









R E M A I N S

Se sub serenis vultibus
Austera virtus occulit,
Timens videri, ne suum,
Dum prodit, amittat decus.

PART THE SECOND.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

DERBY :

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PREFACE.

IT was of course impossible but that the quantity and variety of censure, which was elicited by the publication of the former part of these Remains, should be felt by the Editors as a call for much calm and patient consideration, before proceeding, in further fulfilment of their trust, to offer these additional volumes to the world. One thing has at least become evident, which was at first very uncertain: that it was a publication of some importance for good or for evil. The notice which it has attracted, favourable or otherwise, is at least a token that the Editors were not mistaken, as partial friends are so apt to be, in their estimate of the force and originality of the Author's character, or of the keen, courageous, searching precision, with which he had, though it were but incidentally, put forth his ecclesiastical and theological opinions, and applied them to things as they are.

But in such measure as all doubt on the importance of the publication is removed, the responsibility of it is doubtless enhanced; and it seems right to preface it with something like a fair and full statement of the reasons, why the Editors have judged it, on the whole, their duty to persist in this step: not wilfully slighting any man's scruples or remonstrances, but still thinking that the cause of the Church, which is paramount

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to every thing else, leaves them not at liberty either to withdraw any important portion of what has been already made public, or to suppress what remains. And what will be alleged for perseverance now, will be found perhaps in a good measure to justify the original publication; taken, as it must be, in aid and in enforcement of the considerations offered in the Preface to the first volume.

And first, if there be any persons, as undoubtedly there are not a few, who think, more or less explicitly, that the mere circumstance of a book's raising an outcry constitutes a strong objection to it, they are requested to put themselves for a single moment so far in the position of the Editors, as to imagine the case of the Author's views being mainly and substantially true; and then to consider how such outcry could have been avoided. For if it be found that uneasiness, discontent, clamour, nay, if you will, permanent unpopularity, are the necessary results of a certain statement, supposing it to be true, then the actual prevalence of such feelings, however undesirable in itself, is no objection to the truth of the statement, but rather an argument in its favour, as far as it goes.

Suppose, for example, that the common opinions of the Protestant world concerning the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist were indeed verging as near to a profane Rationalism, as these Remains in several passages assume, would not the charge of superstition, mysticism, and popery be echoed all around against both Author and Editors, much in the same way as it has been heard for the last few months?

Suppose it again true, that there is some secret but real and fatal connexion between the aforesaid faithless Rationalism, and those views regarding the great doctrines of Christianity and their application to individual Christians, which have of late arrogated to themselves exclusively the

name of vital religion, is it not certain that the disregard (for it is rather that than actual opposition) which those views constantly meet with at the hand of this author, would unite against him the champions of those apparently opposite schemes, just in the manner in which we see them actually united?

If it should so be that there is a large portion of Churchmen, whom the circumstances of these or of former times have led to form an exaggerated opinion of the necessity and sacredness of the alliance of Church and State: to sacrifice more or less of the very being of the Church, in order, as they think, to secure its well-being:—could it fail to happen that such as these would be alarmed and disgusted at the fearless uncompromising tone, in which the inviolability of the Church is here asserted, and the past and present tyranny of the State, in every part of Christendom, denounced?

Lastly, should there be any considerable number of decent religionists in the land, who would themselves make no scruple of professing that hatred of “asceticism” is a main ingredient in their notion of Christianity, it were little trouble to point out the pages in this work, at which they are likeliest to be startled and disgusted; and yet it might be true all the while, that the writer’s views are Scriptural and Catholic, and those which they have glided into, discountenanced by the Bible and the Church.

So far then as the unfavourable criticism, with which these Remains have been visited, may be set to the account of any or all of the four classes now mentioned, it was of course to be expected, nor is any particular deference due to it; and the bitterer and louder it is, and the longer it lasts, the more reason may it perhaps give to a considerate person for suspecting that the words which provoked it were not altogether unseasonable. But there seems to be a

fear entertained, among persons worthy of all respect, of no less an evil than encouragement given to irreverence and lightness on sacred subjects, partly by certain opinions of the Author, which would lead Englishmen (it is feared) to disparagement of their Church as it is; partly by something in his tone and manner of writing, which many find startling, and can hardly reconcile to themselves. To these persons, and these feelings, a more particular explanation seems due; and such will therefore be now attempted, though in no sanguine expectation of satisfying them to any extent, yet not altogether without hope, that in some instances they may be led to suspect their own misgivings, as arising from impulse and habit, rather than from sound and true views of sacred things.

The best way perhaps will be to commence by calmly recalling a few plain facts. It is no long time ago, and yet the career of events has been so rapid, that it seems far removed from us; but let us endeavour to realize for a moment the posture of mind in which sincere Churchmen found themselves, in 1832 and 1833, when the constitution of the country had been changed by threats of violence, and the cry of Church Reform was being raised with a view to a similar process, and no person knew how much strength it might gather, or by what unscrupulous means it might be enforced. The Liturgy in particular seemed to be an object of attack; and the authority of Bishops was so slighted both in and out of parliament, as to make men apprehend that in no long time the whole functions of the Church would be usurped by the State. At that crisis the writer of these Remains felt in common with not a few others, but with a vividness and keenness of perception almost peculiarly his own, that a call was given, and a time come, for asserting in their simplicity the principles of the only primitive and true Church—those essential rights

and duties which seemed in danger of being surrendered, in mere ignorance, to preserve certain external trappings. He surrendered himself to this feeling without reserve: he spoke, and wrote, and acted from it continually: he devoted to it what remained of life and health: and it seems to have been this more than any thing else, excepting perhaps an unaffected mistrust concerning the sincerity and depth of his own repentance, which caused the sort of anxiety to recover, many times traceable in his correspondence. To use the words which Walton has reported of Hooker, "he could have wished to live longer, to do the Church more service."

This being so, it cannot but be interesting and useful, now that Providence has brought us a stage or two further on in the warfare which he was among the foremost to commence, to have the means of consulting such a record as the present volumes supply, of the wishes, counsels, and anticipations of a mind so rare as his, concerning the conduct and probable course of the struggle. Those who have been sharers or approving witnesses of the several gatherings (so to call them) which the events of the last six years have occasioned, tending more or less to the revival of old Church principles, will here find many a sentiment which animated them half unconsciously at the time, not only expressed in a way to sink into men's hearts, but brought out in its full bearings and pursued to its legitimate consequences: it was wild inarticulate music before, but now we have the words and the meaning. And conversely, events have been continually happening, which have tended in a remarkable manner to illustrate the Author's remarks and confirm his prognostications: so that already many things, which sounded paradoxical and over bold when he first uttered them, may be ventured on with hope of a reasonable degree of acceptance. His sagacity,

it begins to be found, did but anticipate the lessons of our experience. If he loved to dwell on the noble act of Convocation in censuring Hoadly, and to forebode the rising of the sun which set so brightly; the great majority of the University of Oxford has since judged a like warning, however painful on personal grounds, yet most necessary in regard of certain opinions not very unlike Hoadly's. If he speaks what some would call bitterly concerning any party in the State, on account of an hostility to the Church, whether conscious or instinctive, which he thought he discerned in them; it seems now to be generally acknowledged that the subsequent proceedings of that party have been such as to justify a Churchman's aversion. If he had what were then esteemed exaggerated feelings about Parliamentary Suppression of Bishoprics; we have since seen the sense of the Church so strongly expressed on that subject, as to force from the Legislature the restoration of a See which had been actually extinguished, as far as any act of theirs could extinguish it. If he deprecated the current notions about the necessity of clerical endowments, good connexions, and the like, as the most effectual bar to all projects for true Church Extension; is not the Church in our Colonies even now applying for Bishops without endowment? and are not new Churches being every where consecrated at home with only bare nominal endowment? If he had learned of other times to regard each Bishopric as a divinely instituted monarchy, and therefore to condemn all intrusion on Episcopal authority, by parliaments or otherwise, as not only disorderly but profane; are not the Clergy of England even now, in the case of the Church Discipline Bill, asserting that same principle against the authority which personally they would most revere? If he had brought himself habitually to contemplate the separation of Church and State as not necessarily a fatal alter-

native; there have been recent declarations, lay and ecclesiastical, to the same effect, in quarters which cannot be suspected. The Church has been congratulated on having “recovered herself” so far as “to feel her own strength and look to her own resources;” on having “become sensible that however desirous to act in unison with the State, she can boast of an independent origin, and can, as she has done before, exist in a state of independence¹.” And to go no further in enumeration at present, if the writer of these Remains thought very seriously of the importance of those arrangements in Divine Service, which tend most to remind the worshipper that God’s house is a house of prayer and spiritual sacrifice, not of mere instruction; we have but to look around us on the new Churches, and new internal fittings up of Churches, which are in progress in most parts of the country, to be convinced that on this point also men sympathize with him to a much greater extent than they did².

Other instances might be mentioned, in which his judg-

¹ Dean of Chichester’s Charge, 1839.

² Of course it is not meant that any abstract proprieties of this kind, or any extent of ancient custom, could justify a clergyman in disobeying the Rubric, which he has pledged himself to observe; and therefore it may be as well to remark in connexion with this subject, that the custom of turning away from the people in oblation and consecration of the Holy Eucharist, which probably the Author, in the passages above referred to, had principally in his mind, is believed by those who recommend it to be at least not contrary to the Rubric; the only directions there given about the position of the Minister being, 1. that in the preparatory part of the service he shall *stand at the north side of the Table*; 2. that he shall move out of this position to *place the alms and oblations* on the Altar; 3. that immediately before the Prayer of Consecration he is to be *standing before the Table*. In the absence of any more particular injunction, it seems reasonable to believe, that during the rest of the Anaphora, the position which was generally practised at the time the Prayer-book was compiled, has the sanction of those who enacted it; i. e. that they most exactly conform to the spirit of the Rubric, who turn towards the Altar and away from the people.

ment, both of persons and things, has been remarkably verified, even in so short a time; but these may be sufficient to explain in some measure why his Editors should have been more than usually scrupulous in suppressing any of his deliberate opinions or forebodings, however lightly he might have chosen to express them. Long experience had taught them how much meaning and truth lay hid even in his most casual observations on such subjects; and how probable it was that those who were at first startled by them, would on mature consideration find them reasonable and right. And whereas it has been truly observed, both in friendly and unfriendly quarters, that the developement of old principles which now seems to be advancing, is not such as to be accounted for by the efforts of any particular individuals;—it is something in the air, something going on in all places at once, and in spite of all precautions;—it seemed a circumstance worth remarking, that it should have been thus anticipated and rehearsed in a single mind; a mind of itself inclined to rationalism, but checked first in that process, and finally won from it, by resolute and implicit submission to the lessons and rules of the Church in England, and rewarded (if we may humbly judge) for such submission, by a more than ordinary insight into the true claims of the Universal Church, and the means of improving to the utmost our high privilege of being yet in her Communion.

One who knew and appreciated him well, (whatever subordinate differences might exist between them,) and whose honoured name it is now more than ever a satisfaction to join with his—the late lamented Mr. Rose—used to say of him, that he was “not afraid of inferences,” meaning, as it would seem, that he was gifted with a remarkable fearlessness in regard of conclusions, when once his premisses were thoroughly made good. To see his way

rapidly and acutely, was common to him with many: but to venture along it with uncompromising faith, was in a degree peculiar to himself. Perhaps it was this quality, humanly speaking, which kept him always somewhat in advance of his time, and of those with whom he most cordially acted. However, since it was in him consistent, bearing fruit in action as well as in speculation, and causing him to deny himself as unsparingly, as he contradicted popular opinions; it does seem to give all views of his a peculiar claim to consideration, on the part of those who agree with him in first principles. There will always be a fair presumption, previous to inquiry, that his conclusions are the legitimate result of propositions which we admit in common with him, but which we have not as yet the courage to follow up as he did: not to dwell on the moral nobleness of such fearless and devout adherence to the Truth. It is the very description of Faith, "to obey and go out, not knowing whither it goes;" and a character of which that is the principal mark, is surely not ill fitted to exemplify what the whole Church may soon be called on to practise. So far, in his papers and life we seem to have as it were embodied, a type of the kind of resistance due to the spirit of this age on the part of the Catholic Church, and of all her dutiful children. Could it be right, merely through dread of censure incurred, or disturbance given, to suppress such a document, providentially coming into our hands?

Now when the great principle of Catholicism, *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, had once rooted itself in the mind of a person thus determined not to flinch from results; when he had once come to be convinced that the only safe way for the Church is, to go back to the times of universal consent, so far as that is possible, inasmuch as such universal consent is no doubtful indica-

tion of His will, in whom we are all one Body : would he not naturally go on and say to himself, “ If I lay down this rule on one question, I shall not be dealing fairly with myself, honestly with my opponents, reverently with Him to whom I am virtually appealing, except I carry the same mode of reasoning into all other questions also, wherein it is applicable? Accepting the Church’s interpretation of Scripture as to the necessity of real outward Baptism, I must accept it also as to the connexion of the Gift of Regeneration exclusively with Baptism ; accepting her view of the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist, I must not decline her doctrine of the accompanying Sacrifice, gathered from the same Liturgies and the same interpretation of Holy Scripture : believing her concerning the genuineness of the Bible, I must believe her also concerning a transmitted Priesthood : taking it on trust from her Creeds, that such and such is the only true account of the doctrines of the Bible, I may not doubt her consistent and perpetual witness, that such and such are the right rules for interpreting the same holy Book : I believe, because she assures me, that Bishops only have the right to ordain ; must I not believe her equally positive assurance, that Excommunication is also theirs by exclusive and indefeasible right, and that it is no true Eucharist which is not consecrated by hands which they have authorized?” These are instances of the manner in which the author of these papers reasoned ; and certainly at first sight there seems to be much force in his mode of reasoning ; the *onus probandi* seems cast on those who demur to it : it seems, if it were not for its practical consequences, more satisfactory than the summary ways of dealing with such matters, which we find not seldom adopted ; fairer and more ingenuous than the saying, “ Times are altered ; it might be all right then, but it does not follow that it is so now ;” more reverential than

the other saying, "The Fathers were good sort of men, but no number of fallible beings can make an infallible Church;" more in harmony with Scripture and with God's general Providence, than to dismiss such portions of the ancient system as we think proper with the aphorism, "It may be and has been abused, and therefore is best let alone." And having all these advantages, it seemed to him part of faith to suppose, that in the end it would prove also the best and most effective way of maintaining the truth of God, against superstition and idolatry, as well as against scepticism and profane exaltation of reason.

But further: such a mind as is here supposed, thoroughly uncompromising in its Catholicity, would feel deeply, that as Ancient Consent binds the person admitting it alike to all doctrines, interpretations, and usages, for which it can be truly alleged; so there is something *less tangible and definite* though *not less real* than any of these, which no less demands his dutiful veneration, and to which he is bound to conform himself in practice; that is to say, the cast of thought and tone of character of the Primitive Church, its way of judging, behaving, expressing itself, on practical matters, great and small as they occur. For what in fact is this character, but what an Apostle once called it—"the Mind of Jesus Christ" Himself, by the secret inspiration of His Spirit communicated to His whole mystical Body, informing, guiding, moving it, as He will? A sacred and awful truth; of which whoever is seriously aware, will surely be very backward to question or discuss the propriety of any sentiment, allowed to be general in Christian Antiquity, how remote soever from present views and usages; much more, to treat it with any thing like contempt or bitterness.

Should it appear to him, for example, that the Ancient Church took in their literal and obvious meaning, those

expressions of our Saviour and of St. Paul, which recommend celibacy as the *more excellent way*, so as to give honour to those who voluntarily so abode, that they might wait on the Lord; and in particular, to assume that the Clergy should rather of the two be unmarried than married; he will not permit the prejudices of a later time to hinder him from honouring those whom his Lord so delighted to honour; he will consider that the same cast of thought which leads men to scorn religious celibacy, will certainly prevent marriage also, which they profess to honour, from being strictly religious. Should he find that the records of the Fathers bear witness in every page to their literal observance of the duty of Fasting, and the high importance which they attached to it; it is not the titles of Jewish, Pharisaical, self-righteous, nor yet that of Ascetic (more widely dreaded than all) which will deter him from obeying his conscience in that particular. Should he perceive that the counsels and demeanour of the holy men of old, towards heretics and other sinners, correspond much more truly with the Apostolic Rule, *Put away from among yourselves that wicked person*, than with the liberal and unscrupulous intercourse, which respectable persons now practise, for peace, and quietness, and good nature's sake; it is a conviction which cannot but widely influence both his judgment of other times, and his conduct towards his contemporaries; it will lead to many a sentence that will sound harsh, and many a step that will be counted austere; it will cause him often to shock those by whom he would greatly wish to be approved; and yet, thus he must judge and act, if he will be true to his own principle, and conform himself throughout to that will of God, which the consent of those purer ages indicates.

Another very distinguishable circumstance in the tone and manner of the early Church is its reverential Reserve with re-

gard to holy things ; of all its characteristics apparently the most unaccountable to the spirit of the present age. This also we may expect to discover in a true, courageous, consistent follower of the ancients ; not so much by any conscious endeavour of his, as because it will come to him instinctively, as some birds are said to contrive ways for enticing observers away from their nests. And because it is Reserve, we may expect now and then to be startled at the very form of it. The nature of the thing excludes conventional expressions, and drives people often on such as are rather paradoxical ; deep reverence will occasionally veil itself, as it were, for a moment, even under the mask of its opposite ; as earnest affection is sometimes known to do. Any expedient almost will be adopted by a person who enters with all his heart into this portion of the ancient Character, rather than he will contradict that Character altogether by a bare, unscrupulous, flaunting display of sacred things or good thoughts.

Once more : he who makes up his mind really to take Antiquity for his guide, will feel that he must be continually realizing the Presence of a wonder-working God : his mind must be awake to the possibility of special providences, miraculous interferences, supernatural warnings and tokens of the divine purpose, and also to indications of other unseen agency, both good and bad, relating to himself and others : subjects of this sort, if a man be consistent, must fill up a larger portion of his thoughts and affections, and influence his conduct far more materially, than the customs and opinions of this age would readily permit.

Other particulars might be mentioned ; but these which have been enumerated are surely sufficient to teach persons a little caution, how they apply the readily occurring words, "overstrained, fanatical, ascetic, bigotted," to no-

tions and practices such as have been now alluded to. Previous to examination, they cannot be sure that any such notion or practice is not a developement of the Character, which our Lord from the beginning willed should be impressed on His Church. If we have not the boldness to take it on ourselves, and *follow the Lamb, whithersoever He goeth*, at least let us not throw stumbling-blocks in the way of those who are more courageously disposed. When a thing is fairly proved superstitious, uncharitable, ascetic in a bad sense, unwarranted by Scripture and Antiquity, then let it be blamed and rejected, not before; lest we incur such a rebuke as he did, who with more zeal than knowledge would have prevented our Lord Himself, as these would the least of His Brethren and Members, from taking up and bearing the Cross. It was in love to Christ that he remonstrated; yet what was Christ's reproof? *Get thee behind Me, Satan; thou art an offence unto Me; for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men.*

The subjects, and ways of thinking, above indicated, are all such, that an uncompromising follower of Antiquity might be expected, more or less, to incur in regard of every one of them such censure as the Author of these Remains has incurred; and therefore, in each case the only real question will be, Is he with Antiquity or not? If not, if in substance or in tone he contradict the Early Church, the penance can hardly be named so severe, to which he would not have wished himself condemned; but if on the contrary his seeming paradoxes should be found but to repeat her teaching, his supposed eccentricities and harshnesses but to reflect her aspect; then it will be a comfort, by and by, not to have given way to first impressions, in rejecting or disliking them unexamined, but rather to have suspended our judgment and enquired patiently. It is at least possi-

ble that what offends us may be one of the points, in which this generation and the primitive age cannot be both right; and until this is ascertained, positive censure and deprecation are better perhaps withheld. We have read of one who "came" in fallen times, "neither eating bread nor drinking wine," and whether it were the duty of every one to receive him implicitly at once, or no, yet surely it was better for such as refrained from saying, "He hath a devil."

Assuming this then as our ground and first principle, that a Churchman's adherence to the doctrine of Universal Consent is to be strictly and really uncompromising, it seems no hard question, what is to be done, should the principles and practice of the age we live in appear on inquiry in any material respect contradictory to those of ancient Christendom. Clearly each one in his station is bound to take his part, not with the new Error, but with the old Truth. No one will dispute it; for it will even be granted in a case much more painful and perilous, yet, as things are, but too probable. It will be granted that even where the National Church, to use a modern phrase, which any one belongs to, insists as the condition of her communion on something contradictory to the known consent of Antiquity, such communion can no longer be embraced with a safe conscience. This must be granted, for it is the very reason why we are not and cannot be Romanists; and why our brethren of the Scottish Church are not schismatics in declining to communicate with the adherents of the State Religion there. Now a discrepancy which would justify the incurring of excommunication, supposing it embodied in the formularies of any Church, will *a fortiori* justify remonstrance and censure, and warning of all sorts consistent with charity, when it only exists as a theological school, or tone of opinion, in almost all places checked and dis-

couraged, and in none more than doubtfully warranted, by the authoritative voice of the Church we belong to. This, the writer of these Remains thought (and so far all lovers of Antiquity among us appear to agree with him) was the case of Protestantism as distinct from true Catholicism, here in the Anglican Church. In her teaching and practice for the time, it seemed to him dominant; while in her authorized laws and rites, though he could not conceal from himself that he saw certain traces, or rather negative effects of it, he found nothing to commit her ministers and members to it, but very much of a contrary cast. In regard of these, therefore, he found all reason for "diffidence"; (that is his own word): but in regard of the fatal perversion of them, and consequent lowering of Catholic Truth, and neglect of Sacramental Grace, which he found almost every where prevailing; there was no reason why he should not speak and write as keen minds do of deadly errors and irreverences, usurping authority and displacing divine truth: nor was the severity of his censure any reason for suppressing it, provided the matter of it were sound and valuable: directed as it invariably was against parties and opinions, not against individuals any further than as they might be considered types of the parties and opinions.

Thus far of his strictures on contemporary errors; we will now so far change our ground, as to suppose the adherent of Antiquity looking back on other times; must he not, if he will be consistent, pass the same kind of censure on the same unauthorized errors in former generations, more especially if he found them continually appealed to as authority by the religionists of the present day? Surely he must; nor ought he to be silenced by any praise, which may be due to the former maintainers of such error, for services performed in another direction. If we granted that Baxter wrote well against Independents, and Lardner

against Deists, it would not in any degree preclude us from censuring the Presbyterians or Arians as a party.

It will be seen how this is meant to apply: it touches on that, which more than any thing else in these Remains seems to have startled and displeased many, who in principle would agree with the writer: on the unfavourable mention made from time to time of the Reformers as a party, and inclusively of the English Reformers. Undoubtedly it appeared to him,—and his Editors, by publishing his sentiments on that head so unreservedly, without any kind of disavowal, intimated of course their own general acquiescence in the opinion,—that the persons chiefly instrumental in that great change were not, as a party, to be trusted on ecclesiastical and theological questions: nor yet to be imitated in their practical handling of the unspeakably awful matters with which they were concerned. Whether he were right or wrong in this opinion, there are certain considerations not always adverted to, however obvious in themselves, which ought perhaps to abate the antecedent prejudice and suspicion sure to accompany all such statements.

First, it should be considered that the topic was by no means a gratuitous one: it lies straight not only *in* but *across* the way of an English Churchman inculcating adherence to Antiquity: invidious, it might be, painful, indelicate, but it could not be overleaped or passed by; if it were only for this reason, that both the defenders of low views within the Church, and the assailants of her independence from without, are constantly appealing to the precedents and sanctions of that time. Now it is obvious that this appeal can only be met in one or other of two ways: the fact may be denied, or the authority disavowed; it may be argued, either that our Reformers were not of the irreverent school which claims them, or that, whatever they were, we have no call to follow their opinions. Their

cause may be separated either from that of the continental Reformers on the one hand, or on the other from that of our Church and its formularies. The former side of this alternative has been chosen by writers of high authority, and quotations numerous and in themselves decisive have been collected, to shew that the Prelates and other divines who acted with or under the reforming governments of Henry, Edward, and Elizabeth, were neither in their school of doctrine Rationalists, nor Erastians in their ecclesiastical policy. Who would not wish that such a line of argument could be sustained; not only as being in itself the more attractive and popular, but even for natural Piety and Gratitude's sake? Who would not wish that those whom Providence has made instrumental to his enjoyment of certain great blessings, may be proved clear, in intention at least, of the alloy and corruption with which those blessings are tarnished? No wonder then if many of those whom all would least desire to offend, feel hurt and aggrieved when this favourable view is disturbed; it is in some measure like impeaching the probity of a personal benefactor, or even of a parent; nature herself rises up and prompts us to reject it. Still the facts remain as they were; they cannot be altered by our feelings; and if they should be other than we could wish them, what is to be done? There will be danger on two sides; our personal affection and admiration may drift us away from our Church principles, and we may go after these venerated men into the wrong kind of Protestantism, with which, on this hypothesis, they were infected; or the reaction natural on our disappointment may lead us to forsake the Church of England herself, which we have incautiously identified with these its Reformers. To guard against both errors, the other side of the alternative is worth considering, the reasonableness, namely, of regarding the Anglican Church as

in no way bound to the private opinions of any man, or any school; the right and duty of taking her formularies as we find them, and interpreting them, as, God be thanked, they may be always interpreted in all essentials, conformably to the doctrine and ritual of the Church Universal.

This was the view taken by the Author of these Remains. He entered on the study of the Reformers' Theology with the general and natural impression, that he should find on the whole a treasure of sound Anglican doctrine, and a tone of thought in unison with the Ancient Church. He found himself greatly disappointed, and the process and result of that disappointment are distinctly enough exhibited in his correspondence. He speaks with the fervour of an earnest inquirer, and the indignation of one who had met, or thought he met, with irreverence, where he expected primitive piety: and allowance being also made for the unstudied language of private letters, it may be that when the first feeling of annoyance has passed over, persons may find this picture of his feelings not uninteresting nor uninteresting, nor without consolation for perplexed and doubting minds. They will find him retiring on the letter of the Articles and Liturgy for refuge from the spirit of their first compilers; their letter, as interpreted and acted on by later generations, more alive to the claims of antiquity—the generations of Andrewes, of Laud, and of Ken; they will find him throwing himself back the more unreservedly on the pure theory of the ancient Church, and watching with the more scrupulous jealousy all deviations from her practice. And surely there are, and are likely to be, persons to whom the register of his experience may be profitable; persons to whom (among other things) it may serve as the providential mean for keeping them in communion with their Mother Church; and for their sake we may well bear with some occasional severity of ex-

pression. Without copying some phrases of that kind, it was impossible to convey a true impression of what was going on in his mind; those whom he was most likely to profit would have failed to discern their sympathy with him; the right note would not have been struck.

Thus much to do away with the notion, that this whole topic was capriciously introduced, damaging the cause of the Church, and dividing those who should be united in her defence.

Next, it cannot be too carefully inculcated, what has just been mentioned incidentally; that the cause of the English Church is not at all mixed up, neither in reason nor in fact, with the personal conduct or theological opinions of her Reformers. As far as conduct is concerned, this will be readily allowed by all who have paid any serious attention to the providential history of the world. If Jehu destroyed Baal out of Israel, if Constantine put an end to the ascendancy of Paganism, and the one is no objection to the Law, nor the other to the Gospel; neither is it a valid objection to our present formularies, that the movement which left them such as they are was mainly originated and controlled by Henry VIII. and the Protector Somerset, and by ecclesiastics, evincing a most unworthy subservience to the capricious sensuality of the one and the unblushing sacrilegiousness of the other. This is obvious, but it is hardly to be expected that the Church should remain comparatively uninfluenced by the doctrinal and ecclesiastical views of the divines who were called on to remodel it. Yet so it seems to have been in the present case; and we may thankfully attribute it to a special Providence, the workings of which, this is not the place for investigating: but on a general survey two remarks occur; first, that the princes, courtiers, statesmen and lawyers, by whom the reforming divines were controlled, wanted only

so much doctrinal and liturgical reform as was necessary to bring about their ecclesiastical changes, their abstraction of Church property, and usurpation of Church government; and therefore would naturally be a check on the divines, when they in their sympathy with continental Protestantism might be inclined to innovate on formularies and services to an extent that might as yet be unpopular and embarrassing: next, that the vacillations of Henry's opinion, the death of Edward, Elizabeth's contracting a prejudice in favour of the ancient ritual, and other seeming chances which might be specified, occur so critically, as even to suggest the idea of a Design to prevent the English Reformation from proceeding in any point to express contradiction of Antiquity. As a mark of decay and deserved anger, our Church seems to have been left an inadequate image of Antiquity; as a token to encourage hope, and penitence, and labour, it was not however an untrue image. Therefore the uncompromising love of Antiquity, which would make a person dissatisfied with the conduct and opinions of the first revisers of the Liturgy, does by no means involve irreverent dissatisfaction with the Liturgy itself as we have it. Nor must we forget this other providential fact, tending strongly the same way; that it has been since subjected to two other revisions, one in the reign of James I. the other at the Restoration, on principles more conformable to Antiquity; and that if the meaning of any set of individuals is to be considered as authoritative in its interpretation, the divines of 1660 surely have the fairest claim.

But on this whole subject the reader is referred to an Essay lately published¹, which may be considered as an expansion of the sentiment in which the Author of the Remains found refuge: that the present details of the

¹ Tracts for the Times, No. 86.

Church System in this country, and possibly in every other country, may perhaps be well regarded as " crumbs from the Apostles' Table : " which it becomes us to take and use with all thankfulness, under a deep conviction that they are far better than we deserve, yet deeply to regret and strive against the unworthiness which has been punished by the loss of their first grace, coherence, and perfection. The changes themselves, examined in minute detail, point to this as the frame of mind with which it was intended we should acquiesce in them ; as the dissertation, just referred to, shows at large.

Here it will be said, " Well, suppose we grant that our conformity to the Church of England, and acquiescence in her ritual, is not endangered by the view of which we are speaking ; yet what becomes of the singleness of trust, the undoubting affection, with which we have been taught and accustomed to cling to the English Prayer Book without misgiving, as containing all that the Church can give, or the devout Churchman desire ? " This sort of question will be asked, sometimes in reproach, sometimes only in sadness. How is it to be met ?

Indeed we must own that we are intruding upon that first happy childlike feeling : even as the realities of life intrude on the visions of perfection in familiar things and persons, which youth so unwillingly parts with. But is nothing offered in exchange or compensation ? The notion we dispel is, that the English Liturgy is faultless in its kind—faultless, that is, as a work of man may be : the notion we substitute, leaving untouched whatever excellence it really possesses of that sort, lifts it, in parts, and important parts, to a higher kind of excellency : higher beyond expression or measure : as much higher, as words and rites truly apostolical and divine transcend the best and wisest inventions of man. The dreams of childhood are

delightful, and it is painful to be roused from them; yet who would not consent to take in exchange for them the "sober certainty" of great and eternal truths, and of hopes thereupon depending, which manhood well employed, for all its drawbacks, secures to us? Even so, what mind, that has learned true faith and reverence, would not think it gain to be convinced that our service is a fragment of a work which came down from heaven, rather than a fabric, ever so perfect, wrought out by the piety and charity of Christians in successive ages?

If we had reason to think the Bible was mutilated, would our longing after the lost books imply any kind of irreverence to the books which remained, or to such human writings, as our instructors had used to supply the deficiency as well as they could?

Surely that view of the ancient Liturgies, which makes us regret certain changes in our own Prayer-Book, does yet enable us, on the whole, to use it with a higher and holier satisfaction than we could have had in any other way. It is in some good measure like pointing out the difference between the Lord's Prayer and other prayers: between His Sacraments and other ceremonies. It brings closer to us the promise, "*If two (and still more, if all) of you shall agree on earth touching any thing ye shall ask, it shall be done for them of My Father which is in Heaven.*" But this great, and awful, and transporting conviction we cannot have, and yet retain undisturbed our old notions about the perfection of the Liturgy. The regret we feel in some particulars is a price which must be paid for the unspeakable consciousness of the blessing yet vouchsafed to us in those which are most essential.

Such is the feeling which pervades these Remains, wherever they touch on the subject of the Liturgies: and it is not perhaps carrying the matter too far, if we add that

in no other feeling could a reverential mind possibly contemplate the facts, supposing them fairly brought before it, and proved. If then it be a wrong or inexpedient feeling; let the blame of it at least be divided with those learned men, whose recent labours have contributed so widely to diffuse the knowledge of those facts and of their evidence. But if the *Origines Liturgicæ*, the Remains of Cranmer, the reprint of King Edward's two Liturgies, and other like works, are rightly accounted seasonable boons to the Church: then let not the Author of these Remains be unsparingly censured, for thoughts and feelings which are the natural and necessary result of the unprejudiced study of those publications. What is the use of taking pains to acquaint men so thoroughly with the premisses, if they are not to be allowed to go on and draw the conclusion?

Neither can it be justly alleged that this mode of reasoning takes away the use of our Formularies, as a guide to the simple and unlearned in their religious perplexities. As far as they are concerned, it leaves those Formularies where they were; the form, namely, wherein by God's Providence the teaching of the Catholic Church, in all essential points, is laid before them, and brought home to them. They are told that some part is positively divine, some part merely human; and they do not exactly know which is which. What matters it, if practically and humbly they receive all? It is but the same kind of difficulty, as is created by the knowledge that the Scriptures they read are not originals but translations, and that there is always a chance of what strikes them in any text being due to the translator, and not the pure mind of the Spirit. If this consideration does not interfere with the practical use and comfort of the Scriptures, neither need the other with that of the Prayer-Book. The passage in the Re-

mains which may seem at first contrary to this (vol. i. p. 401—3), will be found on examination not to bear on the *practical* sufficiency of our Formularies to an *unlearned* Englishman, but rather on their *exclusive* competency to decide, among *all* Englishmen, concerning all controverted points; exclusive, i. e. of all other documents, which may reasonably be considered vehicles of the Mind of Christ, as manifested in Ancient Consent.

We should not perhaps be duly thankful for so much of the Apostolical Ritual, preserved to us by a gracious Providence, if we were not sometimes called on to take notice how narrowly we have escaped losing the whole: neither again can our escape be rightly appreciated, without taking into the account the tendency of the school to which our Reformers had joined themselves, and the little dependence that could be placed on their love of Antiquity, as a safeguard against that evil tendency.

All this of course implies, that whatever praise and admiration may be due to individuals, both some of the principles of the movement which is called the Reformation, in the several countries of Europe, and in parts also the tone of character which it encouraged, were materially opposed to those of the early Church. At the risk of prolonging these remarks, already much longer than is desirable in a preface, a few heads shall be mentioned, to which the Author would probably have referred as mainly accounting for his feelings on this matter.

First of all, he would have complained of their tone with regard to the Apostolical Succession; not this or that writer only, but the general body who favoured that cause, treating it as no better than a politic invention, to secure the influence of Church governors, in the absence of true doctrine, and visible spiritual gifts. Nor would he probably have thought this charge answered by any number of quotations

from their writings, apparently tending the contrary way : because, where opposite sets of quotations may be adduced from the same writer, and from compositions of the same date, either his opinions are so far neutralized, or we must ascertain by his conduct, his connexions, the cast of his sentiments generally, and such other evidence as we can get, in which of the two statements he was overruled, and in which left to the free expression of his own mind.

By the same mode of inquiry, he would come to judge unfavourably of their tenets about Sacramental Grace, especially in the Holy Eucharist ; about the Power of the Keys, and the sacredness of the ancient discipline ; and about state interference in matters spiritual ; although in this latter point especially, their conduct spoke out for them too plainly to admit of any construction but one.

Any one who pleases, may verify or contradict the impressions of the Author on these and similar points, by simply examining the remains of the principal Reformers, with such cautions as are above indicated. Until he has done so, and satisfied himself that those impressions were not merely erroneous, but such as no student of tolerable fairness could adopt, it may be questioned whether he has much right broadly and positively to condemn the Author, for wishing “to have nothing to do with such a set.”

And this more especially, if he take into consideration likewise certain less palpable but not less substantial differences in the way of thinking and moral sentiment, which separate the Reformers from the Fathers, more widely, perhaps, than any definite statements of doctrine. Compare the sayings and manner of the two schools on the subjects of Fasting, Celibacy, religious Vows, voluntary Retirement and Contemplation, the memory of the Saints, Rites and Ceremonies recommended by Antiquity, and involving any sort of self-denial, and especially on the

great point of giving men divine knowledge, and introducing holy associations, not indiscriminately, but as men are able to bear it : there can be little doubt that generally speaking the tone of the fourth century is so unlike that of the sixteenth on each and all of these topics, that it is absolutely impossible for the same mind to sympathize with both. You must choose between the two lines : they are not only diverging, but contrary.

For instance, let the passages be considered, which are subjoined to this Preface, touching more or less on many of these important matters, and taken from a work, which, if any, might be considered as the free expression of its author's theological views : written in security and at leisure ; with books and learned friends at hand, and at a time when the cause which it advocated was comparatively triumphant.

What would be the natural judgment of a mind, imbued with the sentiments of the Ancient Church, on meeting with such trains of thought, and still more with such a tone of expression, as the extracts here referred to exhibit, in an anonymous work of an unknown date ? In what class of divines would he instinctively place the Author, supposed as yet unknown ? and how highly would he rate his reverence for sacred things and his authority on sacred subjects ? Could any number of sayings of a contrary sound, producible from the same writer, do away the feeling, that when he wrote this work he was at heart a despiser of the Apostolical Succession, and of the great truths and rules connected with it from the beginning ? And if it afterwards appeared that he was the chosen advocate and champion of a certain school in the Church, and that this very treatise was all but accepted by them, as a kind of formulary and official exponent of their views ; would not this be a strong fact to justify any dislike or

suspicion which might be felt of that school or party generally? Whatever might be truly said of the provocation they had received; the cruelty, corruption, irreverence of their opponents, their own personal virtues and sufferings, and the good to which they were made instrumental; would it not be rightly done for a Churchman to decline their authority as a theological school, and be careful how he symbolized with them in their use of theological words?

When these questions are answered, an account will have been given of a circumstance which seems to have given much pain to many of those whom one would least wish to annoy; viz. the manner in which the Author speaks of the *Defence of the Apology of the Church of England*, and of the party which adopted that work as the true type of their views and feelings.

But some say, Whether right or wrong in his views, he ought not to have spoken so rudely of these subjects: and this brings us to the second head of offence, his way of expressing his sentiments on grave matters, generally. Such censurers appear to forget, that his feelings are conveyed to us in familiar letters, and of course, as his other Remains prove, in a different tone and manner from that which he would have adopted, had he been preparing to give the expression of them to the world: not however more unsuited to the occasion, than the epistolary tone and manner of very many imaginative persons, on points concerning which nevertheless they feel the deepest and most serious interest.

This however, it may be thought, is only shifting the blame from him on his Editors. But it will be found that his phrases, however sportive, or even flippant, in their sound, had each their own distinct meaning, embodied his views and the reasons of them often in a wonderfully brief

space, and could not be omitted without much loss of instruction and frequent risk of missing their point and meaning. Like proverbial modes of speech, they were of course not always to be taken literally, though the principle they contained might be true in its fullest extent. Thus he once told a friend, that he was “*with the Romanists in Religion and against them in Politics.*” Again he says, in a letter to a friend, “When I come home, I mean to read and write all sorts of things, for now that one is a Radical, there is no use in being nice.” In another, “We will have a *vocabularium apostolicum*, and I will start it with four words: ‘pampered aristocrats,’ ‘resident gentlemen,’ ‘smug parsons,’ ‘pauperes Christi.’ I shall use the first on all occasions: it seems to me just to hit the thing. How is it we are so much in advance of our generation¹?”

Next, the reader is requested to consider, whether a good deal of what has startled him in that way may not be accounted for by the nature of *εἰρωνεία*: not mere ludicrous irony, according to the popular English sense of that word, but a kind of Socratic reserve, an instinctive dissembling of his own high feelings and notions, partly through fear of deceiving himself and others, partly (though it may sound paradoxical) out of very reverence, giving up at once all notion of doing justice to sacred subjects, and shrinking from nothing so much as the disparagement of them by any kind of affectation. This whole topic admits of forcible illustration from different persons’ ways of reading sacred compositions. There is an apparently unconcerned mode of enunciation, which in fact arises from people’s realizing, or at least trying to realize, their own utter incompetency to speak such words aright. Again, of all

¹ Remains, Part I., Vol. I., pp. 306, 329.

the serious persons in the world, it is probable that no two could be found, who would thoroughly enter into each other's tones and expression. We must have a little faith in our neighbour's earnestness, in order not to think his reading affected. A little consideration will perhaps show, that most of what some might be tempted to call harsh, or coarse, or irreverent in this work, may be accounted for in the manner here indicated; e. g. the Author's playful custom of speaking of his own and his friends' proceedings in the language which an enemy would adopt; calling himself and his friends, "ecclesiastical agitators," their plans for doing good, "a conspiracy," and the effect of them, "poisoning people's minds:" and his use of "cant" schoolboy words, which no doubt has disgusted many, may be referred to the same head.

Often, indeed, he seemed instinctively to put his own or his friends' views and characters in the most objectionable light in which they could be represented: as if to show that he was fully aware of the popular view which would be taken of what he approved; or the argument against it, which would seem plausible to the many; and that he was not in the least moved by it. Thus he somewhere utters a wish that "the march of Mind in France *might yet prove a bloody one.*" Elsewhere he regrets "that any thing should be done to avert what seems our only chance—*a spoliation on a large scale.*" Thus he habitually forced his mind to face the worst consequences or the most unfavourable aspect of his own wish or opinion—the most obnoxious associations with which it could be connected: and therefore used terms expressive of those consequences or associations. It was one form of his horror of self-deceit.

Put these things together; add also the fertility of his mind, his humour, his pointed mode of expression, his consciousness of fearless integrity, his hatred of half truths

and cowardly veils; his confidence in his friends' understanding him and allowing for him: and it will be found that they go far towards explaining the *manner*, just as the principle of adhering to Antiquity accounts for the *matter* of what he says.

But if after due allowance made for all these things, there should still remain more than we can easily reconcile ourselves to, in the way either of severity, or of seeming rudeness of speech; coldness where we expected fervour, and criticism where we looked for sympathy; we shall do well to remember, that the fault, if there be a fault, is not necessarily all on the Author's side: it may be right to suspend our judgment, till we have ascertained whether these things be not in fact due to the Character of Christian Antiquity, which he might be unconsciously realizing in greater perfection than his age could yet bear. Does there yet remain something that troubles us, something that we cannot at all explain? We must not forget (it is a deep and high allusion, but not, it is humbly trusted, altogether irrelevant to this case) that as all other manifestations of our Lord, so those which He has vouchsafed to make of Himself in His Saints, have ever been more or less mysterious and unaccountable. Which of the great Scripture characters is there, whose conduct, even that part of it which the Holy Spirit seems to mention approvingly, is not in some respect or another a riddle and a paradox to us with our modern views? Are there not things recorded of the Ancient Church, which we know not how to enter into, yet must needs venerate, because she gave them her sanction? Nay, and is it not very conceivable that every one of those approved in God's sight would be in like manner, were his history fully disclosed, "a monster" (as the Psalmist phrases it) to every other? that Faith is necessary in a degree for our holding by Christ in any one of His mem-

bers, as it is the great requisite whereby we keep hold of Him our Head? These remarks are of course hypothetical: nothing is asserted of peculiar sanctity in any one: only it seemed advisable to remind men, that where there are appearances in one part of a character of holiness and self-denial in a remarkable degree, there we may expect, by a kind of law of God's Providence, to find in other matters something very much beside our expectations, and unlike our own moral taste.

At the same time it should not be forgotten, that there are persons in the world, to whom this very disposition to irony and playfulness, and what we may perhaps call a certain youthfulness of expression, serves to recommend the Author's views, and attract them to him. That seeming lightness which was natural to him, is natural also to some others, perhaps not a few: and it is useful that they should have the means of knowing that it is not inconsistent with high and earnest thoughts of things invisible, and strict rules of Christian obedience.

Enough perhaps has now been said, if not for conviction, at least to show that this publication is not persisted in recklessly. Indeed, amidst all the uneasiness which has been professed, there are encouraging results in sight, if in such things it were right to dwell much on visible results. Are there not multitudes who cry out against "extreme views," yet themselves go further than they would otherwise in sympathy and conformity with the ancient Church? who grant our premisses, but only deny our conclusion? They are placing themselves indeed in a false position, which Romanists in particular will by and by know too well how to take advantage of: so much the more desirable is it to provide them beforehand with ground on which they may retire; to show them that however ill they may in time come to think of the Reformers as a

party, they need not be driven towards Rome : there is the ancient Church waiting to receive them, and the Prayer-book, and the Anglican divines of the 17th century, ready to cover their retreat towards it.

After all, it is not to any thing that we see, or that the world is likely to see, that we look for the effect of these Remains. If there be any who brood over them in secret, who have found them implant a sort of sting in their bosoms, who feel that it would have been a privilege to know their author, and watch his ways of discipline and obedience ; and if they had known him, to remember him afterwards, and say silently, *Heu quanto minus est cum reliquis versari, quam tui meminisse* ; if there be any, who have an eye for all that is exquisite and beautiful in nature and art, yet gladly turn away from all to admire any plain downright specimen of self-denial and obedience in the little ones of Jesus Christ ; if any person dwell with regretful love on parents, kindred, home, friends, humbling himself all along with remembrance of past unworthiness and disparagement of them, yet more willing, as he values them more, to part with them for the Church's sake : that is the sort of reader to whose judgment, if to any human, the Editors of these Remains would appeal from the prejudices, religious and political, of the day. But who they are that will so read, and how much they will be profited, may not be known in this world.

And now if the reasons above enumerated are at all available for the former publication, they seem *a fortiori* to justify the additional volumes which are now given to the public. For in these papers, unfinished as they still are, will be found a specimen of the reasoning out and application of the same principles, the preparatory training for which is exhibited in the Journal, seriously and contemplatively ; and its practical fruits in the Letters, though

under a veil of sportive reserve. And if any have failed to be struck with the force, and depth, and acuteness, of the former Remains, his estimate possibly will be raised upon diligent perusal of what is now set before him.

It is obvious, moreover, that those who at their own hazard have given *their view* of the Author's mind from his private writings, must naturally feel it yet more incumbent on them to give to the world *his own view* of things also, as contained in his writings published dispersedly, or intended for publication.

Nothing more perhaps need be added, except that the Editors are answerable as before for the main principles of the Writer, though not for each detail of his opinions; for the general tone of character, not for each several expression. In the Introduction to the Becket Papers, especially, there is a view attributing an exclusive jurisdiction to Church Officers, which they give as they find it, and as they know the Author meant it to be printed; not wishing to express any judgment for or against it. Also they would have it particularly understood, that *no person at all but themselves* is responsible for any thing in either these or the former volumes, except the mere permission to publish on the part of the Author's representatives; excepting also, that they are indebted to a friend of theirs and of the Author's, for the revision, illustration, and completion, of the series of papers on the history of Archbishop Becket.

EXTRACTS FROM THE WORKS OF BISHOP JEWELL,

Referred to in page xxix¹.

Of the Apostolical Succession.

1. "Lawfull succession standeth not only in possession of place, but also, and much rather, in doctrine and diligence. Yet the Bishops of Rome, as if there were nothing else required, evermore put us in minde, and tell us many gay tales, of their *Succession.*" *Defence of Apology*, p. 37, Edit. 1611.

2. "Surely the godly say, that as *your Bishops do no part of Bishops' duty, and therefore indeed are no Bishops at all*; so your late Convent at Trident, whatsoever glorious name it pleaseth you to give it, yet notwithstanding, indeed and verily was no Councell." p. 42.

3. "As for the Bishop of Rome, who now calleth all matters before himself alone; except he do his duty as he ought to do, except he minister the Sacraments, except he instruct the people, except he warne them and teach them; we say that he ought not of right once to be called a Bishop, or so much as an Elder. For a Bishop, as saith Augustine, is a name of labour, and not of honour; that the man that seeketh to have pre-eminence, and not to profit, may understand himself to be no Bishop." p. 110.

4. "If it were certain, that the Religion and Truth of God passeth evermore orderly by *Succession*, and none otherwise, then were *Succession*, whereof he hath told us so long a tale, a very good substantial argument of the Truth. But Christ saith, '(By order of *Succession*), the Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses's chaire.' Annas and Caiaphas, touching *Succession*, were as well Bishops as Aaron and Eleazar. Of *Succession*, Paul saith to the faithfull at Ephesus, 'I know that after my departure hence, raveing wolves shall enter and *succeed* me; and out of yourselves there shall (by *Succession*) spring up men speaking perversely.'" p. 120.

5. "Let the Pope do the duty of a Bishop, let him exhort, let him preach, let him dispense God's Mysteries, let him fulfill his office, let him do the part of an Evangelist; and we will love him and reverence him, although not as Christ's Vicar-General, yet at least as a Bishop." p. 366.

6. "Indeed Christ hath ordained *Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists, Pastors and Teachers* in the government of His Church; notwithstanding the same be not alwaies allowed to sit in Councils, nor be alwaies knowne by *Rochets*, or *Miters*. If God had not provided other *Pastors* and *Feeders*, besides your Prelates, the whole Church might starve for hunger." p. 626.

¹ See, for more examples, Part II. Vol. II. of these Remains, p. 406.

7. "Whereas some use to make so great a vaunt, that the Pope is only Peter's *Successor*, as though thereby he carried the Holy Ghost in his bosom, and could not erre; this is but a matter of nothing, and a very trifling tale. God's grace is promised unto a good mind, and to any one that feareth Him; not unto Sees and Successions.....If so be the place and consecration only be sufficient, why then Manasses succeeded David, and Caiaphas succeeded Aaron. And it hath been often seen, that an Idol hath been placed in the Temple of God. p. 632.

8. "For that ye tell us so many faire tales of Peter's *Succession*, we demand of you, wherein the Pope *succeedeth* Peter. You answer, 'he *succeedeth* him in his *Chaire*;' as if Peter had been sometime installed in Rome, and had sate solemnly all day with his *Triple Crown* in his *Pontificalibus*, and in a *Chaire* of *Gold*. And then, having lost both Religion and Doctrine, ye think it sufficient at least to hold by the *Chaire*; as if a Soldiēr that had lost his sword would play the man with the scabbard. But so Caiaphas succeeded Aaron. So wicked Manasses succeeded David; so may Antichrist easily sit in Peter's *Chaire*." p. 634.

Of the Power of the Keys.

9. "We commit the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven only unto the Priest...Yet nevertheless hath not every Priest the use of these Keys. Peter Lombard himself saith, 'We may safely say that all Priests have not the one of these two Keys, I mean the knowledge to discern.'" p. 144.

10. "The office of loosing consisteth in this point; that the Minister either by the Preaching of the Gospel offereth the merits of Christ and full pardon to such as have lowly and contrite hearts.....Or else that the same Minister, when any have offended their brothers' minds with some great offence.....whereby they have, as it were, banished and made themselves strangers from the common fellowship.....then after perfect amendment of such persons doth reconcile them." p. 143.

11. "Neither doth it follow of our doctrine, that either children or laymen do or may forgive sins. And yet God's Word may be mighty, be the pronouncers of it never so simple." p. 145.

12. "We say that the Minister doth execute the authority of binding and shutting, as often as he shutteth up the gate of the Kingdom of Heaven against unbelieving and stubborn persons, denouncing unto them God's vengeance, and everlasting punishment; or else, when he doth quite shut them out from the bosom of the Church by open excommunications." p. 148.

13. "The power of loosing, as also of binding, standeth in God's word; and the exercise or execution of the same, standeth either in preaching, or else in sentence of correction, and ecclesiastical discipline. Of the latter hereof there is no question; of the former.....'Binding,

(saith he [his opponent]) and shutting, standeth not in denouncing of God's vengeance.' And hereof he certainly assureth us, as of a most undoubted verity. Howbeit, in so saying he seemeth not to consider the power and weight of the Word of God." *Ibid.*

14. "As touching the Keys, wherewith they may either shut or open the Kingdom of Heaven; we with Chrysostom say, 'They be the knowledge of the Scriptures;' with Tertullian we say, 'They be the Interpretation of the Law;' and with Eusebius we call them, 'The Word of God.'.....Tertullian saith, 'Quam clavem habebant Legis Doctores, nisi Interpretationem Legis?'.....Chrysostom saith, 'Clavis est scientia Scripturarum, per quam aperitur janua veritatis'.....He hath well multiplied and increased his Keys, and hath brought us forth a whole bunch of them together. *The Keys of Orders, The Keys of Jurisdiction, The Keys of Discretion, The Keys of Power, The Keys most principal, and the Keys not so principal.*.....And all these pretty shifts of Keys hath he devised to avoid confusion, and to make up his tale, as if the Pope's Cross Keys were not sufficient. Plagues and Miracles, and I know not what things else, are brought forth unto us in the likeness of Keys.....What answer were it best to make to such vanities? Indeed, when the right Key of Knowledge was lost and gone, it was time to devise some other pretty picklocks to work the feat." p. 150.

15. "Christ's Disciples did receive this authority.....to the end they should go, they should teach, they should publish abroad the Gospel.... that the minds of godly persons being brought low,.....might be opened by the Word of God, even as a door is opened with a Key. Contrariwise, that the wicked and wilful,.....should be left still as fast locked, and shut up.....This take we to be the meaning of the Keys; and that after this sort men's consciences be either opened or shut." p. 151.

16. "Our doctrine is plain, that there be two Keys in the Church of God. The one of Instruction, the other of Correction. Whereof the one worketh inwardly, the other outwardly; the one before God, the other before the Congregation." p. 153.

17. "Seeing the Key whereby the way and entry to the Kingdom of Heaven is opened unto us, is the Word of the Gospel, and the expounding of the Law and Scriptures; we say plainly, where the same word is not, there is not the Key." "And seeing one manner of word is given to all, and one only key belongeth to all, we say, there is but one only power of all ministers, as concerning opening and shutting. And as touching the Bishop of Rome.....except he go so to work, as men's consciences may be made pliant, and subdued to the Word of God; we deny that he doth either open or shut, or hath the Keys at all." p. 161.

Of Sacraments, and Sacramental Grace.

18. "The Sacraments of the Old Law and of the New, in Truth and substance are all one. S. Paul saith, the Fathers in the Old Law did all eat *the same meat*, that is to say, the same Christ, that we eat." p. 208.

19. "When S. Augustine saith, 'Our Sacraments give salvation,' his meaning is this, our Sacraments teach us that salvation is already come into the world." *Ibid.*

20. "The holy Fathers say, 'The Sacraments of the new Law work salvation,' because they teach us that our salvation is already wrought. So Bonaventura saith of the Sacraments of the Old Testament; *Mundare dicebantur*; i. e. *mundatum ostendebant*: 'They were said to make a man clean, because they showed or signified that a man was made clean.'" p. 209.

21. "It appeareth by the witness of the ancient learned Doctors and Fathers, that we are really and corporally joined and united unto Christ, not only by the Mysteries of the Holy Supper, but also *by Faith*, by Baptism, *by the Spirit of God, by Love, and other ways.*" p. 240.

22. "Ye say, 'The raising of our flesh is also assigned in Holy Scripture to the real and substantial eating of Christ's Flesh.' But whence had ye these words? where found ye these Scriptures? Dissemble no longer; deal plainly and simply; it is God's cause. For a show ye allege these words of Christ, written by St. John:—*He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood hath Life everlasting; and I will raise him up again in the last day.* These words we know, and the eating of Christ's Flesh we know; but where is your *real*, and *substantial*, and *carnal* eating.....St. Augustine expounding the same words saith thus, '*Crede et manducasti; Credere in Christum, hoc est manducare Panem vivum; Iste Panis interioris hominis quærit esurientem*¹.....' One of your own Doctors saith, 'These words of St. John pertain nothing to the Sacrament.' It was some oversight of your part to seek to prove the eating of the Sacrament by such words, as by your own Doctor's judgment pertain nothing to the Sacrament." p. 306.

23. "Ye pronounce your *definitive sentence* as a judge, and condemn us for heretics, for that we have taken down your shops and gainful booths, which ye call the *Holy Altars of God*. Verily this must needs be thought either extreme rigour or great folly, of the removing of a stone to make an Heresie." p. 315.

24. "The Bishop of Sidon, in the late Diet of the Empire, holden at Augusta, avowed openly, that ye had your whole *Canon* from the

¹ Yet St. Augustine begins a popular discourse on St. John vi. 54, with these words, among others to the same effect:—"Corpus dixit escam, sanguinem potum. Sacramentum Fidelium agnoscant Fideles: Audientes autem quid aliud quam audiunt?" V. 446, F. comp. 450, A. B.

Apostles of Christ, even as it is peevishly written in your *Mass Books*." p. 441. [See Palmer on the Prim. Liturgies, c. vi.; by which it appears that the portion of the Mass Service which is called the Canon, is now as in the time of Gelasius, A. D. 492; and that it was probably of Apostolical origin.]

25. "Optatus saith, '*The Body and Blood of Christ is wont to be laid upon the Altar*; and with these words ye would fain astonish your simple Reader, as if Christ's Body lay there Really, Fleshly, Verily and in deed. But.....even so St. Augustine saith, *The whole people was in the Communion Cup, and laid upon the holy Table*. These be his words; *Vos estis in mensa; vos estis in calice*. As the People is upon the Table, so is Christ's Body upon the Table.'" p. 316.

26. "When they did of late put in print the ancient Father Origen's work upon the Gospel of St. John, why left they quite out the whole sixth Chapter? wherein it is likely, yea rather of very surety, that the said Origen had written many things concerning the Sacrament of the Holy Communion, contrary to these men's minds, and would rather put forth that book mangled, than full and perfect, for fear it should reprove them and their partners of their error? Call ye this trusting to *Antiquity*, when ye rent in pieces, keep back, maim and burn the ancient Fathers? [Then, having been reminded, as the fact is, that all the copies of Origen are very imperfect, and that all this is nothing but conjecture, he replies in a subsequent work:] We lay not in the mangling of this ancient Father as matter of sufficient evidence, but only as a great conjecture of your corruption, referring the judgment thereof to the Reader." p. 444, 445

27. "What one thing, tell me, had Peter ever like unto the Pope, or the Pope like unto Peter? Except peradventure he will say thus, that Peter when he was at Rome,.....consecrated with his holy breath, oil, wax, wool, bells, *chalices, Churches, and Altars*....." p. 634.

[The following are from other publications of the same writer.]

28. "They talk much of an unbloody Sacrifice, it is not theirs to offer it. Queen Elizabeth shall offer it up unto God; even her unbloody hands and unbloody sword, an unbloody people, and an unbloody government. This is an unbloody sacrifice. This sacrifice is acceptable unto God." *View of a seditious Bull*, p. 22.

29. "For the rest of these new witnesses [including the ancient Liturgies].....there is scarcely one of them, but may be doubted of." *Answer to Hardinge*, p. 8.

30. "Consecration.....standeth not....in precise and close pronouncing of certain appointed words, but in the converting of the natural elements into a godly use."....." "*The word of Faith which we preach*," saith St. Augustine, 'not the word which we whisper in secret, is the word of Consecration.'" p. 14.

31. " "*The people is negligent and undevout*; Ergo, the Priest may say *Mass alone*.' This argument is very weak.....So might he say, 'The people will not hear the word of God; Ergo, the Priest may go

into the Pulpit and preach alone. *For Christ's Supper*, as St. Augustine saith¹, is a Sermon, and the Priest therein preacheth and uttereth the Death of the Lord." p. 13.

32. "St. Augustine wrote three special books, namely of the Miracles of the Old and New Testament; and Gregory Nazianzen wrote in like sort of the same; yet did neither of them both ever make mention of this miracle [of the Real Presence.] Certainly, St. Augustine hereof writeth thus:—*These things* (speaking of the Sacrament of Christ's Body) *because they are known unto men, and by men are wrought, may have honour, as things appointed to religion; but wonder, as things marvellous, they cannot have; honorem, tanquam religiosa, habere possunt; stuporem, tanquam mira, non possunt.* Thus St. Augustine overthroweth M. Hardinge's whole foundation; and saith, that in his great miracle, there is no wonder or miracle at all." p. 260.

33. "The marvellous effects that God worketh in the faithful, in that dreadful time of the holy Communion, wherein the whole mystery of our Redemption, that we have in the Blood of Christ, is expressed, Chrysostom calleth a Miracle; and therefore the more to stir the people's minds to the consideration of the same, he inflameth his speech with rhetorical amplifications, and heat of words. This advancing and ravishing of the mind, he calleth a miracle." p. 264.

34. "Christ is present at the holy ministration, because His Truth, His Wisdom, His righteousness, His Word, is there present, as the face is present in the glass; not by any bodily or fleshly Presence..... And such kind of presence at one time in sundry places is avouched by St. Chrysostom, not only of Christ's Body, which is immortal and glorious, but also of any other godly mortal man." p. 268.

35. "Neither do we hereof make a bare or naked Token, as is imagined, but we say, as St. Paul saith, (Rom. iv.) It is a perfect seal, and sufficient warrant of God's Promises, whereby God bindeth Himself unto us, and we likewise stand bounden unto God, so as God is our God, and we are His people." p. 283.

36. "The Bread of the Sacrament is not that bread of which Christ speaketh in the 6th of St. John." p. 284.

37. "Christ in these words, (St. John vi. 54.) as it is witnessed by all the holy Fathers, speaketh not of the Sacrament, but of the spiritual eating with our Faith; and in this behalf utterly excludeth the corporal office of our Body." p. 292.

38. "The cause why Sacraments are ordained is this; that by mean of such visible and outward things we may be led to the consideration of heavenly things.....And touching this holy Mystery of Christ's Body and Blood, the cause of the institution thereof was, as Chrysostom saith, to keep us still in remembrance of Christ's great Benefit, and of our salvation." p. 331.

¹ De Trin. iii. 4.

39. "True it is, the new Sacraments of Christ's Institution are plainer and clearer than the old: as the Gospel is plainer and clearer than the Law. But the things signified are no more contained in the one than in the other." p. 339.

40. "The difference between the Sacraments of the Old Testament and of the New, standeth not in containing or covering, as it is here surmised, but in the order, and manner, and evidence of showing." p. 344.

41. "The old learned Fathers.....delighted themselves oftentimes with these words, *Sacerdos, Altare, Sacrificium*, notwithstanding the use thereof were then clearly expired, only for that the ears of the people, as well of the Jews as of the Gentiles, had been long acquainted with the same." p. 410.

42. "'Three ways,' saith he, 'Christ is offered up unto His Father; in a figure, as in the old Law; indeed, and bloodily, as upon the Cross; in a sacrament, or mystery, as in the New Testament.' Of which three ways, the bloody oblation of Christ upon the Cross is the very true and only propitiatory Sacrifice for the sins of the world. The other two, as in respect and manner of signifying they are sundry, so in effect and substance they are all one." *Ibid.*

43. "We deny not but it may well be said, 'Christ at His Last Supper offered up Himself unto His Father;' albeit not really and indeed, butin a Figure or Mystery; in such sort as we say, Christ was offered in the Sacrifices of the Old Law." p. 417.

44. "Whatsoever mortal man.....dareth to desire God the Father so favourably to behold His own only Son, as in old times He beheld the oblation of Abel or of Melchisedech, and is not afraid therewith to beguile the simple, and to mock the world,.....daily at his Mass, he cannot well excuse himself of open wickedness." p. 418. [See the Canon of the Mass, and compare No. 24 of this paper.]

45. "How dareth he to desire God to receive His only begotten Son into favour, and favourably and fatherly to look upon Him at his request? For thus he biddeth his prayer even in his Canon, even in the secretest and devoutest part of his Mass; Super quæ propitio ac sereno vultu, &c. *Upon these things* ('that is to say,' saith Gabriel Biel, 'upon the Body and Blood of Christ Thy Son') *O Lord, look down with a merciful and cheerful countenance; and receive the same* (the Body and Blood of Thy Son) *as Thou didst in old times receive the Sacrifice of Abel and of Abraham* (which was a wether, or a calf, or some other like thing.) Thus he not only taketh upon him to pray for Christ, but also compareth the sacrifice of the Son of God with the sacrifice of brute cattle. If he deny any part hereof, his own Canon, his own Mass-book will reprove him. If this be not blasphemy, what thing can be called blasphemy? But God will answer such a blasphemous and rash Sacrificer, 'I know My Son; in Him My heart is

pleased ; but what art thou ? Who bad thee thus to pray ? Who required such sacrifice at thy hand¹ ?” p. 430.

46. “ Christ hath ordained the Sacraments, that by them He might set before our eyes the mysteries of our Salvation, and might more strongly confirm the faith, which we have in His Blood, and might seal His grace in our hearts. As princes’ seals confirm and warrant their deeds and charters, so do the Sacraments witness unto our conscience, that God’s promises are true, and shall continue for ever. Thus doth God make known His secret purpose to His Church : first He declareth His mercy by His Word ; then He sealeth it and assureth it by His Sacraments. In the Word we have His promises ; in the Sacraments we see them.” *Treatise of Sacraments*, p. 261.

47. “ What ? are they nothing else but bare and naked signs ? God forbid. They are the *seals* of God, heavenly *tokens* of the grace and righteousness and mercy given and imparted to us. *Circumcision was not a bare sign. Even so is not Baptism any bare sign.* They are not bare signs : it were blasphemy so to say. The grace of God doth always work with His Sacraments, but we are taught not to seek that grace in the sign, but to assure ourselves by receiving the sign that it is given us by the thing signified².” p. 263.

48. “ The Sacrament” (of Baptism) “ maketh not a Christian³, but is a seal and assurance unto all that receive it, of the grace of God, unless they make themselves unworthy thereof.” p. 267.

49. “ We do both think and speak soberly and with reverence of the holy mysteries. We say, they are changed ; that they have a dignity and pre-eminence which they had not before ; that they are not now common bread or common wine, but the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ ; a holy mystery ; a covenant between Christ and us ; a testimony unto our conscience that Christ is the Lamb of God ; a perfect seal and sufficient warrant of God’s promises.” p. 274.

50. “ Believe that it is He which hath reconciled all things by His Blood. Here is nothing to be done by the mouth of the body. Whosoever thus believeth, he eateth, he drinketh Him.” p. 275.

51. “ The Patriarchs and Prophets and people of God which lived before the birth of Christ, did by faith eat His flesh and drink His blood. St. Paul saith, *They did all eat the same spiritual meat, and did all drink the same spiritual drink.* Whosoever believed in Christ, they were nourished by Him then as we are now.” p. 276.

¹ Here is an instance of the way in which the true arguments against Romanism may be missed for want of *consistent* reverence for Antiquity. This passage in the Canon of the Mass might well be alleged against any gross earthly notion of the Presence of our Lord’s Body : instead of which it is urged as an instance of the “peevishness” and “blasphemy” of that ancient service itself.

² This sentence shows that its author received but half the doctrine of the Catechism. He considered the Sacraments not as means of grace, but only as pledges to assure us of it.

³ Comp. Hooker, E. P. v. lx. 4. Note 23.

Of making common cause with the Foreign Protestants.

52. “Ye have not proved the truth to be of your side, nor ever shall be able to prove, maintaining the doctrine of the Lutherans, Zuinglians, and Calvinists, as ye do. . . .”

“This is the very issue of the case ; whether the Doctrine that we profess be the Truth or no.” *Defence of Apology*, p. 25.

53. “For they be not all mad at this day, so many free cities, so many kings, so many princes, which have fallen away from the seat of Rome, and have rather joined themselves to the Gospel of Christ.” p. 33.

54. “Those worthy and learned Fathers, Luther and Zuinglius, and other like godly and zealous men, were appointed of God, not to erect a new Church, but to reform the old.” p. 46.

55. “Your doctors. . . . are over young. . . . Neither is there any sufficient cause to the contrary, but that Berengarius, John Wickliffe, John Hus, Doctor Luther, Zuinglius, Æcolampadius, and others, either for learning, or for truth, or for judgment in the Scripture, or for antiquity, may be well and safely compared with them.” p. 47.

56. “Of the Sacrament of Baptism, Mr. Calvin every where writeth with all manner of reverence, calling it a divine and heavenly mystery, and the Sacrament of our Redemption.” p. 65.

57. “Touching Mr. Calvin, it is great wrong untruly to report so reverend a Father, and so worthy an ornament of the Church of God. If you had ever known the order of the Church of Geneva, and had seen four thousand people or moe, receiving the holy mysteries together at one Communion, ye could not without your great shame and want of modesty have published to the world, that by Mr. Calvin’s doctrine the Sacraments of Christ are superfluous. Certainly to leave all that he hath otherwise spoken of the Sacraments in general : of the Sacrament of Christ’s last Supper he writeth thus : ‘Magnum consolationis ac suavitatis fructum ex hoc Sacramento colligere possunt piæ animæ, quod illic *testimonium habeant*, Christum nobis adunatum esse, nos illi vicissim insertos. . . .’ ‘But Calvin,’ (you say) ‘writeth thus : *The Supper is a token of remembrance, to lift up and help our infirmity : for if otherwise we were mindful enough of Christ’s death, this help were superfluous.*’ O how far malice may bear a man ! Because Mr. Calvin saith, ‘We are weak and have need of Outward Sacraments, to quicken the dulness of our senses,’ saith he therefore that the Sacraments be superfluous ? . . . If this be so dangerous doctrine as you tell us, why then are the ancient Catholic Fathers suffered to hold and maintain the same ?” p. 154.

58. “For those persons, whom they upon spite call Zuinglians and Lutherans, in very deed they of both sides be Christians, good friends and brethren. They vary not betwixt themselves upon the

Principles and Foundations of our Religion, . . . but upon one only question, which is neither weighty nor great." p. 328.

59. "Martin Luther, and Hulderike Zuinglius, being most excellent men, even sent of God, to give light to the whole world, . . . came unto the knowledge and preaching of the Gospel." p. 360.

60. "'Hath the Queen of Scotland cause to praise the proceedings of your Gospel, through occasion whereof she ruleth not her subjects, but is rather ruled of her subjects?'

"Touching the Queen of Scotland, I will say nothing. The kingdoms and states of the world have sundry agreements and compositions. The nobles and commons there neither drew the sword, nor attempted force against the Prince. They sought only the continuance of God's undoubted Truth, and the defence of their own lives against your barbarous and cruel invasions.

"'What is a lie, if this be none?'

"Indeed, the Nobles and Commons of Scotland were in the field, we deny it not. So was David in the field against King Saul. They stood in armour, not to invade or attempt force against their Prince, but only to defend themselves, as by way of retire. And therefore they withdrew themselves into the Marches of England, not for want of strength or courage, (for they had then double more men in the field than came against them) but only for reverence of their Prince, that came upon them, lest they should be forced by rage of their enemies and fury of war to strike the Anointed of the Lord. Such broils have often happened in many countries, as by sundry stories it may appear.

"The subject is bound to obey his prince: howbeit not in all things without exception; but so far as God's glory is not touched. These Nobles had learned of St. Peter, *It is better to obey God than man.* And of the Prophet David, *Better it is to trust in God than to trust in Princes.* . . .

"To conclude, the Queen of Scotland is still in quiet possession of her estate; and is obeyed of her subjects, so far as is convenient for godly people to obey their Prince.

"'What will you stick to say, or write, which do say, write, and set out in print such a palpable and manifest falsehood?'

"*The Answer.* At the time of my writing, and first entry into the printing of my book, these words were true. For then was the Queen of Scotland in full possession of her estate. Neither could I prophesy what things would follow. Shortly afterwards the whole case was altered, as it is known. In the end of the print, by forgetfulness, this place escaped my hands without correction. . . . Indeed as I could not foresee the restraint of the said Queen's liberty which followed, but wrote of her state as it then presently was, . . . so could I not foresee the causes that occasioned that alteration. For, that the King should shortly after the time of my writing be so murdered¹, and the house

¹ Elsewhere the same author attributes the murder of Darnley to the Pope. "I know not what dispensation past lately into Scotland, but the King was strangled, &c. A horri-

wherein he lodged blown up with powder ; that a wicked man, accounted the certain author of that parricidal murder, having himself a wife yet living, should attain to the marriage of the same Queen, whose husband he had so traitorously slain, were things unknown to me, and to all men also when I did write this. And what way the nobles and body of the realm would take for the safety of the young Prince, who seemed to all men to be in great danger, was likewise unknown to me. And . . . these were the occasions of the alterations of the state, from that it was when I did write, and not Religion : which might well be known by that, that many of the said Queen's Religion were against her, and many Protestants were and are her friends. And it seemeth . . . reason that parricides, murders, and shedding of blood, especially blood royal, rapes, incest, and such like, should not pass without all controulment. Surely God hath not suffered such great faults to escape unpunished, even in Princes ; as doth well appear by the examples of Queen Jezebel in Israel, Queen Joan in Naples, King Tarquin in Rome : whom for their great wickedness, God by stirring up their own subjects against them deprived of their princely estates. For Princes also are God's subjects, against whom, for their offences against His Majesty, He proceedeth, as well as against the basest sorts of men, by such ways as to His heavenly wisdom it seemeth good." p. 15, 18.

61. " We give our Lord God thanks, whose only cause this is, there hath yet at no time been any such example in all the realms, dominions and commonweals which have received the Gospel. For we have overthrown no kingdom : we have decayed no man's power or right : we have disordered no commonwealth¹." p. 362.

ble deed—the world knoweth it was so, what mists and pretences soever they make. To work such practices, the Pope sendeth abroad his dispensations." *View of a seditious Bull*, p. 24.

¹ These two last quotations, compared with the Homilies on Rebellion, are a good instance of the witness which the Church of England so frequently bears against the private opinions of her Reformers.

ESSAY ON RATIONALISM,

AS SHOWN

IN THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE ;

AND OTHER ESSAYS

ON ECCLESIASTICAL SUBJECTS.

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ESSAY
ON RATIONALISM,

AS SHOWN

IN THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE¹.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF RATIONALISM.

No one who has made a study of his own heart can be altogether ignorant of the temptation he lies under to attach undue weight to human experience in the interpretation of Scripture, nor altogether free from apprehension lest he should in some points have unconsciously yielded to it. Yet few perhaps are fully aware of the extent to which this temptation influences them, and of the various and subtle disguises under which it presents itself. In the Protestant part of Christendom especially, it seems at the present day to exercise a sway almost universal; though the effects it produces on different minds are very dissimilar, and in some points of view even directly opposite.

¹ [Written, as it would appear, at Barbadoes, in 1834.]

Considered as effects of this temptation, the opinions of Protestants seem, generally speaking, to admit of being grouped into two classes, of which the respective partisans would doubtless be surprised at being supposed to have any thing in common. On the one hand we see a very strong and general disposition to divest Scripture of its apparent meaning, when such as our natural faculties cannot apprehend and verify; and on the other to invest man with supernatural faculties for the purpose of verifying it: thus, in both cases, Revelation and Experience are brought into accord, though by processes the direct reverse of one another, and by persons for the most part diametrically opposed in all their habits of thought and feeling.

This twofold genius of Rationalism¹ is no where more strikingly exemplified than in the interpretations put by opposite classes of religionists on the evangelical promises of the assistance of the Holy Spirit. On the one hand we find persons who have wrought themselves into a belief that prayers are perceptibly answered, conversions perceptibly wrought, a perceptible intercourse kept up between God and man; while others are unwilling to allow of any other efficacy either in prayer or the Sacraments or any other religious ordinance, except such as can be accounted for by their natural tendency.

¹ [What the Author means by this word, and how it applies here, will be seen more distinctly from the next chapter.]

Thus in the works of a leading Dissenter recently dead, who from the estimation in which he is held may be supposed to represent a very large party, we find the following declaration : after producing and commenting on the Scriptures which speak of the witness of the Spirit, he proceeds,

“ It might have been doubted that we have misunderstood these Scriptures, and made them the basis of an article, which they do not fairly and naturally support, if the general testimony of all sincere converts to the Gospel of Christ had not illustrated the facts ; and had not the *experience* of those converts been uniform in this particular, while in many cases, their habits of life, education, and natural temperament, were widely different.... Most of you know that I am no enthusiast,—that I have given no evidences of a strong imagination,—that I am far from being the subject of sudden hopes or fears,—that it requires strong reasons and clear argumentation to convince me of the truth of any proposition, not previously known. Now, I do profess to have received, through God’s eternal mercy, a clear evidence of my acceptance with God ; and it was given me after a sore night of spiritual affliction ; and precisely in that way in which the Scriptures, already quoted, promise this blessing. It has also been accompanied with power over sin ; and it is now upwards of seven years since I received it, and I hold it, through the same mercy, as explicitly, and clearly, and as satisfactorily, as ever. No work of imagination could have ever produced or

maintained any feeling like this. I am, therefore, safe in affirming, for all these reasons, that we have neither misunderstood nor misapplied the Scriptures in question¹.”

Again on the other hand it is melancholy to find the counterpart of these sentiments in the works of an admired Prelate of the Church of England, who in a treatise on the Holy Eucharist expresses himself thus :

“ The benefits received from all such performances, by reasonable creatures, cannot possibly be received but in a reasonable way. These duties, how well soever performed, cannot be supposed to operate as charms, nor to influence us, as if we were only clockwork or machines, to be acted upon by the arbitrary force of a superior Being.” He next shows, that, in duly performing our part in the Eucharist, “ we do that which *we ourselves can see to tend naturally* to revive and keep alive in our minds all such thoughts, dispositions, and tendencies as are proper to work upon the conduct of our whole lives ;” and then asks, “ And what reasonable creature would not be content with benefits of this sort, which are always of substantial and lasting service ; without fancying to himself privileges, communications, or impressions from above of another sort, never expressly promised to this duty ; never with certainty to be rightly judged of in any case ; often fallacious ; and always leaving

¹ Adam Clarke's Life, pp. 104, 106.

the mind, in which the images of them have been worked up, in a state satisfied with what carries no rational satisfaction in it¹.”

Again, with respect to the benefit of prayer : “ The great design of the duty of Prayer is to express, under an actual sense of the presence of God, those good sentiments and pious dispositions, which it is proper for us to entertain and cultivate within us, considered as dependent, reasonable, and social creatures....And then only it is that we fully answer the design of this duty, when we perform it in such a manner as that it may have a good effect upon ourselves, by keeping up the justest sense in our minds of all such important considerations, as are the true grounds of our faith and hope in God, and the strongest motives to our own constant practice of all that is good and praiseworthy. This indeed I always consider as the great end of Prayer as well as of Faith².”

And again, still more remarkably with respect to the benefits of Intercession : “ The expression of our good will and extended benevolence towards all our fellow-creatures is so becoming us, both as we are men and as we are Christians, that it cannot but recommend *us* to the favour of Him who is the God of love, and the Father of all beings. And this expression often and seriously repeated cannot but awaken the kind affections where they are drooping ; and keep them alive, and enlarge and

¹ [Hoadly on the Lord's Supper] p. 154. ² [Ibid.] p. 195.

increase them where they are awake.—I have therefore done my endeavour to adapt this part to the purposes of rational and social creatures, in such manner that in the use of it *they* may be acceptable to God¹.”

In these passages we have exhibited to us, in very unequivocal colours, a specimen of each branch of that twofold Rationalism, so unhappily prevalent among Protestants. On the one hand, we find a leader among those who are thought to take the most spiritual view of religion, avowing his belief that he himself, and as he is pleased to say, “all sincere converts to the Gospel of Christ,” have a faculty within them, for recognising and experiencing the supernatural action of the Holy Spirit on the human heart; and, what is very remarkable, avowing likewise, that this belief was not founded on Scripture, (for the expressions of Scripture he owns to be equivocal,) but on his own experience and that of his friends.

On the other hand, we find a Prelate of the Church of England, whose opinions many still regard as a standard of rational piety, disavowing his belief in any efficacy of prayer, intercession, and the Sacraments, except such as is inseparable from the right performance of these services, and belongs to them through their natural tendency.

It may be hoped, indeed, that among the members of the Church of England, a large body at least still remains uninfected to this extent with the

¹ p. 200.

unhappy spirit of Protestantism ; and who would regard either of the above classes of opinion with pity and disapprobation ; the one as enthusiastic, the other as sceptical. But yet let not those who have escaped the extreme of either error, feel confident that they are altogether free from it : many intermediate stages there are between a downright refusal to walk by faith, in opposition to sight, and a calm and reasonable readiness to do so in all respects : many people may believe a little and yet be very far from believing enough.

A lower modification of Rationalism, in one or other of its shapes, is exhibited to us in the disposition now so prevalent, to set up Sermons as means of grace, to the disparagement of Sacraments¹.

¹ [The following passages occur in a rough draught of this chapter :] It is important to observe with respect to all the ordinances of religion among Protestants, that very good ground can be assigned for them, without admitting any thing that is contrary to experience, any immediate reference to inspired authority, and that it is only when particular constructions are put upon them and effects assigned to them, that such reference becomes necessary. Taken in themselves, they are plain, practical inferences from the broad facts and principles of revealed religion, and become at once intelligible, on the admission of these facts and principles. They imply no belief of any thing going on either within us or immediately around us, but what we know from reason and experience to be going on, and the only belief which they imply more than this, relates to matters about which, from the nature of things we can have no experience.

Thus the setting apart of particular persons to teach religion, has been shown over and over again to be nothing more than mere observation of human nature suggests to us, and all the

It will, I believe, be admitted by every one, that to the attendance on Sermons, as such, no promises

offices which are assigned to them in Protestant countries admit of such explanation as to make them appear suggestions of common sense. Preaching...to which the place of first importance seems generally assigned, is evidently of this sort; if neither the Bible nor the practice of ancient Christians gave us one word of instruction on the subject, still the use and importance of it would be just as obvious as at present. A good sermon carries with it the proof of its own usefulness; no one need do more than attend seriously to it to know he is benefitted by it; nor do I know of any view that has ever been taken of preaching, which ascribes any other advantages to it than those which are thus made known. [See Hooker. E. P. v. 22. § 1; compare 67. § 12.] Whatever advantages are ascribed to this office, are ascribed to it by reason and experience, as well as by revelation.

The same remarks will, in a degree at least, [apply] to an ordinance, which indeed some Protestants have rejected as superstitious, but which the Church of England retains,—Episcopal ordination; for which many good reasons can be assigned, without supposing it to convey to the person ordained any thing more than a *legal qualification* to minister the Word and Sacraments. It may be thought, however, and with some reason, that more than this seems implied in the English Ordination Service, when the Bishop laying on his hands on the persons to be ordained priests, pronounces over them the words which our Blessed Lord used in conveying the Holy Ghost to His Apostles. Yet I believe it is not universally acknowledged by members of the Church of England that this act of the Bishop, or these words, convey any *real powers*, unattainable by other means.

Nor again, is there any thing in the way in which [the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper] is commonly administered among Protestants, which implies necessarily that more is intended by it than [to remind themselves of Christ's death.] [As to] the

are annexed in Scriptures ; but to the due observance of Sacraments, as such, high promises. A sermon is not, I believe, supposed by any one to be beneficial *because* it is a sermon¹, or to be attended

Services of the Church of England, in particular, it has been explained at length by Bishop Hoadly, that the assertion in the Catechism that the inward part or thing signified in this Sacrament is the Body and Blood of Christ, and that these are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper, means simply that they who eat the Bread and drink the Wine in the religious remembrance of Christ's Body and Blood, do verily and indeed "take both in the sense in which Christ called them His Body and Blood, viz. as memorials of them." p. 149. So too, when it is declared in another answer in the Catechism, that the benefits of which we are partakers in this rite, are "the strengthening and refreshing of our souls by the Body and Blood of Christ, as our bodies are by the bread and wine," the Bishop interprets it thus, "as bread and wine, considered only as natural food, strengthen and refresh our bodies, so this bread and wine considered and taken as memorials of the Body and Blood of Christ our Master, lead us by their *peculiar tendency* to all such thoughts and practices as are indeed the improvement and health of our souls." p. 162.

¹ [In one sense it is, in which the Author would not have denied it. The Psalms, Proverbs, &c. are surely written in a tone of promise to hearers of God's Word, simply as such ; so that a blessing may be considered to rest on one who receives a Sermon in Church as God's Word, over and above the edification which he may experience. The same thing may be argued from what is said in the New Testament about "preaching and teaching the Gospel;" except that of course much more besides delivering Sermons is included under the word. St. Paul may be said to have "preached Christ" in the ship, by his whole behaviour ; our Saviour "bore witness unto the Truth," even when he "held His peace," and gave Pilate "no answer."]

with any other consequences than such as it has a natural tendency to produce. A dull, drowsy sermon has no effects, either good or bad, except as a discipline of patience. An impressive or affecting sermon is wholesome or the reverse, *according to* the impression it creates or the affections it moves. In all cases it is the *character* of the Sermon, and not any promises of Scripture annexed to the attendance on it, which can alone afford any rational ground for judging of its effects: it is Experience and not Faith. On the other hand, the beneficial efficacy of Sacraments will be admitted, by many, to belong to them *because* they are Sacraments; not because they are strikingly and impressively administered, not because the accompanying Services are calculated to awaken our most serious thoughts, but because the rites themselves are instituted by God for the express purpose of benefitting us, whether we can perceive how or not: the effects of Sacraments may be judged of, not by their *nature* or *tendency* only, but by the *promises* of Scripture: their proper proof is not Experience but Faith.

Here then are two ordinances, to one of which, as such, God has annexed no promises, and to the other great promises; and so far I suppose there can be little doubt which would claim our most constant and dutiful attendance. The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, professing as it does to feed us with the Bread of life, and to make us spiritual partakers of the Body and Blood of Christ, ought, one would think, in all reason to form the most

prominent feature in the worship of the faithful; to be dwelt on as the sure and abiding pledge of God's love, and sought for earnestly, if possible, as the daily, or at any rate the weekly sustenance of souls hungry and thirsty after righteousness. One would expect to find those who from circumstances were detained from every other Service, yet, at least, endeavouring to present themselves at this; if necessity compelled them to forego some part of the appointed instruction of the Church, rather one would imagine ought [it] to be any part than the most solemn and important of all. Churches might be empty, or thinly attended, during the celebration of every other rite: the prayers, the litany, and sermon might be attended only by persons who, from station or accident, were disengaged from necessary occupations: but the Holy Mystery of our religion, that solemn rite at which is distributed the blessed Bread which came down from heaven, this, at least, should be a signal for the general assemblage of Christ's flock, not, as it now unhappily is, for their dispersion. So, too, the commissioned servants of the Lord, those whose office it is to feed the flock of Christ, and to whose custody this Heavenly Food has been committed, anxious, one would think, must they be to deliver out this precious dole, ever ready to distribute their unfailing treasure, which, like the widow's cruse of oil in the Prophet's hands, will ever flow on inexhaustible. Borne down they may be with various toils, their strength exhausted, their time unceas-

ingly occupied, yet for this at least the most important of all their toils, some time, some strength would be reserved : rather ought any duty to be left unfulfilled, any part of their commission undischarged, than this their greatest duty, the very essence of their commission.

Such, I say, is the view one would take of the respective duties of the Clergy and their flocks in regard to the different parts of religious worship, if the importance of these parts were measured by the standard of Faith alone ; by the promises of God, and without any regard to human Experience : and such, as a fact, is the view taken of them in all countries, not Protestant, from one end of Christendom to the other. The ignorant and superstitious Churches of Greece and Rome, in this respect at least, present a spectacle fraught with instructive lessons to the serious member of our own enlightened communion. Among them he sees, in the outward part of religion at least, an exhibition of that deference of sight to Faith in which we are externally so deficient. The opening of the Eucharistic Service, which among ourselves is a signal for three-fourths of the congregation to withdraw, operates there like the voice of the good shepherd which the sheep hear and obey. The areas of the Churches, which we fill with seats to accommodate the gazing audience of a popular preacher, so arranged for the most part as to make kneeling almost impossible, are among them¹ a

¹ [e. g. in Italy.]

marble pavement, where to sit is impossible, and adapted only to the use of devotees who come to humble themselves before their God.

But not to dwell longer on this contrast : let serious persons after duly weighing the difference between the Evangelical promises annexed to the Eucharist as such, and to Sermons as such, proceed to ask themselves these two questions : What at this day would be thought of a Clergyman of the Church of England who was to content himself with preaching four, or eight, or even twelve sermons in the course of the year ? and how many Clergymen of the Church of England are there who administer the Eucharist in their Parish Church more at any rate than twelve, or even than eight or four times in the same period ?

And now let it be considered why all this is so : What are the arguments by which this course is justified ? Will not one and the same answer be returned every where ? viz. that very few would attend the Eucharist if administered more frequently¹,

¹ A similar argument may be [drawn out] on the notions prevalent among Protestants, respecting public worship in general. If the use and duty of such worship is founded on Scripture, it is founded on the expression, "Where two or three, &c.;" so that persons who think that a clergyman is wasting time for having service on week days, with congregations of two or three, but that he is not wasting time if there are two or three hundred, certainly conceives the use of public worship to be something else than that promised in the Bible, and that when this something else cannot be got, the thing promised in the Bible is not worth having.

and that a great deal more good is done by Sermons. This answer, which is essentially rationalist,—which assumes that the experimental good of Sermons is commensurable with the promised blessings of the Eucharist,—will be returned unhesitatingly by two parties, differing most widely on every other religious question ; by those who regard each other mutually as too hot or too cold, as semi-sceptics or semi-enthusiasts. One party relies on plain sensible discourses, the tendency of which to improve and instruct is evident to common sense ; the other on exciting topics, strong appeals to feeling, striking views of doctrine, calculated to awaken sensations, which are regarded as sensible influences from on high. Both however agree in this, that whether through common sense or super-human influences, human experience, somehow or other, is the criterion of religious good ; and that we are justified in dwelling most on those ordinances, the benefits of which are most seen.

To persons who have habitually taken this view of the relative importance of Sermons and the Eucharist, the above remarks will of course seem entitled to little weight ; their own opinions, which have always hitherto appeared to them just and obvious, will appear so still ; and those which I have suggested as more conformable to Scripture, will be put aside at once ; by one party as indicating an unspiritual reliance on forms, by the other as visionary unpractical speculations arising from ignorance of human nature and an incapacity for

weighing evidence. Any thing will rather occur to either party than that they themselves are chargeable with Rationalism. And doubtless it would be most unjust in many cases to charge them with it, in the offensive sense which that word now frequently bears. All that is here intended is, to point out to them that, in thinking as they do, they follow Experience more and the letter of Scripture less, than they would do in thinking the reverse. It may be that they are right in this; that the case in question is one where the letter of Scripture should be interpreted by Experience; where sight was intended to assist Faith, not to bow before it: it may be so at least for ought that has been yet said, though I hope to show by and by that it is not so. But the fact that they do thus interpret Scripture by Experience, that so far at least they do walk by sight and not by Faith, it is important for them to notice. For this fact should of itself beget in them an apprehension that they may perhaps be in the wrong; it should remind them, that their opinions belong to a class which on the whole is regarded by God with disapprobation, and what is more, that they have been formed under a very strong temptation, for which it would be difficult to make too great allowance.

It is much to be wished, that such persons, before they condemn opinions opposed to their own as visionary and fantastical, would recollect the light in which their own opinions are in turn regarded

by others, who outstrip them in the race of Rationalism. Let them but reflect on the whimsical and fantastic appearance assumed by any kind of religious strictness on the distorted retina of habitual laxity: the odd, unintelligible spectacle which their own characters exhibit to the cleverheaded, calculating man of the world, or the careless wit, to whom sight is every thing and Faith nothing; and they would perceive how dangerous it is for themselves to rely on their own mental vision, where it leads them away from the plain letter of Scripture.

These and similar considerations ought, one would think, to weigh with serious Protestants, and induce them to suspect, at least, that a rationalist spirit may in some respects have unconsciously influenced them; that they may perhaps have formed some of their opinions too much on experience and too little on Scripture, and thus have attained at last only to a partial knowledge of the Truth in Christ Jesus. In the earnest hope that some few at least may happily be prevailed on to regard this as possible, and so to lay aside that jealous controversial spirit which ever arms itself [against the reception of truth,] the following brief compilation has been arranged. Its object is to prove that certain views of religion, now generally discarded among Protestants, are, to say the least, *more probable than not*; and that, all things considered, it is our *safest course* to act on them. The views themselves, as will be seen at once, are of no trivial importance; nor is it practically a light

question, whether we shall act on them or not. Again, there is nothing of novelty about them, though to most persons at the present day they may appear new. At one time they were generally adopted by all the learned of the Church of England, and from that time to this there have never been wanting, able and pious persons to uphold them; though of late, for circumstances, they have attracted little attention. The works from which they are compiled are chiefly those of the famous William Law, Bishop Hicke, Bishop Butler, and Dr. Brett; whose views it has been the compiler's endeavour to systematize in a short compass, referring to their most valuable writings for fuller light and more detailed statements. Of his own he has added little, in the way even of argument, to what has been already urged by these great men; and in the way of opinion absolutely nothing. On the subject of religion he is firmly convinced of the truth of the maxim that old ways are right ways; and he will think any of his views sufficiently refuted, if the charge can be substantiated against it, that it is *new*.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROPER OFFICE OF REASON¹.

THERE are few mistakes which originate in a greater confusion of thought, or have led to more irrational conclusions, than the commonly received notion, that Reason and Faith are in some cases opposed to one another.

Reason, if people would be at the trouble to think accurately what they mean by it, is a name which we apply to two distinct faculties: the faculty by which we are enabled to weigh evidence, and that by which we trace the relations of ideas; and neither of these faculties ever are, or in the nature of things can be, opposed to Faith.

1. Reason, when it means the faculty by which we trace the relations of ideas, cannot possibly be opposed to Faith, because Faith only informs us of matters of fact, and Reason, in this sense, can neither prove nor disprove, nor in the slightest degree affect the probability of any fact whatever.

To show that this assertion is true with respect to a fact, the discovery of which would perhaps of

¹ [This chapter is printed from four MSS., of which the finished copy does not go further than the sentence ending "trivial," p. 25. The rest is in various degrees of completeness.]

all others be most commonly selected in proof of the powers of Reason, i.e. the gravitation subsisting between the heavenly bodies, it will only be necessary to point out why this is believed to be a fact.

Astronomers have found out by telescopes and other contrivances that the Sun and Planets are globes, that the former is very large with respect to every one of the latter, that they revolve round about it in conic sections, and that their velocities and periodic times depend in a certain fixed manner on their distances from it. Newton discovered, that if particles of matter are supposed to attract one another with a force varying inversely as the squares of their distances, then globes made up of such particles conglomerated, would attract one another with a force varying directly as the quantity of such particles contained in each, and inversely as the squares of the distances between their centres ; and that, such being the case, if any number of such globes were projected in space, some one of them being very large with respect to the others, these would revolve about it in conic sections, with velocities and periodic times depending upon their distances from it, in exactly the same way as the velocities and periodic times of the Planets depend on their distance from the Sun. And therefore, since all we know about the motions of the heavenly bodies is exactly what it must be, if the force of attraction existed, we suppose as the simplest account of these motions that it does exist. It will be observed that the truth of this supposition rests

not on any demonstration which reason tells us to be certainly true, but on the assumed accuracy of telescopes and other instruments in the first instance, and secondly on the further assumption, that what these instruments have shown us respecting the motions of the heavenly bodies is all that is to be known on the subject : two things, either of which may turn out to have been a mistake, for aught Reason tells us to the contrary. Thus, for aught we know by Reason, a planet may hereafter be discovered which shall move on some other curve than a conic section, and with velocities depending in no fixed way on its distance from the sun : and this discovery, though it would contradict the belief that the force of attraction, as stated by Newton, is a universal principle, would in no way contradict Reason, nor ought in the least degree to stagger our reliance on it. Nor is the likelihood that such a planet may be discovered at all affected by any of the reasonings on which Newton's system is founded. Reason tells us just as exactly about the motions of heavenly bodies acted on by any forces whatever, as by the particular force of gravitation, and affords no conclusive presumption in favour of the reality of one force more than of another, nor indeed any presumption in favour of the reality of any force.

It tells us that, if the force of attraction varied inversely as the cubes of the distances between the heavenly bodies, instead of the squares, they would revolve in spirals, instead of conic sections, and all

at last fall into the Sun. And the fact that the known Planets do not revolve in such spirals, may just as correctly be said to oppose Reason, as the discovery of other Planets not revolving in conic sections could be said to oppose it.

With respect to astronomy then, Reason, in the sense in which it is the basis of the Newtonian System, cannot be said to give us any information about matters of fact, either negative or affirmative; nor can any astronomical phenomenon whatever, that either experience may discover or fancy imagine, be, in any correct sense of the words, either opposed to Reason or consistent with it. And the same truth holds with respect to all other matters of fact, whether moral, political, or religious. Reason, if it means the faculty by which we trace the relations of ideas, and demonstrate one proposition from having previously ascertained another, is altogether unable to take cognisance of them; it can affirm nothing respecting them, and therefore cannot be contradicted by any thing we may fancy about them, be it true or false.

2. Again, if by Reason is understood the faculty by which we are enabled to weigh evidence, in this sense it is equally unintelligible to speak of it as opposed to Faith.

To assent to any doctrine or precept of religion, whether natural or revealed, on any other ground, except that the balance of evidence points out the reasonableness of doing so, is what no man was ever commanded to do by God, and what in the

nature of things it is impossible he should do. That some doctrines and precepts are received by some men, against which others think there is a balance of probabilities, is indeed perfectly true : but that, if these men were to argue together, the question would turn on, which ought to be trusted, Reason or Faith, is absurd ; the real question being, which is the most reasonable, Faith or Disbelief. I believe in the miraculous conception of our Blessed Lord, another person disbelieves it ; but then my belief is not founded on a submission of Reason to Faith, nor again, is his belief a triumph of Reason over Faith. His notions of the laws of evidence are different from mine : [whether or not] he be right and I wrong, the question between us is not, which ought to be most trusted, Faith or Reason, but whose notions of evidence are most reasonable, his or mine. He attributes more weight than I do, to the presumption drawn from experience, that the course of nature is uniform, and therefore cannot have been deviated from in this particular instance ; I attribute more weight than he does to the testimony, which proves Scripture authentic, and the text, in which this miracle is stated, genuine. His reason teaches him to think it more probable that the parts of the Bible are a forgery, or at least couched in vague and random language, than that the order of nature which we see around us should have been so wonderfully set aside ; mine teaches me the reverse. Thus it is not his Reason and my Faith that are opposed, but his reliance on expe-

rience and my reliance on the genuineness and authenticity of Scripture : each of us being equally ready to appeal to Reason as the arbiter.

Experience and the declarations of Scripture are indeed seemingly opposed to one another at every turn, and it is the office of Reason to judge which is most to be trusted ; but to oppose Reason to Faith is absolutely unmeaning, just as much so indeed as to oppose Reason to Experience. Nor would it be any greater abuse of terms to say that those who explain away the declarations of Scripture prefer Experience to Reason, than it is to say that those who accept them literally prefer Faith to Reason.

Nor let it be thought that all this is a mere cavil about words. Any man, doubtless, has a right, if he pleases, to mean by Reason something different either from the faculty by which we trace the relations of ideas, or that by which we weigh evidence ; he is perfectly at liberty to invent any new notion whatever and to call it Reason, and to write books in which he calls it so ; but then it should be distinctly borne in mind that what he calls Reason is not what is commonly called so, is something very different from the exalted faculty which is allowed to be “ the only faculty wherewith we have to judge concerning any thing, even revelation itself¹.” And thus, in the case before us, any one is at liberty to write books in which he opposes Reason to Faith ; but then it ought always to be borne in mind that

¹ Butler's Anal. ii. 3.

the word Reason, when so used, does not mean this faculty, but something quite different, viz. an assumption respecting the preference due to human experience over the literal meaning of Scripture; and since this is not always borne in mind, but is in general left entirely out of sight, and since this new sort of Reason enjoys in consequence the full benefit of its equivocal name, it becomes necessary to expose the fallacy.

It must be borne in mind then, that, when in a vague way of speaking, Faith is ever said on any subject to be opposed to Reason, nothing more is meant than that it is opposed to Experience; that is, that on the subject in question we should be led to opposite conclusions by looking only to what Experience and the light of nature seem to suggest, and by looking only to the apparent meaning of Scripture.

In all cases, however, when this opposition occurs, or indeed wherever any other difficulty seems to hang over the interpretation of Scripture, it must be remembered, that Reason is the sole arbiter to which reasonable creatures can appeal¹. In such cases to insist on the duty of Faith, though true indeed, is perfectly irrelevant, since it is not our duty to believe, unless the apparent meaning of

¹ [It is not here asserted that we must ever be *consciously* acting on Reason, but that when we come to *analyse* our opinions and views, when we come to argue and infer, the "*appeal*" lies to that which is the "sole" ultimate "*arbiter*" of truth which has been given us.]

Scripture is shown by Reason to be the real meaning, and till the opposite suggestions of Experience are repudiated by it as trivial¹. To illustrate this, let us consider Hume's argument on the subject of miracles. Experience, he tells us, shows that the course of nature is regulated by certain fixed principles admitting of no deviation ; that such Experience is our sole ground for calculating on any future event whatever, even the recurrence of the seasons or the rising of the sun to-morrow morning : on the other hand that Experience shows the minds and actions of men to be subject to great variety and caprice, that one man may act on motives which to another are unaccountable, and therefore that, however little the conduct of the Sacred Historians may look like that either of enthusiasts or impostors, still the conclusion that they were not so, and consequently our reliance on them as credible witnesses, must rest on our Experience of so capricious and mutable a thing as the human heart ; whereas our reason for not relying on them rests on the immutable laws of Nature.

¹ [This means, " It does not *become* a duty to believe, except so far as we have reason to think that, &c. ;" or " The duty of belief does but rise out of the conclusion in reason, that the apparent meaning of Scripture is the true one, &c. Hence, moreover, there are two points for consideration : 1st, Whether " the opposite suggestions of Experience " are relevant, or whether Rationalism is not unreasonable, which is treated of in Chapter iii. ; and 2nd, On what principles Scripture is to be interpreted, a fragment on which subject is contained in Chapters iv. and v.]

Now it is frankly admitted that this, to a certain extent, is a fair statement of the argument; the question is, whether it is more reasonable to allow that such and such laws of Nature may have been suspended, (taking into consideration the reason assigned for their suspension, and the agents to whom it is attributed,) or to believe the alternative, viz. that certain men, such and so many as are described in the New Testament, were by a simultaneous caprice induced to act the part assigned in history to the Apostles and Disciples of our Lord and their first Christian converts all over the world; and on the decision of this question, the reality of the supposed Christian revelation must depend.

In the same manner, with regard to the Socinian question, the point to be decided is, whether, taking every thing into consideration, we have on the whole so good ground for satisfaction with the completeness of the knowledge derived to us by Experience and the light of Nature concerning the nature of the Supreme Being, the sense in which Personality can be attributed to Him, His intentions towards mankind, and the principles on which He regulates the great scheme of the Universe, as to make it certain that any texts of Scripture, which add to or modify, or interfere with such knowledge, must either be interpolations or modes of speech foreign to the idiom of the Greek language, or figures for the use of which [if they be such] no reason can be given except an intention to perplex. On the answer of this question depends

the whole controversy. If we have such ground, then it is clear that revelation opposes Socinianism only apparently, not really.

These and all similar disputes must be decided by Reason, and Reason only, and the two things which it has to weigh against one another are, on the one hand the grounds we have for trusting to the suggestions of Experience, and on the other for believing that a supposed revelation contrary to them, is real. This is a question, which it is not only safe, but necessary, to entertain in religious questions; for although to oppose any experience to a revelation ascertained to be real, would be infinitely absurd, yet Experience may on some questions afford us a light sufficiently clear to prove that a revelation which contradicts it cannot be real. Indeed it is clear that on some points Experience gives us such certain information, as of itself to render questionable any supposed revelation contradictory to it, or indeed to prove it no revelation, however strong might be the positive evidence on its side. Conscience, which is part of Experience, teaches us certain notions of right and wrong, which we know so well to be the Law of God written in our hearts, that, if miracles were to be done under our own eyes to upset such notions, we might be sure these miracles were from Beelzebub; as indeed we are clearly taught by our Saviour, who appeals to the consciences of His hearers as the proper proof that His own miracles

were not from Beelzebub¹. In such a case Experience is sufficient to outweigh any positive proof of a revelation opposed to it, and ought to make us certain that such supposed revelation could not be real.

It is obvious, however, that there are very few cases in which Experience can be so far relied on ; and that in any case, where the slightest doubt hangs over its suggestions, in such case, unless the proofs of an opposed revelation are absolutely none at all, it will be our duty to proceed with the greatest caution ; for that in such a case it will be doubtful whether God has given a revelation or not, and it is obvious that to treat what may possibly be a revelation from God as if it certainly was not, is the very height of presumption.

A farther reason for caution is furnished us by the fact, that in all cases where an appeal is made to Experience on the one side, and to Faith on the other, there is a decided bias in all minds to give undue weight to Experience. To assign a reason for this is beside my present purpose ; the fact will, I believe, be acknowledged by all thinking persons,

¹ [Matt. xii. 25. St. Paul tells us that, though an Angel brought doctrine contrary to the faith once delivered, he would have no claim on our attention. Accordingly it has been observed that such divine communications in Scripture as run counter to our natural feelings of right (e. g. the destruction of the Canaanites) always relate to *single actions*, not to *doctrines*. Abraham was told to sacrifice his son ; he was not told that the sacrifice of children was ordinarily allowable.]

and it is to this that I would direct attention; for if, as cannot be denied, we have an inclination prompting us to trust more than is reasonable to Experience, and less than is reasonable to the proofs of a revelation opposed to it, we are bound in common prudence to watch ourselves as narrowly in deciding what to believe, as if we were deciding how to act, when under the influence of temptation. A wise man will be as jealous in believing what Experience tells him against the slightest semblance of a revelation opposed to it, as an honourable man would be [cautious of] avoiding danger when there was the slightest doubt whether it might not be his duty to face it; or as a temperate man [of] indulging pleasure when there was a chance that the better course was abstinence.

That such an inclination to trust Experience really exists, and is not a fancy of those who suppose themselves to overcome it, must, I think, be granted even by the most sceptical, when they consider how different are the feelings with which they regard opinions opposed to Experience, from those with which persons of a different turn regard opinions opposed to what they own for revelation.

It must be clear to every one, that, with respect to questions involving the opposition of Sight [Experience] to Faith, men think and argue almost with the same keen feelings as on questions where Pleasure is opposed to Faith. Take, for instance, two men who have undergone an opposite change in religion; one who has learned

to trust Experience where he formerly trusted a supposed revelation contrary to it ; the other who has come to think a revelation real which he formerly rejected. A man who has resisted or unlearned any views of religion founded on questionable revelation and against Experience, always feels and talks as if he had disencumbered himself as [of] a burden, whereas one who has undergone the opposite change feels and talks as if he had escaped a snare ; ways of speaking which would absolutely suggest no idea, unless it was felt by both parties that the alternative of belief and disbelief was not indifferent to them, that the one was a burden and the other a relief. If at a place where his road divided into two, a traveller wholly unacquainted with either, and to whom each seemed to offer equal advantages, was to be advised by one countryman to take the right hand, and by another the left, it certainly would never occur to him to think that the one was imposing on him nor the other ensnaring him. Such a thought would only be natural and intelligible, if the one was smooth, inviting, and apparently straight, the other rugged and circuitous. And thus, if the two ways, that of Faith and that of Sight [Experience] were at first sight equally inviting, no one would have ever dreamed of attributing opposite motives to their advocates¹.

¹ [The following passage occurs in a rough copy of Chapter i.] Most persons who will be at trouble to examine their own hearts, will find in themselves, however mixed with counter-

[Hitherto the extreme case has been taken of belief and disbelief in revealed religion ; but]

acting feelings, a dislike to believe any thing in the dispensations of Providence, which is unlike the known course of things, and not discoverable without a revelation. I do not deny that to many minds the belief in such things is a source of positive pleasure ; in this respect they seem to resemble many other things, which, though upon the whole painful, and such as no one would voluntarily expose himself to, yet are in some way or other fascinating to the imagination; and often when unwillingly enjoyed, leave nevertheless behind them a strange impression of delight. All I mean is, that after making every allowance for such fascination, the bias of all minds inclines them to believe whatever differs from, or is (as they call it) contrary to their experience. They take a pleasure in getting rid of such things themselves, and are not indifferent spectators of credulity in other people. Every man who has been brought up in religious opinions that he learns afterwards to regard as superstitious, feels and talks as if he was relieved from a burden, and if he sees able men inculcating such opinions, or simple ones admitting them, his impulse is to be angry against the one, and to condemn the other. I do not say he indulges this impulse, but it crosses him, which it would not do, if such opinions were indifferent to him. Now I do not speak of this feeling to find fault with it, but merely to remind people that, in deciding between two opinions, the one in conformity to the ordinary course of things, and the other different from it, they are not unbiassed judges, nor unlikely to deceive themselves, and that unless they make allowances for it they will infallibly do so. Religion is offered to them in a variety of forms, some more, some less in accordance to our notions of what is natural, some stopping short at what is discoverable by reason and experience, others making almost unlimited demands on our credulity. . . . As it is the principle of the Deist that he who believes least is wisest, so it is the principle of the Romanist that he who believes most is safest.

*Sight [as Scripture calls Experience] and Faith¹ are opposed to each other in many ways and degrees, some of which are more perplexing to some minds, some to others, according to their various turn of thought, natural or acquired, and have given rise in consequence to a great variety of religious opinion. It is no more correct to speak of the Deists as the only persons who trust Sight against Faith, than it would be to speak of the Roman Catholics as the only ones that trust Faith against Sight². Between the two extremes of those who believe nothing and who believe every thing, there are a vast variety of shades, melting into one another almost imperceptibly, and constituting the various denominations of Protestants.

In one sense Sight and Faith may be said to be opposed, whenever we are called on to believe any thing not discoverable without a revelation and unlike the ordinary course of things, because we feel within us a strong propensity to assume that the ordinary course of things is the only course of things, that the system of nature is permanent and uniform, or in other words "that all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." Yet this assumption is so purely an assumption,

¹ [In the M.S. it stands thus: "Sight then and Faith, not reason and faith, are opposed," &c. The whole of this Paragraph between the asterisks is apparently crossed out by the Author.]

² [The Roman Catholics, however, in many ways indulge a spirit of Rationalism; as must be evident to any one who has studied their system.]

that serious persons generally feel it to be untenable even against a low degree of positive evidence: thus it is seldom, that a person with any show of religion disbelieves any miraculous parts of the Scripture* history, only on the ground that it is different from what we now experience. A miracle recorded simply as an historical fact, and affecting only persons who lived in distant ages, appears credible to many persons, who nevertheless feel differently with respect to miracles spoken of as abiding continually, and affecting ourselves in our relation to God and the future world: I mean “the invisible Dispensation of Providence, carrying on by God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are represented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin¹.” Again, it must be observed with respect to this Dispensation itself, that some understand it to be only so far miraculous, as it relates to the nature of God, and to the invisible world; while others believe that the very world on which we live, and the order of things in which we are engaged, is at this day the scene of invisible miracles, which take place within us and around us, through the operation of powers transmitted to our time in an appointed manner, from our Lord, through His Apostles and their successors. Persons who feel no difficulty in admitting the doctrine of the Ever Blessed Trinity, the Atonement made for the sins

¹ Butler’s Analogy, part ii. c. i.

of the whole world by Jesus Christ, and the agency of the Holy Spirit in effecting our sanctification, on the authority of revelation alone, shrink nevertheless very frequently from admitting either that this Atonement can be rendered available to us, or this Sanctification imparted, except in ways which may be perceived to improve faith and holiness. What relates to God, they can believe and feel to be beyond their comprehension; but what relates to themselves, and falls apparently under the full cognisance of Experience, they cannot understand except in such a way as is verified by Experience.

Thus, without entering at present on the question, whether such or such particular opinions about the unseen order of things are borne out by sufficient positive evidence, it seems that Experience, or, to use the Scripture phrase, Sight, opposes greater difficulties to the reception of some than others; and the greatest of all to those that bear upon our present condition, and the means by which the graces, promised in revealed religion, are conveyed to us.

Now the importance of observing these various shades of opposition, between Sight and Faith, arises from the circumstance, [already noticed] that, wherever this opposition exists in any degree, we are likely to be in some degree prejudiced judges of the evidence on the side of Faith, and of the objection raised by Sight; we are likely to underrate the one and overrate the other, to neglect the one and dwell on the other; in short, to deny

our reason fair play in deciding the balance : and the greater the opposition is in any case, the greater is likely to be our prejudice ; to such a degree that, unless we take particular care to guard against it, we shall be apt to take many important questions entirely for granted, without giving a moment's attention to what can be said upon them. That the generality of careless people are in the habit of judging in this way on almost all religious questions, is but too evident : but persons who know that they are not careless are not on this account to feel secure of themselves. Whether they are conscious of it or not, they are all under a strong temptation, which probably has influenced them the more, the less they have observed it : and this temptation assumes a great variety of shapes according to the different turns of mind it acts upon. It urges some people to levity and profaneness ; but it is not only those who jest at what they disbelieve, that disbelieve under its influence. It often appears under a grave and stately guise, putting forward the honour of God and the purity of religion as the ends to be attained by following it ; and not unfrequently appeals to strong religious feelings, making them its instruments of seduction¹. *Many a goodly monument of ancient piety, many a sacred relic of Saint or Martyr, has been insulted and destroyed under the colours of religious zeal ; nay I can

¹ [The passage between asterisks has a line across it in the M.S., as if it broke the course of the paragraph.]

believe that one at least of the two glorious and ever-blessed Martyrs whom the Reformed Church of England has given to God, was the victim of a misguided dread of superstition; and that even the perilous and shocking step of denying the Godhead of our Blessed Lord has by some persons been taken under the full conviction that they were flying from idolatry.* Nothing is more certain than that a man may think himself to be actuated by a grave love of Truth, or a zeal of Godliness, while in fact he is taking no rational step to attain the one or the other, but is urged on by a mere prejudice, which he retains by refusing to examine it.

And thus, in the case before us, many a man, who has suspected any thing rather than that he was acting irreligiously or unphilosophically, has, under the blind influence of a temptation to prefer Sight to Faith, believed some things and disbelieved others, equally without examination, and having assumed from the first that they did not require it.

CHAPTER III.

UNREASONABLENESS OF RATIONALISM¹.

Blessed are they who have not seen and yet have believed.

§ 1. *Ecclesiastical Questions not necessarily unspiritual.*

MANY serious persons who read and think much on the subject of religion, are nevertheless accustomed to regard questions connected immediately with the Church as undeserving any large share of their attention. Discussions, for instance, respecting the manner in which a Christian community should be governed, or respecting the reasons for joining ourselves to one rather than another, appear to them rather political than religious; or at any rate so confined to the mere externals of religion as to divert the thoughts from what is inward and spiritual. It is common to hear this whole class of subjects grouped together under the name "matters of Discipline," and so contrasted with "matters of Doctrine," as obviously of minor importance, if

¹ [i. e. the System of Rationalism has no foundation in *Reason*, i. e. in Experience. Hence all the Sections are negative: "Ecclesiastical questions *not* necessarily unspiritual, &c."]

of any. Indeed, a disposition to lay stress on them is not unfrequently regarded as a proof of a worldly mind; and some are even found, who think that ignorance of what has been alleged, on any side of the questions that have arisen out of them, is a positive good. Now in all this there is much of real though mistaken good feeling. The views entertained by such persons would be perfectly just, if there was no more in the question above spoken of than the world generally supposes.

If, when so much is said to prove that the Primitive Church was governed by Bishops and not by Presbyters, nothing more was intended than to show that primitive precedent was in favour of the Episcopal form of Church government;—in this case, few discussions could be more unedifying to the practical Christian. It is obvious to common sense, that the present circumstances of Christian communities are so different from what they were in the Apostolic times, that the very same reasons which recommended one form of government then, may recommend an opposite form now; and that to insist on imitating the Apostolic Church in these days, in points where no particular reason can be assigned for imitating it, is a mere nicety, a piece of antiquarianism. If the Episcopal question terminated in ascertaining whether Episcopacy was conformable to Apostolical practice, the settlement of it one way or another could be of little consequence to us. We have changed many Apostolical practices. We do not consider ourselves bound to a

community of goods; yet the Apostolic Church had all things in common. We do not feel obliged to wash one another's feet, yet one of the last commands of Christ obliged the Apostles to do so. If then we do not scruple to deviate from Apostolic practice in things like these, which evidently have a moral meaning, to lay great stress on Episcopacy, if a mere matter of form, seems little better than a refinement.

Again, what can be flatter and less interesting, in a religious point of view, than long historical researches to prove the Apostolical succession, if no other inference is to be drawn from it, than the *formal* identity of Episcopal Christian communities among us with communities set on foot by the Apostles? such an identity, for instance, as that subsisting between the Free Masons' Society of the present day and the Secret Societies of the middle ages. To investigate such a point might indeed afford amusement for the leisure hours of the curious, and undoubtedly the fact is very remarkable: but to lay stress on it as part of religion would certainly be trifling in the extreme.

Let it only be assumed, as it is now almost universally assumed, that the sole ends for which the Church was instituted are decency, order, and the propagation of true doctrine, and an end is put at once to all ground for arguing about the Apostolical Church Government and Succession. Any religious community which answers these sole ends, for which the Church was instituted, answers every

good purpose which the Church can possibly answer ; and the question between one community and another will be, not, Which can trace back its succession farthest, or which retains most of the Primitive forms, but, Which best fulfils these great essentials, the maintenance of order, decency, and true doctrine. Judging as the world now judges respecting the nature and intention of the Church, to prefer one community to another for any other superiority than this, is laying undue stress on non-essentials, and confusing formal with real religion. And so far those persons are right, who, taking for granted the common notions about the Church, discard the consideration of any merely Ecclesiastical questions.

Let it not however for a moment be supposed, that it was any undue attachment to non-essentials, or any inability to distinguish between the forms and the spirit of religion, which has in all ages led so many holy and humble men of God to treat these merely Ecclesiastical questions as matters of vital importance. It was not for want of discriminating between external and internal, or between doctrine and discipline, or between forms and realities, that such men as the great Hammond wrote and thought so much on the divine institution of Bishops, and the invalidity of Presbyterian ordination, and the obligation that all Christians are under to communicate with the Apostolic Church. It will be remembered by most persons that the Reformed Church of England has given birth to two Martyrs,

an Archbishop and a King, and that these blessed Saints died for Episcopacy. But was it for a form, or a point of discipline, that they resisted thus unto death? surely not. Whether mistaken or not, they had far other thoughts of the cause in which they suffered. In their view it would have been just as shallow theology, to say that the Church was instituted solely for decency, order, and the maintenance of sound doctrine, as to say that Christ came into the world only to establish order, decency, and sound doctrine. And when they contended for Episcopacy as one of the essentials of religion, they no more regarded it as an external and a form, than they regarded Christ's death upon the Cross as an external and a form. As they conceived Christ's coming into the world, and death upon the Cross, to be mysterious parts of the Divine Economy for the salvation of sinners, so they regarded the institution of the Visible Church as a not less mysterious part of the same Economy towards the same end¹: and Episcopacy they considered as a Divine Mystery for perpetuating this Church.

Their belief on this subject seems to be contained in [the] following propositions.

1. That, before Jesus Christ left the world, He breathed the Holy Spirit into His Apostles; giving them the power of transmitting this precious gift to others by prayer and the imposition of hands;

¹ [i. e. Christ's death the *meritorious* cause, and the Church the *instrument* and *means* of our salvation.]

that the Apostles did so transmit it to others, and they again to others; and that in this way it has been preserved in the world to the present day.

2. That the gift thus transmitted empowers its possessors, (1.) to admit into or exclude from the mysterious Communion, called in Scripture "the Kingdom of Heaven," any one whom they judge deserving of it; and this with the assurance that all whom they admit or exclude on earth, and externally, are admitted or excluded in Heaven, and spiritually, in the sight of God and of Holy Angels: (2.) that it empowers them to bless, and intercede for, those who are within this Kingdom, in a sense in which no other men can bless or intercede: (3) to make the Eucharistic bread and wine the Body and Blood of Christ, in the sense in which our Lord made them so: (4.) to enable delegates to perform this great miracle by ordaining them with imposition of hands.

In these propositions is contained the substance of what the great champions of Episcopacy have contended for: and these, if admitted to become in the remotest degree credible, evidently give a new complexion to the whole question. To be admitted within the mysterious precincts of the Kingdom of Heaven, to be miraculously blessed, and miraculously fed with the Bread that came down from Heaven, these are surely something more than forms and externals; and the Episcopacy that has (if indeed it has) preserved them to us, is something more than

a matter of bare Discipline, observed in conformity to Apostolical practice.

According to this view of the subject, to dispense with Episcopal Ordination is to be regarded not as a breach of order merely, or a deviation from Apostolical precedent, but as a surrender of the Christian Priesthood, a rejection of all the powers which Christ instituted Episcopacy to perpetuate : and the attempt to substitute any other form of ordination for it, or to seek communion with Christ through any non-episcopal Association, is to be regarded, not as a schism merely, but as an impossibility¹.

It must not therefore be taken for granted, that questions relating to Church Government, and to what are commonly called externals, are on that account the less connected with the very vitals of religion, or the less deserving our most serious attention. If the Church really is what so many great men, who have lived and died for it, have believed it to be ; then, though external, it as vitally affects our spiritual condition, as the death of Christ did, which was not less external. And the only question, which remains to be considered, is whether the belief of these great men is so absurd as not to be worth examination ? For, if this belief be only supposed possible, the practical consequences of it are so awfully important, as to demand all the examination we can give them.

¹ [Not that the members of such an Association are certainly destitute of Communion with Christ, but that, if they have that privilege, it is not *through* the Association.]

Unless we can be absolutely certain that these notions of the Church are a mere dream, to refuse inquiring into the grounds of them, as though it were an inquiry not spiritual enough for us, is a course alike imprudent and irreverential.

§ 2. *Invisible Power not necessarily unreal.*

The view of the Church, in which it is presented to us as an appointed means for the conveyance of mysterious blessings, distinct from the decent and orderly propagation of true doctrine, is arrived at through the belief that Episcopal Ordination conveys *real* though invisible power. This is the keystone by which the whole system is held together. If this can be shown to be absurd or incredible, all need of farther inquiry will be removed. Accordingly, we find the ablest opponents of Church authority selecting this for their main point of attack. It is contended that what Ordination conveys to the person ordained is, not any *real* power, but only a *legal*, or rather a *formal* qualification for the discharge of certain offices in a decent orderly manner; and in support of this assertion it is asked, with something like triumph¹,

¹ vid. Jewel's Defence of his Apology. ["To be Peter's lawful successor, it is not sufficient to leap into Peter's stall. Lawful succession standeth not only in possession of place, but also, and much rather, in doctrine and diligence. Yet the Bishops of Rome, as if there were nothing else required, evermore put us in mind, and tell us many gay tales, of their succession." Jewel's Def. of Apol. part i. c. 5. div. 4.

“If Ordination conveys any *real* powers, what are they? Are ordained persons more eloquent, better acquainted with Scripture, wiser, holier, than they were before Ordination?” as if, forsooth, unless some such visible effects could be attributed to it, the whole question was set at rest, and all farther inquiry rendered unnecessary; for that no power could possibly be real, the effects of which are not visible.

Now the fallacy of this assumption may be shown in many ways:

1. It may, I suppose, be taken for granted that, when our Lord Jesus Christ, before His final sepa-

“The godly say, that. . . . your Bishops do no part of Bishops’ duty, and therefore indeed are no Bishops at all.” Ibid. c. 6. div. 1.

“If it were certain, that the Religion and Truth of God passeth evermore orderly by succession, and none otherwise, then were Succession, whereof he hath told us so long a tale, a very good substantial argument of the Truth.” part ii. c. 5. div. 1.

“The effect of M. Harding’s answer hereto is this: ‘The Pope may be holy, although not by virtue that should be within him, yet by his office that is without him.’ And yet it is universally confessed among the learned, that holiness is a virtue, and that virtue is an ornament of the mind, and is within us. . . . But the Pope hath a privilege above others, and may be holy without holiness. . . . So the Scribes and Pharisees, and Annas and Caiaphas, were they never so wicked, might be holy by their office; and so, by this conclusion, it may stand well with reason, that wickedness and holiness may dwell together.” Ibid.

“The Scribes and Pharisees. . . . to maintain themselves in credit, for that they had *succession* and continuance from Aaron, and sate in Moses’ chair. . . . kept Christ quite out of

ration from the Apostles, breathed on them and said, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost," they did receive the Holy Ghost, and therewith some real power as distinguished from a mere formal commission. And yet it would be difficult to point out any part of their subsequent conduct, in which this real power visibly displayed itself. The miracles which they performed, they did by virtue of powers committed to them long before, when they were first chosen as Apostles, and commanded among other things to "heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils." The gift of tongues was not conferred on them till afterwards, "when suddenly

possession; and said unto Him then, even as M. Harding saith now unto us, Whoever taught us these things before Thee? What ordinary *succession* and *vocation* hast Thou? What Bishop admitted Thee? Who confirmed Thee? Who allowed Thee?" Ibid.

"This is M. Harding's *holy succession*. Though faith fall, yet *succession* must hold. For unto such *succession* God hath bound the Holy Ghost. *For lack of that *succession*, for that in our sees in the Churches of England, we find not so many idolaters, heretics, necromancers, &c. &c. as we may easily find in the Church of Rome; therefore, I trow, M. Harding saith, we have no *succession*; we are no Bishops; we hear no Church at all. . . . S. Paul saith, Faith cometh, not by *succession*, but by hearing; and hearing cometh, not of legacy or inheritance from Bishop to Bishop, but of the word of God. . . . By *Succession*, Christ saith, Desolation shall sit in the holy place; and Antichrist shall press into the room of Christ." Ibid.

"As touching the Bishop of Rome; . . . except he go so to work, as men's consciences may be made pliant, and subdued to the word of God, we deny that he doth either open or shut, or hath the Keys at all." Apol. part ii. c. 7. div. 5.]

there came a sound from Heaven as of a rushing mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting, and then appeared to them cloven tongues like as of fire, and sat upon each of them.” Nor was it till this time, or at any rate till after Christ had departed from them and gone to the Father, that they received the promised Comforter, who was “to guide them into all Truth,” “to show them things to come,” and “to bring all things to their remembrance.” If then it is still maintained that a power in order to be real, must be visible, some other manifestation of such power must be discovered in the Apostles, besides those of speaking with tongues, or raising the dead, or knowing all truth, or seeing things to come: or else it must be maintained also that, when Jesus Christ breathed on them and said “Receive ye the Holy Ghost,” they received nothing.

2. It will probably be admitted that the hearts of all persons in covenant with God are continually acted on by a *real* power: the very power of the Holy Ghost, who is ever calling us day and night to repentance and salvation, inviting, warning, rebuking, succouring us; yet let any one fairly ask himself whether this is a visible power? Let him turn his thoughts on that desolate wilderness, his own conscience, and say what he sees there. I do not say, that at the end of a long life, or even after the lapse of any very considerable period of years, a man may not, by looking back, detect here and there, on putting various things together, faint

traces of the mighty influence to which he has been subjected; he may track them out like a path over the mountains, more distinctly as the prospect becomes distant. But that at any given time, at the moment, for instance, when the greatest effects are being wrought in us, these can in any sense be called perceptible effects, is what few but enthusiasts will maintain. But even supposing (what is not at all to be supposed,) that the influences of the Spirit were in some cases perceptible, nay that they were generally so, still, if they ever were not perceptible, if ever there has been any single case in which they have not been so, that single case is sufficient for the present purpose: it proves that power, though invisible, may nevertheless be real.

3. It will hardly be denied, that the power which good Christians have, of interceding with God for others, is a *real* power, and prevails with God for the good of those for whom they intercede. Yet what are the visible effects of this power? I believe it would be quite as easy to point to the blessings procured by the ordained Clergy for their flocks, as to show that the prayers of one Christian are, as such, ever beneficial to another.

4. Were we uninformed of the fact, which Scripture teaches us, that our souls are thus acted on by real, though imperceptible powers, still even Reason would teach us to apprehend that such might be the case. For with regard to the state of our own hearts, and the means by which they are urged, whether towards good or evil, it is evident to com-

mon sense that we are in a state of entire ignorance. Thoughts come into our minds we know not how, and pass away as unaccountably. The very same things presented to us at different times affect us so differently, as to make it quite clear that the thing presented furnishes us with no account of the affection consequent upon it; at one time we are moved with fear, compassion, wonder, at the contemplation of the very same objects which at another time we have surveyed with apathy: we make resolutions and abandon them, we devise schemes and reject them, we pursue or avoid, like or dislike, approve or again disapprove, with a very incomplete knowledge of the motives that actuate us. In all this then there is infinite room for the intervention of powers, which day and night may act upon our hearts, and yet altogether escape our observation. Indeed, so entire is our incapacity for forming any opinion on our own state and the causes that affect it, that we may make almost indefinite progression either towards good or evil, and yet hardly be aware of any important change taking place within us; the best men know they are very far from what they ought to be, and the very worst think that, if they were but a little better, they should be as good as they need be¹. It is then distinctly conceivable, not merely that we may be acted on unconsciously by *real* powers,

¹ “ Les élus ignorent leur vertus, et les reprouvés leur crimes. Seigneur, diront les uns et les autres, quand nous avons vous vu avoir faim,” &c. Pascal, Pensées, 17. 23.

impelling us whether to good or evil, but that these powers should effect changes in us indefinitely great, and yet our consciousness be never the more awakened. Reason therefore furnishes us with ample ground for apprehending that all may be true which Scripture intimates, respecting the influence of good and evil spirits over the souls of men; nay, perhaps, without any reference to Scripture, it might teach us to believe the fact that we are so influenced. For if we adopt the maxim of natural philosophers, that all effects are referable to some cause, then all the unaccountable phenomena above noticed may be regarded as so many indications of a cause at work which is as yet undiscovered; and the operation of good and evil spirits upon the human heart will become as supposable, nay as probable, as the agency now commonly attributed to magnetism and electricity in bringing about many of the seeming irregularities of nature. Even common sense then, leaving Scripture out of consideration, might sufficiently warn us against the assumption, that the power to convey spiritual graces to the human heart, if real, must also be perceptible.

5. But lastly, even were we without any such warning, it would be plain enough that such an assumption was mere folly. The considerations, which have been suggested, prove it to be a false assumption: but setting them entirely aside, what is there to make us think it true? It is a mere random proposition, and, till proved, is as worthless

as any other random proposition. It proceeds on the assumption, that man's natural faculties are sufficient to show God's whole method of dealing with us; whereas we have no reason to suppose that they afford us more than the faintest and most partial glimpse into it. In fact, it would be just as rational for a blind man to deny the reality of light, or a deaf man the reality of music, as for our blind and deaf hearts to deny the reality of any operation of the Holy Spirit, however invisible.

Obviously then, a less conclusive argument could not possibly have been devised against the reality of the powers supposed to be conveyed in Ordination, than that these powers do not manifest themselves to our experience.

§ 3. *Human Excommunications and Absolutions no infringement of the Prerogative of God.*

The claims of the Christian Priesthood are opposed, not merely because they do not manifest themselves to our experience, but as being in themselves unreasonable, nay blasphemous; and this charge is supposed to apply especially to the claim to excommunicate and absolve.

It is said, that, if human sentences of excommunication and absolution are supposed to have any effect in the next world, this is in fact taking judgment out of the hand of God. The claim to pass such sentences is treated as a claim to pass the irreversible sentence at the last day; and the claimants

are hated, as arrogating to themselves the absolute disposal of the eternal happiness or misery of their fellow-creatures.

Between this notion of excommunication and absolution, and the notion that they are mere formal declarations, of what the person pronouncing them supposes to be the terms of salvation, it seems to be thought that no medium can be conceived. These sentences must be either every thing or nothing; either mere forms, or usurpations of omnipotence.

Now it will not take many words to show, how Excommunication and Absolution may have real effects; the one favourable, the other unfavourable to man's condition in the sight of God, both in this world and in the next; and yet neither the one be able to save, nor the other to damn us.

For it will perhaps be granted, that the thing spoken of in the Bible as "the Kingdom of Heaven" is a reality; and that admission into it is set forth as a real blessing, exclusion from it as a real calamity. Nor will it be pushing matters very far to assume, that this blessing consists in bettering man's condition with respect to the favour of God, and this calamity in deteriorating it; nay that in the next world those that are within this kingdom will, as such, be more favourably circumstanced than those without it. And yet it is absolutely certain, from the most explicit declarations of our Lord, that many who are without this kingdom shall be saved, and many who are within it damned.

For on the one hand, we know that John the Baptist was not included within the Kingdom of Heaven, inasmuch as “the least in that Kingdom is greater than he;” and on the other hand it is plainly declared “that the Kingdom of Heaven is like a net which was cast into the sea, and gathered of *every kind*; and which when it was full, they drew to shore, and sat down, and gathered the good into vessels, but *cast the bad away*. So shall it be in the end of the world: The Angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire.” These are awful considerations, fitter for meditation than controversy: they are however most clearly intended to show us, that, however great is the blessing of admission into the Kingdom of Heaven, the subjects of that Kingdom are not exempted from fear and trembling. To assume then that no spiritual blessing can be real, without [its] insuring salvation, nor spiritual calamity real and yet short of damnation, is most shallow theology.

Now when to these considerations we add the fact, that those who put the power of excommunication and absolution highest, define it to consist in admitting to or excluding from this very Kingdom of Heaven, which can be thus proved immediately from Scripture to confer real spiritual blessings, and yet not to insure salvation, it certainly does seem unaccountable how it ever could have entered into any one’s head, to confuse them with “the irreversible sentence at the last day.”

Still however it is asserted, that the power to confer or withdraw the favour of God, however circumscribed may be its effects, is in its very nature unfit to be trusted to fallible man, except with such limitations as render it altogether nugatory. Excommunication and Absolution, it is said, must be supposed to take effect, either only in those cases where they are deserved, and so will come to nothing, because the favour of God would have been gained or forfeited without them through the desert of the parties; or in all cases, whether deserved or not, and so will be inconsistent with God's justice, and therefore incredible.

Now, however plausible this reasoning may seem, it involves a fallacy either way. For, though the sentence only took effect where it was deserved, it might nevertheless have a real effect; and though it took effect in all cases, it would not be inconsistent with any thing we know, either through nature or revelation, respecting God's justice.

With regard to the supposition that the sentence only takes effect when it is deserved, the fallacy of the inference drawn from it, is exposed very clearly in Law's admirable Letters to Bishop Hoadly.

"The whole argument¹," says he, "amounts to this, that a *right* censure of the Church hath no effect, because a wrong one hath not. I should think any one in mighty want of a proof, who should say that the excommunication of the inces-

¹ [The quotation which follows is erased in the MS.]

tuous Corinthian could have no effect, because the excommunication of some virtuous person will not have any effect; yet this is your Lordship's demonstration, that it can signify nothing when it is right, because it signifies nothing when it is wrong. Is it an argument, my Lord, that when a bullet flies through a man's head it has no effect upon him, because it will have no effect if it miss him? Is it a proof that motion cannot produce heat, because rest cannot produce heat? If not, how comes it to be an argument that a right sentence hath no effect, because a wrong one hath not the same effect? A right sentence is as opposite to a wrong one as motion is to rest; and it is as good sense to say motion has no such effect, because rest has no such effect, as to say a right sentence has no effect, because a wrong one has not the same.....Your Lordship's argument is this, that the sentence hath not such an effect in *some* circumstances, because it hath not the same effect in *all* circumstances: which resolves itself into this proposition, that nothing can produce any particular effect, unless it produce the same effect in all circumstances. Your Lordship might as well have called it a demonstration against all effects in the world, as against the effects of spiritual censures: for there is nothing in the world, no powers either natural, moral, or political, which produce their effects, but in *some* supposed *right circumstances*; yet this ecclesiastical power is demonstrated away by your Lordship, because it does not produce the same effect in all circumstances."

“If there is no effect,” says he, “in a right sentence of the Church, because there is no effect in a wrong one, then it will follow that there is no effect in either of the Sacraments, when rightly received, because they want such effect in persons who do not rightly receive them. It may as often happen that the Sacraments are administered in wrong circumstances, and as void of that effect for which they were intended, as any wrong sentence of the Church be pronounced; but does it therefore follow that there is no effect in the Sacraments? that they are empty and useless to those who receive them rightly, because they are so to those who receive them otherwise?” It must either be affirmed, “that the Sacraments have no effect, or that the *opus operatum* is always effectual. For if you say they have any effect, though not always, then it is certain that the sentence of the Church may have effect, though not always. Whether your Lordship will own the popish doctrine of the *opus operatum*, or deny the Sacraments to be means of grace, that is, to have any effect, I cannot tell: but sure I am, if you do not hold one of these doctrines, you must own the Sacraments to have conditional effects in supposed circumstances; which will sufficiently confute your own strict demonstration that Excommunication can have *no* effect, because it has not in all circumstances¹.”

This, I suppose, is clear enough, and sufficiently

¹ Law's third Letter to Bishop Hoadly.

disposes of the assertion that Excommunication can never have real effects, if it has no effects when unmerited.

Again, on the other hand, if we suppose the sentence to take effect in all circumstances, whether merited or unmerited, still there is nothing in this inconsistent with what we know of God's justice, either from nature or the Bible.

The difficulty of this supposition, if it has any difficulty, must turn on the assumed unlikelihood that God should measure out His favours to men by any rule but their own deserts. For it will not be maintained that, if they can be supposed to gain or lose God's favour by any other means than their own deserts, there is any particular difficulty in placing excommunication and absolution among the means. If we find some men placed in a more favourable condition than others, with respect to the chance of obtaining God's favour here and hereafter, in consequence of circumstances over which they can have had no controul, and which in fact arose before themselves had done good or evil; it will hardly be said that excommunication cannot place men in a less favourable condition, nor absolution in a better, in these respects, simply *because* the person sentenced has not incurred [them] through his own conduct. Let these sentences be supposed to be administered in some cases by the merest caprice, or in the most complete ignorance, and still they will not, as far as we can see, have been more capricious, or less regulated by the merits of

the parties, than are those causes, which bring one man into the world under the guardianship of heathen parents, and another of Christian; which doom one to be educated in vice, and scarcely leave him a chance of escaping it, while they surround another from his very birth with such examples of holiness, that only great perversity can prevent his being enlightened by them. If it be said, that these causes are retained by God in His own hands, and that He sways them, unobserved by us, in such a manner as to exclude injustice; may it not be said with equal probability, that the caprices of men are in His hands, and that He makes them unconscious instruments of His will? But this is mere conjecture; the fact is all we are concerned with at present: and the fact is, that God does, in a great variety of ways, make the condition of some men more advantageous than that of others, with regard to raising themselves high in His favour both here and hereafter, without our being able to trace any connexion between these advantages and the merits of the parties; so that to consider excommunication and absolution as among these ways, is but to consider them of a piece with what we know to be consistent with God's justice.

It will perhaps occur to some persons, that it is pressing matters too far, to speak of the accidents of birth and education as affecting men's welfare in the next world: for that at the last day all these things will be taken into consideration, and that each will be accepted "according to that he had,

not according to that he had not." Now it is undoubtedly true that these things will be taken into consideration, and merciful allowance made accordingly : indeed, were this not true, the moral and religious condition of the world would be too shocking to be contemplated. And yet, as is remarked by the great Bishop Butler, "this doth not by any means imply that all persons' condition here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity." If it is a reasonable thing to thank God that we were born in a Christian land, and of pious parents, it cannot be reasonable to regard these as only nominal advantages ; and he who should explain them away or reduce them to nothing, would go far towards proving that Christ might as well have not died for us.

Thus much then we learn from the Light of Nature respecting the truth of the proposition that human desert is the only rule by which a just God can dispense His favours. How far these inferences are confirmed in Scripture, the following declaration of St. Paul will enable us to judge : "The children," that is, Jacob and Esau, "being not yet born, neither having done good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth ; it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger, (as it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.) What shall we say then ? Is there unrighteousness with God ? God forbid. For He saith unto Moses, I will have mercy on whom I

will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." And again, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it, Why hast Thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour?"

Such is the language of Scripture; it is also, as has been seen, the language of Experience; nor is there any thing in it irreconcilable with Reason and our natural notions of justice, as has been pointed out by the great and wise Prelate above quoted.

"It is not," says Bishop Butler, "unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of Nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed Him also to place creatures of like kinds in different situations; and that the same principle which disposed Him to make creatures of different moral capacities, disposed Him also to place creatures of like moral capacities in different religious situations; and even the same creatures in different periods of their being."

To conclude then:—it has, I think, been shown,
 1. That excommunication and absolution, though not amounting, either the one to damnation, or the other to salvation, may nevertheless be, the one a real spiritual blessing, and the other a real spiritual calamity: 2. That, though these

sentences should be supposed to have no effects when passed undeservedly, still their effects may be real, when passed deservedly : 3. That, though they are supposed to take effect in all cases, whether deserved or undeserved, still there is nothing in this inconsistent either with what we know from Experience of God's natural providence, nor from Revelation of His extraordinary providence, nor with any sound notions of natural justice.

§ 4. *The Miracle of the Eucharist not contradicted by the Senses or by Reason.*

Protestants, in their zeal to refute the Roman Catholic doctrine of Transubstantiation, have not been contented with arguments against it from Scripture, which supplies us with its proper refutation, but have indulged in appeals to the Senses and to the supposed suggestions of Reason. Such appeals are certainly redundant, and they appear to me to be weak, but as they carry satisfaction to some minds, I should never have noticed them, if Transubstantiation was the only doctrine they were urged against. It appears, however, that they do not rest here, but interfere with the Scriptural Miracle of the Eucharist, just as much as with the unscriptural glosses that have been put upon it.

1. It is said that the Eucharistic bread and wine cannot be supposed to become that very Body of Christ which was broken for us, and that very Blood of the New Testament which was shed for

us, without supposing that the Body and Blood of Christ are at the same time present in two places, in Heaven and on the Altar; and that this is a contradiction.

Now I am convinced that upon serious reflection faithful Christians will admit it to be no contradiction. As to the sense in which it is true to say, the Body and Blood of Christ are present on the Altar, many persons may entertain doubts about it; but that there is any contradiction in supposing the very Body of Christ, which is in Heaven, to be also on the Altar, they will, I think, see to be an ignorant prejudice¹.

For, it must be recollected, that, where the bread is said to be the very Body of Christ which was broken for us, and the cup the very Blood that was shed for us, it is meant that they are the same in that sense in which our bodies after the Resurrec-

¹ [If this statement appear to any one startling, from its seeming contrariety to the Rubric of our Church about kneeling at the Holy Communion, he may consider, 1. Whether the use of the word Natural in that Rubric does not go far to do away the contradiction. The Church of England clearly intended to deny any *gross corporal* presence, such as is implied in the coarse questions frequently debated in connexion with Transubstantiation. In short, she affirms a *spiritual* Presence, and the Author affirms the presence of a spiritual Body. 2. In so far as there is any contradiction, it is not on a sacred Truth, but in a point of Philosophy: on a Premiss, not on a Conclusion: on such a matter, that we may fairly doubt the accuracy of the reasoning on which the revisers of the Liturgy proceeded, without impugning their statement as contrary to the Word of God.]

tion will be the same with our present bodies. The same undoubtedly will be those bodies which shall rise from the grave with those which descend into it ; the same in the strictest sense ; the same in that very sense in which they can alone now be said to be the same that they were formed in the womb. But “ It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption ; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory ; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power ; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.” So then the very same Body of Christ which was broken for us, though then a natural Body, is now a spiritual Body. But surely it needs but little reflection to suggest to us, that of the nature of spiritual bodies we know little indeed, either with regard to their relation to place, or to the manner of their union with the soul. In what sense they can be said to be present any where we know not ; nor in what their identity consists ; nor how new matter can become part of them, nor old matter be detached from them. Of these things in regard to our natural bodies we have very indistinct conceptions ; much less distinct than most persons seem aware of. But to argue, as if we had distinct conceptions of them in the case of spiritual bodies, is very wild and random indeed. We do not know where Heaven is, or how Christ’s body can be said to be in one place rather than in another ; or in how many places it may be at once ; or how any portion of matter can become part of Christ’s Body, or cease to be so ; or how its appear-

ance would be affected by the change. In fact, our whole notions on the subject, if we have any, must be mere guess-work ; and are as much more likely to be wrong than right, as any guess we may make about history or science, is more likely to prove a fancy than a fact. So that to set aside the positive proof, whatever it may be, of the Miracle of the Eucharist, on the ground that it contradicts some one or other of these guess-work notions, is like refuting Newton's system out of the theories of the Schoolmen.

2. This Miracle is supposed to be in some especial manner contradictory to the experience of the Senses. So much so, that many who regard Mr. Hume's argument on the general question of Miracles as an atheistical sophism, yet consider a particular modification of it to be in this instance both applicable and pious.

Mr. Hume argued that the Experience, which teaches us to rely under certain circumstances on the accuracy of human testimony, is more liable to error than the Experience which teaches us that the course of nature is uniform : and therefore that, when human testimony otherwise credible is brought forward to prove that the course of nature is not uniform, it is less difficult to suppose the testimony erroneous than the thing testified true. So too I have heard serious persons argue that were the Miracle of the Eucharist revealed in Scripture so distinctly as not to admit of evasion, they would rather disbelieve their eyesight which told them

the existence of the text than the concurrent testimony of two senses which prove that no change takes place in the bread and wine¹ ; or, as some with less reverence express themselves, that they would rather believe the Bible false than the Miracle true.

This method of arguing does not seem becoming in the professed followers of Him who has said, "Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." But what I now object against it, is not so much its unbecoming character as [the confusion of thought which it seems to indicate.]

If persons who argue thus would only bear in mind that the Miracle of the Eucharist professes to be a double miracle, the [making] of the Body and Blood of Christ for our spiritual food, and the preservation of the sensible bread and wine to exercise our faith, they would perceive that what their senses tell them exactly accords with the professed character of the Miracle. It is true they see and taste nothing but bread and wine ; but these are the only things that they would see and taste, if the double miracle took place. So that their argument runs thus : the Miracle of the Eucharist cannot take place, *because* our senses tell us exactly what they would tell us if it did take place ; the thing cannot be true, *because*, as far as appearances go, it seems to be true. This is really the very

¹ [What they say is rather, that they cannot do more than *doubt*, when both facts seem to come alike through the same sense. And they only refer it to Transubstantiation.]

best they can make of it, unless they are prepared to say that God cannot perform a double miracle¹.

To convince serious persons with how little favour God is likely to regard this particular species of scepticism, it may be useful to remind them of a double miracle recorded most unequivocally in Scripture, which was as completely concealed from the senses of the person for whose instruction it was performed as the Miracle of the Eucharist is from our senses, and which he was likely to have paid a heavy penalty for disregarding.

The ass on which Balaam rode, stood still contrary to her wont in an apparently unobstructed road : she was his ass on which he had ridden ever since it was his unto that day, and was never wont to do so with him. This, it seems, ought to have convinced Balaam, taking into consideration the warning he had received from God, that some cause miraculous, though invisible, was operating to prevent his progress. Balaam, however, looked before him, and he saw nothing but a clear path among vineyards, with a wall on this side and a wall on that side. "Shall I not," said he, "believe the

¹ [Perhaps it will be urged that there does seem an antecedent improbability in any alleged fact, which undermines our reliance upon our senses. Considering how entirely our reliance is built upon instinct and prejudice not on reason, it might appear that God would not so appoint things as to bring objections to a medium of knowledge which we are accustomed to receive implicitly as His own impression upon our minds. To this it may be replied that the separate senses themselves sometimes contradict each other.]

evidence of my senses? Am I to rely on dreams that I had last night, and on the past faithfulness of this animal rather than trust what I see with my own eyes?" Balaam's was truly a Protestant spirit, and his anger was kindled, and he smote the ass with a staff. Yet Balaam had little reason thus to rely on his senses: and God made little allowance for his doing so: and unless the faithfulness of his ass had prevented his following his own will, there was one in the way who surely would have slain him and left her alive. "The Lord opened the eyes of Balaam, and he saw the Angel of the Lord standing in the way, and his sword drawn in his hand." The Angel of the Lord was as really standing in the way, before Balaam saw him, as afterwards; and the bread and wine may become as really the Body and Blood of Christ, though we perceive it not, as though we perceived it¹. Balaam's disbelief deserved that the Angel of the Lord should slay him: of how much sorer punishment shall we be thought worthy, if it proves that we have trodden underfoot the Son of God!

I conclude then that the arguments against the Miracle of the Eucharist, whether drawn from Reason or the Senses, are far from infallible, and that God will make but little allowance for them should they in the end prove false.

¹ [These reflections throw light upon St. Paul's words about "eating and drinking judgment to one's self" as "not *discerning* the Lord's Body."]

§ 5. *The claims of the Christian Priesthood not inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity.*

But further, it is said, that though the claims of the Christian Priesthood to excommunicate, absolve, and perform the Miracle of the Eucharist, should be granted to be neither absurd in themselves, nor inconsistent with what we know of God's goodness, still they would be inadmissible on the ground of their repugnance to the tenor and spirit of Christianity: for that in the New Testament we are expressly directed to seek God's grace and favour, not through Ordinances¹, but [through] dispositions of our own heart; through mercy, and not sacrifice; not through meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.

Now with respect to this argument, it deserves, in the first place, to be especially noticed, that whatever inference can be drawn from it against the efficacy of Ordinances under the New Covenant is full as applicable to the Old; for that none of the expressions, in which our Lord and His Apostles appear to disparage Ordinances, and lay exclusive stress upon tempers, are clearer and stronger than expressions of a similar import in the writings of Moses and the Prophets.

For instance, the following are the terms in which the *Ordinance of Circumcision* is spoken of in the Old Testament. "Circumcise the foreskin

¹ [i. e. through positive acts.]

of your heart, and be no more stiffnecked. For the Lord your God....regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward." Deut. x. 16.

"Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, when I will punish all the circumcised with the uncircumcised. Egypt and Judah and Edom and the children of Ammon and Moab....for all these nations are uncircumcised, and all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart." Jer. ix. 25.

Again, the privilege of being Sons of Abraham is spoken of thus: "Doubtless Thou art our Father, though Abraham be ignorant of us, and Israel acknowledge us not." Is. lxiii. 16. That is, the Israelites were blessed as God's children, not as Abraham's; and on the other hand with regard to the bad, "I will move them to jealousy with those that are not a people; I will provoke them to anger with a foolish nation." Deut. xxxii. 21.

[Next] it is to be observed, that the claims of the Christian Priesthood, setting them at the very highest, do not direct us to look for grace through Ordinances, in any different sense from that in which all the great doctrines of Christianity direct us to do so.

No one pretends that the Ordinances of Absolution, Benediction, and the Sacraments, however rightly performed, are the least benefit except to those who sincerely strive after a Christian frame of mind; but that to strive after such a frame of mind is not of itself sufficient without Ordinances,

every leading doctrine of Christianity proves, unless explained on Socinian principles.

The death of Jesus Christ upon the cross was an Ordinance, and yet was necessary to our salvation ; as our faith is necessary to it. The Priesthood of Jesus Christ in Heaven is an Ordinance, and yet is necessary to obtaining God's favour for us ; as our prayers are necessary to it. His ascent into Heaven was an Ordinance, and without it the Comforter would not have come unto us, however strongly we might have felt the need of spiritual assistance, and however elevated might have been our aspirations after it. Men may repent ever so heartily, believe ever so faithfully, pray ever so earnestly, yet it will not be these dispositions that will save them in the last great day, but an Ordinance, the celestial Absolution pronounced in these words, "Come, ye blessed of My Father."

Such being the case then, it is plainly false to speak of the spirit of Christianity, as if it represented human dispositions as sufficient to procure God's graces. That suitable dispositions are indispensably requisite towards this end, no one doubts ; but that they are of themselves sufficient, is inconsistent alike with every leading doctrine of Christianity ; with the necessity of Christ's death upon the Cross, with the effects ascribed to His ascent into Heaven, with His Eternal Priesthood, and with the office ascribed to Him as Judge at the last day.

It will be said¹, perhaps, that it is a very different thing to acknowledge the necessity of what Christ has done for us, and to believe that any thing further has been left for men to do for us : and so undoubtedly it is ; the one belief may be true, and the other false : but the question here is, whether the one proves the other to be false ; whether the spirit and tenor of Christianity, which insists throughout on the insufficiency of human dispositions, [are] irreconcilable with the claims of the Christian Priesthood, simply because these insist on the necessity of something else besides such dispositions.

But again another ground is taken ; it is objected that the supposed necessity of an earthly Priesthood implies insufficiency in what has been effected for us by Christ. Now here it is obvious to answer, that this objection assumes the institution of this earthly Priesthood to be no part of what was effected for us by Christ, which is the very point under dispute. If the earthly Priesthood can be shown not to have been set up by Christ, no reasonable man will maintain its necessity ; but, on the other hand, if it has been set up by Him, it is part of what He has effected for us, just as much as the descent of the promised Comforter is part of this ; and to object to it as implying insufficiency in the other parts of what Christ has effected for us, is no better argument than it would be to object to the doctrine of spiritual assistance, for the same reason.

¹ [The passages between asterisks are erased in the original.]

*The fact is, that throughout Scripture the scheme for effecting man's salvation is represented as consisting of many parts, any one of which may, for aught we can see, be as indispensably necessary as any other: to such a degree that no wise man will suppose he sees the full meaning of any one part of it, or all its relations to other parts; but will be contented to believe whatever appears to be revealed, without requiring that it should accord with his deductions from other revelations.

If indeed any principle has certainly been laid down in one part of Revelation, no fact that militates against it can possibly have been revealed in any other part, and no appearances of such a revelation can be trusted. But if the principle in question is merely a human deduction from one class of revealed facts, then, unless it accords with every other revealed fact, it must be delusion; and the slightest appearance that any fact not in accordance with it has been revealed, should teach us to distrust it. In all cases, the greatest possible distinction must be observed between human theories respecting the spirit of Christianity, and revealed declarations about it. For as in physical science nothing has so much obstructed men's progress, as the disposition to theorize on insufficient data, and then to make these theories the test of facts, instead of trying them by facts; so the same observation seems to extend to religion with still greater force, though mankind are not so ready to admit of it. Christianity, as well as Natural Philosophy, is a

system of facts, and, as such, can only be made known to us either by Experience or Testimony : Experience is out of the question, so that Testimony is the only evidence of which the case admits. And hence, in the case of Christianity to disregard Testimony, is exactly the same solecism as it is to disregard experiment in Natural Philosophy : in either case it is to disregard the only evidence which can by any possibility be afforded us. Neither is it in any degree more reasonable, to disbelieve some facts which appear to be revealed, because they do not accord with theories which we have formed, about other facts admitted to be revealed, than it would be to discredit any new discovery of Science, because it proved that we had drawn wrong inferences from former discoveries.*

§ 6. *The proof of the Ecclesiastical System not inadequate because doubtful.*

The Ecclesiastical System, founded on a belief in the Apostolical Priesthood, has not been as explicitly revealed as many other parts of Christianity. In the Holy Scriptures it is only intimated, not inculcated ; and were it not from the reflected light thrown on these intimations, by our knowledge how they were interpreted in the Primitive Church, probably we should have attained only to a partial knowledge of their drift. This is admitted by all Churchmen, and this admission their opponents turn into a positive argument against them, on the

assumption, that were the Ecclesiastical System true, it would not be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence.

The process, by which doubtful proof is thus turned into refutation, is founded on the two following canons :—

1. That God cannot be believed to have made any revelation to man, without causing it to be embodied in writing by inspired persons.

2. That in the writings of inspired persons, nothing can have been intended to be revealed, except what is fully, clearly, and unequivocally revealed, so that he who runs may read. And that whatever besides may be elicited from these writings in the way of intimation and allusion, interesting though it may be to the Theologian, can constitute no part of what it was God's purpose to communicate.

Now, if these two canons are admitted, the Ecclesiastical System, and perhaps other parts of Christianity, must fall to the ground. I believe, however, that they will not be found to stand the test of examination. For,

1. Neither of them are self-evident axioms, nor yet deducible from any principles of mere Reason : as will be admitted by all who acquiesce in the following remarks of Bishop Butler :—

“ We are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected God would give mankind by Revelation, on the supposition of His affording one ; or how far, or in what way, He

would interpose miraculously, to qualify them to whom He should originally make the revelation for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live; and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful; or whether all who should have any degree of instruction from it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same; or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we are not in any sort able to judge, whether it were to have been expected that the revelation should have been committed to writing, or left to be handed down, and consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such a time as they are permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as they will.

“But it may be said ‘that a revelation, in some of the above mentioned circumstances, one for instance which was not committed to writing, and thus secured against danger of corruption, would not have answered its purpose.’ I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the purposes which it has now answered, and in the same degree; but it would have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which of these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with His general government, we could not have determined beforehand.

“ Now, since it has been shown that we have no principles of Reason, upon which to judge beforehand, how it were to have been expected revelation should have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, in any of the fore-mentioned respects ; it must be quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them, against its being left in one way rather than another : for this would be to object against things upon account of their being different from expectations which have been shown to be without reason.”

Thus, according to Bishop Butler, the Almighty, in revealing to us any part of His will in writing, has done more than we had any reason to expect ; and consequently He may have left¹ many parts of it unrevealed in writing, for aught Reason tells us to the contrary. It is consistent with all we know of God's attributes, to have revealed His will to man only orally, and left it to be handed down only by Tradition : and consequently the supposition, that He may have left some parts of it to be thus handed down, cannot be inconsistent with any thing we know of them. And hence the first of the two canons under consideration, and *à fortiori* the second, are certainly not axioms, nor yet deducible from any principles of mere Reason.

2. Before entering into the inquiry, whether these canons can be proved from Scripture, it is

¹ [That is, He *may* have done so, as far as all *antecedent* reasoning tells us, though *in fact* He has not so left any doctrine necessary to salvation.]

desirable to remind the inquirer, that all other considerations, besides the real sense of Scripture, must be laid aside *bonâ fide*. He must not carry in his mind a lurking prepossession in favour of one view rather than another: he must not say to himself that, though he cannot answer Bishop Butler's argument, still he is sure there is a fallacy somewhere, and in this state of mind search Scripture for a confirmation of what he already believes: or at least, if he does this, it may be his wisest way to trust prejudice entirely, since he trusts it so much; without being at the pains to cheat himself with a mock inquiry.

The proposition to be proved is, "that God cannot be believed to have made any revelation to man, without causing it to be embodied in writing by some inspired person." The arguments by which it is commonly supported are as follows:

(1.) That many corrupt Traditions existed among the Jews in the time of our Lord: and that He rebuked them for making use of these in order to explain away the true meaning of the Law. (St. Matt. xv. 3. [St Mark] vi. 9.)

(2.) That our Lord directed the Jews to search the Scriptures of the Old Testament, for that they testified of Him. (St. John v. 39.)

(3.) That the Jews of Berœa were commended by St. [Luke] as more noble than those of Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures (that is, the Old

Testament) daily, whether those things were so. (Acts xvii. 11.)

(4.) That St. Paul mentions among the advantages which Timothy had through a religious education, "that of a child he had known the Holy Scriptures" (the Old Testament) "which were able to make him wise unto salvation, through Faith which was in Christ Jesus;" (2 Tim. iii. 15, 16.) adding also that "all Scripture" (that is, the Old Testament) "is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, throughly furnished unto all good works."

(5.) That St. Luke assigns as the reason why he wrote his Gospel, that he wished his friend Theophilus "to know the certainty of those things wherein he had been instructed." (St. Luke i. 4.)

(6.) That the Gospel of St. John was written that those to whom it was addressed "might believe that Jesus is the Christ....and that believing they might have life through His name." (St. John xx. 31.)

The two last arguments, though gravely brought forward by Bishop Burnet, will not, I suppose, be considered to require examination; but the others are still appealed to with confidence, as proving that Scripture contains a full, clear, unequivocal declaration of the whole counsel of God, as far as it is of importance to man. It is said that the manner in which the Old Testament is referred to in the above cited texts, is a proof that previous to

our Lord's coming God had made no unwritten revelations, and therefore that it cannot be conceived He would make any unwritten revelations afterwards; but that, as all that had been revealed formerly was contained in the Old Testament, so, when the canon of the New was complete, it must have contained whatever was revealed subsequently. And then are added several high-sounding phrases about "blasphemous additions to the word of God," and about daring "to accept human traditions as the interpreters of the divine will," &c. &c.; the relevance and good feeling of which, as applied to the doctrines of the primitive Church and the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, may perhaps be illustrated in the following parallel.

Suppose then that a son, on coming of age, had strong representations made to him by his father's friends, who had attended his death-bed, that he had on that occasion expressed a wish concerning the distribution of his property, which was not formally embodied in his will: suppose farther, that on the son's refusing to attend to such representations, he assigned the following reasons for his conduct; viz. "That on a careful examination of his father's will, he had found in one of the codicils last appended to it, certain expressions proving to him that his father, up to the time he wrote it, had given no express directions concerning the distribution of his property, except those contained in the former codicils; whence it was clear to him that his father must have embodied all his subsequent

directions in that and the subsequent codicils : and that, for his part, such was his reverence for the sacred memory of his parent, that he did not dare to take any thing but his own words as interpreters of his wishes.

“Can I allow myself,” suppose him to say, “so to trifle with the hallowed obligations of filial duty, as to put the vague impression of persons connected with me by no ties of blood, on a level with the recorded commands of my nearest relative ? him to whom I owe every thing : not my property only, but also my very existence ? No : I will adhere close to the very letter of the Will. I will add nothing to it. Nor will I believe or do or sacrifice any thing, in deference to imagined recommendations of my Father, without the most indisputable evidence¹.”

Now I put it to any one whether this would pass, even in the world, for an effusion of sense or piety ? and, if not, whether there is more sense or more piety in setting at nought the friends and successors of the Apostles, because Jesus Christ has said to the Jews, “Search the Scriptures, for they testify of Me ?” or because St. [Luke] praised the Bereans for “searching the Scriptures daily, whether these things were so ?”

¹ [To give this argument its full force, it ought perhaps to be further supposed, that the unwritten directions tended on the whole to self-denial and self-sacrifice on the son's part ; that they increased the call for circumspection, and abridged his right to do as he pleased with the property.]

But farther it must be remembered that the texts hitherto adduced, whatever weight may be thought due to them, contain only an *ex parte* view of the case. Whatever weight is due to them taken by themselves, they have to be balanced against texts of an opposite tendency; and perhaps it may be thought on consideration that these other texts come much closer to the point, bearing as they do directly on the Apostolic manner of teaching, and seeming to indicate that the Apostles did not write all they taught¹, but trusted some things to the fidelity of their successors.

The texts in question are as follows.

1 Cor. xi. 2. "I praise you, brethren, that you remember me in all things, and keep the ordinances, [traditions] (*κατέχετε τὰς παραδόσεις*) as I delivered them to you."

2 Thess. ii. 15. "Brethren, stand fast, and hold the traditions (*κρατεῖτε τὰς παραδόσεις*) which ye have been taught, whether by word or our epistle."

2 Tim. ii. 2. "The things that thou hast heard of me among many witnesses, the same commit thou to faithful men, who shall be able to teach others also."

With these texts the inquiry seems naturally to conclude; as it is not perhaps overstating the matter to say, that they appear decisive. An hypothesis has however been started to escape the obvious

¹ [i. e. not all as far as *developments* are concerned, or as far as *explanations* of the words they use.]

inference from them, which it may be worth considering, if only to point out that it is a mere hypothesis, and that, till proved itself, it can prove nothing else. It is said that, though at the time St. Paul wrote the Epistles, from which the above texts are quoted, much of the knowledge of each Church rested on oral as well as written communications; still, that when the Canon of Scripture was concluded, and the whole of it made known to every Church, then the deficiency, for the temporary supply of which oral instruction had been adopted, was at an end; for that each Church found, in the aggregate of what had been written to the other Churches, a thorough written exposition of every fact, doctrine, precept, intimation, which they had themselves received hitherto on Tradition. Now this hypothesis would be very useful and pious, if it was an ascertained fact that the Apostles taught nothing but what is contained at full length in the Scriptures, as it would do away with the seeming inconsistency between *this fact* and the texts above cited. But till this fact is ascertained, there is no inconsistency to be done away with, and therefore no need of an hypothesis. Indeed it may truly be called a gratuitous hypothesis, nor can any imaginable use be made of it, except to prove the ingenuity of its deviser.

Enough perhaps has now been said on the Canon so frequently insisted on, "that God cannot be believed to have made any revelation to man, without causing it to be embodied in the writings of

inspired persons." And every argument, which has been urged against this Canon will apply to the other *à fortiori*. It is however possible, that many serious Christians, though acquiescing to a certain extent in the arguments which have been brought forward, may feel at first unable to reconcile themselves to the conclusion. That we should be left in any kind of doubt on so important a subject as the will of God, and the manner in which to serve Him, may seem at first sight a shocking and unsettling thought, calculated to awaken a general scepticism, and to reduce religion to a calculation of chances.

Now all persons, on whom this presses as a difficulty, will do well to consult Bishop Butler (Anal. part. ii. c. 6), where many important trains of thought are suggested that may well tend to quiet their minds. These thoughts are indeed cast by Bishop Butler in a mould more immediately suited to the doubts of a Deist than a Christian: but by very slight alterations here and there of words obviously immaterial to the argument, it will be found that they apply with equal force, and carry equal satisfaction, to those who doubt how much they shall accept for revelation, as to those who doubt about accepting any at all. As a specimen of the way in which such application may be made, I shall extract one or two of this great Bishop's reflections, making the few required substitutions. On reference to the original it will easily be seen, whether any force has been put on the sentiments

of the author ; and persons interested in the subject may perhaps be led to make a similar use of other parts of that remarkable volume.

“ It appears¹ to be a thing evident, though not much attended to, that, if on consideration of any professed revelation of God’s will, the evidence of it should seem to some persons doubtful, in the highest supposable degree, even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them under very serious obligations. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether one who was most certainly his best well-wisher, and most thoroughly knew his interest, did not very earnestly wish him to adopt some particular course of conduct, though for some reason or other he forbore to press it explicitly : suppose farther, that he was under obligations to this person of the deepest kind : no one who had any sense of gratitude or prudence could possibly consider himself in the same situation, with regard to choosing or avoiding such a course of conduct, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just to say that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say that the situations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty, in point of gratitude or prudence, as if he were certain that his wise and excellent friend had no such wish. And thus, though the evidence, that it is God’s will we should act in a particular way, should be little more than that we are given to see it to be supposable and credible,

¹ vid. Butler’s Anal. ii. 6.

this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical apprehension that it may be true: and the apprehension, that such and such things may be the will of God, does as really lay men under obligations, as a full conviction that they are so. Such apprehension ought to turn men's eyes to every degree of new light which may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce them to refrain, in the meantime, from every thought or act which may perhaps turn out in the end to have been an offence against God. Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all profane levity; for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to treat with the greatest reverence a matter on which such great things depend.

“Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence of some parts of religion is involved, may make even the principal part of some persons' trial. For, as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives to injustice or unrestrained pleasure, or to live in the neglect of religion from that frame of mind, which renders many persons almost without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of their senses; so there are other persons without this shallowness of temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future, who not only see, but have a general practical feeling, that what is to come will be present, and that things are not less real for not being objects of sense; and who, from

their natural constitution of body and temper, and from their external condition, may have but small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the common course of life. Now, when these latter persons have a distinct full conviction of the truth of any part of religion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will do constant violence to their own minds ; and so much of religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise, in a higher degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they should give some farther manifestation what is their moral character, to the creation of God, than such an easy practice of it would be. Thus, in the great variety of religious situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence of some parts of religion is involved ; and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will behave under and with respect to these difficulties.”

Such considerations, if well weighed, will prove to serious persons, that doubtful evidence on the subject of religion, far from being a just cause of distress and perplexity, affords us the best opportunities for showing our real love towards God, and

our desire to please Him : and that, such being the case, we should thankfully treasure up even the remotest hints that are afforded us respecting the Divine will, as loving children would the intimations of a departed parent : looking anxiously for them wherever they are to be found, and being more ready, a hundred times over, to make personal sacrifices in deference to an imagined wish, than in any case to neglect a real one.

CHAPTER IV.

[THE INFLUENCE OF PREJUDICE] IN THE INTER- PRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.

¹ SOME people say to themselves, "We will not be prejudiced, we will read and think and interpret for ourselves, by common sense, and not according to the ingenious pedantry of commentators," &c. Such people are under a great delusion. Let them try ever so much, they neither think for themselves nor interpret for themselves. They are in a groove, and cannot get out of it. Their notions, their feelings, their associations, are not their own. They have picked them up from others, or from opposing others. Every idea of theirs is different from what it would have been, if they had been brought up in other times or in other society. The views of their times and their society are most dogmatical commentators, and will intrude at every instant on unprejudiced thought, unperceived and unsuspected. What they have to choose between is, whether they will resign themselves to this commentator, or compare its dogmata with those of other commentators, whose times and whose society have been different.

¹ [The rough notes which follow in smaller type are all that remains of what it was intended to introduce into this chapter. They appear to have been written later than the rest of the Essay.]

Do they mean to say that if a plain, simple, uninstructed heathen took up the Bible, he would think it such a very plain book, so completely within the reach of his understanding? would it not be a mass of mystery to him from beginning to end? and why so? because he would not be familiar with hundreds of words and phrases, with which, from hearing them very often, the same class of understandings are now familiar, e. g. "Two or three gathered together." Now this very familiarity is a prejudice, a grotesque prejudice. It is either accompanied with ideas, or a substitute for them. If the former, the ideas are a prejudice, imbibed unconsciously, and therefore at random; from all kinds of sources which chance, not our own wisdom, has selected for us.

A man reads over the verse, "Whatsoever ye bind," &c¹. and goes on to the next as if his eyes had met nothing to arrest them. He sees nothing in it remarkable; all there is quite plain; it is merely an Orientalism, or a Hebraism, or a strong mode of speaking, to assure faithful Christians of His [Christ's] support. What does he know of Orientalisms or Hebraisms? or has he ever in his own experience encountered such strong modes of speaking? If a friend had said to him "Whatever debts you contract, I will pay," and he had contracted debts in the assurance, would he be well contented with the explanation that nothing more was meant than a strong expression of good will? No, these strong modes of speaking are not the sort of thing men meet with themselves, and would never come into their heads but by being put in. Somebody (they forget who) once (they forget when) told them this was

¹ [It must be recollected that our Church, instead of confining the promise to the Apostles, interprets the corresponding text of the gifts of her Priests, at their Ordination.]

a strong mode of speech. They never took the trouble to ask whether he was right or wrong; they have altogether forgotten the circumstance; but the explanation floats before their mind, and they think it the suggestion of their own unbiassed common sense.

People talk a great deal about being Bible Christians, as if it was a fine and praiseworthy thing to have rejected all sources of instruction but the Bible; to have gone at once to the fountain head, to have been taught only by God's word, not by man's, &c. What would these good people say to a sky astronomer? The sky is the fountain-head of all astronomical knowledge; nothing can be known about astronomy except what is seen there. There it shines in gold and azure; every syllable of the system of Newton is there, and it is only because there that it is true. When these good people can read the system of Newton in the sky, and think a man's knowledge of astronomy better and more complete because he is a sky astronomer, and has read and heard nothing else on the subject except the book of the heavens, then they may with more consistency talk about Bible Christians....

CHAPTER V.

REVERENCE NOT DANGEROUS [IN THE INTER- PRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.]

To hear some persons talk, one would suppose that a propensity to overrate the sacredness of sacred things is among the besetting frailties of the human heart, a temptation against which we ought to be as watchfully jealous as against the lust of the flesh, or the lust of the eyes, or the pride of life. Nay, so sensitively alive are many to their danger on this quarter, that on no occasion do they feel called on to sift evidence so minutely, or to demand such unequivocal and demonstrative proof, as in order to satisfy themselves that they can with a safe conscience acknowledge a debt of veneration.

Of the many subjects on which this scrupulousness has exercised itself, none, perhaps, have attracted a larger share of it than the Apostolical Ministry, and the Eucharistic Bread and Wine after consecration.

To think more of these sacred things than the Scriptures actually force us to think, to believe any thing about them which by any interpretation we

can avoid believing, seems to such persons an actual sin : on the sceptical side they see nothing but safety, on the credulous side nothing but danger. Thus, though they know that the 6th chapter of St. John is the only place in the Bible where the Body and Blood of Christ is [are] mentioned, except the four places which record the institution of the Eucharist, yet since it is possible that in this one place it may be used in a different sense from [that in] which it is used in the other four, they at once assume that it is so. Though they know that *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν* are the most natural words for our Lord to have used if He meant to say, "Sacrifice this in remembrance of Me," yet since it is possible He may have meant no more by them than "Do this in remembrance of Me," they take for granted that He meant the latter and not the former. They know that some of the Evangelists describe our Lord's words over the elements as *εὐλογία* [blessing]; but since others describe them as *εὐχαριστία* [thanksgiving] they assume that *εὐλογία* can mean no more in this place than the *εὐχαριστία*. They know that our Lord's remarkable promises, "Where two or three are gathered together in My Name, there am I in the midst of them," and "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world," were as a fact spoken to the Twelve, when apart from the other disciples; yet since they are sense, if understood as promises to all Christians, they assume that they certainly were made to all Christians equally. They know that our Lord said

to the Twelve, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven," and "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted;" but having made a paraphrase of these words which explains away their obvious meaning, they take this as a proof that the obvious meaning is false. They know that Jesus Christ communicated the Holy Ghost to His Apostles by breathing on them, and they to their successors by the imposition of hands, commissioning these successors to lay hands likewise themselves on persons to succeed them; but since it is no where expressly stated that this last imposition of hands was to convey onwards the precious gift, they conclude from hence that it did not.

In this manner the ancient belief of the Church, respecting the Sacraments and the Priesthood, is conceived to be refuted. It is proved that this belief is not forced upon us by Scripture; that the texts which seem to imply it, do not necessarily imply it: and hence it is inferred that they certainly do not imply it; that it is not alluded to in Scripture; and is therefore a foolish, if not criminal superstition.

Persons who think in this manner will do well to recollect, that there are in the Bible the following words, "Thomas, because thou hast seen Me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." These words certainly do not apply directly either to the Sacred Elements or the Priesthood; primarily they refer to our Lord's resurrection, not to the institutions which are the

standing monuments of it ; yet they are not the words of one who would be exceedingly displeased at our accepting even these on evidence short of demonstration. "Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed,"—this declaration [humanly speaking] is strangely unguarded, if a generous unsuspecting reverence for all that claims to be from Him, is indeed so dangerous a temper : nor do I think that man's condition an unenviable one, who at the last day shall plead as validly for all his errors, as this text will plead for those of a ready Faith.

If at that day it shall indeed prove true, that Sacerdotal Benedictions and Absolutions, and the mysterious Consecration of the Bread and Wine, are nothing more than many a zealous Protestant would reduce them to ; and the reverence of those who have bowed to them as Christ's ordinances, shall thus turn out to have been superfluous ; is it to be thought that the fear to reject what might possibly be from the Lord, will prove no excuse for having accepted what was not ? that the temper which has in these instances been led astray by trusting evidence short of demonstration, will find no grace in His eyes who reproved the incredulity of Thomas ?

And now let us think for a moment on the opposite alternative. It must be remembered that the interpretation of Scripture on which these ordinances are founded, though not certain, is not disproved. It may be the true interpretation :

Absolutions, Benedictions, and Consecrations, may turn out at the last day to have been all that the Primitive Church considered them, and those who have set them at nought may be called on to render account accordingly.

Now in this case it may be worth considering, whether the sin of such persons will wear a very different aspect from the sin of Korah. Many persons will possibly shrink from such a thought as too shocking, or turn from it in disgust, satisfying themselves that it turns on some assumed and unproved analogy between the Christian and Aaronical Priesthood; yet let them consider a little: reference to Jude 11. will convince them that Christians may perish in the gainsaying of Korah, and therefore that the nature of this gainsaying cannot be indifferent to them; nor is it a safe way for them to draw exaggerated pictures of Korah's guiltiness, and thus to satisfy themselves that, because they feel horror at it, they cannot partake it.

Korah's sin has its mitigating circumstances, which ought on no account to be kept out of sight; for it is a kind of mitigation which did not exempt him from punishment, and therefore will not exempt us. 1. The evidence which Korah had before him, that God had reserved the Priesthood to the family of Aaron, was not so conclusive as was afterwards vouchsafed: at the time when he claimed to exercise its functions Aaron's rod had not budded; God's will was not yet fully revealed

upon the subject: indeed it cannot be proved that his sin consisted in any thing worse than in venturing to sacrifice without having received an express commission for doing so¹. 2. Korah was certainly sincere; he was thoroughly convinced of his right to what he claimed. His conduct shows no fear or hesitation; he readily accepts the challenge of Moses, and presents himself at the place appointed, to wait the answer of the Lord. "Moses said unto Korah, Be thou and all thy company before the Lord, thou and they and Aaron to-morrow: and take every man his censer, and put incense in them, and bring ye before the Lord every man his censer, two hundred and fifty censers; thou also and Aaron each of you his censer. And they took every man his censer, and put fire in them, and laid incense thereon, and stood in the door of the tabernacle of the congregation with Moses and Aaron: and Korah gathered all the congregation against them unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation; and the glory of the Lord appeared unto all the congregation."

After weighing these things well, let it be considered whether, at the last day, in the event of there proving to have been such a thing as a Christian Priesthood, the incompleteness of the evidence with which it is revealed, or the sincerity

¹ [But see Numbers iii. 10; iv. 15; from which it would seem that he may have disbelieved Moses and Aaron's report of what God had told them.]

of those who disbelieve it, will make any wide difference between their case and Korah's.

It might be easy to multiply instances from the Old Testament, setting forth how dangerous it is to underrate the sacredness of sacred things; but perhaps this may be sufficient; and in the absence of any single instance setting forth the danger of the opposite course, will warrant us in concluding, that in all cases of doubt, where Scripture leaves the choice between two interpretations, the most reverential side is always the safe side.

* * *

CHAPTER VI.

THE CHURCH SYSTEM UNDER THE APOSTLES, AS EXHIBITED IN SCRIPTURE.

§ 1. *The invisible powers of the Apostles.*

IT has already been pointed out that the powers conveyed to the Apostles, by our Lord's breathing on them, and saying, "Receive the Holy Ghost," were invisible; and this not from any consideration of the nature of those powers, but from the fact that the only visible powers they possessed, were conveyed to them either before or not till afterwards.

I proceed now to inquire what these invisible powers were, by an examination of the grant in which they were conveyed.

The words of the grant are recorded by St. John, (xx. 21.) "And Jesus said unto them, Peace be unto you; as My Father hath sent Me, even so send I you. And when He had said this, He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained."

Now there can hardly be a greater proof, how difficult it is to explain away the obvious meaning of these words, than will be suggested by analysing the explanation commonly adopted for this purpose. It is said that the power here given, was the power to declare authoritatively the terms of salvation; and this, whether in censures, assurances of absolution, or sermons: in which case the words of our Lord must be thus paraphrased: "To whomsoever ye declare the terms of salvation, the terms of salvation are declared;" and since this paraphrase admits only of one or other of the two following interpretations, we shall have no choice but to adopt one or other of them. It either means, "To whomsoever ye declare the terms of salvation, (whether truly or falsely) the terms of salvation are declared;" in which case little seems to be gained by the explanation:—or it means, "To whomsoever ye truly declare them, they will be truly declared¹," a truism so obvious, that it seems scarcely to respond to the expectation naturally raised by the words and act which had preceded it. The declaratory hypothesis, it seems, leaves us in this dilemma: we must either suppose that our Lord authorised the Apostles to declare any terms of salvation they pleased, with the assurance that

¹ [The interpretation commented on really stands thus: "When *ye* declare the terms of salvation, ye shall *really* declare them;" i. e. "*your* word shall be with *authority*. I will make good your words." This is very intelligible in point of *meaning*; but one does not see how it is *gained* from the sacred text.]

these should hold good in the case of the persons to whom they were declared: or we must suppose, that His most solemn and impressive act, and the awful gift which accompanied it, the breath of the Son of God, now no longer mortal, and the communication of the Ever-blessed Spirit, were intended only to confirm an authority which no incredulity could question.

The existence of such an hypothesis as this, and much more the general adoption of it, is a fact which should warn cautious persons against theorising on the passage which has given rise to it. A more prudent, as well as a more pious course, will be to refer to the other parts of Scripture, for such light as may be brought to bear upon it, and when we have done this, to attempt no more.

Now it will be recollected that, in a previous part of our Lord's ministry, He had made a promise to the Apostles, couched in terms so nearly resembling those of this mysterious grant, as to make it at least supposable, that they allude to it, and thus that the grant is the fulfilment of the promise. St. Matthew informs us (xvi. 17,) that on occasion of St. Peter's confessing Jesus to be the Christ, He had answered and said, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in Heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in Heaven."

This promise was afterwards repeated to all the Apostles, (St. Matt. xviii. 18.) and accompanied with other assurances, which seem to give it a more distinct meaning. "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone....But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican. Verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in Heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in Heaven."

Now in this passage many things deserve to be noticed. (1.) We may observe that a Society was to be set up, consisting either of the Apostles alone, or of the Apostles together with others, called the Church, with authority over offenders, and that *such* an authority, as belonged to private men neither separate nor united together. For the offender here was to be admonished, first by a single person; then by *one or two more*, i. e. by an indefinite number, who still had no commission except to admonish; but as soon as he is brought before the Church, there an authority appears, and the offender is to feel its sentence, "Let him be unto thee as a Heathen."

(2.) That this authority was not to belong to the Church, considered *only* as a greater number of Christians, but as it signified particular persons

who had this authority from Christ, for the edification of His Church. For Christ expressly declares in the following verse, that “where two or three are met together in His Name, there is He in the midst of them.” Here is the description of that Church, before which the offender was to be brought, and whose authority Christ promises to support; it is “two or three met together in His Name.” Now the Church was not to have this authority over the offender, considered as a *number*, i. e. two or three; for we see that the offender had been already before *such* a Church; he had been before two or three: and after the neglect of them he was to be brought before another *two or three*, met together *in Christ’s Name*¹. Which is a plain proof that the offender was not to be censured by the Church as it signifies a number of Christians, but as it implies particular persons, acting in the *Name* of Christ, and with *His* authority.

(3.) That the authority here promised to the Church, was a judicial authority, such as to affect and alter the condition of persons censured by it. This is implied in the words, “let him be unto thee as a heathen;” which means, in the most natural and common sense of the words, that they should look upon him no longer as a Christian, or within the kingdom of Heaven, but as reduced to the state of heathens.

¹ [That is, our Lord’s words seem to run as follows: “If he will not hear them, tell it to the Church; now, where two or three are gathered in My name, *there* is the Church, My representative.”]

(4.) That this judicial authority was to affect man's condition, not merely in relation to their fellow-men, but also to God. For it is declared that "whatsoever should be thus bound on earth, should be bound in Heaven¹."

From this analysis of our Lord's second promise, we derive a very intelligible explanation of the first; "And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven;" which is precisely equivalent to the assurance here given, that admission into, or exclusion from this kingdom, should belong solely to the Apostles. The keys of the kingdom of Heaven were to be entrusted to St. Peter and the other Apostles, in such a sense, that no one could enter it without their leave, nor remain in it against their command.

Now it is only to suppose that the kingdom of Heaven was set up for the remission of sins², (a proposition, which I suppose no one will question,) and that the sins of those who are excluded from it are not remitted in the same sense, or to the same extent, as the sins of those that are within it, and then the two promises which have just been com-

¹ These four remarks are taken almost word for word from Law's third Letter to Bishop Hoadly.

² [It would seem that the connexion between the Kingdom of Heaven and the Remission of Sins, was of such a nature as to make the one phrase naturally suggest the other to the Apostles. Comp. St. Matt. iii. 2. with St. Mark i. 4. and St. Luke iii. 3. Part of the baptismal Creed in St. Cyprian's time was, "Credis remissionem peccatorum et vitam æternam per sanctam Catholicam Ecclesiam?" Ep. 69. ed. Fell.]

pared and explained, receive their exact fulfilment in the grant recorded by St. John, "Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained."

As a farther illustration of the nature of this grant, two instances are recorded, in which the Apostle St. Paul appears to have acted on it. St. Paul was not indeed one of those on whom our Lord breathed, and to whom His words, "Receive the Holy Ghost," were in the first instance addressed. But that he was "caught up into the third heaven," and there "heard unspeakable things," that he was "called to be an Apostle, not of men, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ," and that he was "nothing behind the very chiefest of the Apostles," he himself has thought it necessary to assure us. From whence it is manifest, that the power of remitting and retaining sins, whatever it was, must have been among those committed to him: and if it should appear that on any occasion he acted conformably to the view of that power which our Lord's previous promise suggests, we may presume, perhaps, that this was the view he himself took of it, and consequently the true one.

Now, in the case of the incestuous Corinthian, we find St. Paul issuing the following command "to the Church of God which was at Corinth." "I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have *judged* already as though I were present, concerning him that hath done this deed; *In the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ*, when ye are

gathered together, and my spirit with the power of the Lord Jesus, *to deliver such an one unto Satan*, for the destruction" (or, more properly, "mortification") "of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus." Here then we find a Church, i. e. persons gathered together in Christ's Name, under the authority of an Apostle, sitting as judges on an offender, and reducing him from the state of a Christian to the state of a heathen: i. e. using the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven in that very sense in which our Lord's promise suggests that they were intended to be used, and in which they would seem precisely to correspond to the power of remitting and retaining sins. Jesus Christ had said, "Whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained;" this has been shown to be perfectly intelligible, if understood to mean, "Whomsoever ye exclude from the Kingdom of Heaven, they are excluded;" and thus St. Paul himself appears to have understood and acted upon it.

That the expression, "to deliver such an one unto Satan," is only another way of saying, "to exclude such an one from the Kingdom of Heaven," seems to require little proof; though, if any were wanted, it is afforded us in Coloss. i. 13: where being "delivered from the power of darkness" is evidently spoken of as the same thing as being "translated into the Kingdom of God's dear Son." The same phraseology is also to be found in Acts xxvi. 10, where the Christianizing of the Gentiles is called, "turning them from darkness to light, and

from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified.”

To suppose that a person when delivered back to Satan, became subject to any bodily disease, which he was not subject to before he was a Christian, seems gratuitous: the words, *εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός*, do not necessarily imply any thing of the sort; it is well known that in the Greek Testament ἡ σὰρξ means carnal dispositions and feelings; clearly, then, the killing of such feelings may mean no more than mortification, humiliation, &c. and, till the context can be shown to require a different interpretation, this will be the natural one¹. To

¹ [Whitby in loc. says, that the Ancient Fathers “all interpret the words, *εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκός*, of some disease to be inflicted on the offender by Satan.” Vid. also on 1 Tim. i. 20. Johnson (Unbloody Sacrifice, part ii. ch. 4.) says, “Some both of the Ancients of the fourth century and of our modern divines, do suppose that St. Paul...did mean to say, that by virtue of this sentence the Devil” was “enabled to inflict pains and diseases on him: now I have no great reason to contradict these great men in this particular, so it be allowed that these pains and diseases were an additional punishment, over and above the Excommunication: . . .but. . .I do not see sufficient reason to believe that St. Paul intended any such thing, nor does it appear from any other text of Scripture that either the incestuous person, or Hymenæus and Alexander. . .were ever treated by Satan in this manner. When St. Paul smote Elymas. . .he expressly says, ‘The hand *of the Lord* is upon thee.’” Yet, after all, surely the history of Job affords a remarkable illustration of the passage in question; “The Lord said unto Satan, Behold, He is in thine hand; but save his life.” ii. 6. And so, perhaps, do the words, “Whom Satan hath bound;” S. Luke xiii. 16.]

appeal to the sicknesses which St. Paul ascribes to unworthy reception of the Communion is irrelevant; for even, at this day, we profess in our Communion Service, that unworthy communicants “provoke God to plague them with divers diseases and sundry kinds of death;” and any one who makes this profession sincerely, would at this day point to epidemic diseases among Christians, as a proof that God was provoked with them. So that when St. Paul speaks of an epidemic at Corinth as a proof of God’s displeasure, he does no more than the Prayer-Book authorizes us to do; and to infer from hence, that unworthy Communion in his time was always followed by bodily visitations, is as [reasonable] as it would be to infer from our Communion Service, that unworthy Communion among ourselves is always so followed.

The other instance, in which St. Paul seems to have used the Power of the Keys, is less detailed in its circumstances: all we are informed of is, that two persons, Hymenæus and Alexander, who, “concerning the faith had made shipwreck,” were “delivered unto Satan that they might learn not to blaspheme.” The fact, however, is important in one respect; since, as the sentence in the former case had been passed on immorality, so this we see was passed on heresy; thereby proving that errors of opinion, as well as of practice, were judged by St. Paul to unfit men for the Kingdom of Heaven.

If the Alexander here mentioned was, as is generally supposed, the “Alexander the coppersmith,”

who afterwards did St. Paul “much evil,” and against whom he prays, “the Lord reward him according to his works,” it would seem that in his case excommunication certainly had not been attended with a temporal judgment; for, had it been so, he would already have been rewarded according to his works; and besides, such a visible badge of God’s displeasure would have interfered with his ability afterwards to “do much evil.” One, whom all his neighbours saw to be under God’s sentence, would not be able “greatly to withstand the words” of his judge¹.

¹ [To the above indications of a real power, and divinely given, over the souls of his converts, may be added a number of passages in which the Apostle speaks of his *ἐξουσία*, *δύναμις*, *δωρεά*, &c. in the Gospel. Of these *ἐξουσία* is the most remarkable word, as being that adopted by our Lord concerning Himself. “All *power* (*ἐξουσία*) is given unto Me in heaven and in earth.” Matt. xxviii. 18. Vid. also John x. 18, Matt. xxi. 23. The word means more than *power*; it is rather a faculty, privilege, dignity, right, or prerogative, or what we expressly call a *gift*. Hence St. John says, “As many as received Him, to them gave He the *power* [or rather the faculty or dignity] of becoming the sons of God.” i. 12. Vid. Rev. xxii. 14. Hebr. vi. 4, 5. It was not merely that their external state was changed, but the actual condition and capacities of their nature, as if a blind man had gained sight, or an ignorant man a knowledge of the languages, or a brute animal had become a rational being. So again, “He gave them the faculty or gift (*ἐξουσίαν*) of casting out unclean spirits, and of healing all manner of sickness and disease.” Matt. x. i. Vid. Acts viii. 10. With the above uses of the word *ἐξουσία* before his mind, let the reader consider the texts that follow. First, our Saviour commits *His* *ἐξουσία* to the Apostles. “All power is given

The conclusion of the whole appears to be, that the power of remitting and retaining sins was the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven: that it enabled those who were entrusted with it to admit into that Kingdom, or to exclude from it, whomsoever they judged worthy of admission or exclusion; and that persons so admitted or excluded, underwent a change of condition, not in relation to men only, but also to God. What was the precise nature and extent of the change, we have not perhaps sufficient data to determine; but that it may have been incalculably great and important no wise man will deny, or, I think, doubt.

unto Me in heaven and in earth; go ye *therefore*," &c. "*As My Father hath sent Me, even so send I you.* And when he had said this, He *breathed* on them, and saith unto them, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost.*" Thus the power given them was an *ἐξίς*, habit, or new nature. The properties of it are next mentioned, "Whosoever sins ye remit," &c. Again, "The Son of man is as a man taking a far journey, who left his *house*, and gave *authority* (τὴν ἐξουσίαν) to his servants, and to every man his work." Mark xiii. 34. "The Kingdom of God is not in word, but in *power*," (ἐν δυνάμει). "What will ye? Shall I come unto you *with a rod*, or in love and the spirit of meekness?" 1 Cor. iv. 20, 21. "For though I should boast somewhat more of our *authority* (ἐξουσίας) which the Lord hath given us for edification, and not for your *destruction*," (vid. 1 Cor. v. 5.) "I should not be ashamed." 2 Cor. x. 8. vid. also xiii. 10. Thus Baptism, Absolution, and Excommunication, are ministrations directly resulting from a definite gift of the Holy Ghost.]

§ 2. *The Powers of the Apostolic Missionaries.*

The structure of the New Testament does not allow us to suppose, that the information it affords us respecting the power of the Apostolic Missionaries, is any thing like so complete as what we derive from it respecting that of the Apostles.

The four Gospels, treating as they do, one may almost say principally, of the education of the Apostles for their destined ministry, from the time of their first call till their final separation from their [Heavenly] Instructor, may naturally be supposed to embrace whatever was most prominent either in the instructions they received, or the powers granted for their execution; not indeed that we can see any necessity for these points being mentioned in Scripture, but because the subject so naturally led to mentioning them, that we can hardly suppose them to have been unintentionally passed over.

But with regard to the Apostolic Missionaries, the case is very different. Of all the Books of the New Testament, one only professes to give us any account of any thing the Apostles did after our Lord's ascension; and there is nothing in the structure or apparent intention of this Book to call forth a detailed account of their Missionary System. Its professed object was, to inform St. Luke's friend, Theophilus, of certain remarkable transactions which he had not before heard from authentic

sources ; and in doing this, it would of course pass over all such matters of ordinary routine as must have been familiar to every Christian of that day. Now, interesting as it would be to us in the 19th century to have set before us in detail the system of the primitive missions, and the powers entrusted to the Missionaries ; yet, to Theophilus, it is obvious that this system must have been as familiar as the arrangements of Missionary Societies of the present day, are to their respective members ; and it would be as unnatural for St. Luke to enter into an explanation of them to his friend, as it would be for a Missionary of the present day, writing from Africa to England, to fill his letter with a copy of his Society's rules. On this subject, whatever may be contained in the Acts of the Apostles must be looked for only in scattered notices, and picked up here and there, as it were accidentally.

It is farther to be observed, that the portion of this book which touches at all on the subject of Missions is exceedingly short. The first twelve chapters are almost entirely occupied with events which took place at Jerusalem, and in three narratives respecting the conversion of three individuals, the Ethiopian Eunuch, St. Paul, and Cornelius ; while the eight last relate exclusively to the capture, imprisonment, and voyage, of St. Paul : thus leaving only eight to that apparently inexhaustible subject, the general propagation of Christianity. We cannot therefore expect to find much, even in the way of allusion, to what were then matters of

routine, within a compass so very limited, and where such a mass of materials presented themselves for insertion.

Of the remaining Books relating to events after our Lord's death, one is prophetic, and the others are letters arising out of particular circumstances, and giving advice with reference to them; nor does the subject of any one of these appear to call for a full statement of the powers of the Apostolic Missionaries. To consider these Letters either singly, or in the aggregate, as a general treatise on Christianity, is an assumption unwarranted by any declaration of Scripture, and, as has been clearly shown, unfounded [on] any principles of sound reason. We must take them for what they profess to be, and expect no fuller information from them than what their respective subjects are likely to call forth.

From the New Testament, then, we may expect to collect only incidental notices of the powers of the Apostolic Missionaries. Nor will it follow, though the information we can gather from such notices should amount to little, that the powers themselves were trifling and unimportant. For if wherever we find them noticed at all, they are noticed in such a manner as is consistent with their being of the greatest importance, the mere fact, that the notice does not force us to think them so, implies nothing. Unless it can be shown, either that they are anywhere so noticed as to negative their importance, or that in any particular

place where they are not noticed, such silence is inconsistent with their importance, then whatever we can anywhere else collect of a positive kind must be taken without drawback.

I proceed then to collect such notices as appear to bear upon the subject; and perhaps it will be found, that, considering the scanty materials from which they are taken, they amount on the whole to more than could have been expected¹. And,

1. It will be observed, that almost the first fact with which the Book of Acts acquaints us, is most important in relation to this very inquiry.

The very first thing we are there informed of, after our Lord's ascent into heaven, is an incontestable proof that the Apostles considered themselves empowered to make an Apostle; and this, not by any play upon words, but in the very same sense in which they themselves were Apostles. They prayed God to direct them in choosing one to fill that very Apostleship from which Judas, by transgression, fell; and the person whom they were directed to choose was numbered with the [eleven] Apostles².

¹ [That is, though the writing and preservation of the books of the New Testament are apparently so fortuitous, that a complete system of Christianity is not to be *expected* in them, yet it is *overruled* by Divine Providence that they should constitute a Rule of Faith. The *proof* that Scripture is such a Rule, lies in the *testimony* of the Fathers to the fact; but with this subject we are not here concerned.]

² ["I wish to draw attention to one circumstance more especially, viz. the time when it [the ordination of St. Matthias] occurred. It was contrived, (if one may say so) exactly to fall

Now the certainty that they exercised this power to so full an extent in any one case, will of course greatly diminish the difficulty of supposing that they did so in others: and among other things will render it credible, that, when St. Barnabas is called Apostle, he, though not one of the twelve, still was an Apostle in the same sense as they were, and endowed with the same powers.

I mention this, in the first instance, as clearing the way for the consideration of other and inferior powers, which the Apostles were in the habit of dispensing much more frequently, and without

within the very short *interval*, which elapsed between the departure of our Lord and the arrival of the Comforter in His place: within that "little while," during which the Church was comparatively left *alone* in the world.... Of course, St. Peter must have had from our Lord express authority for this step: otherwise it would seem most natural to *defer* a transaction so important, until the unerring Guide, the Holy Ghost, should have come among them, as they knew He would in a few days. On the other hand, since the Apostles were eminently Apostles of our Incarnate Lord, since their very being, *as Apostles*, depended entirely on their personal mission from Him.... in that regard one should naturally have expected, that He Himself, before His departure, would have supplied the vacancy by personal designation. But we see it was not His pleasure to do so. As the Apostles afterwards brought on the Ordination sooner, so He had deferred it longer than might have been expected. Both ways it should seem as if there were a purpose of bringing the event within those ten days, during which, as I said, the Church was left to herself; left to exercise her faith and hope, much as Christians are left now, without any *miraculous* aid, or extraordinary illumination from above." Tracts for the Times, No. 52.]

the reception of which no society of converts appear to have been regarded as a Church.

2. It seems to be quite clear, that, on the formation of every new society of Christians, it was the constant practice to confer on some, at least, of the first converted among them, the gift of the Holy Ghost. Immediately on Philip's success in Samaria becoming known at Jerusalem, St. Peter and St. John were sent thither to complete the work by conferring this gift¹. In the same way, as soon as it was known that there were converts at Antioch, St. Barnabas was despatched to visit them, and took with him St. Paul; and though no mention is here made of conferring the Holy Ghost, yet this was probably an object of their journey². That, till the reception of this gift, the formation of a Church was not effected, seems evident from the manner in which St. Paul, on his first arrival at Ephesus, inquired of certain converts whom he found there, "whether they had received the Holy Ghost since they believed?" where the very manner of putting the question implies, that this was necessary to complete the work which had been begun among them. It appears, too, that the ordinary manner of receiving this gift, was through

¹ [If our Church, in the Gospel for Whit Tuesday, has a view, as is probable, to the Ember Week, she confirms this interpretation.]

² [If St. Barnabas and St. Paul were not consecrated till Acts xiii. they can hardly be supposed to have conferred the Holy Ghost in Acts xi.]

prayer [and] the laying on of an Apostle's hands : certainly it could not be received from any other human source ; otherwise so great a Saint as Philip, and one endowed with such highly miraculous powers, would not have been unable to confer it : but that it was sometimes given by special interposition immediately from God, the case of Cornelius and his household puts out of question ; and perhaps in the case of the Samaritans, the expression "for as yet He was fallen upon none of them," may imply that such interpositions were not extremely rare. From the case of Cornelius, however, we are not entitled to draw any such inference, as the reason for making it an exception is evident, and as evidently unique.

What was the exact nature of the gift of the Holy Ghost, and what the powers it conveyed, must in some degree remain a subject of conjecture. That they were in part visible, consisting in prophecy, the gift of tongues, &c. is certain ; but whether these were the whole of what was given, or, as in the case of the Apostles, only accompaniments of other invisible powers, does not appear.

Another fact, of which there can be little doubt, with regard to the formation of new Churches, is, that they were incomplete until persons had been appointed over them with some sort of spiritual authority. These persons are in different places variously styled "Elders," (*πρεσβύτεροι*),¹ "Governors," (*ἡγούμενοι*),² "Chiefs," (*προϊστάμενοι*),³ "Overseers,"

¹ Acts xiv. 2. 3. xx. 17. ² Heb. xiii. 7, 17. ³ 1 Thess. v. 12.

(ἐπίσκοποι;)¹ also “Prophets²” and “Teachers³.” The offices assigned to them are διακονεῖν⁴ and λειτουργεῖν⁵, that is, to act as inferior and superior Priests⁶; also “to baptize⁷,” “to labour⁸,” “to admonish⁹,” “to feed the flock of God¹⁰,” “to watch for souls as they that must give account¹¹,” and the people in their turn are required “to submit themselves,” “to obey,” “to esteem them very highly in love,” “to receive them in the Lord with all gladness.” The greatness of the powers given is perhaps nowhere more strongly implied than in the passage where they are warned by St. Peter, not κατακυριεύειν τῶν κληρῶν “to lord it over God’s heritage;” in which it is plainly implied, that they had the ability to do what they were cautioned against doing. It appears farther, that the conveyance of these powers was ordinarily effected by the presence of an Apos-

¹ Acts xx. 28. ² Acts xiii. 1. ³ 1 Cor. xii. 28. ⁵ *ibid.*

⁴ 1 Tim. iii. 10, 13. ⁵ Acts xiii. 1.

⁶ The use of the word Priest, as denoting a Christian Minister, has been often cavilled at. It has been pointedly observed, that the office of the Priest was to pray *for* the people, that of the Minister to pray *with* them; that the Priest is ordained for men “in things pertaining to God,” the Minister “for God in things pertaining to men.” [Outram de Sacrificiis, i. 19, 4.] Now, without going into a full discussion of this subject, which has been most satisfactorily done by Bishop Hickee, it may be sufficient to refer the admirers of the above sayings to Col. i. 7. where they will find these words, “Epaphras, our dear fellow-servant, who is *for you* a faithful minister of *Christ*,” ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν διάκονος τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

⁷ Acts viii. 12. ⁸ 1 Thess. v. 12. ⁹ *ibid.* ¹⁰ 1 Pet. v. 2.

¹¹ Heb. xiii. 17.

tle: thus, on St. Paul's first journey through Asia Minor, we find him retracing his steps city by city, for the purpose of ordaining Elders in each. It also appears, that the manner of conveying them was precisely the same as that of conveying the gift of the Holy Ghost, the imposition of hands, and prayer; for the expression, *χειροτονήσαντες αὐτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους, προσευξόμενοι μετὰ νηστεϊῶν, παρέθεντο αὐτοῖς τῷ κυρίῳ*, can hardly be thought to imply less; *χειροτονεῖν* cannot in this place be understood in its common meaning, "to elect by a show of hands," the choice of the word is hardly natural, unless some other application of hands is implied in it; and what this expression renders probable, becomes next to certain on comparing it with 1 Tim. v. 22¹. where "lay hands suddenly on no man," is evidently equivalent to "be cautious in the selection of Presbyters."

Now, with regard to the powers of Presbyters, and the powers conveyed by the gift of the Holy Ghost, a question occurs, whether they are the same or different; perhaps the following considerations may lead us to identify them.

It has been already seen that both were imparted in the same way, and both necessary to the existence of a Church. Farther, it is quite clear, that, as each Church increased, and those who had

¹ [The meaning of this text is not perhaps so evident as the Author considered. It might *include* confirmation, restoration of penitents, &c. Chrysostom and Theodoret, however, explain it distinctly of Ordination.]

received the Holy Ghost became, as they necessarily must in the absence of an Apostle, only a few among many, they would be entitled, as a matter of course, to certain pre-eminence, such as is implied in the words Governors, Chiefs, Overseers, &c.; and, as being older converts than the rest, to the title, Elders. This would be the case, even supposing that when the Apostles are said to have given the Holy Ghost to a Church, it is meant to include all who were converted at that time. But, in the first place, there seems no need for supposing this;¹ (since a gift may very naturally be said to be conferred upon a society, when it is given to some members of that society for the benefit of the rest). And, secondly, there is at least some reason for supposing the contrary; at least it appears that those on whom St. Paul conferred the Holy Ghost at Ephesus, were only twelve in number, and there were no women among them (Acts xix. 8.) neither were there, as it would seem, any women among the spiritually gifted persons at Corinth. (1 Cor. xiv. 34.) Now if, as is thus suggested, the number to whom spiritual gifts were confined, was limited

¹ [It will not follow, even though but a few were gifted with miraculous gifts, that therefore a few only were *confirmed* (as we now express it) by the laying on of the Apostles' hands. The visible effects of the presence of the Holy Ghost would take place, according to His good pleasure; that such did not in matter of fact take place in all, no one perhaps will deny. Laying on of hands was customary in the early Church for a great variety of purposes.]

from the first, it certainly does seem more probable than not, that the persons gifted with them were the same persons as those who, by the same process and at the same time, had been ordained Elders or Presbyters. Lastly, the fact that the Prophets and Teachers *are* in the Church of Antioch spoken of as the same persons, (Acts xiii. 1.) is a presumption that they may have been so in other cases ; and the manner in which ecclesiastical offices are assigned by St. Paul (1 Cor. xii.) to those who shared the various gifts of the Spirit, would lead us to suppose that those possessed of them were entitled to bear rule in the Church.

At any rate, whether it is thought that the gifts of the Holy Spirit were confined to Presbyters or extended to others, the office of Presbyter itself was a gift of the Holy Spirit (Acts xx. 28.) and gave a pre-eminence over all the rest of the flock, whether endowed with other gifts or not. How high are the terms in which this office is spoken of, we have already seen ; and that, sharing, as they did, in many of the visible powers of the Apostles, they may likewise have had some share of those which were invisible, it would be rash to deny. Nor will it be reasonable to infer, from our finding the discharge of any spiritual duty committed to them, that such duty had in it nothing of mystery, or could be performed by ordinary men at the present day. If any doubt should appear to hang over the nature of any duty laid upon them, much more if any positive presumption, however slight,

can be adduced, to throw over it a supernatural character, it will be a great folly to treat such doubt or such presumption as if it were nothing, and to assume for certain that they did nothing but what any one can imitate¹.

3. Distinct in many respects from the powers of Presbyters, were those committed to Timothy at Ephesus, and to Titus in Crete.

If, as perhaps will hardly be doubted, the Office committed to each of them was one and the same, and if consequently we may assume that what is said of or to either, is applicable to both, then from

¹ [It may be remarked, that among the *spiritual gifts* of the Apostolic age, St. Paul reckons the diaconate; ἔχοντες ἐκ χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν διαφορα, εἴτε προφητείας. . . εἴτε διακονίαν, . . . κ. τ. λ. Rom. xii. 6, 7. So again, as the Author observes, in 1 Cor. xii. 28, he reckons indiscriminately with supernatural gifts, such as “miracles, gifts of healing,” &c. “helps” and “governments.” vid. also 1 Pet. iv. 10, 11. The view contained in the last pages seems to be this; that the “gifts of the Holy Ghost” were of a miraculous nature, sometimes attended, sometimes not, with *visible* displays of their heavenly origin; that among other uses, they were *qualifications* for the Christian Ministry, in one or other of its departments, which became as numerous as those gifts; that in process of time these all ceased but the following, and those unattended, ordinarily, with outward displays of power,—the gifts of administering the Sacraments, the gifts connected with imposition of hands, such as ordaining, confirming, reconciling, admitting as catechumens, &c., the gift of binding and loosing, the gift of exorcising, the gift of ruling, the gift of preaching, the gift of ministering, &c. These have from the first been divided among three orders of Ministers,—Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons.]

a comparison of the letters addressed to them we may collect the following particulars.

(1.) That the powers entrusted to them were conveyed in the same manner, indeed, as was used in conveying the inferior powers, by prayer and the imposition of Apostles' hands, but with greater solemnity, the laying on of the hands of the *presbytery* being an additional circumstance. (Cf. 2 Tim. i. 6. 1 Tim. iv. 14.)

(2.) That among these powers, that of ordaining presbyters themselves, by the imposition of their own hands, was one. "For this cause," says St. Paul to Titus, "left I thee, that thou shouldest ordain elders in every city;" and again to Timothy, "Lay hands suddenly on no man."

(3.) That they had authority over the elders of their respective districts, and were the tribunals to whom complaints against them should be referred. 1 Tim. v. 19.

(4.) That they had the power of remitting and retaining sins. The proof of this important power may be thought, perhaps, to rest on very insufficient data, and so undoubtedly it does: properly speaking, we have no proof of it, but only an intimation, and that perhaps equivocal. Yet, considering how short the letters are that contain it, and that they do not profess to touch upon the nature of the powers committed to [Ministers, such as Timothy and Titus] which undoubtedly had been explained fully to them, by St. Paul in person, before their mission, but are simple exhortations to a right use

of these powers, in such points as were likely to embarrass them ; such equivocal intimations are all we could have expected, and are not to be set aside as if they were absolutely nothing. The expression which seems to imply that Titus had the power of retaining sins, is so translated in our version as to lose its force. The Greek words are, ἐλεγχε αὐτὸς ἀποτόμως, ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει¹, which, if rendered so as to give the full meaning of the words, is, “rebuke them after the manner of a surgeon, who, having failed in healing a limb by mild treatment, has recourse to the knife and cuts it off, that so, if by no other means, yet by this, they may become sound or healthy in the faith.” That all this is *primarily* implied in the word ἀποτόμως, no critic will deny ; and the only question is whether in this place the metaphor has been adhered to ; so that if the same expression was no where else used by St. Paul, still the argument would amount to something. It does, however, so happen, that an expression almost identical with it, is used by him on a formal occasion, where there can scarcely be a doubt that it implies, “cutting off a diseased mem-

¹ [Tit. i. 13. βαθυτέραν, φησί, δίδου τὴν πληγὴν. Chrysost. in loc. τοῖ ἀσθηροτέροις προσήκει θεραπεύειν φαρμάκοις. Theodor. ibid. The only place in St. Paul where the word, ἀποτομία, is used, is of the same kind. “Behold, therefore, the goodness and severity (ἀποτομίαν) of God : on them which fell, severity, but towards thee, goodness, if thou continue in his goodness : otherwise thou also shalt *be cut off*.” Rom. xi. 22. Comp. Gal. v. 12. “I would they were even *cut off* which trouble you.”]

ber from the Church or Body of Christ," i. e. excluding him from the Kingdom of Heaven, or, which is the same thing, excommunicating him. In St. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians, it will be remembered that he gave peremptory orders for the excommunication of an offender. From the second, it appears that there were still some in that Church who rebelled against his authority; and this Epistle, after many earnest exhortations to such persons, inviting them to submit, without driving him to extremities, concludes thus; "My reason for thus writing to you, while absent, is to prevent the necessity of treating this disease, when present, *according to the powers which the Lord hath given me*¹:" *ἵνα παρὼν μὴ ἀποτόμως χρήσωμαι, κατὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἣν ἔδωκέ μοι ὁ Κύριος.* Now I suppose it can hardly be doubted that St. Paul in this place does intimate an intention to visit the obstinate offenders with excommunication; and therefore that the same mode of expression, which is here used with this meaning, is likely in another place of similar import to be used with the same meaning. It seems, then, that without attaching undue force to a metaphorical expression, we may regard the passage above cited from St. Paul's Epistle to Titus,

¹ [Let it be observed, the whole argument turns upon St. Paul's *gift*. That he *did* excommunicate, is plain from other passages, the only question is, whether he did so in consequence of a supernatural gift. (vid. note on p. 108.) If so, then Titus also, if bid by St. Paul to excommunicate, must already have had the *power* to do so committed to him.]

as a direction to excommunication; and, if so, as implying that he had power to do so: and when the credibility that he had this power is once suggested, there are other passages in the same Epistle, as well as in those to Timothy, which may be regarded as allusions to this same power; by themselves, perhaps they would not suggest it, but directly as it is suggested they harmonize with it. 1 Tim. v. 20, 22. 2 Tim. i. 6, 7. Tit. ii. 15. iii. 10.

On the whole, then, we may safely say, that, [even] though these letters do not prove Timothy and Titus to have had the power to remit and retain sins, they are more intelligible on this supposition than [on] the contrary one.

4. If the powers which have been attributed to Timothy and Titus were not confined to them only, and intended only for the Churches of Ephesus and Crete, but were likewise imparted to other Apostolic Missionaries, for the edification of the other Churches, (and perhaps the certainty that the same wants which Timothy and Titus were to supply in their respective dioceses must have existed elsewhere, will make it credible that such was the case,) then it would seem probable that the persons who in Rev. ii. and iii. are spoken of as the Angels of the Seven Churches of Asia Minor, were such Missionaries. And, if so, the accusations brought against the Angels of the Churches of Pergamos and Thyatira, will most evidently refer to a neglect on their part of the power to "retain sins." St. Paul had charged Timothy, (1 Tim. v. 22) "not to

be partaker of other men's sins." It seems the Angels of these Churches had made themselves partakers of other men's sins, simply by allowing them to remain in communion. "I have a few things against thee," says our Lord to the Angel of the Church of Pergamos, "because thou hast there them that hold the doctrine of Balaam:" and again, to the Angel of Thyatira, "I have a few things against thee, because thou sufferest that woman, Jezebel, which calleth herself a prophetess, to teach and to seduce My servants." Now it can hardly be supposed that these Angels would be accused of allowing what they had no power to prevent; so that perhaps it may be thought that they, as well as Timothy and Titus, had the power "to remit and retain sins," and if so, then in all probability the power of ordaining Presbyters likewise.

On all these points we cannot too constantly bear in mind, how little light we have any reason beforehand to expect, and therefore how unreasonable it is to demand more than a little. Faint glimmering intimations are all that the subjects of the different Books of the New Testament were likely to give occasion for; and that they have given occasion to such intimations is, I suppose, evident enough.

§ 3. *The Apostolical System a part of Christianity.*

It has been shown, that the Christian world under the government of the Apostles, and probably of their immediate successors, was an organized society or polity, to which every individual convert was obliged to conform. It may, I think, be farther collected from Scripture, that this obligation was not positive, but moral: that it arose, not simply from the circumstance that the Apostles enjoined such conformity, but would have existed, had such injunction never been given: in short, to use the common distinction, that conformity was not necessary because the Apostles commanded it, but that they commanded it because it was necessary, i. e. in the same sense in which faith was necessary, and as a means co-ordinate with faith, of appropriating the benefits of our Lord's death.

That such is the real nature of the obligation to conformity seems more than probable, from many Scriptural intimations respecting the nature of the Christian System. (1.) It would seem to be implied in the terms of our Lord's last commission to the Apostles, that the setting up some kind of Polity was a duty as peremptorily laid upon them as the dissemination of doctrines. Their commission was not simply to teach all nations, but to make disciples of them, *μαθητεύειν*, not simply *εὐδίδασκειν* or *εὐαγγελίζεσθαι*. The threat too, which was de-

nounced against those who should not believe them, was not to be escaped simply by belief, but by belief and a federal rite, in which they acknowledged themselves disciples,—Baptism¹.

(2.) It is very observable that the figure under which the Christian System is most frequently designated in the New Testament is that of a Kingdom: the Kingdom of Heaven, or the Kingdom of God, or the Kingdom of Christ. Now it seems to be well worth considering, whether there is any thing in Christianity, regarded simply as a system of doctrine, which so responds to this figure as satisfactorily to account for the selection of it; and, if not, whether Christianity must not be something more than a system of doctrine, and whether something else than belief may not be necessary, in order to make men Christians. Certainly it does appear, in whatever light we view the subject, that if God ever at any time did reveal Himself to mankind as King, more especially than at another, it was at the commencement of that very system which Christianity was to supersede; on Mount Sinai in Arabia. Perhaps too it may be said without exaggeration, that under no system of religion, whether natural or revealed, has He ever so veiled His kingly character, as under that system which is said to have emancipated us from “the yoke of bondage,” placing us under “the perfect law of liberty,” giving us “the spirit of adoption,” and

¹ [“He that believeth *and is baptized* shall be saved.” St. Mark xvi. 16.]

representing us no longer as the “servants” of God, but as His “sons.” And, if for these reasons the propagation of the Christian doctrinal system can hardly be represented as the setting up of a Kingdom; then, since as a fact we know that something else was propagated conjointly with the Christian doctrines, which may with great propriety be called a Kingdom, viz. the Apostolical Polity, it certainly does seem reasonable to regard this Polity as the feature of Christianity, in respect of which it has received its commonest scriptural name, and consequently as a prominent, perhaps as an essential feature of it.

(3.) The Apostolical Polity appears to be very distinctly pointed at in two other figures, by which Christianity is designated in the sacred writings, viz. the Temple of God¹, and the Body of Christ².

Thus when the Christian Church is spoken of as the Body of Christ, Christ Himself is represented as its head, and among its members there follow first, Apostles, and afterwards, subordinately, prophets, shepherds, teachers, and the other titles indicating the possessors of spiritual gifts: and we are told, that “the whole body fitly joined and compacted together, by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working of the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body, unto the edifying of itself in love.”

¹ 1 Cor. iii. 16. 2 Cor. vi. 16. Eph. ii. 22.

² Eph. i. 22, 23. iv. 12. Rom. xii. 5. 1 Cor. xii. 27. Col. i. 18.

When the Temple of God is the figure chosen, it is said, by a metaphor exactly corresponding in every detail, to be built on the foundation, first of Apostles, then of Prophets, of course implying other spiritually gifted persons likewise, such as shepherds, teachers, &c. and to be held together by Jesus Christ Himself, as the chief corner stone; "in whom all the building, fitly framed together, groweth unto a Holy Temple in the Lord; in whom ye also," says St. Paul, addressing the rest of the flock, "are builded together, for an habitation of God, through the Spirit."

(4.) The intimate connexion of Christianity with the Apostolical Polity is not merely suggested to us in figures and metaphors, but on one occasion seems to be distinctly stated by St. Paul. We find, from Eph. iv. 8—12, that the power given to the Apostles, Prophets, and other subordinate officers by whom that Polity was held together, was given for the very purpose of effecting what the above figures represent as its accompaniment, the raising up of the Body of Christ. "When He ascended up on high, He led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men; and gave some Apostles, and some Prophets, and some Evangelists, and some Pastors and Teachers, for the perfecting of the Saints, in order to the work of their Ministry, and the rearing up of the Body of Christ."

Now I do not say that it is impossible to devise a meaning for these passages which shall not refer to the Apostolical Polity at all; but when we bear

in mind what that Polity was, every one, I think, must see that they contain a very intelligible commentary on it; explaining spiritually what would otherwise have been known to us only as a system of facts; and that they scarcely could have been understood in any other sense by persons, such as those to whom they were addressed, living under that Polity, and in the midst of it. So that unless we deny St. Paul to have meant by these passages, that meaning which they must naturally have conveyed to those he addressed, we can hardly doubt that, in his time at least, the [appointed] means by which individual Christian converts were taken up into the Body of Christ, or built as living stones into the Temple of the Holy Ghost, was the Apostolical Polity; and if so, that this was an essential part of the Christian System. Whether it has now ceased to be [an] essential part, owing to the revelation of some new means for effecting the same end, is a different question.

In conclusion, it is important to notice, that, whatever the power was, which enabled the Prophets or Presbyters of the Apostolic times to effect the mystical union of their flock with the Body of Christ, or to build them together as living stones in the Temple of the Holy Ghost¹, this power was an invisible power. Speaking with tongues, healing the sick, and other visible powers which those officers were in the habit of exercising, just as little

¹ [See Hooker, E. P. v. lxxvii. 2.]

resemble or imply the ability to sustain this marvellous fabric, as did any of the visible powers of the Apostles resemble or imply the possession of the Keys of [the Kingdom of] Heaven. In both cases it will be obvious to any one who has eyes to see, that the invisible power [is] of indefinitely greater import than the visible; that the one may have been nothing more than a mere temporary assistance to the first developement of that system, over which the other was to preside; that the one might wax old as doth a garment, that as a vesture it might be folded up and changed, while the other was to endure for ever and its years not to fail.

§ 4. *The Apostolic Eucharist miraculous.*

In order to our rightly understanding the Scriptural account of our Lord's Last Supper with His disciples, it is necessary, in the first place, to determine to whom is addressed the command accompanying it, "Do this in remembrance of Me;" whether, i. e. it is to be understood like the commands, "Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead," &c. as applying only to the Apostles, and a few other highly favoured individuals, or whether it extends generally to all mankind.

For it will easily be seen that on the answer to this question, our interpretation of the act which our Lord Himself had just performed, must in some measure depend. If the command must be understood generally, as applying to all mankind,

then it would seem, as a matter of course, that it must be such a command as all mankind are capable of complying with, and, in this case, we should be justified in concluding that what our Lord had Himself done, was no more than what every one else has ability to do. Whereas on the other hand, if no strong reason can be assigned for thus extending it, if consistently with what we are told in Scripture, it may be supposed to include only particular persons, gifted with powers in which ordinary men do not share; in this case we shall be free to interpret the Scripture account of what our Lord did and said on this occasion, without any reference to what the rest of mankind [are] capable of doing, but by a simple consideration of the account itself and of the wonderful Person who was the agent in it.

I would not here be understood to imply that men are in any way competent to judge what they can do, or what they cannot, in compliance with direct commands from God; but what I mean is, that the command in question, unaccompanied as it is with any assurance of power to execute it, must, on mere grounds of criticism, be supposed to imply only such powers as those to whom it was given, might have independent reason for thinking themselves possessed of. Thus it is evident, as a point of criticism, that when our Saviour said, "Son, thy sins are forgiven thee," the declaration was quite of a different character from any that ordinary men may make, in compliance with the command to for-

give one another's trespasses; this, I say, is evident as a point of criticism, not from any assumed impossibility that our Lord should have given to all mankind the power of remitting one another's sins in His name, but from the certainty, that, if He had meant this, the command would have been given in a more distinct form, implying that He had done so. And thus in the case of the Eucharist, it is evident that if all mankind are called on to do a particular thing in remembrance of Christ, no promise of especial power being given them for that purpose, then the mere wording of the command implies that no especial power is requisite.

For these reasons it seems to me very important to determine, whether the command in question is general or particular, extending to all men, or confined to certain persons, gifted for the purpose of executing it.

Now the first thing that strikes one in answer to this inquiry, is the fact, that in the Corinthian Church, the Eucharistic Rite, which was observed in compliance with this command, most evidently was regarded as one of the mysteries of the Apostolical Polity, nay, as the very connecting tie of that Polity, as the principal agent in effecting the mystic absorption of individual Christians into the Body of Christ; and therefore probably as requiring, in order to its due administration, an exercise of that invisible power, the chief object of which was to effect this absorption. "The cup of blessing, which we bless," says St. Paul, "is it not the communion

of the Blood of Christ? the bread which we break, is it not the communion of the Body of Christ? For we *being many* are one bread and *one body: for we are all partakers of that one bread.*"

Certainly then it does seem probable that the Eucharist, which thus effected the great end of the Apostolical Polity, was administrable only through the powers vested in that Polity.

The argument is this: St. Paul informs us that Jesus Christ, when He ascended up on high, and led captivity captive, left behind Him among men certain spiritual gifts, "for the perfecting of the Saints in order to the work of their ministry, and *the rearing up of the Body of Christ.*" Now, if he is here understood to mean that these gifts were necessary towards the accomplishment of this end, it would seem that the Eucharist, which was a principal means towards this end, must have required such gifts for its administration. And in this case it will not have been administrable by any but those whom St. Paul enumerates as depositories of such gifts, the Apostles, Prophets, and other Rulers of the Apostolical Polity.

In answer to this, should any one think it reasonable to assert that the command, "Do this in remembrance of Me," carries with it the evidence of being general; for that, although none but the Apostles were present when it was given, still it is not expressly restricted to them; and that it is blasphemous to restrict God's commands where He has not expressly done so himself, such a person

may be referred to another command given by our Lord at this very same time to this same audience, and without any expression to limit it, and yet which no one ever imagines to be general.

“Jesus,” as we are told by St. John xiii. 3. “knowing that the Father had given all things into His hands, and that He was come from God, and went to God; He riseth from supper, and laid aside His garments; and took a towel and girded Himself. After that He poureth water into a bason, and began to wash the disciples’ feet, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith He was girded. Then cometh He to Simon Peter: and Peter said unto Him, Lord, dost Thou wash my feet? Jesus answered and said unto Him, What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter. Peter saith unto Him, Thou shalt never wash my feet. Jesus answered Him, If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with Me. Simon Peter saith unto Him, Lord, not my feet only, but also my hands and my head. Jesus saith unto him, He that is washed needeth not, save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit: and ye are clean, but not all. For He knew who should betray Him; therefore said He, Ye are not all clean. So, after He had washed their feet, and had taken His garments, and was set down again, He said unto them, Know ye what I have done to you? Ye call Me Master and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am. If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another’s feet. For I have

given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you.”

I have given this passage at length to call attention to its extreme solemnity. If it was necessary to press this argument, as far as it admits of being pressed, it might with truth be said, that the action and words of our Lord here recorded, look much more like the institution of a Sacramental Rite than any thing does, which we are told respecting the Lord's Supper in either of the four accounts of it. This whole action was, in the fullest sense, an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace given unto the Apostles by Christ Himself, as a means whereby they received the same, and a pledge to assure them thereof. “Jesus answered him, if I wash thee not, thou hast no part with Me;” and again, “he that is washed needeth not, save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit.” Certainly no pledge of grace so unequivocal as this is recorded in the history of the Lord's Supper, nor is it easy to conceive a more distinct assurance that the *pledge* was also a *means*. But to press this consideration is not in any way necessary. All that is wanted for my present purpose must obtrude itself unto the most superficial reader, in the last words of the narrative, “I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you:” a command which will hardly be called less explicit and earnest than that conveyed in the words, “Do this in remembrance of Me.” Yet it is quite certain that a literal compliance with the former command

has never been considered due from Christians at the present day, and it would be difficult for them to excuse themselves from a literal compliance with this command by any argument which would not equally excuse them from the other. If they acknowledge either to be general, they must in consistency acknowledge both¹.

With this preface, I proceed to consider the Scripture account of our Lord's act, and the other Scriptural passages which illustrate its meaning. The account itself is contained in the four following passages :

S. Matt. xxvi. 26. "And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and brake it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat ; this is My Body. And He took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of it :

¹ [The following passage occurs in a rough draught :] But further, it will be urged that in the Church of Corinth the Eucharist was administered evidently as the same rite which our Lord enjoined on the Apostles ; so that this rite was not confined to the Apostles, and therefore extends to every one. This is the simplest form in which the argument can be put, and certainly it is not very consecutive : it becomes still less so, however, on stating details. The facts are, that in the Church of Corinth, in which there were persons endowed with many visibly miraculous gifts, some persons, with whom St. Paul classes himself, were accustomed to bless the Eucharistic Bread and Wine, and that these, upon such blessing, became the communion of the Body of Christ, and the communion of the Blood of Christ ; and hence it is inferred, that what these persons did, was nothing more than other persons, endowed with no visibly miraculous gifts, are able to do at the present day.

For this is My Blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins.”

S. Mark xiv. 22. “And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake it, and gave to them, and said, Take, eat : this is My Body. And He took the cup, and when He had given thanks, He gave it to them : and they all drank of it. And He said unto them, This is My Blood of the new testament, which is shed for many.”

S. Luke xxii. 14. “And when the hour was come, He sat down, and the twelve apostles with Him. And He said unto them, With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer : For I say unto you, I will not any more eat thereof, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God. And He took the cup, and gave thanks, and said, Take this, and divide it among yourselves : For I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God shall come. And He took bread, and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them, saying, This is My Body, which is given for you : this do in remembrance of Me. Likewise also the cup after supper, saying, This cup is the new testament in My Blood, which is shed for you.”

1 Cor. xi. 23. “For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, That the Lord Jesus, the same night in which He was betrayed, took bread : And when He had given thanks, He brake it, and said, Take, eat ; this is My Body, which is broken for you : this do in

remembrance of Me. After the same manner also He took the cup, when He had supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in My Blood : this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of Me.”

These four passages comprise all the direct information that Scripture affords us, as to what passed on this remarkable occasion. But in order to our understanding the words here ascribed to our Lord, in the full sense in which they were likely to be understood by His hearers, it will be necessary to refer to another place to which they evidently refer. We are told by St. John that on a former occasion our Lord had expressed Himself in the following remarkable way.

“ I am that Bread of life. Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead. This is the Bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die. I am the living Bread which came down from heaven : if any man eat of this Bread, he shall live for ever : and the bread that I will give is My Flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this Man give us His Flesh to eat? Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the Flesh of the Son of man, and drink His Blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth My Flesh, and drinketh My Blood, hath eternal life ; and I will raise him up at the last day. For My Flesh is meat indeed, and My Blood is drink indeed.”

These words we find made a great impression on

the disciples, so that many of them, "when they heard this, said, This is a hard saying, who can hear it?" Nor was this impression likely to be diminished, nor their wonder satisfied by the answer returned to them, "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life¹."

Now when we couple the stress here laid on eating the Flesh of Christ and drinking His Blood, with the fact, that nothing except the Eucharistic elements is any where called His Body and Blood, it can hardly be thought, that those to whom the latter were given expressly to be eaten and drunken, would not identify them with the former. Nor can we suppose that expressions, which were sure to suggest this identity, were not intended to suggest it.

Putting these things together then, and farther taking into consideration Who the Person was, that is here represented as having blessed the bread and

¹ [The following passage occurs in a rough draught:] St. Paul, when explaining to the Hebrews the analogy between the efficacy of the typical blood of the Old Testament and the Blood of Christ, which was the Blood of the New Testament, states, as a fact with which they would be all familiar, that "when Moses had spoken every precept to all the people according to the Law, *he took* the blood of calves and of goats, with water and scarlet wool and hyssop, and sprinkled both the book and all the people, saying, *This is the blood of the Testament, which God hath enjoined unto you.*" Heb. ix. 19, 20. It is perhaps scarcely too much to infer, that the acts and words of our Lord, at His Last Supper with the Apostles, were calculated to bring into their minds the acts and words of Moses, when he purified the people before his ascent into Mount Sinai.

then declared it to be His Body, and then as having blessed the cup and declared it to be His Blood of the New Testament; viz. that He was the same Person of whom is told in another place, "He spake the word, and they were made, He commanded, and they were created:" putting all these things together, I cannot but think, that we have no sufficient ground for denying the whole transaction to have been miraculous; and that we shall do better to admire it in silence, than to indulge our invention by putting unauthorized glosses upon it.

All this seems so plain, that I could be well content to leave it as it is, for the consideration of all unprejudiced persons; but unhappily the subject is so beset with cavils and sophistry, that few can be found to give their minds fair play in considering it. On this, as on some other questions, men debate in certain controversial trammels; they tie themselves to a phraseology, which will not allow their thoughts to traverse freely; and having once satisfied themselves with a particular way of expressing their meaning, are as jealous of deviating from it, as if it was very Scripture. For this reason, it seems desirable to compare the opinion above expressed, with some of the approved dogmas by which its truth will be tried, and to show that it accords with these, [in] so far as they accord with reason and Scripture.

The first of these, which I shall notice, occurs in the 28th Article of the Church of England: "The

Body and Blood of Christ is given, taken, and eaten, in the Supper, only after a heavenly and spiritual manner." Now, without meddling with the question, how the words should be understood in relation to the rite we now administer, it is quite clear, that with regard to the Apostolic Eucharist, their meaning must be restricted to a simple denial that the Body and Blood of Christ are eaten after a worldly and carnal manner, or, that "this eating and drinking has its exact parallel in any other eating and drinking," and therefore that we are not to attempt to explain it, or put our own glosses upon it; but to receive the declaration of our Lord with faith and humility, as coming from One, whose words are spirit and life. In this sense, the words of the Article are just and natural; but if it is understood to imply any more than this; if it is supposed to remove any part of the mystery that hangs over the Scripture narrative, or to make the matter in any way clearer than it found it; if, instead of simply denying that the Body and Blood of Christ were received in one way, it is supposed to help us in conceiving how they may be received in another; then, in this sense, it is chargeable with exactly the same error against which, in the other sense, it is calculated to guard us, that of putting human glosses on divine words, and confining the promises of the Almighty to the limits within which we can trace their accomplishment. "Heavenly and spiritual eating and drinking," if understood to mean

any thing positive, and within the range of our apprehension, are just as meagre and inadequate expressions as “worldly and carnal eating and drinking;” and the fault of both is the same; viz. that they relieve the mind from that state of prostration, which the consciousness of an idea imperfectly apprehended by it is calculated to produce; that they attempt by much speaking to make that plainer, which, doubtless, God has made as plain as it admits of being made.

Again, it is frequently laid down, that, when our Lord said, “This is My Body,” He meant, “This is a sign of My Body,” &c. Now this way of speaking, like the above, is true in one sense, and, in every other, gratuitous and improper. If it is intended simply to deny, that, by the words, “This is my Body,” our Lord meant, “This is that very Body of Mine which you see before you sitting at the table,” then indeed the sentiment is true, however awkward may be the expression of it. But if the words, “Sign of My Body,” are understood to convey any idea more definite and intelligible than that which is conveyed in our Lord’s own words, then most certainly that idea is unscriptural; it is a mere human invention, fabricated to set the mind at rest, where God has seen fit to leave it in uncertainty. No doubt, if the words, “Sign of My Body,” had been a more accurate expression of our Lord’s meaning, He would Himself have used them, and not perplexed a plain matter with language unnecessarily figurative.

In this place it will not be irrelevant to notice, with regard to Scripture figures generally, that it is a great mistake to suppose figurative expressions proper to inspiration as such, and preferred on this account to a plain manner of speaking. Figures and metaphors are not chosen by inspired writers as they were by the heathen oracles, to give elevation to plain matters, but because the matters of which they speak are in themselves so elevated as not to admit of being expressed plainly. It is no part of their object to make plain things difficult, but difficult things as plain as they admit of being. Thus it is with the various names and titles, by which Jesus Christ is figured in the Bible ; and which are given Him, not with a view to perplex and obscure our ideas, on a subject which might otherwise have been more clearly presented to us, but because such obscure and perplexed ideas are the nearest approaches to accuracy of which our faculties are susceptible. He tells us, that " He is the Way and the Truth and the Life," that " He is the Vine and we are the branches ;" He is called in one place " the Seed of the woman," that was to " bruise the serpent's head," in another, " the Lamb of God," in another, " the Desire of all nations," in another, " the Son of man," in another, " the Brightness of His Father's glory," in another, " the Bread that came down from heaven," in another, " the Tree of life," " the Alpha and Omega ;" and all this, not because it is a more striking way of saying what could equally well have been said in

plainer ways, but because it is the plainest and most literal way of speaking of which the nature of the subject admits. And thus, when at the conclusion of the Last Supper our Lord took bread and blessed it and gave it to His Apostles, saying, "This is My Body," we may [be sure] He stated that which was more near the literal truth than could be expressed in any other language whatsoever.

Opposed to these errors, but erroneous much for the same reason, is the Roman Catholic dogma about Transubstantiation. Unlike the Protestant glosses, this does not attempt to explain away every thing miraculous in the history of the Last Supper : but, by explaining precisely wherein the miracle consisted, and how it was brought about, it aims, like them, at relieving us from a confession of ignorance, and so far must be regarded as a contrivance of human scepticism, to elude the claims of Faith, and to withdraw from the hidden mysteries of religion the indistinctness in which God has thought fit to envelope them.

Let men take God at His own word ; and since we know that He can do miracles, let us not doubt when He asserts that He has done so.

The foregoing observations, it will be noticed, turn all on the supposition that the command, "Do this in remembrance of Me," extended only to persons gifted with supernatural powers, for to such persons only would it be credible, that the thing they were commanded to do was miraculous. If

the command had been general, then, unaccompanied as it is with a general assurance of power to execute it, we must have understood it to enjoin nothing more than our natural faculties would enable us to obey. But this does not appear to have been the case; and therefore the consideration of what *we* are able to do, is altogether irrelevant, as it affects the *Apostolic Eucharist*, necessary as it is to be considered with reference to the interpretation of the *Traditionary Rite*.

§ 5. *The Apostolic Eucharist Sacrificial.*

If the *Apostolic Eucharist* may, for aught we know, have been as great a miracle as the accounts of its institution, [literally taken,] imply it to have been; and if, consequently, no one can reasonably undertake to administer it, who has not reason to think himself extraordinarily gifted for that purpose; it may seem unpractical to pursue the subject farther, without previously showing, first, the credibility that such gifts exist any where at the present day, and secondly, how the possessors of them are to be distinguished. Neither of these questions however can, properly speaking, be answered from *Scripture*; and as such do not come under this inquiry, which relates only to *Scripture*, I postpone them for the present, and proceed to such farther notices as *Scripture* affords, respecting this one great rite of *Christian worship*.

It is well known, that immediately after the *Apostolic times* the *Eucharist* was regarded by

Christians as sacrificial; and this alone, though Scripture were entirely neutral on the subject, might in the absence of any counter argument, amount to a presumption that it was really so. Scripture, however, is not absolutely neutral, but on more than one occasion appears to countenance the views of the ancient Christians.

1. The words of our Lord, [in Luke xxii. 1 Cor. xi.] which the English version renders, “*This do* in remembrance of Me,” are, *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε*. Now if these words are translated right, they leave us in doubt, in all the three passages where they occur, what the exact thing was which the Apostles were directed to *do*. If we looked only to the passage in St. Luke, we should suppose them equivalent to, “eat this in remembrance of Me;” for in this Gospel the words, “take, eat,” of St. Mark and St. Matthew are omitted, and they in their turn omit the words, “Do this.” St. Mark and St. Matthew represent our Lord as saying, “Take, eat, this is My Body.” The parallel words in St. Luke are, “This is My Body which is given for you: *This do*,” &c.; so that from a comparison of these passages, St. Luke would seem to have expressed by “This do,” what the other Evangelists expressed by “Take, eat.” St. Paul’s account, however, proves that our Lord used both expressions “*Take, eat*,” and “*This do*.” “*Take, eat*, this is My Body which is broken for you; *this do* in remembrance of Me;” and again, “This cup is the New Testament in My blood, *this do*, as often

as ye shall drink it, in remembrance of Me." Yet even here it is not at all obvious to what the words, "This do" are to be referred, though they certainly mean something more than "this eat" and "this drink." The whole passage is this; "The Lord Jesus, the same night in which He was betrayed took bread, and when He had given thanks, He brake it, and said, Take, eat, this is My Body which is broken for you: this do in remembrance of Me. After the same manner also He took the cup, when He had supped, saying, This cup is the New Testament in My Blood, this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of Me." Now the awkwardness of this last expression, if it simply means, "*This drink*," is obvious; and the only other thing which it can mean, viz. "Take this cup as I have taken it," is, to say the least, vague, for we are no where told how our Lord took the cup, or how He gave thanks over it, or how He blessed it, but simply that He did these things, and that the result was the conversion of the bread and wine into His Body and Blood. I do not bring this forward as a proof that the words, *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε*, are translated wrongly; for there is no difficulty in supposing that they were intended to be as vague as this translation makes them; but simply to show that, if they admit fairly of another and fuller meaning, we should not reject it as wholly unworthy of attention; for that our present version [of them] is not so absolutely satisfactory as to render all further research superfluous.

Now it should be observed that, though the *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε*, certainly may mean, "This do," it also may mean, and in numberless and most unequivocal instances does mean, "Offer this," or "Sacrifice this." Thus Ex. xxix. 36. "And thou shalt *offer* every day a bullock for a sin offering for atonement," *τὸ μωσχάριον τῆς ἁμαρτίας ποιήσεις*. And again, v. 38. "Now this is that which thou shalt *offer* upon the altar, two lambs of the first year," *ἀ ποιήσεις*. Again, v. 39, "The one lamb thou shalt *offer* in the morning, and the other lamb thou shalt *offer* at even," *τὸν ἄμνον τὸν ἕνα ποιήσεις*. κ. τ. λ. And v. 41. So again, Ex. x. 25. "And Moses said, Thou must give us also sacrifices and burnt offerings, that we may *sacrifice* unto the Lord our God," *ἀ ποιήσομεν τῷ κυρίῳ*. So again, Lev. iv. 20. And thou shalt *sacrifice* the bullock, as the bullock for a sin offering," *ποιήσεις τὸν μωσχόν*. Also, Lev. vi. 22. "The priest of his sons that is anointed in his stead shall *offer* it, (for a sweet smelling savour)" *ποιήσει ἀντὴν [θυσίαν]*. Also, Lev. ix. 7. "And Moses said unto Aaron, Go unto the Altar, and *offer* thy sin offering, [*ποιήσον τὸ περὶ ἁμαρτίας σου*] and thy burnt offering, and make atonement for thyself and for the people; and *offer* the offering of the people [*ποιήσον τὰ ἑώρα τοῦ λαοῦ*] and make an atonement for them, as the Lord commanded." Also, v. 16. "And he brought the burnt offering, and *offered* it according to the manner," *ἐποίησεν αὐτό*. Also, v. 22. "Aaron...came down from *offering* of the sin offering," *ποίησας τὸ περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. Also, Lev. xiv. 19. "And the Priest shall

offer the sin offering," ποιήσει τὸ περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Also, v. 30. "And he shall *offer* the one of the turtle doves," ποιήσει μίαν ἀπὸ τῶν τρυγόνων. Also, Lev. xvii. 4. "to *offer* it for a burnt offering," ὥστε ποιῆσαι αὐτὸ εἰς ὀλοκαύτωμα, and v. 9. "And bringeth it not to *offer* it unto the Lord," μὴ ἐνέγκῃ ποιῆσαι αὐτὸ τῷ Κυρίῳ. Also, xxiii. 12. "And ye shall *offer*...an he lamb without blemish," &c. ποιήσετε πρόβατον. Also, 1 Kings xviii. 23. "And I will dress [or *offer*] the other bullock," ποιήσω τὸν βοῶν. And v. 25, "choose you one bullock for yourselves, and dress [*offer*] it first," ποιήσατε πρῶτοι. And v. 26, "And they took the bullock and they dressed [*offered*] it," &c. καὶ ἐποίησαν.

In all the places above quoted, it is obvious that ποιεῖν must be rendered "offer," or "sacrifice." It is also probable, that, wherever it occurs in combination with τὸ πάσχα, [the Passover] it has this signification¹; for, though this phrase sometimes means "the feast of the Passover," and in this sense can be said ποιεῖσθαι, without expressing the notion of sacrifice, yet it much more frequently means, "the paschal lamb," and therefore most probably means this, wherever the context will allow of it: and hence, ποιεῖν τὸ πάσχα, since it may mean, "sacrifice the paschal lamb," probably does mean it.

Clearly then it is in no way far-fetched or unnatural, to translate τὸυτο ποιεῖτε, "offer" or "sacrifice

¹ 2 Chron. xxx. 1, 2; xxxv. 1. Ezra vi. 19. Numb. ix. 2. Josh. v. 10. 2 Kings xxiii. 21. 1 Esdr. i. 6.

this ;” especially when we regard the Eucharist as instituted at the paschal feast, when the circumstances would naturally suggest the sacrificial association to which the words adapt themselves.

Neither does it appear wholly unworthy of consideration, that the mode of expression, *ποιεῖν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν*, [“offer for a remembrance”] appears to correspond to the modes of expression above quoted ; *ποιεῖν εἰς ὄλοκαύτωμα*, and *ποιεῖν εἰς ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας*, [to offer for a burnt offering, to offer for a sweet smelling savour,] Ex. xxix. 41. Lev. xvii. 4 ; xiv. 31. xxiii. 12 ; thus referring the Eucharistic Sacrifice (if such it is to be esteemed) to a class distinct from the sacrifices, *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, [for sin] which were to cease under the New Covenant, (Heb. x. 18). And the continuance in no way interferes with the perfection and sufficiency of the one “Sacrifice for the sins of the whole world,” offered by Christ upon the Cross. It is as though our Lord had said, Offer this, but not “as a sacrifice for sin ;” for this I shall Myself offer once for all. Offer it rather as you have been accustomed to offer sacrifices “for a burnt offering,” or “for a sweet smelling savour.” Offer it “for a memorial of Me.”

On the whole then it appears that the Greek words, *τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*, may, if regarded by themselves, be rendered, “Sacrifice this for a memorial of Me,” with as much propriety as they have been rendered, “Do this in remembrance of Me.” And perhaps it will not be denied, that, by substituting the former for the latter rendering,

in St. Paul's account of the institution of the Eucharist, some indistinctness is removed, without any injury to the general meaning.

2. The sacrificial view of the Eucharist is further countenanced in the parallel drawn by St. Paul between it and the Heathen Sacrifices. In order to show the Corinthians the incompatibility of their duties as Christians with occasional attendance at idolatrous rites, he argues, (1.) "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the Blood of Christ? the bread which we break, is it not the communion of the Body of Christ?" (2.) "Behold the Israel after the flesh, are not they which eat of the sacrifices communicants of the Altar?" and then concludes, "That which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice unto devils, and not to God; and I would not that ye should have communion with devils." Here then it is at least implied, that the Eucharist was a rite corresponding to the Jewish and Heathen Sacrifices; all three being in the same sense means of communion, the one with the Body and Blood of Christ, the other with the Altar of God, and the last with devils; that they were corresponding parts of different religions, different not with respect to the nature of their worship, but the object of it. This correspondence is still farther dwelt on, and pointed out more in detail in the following verse, "Ye cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils; ye cannot be partakers of the Lord's table, and of the table of devils;" in which place it seems to be

implied, not merely that the Eucharist among Christians corresponded to the Heathen Sacrifices, but that the thing sacrificed was in both cases *material*. The cup of the Lord in the Eucharist could hardly correspond to the cup of devils in the Heathen Sacrifices, unless there was some correspondence in the manner of their dedication; nor could the table of the Lord correspond to the table of devils, unless there was some correspondence in their respective uses. But it is well known that in the Heathen rites the cup which the worshippers drank, was in the first instance offered by the Priest; and that the table at which they partook of it was the altar on which it had been sacrificed.

3. There is one other passage in St. Paul's Epistles which acquires much force and clearness by supposing that the Eucharist was administered in his time with the same rites, and viewed in the same light, as we know it to have been in the age immediately succeeding. It is this: "Nevertheless, brethren, I have written the more boldly to you in some sort, as putting you in mind of the grace that is given me of God, that I should be a Priest of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, sacrificing the Gospel of God, that the offering up of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being sanctified by the Holy Ghost¹;"

εἰς το ἔιναι με λειτουργὸν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, ἱεουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα γένηται ἡ προσφορὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν εὐπρόσδεκτος, ἡγιασμένη ἐν Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ.

¹ [vid. Hickes.]

Now I suppose it cannot by any possibility be doubted that here is an allusion to some sacrificial rite or other. The sentiment is certainly not conceived in such plain matter of fact language as to allow us to rest satisfied with a bare literal interpretation: metaphorical it certainly is in a very high degree, and the metaphor is as certainly taken from some sacrificial rite: to deny this is to deny that the passage has any meaning at all. Again, in inquiring from what sacrificial rite the metaphor is taken, one naturally looks for that which offers most points of resemblance; and if any should suggest itself, the parts of which correspond exactly clause by clause to St. Paul's figurative expressions, it will be at least a presumption that this was what he alluded to.

Now although the words, *λειτουργιὸς, ἱερουργεῖν, προσφορά*, and *ἐνπρόσδικτος*, are all common to every sacrificial rite, Jewish, Heathen, or Christian, it is quite clear that *ἡγιασμένη Πνεύματι Ἁγίῳ* can have no connexion with either of the former; that no offering except a Christian offering can ever have been "sanctified by the Holy Ghost." So that either these last words must be suffered to introduce a new and irrelevant metaphor, or the whole must be referred to a Christian rite. It is farther observable, that the words, "sanctified by the Holy Ghost," not only preclude the notion of any but a Christian rite, but they are in an especial manner applicable to a rite, which we know to have existed among Christians in a very early age. The most

marked feature in the ancient Eucharistic rite, was the Invocation of the Holy Ghost upon the elements of bread and wine, that they might thereby be made the Body and Blood of Christ. This rite we know to have been universally observed in the age next to the Apostolic; and if we suppose it to have originated but a few years earlier, it will afford a clear and easy key to St. Paul's whole meaning. The passage in question will then run as follows: "Nevertheless, brethren, I have written more boldly to you in some sort, as putting you in mind of the Apostolical office which is given me of God, that I should be a Priest of Jesus Christ among the Gentiles, the preaching of the Gospel being my sacrificial rite, and the whole Gentile Church my offering, acceptable to God, not as the legal sacrifices, which were seasoned only with salt, but, as the Evangelical Offering of the Holy Eucharist, sanctified by the Holy Ghost."

Thus a text, otherwise obscure, acquires a most simple and obvious meaning, on supposing the Apostolic Eucharist to have been, like the primitive, a sacrificial rite; and, so far, must be allowed to countenance that supposition.

§ 6. *No Eucharist without a Priesthood*¹.

....Either the benefits we derive from the Eucharist are only such as a serious observation of our

¹ [The remaining question whether the Apostolic Eucharist still remains in the Church, is not treated by the Author, who;

own hearts show us we derive, or besides these there are others of which we are necessarily unconscious, and which we cannot, with our present faculties, understand....

That from a right participation of this Ordinance we derive benefits of the first kind, both great and many, will be admitted by all serious persons :

however, has left the notes which follow, and which were written prior to what has gone before, showing the mode in which he proposed to handle it. The argument ran thus: 'The Apostolic Eucharist was miraculous; therefore, if ours be the Apostolic, it is miraculous; but miracles imply persons gifted with power to work them; our Eucharist, therefore, is not miraculous, unless there has been an appointment of consecrating persons, in other words, a Priesthood. He had then two points to insist on; first, that "no real Eucharist is without a Priesthood," next, that "a Priesthood exists." The former of these he discusses in the following paragraphs as far as they go; the latter he considered, in a great measure, an *historical* not a Scripture question, (as the ascertainment of the Canon is,) falling, to use his own words, under the following heads:] 1. It appears that our Lord made provisions for perpetuating the means of observing the Eucharist. 2. That these provisions have not yet been frustrated by man's perverseness. 3. And therefore that since the means still exist, it is our duty to avail ourselves of them; for that they would not have been perpetuated for nothing. [This was to have been followed by a chapter on the "Credibility of historical evidence in religious matters," of which one sentence is written,] As it is not my wish to throw a doubt over the identity of the modern and ancient Eucharist, but rather to make it credible that both are miracles, it is desirable to show that the grounds on which the two opinions rest, are not merely the same, which has been pointed out already, but that they are sufficient.

(1.) Because the rite itself is a standing evidence of the fact which it professes to commemorate, the death of our Lord ; and thereby has an evident tendency at once to strengthen our own faith by bringing this evidence strongly before our mind, and to call the attention of unthinking people to the shortest and easiest refutation of Deism. This subject has been so admirably handled in Mr. Leslie's well-known Treatise, that it is useless to dwell upon it. (2.) Because the great solemnity of the service, and the discipline which is required preparatory to it, are a most wholesome interruption of the worldly thoughts and pursuits which are so apt to engross us ; and must, if properly observed, assist and enliven our devotions. These benefits are not small ; and these, it is evident, are the natural consequences of a right participation of the Eucharist.

A question, however, arises, whether these are the only benefits derived from it, or whether there are not others of a hidden and mysterious character, to produce which we see in it no natural tendency, and which no examination of our own heart can enable us with any certainty to detect.....

Such being the state of the case, it seems to me not a little remarkable, that the whole controversy should have been allowed by both parties to turn on a point, the relevance of which is far from being obvious, except on the admission of a fact which removes all ground for controversy. The question under dispute concerns the benefits which we at this

day derive from commemorating our Lord's Last Supper with His Apostles : the question which has been substituted for this by both parties, concerns only the benefits which the Apostles derived from that Last Supper itself¹. Of which two questions the identity is by no means obvious, as will be seen by every one who considers the subject dispassionately ; and the confusion which has arisen from treating them as one and the same, has been in two respects prejudicial to the truth.

On the one hand it has tended to withdraw from view a very important fact², the due consideration of which might reconcile many inquiring minds to the mysterious view of the Eucharist, as administered now ; and on the other it has driven many, who feel a natural repugnance to this view, to cherish a similar repugnance with respect to the Eucharist of our Lord, and to acquiesce in forced and unnatural interpretations of it, which, when they have become habitual, are a barrier to all farther inquiry.

Thus, if people would but open their eyes to the total and immeasurable difference between the most solemn circumstances under which the Eucharist

¹ [i. e. a question, which is only of importance on the *assumption* that our commemoration is the *same* in its benefits as our Lord's actual Supper ; an assumption which is not tenable, except there are persons who can do what our Lord did in it ; i. e. except on the admission of a fact which removes all ground for controversy.]

² [viz. the existence of persons who can do what Christ did.]

can now be administered among us, and those under which it was originally administered, and likewise between the persons receiving in the two cases, and above all between the administrators, they will clearly perceive that nothing could give any colour of probability to the identity of the two rites, except it could be made to appear that our Lord had left behind Him persons endowed with superhuman powers for this express purpose, and had secured a succession of such persons for ever; but if this could be made to appear, the mysterious view of the rite would lose all its seeming absurdity, and become at once as credible as the other, even to the most sceptical mind: and unless this could be made to appear, such persons might fearlessly acquiesce in a plain straightforward interpretation of the Scriptures relating to the Lord's Supper, without having recourse to the sophisms, which are now too frequently made use of in lowering that wonderful narrative, or being obliged to raise the modern Eucharist above the level which their reason assigns to it.

What Jesus Christ did in administering the holy bread and cup to His Apostles, is one thing; and whether any persons exist now on earth with power to do the same thing, is another. And these two questions are as perfectly distinct as any two questions can be.....

The reason why men hesitate to adopt this view [the miraculous] of our Lord's Last Supper, is a notion that they are thereby committing themselves

to a similar view of the modern Eucharist: let them again call to mind the wide difference between the two cases, and not fear that any admissions they may make respecting the power of the Incarnate Word can involve assent to irrational superstitions. No argument can be brought forward to identify the original Eucharist with our commemorative imitation of it, except one which, if made good, will make the miraculous character of the latter just as credible as that of the former¹, and which is perfectly independent of any views that may be adopted respecting the words, "This is My Body," and "This is My Blood." So that on this point men may trust their own impartial thoughts without any fear of consequences, or at all compromising their Protestantism.....

The importance of guarding against this and similar fallacies [that of arguing from the Apostolic to the modern Eucharist,] arises from the tendency they have to leave the mind satisfied with a half truth. The conclusion drawn in this instance is perfectly true, however inconsecutive; and if it were the whole truth, there would be no reason for criticizing the arguments. But since it is only part of the truth, and since the manner of drawing it has a tendency to obscure the other half, such criticism becomes necessary. If the arguments on which we allow ourselves to rest the identity of the Apostolic Eucharist and that performed among

¹ [viz. that there is a person able to effect it.]

ourselves, do not at the same time show it to be credible that miraculous powers have been left among us for the performance of it, then it will be to us incredible that the Apostolic Eucharist was miraculous; and this, I believe, is the way in which most persons argue. Whereas the fact is, that there is no ground whatever for believing the two rites identical, except what is equally a ground for believing that there are persons now in the world endowed with miraculous powers for making them so.

The short of the matter is, that both these things are credible, or neither are; in the former case there is no difficulty in attributing a miraculous character to the modern as well as the Apostolic Eucharist; in the latter there will be no inconsistency in denying it of the one, though we assert it of the other. The consecration of the bread and wine among ourselves need not be more than a form, though among the Apostles it was a miracle; nor among the Apostles need it have been less than a miracle, though it be a form among ourselves. The two questions are distinct, and should be treated as such.

Possibly it may here occur to many serious persons, not indeed as an argument against this view, but as a reason for disliking it, that it tends to throw an air of uncertainty over the use and excellence of our most solemn religious rite. Now of such persons I would ask, what do they consider to be the benefits they derive from this rite? If

they are members of the Church of England they will say, they consider their souls to be strengthened and refreshed by the Body and Blood of Christ, as their bodies are by the bread and wine: but these expressions are very ambiguous, and different persons interpret them differently. The Body and Blood of Christ are in one sense the spiritual aliment of pious souls, at all times and in all places, and are more so at one time than another, in proportion as we are more or less intent on the thought of what He has done for us, and on the resolution to identify our own will with His. If this sense of the Body and Blood of Christ is the sense in which it is said to be the inward part or thing signified in the Sacrament, and to be verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful, then it is taken and received by them at all times, in proportion as they are faithful, and only at the Lord's Supper more than at other times, according as the outward and visible sign tends to enliven their faith, and to fix their hearts more intently on Christ. All persons then who conceive that this kind of spiritual eating and drinking of the Body and Blood of Christ is the only benefit of which we are partakers in this Sacrament, may at once divest themselves of any apprehension lest uncertainty should be cast over its use and excellency; the only uncertainty of which the nature of the case admits, must arise from their own want of faith, and has no connexion whatever with the origin of the institution.

On the other hand, those who do not take this

limited view of the benefits of this Sacrament, but believe that in some sense or other the consecrated bread becomes really the Body, and the cup the Blood of their Lord, and that on eating and drinking they become nourished by Him in some unperceived and incomprehensible manner, such persons will have little reason to complain of [the above] view, as opposing difficulties to their generous faith. Surely if they attribute to consecration such wonderful effects, without at the same time supposing that there are persons set apart by God to consecrate, and endowed for this purpose with power from on high, their difficulties are great enough already. If they believe that because our Lord said, "Do this in remembrance of Me," therefore any one is able to kneel down with a party of his serious friends, and by repeating the words of Him who spoke as never man spake, to make common bread and wine into His precious Body and Blood, they certainly will find it no fresh tax on their faith to believe that Christ has left behind him on earth, a succession of persons, empowered by a special commission, to work this miracle, which they can conceive to be done even without a commission.

The modern Eucharist is either a [mere] commemoration or a miracle; if it is only a commemoration, it is good and pious whoever instituted it; if it is a miracle, no one can complain of its being shown to be a credible miracle.

COLLECTION OF TEXTS,
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE VIEWS CONTAINED IN
THE ABOVE ESSAY.

I. TEXTS INTIMATING THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

WHEREIN IT IS CALLED,

1. *The Kingdom of God.*

Matt. iv. 23. Jesus went about... κηρύσσων τὸ εὐαγγελίον τῆς βασιλείας.preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom.

Matt. x. 7. The Apostles were commissioned to go to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.... κηρύσσετε, λέγοντες· Ὅτι ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν ἑρανῶν. ..Preach, saying, The Kingdom of heaven is at hand.

Matt. xvi. 28. Jesus tells the Disciples that some persons then living should not taste of death till they saw the Son of Man coming ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ αὐτῆς. coming in His kingdom.

Matt. xxi. 43. Jesus prophesying respecting the Jews, says, ἀρθήσεται ἀφ' ὑμῶν ἡ βασιλεία τῆς Θεοῦ. The kingdom of God shall be taken from you.

Mark i. 14, 15. After John was delivered up Jesus came to Galilee, κηρύσσων τὸ εὐαγγελίον τῆς βασιλείας τῆ Θεοῦ, Καὶ λέγων· Ὅτι πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρὸς, καὶ ἤγγικεν ἡ βασιλεία τῆ Θεοῦ· μετανοεῖτε, καὶ πιστεύετε ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ.

Luke i. 32, 33. The prophecy of the Angel to the Virgin Mary: καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ Κύριος ὁ Θεὸς τὸν θρόνον Δαβὶδ τῆ πατρὸς αὐτῆς. Καὶ βασιλεύσει ἐπὶ τὸν οἶκον Ἰακώβ· εἰς τὰς αἰῶνας, καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτῆ οὐκ ἔσται τέλος.

Luke viii. 1. εὐαγγελιζόμενος τὴν βασιλείαν τῆ Θεοῦ·

Luke xxi. 31. So likewise ye, when ye see these things . . . know ὅτι ἐγγύς ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τῆ Θεοῦ.

Acts i. 3. After the Resurrection, Jesus was with them forty days, λέγων τὰ περὶ τῆς βασιλείας τῆ Θεοῦ.

Acts viii. 12. When they believed Philip, εὐαγγελιζομένῳ τὰ περὶ τῆς βασιλείας τῆ Θεοῦ, καὶ τῆ ὀνόματος τῆ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐβαπτίζοντο·

Acts xx. 25. . . . διήλθον κηρύσσων τὴν βασιλείαν τῆ Θεοῦ.

Acts xxviii. 31. . . . Κηρύσσων τὴν βασιλείαν τῆ Θεοῦ, καὶ διδάσκων τὰ περὶ τῆ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

. . . .preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the Gospel.

The Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of His father David: And He shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of His kingdom there shall be no end.

. . . .Preaching . . the glad tidings of the kingdom of God.

. . . .that the kingdom of God is nigh at hand.

. . . .speaking of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God.

. . . .preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God, and the Name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized.

. . . .preaching the kingdom of God.

. . . .Preaching the kingdom of God, and teaching those things which concern the Lord Jesus Christ.

1 Cor. xv. 24. *Ἔτα τὸ τέλος, ὅταν παραδῶ τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ.*

Then cometh the end, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father.

Col. i. 13. *Ὃς ἐρρύσατο ἡμᾶς ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας τῆς σκοτίας, καὶ μετέστησεν εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῆς υἱῆς τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτῆς.*

Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son.

2. *The Dominion of Christ.*—vid. Dan. ii. 44, vii. 14, 27.

Heb. i. 8. Unto the Son He saith, *Ὁ θρόνος σου, ὁ Θεὸς, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τῆς αἰῶνος· ῥάβδος ἐδούλητός ἡ ῥάβδος τῆς βασιλείας σου.*

Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever, a sceptre of righteousness is the sceptre of Thy kingdom.

Heb. ii. 8. *Πάντα ὑπέταξας ὑποκάτω τῶν ποδῶν αὐτῆς.*

Thou hast put all things in subjection under His feet.

1 Tim. vi. 15. *Ὁ μακάριος καὶ μόνος δυνάστης, ὁ Βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλευόντων, καὶ Κύριος τῶν κυριευόντων,*

The blessed and only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords;

Rev. xvii. 14. and xix. 16. *Κύριος κυρίων καὶ Βασιλεὺς βασιλέων.*

Lord of lords, and King of kings.

Acts ii. 36. *Κύριον καὶ Χριστὸν αὐτὸν ὁ Θεὸς ἐποίησε.*

God hath made that same Jesus . . . both Lord and Christ.

Rom. xiv. 9. *Εἰς τέλος γὰρ Χριστὸς καὶ ἀπέθανε καὶ ἀνέστη καὶ ἀνέζησεν, ἵνα καὶ νεκρῶν καὶ ζώντων κυριεύσῃ.*

For to this end Christ both died, and rose, and revived, that He might be Lord both of the dead and living.

Philipp. ii. 9—11. *Διὸ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσε, καὶ ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὀνομα· Ἴνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ πάντων γόνυ κάμψῃ ἐπερα-*

Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a Name which is above every name; That at the Name of Jesus every knee should

νίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχ-
θονίων· Καὶ πᾶσα γλῶσσα
ἐξομολογήσεται, ὅτι Κύριος
Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς, εἰς δόξαν Θεοῦ
πατρὸς.

bow, of things in heaven, and
things in earth, and things
under the earth; And that
every tongue should confess
that Jesus Christ is Lord, to
the glory of God the Father.

3. *The City of God.*

Gal. iv. 24—26. Αὐται γάρ
εἰσιν αἱ δύο διαθήκαι· . . . Τὸ
γὰρ Ἄγαρ, Σινᾶ ὄρος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ
Ἀραβίᾳ, συστοιχεῖ δὲ τῇ νῦν
Ἱερουσαλήμ, δελεύει δὲ μετὰ τῶν
τέκνων αὐτῆς· Ἡ δὲ ἄνω Ἱερε-
ουσαλήμ, ἐλευθέρα ἐστὶν, ἣτις ἐστὶ
μήτηρ πάντων ἡμῶν.

Eph. ii. 19. Συμπολιταὶ τῶν
ἀγίων καὶ οἰκεῖοι τῆ Θεοῦ·

Heb. xii. 22. Προσεληλύθατε
Σιών ὄρει, καὶ πόλει Θεοῦ ζῶντος,
Ἱερουσαλήμ ἐπερανίῃ.

For these are the two cove-
nants; . . . For this Agar is
mount Sina in Arabia, and
answereth to Jerusalem which
now is, and is in bondage with
her children. But Jerusalem
which is above is free, which
is the mother of us all.

. . . Fellow-citizens with the
saints, and of the household
of God.

Ye are come unto Mount
Sion, and unto the city of the
living God, the heavenly Jeru-
salem.

4. *The House and Household of God.*

Eph. ii. 19. Οἰκεῖοι τῆ Θεοῦ.

1 Tim. iii. 15. Ἴνα εἰδῆς
πὼς δεῖ ἐν οἴκῳ Θεοῦ ἀναστρέ-
φεισθαι, ἣτις ἐστὶν ἐκκλησία Θεοῦ
ζῶντος.

Heb. iii. 1—6. . . . Χριστὸν
Ἰησοῦν Πιστὸν ὄντα τῷ ποιήσαντι
αὐτὸν, ὡς καὶ Μωσῆς ἐν ὄλῳ τῷ

Of the household of God.

That thou mayest know
how thou oughtest to behave
thyself in the house of God,
which is the Church of the
living God.

. . . The Apostle and High
Priest of our profession, Christ
Jesus; Who was faithful to

οἴκῳ αὐτῆ· Πλείονος γὰρ δόξης
ἔτος παρὰ Μωσῆν ἠξίωται, καθ'
ὅσον πλείονα τιμὴν ἔχει τῷ οἴκῳ
ὃ κατασκευάσας αὐτόν· Πᾶς
γὰρ οἶκος κατασκευάζεται ὑπό
τινος· ὃ δὲ τὰ πάντα κατασ-
κευάσας, Θεός. Καὶ Μωσῆς μὲν
πιστὸς ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτῆ, ὡς
θεράπων, . . . Χριστὸς δὲ, ὡς υἱὸς
ἐπὶ τὸν οἶκον αὐτῆ. Ἐ οἶκός
ἐσμεν ἡμεῖς.

Him that appointed Him, as
also Moses was faithful in all
his house. For this man was
counted worthy of more glory
than Moses, inasmuch as he
who hath builded the house
hath more honour than the
house. For every house is
builded by some man; but He
that built all things is God.
And Moses verily was faithful
in all his house, as a servant,
. . . . But Christ as a Son over
His own house; whose house
are we.

1 Pet. ii. 5. Αὐτοὶ ὡς λίθοι
ζῶντες οἰκοδομεῖσθε, οἶκος πνευ-
ματικὸς.

Ye also, as lively stones, are
built up a spiritual house.

5. *A Temple.*

1 Cor. iii. 16, 17. Οὐκ οἴδατε,
ὅτι ναὸς Θεοῦ ἐστε, καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα
τοῦ Θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν; . . . ὃ γὰρ
ναὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἅγιός ἐστιν, οἷτινές
ἐστε ὑμεῖς.

Know ye not that ye are the
temple of God, and that the
Spirit of God dwelleth in you?
. . . . for the temple of God is
holy, which temple ye are.

2 Cor. vi. 16. Ὑμεῖς γὰρ
ναὸς Θεοῦ ἐστε ζῶντος· καθὼς
εἶπεν ὁ Θεός· Ὅτι ἐνοικήσω
ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐμπεριπατήσω.

For ye are the temple of
the living God; as God hath
said, I will dwell in them, and
walk in them.

Eph. ii. 20—22. Ἐποικο-
δομηθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ θεμελίῳ
τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ προφητῶν,
ὄντος ἀκρογωνιαίου αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ
Χριστοῦ· Ἐν ᾧ πᾶσα ἡ οἰκο-
δομή συναρμολογημένη αὖξει

And are built upon the
foundation of the apostles and
prophets, Jesus Christ Himself
being the chief corner-stone;
In whom all the building, fitly
framed together, groweth unto

εἰς ναὸν ἅγιον ἐν Κυρίῳ· Ἐν
 ᾧ καὶ ὑμεῖς συνοικοδομεῖσθε, εἰς
 κατοικητήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν Πνεύ-
 ματι. an holy temple in the Lord :
 In whom ye also are builded
 together for an habitation of
 God through the Spirit.

6. *The Commonwealth (polity) of Israel.*

Ephes. ii. 12. Ἄπηλλοτριω- Aliens from the common-
 μένοι τῆς πολιτείας τοῦ Ἰσραήλ. wealth of Israel.

7. *The Body of Christ.*

Eph. i. 22, 23. Καὶ αὐτὸν And gave Him to be the
 ἔδωκε κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα τῇ head over all things to the
 ἐκκλησίᾳ. Ἥτις ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα Church, which is His body.
 αὐτοῦ.¹

Eph. iv. 11, 12, 16. Καὶ And He gave some, apostles ;
 αὐτὸς ἔδωκε, τοὺς μὲν, ἀπο- and some, prophets ; and some,
 στολούς· τοὺς δὲ, προφήτας· evangelists ; and some, pastors
 τοὺς δὲ, εὐαγγελιστάς. τοὺς δὲ, and teachers ; For the per-
 ποιμένας καὶ διδασκάλους, Πρὸς perfecting of the saints, for the
 τὸν καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων, εἰς work of the ministry, for the
 ἔργον διακονίας, εἰς οἰκοδομὴν edifying of the body of Christ...
 τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ.... From whom the whole body
 Ἐξ ἧ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, συναρμολο- fitly joined together and com-
 γήμενον καὶ συμβιβασόμενον διὰ pacted by that which every
 πάσης ἀφῆς τῆς ἐπιχορηγίας, joint supplieth, according to
 κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν μέτρῳ ἐνὸς the effectual working in the
 ἐκάστῃ μέρει τὴν αὐξησιν τοῦ measure of every part, maketh
 σώματος ποιεῖται, εἰς οἰκοδομὴν increase of the body, unto the
 ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ· edifying of itself in love.

Eph. v. 23. Χριστὸς κεφαλὴ Christ is the head of the
 τῆς ἐκκλησίας· Church.

¹ What does v. 21. Ὑπεράνω πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας.... and
 οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ, &c. mean ?

Eph. v. 30. Ὅτι μέλη ἐσμὲν τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀστέων αὐτοῦ.

(Cf. John xv. 5. Ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ ἄμπελος, ὑμεῖς τὰ κλήματα·

Rom. xii. 4—8. Καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι μέλη πολλὰ ἔχομεν, τὰ δὲ μέλη πάντα οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει πρᾶξιν· Οὕτως οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν σώματι ἐσμὲν ἐν Χριστῷ, ὁ δὲ καθ' εἷς, ἀλλήλων μέλη. Ἐχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθείσαν ἡμῖν διάφορα εἶτε προφητεῖαν, Ἐἴτε διακονίαν, εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων, Ἐἴτε ὁ παρακαλῶν, ὁ μεταδίδους, ὁ προϊστάμενος, ὁ ἐλεῶν.

1 Cor. xii. 12, 13, 27, 28.

Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἓν ἐστί, καὶ μέλη ἔχει πολλὰ, πάντα δὲ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἐνὸς, πολλὰ ὄντα, ἓν ἐστί σῶμα· ἕτω καὶ ὁ Χριστός. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ Πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν. . . . Ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ, καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρες. Καὶ οὓς μὲν ἔθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ πρῶτον ἀποστόλους, δευτέρου προφήτας, τρίτον διδασκάλους· κ. τ. λ.

Coloss. i. 16, 18. Ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα . . . θρόνοι, . . . κυριότητες, . . . ῥχαὶ, . . . Καὶ αὐτός ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ἐκκλησίας.

For we are members of His body, of His flesh and of His bones.

I am the vine, ye are the branches :)

For as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office ; So we, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another. Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us, whether prophecy, Or ministry, or he that teacheth, Or he that exhorteth, he that giveth, he that ruleth, he that sheweth mercy.

For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body : so also is Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular. And God hath set some in the church, first, apostles ; secondarily, prophets ; thirdly, teachers ;

For by Him were all things created thrones dominions principalities powers ; And He is the head of the body, the church.

II. TEXTS INTIMATING THE NATURE OF
ITS GOVERNMENT.

1. *Power of binding and loosing.*

Matth. xvi. 18, 19. Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μὲς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν· καὶ πύλαι ἧδα οὐ κατισχύσουσιν αὐτῆς· Καὶ δώσω σοὶ τὰς κλεῖς τῆς βασιλείας τῶν οὐρανῶν· καὶ ὃ ἐὰν δήσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ἔσται δεδεμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· καὶ ὃ ἐὰν λύσῃς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ἔσται λελυμένον ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς.

Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

Matt. xviii. 17—20. Ἐὰν δὲ παρακούσῃ αὐτῶν, [δύο ἢ τριῶν μαρτύρων] εἰπὲς τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας παρακούσῃ, ἔστω σοὶ ὡσπερ ὁ ἐθνικὸς καὶ ὁ τελώνης. Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅσα ἐὰν δήσητε ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ἔσται δεδεμένα ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· καὶ ὅσα ἐὰν λύσητε ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ἔσται λελυμένα ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ. Πάλιν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅτι ἐὰν δύο ὑμῶν συμφωνήσωσιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς περὶ παντὸς πράγματος, οὗ ἐὰν αἰτήσωνται, γενήσεται αὐτοῖς παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου, τοῦ ἐν οὐρανοῖς. Οὗ γὰρ εἰσι δύο ἢ τρεῖς συνηγμένοι εἰς τὸ ἐμὸν ὄνομα, ἐκεῖ εἰμι ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν.

And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. Again I say unto you, That if two of you shall agree on earth as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of My Father which is in heaven. For where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.

John xx. 21—23. Καθὼς ἀπέσταλκέ με ὁ πατήρ, καθὼς πέμπω ὑμᾶς. Καὶ τοῦτο εἰπὼν ἐνεφύσησε, καὶ λέγει αὐτοῖς· Λάβετε Πνεῦμα ἅγιον. Ἐάν τινων ἀφῆτε τὰς ἁμαρτίας, ἀφίενται αὐτοῖς· ἄν τινων κρατῆτε, κεκράτηνται.

As My Father hath sent Me, even so send I you. And when He had said this, He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost: Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained.

2. *St. Paul's practical Comment upon these powers.*

1 Cor. v. 3—5. Ἦδη κερικα ὡς παρὼν, τὸν οὕτω τοῦτο κατεργασάμενον· Ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, συναχθέντων ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πνεύματος, σὺν τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, Παραδοῦναι τὸν τοιοῦτον τῷ Σατανᾷ εἰς ὄλεθρον τῆς σαρκὸς, ἵνα τὸ πνεῦμα σωθῆ ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ.

I, verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have judged already, as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed, In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, To deliver such an one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus.

1 Tim. i. 20. Ὑμέναιος καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος· οὓς παρέδωκα τῷ Σατανᾷ, ἵνα παιδευθῶσι μὴ βλασφημεῖν.

Hymeneus and Alexander; whom I have delivered unto Satan, that they may learn not to blaspheme.

1 Cor. iv. 21. Τί θέλετε; ἐν ῥάβδῳ ἔλθω πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἢ ἐν ἀγάπῃ, πνευματί τε πραότητος;

What will ye? shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love, and in the spirit of meekness?

2 Cor. x. 2. Δέομαι δὲ, τὸ μὴ παρὼν θαρρῆσαι τῇ πεποιθήσει, ἢ λογίζομαι τολμῆσαι ἐπὶ

But I beseech you, that I may not be bold when I am present with that confidence

τινας τοὺς λογιζομένους ἡμᾶς ὡς
κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦντας.

wherewith I think to be bold
against some, which think of
us as if we walked according
to the flesh.

2 Cor. xiii. 10. Διὰ τοῦτο
ταῦτα ἀπὼν γράφω, ἵνα παρὼν
μὴ ἀποτόμως χρήσωμαι, κατὰ
τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ἣν ἔδωκέ μοι ὁ
Κύριος εἰς οἰκοδομὴν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς
καθαίρεσιν.

Therefore I write these
things being absent, lest being
present I should use sharp-
ness, according to the power
which the Lord hath given me
to edification, and not to de-
struction.

1 Cor. v. 12, 13. Οὐχὶ τοὺς
ἔσω ὑμεῖς κρίνετε; . . . Καὶ ἔξα-
ρεῖτε τὸν πονηρὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν.

Do not ye judge them that
are within? . . . Therefore put
away from among yourselves
that wicked person.

3. *St. Paul's Commission.*

Rom. i. 1. Παῦλος, δοῦλος Ἰη-
σοῦ Χριστοῦ, κλητὸς ἀπόστολος,
ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγελίον Θεοῦ.

Paul, a servant of Jesus
Christ, called to be an apostle,
separated unto the gospel of
God.

Cf. 1 Cor. i. 1, and 2 Cor. ii. 1.

Gal. i. 1. Ἀπόστολος οὐκ
ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ δι' ἀν-
θρώπου, ἀλλὰ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

An apostle, not of men,
neither by man, but by Jesus
Christ.

Gal. i. 12. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ
παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον αὐτό,
οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην· ἀλλὰ δι' ἀπο-
καλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

For I neither received it of
man, neither was I taught it,
but by the revelation of Jesus
Christ.

4. *Extent of the Apostolical Commission.*

Mark xvi. 15. Εἶπεν αὐτοῖς·
Πορευθέντας εἰς τὸν κόσμον
ἅπαντα, κηρύξατε τὸ εὐαγγέλιον
πάσῃ τῇ κτίσει.

He said unto them, Go ye
into all the world, and preach
the gospel to every creature.

Matt. xxviii. 18—20. Καὶ προσελθὼν ὁ Ἰησοῦς, ἐλάλησεν αὐτοῖς, λέγων· Ἐδόθη μοι πᾶσα ἐξουσία ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς. Πορευθέντας οὖν μαθητεύσατε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος· Διδάσκοντες αὐτοὺς τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐνετειλάμην ὑμῖν· καὶ ἰδοὺ, ἐγὼ μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας, ἕως τῆς συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος. Ἀμήν.

Luke xxiv. 49. Καὶ ἰδοὺ, ἐγὼ ἀποστελλω τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ πατρὸς μου ἐφ' ὑμᾶς· ὑμεῖς δὲ καθίσατε ἐν τῇ πόλει Ἱερουσαλήμ, ἕως οὗ ἐνδύσασθε δύναμιν ἐξ ὕψους.

Matt. x. 16. Ἴδοὺ, ἐγὼ ἀποστέλλω ὑμᾶς ὡς πρόβατα ἐν μέσῳ λύκων.

And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen.

And, behold, I send the promise of my Father upon you: but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high.

Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves.

5. Commission given by the Apostles to their immediate Successors.

Acts xx. 28. Προσέχετε οὖν ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ποιμνίῳ, ἐν ᾧ ὑμᾶς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἔθετο ἐπισκόπους.

May not these, ἐπισκόποι have been called πρεσβυτεροὶ catechrestically? as St. Paul calls himself διάκονος (1 Cor. iii. 5. Eph. iii. 7.) St. Peter calls himself πρεσβυτερός, 1 Pet. v. 1. and St. John, 2 John 1, and 3 John 1.

Acts vi. 5, 6. Καὶ ἐξελέξαντο Στέφανον, ἄνδρα πλήρη πίστεως καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου, καὶ Φίλιπ-

Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers.

And they chose Stephen, a man full of faith and of the Holy Ghost, and Philip, and

πον, καὶ Πρόχορον, καὶ Νικάνο-
ρα, καὶ Τίμωνα, καὶ Παρμενῶν,
καὶ Νικόλαον προσήλυτον Ἀντι-
οχέα. Οὓς ἔστησαν ἐνώπιον
τῶν ἀποστόλων· καὶ προσευξά-
μενοι ἐπέθηκαν αὐτοῖς τὰς χεῖρας.

Acts xiv. 23. Χειροτονή-
σαντες αὐτοῖς Πρεσβυτέρους κατ'
ἐκκλησίαν, προσευξάμενοι μετὰ
νηστεῶν, παρέθεντο αὐτοὺς τῷ
Κυρίῳ.

Titus i. 5. Τοῦτου χάριν
κατέλιπόν σε ἐν Κρήτῃ, ἵνα τὰ
λείποντα ἐπιδιορθώσῃ, καὶ κατα-
στήσῃς κατὰ πόλιν πρεσβυτέρους,
ὡς ἐγὼ σοι διαταξάμην.

1 Tim. iv. 14. Μὴ ἀμέλει
τοῦ ἐν σοὶ χαρίσματος, ὃ ἐδόθη
σοι διὰ προφητείας, μετὰ ἐπιθέ-
σεως τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου.

2 Tim. i. 6. Δι' ἣν αἰτίαν
ἀναμνήσκω σὲ ἀναζωπυρεῖν τὸ
χάρισμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐν σοὶ
διὰ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν μου.

Heb. v. 4, 5. Καὶ οὐχ
ἑαυτῷ τις λαμβάνει τὴν τιμὴν,
ἀλλὰ ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ,
καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀαρὼν. Οὕτω
καὶ ὁ Χριστὸς οὐχ ἑαυτὸν ἐδόξασε
γεννηθῆναι ἀρχιερέα, ἀλλ' ὁ λα-
λήσας πρὸς αὐτόν· Υἱὸς μου εἶ
σύ, ἐγὼ σήμερον γενένηκά σε.

Prochorus, and Nicanor, and
Timon, and Parmenas, and
Nicolas a proselyte of An-
tioch; Whom they set before
the apostles: and when they
had prayed, they laid their
hands on them.

When they had ordained
them elders in every church,
and had prayed with fasting,
they commended them to the
Lord, on whom they believed.

For this cause left I thee in
Crete, that thou shouldest set
in order the things that are
wanting, and ordain elders in
every city, as I had appointed
thee.

Neglect not the gift that is
in thee, which was given thee
by prophecy, with the laying
on of the hands of the pres-
bytery.

Wherefore I put thee in re-
membrance, that thou stir up
the gift of God, which is in
thee by the putting on of my
hands.

And no man taketh this
honour unto himself, but he
that is called of God, as was
Aaron. So also Christ glori-
fied not Himself to be made an
high priest; but he that said
unto Him, Thou art My Son,
to-day have I begotten Thee.

6. *The Apostles require obedience to their Successors.*

Heb. xiii. 7. Μνημονεύετε τῶν ἡγερμένων ὑμῶν.

Remember them which have the rule over you.

Heb. xiii. 17. Πειθήσεθε τοῖς ἡγερμένοις ὑμῶν, καὶ ὑπείκετε· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀγρυπνοῦσιν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν, ὡς λόγον ἀποδώσοντες·

Obeys them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves; for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account;

1 Thessal. v. 12, 13. Ἐρωτῶμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, εἰδέναι τοὺς κοπιῶντας ἐν ὑμῖν, καὶ προϊσταμένους ὑμῶν ἐν Κυρίῳ, καὶ νεθετοῦντας ὑμᾶς· καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐκπερισσοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ, διὰ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν.

And we beseech you, brethren, to know them which labour among you, and are over you in the Lord, and admonish you; And to esteem them very highly in love for their work's sake.

7. *The use the Successors of the Apostles were to make of their powers.*

1 Tim. v. i. Πρεσβύτερω μὴ ἐπιπλήξῃς, ἀλλὰ παρακάλει ὡς πατέρα·

Rebuke not an elder, but entreat him as a father;

1 Tim. v. 20. Τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας, ἐνώπιον πάντων ἔλεγχε, ἵνα καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ φόβον ἔχωσι.

Them that sin rebuke before all, that others also may fear.

2 Tim. iv. 2. Κήρυξον τὸν λόγον, ἐπίστηθι ἐνκαίρως, ἀκαίρως· ἔλεγχον, ἐπιτίμησον, παρακάλεσον.

Preach the word; be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort,

Tit. i. 13. Ἐλεγχε αὐτοὺς ἀποτόμως, ἵνα ὑγιαίνωσιν ἐν τῇ πίστει·

Wherefore rebuke them sharply, that they may be sound in the faith;

Tit. ii. 15. Ἐλεγχε μετὰ πάσης ἐπιταγῆς· μηδέίς σοῦ περιφρονεῖτω.

Rebuke with all authority; let no man despise thee.

Rev. ii. 14. Ἔχω κατὰ σοῦ
ὀλίγα, ὅτι ἔχεις ἐκεῖ κρατοῦντας
τὴν διδαχὴν Βαλαάμ.

But I have a few things
against thee, because thou hast
there them that hold the doc-
trine of Balaam,

Rev. ii. 20. Ἔχω κατὰ σοῦ
ὀλίγα, ὅτι ἐὰς τὴν γυναῖκα Ἰεζ-
αβήλ, τὴν λέγασαν ἑαυτὴν προ-
φήτιν, διδάσκειν καὶ πλανᾶσθαι
ἐμοὺς δούλους.

I have a few things against
thee, because thou sufferest
that woman Jezebel, which
calleth herself a prophetess, to
teach and seduce my servants.

8. *Warnings to those who join the Rulers of this world
against the Apostles.*

2 Chron. xxvi. 17, 18. And Azariah the priest...with
fourscore priests of the Lord, that were valiant men;...with-
stood Uzziah the king, and said unto him, It appertaineth not
unto thee, Uzziah, to burn incense unto the Lord, but to the
priests the sons of Aaron, that are consecrated to burn incense :
go out of the sanctuary ; for thou hast trespassed : neither shall
it be for thine honour from the Lord God.

Matt. x. 40. Ὁ δεχόμενος
ὑμᾶς, ἐμὲ δέχεται· καὶ ὁ ἐμὲ
δεχόμενος, δέχεται τὸν ἀποστεί-
λαντά με.

He that receiveth you, re-
ceiveth Me ; and he that re-
ceiveth Me, receiveth Him
that sent Me.

Luke x. 16. Ὁ ἀκούων
ὑμῶν, ἐμοῦ ἀκούει· καὶ ὁ ἀθετῶν
ὑμᾶς, ἐμὲ ἀθετεῖ· ὁ δὲ ἐμὲ ἀθε-
τῶν, ἀθετεῖ τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με.

He that heareth you, hear-
eth Me ; and he that despiseth
you, despiseth Me ; and he
that despiseth Me, despiseth
Him that sent Me.

John xiii. 20. Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν *
λέγω ὑμῖν· Ὁ λαμβάνων, ἐάν
τινα πέμψω, ἐμὲ λαμβάνει· ὁ
δὲ ἐμὲ λαμβάνων, λαμβάνει τὸν
πέμψαντά με.

Verily, verily, I say unto
you, he that receiveth whom-
soever I send, receiveth Me ;
and he that receiveth Me, re-
ceiveth Him that sent Me.

9. *Conflict between Christ's Kingdom and that of the world.*

Matt. x. 34. Μὴ νομίσητε ὅτι ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν· οὐκ ἦλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην, ἀλλὰ μάχαιραν.

Think not that I came to send peace on earth; I came not to send peace, but a sword.

Acts iv. 19. Ὁ δὲ Πέτρος καὶ Ἰωάννης ἀποκριθέντες πρὸς αὐτοὺς εἶπον· Εἰ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ὑμῶν ἀκούειν μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ, κρίνατε.

But Peter and John answered and said unto them, Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye.

Acts v. 29. Ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ ὁ Πέτρος καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι, εἶπον· Πειθαρχεῖν δεῖ Θεῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνθρώποις.

Then Peter and the other Apostles answered and said, We ought to obey God rather than men.

Acts xvii. 6, 7. Οἱ τὴν οἰκεμένην ἀναστατώσαντες, οὗτοι καὶ ἐνθάδε πάρεισιν, . . . καὶ οὗτοι πάντες ἀπέναντι τῶν δογμάτων Καίσαρος πράττεσι, βασιλέα λέγοντες ἕτερον εἶναι, Ἰησοῦν.

These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also; . . . these all do contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is another King, one Jesus.

Luke xxiii. 2. Ἦρξαντο δὲ κατηγορεῖν αὐτοῦ, λέγοντες· Τοῦτον εὗρομεν διαστρέφοντα τὸ ἔθνος, καὶ κωλύοντα Καίσαρι φόρος διδόναι, λέγοντα εἶναυτον Χριστὸν βασιλέα εἶναι.

And they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting the nation, and ¹forbidding to give tribute to Caesar, saying that He Himself is Christ a King.

¹ It should be translated, "leading them to withhold tribute, by saying."

III. TEXTS INTIMATING THE MYSTERY OF GODLINESS.

Rom. viii. 38, 39. Πέπεισμαι γὰρ, ὅτι οὔτε θάνατος, οὔτε ζωή, οὔτε ἄγγελοι, οὔτε ἀρχαί, οὔτε δυνάμεις, οὔτε ἐνεστώτα, οὔτε μέλλοντα, οὔτε ὕψωμα, οὔτε βάθος, οὔτε τις κτίσις ἑτέρα, δυνήσεται ἡμᾶς χωρίσαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ Θεοῦ, τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.

Eph. i. 17—21. ὁ πατήρ τῆς δόξης, ἐφῆ ὑμῖν Πνεῦμα σοφίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως ἐν ἐπιγνώσει αὐτοῦ· Πεφωτισμένους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς διανοίας ὑμῶν, εἰς τὸ εἰδέναι ὑμᾶς, τίς ἐστίν ἡ ἐλπίς τῆς κλήσεως αὐτοῦ, καὶ τίς ὁ πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης τῆς κληρονομίας αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις· Καὶ τί τὸ ὑπερβάλλον μέγεθος τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς, τοὺς πιστεύοντας κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργειαν τοῦ κράτους τῆς ἰσχύος αὐτῆ· Ἦν ἐνήργησεν ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, ἐγεῖρας αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν· καὶ ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἐπερانیοις, Ὑπεράνω ωάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας καὶ δυνάμεως, καὶ κυριότητος, καὶ παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένους οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι.

For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

That...the Father of glory, may give unto you the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Him: The eyes of your understanding being enlightened; that ye may know what is the hope of His calling, and what the riches of the glory of His inheritance in the saints, And what is the exceeding greatness of His power to us-ward who believe, according to the working of His mighty power, Which He wrought in Christ, when He raised Him from the dead, and set Him at His own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come.

Eph. iii. 8—10. Ἐμοὶ ἐδόθη ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν εὐαγγελίσασθαι τὸν ἀνεξιχνίαστον πλοῦτον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ φωτίσαι πάντας, τίς ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ ἀποκεκρυμμένου ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων ἐν τῷ Θεῷ τῷ πάντα κτίσαντι διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ· Ἴνα γνωρισθῇ νῦν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ἐν τοῖς ἐπερανοῖς, διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἣ πολυποίκιλος σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ·

Unto me is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ; And to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ: To the intent that now, unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God,

Eph. vi. 11, 12. Ἐνδύσασθε τὴν πανοπλίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι ὑμᾶς στήναι πρὸς τὰς μεθοδείας τοῦ διαβόλου· Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη πρὸς αἷμα καὶ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς, πρὸς τὰς ἐξουσίας, πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπερανοῖς.

Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.

Col. i. 16. Ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τὰ ὄρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, εἴ τε θρόνοι, εἴ τε κυριότητες, εἴ τε ἀρχαὶ, εἴ τε ἐξουσίαι· τὰ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἔκτισται·

For by Him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him, and for him;

Col. ii. 9, 10, 15. Ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς· καὶ ἔστε ἐν αὐτῷ πεπληρωμένοι, ὅς ἐστιν

For in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. And ye are complete in him, which is the head of all prin-

ἡ κεφαλὴ πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας. . . . Ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἐξουσίας ἐδειγμάτισεν ἐν παρρησίᾳ, θριαμβεύσας αὐτοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ.

1 Pet. iii. 22. Ὁς ἐστὶν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ Θεοῦ, πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανὸν, ὑποταγέντων αὐτῷ ἀγγελῶν καὶ ἐξουσιῶν καὶ δυνάμεων.

Philipp. ii. 9, 10. Ὁ Θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσε, καὶ ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων ὀνομάτων. Ἴνα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ πάντων γόνων κάμψη ἐπερανίων καὶ ἐπιγείων καὶ καταχθονίων.

Heb. ii. 8. Ἐν τῷ ὑποτάξαι αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, οὐδὲν ἀφήκεν αὐτῷ ἀνυπότακτον.

Titus iii. 1. Ὑπομνήσκει αὐτοὺς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἐξουσίαις ὑποτάσσεσθαι,

Jude 8, 10. Οὗτοι ἐνυπνιαζόμενοι, σάρκα μὲν μαινεσι, κυριότητα δὲ ἀθετοῦσι, δόξας δὲ βλασφημοῦσιν. . . . ὅσα μὲν οὐκ οἶδασι, βλασφημοῦσιν. ὅσα δὲ φυσικῶς, ὡς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, ἐπίστανται, ἐν τούτοις φθειρόνται.

1 Cor. vi. 3. Οὐκ οἶδατε ὅτι ἀγγέλους κρινοῦμεν;

Cf. 1 Tim. v. 21.

cipality and power; . . . And, having spoiled principalities and powers, He made a shew of them openly, triumphing over them in it.

Who is gone into heaven, and is on the right hand of God; angels, and authorities, and powers, being made subject unto Him.

Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name; That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth;

For in that He put all in subjection under Him, He left nothing that is not put under Him.

Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers.

These filthy dreamers defile the flesh, despise dominion, and speak evil of dignities. . . . speak evil of those things which they know not: but what they know naturally, as brute beasts, in those things they corrupt themselves.

Know ye not that we shall judge angels?

1 Cor. xv. 24, 25. *Εἴτα τὸ τέλος, ὅταν παραδῶ τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ, ὅταν καταργήσῃ πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν. Δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν βασιλεύειν, ἄχρις οὗ ἂν θῆ πάντας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ.*

John v. 22, 27. *Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ πατήρ κρίνει οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ τὴν κρίσιν πᾶσαν δέδωκε τῷ υἱῷ. . . . Καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ καὶ κρίσιν ποιεῖν, ὅτι υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ.*

Matt. xix. 28. *Ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ, ὅταν καθίσῃ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ θρόνον δόξης αὐτοῦ, καθίσεσθε καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ δώδεκα θρόνους, κρίνοντες τὰς δώδεκα φυλὰς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ.*

Luke xxii. 29, 30. *Κἀγὼ διατίθεμαι ὑμῖν, καθὼς διέθετό μοι ὁ πατήρ μου, βασιλείαν ἵνα . . . καθίσῃσθε ἐπὶ θρόνων, κρίνοντες τὰς δώδεκα φυλὰς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ.*

Then cometh the end, when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom of God, even the Father; when He shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For He must reign, till He hath put all enemies under His feet.

For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: . . . And hath given Him authority to execute judgment also, because He is the Son of Man.

In the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of His glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

And I appoint unto you a Kingdom, as My Father hath appointed unto Me; That ye may . . . sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

REMARKS
ON
STATE INTERFERENCE
IN
MATTERS SPIRITUAL¹.

*Introductory Matter*².

THE recent changes which have taken place in our political constitution are still regarded throughout the country with such strong feelings either of triumph or disapprobation, that it is scarcely possible to utter any opinion about them without calling forth the angry feelings of one party or another; while with more dispassionate persons the whole subject is studiously put aside as one which can no longer lead to any practical good. Yet if the following Remarks should be so fortunate as to attract attention, it is hoped that they will on the whole be

¹ [Written in 1833. The MSS. are very numerous, and vary a good deal. The greater part has appeared in the British Magazine.]

² [Apparently the beginning of a re-cast of the whole.]

found neither irritating nor unpractical; indeed that their tendency may in some respects prove healing and conciliatory, while at the same time they may be not wholly destitute of importance.

On the political effects of these changes the writer has no intention of expressing any opinion: his hope is that they may prove as beneficial to the country as their most sanguine advocates anticipated; and that all those who, like himself, have felt alarm at the spirit in which they were enacted, may live to recognize in them the favour, not the wrath, of an over-ruling Providence. Their political effects we must leave time to interpret for us: other effects, however, they certainly have had, quite independent of Politics, on which, as they respect not the future, but the past, and turn simply on facts, without involving any questions of opinion, it may be possible to arrive at something like a general agreement.

The joint effect of three recent and important Acts, (1.) the Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, (2.) the Concessions to the Roman Catholics, (3.) the late Act for Parliamentary Reform, has most certainly been to efface in at least one branch of our Civil Legislature, that character which, according to our great Authorities, qualified it to be at the same time our Ecclesiastical Legislature, and thus to cancel the conditions on which it has been allowed to interfere in matters spiritual.

This is no subject on which we may lightly dogmatise one way or the other; the interests at stake

are too important to be so dealt with. We must come to it in a serious considerate frame of mind, looking steadily to the result of our determination. On the other hand, we must weigh well the responsibility we incur if in our time we allow a *new* system to be established, an *usurpation* to be commenced, affecting an Institution so important as Christ's Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church, without taking pains in the first place to assure ourselves that we are not compromising its safety or even dignity; for even the dignity of the Church is not to be lightly disregarded. On the other hand, we must not conceal from ourselves the hazard of the alternative; the more than possibility that a rejection of Parliamentary interference may lose for us Parliamentary protection. On this important question then, the writer of these pages will not take upon himself to dogmatise; he has his own opinion, but he leaves others to form theirs. Of this, however, he is certain, that we are now commencing a new system of Ecclesiastical Polity, the merits of which are yet to be decided.....

The¹ extent to which Parliament has lately pressed its claim to interfere with the internal government of the Church, naturally excites attention in the minds of Churchmen: and many who have been led to canvass the justice of the claim, on what appears to be [its] own merits, have found it difficult to devise any reasonable pretext for [it].

¹ [This seems to be a new beginning.]

It seems at first sight something short of reasonable, that persons, not necessarily interested in the welfare of the Church, should deliberate for its good ; and still less so, that they should be allowed to dictate laws to it, without the consent of those who are necessarily interested ; and least reasonable of all, when we add the consideration, that many of the persons so dictating, are, as a fact, its avowed enemies, and that their dictates are deeply reprobated by the great body of its attached members. And yet that the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland are not necessarily interested in the welfare of the Church, indeed that many of its members are our avowed enemies, and that the Church, as a body, deeply deploras this interference in its concerns, are, it is supposed, admitted facts. So that persons, who have been led to canvass the question on its own merits, have felt in some degree perplexed at the recognition of a claim apparently so ill according with common sense.

To such persons a painful doubt is apt to suggest itself, whether there may not be something unsound, and almost unjust, in the system of government which authorises such a claim ; whether, after all that has been said and felt about the excellence of the English Constitution, there may not still be something wrong about it ; some hollowness or flaw which has hitherto escaped notice only because circumstances have kept it hidden : in short, whether we may not even now have to

revert to first principles, and lay our foundations afresh¹.

Such a doubt [may indeed] be resolutely repressed even by [him] to whom it occurs most forcibly, in the full conviction, that, whatever may appear to himself to be just and reasonable, still that the great and good persons who have lived before him, could scarcely have overlooked the anomaly so apparent to himself, nor have passed it uncensured, unless they had been prepared to justify it. Still, however, though the doubt may be suppressed, the perplexity will remain; common sense will persist in obtruding its suggestions, and these are, it may be, more easily silenced than satisfied.

It is with a view to this perplexity that the following considerations are put together. They are addressed to persons who fear to trust their common sense in a matter of such importance, and who, though they cannot justify the system of government under which they live, still feel inclined to acquiesce in it, out of deference to their wiser predecessors. For the satisfaction of such persons, it may be noticed, in the first place, that the inconsistency which they suppose to subsist between the views of their predecessors and their own, is rather apparent than real; for that the system of government which they allowed to pass uncensured, was

¹ [This passage may throw light on the Author's meaning in saying, that "the Reformation was a limb badly set." vid. vol. i. p. 433.]

then free from the anomaly, the existence of which constitutes our difficulties.....

§ 1. [*Legislative interference considered on*] *Conservative Principles*¹.

“A *union* between *excellent* men of *all parties* for the maintenance of peace and order!” *excellent* truly, and of *all parties!* parties who agree in nothing but a wish to maintain peace and good order! who differ in opinion respecting all man’s higher interests and duties, respecting all those points about which to differ is to disapprove; who will unite on no other basis than that of selfish worldly convenience; and yet who are to recognise each other as *excellent men!* How can one protest too earnestly against such mawkishness as this?

Excellent Independents forsooth; and excellent Socinians; and excellent Jews; excellent aliens from the Church of Christ; excellent unbelievers in the faith, in the which “he that believeth not shall be damned;” and, to amalgamate the strange mass, excellent latitudinarians, who, like Gallio, “care for none of these things!” These *excellent persons* are to come together, and, waving those *minor points* on which they differ, to unite on those of which all acknowledge the importance,—*the maintenance of peace and good order.*

And yet, say many considerate persons, it is much easier to declaim against the absurdity of

¹ [From the British Magazine for July, 1833.]

such an arrangement than to suggest a substitute for it, which is at once better and practicable. It may be very true that peace and good order are but of secondary importance to the well-being of society; it may be very sad and grievous to abandon the nobler parts of our political system; it may be a revolting task to co-operate with those for whom we entertain a just and deep-rooted antipathy: all this may be, and yet it may become a wise and good man to lay a strong restraint upon his feelings, and to accept, as an alternative, what in itself he considers ever so objectionable.

Such is the tone of many considerate and right-minded persons, who, looking to the present dispositions of Parliament, and to the probable current of what is called public opinion, have judged it, humanly speaking, impossible for the Church of England to recover her lost ascendancy in the councils of this nation. They believe, and perhaps justly, that the changes lately introduced into the British constitution have enabled the dissenting and latitudinarian parties to overthrow any government formed on exclusive principles; and that no set of men will ever again share a preponderating influence except on the basis of concession; in short, that an effort to secure to ourselves any thing more than peace and good order, can end in nothing less than anarchy and confusion.

Now is this the real state of the case? Is our position indeed so altered in the course of the last few years? This is no unimportant question, no

dreamy unpractical speculation, no subject for profitless inquiry or otiose acquiescence. If we must indeed make up our minds to the course which is here prescribed; if we must abandon all hopes of recovering our lost position; if we are no longer to contend for the exclusive supremacy that was formerly deemed the right of the Church of England;—if so, then it is high time for us to look the truth in the face, to examine it in all its bearings, and follow it out into all its consequences. It is not for us to hope and to wait, and to praise caution, and to deprecate gloomy views, and to trust things may turn out better than we expect, and to lull our apprehensions by dreaming about “excellent men,” and “minor points,” and “peace and good order,”

“Non hoc ista sibi tempus spectacula poscit.”

If Churchmen must submit to a union with dissenters and latitudinarians, they should at least do so with their eyes open. If they must make up their minds to concession, they should at least see clearly what they can concede legally and without impiety; what parts of their system they *may* relinquish, and what they *must* maintain at all costs. For whatever sacrifices we may be prepared to make for peace and good order, we must sacrifice even these for the Church of Christ.

The practical question, then, on which we have to decide, is this:—Is it possible so to remodel our Church system as to propitiate the dissenting and latitudinarian parties? and if so, have we a right

to do this? Nor do I doubt that most persons will feel themselves prepared with a ready answer to both these questions. It seems to be generally assumed that such a reconciliation would be no hard matter; that the worst we have to fear is such a re-arrangement of Church property as should render the higher clergy less obnoxious to envy, and perhaps lower the body generally as a caste of society. This seems to be the very worst fear of the most apprehensive persons; and to all this it seems to be admitted that we might consent without a compromise of principle.

But let the good persons, who satisfy themselves so easily, but open their eyes a little wider. Let them not look forward so many moves; but observe more closely how things stand at present. Let them not flatter themselves that the changes about which they deliberate are future and distant. They are present,—nay, past. A great change has taken place already in the constitution of the Church of England,—a change which affects her welfare not remotely or virtually, but actually and at once. Whenever it was that the Church of England lost her exclusive supremacy in the councils of this nation, then, at that very instant, a change took place in her internal constitution—a change, too, of no ordinary magnitude or importance, but a *down-right Revolution*. A trust, which had been reposed by our Apostolical predecessors on a power internal to the Church, was then allowed to devolve upon aliens; and that, too, in a matter of

the very highest consequence, virtually affecting her well-being, perhaps even her existence as a visible society.

As long as the governing power was restricted, either by law or in fact, to persons in communion with the Church, so long it was safe and proper to confide to that power the nomination of our ecclesiastical superiors. But now, that neither law secures to us such a government, nor does the existing state of things permit us ever again to hope for it, the question assumes a very altered aspect. "Quel sera la garantie de leur choix?" says one of the able writers of the "Avenir," under circumstances very similar to our own. "Quel sera en effet pour nous la garantie de leur choix? Depuis que la religion Catholique n'est plus la religion de la Patrie, les Ministres d'état sont et *doivent être* dans une *indifférence légale* à notre égard: est-ce leur indifférence qui sera notre garantie? Ils sont laïcs, ils *peuvent être* *Protestants, Juifs, Athées*: est-ce leur conscience qui sera notre garantie? Ils sont choisis dans les rangs d'une société imbue d'un préjugé opiniâtre contre nous: est-ce leur préjugé qui sera notre garantie? Ils régneront enfin depuis quatre mois: est-ce leur passé qui sera notre garantie?"

So too with us, according to the wretched principles which it is supposed impossible any longer to withstand. His Majesty's Ministers, in future must be, and ought to be, at least in their public capacity, *detached from religious parties*,—dans une *indiffé-*

rence légale a notre egard : with us, then, as with the Catholics of France,—est-ce leur indifférence qui sera notre garantie? Nor is *indifference* the worst we have to fear; they *ought* to be *indifferent*; they *may be*, on conscientious principles doubtless, *our enemies*; they may be conscientious dissenters, or conscientious Jews, or conscientious Atheists; est-ce leur conscience qui sera notre garantie? Finally, and with sorrow be it spoken, we have ground for alarm not merely in what they *ought to be* or what they *may be*; melancholy indeed is the truth, but nevertheless it is a truth, that we can look with no greater confidence to what they *have been*. “Est-ce leur passé qui sera notre garantie? Ils n’ont ouvert la bouche que pour nous menacer; ils n’ont étendu la main que pour abattre nos croix; ils n’ont signé les ordonnances ecclésiastiques que pour sanctionner les actes arbitraires dont nous étions victimes; * * ils ne nous ont pas protégés une seule fois sur un seul point de France; ils nous ont offerts en holocauste prémature à toutes les passions.” And here too the painful parallel of our situations will suggest itself but too vividly. “VOILA LES MOTIFS DE SECURITE Q’ILS NOUS PRESENTENT! VOILA LES HOMMES DE QUI VOUS CONSENTIRIEZ A RECEVOIR VOS COLLEGUES DANS LA CHARGE DE PREMIERS PASTEURS.”

Nor need we fear, continues this able writer, to reassert our privileges; the power as well as the right is ours; let us know our strength and use it. QUE CRAIGNEZ VOUS! N’ETES VOUS PAS EVEQUES?

Bishops of Christ's holy everlasting Church, who shall interfere with the free exercise of your indelible prerogative? Consecrate or refuse to consecrate: who shall reverse your decree? You can bind, and who shall loose? *UNE SEULE CHOSE LEUR EST POSSIBLE; LE RETRANCHEMENT DE NOTRE BUDGET.* Evêques de France! nous de vous en disons pas d'avantage: c'est a vous de voir lequel vous preferez laisser sur vos sièges, en mourant, ou d'un Episcopat riche et corrupteur, ou d'un Episcopat pauvre et digne de vous succeder."

Such are the sentiments of a true conservative: a conservative, not of names, but of things; not of appearances, but of realities: a conservative that would conserve, not to a latitudinarian government trusts that had been repôsed in an exclusive government, merely because it was a government, and is a government, but to the representatives of the Church, rights which have always belonged to the Church, though they were once a ruling party, and are now a persecuted party.

And now, good cautious people, you that praise peace and order, and thank Heaven you are not ultras, be at the pains to give these suggestions just so much thought as to see that they cannot be set aside by a shake of the head, or a shrug of the shoulders, or a declaration that "you cannot go these lengths." Look fairly at the question before you; make up your mind, not whether you will "go these lengths" or remain where you are, but whether you will go *these* lengths or *other* lengths.

Lengths you must go, whether you will or no ; lengths you have already gone, and intolerable lengths. Open your eyes to the fearful change which has been so noiselessly effected ; and acknowledge that BY STANDING STILL YOU BECOME A PARTY TO REVOLUTION.

§ 2. [*Legislative Interference considered upon the principles of Hooker*¹.]

The recent changes in our constitution have been so warmly and ably canvassed that the subject is now supposed to be exhausted, and has become distasteful to all parties. It is hoped, however, that if any one can so far overcome this distaste as to give the following remarks a few minutes' consideration, they will be found to open a view of these changes in some respects novel, and not wholly destitute of practical interest.

In order to ascertain what the CONDITIONS were on which conscientious men among our predecessors *consented to parliamentary interference in matters spiritual*, it is obvious to consult the 8th Book of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity. There, if any where, we shall find the views of a holy and humble man of God, who consented to the interference here spoken of, and who has distinctly informed us of the CONDITIONS on which he so consented.

Now the proposition which will be maintained

¹ [From the British Magazine for November, 1833.]

in the following paper is simply this, that if Hooker be right, by the operation of recent changes, the *CONDITIONS on which Parliament has been allowed to interfere in matters spiritual* are CANCELLED.

1. Hooker¹ gives the following opinion as to the natural and religious course of making laws for the Church :—

“ The most natural and religious course in making laws is, *that the matter of them be taken from the judgment of the wisest in those things which they are to concern.* In matters of God—to set down a form of prayer, a solemn confession of the articles of the christian faith, and ceremonies meet for the exercise of religion—it were unnatural not to think the PASTORS and BISHOPS of our souls a great deal more fit than men of secular trades and callings. Howbeit, when all which the wisdom of all sorts can do is done for the devising of laws in the Church, it is the GENERAL CONSENT OF ALL *that giveth them the form and vigour of laws,* without which they could be no more unto us than the counsel of physicians to the sick. Well might they seem as wholesome admonitions and instructions, but *LAWS they never could be without the consent of the* WHOLE CHURCH TO BE GUIDED BY THEM ; whereunto both nature and the practice of the Church of God, set down in Scripture, is found every way so fully consonant, that God Himself would not

¹ E. P. viii. vi. 11.

impose, no not His own Laws, upon His people by the hand of Moses, without their free and open consent.”

Such is the opinion of the great Hooker as to the natural and religious course of making Laws for the Church. He determined it to be “unnatural” that the *origination* of such laws should not rest with the BISHOPS and Pastors of our souls; but that “when all that the wisdom of all sorts can do, is done, for devising” them, still the GENERAL CONSENT OF ALL TO BE GUIDED BY THEM is necessary to give them *the vigour and form of laws*. From whence it follows, that no *law* can obtain *vigour* in the Church of England—can ever become “naturally” or “religiously” binding, *without the sanction of a GENERAL SYNOD, competent to represent the whole Church, LAITY as well as CLERGY.*

2. We are informed by Hooker¹ that, in his time, *such a sanction* was conferred by the approbation of PARLIAMENT and CONVOCATION. For that as CONVOCATION was a synod of the clergy, so PARLIAMENT was a SYNOD OF THE LAITY OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. “The PARLIAMENT of England, together with the CONVOCATION thereunto annexed, is that upon which the very essence of all government within this kingdom doth depend; *it is even the* BODY OF THE WHOLE REALM; it consisteth of the King and all that within the land are subject unto him.”

¹ E. P. viii. vi. 11.

Here then is one step in the argument: *parliament* and *convocation* represented *the whole body of the realm*. But, further, *the whole body of the realm* was, in Hooker's time, only another name for the *Church*. "We hold," says he¹, "that seeing there is not a man of the CHURCH OF ENGLAND, but the same man is also a member of the COMMONWEALTH; nor any member of the COMMONWEALTH which is not also of the CHURCH OF ENGLAND; therefore, as in a triangle, the base doth differ from the sides thereof, and yet one and the selfsame line is both a base and also a side; a side simply, a base if it chance to be the bottom and underlie of the rest; so albeit properties and actions of one sort do cause the name of a commonwealth, qualities and functions of another sort the name of a Church, to be given to a multitude, yet one and the selfsame multitude may in such sort be both. Nay, it is so with us, that no person appertaining to the one can be denied to be also of the other." And again², "When we oppose therefore the CHURCH and COMMONWEALTH in a Christian society, we mean by the COMMONWEALTH that society, with relation to all the public affairs thereof, the matter of true religion only excepted; by the CHURCH, the same society, only with reference to true religion, without any affairs besides."

Thus, according to Hooker, the *representatives of the commonwealth*, i. e. the PARLIAMENT of

¹ E. P. viii. i. 2.

² E. P. viii. i. 5.

England, were at the same time *representatives of the Church*, and thus a LAY SYNOD OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. And it was *because* parliament was such a synod, and *only* because it was so, that Hooker justified himself in consenting to its *interference in matters spiritual*: in any other case, such interference would have been, in his judgment at least, alike unconformable to the “law of nature” and the “practice of the Church as set down in Scripture.”

As a proof that Hooker was not trifling with himself in thus identifying the Commonwealth and the Church of England, the following Act of Parliament will probably be deemed sufficient:—

“35 Elizabeth,” [c. 1.] A. D. 1592.

“Be it enacted by the Queen’s most excellent Majesty, and by the Lords spiritual and temporal, and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, That if *any person or persons above the age of sixteen years*, who shall obstinately *refuse to repair to some church, chapel, or usual place of common prayer, to hear divine service, established by her Majesty’s laws and statutes* in that behalf made, and shall forbear to do the same by the space of a month next after, without any lawful cause; or, &c.....shall (at any time after 40 days next after the end of this session of parliament,) either by him or themselves, or by the motion, persuasion, enticement, or allurements of any other, *willingly join*

*in, or be present at, any (unlawful) assemblies, conventicles, or meetings, under colour or pretence of any exercise of religion, contrary to the laws and statutes of this realm: that then every such person so offending as aforesaid, and being thereof lawfully convicted, shall be committed to prison, there to remain without bail or mainprize, until they shall conform and yield themselves to come to some church or chapel, or usual place of common prayer, and hear divine service, according to her Majesty's laws and statutes aforesaid, and to make such open submission and declaration of their said conformity as hereafter in this act is declared and appointed*¹.

“Provided always, and be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that *if any such person or persons* which shall offend against this Act, as aforesaid, *shall not within three months* next after they shall be convicted for their said offence, *conform themselves* to the obedience of the laws and statutes of this realm, in coming to the Church to

¹ The form of submission, as far as it affects the Church, is as follows:—“I, A. B. do humbly confess and acknowledge that I have grievously offended God in contemning her Majesty's godly and lawful government and authority, by absenting myself from church and from hearing divine service, contrary to the godly laws and statutes of this realm, and in using and frequenting disordered and unlawful conventicles and assemblies, under pretence and colour of exercise of religion, &c. . . . And I do promise and protest, without dissimulation, or any colour or means of any dispensation, that from henceforth I will perform and obey her Majesty's laws and statutes, in repairing to the Church and hearing divine service, and do my utmost endeavour to maintain and defend the same.”

hear divine service, and in making such public confession and submission as hereafter in this Act is appointed and expressed, being thereunto required by the Bishop of the diocese, or any justice of the peace of the county where the same person shall happen to be, or by the minister or curate of the parish: that in every such case *every such offender* being thereunto warned or required by any justice of the peace of the same county where such offender shall be, *shall, upon his or their corporal oath*, before the justices of the peace in open quarter sessions of the same county, or at the assizes and gaol-delivery, *abjure this realm of England and all other the Queen's dominions for ever*, unless her majesty shall licence the party to return. *And hereupon shall depart out of this realm, at such haven or port, and within such time as shall in that behalf be assigned and appointed* by the said justices before whom such abjuration shall be made, unless the said offender be letted or stayed by such lawful and reasonable means or causes as by the common laws of this realm are permitted and allowed in cases of abjuration for felony. And in such cases of lett or stay, then within such reasonable and convenient time after as the common law requireth in case of abjuration for felony as aforesaid. And that the justices of peace before whom such abjuration shall happen to be made, as is aforesaid, shall cause the same presently to be entered of record before them, and shall certify the same to the justices of assize and gaol-delivery of

the county, at the next assizes or gaol-delivery to be holden in the same county.

“ *And if any such offender* which by the tenor and intent of the act is to be abjured, as is aforesaid, *shall refuse to make abjuration*, as is aforesaid, or *after such abjuration made shall not go to such haven and within such time as is before appointed, and from thence depart out of this realm* according to this present act, or *after such his departure shall return or come again into any her majesty's realms or dominions*, without her majesty's special licence in that behalf first had and obtained; that thus, in every such case, *the person so offending shall be adjudged a felon*, and shall suffer as in case of felony without benefit of clergy.”

This act, it must be admitted, is sufficiently to the point. Persecuting it may be called, unjust and atrocious, if the reader pleases; but it is, at any rate, decisive. It goes straight to the point, and empowers the magistrates and clergy to drive out dissenters, Roman Catholic or protestant alike, all who choose to withhold themselves from the worship of the Church of England: in short, if rigorously enforced, it ensures the identity of the CHURCH and the COMMONWEALTH.

Here, then, we have a formal acknowledgment of the principle on which Hooker justified the then existing relations of Church and State, a RATIFICATION of the CONDITION on which *he consented to parliamentary interference in matters spiritual.*

It remains to trace this principle in the various modifications which it has subsequently undergone, and to show that it was not finally obliterated, nor consequently the *CONDITION CANCELLED*, till the recent changes which have taken place in our constitution.

On referring, then, to Gibson's Summary of "Temporal Laws against Separation," we find that the act above cited, made in the 35th year of Elizabeth, was pronounced to be in force by subsequent acts in the 39th and 43rd years of her reign, and also in the 1st and 7th years of James I.; that in the subsequent parliament, ending in the 18th year of James I., no provision was made for its continuance, through oversight; but that it was again continued in the 21st of James I., and in the 3rd of Charles I. Then a long interval occurs till 1663, which is called the 16th of Charles II., when in the famous act "to prevent and suppress seditious conventicles," we find—"Whereas an act made in the 35th year of the reign of our Sovereign Lady Queen Elizabeth, entitled, &c.....hath not been put in due execution, by reason of some doubt of late made, whether the said act be still in force, although it be very clear and evident; it is hereby declared that the said act is still in force, and ought to be put in due execution." The history of the act winds up in the year 1688.—1 William and Mary,—“In an act entitled, An Act exempting their Majesties' Protestant Subjects, Dissenting, &c.....[Dissenters] shall not be liable to any pains,

penalties, or forfeitures, mentioned in an act made in the 35th year of the reign of the late Queen Elizabeth, entitled, &c.”

But though *this* act was finally repealed in 1688, still the principle on which it was founded was allowed to survive it. *Three other* acts which had been founded on the same principle were allowed to continue in force : viz. (1.) An act made in the 13th year of Charles II., “for the well-governing and regulation of corporations.” (2.) An act made in the 25th year of Charles II., “for preventing dangers which may happen from Popish recusants.” (3.) An act made in the 30th year of Charles II., “for the more effectual preserving of the King’s person and government by disabling Papists from sitting in either house of parliament.” And till these acts were repealed, the CONDITION on which Hooker insists was not thoroughly CANCELLED.....His argument was indeed in some respects weakened by the Act of Toleration, in 1688, but still it was not entirely overthrown. From that time the *Commonwealth* did indeed cease to be *identical* with the *Church* ; but *parliament* did not cease, at least, did not entirely cease, to *represent* the *Church* ; it was still, by virtue of the foregoing acts, in some sense at least, a *lay synod of the Church*. By the 13th of Charles II. the government of all corporations had been consigned into the hands, not merely of churchmen, but of *communicants* ; by the 25th, the crown was protected from all dissenting influences by the exclu-

sion of all except *communicants* from every office held directly or indirectly by royal appointment; and by the 30th, the most influential body of dissenters, i. e. the Roman Catholics, were shut out from either house of parliament. And, till the repeal of these acts, it is clear that vigilance on the part of the Church might have secured for itself at least a very strong party in the House of Commons.

The Church, however, was not vigilant, and two, at least, of these important acts were allowed to fall into disuse. In the 5th year of George I it was enacted, by a House of Commons in which the Church ought to have retained an ascendancy, "that elections into corporate offices shall not be void on account of the person elected having *omitted to communicate* within a year of the election, unless he shall be removed within six months of the election, or unless a prosecution shall be commenced within that time and be carried on without delay." In the 9th year of George II. a further act was passed, "indemnifying all those who, though not communicants, held offices which were restricted to communicants." And subsequently it became a regular practice to pass an act of "indemnity" every session of parliament. At length, in 1828, men had so completely forgotten the principles on which Church and State were anciently united, that the 13th and 25th of Charles II., viz. the test and corporation acts, were repealed, almost without opposition; and the year following, the Roman Catholics were admitted to seats in parliament. In 1832,

the extinction of the Irish Protestant boroughs, and the great power accidentally given to dissenters by the Reform Act, gave a concluding blow to the ancient system. And in 1833, we have witnessed the assembling of a parliament in which few perhaps can detect the traces of a LAY SYNOD OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. To revert, then, to the original proposition, it does appear that, according to Hooker, our *civil* legislature is no longer qualified, as it formerly was, to be our *ecclesiastical* legislature; that the CONDITIONS on which our predecessors consented to *parliamentary interference in matters spiritual* are CANCELLED¹.

¹ [The following remarks on the foregoing Section occur in a letter written in July or August, 1833, by the Author, to a friend who seems to have observed upon it:] I have thought a great deal of your last letter, and quite admit that Hooker's argument has no especial reference to the appointment of Bishops, but goes to any kind of State Interference as well. You seem to think indeed that I stretched it unfairly in applying it to the case of Bishops at all, but this is Hooker's fault, not mine. I have some misgiving myself that it [Hooker's theory of State Interference] is a quibble, but it is the quibble of a great man; and really, if it *is* a bad argument, I can find no other justification for either our ancestors or ourselves, for having so long tolerated the King's usurpation. However, if one looks only at the common sense of the matter, is it not this? As long as the Church had *preponderating* influence in Parliament, so long it was the interest of the Minister, *cæteris paribus*, to prefer a Churchman to a Latitudinarian; if the latter obtained preference, it would be not *because* of his opinions, but *in spite* of them. The short Whig Dynasties have been an exception to this statement; and it is because they were an exception that they were short. The country, such as it was

§ 3. [*Interference of the Crown considered under its existing disabilities.*]

I have already shown on the principles of the great Hooker, that our Civil Legislature is no longer competent to act as our Ecclesiastical Legislature. I now throw out for enquiry, whether the same principles may not affect the competence of the *head* of Civil Legislature, as *head* of the Ecclesiastical Legislature.

The two cases are certainly in one respect very different, for after all the changes that have taken place in the constitutional relations of Church and State, it still remains a law that the King of England must be in communion with the Church of England. Yet it may be questionable whether any great stress should be laid on this difference, as

then, did not like their principles, and turned them out. Now we shall have long Whig Dynasties, because the country, as it is now, does like their principles: and we shall have Latitudinarians appointed *because they are such*; which is what I meant when I said we had no guarantee against the *systematic* appointment of Latitudinarian Bishops. Indeed this is what you say in the latter part of your letter, viz. that such appointments will be more a *matter of course* than formerly. Now it appears to me, that (whether Hooker was refining or not) this is enough for us, and practically settles the point. I wish Bishops had never been appointed by the King; but it seems to me that the impropriety of allowing it now is in *degree* so vastly *greater* than it was till within this last year or two, that I see no great use in the enquiry whether it is *new in kind*. However, it is no use to trouble you on paper, as I mean to accept your kind invitation, &c.

tending to affect his Majesty's *public* acts. In those acts it was never at any time possible for the King of England to maintain a course systematically and constantly opposed to the will of Parliament: he might, indeed, in frequent instances oppose the wishes of his people, either in resisting their caprices or in indulging his own; but to maintain such opposition, in a systematic line of conduct, is what no King has successfully attempted since the first opening of our constitutional liberty. At any time then, at any previous period of our history, the religious opinions of the King, if opposed to the resolute will of Parliament, could have exerted but little influence on his public conduct. At present the case is very much stronger, as will readily be acknowledged by all who have watched the recent progress of events; and more especially those of May, 1832. On the 17th of that month in particular, a scene took place in the House of Lords, in which we are furnished with a very vivid and forcible proof of the dependence of His present Majesty on the will of his Parliament.

In the debate on that night, as reported in the *Mirror of Parliament*, the following words are attributed to Lord Lyndhurst.

“When I was introduced to his Majesty he was pleased to say, he was wholly unprepared for the situation in which he found himself placed, that he had sent to his former chancellor, to consult and advise with me as to the course he should pursue. His Majesty was desirous that I should collect

information and communicate it to him, with respect to the state of the country and the state of parties, in order that he might have materials to guide him in the *difficult* situation in which he was placed."

This subject is further elucidated by the Duke of Wellington, as follows:—

"Your Lordships will recollect that in the course of the last week, I think it was Wednesday, his Majesty's ministers informed your Lordships that they had offered certain advice to his Majesty, in reference to the important subject of the Reform Bill; and as his Majesty had not thought proper to follow that advice, they had considered it their duty to tender their resignations to his Majesty, which resignations his Majesty was pleased to accept. His Majesty was graciously pleased on that occasion, on which he was left so entirely alone by his ministers, to send for a noble friend of mine, to enquire whether, in his opinion, there were any means of forming a government for his Majesty * * * * My noble friend came to me and informed me of the *difficulty* of his Majesty's situation * * * * and I stated that I was ready to serve his Majesty in any or no capacity, so as best to *assist him in carrying on a Government to resist the advice that had been given him* by his late ministers * * * The only course of proceeding at this eventful crisis, worthy of the men with whom I have the honour to be connected, was to counsel his Majesty to resist the advice that had been given him, IF HE COULD FIND MEANS OF CARRYING

ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COUNTRY WITHOUT ACCEDING TO IT * * * * For myself, my lords, I feel that if I had been capable of saying to his Majesty, ‘I cannot assist you in this affair,’ I do not think I could have shewn my face in the streets for shame at having done so—for shame at having abandoned my Sovereign under such *distressing circumstances* * * * * It was impossible that I should shrink from his Majesty in the *distressing circumstances* in which he was placed * * * But, my Lords, when I found that *in consequence of the discussions on Monday in ANOTHER PLACE, when I found from these discussions that it was impossible to form a Government from that House of such a nature as to secure the confidence of the country*, I felt it my duty to inform his Majesty that I could not fulfil the commission with which he was pleased to honour me, and his Majesty informed me that he would renew his communications with his former ministers.”

From this declaration of the Duke of Wellington we learn, at the first glance, that in a case where his Majesty has a strong opinion, and is prepared to maintain it, without flinching from the most “difficult” and “distressing” circumstances; when moreover, he is “assisted” in maintaining it, with no ordinary zeal, and by no ordinary person, still the discussions of one night in the House of Commons may compel him to abandon it; may prove to a very firm man that it is “impossible to form a Government from that House,” without acceding

to the terms it requires, and therefore impossible for himself to "assist" his Majesty in "resisting." This much we learn at a first glance—farther examination will teach us more. The terms which the House of Commons required of the King, and to which he was compelled to accede, were of a kind peculiarly relevant to the subject now under consideration: and his Majesty's submitting to them proves, not only that in some cases he may be compelled to submit against his conscience, but that he may be so compelled in spite of the most sacred religious obligations.

Every one knows that the advice tendered to his Majesty on the above occasion was, to create a sufficient number of Peers to force the Reform Bill through the House of Lords. It is also well known that this Bill was opposed by the Bishop of Exeter, on the ground that it must "extinguish the Protestant power which was retained in the then existing Corporations in Ireland," and that for this reason it was contrary to the Coronation Oath. Also that Lord Grey answered this objection by stating, that the King, in consenting to this Bill, would be acting only in his Legislative capacity, whereas the Coronation Oath bound him only in his Executive; admitting thereby, that if the Coronation Oath bound his Majesty in both capacities, he could not consent, i. e. that the Bill was contrary to the principles to which his Majesty was pledged in his Executive capacity. It appears then that on this memorable occasion, Lord Grey in the

first instance, reconciled his Master's conscience to passing this Bill, because in passing it he should have to act only Legislatively; then, finding that this would not do, advised him to act Executively, which, by his own showing, was a violation of the Coronation Oath; and when his Majesty shrunk from this, forced the advice [upon him] by the threats of the House of Commons. "Voila les hommes de qui vous consentiriez à recevoir vos premiers Pasteurs."

Such is the Supreme Head of the Church. I shall not myself presume to decide whether it is safe or wise for us to trust our most valued interests in such hands, relying on the difference which subsists between his Majesty's own religious opinions and those of his Parliament. Yet this I would remark, that to the Coronation Oath at least we cannot look with any reasonable confidence.

§ 4. [*State Interference considered on the principles of Former Times.*]

In speaking of the incompetence of our present Governors to interfere in the spiritual concerns of the Church, I may appear to some persons to be speaking evil of the powers that be.

That impression may perhaps be counteracted by the following considerations.

(1.) Although by "the Powers that be" we generally understand our Civil Governors, and though it is quite evident St. Paul was alluding to those

when he said, "the Powers that be are ordained of God," still it will be admitted at once by all members of the Church Catholic, that Civil Governors are not the only Powers on earth that are Ordained of God. Those who believe that when our Lord said to His Apostles, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven," He gave them a commission which was not to perish with themselves, but to continue till the end of the world, will scarce doubt that there exists on earth *somewhere* a Power quite distinct from the sword of the Civil Governor, and that too ordained of God. And those who on the most solemn occasion of their lives have consented to accept authority to remit and retain sins, will scarce doubt *where* this Power rests. Let it be once admitted that the Ordination Service of the Church of England is not lightly expressed, and it follows, that besides the power of the Civil Magistrate, there exists also another power, independent and essentially superior, derived through the Successors of the Apostles from Christ Himself,—the power to remit and retain sins.

(2.) If our obligation to obey the Civil Magistrate arises from the fact that "he who resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God," the same fact can give rise to no less obligation in the case of other "Powers that be." This is a plain truth, which cannot be set aside by any apparent difficulty that may arise out of it. The obligation to twofold obedience may and must entail its per-

plexities, but be these perplexities what they may, they cannot prove such obligation absurd. It is enjoined by God; “let God be true, but every man a liar;” whether it leaves the way of duty plain to us or difficult, some way there must be of fulfilling it in both its parts.

(3.) Since then in all countries the allegiance which Christ’s flock owes to the Powers that be, is necessarily a *divided allegiance*, and since in such a case it is evidently not the right way to neglect either, we have no choice but to inquire what is due to each.

(4.) Though it might be no difficult task to elicit from Scripture, precepts sufficient to satisfy this inquiry, it may perhaps be a shorter and a surer process, to refer to the interpretation put upon these precepts by persons better qualified than ourselves to judge of them: and for that I shall refer to one of acknowledged learning, and who will not be suspected of any religious prepossession,—the historian Gibbon.

“The distinction,” says he, “of *spiritual* and *temporal* powers, * * * was introduced and confirmed by the legal establishment of Christianity. * * * In the Christian Church, which entrusts the service of the Altar to a perpetual succession of consecrated ministers, the monarch, whose spiritual rank is less honourable than that of the meanest deacon, was seated below the rails of the sanctuary, and confounded with the rest of the faithful multitude. The emperor might be saluted as the father of his

people, but he owed a filial duty and reverence to the fathers of the Church; * * * The opposition or contempt of the civil power served only to cement the discipline of the Primitive Church. The Christians had been obliged to elect their own magistrates, to raise and distribute a peculiar revenue, and to regulate the internal policy of their republic by a code of laws which were ratified by the consent of the people and the practice of three hundred years. When Constantine embraced the faith of the Christians, he seemed to contract a perpetual alliance with a distinct and independent society, and the privileges granted or confirmed by that Emperor or by his successors, were accepted, not as the precarious favours of the court, but as the just and inalienable rights of the Ecclesiastical Order. The Catholic Church was administered by the spiritual and legal jurisdiction of eighteen hundred Bishops. * * * The important review of their station and attributes may be distributed under the following heads. 1. Popular Election. 2. Ordination of the Clergy. 3. Property. 4. Civil Jurisdiction. 5. Spiritual Censures. 6. Exercise of Public Oratory. 7. Privilege of Legislative Assemblies." Of these the 1st and 5th are the ones which require attention.

" 1. The freedom of elections subsisted long after the legal establishment of Christianity, and the subjects of Rome enjoyed in the Church the privilege which they had lost in the Republic, of choosing the magistrates whom they were bound to obey. As

soon as a Bishop had closed his eyes, the Metropolitan issued a commission to one of his Suffragans, to administer the vacant See, and prepare within a limited time the future election. The right of voting was vested in the inferior Clergy who were best qualified to judge of the merits of the candidates; in the Senators or Nobles of the city, all those who were distinguished by their rank or property; and finally, in the whole body of the People, who on the appointed day flocked in multitudes from the most remote parts of the Diocese * * *

The authority of the Provincial Bishops who were assembled in the vacant Church to consecrate the choice of the People, was interposed to moderate their passions and to correct their mistakes. The Bishops could refuse to ordain an unworthy candidate, and the rage of contending factions sometimes accepted their impartial mediation. The submission or the resistance of the Clergy and People, on various occasions, afforded different precedents, which were insensibly converted into positive laws and provincial customs, but it was everywhere admitted as a fundamental maxim of religious policy, that no Bishop could be imposed on an Orthodox Church, without the consent of its members. The Emperors, as the guardians of the public peace, and as the first citizens of Rome and Constantinople, might effectually declare their wishes in the choice of a Primate; but those absolute monarchs respected the freedom of ecclesiastical elections; and while they distributed and resumed the honours of the state and army,

they allowed eighteen hundred perpetual magistrates to receive their important offices from the free suffrages of the People. * * *

“5. The Bishop was the perpetual censor of the morals of his people. The discipline of penance was digested into a system of canonical jurisprudence, which accurately defined the duty of private and public confession, the rules of evidence, the degrees of guilt and the measure of punishment. It was impossible to execute this spiritual censure, if the Christian Pontiff, who punished the obscure sins of the multitude, respected the conspicuous vices and destructive crimes of the magistrate: but it was impossible to arraign the conduct of the magistrate without controlling the administration of civil government. Some considerations of religion, or loyalty, or fear, protected the sacred persons of the Emperors from the zeal or resentment of the Bishops; but they boldly censured and excommunicated the subordinate tyrants who were not invested with the majesty of the purple. St. Athanasius excommunicated one of the ministers of Egypt; and the interdict which he pronounced of fire and water, was solemnly transmitted to the Churches of Cappadocia. Under the reign of the younger Theodosius, the polite, the eloquent Synesius, one of the descendants of Hercules, filled the episcopal seat of Ptolemais, near the ruins of the ancient Cyrene, and the philosophic Bishop supported with dignity that which he had assumed with reluctance. He vanquished the monster of

Lybia, the president Andronicus, who abused the authority of a venal office, invented new modes of rapine and torture, and aggravated the guilt of oppression with that of sacrilege. After a fruitless attempt to reclaim the haughty magistrate by mild and religious admonition, Synesius proceeds to inflict the last sentence of Ecclesiastical justice, which devotes Andronicus with his associates and their families to the abhorrence of earth and heaven. The impenitent sinners * * * are deprived of the name and privilege of Christians, of the participation of the Sacraments, and of the hope of Paradise. The Bishop exhorts the clergy, the magistrates, and the people, to renounce all society with the enemies of Christ; to exclude them from their houses and tables; and to refuse them the common offices of life, and the decent rites of burial. The Church of Ptolemais, obscure and contemptible as she may appear, addresses this declaration to all her sister Churches of the world, and the profane who reject her decrees will be involved in the guilt and punishment of Andronicus and his impious followers¹.”

Such was the independent power asserted by the church when its champions emerged from the bracing air of persecution, with their armour bright and their loins girded.

1. The whole body of Christ's Church asserted and maintained to themselves the right of freely choosing those who were to be their Spiritual Ru-

¹ Gibbon—Roman Empire, ch. 20.

lers. This right they did not think it fit to make over either to the Emperor's ministers or to the Emperor himself. It was their own; it had been bequeathed to them by the Apostles; and they would not sell the inheritance of their fathers. 2. The persons so elected, after they had received the spiritual gift which qualified them for their high office, deemed it in no wise incumbent on them, or consistent with their duty, to consult their civil governors as to the manner in which they should administer it. The sword of the Holy Spirit was in their hand, and they turned it against whomsoever that Spirit pleased.

I hope, then, that when I maintain the incompetence of our present Governors to represent Christ's flock in the choosing who shall be Bishops, and to represent a higher Power in controlling them when they are Bishops, I shall escape the imputation of speaking lightly of the Powers that be.

Perhaps the same conclusion may be brought home to some minds more forcibly, by a short sketch of the process which has brought things into their present state. Nor will it be necessary in tracing this process to enter at all on the long and often told tale of Papal usurpations, which, important as they are in the internal history of the Church, have no immediate connexion with its external relations to Civil Governments. In the long and obscure interval between the 5th and the 13th centuries, however unjust and oppressive may have been the encroachments made on the indepen-

dence of different national churches by the policy of the Roman Pontiff, still it does not appear that the Church as such had effected any material aggression on the Rights of Christian States. Indeed, if we compare the claims of Gregory VII. and his austere successors, with those which Gibbon allows to have been conceded by Constantine and other Emperors to the Patriarchs of the primitive Church, it may be thought on the whole that their policy, with respect to Civil Governments, was directed rather to recovering losses than extending conquests.

Without attempting then to trace the various stages by which the independent rights of each separate Church were absorbed in one, as the Catholic head of Christendom, it may be sufficient to describe briefly the state of things existing in the middle of the 14th century, from which time we may date the systematic and open aggressions of the powers of this world against "that Kingdom which shall not be destroyed."

In the middle of the 14th century, the two prominent features of primitive Ecclesiastical Polity, the popular Election of Bishops, and the system of Episcopal Jurisdiction, had undergone a complete change. In elections, the voice of the people had ceased to be in any way formally expressed; and whatever influence was still left to the voice of the clergy, instead of extending, as it had formerly done, to the clergy of the whole diocese for which a Bishop was to be chosen, had been insensibly nar-

rowed to the small circle of Ecclesiastics officiating round the Cathedral Church. Neither indeed were these privileged Electors allowed to exert any discretionary power in the choice of their Pastor: a third and controlling influence had been introduced with which they might seem to co-operate, but which they could not effectually resist. In fact, the remaining vestiges of Election had become only forms; the electors had no course open to them but either to second the Nomination of the Pope, or, by a refusal, to forfeit, *pro hâc vice*, all apparent share in the appointment; since, in this case, an authoritative Presentation superseded all further ceremony. Sometimes, even without the courtesy of a formal Nomination, the Pope proceeded at once to present; as in the case of Grandison, Bishop of Exeter, who, happening to be in Italy at the time when a vacancy of that See was announced, procured his own immediate presentation and consecration, without any intervening form whatever, indeed to the prejudice of a regular election, in which the Canons of Exeter had chosen John Godley for their Bishop, A. D. 1327. Or more remarkably, in the case of Simon Islip, A. D. 1349, who had been regularly elected a Bishop by the Convent of Canterbury, but was unable to obtain from Rome the mandate for his consecration, except on the condition that the election should be cancelled, and the appointment made out in the Pope's name (*ex plenitudine potestatis*.)

Yet it will be observed at once on comparing the

elective system of the 14th century, with that described by Gibbon as existing in the age of Constantine and his successors, that the change which had taken place affected only the internal arrangement of the Church, and not its external relations to Civil Governments. The usurpations of the Roman Pontiffs were usurpations, not on the rights of Kings and Governors, but on the rights of the Church itself, of the congregations of Christ's little ones, the poor, the halt, the lame, and the blind ; for of a truth it was to other hands than those of Nero and Domitian that Christ had committed the precious gift, the right of choosing Successors to the Apostles.

Again, with respect to the administration of spiritual censures, it was indeed true that the authority to excommunicate which had in the first instance resided independently in the decree of each separate Bishop, was by degrees entangled with various canonical restrictions, which subjected the judgments of subordinate courts to the revisal of superiors, and at length constituted the Bishop of Rome and his Cardinals a court of ultimate appeal "over all persons and in all causes ecclesiastical." Yet here again it cannot be maintained, that the withdrawal of ecclesiastical causes from inferior courts, and their ultimate concentration in the court of Rome, was in any sense an encroachment on the right of secular princes. These princes, as Gibbon most clearly demonstrates, enjoyed in the Primitive Church no authority whatever over the

spiritual functions of the meanest officer of the Church : indeed their highest ministers, and occasionally themselves, were subjected to the utmost severity of Church censure. The president of Libya bowed before the Bishop of Ptolemais ; and the great Theodosius did public penance in the Cathedral of Milan. Vain is it then to pretend that the loftiest of the Roman Pontiffs, either Gregory or Innocent, exalted themselves unwarrantably above the proud Potentates of Europe. Unjust they may have been in the infliction of their censures, unchristian in the spirit with which they wielded them ; but that the circumstance of their directing them against princes was in itself unchristian, is what the history of the early Church most unequivocally denies. The encroachments which they had effected were, as in the case of Elections to Bishoprics, encroachments upon other Churches, not on secular Powers : and however unjustly they may have monopolised, they in no degree extended the limits “ of that Kingdom under the whole heaven which shall be given to the people of the Saints of the Most High.”

The selfish policy of the See of Rome, which was more or less successful up to the middle of the 14th century, had nevertheless tended gradually to undermine the foundations on which it had built its power ; and to smooth the way for that course of systematic aggression which has from that time been pursued by the “ kings of the earth,” not merely against the offending See itself, but against

the whole Church, “against the Lord and against His Anointed.” In particular it had introduced one idea unknown to Catholic antiquity, but which in its subsequent developement has occupied a very prominent place in English ecclesiastical history, that of a “Supreme Head of the Church:” and at the same time had associated this idea with so much of what was worldly and intriguing, that, as far as appeared in practice, this upstart authority might as well be wielded by Lay hands as by Clerical; might be consigned to the King of England as to the Pope of Rome.

We have seen that in the year 1349, the right of the monks of Canterbury to elect their own Archbishop, had been denied by the Pope, in the case of Simon Islip, whose election he annulled, though he ratified the appointment (*ex plenitudine potestatis.*) This and similar aggressions seem to have caused a feeling on the part of the Clergy, which enabled Edward III. to commence a system of counter aggressions, vitally injurious to the liberty of the Church as a whole, though it might seem in some degree favourable to the liberty of the English branch of it. Accordingly, in the year 1350, an Act was passed, professing to guarantee the freedom of English Elections by the severest restrictions on Papal interference, but at the same time providing that in all cases where the Pope had interfered, the King should; and explaining that by a free Election was meant an Election licenced and confirmed by the King.

However, the time was not yet arrived when such a system could be followed up effectually. The spirit of the monks of Canterbury was still too high to bow before an earthly sovereign, as they had habitually done before the "Vicar of Christ;" and when unshackled by a Power to which they had deferred for conscience' sake, they were not so readily to be overcome by force. Twenty-five years after the enactment of the foregoing statute, a vacancy occurred in the Metropolitan See, on the death of William Wittlesey, and Adam Easton, one of the college of Cardinals, was unanimously elected as his successor. The enraged King was on the point of proscribing the whole convent, and driving them in a body from his dominions; but afterwards, as if shrinking from the unpopularity of such an outrage, he gladly accepted the mediation of Gregory XI., and in direct violation of his own statute, allowed Simon Sudbury to be collated by a Papal Bull.

Again, in 1392, the 16th of Richard II., a fresh attempt was made to substitute Regal for Papal interference, by the famous Statute of Præmunire, in which the penal clauses of the Statute of Edward III. are extended to all such as "pursue or cause to be pursued, in the Court of Rome or *elsewhere*, any sentences of Excommunication, or any other things whatsoever which touch the King, against him, his crown, his regality, or his realm, and they which bring within the realm, or receive or make notification thereof, or any other execution what-

ever, within the said realm or without," and moreover to all "their notaries, procurators, maintainers, abettors, actors, and counsellors." Yet neither was this act more than partially successful: only four years after it passed, 1396, Thomas Arundel was translated from York to Canterbury "provisiōne papali;" and again, in 1414, Henry Chicheley from St. David's. But these can only be regarded as expiring efforts: the inherent strength of the Church had been lost with its primitive constitution, and the great body of Christ's flock looked on as unconcerned spectators, amidst the selfish struggles of the Civil and Ecclesiastical Powers. The Clergy and the People of the Holy Church were no longer knit together with those indissoluble ties which in former ages had compacted their system and rendered it proof against all the fiery darts of the wicked. The wealth of bishoprics and dignities, which was once regarded as the patrimony of the poor, had by degrees assumed the character of worldly property, was bestowed by patronage, and used for private gratification; while the lordly personages who possessed it, with the enjoyment of riches, had imbibed the dread of poverty, and shrunk from asserting their station as Successors of the Apostles, for fear of losing their station in society.

In this melancholy and fallen condition, that edifice against which the gates of Hell shall not finally prevail, became a ready prey to the rapacious Henry. It had been polluted, it fell;—shall it ever rise again?

§ 5. [*State Interference considered on Popular Principles.*]

In a former [section] I have endeavoured to point out to members of the Church of England, the duty of resisting State Interference in the appointment of Bishops, on the ground that the conditions which once legalised that interference have been recently cancelled.

The Constitution, as it at present stands, affords us no one security against a succession of latitudinarian appointments. Our Chapters indeed cannot be compelled to elect, nor our Archbishops to consecrate, persons whose bad principles are notorious; but these are not the persons against whom we need security. Weak, compromising, latitudinarian governors may, in spite of Chapters and Archbishops, be one after another obtruded on the Church; till the whole vigour of our system has been undermined, till our salt has lost its savour, and ourselves [are] trodden under foot of men.

The defencelessness of our present position, and at the same time the illegality of submitting to it, [has already been shown] by contrasting it with the position which we held formerly, indeed which we have been always assumed to hold by the defenders of our Ecclesiastical System. The state of things [has been described] which, according to the great Author of the Ecclesiastical Polity, could alone justify the Church in tolerating the interference of the Governing Power [of the State;] and

consequently, whenever this state of things should cease, it would become the imperative duty of the Church to resist that interference. When the governing power should cease to reside exclusively in members of the Church of England, then the condition on which the Church had trusted that power would be cancelled ; and consequently the trust itself ought to be revoked immediately. There can be no doubt then, that, according to this high authority, the interference of our present Government in the nomination of Bishops is a *usurpation* ; and that we are called on to *resist* it.

To this it [may] be answered, that the responsibility of deciding whether we ought or ought not to resist, does not devolve upon the present generation ; that the state of things described by Hooker, ceased long ago ; that prescription has long before this legalised the present system ; and consequently, that the time for resistance has gone by. Nor is it denied that the process by which the Church Influence has been undermined, began before our times. A Grafton or a Shelburn would not otherwise have obtained access to the Cabinet, nor a Hoadly to the Bench.

In order then to make it clear that the duty of resistance belongs especially to us, First, let us observe that the duty has belonged to *some one* ; shift it as we may from one to another, it rests *somewhere*. Some period or other between the times of Hooker and our own, has been the time to resist. The change in our Civil Institutions which has taken

place between the reigns of Elizabeth and William IV. is not the less a change because it has been gradual; and the time for making a corresponding change in our Ecclesiastical Institutions has not the less *certainly arrived*, because we cannot point out when it arrived. Secondly, Let us bear in mind, that in order to decide what particular time has been the time for resistance, we must inquire, not when the changes in question began, but when they arrived at their *turning point*. Thirdly, with a view to discover this turning point, let any candid man compare the present position of the Church with that which it held under the administration of Lord Liverpool. Let him recollect that the power of the Church was still fortified by many exclusive acts, that its influence was in a general way so preponderating as to secure to it, in ordinary cases, the deference of the Minister; that we have a sufficient proof of the justice with which this might have been urged, in the vehement and acrimonious clamours with which this exclusive system has been in our own times assailed. Surely it was not for nothing that till 1829 our Government was so loudly stigmatised as “bigotted,” “oppressive,” “persecuting.” But then let him turn his eyes to the notable pageant of Feb. 12, 1833¹; and he will probably admit, that *between these two points* in our history, the *balance of*

¹ The day on which the promised extinction of ten Bishoprics was hailed so memorably by the House of Commons.

Political Power has been turned against the Church of England. If then the duty of resistance belongs to any one, it belongs to us.

¹ It will be my object now to dwell more minutely on the facts to which I only alluded [before,] and to give a more definite shape to the conclusions I drew from them. And first, I wish it to be understood that the following observations are addressed to LAYMEN.

1. *To the Laity of the Church of England.*

It is well known that in the earliest ages of the Church, it was considered the right, and therefore the duty, of lay Churchmen, to interpose their voice in the election of their spiritual rulers. And since primitive usage carries with it on such points, an authority which we can hardly venture to dispute, it should seem that the same right and duty have devolved on all succeeding lay Churchmen as an inalienable inheritance.

How far our ancestors have fulfilled their duty in transferring to the King a right naturally their own, is a point on which men may differ in opinion; but we should never lose sight of the fact that they did so transfer it; that whether rightly or wrongly, whether voluntarily or on compulsion, they suffered the Crown to interfere in the appointment of Bishops, in which they themselves had a right to inter-

¹ [From the British Magazine for Sept. 1833.]

fere; that the interference of Kings is to this day, nothing more than a *substitute* for the interference of the whole laity of the Church; and that the responsibility of sanctioning this substitution rests not only on those who first submitted to it, but on every subsequent generation that has allowed it; finally, that this responsibility has become *greater and greater*, in proportion as our institutions have become *more popular*. In these days more especially, when the recent changes introduced into our Constitution have given an opportunity almost to an individual churchman for legally expressing his opinion on this subject, each individual is proportionably responsible for not expressing it. In our case, silence must in an especial sense be construed into positive approbation. If we, in these days, do not avail ourselves of our many opportunities for protesting and resisting, more credit or more blame is due to us than was ever due to our predecessors, who were without such opportunities; more credit, if in submitting, we act rightly,—if, on the contrary, by so doing we are neglecting a duty, more blame.

The degree in which each of us is responsible for the continuance of the present system, will perhaps become more apparent when we regard it as depending on the will of Parliament,—on the will of a body of which some of us are constituent members, in the selection of which most of us have a voice, direct or indirect, and before which we all of us have an acknowledged right to lay our remonstrances, under the recognised form of petitions.

It would seem then, that without having recourse to any of those extra-legal means which a strong conviction of our duty might in such a case seem to authorise, we have ways of resisting ready made to our hands; ways recognised by the law of the land, and pointed out to us by the every-day practice of every body who, in any matter, however trifling, considers himself aggrieved. For it is by the will of Parliament that the present system of appointment is upheld; the system itself is based on nothing more than an *Act of Parliament*, and is in its nature in no way more permanent or inviolable (even on Parliamentary principles) than any of the thousand other usages which are daily moulded and remoulded, according to the will of the existing legislature.

If the statute under which the Bishops of the Church of England are nominated by the Crown be an evil, it is an evil that may be resisted by all the means which in the case of other evils, real or supposed, are brought daily into operation, by parties considering themselves aggrieved,—by the very means which, within this last few years, we have seen employed, and employed successfully, by other classes of his Majesty's subjects, in procuring what they called their just rights,—nay, by means far more powerful. His Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects had no access themselves to that Parliament which they compelled to cede their claims: their influence as electors and petitioners was alone sufficient. Unlike the Roman Catholics, the laity

of the Church of England may press their demands in person, as speakers and voters; they constitute at least a portion of our great deliberative assemblies; and if they learn to act together, perhaps no despicable portion.

With these advantages then, with these great and legal means of resistance, the laity of the Church of England are indeed responsible for their submission. Truly great is the praise due to them, if their silence is the result of thought and conscientious forbearance, and not less their guilt if it result from negligence or apathy.

But to go on to particulars. The basis on which the present system of appointment rests, and on the removal of which it must fall to the ground, is the following Act of Parliament. The laity of the Church of England are earnestly requested to peruse it, and with attention; making up their minds, each person for himself, whether he, as an individual, can acquiesce in it conscientiously,—whether he can with a safe conscience intrust to the king his own voice in the nomination of his spiritual rulers, in the way in which, by tolerating that act, he does intrust it.

“A. D. 1533. 25 Hen. VIII. cap. 20¹.

“*An Act entituled ‘An Act... of the Electing and Consecrating of Archbishops and Bishops within this realm.’*”

“Clause IV. And furthermore be it ordained and established by the authority aforesaid, that at every

¹ Cf. Gibson’s Codex, vol. 1. p. 107.

avoidance of any archbishopric or bishopric within this realm, or in any other of the King's dominions, the King, our Sovereign Lord, his heirs and successors, may grant to the Prior and Convent¹, or to the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral churches or monasteries where the see of such archbishopric or bishopric shall happen to be void, *a Licence under the Great Seal*, as of old time hath been accustomed, *to proceed to the election* of an Archbishop or Bishop of the see so being void, with a *letter missive, containing the name of the person which they shall elect and choose*: by virtue of which licence the said Dean and Chapter, or Prior and Convent, to whom such *licence and letter missive* shall be directed, shall with all speed and celerity, in due form *elect and choose* the said person *named in the said letter missive*, to the dignity and office of the Archbishopric or Bishopric so being void, and none other.

“ And if they do defer or delay their election above twelve days next after such *licence and letter missive* to them delivered, that then for every such default the King's Highness, his heirs and success-

¹ Anciently, the elections of Bishops, in the case of the following sees, resided in the Prior and Monks of convents attached to the Cathedrals; and the elected Bishop was Abbot:—Canterbury, Rochester, Winchester, Ely, Norwich, Worcester, Durham. The Bishop of Bath and Wells was elected, alternately, by the Monks of Bath and the Canons of Wells: so, too, the Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, alternately, by the Canons of Lichfield and the Monks of Coventry.

ors, at their liberty and pleasure, shall *nominate and present, under the Great Seal*, such a person to the said office and dignity so being void, as they shall think able and convenient for the same.

“And that every such *nomination and presentment* to be made by the King’s Highness, his heirs, or successors, if it be to the office and dignity of a Bishop, shall be made to the Archbishop and Metropolitan of the province where the see of the same Bishopric is void, if the see of the said Archbishopric be then full and not void; and if it be void, then to be made to such Archbishop or Metropolitan within this realm, or in any of the King’s dominions, as shall please the King’s Highness, his heirs, or successors. And if such *nomination and presentment* shall happen to be made for the default of such *election* to the dignity and office of any Archbishop, then the King’s Highness, his heirs, and successors, by his *Letters Patent, under his Great Seal*, shall *nominate and present* such persons as they will dispose to have, the office and dignity of Archbishop being void, to one of such Archbishops, and two such Bishops, or else to four such Bishops in this realm, or in any of the King’s dominions, as shall be assigned by our said Sovereign Lord, his heirs and successors.

“V. And be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that whensoever any such *nomination and presentment* shall be made by the King’s Highness, his heirs, or successors, by virtue and authority of this Act, and according to the tenor of the same, that

then every Archbishop and Bishop to whose hand such *nomination* and *presentment* shall be directed, shall, with all speed and celerity, *invest* and *consecrate* the person *nominated* and *presented* by the King's Highness, his heirs, or successors, to the office and dignity that such person shall be *presented* unto, and give and use to him Pall, and all other benedictions, ceremonies, and things requisite for the same, without suing, procuring, or obtaining hereafter any Bulls or other things at the see of Rome, for any such office or dignity in that behalf.

“ And if the said Dean and Chapter, or Prior and Convent, after such *licence* and *letters missive* to them directed, within the said twelve days do *elect* and *choose* the said person mentioned in the said *letters missive*, according to the request of the King's Highness, his heirs, or successors, thereof to be made by the said *letters missive* in that behalf, then their *election* shall stand good and effectual to all intents; and that the person *so elected*, after certification being made of the same *election* under the common and convent seal of the electors to the King's Highness, his heirs, or successors, shall be reputed and taken by the name of the Lord elected of the said dignity and office that he shall be *elected* unto; and then making such oath and fealty duly to the King's Majesty, his heirs, or successors, as shall be appointed for the same, the King's Highness, by his *Letters Patent, under the Great Seal*, shall signify the said *election*, if it be to the dignity of a Bishop, to the Archbishop and

Metropolitan of the province where the see of the said Bishopric was void, if the see of the said Archbishopric be full, and not void : and if it be void, then to any other Archbishop or Metropolitan within this realm, or any other of the King's dominions, as shall please the King's Highness, his heirs, or successors ; requiring and commanding such Archbishop to whom any such signification shall be made, to *confirm* the said *election*, and to *invest* and *consecrate* the said person so *elected* to the office and dignity that he is elected unto, and to give and use to him Pall, and all other benedictions, ceremonies, and things requisite for the same, without suing, procuring, or obtaining hereafter any Bulls or other things at the see of Rome, for any such office or dignity in that behalf. And if the person be *elected* to the dignity and office of an Archbishop according to the tenor of this Act, then, after such *election* certified to the King's Highness, in the form aforesaid, the said person so *elected* to the office and dignity of an Archbishop, shall be reputed and taken Lord elect to the said office and dignity of an Archbishop whereunto he shall be so elected. And then after he hath made such oath and fealty to the King's Majesty, his heirs, or successors, as shall be limited for the same, the King's Highness, by his *Letters Patent, under his Great Seal*, shall signify the said *election* to one Archbishop and two other Bishops, or else to four Bishops within this realm, or in any of the King's dominions, as shall be assigned by our Sovereign

Lord, his heirs, or successors, requiring and commanding the said Archbishop and Bishops, with all speed and celerity, to *confirm* the said *election*, and to *invest* and *consecrate* the said person so *elected* to the office and dignity of an Archbishop that he is *elected* unto, and to give and use to him Pall, and all other benedictions, ceremonies, and things requisite for the same, without suing, procuring, or obtaining any Bulls or other things at the see of Rome, for any such office or dignity of an Archbishop in that behalf.

“VI. And be it farther enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that if the Prior’s Convent of any monastery, or the Dean and Chapter of any cathedral church where the see of an Archbishop or Bishop is, within any of the King’s dominions, after any such *licence* as is aforesaid rehearsed shall be delivered to them, proceed not to *election*, and signify the same according to the tenor of this Act, within the space of twenty days next after such *licence* shall come to their hands : or else if any Archbishop or Bishop within any of the King’s dominions, after such *election*, *nomination*, or *presentation*, shall be signified unto them by the King’s *Letters Patent*, shall refuse, and do not *confirm*, *invest*, and *consecrate* with all due circumstance as is aforesaid, every such person as shall be so *elected*, *nominated*, or *presented*, and to them signified as is above mentioned, within twenty days next after the King’s *Letters Patent* of such signification or presentation shall come into their hands, or else if any of them,

or any other person or persons admit, maintain, allow, obey, do, or execute any censures, excommunications, interdicts, inhibitions, or any other process or act, of whatever nature, name, or quality soever it be, to the contrary or lett of the due execution of this Act, that then every Prior and particular person of his Convent, and every Dean and particular person of the Chapter, and every Archbishop and Bishop, and all other persons offending and doing contrary to this Act, or any part thereof, and their aiders, counsellors, abettors, shall run in the dangers, and pains, and penalties of the Statute of Provision and Præmunire, made in the 25th year of the reign of King Edward III., and in the 16th year of King Richard II.”

Such is the Act under which the Bishops of the Church of England are at this day appointed. The following is an analysis of it:—

1. It apportiones severally to the laity, the clergy, and the Archbishop of the province, their respective shares in an appointment which was anciently their joint right. To lay hands it consigns the right of *nomination*, to clergymen that of *election*, and to the Archbishop *confirmation*.

2. It constitutes *the King the representative of the laity*, by vesting the entire right of nomination in his hands.

3. As it makes over to the King the entire rights of the laity, so it enables him to *controul the clergy* in the exercise of theirs, by enforcing their acqui-

escence in his wishes, under certain pains and penalties.

4. In case these pains and penalties should prove insufficient, it enables him to *supersede elections* and *confirmation* by a third process, *presentation*, to which he may have recourse at pleasure.

5. And as, over and above *nomination, election, and confirmation*, which are human institutions, and may be superseded by the authority that enacted them, there remains a fourth process, *consecration*, of divine institution, and consequently indispensable, those whom God has empowered to use or refuse it, are commanded by this Act to employ their great trust at the King's pleasure, under the pains and penalties aforesaid.

Thus the rights of the whole Church of England, and of every individual member of it, laity, clergy, and Bishops, are surrendered unconditionally to one person,—the King. It is for us to consider, laity as well as clergy and Bishops, whether this is any longer to be tolerated. Whether the crown, exposed as it has been, by recent changes in our constitution, to all sorts of influences, dissenting and latitudinarian, is any longer qualified to represent *the entire Church of England*.

This is the great question on which members of this Church must decide, each person for himself. And if, after due consideration, any individual sees reason to think that his own voice in the nomination of his spiritual rulers is still safely vested in the hands that are now intrusted with it, he, of

course, may still, with a safe conscience, acquiesce. If, after the events of May 1832, he still finds reason to hope the King's views and feelings, when opposed to those of ministers and parliament, will prevail,—if, with the scene of February 12, 1833, yet fresh in his memory, he is still able to suppose a parliament such as ours rightly impressed with the importance of the episcopal office, and good judges of the qualifications it requires,—lastly, if he feels that he can repose any great confidence in His Majesty's ministers, when he recollects the manner in which they have trifled with the King's coronation oath, even as interpreted by themselves,—if he sees fit to intrust his most sacred interests to such hands,—if so, well. If not, the remedy is in his own hands.

But the members of the Church of England are not the only persons who may be supposed to be compromised in the foregoing Act of Parliament. There are some of its provisions which concern all British subjects alike.

2. *To the People of England.*

A growing feeling has for a long time prevailed against all legislative interference with the freedom of conscience, and that more particularly on the subject of religion. This feeling may or may not be correct, but it is certainly general, and has been a principal instrument in effecting most of the great changes which have lately been brought about in our constitution. It is a feeling which has been

avowed over and over again by almost all who now take a lead in public affairs ; and, doubtless, after their successful labours on former occasions, they will be interested in finding a fresh field open for its exertion. All those who feel sincere sympathy for an honest conscience restrained by legislative enactments in the discharge of its religious duties ; all that numerous and powerful class by whose influence the Test Act was repealed and the Catholic claims conceded, will do well to look into the penal provisions of the foregoing Act.

Penalties, it will be remembered, are there enacted, (1.) against Dean and Chapter who fail to elect within twenty days the person nominated by the crown for their future Bishop ; (2.) against any Archbishop who fails, within the said time, to confirm such election, if duly made, or, in case the Dean and Chapter hesitate to elect, who refuses to consecrate on the King's presentation. In these cases, the recusant Archbishop, or Dean and Chapter, are liable to the pains and penalties of the Statutes of *Provision* and *Præmunire*, made in the 25th year of the reign of Edward III., and in the 16th year of the reign of Richard II. Now, whatever these penalties may be, be they nominal or real, little or great, as far as they are penalties at all, they must be perceived to interfere with freedom of conscience. For any one, even slightly acquainted with the present state of the Church of England, must be aware, that there exist among its nominal members some whose general reputation makes it at least supposable that

they may be nominated to Bishoprics, and yet whose opinions are regarded by their own body with something more than jealousy. It is, then, at least supposable, that an Archbishop, or Dean and Chapter, imbued with the sentiments common among clergymen, should be called on to elect, or, what is still worse, to consecrate one of whom they cannot in their consciences approve; or, what is the same thing, that circumstances may arise under which the penalties incurred on a refusal to elect or consecrate, will interfere directly with the plain dictates of conscience. I ask then, are such penalties, be they what they may, consistent with the principles of modern legislation? Can they be consistently upheld by persons who have condemned the Test Act as unjust and oppressive? Is the case of dissenters so very unlike that of churchmen that it can be right to treat their conscientious scruples so differently? It must certainly be felt that, under such circumstances, to subject a set of clergymen to any penalties whatever, even to the most trifling civil disabilities, is to interfere, and very inconsistently, with freedom of conscience.

How great, then, is the amount of this inconsistency, when we take into account what these penalties are to which such clergymen subject themselves: i. e. those of the Statutes of Provision and Præmunire, made in the 25th of Edward III., and the 16th of Richard II. It is really to be hoped, for the credit of those who speak so often and so successfully on the subject of religious liberty, that

they are ignorant of the nature of these two atrocious statutes. They are as follows :—

“ A. D. 1350.

“ *The Statute of Provisors¹ of Benefices, made in the 25th year of Edward III.*

* * * * *

“ And in case that the Presentees of the King, or the Presentees of other Patrons or Advowees, or they to whom the King, or such Patrons or Advowees aforesaid, have given Benefices pertaining to their Presentments or Collations, be disturbed by such Provisor, so that they may not have possession of such Benefices by virtue of the Presentments or Collations made to them, or that they which be in possession of such Benefices be impeached of the said possessions by such Provisors : *then the said Provisors, their Procurators, Executors, and Notaries, shall be attached by their body and brought to answer : And if they be convicted, they shall abide in prison, without being let to mainprize, or bail, or otherwise delivered, till they have made fine and ransom to the King, at his will, and agree to the party that shall feel himself aggrieved.*

“ *And nevertheless, before that they be delivered, they shall make full renunciation, and find sufficient surety that they shall not attempt such things in time to come.*”

¹ Provisores dicuntur qui vel Episcopatum vel Ecclesiasticam aliam Dignitatem in Romanâ Curiâ ambiebant.—*Spelman's Glossary.*

“ A. D. 1392.

“ *The Statute of Præmunire made in the 16th year
of Richard II.*

* * * * *

“ Whereupon our said Lord the King, by the assent aforesaid¹, and at the request of his said Commons, hath ordained and established, that if any purchase or pursue, or cause to be purchased or pursued, in the Court of Rome or elsewhere, by any such Translations, Processes, and Excommunications, Bulls, Instruments, or any other things whatsoever, which touch the King, against him, his crown, his royalty, or his realm, or them receive, or make thereof notification, or any other execution whatsoever, within this same realm or without, *that they, their Notaries, Procurators, Maintainers, Abettors, Factors, and Counsellors, shall be put out of the King's protection, and their lands and tenements, goods and chattels, forfeit to our Lord the King:* and that they be attached by their bodies, if they may be found, and brought before the King and his Council, there to answer to the cases aforesaid : or that process be made against them by “ Præmunire facias,” in manner as is ordained in other Statutes of Provisors.”

The penalties of these statutes are, as the law of England now stands, transferred from those against whom they were originally enacted, to any Archbishop or Dean and Chapter who dare act on the plain dictates of conscience in refusing to elect or

¹ Of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal.

consecrate state favourites of whose principles they disapprove—they, their notaries, procurators, maintainers, abettors, fautors, and counsellors, are to be put out of the protection of the law: their lands and tenements, goods and chattels, all forfeited to the king; and themselves to abide in prison, without being let to mainprize or bail, or otherwise delivered, till they have made fine and ransom *at the King's will*, and have *satisfied* the parties that *consider themselves* aggrieved, and have *made full renunciation*, and found sufficient surety that they *shall not attempt such things in time to come*: i. e. till they have pledged themselves to violate the plain dictates of conscience.

Such is the law of England as it at present stands,—a law which is allowed to exist in the nineteenth century, and by a nation second to none in its admiration of religious liberty.

But to place this whole subject in a clearer light, and to enable persons themselves unconcerned to enter into the feelings of electors when ordered, under circumstances at least supposable, to choose a Bishop of whom they cannot approve, it may be useful to exhibit, at one view, all the formal proceedings which take place at such elections. These documents will be found not unworthy of perusal as mere matters of curiosity; but as monuments of the spirit in which elections were once conducted, and ought to be conducted now, and as showing the incongruity of this spirit with that of the foregoing statutes, they are invaluable.

When a vacancy occurs in an English bishopric, as a first step towards filling it up, the King grants “to the dean and chapter of the cathedral church where the see of such bishopric happens to be void, *a licence under the Great Seal, to proceed to the election* of a Bishop of the see so being void,” which is commonly known by the more familiar name of

Congè d'Elire.

“William IV., by the grace of God, &c., to our trusty and well-beloved the Dean and Chapter of our Cathedral Church of —, in the Diocese of —, greeting.

“Supplication having been humbly made to us on your part that, whereas the aforesaid Church is now void and destitute of the solace of a Pastor, by the death of the Right Rev. Father in God, —, late Bishop thereof, we would be graciously pleased to grant you our leave and licence to elect you another Bishop and Pastor; we being favourably inclined to your prayers in this behalf, have thought fit by virtue of these presents to grant you such leave and licence, requiring and commanding you by the faith and allegiance by which you stand bound to us, that you elect such a person for your Bishop and Pastor as may be devoted to God, and useful and faithful to us and our kingdom.

“In witness whereof we have caused these our Letters to be made Patent: Witness ourself at Westminster on the — day of —, in the — year of our reign. By Writ of Privy Seal.”

This *licence to elect* is always accompanied with a *letter missive, containing the name of the person which they shall elect and choose.*

Letter Recommendatory.

“To our trusty and well-beloved Dean and Chapter of —, in the Diocese of —.

“Trusty and well-beloved, we greet you well.

“Whereas the Bishopric of — is at present void by the death of the Right Rev. Father in God, —, late Bishop thereof, we let you know that for certain considerations us at this time moving, we of our princely disposition and zeal being desirous to prefer unto the same see a person meet thereunto, and considering the virtue, learning, wisdom, gravity, and other good gifts wherewith our trusty and well-beloved — is endued, we have been pleased to name and recommend him unto you by these Presents, to be elected and chosen into the said Bishopric of —.

“Wherefore we require you upon receipt hereof to proceed to your election according to the laws and statutes of this our realm, and our Congè d’Elire herewith sent unto you, and the same election so made to certify unto us under your Common Seal.

“Given under our Signet at our Palace of Westminster, the — day of —, in the — year of our reign.”

On the receipt of these letters a citation is issued by the said Dean and Chapter to all persons

having, or pretending to have, any right or interest in the ensuing election, which runs as follows:—

Citatory Letter from the Dean and Chapter.

“A. B., Dean of the Cathedral Church of —, in the Diocese of —, and the Chapter of the said Church, send greeting to —.

“Whereas the episcopal see of —, by the death of the Right Rev. Father in God, —, late Bishop thereof, is vacant and destitute of a Pastor; and we, the said Dean and Chapter, have on this present with all due reverence received in our Chapter House from his most excellent Majesty William IV. Letters of Congè d’Elire under the Great Seal of Great Britain, for choosing another Bishop and Pastor of the said Cathedral Church, and also other Letters Recommendatory, under the Signet of his said Majesty, to us the Dean and Chapter directed; we, the said Dean and Chapter, according to the same respective Letters, have determined to proceed to the election of a future Bishop in our said Cathedral Church so as aforesaid vacant, and have appointed that you the aforesaid — in particular, and the Canons of the said Church in general, and others having, or pretending to have, right or interest in the said election, be lawfully cited to appear on —, the — day of —, between the hours of ten and twelve in the forenoon of the same day, to give your votes respectively.

“We do therefore, by virtue of these Citatory Letters, warn you, the said —, that you do

appear before us, the Dean and Chapter of the said Cathedral Church, on the day and at the hour and place aforesaid, in the forenoon of the same day, and in the choir of our said Cathedral Church proceed to the election of a new Bishop and Pastor in the same Cathedral Church as aforesaid vacant; according to the tenor of the said Congè d'Elire and Letter Recommendatory to us the said Dean and Chapter directed: intimating to you and every of you, as by these Presents we do intimate and signify, that we the said Dean and Chapter then present, do intend on the same day, and at the same hour and place, to proceed in the whole business of the said election, with all its incidents, emergencies, and dependences whatsoever, until the final despatch of the said election, as, God willing, we ought to proceed, your contumacy or absence notwithstanding.

“In testimony whereof, we, the said Dean and Chapter, have hereunto put our Common Seal, the — day of ——.”

On the day mentioned in the citatory letters, if the election takes place, a record of it, to the following effect, is entered in the Chapter Register:—

Record of the Election.

“Acts in the Cathedral Church of ——, on the — day of ——, in the — year of our Sovereign Lord, &c., between the hours of ten and twelve in the forenoon of the same day, in the presence of C. D.,

Registrar of the Dean and Chapter aforesaid, and public Notary.

“At which day, hour, and place above written, immediately after morning prayers, the Rev. —, and the Chapter of the said Church, did, in the South Chapel of the said Church, (his Majesty’s Royal Licence of Congè d’Elire and Letter Recommendatory for choosing another Bishop to the See of —, vacant by the death of —, being first read,) with one assent and consent elect unto the said See of —, the Rev. —, and him by them so elected Bishop of —, did openly and solemnly declare in the body of the said Church, before all the people there, and also before C. D., public Notary and Registrar of the said Dean and Chapter. So I attest, C. D., Public Notary.”

Signification of the Election to the King.

“To his most excellent Majesty —, your most humble and devoted the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral Church of —, all manner of obedience and subjection due to your most excellent Majesty.

“We, the said Dean and Chapter, do by these Presents most humbly intimate and signify unto your Majesty, that the episcopal see of —, being vacant by the death of —, we, by virtue and authority of your Majesty’s Royal Licence, to us most graciously made and granted, for electing another Bishop of the said Cathedral Church, being capitularly assembled in the said Cathedral Church, and there making Chapter (*saving to ourselves all*

the privileges that ought to be saved with regard to the said election, as well by the laws of this our famous kingdom of Great Britain, as by the ancient and laudable customs of your said Cathedral Church,) and having *maturely and seriously considered of a person* MEET TO BE ELECTED *thereunto, at length* we have unanimously agreed and given our consent and voices for the Rev. —, being nominated and recommended unto us by your Majesty, as a person endued with virtue, learning, wisdom, and gravity, and other good gifts; and by virtue of your Majesty's Letter Recommendatory, we the said Dean and Chapter unanimously, and no one contradicting, have elected the said — to be Bishop of —, and we most humbly beseech your most excellent Majesty that you will be graciously pleased to command and cause to be confirmed, our said election made of the person of the said —, as aforesaid. So that, by the favour of Almighty God, the giver of all good things, the said —, Bishop of —, by us elected, may be devoted to God, and to the service of your said Majesty and your kingdom, and may be able usefully to preside over us the said Dean and Chapter, and to promote the interests of your said Cathedral Church. And so may Almighty God always prosper and protect your most Sacred Majesty.

“In testimony whereof, we the said Dean and Chapter, have hereunto put our Common Seal, dated in our Chapter House in —, the — day of

—, in the — year of his Majesty's reign, and in the year of our Lord Jesus Christ —."

A similar signification is sent to the Archbishop of the province, or "to any other who hath or shall have sufficient authority in this behalf," praying him to confirm the election; and at the same time a letter is addressed to the Bishop Elect, requesting his consent.

Address to the Bishop Elect.

"To the Rev. —, your humble and devoted the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral Church of —, in the Diocese of —, send greeting.

"We, the said Dean and Chapter, do humbly certify to you that the episcopal See of —, being vacant by the death of —, we, the said Dean and Chapter did, on —, the — day of — instant, with all due reverence receive his Majesty's Patent of Congè d'Elire, or Royal Licence, under the Great Seal of Great Britain, for electing to us another Bishop and Pastor, and also his Majesty's Letter Recommendatory, under his Royal Signet to us the said Dean and Chapter directed. And then and there, according to the tenor of the aforesaid Licence, we did agree to proceed to the election of a future Bishop of the Church aforesaid, as aforesaid vacant, and for that purpose did cause all and singular of the Canons and Prebendaries of the same Church, and others having or pretending to have any right or interest in that behalf, to be cited to appear on this — day of —, to give their con-

sent and voices respectively : which said — day of — being come, *and Prayers to Almighty God before all things being humbly offered up*, we the said Dean and Chapter, capitularly assembled in the said Cathedral Church, and making a full Chapter, did there, by virtue of his Majesty's Royal Licence, and according to the Statutes and *Ecclesiastical Laws* of the famous Kingdom of Great Britain, *canonically proceed* to the election aforesaid, in the manner and form following : (to wit)—

“ First, *after mature and serious consideration had between ourselves concerning a FIT PERSON, in that behalf to be elected*, (and saving to ourselves, &c.) we did *at length* agree to give our votes for you, being nominated and recommended to us by his Majesty's said Letter Recommendatory, as a person endued with virtue, learning, wisdom, and other good gifts, and by virtue of his Majesty's said Licence and Letter Recommendatory, with our whole assent and consent, no one contradicting, we did elect you Bishop and Pastor of the said Cathedral Church : which said election of you as is aforesaid made, we immediately published to the clergy and people then and there present in the public and usual place, and all and singular other things of right or by custom in that behalf necessary, we have caused to be done and despatched in the presence of a Registrar or Public Notary, and other credible witnesses, as by Act or Public Instruments, which upon the whole election aforesaid, we have

taken care to make more plainly appear, all and singular which things, according to the Statutes of this United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in that behalf provided, were duly had and made, as we have signified to our said Sovereign Lord the King by other Letters certificatory of the day of the date of these Presents, sealed with our Common Seal.

“The same like by these our Letters, sealed with our Common Seal, we do signify to you, and we earnestly desire you to give your assent and consent to such election so made of you as aforesaid.

“In testimony whereof, &c.”

Such are the processes gone through by every Dean and Chapter at every election: “prayers to Almighty God are before all things humbly offered up;” they then proceed “maturely and seriously to consider between themselves concerning a fit person to be elected,” and “at length,” “according to the ecclesiastical laws,” “canonically proceed to election.” And yet, if they exercise any discretion in this most weighty matter, if they require time, i. e. exceeding twenty days, to enquire into the character and opinions of the person nominated, who may be wholly a stranger to them, or if they hesitate to accept one who is known to them, and that most unfavourably, they are forthwith outlawed, all their goods forfeited, and themselves imprisoned till they consent to violate their conscience.

I shall not dwell on the enormity of this perse-

cuting law—to state it most nakedly is to expose it most forcibly. Surely it is not unreasonable to call on our dissenting countrymen to join in effecting the speedy removal of a grievance such as this, so much severer than any which themselves have experienced. This is no question for party jealousy; it involves no doctrinal nicety, no principle of politics; it turns not on the peculiarities of sect or faction; Presbyterian, Quaker, Independent, Socinian, all must agree on it, all, in short, whose creed obliges them to uprightness and fair dealing, who profess to act on the broad principles of common sense and common honesty.

§ 6. *State Interference and State Protection*¹.

We are very naturally jealous of the attempts that are making to disunite, as it is called, Church and State; which in fact means neither more nor less, in the mouths of those who clamour for it, than a general confiscation of Church property, and a repeal of the few remaining laws which make the true Church the Church of England.

This is what Dissenters mean by disuniting Church and State; and we are all naturally anxious to avert a step at once so unjust towards men and sacrilegious towards God.

Let us not imagine, however, that every one who apparently joins with us in this anxiety must necessarily have the welfare of the Church at heart.

¹ [This Section forms No. 59 of the Tracts for the Times.]

Many people seem to join us at this crisis, and protest loudly in favour of the Union of Church and State, who nevertheless mean by this, something very different from what Dissenters mean, and from what we mean when we are opposing Dissenters. The "Union of Church and State," which many persons so call, and are so anxious to preserve, is in some points almost as great an evil, as it is confessedly, in other points, a good: and there are almost as many persons who support it for its bad points, as there are who hate it for its good.

To make this plain, I shall endeavour to explain what it is that the Union of Church and State consists in, as now enforced by the law of the land.

It consists in two things, STATE PROTECTION and STATE INTERFERENCE; the former of which, Dissenters wish to overthrow; and the latter of which, governments, of whatever kind, are very naturally anxious to retain: while Churchmen have hitherto been contented to accept both conjointly, without perhaps very exactly calculating how little they gain on the one hand, and how much they sacrifice on the other. This subject is indeed one which, from the confidence hitherto placed by us in the integrity of government, has, perhaps, been much less investigated than any other of equal importance. But recent changes in the constitution have now so entirely altered the mutual relations of the Church and the Legislature, that what has in past times been a becoming, though perhaps misplaced,

reliance on authority, would at present be a disgraceful negligence about our most sacred interests. In the following pages, then, it will be my object to consider the *gains* and *losses* which we accept jointly, in the Union of Church and State, arranging them under the above-mentioned heads: STATE PROTECTION and STATE INTERFERENCE.

I. The PROTECTION which the Church receives from the State consists principally in four things.

1. In securing to us by Law some small portion of those ample endowments which the piety of our forefathers set apart for the maintenance of true religion in this country. Of these endowments far more than half are at this day in the hands of noble aristocrats, who may be of any religion or none, and do not consider themselves obliged to spend one farthing of it in the cause of God. But there is still a certain remnant in the hands of the clergy, who are thereby enabled to spread truth over the land, in the poorest and most remote districts; and to live in decency themselves, without being a burden to the poor people for whose good they are labouring. This remnant then the State has forborne to confiscate, as it has confiscated the rest; and in this consists the first kind of State Protection.

2. It further consists in enabling us to raise a tax on real property for the keeping our parish churches in tolerable and decent repair through the country,—which tax, as estimated by those who put it at the highest, amounts to about as many

thousands a year as the other taxes amount to hundred thousands. This is the only existing law by which Englishmen, as such, are called on to assist in the maintenance of the Church of England.

3. It consists, farther, in allowing Thirty Bishops to sit and vote in the House of Lords, to which House all Bishops, and many other Church Dignitaries belonged, as a matter of right, at the signing of *Magna Charta*; and from which they never can be excluded without violating the very first article of *Magna Charta*, the basis of English liberty.

4. In the law *De excommunicato capiendo*, by which the State engages, that on receiving due notice of the excommunication of any given person, he shall be arrested, and put in prison until he is absolved.

Such are the four principal heads of STATE PROTECTION: on reading them over, it will occur to every one, that the first is nothing more than common justice, and no greater favour than every other person in the country receives in being protected from thieves; that, as to the second, the most that one can infer from it is, that in the eye of the State the importance of the Church is to the importance of civil government as a thousand to a hundred thousand, or as one to a hundred; that to counterbalance the third, which admits some Bishops to the House of Lords, all clergymen whatever are excluded from the House of Commons; and

that the fourth is a bad useless law, which cannot be done away with too soon.

II. Such is STATE PROTECTION: now, on the other hand, let us consider the existing *set off* against it, which is demanded of us. This is STATE INTERFERENCE, which encumbers us in ways too numerous to be catalogued, but is especially grievous in regard to the two following particulars:—1. Church Patronage. 2. Church Discipline.

1. With regard to the first of these, it is obvious that the efficiency of the Church must ever mainly depend on the character of the Bishops and Clergy; and that any laws which facilitate the intrusion of unfit persons into such stations must be in the highest degree prejudicial. The appointment of our Bishops, and of those who are to undertake the cure of souls, is a trust on which so much depends, that it is difficult to be too cautious as to the hands in which it is placed, and as to the checks with which its due execution is guarded. The sole object which should be kept in view is the getting these offices well filled, and the fewer private interests which are allowed to interfere in filling them the better. Yet what are the Laws which are forced on the acceptance of the Church for regulating this important matter? What is the care that has been taken to vest the appointment in proper hands? with what *checks* is its due execution guarded? what attention has been paid to any one point except the very last that should have been

thought of, the private interests of patrons? We shall see.

The appointment of all our Bishops, and, in much the greater number of instances, of those who are to undertake the cure of souls, is vested in the hands of individuals irresponsible and unpledged to any opinions or any conduct; laymen, good or bad, as it may happen, orthodox or heretic, faithful or infidel. The Bishops, every one of them, are, as a matter of fact, appointed by the Prime Minister for the time being, who, since the repeal of the Test Act, may be an avowed Socinian, or even Atheist. A very large proportion of other Church benefices, carrying with them cure of souls, are likewise in the hands of the Prime Minister, or of the Lord Chancellor and other Lay Patrons, who, like him, may be of any or no religion. So much for the hands in which these appointments are vested: the checks by which they are guarded must be considered separately in case of Bishoprics and of inferior benefices.

At former periods of our history, even in the most arbitrary and tyrannical times, various precautions were adopted to prevent the intrusion of improper persons into Bishoprics. To exclude the great officers of state from a share in the nomination was indeed impossible,—perhaps not desirable;—but to prevent their usurping an undue and exclusive influence, their choice was subjected to the approbation of other bodies of men, with different

interests, and sufficiently independent to make their approbation more than a form.

The Nomination of the King and his Ministers was to be followed by a real *bonâ fide* election on the part of the Collegiate Body attached to the vacant See. In the Church of Canterbury this body consisted of 140 men, with small incomes, and connected, in many instances, with the peasantry of the country, whose feelings and opinions they seem to have, in a great measure, represented. The courage and resolution with which these men frequently resisted state persecution, will be appreciated on reading Gervase's History of Canterbury, between the years 1160 and 1200. Indeed, it would be no difficult matter to make a catalogue of the atrocities perpetrated at different times on these collegiate bodies by kings and nobles, in the hope of extorting consent to improper nominations, such as would rival Fox's Book of Martyrs in number and cruelty. Here then was the first check on improper appointments.

Again, after Nomination and Election followed Confirmation, a process well calculated to elicit any sinister dealings which might have influenced the previous steps. On a day appointed by the Archbishop, all persons whatever that had any objection to urge against the election or person elected, were cited to appear in the cathedral church of the vacant Diocese. The Archbishop was himself to be in attendance as judge, to confirm or annul what had passed, according to the evidence which should

come before him. The publicity of this process, and the circumstance that it was conducted in a place of all others the most interested in the result, seemed calculated to preclude any very flagrant neglect of duty.

But, should no obstacle have interfered with the will of the State, either in Election or Confirmation, it still remained with the Archbishop to decide whether he was justified in consecrating: and in deciding this he was left to the dictates of his own conscience, exposed indeed to the vindictive tyranny of power, but uncontrolled by any law, and responsible to no earthly tribunal.

Thus it appears that in the most arbitrary and tyrannical times the constitution of England recognised three independent checks to the King's appointment, allowing a *veto* to be put upon it either at Election, Confirmation, or Consecration. These checks were, indeed, frequently overpowered by the capricious tyranny of the feudal system, or the still more capricious interference of the Bishop of Rome. Perhaps, also, though upon the whole well adapted to the times in which they were devised, they are unsuited to those in which we live. Yet it is evident, that whatever difference exists between those times and our own, it is a difference in our favour; whatever checks to abuse of power could exist then, might exist, and more effectually, now; nor can any objection we may make against the particular checks adopted under the feudal system, be an

argument for abolishing them without finding a substitute.

[Let us then take a survey of our present condition.]

It cannot be denied that at present it is treated far more arbitrarily, and is more completely at the mercy of the chance government of the day, than ever our forefathers were under the worst tyranny of the worst times. Election, Confirmation, Consecration, instead of being rendered more efficient checks than formerly, are now so arranged as to offer the least possible hindrance to the most exceptionable appointments of a godless ministry. As to Election: the Dean and Chapter, with whom it still formally rests, have only twelve days given them to inquire into the character of the person nominated, who may be an entire stranger to every one of them, or known through report most unfavourably; if they fail to elect in this time, *election* becomes unnecessary, and the Crown *presents* without it. And now the Dean and Chapter have eight days given them, and the Archbishop, twenty, for reflection; if within these periods the former fails to go through the form of election, and the latter to consecrate, both parties subject themselves to the pains and penalties of a *Præmunire*, i. e. all their goods, ecclesiastical and personal, are liable to confiscation, and themselves to imprisonment till such time as they submit. Such is the legal urgency which has been substituted for the violence of former times: and thus, as the law now exists, we

have actually no check on the appointments of a Socinian (if it so happen) or Infidel Minister, guided by the more violent influences of a legislative body, for which I feel too much respect as a political power, to express an opinion about certain portions of its members.

Again, with regard to the inferior patronage of the Church: a large proportion of our benefices are, as has been already noticed, in the hands of laymen, who may be of any religion under heaven; and the laws of England (it must be confessed with sorrow) watch so jealously over the interests of these patrons, and so little over those of the Church, that they compel the Bishops, except in cases so outrageous that they can hardly ever occur, to accept at once of the person first *presented* to them, and to commit the cure of souls to him by the process of *institution*. It is worth observing what Judge Blackstone says upon this subject. "Upon the first delay," says he, "or refusal of the Bishop to admit the Clerk, the Patron usually brings his writ of *Quare impedit* against the Bishop for the temporal injury done to his property in disturbing him in his presentation.....The writ of *Quare impedit* commands the Bishop to permit the plaintiff to present; and unless he does so, then that he appear in Court to show his reason." What sort of reason the Court will be satisfied with, the Judge informs us in another place. "With regard to faith and morals," says he, "if the Bishop alleges only in generals that he is *schismaticus inveteratus*, or ob-

jects a fault that is *malum prohibitum* merely, as haunting taverns, playing at unlawful games, or the like, it is not good cause of refusal." The Judge proceeds, "if the cause be some particular heresy alleged, the fact, if denied, shall be determined by a jury." The sum of the whole is, then, that unless the Bishop can prove to the satisfaction of a jury in a Court of Common Law, that the person *presented* to him for institution has been guilty of some particular immoral act above the grade of *malum prohibitum*, or has maintained some opinion such as shall come under the strict definition of heresy, he loses his cause, and then, if he persist in his refusal, is liable to an action for damages, in which the Judge informs us "the patron may recover ample satisfaction."

Now, if any one were to search among his own acquaintances for those whom he considers least fit for clergymen, he would certainly find that his reason for thinking so was of a kind which he could not make good before a court of justice. Those who wish to see this matter in its true light should read over 1 Tim. iii. to verse 10., and then reflect whether St. Paul would have been very likely to approve of the law of England as it now stands.

2. These are among the effects of STATE INTERFERENCE, as it affects Church Patronage. As to Church Discipline, without entering into the reasons for restoring it, it may be sufficient to mention one fact, showing the practical effect of the law to suppress it.

Every Churchwarden in every parish in England is called on once a year to attend the visitation of his Archdeacon. At this time oaths are tendered to him respecting his different duties, and among other things he swears, that he will present to the Archdeacon the names of all such inhabitants of his parish as are leading notoriously immoral lives. This oath is regularly taken once a year by every Churchwarden in every parish in England; yet I believe such a thing as any single presentation for notoriously immoral conduct has scarcely been heard of for a century. So that it would certainly seem that, if within this last century any *notoriously* immoral man has been residing in any parish in England, the Churchwardens of that parish have been perjured: and this is the effect of certain laws, which we should call persecuting, did they not exist in our own free country, which interfere with the due discharge of their solemn engagements.

All these evils result from what is called the Union of Church and State, and must be balanced against its benefits before enumerated. It is for the sake of these very evils that all mere statesmen support this Union; and I question whether such supporters are not worse enemies than the Dissenters themselves.

Let us then beware of trusting too much to these words, "The Union of Church and State;" and remember that it consists of two parts, STATE PROTECTION and STATE INTERFERENCE.

In conclusion, I recommend the following reflections of a modern [writer :]

“How long, O Lord of Grace,

Must languish Thy true race,

In a forced friendship linked with Belial here¹ ;” &c. &c.

¹ [vid. *Lyra Apostolica*, No. 119, 2nd edit.]

REMARKS
ON
CHURCH DISCIPLINE.

§ 1. [*On National Religion*¹.]

AMONG the arguments which have been devised for justifying our neglect of Church Discipline, not the least approved is a certain hocus pocus that has been got up about Church and State.

An admirer of former times regrets the inability of our bishops to eject delinquent clergymen from their benefices. "Ah," replies a [supporter of things as they are,] "that was very well in the Primitive Church, where no secular interests were involved; but you forget that ours is an *Endowed Church*." The foiled objector turns to another point. In the primitive Church he finds no authority for patronage, particularly for vesting the patronage of bishoprics in the crown. "I admit it," replies the advocate, "but then the Primitive was not an *Established Church*." The objector has yet another difficulty: he recollects the stress invariably laid by the early Fathers on the power of the Keys, and ventures to regret in our Church the disuse of

¹ [Written in 1834.]

Excommunication. "True, my young friend," replies the other, with a Burghleyian shake of the head, "but don't you see that it is impossible in a *National Church*?"

This is what may be called a general solution of the problem how to reconcile the Church of England and the Primitive Church. And truly when the argument stops here it must be allowed to pass for unanswerable.

But some more discursive champions of existing institutions have ventured further; the talismanic words have been expanded, and their logical force displayed to our view.

"Of all problems," says Mr. Le Bas, "which can task the wisdom and piety of man, there is none perhaps more full of perplexity than the construction of the scheme of Spiritual Discipline for a great *national* and *established* Church." So far the old story, but he proceeds, "When Christian communities were small, and surrounded by societies lost in the outer darkness of Paganism, the task of spiritual government was one of comparative facility. Communion with the Church was in primitive times regarded as the highest and most transcendent of privileges, &c.....And hence it was that years of contrition, &c.....were frequently submitted to, to secure in time the restoration of the transgressor to the Ark of Christ's Church. But when the visible boundaries of the Church were enlarged, the case was widely different: and afterwards, when the world was called after the name of Christ, to

be a Christian was unhappily no longer regarded as so high an honour, &c.....The inevitable consequence was, that Church Discipline was gradually overpowered by the abounding of iniquity."

That is to say, so long as Church Discipline was so vigorously enforced that none were allowed to retain the privileges of Christians who did not regard these privileges as very "high and transcendent," it was very easy to enforce Church Discipline; but afterwards, when "the case was evidently different," and people were let into the Church for asking, whether they "regarded it as a high honour" or no, i. e. when Church Discipline was given up, "the inevitable *consequence* was, that it was overpowered." Really I know nothing equal to this except the speech of Dr. Johnson's Ghost, "What is permanent cannot be removed, for when removed it *soon* ceases to be permanent."

Of course, if a national Church means a Church to which every one is admitted that chooses, to set up a system of discipline in such a Church without unnationalizing it, is a pretty difficult "problem." But it should be remembered, that however good an excuse this may be for having no discipline in a national Church, it is no excuse for having a national Church at all. If a national Church means a Church without discipline, every argument for discipline is an argument against a national Church; and the best thing we can do is to unnationalize ours as soon as possible.

I am, however, very far from agreeing with Mr.

Le Bas in this notion of a national Church. I cannot see why, if the body of a nation are sincere converts to Christianity, it might not be possible to "enlarge the visible boundaries" of the Christian community, and to allow the nation to "call itself after the name of Christ," without admitting into the Church any "who are insensible to the high honour of being called a Christian." It will hardly be thought that the increased number of sincere converts could have any tendency to degrade in each other's eyes the religion to which they were converted: at least this is not the case with any other matter except religion. Maxims of morality are not less prized because every one acknowledges them to be just: a poet is not the less admired because he has many admirers: a man is not the less disposed to value his college, or his city, or his country, because it is larger than other colleges, cities, and countries. Nor is it easy to see what should make the case of Christianity different, except indeed the humiliating fact, that as its visible boundaries were enlarged, the clergy learned to think more of the numbers than the sincerity of their converts.

The true cause of the decay of Church Discipline is not that nations have become Christian, but that the clergy have wished to make them appear Christian, either before they were so or after they have ceased to be so. And if at the present day it is difficult to enforce Church Discipline in England, it is not because we have a national Church, but

because the clergy are too anxious to keep up the show of one.

The body of the English nation either are sincere Christians or they are not: if they are, they will submit to Discipline as readily as the primitive Christians did. If not, let us tell the truth and shame the devil: let us give up a *national* Church and have a *real* one.

§ 2. [*On Excommunication*¹.]

The report of the late ecclesiastical commission has shown that the restoration of a Godly Discipline in the Church is not so difficult a problem as has been imagined. The Commissioners suggest a process for the trial of delinquent clergymen which might be extended without restriction to the trial of all delinquents: and if the evidence which they have judged sufficient for suspension or deprivation of offending clergymen, was made sufficient for the excommunication of notorious ill-livers, we should be provided with means for enforcing a very efficient system of Church Discipline.

Yet on this subject of Church Discipline the Commissioners say not one word. It has not even attracted their attention: they could not have passed it over in more marked silence if they had wished to show that they thought the very notion of it childish.

¹ [Written in 1834.]

Now this is surely enough to set serious people thinking, and to put them upon re-examining the foundations of their own opinion, as well as the declaration of the Church, that "a Godly Discipline is much to be wished." Good and learned men have set their names to a document, which treats Church Discipline as they could but treat it, if they thought it a "trifle" and a "dream." A Commission of Hoadlys could not have made it of less consequence than they have done. Were they right in this? or were they wrong?

In making up our minds on this question, it seems to me that we have to discuss a preliminary point about which too much has been taken for granted in late writings, i. e. the nature of EXCOMMUNICATION and ABSOLUTION, in the use of which Church Discipline consists. What these are, then, and how they bear on the main question, will be the subject of this paper.

It is now generally assumed that the right, by which the Church may excommunicate unworthy members, is nothing more than what belongs to other Societies *as such*, i. e. of excluding those who will not conform to its regulations: that excommunication is simply an act of the members of the Church through their constituted governors; involving no consequences but what the Society consents to enforce (such as a withdrawal of communion and social intercourse;) and being in fact nugatory where such consent does not exist. With these notions of Excommunication, it is natural that

our Spiritual Rulers should think themselves at liberty to dispense with it, in such cases as would lead human societies to dispense with their rules and overlook delinquencies, i. e. whenever such dispensations might seem expedient: and that the attempt to enforce it, where there seems no chance of such consent as could enforce its visible penalties, should seem childish and unpractical.

It should not however be forgotten that this notion of Excommunication, prevalent as it now is, has not been always equally so. It is not long since religious men, both learned and unlearned, regarded it in a very different light, such as would give the whole question a different aspect.

The proposition, that the right by which the Church excommunicates is no other than that by which any society, as such, excludes refractory members, would have sounded as strange in the ears of the great Divines of the 17th century, as that the right by which the Church baptizes is no other than that by which any society, as such, admits those who will conform to its regulations. Excommunication would appear to them no more like exclusion from an ordinary society than Baptism like admission to such a society; and he who should have said that the former involved no consequences but what Churchmen should consent to inflict, would have been thought just as much a despiser of God's Ordinances, as he who should deny any consequences to Baptism except such as Churchmen should consent to grant. An excommunicated

person was conceived to be excluded from the Church in exactly the same sense as a newly baptized person to be admitted to it. If the one was made a member of Christ and an inheritor of the kingdom of Heaven, the other was cut off and disinherited; if the one became a child of God, the other was delivered back to Satan. Whatever privileges were conferred by the one Ordinance were revoked by the other: and thus exactly in the same way as Baptism was a good, Excommunication was an evil.

On this subject the famous William Law has expressed himself as follows:—

“Is not Christ’s authority,” says he, “as effectual and significant in excluding as in admitting persons into His kingdom? Is not the same power as able to take away the privileges of Church membership as it was at first to grant them? If, therefore, there be any blessing or happiness in our being admitted into the Church, there must be as much misery and punishment in our exclusion out of it. For as it implies the loss of all those privileges and favours we were made partakers of by our admission into the Church; so we must needs be punished in the same degree that we were happy.

“If therefore Baptism, a divine positive institution to admit us to the privileges of Christianity, makes any alteration in our condition as to the favour of God, i. e. if we are brought any nearer to God by Baptism than we were before; then it plainly follows, Excommunication, a divine positive institution which deprives us of all the privileges of

Christianity, and...reduces offenders into the state of Heathens, must needs affect our condition with regard to the favour of God. For if there be any thing in Baptism which is just matter of joy, there is something equally terrible in Excommunication, which, when rightly executed, as effectually makes us aliens from the promises of God, as Baptism, when rightly administered, makes us children of God and heirs of eternal life. So that he who can ridicule and expose the terrors and effects of Excommunication is acting just as Christian a part as he who fleers at and despises the benefits and advantages of Baptism¹."

Such was the old notion of Excommunication, which, if just, will evidently place on an entirely new footing the duty of upholding Church Discipline.

For if it be true that the power with which the Church is invested for upholding and enforcing this Discipline is indeed such as has been stated; if exclusion from Christ's Kingdom by the sentence of God's appointed Judge, the Bishop, no more resembles exclusion from any human society by consent of its members, than Baptism resembles admission to such a society; if, in short, the separation from external communion (its worst human consequence) is nothing more than the outward visible manifestation of an unseen and spiritual separation from the mystical body of Christ; if all this is so, by what argument shall we justify the disuse of a

¹ Law's 3rd Letter to Bishop Hoadly.

power so transcendent, on the part of those to whom it has been given from on high? The feeling which such disuse is calculated to excite in persons who take this view of Excommunication, has been admirably expressed by a modern poet, who comments upon our Lord's promise to remit and retain sins according to the sentence of the Apostles, in the following lines addressed to their Successors:—

“Behold your Armoury!—sword and lightning shaft,
 Culled from the stores of God's all-judging ire,
 And in your wielding left! The words that waft
 Power to your voice Absolving, point with fire
 Your awful Curse. O grief! should Heaven's dread Sire
 Have stayed, for you, the mercy dews of old
 Vouchsafed when pastors' arms in deep desire
 Were spread on high to bless the kneeling fold!
 IF CENSURE SLEEP WILL ABSOLUTION HOLD?
 Will the great KING affirm their acts of grace
 Who thankless leave to cankering rust and mould
 The flaming sword that should the unworthy chase
 From His pure Eden? O beware lest vain
 Their sentence to *remit* who never dare *retain*¹.”

But, not to rest any thing so important on mere feeling, it will readily be seen, on the calmest and most dispassionate review of the subject, that if Excommunication be once admitted to be such as has been described above, a divine ordinance entailing effects beyond those of which our experience takes cognizance, in this case, persons commissioned to administer it cannot possibly be judges how far

¹ [Lyra Apostolica, No. 163, 2nd edit.]

it is expedient for them to execute their commission, and have nothing to do but to obey their instructions.

This will be evident on examining the different pleas which are now commonly put forward in defence of our present deviation from the primitive practice. For it will be observed that they all proceed on the notion that we can understand the full or the principal consequences of Excommunication, and so are judges whether under given circumstances they are likely to be on the whole beneficial or otherwise.

For example, one common and obvious reason for the general acquiescence of Churchmen in the present systematic disuse of Excommunication, is an impression that if restored it could have no practical influence,—for, that the Church has lost that ascendancy in public opinion which could alone enforce the observation of its sentences. The time is past, people say, for that system of Ecclesiastical dictation which the Clergy once maintained through superior learning and acquirements: the Laity now enjoy the advantages of education at least in an equal degree with themselves, and can no longer be induced to submit to them with the same reverence which they once paid to acknowledged superiority. It might be easy to run on in this way dilating on the difference between the present and past relations of Clergy and Laity, and the hopelessness of restoring the personal influence of the former over the latter; but when the topic was worn thread-

bare, after all it could come to no more than this, that in whatever degree the efficacy of Excommunication depended on the personal influence of the Clergy over the Laity, in that degree it would at present be unavailing. This is the very most that can be inferred even from the most exaggerated hypothesis,—even from supposing that the Clergy have altogether lost all hold upon the minds of the Laity, and that it is impossible for them to recover it; and whether true or false, can affect only those consequences of Excommunication that depend upon human opinion: whereas we are now supposing that it has other and mysterious consequences, depending only on the truth of the divine oracles, and on the authority of the person pronouncing sentence, which of course must remain as immutable as those oracles themselves, and as the commission which Christ has given to the Apostles and their successors.

Unless, therefore, we are prepared to assume as self-evident, that these consequences of Excommunication are, as compared with its human consequences, unimportant, and little calculated to benefit that society for the sake of which God has promised to enforce them; unless this is taken for granted, it is by no means clear that a systematic refusal to excommunicate may not be an interruption of God's plan for our salvation.

The same thing may be shown of other objections, such as that urged by the late amiable and

lamented Bishop Jebb, who on this subject adopts the opinions of his friend Mr. Knox.

“Mr. Knox,” says he, “maintained that the want of discipline in the Church, so much complained of, was one of its happy features. His reason for so regarding it, was, that religion was thus presented to the view and acceptance of men without any obstruction of human interference; without any offence to the scrupulousness of a hesitating, and bashful mind; without any violation to that sort of nervous delicacy which is peculiar to some constitutions; without interposing any mediator between man and his God. He was glad that in one place Christianity appeared free to all; unfettered by any laws, unfenced with any preliminary examinations or menaces of disciplinary infliction. He thought that any kind of impediment thrown in the way even of profligates coming to the participation of Christian ordinances, would operate as a hindrance and repulse to timid though honest votaries. He mentioned the case of Lord Chancellor Clare; who, toward the close of his life, went to a village Church, where he might not be known, to take the Sacrament¹.”

Now it is obvious at once, without going into the details of this reasoning, that it supposes us competent to balance the good and evil, which in the present state of Society would result from enforcing Church Discipline. This I say is obvious, for un-

¹ Introduction to Burnett's Lives, p. xxxv.

less we are supposed to know the full extent of the good, to what purpose is it to dwell on the evil? In this world nothing, however good, is free from evil, nor do we reckon any thing good, except because on the whole the good attendant on it exceeds the evil. If to mention certain evils as likely to result from enforcing Excommunication, is a sufficient reason for not enforcing it, at that rate any one might quickly be argued out of attempting any thing, for there is no attempt from which evil may not result. But a reasonable man will face the evil when he sees a likelihood of its being out-balanced by good; and before we can pretend to decide that the evils of enforcing Excommunication are such as ought not to be faced, we must know the limits of the good which God contemplated as its counterpoise.

So that whatever ground there is for supposing Excommunication to be a divine ordinance with mysterious consequences, there is that same ground for believing the systematic disuse of it a presumptuous error. Nor can I doubt that if the late Ecclesiastical Commission had taken this view of the subject, they would have given more thought than they appear to have done to devising means for the restoration of Church Discipline.

Now the notion that Excommunication, and its counterpart Absolution, has the divine and mysterious character which was just now attributed to it, is in such strict conformity with the well known words in which Scripture records their institution,

that I am persuaded every one would put this interpretation upon them, unless they supposed it liable to more than ordinary objections.

No one can read the comments of those who have endeavoured to give these texts another meaning, without being sensible that they have written under a bias, and that they never could have so perplexed a plain matter if they had confined themselves to a simple examination of the context. It is quite clear that they have one and all of them set out on this inquiry with a determination to avoid a particular result, and that rather than reconcile themselves to it they had recourse to any absurdities.

What for instance are we to suppose, when we find a man of first-rate abilities, like Bishop Hoadly, betaking himself to such a device as this? “The Apostles,” says he, “might possibly understand the Power of remitting and retaining sins, to be the same with that power of laying their hands upon the sick¹.”

But not to dwell on this and the like delusions, I pass on at once to the more approved notion: viz. that in the famous passages (St. Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18; and St. John xx. 23) the commission given by our Lord to the Apostles, extends simply to declaring the Gospel terms of acceptance; that by remitting and retaining sins is meant no more than declaring on what terms God has offered to remit or threatened to retain them: and in the

¹ Preservative. Works, vol. i. p. 594.

same way, that binding and loosing is neither more nor less than declaring what things God has commanded and forbidden. On this interpretation the passage in St. John's Gospel will run thus¹:—

“And when He had said this He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive the HOLY GHOST : to whomsoever you truly declare the terms on which God will remit and retain sins, their sins God will remit or retain on those terms.”

And again, that in St. Matthew :—

“Jesus answered and said unto him,...Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church ; and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the KEYS of the Kingdom of Heaven : and whatsoever thou shalt truly declare on earth to be commanded or forbidden by God, God will in Heaven hold that as commanded or forbidden.”

Thus the KEYS of the Kingdom of Heaven are said to be given to St. Peter, inasmuch as what he truly states to be God's commands will be God's commands : and all the Apostles are inspired with the Holy Ghost, that what they truly declare to be the terms of Salvation may be the terms of Salvation. Surely no man, who looked only to making sense of what he commented on, would have recourse to such an interpretation as this.

In fact it is quite obvious, that the reason why these far-fetched notions are substituted for a very plain and intelligible one, is the general and strong

¹ vid. above p.

impression, that what the words seem to say in their plain and literal sense is somehow or other incredible; and that it is inconsistent either with God's attributes as made known to us in natural religion, or with the general plan of Providence as revealed in Scripture; and that rather than adopt it we must make up our minds to any difficulty.

Now I am far from underrating the temptation we are under to take this view. No one can be insensible to the difficulty of believing, that the blessing or curse of another man like himself can really affect his situation in the sight of God, either for the better or worse. But this is a difficulty to imagination only, not to reason; and, however great it may be, reasonable men should strive against it. We know nothing of God to teach us by what laws He dispenses or withholds spiritual privileges; and cannot without great presumption say either that this method or that method of dispensing them is inconsistent with His attributes. The whole subject is a mystery to us: "God will have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and He will have compassion on whom He will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth or of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." Nor is there any thing in the least degree more wonderful or unaccountable in God's admitting one man to the privileges of Christianity, and excluding another, because the rulers of the Church have decreed it should be so, than in His doing the same thing because one man happened to be born

in England and another in China. Let it be as mere a matter of chance whom the Church excommunicates and whom it absolves, as it is a matter of chance who is born in England and who in China, and still it will be just as consistent with God's attributes to exclude excommunicated persons, and admit absolved ones, as it is to exclude born Chinese, and admit born Englishmen.

This causes, however, in most men's minds, a confusion on this subject, which greatly interferes with their seeing and receiving the truth. It seems to be commonly imagined, that a claim on the part of our Ecclesiastical Rulers to remit and retain sins, in such a sense as to affect our condition in the sight of God, and to have any influence on our prospects hereafter, can amount to nothing short of a claim, absolutely to dispose of us in the next world, consigning us over at their pleasure to endless happiness or misery. Now if such were the claims of those who advocate the primitive view of Ecclesiastical authority, they would well deserve all the opprobrious epithets that have been heaped on them by Bishop Hoadly and others, as blasphemous pretenders to the divine prerogatives, [and the like.] But surely it needs no great consideration, to discover the difference between a claim to some influence over men's prospects hereafter, and an absolute uncontrollable disposal of them. Something and everything are surely words to which in common language we attach very different meanings: nor will a reasonable man assume as self-evident,

that a power to dispense or withhold some kind of blessedness in the next world, is necessarily the same thing as the power to pass the irreversible sentence at the last day.

This one would think is obvious enough to common sense, or, if not, is at least abundantly manifest from Scripture. If men would but read their Bibles instead of speculating, they might easily satisfy themselves that there is such a thing as admission to the kingdom of Heaven and exclusion from it, and that the one is spoken of as a great blessing, the other as a great evil, affecting our condition in the next world. And yet it is also perfectly certain, that this blessing does not amount to salvation, for "the kingdom of Heaven is like unto a net" in which are fish bad and good (S. Matt. xiii. 47, 48.) which shall be separated in the last day. Nor again does this evil amount to damnation, for the Saints of the Old Testament, even to John the Baptist, are not included in the kingdom of Heaven, indeed are less than the least in it. So that it is certain that persons within the kingdom of Heaven may, and that many of them unhappily will, perish everlastingly; and that those who are not within it, may nevertheless "come from the east and from the west, and sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob."

Let it be remembered then, that when a Christian Bishop claims the power to admit authoritatively into the kingdom of Heaven, or to exclude from it, he claims no power either to save or to

damn, but only to confer or deny that blessedness which Scripture assigns to the subjects of that kingdom, be it little or be it great.

Lastly, if, after due weight has been given to these considerations, a doubt should still appear to hang over the remarkable promise of our Saviour to the Church, it should be borne in mind, that on the interpretation of this promise there hangs a practical question of no small importance: whatever difficulty we may experience in deciding, we are not at liberty to remain in indecision: two courses of conduct are before us, one or other of which we must choose, however doubtful may be the evidence that determines us. We have to act either on the hypothesis that we know the nature and consequences of Excommunication and Absolution, or that we do not know them. In the former case, we are at liberty to use or dispense with them according to our notions of expediency; in the latter, we must use them according to the rule which Christ has given us, without exception or partiality. And what we have to make up our minds about is, not whether we can attain to certainty either one way or the other, but which of these two courses appears to be the SAFEST.

In settling this point we may be assisted by a parallel case. Consider, then, the case of a sentinel, who having been stationed at a particular post, began after the departure of his officer to doubt whether the circumstances had not altered which led to his being placed there; suppose that insulated

as he was, and forming but a point in an extended plan of operations, he conceived himself to be in full possession of the reasons on which his station had been selected, and on this hypothesis was debating with himself, whether, as things stood, he should not be forwarding his commander's views by changing it on his own responsibility. It is scarcely to be doubted what would be his safest course; nor, I should think, much more so what is ours.

For what if God has chosen to give His sentinels no fuller insight into His reasons for assigning them their several stations and duties, than a general usually does to his inferior officers? what if He reserves to Himself His own great plan, and only allows us such imperfect glimpses of it as may enable us to perform our several parts? what if we know as little of His reasons for instituting Excommunication as the sentinel does for the allotment of his post, and yet for the fear of such evils as Mr. Knox and others have pointed out, neglect God's especial commission for enforcing it?

Truly in that case the predicament of the unwise Virgins is preferable to ours.

§ 3. [*On shunning heretics and evil-livers*¹.]

The Church of England does not excommunicate: if she did, there would be no occasion for the

¹ [This Section has been published in the *British Magazine* for July, 1834.]

following remarks. But as she does not, a question arises whether the responsibility, incurred by her through this omission, rests only on the heads of our Spiritual Rulers, to whom the power of Excommunication, strictly speaking, belongs; or, whether it may not be in a degree shared by the inferior clergy, and even by the lay members of the Church? Whether, in short, dutiful Churchmen are at liberty to remain perfectly passive in this matter, contented with lamenting annually in the Communion Service the circumstances which restrain the exercise of a Godly Discipline; or whether some active duties do not devolve on them in consequence?

Our Spiritual Governors are prevented from executing this part of their divine commission by tyrannical laws. Is there no way in which we can assist them? or, in case this is impossible, is there nothing we can ourselves do? If Excommunication was enforced, all notorious ill livers and professed heretics would be authoritatively cut off from familiar and intimate intercourse with Churchmen. They are not so cut off at present by any authoritative sentence; but I believe it will be found in Scripture that each individual Christian is authorised, nay bound, to cut them off for himself, to withdraw personally from all *intimate* contact with them, and, as far as his influence extends, to induce others to do so. This I conceive to be the course prescribed in Scripture for each individual Christian; but before stating my reasons for thinking so, it may be useful to notice a confusion of thought that seems

to have diverted many persons from the truth in this particular.

The question, "How ought a Churchman to behave towards professed heretics and notorious ill livers?" is sometimes confused with another question which sounds like it, but is, in fact, very different; viz. "How ought persons who conceive themselves to be spiritually-minded, to behave towards those whom they think worldly-minded?"

These two questions are often, whether designedly or weakly, regarded as one and the same, and all the folly and pride which the latter implies, are attributed to the former.

The evident truth, that no one has any right to judge himself spiritually-minded, or his neighbour worldly-minded, is used as a proof that no one can know himself to be a Churchman, or his neighbour a notorious ill liver, or professed heretic. And this sophism, obvious as soon as stated, has been a means of silencing inquiry on an important practical subject. A moment's consideration will show that for a man to know himself to be a Churchman, is just as easy as for him to know that he is a Frenchman or an Englishman, and that it implies just as little self-satisfaction and spiritual pride. It is also quite plain and obvious, that if any neighbour professes to be a Socinian or Latitudinarian, or if he is living with a mistress, or uses indecent language, I can no more help knowing that he does so, than I can help knowing that he is six feet high, or forty years old; and that the knowledge of the

former facts does not, any more than of the latter, imply that I judge him, or pretend to say how he stands with his Maker.

A Churchman is a man who has been baptized and admitted into the Church, and is not under sentence of Excommunication: surely a man may know this of himself, without any extraordinary pretence to a spiritual mind. Also a professed heretic is a man who makes no secret that he holds opinions contrary to the Creeds; and a notorious ill liver is a man that makes no secret of his immorality; so that every one who has eyes and ears must know both the one and the other. Now the question is, whether any directions are given in Scripture for the behaviour of Churchmen towards these two classes of persons? whether persons who (however conscious of their own failings) are anxious to obey God as well as they can, have any rules given them for their conduct towards others, who (whatever may be their excuses in the sight of God) make no secret of deliberately violating His commandments, or make light of His Church?

Those who think this question worth attending to, are requested to consider the following texts:—

“Now I have written to you *not to keep company*, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner: with such an one NO NOT TO EAT.” [1 Cor. v. 11.]

“Many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the

flesh.....If there come any to you and bring not this doctrine, *receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed* (χαίρειν αὐτῷ μὴ λέγετε.) For he that biddeth him God speed is PARTAKER OF HIS EVIL DEEDS." [2 John 10, 11.]

Now I will not say that these texts are to be interpreted literally, and without exception, nor will I assert that if St. Paul and St. John were writing expressly for our direction at the present day, they would have used precisely the same expressions. Yet let the utmost latitude be allowed for modes of speaking and difference of circumstances, let the words be turned, twisted, and tampered with in every conceivable way, and still I doubt whether they can be brought into any kind of consistency with the avowed and almost universal practice of Christians at the present day. Take, for instance, the words of St. John, and conceive that Apostle explaining to a modern churchman what he intended by his advice to "the elect lady;" can it be conceived that he would put this paraphrase on his words?

"When I spoke of persons who did not believe rightly in the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, and forbade my flock from receiving them into their houses, and bidding them God speed, I was far from wishing to interrupt friendly intercourse between persons who thought differently on an important subject. As long as your neighbours are amiable, respectable people, I have no objection to your living with them on the most intimate

terms,—to your eating, drinking, and being merry with them,—to your contracting friendships and intermarrying,—in short, I wish you to make no kind of difference between people on account of mere opinions.” Can it be supposed that St. John meant this? if so, anything may mean anything. It is as easy to conceive that when he said, “The Word was God,” he meant “The Word was not God,” as to conceive that when he said—“Receive not heretics into your house, nor bid them God speed,” he meant, “be very good friends with Sociinians and Latitudinarians.” And again, as to the advice of St. Paul to the Corinthians, it certainly is no very intelligible method of interpretation which could elicit from the words, “keep no company with drunkards and fornicators, do not even eat with them,” a permission “to associate with them on easy terms, to dine with them and ask them to dinner.” No; the words of the Apostles are stubborn, and refuse to be tampered with: do what you will, and you cannot strip them of a meaning which renders heresy or immorality, the one as well as the other, some kind of barrier to friendship and intimacy, which obliges churchmen to some degree of coldness and distance in their intercourse with open despisers of the Creed and commandments.

Some persons indeed there are who harden their minds against the reception of this plain truth, by calling it uncharitable, &c., a method of arguing which seems to bear harder on the inspired Apostles, than on those who take them to mean what

they have most plainly stated ; and to such persons it might be a sufficient answer, “whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye.” But to show in what a mere piece of self-deceit and delusion their objection originates, I shall try the principle it proceeds on, in a parallel case. If it is uncharitable to make distinctions between people because they happen to have been brought up in habits and opinions different from our own, I presume it is just as uncharitable to do so, when the difference is very trifling and nonsensical, as when it turns on serious and important matters. However wicked and uncharitable it may be to withdraw from a neighbour’s society, because in some respects, he thinks, feels, and acts differently from ourselves, it will hardly be more wicked when these respects are of vital consequence than when they involve mere fancies. If it is wicked to withdraw on account of religious differences, how much more so on account of any other difference in the world.

Bearing this in mind, then, let us examine for a moment certain distinctions, which are acknowledged through the whole world, good and bad, as regulating the terms on which one man associates with another.

B is a man of excellent character, honest, sober, kind-hearted, brave, religious ; and A knows it and esteems him. Does it follow from this that A acknowledges B as an equal, visits him, allows the families to contract intimacies and intermarriages ?

No; B is a fisherman and A is a Lord: one has rough hands, and the others mooth; one has little money, the other a great deal; and other differences of about the same real importance; and these are allowed to constitute a just, rational, natural barrier between the families of A and B.

Such is the world which stigmatizes a separation from Socinians as uncharitable! If I did not know respectable persons who joined in this senseless cry, I should refer it either to hypocrisy or madness.

Yet granting that we are in duty bound to withdraw, in some degree, from the society of lax persons, whether in faith or morals, it will be said that it is a difficult and almost impossible task to judge what that degree is. The thoughtlessness of others, and of our own past lives, has entangled us with friendships, and relationships, and obligations of various kinds, in families from which we are thus called on to separate ourselves; are all such ties to go for nothing? or if not, how intricate is the path of duty! It is so. It imposes on us a painful and most perplexing task. Who is sufficient for it? If indeed the Spiritual Rulers of the Church were free to use their Apostolical authority, their word would be a law to us in this embarrassing situation. We should then be furnished with a guide far safer than our private judgment, swayed as this must perpetually be, either by fear or favour. But as things are, we are left to ourselves: persecuting laws, enacted in despotic times, prevent our holy fathers, the Bishops, from acting. If they took on

themselves to excommunicate, except under certain imposed restrictions, that amount in almost all cases to a prohibition, they would forthwith come under a law enacted by Edward III.; confiscating all their goods, whether ecclesiastical or personal, and subjecting themselves, their aiders and abettors, to perpetual imprisonment. Can we expect them to face such consequences, if we shrink from our own share of pain and difficulty?

§ 4. [*On Mr. Knox's views of Church Discipline*¹.]

Mr. Knox [is reported to have expressed the following sentiments:]

“He very eloquently maintained, that *the want*

¹ [The following remarks, which were written in 1834, and in the MS. stand in the form of a letter to a third person, must be considered as directed, not so much against so remarkable a man as Mr. Knox, who had to struggle with many disadvantages in pursuing religious truth, and who, considering these, is rather to be honoured for what he attained, than to be severely treated where he failed, as against the doctrine which he is reported to have advocated in the passage referred to. The cause of his advocating it is to be founded in the amiable endeavour, so remarkable in his writings, to prove that every thing is best just as it is. Accordingly he must be considered, in the case in question, rather as an advocate making the most of given circumstances, than as feeling it incumbent on him to give an independent and unbiassed opinion on a question which had to be decided as the Word of God enjoined. It may be as well to add, that the Author of these Strictures is known to his friends to have felt the excellence and value of other writings of Mr. Knox, which appeared at a later date, such as his *Essay on the Eucharist*.]

of discipline in the Church, so much complained of, was one of its happy features. His reason for so regarding it was, that religion was thus presented to the view and acceptance of men without any obtrusion of human interference; without any offence to the scrupulousness of a hesitating and bashful mind; without any violation to that sort of nervous delicacy which is peculiar to some constitutions; without interposing any mediator between man and his God. He was glad that in one place Christianity appeared free to all; unfettered by any laws, unfenced with any preliminary examinations or menaces of disciplinary infliction. He thought that any kind of impediment thrown in the way, even of profligates coming to the participation of Christian ordinances, would operate as a hindrance and repulse to timid, though honest votaries. He mentioned the case of Lord Chancellor Clare; who, towards the close of his life, went to a village Church, where he might not be known, to take the Sacrament. He thought that the advantage of an establishment was twofold :

“ 1. It diffused universally a low form of religion; overspread the land with a weak but pervading light; preserved in the minds of all men, the idea that there was a God to go to, and such general notions respecting Him, as might afterwards be made efficient by any casual misfortune or event occasioning serious consideration. This was a light into which every man was born: he found himself enveloped in it without any effort of his

own : he had it in his power to make all the use he pleased of it, but was not disgusted by its obtrusive and imperious implicitness.

“2. The other advantage was that of enabling men of higher intellectual powers to frame their own religion, without the intervention of any human guides ; to become acquainted with God for themselves, through the medium only of the established formularies and ordinánces ; cultivating a deep, inward, spiritual, philosophical, cordial piety, of a more refined and sublime nature, than could be produced under the agency of religious instruction.

“An establishment, therefore, was suited to the diffusion of important general notions, and to the promotion of a sublime piety.

“Between these two extremes, it was very desirable that there should be an energy, an explicitness, a forwardness, and a familiarity of religious instruction, adapted to produce strong though not refined feelings of devotion, and suited to train up the less abstracted and contemplative mind. This object he considered the best attained by sects and societies¹.”

On the other hand, we read in the Communion Service, that “In the Primitive Church there was a Godly Discipline, that at the beginning of Lent, such persons as stood convicted of notorious sin, were put to open penance, and punished in this world, that their souls might be saved in the day of

¹ Jebb's Introduction to Burnet's Lives, pp. xxxv. xxxvi.

the Lord ; and that others, admonished by their example, might be the more afraid to offend.

“ Instead whereof, (*until the said Discipline may be restored again, which is much to be wished,*) it is thought good, that at this time (in the presence of you all) should be read the general Sentences of God’s cursing against impenitent sinners, gathered out of the seven and twentieth chapter of Deuteronomy, and other places of Scripture : and that ye should answer to every Sentence, *Amen* : To the intent that being admonished of the great indignation of God against sinners, ye may the rather be moved to earnest and true repentance ; and may walk more warily in these dangerous days ; fleeing from such vices, for which ye affirm with your own mouths the curse of God to be due.”

The first remark which I have to offer respecting these views of Mr. Knox’s, will possibly appear to many excellent persons entitled to little weight. It is, indeed, so obvious, and lies so much on the surface of this question, that it can scarcely have escaped the attention of any one to whom the subject is familiar. Yet, as there are perhaps some, who may, without inquiring for themselves, have taken for granted that the opinion of the Church, expressed in the Commination Service, is right, and on finding this opinion disregarded by the persons in question, may at first feel perplexed and distressed, I think it worth noticing what may possibly have escaped their observation, that is, that

Mr. Knox's view is built on a denial of the Apostolical Priesthood.

The supposition that Christ has left behind Him on earth a set of persons commissioned as His Ambassadors to their fellow men, is at once subversive of his whole system; and consequently it is on a denial of this that his system rests. If the existing Bishops and Presbyters of the Apostolical Church are really authorised by Christ to act as His vicegerents on earth; if it is God's ordinance that Christianity should be offered to men through other men, set apart by Him for that purpose, and commanded to teach all nations in His name; if these things are admitted, then Mr. Knox's proposition will run as follows:—

“The want of Discipline so much complained of in the Church is one of its happy features. For Religion is thus presented to the view and acceptance of men without any obtrusion of human interference (on the part of those whom God has set apart for the purpose of obtruding it;) without any offence to the scrupulousness of hesitating and bashful minds, (which would feel offended at having religion offered to them as God has appointed that it should be offered;) without any violation of that sort of nervous delicacy which is peculiar to some constitutions, (and which God did not sufficiently consider;) without interposing any mediators between man and his God, (even those whom God has Himself chosen to interpose.)

“By the absence of Church Discipline, men of

higher intellectual powers are enabled to frame their own religion, without the intervention of (those) human guides, (whom God has provided to assist them in framing it;) to become acquainted with God for themselves, through the medium only of formularies and ordinances, established (by men); cultivating a piety more refined and sublime, than could be produced under the agency of (that) religious instruction (which is established by God Himself.”)

Such is Mr. Knox's assertion, when paraphrased, as it must necessarily be, by those who acknowledge an Apostolical Priesthood; and if, under this paraphrase, it becomes a gross and evident absurdity, I shall scarcely [take] an unwarrantable [step] in concluding that Mr. Knox did not acknowledge such a Priesthood. The same thing, however, is more fully avowed a little farther on. In unfolding to us the different schemes of religious instruction which he considers best adapted to the various conditions of Christians, more or less advanced in intellectual refinement, he informs us that there is one class whose spiritual welfare he considers “best provided for by” (I cannot believe that his friends go along with him in this opinion,) “Sects and Societies.” That is to say, he considers that there is a class of persons who are more likely to become good Christians when out of the communion of the Church than in it; persons who will derive more benefit from the Ministry of unordained than of ordained persons; who had better

eat bread and drink wine in the meeting-house than partake of the consecrated elements in Church.

Such is the estimate Mr. Knox has formed of the privileges of Church Membership, and the use of the Apostolical Priesthood: first, he holds up as obtrusive meddlers all those who presume, in the presence of the higher orders, to stir up the gift that is within them by the imposition of hands; and secondly, as to the lower orders, if I may speak his meaning in plain words, he thinks Dissent is good enough for them.

I have made these observations, not with any idea that they will tend to lower Mr. Knox's authority in the judgment of his admirers. The opinions which I have attributed to him, are, I know, but too common among that class of intellectually refined persons who "have framed their religion for themselves." Nor again is it my intention to argue against these opinions, which has been done already so many hundred times over, that those who have not been convinced, cannot. I have merely stated the fact, that Mr. Knox did entertain them, for the sake of plain and humble-minded Christians, who might be disposed to defer unduly to the authority of those who sanction him, unless they saw the lengths to which it was to carry them.

And now I shall proceed to another point, the consideration of which will not be regarded, even in this age, as altogether superfluous. That Mr. Knox's views consist ill with a due regard for the Apostolical Priesthood, I have already pointed out;

I proceed to inquire whether they consist better with the Holy Volume itself.

And first I call attention to what seems to me Mr. Knox's fundamental error; the primary discrepancy between his system of religion and that proposed to us by Jesus Christ. It is unnecessary for me to remind his friends, that in the New Testament we find no intimation of any advantage accruing to Christians in the eyes of God from intellectual powers and philosophical refinement. If Mr. Knox had thought more of his Bible, and less of "framing for himself his own religion," he would have learned to form a very different estimate of "seducing words of man's wisdom," of "philosophy and vain deceit," of "knowledge that puffeth up," of that temper to which "the Cross of Christ was foolishness." Surely it is in no very strict accordance with such expressions, that we find Mr. Knox restricting the capacity for what he is pleased to call "a sublime piety," to this very class, from among whom St. Paul tells us that so few were called. This appears to be a very unscriptural thought indeed, and to indicate a frame of mind which in the primitive ages of Christianity would scarce have found the straight gate and narrow way that leadeth unto life.

The same sentiment is brought out in a still clearer and more offensive form, in what Mr. Knox tells us of that other class of zealous Christians, whom for a want of intellectual refinement he deems incapable of his "sublime piety." "Between the

two extremes," says Mr. Knox, (that is, between the sublimely pious persons of high intellectual powers, and those who, to use Mr. Knox's words, have just preserved "the idea that there is a God to go to, and such general notions respecting Him as may be afterwards made efficient,") "between these two extremes it is necessary that there should be an energy, an explicitness, a forwardness and familiarity of religious instruction, adapted to produce strong, though not refined, feelings of devotion, and suited to train up the less abstracted and contemplative mind." It is impossible to mistake this, even if it were disjoined from the precious declaration about "Sects and Societies." It is but too plain that Mr. Knox considers all those whom nature or fortune has disqualified for high intellectual occupations, as disqualified likewise for a high station in the kingdom of Heaven. It is impossible to deny that this is [the] spirit of the passage which has just been quoted. Mr. Knox evidently considers, that the highest state of moral and religious elevation can be attained only by the educated and polished classes of society, and even among these by none except persons of higher intellectual powers; while the rest of the congregation of Christ's little ones, the poor, the illiterate, the slow of thought, the "less abstracted and contemplative minds," are grouped together in a body, and consigned over to "strong though not refined feelings of devotion."

This is really such a flight as I should scarce expect to find sanctioned by a Christian Bishop.

What! are we to be told that the Fishermen of Galilee were strangers to the high devotion of a modern philosopher? Is the Gospel of St. John a Methodistical rhapsody, resulting from "strong though not refined feelings of devotion?" and what shall we say of Mary, the sister of Lazarus, and of that other Mary, whom "all generations shall call Blessed?" and who are they that shall "sit on thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel," when "the last shall be first and the first last?"

In fact, this notion is one which cuts at the very root of the Christian spirit; and instead of teaching us to love the thing which Christ commands, and to desire that which He doth promise, proposes to us a new calling, whereunto He hath not called us. "Ye see your calling, Brethren," says one incapable of abstracted contemplation, "how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called. But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty; and the base things of the world and the things which are despised hath God chosen, yea the things that are not, to bring to nought the things that are: that no flesh should glory in His presence."

The religion of Jesus Christ is in an especial manner the religion of the poor; and it was to these that the Gospel was first preached; it was these that heard it gladly. The fisher's cot by the

lake of Gennesareth, the shop of the wandering tent-makers at Corinth, and of the purple-seller of Thyatira, these were the good ground where the seed of the true Faith fell, and brought forth its thirty, and its sixty, and its hundred fold : and Mr. Knox, when he sets up, in opposition to these, “ the deep inward philosophical cordial piety ” of his “ abstracted and contemplative minds,” has exhibited to us a very deplorable example of a “ man of higher intellectual powers framing his own religion for himself.”

This I conceive to be the foundation of Mr. Knox’s errors ; but it has led him into others, which I shall proceed to notice as they occur, and which are all traceable to the same spirit of undue partiality towards cultivation and refinement

Mr. Knox seems to augur some great advantage from the universal diffusion “ of a low form of religion...of which men have it in their power to make all the use they please, without being disgusted at its obtrusive and imperious implicitness.” Without stopping to inquire whether Mr. Knox did not mean explicitness, I will ask attention to the question, whether this low form of Religion, if truly predicated of the general state of baptized persons, in acknowledged possession of the full privileges of Church membership, may not likewise be truly predicated of the Church itself, which acknowledges them. I believe it will be found that in the Scripture language, when any fault or excellence is attributed to great bodies of men, as cities, nations, and, in the New Testament, Churches, it is attribu-

ted, not to every individual member of those bodies, but to the generality; and that it alludes not to the inward tempers and characters, but to their superficial developement, to the broad and obvious features which are obtruded on the public view: and if, notwithstanding the sublime piety which Mr. Knox speaks of as existing in the Church of England, still it may be truly said of the great body of its members, that the form of religion diffused among them is “low;” if for fear of “disgusting” these half-converted votaries “with its forwardness,” it silently countenances their gross and public vices; then, according to the Scriptural method of judging, it cannot be acquitted of their sins.

I put it to Mr. Knox’s admirers; have we any good reason for feeling certain, that in the Church of Laodicea, there may not have been among those whom Jesus loved, (Rev. iii. 19.) some persons as sublimely pious as any of Mr. Knox’s self-tutored philosophers? Is there any thing in the description of that Church which proves its religion to have been worse than generally “low,” its zeal feebler than to shrink from the imputation of “forwardness?” May there not have been in Laodicea, as in the days of Ahab, “seven thousand who had not bowed the knee to Baal?” And may it not be that, in spite of all the “deep inward philosophical piety” which Mr. Knox discerns among ourselves, we nevertheless may in too many points resemble the devoted Laodiceans? May it not be, that if the Amen, the Faithful and True Witness, should in

His goodness deign to utter His warning voice against the Angel of the Church of London, it would run in terms similar to the following? “Because thou sayest, I am rich, and increased in goods, and have need of nothing, and knowest not that thou art wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked, I counsel thee to buy of Me gold tried in the fire, that thou mayest be rich, and white raiment that thou mayest be clothed, and that the shame of thy nakedness do not appear.”

In another of Mr. Knox’s remarks, he displays a peculiar tenderness for what he calls, “the scrupulousness of a hesitating and bashful mind,” and “that sort of nervous delicacy which is peculiar to some constitutions.” One would have thought, that when Mr. Knox wrote this, he must have been thinking on matters very different from the stern intercourse of Priest and penitent ;

*οὐ μὲν πως νῦν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ δρύος οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πετρῆς
τῷ ὀαρίζεσθαι, ἅτε πάρθενος ἡθεός τε,
πάρθενος ἡθεός τ’ ὀαρίζετον ἀλλήλοισιν.*

I am indeed aware, (as who is not?) that persons in the higher and more refined ranks of life do feel a certain awkwardness and reluctance as to acknowledging their filial relation to the Clergy. To associate with their Parish Priest on the footing of a gentleman they do indeed sometimes condescend, when his education and habits of life seem to entitle him to that character; or even should he in these respects fall something short of the standard re-

quired from their lay associates, they can admit him to their table on Sunday, and even refrain from smiling when he says grace. But I can feel with Mr. Knox that all this falls something short of a recognition of his pastoral character, and that any attempt on his part to approach them on a different footing would be received with a "scrupulousness," whether "hesitating," or "nervous," or "bashful," or what Mr. Knox pleases, which would operate as a "repulse;" such a repulse as John the Baptist met with from Herod.

But to go at once to what seems to be Mr. Knox's main point, the palmary argument, by which he would prove the evil tendency of Church Discipline.

"He thought that any kind of impediment thrown in the way, even of profligates coming to the participation of Christian ordinances, would operate as a hindrance and repulse to timid though honest votaries. He mentioned the case of Lord Chancellor Clare, who, towards the close of his life, went to a village Church, where he might not be known, to take the Sacrament."

When one reads of timid votaries, the first thing that suggests itself to one is the publican in the parable, "who stood afar off, and would not so much as lift up his eyes to heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying, God, be merciful to me a sinner." Such is the timidity of a broken and contrite heart, and most assuredly such timidity God will not despise. Yet it is worth considering for a moment,

whether this is very like the case of Lord Chancellor Clare. First, in what sense can it be said that Lord Clare stood afar off, and would not so much as lift up his eyes to Heaven? How could he, if he had been the most presumptuous man on earth, have approached his Maker more closely, or raised his eyes higher? If the Altar of Christ is afar off, what is near? If mortal eyes can look towards Heaven, where else shall they seek for it, than in the presence of the Body and Blood of their Redeemer? If Lord Clare stood afar off, what place is left for the Pharisee?

I fear that the timidity [which] the Bishop's friend here speaks of, is very different from that encouraged in the gospel. Lord Clare's timidity consisted in "going to a village Church, where he might not be known;" in concealing from his associates and acquaintance an act which seemed to imply a confession of past misconduct; in fearing to confess Jesus Christ before men, that is, in ranging himself among those against whom we have the terrible declaration, that "of them the Son of man shall be ashamed, when He cometh in the clouds with His holy Angels."

I can believe that to such timidity, what Mr. Knox calls preliminary exactions, might operate as a repulse. Whether such a repulse would not be the harbinger of a more fearful one hereafter, I leave his friends to determine.

Nor will the advocates for Church Discipline shrink from admitting that there is also another

class of persons to whom its “menaces” “might operate as a repulse.” There are certain spoliators whose love of religion is said to stand high in their own estimation, and that of some of Mr. Knox’s advocates. Picture them extending hands, fresh stained with sacrilege, to receive the Blessed Body of our Lord ; picture them, and if your vocabulary will furnish you with no fitter designation, class them too with your timid votaries. To these persons, and to the like of them, I can conceive that disciplinary inflictions might indeed prove very unacceptable. I can conceive the “hesitating bashfulness” with which they would receive any “obtrusive interference between themselves and their God.” I own, however, it does not appear clear to me that such interference would be unkind or unnecessary, unless it is no longer possible, in the present state of the world, that “prayer should be turned into sin.” There are persons to whom the Lord hath said, “Why dost thou preach My laws and takest My covenant into thy mouth, whereas thou *hatest to be reformed*, and hast cast my words behind thee ; *when thou sawest a thief thou consentedst unto him, and hast been partaker with the adulterers.*”

To these two classes of persons, the penitent who is ashamed of being known to repent, and to the self-satisfied sinner, a Godly Discipline would certainly deny access to the Holy Mysteries of our Religion ; and doubtless, if it is assumed as an axiom that all such denial must necessarily be wrong, if there is no such thing as an unworthy

communicant, but the mere fact of his wishing to communicate is to be taken as a proof of fitness for it, then indeed it must be admitted that the absence of Church Discipline is, as Mr. Knox has called it, "one of the happy features of the Church of England." But let it be understood fairly and clearly that this assumption is what Mr. Knox's view proceeds upon. Let not the mind of the unwary reader be distracted with such irrelevant phrases as those with which Mr. Knox's naked and unsupported assertion has been so studiously [mixed up.] Let us hear no more of "hesitating bashfulness," and "nervous delicacy," and "timid votaries;" but let the truth be spoken out at once; the naked proposition enunciated, that Mr. Knox considers Church Discipline a bad thing, not because in some cases it might operate prejudicially, but because in its very idea it is an evil; not because it might occasionally exclude worthy communicants, but because an unworthy one is an absurdity.

REMARKS
ON THE
GROUNDS OF ORTHODOX BELIEF;

BEING A

REVIEW OF SOME LATE PUBLICATIONS¹.

OF the three small volumes which form the subject of [the following remarks,] only one is acknowledged in the title page as Mr. Blanco White's ; but so little trouble is taken by the author to conceal the identity of the source from which they proceed, that there can be no discourtesy in treating them all as his, and using them to throw light (which they frequently do) on one another's meaning.

Their intention is to exhibit the process of thought by which Mr. Blanco White, after he had renounced the errors of the Roman Catholic religion, was prevented, in the first instance, from acquiescing implicitly in any of the established forms of orthodox Protestantism ; and then gradu-

¹ [viz. 1. Observations on Heresy and Orthodoxy. By the Rev. Joseph Blanco White. 2. Second Travels of an Irish Gentleman in search of a Religion, with Notes and Illustrations. *Not* by the Editor of Captain Rock's Memoirs.—These Remarks were written in November, 1835, and appeared in the British Critic for January, 1836.]

ally urged forward, without the power of discovering any other resting place, first, to a Latitudinarian conviction that no single definite belief respecting the object of religious faith was better or more pleasing to God than any other ; and finally, to a full adoption, which, however, he still holds to be a matter of indifference, of the Socinian creed. And what makes them particularly interesting is, on the one hand, the known ability and character of the writer ; and on the other, the length and painful nature of the struggle, in which he endeavoured, however ineffectually, to hold fast against what appeared to him the suggestions of reason, the faith which habit had taught him to revere.

Mr. Blanco White's present opinions have not been embraced by him hastily, or carelessly. He has not arrived at them by the off-hand, heedless process which leads the modern indifferentist to disencumber himself of what he thinks superfluous articles of belief, or wilfully to take up such as are most congenial to his feelings. His Latitudinarian views are the result, not, as is generally the case, of a haughty negligence, which will not stoop to examine the foundations of different creeds, but of a minute and pains-taking enquiry into the foundation of each ; and the particular notion of the Christian system which he has adopted for his own, far from having been taken up wilfully, or in compliance with the bent of his disposition, seems, on the contrary, to have been forced on him against his will, to the overthrow of early mental habits,

and of strong devotional sentiments, by what appeared to him the overwhelming demands of reason.

The following is his own brief account of his state of mind during the interval between his throwing off Roman Catholicism and finally adopting his present creed, from which it will be seen, that, fatal as is the error into which he has fallen, he at least may be considered, so far as it is possible for us on such subjects to judge of one another, to have fallen into it sincerely.

“My doubts of the truth of the Established views began with the systematic and devout study of the Scriptures, which I undertook in 1814, when, free from the engagements which, in the service of England, as well as of my native country, had occupied me during the four preceding years, I removed to Oxford, for the exclusive purpose of devoting myself to theology.

“In the year 1818,...I arrived at the Unitarian view of Christianity.....

“Having, till about 1824, continued in that state,...a revival of my early mental habits, and of those devotional sentiments which are inseparably connected with the idea of intellectual surrender to some Church, induced me again to acquiesce in the Established doctrines,—not from conviction—not by the discovery of sounder proofs than those which I had found insufficient,—but chiefly by the power of that sympathy which tends to assimilation with those we love and respect.....

“But to proceed. Not long after my strong

attachment to many orthodox and highly religious persons had given full sway to my deeply seated habits of attachment to *a church*, (habits which, when it is remembered that from the age of fourteen I belonged to the most compact and best organized body of clergy which ever existed, must be found quite natural,) my reason resumed its operations against the system that I had thus wilfully re-embraced.....I had not yet at that time settled, to my entire satisfaction, the important point which forms the subject of the following letters. I had long been convinced that most of the questions which so hopelessly divide the Church of Christ, are not essential to Christianity. I knew that the distinction between *essential* and *non-essential* articles of faith must be arbitrary, since there is no certain rule to distinguish them. But I had not fully made the application of that fact,—the absence of a rule not subject to rational doubt; nor found, as I did soon after, that the absence of every rule of dogmatic faith is in perfect conformity with the tenor and spirit of the New Testament. As I had not yet obtained this conviction, and was not indifferent about my duty to God, I could not but feel distressed, when, still under a remnant of those early impressions of identity between *saving faith* and *right opinions*, I found my orthodoxy crumbling to dust, day by day.....

“The last fact I shall state is, that in my anxiety to avoid a separation from the Church, by a deliberate surrender of my mind to my old Uni-

tarian convictions, I took refuge in a modification of the Sabellian theory, and availed myself of the *moral* unity which I believe to exist between God the Father and Christ, joined to the consideration, that Christ is called in the New Testament the *Image* of God, and addressed my prayers to God, as appearing in that image. I left nothing untried, to cultivate and encourage this feeling by devotional means ; but such efforts of mere feeling... were always vain and fruitless.....The devout contrivance would not bear examination. Sabellianism is only Unitarianism disguised in words.....In this state, however, I passed five or six years ; but the return to clear and definite Unitarianism, in which I had formerly been, was as easy as it was natural."

Such is the melancholy history Mr. Blanco White has given us of the state of his mind, "during the greatest part of more than twenty years," and he concludes it with the following reflection:—

"I do not absolutely reproach myself for having so long indulged the sympathies which made me linger in connexion with the Church, when my understanding had fully rejected her principal doctrines ; at all events, I derive from that fact, the satisfaction of being assured, that far from having embraced Unitarianism in haste, the only fault of which I cannot clear myself, is that of reluctance and dilatoriness to follow my convictions in its favour."

Now every one who reads this account, unless, indeed, he supposes Mr. Blanco White to have

altogether deceived himself as to the state of his feelings and inclinations, will admit at once, that his errors, great and perilous as they are, ought not to be confounded with common-place laxity of religious opinion. The train of thought which has operated so powerfully with a person of his intellectual acuteness, may be expected beforehand to be free from the vulgar fallacies which are the stumbling-blocks of inferior and less serious minds. Absolute novelty of course cannot be looked for, on a subject which has for centuries engaged the speculations of first-rate intellects,—of an Episcopius, a Hales, a Chillingworth, a Locke; but ancient and often-refuted arguments may be exhibited by an original thinker, in guises so novel as apparently to elude the force of all that has been urged against them, and to require for all practical purposes a new refutation. And this is just what has been effected by Mr. Blanco White. Doubtless, to persons of habitually settled views, the conclusions at which he arrives will appear so extravagantly rash, as themselves to furnish a refutation of the steps which led to them.

Such persons will, perhaps, feel impatient at seeing arguments, which to their own matured judgments are self-destructive, opposed on any ground except that of their terminating in absurdity; and certainly, if all persons were of mature judgment in religious matters, and of habitually settled views, a critical examination of Mr. Blanco White's reasonings might justly merit their impatience, being,

as in that case it would be, a work of mere superfluous curiosity. But, unhappily, the number of persons so circumstanced is extremely limited; when compared with the countless multitudes whose circumstances are directly opposite, it is as nothing. Matured judgment and habitually settled views on the subject of religion are to be found but in rare instances, few and far between; while the generality, rash, ignorant, roaming negligently from one opinion to another, are ready victims of the first sophist who comes in contact with them: and even among minds of a higher cast, really intent on discovering truth, we see boldness of enquiry carried to such excess as to make it evident that no conclusion, however contrary to received and established doctrines, would act as an antidote to arguments brought forward clearly in support of it. Certain it is, then, that such persons, unless supplied with some defence less fragile than what their own habits can furnish them with, must, on the perusal of books like Mr. Blanco White's, fall at once into the train of fallacies from which subtler minds have been unable to extricate themselves. It may be said, indeed, that their error will in that case be their own fault, for that they would have escaped but for the irreverent habits which they had indulged; yet this seems hardly a reason for refusing them our sympathy and assistance, even should it prove necessary in affording these, occasionally to abandon, for argument's sake, the high ground on which established orthodoxy has en-

trenched itself, and to adopt methods of reasoning, as far as ourselves are concerned, simply hypothetical, and addressed to the mistaken hypothesis of those we would instruct.

To proceed, then, with Mr. Blanco White's argument. In the first place, it must be observed that this is not intended to be, any more than it is, a regular defence of Unitarianism. It is an exposition of the process of thought which eventually led the writer to become a Unitarian, and which probably, if adopted by any other equally clear and independent mind, would terminate in the same conclusion: but its bearings on the Unitarian question are only indirect; it is occupied entirely with preliminary discussions, directed against certain views and feelings, which tend (as we should say) happily, but as Mr. Blanco White contends, most injuriously, to repress freedom of inquiry on religious subjects. His primary object is to advocate what he considers a just liberty of thought, and to encourage a spirit of investigation in the department of religious truth similar to that which has led to so many discoveries in physical science. In this point of view, creeds, articles, confessions of faith, occupy a prominent place in his disapprobation. These are, as it were, an advanced guard arrayed in opposition to his views, and accordingly he selects them for the first point of his attack. Romanist confessions, which claim to be based on infallible authority, he argues against in the common way, urging the disputes existing among the Romanists themselves as to the

seat of infallibility, the contradictory decisions which must be ascribed to it wherever it is supposed to reside, and the total absence of any evidence for its existence any where. But that such formulæ should have been adopted by Protestant communities, he seems to look on as an error of a far more aggravated character, and this for the following reasons.

In the first place, he argues that a confession of faith drawn up on an authority short of infallible, and yet claiming to be obligatory on the consciences of those to whom it is offered, is a self-evident absurdity,—an insult to common sense, so gross, that in comparison with it even the Romish figment of infallibility seems tolerable. He insists largely on the contradiction involved in the assumption of a right to controul the judgments of other men on the part of persons who admit the fallibility of their own,—the wild unreasonableness of undertaking on the one hand to silence doubt, while denying on the other the only rational and consistent ground for certainty; and then, as if not contented with this general ground of attack, he proceeds to charge the framers of the existing confessions with further inconsistency, in having, by the very act of drawing them up, asserted in their own persons a right which they were at the same time attempting to withhold from all the rest of mankind,—the right of private judgment in opposition to received standards of belief. The following passage he quotes

from M. Guizot, in the Appendix to the "Travels of an Irish Gentleman."

"The Reformers, while employed in the abolition of an absolute power over things spiritual, were far from understanding the true principles of human liberty. They enfranchised the human mind, and yet wished to govern it by law: they were, in fact, establishing the supreme independence of private judgment, and believed all the while that they had succeeded in establishing a *legitimate* authority in matters of faith instead of an *illegitimate* one. The Reformers had neither risen to the first principles on this subject, nor did they follow their own work to its ultimate consequences.....They either did not know or did not respect the rights of the human mind to their full extent. Claiming those rights for themselves, they violated them in others..... Hence the air of inconsistency, the narrow basis which give such undue advantages to the enemies of the Reformation."

And again, in the "Observations on Heresy and Orthodoxy," he supposes a Roman Catholic to argue thus with a Protestant, respecting the authority of the Thirty-nine Articles.

"If a judge of controversies (competent to impose confessions of faith) is (after all) to be acknowledged, what prudent man will hesitate between one so distinguished and eminent as ours, and those which the Reformation set up? You blame us for grounding our Christian certainty on the *questionable* fact of the divine appointment of Rome to be

the head of the Christian world; but can this uncertainty be compared with that which lies at the very foundation of your Churches? A few divines meet and draw up a list of theological propositions; the secular power takes them under its protection, ejects the clergy who will not submit to them, fences the Articles for a long period with penalties and civil disabilities, and makes them the rule of Christian faith *for ever*. This is what you call the judgment of the Church, which to oppose is heresy. It is heresy now to dissent from the Thirty-nine Articles; but there was, it seems, a happy moment, when the notions of a few individuals could be set up without heresy, against the judgment of a well defined and well constituted Church, to which all Christians, except heretics, had for ages submitted their private views of Christianity.”

Such are Mr. Blanco White’s views as to the absurdity of Protestant confessions of faith generally, and in particular of the self-condemnation involved in the conduct of those who imposed our own¹:

¹ [He has in fact taken it from the infidel Gibbon:]—“The pious or personal animosity of Calvin proscribed in Servetus the guilt of his own rebellion; and the flames of Smithfield, in which he was afterwards consumed, had been kindled for the Anabaptists by the zeal of Cranmer. The nature of the tiger was the same, but he was gradually deprived of his teeth and fangs. A spiritual and temporal kingdom was possessed by the Roman Pontiff: the Protestant doctors were subjects of a humble rank, without revenue or jurisdiction. *His* decrees were consecrated by the antiquity of the Catholic Church; *their* arguments and disputes were submitted to the people; and their

but not contented with this, he attempts further to exhibit their practical ill effects in the present, as he considers it, lamentable condition to which the existing Church of England has been reduced by them. He speaks of them, as if they had arrested the growth and repressed the expanding energies of our system, at a time when, humanly speaking, it could not possibly have attained perfection, and when no one pretends that it had done so ; as having preclu-

appeal to private judgment was accepted beyond their wishes by curiosity and enthusiasm. Since the days of Luther and Calvin a secret reformation has been silently working in the bosom of the Reformed Churches : many weeds of prejudice were eradicated, and the disciples of Erasmus diffused a spirit of freedom and moderation. The liberty of conscience has been claimed as a common benefit and inalienable right ; the free governments of England and Holland introduced the practice of toleration, and the narrow allowance of the laws has been enlarged by the prudence and humanity of the times. In the exercise the mind has understood the limits of its powers, and the *words and shadows* which might amuse the child, can no longer satisfy his manly reason. The volumes of controversy are overspread with cobwebs ; the doctrine of the Protestant Church is far removed from the knowledge or belief of its private members, and the forms of orthodoxy are subscribed with a sigh or a smile by the modern clergy. Yet the friends of Christianity are alarmed at the boundless impulse of enquiry and scepticism ; the predictions of the Catholics are accomplished ; the web of mystery is unravelled by Arminians, Arians, and Socinians, whose members must not be computed from their separate congregations ; and the pillars of revelation are shaken by those men who preserve the name without the substance of religion, who indulge the licence without the temper of philosophy." Chap. 54.

ded every subsequent generation of Churchmen from the exercise of rights, the necessity of which to the Church's welfare, nothing but the attainment of such perfection would have superseded; in short, as having acted the part of a petrifying stream, of having found us living, and left us stone. The governors of our Church, he contends, have been in every age between this and the Reformation, just as competent, in point of authority, to decide the questions settled in the Articles as their framers themselves were; and the intervening period has been just as likely to suggest matter for reconsideration and change, as that was which suggested the necessity of any Articles at all. Yet things have been so arranged, that, arise what new matter there may for consideration, the only authority competent to consider it is disqualified for doing so: the Articles which our bishops have subscribed are the condition of their remaining members of the Church, and should any thing come before any one of them to shake his belief in the accuracy of any one of these Articles, he has no alternative but to withdraw. Thus the body, who are to judge of the Articles, must remain for ever, one and all of them, firm believers in these Articles; for the act of disbelief cancels *ipso facto* the right of judgment, and all in consequence are excluded from the tribunal, except those who remain pledged to decide one way. The self-perpetuating system which results, gives occasion to the following remarks:—

“It is an abuse of terms, to speak of the Church

of England as a body capable of collective views and opinions, capable of improvement, and able to remove whatever defects either time or the weakness of men have brought upon her. The Church of England, as by law established, consists in certain formularies,—words, put together by four or five men, and acquiesced in by a large portion of the then existing clergy.....I do not reject those formularies; but I object to their having supreme and irrevocable power over the living Church. In the present state of things, the formularies are above the Church. That they are so, is proved by the fact that the living congregation of christians, who by law are called ‘members of the Church established in these realms,’ are and must be perfectly passive.....The dimensions and shape of the mould into which the law has fixed them, must be the dimensions and shape of their minds. Although it is not pretended that the framers of the mould were infallible, the mould itself is by law supposed to be unalterable. Whoever attempts to touch it must go out of the Church. There may be something wrong, there may be something superfluous, there may be much that is ill adapted to our times. Nevertheless the Church, the now-existing Church, like a geological petrification, must remain what it is for ever.....That such men as conceive themselves endowed with infallibility, should provide for the perpetuity of their opinions, is natural. But that those who never pretended to it, should contrive to make their views a law as immutable

as those of the Medes and Persians, is a curious and melancholy instance of the force of theological prejudice."

So far, Mr. B. White's argument applies generally, without reference to subject matter, to all Protestant confessions and subscriptions, as imposed by one generation of Churchmen, confessing themselves fallible, on successors who are not likely to be one whit more so. There remain, however, according to his view, other and still greater objections to them, arising out of the subject-matter with which they are for the most part occupied, and which he considers to be such, as in the nature of things, to refuse human explanation. The subjects, he argues, which are brought before our contemplation in Scripture, if regarded in reference to our capacity for apprehending and explaining in our own language what is told us about them, are distinguishable into two very broad classes. One class relates to matters of which human experience takes cognizance—to historical facts—to the conduct and motives of men—to the passions which seduce, and the principles which should be cultivated to guard them. All these and similar, are such as to admit of being set before us in a very distinct and intelligible manner. The words and phrases in which Scripture speaks of them, are used in their ordinary and literal sense, standing for all they stand for in common language, and for nothing more; and hence the ideas they convey may be complete and accurate, just as much so as those

conveyed in correct conversation, or in well written books, and will just as much admit of being restated in other language, without any risk of being, from this circumstance, mutilated or distorted. If the idea intended to be conveyed in Scripture is distinctly apprehended, a strict adherence to Scripture language is not necessary in the expression of it; we may explain our meaning in whatever terms seem best calculated for the purpose, and exhibit it in as many points of view as we please; and, since in those parts of Scripture where the language is literal such distinctness is attainable, there is nothing irrational in a person, who thinks he has attained it, undertaking to paraphrase and interpret for the benefit of other people. So far, then, as this class of subjects is concerned, creeds and articles, regarded merely as paraphrases of Scripture, are perfectly unexceptionable, open as they may be to objection on other grounds.

But then the class of subjects to which such formulæ principally relate, are very far from being of this character. Those subjects, which, from their falling under the cognizance of experience, can be treated of in literal language, have attracted, comparatively speaking, but little notice from the framers of confessions, who, on the contrary, have been almost entirely taken up with things far removed from our senses and knowledge;—with things which eye hath not seen nor ear heard;—the mysterious essence of the invisible God and the interminable scheme of His providence. And with

respect to these, it is obvious that the case is altogether different. On these subjects there are no literal words to stand for the ideas to be conveyed to us. Whatever language is employed for this purpose, must be deflected very far from its original meaning. It must be used as Mr. B. White happily expresses it,—hieroglyphically. Sensible objects must be made use of as emblems of objects beyond our senses; and this, through resemblances and analogies, often exceedingly remote and indistinct; like that somewhere said to subsist, between scarlet and the sound of a trumpet, which, though sufficient, perhaps, to bring before a blind man an idea nearer the true one than any other he is capable of receiving, is nevertheless wholly inadequate for the conveyance of any real knowledge. Thus we have the undefinable relation subsisting between the Creator and His creatures, imaged to us under the figure, or as Mr. Blanco White would call it, hieroglyphic, of Father and Children; that subsisting between Jesus Christ and His Church, under the figure of the vine and its branches, or again the head and the body, or the corner-stone and the building held together by it; while the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity (to denote His universal yet invisible influence, John iii. 3.) is represented to us by the same word, which in the original language of the New Testament signifies wind. So, too, in like manner, the Elements in the Eucharist, admitting of description in no literal and definite expressions, were figured, when our Lord would

explain their nature to His disciples, under such sensible images as would suggest the nearest approximation to the truth, being called with this intent His Body and Blood.

Now with respect to this class of subjects, since the language, in which alone they can be set before us, is necessarily so vague and imperfect, it is quite obvious that the best ideas which can be conveyed to us through it, must be vague and imperfect likewise. Ideas expressed in literal words are, if expressed skilfully, much more full and complete than a first inspection of the words would indicate; they admit of minute examination, and may be looked at on a different side; but ideas which we arrive at only through the use of metaphors and analogy, are necessarily one-sided,—examine them as we will, we can never get beyond the one simple impression, that in some unknown respect or other, a resemblance subsists between the sign and the thing signified. And hence, according to Mr. Blanco White, the folly, as well as presumption, of attempting to make such ideas clearer by any deviations from, or additions to, the strict Scripture expressions of them. All we know of them, he argues, is, that they are signified in Scripture under certain metaphors or hieroglyphics, and from this scanty knowledge, to proceed to fill up the picture by the introduction of other hieroglyphics, is, at best, to encumber the simplicity of the Divine Word, and in all probability, to distort and violate it. On these subjects, then, he sets up his face, not merely against

creeds and articles, which he thinks intolerable on any subject, but against all attempts at human interpretation whatever. "Metaphors, explanatory of metaphors," he would altogether eschew; and "would leave the original, i. e. the Scriptural figure, to cast what shadow of itself it might, on each individual mind."

The argument which it has just been attempted to draw out, will not be found in a continuous form in either of the volumes under our consideration, but has been brought together from scattered sources, and disengaged from much irrelevant matter, with which the author has mixed it up. The selection of one or two extracts, however, may in some degree enable the reader to judge whether it has been fairly stated.

"Words, when they express objects or actions with which we are experimentally acquainted, have their meaning proved by the objects expressed. If there is any doubt of the meaning, we point to the object, we describe the action, we refer to some feeling which we make definite by means of external marks. But when words attempt to express things with which no man is acquainted except *in his own mind*, there is no possibility of ascertaining the exact meaning in which any one individual uses them. You cannot be sure of the meaning of a word, unless you are experimentally acquainted with the thing the word stands for. If the word represent a conception of another man's mind, no other man can be sure that he knew the exact

meaning, unless he could be experimentally acquainted with the conception itself.”—Second Travels of an Irish Gent., vol. ii. p. 48.

“The sense of words expressing objects which are known by the senses, of actions which are known by experience, of feelings and affections of which we are conscious—all this may be made the subject of verbal communication, with a great degree of certainty. Observe, I pray, that my enumeration embraces not only the objects of moral legislation, but also all internal desires and tendencies, as well as principles and motives. All these subjects are indeed capable of being expressed in language conveying a degree of certainty, adequate to every purpose connected with the regulation of the moral or accountable part of our being. But words which attempt to explain the meaning of other words, without a final reference to some of these objects of experience.....reveal nothing.”—Irish Gent., vol. ii. p. 63.

“Every metaphor is a material figure. Every metaphor is a hieroglyphic which might be painted to the eye. The Scriptures, as they employ human language, necessarily use these verbal hieroglyphicsThese material figures are addressed of course to the human mind. It is there that they must be spiritualized by an individual and incommunicable process of the mind itself. But what have Divines done?.....fearing that (the original material figure) would not convey a *proper similitude of things invisible*, they have added several other *material*

figures by way of *spiritualization*.....when out of these strange materials, each individual has made up a picture, such as he may be disposed to contrive, then, and not before, is the divine satisfied that he has conveyed to others the conception which his own mind had formed from the Scriptural metaphor.”—Irish Gent., vol. ii. p. 51.

“The original, i. e. the Scriptural figure, should be left to produce whatever shadow of itself it might cast upon each individual mind. He who knew what was in man, must have intended it so, else he would have provided means for a different state of things. Surely he cannot have designed that, by using our own *explanatory figures*, and casting *their* shadows upon the shadow produced by the original metaphor, we should attempt to throw light into our own or other men’s minds.”—Irish Gent., ii. 53.

With these extracts we conclude our review of Mr. Blanco White’s preliminary argument, respecting creeds and confessions, which, unless it can be made out that they rest on infallible authority, he conceives himself to have proved destitute in all cases, of all obligation on the consciences of those to whom they are proposed, and in most cases, i. e. wherever a mystery is involved, to have a necessary tendency to mislead.

And now we come to his next point, viz. the consequent extreme difficulty, or, as he would say, practical impossibility of arriving at the true mean-

ing of Scripture on any one of these mysterious subjects.

Human interpretations he has taught us altogether to discard, as impediments to the truth. He has shown, as he thinks, that neither in point of duty, nor even of prudence, is there any reason for our submitting our private judgments to the judgment of the Church; nor, when we have no judgment of our own, but are absolutely in doubt, for applying to the Church for a solution of it. And now he proceeds to infer that Scripture, when we have disengaged ourselves from these false interpreters, and thrown ourselves on its own context as our sole guide to its meaning, is in many respects so obscure and ambiguous as to admit of almost any variety of meanings with equal probability. In this opinion, indeed, Mr. Blanco White is not singular, as doctors of our Church have recently expressed it in the same or similar language. The ears of some of our readers will be familiar with a phrase of modern introduction—"the facts of Scripture," which we find by certain writers distinguished from its "doctrines;" though, from the loose manner in which they have expressed themselves, it might seem as if they had only imperfectly comprehended the terms which they had used. The drift of the distinction, however, has been plain enough. The "doctrines" which have been thus distinguished from "the facts," are next spoken of as "human theories" raised upon passages of Scripture, which might, with equal probability,

have been made the bases of “numberless other theories,” i. e. systems of doctrine. And thus the received doctrines of the Church are exhibited by professing Churchmen, as one among an infinite variety of possible meanings of the texts from which they are supposed to be deduced. But, to proceed: Mr. Blanco White seems to be aware that this view of his, supported as it may be by some of the learned, will not meet with a ready reception among the people at large. Clothe it as he may in ingenious language, he is conscious that the common sense of mankind will find something revolting in it,—that he shall be unable to convince persons who have studied the first verse of St. John, that what appeared to them its obvious and only meaning, was in reality only one among numberless others equally probable,—and so on with other texts: so to remove this (as he considers it) foolish prejudice, he remarks as follows:—

“Language being a collection of arbitrary signs and words, having no meaning but that which is given them by the mental habits of those who use them, any word, and still more, any sentence, if habitually repeated in connexion with certain notions, will appear to reject all other significations, as it were by a *natural* power. The identical texts which opposite parties of Christians so decidedly assert to convey, *naturally* and *obviously*, notions which destroy each other, are striking instances of the power of association over language. The controversialists stare in unfeigned surprise at what

each conceives to be the glaring absurdity and perverseness of his opponent. The ill-subdued flames of equally genuine zeal make the blood boil in their veins when they observe that *plain* words are not used in their *obvious* sense; forgetting that in arbitrary signs, especially when they may be used *figuratively*, that sense alone can be obvious which use has rendered familiar."—*Heresy and Orthodoxy*, p. 47.

Thus he would persuade himself, and the Protestant world in general, that the confidence felt in our leading doctrines is nothing better than the result of habit, which has taught us to associate this particular meaning with certain texts equally adapted to the conveyance of other, and even opposite associations—that it is nothing but habit which makes us refuse to interpret the first verse of St. John as vaguely as we interpret Matt. xxvi. 26. concerning the Eucharist; and that to proceed, as most Protestants do, to accuse of equal blasphemy those who interpret the latter text literally, or the former figuratively, is an exhibition of prejudice in its most recondite form. He seems to imagine that the system of Protestant interpretation, however we may persuade ourselves to the contrary, is in reality as little dependent on private judgment as that of the Roman Catholics themselves; the only difference being, that the Roman Catholics profess, as a principle, their obligation to submit to tradition, while we unconsciously follow in the wake of certain doctors, whose views we have imbibed with

our mother's milk, and afterwards, from having so long taken them for granted, suppose to be self-evident. If he could but open our eyes to this fact, if he could but convince us how little real independence of thought our rejection of Romish infallibility has procured for us, and throw us really, as we vainly believe we have thrown ourselves, on the resources of private judgment, his object, he seems to think, would have been effected; Scripture would appear to every one as obscure and impenetrable as it does to himself; we should have no more dogmatism, no more "obvious meanings" of passages relating to the mysteries of religion; the utmost we should expect would be to arrive at some "probable meaning;" and we should be content with seeing, as "through a glass darkly." For the farther illustration of his views on this subject, Mr. Blanco White has printed, in his Appendix, an extract from some work of a Professor Norton, an American Unitarian, whose object, like his own, seems evidently to be the introduction of a general scepticism on the subject of Biblical interpretation. This person argues—

"That a very large portion of sentences, *considered in themselves*, that is, *if regard be had merely to the words of which they are composed*, are capable of expressing not one meaning only, but two or more different meanings; or (to state the fact in other terms) that in very many cases the same sentence, like the same single word, may be used to express various and often very different senses.

Now, in a great part of what we find written concerning the interpretation of language, and in a large portion of the specimens of criticism which we meet with, especially upon the Scriptures, the fundamental truth, this fact which lies at the very bottom of the art of interpretation, has either been overlooked or not regarded in its relations or consequences. It may be illustrated by a single example. St. John thus addresses the Christians to whom he was writing, in his First Epist. ii. 20 :— ‘*Ye have an anointing from the Holy One, and know all things.*’ If we consider these words in themselves merely, we shall perceive how uncertain is their signification, and how many different meanings they may be used to express. The first clause, ‘*Ye have an anointing from the Holy One,*’ may signify—

“1. *Through the favour of God ye have become Christians, or believers in Christ; anointing being a ceremony of consecration, and Christians being considered as consecrated and set apart from the rest of mankind.*

“2. Or it may mean, *Ye have been truly sanctified in heart and life; a figure borrowed from outward consecration being used to denote inward holiness.*

“3. Or, *Ye have been endued with miraculous powers: consecrated as prophets and teachers in the Christian community.*

“4. Or, *Ye have been well instructed in the*

truths of Christianity. (See Wetstein's Notes on this passage, and 1 Tim. iv. 7.)

“ I forbear to mention other meanings which the word *anointing* might be used to express. These are sufficient for our purpose.

“ The term *Holy One*, in such a relation as it holds to the other words in the present sentence, may denote either God, or Christ, or some other being.

“ *Ye know all things*, literally expresses the meaning, *ye have the attribute of omniscience*. Besides this meaning, it may signify, *ye are fully acquainted with all the objects of human knowledge*; or, *ye know every truth connected with Christianity*; or, *ye have all knowledge necessary to form your faith, and direct your conduct*; or the proposition may require some other limitation: for *all things* is one of those terms, the meaning of which is continually to be restrained and modified by a regard to the subject present to the mind of the writer.

“ This statement may afford some imperfect notion of the various senses which the words before us may be used to express.....It must be remembered, that this passage has been adduced merely by way of illustration; and that if it were necessary, an indefinite number of similar examples might be quoted.”

But it is not only in detached passages regarded by themselves that Mr. Blanco White would maintain the sense to be thus obscure. He would have

it believed, that in many cases, no number of such passages, brought ever so skilfully to bear on one another, can suffice to clear this obscurity up, or to bring out a precise and definite meaning. In the Letters on Heterodoxy and Orthodoxy, he appeals thus to his imaginary correspondent:—

“You must frequently have observed the hopelessness of the attempts which are constantly made to establish various points of Christian doctrine, by logical arguments, founded on detached texts of Scripture. You must have seen regular collections of passages, selected with the utmost patience, and arranged into classes with the greatest ingenuityMost works on controversial divinity, are attempts of this kind, to draw some abstract proposition, as the unquestionable result of the various expressions of Scripture upon the given subject. You cannot but have observed, moreover, how short all such attempts fall of the intended object; how very seldom any one is convinced by such works, unless, by a predisposition of the will, he reads them in order fully to become, or to continue, of the same opinion.”

The foregoing analysis may afford some notion, though certainly an inadequate one, of the line of argument which has conducted Mr. Blanco White up to this point. We now are brought at once to his conclusion, viz. that since the sense of Scripture respecting those points on which the Christian world is divided into orthodox and heterodox, must thus ever be obscure and ambiguous, the circum-

stance of our having arrived at one belief or at another respecting it, cannot be of that paramount importance which is usually supposed; in other words, that the common opinion, which identifies what are called orthodox opinions with the scriptural notion of saving Faith, cannot be a correct one.

“If saving Faith implies orthodoxy, i. e. acquiescence in a certain collection of abstract deductions from the Scriptures, as logically true, or properly inferred from the language of Scripture, and no higher or more certain means to attain this object have been given to men by God, than their individual logical powers: the discovery of saving Faith has an infinite number of chances against it, in respect to each individual. Could this be the plan of the All-wise and All-good for the salvation of His creatures?”

And again:—

“I repeat it with the most heartfelt confidence: a just and merciful God, when making the greatest display of His love to mankind.....God, the Author and Fountain of the blessings prepared for all mankind in the Gospel, must not be supposed to have made them dependant on doctrines so intricate, so incapable of being proposed in clear and uncontradictory language, so entirely unconnected with the sources of moral certainty.”—*Her. and Orth.* p. 26.

In this summary manner, does Mr. Blanco White dispose of that whole portion of divine revelation which relates to the mysteries of the world to come, and brings before us the invisible Object of our

Faith. If considered by itself, he says, it is so ambiguous, that we can never ascertain which, among its many possible meanings, is the real one : and if, to escape the doubts thus suggested, we seek certainty in the authorized interpretations, a short reflection must convince us, that unless these interpretations rest on infallible authority, all the certainty which they can afford us must be founded on self-delusion. Hence, that it is inconsistent with God's goodness to suppose, that on these matters He should require of us any one belief in preference to any other ; that all of us may abide fearlessly by the result of our separate judgments ; and that the conclusion at which each arrives will be, as far as he is concerned, the true one.

Such is the conclusion which he deduces from what he considers the grand principle of Protestantism,—the recognition of the text of Scripture as the sole infallible guide in matters of religion. And from this conclusion, he maintains that we have no possibility of escape, except by going all lengths with the advocates of the opposite system, and submitting implicitly to the Romanist figment, of a standing infallible judge of religious controversies. Between these two extreme opinions,—absolute Latitudinarianism on the one hand, and on the other, unreserved submission to all the dogmata of Trent,—Mr. Blanco White would persuade Protestants that no middle ground is open to them, that any middle position they may attempt to take up, must be altogether untenable and self-contradictory.

dictory ; and that no other account can be given of the fact, that so many able men have imagined such a position tenable, except the omnipotence of party prejudice. This dilemma will doubtless appear to many persons so excessively absurd, as to be altogether unworthy of serious notice. Mr. Blanco White himself, indeed, seems half conscious that such will be the case, and that on this question, his speculations will be thought deserving of no other answer than a strong expression of disapprobation. "I know," he says, painting to himself the indignation he shall excite, as if the fault were in those who felt it, and not in its object, "I know that few will attempt the mental examination necessary for the acknowledgment of (what I have stated). A storm of feeling will arise at the view of the preceding argument ; and impassioned questions, whether Christianity is a dream,—whether Christ could leave us in such a state of uncertainty,—whether there is no difference between truth and error,—&c. &c. will bring the enquiry to an end." Nor would there be need to bring it to any other end, were all the class of persons calling themselves Protestants so confirmed and settled in their views, as, like those thus spoken of, to perceive intuitively, and reject indignantly, the specious errors to which they are invited.

But as it is not the fortune of all persons bred up in our communion to have imbibed views of this settled and confirmed character, especially with regard to the authority of our national establish-

ment, its articles and other formulæ; or to be practically influenced and satisfied by the considerations of expedience commonly used in the argument¹: on these accounts, for the sake of undecided persons, and especially such of them as are seriously engaged in the pursuit of truth, it may be useful to notice a flaw in Mr. Blanco White's arguments, which, even admitting the incompetence of Protestant Churches to draw up Creeds, and admitting, too, the inherent ambiguity of Scripture, unless interpreted by such Creeds, still will afford them a refuge from the entanglements of the proposed dilemma. For the sake of such persons, it may be useful to point out, that even though they may feel disposed to go great lengths with Mr. Blanco White, in regard to his preliminary positions, and may fancy they see much force and truth, as well as ingenuity, in the observations he brings to bear upon them, still that it is not necessary for them to go on with him to his conclusion; that still, in spite of all he has contended for, there will remain a ground for them to take up, where, without making any concessions to the Romish claims of infallibility, they may protect themselves against the cheerless doctrines of measureless Latitudinarianism.

¹ [A parenthesis is omitted here which was not the Author's. There are elsewhere some clauses or phrases not his; but he says of them, in a letter to the corrector, "I was very well contented with your alterations; indeed they seemed to me to have improved the style as well as the sense, all except one unfortunate parenthesis."]

In the suggestions, then, now about to be offered, it is not supposed that any satisfaction will be afforded to minds thoroughly made up on the authority of Protestant confessions, or on the obviousness of the meaning of those texts on which our mysterious doctrines are founded. Such persons find their satisfaction nearer to them, and on easier terms. Nor is it unlikely they may even be unwilling to hear a question on which they are thoroughly satisfied, argued on grounds different from those which have satisfied them. But this objection, naturally as it may arise on a first view, obviously is not sufficient to weigh in the scales of deliberate judgment. If there be men, as there are many, who either from ignorance, or from the peculiar construction of their minds, are unable to understand the principles which the mere hereditary Protestant (as Mr. Blanco White would consider him) takes for granted, with such persons an argument would have no weight at all, which did not leave these principles entirely out of sight. Yet again, if among such there be men of sincere minds, earnestly bent on the pursuit of truth (and, doubtless, such there are, even among the ranks of those who are on the high road to dangerous error,) it ought hardly to be withheld, defective though it may be, if it tends to rescue them from a more perilous defection,—say to Romanism itself.

With this apology, then, it is submitted in reply to arguments, such as those of Mr. Blanco White, that we may persist as steadfastly as ever in deny-

ing what the Papist contends for, viz. a standing infallible judge of controversy, and yet still may be able to maintain that at least some, and those not unimportant portions of our formulæ, *have* the sanction, which Mr. Blanco White demands, of an unerring authority, and may be applied, without contravening any one of his observations, to the interpretation of some of the most mysterious parts of Scripture. For it will hardly be contended, that the non-existence of an infallible judge, in the present age of Christianity, is a proof that none such ever existed in any preceding age. Undoubtedly, in the first age of all, when the Apostles yet lived, and governed the Churches and conversed familiarly with their disciples, it may be presumed that their judgments, wherever the rise of controversy rendered it necessary to deliver them, were infallible, as well when delivered orally to those among whom they resided, as when sent in writing to their most distant converts. So far cannot be denied, and therefore so far every one, even Mr. Blanco White, must admit that there resided at one time with the Church on earth an infallible judge of controversies on all subjects whatsoever; and consequently that any judgments thus passed or interpretations thus sanctioned, even though it should not have happened that they were committed to writing, must still, as long as the memory of them was believed to be faithfully preserved, have been as binding on men's consciences as the written word itself; and that, if any portion of them has been preserved

faithfully to the present day, it is still binding, for the same reason and to the same extent. Now it will be found that such a portion of these doctrinal interpretations of Scripture was actually secured and recorded in primitive times, and has been transmitted to us, by means of history, as is sufficient to answer the purpose of an unerring guide, as far as the mysteries of religion are concerned ; so that we have no need at all, as Mr. Blanco White would pretend, to rely upon the fallible judgment of expositors of modern times.

To illustrate the state of the case by an instance. It is well known that in the year 325, a general council of all the Bishops of the Catholic Church was summoned by Constantine the Great, to meet at Nicæa, for the purpose of settling disputes which had been raised in the Eastern Church by Arius, and other upholders of his doctrine. At this council three hundred and eighteen Bishops actually assembled, from the most distant and disconnected parts of Christendom ; and on a comparison of their opinions, it appeared that all of them, except thirteen, agreed in condemning Arius's doctrine, on the ground that it contradicted the interpretation which in their several Churches had always been put upon certain texts of Scripture : while the thirteen who ventured to uphold it, relied for the most part on an argument of a different kind, viz. that what appeared to them the true meaning of the texts in question, was in favour of Arius. So far, then, as the belief of the Nicene Bishops may be

supposed to represent that of the Church at large from which they were indiscriminately called together, it attests to us the existence, in the year 325, of a certain systematic interpretation of mysterious texts, received at that time by every Church in Christendom, on the belief that it had been traditional in each from the very first, and consequently derived ultimately from the Apostles. This is an admitted historical fact, and, if carefully considered, will be found to afford a proof little short of demonstration, that the system of interpretation in question, really was, what it was believed to be, Apostolic and authoritative. For if we adopt any other supposition, the difficulty of accounting for the universal belief above stated, may, without exaggeration, be regarded as insurmountable. If we suppose the system not to have been handed down from the first, but to have been introduced afterwards, in the course of the years that intervened between St. John's death and the council of Nicæa, we shall then have to account, first of all for the universality of its reception in countries most remote from one another, and by Churches entirely independent; and secondly, for the obliteration of all traces of its first introduction into any single Church. We shall have to believe that the person or persons to whom the system owed its origin, on the one hand, were so successful in their schemes of proselytism, that through themselves or their successors, they contrived in the course of two hundred and twenty years to revolutionize the belief of the

whole Christian Church, and on the other, that the process by which they effected that revolution was so silent and imperceptible, as to have attracted no observation in any quarter, and to have left behind no traces of its operation. It is not merely the promulgation of the Trinitarian Creed throughout the Christian world, nor the rapidity with which this must be supposed to have been effected, nor yet the circumstance of its having met with no recorded opposition, marvellous as each of these things would be to all, to which we have in the present instance to reconcile our incredulity; we have likewise to persuade ourselves that, after having been so promulgated and received, all record, or even tradition of such promulgation, was in the course of a very few years entirely swept away in every Church; and that another belief respecting its origin came at the same time to be universally prevalent, viz. that it had been traditionary from the first.

To do justice to this argument, would require more space than our limits allow. Enough, however, may perhaps have been said, to suggest to persons disposed to follow the thought out for themselves, the moral certainty that the interpretations of Scripture, witnessed by the Nicene Fathers, have an origin altogether different from the speculations of mere human wisdom; and that they do not come within the range of the censures directed by Mr. Blanco White against confessions and articles resting on fallible authority, or human hiero-

glyphics distorting or encumbering divine ones. If the Nicene creed really does, as its framers believed, rest on a direct Apostolic tradition, its metaphors cannot be looked on as human and secondary, any more than those which occur in St. Paul's Epistles; nor can its authority be, in that case, consistently regarded as less than infallible. And thus, in requiring assent to the truth of this creed, Protestant Churches, though admitting themselves fallible, will not be more justly chargeable with inconsistency, than in requiring a similar assent to the truth of the Canonical Scriptures.

A parallel argument might, if necessary, be drawn out respecting the creed commonly called Athanasian.

Thus, it appears on the whole, that even such persons as are disposed to go considerable lengths with Mr. Blanco White in many parts of his argument, may, nevertheless, without making one step towards the Popish doctrine of a standing infallible judge of controversies, place such reliance on the ancient Catholic formulæ, as to find in them a protection against the varied assaults of Latitudinarianism. Whatever, then, becomes of his theory, the high theological tenets of the Gospel are beyond its reach, and can excite no anxiety for their safety. As to the modern formulæ, such as our Articles and the like, they certainly, as far as they contain additions to the Creeds, stand on distinct grounds, which, as being sufficiently understood, it was not our intention to have alluded to here. In order,

however, to avoid any misconception of our meaning, it may be advisable briefly to observe that such confessions have never been considered by our divines to be of more than secondary authority, nor to be portions, as such, of necessary faith; and that, while they are venerable as being professed by an ever-increasing number of pious and learned men, they are justified on the ground of a strong and imperative expediency. But on this subject it will be best to convey our meaning in words which will come with more weight than any arguments we could urge in explanation of it, viz. those of Bishop Stillingfleet and the present Bishop of Peterborough:—

“I deny not,” says the former of these learned champions of our Church against the Romanists, “but that, in cases of great divisions in the Christian world, and any national Church’s reforming itself, that Church may declare its sense of those abuses in articles of Religion, and require of men a subscription to them; but then we are to consider, that there is a great deal of difference between the owning some propositions in order to peace, and the believing them *necessary* articles of faith. And this is clearly the state of the difference between the Church of Rome and the Church of England. The Church of Rome imposeth new articles of faith to be believed as necessary to salvation, as appears by the formerly cited Bull of Pius IV.....But the Church of England makes no articles of faith, but such as have the testimony and approbation of the

whole Christian world of all ages, and are acknowledged to be such by Rome itself; and in other things, she requires subscription to them, not as articles of faith, but as inferior truths, which she expects a submission to in order to her peace and tranquillity. So the late Lord Primate of Ireland, (Bramhall,) often expresseth the sense of the Church of England, as to her thirty-nine Articles. ‘Neither doth the Church of England,’ saith he, ‘define any of these questions as necessary to be believed, either *necessitate medii*, or *necessitate præcepti*, which is much less; but only hindereth her sons, for peace’ sake, not to oppose them.’ And in another place more fully. ‘We do not suffer any man to reject the thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England at his pleasure; yet, neither do we look upon them as essentials of saving faith, or legacies of Christ and his Apostles; but in a mean, as pious opinions fitted for the preservation of unity: neither do we oblige any man to receive them, but only not to contradict them.’—Grounds of Protestant Religion, part i., chap. 2.

This doctrine, indeed, even goes farther than we should be willing to admit, in making the articles *merely* articles of peace; but the main argument is clearly and convincingly put, and indisputably true.

The same general doctrine, on another side of it, with some inconsiderable difference of terms, is expressed in the following extracts from Bishop Marsh’s Comparative View of the Churches of England and Rome, chapter viii. :—

“How,” he asks, “is the Church of England to be vindicated, in the end, from the charge of acting like the Church of Rome in the exercise of its *authority*? How can it be rescued from the charge of trenching on the right of private judgment, which is the glory and pride of Protestants? Arduous as the task may seem, it is still a task to be performed.....The Church of England carries its authority no further than is absolutely necessary for its own preservation. When the twentieth Article gives authority to the Church in controversies of faith, it gives no more authority than such as is possessed by every *civil* society in controversies of *civil* import.....At the time of the Reformation, the sense of Scripture, in regard to various doctrines, was disputed. The Convocation, therefore, which is our highest judicial authority in spiritual concerns, as the Judges are the highest judicial authority in temporal concerns, assembled and determined, in the name of the Church which it represented, what the sense of Scripture, in regard to the disputed points really was.....But is there no difference, it will be said, between the interpretation of a human law, and the interpretation of a divine law?.....Shall any man, therefore, be bound to accept an interpretation of Scripture, imposed on him by the will of another, if on mature deliberation he himself is convinced that such interpretation is false? Undoubtedly, he is not bound: nor does our Church impose the obligation.....If our consciences will not allow us to comply with those

terms which are offered by the Established Church, we may withdraw from its communion.....But if men choose to continue members of the Established Church, they must conform to its regulations, as they must also to the regulations of any other society for which they may think proper to exchange it. For no society whatever can long subsist, unless rules are prescribed for the conduct of its members, and an assent to those rules is made a condition of communion with that society," &c.

It is not, of course, here intended to adopt every word of this extract, any more than of that which precedes it; but both the one and the other present a general and intelligible view, that the articles of the Church are not of its essence, but an addition, of the nature of a preservative, necessary to its well-being and peace; but not to be put on a level with the ancient Creeds, as necessary to be believed in order to salvation: a characteristic which Mr. Blanco White denies at once to the Creeds and to the Articles, but which belongs to the one and not to the other.

REMARKS

UPON THE PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED

IN INTERPRETING SCRIPTURE¹.

THE following principle is laid down by Dr. Arnold², to assist students of Scripture, in determining when the doctrines and practices, which it appears to them to sanction, are to be regarded by them as essential, and when as indifferent; in what cases they may reasonably insist on their own belief, as to the meaning of the inspired writers, and in what cases they are to rest content with their own opinion, in perfect *tolerance* of the opposite opinion entertained by their neighbour.

“If,” says he, “after we have employed our utmost pains on the right understanding of the Scripture, there remain any doctrines fairly disputable, any practices the advocates and opponents of which equally can appeal to Scripture, as justifying or condemning them; then we may be sure that those

¹ [The following, written in November or December, 1835, is the rough draft of what, had it been finished, was intended by the Author for publication. The thread of the argument is sometimes broken.]

² Introd. to 3rd vol. Sermons, pp. xxvii. xxviii.

doctrines and practices are really unessential and indifferent, and that every man must be content with holding his own opinion about them, in perfect tolerance of the opposite opinion entertained by his neighbour."

Now, before examining the truth of this proposition, it will be necessary to offer a few remarks respecting its meaning. For there is a vagueness in the wording of it, which, unless attended to, may mislead incautious reasoners, by procuring their assent to it first of all, in a sense quite different from that in which they are afterwards taught to apply it. The words, "utmost pains," "fairly disputable," &c., appear at first sight to bear a meaning which, nevertheless, cannot in this case be attributed to them, without rendering the proposition in which they occur, altogether irrelevant to Dr. Arnold's purpose. And hence, incautious reasoners are in danger, first of all, of assenting to this irrelevant proposition, and then of substituting for it, unconsciously, a perfectly distinct proposition which is relevant.

If we are to understand by persons who have "employed their utmost pains on the right understanding of Scripture," only those who, as the words seem literally to imply, have overcome, so far as human imperfection will permit, every obstacle that could possibly interfere with their right understanding of it; and if by "doctrines fairly disputable," we are to understand only such doctrines as a competent judge would pronounce dis-

putable, then, indeed, it is possible enough that many a sober-minded person may assent to Dr. Arnold's proposition, as rational and true. But then, if these expressions are to be so understood, the proposition becomes altogether inapplicable to Dr. Arnold's purpose, which is the *practical guidance* of students in discriminating between essential doctrines and unessential. For who shall say of himself or any other human being, that he has done his utmost to remove every obstacle that could interfere with his right understanding of Scripture? or how are we ever to ascertain that any person, pronouncing any doctrine disputable, is a competent judge? We all know how powerful is the influence of habit in moulding our opinions, and the consequent probability that every evil habit we may have contracted, consciously or unconsciously, from the day of our birth to the present hour, has in its degree perverted our judgment. And who shall say that his own judgment, or that of any other person, is thoroughly emancipated from this influence? or that the pains, which either he or they have as yet employed in [emancipating] it, are in reality their utmost? So that, if by the words, "utmost pains," and "fairly disputable," we are to understand what they would seem literally to imply, Dr. Arnold's proposition, however admissible it may be as an abstract truth, becomes inapplicable to any practical purpose whatever; and on the other hand, if we are to proceed with Dr. Arnold to make a practical application of it, we must reduce the

meaning of the terms to a *caput mortuum*. “Utmost pains,” in this case, must stand for only such a degree of candour and attention as a modest student may reasonably take credit for; otherwise, the very pretence to such a qualification would prove the want of it; and in order to prove doctrines to be “fairly disputable,” it must be required, not that a competent judge should pronounce them so, (for who is to decide the judge’s competence?) but only that they should appear so to the student.

This is the only interpretation of Dr. Arnold’s proposition which will leave it any practical application whatever; and no cautious reasoner will proceed to apply it, without first ascertaining whether he assents to it when thus interpreted. For, however true it may be, that when the sense of Scripture respecting any particular doctrine or practice is really undeterminable, such ambiguity proves the doctrine or practice in question to be indifferent, still, it by no means follows that the accident of fallible men thinking it so, proves the same thing. However true it may be, that if we could find any number of men who had in good earnest purified their minds from every faulty prejudice, such persons would agree about the sense of Scripture in all essentials, and that their disagreement, if ever they disagreed, would prove the point to which it related, unessential and indifferent; still, it may be very false that taking men as they are, with the “imagination of their hearts only

evil continually," any similar inference is warranted by their multiform disputations.

So much on the fallacy of Dr. Arnold's principle. It is further worth observing, that he himself has fallen a victim to it; that, while he is applying his test to the opinions of those who agree with him, he takes it in one of its meanings, and when to the opinions of his opponents in the other; that he expects every one to give credit to certain supporters of what are called Erastian tenets, for having employed their utmost pains on the right understanding of Scripture, because they may be supposed to have done so in one sense, and that he himself refuses this to the supporters of opposite tenets, because he does not think them to have done so in another sense; that when Scripture is quoted by Hooker in proof of the power of the Priesthood, this is to go for nothing, as he must be supposed to have been under the influence of party spirit, and therefore not to have employed his utmost pains on the right understanding of it, but that the opponents of this doctrine, though of course, as men, exposed equally to the same influence, ought to have credit given them for having employed their utmost pains, and that this credit should pass current, as a guarantee for their opinions; and therefore that party spirit is consistent with "utmost pains" in one case, and incompatible with it in the other.

The position of this portion of Dr. Arnold's argument admits of dwelling upon. If he is consis-

tent in the application of his own principles, he is bound either to deny universally of all supporters of the Apostolical Succession, that they "have employed their utmost pains on the right understanding of Scripture" on the subject, in the sense in which he affirms this of the class of persons usually termed "pious and eminent Dissenters;" or he must rest "content with his own opinion about it, in perfect tolerance of the opposite opinion entertained by" the persons in question. [Now] it so happens, that among the persons who have supposed themselves to find this doctrine of a Priesthood in Scripture, some there are, of whom Dr. Arnold entertains a favourable opinion; at least we may collect this from the manner in which he occasionally speaks of the admirable authors of the "Sacra Privata," "Holy Living and Dying," and "the Ecclesiastical Polity." And considering this, one might have been led to imagine that he would show at least some tenderness to their deliberate and earnest opinions, though perhaps not that full share of it which he may think due to a different class of religionists. But what is the fact? a curious and instructive fact it is, though at the same time a melancholy one. So far is Dr. A. from giving these eminent persons credit for having "employed their utmost pains on the right understanding of Scripture," so far is he from inferring that points on which they think differently from himself are "fairly disputable," and from resting on that account, "content with his own opinion in

perfect tolerance" of theirs, that he does not scruple to stigmatize the "doctrines and practices" insisted on by them, in terms the strongest which the courtesies of society will allow. These "doctrines and practices," are held by him to be "mischievous," "profane," "manifestly unchristian," "priest-craft," "Judaism," "positive blasphemy." Nay, so ardent is his zeal to vilify the doctrines, that he is even led on to inveigh against certain professors of them. These, he does not hesitate to assert, are less excusable than the Judaizing Christians condemned of old by St. Paul. They "veil under a convenient mysticism, notions which are too unchristian to bear the light;" "they would gladly insinuate doctrines, the full profaneness of which they dare not openly avow."

Such, alas! is the spirit in which Dr. Arnold's principles allow him to speak of persons who do but hold what was held by Hooker, Taylor, and Wilson. Such the degree of his "tolerance of the opinions entertained by his neighbour," when they come into too rude collision with his own.

One cannot suppose that Dr. Arnold deliberately holds the "pains employed in a right understanding of the Scriptures," by such persons as Hooker, Taylor, and Wilson, at a less value than that at which he holds his own. Charity to Dr. Arnold itself forbids such a supposition, were we without the proof his own writings afford us of his high respect for them. Equally un-supposable is it, that he can be ignorant of the great stress laid by each of the

three, and more especially the last, on a doctrine believed by them to be contained in Scripture, though his own researches have not enabled him to detect it there. One would have imagined, therefore, that here, if anywhere, Dr. Arnold would admit "the utmost pains" of good men insufficient to secure agreement respecting the sense of Scripture, and, consequently, that he would maintain the doctrine in question to be "indifferent," and feel "content with his own opinion, in perfect tolerance of the opposite opinion entertained" by them. Such at least is the conclusion to which Dr. Arnold's principles should have led, but far different is that at which he has arrived.

From this inconsistency Dr. Arnold cannot escape, except he maintain that the particular opinions in question are in themselves so worthless, as to show that the upholders of them could not so far have employed their "utmost pains" on the right understanding of Scripture; an inference to which he almost confesses in the case of Hooker, but which he can hardly expect others to allow, in order to his deducing from it what he in this case starts with assuming, the worthlessness of these particular opinions. Yet he seems inclined thus to argue in the case of Hooker; as if the views of those who follow him on this subject were a proof of a want of candour, which want of candour, so proved, is afterwards to be made an argument against their views.

Dr. Arnold will perhaps say, that persons who

believe the doctrine of the Apostolical Succession to be in Scripture, are not on that account condemned by him, as long as they are content that others should think the contrary; that what he condemns is, their intolerance in insisting on their own interpretation as essential, and censuring others for dissenting from it. This indeed is not said by Dr. Arnold himself, but is here suggested, as a possible explanation of his mode of speaking of them. Yet, let it be considered what this amounts to. The doctrine of the Apostolical Succession, involves the belief that God has appointed on earth "an unchangeable Priesthood." Now surely it is no very tolerant spirit in Dr. Arnold, which, as a condition of toleration, would compel all who believe that God has appointed an unchangeable Priesthood, to believe, at the same time, that this Priesthood may innocently be changed.

If this is the ground on which Dr. Arnold refuses the benefit of his own principle to the advocates of the Apostolical Succession, he must refuse it on the same ground, to the advocates of every doctrine which, in its nature, asserts its own importance. He must maintain, that no "pains" which one can "employ on the right understanding of Scripture," can justify him in holding his opinion as to the sense of Scripture, however clearly that sense may seem to be expressed, if the supposition of its being *true* involves its *importance*. To show that a doctrine, if true, must be important, seems in Dr. Arnold's opinion, a *reductio ad absurdum*.

It appears, then, from what has been said, that the words "utmost pains" and "fairly disputable," are extremely vague and indefinite; and in consequence it is natural to ask how Dr. Arnold would propose to limit them? how a student is to ascertain that in Dr. Arnold's sense he has employed his "utmost pains," and that the points on which he differs from other commentators on Scripture are "fairly disputable?" It is also obvious that, till he is furnished with a tolerably precise answer to this question, he will be as much at a loss as ever to know what doctrines and practices he is to regard as "unessential and indifferent;" and that as wide a door as ever will be open to the very evil against which Dr. Arnold would protect the Christian world, viz. difference of opinion as to what is essential and what not so. So much, however, is certain, that Dr. Arnold's standard of the "utmost pains" to be employed on the understanding of Scripture, is higher than that actually taken by Hooker, Taylor, and Wilson. What doctrines remain in dispute after such examination as theirs, he will not allow to be "fairly disputable;" nor, when they, equally with himself, *do* appeal to Scripture, will he allow that they "equally can" do so. Before the existence of disputes, doubts, and opposite appeals, are to be deemed proofs that the points contended for are indifferent, Dr. Arnold will demand higher qualifications from the contending parties than are to be found in these great luminaries of our Church; and till they have

proved such qualifications, far from being “content with his own opinion in perfect tolerance” of theirs, he will think himself at liberty to brand them, should cause arise, as upholders of Priestcraft, Judaism, profaneness, and positive blasphemy.

Such are the difficulties to which Dr. Arnold is reduced in the application of his own principle. But this circumstance, though an argument against Dr. Arnold’s trustworthiness as a logical reasoner, is no argument against the principle itself; and as this principle in one or other of its modifications is held very generally, and as, in the degree in which it is held, it must ever have considerable effect on theological opinion, it is worth examining the grounds on which it is usually rested. These are stated by Dr. Arnold as follows:—

“If this be not so,” he says in proof of the principle in question, “and if the sense of the Scriptures as to any important point may fairly be doubted by honest and sensible men, it seems to me no better than a mockery to call them the rule of faith; and it is imputing an obscurity to God’s revelation, such as attaches to the works of no philosopher and no human legislator¹.”

Now it will not be attempted here to dispute the correctness of this reasoning, except with such persons as conceive themselves to acquiesce in Bishop Butler’s argument in the second part of his Analogy; but all such persons are seriously requested

¹ Introd. to 3rd vol. Sermons, p. xxviii.

to reflect how much of that argument, particularly the parts contained in the 3rd and 6th chapters, turns on the assumption that we have no knowledge at all *à priori* what degree of information it were to be expected that God would give us in a revelation, or with what degree of distinctness He would communicate it, or indeed of the purpose with which any revelation would be given us at all; and therefore that it is of course frivolous to object to particular interpretations of it as implying an obscurity which, for aught we know, may have been intended. This assumption holds no accidental or supplementary place in Bishop Butler's system: it is not one which we may set aside for further consideration, and yet acquiesce in the general tenor of his argument; but is his sole answer to a principal class of objections. Yet every one must at once perceive, that the very contradictory of this is assumed in the foregoing observation of Dr. Arnold.

“Upon supposition,” says Bishop Butler, “of” God’s “affording us light and instruction by revelation additional to what He has afforded us by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges by what methods and in what proportion it were to be expected that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us.” Dr. Arnold, on the contrary, takes it for granted, that it would be afforded by such methods and in such proportion, as to make it impossible that on “any important

point" "any honest and sensible man" should be left in doubt.

"We are wholly ignorant," Bishop Butler tells us, "how far or in what manner God would interpose miraculously to qualify them to whom He should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it, and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live, and to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful.... Nay, we are not in any sort able to judge whether it were to have been expected that the revelation should have been committed to writing, or left to be handed down, and consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition." Dr. Arnold on the other hand expects all men to agree with him, that to suppose a divine revelation, not merely not committed to writing, but not written in the most precise and definite terms, is a self-evident absurdity.

According to Bishop Butler, "those who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth remarking, that there are several ways of arguing, which, though just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture...We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot be the sense or intent of such a passage of Scripture, for if it had, it would have been expressed more plainly...yet we may justly argue thus with respect to common books." According to Dr. Arnold, no rational man will "impute to God's revelation" "an obscu-

rity” such as does not “attach to the works” of human philosophers and legislators.

Lastly, in order to form a just estimate of the line of argument here adopted by Dr. Arnold, and by half the Protestant world before his time, it may be useful to meditate on the following sentence:—

“But it may be said,” proceeds Bishop Butler, “that a revelation in some of the above mentioned circumstances, one e. g. which was not committed to writing, and thus secured against danger of corruption, would not have answered its purpose; I ask, What purpose? It would not have answered all the purposes which it has now answered, and in the same degree; but it would have answered others, or the same in different degrees; and which of these were the purposes of God and best fell in with His general government, we could not at all have determined beforehand. Now since it has been shown that we have no principles of reason upon which to judge beforehand how it were to be expected revelation should have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government in any of the forementioned respects, it must be quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them, against its being left in one way rather than another: for this would be to object against things upon account of their being different from expectations which have been shown to be without reason.”

This doctrine of Bishop Butler’s is here put forward principally for its intrinsic importance, as

exhibiting the whole subject of Biblical interpretation in a light too little considered by the Protestant world. There is, however, another and subordinate reason for noticing it. For if, as the writer believes, Bishop Butler's Analogy is one of the works which Dr. Arnold holds up as a standard of correct thought, in that case the fact that he has overlooked the radical incompatibility of his own primary principle with the above leading feature of Bishop Butler's system, becomes a fresh proof of that crudity of judgment, which in a former instance has already been pointed out, and of which it is of some consequence that Dr. Arnold's readers should be aware.

But to proceed upon the line which Dr. Arnold has marked out. After disposing of a certain portion of Scripture as unessential, he goes on to show that this portion is not wholly without a use; and here again we are met with a fresh exhibition of vague thought, such as surprises one in a person of Dr. Arnold's reputation. Speaking of "the true way of reasoning," he says, "What is noticed indirectly, or not so clearly as to prevent fair differences of interpretation, it regards as unessential and undetermined, as a means of trying men's love of the truth, together with their charity; their love of truth in endeavouring to arrive at a probable conclusion for themselves as to the mind of the Spirit, their charity in not presuming to force their own conclusions on others, nor condemning them for concluding differently."

Now¹, to pass over the *petitio principii* involved in the word “fair,” and the identical proposition [of “regarding *undetermined* what is noticed not so clearly as to prevent fair *differences* of interpretation,” Dr. Arnold appears to conceive that the love and desire of Truth can exist apart from the fear of missing it, or that it is a kind of curiosity; in other words that] a man’s love of truth may be shown by mathematical investigations.....

.....Every one who thinks it possible that the Scripture anathemas refer to a right acceptance of the texts relating to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and to Jesus Christ having come in the flesh, must surely feel some degree of fear lest he should miss their right meaning through his own fault. And so far forth as his love for his neighbour equals his love for himself, he must have a similar feeling for others. What he would think rash in himself, he must think rash in them. What he would think irreverent in himself, he must think irreverent in them. On the whole he will feel bound to act towards them, as charity to them, to others, and to himself, would direct him to act towards rash and irreverent people. This feeling, and the sense of obligation, are altogether independent of any assurance that the person acknowledging them has attained to the true meaning of the

¹ [The rest of these Remarks are only in the shape of notes, sometimes expressed only by means of detached words and phrases, or by sentences crossed out as faulty in composition.]

texts in question ; indeed is [are] compatible with the most absolute doubt about them. It is possible [for men] to see that certain methods of inquiry are rash and irreverent, without pronouncing any opinion on the truth of the conclusion to which they have been led thereby. Common sense tells us how men inquire when they think much depends on the result of their inquiry.....

Let us turn to another writer, whose reasonings are directed to the proof of two points ; first, that it is presumptuous in any man or set of men to think it necessary for other men to adopt their phraseology in the explanation of the Scripture Mysteries ; next, that it cannot be a matter of any consequence to any individual whether the sense in which he understands the Scripture Mysteries is true or false. “The great moral duty,” he says, “of the will, in relation to the understanding, is *Veracity*. The impressions which every individual receives, the reflected truths, which after proper examination are found to be permanent on the understanding, should be sacred to *Veracity*. I need not add that this duty is peculiarly incumbent on the Christian, respecting the religious truths which he finds in the Scriptures.....Let them [who have courage to think] beware of superstitious fear in the investigation of religious truth ; let them encourage in their souls an habitual attention to the duty of *Veracity*, and read the Scriptures with a firm determination of not deceiving themselves, for the sake of a false internal

peace with early prejudices ; and, still more, of not concealing from others whatever impressions may have assumed a clear and prominent character during the examination of the Sacred Writings. Since subjective religious truths, i. e. the impressions which the Scriptures leave on each individual, have not been made by God a matter of *Obedience* to any authorized judge of truth ; since the meaning of the Scriptures has been left unlimited by the judgment of any external authority, it must be supposed that it is the intention of Providence that the Scriptures be studied, in common, by all those who acknowledge their authority ; and, if such be the purpose of the Divine Mind, it must be a duty of all Christians not to deceive each other as to the results of their respective perceptions of the sense of the Scriptures. To act otherwise, must be a sin of *Falsehood* ; it must be ‘ holding the truth in unrighteousness,’ or, translating more literally, ‘ in injustice ;’ for what injustice can exceed that which is done to mankind, when any one casts into the common treasury of intellectual experience, as his own *Truth*, as the real impression on his mind, that which is entirely unlike that impression ? Such a deliberate *Lie*, in relation to the Scriptures, must be hateful in the eyes of God.”—*B. White’s Heresy and Orthodoxy*, pp. 32, 33.

In this passage there is something peculiarly curious, and this not solely on its own account. Doubts concerning religious truth, e. g. about the truth of the Object of worship proposed on the

orthodox system, evidently impose *some* moral obligation upon us. It cannot be that there is nothing we ought to do in consequence of being in a state of doubt, which we ought not equally to have done, were we in a state of disbelief. Mr. Blanco White's acuteness will not permit him to admit this. He confesses that, if persons feel doubt about *the existence of a God*, they are to act as if they had no such doubts, "to hope against hope," that such conduct is a proof of faith, and produces higher degrees of it. But he does not allow that they ought so to act in the case of doubt concerning the *Object of Orthodoxy*. Yet he feels at the same time that such doubt must impose an obligation, and he invents one. He considers the doubt to be a call upon the person feeling it to *record his doubt* for the benefit of others.....

This throws light on a school of theological opinion, which has other writers besides those which have been mentioned. A celebrated Essay on the Love of Truth has spoken of that virtue in a way to confuse it with the love of Knowledge.

"He who would cultivate," the author says, "an habitual devotion to Truth, must be solicitous in the first place to avoid error; and consequently must in all cases prefer *doubt* to the reception of falsehood, or to the admission of any conclusion on insufficient evidence. One who has an aversion to doubt, and is anxious to make up his mind, and to come to *some* conclusion on every question that is discussed, must be content to rest many of his

opinions on very slight grounds ; since no one individual is competent to investigate fully all disputable points. Such a one, therefore, is no lover of Truth ; nor is in the right way to attain it on any point. He may more reasonably hope this, who, though he may on many points perceive some (and perhaps a great) preponderance of probability on this or that side, is contented to come to a decisive conclusion, only on those few which he has been enabled thoroughly to investigate.

“ The fault I have been speaking of, is one which men are the less likely to detect in themselves, from this circumstance ; that in many practical cases, it is necessary to come to some decision speedily, even though we may not have before us the fullest evidence that we could desire, or even that we might hope, were more time allowed us, to obtain. The physician may be compelled to prescribe, or the general to give his orders, immediately, and without waiting to examine all the reasons on both sides ; because delay would be as pernicious as mistake. In cases of this kind, the utmost we can do is to make up our minds according to the best reasons that occur ; and though we are not called on, even then, to come to any certain conclusion in our own minds, if there are no grounds for it ; yet we must *act* as if we *were* certain. And the habit is often in this manner acquired, of forming our *opinions* as hastily as our practical decisions ; and that too, even in cases where no immediate step is

taken,—no danger, equal to the danger of error, to be incurred by remaining in suspense.”

The writer of this passage plainly declares, that religious truth is mainly a matter, not of practice but of opinion, in spite of there being “cases,” and those many, where it is otherwise; and that, therefore, doubts about it involve the necessity of a suspension of judgment.....

In another place he observes, that there is no real force in an objection which is sometimes urged against the pursuit of Truth; viz. that “it is not even desirable, were it possible to bring the mind into a state of perfectly unbiassed indifference, so as to weigh the evidence in each case with complete impartiality.”

“The evidence,” he continues, “for the truth of the Christian religion, it is said, a good man must wish, and ought to wish, to find satisfactory; one who loves and practices virtue, cannot be, and ought not to be, *indifferent* as to the question whether there be or be not a God who will reward it. This objection arises, I conceive, from an indistinct and confused notion of the sense of the terms employed. A candid and unbiassed state of mind, which is sometimes called *indifference* or impartiality, i. e. of the *judgment*, does not imply an indifference of the *will*,—an absence of all *wish* on either side, but merely an absence of all influence of the wishes in forming our decision, all leaning of the judgment on the side of inclination,—all perversion of the evidence in consequence. That we should

wish to find Truth on one side rather than the other, is, in many cases, not only unavoidable, but commendable; but to *think* that true which we wish, without impartially weighing the evidence on both sides, is undeniably a folly, though a very common one.....If a scheme be proposed to any one, for embarking his capital in some speculation by which he is to gain immense wealth, he will doubtless wish to find that the expectations held out are well founded; but we should call him very imprudent, if (as many do) he should suffer this wish to bias his judgment, and should believe, on insufficient grounds, the fair promises held out to him; his wishes, we should say, were both natural and wise; but since they could not render the event more probable, it was most unwise to allow them to influence his decision. In like manner, (to take the instance above alluded to,) a good man will indeed *wish* to find the evidence of the Christian religion satisfactory; but a wise man will not for that reason *think* it satisfactory, but will weigh the evidence the more carefully, on account of the importance of the question.”

[It is here supposed that the deference due to any professed religious truth, varies with the probability that it is true, not in any degree with its importance.].....The points fixed by the Creeds are the only ones, on which there is not a safest course.

It was observed by the great M. Pascal¹, con-

¹ Pensées, c. 7.

cerning the truths of religion, that even supposing their evidence to be, as sceptics assert, so inconclusive as to leave us altogether in doubt whether they are true or not; supposing it to be even as likely as not that they are a groundless fiction; still, even in this case, we are bound, on all the common principles of prudence, to take for granted their truth, and to regulate all the details of our conduct as if we were certain of them. For, that even on this supposition, our case would be like that of persons playing at a game of chance, whose interest it obviously is, to hazard a small sum on the chance of gaining a great one, wherever that chance is any thing like an even one.

Supposing, for instance, that I am any thing like as likely as not to gain a £1000. prize in the lottery by paying 20 shillings for a ticket, even though I am at the same time as likely as not to draw a blank, still it is obviously my interest to run the risk. And similarly, supposing it to be as likely as not that I may obtain eternal happiness in exchange for eternal misery, by leading a religious life, even though I am at the same time as likely as not, to gain nothing by it, it is surely not overstating the matter, to say, that in common prudence, I am bound to hazard a trifling temporary self-denial, which, at worst, will be but thrown away, and which is as likely as not to prove of incalculable advantage.

Such is the argument of Pascal, which admits of being extended thus:—

On the principles of games of chance, supposing the chances even, whether I shall draw a prize or a blank, it is worth paying £50. on the chance of drawing £100.; for if I lose, I shall lose only £50., and if I gain I shall gain £50., and I am as likely to gain as to lose.

Again, supposing it two to one against my gaining, yet, if the gain, supposing me to gain, is twice as great as the loss will be, supposing me to lose, still the chance will be worth running;—which will be the case, if I pay £33. 6s. 8d. on the chance of £100.; for if I lose, I lose only £33. 6s. 8d.—if I gain, I gain £66. 13s. 4d.

Again, supposing the chances against me three to one; still I might risk £25. to gain £75.

On supposing then ninety-nine to one against me, I might risk £1. to gain £99.

[With so great a prize then as eternal life in view, the risk of this life, though on a very small chance, is even justified on the principles of calculation.].....

In the affairs of this life, men know well enough what is meant by *the safest course*. In religion, a difficulty arises from the dread of superstition.

When you must necessarily act on one of two views of a subject, it does not follow that the most probable of the two is the safest to act upon; one may be indefinitely improbable, and the other next to certain, and yet it may be *safest* to act as if the first was true, and the second false. On the contrary, in matters of mere speculation, when two

views can be taken of a subject, that which has a preponderance of probability in its favour is that which we must suppose true.....

When one person undertakes to prove a point which another disputes, he seems to place himself in the position of an aggressor, and is supposed to fail of his object, if his proofs fall short of demonstration. Hence the disadvantage in which any one places himself by volunteering an argument. He is not only expected to show his view more probable than its opposite, but the only possible one. If he does less than this, he is supposed in common matters to leave things as he found them, and in matters of religion to furnish his own refutation; for it is assumed that in such matters proofs short of what may be thought possible, are as disproofs.

Nearly all disputes in practical matters may be traced to a difference of opinion about the *onus probandi*. There are few cases in which each party is not nearly agreed as to the amount of evidence brought forward on either side. It is seldom that the party affirming will not admit their proof to be incomplete, and that the party denying will not admit it to amount to something; but they differ in this, that the one feels justified in affirming till his proof has been altogether destroyed,—the other in denying till it has been completed.

The Atheist does not deny that there are arguments for the existence of a God; the believer does not deny that there are arguments against it; but

the one contends that it is absurd to believe till the affirmation has been demonstrated, the other that it is absurd to disbelieve till the negative has been so.

The Deist does not deny that the evidence for a Revelation amounts to something, nor the believer that it is short of what we might conceive possible, but the latter thinks any evidence enough, the former any supposed defect of evidence a refutation.

In almost every case, the one party argues that there is some proof, admitting at the same time that it is inconclusive ; the other that the proof is not conclusive, admitting at the same time that it is something.

“ If saving faith,” says Mr. Blanco White, “ implies orthodoxy, i. e. acquiescence in a certain collection of abstract deductions from the Scriptures, as logically true, or properly inferred from the language of Scripture, and no higher and more certain means to attain this object have been given to men by God than their individual logical powers ; the discovery of saving faith has an infinite number of chances against it, in respect to each individual : to use more definite language, the chance of success in the search after saving faith, is as one to the number of sects and subdivisions of sects which now divide, and may still further subdivide, the Christian world.”—*Her. and Orth.* p. 9.

That is, my chance of getting at the Truth depends on processes of mind going on within

people whom I shall never see, nor hear, nor think of.

“All Catholics,” he says, “and most Protestants will probably unite in the reply, that absolute certainty is inconsistent with our present state of existence. To this I answer, that in regard to the appointment of any means to remove uncertainty, the All-wise Being could not want resources to produce in us the highest degree of moral confidence of which we are capable.”

Yet Almighty God’s miraculous displays at Sinai were not sufficient to hinder the Israelites worshipping the golden calf.....

FRAGMENTS.

1. *Protestant Paralogisms.*

1. THAT, because St. Paul has declared that all the Scriptures of the Old Testament were “given by inspiration of God, and are profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness,”—*therefore* the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament together are the only things which have ever been given by this inspiration, and that it is impious, damnable, and heretical to believe a word that the Fathers say when it cannot be proved by sure and certain warrant from one or other of these documents.

2. That, because a change discernible by the senses does not take place in the Eucharistic Bread and Wine on consecration,—*therefore*¹ a change not discernible cannot take place in them; i. e. that our senses contradict the doctrine of an insensible transubstantiation, *because* they prove that, if transubstantiation takes place, it is insensible.

¹ [It must be observed, that the point here objected to by the author, is the *argument*,—the unfairness of the reasoning on which the conclusion is maintained.]

3. That when our Lord blessed the Sacramental Elements, He may have meant only to say grace over them,—*therefore* this is certainly all He meant.

4. That the 6th chapter of St. John can be explained without reference to the Eucharist,—*therefore* to believe it has such reference is illogical.

5. That, when our Lord breathed on His Apostles and said, “Receive ye the Holy Ghost,” &c., He may have only conveyed to them an earnest of what they should receive at Pentecost,—*therefore* it is certain He did no more.

6. That, since our Lord did all that was necessary in order to complete our reconciliation,—*therefore* to suppose that one of these things was the setting up of a Priesthood, is blasphemously to suppose that what He did for us was not sufficient to complete our reconciliation.

7. That, since it is possible that the Ecclesiastical Polity implied in the Acts of the Apostles was intended only for decency and order,—*therefore* it cannot have been intended for any thing more.

8. That the fate of Uzzah and Uzziah, Corah, Dathan and Abiram, may possibly be an exception¹ to St. Paul’s statement, “these things happened unto them for enamples,”—*therefore* they must be so.

9. That the passages in Scripture, which seem to imply an intermediate state, can be explained away,—*therefore* to believe an intermediate state is absurd.

¹ [Vide, however, Jude 11.]

10. That the words, "He that believeth not shall be damned," need not necessarily refer to every Christian, and, if so, perhaps not to the doctrine of the Trinity,—*therefore* they certainly do not refer to that doctrine.

11. In like manner it has been urged that Abraham may not have known the heinousness of human sacrifice, and that *therefore* we may talk as if we were sure he did not.

2. *The Erastians.*

The recognition of Civil Government, as the primary source of Church authority, was among the first steps adopted by the Reformers both in England and on the Continent. Luther, Zuinglius, and Cranmer all considered themselves as dependent on their respective Rulers, and to this circumstance they owed that large share of secular patronage which enabled them to shake off the Papal Power: nor does the principle on which they acted appear to have been ever questioned by their followers, till Calvin erected his Genevan platform, and claimed for it the Power of the Keys in the full extent in which it had been asserted by the Church of Rome.

It was in opposition to this claim that Thomas Leiber, commonly known by the name of Erastus, wrote his famous Treatise de Excommunicatione, in which he systematized the crude notions of the first Reformers respecting the dependence of Church on State, and maintained them so ably, that his

successors have been unable to devise any new argument in addition to his. The Pastoral Office, according to him, was only persuasive, like that of a Professor of Sciences in relation to his voluntary students, without any Power of the Keys annexed. The Lord's Supper, and other ordinances of the Gospel, were to be free and open to all. The Minister might dissuade the vicious and unqualified from communicating, but might not reject them, nor inflict any kind of censures; the punishment of all offences whether of a civil or religious nature being reserved to the Civil Magistrate. Thus his system entirely removed all that spiritual jurisdiction and coercive power over the consciences of men which had been claimed by Popes, Prelates, and Presbyteries; and reduced the Church to a mere creature of the State. It may be amusing to know that among the many topics now in vogue on this subject, which originated with him, the plausible phrase *imperium in imperio* is one. At what time he composed this treatise is not precisely known; its publication, however, which was delayed till six years after his death, was so timed as to add very materially to its celebrity in England.

In this country the source of Ecclesiastical authority did not come under discussion till after it had been long agitated on the Continent: a fear on the one hand of offending the Queen by questioning her supremacy, and on the other of unchurching the foreign Protestants, had made our Bishops especially cautious of advancing any claim to a

Divine right. Nor was it till after the constitution of the Primitive Church had been thoroughly examined, and till a length of time had allowed men's minds to recover from the unsettling effects of the Reformation, that our Divines seem to have opened their eyes to the nature and extent of the Apostolical Commission. The first person who seems to have arrived at just views on this subject, was Hooker's intimate friend, the learned Saravia. Hooker himself, at the time when he composed the seventh Book of his Ecclesiastical Polity, informs us that his own mind had undergone a gradual change respecting it; and that having formerly thought Episcopacy one (perhaps the best) among the many admissible forms of Church Government, he now began to think it essential to the very being of a Church. But the first public occasion on which the Divine right of the Successors of the Apostles was brought prominently forward, was in the year 1588, when Richard Bancroft, at the suggestion of the Archbishop of Canterbury, preached his famous sermon at Paul's Cross. At this crisis Erastus's work was first published, as if reserved for the occasion, and his opinions and arguments were gladly adopted by political Churchmen and lukewarm Calvinists, who from this time have gone by the name Erastians.

A curious account of the proceedings of this party in the Assembly of Divines, and in the Parliament of 1645, is given at length in Neal's History of the Puritans, where it is amusing to observe

how much they were able to perplex the Presbyterians with questions which an Apostolical Christian would have had no difficulty in answering.

Among the reasons which have contributed to the spread of Erastianism in this country, one is the confusion of thought which has been caused by the Union of Church and State. The complicated interweaving of Ecclesiastical and Civil Offices which is effected by the English Law, renders it difficult to distinguish clearly between them. Excommunication is followed by civil punishments; Baptism by civil rights; Marriage within the pale of the Church is necessary to legitimatize children; Property cannot be bequeathed except through the intervention of Ecclesiastical Courts: and on the other hand, the consent of the civil authorities is rendered necessary for the exercise of every part of Ecclesiastical Discipline. Thus, almost every act of every Ecclesiastical officer has in it something of a civil character, arising, not out of the nature of his office, but from the Law of the Land.

Every Clergyman who baptizes or marries, conveys privileges which, as a Clergyman, he is in no way commissioned to convey; and every Bishop who should venture to excommunicate, would by that act take away privileges with which, as a Bishop, he could have no right to interfere. Now, so far forth as our Bishops and Clergy are empowered to do this, they are creatures of the State,—simple magistrates acting under the Civil Government; and since almost all their ministerial acts

have this effect in some degree or other, it is natural that half-thinking people should regard their whole ministry as civil, and dependent on the State. This confusion, however, may appear to be in some respects cleared up by the following observations of Dupin, who points out a very broad and intelligible distinction between powers essentially Ecclesiastical, and essentially Civil.

“There are,” says that able writer, “two most noble and excellent societies among men, the Civil and Ecclesiastical; of which, though the same persons are members of both, and for that reason they may seem to vulgar eyes confused and intermixed with one another, yet in reality they are powers of a different *kind* and *nature*, and tend by different means to different ends.

“The end of the Ecclesiastical society is *eternal life*, but of the Civil, *peace* and *tranquillity* to the commonwealth; and since these ends are *sundry, and wholly separate from one another*, it is no wonder that the means which conduce to them are plainly different from each other. For no man can attain to *eternal life* but by those actions which flow from the *freest* motions of his *will*, proceeding from the love of God; from whence it is the business of religion to dispose and cultivate the minds of men by Faith and Piety, that they may willingly and freely obey the commandments of Christ. But on the other hand, it makes no difference as to the *tranquillity of the commonwealth*, whether its laws be observed willingly or otherwise, *so they be ob-*

served; and therefore it is the business of the Civil society to take care that they be observed, which is effected by fear of temporal punishment and death. In a word, the power of the Civil society hath the *bodies* of men for its object, but the authority of the Ecclesiastical regards their *souls*. Wherefore, seeing *bodies* are subject to force and compulsion, it is their office who are governors of the Civil society, to punish offenders and put them to death. But since force cannot touch the *souls* of men, it must follow that the Ecclesiastical society hath no power to use external force, nor to reduce sinners in any other way from their sinful courses, but by prayers and precepts, which, if they will not obey, it can inflict no other punishment upon them but excommunication, by which they are denounced unworthy of the *Church's society and eternal life*. In the last place, the laws of Civil societies regard the good and tranquillity of the Commonwealth; but contrariwise, there is no other end of Ecclesiastical laws but *to keep the sanctity and purity of Christian Doctrine and Discipline sound and undefiled*.

“ From these principles, which are most evident and sure, it follows that the Power of the Church is wholly spiritual, and does not in the least reach the temporal rights or goods of Kings or other men; so that neither Kings can be deposed, nor private persons be deprived in any manner of what they have, by mere Ecclesiastical power. Wherefore a great difference is to be observed between the power and him that useth and exerciseth the

power. For it may so happen, that he who useth the power, may be subject to another power, though that power which he exerciseth is subject to no power. The same man may at the same time be a member both of the Civil and Ecclesiastical society, and therefore by different personal relations be subject both to the Ecclesiastical and Civil power: but then it doth not follow from hence, in the least, on this hand, that the Civil power which he may have is subject to the Ecclesiastical, or, on the other, that the Ecclesiastical is subject to the Civil. Thus Bishops are subject to the Regal power in Civil matters, but so that the Episcopal power is not subject to the Civil power. And therefore a King or Emperor cannot constitute or depose a Bishop by Civil authority and force. In like manner Kings are subject unto Bishops and the Chief Pontiff in matters Spiritual; but they cannot be made or deposed by Ecclesiastical authority.

“Wherefore, though it is out of all doubt that Kings are subject to the Spiritual, and Bishops to the Temporal power; yet we must not from hence assert, that the Ecclesiastical power is subject to the Civil, or the Civil to the Ecclesiastical; because both these powers are of a sundry different nature, and wholly dependent upon God, by whom they are so instituted that neither of them can do any thing against the other, notwithstanding the Spiritual is more noble than the Temporal power.”

According to this statement of M. Dupin, it will readily be perceived, that the Civil and Ecclesiasti-

cal powers, however combined in the person of the same officers, are essentially distinct : that this distinction arises from no nicely drawn fancy, but from the broadest and most obvious principles ; and that the dependence of the officers of the Church on the State, in respect of that part of their ministry which is civil, in no way implies total dependence, nor interferes with their fullest liberty in matters Spiritual.

It is true, indeed, that in this country, under the existing laws, a recognition of this liberty would cause the inconveniences of *imperium in imperio* : but this does not arise out of the nature of Ecclesiastical power, the independence of which (though admitted to the fullest extent) could lead to no collision between the officers of Church and State while they adhered strictly to their respective commissions. What it does arise from is the perplexed character of the English law, by which the officers of the Church are in every ministerial act compelled to exceed their commissions. Jesus Christ never commissioned His Apostles or their Successors to give to children civil privileges, by admitting them into His Kingdom ; but a Clergyman of the Church of England can neither baptize without conferring civil privileges, nor refuse to baptize without withholding them. Thus, in the first place the law compels him to exceed his commission, and in the second makes this an excuse for controlling him in the exercise of his commission.

If this and similar matters were simplified, as

they might easily be, Erastianism would probably become less common, or at least Erastians would have less excuse for their errors.

Calvinism, such as it existed in the 16th century, amidst all its errors had two truths. Though its Articles of Faith were erroneous, yet it asserted that a true faith was necessary to salvation: and though its discipline was a human invention, yet it asserted that Church authority was from God.

Against these two truths of Calvinism were forged the doctrines of Arminius and Erastus; the former asserting that mere opinions were matters of indifference, the latter that the Church was a mere creature of the State.

It is a remarkable fact, that from the restoration of Charles II. to the present day, Calvinism, Erastianism, and Arminianism, have, like Herod and Pontius Pilate, been made friends together to carry on a joint war against Apostolical Christianity. In this war the last acts of Convocation are a very important stage; and at the present crisis deserve particular attention, especially considered in connexion with the previous history of the contending parties.....

3. *The Arminians.*

It is commonly, but [inconsiderately] asserted, that Archbishop Laud and those who thought and acted with him, were Arminians. Certainly they did agree with the Arminians in some points in

which these differed from the Calvinists, but then, these points were neither characteristic of the Arminian system nor yet peculiar to it; and what is more, there existed at that time in England, a party who did hold all the characteristic tenets of the Arminians, and corresponded with them, and who, though during the reign of Charles I. they sided with the Archbishop, yet afterwards showed themselves very warm and constant opponents of his surviving friends and their followers. To group two such parties together under a common name, is an unnecessary confusion; and to avoid it I shall call the Archbishop and his friends the Apostolical party. With this preface, I proceed to the history of the party properly called Arminians.

James Van Harmin, otherwise called Arminius, was born at Oudewater in Holland, in 1560. He received his early education from a Catholic Priest, but afterwards studied at Utrecht, Leyden, and Geneva; he then visited Padua, and travelled in Italy. In 1588, he became a distinguished preacher at Amsterdam, and three years afterwards made himself generally notorious by the opinions which have since gone by his name. In 1603, he was elected Professor, at Leyden, and died in 1609. The following year, his followers presented to the States of Holland, a Remonstrance against certain of the Calvinists, from whence they are sometimes called Remonstrants. Conferences were held between them and the Calvinists in 1611 and 1613, and in 1618 was convoked the famous Synod of

Dort, in which they were excommunicated, their religious assemblies suppressed, and their ministers deprived of their benefices.

The original difference between the Arminians and Calvinists was professedly confined to what are called the *five points*, relative to the doctrines of predestination and grace. "But," says Mosheim, "after the Synod of Dort, their system underwent a remarkable change, and assumed an aspect that distinguished it entirely from that of all other Christian Churches. For then they gave an explanation of these *five articles*, almost equivalent to a denial of the necessity of divine succours in the work of conversion and in the paths of virtue. Nay, they went still farther, and bringing the greatest part of the doctrines of Christianity before the tribunal of reason, they modified them considerably.....Arminius was undoubtedly the inventor of this new form of doctrine, and taught it to his disciples, but it was first digested into a regular system by Episcopius.....The great and ultimate end the Arminians seem to have in view is, that Christians, though divided in their opinions, may be united in fraternal charity, and thus formed into one community, notwithstanding the diversity of their theological opinions." So far Mosheim¹. According to Le Clerk, their definition of Christian excludes only the following persons: (1.) qui sunt idolatriâ contaminati, (2.) qui minime habent Scrip-

¹ History, Cant. 17, § 2, p. 2, ch. 3.

turam pro fidei normâ, (3.) qui impuris moribus sancta Christi præcepta conculcant, (4.) aut qui denique alios religionis causâ vexant.

The opinions of Arminius were first introduced into England by the well-known JOHN HALES, whose followers have designated him by the title, "the ever memorable." Mr. Hales, who had been bred a Calvinist, attended the Synod of Dort, in company with Sir Dudley Carlton, the English Ambassador, and there contracted an intimacy with Episcopius, the effects of which are discernible in the following extracts from his writings.

"It hath been the common disease of Christians from the beginning, not to content themselves with that measure of Faith which God and the Scriptures have expressly afforded us.....but upon pretence of Church authority which is none, or tradition which for the most part is but a figment, they have peremptorily concluded, and confidently imposed upon others, a necessity of entertaining conclusions of that nature, and to strengthen themselves have broken out into divisions and factions... Hence arose all those ancient and many separations among Christians occasioned by Arianism, Euty-chianism, Sabellianism, &c., which, indeed, are but names of *Schism*, howsoever in the common language of the Fathers, *heresies*.....Can any man avouch that Arius, Nestorius, and others that taught erroneously concerning the Trinity or the person of our Saviour, did maliciously invent what they taught, and not rather fall upon it by error

and mistake? Till that be done, and upon good evidence, we will think no worse of all parties than needs we must; and take these rents in the Church to be at the worst but *Schisms* upon matters of opinion." (Tract on Schism, p. 212.)

Again, "Were Liturgies and public forms of service so framed, that they admitted not of particular and private fancies, but contained *only* such things as in which *all Christians do agree*, Schisms on opinion were utterly vanished. For consider of all the Liturgies that either are, or ever have been, and remove from them whatsoever is scandalous to any party, and leave *nothing but what all agree on*, and the event shall be, that the public service and honour of God shall no wise suffer. Prayer, confession, thanksgiving, reading of Scriptures, exposition of Scripture, administration of the Sacraments in the *plainest and simplest manner*, were matter enough to furnish out a sufficient Liturgy, though nothing either of private opinion or of Church pomp, &c. did interpose itself." *ibid.* p. 215.

Again, "They do but abuse themselves and others, that would persuade us that Bishops, by *Christ's institution*, have any superiority over other men, farther than of reverence." p. 224.

Again, in a tract on "The Lord's Supper," having argued against the necessity of using any words of consecration, he proceeds:—"And in truth, to speak my opinion, I see no great harm that would ensue, were the words of institution quite omitted. Certainly, thus much good would

follow, that some part (and not a little one) of the superstition that adheres to that action, by reason of an ungrounded conceit of the necessity and force of the words in it, would forthwith pill off and fall away." p. 47.

His opinion concerning the nature of this Sacrament he sums up as follows :—

“(1.) In the Communion there is nothing given but bread and wine. (2.) The bread and wine are *signs* indeed, but *not of any thing there exhibited*, but of something given long since, even of Christ given for us upon the Cross, sixteen hundred years ago and more. (3.) Jesus Christ is eaten at the Communion Table *in no sense*, neither spiritually, by virtue of any thing done there, nor really, neither metaphorically nor literally. Indeed that which is eaten (I mean the bread) is called Christ by a metaphor ; but it is eaten truly and properly. (4.) The spiritual eating of Christ is *common to all places as well as the Lord's table*.

“Lastly, the uses and ends of the Lord's Supper can be no more than such as are mentioned in the Scriptures, and they are but two. (1.) The commemoration of the death and passion of the Son of God ; specified by Himself at the institution of the ceremony. (2.) To testify our union with Christ, and communion with one another ; which end St. Paul hath taught us.

“In these few conclusions the whole doctrine and use of the Lord's Supper is fully set down, and

whoso leadeth you beyond this doth but abuse you. Quicquid ultra quæritur non intelligitur¹.”

After this exhibition of Mr. Hales's opinions, the reader will doubtless wonder how he obtained preferment from Archbishop Laud: of this Dr. Heylin gives us a curious account. He says, that on the circulation of Hales's tract on Schism, the Archbishop sent for him to Lambeth, in hopes to gain the man, whose abilities he was well acquainted with. About nine o'clock in the morning he came to know his Grace's pleasure, who took him into his garden, giving orders not to be disturbed upon any occasion. There they continued in discourse till the bell rang to prayers; and after prayers, till dinner was ready; and after that, too, till the coming of the Lord Conway and some other persons of honour put a necessity upon some of his servants to give him notice how the time had passed away. So in they came, high-coloured, and almost panting for want of breath, enough to show that there had been some heats between them, not then fully cooled. “I was chance,” says Heylin, “to be there that day, and found Hales very glad to see me, as being himself a mere stranger there, and unknown to all. He told me afterwards that he found the Archbishop (whom he knew before for a nimble disputant) to be as well versed in books as business, and that he had been ferretted by him from one hole to another, till there was none left to

¹ Tracts published in 1677, p. 62.

afford him any farther shelter; and that he was now resolved *to be orthodox, and declare himself a true son of the Church of England, both for doctrine and discipline.* That to this end he had obtained leave to call himself his Grace's Chaplain, that naming him in his public prayers for his Lord and Patron, the greater notice might be taken of the alteration." *Cyprianus Anglicus*, A.D. 1638.

Another writer in the reign of Charles I. whose works have procured him great celebrity among the Arminian party, was WILLIAM CHILLINGWORTH. When at Oxford, he turned Papist, and shortly after returned to the Church of England; and considered that in each change he had done an act pleasing to God, for which he need feel no kind of shame, or even regret: indeed he gloried in them as a proof of his zeal for truth. Though he accepted preferment in the Church of England, and subscribed to its formulæ, he thought the damnable clauses of the Athanasian Creed unscriptural, and likewise the assertion in the twentieth Article, that "the Church has authority in controversies of Faith." In his famous work, "The Religion of Protestants a safe way to Salvation," it is his object to vindicate, not this or that Protestant community, but Protestantism *as such*; the essence of which he makes to consist in believing, "that the Scriptures are the word of God, and contain all things necessary to salvation," and interpreting them, each person for himself, according to his sincere conviction.

Hales was a very intimate friend of Chilling-

worth's, and wrote his tract on Schism for him in particular. They were both great Royalists, probably because they disliked the bigotry of the Puritans; but the party who afterwards took up their opinions, and to whose admiration they owe their celebrity, were the chief instruments in bringing about the Revolution.....

4. *On the present state of the French Church.*

A Revolution so sudden and so complete as that of the three days of July, would necessarily leave a stunning effect on the minds of its immediate victims. Its consequences would in the first instance be indistinctly and very partially felt, even by those whom it most affected. Old associations would for a time survive the circumstances which had suggested them; and lines of conduct which, with the change of regime, had changed their entire character, would still in many instances be continued on principles no longer applicable.

Among Churchmen, in particular, this deadness to their altered position, exhibited itself in two distinct forms. 1. Among the Royalists. 2. Among what we may term the Conservatives.

1. The first of these classes, with a generous recollection of the sacrifices which Charles had made for their cause, still clung to the hope of his speedy and triumphant restoration. Without considering the disastrous weakness of their party, which neither the advantage ground of possession, nor the

command of the military could uphold, they imagined that when these advantages had been transferred to their enemies they might now acquire what they had been before unable to retain. Forgetting, too, that the usurping government was now among the "powers that be", Royalism and Catholicism were the joint subject of their discourses, and the cross was blended with the fleur-de-lis in the badges of their party.

2. The other class, from a less chivalrous, but at the same time very [intelligible] feeling, adhered with mistaken caution to such relics of the ancient system as appeared to have survived the convulsion. It seemed to them the safer course to maintain even the outward form of "things as they were:" nor did they perceive that in order thus to preserve appearances they sometimes sacrificed realities; as indeed was especially the case with those relations between Church and State, which, for the very reason that they had been beneficial under a Catholic dynasty, must be pernicious under a Latitudinarian.

In the meantime a third party of persons, perhaps rather speculative than practical, and whose views seem to have been founded more upon an extended knowledge of Church History than an habitual attachment to the system under which they had themselves lived, imagined that they could point out a line of conduct, at once more becoming and expedient than that to which either of the above-mentioned classes had attached themselves. It

seemed to them that the views both of the Royalists on the one hand, and of the Conservatives on the other, arose equally from a confusion of thought which more extended observation would have remedied,—that the supposed identity of monarchical and catholic principles, however long it had been acknowledged by the practice of the Church, was nevertheless no part of its theory. That as a matter of history, the supposition itself was, comparatively speaking, of recent origin, having been unknown earlier than the 16th century; and that as the circumstances in which it had originated, now unhappily no longer subsisted, to persevere in acting upon the views and feelings connected with it was a course without hope and without object.

Again, with respect to the Conservatives, they observed with regret the misdirected caution which [was satisfied with] institutions, old only in name, but in effect under their new combinations the most grievous of all encroachments; such, for instance, as the appointment of the bishoprics by a government no longer constituted on Episcopal, or even on Christian principles, and the payment of the Clergy from funds no longer consigned to them as their right, but administered as a fee.

They felt, moreover, with respect to the conduct of both these parties, that to mix up the cause of religion with that of any merely political party, whether that of the King *de jure* or of the King *de facto*, was in fact to confuse two questions essentially independent. A usurping Tiberius had been

acknowledged as Cæsar, and in the same way the usurpation of a rebel oligarchy must be tolerated, even by the most uncompromising legitimatist. It was not incumbent on the Christian Priesthood to clog the cause of divine truth with another cause, which, however just, was certainly of less paramount importance, and which had now unhappily been so long misunderstood as to have become almost unintelligible. Still less was it necessary, or even becoming, to encumber themselves with the unpopularity of the upstart dynasty, or to repress the growing feeling of indignation which attached itself to the hypocrisy of the selfish Traitor. The duty of the Clergy seemed clear and simple; to detach themselves from all parties, to dissolve their connexion with the State altogether, to reject its pay and to resist its interference, and quietly devoting themselves to spiritual concerns, gradually to undeceive a misguided people, who had been taught to regard the Church as a mere instrument of Regal oppression.

These seem to have been the leading views of the party who, in September, 1830, undertook to conduct the "Avenir;" and though they have mixed up these with others of which we can in no way approve, and which illustrate but too evidently the sad unscrupulousness of the ill-fated Church of Rome; still the knowledge they possess of the actual state of France, and the talent which they display in exhibiting their opinions, as well as the indirect, though certainly very partial bearing of their

observations on the situation which but too probably awaits ourselves, have appeared to the writer of this article not wholly unworthy of our attention...

5. [*On Jewell's Defence of his Apology*¹.]

Jewell's Works, London Edition, 1611.

P. 453. He calls the Mass, "your cursed paltrie service."

About the Apostolical Succession, p. 123. "But wherefore telleth us M. Harding this long tale of Succession? have these men their own Succession in such safe record? who was then the Bishop of Rome next by succession unto Peter? who was the second? who the third? who the fourth? Irenæus reckoneth them together in this order, Petrus, Linus, Anacletus, Clemens: Epiphanius thus, Petrus, Linus, Cletus, Clemens: Optatus thus, Petrus, Linus, Clemens, Anacletus: Clemens saith that he himself was next unto Peter, and then must the reckoning go thus, Petrus, Clemens, Linus, Anacletus. Hereby it is clear that of the four first Bishops of Rome, M. Harding cannot tell us who in order succeeded other. And thus talking so much of Succession, they are not well able to blaze their own Succession."

P. 139. "And to leave Dame Johane, the woman Pope, with many others more of like virtue

¹ [Written in 1834. vid. above p. 45, where the words under inverted commas are not meant as Jewell's, but seem to be a quotation from a recent writer.]

and holiness.”.....“ This is M. Harding’s holy Succession. Though faith fall, yet Succession must hold. For unto such Succession God hath bound the Holy Ghost.”.....“ But St. Paul saith, ‘ Faith cometh,’ (not by Succession, but) ‘ by hearing ; and hearing cometh,’ (not of legacie or inheritance from Bishop to Bishop, but) ‘ of the Word of God.’ ”.....
 “ Succession, you say, is the chief way for any Christian man to avoid Antichrist. I grant you, if you mean the Succession of Doctrine.”

P. 149. “ Touching the Priests of your making, M. Harding, of whom you seem to make so great account, your own Peter Lombard saith of them, ‘ Sane dici potest, quod alteram clavem, i. e. scientiam decernendi, multi Sacerdotes non habent.’ And in like manner saith your own Bonaventura, ‘ Omnes fere ita sunt simplices et idiotæ post suspensionem sacerdotii sicut ante.’ ”

Concerning the Power of the Keys, p. 153.
 “ Our doctrine is plain, that there be two Keys in the Church of God, the one of *Instruction*, the other of *Correction*, whereof the one worketh inwardly, the other outwardly, the one before God, the other before the congregation.”

I am weary of Jewell. He puffs Calvin and the Church of Geneva as Saints ; especially their way of receiving the Sacrament, in such terms as make one think he wished for it in England. p. 154.

He justifies Calvin for saying the Sacraments were superfluous, if we remembered Christ’s death enough without it. p. 155. Harding charges Calvin

with holding that the children of the faithful are born holy; and thus disparaging Baptism. Jewell justifies him by the text, 'Now are your children holy.' 1 Cor. vii, 14. p. 155.

" 'Opening' means nothing more than 'making men's consciences pliant, and subduing them unto the Word of God.' " p. 162.

Harding says of the Sacrament of the Altar, 'The forms of Bread and Wine outwardly present the spiritual nourishing of the soul.' p. 205. Jewell answers, "The mystical signification that M. Harding hath imagined of his shows and accidents, is vain and fantastical." p. 207.

"Another fantasie M. Harding hath found, 'that the Sacraments of the New Law work the thing itself that they signify, through virtue (as he saith) given unto them by God's ordinance to special effects of grace.' This, as I said, is but a fantasie."....."When S. Augustine saith, 'Our Sacraments give salvation,' his meaning is, 'Our Sacraments teach us that salvation is already come into the world.'" p. 208.

Harding said, p. 196, in order to show that some doctrines were heretical which could not nevertheless be proved by Scripture, "They who denied the distinction of a Bishop and a Priest were condemned of heresie, as we find in St. Augustine (de hæ. ad Quodvult deum, c. 53) and in Epiphanius (lib. iii. c. 75). In the Council of Constance the same is to be found." Jewell, p. 202. "But what meant M. Harding here to come in with the dif-

ference between Priests and Bishops?" and goes on to contend that Chrysostom and Augustine thought them the same; quoting Chrysostom (in 1. Tim. Homil. ii.) "Inter Episcopum et Presbyterum interest ferme nihil;" and Augustine (in Quæst. nov. et vet. Test. quæst. 101) "Quid est Episcopus nisi primus Presbyter, hoc est, summus Sacerdos. Also Ambrose [Ambrosiaster] (in 1 Tim. iii.) "Episcopi et Presbyteri una ordinatio est, uterque enim Sacerdos est, sed Episcopus primus est." p. 202.

Harding, (speaking of the Council of Trent, Jewell, p. 550) "The world had then no need of any new determinations or decrees concerning the Trinity; what it shall have hereafter by reason of your chief, M. John Calvin's doctrine, it is more feared than yet perceived." Jewell. "A slanderous untruth; M. Calvin was ever an enemy unto the Arians."

P. 196. Harding asks, "How do we know the Canonical Books of Scripture to be so? yet it is necessary to believe them." Jewell (in the margin, "Stale and fond questions;" "untruth, for it is not necessary to salvation.") p. 204. "Thus they labour to pull all credit from the Word of God, and send us only to their traditions."....."A man might well demand the like question from M. Harding, How know you that the Sun is the Sun, or that the Moon is the Moon?"

Harding objects to our form of consecrating the Sacrament. Jewell, p. 211. "Howbeit indeed we

use the same words that Christ used. If Christ and His Apostles consecrated, then do we undoubtedly likewise consecrate. The want that he findeth in us, he may also find in them." Also he is jocose on the idea of consecration, p. 211, and when charged with not having the *intention* to consecrate, he says, "Our intention is to do what Christ hath taught us to do, that is, to minister the Holy Sacrament 'in remembrance of Him,' and as St. Paul saith, 'to show forth the Lord's death till He come.'" p. 212.

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