subject led me to dwell, though by no means exclusively (see p. 46* of my Charge), on the earlier project. You have dwelt on the later, so as to keep the other as much as possible out of view.

I observed that you appear to have been misled by the ambiguity of the term *Diocesan Synods*. In fact, while using this term, we have been speaking of two different things, and your remarks on the one do not touch that which I said of the other. Only, I used the term in the proper sense of a Diocesan Synod, "in its primitive form," as it is described by Mr. Joyce. You applied the term to an assembly constituted on a new plan. This ambiguity was noticed in the debate on your motion in the Lower House of Convocation. To Archdeacon Hale it appeared that a great difficulty might be avoided by giving up the word "Synod." "I am myself," he said, "opposed to formal Diocesan Synods. . . . At the same time I am as anxious as any one can be to promote the union of the Clergy and Laity." Lord A. Compton thought "there may be some risk lest these united Synods of Clergy and Laity should render it more difficult to hold *real Diocesan Synods*,

* [Vol. ii. p. 128, Collected Edition.]

consisting of the Clergy alone." You yourself, referring to these remarks, said, "I have always contemplated the Bishops summoning Synods consisting exclusively of Clergymen." I think it would not be too bold an assumption to believe that you must, at the same time, have contemplated the high probability—not to say certainty—that the "chief, if not the sole" business of such Synods, whenever there was any "trouble" in the Church, arising from questions of doctrine, would be, as it was at Exeter, "some declaration of faith." Such, at all events, I understand to be the view of Dr. Jebb, when he said in the same debate (*Chron. of Convoc.*, p. 1509), "I think it is the duty of the Synods of the Church, and of all assemblies of the Church which possess authority—it *should be their business now* to assert the true doctrine of the Church." *Their business.* That must be either their *sole*, or at least their *chief* business. Was I then so far wrong when I said that such an assertion or declaration was the chief, if not the sole motive of the wish expressed for the renewal of Diocesan Synods? Sir H. Thompson says, "I cannot imagine any subject in which the Church feels an interest, that would not be brought before such Synods." In what subject does the Church feel a greater interest than in the "trouble" which was then and is still present? It is to this that I understand Archdeacon Denison to refer, when he observes, "We have had enough of this fighting about words in the Oxford Declaration. There were things said irregularly in the Judgment, and no doubt the Declaration has met it with something irregular also; but what is wanted is the expression of the Church." Though I do not pretend to be able to reconcile these words with those of a sentence which occurs only a few lines above: "It is admitted that questions of doctrine are not to be touched."

If we keep this distinction in view, it will be seen that I have said nothing of Diocesan Synods to prevent me from regarding the general object of those which you proposed with sympathy and approbation. I can truly say, with Archdeacon Hale, that though I am opposed to the assembling of Diocesan Synods for some purposes, "I am as anxious as any one can be to promote

the union of the Clergy and Laity." If I question the expediency of the kind of Synod which was the subject of your motion, it is partly because I share the doubts of Chancellor Massingberd, who asked, "What is the use of these Synods?" I do not know whether he was satisfied with the answer he received. I was not. But I must own that I also view your project with some degree of positive distrust. I can however assure you that the "apprehension" which you think it so "evident" that I felt, "that such Synods would diminish the power of Bishops," is one which never entered my mind, and is as remote as possible from my habits of thinking and feeling. What I really apprehend is, that it may be found exceedingly difficult, if possible, to secure the benefit, whatever it may be, of the Synods, by whatever name they may be called, which you advocate, so as to avoid the mischief which seems to me to be threatened by the purely Ecclesiastical, or, as Lord A. Compton calls them, "real Diocesan Synods," which you, and probably many others, "have always contemplated." The occasion on which you then spoke did not require you to explain your view of the relation in which these two kinds of Synods would or ought to stand to each other: whether, for instance, you thought it desirable that one of each kind should be held annually, or that the mixed Synod should be held regularly, the pure one only on special occasions. But it seems clear that nothing would be easier than to contrive some arrangement by which the same gathering of Clergy and Laity might be made successively to assume either character, and to serve both purposes. The arrival of the Clergy might be made to precede that of the Laity, or the stay of the Clergy might be prolonged after the departure of the Laity, so as to afford time for any proceedings in which the Lay members of the Synod were not deemed competent to take part. It might even happen that in some dioceses the scruple, which could alone render such a temporary separation necessary, might not be felt by the greater number of the Clergy.

Hence I cannot derive unalloyed satisfaction from your statement—undoubtedly as I believe it—of the motives with which you advocate the renewal of Diocesan Synods, but which could

have no effect on the course or the issue of the movement. And I am not completely reassured by your suggestion at p. 13, that "no subject should be introduced without the permission of the presiding Bishop." I need hardly remind you that all Bishops do not take exactly the same view of that which is expedient for the interests of the Church; and if a measure was adopted which I considered as mischievous, it would not appear to me less dangerous because it had been sanctioned by a Bishop. But I am not sure that every Diocesan Synod would be practically so under the Bishop's control that he could prescribe the course of its proceedings. In theory it may be so. But the exercise of such a power might place him in a very invidious and unhappy position.

I have thus endeavoured—with what success others must judge—to show that I had good ground for the statement in which you believe yourself to have convicted me of a mistake. I am still more anxious to clear myself from the charge of *injustice*, especially injustice so crying that you are moved to say, "A more unjust imputation than that which is cast by your Lordship upon a large body of your brethren in the ministry, I have scarcely ever read." I hope to satisfy you that this charge of injustice has arisen—as with your habitual gentleness you half suspect—from a misunderstanding. Indeed, unless I have wasted my labour, what I have already said must have enabled you to comprehend that the language of which you complain was not meant to apply to any "effort on behalf of Diocesan Synods, the characteristic feature of which is the endeavour to give to the Laity a place in the Councils of the Church, which they now have not," however appropriate it may be to "real Diocesan Synods, consisting of the Clergy alone." In these last I think it may be properly said that the Church is "identified with the Spirituality," in the sense that—as Mr. Joyce expresses it in the Dedication of his work on Synods—"questions touching the law divine have been held to belong to the Spirituality;" so that, when such questions are to be discussed, the Laity must entirely disappear, or, if allowed to be present, only on condition that they have no voice in the deliberation, or merely echo the decision of their pastors.

But it also seems clear that you have overlooked the point of my allusion in the passage which you cite from page 67* of my Charge, where I speak of the period before the Reformation as one "to which so many of our Clergy are looking back with fond regret, as to a golden age, which, if it were permitted to man to roll back the stream of time, and to reverse the course of nature and the order of Providence, they would gladly restore." I had imagined that the reader would at once understand me to be speaking of the party whose proceedings occupy so large a part of my Charge. I do not know whether you would admit that I had a right so to speak of the Ritualists: and this may call for a word of explanation.

I do not pretend to dive into the secrets of any man's consciousness. I should not, for instance, think it right to affirm that the English Church Union is the focus of a Jesuitical conspiracy for bringing our Church, first to the feet, and then into the arms, of Rome. But I claim a right to express my opinion that if such was the object of the Union, no proceedings could have been better fitted for the attainment of that object than those it has actually adopted. I know that the President has lately issued an Address, in which he speaks of "our beloved Church." I have no right or wish to question the sincerity and warmth of his love for the Church. But it might, in his mind, be consistent with the view that the greatest of all blessings for the Church would be a euthanasia or nirvana, by which she would breathe her last in the bosom of her ancient mother, and with most zealous exertions for the hastening of that happy consummation. I have a notion that Archbishop Manning retains this kind of affection for the Church of his early days. I would not even undertake to say that the object of those who drew up the Report on Ritualism was to give the greatest possible encouragement to the Romanizing party, and to play into its hand. But no protestations of a different intention on the part of those persons—however I might give them credit for perfect sincerity—would in the slightest degree shake my conviction that such is the actual tendency and effect of that

* [Vol. ii. p. 140, Collected Edition.]

Report, when I see that it is so framed as in fact to serve the ends of that party, by masking its most characteristic features, by adopting its most glaring fallacies, and by describing it in terms of eulogy, which are only just so far as they are utterly irrelevant to the main question.

I believe that I have now said as much as the occasion requires on the subject of your Letter, and that, if I had nothing else to deal with, I might conclude at once. Perhaps I owe you some apology for making a Letter, which was originally designed solely for you, the vehicle of an answer to one which I have since received from Mr. Joyce, and which he informs me may be found in print in the *John Bull* newspaper of Saturday, February 23rd. The public convenience, no less than my own, obliges me to take this opportunity of publicly answering Mr. Joyce, though I am reluctant so to associate your name with his, which you have, it would seem, studiously avoided introducing in your letter, even where the occasion appeared to suggest, if not to require it. I am the more reluctant, because there is a tone of asperity in Mr. Joyce's Letter, which presents an unpleasant contrast to the mildness of yours. I do not however complain of that tone, nor of the resentment which it betrays; but I do complain of that which has been the cause of both. For they are the effect of a misconception, which, as I believe, a moderate degree of attention to the part of my Charge which is the subject of Mr. Joyce's complaint would have rendered impossible. As it is, I may adopt your strongest language with regard to myself, and can truly say, a more unjust imputation than that which has been cast upon me by Mr. Joyce, I have scarcely ever read.

The peculiar hardship which I suffer from it is this, that Mr. Joyce first echoes my own sentiments, says the very same thing which I have said in my Charge, and then reproaches me, as if I had overlooked or gainsaid it.

The passage of my Charge occurs at page 68,* and I am obliged to transcribe as much of it as will enable the reader to understand and appreciate the force of Mr. Joyce's objection:—

* [Vol. ii. pp. 141, 142, Collected Edition.]

“It is not a light evil that men should be taught to consider themselves as living in ‘galling fetters,’ and an ‘ignominious bondage,’ [this is an allusion to the language of Mr. Joyce, ‘Ecclesia Vindicata,’ p. 220, where he speaks of a ‘statesman’ who ‘would free the Church of this nation from galling fetters, in which she is now ignominiously bound,’] if this is not a true description of their real condition. But those who have been so taught, if they are conscientious and honourable men, will not be content to sit down and weep, but will strive with all their might to break their fetters and to regain their freedom. And it will be impossible for them, even with the example of their guides before them, long to forget that after all these fetters are self-imposed, and this bondage a state of their own choice; that they have only to will, and their chains will drop off, and their prison doors fly open.”

I then proceed to say that—

“There are voices enough on the outside, bidding them to come forth, and inviting them to take refuge”—in the Church of Rome; but that, if they are not prepared for such a step, “they may find room nearer at hand for a new Church, in which they may enjoy the shelter without the control of the State.”

On this Mr. Joyce has allowed himself to make the following comment:—

“In the foregoing passage your Lordship suggests, that for such persons among the Clergy and Laity of the English Church as have learned to be dissatisfied with the present constitution of the Court of Final Appeal in Ecclesiastical Causes, there is an alternative refuge. It is also said that under the supposition of their being ‘conscientious and honourable men,’ they ‘will not sit down and weep.’ Thus it appears that in your Lordship’s opinion their conscience and honour are in some sort compromised, unless they arouse themselves to take shelter in one of the refuges which your Lordship has pointed out.”

I appeal to you, as a candid man, not just now at all prepossessed in my favour, whether there was ever a grosser perversion of language, and whether this is not a process by which the Holy Psalmist might be convicted of atheism. For did he not write a verse in which we read “There is no God?” Mr. Joyce represents me as saying that conscientious and honourable men, who take his view of the present highest Court of Appeal in Ecclesi-

astical Causes, instead of sitting down to weep, will "arouse themselves to take shelter in one of the refuges which I have pointed out." What an extraordinary oversight that Mr. Joyce should have failed to observe that, if I say that conscientious and honourable men, who share his views as to the actual condition of the Church, will not be content to sit down and weep, it is because I expect—not that they will "arouse themselves to take shelter" in a *refuge* of any kind, but—that "they will strive with all their might to break their fetters, and to regain their freedom!" And is not this the line of conduct which Mr. Joyce, being himself a conscientious and honourable man, would think right? Is it not that which he has himself pursued? Was not this the "main object" of his works on Synods (see the Dedication), and the sole object of his "*Ecclesia Vindicata*?" The "statesman" indeed, whose advent he foreshadowed in the latter work, the future emancipator of the Church, has not yet appeared. But probably Mr. Joyce does not despair of his arrival, and trusts that a good time is coming, when "the requirements of the State and the conscience of the Church will be satisfied at the same time," by a "plan" "consigning in the last resort the correction of offences to the civil power, and meanwhile providing for the due interpretation of the national faith by those to whose guardianship it has been by God committed." [Between ourselves, does not this mean that the clergy are to decide the question of heresy, and then to hand over the offender to the secular arm?]

I do not know Mr. Joyce—or unfortunately you—even by sight. But the idea I have formed of him from his writings and speeches leads me to imagine that a patient biding of a better time, though under very untoward and trying conditions, may probably be more suited to the gravity of his character and the maturity of his discretion than a headlong plunge to seek "shelter" in the unknown. And as even the calmest and sagest of men are apt to be more or less governed by their wishes in their estimate of probabilities, he may think that he sees grounds of hope in the present ferment and agitation, and in the general aspect of Church affairs, which to others are quite invisible. But cannot

you—is Mr. Joyce himself unable to conceive it possible that there may be many who share his views, and are keenly sensitive to the misery of those galling fetters and that ignominious bondage under which he is writhing, but who are not gifted with his strength of mind or power of endurance; who can perceive no sign of his “statesman” coming into power, or even into being; who put no trust in the help of any Synods, Diocesan, General, or even Pan-Anglican; and who, when they look around them, can see no prospect of deliverance, and are thus led to ask in despair, “What shall we do?”

But is it quite fair to represent me, as Mr. Joyce has done, as “suggesting” rash and desperate courses to those who are in this state of perplexity? It is not I who have intimated an opinion that “their conscience and honour are in some sort compromised” unless they take shelter in either the Roman Communion or a Free Church. But would Mr. Joyce deny what I have said, that “there are voices enough on the outside, appealing to their sense of duty and of honour, bidding them to come forth and inviting them to take refuge in” the Church of Rome? What said Dr. Manning in his “Letter to an Anglican Friend,” headed “The Crown in Council on the Essays and Reviews?” He wrote (p. 23), “It is of no use, it is not, I must say, manly, or real, or truthful, to pretend that the Church of England, or those in it, are free from complicity in the decisions of its own tribunals.” And I dare say you know his practical conclusion, and that he ends his letter with a prayer “that many may, in this moment of confusion, come forth from the spiritual captivity in which they are bound, and return to the liberty” of the Papal Church. Dr. Manning probably found in his own personal recollections strong ground to hope that this prayer would be granted. I am aware that the writer of the Autobiography in “The Church and the World” believes that Anglo-Catholics of her school are in no danger, either from the force of Archbishop Manning’s arguments or from the efficacy of his prayers. But I do not know whether Mr. Joyce has so completely abandoned what she calls the “secular notion of an Anglican Church as a distinct entity” as fully

to share her confidence. But at all events he will not say that I have invented or misreported the utterances of the "voices on the outside," which invite the captives to seek refuge in the Roman liberty. And I would ask you first to observe how much stronger are the terms in which Mr. Joyce describes the "spiritual captivity" of his brother churchmen than any that are applied to it by Dr. Manning, and then to say whether the impression made by "the voice on the outside" is not likely to have been deepened by its accordancy with the louder and more impassioned strains of the voice from within? And again, have I done anything more than state a simple and unquestionable fact, when I point to the possibility that those who are as vehemently dissatisfied as Mr. Joyce, and on the same ground, with their present position, if they should recoil from submission to the Papal authority, may be tempted to take refuge in a Free Church? Would Mr. Joyce maintain that the question which caused the disruption of the Kirk was more important than that which agitates the Church of England, with regard to appeals in matters spiritual? Or does he only think that the *perfidam ingenium Scotorum* hurried the Scotch seceders into excesses from which we are sufficiently secured by the coolness of our national temperament? Let me only say that I have no interest in affirming or denying either proposition.

The remainder of Mr. Joyce's letter is chiefly occupied with an argument to show that—

"Though the existence and action of the Court (of Appeal), being in the estimation of many persons an encroachment on the rights of the Church of England, and a grave scandal to our national jurisprudence, supply without doubt very valid reasons for their endeavours, as conscientious and honourable men, to obtain a reform of the Court; yet they supply no shadow of a reason at all for deserting the Church of their Christian birth, of their earliest love, of their present fond affections."

If this argument had been addressed to Archbishop Manning, though indeed it would have been little more than one assertion opposed to another, it would at least have been to the point. But that it should have been addressed to *me*: that it should have been

for the purpose of enlightening and convincing *me* that Mr. Joyce points out that “the distinction between the authoritative voice of the national Church and the judgment of a law court is very broad and very obvious:” that he should suppose this distinction had been overlooked by *me*, who in the very Charge of which he complains, and within a very few pages of the passage which is the subject of his Letter, wrote (p. 64), “A wrong decision of the Court, as it is now constituted, can only affect the position of individuals in the Church, but leaves the doctrine of the Church just where it was”—this is not only very strange, but something which, as I observed, I feel as a peculiar hardship. Have I ever intimated an opinion that the objection to the present constitution of the Court of Appeal is a sufficient “reason” for any one who entertains it to secede from the Church? On the very contrary, it is just because I think that it is no reason at all, that I both deplore and disapprove of rhetorical exaggerations, such as have fallen from Mr. Joyce, which inevitably tend to inflame the passions and to interfere with a calm exercise of “reason,” and therefore give the greatest possible advantage to those who would seduce conscientious and honourable men from their allegiance to the Church. On the other hand, I have never presumed to lay restrictions on natural sensibility. It is only through want of attention to my language that Mr. Joyce supposes me to have said that “conscientious and honourable men,” under the influence of his opinions, “will not weep.” I only said they would not be “content to weep,” but would “strive;” just as he thinks it their duty to do. It was therefore quite needless for him to say that they are “ready to justify their tears.” I have never even exhorted Mr. Joyce himself to dry his; much less required him to *justify* them. And indeed none but artificial tears need a justification; those which spring from the heart speak for themselves. But I do not understand what “conscience” or “honour” has to do with this questionable sign of an emotion which might lie too deep for tears. Conscience and honour may spur men to action: but it is surely no part of their proper functions to bid any to “sit down and weep.”

I will not detain you any longer on a matter in which you have no personal concern. I entertain a lively hope that what I have written may satisfy you. I feel a stronger persuasion that you will think it ought to satisfy Mr. Joyce.

I remain,

Reverend Sir,

With the highest respect,

Your obedient Servant,

C. ST. DAVID'S.

REV. CANON SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Mr. Joyce's Letter has been inserted in the *Guardian* of the 20th of March.

THE EPISCOPAL MEETING OF 1867.

A LETTER TO THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.

MY LORD ARCHBISHOP,

WHEN I received your Grace's Circular, requesting my presence at a Meeting of the Bishops in visible communion with the United Church of England and Ireland, in September next, it happened that I was so much occupied with other matters, that I was obliged to lay it aside for further consideration. When I again perused it with the attention due to the subject and the writer, I felt that I ought not simply to acknowledge the receipt, and either accept or decline the invitation, without informing your Grace of my opinion with regard to the proposed Meeting, viewed in the light of your Circular. My first impulse was to do this in a private letter to your Grace. But, on further reflection, it appeared to me that it would be hardly right to make your Grace the sole depository of my views, and that if I thought them worth communicating at all, I was bound to submit them to the judgment of the Church. My own position in this affair is so far peculiar, that I trust I shall not expose myself to the imputation of egotism or presumption by the publication of my sentiments. I was not present when the question was discussed at Lambeth; and the debate on it in the Upper House of Convocation was confined within a narrow compass. And not only so, but the little I said on that occasion was said under an impression which I afterwards found to have been erroneous. I then imagined that I stood alone among our brethren in my unfavourable opinion of

the proposed measure. I have since learnt that I am not a solitary exception to the general unanimity.

While for these reasons I am anxious to explain my views more fully than I have yet done, I feel that it would be scarcely fair to your Grace to put them before you alone. Already your position with respect to this question is one which affords a striking example of the heavy burdens attached to your high dignity. You have to bear the apparent responsibility of the chief share in a proceeding of great importance to the Church, but of doubtful issue, and, as some think, attended with considerable danger. And yet, such have been the circumstances in which you have been placed, that you can hardly be said to have been a free agent. For after such an expression of a general wish as has been addressed to your Grace by many of your suffragans, by representatives not only of the Colonial, but of the American Episcopate, and by a majority of both Houses of the Convocation of your Province, whatever might have been your private opinion, it was almost morally impossible for you to withhold your consent. And therefore what I have to say in the way of objection to this measure concerns your Grace less than others, with whom, in my judgment, the heavier weight of responsibility really rests.

Whatever may be thought, according to men's hopes or fears, of the prospects of the proposed Meeting, your Grace at least is no doubt fully sensible of the grave importance of the step you have been induced to take. It is without example in the annals of our Communion. It is confessedly in the nature of an experiment, and one of so costly a kind, that it cannot be expected to be often repeated. Whatever harm might arise from its failure would probably be irreparable; and it is subject to the risk of failure in more ways than one. The experiment will have failed, if the attendance of Bishops from beyond the seas should be comparatively small. It will have failed still more signally and grievously, if the attendance should be very large, but the practical result either null, or very small in proportion to the greatness of the effort. The intended Council has been made a subject

of pleasantry by some who believe that its highest merit will be harmless insignificance. But I am sure your Grace will agree with me that it would be a serious misfortune if that pleasantry should be justified by the event, and the Meeting should pass away without leaving any trace in the history of the Church. Clearly, I think, such an experiment should not be made without an adequate motive on the one hand, and on the other without all the precautions that prudence could suggest to ensure its success. I felt grave doubt on the first head, even before I received your Grace's Circular, by which it has been rather confirmed than dispelled. On the other hand, perhaps I had no right to expect to find any information in the Circular; but certainly I have found none, there or anywhere else.

In the first half of the Circular your Grace recounts the various requests which you have received from the Metropolitan and Bishops of Canada, from the Bishops assembled at Lambeth, and from the two Houses of Convocation, by which you were "moved to call together the Meeting so earnestly desired." Nothing can be clearer or more satisfactory than this statement of the circumstances under which you came to this resolution. They were such—as I have already observed—as made it almost impossible for you to act otherwise, even if you had been much less hopeful than you appear to be of a happy result. But when you proceed to describe the objects and the business of the Meeting, I no longer find the same perspicuity or distinctness; but, after the closest attention I could give to your language, am left in very painful doubt and perplexity. The terms used are large enough to include every conceivable subject of ecclesiastical deliberations; but the only distinct allusion to a definite object is made for the purpose of excluding it from the range, if not of discussion, at least of practical conclusions. And this single specific exception is very remarkable, and will call for further notice.

But I do not find a word to indicate that, in your Grace's view, there is anything in the circumstances of the present time that renders such a Meeting necessary or peculiarly desirable: any language which would not have been equally appropriate if the

Meeting had been summoned for the year 1877, or if the intention had been that it should be henceforth held yearly. The only reason that can be gathered for fixing on the present year rather than any other is, that this happens to be the earliest opportunity which your Grace could take for complying with the requests you had received. For the validity of the grounds on which they were made, your Grace may perhaps justly think that the applicants, and not you, are responsible, and you may have wisely abstained from making any allusion to them. But the fact remains that in the Circular there is no hint of any special seasonableness in the present juncture for the convoking of such an assembly. And as its recurrence, except at very long intervals, neither has been nor could be contemplated for a moment by any one, it must be supposed that the effect produced by this year's Meeting is expected to be so great as to last, and be seen, and felt for a long period, perhaps for a whole generation to come; that it will form an epoch in the history of our Church, like those of several Great Councils in other Churches and Religions. I yield to none in the heartiness of my wish that such may be the case. But I cannot shut my eyes to the possibility of another alternative; that the effect produced may be so nearly null, or so far negative, as to extinguish every desire for a renewal of the unsuccessful experiment. No one could have so much reason to deplore such an event, as well on personal as on public grounds, as your Grace; and therefore I hope that you will be the more inclined to forgive me, if I should seem to dwell by preference on the gloomy side of the subject, to suggest nothing but objections and difficulties, and to look coldly on the prospect of advantages which others anticipate with eager and fervent longing. The view on the other side is no doubt the more agreeable; but the less hopeful view, if it should tend to inspire caution, may be the more useful, as it may be the means of averting the danger which it foresees.

And yet it may be that I appreciate the value of the benefits shadowed forth by your Grace, as likely to spring from the Meeting, as fully as any of those who paint them in the most glowing

colours. I am glad indeed to observe that your Grace has refrained, as I think most judiciously, from touching on one advantage, the prospect of which seems to have dazzled some minds: the effect of the Meeting, considered simply as a demonstration, an exhibition of the greatness and the strength of the Anglican Communion. I cannot help suspecting that those who have been fascinated by the image of this spectacle, had first cast a longing eye on those which have been so frequently exhibited at Rome during the reign of the present Pope, who is said to take a peculiar pleasure in bringing his Bishops together by hundreds from all parts of the globe, not indeed for the transaction of any serious business, from which he would rather keep them away, but simply to enhance the splendour of a gorgeous ceremony, and to exalt the visible majesty of the pontifical throne. But even if the meeting to be held in September next should include every Bishop "in visible communion with the United Church of England and Ireland"—which is from various causes practically impossible—nothing could be more unwise than to invite a comparison between it and those which the Pope gathers round him in St. Peter's, to witness the canonization of a new saint, or the promulgation of a new dogma, either in point of numbers or (in theatrical phrase) of *effects*. Not only have we nothing to show that would not present a pitiable contrast to those glistening files of brocaded copes and jewelled mitres which adorn the Roman spectacle: but, unless the Meeting was to be held, not, as your Grace proposes, at Lambeth, but in Westminster Abbey or St. Paul's, we could show no spectacle at all. There would be nothing to meet the public eye, except in a newspaper, where the number present might be stated; and it would fall short, probably, by several hundreds, of the Papal gatherings.

Still, I would not say that the Anglican demonstration, on the scale which seems to be anticipated, would in itself be absolutely useless; and it seems to me a mistake to think that it would answer the same purpose, if the statistics of the Anglican episcopate were gathered from an almanack. It is not so. The actual presence of the assembled Bishops would show something which

could not appear in the almanack. It would show not only that the Anglican Communion numbered so many Bishops, but that there was some attraction in that communion capable of drawing them from remote parts of our world-wide empire, and from lands not included in it, to its centre. That is a fact which I do not at all wish to ignore or undervalue. And I should be sorry to think so meanly of my episcopal brethren as not to feel sure that the Meeting which will be gathered round your Grace at Lambeth next September will be as far superior to the Roman assemblages, in an intellectual, moral, and spiritual point of view, as it will be inferior to them in average numbers and in richness of costume. It will be composed, not of splendidly attired puppets, but of men; each with a mind, a will, a voice of his own, and with perfect liberty of speech and action, brought together not merely to be gazed on, or to echo any one's dictation, but to co-operate, according to their free individual judgment, for purposes in which they take a more or less lively interest.

But would any one seriously maintain that, because such a display of Unity would be gratifying and cheering to the friends of the Church, therefore it affords a sufficient motive for summoning Bishops to leave their Dioceses, and undertake long, laborious, and expensive journeys? Certainly, your Grace, who has not thought it worth while even to allude to this object, cannot be supposed to entertain such an opinion. But it appears to me that a like remark applies to those objects to which you have pointed, as of sufficient importance to justify the unprecedented step which you have taken, in convening an assembly of such an extraordinary character. The time of the Meeting is, as I learn from the Circular, to be divided between acts of common worship and "brotherly consultations." Let it not be supposed that I think lightly of the benefit which every one present may be expected to derive from each of these occupations. But "brotherly consultation" may be held in various ways; and the benefit will depend very much on the circumstances under which it is carried on. If it happened that half-a-dozen Bishops of the same communion were staying for a few days at the same

place, nothing could be more natural or fitting than that they should avail themselves of the opportunity, by seeking one another's company, interchanging the results of their experience, and discussing topics of the day, in which they took either a general interest, as Churchmen, or as specially concerned in the government of their several Dioceses. Such a Conference might prove very edifying and instructive to all, and might suggest a wish that a like fortunate chance might bring them together again. That it should lead them to resolve that, though living very far apart, and constantly occupied with duties which left them very scanty leisure, they would come together again, expressly and simply for the same purpose, would be much less probable, and of much more questionable propriety. But that a hundred Bishops should meet by appointment for the sake of such a Conference would, I imagine, be generally thought not only very unwise, on account of the glaring disproportion between the value and the cost of the object, but because it would imply the same kind of mistake into which a man would fall, who, having very much enjoyed the conversation of a few friends at a small round table, should expect to find the like pleasure at a large public dinner. Whatever purpose may be answered by the great Meeting which your Grace has summoned, it will certainly not be that of "brotherly consultation," such as might be held in the case I was supposing. It may be some other, far more interesting and important. But what that is, is just the point on which I most desire information, and am unable to find it in your Grace's Circular.

It is true your Grace proceeds to say of the intended "brotherly consultations:"—"In these we may consider together many practical questions, the settlement of which would tend to the advancement of the Kingdom of our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, and to the maintenance of greater union in our Missionary work, and to increased intercommunion among ourselves." These words at first sight suggest the idea of some definite and valuable practical results, which may be expected from the Conference. But, on closer inspection, one sees that

they do not necessarily imply any such thing, and that they leave it very doubtful whether any such thing was passing in your Grace's mind. For need I observe that it does not follow, because there are "many practical questions, the settlement of which would tend" to most desirable ends, that therefore the consideration of these questions by all manner of persons should lead to any practical result? There is nothing to prevent a question of supreme national interest from being debated in the Cambridge Union Society, as well as in the House of Commons. If, notwithstanding, the proceedings of the two assemblies do not excite our curiosity in an equal degree, it is not because it always happens that less ability or eloquence is displayed by the younger men. If their speeches were much the better, we should read them with the same comparative indifference, because they lead to no decision of the slightest practical moment; and the only benefit they yield consists in the exercise of the Debate itself. And so, in the proposed episcopal "consultations," the questions discussed may be of a thoroughly practical nature, and yet the discussion may not bring them one step nearer to a "settlement." The terms of the Circular just cited are so large and indefinite, that I cannot make out whether your Grace even contemplates that effect, or would be satisfied with something very far short of it.

In one clause, indeed, I seem to catch a glimpse of a more precise meaning; it is that which speaks of "the maintenance of greater union in our Missionary work." It appears that there has been some waste of strength through the concurrence of English and American Missions of our communion in the same fields. If this is so, it is certainly desirable that some arrangement should be made for a better economy of Missionary labour; and this, no doubt, is a practical object. But not only must it be quite unnecessary that the attention of a great Assembly of Bishops should be occupied by such details; this would be as great a waste of labour as that which it is proposed to remedy. Not only, I say, is this quite unnecessary, but it seems evident that such an Assembly is just the least of all fitted for such work.

The "increase of intercommunion among ourselves" is an

immediate necessary effect of a Meeting which is itself an act of intercommunion. How far it may also tend to a further subsequent increase will probably depend on the success of this experiment. But, anyhow, this could hardly be described as part of the business of the Meeting, which is the thing I wish clearly to understand.

So far, however, I could only say that, under the guidance of the Circular, and with all the aid I could get from other quarters, I have been unable to discover any sufficient motive, occasion, or object for the proposed Meeting, or any reason for supposing that the thought of such a Meeting would ever have occurred to your Grace's mind, but for the requests which you received, or that it would have occurred to any one on this side of the Atlantic, if it had not been suggested by the Canadian Address. But when I look further into the Circular, I meet with statements which raise graver and more positive objections, as they seem to me to point to facts which show that the present juncture is not only not the most convenient season for such a Meeting, but one in which it is singularly ill-timed.

The passage last cited is immediately followed by these very remarkable words :—“ Such a Meeting would not be competent to make declarations, or lay down definitions on points of doctrine. But united worship and common counsels would greatly tend to maintain practically the Unity of the Faith, whilst they would bind us in straiter bonds of peace and brotherly charity.”

I do not know how far I may myself have had some share in calling forth this explanation, as it seems designed to quiet apprehensions, such as I had expressed, as to the object of the General Council desired by the Canadian Synod. I read it with pleasure and thankfulness, as evidence of your Grace's wise and charitable intentions ; but in itself it does not go very far to relieve me from doubt and misgiving. The proposition as to the competency of the Meeting is unfortunately ambiguous. It admits of two senses : in the one it is perfectly true, but not so in the other ; and in the sense in which it is true, it offers no safeguard against the danger

I apprehended; while, in the sense in which it would offer such security, it is not true.

It is quite true that such a Meeting would not be competent to "make declarations, or lay down definitions on points of doctrine," in the sense that such declarations or definitions would have the slightest degree of legal authority or practical effect, or, as affecting the doctrine of the Church, would be worth more than blank paper. Indeed, this is so true, and so evident, that I can hardly believe your Grace can have meant your statement to be understood in this sense, in which, as a general proposition, it is superfluous, and, if considered as bearing on actual circumstances, presents no guarantee that it will have any effect on the proceedings of the Meeting. We hold in this sense that the Pope was not "competent" to define the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. And yet he did so. In the same sense the subscribers of the Oxford Declaration were utterly incompetent to make it. And yet they did so. I hope, indeed, that the rebuke which your Grace has incidentally, and perhaps unconsciously, administered to the authors of that Declaration, will make a wholesome impression on them. That which your Grace declares to be beyond the competency of the Meeting which you expect to receive at Lambeth, even if it should include every Bishop of our communion, was treated by them as within the competency, not only of grave and learned Doctors of Divinity, but of the youngest Curate just admitted into Holy Orders. But there is a sense in which it cannot be denied that they were competent to do, not indeed that which they affected to do, but that which they actually did; for it was nothing more than, as free-born Englishmen, they had a clear right to do. In that sense they were fully competent to do it. It may have been a mere waste of ink and paper. But what law forbids an Englishman to waste his paper and his ink?

But this ambiguity of your Grace's statement deprives it of all value as an indication of the course which the proceedings of the Episcopal Meeting may be expected to take in this respect. At the utmost, it could only be construed as signifying your Grace's

personal opinion and wishes to be against occupying the time of the Meeting with the making of declarations, or the laying down of definitions on points of doctrine. Some may doubt whether this is the true construction, especially in the absence of any explanation as to the subject of those "common counsels," to which your Grace looks as "greatly tending to maintain practically the Unity of the Faith." But on the assumption that the words are to be so understood, it would remain to be seen, when the Meeting takes place, whether it shares your Grace's opinion and wishes on this head, or, if it should be otherwise, whether you would think it right to enforce compliance with your own opinion and wishes against those of the majority. This would, I think, be contrary to your Grace's practice, even in assemblies where your position is one of higher authority than you could claim over all Bishops of our Communion.

And so we are led to inquire, with some interest, whether there are any means by which we may conjecture, with more or less probability, what are the opinions and feelings which are likely to prevail in the Meeting on this head? There are two documents, which have been now for some time public property, which throw light on this question. The one is the Address to your Grace from "The Provincial Synod of the United Church of England and Ireland in Canada, assembled at Montreal, in September, 1865," printed in the Appendix to the Bishop of Montreal's Sermon, entitled a "A Pan-Anglican Synod." The other is the Report of the Committee of the Lower House of Convocation, appointed to consider another Address of the same Canadian Synod, presented to the Houses of Convocation of the Provinces of Canterbury and York. In the first of these documents they describe the "painful" and "intense alarm" which had been excited in the minds of many members of the Church by two causes—by the recent decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the cases of "Essays and Reviews," and also of the Bishop of Natal and the Bishop of Capetown; and by the apprehension "lest the tendency of the revival of the active powers of Convocation should leave them governed by Canons

different from those in force in England and Ireland, and thus cause them to drift into the status of an independent branch of the Catholic Church—a result which they would at this time most solemnly deplore ;” and they conclude with an entreaty that your Grace would “convene a National Synod of the Bishops of the Anglican Church, at home and abroad, who, attended by one or more of their Presbyters, or laymen learned in Ecclesiastical law, as their advisers, may meet together, and under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, take such counsel, and adopt such measures, as may be best fitted to provide for the present distress, in such Synod presided over by your Grace.”

I have at present no need to consider whether the prospect of a difference between two branches of the Church in their respective Canons affords just ground for the “intense alarm” which it appears to have excited in Canada. But though the epithet “intense” may seem stronger than “painful,” it cannot, I think, warrant the supposition that the second of the two causes of alarm creates more “distress” in the minds of Canadian Churchmen, or is deemed by them of greater importance than the first. One may safely assume that the reverse is the fact, and that the doctrinal question occupies a much larger and more prominent place in their view than the question of Canons. And it is clear that the second cause of alarm cannot in the least weaken the operation of the other. And so, though there is a very remarkable difference between the Address of the Canadian Synod to your Grace, and that of the same body to our two Convocations, it is not such as to raise any doubt about the feelings which continue to animate the Synod, probably with unabated force. In the second Address, from whatever cause, which I have never yet heard or seen explained, the topic of doctrine, which fills so conspicuous a place in the first, is entirely omitted; and the ground assigned for the wish there expressed for a General, or—we may say—Pan-Anglican Council, is “the threat of isolation, which recent declarations in high places have indicated:” that is, “declarations” “in reference to the position of the Colonial branches of the Mother Church.”

I must own that I am very much surprised that such terror should have been excited by that "threat" of what is called "isolation," but which seems to amount to nothing more than relaxation, or, at the worst, a severance of a political connexion. And I think that by this time that terror must have been greatly allayed, if not entirely removed, by the excellent Paper published by the Bishop of Montreal, in the Appendix to his Sermon, in which his Chancellor, Mr. Bethune, shows most clearly, that there is no ground whatever for alarm or anxiety on that score. It was certainly in no spirit of hostility to the Church that the late Secretary for the Colonies undertook, by a stroke of his pen, to sever the last formal tie by which the Canadian Episcopate remained dependent on the Crown. And when that noble Lord was called upon to vindicate that proceeding, he was applauded for it by one of our brethren, in strains to which the chairman of the Liberation Society, if he had been present, would have listened with agreeable surprise, and with eager assent. It seems almost an affront to the intelligence and good sense of Canadian Churchmen, to doubt that they have now recovered their tranquillity of mind so far as regards the "threat of isolation," and are fully satisfied with the "guarantees for maintaining unity of doctrine and discipline between the different scattered branches of our Church in the Colonies," pointed out by Chancellor Bethune, even without the last, of a General Council, which he seems to have added, out of courtesy to the Synod which had so earnestly solicited it in their Memorials, rather than from his own conviction of its necessity, as he takes care to guard his own opinion with the significant proviso, "if more be needed."

Thus, then, it appears that among the various grounds stated in the two Addresses or Memorials on which the Canadian Synod rested their request for a General Council, the only one of which we can presume with any confidence that it has still any weight in their minds, or that they would now think it worthy to occupy the attention of the Council, is that which stands foremost in the Address to your Grace—the question of doctrine. But there is no reason whatever to suppose that this has lost anything of its

importance or urgency in their eyes. And if we turn to the other document to which I referred, as affording means for at least a probable conjecture as to the opinions and feelings which are likely to prevail in the Meeting of September next—the Report of the Committee of the Lower House of Convocation upon the Canadian Address—we are led to the same conclusion. The Report presents this very remarkable fact. The only document which the Committee had officially before them, the only one which they were appointed to consider, and of which they were supposed to have cognizance, was the Address to the two Convocations. Yet, when they proceed to consider “the principal advantages to be derived from” such a Council as they think “most to be desired,” it might seem as if it was the Address to your Grace that was present to their minds, and the topic first put forward in that Address, that which had chiefly engaged their attention. For the first of the principal advantages they enumerate is this:—“To afford an opportunity for the Churches of the Anglican Communion to confer together upon the questions or errors which may appear in these days to imperil the acceptance of ‘the Faith once delivered to the Saints.’” There can therefore be no doubt what is the subject which in the opinion of the Committee, and of all who share their views, should take precedence of all others at the Meeting in September. It is that suggested by the Address to your Grace.

But could your Grace consistently allow of such a proceeding? Is it desirable, or indeed morally possible, that a great assembly of Bishops should confer together on question or errors which appear to imperil the Faith, without even attempting to come to any conclusion, but so as studiously to avoid doing so? And yet how otherwise can they escape the necessity of trenching on that ground from which they are warned by the Circular to keep aloof: of “making declarations, or laying down definitions on points of doctrine,” for which your Grace has declared that they are not “competent?” And then let me request your Grace to consider for a moment the singular position in which you stand with regard to the Canadian Synod. Your Grace receives an Address, to which you return a favourable answer. You finally resolve to

accede to the wish expressed in it, and even in a larger measure than the Synod had ventured to hope. But, at the same time that your Grace announces this resolution, you virtually exclude from the deliberations of the Meeting which you have called the one subject which was represented by the Canadian Synod as the main ground of their request, and which the Committee of the Lower House of your Convocation rank foremost among the advantages to be derived from such a Council. Is there not reason to fear that our Canadian brethren may think themselves rather hardly treated, as if they had asked bread, and your Grace had given them a stone? May it not be that they would have felt less disappointment if you had withheld the boon which they had so earnestly solicited, altogether, than now that they receive it clogged with conditions which must in their estimation deprive it of almost all its value?

I am not even sure that they will assent to your Grace's statement as to "competency," in the breadth in which it is laid down in the Circular. "If indeed"—they might say—"it was a scientific Congress, we should own that we were not 'competent' to speak with authority on questions which might be proposed to it. But we cannot admit that a Synod of Bishops is not competent to make declarations of faith, or to lay down definitions on points of doctrine." Your Grace might reply, that you did not mean to question their learning or the soundness of their theology, but only the practical effect of their decisions. They might rejoin that, so long as they were permitted to bear their testimony to the truth, they should be content with whatever weight it might have on the mind of the Church. Perhaps it would turn out that your Grace and they were reasoning from entirely different standing-points, which must prevent you from coming to a mutual understanding: that you were thinking of an Established Church, they of purely voluntary associations, bound by no law but the will of their members. A proceeding which, from the one point of view, might justly seem useless and mischievous, may from the other be regarded as necessary and highly expedient. That may be a reason why your Grace should deprecate the introduction of the

subject at the Meeting, but it does not prove that you will find yourself able to exclude it.

The statement that the Meeting "would not be competent" for one specified purpose, naturally suggests the question, What are the purposes for which it would be competent? There are several as to which its competency is in every sense unquestionable. It would be competent to "unite together in the highest acts of the Church's worship," and in effusions of "brotherly charity." All present would be competent, according to their various gifts, to make learned, eloquent, pathetic speeches. The Meeting would be competent to discuss all manner of questions, speculative and practical, concerning the Church. Indeed, as to this, the difficulty would probably be to regulate the discussion, especially as the Bishops could not well be drafted into sections, so as to allow a moderate time for one-tenth of the subjects proposed. I have already said that I do not deny that all this would be edifying and profitable. But I cannot admit that any amount or quality of speech, which does not terminate in some kind of action or work, is an object sufficient to require or justify the bringing our whole episcopate together. The question which most interests me, and which I think deserves your Grace's first attention, is, for what kind of action or work would the meeting be competent? I believe it will be by its works, and not by its words, that it will be either justified or condemned. But this is a question which I do not find it easy to answer. It may be said that it will be competent not only to "consider," but to pass Resolutions on "many practical questions." But a Resolution, however practical may be the question to which it relates, is no more than a form of words, and, unless it be carried into effect, an empty form. A Resolution adopted by the Meeting unanimously might bind those who were parties to it as long as they continued to hold the same opinion. The unanimity would perhaps be a sign of causes at work, which would have produced the same effect if no such Resolution had been passed. But the vote of the majority would not bind the minority, still less the absent, to any course of proceeding at variance with their own convictions.

I can assure your Grace that, while offering the foregoing observations, I have been quite aware that they may be wholly superfluous; that there may be nothing in them that had not before occurred to your mind, or that you have not maturely considered. It is possible that you have already taken steps, or at least conceived a plan, for organizing the business of the Meeting, so as to guard against all dangers, and to ensure, not only a fugitive enjoyment, but some practical, valuable, and abiding results; and it may be your intention to communicate the particulars of this plan to all whose attendance you have invited, before the Meeting takes place. But as it is only through the Circular that I know anything of your Grace's designs, I felt myself constrained to express the doubts and misgivings which it suggested to me, just as if it was the last communication I had reason to expect on the subject.

I have not yet replied to the invitation contained in the Circular; and your Grace will now understand why I am not at present prepared to do so positively and definitively. It would indeed be with extreme reluctance, and only for what appeared to me very grave reasons, that I should decline any invitation of your Grace, and especially one of such a nature. I should accept it with some repugnance, if I had no better ground than I find in the Circular to believe that the result will be useful or honourable to the Church. In no case indeed should I think it right to avail myself of your Grace's permission "to send in a list of subjects to you for consideration and discussion." I believe it to be much less likely that there will be a scarcity of subjects, than that there will be more than sufficient to fill the allotted time. And the terms of the invitation are such as rather suggest the idea of a Church Congress than of a Council of Bishops. And I must say frankly that, the subjects being given, I should expect the discussion they receive at a Church Congress, where all orders and classes of Churchmen meet, to be more instructive than one in which none but Bishops take part.

But if I knew, or had reason to believe, that the subjects to be brought before the Meeting are such as those, the discussion of

which is considered by the Committee of the Lower House of Convocation as among "the principal advantages to be derived from a Council of the several Churches constituting the Anglican Communion;" if the Meeting is "to confer together upon questions or errors which may appear in these days to imperil the acceptance of the Faith once delivered to the Saints;" if it is "to provide a broad basis upon which to found attempts to bring about Intercommunion with other portions of the Church Catholic;" if it is "to discuss and affirm the common principle of 'a right ecclesiastical discipline,' as 'one of the notes of the true Church;'" if it is "to consider the principles upon which Constitutions and Canons applicable to the whole body of the Anglican Communion may best be framed;" if it is "to devise a course of procedure by which Ministers of the Church, whether Bishops, Priests, or Deacons, accused of denying the Faith, or infringing the discipline of the Church, may be duly tried, in a mode recognised by the whole Communion, as just both to the accused and to the Church:" then I should feel myself obliged to make some kind of protest against these proceedings, and that which I should think most consistent with my respect for your Grace would be to stay away from the Meeting. I am not anxious to hasten a separation between Church and State; and, until that is accomplished, the discussion of such questions—unless considered as preparing the way for separation—would appear to me, whether the Meeting is or is not "competent" to entertain them, as premature, and much worse than a mere waste of time. I would fain hope that your Grace may be of the same opinion.

I remain, your Grace's faithful Servant,

C. ST. DAVID'S.

ABERGWILI PALACE, *March*, 1867.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX.

SPEECHES OF THE BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S IN THE UPPER HOUSE OF CONVOCATION OF THE PROVINCE OF CANTERBURY, ON THE REVISION OF THE BIBLE, DELIVERED FEB. 10TH, 1870, AND ON FEB. 14TH AND FEB. 16TH, 1871; TOGETHER WITH TWO LETTERS OCCASIONED BY THE FIRST SPEECH.

THE BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S—I wish to say a very few words on this question, because, though I assent generally to most of what has been said by the Bishop of Winchester, and am quite prepared to accede to his motion, my assent does not rest precisely upon the same grounds. I cannot quite take the same view which he seemed to do as to the absolute duty of the Church to correct every error which it may find to exist in the Authorised Version of the Scriptures. It appears to me that that would involve the necessity of a constant course of revision and alteration, for which I think we cannot be prepared. And this leads me to observe that I think the Bishop of Winchester has underrated some of the objections which have been hitherto made to entering upon this great undertaking. Let me, however, say that I should most entirely assent to his proposition if the defects of the Authorised Version were supposed in any degree to affect the truth of any doctrine contained in Holy Scripture. Then I should say it was the bounden duty of the Church not to let an hour pass without undertaking the work. But I cannot admit that its importance, great as it is in my mind, is of that kind. I do not believe that any revision which could ever be made of the Authorised Version would be found in the slightest degree to affect any doctrine which the Church holds. Therefore it is not on that ground that I rest my assent to my right rev. brother's motion. I think it may be said there are three causes which have hitherto prevented the Church, and those of its members who are best qualified to judge of the necessity of this undertaking, and who most feel the imperfection and inadequacy of the Authorised Version, from recommending that such a work should be undertaken. One of these I believe to be that there has been a very general opinion that the

study of Biblical criticism is one which, especially in this country, is making continual progress, and making fresh and not unimportant discoveries, and that it was upon the whole more prudent to wait until it should have reached a more advanced stage, when this undertaking might have been entered upon with a fairer prospect of complete success. I believe that is a consideration which has influenced not a few minds amongst those who in general would most ardently have desired a revision of the Authorised Version. Another objection I believe to be one which my right rev. brother of Winchester appeared to me to pass over too lightly, but which appears to me a very grave objection indeed, at least one that deserves most mature consideration. It is, that we might possibly construct and send forth a version of the Scriptures which would not enjoy such a universal reception as is the case with the present version; so that, in fact, there might be such a thing as a Church Bible and a Dissenting Bible. I think all my right rev. brethren will agree with me that this would be an evil for which scarcely any advantage that could be gained by a new version would be sufficient to compensate. This induces me to think that an addition to the resolution of the Bishop of Winchester would be very desirable, and I do not see why it should not be perfectly practicable, that we should call in the aid of some of the more eminent and distinguished among the Dissenters to join in the revision now proposed. I think great advantage would be gained by this, even if it only had the effect of reconciling the minds of our Dissenting brethren to the undertaking. This appears to me, indeed, to be an essential condition of its success. There is a third objection or difficulty, over which, also, I cannot help feeling that my right rev. brother has passed too lightly. I must own it is my belief that, when the Authorised Version has received all the amendments of which it is capable, and which it absolutely requires, this will be found to have effected a very great change in many parts of the Bible, and I think one effect of this will be that it will deprive many of the Clergy, and perhaps still more of the Dissenting ministers, of some of their most favourite texts—I mean in reference rather to their own use than for the teaching of others; there may be not a few who would feel that it is really to inflict an injury upon them to make changes entailing this privation, and they may be thus led to feel a secret objection upon other than the professed grounds to the revision of the Authorised Version, which may, in fact, lead to serious difficulty. I may cite as an instance of the way in which I think this would operate, the words of Haggai, “the desire of all nations,” in which the phrase of the original does not really apply to a person, but means “the precious things of all nations,” a change which would prevent many from using it as it is commonly used. Another phrase, which is printed in large capitals, in the portion appointed for the

Epistle on the Twenty-fifth Sunday after Trinity, is “the Lord our Righteousness,” which is well ascertained not to be a correct translation of the original text, and it would only be in a circuitous and indirect way that the same use could be made of it under a correct translation as has hitherto obtained. I, however, quite agree with the Bishop of Winchester that these are not objections which ought to prevent us from engaging in such an undertaking, though I cannot say I am myself affected by a sense of the danger of incurring obloquy and reproach, as if we were impairing the truth of God’s Word. That reproach might be just if the effect of the present Version was to veil objections which otherwise might arise to the doctrines of the Church. I do not believe that to be the case, and therefore I should not feel myself in the least moved by any reproach of the kind. The simple ground on which I should desire the revision and improvement, so far as our present knowledge goes, of the Authorised Version, is, that I am sure it would be of inestimable advantage and value to the mass of English readers, both for public and private reading. I am myself most deeply impressed with the extent of its imperfection and inadequacy, and I think a great deal depends upon the question of extent. We ought not to conceal from ourselves that it will very materially alter the general character of the text of Scripture; but that is not a reason for abstaining from the work, but rather the reverse, so long as we are sure that this alteration will have the effect of presenting to the general reader the mind of Scripture more truly and effectually than has hitherto been done. On that ground it is that I shall give my vote for the resolution. At the same time we must be prepared to find that the improved version, when it has been made, will only gain ground gradually, though I do not consider that this is any real evil or objection, but rather a recommendation, since it will be less likely to give offence to many. With these limitations I give my cordial assent to the motion.

LETTERS OCCASIONED BY THE FOREGOING SPEECH.

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF HAGGAI II. 7.

To the Editor of the Rock.

11th March, 1870.

SIR,—I shall be obliged to you if you will have the goodness to insert in your paper the following remarks on a letter of Mr. Fausset, which appeared in the *Rock* of Tuesday, the 1st instant, but which I only saw in print some days later.

I must observe that Mr. Fausset has confined himself to the task of defending the received version. He has not attempted to point out any objection to that which he rejects, except that he considers it (as I hope to show, quite erroneously) as *Anti-Messianic*. He does not deny that in itself it is perfectly clear and intelligible, perfectly consistent with the rules of Hebrew syntax, and in perfect harmony with the whole context. If, therefore, he had been completely successful in his attempt to get rid of every objection that has been raised to the received rendering, he would only have placed the two interpretations on a footing of equality. But I think he will hardly suppose that he has satisfied those who take an opposite view, as completely as he may have satisfied himself. And when the question is between two interpretations, one of which is free from all difficulty, while the other is open to such grave objections as to appear to many competent judges absolutely inadmissible and grammatically impossible, that which is free from difficulty will have a clear claim to preference, though something may be alleged which may be thought in some degree to weaken the force of the objections raised against the other. In these matters we must always be content with something short of mathematical demonstration, and generally with the result of a balance of probabilities.

Mr. Fausset appears to me to have enormously underrated the gravity of the chief difficulty which he attempts to remove. It is that which stands third in his enumeration: that of the plural verb. Its importance would have entitled it to the foremost place, though even if it had been cleared away, it would have left others standing. To critics whom Mr. Fausset would neither reject as deficient in Hebrew scholarship, nor charge with Anti-Messianic tendencies, it presents the aspect of a solecism, like that which we should have had in the Vulgate, if it had translated, "Venient desideratus." This is the impression it made on Hengstenberg, whose words are so apposite to our present circumstances, and come with such peculiar weight from such a writer, that I cannot forbear quoting them: "The comfort of the heathen" (Luther's translation, 'da soll denn kommen aller Heyden Trost') had struck such deep root in the field of practice, in hymns, sermons, &c., that most of the commentators shrank from the thought of abandoning an interpretation which had grown so dear to them in a way which was not that of critical research. Its untenableness was most distinctly affirmed by Calvin among the early writers, and appears clearly from the following reasons: 1. According to it the plural בְּשֵׁנִי admits of no justification." (*Christologie*, iii. i. p. 226.)

So Köhler (*die Weissagungen Haggai's*, p. 72), having observed that the words which we translate "the desire of all nations" were understood by Luther and most of the earlier commentators of the Messiah,

proceeds to say, "But this interpretation is utterly impossible (völlig unmöglich), if it were only because the subject הַיְּמִינִים has the plural אֲנֵי for its predicate; for this points, by necessary inference, to the fact, that the subject is conceived as a collective noun." Turning homeward, I find that Mr. Whiston, in his *Paraphrase of the Minor Prophets*, translates "their desirable things shall be brought," and observes in a note, "The above translation is approved by the Septuagint, Calvin, Houbigant, Heberden, Secker; and even Newcome places it in the margin as the true sense of the Hebrew, though in the text he followed the Received Version;" and quotes from Heberden, "The English translators of the Bible have followed the Vulgate against the plain construction of the Hebrew text, and have differed from all the other old translators."

On the same side, as to the present question, are the critics of great name who prefer rendering "the choicest" or "best" among the heathen; to which there is no objection, but the want of harmony with the context, and the obscurity of the description. In the sense of "desirable things" the same expression is used, 1 Samuel ix. 20 (where the meaning is fixed beyond question by the contrast with the asses, and is expressed in the Welsh translation, "holl bethau dymunol Israel"), and Daniel xi. 37; and Köhler happily remarks that the use of $\eta\xi\epsilon\alpha$ instead of $\eta\xi\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota$ in the Septuagint indicates that $\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\kappa\tau\acute{\alpha}$ $\tau\omicron\omega\nu$ $\epsilon\theta\nu\omega\nu$ refers to things, and not to persons.

With all this before us, it will, I think, hardly be maintained that the "correction" now under consideration is one of those which can be properly represented as long ago "weighed by competent scholars," "rejected," and exploded. On the contrary, there appears to be a great preponderance both of authority and of evidence in its favour, while the interpretation which is still in possession of the Received Version is constantly losing ground in the field of Biblical criticism.

All that Mr. Fausset alleges in support of his grammatical paradox is that "the masculine verb אָנִי , joined to a feminine collective noun, plainly intimates that not mere abstract desirableness, but the desirable man is meant." The question, however, is not as to abstract desirableness, but as to the concrete, desirable things. The intimation which Mr. Fausset thinks so plain was before the eyes of Hengstenberg, Köhler, and the rest, and to them it was so far from plain that they did not perceive it at all. This plainly shows that it is a mere subjective arbitrary fancy; but until this capital point is settled, it would be premature and useless to discuss those which precede it in Mr. Fausset's list. I have no dispute with him on either; and as to (2), I should freely admit that, when it is once ascertained that the Messiah is designated by the words translated "the desire of all nations," Mr. Fausset's explanation may well be accepted as in itself con-

sistent with the truth, though there would still remain the difficulty, that according to it the meaning is expressed by a description so obscure in itself, without a parallel in the Old Testament, and at the same time so directly and inevitably suggestive of a totally different sense.

But (4) leads me to remark that Mr. Fausset himself believes that the prophecy is to be fulfilled exactly in the way described according to the interpretation which he rejects. "Then," he says, "shall the nations bring those precious offerings which now ye so much miss." What, then, with regard to Messianic prophecy, is the difference between the two interpretations? Simply that in the one there is no express reference to the coming of the Messiah. That omission might be of some importance if Haggai were the only prophet of the Old Testament. But there can be no doubt that he and his readers were familiar with the writings of the elder prophets. They knew that the "precious offerings of the nations" involved the previous coming of the Messiah, that it was when "the Redeemer had come to Zion" (Isaiah lix. 20) that the influx of "the desirable things" described in chapter lx. was to ensue. In a word, the doctrine which Mr. Fausset strives to establish by artifices of interpretation, which tends to bring our Biblical criticism into discredit, is contained, though not directly, yet by clear and necessary implication, in the rendering which he stigmatizes as Anti-Messianic, though both in itself, and in the view of those who adopt it, it is not one whit less Messianic than his own. The interests of "revealed truth" are not in the remotest degree concerned in the question. When I spoke of "favourite texts," I little expected that my forebodings would be so soon and so signally realised. The anxiety and alarm which have been expressed on the subject are, indeed, truly deplorable. But I do not feel that it is I who am answerable for them.

Having occupied so much of your space, and being myself at present pressed for time, I must defer the consideration of the passage in Jeremiah to a future occasion.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.,

C. ST. DAVID'S.

ABERGWILI PALACE, CARMARTHEN.

THE BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S ON JEREMIAH xxiii. 6.

To the Editor of the *Rock*.

March, 1870.

SIR,—I must now ask you to afford room for a few remarks on Jeremiah xxiii. 6.

I will set out from a passage as to which there is no doubt, in the hope that it will be found to throw light on that which is in dispute. Ezekiel closes his prophecy with the new name of the New Jerusalem: "The name of the city from that day shall be, The Lord *is* there:" *Jehovah-Shammah*. Here there can be no question either as to the construction, that our translators have rightly inserted the copula, or as to the meaning of the name, which is equivalent to the Lord's dwelling-place—the City of the Divine presence.

Now, if we compare this name with that of *Jehovah-Tzidkenu* in Jeremiah xxxiii. 16, it seems clear that the construction is exactly the same; that the two words do not stand in apposition, but in the relation of subject and predicate; that the meaning is, not the Lord (*who is*) our righteousness, but the Lord (*is*) our righteousness. It is a symbolical name, expressing the facts that in the Messianic time Jehovah is to be the righteousness of Jerusalem, to bestow righteousness upon her, with all its attendant blessings. According to the other construction, the name Jehovah would be given to Jerusalem.

And then, when we proceed to consider xxiii. 6, the first question is, why should it be supposed that the construction in the one place is different from that in the other? The burden of proof certainly rests with those who maintain what is intrinsically so very improbable. Nägelsbach (in Lange's *Bibelwerk*) observes that Jeremiah is his own best interpreter, and infers that as xxxiii. 16 undoubtedly relates to Jerusalem, so xxiii. 6 must relate to Israel. This is also Ewald's opinion. But I prefer that of Hengstenberg (*Christologie*, II. p. 464), who refers the suffix, for which he justly contends as indispensable, not to Israel, though this is the immediate antecedent, but to the King who "shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth." To me, however, it appears that this is not the material point, and that it has diverted attention from the really important question, which is not whether the suffix is to be referred to Israel or to the King, but what is the true construction of the name, to whichever it is applied; whether, consistently with analogy, it can be considered in any other light than that of a sentence, compendiously describing the Messianic condition of a people whose righteousness is the Lord, who "in the Lord have righteousness" (Is. xlv. 24). It is in substance exactly equivalent to Ezekiel's *Jehovah-Shammah*; for

where the Lord dwells, there dwells righteousness—and to that which the Psalmist says of the “City of God,” that “God is in the midst of her” (Ps. xlv. 5). That is her *name*, the description of her true character and condition, more fully expounded (Rev. xxi. 3, 4). (Compare also Ezek. xliii. 7.)

There is a historical fact which seems to me strongly to confirm this conclusion. It has been observed by many, and recently by Professor Plumptre in his *Biblical Studies*, p. 54, that the weak and unprincipled Zedekiah most probably assumed that name with reference to Jeremiah’s prophecy; but it is impossible to conceive that he meant by this to take to himself the name of Jehovah. All that he could have imagined was, that he might be the king in whose reign the promise was to be fulfilled.

I therefore submit that the sense of the passage is not correctly rendered without the insertion of *is* in italics. The Lord *is* our righteousness. This would perhaps render the text less serviceable for the use which is commonly made of it, but it would not in the slightest degree affect its application to Him who was “made unto us righteousness” (1 Cor. i. 30). With this very slight modification it would remain (in the words of Professor Plumptre, u. s. p. 55) “true at once of the Divine King and of the New Jerusalem, the city of the living God, that the one should be called by the name of the Lord our Righteousness, and the other accept it as the law of its existence.”

I am, Sir, yours, &c.,

C. ST. DAVID’S.

ABERGWILI PALACE, CARMARTHEN.

THE REVISION OF THE SCRIPTURES.—THE WESTMINSTER SCANDAL.”

A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE UPPER HOUSE OF CONVOCATION ON
FEBRUARY 14TH, 1871.

THE BISHOP OF ST. DAVID’S—I think I may venture to say there is none of your lordships—I might even add, no one living—who is more perfectly disengaged than myself from everything in the nature of personal interest of any kind in the matter, for my share of it has been strictly limited to the part I took in the debate on the general question when it was before the House. It may be in the recollection of several of your lordships that I stated some of the objections which had actually been made to a Revision, and the drift of what I said was, how desirable it was to engage the assistance of all the other religious bodies of the

country in the work, and that without such assistance the undertaking could have but a very slight chance of general success, and might lead to mischievous divisions and schism on the subject. After that time I had no opportunity of being present at any meeting of the Committee, or on any subsequent occasion when the matter was discussed. With regard to what has been called the Westminster scandal, I never inquired into it. I never knew what had happened until I saw it in the newspapers, and never had an opportunity of expressing any opinion on the subject, and it is not my intention now to express any opinion, because I conceive that is a matter entirely unconnected with the question before us. Whatever my opinion on the subject may be—whether I thought it something to be highly approved of or strongly disapproved of, my view of the question before us would be the same. At the same time I cannot help mentioning the impression on my mind with regard to what occurred. It appeared that if it had not been for that incident it was highly probable that no step would have been taken with a view to the alteration of the resolution which had been adopted. And I could not help observing another fact which struck me very much. I do not mean to say that any one has expressed anything beyond his genuine feeling—and I believe many persons have been shocked by what is called the Westminster scandal—but I think the persons who expressed themselves most strongly in that sense were persons who disapproved of the revision altogether. I cannot help feeling some little doubt as to the broad fact laid down by the Bishop of Winchester respecting the general unanimity on the subject. I cannot say I have yet heard anything that convinces me that there is such unanimity of opinion in deprecating the appointment of a person or persons holding Unitarian or Socinian views to a place in the Old or New Testament Company. I think the very fact that a Unitarian was elected to be a member of the New Testament Company by a number of Bishops is a conclusive proof on the point that opinions are divided. But whether a majority, and an overwhelming majority, is on one side or the other, must be something very difficult to ascertain. We have heard of the opinions expressed by the American Bishops, and I was struck, as the Bishop of Winchester was speaking, with one expression—the Westminster scandal. I thought that applied to the invitation given to the Unitarian, but I did not clearly understand whether in the letter which he read he alluded to the solemnity, or to the invitation to become a member of the Committee.

The BISHOP OF WINCHESTER—I meant emphatically the invitation of a man who denied the Godhead of Christ to attend at the celebration of the Holy Communion in Westminster Abbey.

The BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S—I am glad to hear that, because it greatly simplifies the question. I do trust, and fully expect, that such

an invitation will never be repeated, and that we shall resolve that it shall not be repeated with our consent. That is a fact belonging to the past, and it is not worth while to express my own feelings on the subject. I think I should be going out of my way to do so. My great object is to confine the question to that which I conceive to be the real point in the debate. I have listened with great attention to the speech of the Bishop of Winchester, and to that of the Bishop of London, but neither of them adverted for one moment to that which I conceive to be the point on which the whole question turns. Perhaps I ought to take some degree of shame to myself; but it is a fact that, having in process of time to take a share in the meetings of the Old Testament Company, a great many gentlemen were unknown to me both by person and by name. I knew nothing whatever of them as to their religious opinions. They might have been Unitarians, Deists, or Atheists for anything I knew; but it never occurred to me that that had anything to do with the matter. I considered them merely in the light of eminent scholars, who were capable by their learning and ability of conducing to the success of the work on which they were engaged. Whatever I had heard of their private religious opinions would not have altered my opinion on that point. I do not see how the divergences of the Unitarian doctrines, whatever they may be,—for the names of Socinian and Unitarian comprise such an infinity of varieties that it is impossible to apply the same language to the opinions of the whole body,—I do not see why the divergence of opinion from the doctrines of the Church renders them, or any eminent scholar belonging to their body, less capable of expressing their opinions and affording very valuable assistance in the work. That point has not been touched upon, and that seems to me to be the only point on which the whole question turns. But if there is anything of the kind, I want to know how it is that it does not apply to the admission of Jews to the Old Testament Company. It has been assumed that there is no objection to the admission of Jews to that body. I should have imagined that questions verging to the same point of our Lord's Divinity are involved in the interpretation of the Old Testament; and that in the interpretation of the prophecies there are divergences of opinion only less important than the departure of Unitarians from the orthodox doctrines of the Church. When I hear any explanation how and why it is that the peculiarities of the Unitarian or Socinian prevent one who holds these opinions from contributing his share to the general work of revision, I shall know on what grounds I am giving my vote. I rise for the present, not pledging myself absolutely one way or the other, but for the purpose of calling your lordship's attention to that which I consider the main—the one point, but which has been entirely omitted in what I have heard in the course of the debate; and I trust I shall be followed by

some speaker who will enable me to form a judgment, and to show what are the opinions which, however it may render it unpleasant and uncomfortable for many of us to meet in the same room with those who hold them, incapacitate those persons from rendering the assistance that may be rendered by eminent scholars in the revision of the Authorised Version of the Old or the New Testament.

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE UPPER HOUSE OF CONVOCATION ON
FEBRUARY 16TH, 1871.

The BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S—Before I proceed to move the resolution of which I gave notice yesterday, it is absolutely necessary for my purpose that I should trespass for a very few moments on your lordships' time with some explanation of the motives which have led me to take this step; and I must remind your lordships, and inform those of our right rev. brethren who were not at the time members of our body, that I stand in a very peculiar position on this subject. I had the honour of seconding the motion of my right rev. brother the Bishop of Winchester when he moved the adoption of the report which contained the five resolutions, the fifth* of which has been the subject of our debates this Session. I am therefore, if it were only in that respect, peculiarly pledged to these resolutions; but if there was one of them to which I was more peculiarly pledged than another, it is that which has now undergone a material alteration. And on looking back at the report of our debates, I observe that the Bishop of Winchester, in the latter part of his speech in moving the adoption of these resolutions, said, "This Committee of our body will have full power to bring to its aid all the external learning it can find." In seconding that motion, I not only gave implicit assent to that statement as a recommendation to the Committee, but I find that when the subject was again brought before this House on the 10th of February I made these observations: "This induces me to think that the addition to the resolution of the Bishop of Winchester would be very desirable, and I do not see why it should not be perfectly practicable that we should call in the aid of some of the more eminent and distinguished amongst the Dissenters to join in the Revision now proposed. I think great advantage would be gained by this, even if it only had the effect of reconciling the minds of our Dissenting brethren to the undertaking.

[* The fifth resolution was as follows:—"That it is desirable that Convocation shall nominate a body of its own members to undertake the work of revision, which shall be at liberty to invite the co-operation of any eminent for scholarship, to whatever nation or religious body they may belong."]

This appears to me, indeed, to be an essential condition of its success." I think, therefore, I may truly say that no one can be more fully pledged to that principle which appears to have been repudiated by the resolution* which was passed by your lordships yesterday than I am. But, independently of my personal connexion with the subject, I must venture to say that I very much lament that resolution, in the first place, as being utterly unnecessary for the object, the sole object assigned for it, resting on a very narrow basis, on a single point, but covering a very large space, and without any reason that I heard assigned for that apparent inconsistency. I must also say that, in my judgment, this resolution, whether it be right or whether it be wrong, has materially altered the position of every member of the Revision Company. Its tendency, and in my opinion its inevitable consequence, has been to introduce distrust and suspicion in the place of mutual confidence and respect. It would be impossible for me ever again to attend one of these meetings with those feelings of entire cordiality and confidence with which I have hitherto attended them. But, besides that, I think its tendency is to mar in a most material and important degree the character of the work itself—to damage and discredit it, and that for the very obvious reason which was assigned by the President himself, when he expressed his intention of seconding the resolution. He adverted to that point which must have been manifest to everybody, that there was a view of the subject, the effect of which was to lead the public, the laity, persons without, to believe that we were afraid of having Dissenters of a particular denomination in our company, because it might have the effect of spoiling our work.

The PRESIDENT—I did not exactly say that.

The BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S—That is my recollection. But I think I cannot be mistaken as to the observations made by the Bishop of Exeter to the same effect.

The BISHOP OF EXETER signified his assent.

The BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S—As I rose third in the debate, I thought it best not to pledge myself as to my vote, but to wait for an answer to what seemed to me a palpable and decided objection to the resolution. The answer was promised by the Bishop of Winchester, but he did not give me any satisfaction on that point, nor did I hear anything like an answer to my question, which was, in what way the particular

[* This resolution, which was proposed by the Bishop of Winchester, was:—
 "That it is the judgment of this House that it is not expedient that any person who denies the Godhead of our Lord Jesus Christ should be invited to join either Company to which is committed the revision of the Authorized Version of Holy Scripture; and that it is further the judgment of this House that any such person now in either Company shall cease to act therewith; and that this resolution be communicated to the Lower House, and their concurrence required."]

opinions of a Unitarian, however wide their divergence from the doctrines of the Church—why his flagrant heresy—I do not care in what terms you describe it—should render his learning, ability, and scholarship unavailing for the purpose of giving useful help to the Company. I must say that I never heard any answer to that question. I conceive, therefore, that this resolution is open to every possible objection that can be made to it. It is utterly needless; it is positively mischievous, as most injuriously affecting the position of every member of the two Companies, and as inevitably throwing discredit on and effecting damage to the work itself. Considering this, and with the light thrown upon it by the language which I heard in the course of the debate—and I would say more especially that which fell from one of my right rev. brethren as to the danger of compromise—it became to me a matter of very serious and anxious reflection whether it was possible for me, under these circumstances, consistently to remain a member of the Old Testament Company. I have come to the conclusion that it would not be consistent with that which I owe to myself, that it would not be consistent with that which I owe to others whose views and feelings I share, and who believe themselves to have been deeply aggrieved by this resolution, if I were to retain my place in that Company. I think it is absolutely necessary that I should make the strongest and most emphatic protest in my power against an alteration of the fifth resolution of which I so utterly disapprove, and I know of no way in which I can make that protest so pointedly and so effectually as by resigning my place in that Company. I can assure your lordships that I have not come to this resolution without deep searchings of heart, without great reluctance, without great pain: for although my attendance at the meetings which have hitherto taken place has been given by myself and my right rev. brethren at considerable sacrifice of time and labour and all kinds of inconvenience, yet I have been amply repaid by the great pleasure, instruction, and benefit which I have derived from the meetings which I have had the privilege of attending. And I think it is due to those with whom I have hitherto been associated, to say that my experience has had the effect of strengthening my conviction of the great value and importance of the undertaking itself, and of the utter futility of all the objections that I have heard raised against it, which I am persuaded would never have occurred to any one who had enjoyed the same experience that I and my right rev. brethren have had of the practical working of the undertaking. Therefore, my lords, it is to me a most painful sacrifice to make. I also think it right to take the opportunity of bearing my testimony, in common with my right rev. brethren who are my colleagues in this Company, to the admirable and excellent spirit which has pervaded the meetings, and which was to my mind a

guarantee of the harmony and good feeling which would continue to prevail to the end. But all these considerations I feel ought to give way to the duty which I owe to myself, and to those who consider themselves, and most justly, specially aggrieved by this alteration, which has led me most reluctantly to the decision that I cannot longer remain a member of that Company. I may observe by the way, that this has been the simple result of my own very anxious consideration of the subject, and that this is the first time I have breathed to any human being a hint of the intention which I have now expressed. I felt at the same time that there was a duty which I owed to the Church on the subject, and it seemed to me that although it was impossible to undo the mischief that has been done, it was possible to mitigate it. It is with this view, and not from any personal feeling, that I drew up the resolution which I yesterday read to your lordships. I do not affect to disguise from myself, nor do I wish to conceal from your lordships, that in my judgment the resolution which I am going to propose is utterly inconsistent with that which your lordships adopted yesterday by a great majority. It is to my own mind perfectly clear that the two resolutions proceed on directly opposite principles. The principle of the resolution of yesterday was that the true bond of union amongst persons engaged in such an undertaking was a perfect agreement in religious doctrines. I think I observe the assent of the Bishop of Lincoln to that proposition. I wish it to be clearly understood that I mean my resolution to be the expression of a totally different principle,—that I mean to deny that which is involved and expressed in the resolution passed yesterday; and it is because I conceive the two resolutions to be directly opposed to one another that I am now going to move this. While I fully admit that agreement in doctrine is for many purposes, and those the highest of all, the most important bond of union, I say that for the special purpose of the revision of the translation of the Scriptures it is not the true bond of union; but that the true bond of union is a common purpose amongst those engaged in the work of setting to it with a single eye to the accuracy and adequacy of the translation. I conceive these two principles are entirely incompatible. There may be an assembly of persons perfectly agreeing in doctrine, but that agreement in doctrine would afford no guarantee whatever of their being animated by that spirit which I consider as the indispensable bond of union. So far from that, the history of the Church from the earliest times to the present day shows that such a body is open to the temptation of warping the letter of Scripture,—of wresting it into a conformity with their own views,—of substituting that which they wished and hoped to see written for that which they actually find. And I cannot help thinking that if the venerable shade of Bishop Andrewes, which has

been so often invoked on this occasion, were actually to return for a few moments to the earth, and could observe the enormous difference, the enormous change, that has taken place in the state of things since his time, it is by no means so clear to me as it appears to be to the Bishop of Lincoln, that Bishop Andrewes would have so strongly condemned the constitution of the body which actually exists. I don't think he was a man so destitute of practical sense, or of so little consistency as not to perceive that change of circumstances, or not to allow his practice to be in some degree governed by it. I have now explained the occasion and the motives which have led me to take the step of submitting this resolution to your lordships. When I read it yesterday I was highly gratified to find that it commended itself at once to two of my right rev. brethren, and that seemed to me to be a favourable presage or omen of the reception it was likely to meet with from your lordships. It would be in the highest degree gratifying to me, because I think it would serve the cause of truth, if your lordships should adopt the resolution unanimously; but I say with the highest respect for your lordships that if the contrary were to be the case—if it should not be supported, or even seconded, I should still feel that which I value more than your lordships' unanimous assent—the conviction that I have on a very important occasion delivered my own soul, and contributed what I could to lessen the mischief which I conceive to have been done to the interests of the Church and the cause of truth by the unfortunate resolution which was adopted yesterday. I now beg to move—

“That, notwithstanding the restriction introduced into the fifth resolution, this House does not intend to give the slightest sanction or countenance to the opinion that the members of the Revision Companies ought to be guided by any other principle than the desire to bring the translation as near as they can to the sense of the original texts; but, on the contrary, regards it as their duty to keep themselves as much as possible on their guard against any bias of preconceived opinions or theological tenets in the work of Revision.”

The BISHOP OF ST. DAVID'S—I will say but a few words with regard to that which personally concerns myself. It is simply that if it were a matter of mere personal feeling and of that which I owe to myself—if I were the only party concerned—the slightest intimation of a wish, not merely of the whole of this House, but of any considerable number of my right rev. brethren, and particularly of those with whom I have been associated in the Revision Company, would have been to me an

obligation and a request which I should have felt myself bound to comply with. But what I cannot do, and what I should be obliged to do if I were to continue a member of the Revision Company, is to be wanting in that which I conceive to be due from me to others. That is something which I feel I have no right to dispose of. I think, I say, that it is due to those whose views and feelings on this subject I share, and who believe themselves to have been deeply aggrieved by the resolution adopted yesterday—it is that which I consider is due to them which seems to me to put it out of my power to recall that determination which I have announced. I may say that it has cost me a great deal of anxious reflection, and that if I had not felt that I had definitively made up my mind, I should have thought it most improper to have announced my intention in this public way. I cannot, however, help adverting to one point which has been raised by my right rev. brother the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, which is a very material one, and important to be generally understood. My right rev. brother conceives that notwithstanding yesterday's resolution it is in the power of either Company to obtain all the external aid that they desire for the purpose of their undertaking. Now, I venture to say that that is not the case, and that it is inconsistent with what my right rev. brother has himself laid down in a most valuable little work on the subject of the Revision, because one of the points on which he most strongly dwelt was the indispensable necessity of oral communication and discussion for the purpose of the Revision. Nothing that can be obtained in the way to which he now refers can answer the purpose of that free oral discussion, and therefore we are not obtaining all the fullest assistance that we might have from scholars who are not members of the Companies. That, I think, is a point that was rather overlooked by my right rev. brother opposite, the Bishop of Norwich, who appeared to think that the purpose might be just as well answered by correspondence as by personal communication. Perhaps I am mistaken in what fell from him, but I think it important that this should be borne in mind—that under the resolution adopted yesterday it will not be in the power of either Company to obtain the fullest assistance which they may require for their undertaking.

NOTES ON CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS.*

DR. LITTLEDALE'S ARTICLE ON "CHURCH PARTIES."

(CONTEMPORARY REVIEW FOR JULY, 1874—PAGE 317.)

IN this article I find myself reckoned among the most conspicuous members of "the Broad Church school."

I should be well content to accept this designation of myself, under protest; to do so absolutely, I must first know what it means.

When I consider that the Church of Jesus Christ was a broad Church in comparison with the Jewish Church: that the Sermon on the Mount was distinguished by the breadth of its teaching from all that the disciples had before heard: that it was the ministry of a Church too broad even for some Christians of that day, for which St. Paul exchanged "the most straitest sect" of the religion in which he had been brought up:—remembering all this, I cannot bring myself to treat "Broad Church" as a term of reproach.

Let others interpret it as they will, to me it does not appear an appropriate description of any existing "school," party, or body, held together by a common set of theological tenets. I understand it as signifying a certain stamp of individual character, which I would describe as a disposition to recognise and appreciate that which is true and good under all varieties of forms, and in persons separated from one another by the most conflicting opinions.

There is an opposition which all educated men more or less clearly understand between High Church and Low Church, but there is none between Broad Church and either. The proper antithesis to Broad is not High or Low, but Narrow. It would be monstrous presumption, and utterly inconsistent with Broad Church principles according to my view, for any school or party to pretend to the monopoly of this title, as if there were no Broad Churchmen to be found out of its own little circle. I hope and believe that there are numbers who have a rightful claim to it, among those who only profess to belong to one or other of the two great sections of the Church.

I should be sorry to think that Dr. Littledale himself was so completely alien from the thing as his polemical writings may seem to indicate, however he may detest the name. Viewing it in this light, he could hardly deem it matter of rejoicing that the party appears to be dwindling away, and the time approaching when it will cease to have any notable representative in the Church of England. It may be added that from this point of view his requirements of distinct proofs

* Reprinted from the *Contemporary Review* for October, 1875.

of productive energy in the Broad Church appear almost ludicrously irrelevant. There is no reason why it should not, or proof that it does not, according to its means, take its full share in every labour of love which commends itself to its judgment. The only reasonable question is, whether its influence, so far as it reaches, is wholesome or not: which seems as much as to ask, whether charity and toleration are good or bad things. Dr. Littledale's view of the subject must be very wide indeed of this: for he measures the value of an adherent of the Broad Church "camp" by his pugnacity, and the efficiency of the party by its "fighting strength." This to me is something new and strange, and quite at variance with my own conception of the state of the case. It may be unavoidable, especially at this day, that a Broad Church writer should be more or less forced into controversy, but it will be either in self-defence or for the purpose of amicable mediation. He has no standing quarrel with High Church or Low Church, though he could not consent to attach himself to either. He claims the right of taking up a position of his own, which he may be prepared to maintain without wishing to disturb the convictions of others.

I do not, however, mean to represent the note of Broad Churchmanship as consisting simply in a certain charitable and conciliatory disposition. No doubt it also implies an intellectual peculiarity, which parts it alike from the High and the Low School. What this is I would rather illustrate by example than attempt exactly to define. I would name among those of past time Bishop Jeremy Taylor, and among those of my own generation Archdeacon Hare, as furnishing a sufficient illustration of my meaning. To Dr. Littledale, and perhaps to all whose minds are differently constituted, this peculiarity will appear as a deplorable natural infirmity, or as the result of a vicious education. But they are labouring under a gross delusion if they believe that it admits of being remedied by any such process as Dr. Littledale suggests. He thinks that the deficiencies of the Broad Church teaching are the effects of ignorance, which might be corrected by a deeper study of theology. And he asserts that "theology grows clearer with advancing knowledge." If that means that, as knowledge advances, more becomes known, all I suppose would bow to the oracle. But if it means that as theology becomes more definite and systematic, it carries deeper conviction of its truth to minds which have ever been used to discriminate between that which is human and that which is divine in it, it would hardly be possible to frame a proposition running more directly counter to all the results of my study of ecclesiastical history, and to those of my personal experience.

To hold a prominent place in such a brotherhood as answers to my conception of the Broad Church would to me appear a most enviable distinction. I have only to lament that I can lay no claim whatever

to such an honour. But, on the other hand, it is a satisfaction to me to know, that if there is a party in the Church which has been guilty of "sleight-of-hand" tricks, and has played "fast and loose with truth," I at least am not one of its "leaders" or its members, have never been admitted into its councils, and, but for Dr. Littledale, should not have known of its existence.

August, 1874.

DR. LITTLEDALE'S ARTICLE ON "ECCLESIASTICAL VESTMENTS."

(CONTEMPORARY REVIEW FOR MARCH, 1875—PAGES 586, 591, 592.)

DR. LITTLEDALE appears to have overlooked the note by Valesius, quoted by Bingham, vol. i. p. 118, and also the obvious general consideration, that either St. John's example was followed by the other Apostles, in which case it would not have attracted any special notice, or, if peculiar to him, must be assigned to some other motive than that supposed by Dr. Littledale. I think it ought to be dropped from the controversy, as incapable of any satisfactory explanation (? as a legend).

Dr. Littledale appears to have overlooked that most important and decisive passage in the Epistle of St. James, from which it is evident that the *ἐσθῆς λαμπρὰ* of the priest was no more splendid vestment than that which was worn by every wealthy member of the congregation, and was only distinguished from those of the other worshippers by its superior neatness and cleanliness. *Vide* St. James's Epistle, ii. 3; Zech. iii. 3, 4, Septuagint.

(PAGE 578.)

This proposition rests upon the assumption that an ornate and gaudy worship is that which is most congenial to the spirit of true piety and devotion, and that one destitute of such accessories must be in proportion careless and irreverent. The history of all Protestant Churches may be safely charged with the refutation of this astonishing assumption. It might also seem that, if it is the business of the Church to educate her children, it must be one of her most important duties to elevate their taste from the lower to the higher kinds of æsthetical enjoyment, to wean them from the natural craving for pomp and glitter, and to accustom them to find satisfaction in the higher arts of architecture, music, and religious oratory, which have, in fact, been always found sufficient to supply the wants of all classes of worshippers, and of the simplest, as well as the most cultivated minds.

April, 1875.

ON A SERMON ON "HEAVEN," PREACHED BY THE RECTOR AT ST. MARY'S, BATHWICK, ON TRINITY SUNDAY, MAY 23, 1875.

It is hard to believe that those who claim the authority of the Book of Revelation for Ritualistic worship can have duly considered the difficulties which this argument ["our service is a rehearsal of the endless service of saints and angels"—*Ivide* Sermon] involves.

(1.) All the rest of the New Testament clearly favours the opinion that every kind of Christian worship is alike acceptable to God, provided it be offered in the spirit of true devotion ("in spirit and in truth"). But, if the point is to be decided by the authority of the Apocalypse, this opinion is erroneous. For God will have declared a decided preference of a mode of worship as stately and gorgeous as the circumstances of the worshippers permit.

(2.) And from this flows another conclusion, which many will find it difficult to accept. A very great number of the most earnest and sincere Christians in the world find this Ritualistic worship repugnant to their religious feelings.

This might have been considered as a harmless prejudice; but, if the authority of the Apocalypse is rightly invoked, such Christians are not only in error, but in sin; for they stand convicted of rejecting or disregarding the declared Will of God; and churches which enjoin or sanction such modes of worship must be guilty of an abuse of their authority, in the ordering of the forms of public worship, and of withholding from God that which is His due, and which He has declared Himself to desire.

(3.) The consideration of the heavenly worship cannot be severed from that of the heavenly blessedness; the Revelation is either history or parable. If it is to be taken as a simple record of matter of fact within the writer's experience, Heaven is a place of circumscribed dimensions, within which certain proceedings are constantly going on; its enjoyments may be infinitely purer than those of the Mahomedan paradise, but they are essentially of the same nature, sensuous, though not sensual, consisting mainly of splendid scenery and delicious music.

This, to many minds, will probably present a still greater difficulty. It is an edifying and fruitful topic for a sermon, that the wicked, even if they were admitted into heaven, would find no pleasure there, as all its highest enjoyments would be repugnant to their habits and pursuits; but no discreet preacher would represent an intelligent taste for the fine arts as an indispensable condition of everlasting happiness. The lowest and narrowest conception of the heavenly blessedness, though it is to be feared it is the most popular, is that which makes it consist, not in any increase of knowledge, not in any enlargement of

our sphere of action, not in any multiplication of the objects of our benevolent affections, but in an everlasting hymn-singing.

(4.) The whole argument is based upon the assumption, that the author of the Apocalypse could not have intended his vision to be a mere vehicle of truths which he deemed needful for the comfort and direction of the Church in his day, without desiring or expecting that it should be regarded in any other light. How far Dr. Littledale may have committed himself to such a proposition, I do not know; but I believe that it is generally held by writers and preachers of his school. It is one which, being incapable of proof, is sufficiently refuted by a simple contradiction.

May, 1875.

MR. ORBY SHIPLEY'S ARTICLE, "OUGHT WE TO OBEY THE NEW COURT?"

(CONTEMPORARY REVIEW FOR JUNE, 1875.)

THIS article ought not to be considered as a mere discussion of an ecclesiastical question; it is a great deal more than that. It is a conclusion of the efforts, which the author has been making for so many years, to effect the disruption of the Church of England. It is not so much a Word as an Act. The author himself can hardly expect that it should produce any effect upon minds that have not already adopted his views, completely identified the Church with the priesthood, and refused to allow the laity any voice, even upon questions of mere outward ceremonial. It is apparently meant as the blast of a trumpet giving the signal for action. Time only can show whether the author has or has not been too sanguine in his hopes of an approaching Disestablishment. But it is possible that he may not have greatly overrated the strength of his party, though it can hardly be considered as more than a section of one more numerous and powerful. But if his wishes should be fulfilled, the most probable effect would be that the Church would be broken up into two or three fragments, each claiming the name of the "National Church;" but one of them, at least, bearing a like proportion as the Church of the Nonjurors to the present Established Church; and the clear gain which would result to Mr. Orby Shipley, beside Disestablishment, would be either the gradual extinction of the smallest and highest of the Churches, or its more speedy absorption in the Church of Rome.

June, 1875.

THE EUCHARIST CONTROVERSY.*

THREE years ago Dr. Vogan published an elaborate work, "The True Doctrine of the Eucharist," the first part of which is mainly devoted to an examination of the sacred words on which the Eucharist controversy chiefly turns, the words of the Institution; and the result is to show that these words have been, unintentionally indeed, but through a very surprising oversight, mutilated, and, in consequence of that mutilation, misinterpreted by Dr. Pusey, and all the writers of his school, specially by Archdeacons Wilberforce and Denison, Bishops Forbes and Moberley, Mr. Carter and Mr. Orby Shipley, and that this gross mistake underlies all the speculations and practices of the Tractarian or Ritualistic party with regard to this sacrament. No unprejudiced person can read Dr. Vogan's work without feeling that it is a very careful and searching investigation of the subject, conducted in an excellent spirit, with an earnest desire to do the fullest justice to the opinions which he controverts, and to treat those who hold them with the greatest possible respect. The appearance of such a work, so temperate in its earnestness, so modest, so charitable, is, independently of the value of its conclusions, a very rare and refreshing phenomenon in our controversial theological literature.

Dr. Vogan believes himself to have proved, by an irresistible mass of evidence, that the doctrine of the "Real Objective Presence" in the Eucharist taught by Dr. Pusey and his friends has no support either in Holy Scripture or in Catholic antiquity; that it is a novelty of very recent date, the product of the nineteenth century,—the consequence of a strange oversight, which the author has placed in the clearest light.

Dr. Vogan points out that the advocates of the real objective (or objective real) Presence in the Eucharist, who most strenuously insist on a literal interpretation of our Lord's words, as that which is most favourable to their view, have totally neglected, and kept entirely out of sight, a most material part of them. They have reasoned as if our Lord had said nothing more than "Take, eat, this is My body"—"Drink ye all of this, for this is My blood." The important qualification contained in these words, "which is given" (or "broken") and "which is shed for you," they pass over as if they were of no meaning or of no moment. But that which was to be eaten was not simply the body; that which was to be drunk was not simply the blood. It was the body in so far as given or sacrificed; the blood in so far as shed. At the time when the words were spoken the body had not yet been so

* [These "Notes" appeared, with some alterations, in the form of a Letter signed "Senex Anglicanus" in the *Times* of July 26, 1874, from which the additional matter has here been supplied.]

given, the blood had not yet been poured out on the cross. That which the disciples ate and drank could not be that body or that blood which had not yet come into being, and as neither has been in existence in the same condition at any time since, no one who has partaken of the Eucharist from the time of its institution can have eaten or drunk that body or that blood, in any but a purely spiritual sense. In such a sense the words of institution are no doubt as true now as ever. But they afford not the slightest support to the doctrine of the Real Presence, whether in the Roman, Lutheran, or Tractarian form. So interpreted, they are wholly inconsistent with the idea of a local presence on a material altar, which is common, and alike essential, to all those forms: and the scenic decorations of the Sacrament, lights, vestments, and ornaments of the altar, so far as they are significant of doctrine, become manifestly unmeaning, incongruous, and misplaced, and the dispute about the "position of the celebrant" a mere waste of breath.

Such being the character and such the main design of Dr. Vogan's work, the manner in which it has been received by the persons whose theological position is most deeply concerned is not a little remarkable. One might fancy that a word of command, issuing from some invisible centre, had gone round the Tractarian party, to neglect and ignore Dr. Vogan's book, and if possible to bury it in contemptuous silence. The person who might most naturally have been expected to notice it in some way or other is Dr. Pusey. If Dr. Vogan's view of the subject is correct, a very large part of the labours of Dr. Pusey's life has been worse than useless. He has then—though with the best intentions—been a blind leader of the blind, and on this important point has misled all who relied upon his authority into mischievous error. He, beyond any other man, is responsible for the evils which now afflict the Church. If his other occupations did not afford him leisure for answering Dr. Vogan—though one can hardly conceive any occupation surpassing or even approaching, in his own view, the importance of this—he might have committed the task to one of his disciples. That none of them should have undertaken it spontaneously, is only a little less surprising than the Master's silence.

But there is something still stranger than this. Two years ago Dr. Vogan sent Dr. Pusey a copy of his book, but has never received a word of acknowledgment. Within the last three months he has applied to Dr. Pusey, both privately and publicly, in the hope of learning from him whether he had or had not correctly represented his doctrine of the "Real Presence," or, in Dr. Pusey's judgment, had fallen into any mistake in his interpretation of the words of institution.

Dr. Pusey's first and last word in reply is that he "declines all controversy." Considering that controversy has been the chief business

of his life, it is not surprising that he should be a little tired of it. But a less happy juncture for declining it could hardly be imagined. No controversy, however, was proposed to him. He was only asked for information, highly important to the cause of truth, and which would not have cost him any great amount of time. The exceeding harshness of the whole proceeding, so difficult to reconcile either with charity or common courtesy, indicates that he has some strong motive for his silence. But most people will consider it as expressive of one of two things—either that he regards Dr. Vogan's book as beneath his notice, or that he feels it to be unanswerable. No one who has read it will believe the possibility of the first of these alternatives.

According to Dr. Vogan's view, the Eucharistic terms "Body and Blood" signify something which differs as widely as possible from the common familiar sense of the words. They are "food:" but spiritual food: food of the soul, such as cannot be placed on any material table or altar, which can be done only with the material symbols of bread and wine.

But then in what sense is it to be understood that the Eucharistic Body and Blood are food of the soul? By a simple and common figure the mind is said to be nourished by knowledge, or the object of knowledge—truth. But such purely intellectual nourishment is not sufficient for the soul. None can supply its wants, but that which kindles the affections, animates the will, satisfies the deepest longings of the heart. Such a kind of truth must be supposed to be veiled under the figurative terms Body and Blood. The soul which receives and embraces this truth, not with simple assent, but with emotions corresponding to its nature, may very fitly be said to feed upon it. According to this view, there is no presence of Christ in the Eucharist, differing in kind from that which is promised whenever two or three are gathered together in His name. There is no room for any adoration, though directed to Christ Himself, through any visible object. He is no more present on or at the Altar than in the Pulpit. The wicked and unbelieving, who do not share the benefit of Christ's death, cannot partake of the Body and the Blood. It may however be asked, If the words of institution are nothing more than a compendious expression and lively presentation of the truth that Christ gave Himself for us, must not the reception of this view tend to abate the fervour and veneration with which devout Christians have ever approached the Eucharist? And it must be owned that it may sometimes be difficult to translate the mystical rhetoric in which the Fathers loved to indulge on the Eucharist into language better adapted to the state of the case.

July 25, 1874.

THE DIVISION IN THE CHURCH :

A DIALOGUE.*

R. How do you reconcile our Lord's promise, as to the indwelling Presence of the Holy Spirit, with the present divisions in the Church?

L. That is a question which seems to be meant to stand for an argument. As such we are very familiar with it in our controversy with Rome; and it appears to have great weight with many minds, among others with Dr. Newman. But you must be aware that many—indeed the great majority of Christians—deny the existence of those divisions which you speak of as an indisputable fact, and consider their absence as one of the most conspicuous characteristics of their own communion. But if you ask how, while rejecting this opinion, and taking an entirely different view of ecclesiastical history, I explain the fulfilment of our Lord's promise, I should feel obliged to decline offering what would be no more than a fanciful and unverifiable conjecture, at the risk of being supposed to attach some value to it myself, as if I had a clearer insight into the Divine counsels than others. But I might have answered your question with another: How do you reconcile the general corruption of manners which at various times has overspread the Christian world, and, in general, the existence of sin in the Church, with that promise?

R. I think I could give a satisfactory answer to that question. The promise of exemption from error did not include immunity from sin, because that would have required a supernatural interference inconsistent with the freedom of the human will.

L. That the Holy Spirit should have been tender of the freedom of the will, while foreseeing the abuse that would be made of it, is a supposition which presents no difficulty to my mind. But it would remain to be explained how it is that, on the same principle, He did not refrain from violating that great law of human nature, according to which an evil life not only burdens the conscience, but darkens the understanding, and is a fruitful cause as well of error as of sin.

R. Would not the preservation of the deposit of the faith be an adequate motive for such an interposition?

L. Possibly; but you do not seem to have considered the nature of the difficulty I suggest. Do you find it easy to conceive a succession of causes severed from their effects?

R. That would be a sheer absurdity.

L. I am not concerned to deny the fact; but I leave it to you to describe it by its proper name. For me, it is enough to say that, to my mind, it is absolutely unthinkable.

* This was the last production of the lamented Bishop, a portion of it having been dictated the day before his death.—[Ed. C. E.]

R. You intimated that you could not admit the force of the argument, drawn by Roman divines from our Lord's promise, in favour of their Church; but you did not explain the grounds on which you rejected it. I should be glad to hear what they are.

L. Briefly and in substance this: I cannot consider an artificial factitious unity, obtained by brute force and terror, as a work of the Holy Spirit, to whose nature it belongs that all His operations are wrought, not by violence, but by a sweet and gentle constraint, and a process of conviction and persuasion, acting on the understanding and the will. When the Church had been transformed from a suffering to a persecuting body, it appears to me that it could no longer be rightly considered as in all respects the same as that to which the promise related; and it would be contradictory to the order of the Divine dealings, so far as they are known to us, that this or any other promise, whether to Churches or to individuals, should have been made unconditionally, and without regard to the character and condition of those to whom it was given. Perhaps the most pernicious and shocking of all heresies was that by which knowledge was elevated above goodness: error on the most abstruse subjects which could occupy the human mind, regarded as the most atrocious of crimes, deserving the severest punishment. Surely the fires of the Inquisition did not come down from heaven, but were lighted from the pit; and the Popes, who are considered by their adherents as the personification and embodiment of unity, lent the whole weight of their authority to this false doctrine, and were the most active promoters of the extirpation of heresy by fire and sword; and this was not a mere passing cloud, which obscured for a moment the firmament of the Church, but an opinion with which she is possessed as firmly as ever to this day.

R. You know the arguments which are used to justify the employment of physical force for the repression of heresy, and by which humane and charitable persons have reconciled themselves to it?

L. Yes; they are grounded partly on the enormity of the guilt attributed to the crime, and partly on the peculiar danger with which it is supposed to threaten the Church. What offence, it is argued, can be comparable in heinousness to one which destroys the souls of men? and, again, who would accuse a physician of cruelty or hard-heartedness because he does not hesitate to prescribe a cautery, or the amputation of an unsound member, which would otherwise spread a fatal disease through the whole body, though it must cause the patient very severe pain? But these analogies, though specious, are fallacious. They rest on the assumption, that lack of knowledge, or weakness of judgment, which in other matters is thought to call only for pity and help, in religious subjects, in which, in proportion to the greater difficulty of ascertaining the exact truth, any aberration

would be the more pardonable, is accounted criminal in the highest degree.

R. Perhaps you would not deny that religious zeal has not rarely been sullied by impure motives, and that the founders and propagators of sects have been impelled by ambition, vanity, personal animosities and prejudices, and other motives quite foreign to the simple search after truth.

L. Such a denial would betray gross ignorance, both of human nature and of history, and is quite needless for any purpose of mine; but the facts admitted could only serve to prove weakness, not wickedness, and this last is what is required to sustain the arguments of the advocates of persecution. But a simple refusal to conform to the expression of orthodox doctrine has always been held sufficient to establish the charge of *hæretica pravitās*. *What Inquisitor was ever known to allow the plea of honesty, earnestness, love of truth, and the like, as a ground of acquittal or a mitigation of punishment?* The persecutors can only justify their maxims and conduct by claiming for themselves the prerogative of the Searcher of hearts, and by practically blaspheming the Holy Ghost, by imputing their own uncharitableness to His inspiration.

R. That is awful language, and I should shrink from using it when applied to a period of at least comparative purity and fervour, to which we are used to look back as to a golden age.

L. Such reluctance is both natural and right, especially when it is a guarantee that the point in question has been carefully weighed, but it would be unwise to reject the evidence of history because we cannot find a place for it in our system. No doubt the actual development of Christianity was widely different from that which would have been expected by Christians who lived at the time of our Lord's departure from the earth, both with regard to the prolongation of the period which was to precede His second coming, and with regard to the events which were to take place, and the nature of the changes which were to pass on the character of the Church. One who heard the last words of comfort addressed by Christ to His disciples might well be led to believe that the borders of the Church were to be enlarged by a series of pacific conquests, and herself to be constantly growing in faith, hope, and charity. Such expectations, however, were, as we know, doomed to disappointment.

R. You have warned me against intruding into the secrets of the Divine government by unauthorized and arbitrary conjectures, but I hope it is not inconsistent with reverent submission to the Supreme Will to consider what conclusions may be allowably drawn from that which is spread before us in the records of the past.

L. Such an inquiry may be both safe and profitable, so long as we

take care to bear in mind that what we see not only includes no part of the illimitable future, but is no more than the shell and surface of the things that are unseen and eternal.

R. I must own that I find myself bewildered by the vast multiplicity and variety of the phenomena, and unable to reduce them under any kind of general law or theory. You have bestowed much thought on the subject, and I should have been glad to hear if you have been more successful.

L. The conclusions to which I have been led are partly negative, partly positive. I postulate two points as essential conditions of every Christian view of the subject. On the one hand, I utterly reject the claim set up by the Church of Rome to be the one and only Church of Christ: the terms on which those pretensions were denounced by the Reformers were, in my opinion, not at all exaggerated, however they may have been tinged by a glow of righteous indignation. The history of the Papacy is, from first to last, a simply human history, and that not only in the sense that every step of it was due to merely natural motives, without any indication of a supernatural interference, but also in the farther sense, that these motives were only those of ordinary selfishness, without anything truly noble and heroic, even when measured by any human standard, much less heavenly, but, on the contrary, of the earth, earthy, and such as could not be ascribed, without blasphemous folly, to the workings of the Holy Spirit. This however does not preclude the admission which I am perfectly willing to make, that many, if not the greater part of the Popes, who contributed most to the aggrandisement of the Papacy, themselves believed in its Divine origin. The general lack of critical intelligence in those ages, and the influence of personal interest, not the less powerful because it was unperceived, are amply sufficient to account for the fact, and I can easily understand how Gregory VII. might die with a cry of afflicted virtue on his lips. The sincerity of this conviction imparted a certain dignity and grandeur to their really iniquitous enterprises, and was one of the main causes of their success, and will probably long continue to exercise a powerful influence on minds of a certain class. The strength of the Papal Church lies in the weakness of human nature: (1) in its childish fondness for a pompous and glittering ceremonial; (2) in its slavish readiness to accept without inquiry any pretensions, however unfounded, if they are only put forward with a sufficient degree of confident assurance; (3) in the cowardice with which it shrinks from the burden of personal responsibility, and is anxious to shift it upon another; (4) in the intellectual sluggishness which makes it impatient (as Thucydides observed) of the labour required for the investigation of Truth; (5) in the proneness to substitute outward devotional exercises for the realities of a religious life, and to take

credit to itself for the performance of such exercises as meritorious works, in proportion to the trouble and annoyance they may have cost; (6) and the intolerance with which, especially in matters connected with religion, it resents dissent from its own opinions as a personal injury, for which it is ever ready to revenge itself by persecution.

July 26, 1875.

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