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TITTMANN'S SYNONYMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,
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
REMARKS
ON THE
SYNONYMS
OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT;
AND
DISQUISITIONS ON VARIOUS GRAMMATICAL AND
PHILOLOGICAL SUBJECTS.

BY

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VOL. II.

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MDCCCXXXVII.



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THE
SYNONYMS
OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT.

CHAPTER XI.

THIS is the nature of synonyms, that they express diverse modes of conceiving the same thing, and thus cause hearers and readers to represent to their minds indeed the same object, (as they call it in the schools), and yet to form varying notions of it. Hence it happens, that among the best and most accurate writers, a twofold use of synonyms is chiefly found, one the logical, which we may call *necessary*, another the rhetorical, which may be termed *not necessary*. We call that necessary, when the writer has had in his mind a certain definite form of any object, and has wished that this form be thought of by the readers; as, for instance, if any one were

to speak of a man destitute of wealth, and compelled to seek his necessary sustenance by hard labour, he ought to call him *πένητα* if he were to use the word *πτωχόν*, the idea of a mendicant, seeking alms, would be raised in the mind of the reader. Those, therefore, who speak accurately, are accustomed to select out of many synonyms, that is words having a kindred meaning, that term which expresses the precise notion which he wishes to convey. The other use, which we have called not necessary, appears in those passages where two or more synonyms are placed together. This may be done for a twofold reason, first, because he who is speaking may wish that these kindred ideas of the same object be thought of separately by the mind of the reader; and next, because he may desire to describe the same thing in all its parts, and to exhibit a fuller and more lively representation of it; which is for the most part peculiar to orators and poets, among whom an accumulation of synonymous terms is a favourite figure. Of the former sort, are those passages, where two synonyms are coupled by a negative particle, as, for example, when Paul, in the Epistle to the Gal. i. 12, says, *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ παρὰ ἀνθρώπου παρέλαβον αὐτὸ, οὔτε ἐδιδάχθην*. For he denies both *τὸ παραλαβεῖν* and *τὸ διδαχθῆναι*.

These words really differ, as synonyms are accustomed to do, for they signify different modes of the same thing (knowledge received from another), as we shall shew in a proper place; but the negative remains the same, for it belongs to the words *παρ' ἀνθρώπων*. Although, therefore, Greek writers, in similar phrases, were, for the most part, accustomed to write not *οὐτε* but *οὐδέ*, yet in this passage *οὐτε* ought not lightly to be disturbed.^a Synonyms of the latter class occur so frequently, that it is strange how any one should have imagined that, in the New Testament, when two or more synonyms are found in juxta-position, one or more must be considered as a gloss, and rejected from the text, without any authority of MSS. The rashness of Wassenbergh has been, of late, in this respect,^b satisfactorily exposed by F. A. Bornemann;^c and our own Beck^d has, later still, with great acuteness remarked, that additional expressions introduced in the discourse, for the sake of illustration and limitation, ought not always to be considered as glosses, and he has

^a See Schaefer, App. to Demosth. III. p. 449.

^b Dissert. de Glossis N. T. praemissa Valkenarii scholiis in libros N. T. Tom. i. p. 1, sq.

^c De Glossemat. N. T. caute dijudicandis. Schol. in Luc. p. ix. sq.

^d Conten. II. de Glossem. quæ in sacris libris occurrunt, p. 15.

adduced as an example, that passage, Tit. iii. 1, where ὑποτάσσεσθαι and πειθαρχεῖν, are put together. On this passage, Wassenbergh has remarked, that πειθαρχεῖν is a scholium upon the preceding word ὑποτάσσεσθαι, for it cannot be supposed that Paul, in such a short Epistle, and in the same place, could have wished to *say the same thing twice*. Bornemann is indeed of opinion, that ὑποτάσσεσθαι refers to ἀρχαῖς and πειθαρχεῖν to ἐξουσίαις. But Beck acutely remarks, that Paul has not repeated the same idea, for ὑποτάσσεσθαι and πειθαρχεῖν do not signify the same thing. Since we have determined to continue the discussion on synonyms, an opportunity having unexpectedly presented itself, let us first speak of these words.

ὑποτάσσεσθαι, πειθαρχεῖν.

ὑποτάσσεσθαι, πειθαρχεῖν: Beck has most truly said, ὑποτάσσεσθαι is used of one who willingly and spontaneously submits to another, having the right to command, and πειθαρχεῖν, of one who also obeys, but from compulsion. Both acknowledge the authority of another, and live according to his pleasure, but it is to him who does it of his own accord, without being ordered and commanded, that ὑποτάσσεσθαι applies, whereas πειθαρχεῖν refers to him who obeys commands or laws, and submitting to the autho-

rity of another, does what is commanded. What an honourable man, therefore, is accustomed to do willingly, not being compelled by violence or fear,—provided the things which are commanded, are just and honourable, ὁ πειθαρχῶν does not do of his own accord, but by the order of another. For in the word ὑποτάσσεσθαι, the power of the middle voice is also conspicuous, which denotes that one does or suffers something, without being persuaded, impelled, or commanded by another. In the same manner, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, of which we shall afterwards speak, signifies to undertake the management of something spontaneously, whence it happens that βοηθεῖν may be applied to the inferior animals and things without life, but ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι cannot.

But that πειθαρχεῖν properly signifies to obey a command given or law prescribed, and to execute the orders of another is clearly shown by this one passage of Lucian: ὥστε νῦν μὲν—ἐπὶ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἤδη ζῶμεν. εἶτα βασιλέας χειροτονῶμεν καὶ πειθαρχῶμεν αὐτοῖς.^e Hence, even in the same author, “life is said to obey the laws which nature prescribes,” πειθαρχεῖ ὁ βίος οἷς ἡ φύσις ἐνομοθέτησεν.^f But we ought not to be surprised that ὑποτάσσεσθαι, in the sense of to submit, or subject one’s self

^e III. Saturn. p. 392.

^f II. Amor. 20, p. 420.

voluntarily to another, is found frequently in the sacred oracles, and not among other writers. For it is peculiar to the rules of Christianity that men, spontaneously, without being compelled by fear, or urged by desire of gain, accustom themselves to perform all the duties of life, to obey the divine will, and to submit to human laws, unless when they order what is sinful.

Wherefore, in that passage the one word cannot be taken for an exposition of the other, and also in the rest of the passages of the New Testament *πειθαρχεῖν* is to follow and obey one who gives orders or advice.^g The Apostles excuse themselves for not complying with the interdiction of the council, Acts v. 29. In the same manner *ὑποτάσσεσθαι*, unless where it has a passive signification, is used in the New Testament of those who spontaneously submit to magistrates,^h to masters,ⁱ to men worthy of honour^k in the cause of humanity,^l to husbands,^m to the authority of Christ,ⁿ to God and his decrees.^o But so much for these. Now let us speak of some other synonyms, and first of the words,

^g Acts xxvii. 21.

^h Rom. xiii. 1, 5.

ⁱ Tit. ii. 9.

^k 1 Cor. xv. 27, 28.

^l Eph. v. 21.

^m Eph. v. 22.

ⁿ Eph. v. 24.

^o Rom. x. 3. Heb. xii. 9. Jas. iv. 7.

βοηθεῖν, ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι,

of which we lately made incidental mention.

They agree in as far as they signify to bring aid. But yet they differ. For βοηθεῖν has the most extensive signification, as the German *helfen, succurrere*, to help to succour: ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι is to undertake the management, defence, or the cause of another: *sich jemandes einer Sache, annehmen*: ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι is to assist some one, as we, using another image, say *beistehen* to stand by. Βοηθεῖν is used also of irrational animals and other things, but ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι and ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι only of men.

βοηθεῖν is therefore truly to give assistance; that is, to afford succour or aid by our power, by our strength, by our advice, by our intrepidity, &c.; in the words ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι and ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, the inclination and endeavour to assist are the leading ideas. All physicians undertake the cure of the sick, ἀντιλαμβάνονται τῶν νοσοῦντων, but all do not render effectual assistance (βοηθοῦσι). But it is not necessary to illustrate the signification of βοηθεῖν by examples from the New Testament. Ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι is always so used in the New Testament, as that it may be distinguished from βοηθεῖν. We have in Luke i. 54, ἀντελάβετο Ἰσραὴλ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ. The author did not say ἐβοήθει,

for God's aid was granted indeed, but in vain, since ὁ παῖς did not receive it; at all events, the result was at that time uncertain. In the same manner also, δεῖ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ἀσθενούντων is employed, Acts xx. 35, for we may all undertake the care of the sick and help them, but we cannot always render the assistance which βοηθεῖν implies. I am surprised in the passage, 1 Tim. vi. 2, that this signification has escaped the notice of almost all interpreters, except Wahl, οἱ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀντιλαμβάνομενοι. They have supposed I know not what idea of perceiving, of feeling, and of enjoying, and they have adduced examples of it very little to the purpose.^p Even Schleusner himself was deceived by an inept scholium upon Thucydides VII. 66, for there the historian means nothing else than to succour. It is a more plausible example, which is given from the *Axiochus* of *Æschines* (1, 6): ὁ δὲ οὐκ ᾔν οὐδὲ τῆς στερήσεως ἀντιλαμβάνεται. It has been translated, he *does not feel*; but why may we not translate it, he does not care, for it is no concern of his. The passage which Elsner quotes from the life of Pericles, in Plutarch, is foreign to the purpose, for there the verb is followed by an accusa-

^p See Elsner. *Observ. Sacr.* upon this passage, and Wettstein.

tive. In another passage of Porphyry on abstinence from animal food, *πλειόνων ἡδονῶν ἀντιλήψεσθαι*, the genitive is indeed employed, but *ἡδονη* required that case. For *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι* and like verbs, are construed with the genitive, if they speak of such things as are perceived by the mind or senses. It is for the same reason the middle voice is used. Besides, these who understand the words *τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι* of those who have received benefits, whether they refer them to masters or servants, seem to pervert the sense of the Apostle. Masters cannot indeed be understood; for if the words *ὅτι πιστοί*, &c. be used of masters, the Apostle would have written in the preceding clause, *μᾶλλον δουλεύετσαν*. But if we understand servants, it is foreign to the purpose to say that they serve Christian masters, more cheerfully, because they have received benefits from them. For the true cause why Christian servants ought more willingly to serve their masters, *ἀδελφοῖς*, is because they themselves are *πιστοί* *καὶ ἀγαπητοί*. But the *ἀγαπητοί* are the *οἱ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι*. I am therefore of opinion that in this passage also *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι* should be understood in the sense of, to have a care, to labour diligently, as Wahl has properly translated it. The sense seems

to be this: Let those who are compelled to serve masters (not Christians) shew them all proper respect, (ver. 1.) But let those who have Christian masters not despise them, because they are their brethren (equals), nay let them indeed attend to them the more, since they are themselves Christians, and beloved by their masters, forasmuch as they sedulously labour for their benefit, that is, study to deserve well of their masters. The sense will become more clear if it be expressed in direct address. Ye, who have Christian masters, do not despise them, because ye are their brethren (it would be improper because they are your brethren); rather serve them the more zealously, because ye are Christians as they, and esteemed by them as persons who have endeavoured to deserve well of them. For this is the proper signification of *εὐεργεσία*, whence is derived *εὐεργετεῖν* to deserve well of some one. Aristoph. Plut. V. 836.

— κἀγὼ μὲν ἄμην οὖς τίως
 εὐηργέτησα δεομένους ἕξειν φίλους
 ὄντως βεβαίους —

In the same manner *τὴν πόλιν εὐεργετεῖν*, v. 913, 914. The passage is one which deserves the attentive consideration of all those who, in our times, wish to deserve well of their country. *Εὐεργ-*

γεσίαν has been applied to servants, in relation to their masters, even by Homer in his *Odyss.* xxiii. 374. In Thucydides, I. 137, Themistocles writes to the king: *καὶ μοι εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται, καὶ νῦν ἔχων σε μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ ὀρᾷσαι πάρεμι.* Therefore *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι εὐεργεσίας*, is to be very careful that you deserve well.

Ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι in the sense of assisting some one, may seem scarcely to differ from the preceding. But if we consider the proper signification of it a little more attentively, a difference of meaning will also appear, for it is to take hold of, to seize upon. Both phrases, *ἡ χεὶρ ἐπιλαμβάνεται* and *ἐπιλαβεῖν τῆς χειρὸς* are used. But *ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τινός* (without any ellipse) is to lay hold of some one. In this sense it is frequently employed in the New Testament, as in 1 Tim. vi. 12, 19, and Heb. viii. 9. Hence it is figuratively to render assistance, by taking one as it were by the hand, in which something else is manifestly implied, than in *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι*, for it signifies present help or service, by which one is assisted in labour or peril. Thus it is used in Heb. ii. 16, *ὡς γὰρ δὴ πού ἀγγέλων ἐπιλαμβάνεται, ἀλλὰ σπέρματος Ἀβραάμ.* Nor is Acts ix. 27 to be taken in a different sense, *Βαρνάβας δὲ ἐπιλαβόμενος αὐτὸν ἤγαγε πρὸς τοὺς ἀποστόλους.* This passage has

been interpreted by many, he had entertained him hospitably, but they adduce no example of this signification, nor indeed is any to be found. Besides, it would have been written, Βαρν. δὲ ὁ ἐπιλαβόμενος αὐτὸν for the article could not be wanting, but αὐτὸν is to be referred to ἤγαγεν, from frequent attraction, ἐπιλαβόμενος (αὐτοῦ) ἤγαγεν αὐτόν. The sense of Luke appears to me, therefore, to be as follows: When Paul was dreaded by the disciples, so that he endeavoured in vain to associate with them, Barnabas assisted him and led him to them, *er stand ihm bey und führte ihn zu den übrigen*. But I do not remember that ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι is used in the sense of helping or assisting any where else, yet συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι is often so used in Lucian, and even in Herodotus and Thucydides.⁹ The scholium upon that beautiful passage of Æschylus, Pers. v. 739, explains the words, ὁ θεὸς συνάπτεται by ὁ θεὸς αὐτοῦ ἐπιλαμβάνεται. It belongs to later Greek, and occurs in *Ecclesiasticus* IV. 12. Ernesti has given a very good translation of it in the Epistle to the Hebrews, ii. 16. It is used both in a good and bad sense, as the Lat. *vindicare*.

⁹ See Hemsterhuis upon Lucian, 1 Prometh, p. 196.

ἐναντίοι : (ὑπεναντίοι) ἐχθροί ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι ἀντιλέγοντες ἀντίδοκοι ἀντικείμενοι ἀντιπασσόμενοι.

So great is the number and diversity of enemies and adversaries, and such is the scarcity of friends, that almost all languages abound with names by which the former are designated, but have very few names expressive of the latter. The Greek language has only one appellation for friends, (φίλος) but many for enemies, of which those mentioned above are found in the books of the New Testament.

Ἐναντίος, which signifies properly contrary, adverse, has the most extensive signification, but it does not contain in itself the idea of hatred or hostile intention, but simply denotes a man who is not μεθ' ἡμῶν, with us, an adversary, an opponent. In the New Testament it is only once applied to men, 1 Thess. ii. 15, πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίων, who oppose all, in which there is the notion of perversity. But in Tit. ii. 8, ὁ ἐξ ἐναντίας has no signification of hostile intention. In Coloss. xi. 14. Heb. x. 27, ὑπεναντίος also occurs, which may be properly rendered, clandestine adversary.

In ἐχθρός the idea of hatred and hostile intention is manifest. There are some who say that in the New Testament, ἐχθρός, sig-

nifies wicked, abandoned, dishonest, and that it specially refers to those who are enemies of God (*ἐχθροὶ Θεοῦ*), but they are mistaken. Rom. v. 10, *ἐχθροὶ ὄντες*, are just the same as those who are called, ver. 8, *ἀμαρτωλοὶ*, but they do not signify flagrant sinners, but men perversely opposing God, as the following words shew. For the Apostle says: *ἐχθροὶ ὄντες καταλλάγημεν*. But this *καταλλαγή* belongs not to God, but to man, as I have shewn in another place. So also in Coloss. ii. 21, it does not signify flagrant transgressors, but men alienated and adverse in their minds to God. But *ἐχθροὶ Θεοῦ*, is an expression never used in the New Testament, for God does not hate men, not even the worst. Paul has very truly said, Rom. viii. 7, *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἐχθρὰ εἰς Θεόν*, which some very improperly interpret, odious to God, although Paul also adds with equal truth, ver. 8, *οἱ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες Θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύνανται*. Indeed there are some who take all these words in the same sense, and do not doubt but *ἐχθρὰ εἰς Θεόν* and *ἐχθρὰ Θεοῦ*, *ἐχθρὸς εἶναι Θεοῦ* and *τῷ Θεῷ*, signify the same thing. The Greeks called a man hateful to the gods, not *ἐχθρὸς Θεῶν* but *ἐχθρὸς τοῖς Θεοῖς*.^r The matter is made very clear by James

^r Sophocle. Œd. R. v. 1336.

iv. 4, 5, ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου ἔχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν. ὃς ἂν οὖν βουληθῆ φίλος εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου ἐχθρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ καθίσταται, that is, he who is accustomed to love the world, cannot love God, for the love of the world is opposed to the love of God.

The words which follow, express the various modes in which an adverse, or hostile mind is manifested. And first, then,

ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι, are those who entertain a different opinion, and who ought not to be rebuked and upbraided, but, if they are in error, mildly instructed. Therefore, the admonition of Paul is just, 2 Tim. ii. 25, ἐν πραότητι παιδεύειν τοὺς ἀντιδιατιθεμένους. This compound word occurs only in this passage, but the sense is plain. Those are more frequently called διατιθέμενοι who are in any way affected in the mind, εἶ, κακῶς, δεινῶς, &c. Therefore, ἀντιδιατιθέμενοι, are those who form a contrary judgment, who differ in opinion. Allied to these are οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες those who resist with words, who contradict, who speak against. Acts xiii. 45, ἀντιλέγοντες καὶ βλασφημοῦντες. In John xix. 12, the phrase ἀντιλέγει τῷ Καίσαρι, contains a more serious accusation. This expression of Paul is softened by Luther, *der ist des Kaisers Freund nicht*, he is not the friend of Cæsar. But those who contradict us, are generally esteemed enemies,

and seem to injure us, for there are few who bear with patience those who contradict them. But much more of the character of enemies is expressed in the phrase *οἱ ἀντίδικοι*, those who carry on a law-suit against another, litigants, adversaries. Thus Matt. v. 25. Luke xii. 58; xviii. 3, and 1 Peter v. 8, *διάβολος* is called *ἀντίδικος*, as the accuser of man before God, such at least was the opinion of the Jews. Those who contend against us at law seem, for the most part, to do us injury; and, therefore, *ἀντίδικος* is taken in a bad sense.^s But we may also *περὶ δικαίων ἀντιδικεῖν*, plead for our right.^t Finally, *ἀντικείμενοι* and *ἀντιτασσόμενοι* also differ. For *ἀντικείμενοι*, are those who are of an opposite party, situated as it were on the opposite side, and *ἀντιτασσόμενοι*, those who stand opposed, as it were, in battle; resist us not only with words, but with actions. Thus Luke xxi. 15, *πάντες οἱ ἀντικείμενοι ὑμῖν*, who contend against us, adversaries. So also 1 Cor. xvi. 9, those who block up the way and prevent us from entering, are called *ἀντικείμενοι διὰ τῆς θύρας*. And Philipp. i. 28, *πυρρόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντικειμένων*, they who are terrified by those who oppose themselves. Such is also that unknown *ἀντικείμενος*. 2 Thess. ii. 4.

^s Xenoph. Apol. 20, 25.

^t Xenoph. Memor. IV. 4, 8.

The expression, however, in a more extensive sense appears to be employed to denote an adversary of any kind, 1 Tim. v. 14, and Luke xiii. 17. But *ἀντιτάσσεσθαι* seems to imply something more than to block up the way and prevent: *ἀντιτασσομένοι* are those, who, standing in an opposite line, assail and attack. Thus Rom. xiii. 2, *ὁ ἀντιτασσομενος τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ*, is not only he who does not render prompt obedience to the magistrate in all things, but injures and assaults his just and lawful authority, and, as it were, wages war with the magistracy. Xenoph. Cyrop. III. 1, 10. *πόλιν ἀντιταπτομένην πρὸς ἑτέρων, ἥτις, ἐπειδὴν ἠττηθῆ, παραχρῆμα ταύτη ἀντι τοῦ μάχεσθαι, πείθεσθαι θέλει.* In Acts xviii. 6, *ἀντιτασσομένων καὶ βλασφημούντων*, is applied to those who resisted, attacked, and assailed the Apostle by words. In the same manner it is also used in the more elegant Greek writers. Nor can it be doubted that *ἀντιτάσσεσθαι*, is a stronger expression than *ἀντικεῖσθαι*. It is said of God, James iv. 6, and 1 Peter v. 5, according to the *Alexandrian version*, *τοῖς ὑπερηφάνοις ἀντιτάσσεται* he resisteth the proud. With this corresponds the Heb. *יִלְי*, he renders the counsels of the proud of none effect, and the words, *τοῖς δὲ ταπεινοῖς δίδωσι χάριν*, are properly opposed." The passage,

" Proverbs iii. 34.

James v. 6, *κατεδικάσατε ἐφρονεύσατε τὸν δίκαιον οὐκ ἀντιτάσσεται ὑμῖν*, is more obscure. With regard to it, the sentiments of interpreters are much divided, but I conceive that *ἀντιτάσσεται* ought either to be taken passively, in the sense of, the evil which you have done is not repaid you; or rather, *ὁ δίκαιος* does not repay you for the evil which you have done, he does not, or will not take revenge. For it cannot be doubted that Christ is *ὁ δίκαιος*, whom the Jews slew, therefore, their countrymen, to whom James wrote, had good reason to dread punishment. The discourse is rapid and short. But it is certain, that in these words, some consolation is to be sought; for *μακροθυμήσατε οὖν*, is immediately added. He had upbraided them severely for their crimes and iniquitous life, the principal crime was *δίκαιον ἐφρονεύσατε.....μακροθυμήσατε οὖν*. Every one sees that, in the intervening words, there ought to be reason, why they should *μακροθυμεῖν*, patiently bear the present evils, until the *παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου*. But if vengeance was to be apprehended, they could not have waited with joy, but would rather have had cause to dread *τὴν παρουσίαν*. Therefore the fear is taken away by these words; *ὁ δίκαιος* does not revenge the crime, that is, he will not avenge it, for in such expressions,

the present is very often used in Greek for the future. If we may trust manuscripts, the passage in the Supplices of Euripides, v. 1150 (1143), is very similar.

ἄρ' ἀσπιδοῦχος ἔτι ποτ' ἀντιτάσσομαι
σὸν φόνον ;—

Supply *τιμωρήσων*. Canterus supposes that *ἀντι-
τίσσομαι* is the just reading. In this passage, in-
deed, the idea of vengeance appears from what
follows, ὅταν ἔλθοι δίκη πατρῶος, but in James, it
is inferred from what precedes.

ἀχρεῖοι, ἄχρηστοι.

Luther translates *ἀχρεῖους δούλους*, in Luke xvii.
10, *unnütze knechte*, unprofitable servants, and
in like manner, Matt. xxv. 30. By the same
word he expresses *ἄχρηστον*, in Philem. v. 11, to
which *εὐχρηστον* is opposed. He has indeed
rendered them correctly, for that word ex-
presses both. But theologians, who, in the
former passage, interpret slaves *to be of no
great importance*, as if their labour and zeal
had no value, depart very far indeed from the
true meaning of the Lord. For why? An ex-
ample of a slave is given : who, after his work
was finished, having returned quickly (*εὐθέως*)
from the field is not admitted immediately to
supper, but ordered first of all to prepare food
for his master, and to serve him at supper.

When the slave had done this, Christ says, his master *seems to owe him no thanks*, although he did all things properly that were commanded, τὰ διαταχθέντα. So therefore ye likewise λέγετε ὅτι οὐλοὶ ἀχρεῖοι ἐσμέν. But surely he is not a man worthless and of no value, who zealously does all τὰ διαταχθέντα. But if he does not what is commanded, we rather call him ἀχρηστον. Indeed our Lord gives the reason why they ought to esteem themselves ἀχρείους δούλους, namely, because they did only what they ought to do. But in what manner, we contend that he, who does properly what he ought, should esteem himself a servant useless, worthless, and of no value? I know, indeed, that ἀχρεῖος, is often interchanged with ἀχρηστος, and, therefore, rendered in the same manner by *lexicographers*. Still, it is manifest, that in this place ἀχρεῖος is not a man of no value, worthless, and useless. He is rather, as appears to me, properly ἀχρεῖος—οὐδὲ οὐκ ἔστι χρεία, or rather χρείος, of whom there is no need; but ἀχρηστος, is he whom we cannot employ properly, because he yields no benefit, and is unprofitable and useless: ἀχρεῖος is a dispensable person (to whom we owe nothing,) ἀχρηστος, unprofitable, useless. Paul says in the Epistle to Philemon, that Onesimus, alluding to the meaning of the word, was for-

merly ἄχρηστος, but now he was εὐχρηστος. But that servant, Matt. xxv. 30, is also properly called ἀχρεῖος, *although he had been* ἄχρηστος, πονηρὸς, καὶ ὀκνηρὸς, for he who does no work is not wanted. Doederlin, in his first Dissertation on the readings of Homer, thinks the difference between them to be this, that ἄχρηστος is, for the most part, used of things, but ἀχρεῖος, of living creatures; many examples, however, shew that he is mistaken.

Since there is no doubt but that ἄχρηστος signifies useless (and then πονηρὸς rather than χρηστούς), we shall speak in this place only of ἀχρεῖος. It is a compound, as I have already mentioned, not of χρεία in the sense of use, χρῆσις, but rather of χρεός or χρεῖος (in Homer χρεῖω), in which sense χρεία is also used. Hence ἀχρεῖος, in its *primary* signification, seems to denote a thing of which there is no need. It occurs twice in Homer, in this sense; ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν, Iliad II. v. 269, and ἀχρεῖον ἐγέλασεν, Odysse. XIII. v. 162, concerning which, see chiefly Doederlin and Eustathius, 217, 25, sq. The Ambrosian scholiast, p. 498, edited by Buttm. upon that passage of the Odyssey, explains ἀκαιρον, μηδενὸς προκειμένου (χρεούς), ἀχρεῖωδες, οὐδὲ πρὸς χρείαν ἀρμοζόμενον. In both passages the scholiast seems to think that it signifies what

ought not to have been done, inasmuch as at that time and place it ought not even to have been done, as we say *that was not required*, intimating that something was done beyond what was necessary, and on that account in an unseasonable and unbecoming manner. But this explanation of the word does not certainly agree with the other passage, where Penelope ἀχρεῖδον ἐγέλασσε. It may be more correctly said, she feigned a laugh, her manner not suiting her words. Nor has Eustathius improperly translated it, p. 1842, 25. An unknown poet, in Brunk's collection of Epigrams, III. 165, has imitated Homer. And Theocritus, in his 25th Eclogue, 70, sq., has applied it to dogs:— τὸν δὲ γέροντα ἀχρεῖδον κλάζον τε περίσσαινόν θ' ἐτέρωθεν, where it is to bark in a fawning (that is, *not seriously*) rather than in an angry manner. Although with other writers ἀχρεῖδος very often denotes the same thing as ἀχρηστος (for of that which is ἀχρηστον, there is generally οὐδὲ χρέος), yet in many passages its proper signification also appears, ἀχρεῖδον καὶ ἠνωφελές are joined together in Xen. Memor. I. 2, 54. In Thucyd. also, I. 84, τὰ ἀχρεῖτα are things of which there is no need, and II. 6, those sent out of the city with the women and children are called οἱ ἀχρεῖότατοι, *the most dispensable*, those who were not necessary.

In a word, there is in ἀχρηστος not only a negative idea, of τὸ χρεσίμου, but the contrary idea τὸ πονηροῦ is generally contained in it, for it signifies not only that which does no good, but that which causes hurt. In Xenoph. Hier. I. 27, γάμος ἀχρηστος, is not a useless but a troublesome marriage. So likewise in the Œcon. VIII. 4. But ἀχρεῖος contains no idea of blame in itself, it only denotes a person or thing of which there is no need, and with which we may dispense, *unnöthig*, *entbehrlich*, words, which of themselves, however, are rarely mentioned without disparagement. For human pride is even apparent in this, that those who have hardly performed their own duty, may think that others cannot want their assistance, and therefore demand the greatest rewards as their right. Hence those perpetual complaints of men, who, thinking that their merits are not sufficiently rewarded in this life, ask of God himself eternal rewards for their virtue. They do not perceive, indeed, that although men were to perform all the duties and commands of God, they have no right to demand anything more by way of a reward, but ought to be satisfied with the consciousness of good deeds, because they have not done God a favour by acting virtuously. By discharging their duty, they

have done, as it were, a favour to themselves, and therefore cannot require that God should hold himself indebted to them, or make a return as if he had received a benefit; for he confers benefits on men, and does not return a favour. He therefore has admonished his friends to esteem themselves ἀχρεΐους δούλους, not because they are useless or indolent servants, or are esteemed so by God, but because God owes them no favour; for the Deity οὐ προσδέεται τινός (Acts xvii. 25), and receives no benefit from man for which he should be grateful. Wherefore Christ has said, ver. 9, that the master does not ἐχρεΐν χάριν will not be grateful to the servant, because this belongs to those who have received a benefit, and therefore it is applicable to man but not to God. The words of Luther are ambiguous (at least in common use), but yet they express the sense properly, as *danken* means to esteem something as a benefit, which is ἐχρεΐν χάριν. The master would be most unjust, that regards the servant, who has diligently performed his duty, as a useless servant, and thus not of any value (which pride, although it may be found in the masters of this earth, certainly agrees not with the character of God). But still he justly demands these duties as his right, and deservedly punishes the ser-

vant, unless ποιῆτ' τὰ διαταχθέντα, he does what is commanded. It notwithstanding becomes the servant, although he has done what was pleasant to his master, not to regard it as a benefit but as a debt. Nor is the master unjust, because non ἔχει χάριν, *i. e.* he does not regard it as a favour, although he does not consider his servant ἀχρεῖον, that is, a man who cannot demand a reward, because he did only what he ought, for God οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχει τινός, has no need of any one, nor θεραπεύεται, is he served by men. But this moderation is rare among men, and on that account μεμψιμοιρία is so much the more frequent.

Βόσκειν ποιμαίνειν.

John xxi. 15, 17, βόσκε τὰ ἀρνία μου. It is not by chance that βόσκειν is here used, while ποιμαίνειν is found in other places. For in βόσκειν there is only the idea of feeding or nourishing (whence a flock βοσκομένη, feeding.) But ποιμαίνειν is not only to feed, but also to lead, to watch, to manage a flock. Luther has properly translated the above words, *weide meine lämmer*, feed my lambs. The Lord himself is ὁ ἀρχιποιμήν, the chief shepherd, 1 Pet. v. 4. But the care of the flock upon this earth was to be committed to the Apostles; therefore he immediately adds: ποιμαίνε τὰ πρόβατά μου. Hence it is very often used of those who preside over

the church, as for example in Acts xx. 28. 1 Pet. v. 2. The idea of feeding is not, however, excluded as in the Epistle of Jude, ver. 12, *ἑαυτοὺς ποιμαίνοντες*. This figure is very ancient. The expression *ποιμένες λαῶν* frequently occurs in Homer. H. Stephen has already remarked, that Æschylus has called kings *ποιμάνορας*. It is found in the tragedy of Pers. v. 239. The same author has applied *ποιμανόριον*, to a flock of men, or rather an army, Pers. v. 73. But both of the words, if we consider their origin, seem to be indeed derived from feeding; there is, however, ground for a distinction. For in the word *βίω*, from which comes *βίσχω*, the universal idea of nourishing is contained, for which reason it is also applied to men, but *ποιμαίνειν* is properly to feed on grass (*ποία*), which is suitable to flocks, nor is it ever found properly said of men. But *ποίμνη* and *ποιμνίον* are very fitly applied to man in a figurative sense, as flock among us. Lucian II. Amor. 457, applies it to grave and supercilious philosophers: *σεμνῶν ὀνομάτων κομψεύμασι τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς ποιμαίνεταιωσαν*. The same author, III. *adv. Indoct.* 3, p. 112, calls the worshippers of the muses *ποιμνία*. But it is not necessary to say more.

CHAPTER XII.

[E schedis meis pauca passim adscripsi, quae ad futurum usum, si licuisset, notaveram. Ferant ea viri eruditi. Quae uncis inclusa sunt, ea proprie quidem non esse synonyma videntur, sed tamen quia aut certis locis de eadem re dicuntur, aut vulgo prorsus non differre plurimis visa sunt (ut composita et simplicia) et tamen ejusdem rei notionem diversam indicant, non praetermittenda duxi. De *formulis synonymis* alio loco dicere, si deus dederit, animus est.]^a

ἀθετεῖν ἀκυροῦν καταργεῖν. ἐξαιεῖρειν. (κενοῦν) ἀθετεῖν est irritum reddere, ἀκυροῦν auctoritate privare, καταργεῖν vim adimere.

αἰνέω δοξάζω μεγαλύνω. αἰνέω laudo. δοξάζω celebroy. μεγαλύνω virtutes alicujus extollo. Recte Lutherus Luc. i. 46.

ἀρῆσειν (ἀμαρτίαν) φέρειν. Illud est, e medio tollere peccatum cum malis ex eo oriundis, hoc est ipsas poenas suscipere et perferre.

^a It has been thought advisable to leave the brief Latin observations, on this unfinished portion of his work, exactly as the Author left them, as a translation might, in many instances, have rather obscured than elucidated his meaning.

αἰσχύνομαι ἐντρέπομαι αἰσχύνῃ ἐντροπή· αἰδώς. Thuc.

I. 84. αἰδώς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνῃς δὲ ἢ εὐψυχία. Male h. l. intellexisse videtur Schol.

(ἀκολουθέω· ἐξακολουθέω.) Postèrius tantum in secunda ep. Petri legitur. Est usque sequi, sectari. Proprie non est synonymum.

ἀληθής· ἀληθινός. Non videntur synonyma, sed tamen distinguenda sunt. Nam ἀληθής in N. T. sensu morali tantum dicitur: θεὸς ἀληθής. Ioh. iii. 33. Sed ἀληθινός est, qui non tantum nomen habet et speciem, sed veram naturam et indolem, quae nomini conveniat. Ioh. i. 19. φῶς ἀληθινόν. vi. 12. ἄρτον ἀληθινόν. xvii. 3. τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν. Occurrit tantum apud Iohannem et in ep. ad Hebraeos.

ἄλλος· ἕτερος. Illud denotat *aliū*, nulla diversitatis, nisi numeri, ratione. ἕτερος non tantum *aliū* sed etiam *diversum* indicat. ἄλλος Ἰησοῦς — ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον 2 Cor. xi. 4, sq.

ἄμα· ὁμοῦ. Utrumque societatem denotat; sed ἄμα temporis potissimum, ὁμοῦ loci et modi. Confunditur ἄμα cum ὁμοῦ. Rom. iii. 12.

ἀναγενναῖσθαι· ἀνακαινοῦσθαι· ἀνανεοῦσθαι (ἀνωθεν γεννηθῆναι). Sensu morali de eadem re dicuntur.

ἀναπεφλοῦν· ἀποκαταλλάττειν. ad Eph. i. 10, et Col. i. 20.

ἀναλογία· μέτρον. ad Rom. xii. 3, 6. Permutantur h. l. sed non idem significant.

ἀνάμνησις· ὑπόμνησις (ἀνα—ὑπομιμνήσκειν). Differunt

ut nostra: *Andenken* et *Erinnerung*. μνήμη
μνεία.

ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀνταπόδοσις ἐκδίκησις ἐκδικεῖν. Illa in
utramque partem dicuntur, haec ultionem deno-
tant. Rom. xi. 35; xii. 19. Hebr. x. 30.

ἀντιῳαστιθέμενοι ἀντιλέγοντες ἀντιπασσόμενοι ἀντικείμε-
νοι ἀντίδικος ἐναντίος ὑπεναντίος. ἀντιῳαστιθέμενοι, qui
contrariam mentem habent, ἀντιλέγοντες, qui con-
tra loquuntur, ἀντιπασσόμενοι, qui contrarias partes
sequuntur, ἀντικείμενοι, qui contra moliuntur, ἀντί-
δικοι, qui lite (injura) contendunt c. al., obtrecta-
tores. *Widersacher*. (ὁ ὑιάβολος. I Petr. v. 8)
ἐναντίοι hi omnes sunt, *Gegner*, adversarii (ὑπε-
ναντίοι clandestini? certe convenit locis Coloss. ii.
14. Hebr. x. 27.)

ἀπέχει ἀρκεῖ ad Marc. xiv. 41, ἀπέχει ἤλθεν ἡ ὥρα
— ἐγείρεσθε, ἄγωμεν, ἀπέχει. Satis est, quod praeteriit:
ἀρκεῖ, sufficit, quod adest.

ἀπειθεῖα ἀπιστία, illud ad animum refertur, hoc ad
mentem.

ἀποκρίνομαι ὑπολαμβάνομαι. Luc. x. 30. Illud est
simpliciter, respondere, hoc est, excipere sermo-
nem alterius, ut contradicas.

ἄρα οὖν τοίνυν. Recte Hoogeven. p. 1002. ἄρα est
illativum, οὖν conclusivum, ἄρα argumentatur, οὖν
accommodat. τοίνυν ab utroque differt; conjungit
enim id quod *nunc* fiat aut fieri debeat, quoniam
aliud quid factum est.

ἀρχή δύναμις ἐξουσία. δύναμις vim aliquid efficiendi

denotat, ἐξουσία potestatem, ἀρχὴ imperium, quod exercet, qui illis utitur. κυριότης.

ἀρχηγός· αἴτιος. Comparanda sunt, quatenus in N. T. de Christo auctore et causa salutis dicuntur. Hebr. ii. 10; v. 9.

ἀχρεῖος· ἄχρηστος. (ἀνωφελής.) ἀχρεῖος est, cujus nulla est necessitas, οὐ οὐκ ἔστι χρεία. ἄχρηστος est, qui non solum nullam utilitatem praebet, sed etiam damnum affert. ἀχρεῖοι δοῦλοι non sunt inutiles, mali, sed tales, quibus, peracto officio, non amplius opus habet dominus, ut praemium postulare non possint, quia tantum quod debebant, fecerunt.

(βαρεῖσθαι· βαρύνεσθαι.) De discrimine horum verborum vid. Gataker. ad Marc. Ant. p. 254.

βάρος· ὄγκος. βάρος ipsam gravitatem denotat, et saepissime sine molestiae notione dicitur 1 Thess. ii. 7. 2 Cor. iv. 17. Sed ὄγκος est βάρος, quod molestum est, impedit etc. Semel Hebr. xii. 1.

βίος· ζωή. βίος est vita, quam vivimus, ζωή, qua vivimus. Hinc ζωὴ αἰώνιος, non βίος, in N. T.

βόσκειν· ποιμαίνειν. Hoc in universum est, curam gregis habere, ducere gregem; sed βόσκειν, pascere, nutrire. Recte Ioh. xxi. 15, 17. βύσκει τὰ πρόβατά μου. Christus est ὁ ποιμήν.

(βρῶμα· βρῶσις) differunt, ut nostra Speise et Essen. γάλα οὐ βρῶμα, 1 Cor. iii. 2. βρῶματα, 1 Tim. iv. 3. βρῶσις καὶ πύσις, Rom. xiv. 17.

γενῆν· τίκτειν. τίκτειν in N. T. semper de mare tantum dicitur, sed γενῆν bis etiam de feminis Luc. i. 13. Gal. iv. 24.

γνώμη βουλή δόγμα. γνώμην διδόναι, 1 Cor. vii. 25.
2 Cor. viii. 10, συμβουλεύειν.

γρηγορέω νήφω ἀγρυπνέω. Conv. quod non dormire
denotant. Sed γρηγορεῖν est, interdium non dormire,
ἀγρυπνεῖν, noctu, νήφειν, vigilare, *wachsam seyn*.

γυνή (χῆρα.) Matth. i. 20. Luc. ii. 5, 24.

δεῖπνον ἄριστον δοχή. De prioribus vide Athenaeum,
i. 9, 10. In v. δοχή nulla est notatio temporis,
sed notio excipiendi convivas. *Gastmahl*.

δαισιδαίμονια εὐλάβεια. Act. xxv. 19; xvii. 22. In
N. T. semper sensu bono dicitur.

διαδιδόναι διαρπάσαι. Luc. xi. 22. Matth. xii. 29.

διδασκαλία διδασχῆ. διδασκαλία est, quam quis acci-
pit, διδασχῆ, quae traditur.

διστάζειν ἀπορεῖσθαι (ἐξ ἀπορεῖσθαι) dubium animum
denotant. διστάζει, qui dubitat, e pluribus quid
sequatur, sentiat etc. ἀπορεῖται, qui nescit omnino
quid faciat.

δίψυχος δίλογος διπλός. Incertum hominis, inge-
nium denotant. Fallunt hi tres omnes; δίλογος
dictis, διπλός moribus quoque, vultu, factis etc.
δίψυχος, quoniam ipse non constat sibi, sed mutat
sententiam. Iac. i. 8; iv. 8.

δόλος ἀπάτη. δόλος dolum denotat, quam quis struit
alteri, ἀπάτη fraudem, qua alter decipitur. *Ver-
führung*.

δωρεάν τῆ χάριτι. δωρεάν respondet nostro *umsonst*.
δοῦναι, λαμβάνειν, δωρεάν est, ita dare, vel accipere,
ut nihil referas, nulla praegressa causa dandi vel
accipiendi. Hinc δωρεάν ἀπέδανε non est, frustra,

temere, sine effectū, sed sine justa causa. Gal. ii. 21. Nam si διὰ τοῦ νόμου ἢ δικαιοσύνης, nulla erat causa moriendi.

εἰκῆ μάτην. Usurpantur promiscue. Nam qui εἰκῆ agit, is plerumque μάτην agit. Illud proprie est temere, hoc frustra.

εἰσέρχομαι εἰσπορεύομαι. Proprie differunt ut nostra hereinkommen et hineingehen.

ἐκάστοτε πάντοτε. Illud tantum de tempore (διὰ παντός) veteres dixerunt. Seniores πάντοτε et de loco. Vide Thom. Mag. Moerid. et Phrynichum.

ἐκεῖθεν ἐντεῦθεν. Matth. iv. 21. προβάς ἐκεῖθεν. Act. xx. 13. ἐκεῖθεν μέλλοντες ἀναλαμβάνειν. (non est ibi h. l.) Matth. xvii. 20; xviii. 36, ἡ βασιλεία ἡ ἐμὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐντεῦθεν. vid. varr. Lect. Luc. xvi. 26.

ἐκκλῶν ἐκκόπτω. Rom. xi. 17, 19, sq.

ἐκκομίζω ἐκφέρω. Illud de funere, semel Luc. vii. 12. Hoc latius patet.

ἐκλέγεσθαι ἐξαιρεῖν. In illo imperat notio optandi e pluribus (unde in medio): hoc habet notionem separandi.

ἐκλελυμένοι ἐρρημιμένοι, ad Matth. ix. 36, (vid. Varr. Lectt.) Lutherus: languidi et dispersi. Imo soluti, vagantes et dispersi.

(ἐκτείνω προτείνω.) Act. xxii. 25. πρόετεινεν αὐτὸν τοῖς ἰμάσι non est, caedendum tradidit, sed vincetis manibus protendi jussit ad caedendum. ἰμάς non est lorum s. flagellum, quo caeditur. conf. v. 29.

ἐκφοβός ἐμφοβός ἐντρομός. Hebr. xii. 21. ἔκθαμβος. (ἐλεγχίζε· ἐλεγχος.) 2 Petr. ii. 16. Hebr. xi. 1.

ἐνδίκως· δίκαιος. Illud est, *gesetzlich*, lege constitutus, legitimus, ἐνδίκως κρίσις, lege promerita.

ἐνδύομαι περιβάλλομαι. Quamquam promiscue dicitur in N. T. ἐνδύεσθαι et περιβάλλεσθαι ἱμάτιον, tamen differentiam ostendunt loci ubi ἐνδύεσθαι tropice dicitur. Luc. xxiv. 49, etc.

ἐνέδρα· ἐπιβουλή. Utrumque tantum in Actis; sensu malo, quamquam posterius μέσον est.

ἐνεργέω· ἐπιτελέω. Philipp. ii. 13. Eph. i. 11, notanda vis propria v. ἐνεργεῖν praesertim propter formulam ἐνεργεῖν ἐν τινί.

ἐνέχω· ἐνεδρεύω· ἐπέχω. Postremum levissimum est; ἐνέχειν τινί est, observare occasionem alteri nocendi, ἐνεδρεύειν insidias ipsas struere.

ἐνισχύω· ἐνδυναμώω· (ἐπισχύω. Luc. xxiii. 5.) v. ἰσχύς et δύναμις. ἐνισχύειν est, vires reddere, reficere, restituere, ἐνδυναμοῦν vim dare. Luc. xxii. 43. Philipp. iv. 13.

ἐννοια· ἐνθύμησις. Hebr. iv. 12. Illud mentis est, hoc animi.

ἐνταλμα· ἐντολή· ἐπιταγή· ἐντέλλομαι· ἐπιτάσσω. *Auftrag. Befehl. Gesetz.—Anordnung,—commission, command, law.—order.*

ἐντευξις· εὐχαριστία ad I Tim. iv. 5.

ἐξαλείφω v. ἀθετέω. Coloss. ii. 14, conf. Eurip. Iphig. Aul. v. 1486.

ἐξάπινα· ἐξαίφνης· ἐξαυτῆς. ἐξάπινα, *repente*, (non expectato) proprie, ἐξαπίνης, ἐξαπιναίως, vid. Thom. Mag. ἐξαίφνης, subito, *improviso*. ἐξ αὐτῆς statim post, *illico*.

(ἐξᾶπορεύω ἀπορέω.) 2 Cor. i. 8; iv. 8, ἀπορούμενοι, ἀλλ. οὐκ ἐξᾶπορούμενοι.

ἐξαρτίζω τειλιόω πληρόω (καταρτίζω.) 2 Tim. iii. 17. Act. xxi. 5.

ἐξέλκω δελεάζω. Iac. i. 14. Egregie Lutherus.

ἐξερρευνάω v. ἐκζητέω. 1 Petr. i. 10, ἐξερρευνᾶ, qui vestigia quaedam sequitur rei quam quaerit, ἐκζητεῖ, qui quaerit nec cessat quaerendo.

(ἐπαγγέλλω ἐξαγγέλλω διαγγέλλω.) ἐπαγγελία, ἐπάγγελμα respondēt nostris; ankündigen, verkündigen,—to publish, make known.

ἐπᾶν ἐπειδᾶν ἐπεὶ ἐπειδῆ. ἐπειδῆπερ vid. Hermann, ad Viger. p. 784, sq. ἐπεὶ propriam significationem habet etiam Rom. iii. 6. Hebr. x. 2.

(ἐπαναπαύομαι ἀναπαύομαι.) Rom. ii. 17.

ἐπιβλέπω ἐπισκέπτομαι. Illud studium, hoc operam designat.

ἐπίγειος χοϊκός. ἐπίγειος est, qui in terra est, fit, nascitur etc. ἐπίγειος οἰκία τοῦ σκήνου. 2 Cor. v. 1. σοφία ἐπίγειος. Iac. iii. 5. χοϊκός, qui ex terra est. 1 Cor. xv. 47. Ille terrester, hic terrenus.

(ἐπιδημέω ἐκοδημέω ἀποδημέω.) Posteriora significant, abesse a patria, prius est, in peregrina terra habitare.

(ἐπιζητέω v. ἐκζητέω.) ἐπιζητεῖν studium rei indicat. Et potissimum flagitare, postulare.

ἐπιθανάσιος θνητός. Ille est morti proximus (ad mortem jam damnatus), 1 Cor. iv. 9. θνητός, natura sua mortalis.

ἐπιλαμβάνομαι βοηθίῳ. Act. ix. 27. ἐπιλαβόμενος
non est *hospitio* excipere, de quo nusquam dici-
tur, sed: curam ejus habuit, ut nos dicimus: *sich*
eines Fremden annehmen. Hebr. ii. 16, 17.

ἐπίσταμαι οἶδα. Intelligo (novi Act. xix. 15.)—scio.
Marc. xiv. 68, οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ ἐπίσταμαι.

ἐπιστομίζω φιμώω. Hoc est, efficere, ne quis ore suo
utatur; illud est, efficere, ut *nolit* loqui.

ἐπιτυγχάνω. λαγχάνω. ἀπολαμβάνω. Differunt ut
nostra: *erhalten, bekommen, empfangen, — to*
get, obtain, receive. Rom. xi. 7. ὃ ἐπιζητεῖ—
οὐκ ἐπέτυχεν. Act. i. 17. ἔλαχε τὸν κληῖρον. Luc.
xvi. 25. ἀπέλαβες τὰ ἀγαθὰ σου.

ἔρχομαι ἦκω. ἔρχομαι venio, ἦκω, veni, adsum.
Recte Lutherus Marc. viii. 3, μακρόθεν ἦκουσι,
sind von ferne gekommen, — have come from afar.
Conf. Luc. xv. 27. Ioh. viii. 42. ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ
ἐξῆλθον καὶ ἦκω, non, natus vel missus, sed *adsum*.
Hebr. x. 7, 9. (ex Psalmo xl. 7, Hebr. יָבִיא) *eodem modo*
vertendum erat.

εὐδοκία ἀγάπη. Phil. i. 15, 17.

εὐθέως εὐθύς ἐξαυτῆς ταχέως vid. ἐξάπινα. εὐθύς et
εὐθέως sunt nostrum: *gleich, sogleich*, statim, nulla
mora, ταχέως fit, quod fit brevissimo tempore,
schnell.

(εὐλογία εὐχαριστία.) 1 Cor. x. 16.

εὐνόεω. Matth. v. 25. ἐπεικῆς.

εὐπειθής ἐπεικῆς. Iac. iii. 17, vide ibi Lutherum.
Wettstenii exempla probant, εὐπειθής nusquam
significare aliud quid quam *obsequiosum*.

εὐρύχωρος· πλατύς. Matth. vii. 13, *weit und breit,— far and wide.*

εὐσημος· φανερός. 1 Cor. xiv. 9.

εὐσπλαγγνος· χρηστός. Eph. iv. 32. 1 Petr. iii. 8.

εὐσχήμων· εὐχάριστος. decorus—acceptus et gratus ob morum castitatem. Coloss. iii. 15.

εὐτραπελία· μωρολογία. Eph. iv. 5. *αισχρολογία.* Col. iii. 8. *εὐτραπελία* est nugax dicacitas, *μωρολογία* fatua, *αισχρολογία* obscoena. Lex. Gr. Aug. § 61.

ἕως· μέχρι· v. ἄχρι. ἕως finem s. terminum indicat, sed comprehendit hunc ipsum terminum. Vide de loco Matth. i. 25. Vulgari explicationi obstat, quae praecedat, negatio, quae non est negligenda.

ζόφος· σκότος. Differre videntur ut nostra *Dunkelheit* et *Finsterniss*. ζόφος τοῦ σκότους. 2 Petr. ii. 13.

ζωογονέω· ζωοποιέω. Act. vii. 19. Luc. xvii. 33. In priori loco ζωογονεῖσθαι est vivum conservari. In posteriori, si lectio sana est, conservare vitam. Sed ζωοποιεῖν est vivum reddere.

ἡλικός· πηλίκος· ὑπότις. Priora proprie quantitatis notitiam inferunt, postremum qualitatis. πῶσος, ποῖος, ποταπός.

θανατόω· ἀποκτείνω· νεκρῶω. θανατωθεῖς—ζωοποιηθεῖς. νεκροῦν est pp. reddere νεκρὸν, i. e. cadaver, viribus omnibus privatum. (πτῶμα.) Vivum cadaver, νεκρὸς τοῖς παραπτώμασι.

θαυμάσιος· θαυμαστός. Proprie θαυμάσιος est, in quo est aliquid, quod possimus admirari, θαυμα-

στός, quem admiramur. *wunderlich* ὃ θαυμάσιε !
wunderbar—Permutari tamen solent.

Θειότης· Θεότης. Rom. i. 20. Coloss. ii. 9. *Göttlichkeit*—*Gottheit*,—*Divinity*—*Godhead*.

Θεραπεύω· ἰάομαι. differunt ut nostra *helfen* et *heilen*.
Θεραπεύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀσθενειῶν. ἰᾶσθαι τοὺς ἀσθενοῦν-
τας.

Θλίβεσθαι· κακουχεῖσθαι. Hebr. xi. 37.

Θλίψις· στενοχωρία· συνοχή καρδίας. Rom. ii. 9. 2
Cor. ii. 4.

Θνητός· νεκρός. Θνητὰ σώματα. Rom. viii. 4. Col.
vi. 12. Nusquam Θνητός est idem quod νεκρός.

Θύρα· πύλη. Nusquam in N. T. permutantur, neque
Actorum iii. 10, vid. Hebr. xiii. 12.

Ἰδε· ἰδοῦ. Vid. ad Lucian. Soloec. iii. p. 572. et
Thom. Mag. Iacobi iii. 3, 4, 5.

Ἰδιος· οἰκεῖος. 1 Tim. v. 8, vid. ad Act. iv. 23; xxiv.
23.

(ἱερατεία· ἱεράτευμα.) Illud functionem sacerdotis
denotat; hoc sacerdotium in abstracto, i. e. indol-
lem, dignitatem eorum, qui sacerdotio funguntur.
Priesteramt, *Priesterthum*. 1 Petr. ii. 5, 9.

(καθαρισμός· κάθαρμα.) Illa est actio purgationis,
hoc est, quo purgatur, piamentum. 1 Cor. iv. 13.
vid. Phavorinus.

(κάθημαι· καθίζω.) Differunt ut nostra *sitzen* et
setzen. καθίζειν semper transitive dicitur. Luc.
xxii. 30, etc. Matth. xxv. 31.

καθίστημι· καθίσταμαι· γίνομαι ad Rom. v. 19, conf.
Iac. iii. 6; iv. 4.

καίω πυρώ. Illud est nostrum *brennen* active, hoc neutraliter.

καλύπτειν κρύπτειν (κατακαλύπτειν.) Non confundenda sunt. 2 Cor. iv. 3. Luc. xviii. 34. Hinc ἀποκαλύπτειν est revelare, ἀποκρύπτειν abscondere. Vis praepositionis eadem est, sed verborum diversa notio. Nam καλύπτειν est, rem, quae in conspectu est, tegere, ut conspici non possit, κρύπτειν, e conspectu eam subducere. κατακαλύπτεσθαι, non κατακρύπτεσθαι dicitur 1 Cor. xi. 6, 7, recte. Male Hesych. κατακαλύπτων κατακρύπτων.

καρπὸν φέρειν (διδόναι) καρποφορεῖν καρπὸν ποιεῖν. Utrumque Graeci elegantiores dixerunt, sed diverso sensu. καρπὸν φέρειν est, fructus ferre. Ioh. xv. 16. Sed καρπὸν ποιεῖν est, proferre, gignere fructus. Hinc Ceres apud Euripidem Rheso v. 964. καρποποιὸς non καρποφόρος appellatur, gignit enim fructus, non fert. Aristotel. de Plant. I. 4, et c. 7. τινῶν μὲν οἱ καρποὶ ποιοῦσι γάλα. Itaque elegantissime Matth. iii. 8. ποιήσατε καρπὸν ἄξιον τῆς μετανοίας. conf. vii. 17, sqq. Aristot. de plant. ii. 9.

κατάκειμαι (κεῖμαι ἀνάκειμαι) κατακλίνομαι. Illud et de convivis dicitur, et de aegrotis; hoc tantum de convivis, qui consederunt (ἐν κλίνῃ, sed recte κατακλιθῆς εἰς τὴν πρωτοκλισίαν, *sich auf den ersten Platz setzen*) ad cibum capiendum.

(κατάκριμα· κατάκρισις.) Rom. viii. 1. 2 Cor. iii. 9. καταμανθάνω κατανοέω. Illud semel Matth. vi. 28, conf. Luc. xii. 24, 27. Differunt tamen, Act. vii.

31. Iacob. i. 23, 24. Rom. iv. 19, conf. Alex. Hiob. xxxv. 5.

καταναρκάω καταβαρέω. 2 Cor. xi. 8, 9; xii. 13, 14, 16. Hieronymus καταναρκᾶν Cilicum esse ait. vid. Wetsten. Tom. II. p. 206.

κατασκευάζω ποίεω. ad Hebr. iii. 2, 3.

(κατατομή περιτομή.) ad Philipp. iii. 2. In contemptum Apost. τὴν περιτομὴν τῶν Ἰουδαίων vocat κατατομὴν, quasi mutilationem.

(καταφιλέω φιλέω.) Praepositio non abundat. Matth. xxvi. 48, 49. Marc. xiv. 44, 45. Discrimine observato, quis non magis etiam sentiat iudae perfidiam?

κατεξουσιάζω κατακυριεύω. Matth. xx. 25. Marc. x. 42. Illud de imperio, hoc de potestate et auctoritate intelligendum. οἱ ἄρχοντες κατακυριεύουσι, καὶ οἱ μεγάλοι κατεξουσιάζουσι.

(κατέχω ἔχω.) 2 Cor. vii. 30. Quaeratur de locis, ubi vulgo dicunt, κατέχειν esse impedire, v. c. Rom. i. 18. Mihi sensus esse videtur: qui possidebant τὴν ἀλήθειαν cum improbitate, i. e. habuere veram cognitionem, et tamen improbe vixerunt, ut χαίρειν ἐν θλίψει, πλουτεῖν ἐν πενίᾳ et similia. Certe sententiae Pauli melius convenit haec interpretatio.

κατηχέω διδάσκω. Differunt ut nostra: *unterrichten* et *lehren*. Tertio, quo nos utimur, *unterweisen*, Lutherus expressit v. σοφίσαι. 2 Tim. iii. 15. λόγοι σεσοφισμένοι. 2 Petr. i. 16, non sunt fraude et

astutia excogitati, sed qui *ab aliis* traditi sunt. opp. ἀλλ' ἐπόπται γενηθέντες.

κατοπτρίζομαι ὀράω. 2 Cor. iii. 18. semel. κατοπτρίζεσθαι neque est clare cognoscere, neque ex parte, sed quasi in speculo considerare aliquid et ὀρᾶν, conspicerere. Artemidor. ii. 7. κατοπτρίζεσθαι καὶ ὀρᾶν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἰκόνα. In gloria domini re-tecta (v. 13.) nostram δόξαν conspiciamus tamquam in speculo, et τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μορφοῦμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν.

(καύχημα· καύχησις.) *der Ruhm, das Rühmen—boast, boasting.*

χειρίαὶ ὀθόνια. Utrumque vulgo male interpretantur: *fascias*, ut σπαργανοῦν, Luc. ii. 7, 12, involvere fasciis. χειρίαὶ pp. de fasciis, quibus mortuorum pedes manusque constringebantur, ὀθόνια sunt lintea quibus, totum corpus involvebatur. σπαργάνα et σπαργανοῦν tantum de recens natis. χειρίαὶ sunt τὰ ἐντάφια δεσμά. (quamquam etiam περὶ κλίνων) non tantum ex ὀθονίοις facta. Etym. M. p. 508, 12, le Moyne ad Var. Sacr. p. 298, sqq.

κείρασθαι ξυρᾶσθαι. 1 Cor. xi. 6, sq. differunt. vid. Dresig, de verb. med. v. ξυρᾶσθαι. Lex. August. § 36. κενός· μάταιος· κενῶς· ματαιίως. differunt ut inanis et vanus. 1 Cor. xv. 14, 17.

κενοφωνία. ματαιολογία. Utrumque tantum in Epp. ad Tim. 1. vi. 20; 2 ii. 16; 1 i. 6.

κενώω καταργέω. Rom. iv. 14, v. ἀδέτεῖν.

κληρώω λαγχάνω τυγχάνω. Lex. Graec. August. § 46. Vid. supra ἐπιτυγχάνω.

κλίνη κρέββατος. Act. v. 15, vid. Phrynich. Thom.

Mag. et Pollux Lib. x. cap. 7, s. 35.

κοινός ἀκάθαρτος. de cibis utrumque Act. x. 14.

vid. Marc. vii. 2.

κολλοβιστής· τραπεζίτης. Recte posterius positum

est Matth. xxv. 27, nam de foenore sermo est :

sed illud suo loco legitur ibid. xxi. 12. Marc.

xi. 15. Ioh. ii. 15, differre eodem modo viden-

tur Romanorum *nummularius* et *mensarius*.

κόπος· μόχθος· πόνος. 1 Thess. ii. 9. 2 Cor. xi. 27.

2 Thess. iii. 8. κόπος et μόχθος junguntur.

κοσμέω· κατασκευάζω. Matth. xxv. 7.

κρίμα· κρίσις. vide Ioh. ix. 39.

κτάομαι· ἔχω. In N. T. κτᾶσθαι semper habet pro-

priam significationem, acquirendi (lucranda) et

possidendi, etiam Act. i. 8, et Luc. xxi. 19. ἐν

τῇ ὑπομονῇ ὑμῶν κτήσεσθε τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν.

(κωφός· ἀλαλος. (κωφός μογιλάλος. Marc. vii. 32)

Marc. ix. 25. τὸ πνεῦμα ἀλαλον καὶ κωφόν. κωφός

neque in N. T. denotat mutum, sed surdum.)

λογισμός· νόημα. 2 Cor. x. 4, 5. λογισμός· ratioci-

natio est, s. iudicium (mentis operatio) sed νόημα

est sententia hominis, qui aliquid decernit. (κατὰ

νοεῖν τινί) Sic νόημα semper apud Homerum. Recte

νόημα opp. τῇ ὑπακοῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Erat Apostolis

dimicandum contra iudicia perversa hominum, et

vanam superbiam sapientiae humanae, et contra

lubidinem propria sententia, suo arbitrio vivendi.

λογισμοὺς, ὑψωμα καθαιροῦντες, καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζον-

τες πᾶν νόημα εἰς τὴν ὑπακοὴν τοῦ Χρ. ut non suo arbitrio, sed Christi vivant subjecti imperio.

λοιπὸν μέλλων. τὸ λοιπὸν καθεύδετε. Matth. xxvi. 45. Marc. xiv. 41. εἰς τὸ μέλλων. Luc. xiii. 9, quod superest, restat, — postea. τὸ λοιπὸν facere aliquid, est, facere usque ad finem, pergere facere. εἰς τὸ μέλλων est postea, in posterum. τὸ λοιπὸν καθεύδετε; (interrogative) num pergitis dormire? *schlaft ihr noch immer?* Aristophan. Eccles. v. 555, 557.

λούω νίπτω. Ioh. xiii. 10. Differunt ut nostra: *baden* et *waschen*. Ergo νίπτεσθαι de quaque parte corporis dicitur, non tantum de pedibus manibusve; λούσασθαι de toto corpore. Act. ix. 37. col. Homer. Il. ω. v. 582.

λύω λυτρῶω. λύειν est solvere, liberare aliquem, λυτρῶω est facere (dare) aliquid ut alter liberetur. Tit. ii. 14. 1 Petr. i. 18.

μαλακία νόσος. Matth. iv. 23, illa est *aegritudo*, hic *morbus*.

μᾶλλον πλεῖον. μᾶλλον est *magis*, *potius*; Matth. x. 6. Marc. vii. 36; x. 48, πλεῖον est *plus*.

μελετάω μεριμνάω φροντίζω. (μέλει μοι.) φροντίζει, qui alicui rei prospicit ut recte fiat, μεριμνάω, qui dum curat, dubitat, veritus ne frustra curet; μέλει μοι, curo, rationem habeo, μελετάω, operam do, ut aliquid facere postea possim. Marc. xiii. 11. μὴ προμεριμνᾶτε μηδὲ μελετᾶτε. Luc. xxi. 14, μὴ προμελετᾶν.

μεστός· πλήρης· γέμων. μεστός, refertus, quum de hominibus dicitur pr. in deteriore partem sumi videtur, πλήρης in meliorem ponitur. Sed in N. T. illud etiam in bonam partem dicitur. Rom. xv. 14. Iacob. iii. 17, vid Hemsterhus. ad Lenep. v. μεστός. γέμει, qui ita πλήρης est, ut superfluat.

μετά· σύν. μετά comitatum denotat, σύν conjunctio-
nem et unionem. Quamquam dicitur : μετά τινος
et σύν τινι εἶναι, μετά τῶν νόμων et σύν τοῖς νόμοις,
etc. tamen differunt. Differentiam docet usus in
compositis. μεταλαμβάνειν, συλλαμβάνειν, μετέχειν,
συνέχειν. all. Dicitur σύν θεῶ, non item eodem
sensu, μετά θεοῦ. Nam quod affertur e Platone
μετά θεῶν βασιλέα στήσασθε, Ep. viii. p. 355, fin.
id non est, adjuvantibus diis, sed potius e senten-
tia deorum, i. e. quem ipsi dii regem fieri volunt.
Sic apud Xenoph. Oecon. XI. 20. ἐρῶμαι μένον ὡς ἐπὶ
τὸ πολὺ σύν τοῖς θεοῖς. Si scriptum esset, μετά τ.
θεῶν, sensus esset : una cum diis. Convenit for-
mula σύν θεῶ εἰρήσεται, apud Aristoph. et illud
Herodoti i. 86. ὡς οἱ εἶη σύν θεῶ εἰρημένον. Vid.
Valckenar. ad Herodot. III. 153. Xenoph. Cyrop.
VIII. 6, 6, (12.) ὑμᾶς δὲ — σύν ἀγαθοῖς τοῖς μεθ'
ὑμῶν, ἐμοὶ συμμαχοῦς εἶναι. Act. xiv. 27. ὅσα
ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς μετ' αὐτῶν. v. 12. δι' αὐτῶν. opp.
ἄνευ τινός. vid. Abresch. ad Thuycd. I. 128. Dilu-
cidat. 130.

μεταλαμβάνειν v. ἐπιτυγχάνειν (ἀπολαμβάνειν.) est
percipere, participem fieri.

μετανοεῖν· ἐπιστρέψασθαι· μετάνοια· ἐπιστροφή. Com-
parentur de vitae mentisque emendatione.

μεταπέμπομαι· μετακαλέω. Utrumque in Actis tan-
tum legitur. vii. 14. ἀποστείλας μετεκαλέσατο. xx.
17. πέμψας μετεκ. x. 5, 32; xxiv. 24, 25, 26.
Ibi non temere permutantur.

μιαίνω· μολύνω. (σπιλέω.) Tit. i. 15. 1 Cor. viii. 7.
μιαίνειν est nostrum *verunreinigen*, μολύνειν *besch-*
mutzen, σπιλοῦν *beflecken*. μιαίνειν pr. est colore
alieno tingere s. inficere (Iliad. δ. v. 141.) deinde
contaminare, integritate nativa privare (violare
Virgil. Aen. XII. v. 67.) unde βίος καθαρός καὶ
ἀμίαντος, γάμος ἀμίαντος, apud Plutarch. et Pau-
lum. μολύνειν est sordibus conspurcare, sordes
contrahere e luto etc. σπιλος pr. maculam denotat,
unde σπιλοῦν potissimum de vestibus dicitur quae
maculantur. Recte 2 Petr. ii. 10. ἐπιθυμία
μιασμοῦ, sed 2 Cor. vii. 1. μολυσμοῦ σαρκός.

μνεία· μνήμη. μνεία est *Erinnerung*, *Andenken*, re-
cordatio. μνήμη *Gedächtniss*, memoria, v. ἀνάμνη-
σις. vid. Thom. Mag. v. μνήμη. Valckenaer. ad
Ammon. p. 95. Lex. Graec. August. § 5.*)

μόγισ· μόλις. μόγισ interpretatur Thomas Mag. μετὰ
βίας, μόλις ἀντὶ τοῦ βραδέως. Vide ibi VV. Was-
sium ad Thuyed. I. 12, et Hemsterhus. ad Lu-
cian. Tom. I. p. 86. Dorvill. ad Charit. L. III.
c. 9.

* Quod edidit e Cod. Augustano Hermannus noster post
Libr. de emendand. graec. gramm. ratione, p. 319, sq.

μοιχάομαι μοιχεύω. Thomas M. μοιχᾶται ὁ ἀνὴρ, μοιχεύεται ἡ γυνή. Non semper observatur hoc discrimen in N. T.

μορφή· σχῆμα. Phil. ii. 6, 7. σχῆμα latius patet (μόρφωσις. Gal. iv. 19. Rom. ii. 20.)

ναός· ἱερόν. In N. T. semper observatur discrimen hh. vv., ut ἱερόν sit, totus locus sacer, cum omnibus atriis, conclavibus, areis etc., sed ναός ipsa tantum aedes sacra, in duas partes divisa, (per τὸ κατὰπέτασμα τοῦ ναοῦ, Matth. xxvii. 51.) ἅγιον (ναόν) et ἄδυτον. In priori sedebat synedrium, Matth. xxvii. 8, hanc ingressus est Zacharias Luc. i. 9. Sed tota aedes haec sacra intelligenda Matth. xxvii. 51. Marc. xv. 38. Luc. xxiii. 45. De adyto non dicitur ναός in N. T. Recte Matth. xxiii. 35. Zacharias necatus dicitur μεταξὺ τοῦ ναοῦ καὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου. Nam θυσιαστήριον erat ante τὸν ναόν, ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ. Ioseph. A. I. VIII. 3, 3. Contra ἱερόν nunquam τὸν ναόν aut adytum denotat. Loci, quos Schleusnerus attulit, id ipsum demonstrant. Eodem modo Iosephus semper ναόν et ἱερόν distinxit. Insignis est locus Ant. Iud. XI. 4, 3, ubi Samaritanis petentibus negatur συγκατασκευάσαι τὸν ναόν, sed permittitur ἀφικνουμένοις εἰς τὸ ἱερόν σέβειν τὸν Θεόν.

νομίζω· οἶμαι· ὑπολαμβάνω. νομίζω arbitror, puto, censeo. (de sententia animi, νόμος) οἶμαι credo, opinor, existimo. ὑπολαμβάνω, suspicor. (plerumque de mala suspicione.)

νοσφίζω· κλέπτω. Illud est pr. nostrum *unterschla-*

gen, partem rerum reddendarum ἰδιοποιεῖν. Act. v. 2, 3. Tit. ii. 10.

νυστάζω· καθεύδω. Matth. xxv. 15. νυστάζειν statum dormientium potissimum denotat; hinc ad animum translatum (opp. τῷ νήφειν.) est, segnem tardum, socordem esse. 2 Petr. ii. 3. Aristoph. Avib. v. 639.

ξενίζομαι θαυμάζω. Recte Lutherus. 1 Petr. iv. 12. μὴ ξενίζεσθε — lasset euch — nicht befremden,—think it not strange. item v. 4. Non est i. q. θαυμάζω. Qui ξενίζεται, θαυμάζει quidem, sed ὡς ξένου τινὸς αὐτῷ συμβαίνοντος.

ξένος· καινός. vide supra καινός. In v. ξένος, non novi notio imperat, sed peregrini, quod aliunde venit, neque ad nos pertinet. 1 Petr. iv. 12.

ξένος· ἀλλότριος· παρεπίδημος. Hebr. xi. 13.

ὁδεύω· ὁδοιπορέω· ὁδοιπορία· ὁδός. Conveniunt in eo, quod dicuntur de itinere, quod fit per terram. Sed ὁδεύειν latius patere videtur; dicitur enim de quocunque itinere terrestri, sive pedibus sive cum equo, fiat. ὁδοιπορεῖν autem de pedestri tantum itinere dictum videtur. Herodian. VII. 3, 9. ὁδεύειν curru. Sed tamen idem V. 4, 13. ὁδοιπορεῖν.

ὁδυρμός· κλαυθμός. Matth. ii. 18. lamentatio — fletus.

οἰκεῖος· ἴδιος. 1 Tim. v. 8. εἰ δέ τις τῶν ἰδίων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν οἰκείων οὐ προνοεῖ. (οἰκιακός.) Christus εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἤλθε, καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι οὐ παρέλαβον αὐτόν. Non scribi potuit οἱ οἰκεῖοι. sed Christiani sunt οἰκεῖοι τοῦ θεοῦ. Eph. ii. 19.

οἶον δυνατόν· οἶον ἐστὶ, fieri licet (ob qualitatem) δυνατόν ἐστὶ, fieri potest (ob quantitatem.)

ἀκνηρός· ἀργός· ἀργός est, qui nihil facit, ἀκνηρός qui tarde facit, piger, quem piget laboris, *faul* — *verdrossen*.

ὀλίγος· μικρός· Illud et de magnitudine dicitur, μικρός potissimum de quantitate.

ὀλόκληρος· τέλειος· ὀλοτελής· ὀλόκληρος est integer suis partibus. 1 Thess. v. 23. τέλειος est perfectus, absolutus omnibus numeris, Iacob. i. 4. ὀλοτελής est omni ex parte perfectus, ut πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως τηρηθεῖη. 1 Thess. v. 23.

ὅλος· πᾶς· ὅλος est, cui ad quantitatem nihil deest, πᾶς numeri plenitudinem denotat.

ὅλως· πάντως· εἰς τὸ παντελές· ὅλως est prorsus, πάντως omnino, εἰς τὸ παντελές plane, ut nihil desit. Luc. xiii. 11. Hebr. vii. 25. Posteriori loco etiam futuri temporis notitiam habet. παντελές πάντως jungitur ap. Aesch. Sept. c. Theb. v. 118.

ὕμβρος· ὑετός· βρογχή· (Apoc. xi. 6. ἵνα μὴ βροῦσθῃ ὑετός.) imber, pluvia, nimbus.

ὁμοίωμα· ὁμοιότης (ὁμοίωσις.) Male dicunt haec tria idem significare. ὁμοιότης est ipsa similitudo, *die Aehnlichkeit*, ὁμοίωσις imago, ad quam aliquid conformatur, ὁμοίωμα ipsum simulacrum.

ἄνειδος· αἰσχύνη· ἄνειδος est, quod ab aliis tibi exprobratur. Luc. i. 25. αἰσχύνη (αἴσχος) cujus te ipsum pudere oportet. *Schmach und Schande*. Sterilitas ἄνειδος erat inter Iudaeos.

ὄντως· ἀληθῶς· ὄντως dicitur, quum quid omnino

esse cogitamus. ἀληθῶς, quum *tale esse* agnoscimus, quale esse cogitur. Matth. xi. 32. ὅτι ὄντως προφήτης ἦν, *revera est propheta.* Luc. xxiii. 47. ὄντως ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὗτος δίκαιος ἦν, *hic homo revera erat justus.* Sed Ioh. i. 48. ἴδε ἀληθῶς Ἰσραηλίτης, *en verum Israelitam.* Si scriptum esset ὄντως Ἰσρ. *inepta sententia prodiret; da ist wirklich ein Israelit.* Xenoph. Hist. Gr. III. 4, 17; iv. 8, 4. ὄντως refertur ad verbum, ἀληθῶς ad objectum. (Vide de usitatori τῶ ὄντι.) Lucian. III. Dial. mer. XI. 310, fin. ἀληθῶς συνῶμεν. Euripid. Alc. v. 805. ὁ βίος ἀληθῶς οὐ βίος. Iph. Aul. v. 1622. ἔχει ὄντως ἐν θεοῖς ἰμμίαν. Ion. v. 223.

ὀξύς· ταχύς. ὀξύς est pp. qui aptus est (acutus), ut brevi tempore aliquo penetret, (δρόμος ὀξύς *ein scharfer Lauf.*) ταχύς, qui celeriter aliquo tendit. Illud motum indicat (*schnell*) hoc tempus (*geschwindigkeit.*)

ὀπή· σπήλαιον. Hebr. xi. 38. caverna — spelunca. vid. Valckenaer. ad Lennep. Etymol. L. Gr. p. 912.

ὁπότε· ὅτε. Non idem significant. ὁπότε respondet nostris: *damals als, wenn einmal*, ὅτε simplici *als et wenn.* Luc. vi. 3. ἐποίησε Δαβὶδ, ὁπότε ἐπεινάσα, *fecit tunc quum esurire.* Si scriptum esset, ὅτε ἐπεινάσα, incertum esset an non saepius hoc fecerit sed fecit semel tantum. Contra Matth. xxi. 34. ὅτε ἤγγισεν ὁ καιρὸς τῶν καρπῶν, ἀπέστειλε τοὺς δούλους, *scribi non poterat ὁπότε ἤγγισεν, i. e.*

quum *aliquando* adesset etc. Manifestum est discrimem in loco Homeri Iliad. ο. v. 230. Πῆ ἔβαν εὐχῶλαι ὅτε δὴ φάμεν εἶναι ἄριστοι, ἅς ὀπύτ' ἐν Λήμνω κενεαυχέες ἠγοράσθε. vid. Hoogeveen. de Part. p. 827. Hermann. ad Viger. p. 916.

(ὄρκωμοσία ὄρκος.) ὄρκωμοσία est solemnis affirmatio s. promissio, quae fit ὄρκῳ. Recte ponitur Hebr. vii. 20, 21, 28. Non est idem quod ὄρκος. οὐ· οὐχι et reliqua v. μή.

ὄφειλέτης· χρεωφειλέτης. Illud latius patet. Rom. i. 14; viii. 12. Gal. v. 3, etc.

ὄψιμος· ὄψιος. *vespertinus, serus.* ὄψιας γενομένης — ὑετός ὄψιμος.

παιδαγωγός· παιδεύτης. Non in v. παιδαγωγός inest notio durioris disciplinae, (1 Cor. iv. 15. Gal. iii. 24, 25), sed potius in v. παιδευτής. Hebr. xii. 9.

παλαιός· ἀρχαῖος. παλαιός est, qui dudum fuit, *vetus.* ἀρχαῖος, qui ab initio fuit, *priscus, antiquus.*

παλαιόω ἀκυρόω. Hebr. viii. 13.

παράβασις· παρακοή. Hebr. ii. 2. Rom. iv. 15.

παρακαλέω· παραμυθέομαι (παρηγορία). 1 Thess. ii 11. Coloss. iv. 11.

παρακύπτω· ἐμβλέπω. Luc. xxiv. 12. Ioh. xx. 5. 11. Iacob. i. 25. Vix synonyma haberi possent, nisi plerumque illud jungeretur cum actione videndi. Sed proprie ei non inest notio visus. Ioh. viii. 6. Neque inest ellipsis.

παράλιος· παραθαλάσσιος. Matth. iv. 13. Luc. vi. 17, ita differre videntur, ut παράλιος opponatur τῷ μεσογείῳ, et dicatur de regionibus maritimis,

- sed παραθαλάσσιος de iis quae sunt in litore maris, urbibus, hominibus etc. Thucyd. I. 5. τῶν βαρβάρων οἱ ἐν ἠπείρῳ παραθαλάσσιοι, conf. II. 56.
- παρασκευάζω· ἐτοιμάζω. Utrumque parare denotat : sed ἐτοιμάζειν est parare aliquid, ut adsit, παρασκευάζειν, ut aptum sit.
- παραυτίκα· παραχρῆμα. παραυτίκα fit, quod in praesenti fit. Polyb. II. 35. παραυτίκα μὲν ἔμειναν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα. — 2 Cor. iv. 17. τὸ παραυτίκα τῆς θλίψεως. Thucyd. II. 64; IV. 54. τὸ παραυτίκα καὶ τὸ ἔπειτα. παραχρῆμα fit, quod statim fit, quum aliud quid factum est. Matth. xxii. 60, etc. Thucyd. I. 22. ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν. II. 17, conf. Polyb. III. 31.
- παραφέρομαι· περιφέρομαι. Hebr. xiii. 9. Differunt sane, *hin und her* — *herum treiben*. Sic nos quoque de nubibus, Ep. Iud. v. 12.
- παρέρχομαι· παραπορεύομαι. vid. ἔρχομαι. Proprie dicitur, Matth. viii. 28.
- πάρεσις· ἄφρσις. Illud uno tantum loco, Rom. iii. 25, in reliquis ἄφρσις. Scite Alberti in Glossario p. 97, observavit, Apostolum studio hoc tantum loco adhibuisse videri vocem πάρεσιν, quam commode *praetermissionem* vertas. Errat, qui dicit, errare eos, qui differentiam statuunt. Scilicet longe aliud est, de quo Ap. h. l. loquitur, quam quum ἄφρσιν celebrat. Nolo δογματίζεισθαι in interpretatione; sed nunquam credam, Apostolum, qui semper v. ἄφρσις utitur, etiam in ipsa ad Rom. epistola, hoc uno loco temere πάρεσιν scripsisse. Nimirum sententia Ap. haec est : deus προέδετο

ἱλαστήριον, ad indulgentiam suam demonstrandam propter s. ob praetermissionem τῶν προγεγονότων ἀμαρτημάτων, i. e. ut praetermitteret, missa faceret peccata olim, i. e. sub lege, commissa. Non poterat autem locum habere haec πάρεσις, nisi per Christum: ergo ostendit τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν. Non scripsit διὰ τῆς παρέσεως, sed διὰ τὴν π. Nam ἡ πρώτη διαθήκη sublata est per Christum. Hebr. ix. 15. Sed de his alias. In ejusmodi vv. saepe erratum est. Similia sunt, sed non idem significant.

παχύνομαι· παροῦμαι. Utrumque metaphor. de mentis animique hebetudine dicitur. Sed sic differre videntur, ut παχύνεσθαι indicet mentem, quae ipsa tarde se movere potest, παροῦσθαι animum, qui quasi callo obductus, rebus aliis parum aut nihil movetur. παχὺς est tardus. (opp. πυκνός) πεπωρωμένος, qui sensu caret, hebes. πεπώρωνται οἱ ὀφθαλμοί. Iob. xvii. 7, quasi callo obducti. Hinc Suidas. πώρωσις· τὸ φλῶσις.

πειράω· πειράζω. πειράζειν plerumque in malam partem dicitur. (etiam Act. xvi. 7, de irrito consilio.) πειραζόμενος est, qui malis pressus ad peccandum incitatur, πειρώμενος, qui jam expertus est mala, iisque ferendis exercitatus.

πένης· πτωχός. pauper, mendicus.

πέρας· τέλος. πέρας pp. loci est, τέλος temporis. πέρας ἀντιλογίας. Hebr. vi. 16. Ad hunc locum spectat glossa Hesychii: πέρας . . και ἡ λύσις, nec debet sollicitari.

περαιρέω ἀφαιρέω (ἀμαρτίας) vid Hebr. x. 4, 11, sacrificia non possunt unquam prorsus tollere peccata, ideoque repetenda sunt.

περικόδαγμα περιψήμα. I Cor. iv. 13. Notandum erat, non simpliciter dici, sed addi κόσμου et πάντων. De hominibus, qui a plerisque tamquam pessimi contemnuntur, comparari possent nostra, *Auswurf* et *Abschaum*.

πλεονεξία φιλαργυρία. Longe peior est ἡ πλεονεξία. Coloss. iii. 5, dicitur εἰδωλολατρεία, est aviditas, s. amor sceleratus habendi, *Selbstsucht*, verissima εἰδωλολατρεία. Apud Herodot. VII. 149, denotat arrogantiam, et λόγος πλεονέκτης eodem sensu ibid. c. 158.

πλήν. De hac part., quam dicunt vulgo vicem sustinere diversissimarum particularum, ἀλλὰ, ὅμως, ἄρα, μόνον, etc. vide Hoogeven.

(πολυμερῶς πολυτροπῶς.) Hebr. i. 1. Recte Lutherus: *manchmal und mancherley Weise*. Glossar. Gr. Alberti πολυμερῶς διὰ πλειόνων sc. χρόνων.

πολυτελής πολύτιμος. Marc. xiv. 3. Ioh. xii. 3.

πράσσω ποιέω. Differunt fere ut nostra *thun* et *machen. agere* et *facere*. Quintil. II. 18. 1. Tertium est ἐργάζεσθαι, quod proxime accedere videtur ad nostrum *handeln*, eo sensu, quo significat *thätig seyn*. ὁ πατήρ μου ἕως ἄρτι ἐργάζεται. Dicitur sine objecti notitia, illa non possunt. εὖ (καλῶς, κακῶς etc.) ποιεῖν, πράσσειν (ἐχεῖν) certissime differunt.

- προσδέχομαι v. ἐκδέχομαι. Differunt ut nostra *erwarten et abwarten*.
- πρόσκομμα· σκάνδαλον. Rom. xiv. 13. πρόσκομμα ἢ σκάνδαλον. v. 20. διὰ προσκόμματος ἐσθίειν differunt ut nostra *Anstoss et Aergerniss*. v. 21. προσκόπτει ἢ σκανδαλίζεται.
- πρόφασις· ἀφορμή. 1 Tim. v. 14. ἀφορμὴν διδόναι. vid. Valckenar. de Aristobul. p. 65. De v. πρόφασις recte Schol. Euripid. Hec. v. 43, proprie non est occasio s. causa. αἰτία est causa, ἀφορμή *Veranlassung, Anlass, πρόφασις Vorwand, Gelegenheit*.
- πταίω· ἀμαρτάνω. πίπτω. Rom. xi. 11. μὴ ἔπταισαν ἵνα πέσωσι.
- πτόεομαι πτύρομαι. ἔμφοβος γίνομαι. Luc. xxiv. 37. πτόησιν φοβεῖσθαι, 1 Petr. iii. 6.
- πυνθάνομαι ἐρωτάω. Conveniunt in notione scitandi, sed differunt; nusquam permutari possunt. Neque temera πυνθάνεσθαι in medio tantum dicitur; *sich erkundigen*.
- ἔαβδίζω ἔαπίζω. Hoc latius patet usu. κολαφίζω. Matth. xxvi. 67. Matth. v. 39. vid. Henr. Steph. in Append. de Dial. Att. c. 4.
- ἔαδιουργία· δόλος. Act. xiii. 10. v. πανουργία.
- ἔῆμα· λόγος. ἔῆμα *verbum* est, sed λόγος *res ipsa*, quae verbis inest, sermo, oratio. Manifestum est discrimen in usu pluralis. ἔῆματα Θεοῦ dicuntur non λόγοι τ. θ.
- ἔομφαία· ξίφος· μάχαιρα. Proprie ita differre videntur, ut ξίφος sit, quo punctim, μάχαιρα, que caesim

hostis petitur. ῥομφαία secundum Hesych. fuit ensis longior Thracicus vid. Eustath. ad Iliad. N. v. 577. In N. T. μάχαιρα, *gladius*, suo loco ponuntur. μάχαιραν φορεῖν. Rom. xiii. 4. (jus gladii) ξίφος non occurrit, sed ejus loco est ῥομφαία. Apoc. i. 6. ῥομφ. δίστομος. Luc. ii. 35. τὴν ψυχὴν σου διελεύσεται ῥομφαία.

σαίνω κολακεύω. ad I Thess. iii. 3. σαίνεσθαι ἐν θλίψεσι, est, in calamitatibus blanda vitae commodioris spe et desiderio pellici, ut deseras officium. Nunquam θορυβεῖσθαι (ut Chrysostomus) aut ταραττεσθαι denotat. Alieni sunt loci, qui afferuntur. Recte Elsnerus ad h. l.

σιγάομαι σιωπάω. vid. Ammon. v. σιωπή. σιγαῖσθαι est *tacere*, σιωπᾶν *silere*. Luc. ix. 36. ἐσίγησαν, καὶ οὐδενὶ ἀπήγγειλαν. xx. 26. θουμάσαντες ἐσίγησαν. Act. xii. 17. κατασείσας σιγαῖν. Luc. i. 20. ἔση σιωπῶν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος λαλῆσαι. Act. xviii. 9. λάλει καὶ μὴ σιωπήσης. vid. Valckenar. ad Lennep. Etym. p. 883.

σοφία γνῶσις φρόνησις. Eph. i. 8. Aristot. Ethic. Lib. I. c. ult. Conf. Raphel. Ann. Polyb.

σπουδάζω σπεύδω. σπεύδειν est *festinare* (de tempore) σπουδάζειν *properare* i. e. festinanter et sedulo aliquid *facere*. 2 Petr. iii. 12. προσδοκῶντας καὶ σπεύδοντας, i. e. acriter et avide exspectantes, quod est festinantium. Recte Lutherus Eph. iv. 3. σπουδάζοντες τηρεῖν τ. ἐνότητά τ. πίστεως. *Seyd fleissig*, sedulo date operam, conf. 2 Tim. ii. 5.

Inest tamen etiam v. σπουδάζειν notio festinationis s. potius sedulitatis.

στενοχωρέομαι. θλίβομαι. 2 Cor. vi. 8. ἐν παντί θλιβόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐ στενοχωρούμενοι. Quum metaphorice dicuntur, θλίβεσθαι dicitur, premi (undique) vexari malis, sed στενοχωρεῖσθαι de iis, qui ita in angustiis versantur, ut de exitu desperent. Egregie Lutherus, 2 Cor. vi. 12. *sich ängsten*. Rom. vii. 9. θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία, *Trübsal und Angst*.

σπερέω στηρίζω σθενώ. *Solidum reddere, firmum sistere, ponere collocare — robustum facere στηρίζειν πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ*, non est obfirmare faciem, quod nihili est, sed firme intendere faciem ad aliquid, *sich etwas fest vornehmen*. Luc. xix. 51, quasi figere oculos aliquo, tamquam in metam. Apud Themist. Or. XIII. πρὸς σε ἀπενίξειν καὶ ἐπιστηρίζειν τὸ ὄφθαλμῷ.

συγκρίνω ἐγκρίνω. 2 Cor. x. 12.

συνεδίω συμφάγω (συνδειπνέω.) vid. simplicia.

συνευδοκέω συνήδομαι. In v. συνήδομαι inest non solum notio probandi, quae est in v. συνευδοκέω, sed etiam laetandi, voluptatem capiendi ex aliqua re. Paulus probaverat quidem caedem Stephani, justam putaverat, ἣν συνευδοκῶν. Act. viii. 1, sed non dicitur laetatus esse eo facinore. Contra ipse scripsit, Rom. vii. 22. συνήδομαι τῷ νόμῳ, voluptatem ex ea capio. . Nescio, quibus exemplis demonstrant, in v. συνευδοκεῖν inesse etiam notionem oblectationis.

συνίεναι νοεῖν. Differunt ut nostra: *verstehn* et *merken*. Marc. viii. 17. οὐπω νοεῖτε οὐδὲ συνίετε. Eodem modo differunt ἀσύνετος et ἀνόητος, de quibus supra.

συντάσσω· προστάσσω· ἐντέλλομαι. προστάσσει, qui rem ipsam praecipit; συντάσσει qui etiam modum faciendi praescribit. Nam Matth. i. 24. ἐποίησεν ὡς προσέταξεν ὁ ἄγγελος, sensus est: fecit id quod jusserat ang. ut viii. 4. προσένεγκε τὸ δῶρον, ὃ προσέταξε Μωσῆς. Contra xxvi. 19. ἐποίησαν ὡς συνέταξεν. et xxvii. 10. manifesta est notio, quam dixi. Sed ἐντέλλεσθαι est dare mandatum et potestatem aliquid faciendi. Matth. xxviii. 20. Vid. Hebr. ix. 20. Moses scilicet acceperat *mandatum* feriendi foederis, διαθήκης ἧς ἐνετείλατο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁ Θεός, quod mandavit deus facere vobiscum. Nec putem, temere Apostolum pro v. διέθετο, quod habent Alex., et usitatori, imo solemni in hac causa, scripsisse ἐνετείλατο.

(συντέμνω· συντελέω.) Rom. ix. 28. Sequutus est Ap. Alexandrinos, qui toto coelo ab hebr. aberrarunt. Sed λόγον illi non dixerunt pro decreto. ταλαιπωρία· στενοχωρία. vid. στενοχωρέομαι. In vv. ταλαιπωρέω, ταλαιπωρία, ταλαιπώρος, inest potissimum miseriae, quae ex nimio labore [quo frustra defatigamur,] nascitur, notio. Recte Rom. vii. 24. ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ὁ Ἰσραῆλ, *mühselig*, qui frustra laboro.

ταράσσω· τυρβάζω. Luc. x. 41. vid. Schol. Aristoph. Equ. v. 311.

τελείωω πληρώω (τελέω.) τελειοῦν est perficere, ut nihil faciendum restet, sed res, opus, τέλειον sit. πληροῦν est complere rem, ut ei nihil desit. Matth. i. 22. et al. ἵνα πληρωθῇ τὸ ῥηθέν. Apud Iohannem tantum semel xix. 28. ἵνα τελειωθῇ. Vide formulas τετελειωμένοι (εἰς ἓν. Ioh. xvii. 23.) πεπληρωμένοι, quomodo differant. τελεοῦν est finire, ad finem et exitum perducere, peragere. Differt a prioribus formula Luc. xviii. 31. τελεσθήσεται πάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα et aliae.

τόπος χώρα. Quamquam τόπος dici potest pro χώρα, tamen χώρα non ponitur pro τόπος. Matth. iv. 16. Ioh. xi. 54. τόπος convenit nostro *Ort*, χώρα est *Platz*, (*Gegend*.) Posteriori inest notio spatii.

τρυφάω σπαταλάω. Iacob. v. 5. τρυφᾶν potius *mollitiam* vitae luxuriosae, σπαταλᾶν *petulantiam* et *prodigalitatem* denotat. Corrige Suidam: σπατάλη ἢ τρυφή. Leg. τρυφή. Hesych. σπαταλᾶ· τρυφᾶ. 2 Petr. ii. 13. ἡδονὴν ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τρυφήν. 1 Tim. v. 6.

ὑπαρξίς κτήμα. Act. ii. 45; v. 1, 3, 8. Illud latius patet; estque scriptorum seriorum: veteres τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ut alias in N. T.

ὑπάρχω εἶμι. differunt sic, ut εἶναι simpliciter esse, ὑπάρχειν conditionem aliquam denotet, qua quis esse cogitatur. ὑπάρχειν ἐν τινί, et ὑπάρχει μοι.

ὑπακούω πείδομαι ὑπέικω. Conveniunt in notione obsequii. Sed ὑπακούειν (proprio sensu Act. xii. 13), est dicto obtemperare, *gehorschen*; πείθεσθαι

monita sequi, *folgen*; ὑπείκειν vi s. auctoritati cedere, *unterthänig seyn*. Hebr. xiii. 17.

ὑπενάντιος v. ἀντίδικος. ὑπενάντιος et ἐνάντιος certe sic differunt, ut illud denotet adversarium, nulla manifestae vis notione, s. potius contrarium.

ὑπερέχω διαφέρω (τινός.) ὑπερέχειν est excellere aliqua re, διαφέρειν τινός aliquo esse praestantio- rem. Philipp. iii. 8. τὸ ὑπερέχον τῆς γνώσεως Χρ. non est praestantissima cognitio Chr. sed ipsa excellentia cognitionis. Haec excellentia causa est, cur omnium honorum reliquorum jacturam faciendam esse putet.

ὑπόδημα σανδάλιον. Vulgo dicunt in N. T. promiscue dici de eadem re. Sed dicant illi, cur bis tantum Marc. vi. 9. Act. xii. 8. σανδάλια tribuantur iter facientibus, ὑποδήματα nusquam. Et Marc. vi. 9. *jubet* dominus Apostolos pedes tantum munire sandaliis, sed Matth. x. 10. Luc. x. 4, de apparatu itineris ibidem loquutus, vetat ὑποδήματα. Scilicet ὑποδήματα sunt pr. *soleae*, quae commoditatis causa pedibus subligabantur extra domum, in spectaculum, coeam etc. euntibus, servisque custodiendae aut ferendae tradebantur (βαστάζειν τὰ ὑποδήματα, Matth. iii. 11. coll. Luc. iii. 16). Sed sandalia *caligae* erant, quae non plantam tantum pedis, sed ipsum pedem usque ad taleam tegebant, quibus et in itinere, et ornatis mollibusque deliciaiores utebantur. Caligis s. sandaliis, non autem soleis, in itinere opus erat.

ὑποκρίνομαι ὑποστέλλομαι. simulo, fingo — dissimulo, reticeo. Plut. de discr. ad. et am. μηδὲν ὑποστέλλεσθαι μηδ' ἀποσιωπᾶν τῶν συμφερόντων.

ὑπομένω ὑπέχω. ὑπέχειν (semel Ep. Iud. v. 7), simpliciter est sustinere, δίκην ὑπέχειν, luere poenam; sed ὑπομένειν animum in perferendo significat. Vid. sequ.

ὑπομονή· v. ἀνοχή. ἀνέχεσθαι de iis dicitur, qui se ipsos cohibent, quo minus indignentur aut ulciscantur. Itaque ἀνοχή τοῦ Θεοῦ, Rom. iii. 26, in tolerandis, nec statim ulciscendis peccatis sita est, et Rom. ii. 4, junguntur ἀνοχή et μακροθυμία. ὑπομονή ipsam animi constantiam et patientiam denotat. Quare non dicitur ὑπομονή τ. Θεοῦ. Sed Θεὸς τῆς ὑπομονῆς, Rom. xv. 5, non est deus, qui *postulat*, sed qui *largitur* ὑπομονήν, ut Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης. ἀνέχεσθαι est nostrum *ertragen*, (ἀνέχεσθαι ἀφρόνων.) ὑπομένειν, *geduldig, ruhig, ausharren*.

φαῦλος· κακός. φαῦλα πράσσειν. φαῦλον πρᾶγμα. φαῦλον εἶπεῖν περὶ τινος. φαῦλος est nostrum *schlecht*. εὐτελής. οὐδαμινός. Vid. Thom. M. Ruhnken, ad Timaeum, et Menag. ad Diog. Laert. III. 63.

φθόγγος· φωνή. Illud 1 Cor. xiv. 7, de ipsa voce, ut videtur, Rom. x. 15. φθέγγεσθαι est sonum aliquem edere. φωνεῖν vocem edere, potissimum humanam. 2 Petr. ii. 16. ὑποζύγιον ἄφωνον ἐν ἀνθρώπου φωνῇ φθεγγόμενον. φθόγγος *Ton*, φωνή *Stimme*.

φυλάσσεισθαι ὁρᾶν προσέχειν. Qui φυλάσσεται, is ὁρᾶ (μὴ) et προσέχει. Matth. xvi. 6.

χρηστός· χρήσιμος. χρηστός est benignus, ad benefaciendum aptus et paratus. Hinc ζυγός χρηστός, Matth. xi. 30, non est jugum suave (melius Lutherus: *sanft*), sed *benignum*. conf. Luc. v. 39. χρηστότης τ. Θεοῦ est benignitas dei, ad benefaciendum hominibus potius parata, quam ad puniendum. Differt a ν. χάρις. In hac enim, certe in N. T., imperat notio benevolentiae et gratiae, quae nihil merentibus bene facit. χρήσιμος est utilis. vid. ἀχρεῖος.

χωλός· κυλλός. Quamquam χωλός latius patet, dicitur enim etiam de manibus ut nostrum *lahm*, tamen κυλλός in N. T. de manibus dicitur proprie, Matth. xviii. 8. Marc. ix. 43.

χωρεῖν· δεχεσθαι. χωρεῖν est capere (spatium) δεχεσθαι sumere (ad se) excipere. Itaque dicitur χωρεῖν cum accusativo rei quae capitur. Ioh. ii. 6; xxi. 25. Matth. xix. 11, sed etiam sine objecto (neutraliter dicunt) cum sola notione loci quam res capit., χωρεῖν εἰς τι, ἐν τινί, habetque significationem eundi, locum capiendi. (apud Homer. cedendi, desistendi). unde ἀναχωρεῖν.

ψυχή· πνεῦμα. Quum de homine dicuntur, ita differunt, ut nostra: *Seele* et *Geist*. πνεῦμα ipsam naturam spirituales denotat, ψυχὴ vim animalem, qua vivimus, sentimus etc. Hinc ψυχικοί parum differunt a σαρκικοίς (nam naturalis homo φρονεῖ τὰ τῆς σαρκός) sed opponuntur τοῖς πνευματικοῖς. ψυχὴ

anima est, qua vivimus, *πνεῦμα* animus, quo sapi-
mus. Sed usus vitae communis non semper ser-
vat discrimina verborum, quibus res, quae sensu
tantum percipi possunt, judicantur. Nos quo-
que dicimus: *Unsterblichkeit der Seele*.

ὠδίν ὠδίνη. *ὠδίν* propria significatione accipiendum
etiam Act. ii. 24. Suidas totum locum Psalmi
explicat. Respondet Hebr. *לְבַר*, quod ipsum
quoque de doloribus parturientium dicitur. (semel
de aliis doloribus, Hiob. xxi. 16,) neque confundi
debebat cum *לְבַר*, quod funem denotat. Vid.
Lamb. Bos. Exercitt. p. 69, et Valckenar. ad
Lennep. Etymol. v. *ὠδίν*. Contra Steph. le Moyne
ad Var. S. p. 296, sqq.

THE following list of Synonyms, with the exception of those which have the paging attached, were left by the Author without any explanatory observations—but they are considered of sufficient importance to be inserted, as they will point out to the student, those words which Dr. Tittmann esteemed to be of synonymous signification.

- Ἄγαθός· δίκαιος, vol. i. 29.
 ἀγαθοεργεῖν· ἀγαθοποιεῖν,
 i. 97.
 ἀγαπᾶν· φιλεῖν, i. 90.
 ἀγιάζειν· ἀγνίζειν· ἅγιος.
 ἄγνός, i. 35.
 ἀγαπητός· ἐκλεκτός.
 ἀγιοσύνη· ἀγνεία· ἀγνίζειν·
 ἄγνός· καθαρός· ἀμίαν-
 τος, i. 35.
 ἀγρυπνέω v. γρηγορέω.
 ἀδημονεῖν v. ἐκπλήσσεσθαι.
 ἀδικεῖν· ἀδικία v. ἁμαρτία,
 i. 79.
 ἄδικος· ἄνομος· ἁμαρτωλός.
 ἀδετεῖν· ἀκυροῦν· καταργεῖν·
 ἐξαλείφειν, ii. 27.
 αἰδῖος· αἰώνιος, i. 65.
 αἰνέω· δοξάζω· μεγαλύνω,
 ii. 27.
 αἴρειν (ἁμαρτίαν)· φέρειν,
 ii. 27.
 αἰσχύνομαι· ἐντρέπομαι
 αἰσχύνῃ· ἐντροπή· αἰδώς,
 ii. 28.
 αἰών· χρόνος· ὥρα· καιρός,
 i. 68.
 αἰώνιος· αἰδῖος, i. 65.
 ἀκαθαρσία· ἀσέλγεια· πορ-
 νεία, i. 260.
 ἀκάθαρτος· ἄσωτος.
 ἄκακος· ἀκέραιος, i. 46.
 (ἀκολουθεῖω· ἐξακολουθεῖω,)
 ii. 28.
 ἀκυροῦν v. ἀθετεῖν.
 ἀλαζόνες· ὑπερήφανοι· ὑ-
 βρισταί, i. 129.
 ἀληθής· ἀληθινός, ii. 28.
 ἄλλος· ἕτερος, ii. 28.
 ἀλλότριος· ἀλλογενής· ἀλ-
 λόφυλος.
 ἄμα· ὁμοῦ, ii. 28.
 ἀμαθεῖς· ἀστήρικτοι· ἀ-
 σθενεῖς· ἄρρωστοί, i. 133.
 ἀμαθής· ἀσύνετος.
 ἁμαρτάνειν· ἀδικεῖν.
 ἁμαρτία· παράπτωμα· ἀ-
 νομία· ἀδικία (ἀδίκημα,)
 i. 79.
 ἁμαρτωλός· ἀσεβής.

ἀμεμπτος· ἀμωμος, i. 50.
 ἀμετάθετον· ἀπαράβατον·
 ἄτρεπτον βέβαιον, i. 152.
 ἀμίαντος· καθαρός· ἄγνός,
 i. 35.
 ἀναγεννᾶσθαι· ἀνακαινοῦ-
 σθαι· ἀνανεοῦσθαι (ἀνω-
 δεν γεννηθῆναι), ii. 28.
 ἀνακεφαλοῦν· ἀποκαταλ-
 λάττειν, ii. 28.
 ἀναλογία· μέτρον, ii. 28.
 ἀνάμνησις· ὑπόμνησις, ii. 28.
 ἀνέγκλητος· ἀνεπίληπτος,
 i. 53.
 ἀνευ· χωρίς, i. 162.
 ἀνοια· ἄγνοια· μωρία·
 ἀφροσύνη, i. 247.
 ἀνομία· ἁμαρτία, i. 79.
 ἀνοχή· μακροθυμία· κα-
 κοπάθεια. (χρηστότης)
 ὑπομονή.
 ἀνταποδιδόναι· ἀνταπόδοσις·
 ἐκδίκησις· ἐκδικεῖν, i. 29.
 ἀνταποκρίνομαι· ἀντέπω·
 ἀντιλέγω.
 ἀντιῳιατιδέμενοι· ἀντιλέγον-
 τες· ἀντιτασόμενοι· ἀν-
 τικείμενοι· ἀντίδικος· ἐ-
 νάντιοι· ὑπενάντιοι, ii. 13.
 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· βοηθεῖν·
 ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, ii. 7.
 ἀξιῶν v. τιμᾶν.
 ἀπαλλάττειν· ἀποκαταλ-
 λάττειν, i. 176.

ἀπάτη· δόλος· πλάνη·
 (ψευδός.)
 ἀπέχει· ἀρκεῖ, ii. 29.
 ἀπίθεια· ἀπιστία, ii. 29.
 ἀπλότης· εἰλικρίνεια· ἀφ-
 ἔλεια.
 ἀπλοῦς, i. 46.
 ἀποκαταδοκία· ἐλπὶς, i.
 187.
 ἀποκρίνομαι· ὑπολαμβάνω-
 νομαι, ii. 29.
 ἀποκαταλλάσσειν v. ἀνακε-
 φαλοῦν.
 ἀπολύτρωσις· ἄφεσις· ἁμαρ-
 τιῶν.
 ἀπορεῖσθαι v. διστάζειν.
 ἄρα· οὖν· τοίνυν, ii. 29.
 ἄριστον v. δεῖπνον.
 ἀρχαῖος· παλαιός.
 ἀρχή· δύναμις· ἐξουσία, ii.
 29.
 ἀρχηγός· αἵτιος, ii. 30.
 ἀσεβής v. ἁμαρτωλός.
 ἀσέλγεια· ἀκαθαρσία· ἁσω-
 τία, i. 160.
 ἀσθενής· ἀσθῆνικτος, i. 133.
 ἄσπονδος· ἀσύνδετος, i. 132.
 ἄστοργοι· ἀνελεήμονες.
 ἀσύνητος· ἁμαθής.
 αὐθάδης.
 ἀφελότης· ἀπλότης.
 ἀφροσύνη· ἀνοια· ἀνόητος, i.
 247.
 ἀχρεῖος· ἄχρηστος· (ἀνω-
 φελής,) ii. 19, 30.

ἄχρι· μέχρι, i. 58.
(βαρεῖσθαι βαρύνεσθαι, ii.
30.

βάρος· ὄγκος, ii. 30.
βασιλεία Θεοῦ· οὐρανῶν.
Χριστοῦ.

βέβαιος, i. 152.

βέβηλος· ἀνόσιος.

βίος· ζωή, ii. 30.

βλέπειν· ὁρᾶν· ὄπτεσθαι·
ἰδεῖν· θεωρεῖν, i. 192.

βόσκειν· ποιμαίνειν, ii. 25.

βουλή· θέλημα.

βούλομαι· θέλω, i. 214.

(βρῶμα· βρῶσις), ii. 30.

(γενεά· γένεσις· γέννησις.)

γεννᾶν· τίκτειν, ii. 30.

(γεννηθῆναι· γίνεσθαι.)

(γνώμη· βουλή· δόγμα, ii.

31.

γνωρίζω· δεικνύω.

γνώσις· (ἐπίγνωσις) v. σο-
φία.

γρηγορέω· νήφω· ἀγρυπνέω,
ii. 31.

γυνή· (χήρα), ii. 31.

(δαιμόνιον· δαίμων.)

δεῖν v. χρεῖ.

(δεικνύω· ἐπιδεικνύω.)

δεῖπνον· ἄριστον· δοχή, ii. 31.

δαισιδαιμονία· εὐλάβεια, ii.
31.

δελεάζομαι v. ἐξέλκομαι.

διαδιδόναι· διαρπάσαι, ii. 31.

διάκονος· v. δοῦλος.

(διαλλάττεσθαι· καταλ-
λάττεσθαι), i. 176.

διασαφεῖν· διαγνωρίζειν·
διαγγέλλειν· παραγγέλ-
λειν· διαφημίζειν· ἐκ-
λαλεῖν· ἐξηγεῖσθαι· κη-
ρῦσσειν.

(διασώζειν· σώζειν.)

διατάσσειν· διαστέλλεσθαι,
i. 149.

διδασκαλία· διδαχή, i. 31.

(διερωτᾶν· ἐρωτᾶν.)

δίκαιος, i. 29.

διστάζειν· ἀποχεῖσθαι· (ἐξα-
ποχεῖσθαι), ii. 31.

δίψυχος· δίλογος· διπλούς,
ii. 31.

δόγμα· v. γνώμη.

δοκεῖν· ἠγεῖσθαι.

δόλος· ἀπάτη, ii. 31.

δόξα· τιμή.

δοξάζειν v. αἰνεῖν.

δοῦλος· θεράπων· διάκονος·
ὑπηρέτης.

δοχή· v. δεῖπνον.

δύναμαι· ἰσχύω· δύναται
ποιεῖν τι ὁ ἰσχύων.

δύναμις· δόξα· ἐνέργεια·
ἐξουσία· ἰσχύς v. ἀρχή
(κυριότης.)

δῶμα· ὑπερῶνον.

δωρεά· χάρις· δῶρον.

δωρεάν· τῇ χάριτι, ii. 31.

ἐγκράτεια· σωφροσύνη.

εἶδω· γινώσκω· ἐπίσταμαι.

εἰκῆ· μάτην, ii. 32.
 εἶπω λαλέω, i. 139.
 εἰσέρχομαι· εἰσπορεύομαι, ii.
 32.
 εἴσοδος· προσαγωγή.
 ἐκάστοτε· πάντοτε, ii. 32.
 ἐκδέχομαι (ἀπεκδέχομαι)
 προσδέχομαι· προσδοκέω.
 καρδοκέω (ἀποκαρδο-
 κέω.)
 ἐκδοπανᾶν· (δαπανᾶν.) ἀν-
 αλίσκειν.
 ἐκδέχομαι v. ξενίζω.
 ἐκδικέω v. ἀνταποδίδωμι.
 ἐκῆθεν· ἐντεῦθεν, ii. 32.
 ἐκζητέω· ἐξερευνάω (ἐπι-
 ζητέω.)
 ἐκκακεῖν· ἐκλύεσθαι.
 ἐκκλάω· ἐκκόπτω, ii. 32.
 ἐκκλίνω· φεύγω.
 ἐκκομίζω· ἐκφέρω, ii. 32.
 ἐκλαλεῖν v. διασαφεῖν.
 ἐκλέγεσθαι· ἐξαιρεῖν, ii. 32.
 ἐκλεκτός· ἀγαπητός· ἅγιος.
 ἐκκελυμένοι· ἐρρημιμένοι, ii. 32.
 ἐκλύεσθαι v. ἐκκακεῖν.
 ἐκπλήσσεσθαι· ἐκθαμβεῖσθαι·
 ἐξίστασθαι, i. 235.
 ἐκπορεύομαι· ἐξέρχομαι v.
 εἰσέρχομαι.
 ἐκταράσσω· ἐκπλήττω· ἐκ-
 φοβέω· ἐξίστημι.
 (ἐκτείνω· προτείνω), ii. 32.
 (ἐκτελέω· τελέω· ἐπιτελέω.)
 ἐκτρέπομαι· φεύγω.
 (ἐκφεύγω v. φεύγω.)

ἔκφοβος· ἔμφοβος· ἐντρομος,
 ii. 32.
 (ἔλεγξις· ἔλεγχος), ii. 32.
 ἐλέεω· οἰκτείρω· ἐλεήμων.
 οἰκτίρω. i. 122.
 ἐλπύω· σύρω. i. 99.
 ἐναντι· ἔμπροσθεν· ἐναντίον·
 ἐνώπιον.
 ἔνδικος· δίκαιος, ii. 33.
 ἔνδυμα· ἔνδυσις· ἱμάτιον· ἱ-
 ματισμός· ἐσθῆς· ἐσθησις.
 ἐνδύομαι· περιβάλλομαι, ii.
 33.
 ἐνέδρα· ἐπιβουλή, ii. 33.
 ἐνέργεια· (ἐνέργημα) vid.
 δύναμις.
 ἐνεργέω· ἐπιτελέω, ii. 33.
 ἐνέχω· ἐνεδρεύω· ἐπέχω, ii.
 33.
 ἐνισχύω· ἐνδυναμῶ, ii. 33.
 ἐννεός v. κωφός.
 ἔννοια· ἐνθύμησις, ii. 33.
 (ἐνοικέω· οἰκέω.)
 ἔνταγμα· ἐντολή· ἐπιταγή·
 ἐντέλλομαι· ἐπιτάσσω, ii.
 33.
 ἐντευξις· εὐχαριστία, ii. 33.
 ἐντρέπω· ἐντροπή v. αἰσχύνη.
 ἐνώπιον v. ἐναντι.
 (ἐξαγγέλλω· ἐπαγγέλλω.)
 (ἐξακολουθέω· ἀκολουθέω·
 ἐπακολουθέω.)
 ἐξαλείφω v. ἀθετέω, ii. 33.
 (ἐξαπατάω· ἀπατάω.)
 ἐξάπινα· ἐξαίφνης· ἐξαυτῆς,
 ii. 33.

- (ἐξαπορέω ἀπορέω), ii. 34.
 ἐξαρτίζω· τελειόω· πληρώω
 (καταρτίζω), ii. 34.
 ἐξέλκω· δελεάζω, ii. 34.
 ἐξερευνάω v. ἐκζητέω, ii. 34.
 ἐξέρχομαι· ἐκπορεύομαι v.
 εἰσέρχομαι.
 ἐξηγέομαι v. διασαφέω.
 ἐξίστημι v. ἐκφοβέω.
 ἐξομολογέω· εὐχαριστέω.
 ἐξουθενέω v. καταφρονέω.
 ἐξουσία v. ἀρχή.
 (ἐπαγγελία· ἐπάγγελμα.)
 (ἐπαγγέλλω· ἐξαγγέλλω
 διαγγέλλω), ii. 34.
 (ἐπακολουθῶ v. ἀκολου-
 θῶ.)
 ἐπάν· ἐπειδάν· ἐπεὶ· ἐπειδὴ,
 ii. 34.
 (ἐπαναπαύομαι· ἀναπαύο-
 μαι), ii. 34.
 (ἐπεγεῖρω· ἐξεγεῖρω.)
 ἐπέρχομαι· ἐπιγίνομαι.
 (ἐπερωτάω v. ἐρωτάω διε-
 ρωτάω.)
 ἐπέχω v. ἐνέχω.
 ἐπιβάλλω· ἐπιτίθημι.
 ἐπιβλέπω· ἐπισκέπτομαι,
 ii. 34.
 ἐπίγειος· χοϊκός, ii. 34.
 ἐπιγίνομαι· ἐπέρχομαι.
 (ἐπίγνωσις· γνώσις.)
 (ἐπιδημέω· ἐκδημέω ἀπο-
 δημέω, ii. 34.
 ἐπιεικεία· χρηστότης.
 ἐπιεικῆς v. εὐπειθῆς.
 (ἐπιζητέω v. ἐκζητέω), ii.
 34.
 ἐπιθανάτιος· θνητός, ii. 34.
 ἐπιθυμία· ἐπιθυμοῦμαι ὀρέ-
 γομαι ὕρεξις, i. 233.
 ἐπικουρία· βοήθεια.
 ἐπιλαμβάνομαι· βοηθῶ, ii.
 7, 35.
 ἐπιποδέω v. ἰμείρομαι.
 (ἐπινεύω· κατανεύω.)
 ἐπισκέπτομαι v. ἐπιβλέπω.
 ἐπίσταμαι· οἶδα, ii. 35.
 ἐπιστομίζω· φιμώω, ii. 35.
 ἐπισυναγωγή (συναγωγή)
 ἐπισύστασις.
 ἐπιταγή v. ἐντολή.
 (ἐπιτελέω v. ἐκτελέω.)
 ἐπιτίθημι v. ἐπιβάλλω.
 ἐπιτιμάω· ἀπειλέω.
 ἐπιτυγχάνω· λαγχάνω
 ἀπολαμβάνω, ii. 35.
 ἐπιφέρω v. ἐπάγω.
 (ἐπουράνιος v. οὐράνιος.)
 ἐργάζεσθαι· ποιεῖν· πράσσειν.
 ἔργον· πρᾶγμα.
 ἔρεω v. λαλέω.
 ἐρίθεια· ἔρις (φιλονεικία.)
 ἐρχομαι ἤκω, ii. 35.
 ἐρωτάω· διερωτάω· ἐξερω-
 τάω· ἐπερωτάω· πυνθᾶ-
 νομαι.
 ἐσθῆς v. ἱμάτιον.
 ἐσθίω· φάγω.
 ἕτερος v. ἄλλος.

- ἔτος· ἑνιαυτός.
 εὐδοκεῖν συγκατατίθεσθαι.
 εὐδοκία· ἀγάπη, ii. 35.
 εὐεργεσία· εὐποιΐα.
 εὐθετος· ἰκανός· χρήσιμος.
 εὐθέως, ii. 35.
 (εὐλογία· εὐχαριστία,) ii. 35.
 εὐνόεω, ii. 35.
 εὐπειθής· ἐπεικής, ii. 35.
 εὐποιΐα· εὐεργεσία.
 εὐρύχωρος· πλατύς, ii. 36.
 εὐσεβής· εὐσέβεια· εὐλαβής,
 i. 252.
 εὐσημος· φανερός, ii. 36.
 εὐσπλαγχνος· χρηστός, ii.
 36.
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ON THE
GRAMMATICAL ACCURACY

OF THE

WRITERS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

AMONG the imperishable merits of Luther, in relation to the church of Christ, it must, no doubt, be reckoned the greatest, that he again laid open the fountains of divine truth, which had been for many ages concealed or corrupted; and vindicated the use of them, not only to teachers and to the learned, but also to *all* Christians. But as in many other things, in which he could only make a beginning, so also here, he left to posterity the duty of becoming more thoroughly acquainted with the sources thus restored to them, and of freeing more and more the doctrines drawn from these fountains from the inventions of human opinions. That this was not done by Luther himself, no one can wonder; although such was his genius, that had he not been deprived, by the multitude of his

other severe and pressing labours, of that leisure which the study of ancient literature particularly demands, he would probably have been superior to all his contemporaries in the true interpretation of the New Testament.

But that after three centuries, and after the labours of so many distinguished men, the interpretation of the New Testament should not yet have been regulated by any certain laws; must surely be matter of wonder to all, and would seem hardly credible, unless one were acquainted with the difficulties of the subject, and the causes of the errors under which it still labours. The number and magnitude of these difficulties become more known, the longer and more diligently the sacred writings are studied. The nature of the errors and faults to be avoided is such, that the more experience one seems to have in interpreting the writings of the New Testament, the more difficult does it become to avoid these errors. They grow indeed by practice, and are so impressed by daily habit, that unless the interpreter shall have been prepared in the best manner, he is constantly more or less influenced by them. Those therefore who in youth, have become imbued by severe study with a deep knowledge of the ancient languages; and the labours of whose future

lives have left them leisure and strength to fulfil the proper duties of an interpreter of the New Testament, enjoy a rare felicity. The lot of very many, however, is widely different; they have been able formerly to read but few of the Greek authors; and having acquired no insight into the genius of the Greek language, are compelled to acquiesce in the decisions of the lexicons, however unsatisfactory and worthless; and are thus unable, through want of leisure and books, to make good in after life, that which they have neglected in youth. On the other hand, those philologists who would seem to be the best qualified for the interpretation of the New Testament, have often such a distaste for the reading of the Scriptures, that they most gladly abandon it to the theologians. But although it may be doubted, with Valckenaer,^a whether those who have acquired their knowledge only in the monuments of the profane writers, should on that account be prohibited from the emendation and explanation of the sacred books; still, it is greatly to be wished, that all theologians, who are in a manner regarded as the only legitimate interpreters of the New Testament, should be

^a Valckenarii Orationes, Lugd. Bat. 1784, p. 288, sq.

able to sustain a comparison with those great men, who have been so much distinguished by their zeal for the study of languages, by learning, sagacity, and sound judgment.

A principal reason why the science of interpreting the New Testament, is not yet firmly settled on its proper foundations, seems to lie in the fact, that many regard the interpreter of the New Testament as having nothing to do with the niceties of grammar. Hence it happens, that even those who have best understood the genius of the Greek language, have in explaining the sacred books paid no proper regard to the laws of grammar or to the analogy of language; and the same thing has therefore happened to them, that has usually deterred mere philologists from treating of the Scriptures. They have taken it for granted, that the sacred writers were far removed from that grammatical accuracy, the laws of which are founded in the nature of language and the use of the best writers; and therefore, in explaining their writings, they have supposed there was little or no use in applying those laws. Indeed it has even been imagined, that in seeking the true sense of the sacred writers, he was exposed to err the most widely, who should endeavour to subject their words and phrases to the ordi-

nary rules of the Greek language. Hence the direction, now to take refuge in Hebraism ; or again, where there is no place for Hebraism, we are referred to the barbarous dialect of Alexandria ; or at last, if there is nothing similar to be found in this dialect, we are told that the words of the sacred writers, so incongruously composed, and construed in a manner so contrary to the laws of language, must be explained from the connexion, and by reference to the object of the writer. Inasmuch now as this mode of proceeding is most pernicious, and not only renders the whole interpretation of the New Testament uncertain, but delivers over the Scriptures to the caprice of every interpreter, it may be worth while to spend a few moments, in endeavouring to form a proper estimate of the grammatical accuracy of the sacred writers.

Our first object will be, to explain in what we suppose this grammatical accuracy to consist. This seems the more necessary, because there is here more than one error to be avoided. It is therefore first of all to be remarked, that we are not to treat here of that *elegance* of style, which we admire in poets and orators. This quality, which consists partly in the choice of words and phrases, and partly in their proper connexion and arrangement in sentences, it will

be easily understood, is not to be sought for in the sacred writers, any more than it is required in the discourse of unlearned men. An elegant selection of words, indeed, demands, in the first place, that there should always be at hand a copiousness of words, sufficient to express all the thoughts ; so that we may not only comprehend what the writer thought, but also the very manner in which he thought it, and in which he wished to present it. This however is a thing so difficult, and that too from such a variety of causes, that although it is properly expected from an author who professes to be a master of the art of writing ; yet it cannot be required of an unlearned man, who utters without preparation what suddenly arises in his mind, or who is compelled to write for others who are destitute of all cultivation. That the sacred writers are of this character, no one will deny.

In the next place, it is also requisite for an elegant selection of words, that the words of the language employed, should suffice to express with perspicuity the things in which others are to be instructed ; so that the writer may not be compelled, either to employ improper words in an unusual sense, nor to choose expressions which have only a cognate meaning.

That the sacred writers were compelled to do both, needs not here to be demonstrated.

Lastly, that elegance which lies in the choice of words, requires that the mind of the writer should neither be excited by the novelty of his subject, nor agitated by the magnitude of his purpose, but composed, tranquil, and never forgetful of himself; especially at the moment of committing to writing the thoughts which he has excogitated. But the sacred writers, regardless of applause, and unmindful of popular favour, always striving for this end alone, that all things should be *πρὸς οἰκοδομήν*, neglected so much the more this elegance of words, because their minds were aroused and inflamed by the magnitude of the things either done by others, and especially by their divine Master, or yet to be transacted by themselves.

In regard also to that elegance of style, which consists in the proper construction and arrangement of sentences, there is probably no one who would demand an elegance of this sort in the sacred writers. It is only in authors whose chief object is to give delight, or who wish to please while they instruct their readers, that this species of elegance must not be wanting. In those writers who desire only to instruct, and to impel to the practice of that

which is honest and good, nothing more is required, than that they shall speak with perspicuity and in a manner adapted to persuade; for the power of persuasion lies not in those allurements of words, but in the weight of thought, and in the force of a mind imbued with a sense of important things, and filled as it were with a divine spirit. So Paul has truly judged, 1 Cor. ii. 4.

I do not here fear that any should charge me with doing injustice to the sacred writers. That occasionally the most elegant expressions and forms of speech are found in them, is apparent to all; and these have been sought out with the greatest avidity by those defenders of their style, who have been more sedulous than judicious. These single forms of elegance, however, cannot constitute an elegant style. But as is the case with many who bestrew a bad Latin style with elegant phrases, like flowers, and still are as far as possible from the true elegance of that language; so here, the use of well-turned phrases and elegant forms of expression, can never cause the writer to be regarded as exhibiting that elegance of style, for which poets and orators are celebrated. Indeed, if there be in the writers of the New Testament any elegance of style, it is that

which consists not in art, but springs from the simplicity and greatness of the thoughts themselves; and the less it is sought for, the more certainly and deeply does it affect those to whom it is addressed. That this species of elegance exists in the sacred writers in the highest degree, is well known to those who have examined the subject.

From all this it will be easily understood, that while we take a liberal estimate of the grammatical accuracy of the writers of the New Testament, we by no means assent to the opinion of those, who have attempted with more zeal than success to shew, that these writers have employed a pure Greek idiom. But would that all those, who have complained of the impure Greek of the New Testament writers, had either themselves understood, or at least explained more perspicuously than has commonly been done, in what this purity of the Greek language consists! Had this been done, there would have been no ground for many and long disputes. At present, however, we will not enter upon this subject; but rather express our general acquiescence in the cautious directions of Ernesti:^b *To inquire respecting words*

^b *Institutio Interp. N. T. Part I. Sect. II. c. 3, § 6. Biblical Cabinet, Vol. I. p. 102.*

and phrases, expressing things about which the Greeks were accustomed to speak; and first, whether such single words are spoken in the same sense in which the Greeks used them; and then, whether such phrases have not only the syntax of the Greek, but also the same sense which Greek usages attributed to them. As to the mention of syntax here, Ernesti does not seem to have so understood it, as if purity of style were to be principally estimated in reference to the legitimate construction of words and phrases. It is one thing to observe the grammatical laws of syntax; and it is a different thing to follow the practice of approved writers and men of cultivated minds, so as to express the same things in the same words that they have used, or in the same way, or at least in a similar and congruous manner.

Whether this is actually done, is not so easy to be determined as is generally supposed. For a habit of speaking or writing with purity and correctness, although it may appear to be unrestrained, is nevertheless limited by necessary laws; the reason of which is often so obscured by usage, and so changed in the progress of language, that it cannot in every case be entirely ascertained. Hence it happens, that words and phrases used by the most approved

writers, appear to many to have been at first received without ground, and as it were by accident; than which opinion, none can be farther from the truth. But syntax, properly so called, consists in the mode of correctly joining together all the parts of style, and depends on other grounds than purity of style; although there are some things common to both. Thus the principal laws of both are deduced from reason, the common source of all languages. We wish it therefore to be distinctly understood, that the question about the purity of style in the writers of the New Testament, is entirely foreign to our present discussion; so that no one may suppose, that we rashly desire to renew this ancient controversy. We are to speak only of the grammatical correctness of the writers of the New Testament, and we can now more easily explain in what this accuracy consists.

It is obvious here at the first view, that the grammatical accuracy of any writer must consist in the observance of the grammatical laws of the language which he uses. What these laws are, and on what causes they depend, seems to be less obvious; inasmuch as those who attempt to expound the grammatical laws of a language, often expend all their labour,

either in explaining single forms and parts of style, or in shewing how these may properly be joined together in order to make out a whole sentence. But why this should be done in this particular way, and in no other, they leave unexplained, and rest satisfied with having proved, by a multitude of examples, that it is often so in classic writers. And although the assiduous perusal of many writers is necessary, in order correctly to observe the laws of syntax in a language; yet the *causes* of those laws are not to be discerned, except by a diligent comparison of the genius of the language in question, with the necessary modes of thinking and speaking common to all languages. He, however, who is ignorant of the causes of these laws, cannot properly understand their use; much less can he teach with clearness the mode in which they are to be applied, nor to what extent they may be changed by usage. Such is the case with many interpreters; they know sufficiently well, how a word or construction usually is, but not *why* it is and ought to be so; and consequently, when they sometimes find it otherwise, they are troubled by the uncommonness of it, and cannot explain why it ought not to be so; or they take refuge in a farrago of exceptions, as they are called. On

this account, it is proper here to treat, in a few words, of the causes and sources of all grammatical laws, before we proceed to shew, how far we suppose the writers of the New Testament have observed them.

There are in every language two kinds of laws. The first kind are in their very nature *necessary*, so that they are and must be found of the same or of a similar character in all languages. The other kind consists of those laws which spring from the peculiar genius of any particular language. The former kind are necessary, because they arise out of the very nature of all human language, that is from reason itself, and can therefore never be violated, but must always be observed. So that if any one should speak in a manner different from what these laws require, he would compel his hearers to connect in thought things which cannot be so joined even in thought; as if a father should say, ἐγέννησα σοῦ; or if any one should call him who is the son of Philip, Φίλιππον παῖδα. Here it is not possible, that he who has begotten another, should at the same time be conceived of as having the cause of generation in that other, which is the force of the genitive; or that he who is to be represented as the son of

Philip, should really be conceived of as a son, when no relation to a father is indicated. The reason of these laws is particularly conspicuous in the Greek prepositions, where their own peculiar force demonstrates the cause, why they are to be necessarily joined with one, two, or three cases. Thus if we accurately consider the proper signification of each preposition, it will not be difficult to see, why $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron$ $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\xi$ and $\pi\rho\omicron$ can only be joined with the genitive, and $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ only with the accusative; as also why $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ and $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}$ not only may be, but also ought to be construed, sometimes with the genitive and sometimes with the accusative.

But there are also other laws, which, as springing from the nature of a particular language, and being in a manner peculiar to it, are not in the same degree necessary; so that it is possible to conceive of a sufficient reason, why a style may be complete and perfect, although these laws are neglected. Hence it arises, that idioms, which are introduced by usage contrary to the general laws of a language,^c are not to be regarded as faulty; and that what may appear as solecisms to the unlearned, are sometimes in fact the most elegant

^c See Hermann ad Vigerum, Leips. 1822, p. 865.

figures (*σχήματα*) of style.^d The reason of these grammatical laws then, although in itself perhaps obvious, is often greatly obscured by opposite usage; so that it is not wonderful, that the precepts of grammarians respecting this part of syntax, should either not have been understood by those who judge of the nature of language only by number and case; or should not have been sufficient to enable us in all instances certainly to determine, whether one has written correctly or incorrectly. It is obvious, however, that in estimating the grammatical accuracy of any writer, these different species of grammatical laws must be distinguished. If a writer violate those laws, of which reason and the nature of things always require the observance, he cannot be said to use the language of man; but if he neglect the other species of laws, we must first examine, whether there is not some probable cause for this neglect. On this account it will be well to treat of the two species of laws separately.

In the first place then, although it may be taken for granted that the sacred writers have observed the *necessary* laws of the Greek language,—otherwise they would hardly seem to

^d Compare *Apollonius Alex.* De Constructione Orationis, L. III. p. 197. ed. Bekker.

have spoken like men endowed with reason,—yet it may be worth while to look more closely at the subject, than has usually been done. There are those who, in interpreting the New Testament, care very little for the observance of any laws; and if the words of any writer interpreted grammatically, that is, according to the laws of language, express a sentiment foreign to their system or to their private opinions, they do not hesitate to disregard entirely those laws, and, neglecting the proper force of the words, contend, that the writer has said what no one in his senses ever could have said by means of such words. And we could show by a multitude of examples, how many false interpretations which have sprung up out of a hatred of orthodoxy, rest solely upon the opinions of men, who, because they have taken it for granted, that the sacred writers did not observe even the necessary laws of language, have supposed that their words might be made to signify just what they themselves pleased. Inasmuch, however, as the interpretation of the New Testament would be destitute of all certain rule and method, unless we observe at least those laws of language, the neglect of which implies also incorrectness of thought, we will endeavour to show by some examples, that

the sacred writers have observed even those laws in which few require accuracy or can judge of it.

To begin with the prepositions; for there is no signification, however repugnant, which has not been assigned to each of the prepositions in the New Testament; and moreover we shall learn to estimate more correctly the accuracy of the sacred writers in a grammatical view, if we find them paying a strict regard even to those laws, which, although necessary, are yet by few regarded as necessary. The nature of the prepositions, as I have remarked above, is such, that they can either govern only one case, or they admit two or more cases; in such a way, however, that, according to the variety of their signification, they require necessarily some one particular case. I do not however fear, in asserting that this nature of the prepositions has been accurately observed by the sacred writers, that any one will consider me as on this account attributing a refinement to the style of unlearned men. It is necessary rather to be on our guard, lest in denying to the sacred writers those things which are regarded as peculiar to men of more cultivated minds, we should seem to approach them with

faults which are scarcely to be excused in persons even of the lowest class.

The force of the prepositions, as Hermann has justly remarked,^e does not depend upon the cases which they govern; but it is to be explained from the verbs on which the prepositions themselves depend. It follows from this, that a preposition, even if it retain the same signification as to the general notion of the thing expressed, may yet require a different case, provided the verb on which that preposition depends, changes in any way the mode of conceiving the relation of that thing. For if prepositions serve to indicate the relations of ideas, the cause is apparent, both why they govern cases at all, and why they govern only one case, or why they govern different cases, if the verb on which they depend changes the mode of conceiving that relation. Some govern but a single case, because the idea expressed by the verb on which they depend, necessarily demands that case; for the force of these prepositions is such, that if other cases were joined to them, the very idea of the verb would be contradicted. Others again govern more cases, because the idea contained in them

^e *Hermann, De emendenda ratione Graecae Grammat.*
p. 162.

is such, that it may be conceived of in various relations, though in a different manner; and hence they may be joined with verbs of different species, which govern different cases.

By verbs of different species, I mean those which indicate the different modes in which the relation of two things may be conceived. Thus *εἶναι* and *ἔρχεσθαι* are different species of verbs; for when we couple the notion of any two things by means of *εἶναι*, we signify nothing more, than that these two notions are in some way connected; but *ἔρχεσθαι* properly indicates *motion*, by which the relation of place is changed. Now motion may be conceived of in a threefold view, as either *in*, or *from*, or *to* a place; and therefore the verb *ἔρχεσθαι* governs also three cases, and calls to its aid those prepositions, which serve to express those different relations. A person is, therefore, correctly said *ὑπὸ Ἰλίου εἶναι*, and *ὑπὸ Ἰλίῳ*, when he is under (at, near) Ilium; but if he is to be represented as coming to Ilium, so as to be under it, he is said *ὑπὸ Ἰλίῳ ἔρχεσθαι*. The reason, therefore, why Homer says: *αἰσχιιστος δε ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἰλίῳ ἦλθε*, is to be sought in the verb *ἦλθε*. Had he said *ὑπὸ Ἰλίῳ ἦλθε*, it would have signified that he came *to* Ilium, but that being under Ilium, he had come to some particular place there. For the

same reason we find, Luke vii. 6. ἵνα ὑπὸ τὴν στέγην εἰσέλθῃς. In the following passages the reason of the construction is different; Mark iv. 32, ὑπὸ τὴν σιάν αὐτοῦ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πατασκηνοῦν, John i. 49, ὅντα ὑπὸ τὴν σκῆν. 1 Cor. x. 1. ὑπὸ τὴν νεφέλην ἦσαν. In these instances the verbs πατασκηνοῦν and εἶναι, seem to require not the accusative, but the genitive or dative; so that at first view one is tempted to suppose that the writers have erred against the necessary laws of language. But there is either a probable reason why ὑπό should be joined with the accusative in a relation of this sort, or else the best writers have erred in like manner. So Xenophon, Anab. III. 4, ὑφ' ἣν ἡ κατάβασις ἦν εἰς τὸ πεδίον Herodotus II. 137, οὕτως γὰρ ἔπεςσι οἰκήματα ὑπὸ γῆν. In Homer also and other writers, ὑπὸ is very often construed with the accusative, when the verb from which it depends seems rather to require the dative. But if we carefully look at all the examples of this sort, it will easily be seen, that the accusative is used in order to make more conspicuous the fact, that a thing or person is so connected with another thing, that the latter is to be conceived of and regarded as an *adjunct* or *accident* of the former. The noun, therefore, which is put in the accusative, is such as de-

notes either the *place* in which any thing is or happens, or the *time* at which it happens; for time and place are necessary adjuncts in all things. So when it is said (1 Cor. x. 1,) that the fathers were all ὑπὸ τῆν νεφέλῃν, we are to bear in mind, that while they were journeying, the cloud was always with them; but had it been ὑπὸ νεφέλῃς, it would have expressed nothing more than that they had been once under a cloud; which was not the intention of the writer.

Should any one be disposed to regard this distinction as more subtle than true, let him reflect why all good Greek writers say ὑπὸ νύκτα, ὑφ' ἡμέραν, and not ὑπὸ νυκτός, ὑφ' ἡμέρας, when they wish to express that any thing was done by night or in the day time. Not unfrequently we are able to see why a thing ought to be said in a certain way, when we perceive that the same could not have been said in any other way.

The principle is also the same, in regard to the preposition διὰ. When διὰ governs the genitive, it denotes the cause *by* or *through* which a thing is or exists, or the manner in which a thing is done or becomes such as we would represent it. With the accusative, on the other hand, διὰ marks the cause *on account of* which a thing is done or conceived to be done. Thus

in Heb. ix. 12, it is properly said, *Χριστὸς διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὰ ἅγια*, for it is the mode in which he entered that is here spoken of. So also it is correctly said in Rev. xii. 11, *ἐνίκησαν τὸν κατήγορον διὰ τὸ αἷμα τοῦ ἀρνίου καὶ διὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς μαρτυρίας αὐτῶν*. Here we are to conceive of them as overcoming out of regard to *τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὸν λόγον*, as if these were the cause on account of which they were impelled to conquer; for they did not regard their own lives, as is immediately subjoined: *οὐκ ἠγάπησαν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν, ἄχρι θανάτου*. And although the cause which impelled them to conquer, also gave them strength and power for the victory, yet the mode of conceiving of it in this first relation is different. Here therefore we are to think not only of the efficient cause, which enabled them to overcome, but also of the impelling cause, which induced them to undertake the contest. The case is similar in 1 John ii. 12, *ὅτι ἀφέωνται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ*. For if John had written *διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος*, we must have supposed *τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ* to be the efficient cause of the remission of sins; which, however, is not the meaning of the apostle; and we are to regard them as having obtained remission *on account of, for the sake of*, his name. And when it said, John vi. 57, *καὶ γὰρ ζῶ διὰ τὸν*

πατέρα, καὶ ὁ τρώγων με, κἀκεῖνος ζήσεται δι' ἐμὲ, we cannot doubt that διὰ denotes not so much the efficient cause, (certainly not that alone,) as the end or object in which the reason of living is to be sought; for as the reason why Christ lived on earth was in the Father who sent him, (since it was the object of his life to fulfil the commands of the Father,) so those live *because of or on account of* Christ, who yield obedience to his doctrines.

The same holds true also when διὰ seems to denote the *impulsive* cause, as it is called: as διὰ φθόνον, διὰ σπλάγχνα ἐλέους Θεοῦ. very similar to which is also John x. 32, διὰ ποῖον ἔργον λιθάζετε με. It is obvious, if he had here said διὰ ποίου ἔργου, we must have thought, not on the deed *on account of* which, but on the manner *in* which, they wished to stone him; just as if one should say διὰ λιθῶν λιθάζειν. Here also, then, διὰ denotes not *per*, but *propter*; and is correctly joined with the accusative. On the other hand, in Acts iii. 16, ἡ πίστις ἣ δι' αὐτοῦ is not πίστις εἰς αὐτόν, but the πίστις of which he is the author and cause. In 2 Pet. i. 3, καλέσαντος ἡμᾶς διὰ δόξης καὶ ἀρετῆς, it is not he who calls us *to* δόξαν καὶ ἀρετὴν, that is meant; but he who calls us *through* δόξαν καὶ ἀρετὴν αὐτοῦ, ἵνα διὰ τούτων τῆς Θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως γενώμεθα, v. 4, comp. 1 Pet.

ii. 9. For the highest *δόξα και ἀρετή* of God are exhibited in this vocation. Had it been the purpose to direct our attention to the object or end to which they are called, it must have been written *διὰ τὴν δόξαν και ἀρετήν*. But the meaning of the formula *διὰ δόξης* in 2 Cor. iii. 11, is the same as is found in many other instances, where *διὰ* either denotes the mode in which a thing is done, as *διὰ ὑπομονῆς*, Rom. viii. 23; Heb. xii. 1, and *διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται*, Rom. ii. 12; or it indicates the cause through or by which a thing is done, as *διὰ τῆς σαρκός*, Rom. v. 19; viii. 3, and *δι' οὗ και τὴν προσαγωγὴν ἐσχήκαμεν*, Rom. v. 2, comp. v. 1, 11. Hence we understand why Peter could say correctly in 2 Pet. iii. 5, *γῆ ἐξ ὕδατος και δι' ὕδατος συνεστῶσα τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγῳ*. Here *ἐξ ὕδατος* signifies that the earth arose out of the water, as if water were the material. This was done *δι' ὕδατος*, through the efficacy of the water itself, in the omnipotent will of God. What is subjoined in v. 6, *δι' ὧν ὁ τότε κόσμος ὕδατι κατακλυσθεὶς ἀπώλετο*, has been rightly interpreted by Markland (ad Lysiam p. 329 ed Reisk.) in the same manner as a thing is said to be done *διὰ τινος*, i. e. during the existence of something else; as in the passage itself of Lyias, *γιώριμος γενόμενος διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου δυναστείας*, i. e. *durante ejus potestate*. So also in Rom. ii. 27, *τὸν διὰ γράμματος και περιτε-*

μῆς, and iv. 11, τῶν πιστευόντων δι' ἀκροβυστίας. Lastly, in the celebrated passage, Rom. iii. 25, Paul has correctly said, that God constituted Christ ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως, (for the ἱλασμις comes through faith,) and has thereby manifested τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, i. e. on account of (*propter*) the pardon of sins; plainly as in Rom. iv. 25, ὅς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν καὶ ἠγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν, on account of pardon and salvation, or that we might obtain pardon and salvation. As the apostle says in 1 Cor. viii. 2, διὰ τὰς πορνείας ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα ἐχέτω, (i. e. on account of, or in order to avoid, fornication,) so also in the above passage he has correctly said; ὁ θεὸς παρέδωκε αὐτὸν ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως, εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων· for this is the end of τῆς δικαιοσύνης, that we may obtain pardon.

These examples suffice to shew, that the sacred writers have observed at least the necessary laws of language with more fidelity than is generally supposed. We pass therefore to the other species of laws, or those peculiar to the Greek tongue. This topic is a very ample one, and covers, so to speak, the whole *usus loquendi*, of that language; and it cannot therefore be expected, that we should here explain every thing in which the inter-

preters of the New Testament have found a departure from Greek usage. The subject of Greek idioms, for instance, has not yet been so clearly explained and settled, that every idiom may be at once referred to a certain rule; nor so that the causes can every where be assigned, in consequence of which usage has correctly introduced forms and modes of speaking, which are contrary to the grammatical laws. In general, the genius of the Greeks was so active and rapid, that their language abounds in forms and figures of this sort, more than any other; and as these do not rest on the authority of law, and seem often to depend on mere taste or caprice, they render this part of Greek grammar exceedingly difficult, and are regarded by the unskilful as faults. Hence, even the ancient grammarians have sometimes named those forms of speaking *solecisms*, which, when occurring in the best writers, they have called *figures*, *σχήματα*, of the Greek language. And since those who have formed their estimate of that language from the jejune precepts of these grammarians, have of course not understood the nature of these *σχήματα*: they have often regarded the sacred penmen as writing incorrectly, when they have only used the same license which is found in the best Greek authors. The sacred writers duly observe the

laws of grammar; but not always the laws of the grammarians. And it is truly said by Apollonius Alexandrinus, *De Constructione Orationis*, III. 2, οὐ δὴ γε θαρσύνῃσιν τις ἀλόγους τὰς τοιαύτας συντάξεις φάναι, τῶν ἐλλογιματάτων ἀνδρῶν χρησαμένων, καὶ τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐμποδίζοντος· δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἢ κατὰ πολὺ γενομένη σύνταξις ἀπηνέγκατο τὴν ὀνομασίαν ᾧ λογῶν καὶ ἄλλα κατὰ πλεον ἐπεκράτησε. “No one indeed will undertake to call such constructions improper, since they are employed by the most approved writers, and are not contrary to reason. It is manifest, therefore, that the predominant construction has borne off the name, just as other things also prevail by numbers.”

Thus, for example, when it said in the Apocalypse (i. 5, 6,) ἀπὸ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστός, — καὶ ὁ ἄρχων τῶν βασιλείων τῆς γῆς· τῷ ἀγαπήσαντι ἡμᾶς καὶ λούσαντι ἡμᾶς καὶ ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς βασιλεῖς· αὐτῷ ἢ δόξα κ. τ. λ. there seems, at first view, to be almost as many solecisms as there are words. *Sed salva res est*. We grant, indeed, that this form of apposition is somewhat unusual; and if it had stood ὁ μάρτυς, no objection could have been made. As to the solecism which is commonly found in the following words, as if the dative τῷ ἀγαπήσαντι were to be referred to ἀπὸ, this comes not from the apostle,

but from the transcribers. The full sentence is completed with $\gamma\tilde{\eta}\varsigma$, and the datives are to be referred to the following $\alpha\upsilon\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \eta\ \delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ for nothing is more common than the insertion of this pronoun, referring back to the article at some distance before it. There remains then nothing to give offence, except the consecution of the indicative after participles; and there are probably those who hold this to be an error of the apostle. But even this is not without some probable grounds. For since the participle partakes of the nature of an adjective, it is easy to see, that he who says $\acute{o}\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\pi\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\varsigma$, means nothing more than *he who loved*; which is the same as if he had said $\ddot{\upsilon}\varsigma\ \eta\gamma\acute{\alpha}\pi\eta\sigma\epsilon\nu$. There is, therefore, no incongruity, in referring an indicative joined with a participle in the same period, to the same subject; because in both, there is the designation of an adjective or predicate. Nor was it necessary that the $\ddot{\upsilon}\varsigma$ which is implied in the participle, should be repeated before $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\epsilon$ since it is necessarily understood. The omission of a word does not render the style incomplete or incongruous, provided it be plainly implied in what is said; neither does a change of case produce this effect, unless there should be no word expressed or implied, which may properly govern one or the other of the cases.

But if there be any thing faulty in figures of this kind, then the writings of the prince of poets swarm with errors; for in Homer such constructions are very frequent. So Il. VI. 509, 510.

— ὑψοῦ δὲ κάρη ἔχει, ἀμφὶ δὲ χαῖται
 ὤμοις ἀΐσσονται ὁ δ' ἀγλαΐηφι πεποιθώς
 ῥίμφα ἐ γούνα φέρει —.

“ He bears his head aloft, his mane floats around his shoulders; but he, trusting in his beauty, his limbs lightly bear him,” etc.

So also 513, 514.

— ἐβεβήκει
 καγχαλώων, ταχέες δὲ πόδες φέρον —.

“ He advanced exulting, and his swift feet bore him.”

But here follows a passage, in which all the constructions occur, that have given so much offence in the Apocalypse; Il. VI. 479, ff.

καὶ ποτέ τις εἶπη σε πατρός δ' ὄγε πολλὸν ἀμείνων!
 ἐκ πολέμου ἀνίοντα φέροι δ' ἔναρα βροτόβεντα,
 κτείνας δῆϊον ἄνδρα.

“ And then may some one say, He is far braver than his father, him returning from battle; and may he bring back bloody spoils, having slain a foe.”

In truth, it is the very nature of such figures as these, to render the style, which would otherwise be encumbered by too many words, more adapted to express the ideas. The power of language does not consist alone in this, that the same idea should be excited in the mind of the hearer, which existed in that of the speaker; but also that it should be perceived, and, as it were, felt in the same manner and degree by the former, as it presented itself to the mind of the latter. If now any one will reduce those words of Hector to the rules of syntax, he will at once see, that they express indeed the same ideas, but in a manner far different from that in which those images affected the mind of Hector himself.

Should it now be said, that figures of this sort, in orators and poets, are artificial and objects of research, but are in the apostles undesigned and accidental; it may be replied, that the question is, not what is said with art and study, but what is said correctly. The best writers, whether poets or orators, or historians, are applauded, not because they have studiously sought for single words and forms, but because they have, as it were, naturally and instinctively, written or spoken in the manner which the subject required, and not necessarily

in that prescribed by the syntax of the grammarians.

It has also been objected to the sacred penmen, that while different classes of authors usually have characteristics peculiar to themselves, the style of the writers of the New Testament is mixed up from every kind of writing ; that while the peculiarities of tragic authors, for instance, are foreign to the style of the orator and historian, in the New Testament all is found mingled together. This representation is not without the appearance of truth ; but the objection may be easily removed. For first, the nature of the style of the sacred writers is such, as to approach as near as possible to the common *usus loquendi* of ordinary life. But this *usus*, which governs alike the learned and the unlearned, is of such a nature, that it submits with difficulty to the fetters of syntax, so far as the laws of this latter are not necessary and essential ; either because the thoughts are uttered in an unpremeditated manner and as rapidly as possible ; or because the mutual interchange of thought does not require or bear, either a multitude of words, nor fulness of construction ; or because, when speaking in the presence of one another, men do not need to express every idea fully in words, since tone,

and expression, and gesture can then afford their aid for the full understanding of what is uttered. It is therefore not surprising, that this mixed kind of writing should be found in the New Testament; and of him who best understands the causes of this style, we should not hesitate to say, that he is the best interpreter of the sacred writers. It is also to be borne in mind, that those peculiar modes of speaking, as they are called, are not so exclusively appropriated to particular classes of writers, but that they may be employed by all those whose minds are affected in the same manner. The modes of expression found in poets, are not peculiar to them merely because their language is regulated by numbers; but because their thoughts are of such a kind as to require, or best to bear, these modes of expression; and therefore he who should think the same things in the same manner, might properly apply the same species of language. The sacred writers, therefore, are not to be censured, because they have promiscuously employed every species of expression, provided only their style has sufficient symmetry and congruity. On this point, it is more difficult to form a judgment than many suppose, who declare that the sacred writers paid no regard

to grammatical accuracy, because they appear sometimes to have used middle verbs for passives, or to have erred in some other manner. This last question, however, refers not to the observance of grammatical laws, but to purity of language, as has been remarked above.

Such then being the result of our inquiries, it follows, that in order that the interpretation of the New Testament may not be left in a state of entire uncertainty, every interpreter should prescribe it as a rule to himself to pay a strict regard to the nature of the grammatical laws, and never in any case to depart from them, nor have recourse to Hebraisms, until he clearly sees, that a passage interpreted according to those laws alone, must be despaired of.

ON
SIMPLICITY IN THE INTERPRETATION
OF
THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THAT the church of Christ is governed not by the will of man, but by the Spirit of God, we are admonished by the approach of the holy festival, on which we are to celebrate the remembrance of that Pentecost, when the apostles were first divinely imbued with this same Spirit, in accordance with the promise which our Lord had given them at his departure from the world. At that time, indeed, it was the case, as often happens to those who seek the hope of safety or the cause of fear in the external vicissitudes of things, that the full import of the high benefit which the apostles then received, was understood by very few.

Nor was it entirely comprehended at a later period, when the church had become corrupted by the lust of power and the authority of mere human opinions. But in this our day, when we behold all things governed by an external power, and the laws of right reason haughtily contemned, it is very seldom that men raise their minds to the contemplation of the holy, pure, divine, internal, and eternal kingdom of God; but borne down under the sense of present evils, they either acquiesce through torpor in those things which they see and feel to be inevitable, or are compelled, however unwillingly, to yield to them the service of their whole lives.^a There are also not a few so forgetful of the promise of our Lord that he will bestow τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας upon his church, as to regard the church of Christ as little other than a human institution. But this opinion is refuted by the voice of time; for never has the Spirit of God wholly deserted the church, even in the periods of her greatest danger; and never will the same Spirit cease to direct and govern her in future, but will preserve her, though sur-

^a There would seem to be in this sentence a general allusion to the political thralldom and despondent feeling of Germany, at the period when the article was written.—ED.

rounded with eminent perils, until the final consummation of all human things.

It is however the duty of all, especially in these our days, to watch and see how the influence and power of the divine Spirit may be preserved and augmented among Christians. It is incumbent particularly on those who have consecrated their lives to learning, to beware, lest through their fault this light of human life should be obscured or extinguished. This may happen, it is to be feared, chiefly through the neglect of those, by whose erudition and zeal the word of God, that instrument through which the Holy Spirit operates, ought to be daily more thoroughly understood and made to illuminate more and more strongly the life of man, that thus the Gospel may be preserved in its purity in the church for ever. For if the Spirit of God operates through the power which is inherent in the word of God, it is obvious, that this divine gift can neither be preserved, nor the church remain secure, unless the sacred Scriptures, correctly interpreted by men of real learning, are open and accessible to all Christians, so that they may draw from this pure fountain the precepts and principles that are necessary, in order to the right discharge of all their duties towards God and man.

This subject of the interpretation of the New Testament, however, although exceedingly ample, has yet been so often treated of by learned writers, that there seems scarcely a remaining topic on which to make suggestions relative to the true method of interpretation. Inasmuch, however, as the most useful precepts can avail nothing, unless the interpreter possess that disposition and those qualities which enable him rightly to employ them, we therefore do not fear that we shall lose our labour, should we dwell for a few moments on some of those qualities of which an interpreter must not be destitute, and thus attempt either to excite the learned or instruct the ignorant. Other writers, and especially Ernesti, have spoken of the manner in which the judgment of the interpreter is to be exercised and formed. But in regard to the general qualities, character, and disposition of mind, which are required for the proper interpretation of the New Testament, there seems yet to be room for other remarks; especially on that *simplicity* which all recommend in interpreting the New Testament, but which very few understand, and to which still fewer have attained. This topic, therefore, we will now briefly discuss.

It will first be necessary to define and deter-

mine in what simplicity in the interpretation of the New Testament consists. It differs from that *facility* which, when conjoined with simplicity, Ernesti does not hesitate to call the chief excellence of an interpreter.^b This facility, which requires an interpretation to be such as to present itself spontaneously to the mind, has indeed thus much in common with simplicity, viz. that the interpretation must not be sought with art and subtilty, but must, as it were, voluntarily offer itself to the mind. It is however possible, that an interpretation which is difficult to be made out, may at the same time be extremely simple; while others, less simple, may put on the appearance of facility. Indeed an interpretation in itself simple, often requires great skill and study in order to arrive at it. The facility of an interpretation, moreover, consists not only in the circumstance, that it may seem to be found without labour, but also therein, that it presents a facile sense, i. e. a sense which connects itself easily with the views, object, and character of the writer. In this view also simplicity is connected with facility; and both are

^b Institut. Interp. N. T. P. II. c. 1. § 22. ed. Ammon. See Biblical Cabinet, Vol. I.

opposed to every thing that is subtile and forced.^c Indeed the term *simple* implies that which is perfect and consistent in all its parts; just as we speak of simplicity of character in a person, in whom the different virtues are exhibited in completeness and harmony. The Greeks, who were much more exact in marking the distinctions of ideas than the Romans, appear to have designated that quality of simplicity which thus consists in completeness, by the term τὸ ὁλόκληρον, and the other by τὸ ἀφελές, *evenness*, and metaphorically, *that which gives no occasion for censure*. And simplicity may properly be called ἀφελεία, in so far as there is nothing plain and certain, which does not accord with that from which it arose, or to which it is to be referred, *i. e.* with its source or with its object; just as we call men uncertain and insincere, whose words and actions do not correspond with their views and purposes, but are often inconsistent one with another, and repugnant to those very things on account of which they appear to have been spoken and done.

But since nothing is or can be entire and

^c See Tittmann on the Principal Causes of Forced Interpretation.

consistent in all its parts, which comes from any improper source ; it follows that simplicity is to be sought in the circumstance, that every thing springs from the source from which it ought to be derived, while nothing is engrafted as it were from any other quarter, which is not in itself inherent in the nature of the person or thing in question. A necessary adjunct also is, and this is a principal mark of simplicity, that nothing be found present, except what could not possibly be absent. Art and subtilty, on the other hand, are easily detected, when any thing is introduced, the necessity of which is not apparent. It is thus that simplicity is so pleasing in the fine arts ; when we see each and every part essential to the completeness of the whole, and find nothing which is superfluous, or that could be spared. So also we applaud the simple elegance of a poem or other work, when it exhibits nothing which does not seem to belong to it. In the same manner, then, must we form a judgment respecting the simplicity of an interpretation. For that interpretation only can be called simple, which gives to the words of a writer such a sense as seems to be the necessary one ; so that when this sense is presented to us, we are immediately

conscious, that the author could not have meant any thing else.

It will perhaps be said, that such an interpretation is to be called *necessary* rather than simple. Indeed the simplicity lies in the very circumstance, that nothing extraneous is intermixed, but all is necessarily consistent and accordant with the nature of the thing itself; and therefore just as we term the words of a person simple, when they are the necessary signs of that which he has in his mind, so also may we properly call that a *simple* interpretation, which derives from the words of a writer that sense which appears to be the *necessary* one.

This necessity, however, requires some further illustration. When we say that simplicity of interpretation is manifested in the circumstance, that it proposes no other sense than what seems to be the necessary one, it may be thought that our definition is more obscure than the thing itself which is to be explained; inasmuch as this necessity would seem to be something ambiguous and uncertain in all writings, and especially in the New Testament. The whole subject is indeed much embarrassed, and requires very great caution, as we shall afterwards see; but still it may be easily disentangled and developed in a twofold method;

of which those who either do not know, or do not well weigh the nature and importance of the duties of a grammarian, appear not to be at all aware.

In the first place, if words be the signs of ideas, and that not arbitrarily, but have become fixed through the *usus loquendi* and by a sort of necessity, it is obvious that we can have no doubt in regard to that which is *necessarily* signified, or that of which the necessary signs are exhibited to us; provided we are acquainted with the *usus loquendi*, (the extent and influence of which is much greater than is usually apprehended,) and with that necessity which, inasmuch as it depends on and consists in reason, the inventress of all languages, may be properly termed the *logical* necessity. There are however not a few interpreters, who after having read a few books, and got by rote the common rules of the grammarians, and turned over the lexicons, which in this respect are for the most part miserably written, suppose themselves to have imbibed treasures of philological learning; and being accustomed without consideration to regard all languages, both ancient and modern, and especially the former, as the result of chance, they pay of course no regard to that necessity which lies in the essential and

universal laws of language, such as every where necessarily regulate the manner of expressing ideas by words. Such persons therefore pronounce that to be the simplest interpretation, which is most easily confirmed by the meagre authority of the lexicons. To us, however, those persons, above all others, seem to be ignorant of the true character of language, who are accustomed to refer every thing, of which they cannot explain the cause, to the mere will or custom of the people among whom this or that language was vernacular. And although we can scarcely hope; ever to be able to perceive fully the logical grounds and causes of all languages; still we ought to make it the object of zealous and unremitting exertion, that these causes, so far as they are necessary and essential, and have sprung up not by accident, but from the laws of human reason itself, should be detected and developed.

In the second place, it is an instinctive quality of the human mind, always to employ the means nearest at hand, and to seek for nothing at a greater distance than is necessary. This indeed is the surest mark of simplicity and integrity even of personal character. We are naturally impelled, not to art, but to seek and to communicate the truth by the shortest

and simplest means possible; and the use of art may be said to arise rather from some obliquity of life or perverseness of mind. Hence, inasmuch as the same law prevails in the use of language, and we express our thoughts and feelings by those signs which make known our meaning in the shortest and surest manner, it is therefore an essential characteristic of simplicity (*i. e.* of completeness and necessity) in interpretation, that we attribute to the words of a writer that sense, of which these words seem to be the nearest and most direct, or the shortest and most certain, signs. And here all who undertake to interpret the New Testament are to be admonished and exhorted, to prescribe to themselves as a rule, this quality of simplicity; and not to recede, except for grave reasons, from that sense which seems to be the nearest and most direct. For although all the writers of the New Testament were not destitute of a certain degree of learning and subtilty of talent; yet they all were exceedingly remote from those arts by which language, that gift of God, is misused in order to conceal depravity of mind or purpose, and to deceive others by words of double meaning. Indeed no one will interpret the writings of these sacred authors with more felicity, than

he who is best able to estimate correctly their simplicity.

It seems proper here to dwell more particularly, for a moment, on this quality of simplicity in an interpreter himself; a subject which has commonly been passed over in silence, even by those who have written with most acuteness upon the qualities and disposition necessary to a good interpreter. There is doubtless a certain simplicity of mind, which is amiable in all men, and which is particularly desirable in an interpreter of the New Testament. It is manifested especially in that integrity and rectitude of mind, which perceives clearly and at a glance every thing that is appropriate and necessary to a particular person or thing. It differs from the disposition of those who, by the employment of art, or in consequence of a mode of life not conformed to right reason, have lost this natural power of perception; and who are therefore no longer affected by that simplicity in which the highest beauty is said to consist, nor are able to perceive any thing in its true light or without doubt and ambiguity. But in that simple character of a mind which seeks no subterfuge or ambiguity, but is apt and prompt to comprehend all that is appropriate and necessary, we

see an ornament of human life, and have the surest pledge and safeguard of a love of truth. Hence it may be regarded as essential to every interpreter, and especially to the interpreter of the New Testament. For whoever is destitute of this quality, and cannot comprehend what is appropriate or necessary to the nature of any person or thing, will not surely be able to attain to the right sense of words; but inasmuch as every thing in his own mind is distorted and perverted, he will naturally be on the look out for ambiguity and quibbles in the language of others.

There is, moreover, cause of apprehension, that this simplicity of character may become impaired at an earlier period than theologians in general come to the interpretation of the New Testament. We ought therefore to be much on our guard lest this happen through our own fault. For in this simplicity is required, first, a certain natural integrity of disposition; secondly, rectitude of intention; and lastly, purity and constancy of mind; from all of which, at the present day, there is usually some falling off. That integrity of disposition which affects us so pleasantly in children, is apt to disappear among the innumerable arts by which human life is encompassed, and drops

away like childhood's earliest flower; so that those who are trained with the greatest care, are not seldom found to have swerved the furthest toward the opposite extreme. Whether this arises from the character of human life in general, which cannot be passed without the employment of art and deception; or from the fault of our mode of education, which is perhaps too far removed from the simple laws of nature; we must in any case regard it as an evil of very great magnitude; and if all our treasures of learning, on which we so gormandize, have been necessarily purchased at this price, there is reason to fear that we have exchanged gold for brass. It is particularly in this respect that the works of the ancient classic writers may be recommended to be studied by an interpreter; because in them, and more especially the Greeks, *e. g.* Thucydides and Xenophon, although they were devoted to letters and occupied with important affairs, there is yet exhibited that natural integrity of disposition and feeling, *i. e.* that simplicity of character, which it has happened to few in our days to preserve.

In regard to rectitude of mind and intention, which is wholly lost in the pursuits of an artificial and complicated life, how can we expect

to find it among the multiplied questions, opinions, and distinctions, which distract theologians—in short, among the innumerable thorns with which theology in these days is overgrown—except in a suffocated and corrupted state? There are few indeed, who approach the interpretation of the New Testament with minds uncorrupted and unprejudiced. The greater part have already imbibed certain opinions. Some have become habituated to the ancient formulas of theologians; others have learned to cast off all restraints, and are wonderfully delighted in the exercise of their own ingenuity. One party are led astray by the authority of some theological system; the other by the most recent form of philosophy. All in short forsake the plain and simple path, and have recourse to art in searching after truth. That rectitude of purpose, therefore, which sees and comprehends the truth directly and without evasion, is exhibited by few in the interpretation of the New Testament. And hence it naturally happens, that as such interpreters are themselves wanting in simplicity, this virtue is also not found in their interpretations.

Lastly, purity and constancy of mind are in the highest degree necessary to simplicity, inasmuch as a mind that is corrupt and wavering

is neither adapted to perceive the truth, nor to understand what is necessary or appropriate to any thing. We must here particularly guard against the opinion of those, who believe themselves sufficiently furnished for the explication of the sacred books, when they have heaped together stores of erudition derived from every quarter; but who regard it as a matter of indifference in what way the mind and heart are formed and affected. For although the error of those who think that piety alone, without learning, is sufficient for interpreting the sacred books, is very pernicious; still it cannot be denied, that the more pure, chaste, uniform, and constant the mind, the better it is adapted to understand and expound the word of God. *Τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. Ψυχικὸς δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ Θεοῦ.* “The things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. The natural man comprehendeth not the things of the Spirit of God.” 1 Cor. ii. 11, 14.

More especially, however, there is required for the simplicity which we are discussing, that virtue or quality of mind which may enable the interpreter always to control his own genius and imagination; so as to indulge himself in nothing, and to avoid constantly every sport

and sally of the fancy. This is truly more difficult than is commonly believed ; especially with those who possess a richness of genius and take pleasure in a figurative style, and who therefore err through natural abundance ; a species of error in which others, men of inferior capacity, so much delight, that they endeavour to cover up their poverty of genius by a ridiculous hunting after similar figures. There is however nothing of greater moment to the interpreter, than to avoid all sallies and arts of this kind : and he should prescribe it as a law to himself, that the more acuteness and skill any interpretation may seem to display, the more cautious should he be in proving it. We are indeed deceived by nothing more easily than by the adulation of our own self-complacency ; and it is often the case, that an interpretation which exhibits great ingenuity, although it be demonstrably false, is scarcely, and perhaps never, laid aside, inasmuch as no one willingly resigns the praise of ingenuity and acuteness. Others again are seduced by such examples ; and they too strive to bring forth something acute and splendid. For since there is in simplicity a certain elegant poverty and an appearance of facility ; many interpreters seem to fear lest they should be

contemned on account of this poverty; and therefore they prefer to show off in the use of false aids, rather than unpretendingly follow after the plain and simple truth.

This simplicity in the interpretation of the New Testament is also so much the more necessary, because of the great simplicity in the thoughts and teaching both of the sacred writers and of our Lord himself. In regard to our Lord, who in all his human character exhibited the highest perfection, no one can be ignorant of the simplicity of heart and mind which reigned in him, unless he himself be wholly destitute of any sense or perception of this virtue. There was in Christ not only that perfect integrity of morals and of practice, by which we so easily distinguish men of simplicity and uprightness from those who are artificial and insincere; but he exhibited also such admirable purity and truth of character, that his whole life is the most delightful image of the highest and most perfect simplicity. And this was exhibited not in any poverty of mind nor in low views of things; but consisted in the simple and true conception of the loftiest subjects, and was chiefly conspicuous in the entire direction of his mind to heavenly things; a virtue which constitutes the essence of true

religion. It is therefore an error to suppose with some, that a man devoid of this simplicity is adapted to comprehend divine things. It is, on the other hand, no doubt true, that through the arts with which we are accustomed to embellish, or rather to corrupt human life, we bring loss and damage to the prevalence of true religion. But the more simplicity of mind and heart, so much the more prompt and prone, as it were, is a person to embrace religious truth. He then only can comprehend the simplicity of our Lord, so conspicuous even in the loftiest sublimity, who is endowed in some degree with the same quality. Theologians, on the contrary, in searching for sublimity in a certain artificial obscurity, have transformed the teaching and doctrines of Christ, so heavenly, simple, and appropriate, and so admirably accordant with the eternal relations of the human race, into a system which is artificial, arbitrary [positive], and more correspondent to human opinions. This might be demonstrated by many examples, especially of such passages as are said to contain mysteries. Interpreters have indeed not seldom found difficulties, because they have not followed the simple method of the divine Master, but have sought in his words the occasions

of doctrinal and metaphysical discussions. More particularly is the perception of this simplicity necessary in those passages, where our Lord has pointed out the necessary and eternal relations of human and divine things, in the comprehending, observing, and following out of which consists essentially all true religion and piety, and which he has brought forth, as it were, from the sacred recesses of his own mind in such a way, that he has often signified them by a word or by language simple indeed, yet significant and forcible in the highest degree. These relations, it is true, are of such a nature, that they are to be comprehended and felt in the mind, rather than expressed in words; and they are therefore little understood by those who are accustomed to embody divine, *i. e.* eternal and infinite things in the resemblances of words and reasonings. Hence there have been at all times few who could justly estimate the piety of the most excellent men, as the example of our Lord himself clearly demonstrates.

But the apostles also possessed the highest simplicity; and it is therefore to be feared, that he who is not capable of perceiving and imitating this quality in them, will be found altogether unqualified for the interpreta-

tion of the sacred books. There are indeed some who suppose, that Paul presents to us a more learned, animated, and subtile mode of discussion and writing; and even Ammon^d does not hesitate to affirm, that in the epistles of Paul the more difficult interpretation is not seldom to be preferred. But although it be conceded, that Paul has sometimes disputed artificially; yet he always exhibits that simplicity which, as we have said above, consists not in facility, or rather in an appearance of facility, but in integrity, verity, consistency, and necessity. And those arts which are charged on this writer, have often arisen, not from the meaning of Paul, but from the imagination of interpreters. They have taken it for granted, that a man deeply imbued with Jewish erudition, has of course instituted subtile disputations in letters written in the language of familiar intercourse; and therefore in the simplest discourse of the apostle, they have sought for artifices τῶν λόγων. How inconsiderately some have done this, Paul has himself shewn in 1 Cor. ii. 4, seq. In this passage the ἀπόδειξις πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως, which is opposed

^d Nota ad Ernesti Institut. Interp. N. T. P. II. c. I. § 22. See also Biblical Cabinet, Vol. I. translated by Mr. Terrot.

το τοῖς πειθοῖς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοις, signifies that simple power of divine truth which the ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται and they are λόγοι διδακτοὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου, which coming with that divine power, produce certain and real persuasion; verse 5. And although it was not always in the apostle's power πνευματικοῖς πνευματικὰ συγκρίνειν, to compare spiritual things with spiritual (verse 13), but he must also sometimes dispute with his countrymen, κατ' ἄνθρωπον or κατὰ σάρκα nevertheless even in discussions of this sort, however subtile, he has still preserved a great simplicity; *i. e.* he has managed these discussions in such a way, as that all the parts and circumstances are consistent and coherent, and tend to one great end, as if by a natural completeness and necessity. But where theologians can justly attribute to Paul any thing of that subtilty which is found in the schools, I am not aware. They would seem rather to be striving to secure the authority of the holy apostle for their own opinions, by making him the author of them; and hence they have not unfrequently been compelled to have recourse to forced or subtile interpretations.

Errors of this kind have been committed the more frequently in regard to the writings of Paul, because interpreters have not sufficiently

regarded the nature of that species of language which is commonly employed for the purposes of familiar intercourse; but have expected rather in his epistles an accurate distribution and arrangement of topics, and a continued and uniform discussion, just as if they were regular theological treatises. Indeed, the interpreter should above all things fix his mind on that simplicity, which men who employ the language of daily life, and are unacquainted with the more learned and artificial style of books, are accustomed to preserve in writings of this sort. This is found in all the writers of the New Testament; so that no interpreter can attain to their true meaning, nor feel the beauty and sublimity of their language, unless his own mind be imbued with the same simplicity which constitutes the characteristic of those ingenuous and uncorrupted men.

This subject, however, of the simplicity so characteristic of the writers of the New Testament, and so conspicuous in their language, is too extensive, and requires a discussion too protracted, for the brief limits of the present essay. I add therefore only this one reflection. How greatly is it to be desired, that in declaring the divine doctrines, in preaching the word of God, we may imitate the simplicity of those

holy men; and that in explaining the sacred Scriptures, we may employ also that simplicity which has been above described; and especially preserve as much as possible that simplicity of mind, which is manifested in an aptness to perceive the truth and to comprehend and embrace the doctrines taught from heaven. Thus may not only the teachers in the church, but also all Christians, hope to perceive and experience more and more the power of that divine Spirit, by which the church is governed.

Come then, fellow-citizens, and celebrate the approaching festival; in order that thus your minds, elevated above the vicissitudes of human affairs, and purified from every unworthy purpose, may be nourished and strengthened in their simplicity and integrity by a grateful remembrance of the divine benefits; so that by the aid of that Spirit which is not of this world, you may be enabled both to persevere in the true faith, and to sustain and augment the faith of others. And being assured that you will gladly do this of your own accord, we willingly indulge the hope that you will be present at the sacred solemnities, which are to be celebrated in the manner of our ancestors, in the university hall, on the first day of Pentecost.

ON THE
PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF FORCED
INTERPRETATIONS
OF
THE NEW TESTAMENT.^a

THERE has been much discussion among theologians in our day, and those too men of learning and deeply imbued with a knowledge of the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin literature, re-

^a The present essay was prepared on the occasion of the author's becoming Professor Extraordinary of Theology in 1803; and was republished with a single additional note in 1829. He remarks on that occasion, that although several things perhaps need further definition and illustration, he yet chooses to leave them in their present state, lest he should seem desirous of embellishing a more youthful performance with the fruits gathered in riper years.

specting those forced^b interpretations of the New Testament, by which, as is supposed, the true and genuine sense of the sacred writings has been corrupted by many recent interpreters. Although this complaint is not without foundation, yet the causes of the evil seem to be more extensive than has been commonly supposed, and are not to be sought only in an ignorance of languages, or in the neglect of grammatical interpretation. For those even who have most closely followed the grammatical method, have been some of the first to offend in this respect, by proposing interpretations of the most distorted kind. Such, for instance, was Origen himself, the celebrated author of grammatical interpretation; who, as is well known, has extracted from the Scriptures, through his superstition, and still more through his imagination, an innumerable multitude of things, which, in the opinion of those best able to judge, are not contained in them.

Indeed, as a general principle, the grammatical method of interpretation, although the

^b The epithet in the original is *contorta*, to which the nearest corresponding English words, as to form, are *contorted*, *distorted*; but these would here be too strong. The idea of the Latin is commonly expressed in English by the words *forced*, *strained*, etc.—ED.

only one which is or can be true, is nevertheless to be employed with great caution, in explaining the sacred Scriptures. It is certainly a correct precept, that the same rules are to be followed in interpreting the sacred volume, which are applied to works of mere human origin ; but yet this precept is not true in any such sense, as would imply that the meaning of the New Testament is to be sought in precisely the same manner, as the meaning of the words and phrases of Thucydides and Polybius. As every one has his own peculiar habit of speaking, so there is not in all cases the same use and application of the same rules (*non est idem apud eundem earundem regularem usus*) ; and an interpretation of a word or phrase in Polybius and Xenophon may be perfectly correct and facile, while the same applied to one of the sacred writers would be as forced as possible. Hence it arises, that those authors who have applied the forms and phrases of the more elegant Greek writers to the explication of the New Testament, have not always been able to escape the charge of proposing forced interpretations ; and there are many things of this kind extant in the works of that fine Greek scholar Raphel, of Elsner, Alberti, and the truly learned Palariet. And although

J. A. Ernesti, the celebrated restorer of grammatical interpretation in our times, has given many excellent precepts on this subject, still (it would seem) they have not always been observed, even by those who profess to follow most closely the grammatical method. Hence, the causes of such forced interpretations must be sought, not so much in the neglect of grammatical exegesis, as elsewhere. It is therefore proposed to offer, on this occasion, some remarks on this subject, tending to unfold briefly some of the chief causes of the interpretations in question.

First of all, however, it is necessary to define the nature of forced interpretation, in regard to which there is some ambiguity. Many call that a forced interpretation, which gives to a passage a sense foreign to the intention of the writer, and which is not contained in his words. Others give this name to every explanation which is not grammatical. But it is obvious, that an interpretation which is foreign to the words, and even repugnant to them, is to be termed *false*, rather than *forced*; and also that an interpretation may be entirely grammatical, and yet forced. This will be evident to the good sense of every one. There are indeed many interpretations, which the *usus loquendi*

and the power of words will admit; but which nevertheless are not satisfactory, and even give offence, by seeming to interrupt the progress of the discourse, and imparting to it a sort of foreign colouring. These no one would call false; nor yet would any one hold them to be true, *i. e.* appropriate to the passages to which they are applied; and they may therefore properly be termed *forced*. To such interpretations Ernesti was accustomed to oppose the very suitable term *facile*.^c Thus in James iii. 1, the words *μη πολλοι διδασκαλοι γινεσθε*, are sometimes rendered thus: *do not too eagerly desire the office of a teacher*. This sense the words indeed admit; though it seems somewhat harsh to understand *γινεσθε* as being put here for *μη θηλετε γενεσθαι πολλοι διδασκαλοι*. but the context rejects this sense; to which such an admonition against an ambitious spirit is utterly foreign. If now we should say that *διδασκαλος* here means a person who carps at and reproves others; no one probably would readily concede that this sense necessarily lies in the word itself; and yet it suits admirably to the succeeding clauses. We may perhaps compare the German

^c *Institutio Interpretis N. Test. P. II. Cap. I. § 22. ed. Ammon. Leip. 1809. See Biblical Cabinet, Vol. II. translated by Mr. Terrot.*

word *meistern*, which plainly answers to τῷ διδάσκειν and διδάσκαλον εἶναι. [So also, in some degree, the English verb *to tutor*.] Nor should I hesitate to explain Rom. ii. 21, εαυτὸν οὐ διδάσκεις, in this manner: *thou who censures the faults of others, dost thou not censure thine own faults?* In nearly the same sense, I think, is διδάσκειν found in Ecclus. ix. 1. In like manner, the word ὀργή, James i. 19, cannot signify *wrath*, which is a notion entirely foreign to the subject there under discussion; but it denotes undoubtedly the *indignation* or *indignant feeling* of a man who is irritable and fretful under the calamities to which, like arrows, the whole of human life is exposed.^d At the same time, the idiom in this passage as to form is not Hebrew,

^d That ὀργή signified among the Greeks not only *anger* and *wrath*, but also the feeling of a man offended or provoked, is not necessary to be shewn to those acquainted with the Greek language. Nor are there wanting in the New Testament examples of the same signification; e. g. Mark iii. 5; Rom. ix. 22; Heb. iii. 11. It may also be observed, in passing, that when this word is employed in the New Testament to denote punishment, chastisement, etc. this is not in consequence of any Hebrew idiom; but it is so found also in the best Greek writers. So Demosthenes adv. Mid. p. 528, ed. Reisk. τῷ δράσαντι δ' οὐκ ἴσθη τὴν ὀργήν, ἂν θ' ἐκὼν, ἂν τ' ἄκων, ἔταξεν ὁ νόμος, just as Paul says Rom. iv. 15, ὁ νόμος ὀργὴν κατεργάζεται. Other examples may be seen in the Index Dem. Reisk. v. ὀργή, p. 540.

but good Greek; since an *Auctor incert.* in Poet. Gnom. has this sentence: γίγνου ὁ εἰς ὀργήν μὴ ταχὺς ἀλλὰ βραδύς.—From these examples it will easily be seen, that the nature of the interpretations under discussion will be very much obscured, if they are to be defined in the usual way above pointed out, *i. e.* if we merely say they are such as are not grammatical.

To interpret grammatically is surely not merely, by the help of a lexicon, to explain simply the verbal meaning and render word for word; but, as the most distinguished interpreters have long taught, it is to ascertain the proper sense of the words, and the idea attached to a particular word in any particular place, by a diligent attention to the *usus loquendi*, the object of the writer, and the logical connexion of the whole context. Neither is the grammatical interpretation a different thing from the historical one; there is not one grammatical sense, and another historical. Under that which earlier interpreters, as Sixtus Senensis, formerly called the historical sense, they understood nothing more than the grammatical one; and they called it the historical, merely because it is deduced from a proper observation of times and events.^e And that which certain later

^e See Ernesti, *Opp. Phil. Crit.* p. 221.

writers have begun to call the historical sense, viz. that which a passage expresses when explained with reference to the time in which the author lived, or that which the words appear to have expressed at that time and place, and among those persons for whom he wrote; this is nothing else than what the earlier interpreters called the grammatical sense. Indeed, according to their views, and those of every correct interpreter, the grammatical interpretation has and ought to have for its highest object, to shew what sense the words of a passage *can* bear, *ought* to bear, and actually *do* bear; and it requires not only an accurate acquaintance with words and the *usus loquendi* of them, but also with many other things. It is not enough to investigate *what* is said; but we must also inquire *by whom* and *to whom* it is said, at what *time*, on what *occasion*, what *precedes*, what *follows*, etc.^f For to interpret, is to point out what ideas are implied in the language; or it is to excite in another the same thoughts that the writer had in his own mind. But the power of doing this does not depend alone on a knowledge of words and of the *usus loquendi*: but demands an acquaintance

^f So Erasmus, *Ratio et Meth. verae Theologiae*, p. 51, ed. Semler.

with many other things, as was said above. All writers do not follow the same *usus loquendi*; Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus have each a different kind of language; Thucydides and Xenophon have little resemblance of style; although the two former were nearly contemporary, and the latter were natives of the same country. We ourselves write differently to learned men and to our familiar acquaintance; and our habit and manner of speaking or writing depends very much upon the talent, disposition, and personal habits of the individual. Practice also effects very much. Besides all these, there is required, in order to become a skilful interpreter, a certain intellectual sagacity and a native tact, such as the Greeks call *εὐφροσύνη*, the want of which cannot be compensated by any degree of art or erudition. Hence it happens, that those who are destitute of this natural talent, however extensively they may possess a knowledge of languages and of the whole construction of style and discourse, very often propose interpretations as foreign as possible to the meaning and purpose of the writer.^g

Since then that must be regarded as the

^g Compare this whole discussion with the article by Prof. Hahn, on Interpretation of Prophecy.

true interpretation, which accurately gives the true sense contained in the words of a writer, and presents in a legitimate way to the mind of another the same thoughts which the writer had, and must have had, in his own mind at such a time and in such a place; it follows, therefore, that we must call that a *forced* interpretation, which does violence in any way to the true meaning of an author; so as to make him express by his words a different sense from that which he, in *this* discourse, and at *that* time and place, intended to connect with those words.

By the common consent of the ablest interpreters, the proper meaning of any writer is to be discovered, first, from the *usus loquendi* which is familiar to him; then, from an observation of the persons and times and places in and for which he wrote; and lastly, from the context, in which is also comprehended the object of the writer, which some make a separate head. Hence there arise three characteristics, by which to distinguish a forced interpretation; viz. first, if it be contrary to the ordinary *usus loquendi* of the writer; secondly, if it be at variance with a due regard to the persons, times, and places, in and for which he wrote; and thirdly, if it be incongruous to the series

of discourse. We therefore call that a forced interpretation, *which, although it may be contained in the words taken by themselves, nevertheless expresses a sense foreign to the intention of the writer ; inasmuch as it is repugnant either to the USUS LOQUENDI of the writer, or to TIME and PLACE, or finally to the CONTEXT.*

There are two species of interpretations of this sort. The one by a certain violence put upon the words, is calculated to displease the learned ; while the other, by a certain appearance of art and refinement, allures the unlearned. The former species may be termed *inept*, and is exhibited when a sentiment is obtruded upon a writer, which is alike foreign both to his constant manner of thinking and speaking, and to his intention and object.^h As if one should say that Paul in Eph. i. 7, had in mind

^h Those interpretations are *inept*, which give a sense not appropriate to the passage, the writer, or the time. Indeed all forced interpretations may be called *inept*, inasmuch as they are inappropriate to the passages from which they are extracted ; but since some offend more the judgment, while others by an appearance of refinement please the unlearned, I have preferred to distinguish them into *inept* and *subtile*. The nature of interpretations of this sort has been well treated of by E. A. Frommann, in his proluision entitled : *Facilitas bonae interpretationis nota*, § X. Opp. Phil. Hist. p. 337, seq.

the system of Christian doctrine ; and he should go on to interpret τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων, of a deliverance from sin, which is effected by this doctrine, confirmed by the death of Christ. Such an interpretation is supported neither by the manner in which the apostle is accustomed to speak of the death of Christ, nor by the object of the writer and the method of the whole discussion, nor by the mode of thinking among the Christians to whom the apostle wrote : unless the utmost violence be put upon the words.—The other species is usually called the *subtile*. These are such as by a sort of art extract from the words a sentiment, good indeed in itself, but foreign to the intention of the writer, and particularly so to the proper force and significance of the words. A great many examples of this kind have been collected by F. F. Gräfenhain, in his *Dissert. de Interpret. N. T. argutis magis, quam veris*, Leips. 1774.

Since then every true interpretation rests upon the *usus loquendi*, the accurate knowledge of persons, and places, and times, and the comparison of the context ; so all instances of forced interpretation must arise either from ignorance or neglect of these same things. There are, therefore, *three* principal causes of

such interpretations, of which we now proceed to treat.

I. The first cause lies in the want of a proper knowledge and correct understanding of the *usus loquendi*. The style of the New Testament, as is now generally admitted, is not pure Greek; but is mixed and made up of words and idioms borrowed from several languages, and particularly from the Hebrew. This has been the judgment of the most learned Greek scholars, as well as of the most erudite interpreters of the New Testament.ⁱ And although this opinion is admitted in our day by all, yet there seems to be an ambiguity hanging around it, which gives occasion to very many forced interpretations.

In the first place, those who, after the example of Daniel Heinsius, have pre-supposed in the New Testament a peculiar *Hebraizing* dialect, have no doubt, by the common consent of the learned, been in an error; and have thus rendered the whole discussion respecting the *usus loquendi* found in the books of the New Testament, and the interpretation of the New

ⁱ See Hemsterhusius ad Lucian. Tom. 1. p. 309. G. J. Planck, Einleit. in die theol. Wissenschaften, Bd. II. p. 42, sq.

Testament itself, uncertain.^k For, in the first place, single forms and idioms cannot constitute a peculiar dialect; nor are those things of

^k It was formerly customary to call the language of the New Testament and of the Alexandrine interpreters, the *Hellenistic*, as if it were a dialect appropriate and peculiar to them; and to regard it, I know not how, Ἑβραϊζουσαν. This opinion is most learnedly refuted by Claud. Salmasius in his *Comm. de Lingua Hellenistica*, Lugd. Bat. 1643, (compare also his *Funus Ling. Hellenisticae* and *Ossilegium*.) against D. Heinsius, who had defended it in his *Aristarchus Sacer*, his *Exercitatt. Sacrae in N. T.* (in the preface,) and his *Exercitatio de Lingua Hellenist.* L. B. 1643. But although no one who is in any degree acquainted with the Greek language, can assent to the opinion of those who defend the purity of the New Testament Greek; yet nevertheless the position seems also incapable of defence, which makes the language, or rather the style of the New Testament, a peculiar and proper διάλεκτον, the so called τὴν Ἑλληνιστικὴν. For it is one thing, to employ a certain common and unpolished (ἰδιωτικὸν manner of speaking, mixed with foreign idioms, and with Latin and other newly coined words, νεοχημοῖς as Phrynicus calls them) and ἀδοκίμοις and it is quite another thing to make use of a particular and peculiar dialect. The position of Salmasius (and in my judgment the correct one) is, that the sacred writers had no such peculiar dialect; while, at the same time, he is as far removed as possible from the opinion of those who boast of the purity of the style of the New Testament.—But if it be said that it is mere verbal trifling, not to admit the name of *dialect*, where it cannot be denied that these writers have employed a kind of writing mixed, ἀδοκίμον, τῶν οὐ πεπαιδευμένων, and therefore filled with many Hebraisms: I answer, that these things we certainly do not deny; since no one not entirely ignorant of the Greek language can do this; but we deny

course Hebraisms, which have some resemblance to the Hebrew language; but all such appearances may be referred to the general feelings and opinions of the writers of the New Testament and to their mode of teaching, rather than to single words and forms of phrases, which are of uncertain origin, and are often common to many languages. And, in the second place, there was no dialect peculiar to the writers of the New Testament; for a dialect belongs to a people, not to a few individuals. It is, as Gregory Corinthus defines it, λέξις ἴδιον χαρακτῆρα τύπου ἐμφαίνουσα¹ “a mode of speak-

that these appearances constitute what it is proper to call a peculiar dialect, Ἑλληνιστικὴν or Ἑβραϊζουσαν. We would not indeed be difficult about words, but we prefer not to use the term *dialect*, because through the opinion which the use of this word would imply, the interpretation of the New Testament is rendered uncertain: inasmuch as it is impossible to form a right judgment respecting the *origin* and *sources* of the language which the sacred writers have employed, unless that ambiguity be removed, which seems to have been introduced into the interpretation of the sacred books by those authors, who talk about a peculiar dialect, without appearing to know or to determine any thing certain respecting it. I merely touch upon this subject here and in the text; proposing hereafter to treat of it more fully on another occasion. I have mentioned it here in order to vindicate the real opinions of Salmasius: since some appear to consider him as differing very little from the error of Pfochen. See G. J. Planck, l. c. p. 44. Bib. Cabinet, Vol. II.

¹ Greg. Corinth. De Dialectis, p. 9. ed. Schaefer. Compare Phavorin. Varin. Thes. (Venet. 1496.) fol. 236, 248.

ing which exhibits [bears] the character of the place." But when all the dialects of the Greeks had become mingled together, and the several tribes had no longer each a separate and peculiar mode of speaking, the grammarians changed also the signification of the term *dialect*, and called this intermixture or farrago of dialects τὴν κοινὴν διάλεκτον.^m The Jews then who spoke Greek, had not a peculiar dialect of their own, but used this common one, τὴν βαρβαρίζουσαν which was also employed by all the Asiatic tribes and nations that then spoke

Maittaire de Graecae Linguae Dialectis, p. 1, seq. Clem. Alex. Strom. VI. p. 678. B. Scholiast. ad Aristoph. Nubb. 317.—The editions of Greg. Corinth. whose definition is given above, have λέξις ἴδιον χαρακτῆρα τύπου ἐμφαίνουσα. Salmasius (p. 450) ingeniously conjectured, that it ought to be written τόπου: although he hesitated to adopt this reading, sufficiently confirmed as it is by the words of other grammarians and writers. Thus Clemens Alex. (Strom. Lib. I. p. 404,) says in like manner: διάλεκτός ἐστι λέξις ἴδ. χαρ. τόπου ἐμφαίνουσα, ἢ λέξις ἴδιον ἢ κοινὸν ἔθνους ἐμφαίνουσα χαρακτῆρα. Salmasius supposes, that the grammarians perhaps changed τόπου into τύπου, because in their times there was no longer any Greek dialect peculiar to any place or tribe. He has also very clearly demonstrated in his book *de Hellenistica*, that a dialect can only belong to a tribe or people, ἔχουσαν φωνῆς χαρακτῆρα ἔθνικόν, as says the schol. in Aristoph. quoted above. The grammarians themselves also do not seem always to have used the term *dialect* very accurately; but have often employed it γλώσσα, ἰδίωμα, λέξις, etc.

^m Salmasius l. c.

Greek. Paul, moreover, a native of Tarsus, had learned Greek in his own country, long before he came to the school of Gamaliel; as was also the case with Luke, who exhibits few traces of a Jewish education.

Nor do those authors appear to have judged more correctly, who have wished to call the diction of the New Testament the *Alexandrine* dialect,ⁿ and have regarded the dialect of Alexandria as the source of the style of the New Testament. This opinion is supported, neither by a comparison of the New Testament with this dialect nor by history. For the writers of the New Testament were not citizens of Alexandria; nor simply because they have sometimes followed the Alexandrine version, can it be concluded that they have imitated the Alexandrian dialect; any more than those who follow the version of Luther, are accustomed to imitate his style in other respects. The dialect of Alexandria was not a language peculiar and appropriate to the citizens of that place alone, but was a kind of speech mixed and corrupted by the confluence of many nations, as Greeks, Macedonians, Africans, Carthaginians, Syrians, East Indians,

ⁿ This name was first proposed by J. E. Grabe in his *Prolegom. ad V. T. ex vers. Sept. Interpretum*, Tom. II. c. 1, § 49.

Sicilians, Italians, and others.^o After the Macedonians had brought the whole of Greece under subjection, and extended their dominion also into Asia and Africa, the refined and elegant Attic began to decline ; and all the dialects being by degrees mixed together, there arose a certain peculiar language called the *common*,^p

^o See on this whole subject Sturz de Dialecto Alexandrina, Leips. 1808. Compare Fischer, Animadv. ad Welleri Gramm. I. p. 46. [See also the essay of H. Planck *de Indole, etc.* in Biblical Cabinet, Vol. II.

^p Κοινή διάλεκτος, Gramm. Leid. p. 640, ed Schaefer. Schol. Venet. Hom. ad Il. α' 85. Eustath. ad Il. α' p. 22. Clem. Alex. Strom. L. I. p. 404, B. See Kirchmeier de Dialecto Graecor. communi, Viteb. 1709. Those who used this dialect were called κοινοί, Schol. Aristoph. ad Plut. 983. Suidas v. ἀθάρα. Phrynicius calls them οἱ νῦν, οἱ πολλοί. On the subject of this dialect Salmasius has a long discussion, in the work so often quoted above. He was of opinion that it ought not to be called a *dialect*, but rather γλῶσσαν κοινήν a tongue common to all, who in speaking the Greek language, Ἑλληνίζοντες, did not follow any one of the ancient dialects. The grammarians, on the contrary, chose to employ for this purpose the name κοινή διάλεκτος, to designate a kind of speech mixed up from all the forms of Greek idioms, and common to all those who spoke Greek in the later ages. Whoever therefore did not follow one of the four dialects, viz. the Attic, Ionic, Doric, or Aeolic, but employed a diction composed from all those idioms, was said to have τὴν κοινήν διάλεκτον ; as for instance Pindar himself ; see Salmasius l. 3. p. 28, 29. But we must also distinguish different periods or ages ; for the grammarians give also to that γλῶσσα which was current among all Greeks before the rise and distinction of the four dialects, the epithet κοινή. This is ap-

and also the *Hellenic*;⁹ but more especially, since the empire of the Macedonians

parent from the fragment of the so called Grammaticus Meermanianus, (which with Gregory Cor. and the Grammat. Leidensis was published by Schaefer, Leips. 1811,) where it is said: *διάλεκτοι δὲ εἰσι πέντε Ἰάσ· Ἀτθίς· Δωρίς· Αἰολίς· καὶ κοινή· ἣ γὰρ πέμπτη, ἴδιον ἐκέχουσα χαρακτηῖρα, κοινὴ ὀνομάσθη, διότι ἐκ ταύτης ἄρχονται πᾶσαι· ληπτίον δὲ ταύτην μὲν πρὸς κανόνα, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς πρὸς ιδιότητα.* ‘The dialects are five, the Ionic, Attic, Doric, Aeolic, and the common. The fifth, having no peculiar character of its own, is called common, because all the others have sprung from it. This one is to be learned by general rule; the others, each in its own particular manner;’ p. 642. But Gregory Corinthus (p. 12) gives the name *κοινή* to that, *ἣ πάντες χρώμεθα, ἥγουν ἣ ἐκ τῶν δ’ συνεστῶσα*, ‘which we all use, viz. that which is composed from all the four.’ With him also coincides the Gramm. Leid. (l. c.) and John Grammaticus. The inconsistency of these grammarians is chastised by Salmasius, l. c. p. 12, sq. But it seems to me that the discrepancy is to be reconciled in this manner, viz. by making a distinction between this ancient *γλώσσα*, the common source or mother of all the four dialects, which the Gramm. Meerm. calls *κοινή*, and that later mixed kind of diction common to all the nations that used the Greek language, and formed by the mixture not only of all the dialects, but also of the idioms of every people that spoke Greek (*Ἑλληνιζόντων*), or that mingled with the Greeks: and which was also commonly called *ἡ κοινή*, and is termed by Phrynicius the dialect *τῶν νεωτέρων* and *τῶν οὐ πεπαιδευμένων*. The grammarians indeed, having no rule but their own taste and judgment, seem very often to have been rash and inconsistent both in their precepts and censures.

⁹ *Hellenic* rather than *Hellenistic*; since the former is recognised by the grammarians and other writers of that age,

was the chief cause of its introduction into general use from the time of Alexander onwards, it was called the *Macedonic*.^r This dia-

while the latter never existed; see Salmasius l. c. But in relation also to the words 'Ελληνικός and 'Ελληνίζειν, the grammarians do not seem to have been of one accord. On the one hand, these words are very often employed in a laudatory sense, when all who spoke Greek are termed 'Ελληνισταὶ and 'Ελληνίζοντες. This is proved by Salmasius with many arguments; and is also sufficiently manifest from the passage in Athenæus (Lib. III. c. 84), where οἱ σφόδρα 'Ελληνίζοντες are those *who speak Greek well*. On the other hand, at a later period they applied the epithet 'Ελληνικός to a kind of speech less elegant, and composed of words and phrases common, obsolete, newly coined, or also foreign; see Moeris sub v. γελοῖον Schol. Aristoph. ad Ran. 6. Hence it arose that τὸ 'Ελληνικῶς λέγειν was opposed to τὸ Ἀττικῶς. The grammarians distinguished in this common language, between such things as were less elegant, which they called ἀδόκιμα, 'Ελληνικά, as being common τοῖς Ἑλλησι. (see Moeris sub v. ἐξίλλων ζυμφάνως) and such other things as were more recent, and among these also foreign idioms, all which they called κοινὰ, i. e. obsolete ἰδιωτικά. which is done by Moeris, as is shewn by Pierson ad Moerid. sub v. φειδωλοί. But all the grammarians very frequently confounded τὸ κοινὸν and κοινῶς with τὸ 'Ελληνικὸν and 'Ελληνικῶς: a circumstance deserving the attention of modern grammarians. Compare Salmasius, l. c. p. 55, sq.

^r Not the *ancient* Macedonic, which we know to have been very similar to the Doric) but the *later*, adopted by the Macedonians about the time of Philip, and especially of Alexander. This came to be employed by all the Greeks, learned and unlearned, in common life and in their writings; nor was there any longer a distinction of dialects. It is very

lect was composed from almost all the dialects of Greece, together with very many foreign words^s borrowed from the Persians, Syrians, Hebrews, and other nations, who became connected with the Macedonian people after the age of Alexander.^t Now of this Macedonian dialect, the dialect of Alexandria, was a degenerate progeny, far more corrupt than the common τῶν Μακεδονιζόντων γλῶσσα, or common Macedonian dialect. It was the current language of all the inhabitants of that city, even of the learned in whom the celebrated school of Alexandria was so fertile, and also of the Jews; for the latter, whom Alexander had permitted to dwell in that city on the same

often mentioned as the *common*, e. g. by Phrynichus; but is also called Μακεδόνων διάλεκτος, Heraclid. ap. Eustath. ad Od. κ'. p. 1654: and Μακεδόνων γλῶσσα, Eudaem. Pelus. ap. eund. ad Od. γ'. p. 1457.

^s Examples are given in Spanheim ad Callim. H. in Del. 150. Compare Hemsterhus. ad Polluc. 10, 16. Heysch. et Phavor. v. ἰζιλά, coll. Selden de Diis Syr. lib. 1. Etym. Mag. v. ἄττα, coll. Heinsius Prol. in Aristarch. Sac. p. 665. [Arist. Sac. p. 446?] Spanheim ad Callim. H. in Dian. 6.

^t Compare Ernesti's Prolusion *de Difficultate N. T. recte interp.* in Opp. Phil. crit. p. 212. See also Diod. Ascalonites ap. Athen. XIV. p. 102, C. Athenaeus himself says, III. 222. Α. Μακεδονίζοντας οἶδα πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀπτικῶν διὰ τὴν ἐπιμιζίαν, coll. IX. p. 102, C. Phrynichus de Menandro Athen. p. 415—418. ed. Lobeck. Eustath. ad Od. τ'. p. 1854.

footing as to rights and privileges with the Macedonians, used not a peculiar dialect of their own, but the common language of the city. What Josephus relates, that the Jews had a certain portion of the city allotted to them, ὅπως καθαρωτέραν ἔχοιεν τὴν δίαίταν, ἥττον ἐπιμισγομένων τῶν ἀλλοφύλων, ‘in order that they might live in greater purity, and have less intercourse with strangers,’ certainly does not of necessity imply, that they had a separate and peculiar speech of their own, which they preserved in the midst of constant intercourse with the multitude of colonists from other nations, Egyptians, Macedonians, Sicilians, and others. Nor were they called Alexandrians for any other cause, as Josephus also relates,^u than that as Jews dwelling at Alexandria, they might be distinguished from the other Jews. This Alexandrine dialect also, thus mixed up from the idioms (ιδιώματα) of many nations, was the language employed by the Greek interpreters of the Old Testament, whoever they were; and of this language it is not enough to say, that it has a *Hebraizing* tendency. It cannot indeed be denied, that the Jews must naturally have adopted into their Alexandrine language many Hebrew words and forms: yet

^u Antiq. Jud. XIX. 5. 2.

it is apparent that the Alexandrine interpreters have not always accurately followed the words of the Hebrew text; but have very often departed from them, and sometimes also even corrupted the sense of them. Indeed, they might themselves not improperly be styled, interpreters of seventy tongues.* The writers of the New Testament, on the other hand, have made use of that common language which prevailed throughout Judea, Syria, and Asia Minor, not less than in the whole of Greece; and have not employed this Alexandrine dialect. This fact is established not only historically, as we have just shewn; but is also proved from the nature of the circumstances themselves.

In the first place, the writers of the New Testament have very many things, which belong to the Macedonic dialect. The examples of

* They were Jews no doubt; a people which, among every nation where they are born or sojourn, employ a certain peculiar dialect of that language which is vernacular to them. It could not therefore well be, but that the Alexandrine interpreters, educated as Jews, should write a kind of Greek less pure, than even the other Alexandrine writers. These latter, so far as their writings have come down to us, were men of cultivated minds, and therefore employed τὴν κοινὴν διάλεκτον indeed, but in a less impure form than those learned Jews, who have translated into Greek the books of the Old Testament.

this are indeed almost innumerable; but the few following may here suffice. The word *παρεμβολή* in the New Testament denotes *camp*, e. g. Acts xxi. 34; Heb. xiii. 11; of which there is no example in pure Greek. But Phrynicius says (p. 377, ed. Lob.) that it is *δεινῶς Μακεδονικόν*, ‘very Macedonic;’ and the Seventy have employed it likewise in this sense for *קַמְּפֵי*, e. g.

Gen. xxxii. 2.^y Further *ῥύμη*, which among the Attics denoted *ὄρμηγν*, *onset*, was used in the Macedonic language for *στενωπὸν*, *a lane, alley*, Luke xiv. 21; and then for *πλατεία*, *a wide street*. Matt. vi. 2.^z So also *προσκοπή*, 2 Cor. vi. 3, coll. Phrynicius, p. 20, ed. De Pauw; (p. 85, ed. Lobeck?) *ῥάπισμα*, id. 175, ed. Lob. coll. Fischer de Vit. Lex. N. T. p. 61, 71; *γενήματα* Phryn. 286; *αἰγμάλωτισθῆναι* id. 442; *πανδοκεὺς*, id. 307; *φάγεσθαι, βάζβαρον*, id. 327; and many others. But at the same time, many words have been condemned by the grammarians unjustly; as *ἀκμηγν*, for *ἔτι*, Matt. xv. 16, which Phrynicius

^y Compare Jos. Ant. Jud. VI. 6. Clem. Alex. Strom. IV. p. 521, D.

^z Phrynicius, p. 404. Pollux. Onom. IX. § 38. says: *τάχα δ' ἂν εὔροις καὶ ῥύμην εἰρημένην τὴν πλατείαν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λέγουσι*, ‘perhaps you may find *ῥύμη* employed to denote *a wide street*, according to present usage;’ where he quotes Philippides *ὁ Μακεδονίζων*.

(p. 125) and Moeris (sub voce) censure without reason; since the use of it seems to be only a little more nice and uncommon.

In the second place, the writers of the New Testament have abstained from employing many forms of speech, and many unusual and evidently corrupted words, which are found in the Alexandrine interpreters; although these latter do not appear to have all been equally in fault in the use of such words. Of this kind are ἡλθουσιν, Ex. xv. 27; ἐφάγοσαν, Ps. lxxvii. 29; ὑηλαφήσασαν, Job v. 14, coll. Acts xvii. 27; τριέληκα, Ps. xl. 11, and many others; to collect and review which would be a matter of infinite and thankless labour; see Sturz, l. c. § 9. It will be enough to mention the word δικαίος and its cognates, by which they have expressed the Hebrew יֵשׁוּעַ, יְצַדִּיק, אֱמֶת, נִקְי; and also עֲשֵׂה, Prov. xi. 7; עוֹל, Job. xxxiv. 10. The concordance of Tromm is full of similar examples. Indeed, the levity, negligence, and inconsistency of these translators in the use of Greek words, is most incredible; nor would it be easy to find any thing ever uttered in Greek, more barbarous than their diction; although in some of the books, more elegance is exhibited. In this way and to such a degree, on

the other hand, the writers of the New Testament have not erred against the nature and elegance of the Greek language; and although their style is not pure, yet they have at least written Greek, and not barbarisms.^a

This ambiguity and inconstancy in the judgments formed respecting the Greek style of the New Testament, to which we have above referred, has operated as the cause of forced interpretations chiefly in three ways, which we now proceed to exhibit.

1. It has thus operated, first, because that which is good Greek has not been sufficiently distinguished from that which is bad Greek, and *vice versa*; and the same words and phrases have been explained now according to the more elegant Greek idiom, and then again from the corrupted language. Thus the word *δίκαιος* and its cognates have been understood by interpreters, sometimes in the pure Greek sense; and at other times in the Hebrew sense; and hence it cannot be otherwise, than that many passages should be exceedingly tortured. We see also many words explained by a reference to foreign

^a Ernesti Opusc. Philol. Crit. p. 209, sq. Institut. Interp. N. T. Pt. III. c. 7. ed. Ammon. Biblical Cabinet, Vol. IV. Mr. Terrot's translation of Ernesti, Vol. II. Planck, Einl. in d. theol. Wissensch. II. p. 46, sq.

sources, when the force and signification of them can be illustrated and fixed by domestic examples. Thus the name λόγος in John many suppose to be borrowed from the philosophy of Plato, or of Philo ὁ Πλατωνίζων others that it signifies the divine wisdom personified in the Jewish manner, or the divine interpreter, τὸν λέγοντα, and they dispute largely here respecting the adversaries whom John intended to refute. But it is perfectly evident, that it here denotes a certain οὐσίαν, ῥήματι θεοῦ γεγονότα πρὸ πάσης κτίσεως, πρωτότοκον, δι' οὗ καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν and that this word, which is used by John as well known to those whom he wrote, *i. e.* not to learned men but to unlearned Christians, is not to be explained in a manner new and unusual among Jews and Christians; but so that it would be easily understood by all those accustomed to speak of the Messiah in the same manner. They however were wont κατ' ἐξοχὴν, to call the Messiah τὸν λεγόμενον, *the promised of God, ἐρχόμενον, him who is to come*, the first and most excellent of all created things in his origin, nature, and power; so that the word is to be explained in the same manner, in which all at that time spoke of the Messiah.^b But from

^b See Keil de Doctoribus Ecclesiae a culpa corruptae per Plat. rec. Doctr. Comm. II. [The author is here describing

this uncertain interpretation of the word *λόγος*, there have not only arisen many forced interpretations, but the whole purpose of the apostle seems to be perverted.

2. There have also been others, in the second place, who have every where sought to find Hebraisms; and these, while they have attempted to explain from the Hebrew language words and phrases which ought to be interpreted according to Greek usage, have in various ways tortured the sense of the sacred writers. Thus they have given it as a precept, that the use of the abstract for the concrete (as we say in the schools) is a Hebraism. But this is done in all languages, and especially among the Greeks, in whose language are extant some of the most elegant examples of this figure.^c The Seventy also have often placed abstract words, where the Hebrew text has concrete ones; *e. g.* Ex. xix. 6, where they have *ἱεράτευμα* instead of *ἱερεῖς*, for the Hebrew *קֹהֲנִים*, as in 1 Pet. ii. 5, 9.—So when the prepositions *ἐν* and *εἰς* are interchanged,

the manner in which the Jews spoke of the Messiah, in order to illustrate the proper sense in which the word *λόγος* is to be understood. The apostle, on the other hand, declares to the Jews, that *Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*.—ED.]

^a Casaubon ad Athen. I. 9. D'Orville ad Chariton. V. 5.

these writers have referred it to a Hebraism. But this permutation was exceedingly common among the Greeks. The phrase *εἰς τὸ φανερόν* instead of *ἐν τῷ φανερῷ*, is well known; and Thucydides very often puts *ἐν* with the dative for *εἰς* with the accusative.^d Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Lib. IV. p. 276) also says *καταλειφθέντες εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον*, for *ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ*. The form *εἰς ἄδου* moreover, is plainly Attic, for *ἐν ἄδου* but in Euripides we read, *ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν ἄδου κείσομαι χωρὶς σέθεν*. But it cannot be denied, that the words *εἰς* and *ἐν* in the New Testament are often employed according to Hebrew usage, when they express the Hebrew בְּ and לְ ;^e e. g. where *ἐν* signifies *propter*, or *per*; although examples of this usage occur in the most elegant of the Greek writers. So Demosthenes de Corona, p. 308, *ἐν οὐδενὶ τῶν παρ' ἐμοῦ γεγονυῖαν τὴν ἤτταν εὐζήσατε* and Andocides de Mysteriis, p. 79, *ἐν τούτῳ σώζεσθαι ὑμᾶς*, for *διὰ τούτου κ.τ.λ.* and so in the other passages.

Hebraisms are strictly forms of speech appropriate and peculiar to those who speak the Hebrew language; or they are *ιδιωτισμοὶ τῶν*

^d Duker ad Thuc. Lib. VII. c. 16.

^e Vorstius de Hebr. N. T. p. 213, 219. Gataker de Stilo N. T. p. 180, sq.

Ἑβραίων. For although even in classical Greek there are found many things which have a great similitude in words and forms to the Hebrew language,^f nevertheless these and all other things which are not wholly peculiar to the Hebrews, but are also found among other nations, and current in their usage and language, are not to be regarded as Hebraisms, but as general forms common to every language, even though they may particularly occur in Hebrew writers. Indeed, as every language has its own *ιδιώματα* or peculiar forms of speech, of which the Greek participles are an example, so also there are other constructions and forms which are of universal prevalence in all languages. When therefore these are found in a writer, they are to be regarded as employed by common right and usage, and not as peculiar to the particular language in which he writes. Thus many expressions in the New Testament have been stamped with the name of Hebraisms for no other reason whatever, than because it was taken for granted that the writers of the New Testament have imitated the Hebrew mode of speaking, just as if they

^f This is shewn by J. A. Ernesti in his *Prolusio de vestigiis linguae Hebraicae in lingua Graeca*, Opusc. Philol. Crit. L. B. 1776.

could not have derived those forms from the like usage of the Greek language which they were writing. Many Hebraisms have thus been pointed out by Vorstius, Leusden, and others, which might be just as properly called *Hellenisms*, because, forsooth, they occur in the New Testament, in writers Ἑβραϊζόντες, they are Hebraisms; while the same things, when found in Demosthenes, Thucydides, Xenophon, or Polybius, are pronounced to be good and elegant Greek. Thus in the New Testament, the use of the demonstrative pronoun without apparent necessity after a noun or relative pronoun, has been regarded as a Hebraism, inasmuch as the Hebrews do indeed use this construction, as also the Arabs, Syrians, Greeks and Romans. Still that cannot surely be reckoned as a *Hebrew* idiom, which is also employed by the best writers of other nations. Casaubon in commenting on a passage of Apuleius, who makes frequent use of this pleonasm, says, “Est Ἑλληνισμὸς, familiaris huic scriptori, apud quem saepe reperias eam dictionem παράλλουσαν.—Ita autem Graeci, Herodotus praesertim atque Pausanias, atque e recentioribus Agathias.” “It is a Hellenism familiar to this writer, in whom you often find this pleonastic construction. So also the

Greeks, and especially Herodotus, Pausanias, and of later writers, Agathias.' But when he adds, *etsi id proprie Hebraeorum dialecti esse, certum est*, 'although this belongs peculiarly to the dialect of the Hebrews,' it is impossible to understand by what right the learned writer makes this assertion. Who would consider Cicero as employing a Hebraism, when he says (Orat. pro Coel. c. 4), "Illud tempus aetatis, *quod*, ipsum sua sponte infirmum, aliorum lubricine infestum est, *id hoc loco defendo?*" or in writing to Sulpicius (ad Div. XVIII. 28), "Illud *quod* supra scripsi, *id tibi confirmo?*" Compare pro Lege Man. c. 10. So also Sallust (Bell. Catil. c. 37), "Sed urbana plebes, *ea* vero praeceps ierat." Moreover in Thucydides, ὁ Ἀττικώτατος, the most Attic of all Greek writers, we find the same construction; e. g. IV. 93, τῷ δὲ Ἰπποκράτει ὄντι περὶ τὸ Δῆλιον, ὡς αὐτῷ ἠγγέλθη. In Demosthenes also οὗτος is elegantly pleonastic (παρέλκει) in his Oratt. (ed. Reisk.) adv. Mid. p. 522, adv. Aristog. A. p. 775, de Corona, p. 280. So in Xenophon, Cyrop. Lib. II. p. 51, τοῖς μὴ θελοῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς προστάττειν ἐκπονεῖν τὰγαθὰ (ὁ θεός) ἄλλους αὐτοῖς ἐπιτακτῆρας δίδωσι. The construction in all these passages is evidently

the same as in Matt. iv. 16, viii. 5 ; John xv. 2, xviii. 11.

We turn now to some examples of forced interpretation, which have sprung from this source. In Matt. xii. 36, many understand *ἔημα ἀργὸν* to mean *wicked and injurious words* ; as if *ἀργὸν* were the same as *πονηρὸν*, which is found as a gloss in Cod. 126. They think the sense to be this : ‘ Believe me, that for every wicked and injurious word shall men hereafter render an account.’ They suppose the Lord intended in these words to reprehend the Pharisees, who had impiously spoken against him, and to threaten them with the severest punishments, inasmuch as every one of their injurious and impious words should one day be punished. The supporters of this interpretation of the word *ἀργὸς* endeavour to confirm it by comparing *בְּטִיל*, (from the Heb. *בִּטַּל*),

which they suppose to be used of vain, useless, and also injurious words. They are not indeed able to bring forward examples from the Hebrew language itself ; but they adduce two passages from the Chaldee version, viz. Ex. v. 9, where Onkelos expresses *דְּבַרֵּי שְׁקָר* by *בְּטִילֵין פְּתַנְמֵין*, and Ecc. v. 2. They ap-

peal also to the Hebrew version of the New Testament published by Münster, which here renders ῥῆμα ἀργόν by רִבֵּר בִּיטוּל; and to the Syriac, which has ܘܒܘܬܘܠܘܬܐ; compare the same versions on Matt. xxv. 30. But, so far as I can see, these examples prove only that ἀργόν might be expressed in Chaldee by בְּטִיל, and denotes *idle, otiosus*, and then *useless, slothful*; but not that the writers of the New Testament, when they said ἀργόντι imitated the usage of the Chaldee tongue. Nor in the Hebrew text are there any examples, that the expression *idle* or *vain* words is used to denote *injurious, mischievous* words. In short, it cannot be proved from these passages, that those translators employed the word בְּטִיל in the sense of πονηρόν. For the ἀχρεῖος δοῦλος in Matt. xxv. 30, is one who is *useless, unprofitable, i. e.* who brings his master no advantage; not necessarily one who is *wicked*. And שֶׁקֶר also often denotes that which is *vain, empty*, as Jer. viii. 8, xvi. 18, where לְשֶׁקֶר is rendered in the Septuagint by εἰς μάτην and very frequently too it signifies *falsehood*, as Ex. xxv. 15, and especially Prov. xii. 22, xvii. 7, where the Se-

venty have rightly translated שְׁפִתַי-שָׁקַר by $\chi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\lambda\eta \psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta$.^g This interpretation, moreover, would not be in accordance with what precedes in verses 33—35, nor with what follows in verse 37. For it is not any *wicked* discourse that is there reprehended, but the feigned piety of the Pharisees, and their affected zeal for the public welfare. In order to avoid the charge of levity and indifference, they demanded (verse 38) a sign, $\sigma\eta\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omega\sigma$, as if desirous that both they and others might know whether Jesus was truly the Messiah. Against this dissimulation in those who uttered nothing sincerely and from the heart, Jesus had inveighed in severe and appropriate terms in verses 33—35, using the comparison of a tree, which no one judges to be good and useful, unless it bears good fruit; and from which, if it be bad, no one expects good fruit.^h But if now the sense of verse 36 is such

^g Compare Drusius in Animadv. ad. h. l. Vorstius de Hebr. N. T. p. 80. Fischer de Vit. Lex. N. T. Diss. XXV. p. 569, sq.

^h Ποιῆν signifies here to *judge, consider, regard*; of which sense Raphel (on this passage) has collected many examples from Herodotus. Such examples however are frequent in Greek; see e. g. Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. IV. 211. Sallust. Philos. c. 9. Stobaeus Serm. 247.—See on the

as these interpreters would make it, there is added in it a sentiment altogether foreign to what precedes, frigid, and ἀργός, *i. e.* wholly destitute of effect and force; and also not congruous to the sentiment of verse 37. For where the Lord says (verse 37) that every one shall hereafter be judged by his words, he cannot be understood as meaning, that every one will be capable of proving his integrity and goodness merely by his words alone; a sentiment surely as far as possible from the intention of our divine Master. We must therefore necessarily understand a certain kind of words or discourse, which, under the appearance of sincerity and integrity, is often the worst possible, and καταδικάζει τὸν ἀνθρώπου, “condemns a man,” because it is uttered with an evil purpose. If then we interpret ἀργὸν according to established Greek usage, there arises a facile and very appropriate sense; namely, ἀργός is the same as ἀεργός, *otiosus*, *vain*, *idle*; then, *void of effect, without result, followed by no corresponding event.*ⁱ Therefore

other hand Glass in *Philol. Sac. Lib.* 1. p. 226, ed. Dathe. But such modes of speech are surely not to be reckoned as belonging to any peculiar usage of the sacred writers, when they are found in almost every language.

ⁱ Compare Demosth. *κατὰ τὸ φόβου λόγος* α'. p. 815, ed. Reisk.

ἔρημα ἀργόν is *empty and vain words or discourse*, i. e. void of truth, and to which the event does not correspond; μάταιος λόγος, πράξεων ἄμοιρος γενόμενος, as Demosthenes expresses it.^k In short, it is the empty, inconsiderate, insincere language of a man who says one thing and means another; and in this sense ἀργός is very frequently employed by the Greeks. Thus in Stobaeus (Serm. c. 34) we find αἰρετώτερόν σοι ἔστω λίθον εἰκῆ βαλεῖν, ἢ λόγον ἀργόν which words, as it seems to me, Palaiet and Kypke (on this verse) have incorrectly understood as meaning *wicked, injurious* language, when they ought to be explained of *empty* discourse, uttered inconsiderately and without sincerity, as is shewn by the comparison of a stone thrown εἰκῆ, *in vain, without effect*. Hierocles also, in speaking of vain prayers,^l ἀνεέργητον εὐχὴν, calls them τὸ ἀργόν, i. e. *inefficacious*, since they result in nothing, being made ψιλῆς τῆς εὐχῆς τοῖς λογισμοῖς, μηδὲν πρὸς τὴν κτήσιν τῶν αἰτηθέντων προσφέροντας, “with merely thoughts of prayer, profiting nothing for the acquisition of the things sought.” The same writer in another passage opposes τὴν ἀργίαν τοῦ καλοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ κακοῦ, “the inefficiency of good to the energy of evil.” The

^k In Orat. ad Philippi Epist.

^l In Carm. aur. Pythagor.

sophism of the ancients, called the ἀργὸς λόγος, *ignava ratio*,^m is also well known. Chrysostom therefore says correctly,ⁿ ἀργὸν δὲ τὸ μὴ κατὰ πρᾶγματος κείμενον, τὸ ψευδὲς, τὸ συκοφαντίαν ἔχον, “the word ἀργὸν signifies that which is not according to fact, false, delusive.” Hence it would appear that the following is the sense of the passage under consideration: “Believe me, he who uses false and insincere language shall suffer grievous punishment; your words, if uttered with sincerity and ingenuousness, shall be approved, but if they are dissembled, although they may bear the strongest appearance of integrity, they shall be condemned.”^o

^m So called by Cicero de Fato c. 12. Facciolatus has treated of this sophism in his *Acroas.* V. [The following is the passage of Cicero above referred to. “Nec nos impedit illa ignava ratio, quae dicitur; appellatur enim quidam a philosophis ἀργὸς λόγος, cui si pareamus, nihil omnino agamus in vita. Sic enim interrogant: Si fatum tibi est, ex hoc morbo convalescere; sive medicum adhibueris, sive non, convalesces. Item, si fatum tibi est, ex hoc morbo non convalescere; sive tu medicum adhibueris, sive non, non convalesces; et alterutrum fatum est. Medicum ergo adhibere nihil attinet. Recte genus hoc interrogationis *ignavum* atque *iners* nominatum est, quod eadem ratione omnis e vita tolletur actio.”]

ⁿ Homil. XLIII. in Matt.

^o We have dwelt somewhat longer on this passage, for the purpose of shewing, with how much uncertainty and indefi-

3. Other interpreters, in the third place, misled by that ambiguity above described, have either neglected all grammatical laws, or have too strenuously observed them. Although the writers of the New Testament have not indeed always followed the rules of the Greek language; yet it cannot be said that they have wholly neglected them. It will suffice to give an example of each kind. On the one hand, interpreters would have spared themselves much pains, and done less violence to many passages of the New Testament, had they recollected the rule of Greek syntax, that *futures* often have the force of aorists;^p as James

niteness the comparison of the oriental tongues has hitherto been applied to the interpretation of the New Testament. Although it is by no means our opinion, that nothing is to be gained by referring to the analogy of those languages; and while we believe, on the contrary, that this is productive of very great utility; still it would seem to be necessary to apply this principle with very great caution. Those interpreters certainly act most considerately, who prefer to explain the words of a writer from the *usus loquendi* of his own language, rather than by the uncertain analogy or similarity of a foreign tongue. The study of such analogies is no doubt very attractive; but they have also given occasion to many forced interpretations. For want of due caution, such interpreters have been exposed *columbae collo commoveri*, as Cicero says, *Academ. IV. 25.*

^p See Lennep, *Analog. Ling. Graecae*, p. 354.

ii. 18, καὶ γὰρ δεῖξω, which is to be rendered, *as I also am accustomed to shew you*; and further, that *aorists* often signify the continuance of the action which the verb expresses; as James v. 6, καταδικάσατε, ἐφονεύσατε τὸν δίκαιον, *i. e.* ye are *accustomed* to condemn and murder the innocent; and so in the passage cited above from Matthew (xii. 33), ποιήσατε is to be translated *judge* or *regard habitually*, etc. I conjecture also, in the very difficult passage in 1 Pet. iii. 20, that ὄτε is put elliptically for ὡς ὄτε, the ὡς being here left out, as is often done in comparisons;^q and this being admitted, a remedy perhaps can be applied to the passage.—On the other hand, in James.iii. 6. ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας, interpreters have been troubled by the article ὁ before the predicate, as if they expected in this writer an entire grammatical accuracy, ἀκρίβεια. comp. John i. 1. It is here the article ἐξηγητικὸς, as it is called, or as used δεικτικῶς,^r and was familiar to the Hebrews, who not unfrequently employed their ׀ to connect the subject with the pre-

^q See Bos, *Ellips. Graec.* p. 392. Noldius, *Concord.* Part. p. 379. Gataker *Advers. Misc.* II. 20, p. 382. Compare Eustath. ad II. ω' 258, δεῖ καὶ ταῦθ' αὖθις προσυπακούειν συνήθως ὡς. Compare also 2 Pet. iii. 4.

^r See Vigerus de *Idiotism. Ling. Graecae*, p. 19, ed. Hermann. 1822.

dicare.^s—It would be indeed a very great merit in regard to sacred interpretation, if some one would ascertain and illustrate the *analogies* of the Greek style of the New Testament with more diligence and accuracy, than has yet been done by those who thus wander in uncertainty and ambiguity ; and would in this way establish some certain principles and rules in regard to this diction. It would then be easy to avoid a multitude of forced interpretations.^t

II. We come now to the second cause mentioned above. We have said that a multitude of forced interpretations have had their origin in this circumstance, that the interpreters have not accurately understood or regarded the

^s Gesenius Lehrgeb. p. 708. Stuart's Heb. Gramm. § 447.

^t Inasmuch as those who are ignorant of the analogies of an ancient language, can employ no certain method in explaining the monuments of that language, but must be governed by the authority of uncertain usage or the hints of grammarians ; so also the interpretation of the New Testament must necessarily be destitute of any certain laws, so long as the analogies of the language which the sacred writers employed, shall not be defined in as accurate and certain a manner as possible. These analogies consist, to use the language of I. D. Lennep, “ in the constant and uniform likeness and correspondence (*similitudo et convenientia*) of all the words which compose a language, distributed into certain classes ; of the significations attached to them ; and lastly, of

genius of the writer,^u and the times and persons for whom he wrote. We will speak of these in succession.

1. There is evidently a diversity of style and manner among the different writers of the New Testament, corresponding to their diversity of talent and disposition, which must be diligently observed by those who wish to avoid a forced mode of interpretation. The style of John is placid, but marked nevertheless occasionally by more difficult words and phrases. The language of Paul is fervid, often involved, throwing aside all else for the sake of some easy similitude, pouring itself out in figures, tropes, comparisons, antitheses of members, parallelisms

the phrases and whole construction ;” and they are exhibited not only in the laws which regulate the formation of words, but also and chiefly investigate the sources of the significations and the proper method of defining them, as well as the various laws of construction. See L. C. Valcknaer and J. C. Lennep, *Observatt. de Analogia Ling. Graecae*, ed. Ev. Scheid. Traj. ad. R. 1790. Whether there are, in the Greek language of the New Testament, any certain and distinct analogical relations, may be questioned by others ; for ourselves we are persuaded, that unless these be discovered and established, the interpretation of the New Testament must be given over to the caprice of every interpreter.

^u The author has not hitherto directly included this particular topic among the causes of forced interpretation ; although he has more than once referred to it indirectly ; see p. 140, seq.—ED.

of words ; yet not wholly destitute of rhetorical art. Peter's mind is rapid and impetuous, scarcely bearing the restraints of continued discourse ; his language is inelegant, often interrupted, obscured by new words, vehement, yet variable. Of the other writers also the genius is different and the style various. The diction of Matthew is unlike that of Luke. In the former you find a mode of writing somewhat harsh and inelegant, indicating an unpractised writer ; in the latter there is more polish, and a certain degree of elegance and ornament. The characteristic of Mark is conciseness in the highest degree. But in each we find certain words and phrases, which are in a manner their own ; and which either do not occur in the others, or are found in a different sense. Now since it is impossible to ascertain the sense of any writer without an accurate knowledge of the particular usage and manner which are familiar and appropriate to that writer ; it is easy to perceive, and the experience of all ages demonstrates the fact, that those who are ignorant of or neglect these things, have proposed interpretations in the highest degree forced. This is done especially in regard to metaphors and comparisons, which every one employs more or less. And the same

thing often takes place, when language which in one writer ought to be interpreted metaphorically, requires in another to be explained literally; or when words which one author uses in their proper sense, are therefore understood in the same manner in another writer.—But to have suggested this point is sufficient; as our object in this discussion is not to speak of particular passages of writers, but of interpretation in general.

2. In order properly to understand and explain any writer, an acquaintance with the times in which he lived and for which he wrote, must evidently be of the highest advantage. In this indeed lies almost the whole sum and essence of the so called *historical* interpretation, from which, however, the grammatical can in no way be separated.* Had now very many interpreters held to this principle, and paid

* The necessity of the union of both these modes, is demonstrated by Keil in his *Commentat. de historica Lib. sacror. interpretatione ejusque necessitate*, Leip. 1788. There is in fact no grammatical interpretation, and cannot be, unless joined with the historical. There are indeed some who wish to separate the two; but while they pass an unfavourable judgment on the former, they change the latter into an unbridled license of conjecture in regard to words.—Comp. G. L. Bauer in *Philol. Glassii his temporibus accommodata*, T. II. Sect. ii. p. 256, seq.

due regard to the circumstances of time and place, there is no doubt that they would have experienced far less difficulty in judging of very many passages of the New Testament. Since, however, they neglected to do this, it was not possible but that they should often distort the true sense of the sacred writers into one entirely different, and thus pervert the doctrine of Jesus and the apostles; or at least should introduce into theology, and therefore into religion itself, things which were written only for those particular times (*e. g.* from the Epistle to the Hebrews); or more especially, from the misapprehension of tropical language, should forge new dogmas foreign to the mind and purpose of the sacred writers. Examples of this kind are too common to require to be exhibited here.

3. If also it be of the highest utility in respect to right interpretation, to have regard to the *men* of those times, to their characters, manners and customs, opinions, vices, etc. then have interpreters been guilty in this respect of a twofold error, and have thus been led to give many a distorted interpretation.

On the one hand, there have been those (and they are probably the greater number), who suppose that the apostles spoke and wrote

according to the preconceived opinions of that age ; and that our Lord himself, in like manner, *accommodated* himself to their feelings and prejudices. This supposition is doubtless in a certain degree true, as has long since been conceded by the most learned interpreters ; but it also cannot be denied, that many in applying it have gone quite too far, and done violence to the sense and intention of the sacred writers. Examples of this are almost innumerable : but none is perhaps clearer and more striking than that of miracles and prophecy. It is evidently not the part of an interpreter, to attempt to shew how far that which is said may be true in itself, but simply to explain the meaning of the writer, and shew what he thought. The former indeed is not to *interpret*, but to *philosophise*, as Ernesti has well demonstrated.^y Now that the opinion of the apostles and of our Lord himself in regard to miracles and prophecy, has been altogether changed and distorted by disputations of this sort, must be conceded, especially by those who are persuaded that these things (miracles and prophecy) exerted their highest influence precisely upon those, among whom they were performed and

^y Prolus. de Vanitate philosophantium in Religione, in Opp. Philol. Crit.

exercised. If the apostles were eye-witnesses, who could not be deceived, and have narrated all events and circumstances just as they occurred; and if our Lord was such as he is described in the New Testament, and such as adversaries themselves concede him to have been, then those interpreters surely act without consideration, who explain their language in such a way as to make them subject either to reproach on account of fraud, or to correction on account of error; who make Jesus either a juggler, deceiving the people by his arts, (for no fraud can derive an excuse from the *intention* with which it is committed), or else a vain-glorious man who boasts that this and that which the prophets have uttered without meaning (*εἰς ἄν*), has not only been fulfilled in himself, but was also primarily spoken in reference to him alone. Whether such interpretation as this is to be tolerated, does not need to be discussed. But if the apostles were deceived, and have narrated many things which they indeed believed to be true, but which in fact are not true, still the interpreter is not permitted to doubt respecting their real opinion. Nor, on the contrary, when the things which they relate, appear not to be true, is he allowed so to explain or rather distort their

words, as to give them a greater appearance of truth. Such license no one would think of employing in regard to profane writers; nor do the laws of just interpretation in any degree tolerate it.

On the other hand, there have been those, especially in former times, who have had no regard whatever to the contemporaries of the sacred writers; nor have observed for what persons, or against what opinions or customs of that age, this or that passage was written; as for instance, in regard to those subjects which Paul discusses in the Epistles to the Romans and Hebrews. Hence they have neither properly understood the sacred books nor rightly explained them; or rather, they have extorted from them doctrines and opinions evidently foreign to the meaning of the writers. In the explanation of single words also, we see many fall into similar errors from the same cause; they have acquired no distinct knowledge of the persons for whom the apostles wrote, and have therefore advanced many things which these writers, addressing those persons, seem never to have thought of. Thus many have formerly supposed that the use of the words *φῶς*, *φωτίζειν ζωή*, *πλήρωμα*, was to be deduced from the philosophy of the Gnostics,

although the use of them with reference to the Messiah was already familiar to the Jews. So R. Chaia explains φῶς, אור, Gen. i. 3, allegorically of the Messiah; and R. Bechai also applies the words וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים יְהִי אֹר to the days of the Messiah, לְרִמּוֹז עַל יְמוֹת דְּמִשְׁיַח. So in the *Pesikta Rabba* it is said that when God hid the *light*, אור Satan came to him and asked him to look at it; and having seen it he said, בְּוֶדְאֵי הוּא מְשִׁיחַ שְׁעֵתִיד לְחַפִּיל לִי וּלְכָל שְׂרֵי אֻמּוֹת הָעֲלָם בְּגִיהֶנֶם, “verily this is the Messiah who is to come, and to cast me and all the princes of the nations forever into Gehenna;” compare Is. xxv. 8. R. Bechai says further (fol. 5. col. 4) that this same light, the Messiah, existed before all ages, and was present בְּרֵאשִׁית, at the creation; that this is the beginning of all things, the light of wisdom, שִׁבּוֹ נִבְרָא הַכֹּל, *ὁ ἰ οὖ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο*, as the apostle says, John i. 3. Bechai in *Leg.* fol. 125. In *Beresh. Rabba all.* R. Samuel Bar Nachman says, that this light was with God; but R. Bechai (fol. 89, 4) teaches, that the same becomes incarnate through the will of God. Hence we

should prefer, were it necessary, to illustrate such words as these from the writings of the Jews, rather than from the Gnostic philosophy. In like manner a very recent interpreter of John's Gospel has explained the words *πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*, John iv. 24, in the sense in which the word spirit would be defined by philosophers at the present day: "God is a Spirit, *i. e.* his whole being is intellectual and moral perfection."² Is it then credible, that our Lord should have taught these philosophical precepts to the Samaritan woman? Indeed, the word was never employed by the Jews in this philosophical sense; nor does it so occur in any Greek writer.

III. There remains now the third cause of forced interpretations, which we have indicated above, and which we may dispatch in few words. The *context*, namely, as is in itself evident, is an important auxiliary in ascertaining the true sense of a passage, especially where there is any ambiguity in the words or forms of construction, any obscurity or novelty in the circumstances, or any neglect of the *usus loquendi*. Still, this principle requires unquestionably very great caution in the application

² "Sein ganzes Wesen ist Geistigkeit und Moralität."

of it, particularly in regard to writers who have not been trained in the rules of the schools, *καὶ οὐκ ἐν διδακτοῖς ἀνδρωπίνης σοφίας λόγοις λαλοῦσιν* and more than all, in epistolary writing, where often an argument is not carried out in such a way, that all its parts are entirely coherent. This indeed is not usual in epistles of any kind. There is commonly in a letter a great variety of topics, some of which are treated in one way, and some in another. When therefore interpreters have trusted too much, or indeed wholly, to this principle, and have been contented to make out a sense in some degree suitable to the context, and to seek every where a dialectic congruity and a sort of logical arrangement; it could not be otherwise than that they should often advance empty conjectures instead of true interpretations, and torture passages of Scripture until they could elicit from them some similitude with the general series of discourse. This however is of itself obvious; and therefore requires here no further illustration.

We come then to the conclusion, for the sake of which this discussion was instituted.

USE OF THE PARTICLE

"I N A

IN

THE NEW TESTAMENT.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE TRANSLATOR.

A SOMEWHAT familiar acquaintance with the writings of Professor Tittmann has brought me to regard him as one of the most able, sober, and impartial critics on the language of the New Testament that Germany has of late produced. He has left nothing behind him which I have seen, that will not abundantly repay perusal, and even study; which is more than can be truly said of most writers, in any age or country.

It requires indeed, some knowledge of criticism, in order to understand and relish the works of this writer. But those who have such

knowledge, will employ their time in a very profitable manner by studying them. Acuteness, sound judgment, uncommon powers of nice discrimination, together with grammatical and exegetical tact, abound in them all. The student who aims at solid philological acquisition, such as the present times demand, should number the works of Titmann among his textbooks.

Sacred literature has, not long since, been called to mourn the too early death of this distinguished critic. The piece which follows is a posthumous publication ; as the title indicates. The importance of the subject which it discusses, can hardly be appreciated in a proper manner, at first, by a cursory reader ; and it may therefore be proper, to premise a few things in the way of explanation.

The use and signification of the *particles* in Greek, once a subject of little interest and attention among lexicographers and grammarians, has come at length, and very justly, to occupy a high and commanding place in criticism. One important ground of preference, which the great lexicon of Passow has over all other Greek lexicons, is the special attention that the author of it has paid to the develop-

ment of the powers and uses of the Greek particles. The old work of Hoogeveen on this subject, which occupies many hundreds of quarto pages, contains a great mass of matter, and is the result of more than Herculean labour. But the critical student finds, after all, so little of order, method, philosophy of language, nice grammatical discrimination, and other qualities of this nature now so imperiously demanded by the present state of Greek criticism, that he is apt soon to grow weary of consulting this *Thesaurus*. Good use may be made of it, however, in the selection of examples, by a student who already possesses the power of discrimination; but Hoogeveen would hardly be a safe guide for one who has yet to acquire such a power.

Devarius *on the Greek Particles*, is a small work. It has, however, some claims to respectful mention. The larger work of Vigerus *de Idiotismis Ling. Graecae*, is well known even in this country, and has become common, particularly by means of the abridged form in which it has lately appeared in England. Hermann, in his German edition of the work, has made many important corrections, and supplied some new and important matter. But after all,

the new patches will hardly suit well the old garment, in this case. The real fact is, that Vigerus, like Hooegeveen, has become in a measure antiquated. The old manner of dividing and subdividing the meaning of words, (until, by ramification which is almost without measure or bounds, the sight of the original meaning of the word and the proper ground of its derived significations are wholly obscured or lost), is the one which Vigerus follows throughout. In this way, one might almost say, it is easy *deducere aliquid ex aliquo*. So has Schleusner often done, in his lexicon of the New Testament; which still is a work that contains much that is valuable. An erroneous taste in matters of this kind, was introduced by a few such works as Hooegeveen, Vigerus, and others of similar character, which greatly injured most of the later lexicographers and critics in regard to their method of treating the Greek particles, until within a few years. A very different school is now rising up under the influence of such works as those of Passow, Hermann, Matthiae, Butmann, Winer, and others; which bids fair to throw more light upon the long neglected subject of those little

words, that have often and appropriately been named *the joints and bands of discourse*.

On the use of a *particle* very often depends the whole turn and mode of a writer or speaker's meaning or reasoning; yea, the main object of the discourse itself. For an example let us take the word *ἵνα*; of which Tittmann has so copiously, ably, and satisfactorily discoursed, in the following pages.

The evangelist Matthew, in chap. i. 18-21, gives an account of an angel's prediction in respect to the supernatural conception and the birth of Jesus, and also of the reason assigned by the angel why the Saviour's name should be called *Jesus*. At the close of this account the evangelist adds: "Now all this was done, *ἵνα πληρωθῆ τὸ ῥηθὲν κ. τ. λ.*, *that it might be fulfilled* which was spoken of the Lord, by the prophet, saying: Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a Son," etc. This is one form in which *ἵνα πληρωθῆ* may be translated, and is translated in our common version. But here, and in many other of the like passages, a serious and very important question arises, viz., whether the phrase *ἵνα πληρωθῆ κ. τ. λ.* is not susceptible of another translation, and one which is justified both by the nature of the

case and by the signification of the particle *ἵνα*. On this question depends the whole tenor or aspect of the evangelist's assertion. As it stands translated above, (which is the form of our common version), the meaning seems to be, that the greatest events which ever happened in our lower world, viz., the birth of Christ, and also the occurrences connected with it, all took place *in order that* or *for the purpose that*, the prophecy of Isaiah (vii. 14) might be fulfilled. But here the reflecting reader will be constrained to pause and ask: "What, then? Was it not to redeem a world in ruin, that the Saviour's miraculous birth and the events accompanying it took place, rather than merely to accomplish the prediction of Isaiah?" The proper answer to this question may undoubtedly be, that *both* of the purposes named were to be accomplished by the birth of Jesus. The world was to be redeemed, and prophecy was also to be fulfilled. But the *great* and *ultimate* end must be, THE REDEMPTION OF MANKIND. The other, viz. the fulfilment of the particular prophecy in question, was altogether *subordinate* and merely *preparatory*. It was indeed the design of heaven, that when a prediction had been uttered respecting the birth of a Sa-

viour and the manner of it, that nothing should be lacking in respect to the accomplishment of this prediction. But to suppose, that the great, the unspeakably important event of the incarnation of Jesus, was simply a fulfilment of a prophecy which designated the manner of his birth—would be a supposition which seems to cover with darkness the wise and benevolent purposes of Heaven in the redemption of man, and to limit them to the production of an event, which (although of high interest as a display of miraculous power) would be, or rather would thus be represented as being, of but little importance in other respects.

Yet if, as some critics strenuously maintain, *ἵνα* means and can mean only, *in order that, to the end that, for the sake or purpose of*, we seem to be thrown into all the embarrassment which such a representation would occasion. If the *telic* use only of this particle is an invariable and necessary idiom of the Greek, it is difficult to see what escape there can be from the conclusion, that the evangelist has reasoned, or at any rate expressed himself, in such a way, that we must necessarily educe from him the sentiment which has already been stated above.

If the reader is at any loss to know what

the *telic* (τελική) use of ἵνα means, he may at once be satisfied from such examples as the following : τί ποιήσω, ἵνα ἔχω ζωὴν αἰώνιον ; “ What shall I do, *in order that*, or *to the end that*, I may have eternal life ? ” Ἐπεισαν τοὺς ὄχλους, ἵνα αἰτήσωνται Βαρῶβαββᾶν, “ They persuaded the multitude, *in order that* they should make request for [the release of] Barabbas.” Here, and so in most cases, ἵνα is *telic*, *i. e.* it points to the *end* or *object to be attained*, viz. attained by that which is related as said or done in the context which precedes it. This use is so frequent, that the reader may every where find examples to the purpose.

But is ἵνα limited to this sense only ? A question which is answered in a satisfactory and masterly way, in the following pages. I cannot but believe and trust, that this question is now put to final rest, by this effort of Tittmann.

The amount of what he has here done, is to shew that ἵνα not unfrequently, even in the *classics*, bears the same sense as ὥστε, viz., *so that*, *quo fit*, or as ὡς, *that*. If this be satisfactorily made out, then it follows, that we may translate ἵνα πληρωθῆ ἧ κ. τ. λ. by the phrase *so that there should* or *might be an accomplishment* :

so that [this or that prediction] *might* or *should* be fulfilled, etc. Let the reader who wishes to consider this subject duly, consult and carefully examine and weigh the following passages, where such a formula is employed; viz. Matt. ii. 15, (23); iv. 14, (viii. 17; xii. 17; xiii. 35); xxi. 4; xxvi. 56; xxvii. 35 (in the text. recept.); Mark xiv. 49; John xii. 38; xiii. 18; xv. 25; xvii. 12; xviii. 9; xix. 24; xxviii. 36. The instances included in parentheses, have ὄπωψ instead of ἴνα, which is an equivalent. These and the like passages will shew, that the use of ἴνα in the sense of *so that*, *that*, must almost of necessity be conceded. Tittmann, however, has done all which needs to be done, to show that this use may properly, and often must be conceded.

This secondary use of ἴνα in the sense of ὡστε, is technically called *ecbatic* (ἐκβατικῆ) i. e. that which designates *the end* or *event which is actually accomplished*; from ἐκβαίνω or ἐκβασις). The difference between the *telic* and *ecbatic* sense of ἴνα, e. g. in the example taken from Matt. i. 22. above, is so great, that an entirely different turn is given to the whole sentiment by means of it. If we say: *All this took place,*
IN ORDER THAT *what was spoken by Isaiah*

might be fulfilled, this is representing the events themselves that are spoken of, as taking place in subordination to the prophecy, and merely or principally in order to fulfil it. But if we say: *All this took place, so THAT the prediction by Isaiah was, or should be, fulfilled*, then we merely affirm that the *modus* of the events was such, that a fulfilment of prophecy was accomplished by it; while at the same time, the events themselves might have an unspeakably higher end in view.

To such importance do some words, often reputed small and unimportant, frequently rise. This may serve, then, to cast strong light on the bad consequences which ensue, by negligence of lexicographers and critics with respect to such words;—a practice frequent indeed, but deeply to be lamented, and deserving of most serious disapprobation.

I must make one remark more on the formula ἵνα πειληρωδῆ, in regard to its *ecbatic* use. It has been questioned, whether the Subjunctive mode after ἵνα can be rendered in any other way than as having a *future* sense. The answer to this might be, that the *Present* and *Aorists* of the Subjunctive, as is now fully conceded by the best grammarians, *do not of*

themselves mark any tense, but depend for their sense in this respect, on the Indicative which may precede them, or on the sense demanded by the nature of the passage. Such, indeed, is the fact with all the derived or secondary modes, viz., the Opt., Imper., and Infinitive. See N. Test. Grammar, § 51. 2.

The student, then, who becomes satisfied of the *ecbatic* use of ἵνα, might translate ἵνα πλ.η.ζ.ω.θ.ῆ by the phrase, *so that there was an accomplishment ; so that it was fulfilled, which* etc. This many have done. But although it seems to be *grammatically* lawful to do so, yet it is unnecessary, in this case, to depart so far from the more usual and classical sense of ἵνα. Thus much can be safely averred, viz., that the accomplishment of prophecy, whether viewed as an *event* (*i. e.* viewed *ecbatically*), or as a *purpose* or *end* (*i. e.* in a *telic* way), was still something *future*—in the order of things and in the mind of the writer—to the events themselves which happened. *Fulfilment*, at least in the order of our conceptions respecting it, *succeeded* the events by which it was brought about. It is therefore nearer to the natural order of thought, in the present case, to translate ἵνα πλ.η.ζ.ω.θ.ῆ by the phrase, *so that it might or should be fulfilled, which* etc.

I apprehend, moreover, that such a mode of translation expresses, more nearly than the other proposed method, the true sense of the original Greek. The writer means to say, if I rightly understand him, that it was so ordered on the part of heaven, that the events of Jesus' birth should fulfil the prophecy of the Old Testament. *Design* or *purpose* I cannot think to be wholly left out of sight or excluded. But to say that the *telic* use of *ἵνα* here is *exclusive*, would be to affirm a position little short of monstrous. On the other hand, to affirm that the *modus in quo* of Jesus' birth was so arranged on the part of heaven, as that it fulfilled the prediction of Isaiah, is a very different thing, and is the very one, I apprehend, which the evangelist meant to assert. Accordingly, when we translate *ἵνα πληρωθῆ* by the phrase, *so that it should be fulfilled*, or *so that it might be fulfilled*, we give, as nearly as our language will permit, the true sense of the original.

If I have succeeded in making the reader understand the main object of Prof. Tittmann in the following dissertation, I trust he will have the patience to read, or rather to study him through, with care and diligence. To speak of *patience*, indeed, when such efforts as this are presented to our examination, is almost

to abuse the word. The spirit of a philologist will drink in the whole, as a delicious draught which quenches a thirst long felt, but perhaps never before fully satisfied.

I add only, that the *ecbatic* use of *ἴνα* was first seriously called in question, I believe, by Lehmann, (ad Lucian I. p. 71). Fritsche next contended against it, in Excursus I. ad Comm. in Matt.; then Beyer, in Kritsich. Journal, IV. p. 418, seq. Winer, in his N. Test. Grammar, edit. 3d, p. 382, admits the possibility of the *ecbatic* use; but he contends that it has been carried a great deal too far; and he denies that it is admissible in the formula *ἴνα πληρωθῆ*, p. 385. He says that the meaning may be thus given: "God has foretold that this should happen; and since the divine predictions must be true, it could not be otherwise than that this should take place." But, admitting that all this is implied in the formula *ἴνα πληρωθῆ*, still this meaning is not at all excluded by the *ecbatic* sense of *ἴνα*. At the same time, to suppose the *telic* use of *ἴνα* in all the cases where this formula occurs, would be making a supposition of a state of ignorance as to the nature of language, or else of a state of mind among the evangelists and other sacred writers, that seems to me to be utterly

irreconcilable with that knowledge and illumination which they every where disclose. It would be representing the main object of the New Dispensation, of which the Old was a mere type and shadow, to be the accomplishment of predictions and types and symbols, rather than the redemption of a world. So much does the sense of the so called *little* words influence the meaning of the Scriptures. Let the reader of the New Testament beware how he deems any word of it to be *little*; and let him learn duly to estimate such efforts as the following, which settle long contested and doubtful questions, with which the meaning of many an important passage of Scripture is intimately connected.

I have only to add, that in translating the following pages, I have, for the sake of perspicuity, used the liberty of breaking up the *protracted* paragraphs (so common among the German writers), and followed, greatly to the prejudice of lucid exhibition and much to the annoyance of the reader, even by Titmann. In some cases I have divided one sentence into two, three, or even four, for the same reason. I have omitted some few remarks made by the author merely *ob iter*, which are in a good measure foreign to the discussion, and of no

advantage in order to understand it. The Greek which Tittmann has quoted in full, without any translation, I have quoted in the text only so far as the citation of the Greek words bears directly on the purpose of illustration; but I have thrown the *original* into the margin. Not having all the original authors at hand, and many of the passages quoted being taken out of context important to its illustration, I do not feel quite certain that I have in all cases given the exact shade of meaning as to every word; but if I have failed here, the reader will receive no prejudice from it, so far as the object of the following essay is concerned. The illustrations are still plain, intelligible, and valid, whether all the words that are more distantly connected are very exactly rendered or not.

There are, after all, some few places of the Latin original of Tittmann to which I shall advert in the notes, that I am not sure I understand. The *words* I can easily translate in a literal way. But the reasoning of the author seems to be expressed in terms, that will not appear, at least to most readers, as being very intelligible. Perhaps the fault is in me, and not in the author. If it be so, the reader, by recurring to the original, may correct me.

I have given a *free* translation, in order to bring the costume of the piece as near to the English fashion as might safely be done. In some cases I have added epexegetical clauses, in order to render the meaning more plain to the cursory reader. In no case have I willingly or consciously departed from the meaning of the original, or withheld any thing important to the object of the piece.—TR.]

USE OF "INA IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

It is now generally conceded, that the *usus loquendi*, although not destitute of some fixed and certain principles, has a very free scope in every language. But though the most learned philologists teach us, that a great part of the hermeneutic art consists in paying a proper attention to this, yet I have often wondered how it should come about, since it is universally allowed that the *usus loquendi* is diverse not only at different times when a language is a living one, but even among individual writers, that still, in those very books which of all are the most diligently studied, many things should yet be found which seem to be dubious and uncertain.

Of late, the interpreters of the New Testament are all agreed, that for the explanation of particular words and phrases in a manner that accords with the sense of their authors, neither the most sharp-sighted search after Hebraisms, nor comparison of the Alexandrine Version, nor the somewhat dubious discovery of Hellenism, suffices. Many, however, and even some lexicographers well versed in making out the signification of particular words, either regard the *usus loquendi* of authors belonging to a golden age as their only standard, or, like a ship upon the rocks, they stick fast upon grammatical precepts. In this way it comes, since no meaning of a word seems to them to be correct unless it is one which can be found in the best writers, that they either find much fault, in their commentaries on the New Testament, with the *usus loquendi* of the sacred writers, or they leave the true sense in doubt; while some appear to teach, with more caution, that this and that word has *properly* only this and another meaning, but yet in such and such a passage it has actually a somewhat different sense. As this must often happen, inasmuch as idioms are frequently blended in the *usus loquendi*, so it will be particularly frequent in those parts of

speech whose sway in every language is somewhat unlimited, and whose interpretation is very difficult. I refer now to the particles, the use of which in the N. Test. seems to differ so much from the manner of the best classical writers. There is so great an affinity, or alliance (*logical* we may call it), between many *particles* that, although their meaning cannot be changed into that of an opposite kind, and although those who write and speak with accuracy ought nicely to distinguish them, still they may, without committing any error, be exchanged in accordance with the different methods in which a subject is conceived of.

As I have been lately engaged in writing upon the Synonyms of the New Testament, it is my present intention to say something concerning certain *synonymous particles*; respecting the use of which in the New Testament, all know that a great contest has existed among the interpreters of the sacred books, which is not settled even at the present time.

The particles to which I now refer, are,

“ Ἰνα · ὅπως · ὡς · ὥστε.”^a

^a All these Tittmann treats of and compares together; but the design of the present essay is merely to treat of Ἰνα,

I have no apprehension that any one will affirm the signification of these particles to be so different, that they can never be regarded as synonymous. "Ἰνα designates the *end* or *cause* on account of which any thing takes place; ὅπως suggests to the mind the *manner* in which any thing is accomplished; ὡστε denotes the *event*, because the particle ὡς is properly employed in the *comparison of like things*, and therefore ὡστε designates an *event* or *effect* which is in accordance with the nature of some antecedent. Now the notions *design*, *end*, *manner of accomplishing the end*, and *of the event itself*, are so related that, as in fact we can scarcely distinguish them in thought, so in speaking they are easily commuted for each other. This, then, is the very reason why they are sometimes to be reputed as synonyms; for unless they agreed in some meaning common to all, they could not be exchanged for each other. Inasmuch, moreover, as this is the nature of synonyms, that they refer a common notion of the same thing to different modes of it, it follows that conjunctions also, which designate the various modes of the same condition in

which involves by far the most interesting questions and the greatest difficulties.—TR.

which two things associated are conceived of, ought to be regarded as synonymous.

The conjunctions of which I speak agree in this, viz., that they designate connexion, *i. e.* *causal* conjunction; for they unite the notions of two things, the one of which is regarded as being a *cause* of the other. But as in every proposition a subject is connected with some predicate; so in those sentences in which a *causal* connection of two things is indicated, it is in such a way, as that in one the cause of the other is suggested.

The manner of sentences which belong to this species, may be two-fold; for the *cause* may be conceived of as being in the *subject*, or as being in the *predicate*. If the cause is regarded as being in the *predicate*, then the conjunction indicates the thing, on account of which that which is conceived of as being in the subject either took place or might have taken place. But if the cause is regarded as being in the *subject* of the sentence, the conjunction indicates that the cause is in the subject *why* any particular thing did or could take place.^b

^b This is expressed with sufficient *abstractness*. The meaning is, that in a sentence with *ina*, etc., between its several parts, if the *subject* of the sentence indicates *cause*,

To my mind, the office of all the *causal* conjunctions seems to be only two-fold, viz. they either show that the cause of a thing is in the subject, or else in the predicate. Consequently if a cause is regarded as being in the subject, the conjunction indicates that the effect is in the predicate; but if the cause is regarded as being in the predicate, then what is done or effected is designated by the subject. Now since the cause must be conceived of as preceding that of which it is the cause, *i. e.* the effect, while the leading idea is still contained in the subject, it follows, that the cause which is regarded as being in the predicate, must be conceived of as the object on account of which the thing designated by the subject was either effected, or might or should have been effected.

then the predicate will indicate the *effect*, and the conjunction between them ($\gamma\alpha$) is adapted to this purpose. But if, on the other hand, the predicate indicates the *cause*, then the subject must exhibit the *effect*, and the conjunction must be adapted to designate such a connection between the two. The relation between the two parts is the same in the two cases, but the *modus* of it is different; for at one time the subject, for example, denotes *cause*, at another *effect*. Yet the *causal* relation designated by the conjunction, remains one and the same in both cases. Thus different *modes* of the same thing are expressed.—Tr.

All *causal* conjunctions therefore have, as before said, a twofold province, to which the various uses of these conjunctions, as enumerated by grammarians, are to be referred in respect to origin; for they designate either *the design*, or *the effect*, of the thing which is expressed by the subject.^c The end, moreover, or object to be attained, may be conceived of in a two-fold manner, viz., either as it is in itself, or as it is regarded in the mind of him who is supposed to have accomplished any particular thing. This last may be named *purpose, design, intent*, (*consilium*). These different modes of causation, then, those conjunctions, serve to express of which I am now to treat. Our first inquiry shall be directed toward

"INA.

It is a sentiment, common among almost all philologists and zealously defended, that *iva* is

^c This clears up the obscurity which rests on the preceding paragraphs, and shews that all conjunctions denominated *causal*, are used only in such sentences as denote that one thing is done, or happens, *in order that* something else may be accomplished, etc. ; or that one thing is done, or happens, *so that* another thing is accomplished. The first denotes purpose, (is *telic*) ; the second shews event itself, (is *ecbatic*). —Tr.

used by accurate writers, only $\tau\epsilon\lambda\iota\kappa\tilde{\omega}\varsigma$, *i. e.* to denote the *end* or *purpose* for which any thing is done. Consequently, when $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ is found to be employed (as it very often is) in the N. Test., in cases where end or purpose cannot be supposed to be designated, these interpreters betake themselves to this refuge, viz. that what was said $\tau\epsilon\lambda\iota\kappa\tilde{\omega}\varsigma$, is still to be understood and explained $\epsilon\kappa\beta\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\tilde{\omega}\varsigma$, *i. e.* in such a way as is declarative of *events* rather than of purpose.^d

The original ground of dispute respecting the sense of $\iota\upsilon\alpha$, may be found in the N. Test. formula, $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ $\pi\lambda\eta\eta\rho\omega\delta\tilde{\eta}$. In many passages, where something is said to have been done or taken place $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ $\pi\lambda\eta\eta\rho\omega\delta\tilde{\eta}$ $\tau\iota$, viz., so that such a prediction might be fulfilled, the nature of the case does not permit us to imagine that $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ can designate *design* or *purpose*; as if, forsooth, that which takes place, had been done or effected merely for the purpose of fulfilling the prophe-

^d It is not the object of Tittmann here to suggest the impropriety of explaining $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ in an *ecbatic* way; for the sequel is occupied with endeavours to establish the very point, that $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ may have and must often have an *ecbatic* sense. The practice which he here indirectly censures, is, that while many critics hold that the only sense of $\iota\upsilon\alpha$ is *telic*, they still give themselves the liberty to explain or interpret it as having an *ecbatic* sense. This *inconsistency* he reprobates, and shews it to be needless.—TR.

cy in question. In these and other passages of the N. Test., although they cannot help seeing that *ἵνα* does not designate purpose or design, yet they pertinaciously adhere to their favourite maxim, viz. that *ἵνα* never denotes *effect* or *event*, although it must still be explained (as they acknowledge) in an *ecbatic* way in such passages.^e

May I not now take the liberty to inquire, what can be the meaning of the assertion, that *ἵνα* never denotes any thing but design or purpose, when in passages without number it manifestly denotes *effect* or *event*? But still they say, 'that among good classical writers it is never ecbatic.' Although we should concede, now, this to be matter of fact, still I cannot perceive in what way it would prove *ἵνα* not to be so used among writers of another description, particularly since it is certain that many writers employ this particle in connecting cause with effect. In languages that are still living, it is easy to distinguish between elegant diction and that which is employed for the purposes of common life. Grammarians

^e The inconsistency charged on these interpreters is here made apparent. While they say that *ἵνα* has only a *telic* sense, they, after all, feel obliged to interpret it *ἰκβητικῶς*, and do so.

who make out the rules of our language, have accurately shewn how those German particles, *dass, damit, so dass, auf dass, um* (with the Gen. or Infin.), do differ from each other in cultivated usage, although all know that these particles are promiscuously employed, *i. e.* used in the same sense, in the daily intercourse of society, not only by the common people, but even by the learned. After all, such critics are unwilling to admit any meaning of Greek and Latin particles, which they do not find among the Attic writers of a polished cast, just as if the *usus loquendi* in any language were limited by the style of the learned and cultivated! In every language, this *usus* is more extensive in conversation than in books. We do not learn the copiousness of any tongue, nor its versatility, from writers of high cultivation merely, but from popular usage. Could examples now be produced of the daily conversation of the Athenians, who lived in the time of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes, I cannot doubt that we should find many words to have been in common use, which are at present reprobated by many philologists as contrary to the *usus loquendi*; and this merely because they are not found among the select few of elegant writers.

No one will understand me as speaking thus because I am desirous that our youth, who are employed in writing Latin or Greek, should make use of and imitate uncultivated writers. But still, when books of a later age, written by men whose *usus loquendi* was that of common life, are to be interpreted, to limit the signification of particles merely to the sense which is found in select classic authors, seems to me to savour of ill-timed rigidity.

If now we should concede that *iva*, in writers named *classical*, is commonly so employed that it denotes *purpose* or *design*, still that would not follow which is commonly affirmed, viz., that *iva* is not always employed to connect *event* or *effect* with cause. There are many writers even of the best stamp, the interpretation of whom would be much more facile, if we should not conclude in our own minds, that in good writers *iva* is never to be understood in an *ecbatic* way. I will not select an example from Archimedes (the only one which Hoogeveen has with confidence adduced, p. 524), although it is a very clear one; for I am apprehensive that the critics just named would disclaim him as an elegant writer. Nor will I choose another passage from Aristophanes (Plut. v. 91), which Hoogeveen has cited in a doubting

way; for there is no good reason why this may not be understood *τελικῶς*. But in this same Aristophanes I find several passages in which, if *ἵνα* be taken *εκβατικῶς*, the sense will appear more easy and agreeable. One may be found in *Vesp.* vs. 311, 312: τί με δῆτ', ὦ μελέα μῆτερος, ἔτικτες, "Ἴν' ἐμοὶ πράγματα βόσκειν παρ' ἐχθρῶν;" "Why, wretched mother, hast thou brought me forth, so that (*ἵνα*) I must take the trouble of procuring food?" The child does not complain that his mother bore him *with the intention* that he should perish by hunger, but that she produced him in such a miserable plight, that he must perish without food.

The same method of interpretation will apply to a passage in *Nub.* v. 58, where *Strepsiades* chides a boy who had *lighted up a drunkard-lamp* (*πότην ἤπτεν λύχνον*), *i. e.* one which would consume an immoderate quantity of oil. Δεῦρ' ἔλθ', says he, *ἵνα κλάης* plainly in the sense of the Latin, *Accede huc ut ejules*, *i. e.* "come here that you may howl," [or, in our vulgar idiom, "that you may have a crying-spell"]. The *design* of the lad's coming would not be this: but this would be the *consequence* or *event* of his coming. He commands him indeed to come, that he may scourge him; but in so saying, he indicates the event itself that would

follow, and not the reason why he gives the order [for the reason of this was the fault committed]. "Ἰνα therefore, in this passage, does not designate the idea of purpose or design, but of the *event* which would take place in case he should come. If, however, any one should think there is more of subtilty than of truth in this explanation, it will suffice to say, that Ἰνα is here employed so as not only to designate the purpose, but also the *event*.^f

In like manner may a passage of Euripides (Iphig. T. vs. 357, 358) be construed, where Iphigenia complains, that no ship has arrived which could bring Helen and Menelaus, ἵνα αὐτοῖς ἀντετιμωρησάμην, "that (ἵνα) I might have been avenged on them." She means to say, that if a ship had brought them, she might have taken vengeance for the wrongs done her at Aulis on their account. [The object or in-

^f There may be still a question, whether ἵνα in this case should not be regarded as telic, in reference to the *design* or *purpose* of him who gives the command. "Come here!" Why? "In order that I may scourge you and make you howl." This was no part, indeed, of the *boy's* purpose in coming; but was it not the end that was in view, in giving the command? The design of the *master* was to scourge the offending lad; and that design may therefore be indicated in the ἵνα κλάγης that follows. Tittmann appears to have felt, that the example is not of a decisive nature.—TR.

tention of the ship's coming, would clearly not have been to accomplish such a purpose. *Event* then, and not purpose, is here designated.]

After comparing many passages, it appears to me, that the signification of *ἵνα*, as indicating what would happen if something else had taken place, may be found in a special manner in those passages in which *ἵνα* is construed with the Preterite of the Indicative. Thus in Sophocles (Oedip. Tyr. v. 1389), we find *ἴν' ἦν τυφλός τε καὶ κλύων μηδέν*, "so that I was, or I might be, blind and dumb;" for immediately after, in v. 1392, we find him saying, *ὡς εἰδοίχα μήποτε κ. τ. λ.* Comp. Aesch. Prometh. Vinc. v. 155. [The conclusion here drawn is not plainly made out.]

Aristophanes (in Eccles. v. 152) says, "I could have wished that some of my friends had spoken what was most worthy of approbation, *ἵνα ἐκαθήμην ἡσυχός*, so that (*ἵνα*) I might have sat silent;"^g for if they had thus spoken, he would have held his peace.

Many passages of the same tenor are found in Demosthenes; from which the following

^g Ἐβουλόμην μὲν ἕτερον ἂν τῶν ἡθάρων λέγειν τὰ βέλτισθ', ἴν' ἐκαθήμην ἡσυχός.

may suffice. Contra Callic. p. 1273, " You might then have said to the father of the defendant, Tisias, why do you do these things? Are you constructing a gutter? Then the water will fall into our field; ἵνα, *so that*, if he had then desisted, nothing troublesome to you had taken place [ἦν Indic.] towards each other. . . . And surely you must shew that a gutter actually exists, *that* (ἵνα) you may prove the father to have done wrong, not in word only but in deed." ^h Pro Phorm. p. 958, 959, " These things you find fault with, instead of decorating and adorning them, ἵνα, *so that* they might appear [ἐφαίνετο Imperf. Indic.] most agreeable to those who give them, and to you who receive them." ⁱ Contra Androt. p. 599, " He says we ought to go before the Judges, if we believe these things to be true, *so that* (ἵνα) we might there risk being fined 1000 drachmas, in case we should be found guilty of false representations." ^k [Here we cannot

^h Τισία, τί ταῦτα ποιεῖς ἀποικοδομεῖς τὴν χαραδραν; εἴτ' ἐμπεισεῖται τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ χωρίον τὸ ἡμέτερον, ἢν, εἰ μὲν ἐβούλετο παύσασθαι, μὴδὲν ὑμῖν δυσχερὲς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἦν. . . . καὶ νῆ Δί' ἐπιδιδῆξαι σέ γε πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις χαραδραν οὔσαν, ἵνα μὴ λόγῳ μόνον, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ τὸν πατέρα ἀδικοῦντα ἀπέφαινες.

ⁱ Ταῦτα, ἀντὶ τοῦ κοσμεῖν καὶ περιστέλλειν, ἵνα καὶ τοῖς δοῦσιν ὡς εὐσχημονέστατα ἐφαίνετο, καὶ τοῖς λαβοῦσιν ὑμῖν, ἐλέγχεις.

^k Καὶ φησὶ δεῖν ἡμᾶς, εἴπερ ἐπιστιόμεν εἶναι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, πρὸς

suppose the meaning to be, that they would go before the judges *for the sake of* being fined, but that such would be the consequence, in the case stated.]

Of the like tenor is the passage in Plato (Euthyd. p. 403), "And truly, said he, that was worthy of a hearing. Why? said I. ἵνα ἤκουσας, [Indic.], *so that* you might have heard men disputing, who are now regarded as peculiarly wise."¹ So in Protag. p. 335, "But it was well for you, who are prepared on both sides, to give place to us, ἵνα, *so that* we might keep company."^m Again in Menex. ad fin. "But that you should not complain of me, ἵνα, *so that* I may, on the other hand, relate [Subj. here?] to you her many and excellent remarks concerning political matters."ⁿ

τοὺς θεσμοθέτας ἀπαντᾶν, ἵν' ἐκεῖ περὶ χιλίων ἐκινδυνεύομεν, εἰ καταψευδόμενοι ταῦτ' ἐφαινόμεθα.

¹ Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, ἄξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι. Τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἵνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων, οἳ νυν σοφώτατοί εἰσι. [This is at least a very doubtful case. What forbids our understanding it as meaning, "For the sake of hearing men, etc."—TR.]

^m Ἀλλὰ σε ἐχρὴν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφοτέρα δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο. [This appears also to be a doubtful case. May not the speaker mean, *In order that we might keep company?*—TR.]

ⁿ Ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ κατερεῖς, ἵνα καὶ αὐθίς σοι πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους παρ' αὐτῆς πολιτικοὺς ἀπαγγέλλω. [ἀπαγγέλλω?]]

In all these passages, according to my apprehension, ἵνα is so employed as not to signify purpose but *event* or *consequence*. Even if I were to concede that ἵνα, when joined with the Opt. or Subj. mode, is so construed by the Attics, that for the most part it directly denotes the design of the thing which precedes, or the purpose of the agent, still I have no apprehension that the notion of *event* or *consequence* is every where excluded. Indeed these notions are so closely joined as easily to coalesce in one; for if we suppose any thing really to take place, we must necessarily suppose that something else was done, which if it had remained undone would have occasioned a failure as to its taking place; and this, whether it was done *purposely* to bring it about, or done only so that the taking place was a *consequence* of it.

Hence it comes, that the notions of a *final cause* (as it is named) and of an *efficient cause*, are not accurately distinguished in the language of common life; and therefore they are usually expressed in nearly the same way. Nor are passages wanting in Homer, in which ἵνα is employed, where he who speaks seems not only to designate a final cause, *i. e.* a purpose or design, but also an efficient one. We will

pass by examples of such a nature as the passage in Il. I. 202, Τίπτ' αὖτ', αἰγίόχοιο Διὸς τέκος, εἰλ' ἠλ' ουθας; ἢ ἵνα ὕβριν ἴδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρειίδαο; “Why art thou come, then, son of shield-bearing Jove? Is it that thou mayest see the disgrace of Agamemnon, the son of Atreas?” I merely remark, in passing, that the particle τίπτε, in Homer, very often is put into an inquiry which respects, not the design or purpose, but *the cause on account of which* a thing is done; *e. g.* in Il. II. 323. XI. 656. XII. 244, etc. A plainer example, however, may be found in Odyss. XIII. 157, “Put a stone near the land, like a swift ship [as to magnitude; *ἵνα*, so that all men will wonder, and a great mountain will overshadow their city.^o Here Neptune does not mean to say, that he would do this for the purpose of exciting wonder, but (as it is explained in v. 151) that “they may stop and cease from sending away men.”^p

It is unnecessary, however, for us studiously to seek after examples from ancient writers. It is evident enough, that authors subsequent to the time of Alexander have very frequently

^o —Θεῖναι λίθον ἐγγύθι γαίης, νηὶ θεῶν ἵκελον ἵνα θαυμάζωσι ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι· μέγα δὲ σφιν ὄρος πόλει ἀμφικαλύψαι.

^p —Ἴν' ἦδη σχῶνται, ἀπολλήξωσι δὲ πομπῆς.

employed *ἵνα* in an *ecbatic* sense. It may be proper to subjoin a few examples; not because any will doubt, who are conversant with the later Greek writers, but because some suppose that only the Alexandrine interpreters have given to *ἵνα* such a meaning.

Marcus Antoninus (Comm. II. 11) says, "The Nature of the universe has neither committed any oversight nor missed its aim, through want of power or skill, *so that* (*ἵνα*) happiness and misery should come alike to the good and bad without any distinction."⁹ Again in VII. 25, "All things which thou beholdest, the Nature which regulates the universe changes, and other things she makes from their substance, *so that* (*ἵνα*) the world is always new (*νεαρὸς, young*)."¹ In the memorable passage (XI. 3), where he describes the man who is ready to die, he says, "The readiness is this, *that* (*ἵνα*) it comes from his own choice, and not from mere party spirit, like that of the Christians, but in a rational way, with serious-

⁹ Ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις οὔτε παρεῖδεν οὔτε ἤμαρτεν ἤτοι παρ' ἀδυναμίαν οὔτε παρ' ἀτεχνίαν, ἵνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐπίσης τοῖς τε ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς πεφυρμένως συμβαίῃη.

¹ Πάντα ὅσα ὀρᾷ μεταβαλεῖ ἢ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις, καὶ ἄλλα ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν ποιήσει, ἵνα αἰεὶ νεαρὸς ᾖ ὁ κόσμος.

ness, and so as to persuade others without any affectation of show.”^s

With Josephus this usage is every where to be found; *e. g.* Bell. Jud. IV. 3. 10, “ We have come into calamity so great, *that* (*ἵνα*) even our enemies must pity us.”^t

In like manner Justin Martyr (p. 504); “ In this way it will not be in your power, *that* (*ἵνα*) you should influence my choice.”^u Again in Ep. ad Zenam (p. 508), he says, “ He is said to be *ἀνόητος* [wanting in good sense], who is disordered in his intellect with respect to some peculiarity of deportment; *so that* (*ἵνα*) want of good sense may be characteristic, as well as simplicity.”^x

So in the epigrams of Agathias (Analect. III. 61); “ No one has ventured to look at your grinders, *ἵνα*, *so that* he should approach you in your dwelling.”^y

^s Τὸ δὲ ἔτοιμον τοῦτο, ἵνα ἀπὸ ἰδικῆς κρίσεως ἔρχεται, μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν, ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοὶ, ἀλλὰ λελογισμένως, σεμνῶς, καὶ ὥστε καὶ ἄλλοι πείθειν ἀτραγῶδως.

^t Πρὸς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν συμφορῶν, ἵνα ἡμᾶς ἐλεήσῃ καὶ πολέμοιοι.

^u Οὐχ οὕτως ἔσται σου τὸ δυνατὸν, ἵνα μου κινήσῃ τὴν προαίρεσιν.

^x Λέγεται δὲ ἀνόητος, ὁ κατ’ ἰδιωτισμὸν παρενεχθεὶς τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἢ ἢ τὸ ἀνόητον ἰδιωτικόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀφελές.

^y Οὐ τις ἀλοιοιτῆρας ἰδεῖν τέτληκεν ὀδόντας ὑμετέρας, ἵνα σοῖς ἐν μεγάροις πελάσῃ.

Sextus Empiricus says (Pyrrh. III. 60), "Hemlock is mingled with every portion of water, and is extended through the whole mass, *ina*, so that the mixture may thus be made."² [But is not this a dubious example? —TR.]

That the Alexandrine interpreters used particles with the greatest liberties, is very evident. Although they follow the original Hebrew very closely, and rarely use the *causal* forms of sentences which are unfrequent in the Hebrew, yet when לְ, כִּי, or לְמַעַן occur in a *causal* sense, they express them, (in the manner of the Hebrews,) promiscuously by *ina* or ὁπως, so as to denote either *design* or *consequence*. Of ὡστε they make very rare use. See and comp. Deut. xiv. 23, 29; xvii. 23; vi. 2; xvii. 19, 20. Prov. xv. 24. Josh. iv. 6. This last example exhibits *ina* in two different senses in the same sentence; "Ἰνα ὑπάρχωσιν ὑμῶν οὗτοι [sc. λίθοι] εἰς σημεῖον κείμενον διαπαντός· ἵνα ὅταν ἐξωτᾷ σε ὁ υἱός σου κ. τ. λ. [The first *ina* here means *in order that*, etc., corresponding to the Hebrew לְמַעַן תְּהִיָּה; the second means *so that*, etc., and *ina* ὅταν ἐξωτᾷ corresponds to כִּי יִשְׁאַלְוּךָ.]

² Ἐπιμίγνυται τὸ κώνειον παντὶ μέρει τοῦ ὕδατος, καὶ παρεκτείνεται αὐτῷ ὅλον ὄλα, ἵνα οὕτως ἡ κῆσις γίνηται.

See also and compare Ps. cxix. 71. Ezek. xxii. 12. Ps. l. 5. Amos ii. 7.

There is, however, no need of examples; for it is plain enough that the Alexandrine interpreters promiscuously express every kind of causal connection by those particles, whether cause strictly considered, or design, be signified by the Hebrew. This, although writing in a dialect which had many barbarisms, they could not do, unless common usage at that time had sanctioned it. Nor were these translators common men, but learned Jews who were acquainted with the vulgar Greek dialect.

In this way it may be made to appear less wonderful, that the idioms of the common spoken language should be found among the writers of the New Testament, especially in the free and undistinguishing use of the *particles*, in which the popular idiom differs most from that of the learned, who have either written classical works, or who have read and imitated them. And since this is so, it were much to be desired, that those who undertake to explain the idiom of the sacred books, would not only have due regard to the rules of syntax with respect to case, tense, modes, etc., but also to the *usus loquendi*, which is discern-

ible not merely in these matters, but also in the meaning of words, or in the logical use of them.

In view of preceding facts, then, I hesitate not to affirm, that in the books of the New Testament, not only *purpose* and *design* are connected by *ἵνα* with the object designed, but antecedent *cause* is also joined with its *effect* by the same particle; which therefore signifies both *purpose* or *design*, and *event*, *effect*, or *consequence*. That rule then, or maxim, of many interpreters of the New Testament, that *ἵνα* properly designates only design or purpose, but in one and in another place must still be interpreted ἐκβατικῶς, although it wears the appearance of refinement and nice distinction, seems to me to be erroneous; for if it is evident that *ἵνα*, in any particular passage, is so employed by the writer as not to express the purpose or design of the preceding action, but to denote event or effect, then is it certain that it does not here express design but *event*, *i. e.* it is *ecbatic*. Indeed it is matter of wonder to me, how it should be that many, who concede that the New Testament exhibits various significations of words peculiar to itself, and which are not found in classical authors, should still deny that the same thing takes place in regard

to the *particles*, and, in order to serve the rules of grammar, prefer making the unfounded distinction adverted to above, to admitting that *iva* has an *ecbatic* use. I concede that they may very properly distinguish what belongs to elegant usage, and may make comparisons; but in explaining the words of the New Testament we are to inquire, not what meanings other writers have given to the words, but what notions the sacred writers themselves have designated by them. Let it be granted, then, that the interpreters in question have fully shewn, that in no *classic* writer is *iva* used in the same sense as *ὡστε* (*so that*), yet this does not at all prove, that in the books of the New Testament and in others which like them were written after the golden age of the Greek, this participle is not used in an *ecbatic* manner. This proof can be made out only by shewing that *iva*, from its very nature, can not be employed to designate effect or event, which has never yet been done. Still they tell us, that in the New Testament *iva* must be *understood* and *explained* in the *ecbatic* way, while in fact it never has such a sense! What this means, I do not well understand. The office of words is merely to designate our ideas or notions of any thing which is the object of our thoughts;

and therefore it is erroneous to say that any word can be employed according to the mind of a writer in a certain sense, and yet that it does not mean what he intended to signify by it.

It is very different from this, if any one should say, for example, that the preposition ἐν in a certain place had the same sense as ἐν or πρὸς or ὑπὸ for the general notion which ἐν expresses, does not admit such a permutation. That often repeated distinction between the *sense* and *signification* of a word, cannot warrant us in the assignment of a meaning to any word to which its original nature is repugnant ; for its proper force and power is the very ground why it significantly designates any thing.

Moreover, that ἰνα cannot designate *event* or *effect*, no examples from the classics prove. Since also it cannot be denied, that other writers employ this particle in an eebatic way, it follows that it may designate event or effect. Nor do these several *causal* notions differ so much, but that the same particle may express the notions of purpose and end, and also of cause and effect. On this account, in almost all languages the use of such particles of design, etc., is much more extended by vulgar custom than in books written with special care ;

nor can we find fault with this, unless we can shew that there is something in the general idea of such a connection [i. e. of a *causal* one], as is repugnant to such a usage.

From all this we may safely conclude, that the *usus loquendi* of select classical authors who employ *iva* only in the *telic* sense, cannot prove that it is incapable of designating an *ecbatic* sense; for it is thus employed in other writers, times without number. The interpreters above mentioned may condemn such a usage, if they please, as being less accurate; I will make no objections to their so doing. But let them not venture on saying, that in the latter class of books *iva* is not employed *ἐκβατικῶς*.

Besides all this, I cannot doubt, if we had a better account of the origin of the particles and of their history, we should judge more equitably respecting the writers of the New Testament, in regard to the use which they make of them. For in the rude state of language, and before letters were cultivated, the use of particles was, no doubt, undefined and various. But when cultivation ensued, and practice in writing was added, this use was circumscribed within narrower bounds. Moreover, when the cultivation of literature declines or ceases, popular usage again usurps the place of principle

or rule, and ancient liberties are again allowed, and even more than these are taken. Such is the condition of all things human, that in their inceptive stages of existence, and before they have become objects of attention and cultivation, they labour under many imperfections; but still, even then they are in a more flourishing state than when they have become as it were superannuated, and are in a ruinous condition through lapse of time, and hastening towards final dissolution.

We come then to the general conclusion, that THE SIGNIFICATION OF ἵNA IN THE NEW TESTAMENT IS OF WIDE EXTENT, so that it not only designates purpose or design, but also *event* or *effect*; and thus it appears very nearly to resemble the German *dass* [that], and the Latin *ut*. There are passages even, where both notions are combined in thought; for when we think of any thing as done or to be done, the thought of the intention, or of the cause, or of the manner, is almost necessarily connected with it.

Conjunctions, moreover, should be referred to both parts of the sentence which they connect. Thus Mark xi. 25, εἴ τι ἔχετε κατὰ τινος, ἀφίετε, ἵνα ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν ἀφῆ ὑμῖν παραπτώματα ὑμῶν. The Saviour could not inculcate on his dis-

ciples the mere prudential duty of forgiving others, *in order that* they themselves might obtain forgiveness, (which would be quite foreign to real integrity and purity of mind); but he wished them to consider, that if they cherished an implacable spirit, they could have no grounds to hope for pardon from God; so that if they themselves were not ready to forgive, it was impossible they should obtain forgiveness.

In like manner in Rom. iii. 8, it is plain that the notion of cause and effect [*i. e.* the notion of such a relation], is comprised in the expression of the men there referred to: ποιήσωμεν τὰ κακὰ, ἵνα ἔλθῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ where some suppose that ἵνα has the sense of *quoniam*. The men in question, after the manner of the Jesuits, deprecate the blame of base conduct; for they allege that they are free from blame, not because they have sinned with the design that good might come, but because their ψεῦσμα (false or treacherous dealing) has been the occasion of making “the truth of God to abound;” v. 7, comp. Rom. vi. 1. “We may then do evil,” say they, “so that good will come.”

The whole dispute about the meaning of ἵνα, as before intimated, has arisen from those passages, in which something recently done is referred to some declaration of the Old Testa-

ment in the way of prediction. Let me illustrate my views, then, respecting this particular point, by an example taken from passages of this nature.

It will be conceded to me by all, that in passages of this character the notion of *design* or *purpose* is not properly admissible. This has taken place only where a thing which is done, is conceived of as done by the counsel or purpose of another; and this idea, as all must perceive, is alien from the passages which we are now considering. Nor does the notion of *end* or *object* any better accord with the nature of the thing; for who does not see, that it would be a most absurd declaration, in case we should affirm that those things which happened in the time of Christ, were all done in order that the predictions in the Old Testament might be fulfilled?

Let us briefly examine a few passages in Matthew. In Matt. i. 2, after the birth of Jesus is related, as announced to Joseph, it is added (v. 22), τοῦτο ὅλον γέγονεν, ἵνα πληρωθῇ τὸ ἐρηθὲν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν, κ. τ. λ. referring to Isaiah vii. 14. Shall we say now, that the Saviour was to be born merely that this prophecy might be fulfilled?

Again; in Matt. ii. 15, we are told, that Jo-

soph remained concealed in Egypt with Jesus, when the latter was a child, until the death of Herod, ἵνα πληρωθῆ τὸ εἰρηδέν κ. τ. λ. viz. so that what is said in Hosea xi. 1, might be fulfilled. The words of the prophet are not the object of my present consideration, nor shall I now inquire whether they were originally spoken in reference to Jesus or to the Jewish people; for it is quite certain that the end proposed by Joseph, and to be accomplished by staying in Egypt, was not the fulfilment of prophecy.

Was it true, moreover, that Christ came and dwelt for some time at Capernaum (Matt. iv. 13), *in order that* what Isaiah viii. 23; ix. 1) had said might be accomplished? The like may be said of Matt. xxi. 4; xxvi. 56.

In Mark the formula under examination is employed but once, viz. in xiv. 9. Luke uses it neither in his Gospel nor in the Acts. In John it is most frequently employed, and it occurs xi. 38; xiii. 18; xv. 25; xvii. 12; xviii. 9; xix. 24, 28, 36.

From all these passages it may be most clearly seen, that the particle ἵνα does not signify design or purpose, when it refers even to the most explicit prophecies; nor was there any need, in the interpretation of these passages, that critics should take refuge in the

double meaning of the particle ἵνα in them, because they apprehended that all the passages of the Old Testament to which an appeal is made, are not real and veritable *predictions*. Uniformly the design is, *to declare the agreement between the event and the declarations of the Jewish Scriptures.*

But the use of ἵνα in an *ecbatic* way is not confined to declarations of this kind only. There are many passages in which the notion of design or purpose has no place, inasmuch as it would make the writer speak absurdity. Many passages of this nature occur in John. It is usual with him, when he assigns causality to any particular thing, to conjoin the *effect* with the *cause* by the use of ἵνα. It is even occasionally employed in both its senses in the very same sentence. *E. g.* i. 7. “The same came for a witness, ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ, *in order that* he might bear testimony concerning the light, ἵνα πάντες πιστεύωσι δι’ αὐτοῦ, *so that* all might believe through him.” Here the first ἵνα declares the immediate purpose of the witness; the second, the ultimate object brought about by his testimony. Comp. 2 Cor. ii. 9; Rom. ix. 17; John xviii. 37.^a Xen. Cyrop. II. 5. 2. So in

^a Here, however, it may be doubtful whether ἵνα has any thing more than the *telic* sense. “For this cause was I

John xvii. 21, ἵνα ἐν ᾧσιν, ἵνα ὁ κόσμος πιστεύσῃ comp. vs. 23, 24, and John xv. 16.^b

I apprehend, also, that the ecbatic use of ἵνα obtains, in several passages, where interpreters have given themselves much trouble to make out the sentiment, and at the same time to insist on defending the *telic* use of ἵνα. E. g. John ix. 2; “Who hath sinned . . . ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῆ” *so that* this man should be born blind.” So John xi. 4, “This sickness is not unto death,] ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα δοξασθῆ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, but for the glory of God, *so that* the Son of God should be glorified.” The death of Lazarus had not this end in view; but it was

born, and for this end came I into the world, ἵνα μαρτυρήσω τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, *in order that*, to the intent that I might bear testimony to the truth:” this latter clause being expegegetical of εἰς τοῦτο, and being logically (although not in point of grammatical form) *co-ordinate* with it. The demands of exegesis are fairly satisfied by this. We do not suppose the Saviour to mean, that his coming had no other ends in view.—TR.

^b This last example, as the reader will see if he consult the original, affords one of the most indubitable cases where ἵνα must have the sense of *so that*. “Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you, ἵνα ὑμεῖς ὑπάγητε, *that* you should go forth and produce fruit, and your fruit should be perennial, ἵνα ὃ τι ἂν αἰτήσητε, *so that* whatsoever ye shall ask, etc.” Jesus did not ordain them, *for the end that* whatsoever they should ask they should obtain, but for the purpose of bringing forth much fruit.—TB.

the *occasion* of glorifying the Son of God. John xi. 15, " I rejoice on your account, (*ἵνα πιστεῦσητε*, so that you might believe), ὅτι οὐκ ἤμην ἐκεῖ, that I was not there." [Here the immediate object of joy is stated to be, that Jesus was not present at the death of Lazarus and *ἵνα πιστεῦσητε* is only a *parenthetic* declaration, epexegetical of what is designed by the clause, δι' ὑμᾶς.] The meaning is, that Jesus rejoices in the prospect, that the resurrection of Lazarus will be attended with the effect of confirming the faith of his disciples, John xi. 37, " Could not this man have brought it about, *ἵνα καὶ οὗτος μὴ ἀποθάνῃ*, that even this person should not have died?" John xi. 42. " On account of the multitude who stood by I said, *ἵνα πιστεῦσωσιν*, ὅτι σύ με ἀπέστειλας, so that they might believe [parenthetic exegetical declaration thrown in], that thou hast sent me. John xi. 50, " It is expedient, *ἵνα εἷς ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαοῦ*, that one man should die for the people." In the same manner is *ἵνα* employed in John xvi. 7; xvii. 3; 1 John v. 3; et al. saepe. The manner of these passages is indeed different; for in some, *ἵνα* is preceded by certain *events*, in others by the *cause*. Yet in all passages of this nature it is plain, that the notion of purpose or design is not expressed.

The same may be said of a multitude of passages in the writings of Paul; whose copious diction, which is often interrupted and almost overwhelmed by supervening thoughts, frequently seems to have employed some particle merely of a *similar* nature to that which might be most appropriate; for his fervent mind, it would appear, could not well brook the delay which a particular choice of words would occasion. As examples, the following passages may be consulted; Rom. iii. 19; iv. 16; v. 20, 21; vi. 1, 4, 6; vii. 13; ix. 11. comp. v. 19. and 31; xv. 6; xvi. 31, 32.

But more examples are not needed. It remains only, that I say a few things concerning two formulas of speech, which have not yet been discussed.

The first is that, *where* *ἵνα* *is put after verbs of asking, admonishing, commanding, and others which indicate some wish or desire.* This is very common in the New Testament. The critics before named deny that *ἵνα*, in these formulas, indicates *object*, and affirm that it designates *purpose, design, etc., viz., of him who exhorts, commands, etc.* *E. g.* εἰπὲς ἵνα παρεκάλεισαν ἵνα ἄψωνται they explain as meaning: ‘Command *for the purpose that* ;’ ‘they exhorted *for the end that* they might touch, etc.’ But be-

sides those things which Winer has already suggested against such a method of interpretation (Gramm. Fasc. II. p. 117, seq.), I may be permitted to adduce examples from the better sort of writers. I am aware that they aver the usage in question, viz. that of placing *ἵνα* with the Subj. mode instead of the Inf. mode after verbs of the kind named above, belongs only to the more recent Greek authors. This example only they admit from Homer: "Ἡ εἰθέλεις, ὄφρα' αὐτὸς ἔχῃς γέρας, αὐτὰρ ἔμ' αὐτῶς ἦσθαι δευόμενον; 'Or do you wish *that* yourself should have the reward, but that I should remain thus bereaved of it?' [Here ὄφρα stands in the like sense with *ἵνα*]. The later authors, they admit, have imitated this; see Hermann ad Orphica, p. 814. I will allow now, if they please, that among the better classic authors the usage in question is very rare; although in the later writers it is exceedingly common. Thus Nonnus, in his paraphrase of John, often employs ὄφρα in order to correspond with *ἵνα* in the evangelist; see his paraphrase of John vi. 7; xi. 15, 57; xvii. 15, 24, etc. Examples in point, however, may be found among the more accurate writers, viz. in Lucian, Dionysius Halicar. (Charit. III. 1. init.), παρακάλει δὲ Καλιρρόην, ἵνα αὐτῷ προσέλθῃ, 'he besought Calirrhoe *that* etc.,'

[instead of saying $\alpha\upsilon\tau\tilde{\omega}\ \pi\rho\sigma\epsilon\lambda\theta\epsilon\tilde{\nu}$]; see Schaefer ad Dionys. Hal. de Verb. Compos. p. 121. Hebraism, therefore, should not be sought after, in such constructions as these in the New Testament. With the Seventy, this idiom is exceedingly rare.

In passages of such a nature, now, I do not see with what reason they can deny that the *object* is designated by the particle $\tilde{\nu}\alpha$. Nor can the German *dass* or *damit* be well compared with $\tilde{\nu}\alpha$. The particle *dass* we do indeed employ in order to designate a *causal* connection; and therefore, when we mean to point out the thing which we seek after; but *damit* answers better to the particle $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$. After verbs of asking, commanding, admonishing, etc., we use *dass* in order that we may designate the thing which we desire, demand, etc. No one would say, "Ich bitte dich, *damit* du mir Brot gebest; ich befehle dir, *damit* du fortgehst, etc. . . . *Damit* denotes *purpose* or *design*; and this is its proper use; but in common parlance and in the Version of Luther, it has a more extended meaning. Still, it cannot be put after verbs of asking, etc. But the particle *dass* has so extended a meaning, that it corresponds to the Latin *ut*, and to the Greek $\tilde{\nu}\alpha$, $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$, $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$, and $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$.

The ground of such a construction seems to me to be this. When the thing we ask for, etc., can be expressed by a *noun*, that noun is put in the Accusative, for this is the proper office of the Acc., *e. g.* αἰτῶ ἄρτον Βούλομαι εἰρήνην. But if we cannot make use of a noun in this way, either because the sense would be imperfect or dubious, or because that which we ask for, etc., is something which consists in action or must be done, we either employ the Inf. mode or use some other equivalent *causal* construction. If we should say, ἐνετείλατο ἄρτον, or παρεκάλεσεν εἰρήνην, the sense which we mean to convey would be imperfect, for it would be, 'he wished that bread should be given or procured;' 'he urged that peace should be studiously sought for or made.' But to express this we should say, ἐνετείλατο ἄρτον ἀγοράζειν παρεκάλεσεν ἔχειν or ποιεῖν εἰρήνην. The Inf. is commonly employed here unless the relation of subject and predicate is or may be uncertain; which is to be known from the meaning of the preceding verb. But as there is certainty in respect to those verbs which signify *wish* or *desire*, the Greeks commonly employed the Inf.; for as to verbs of this sort, there cannot be any uncertainty that what one is said to will, that is the object of his wishes. The

more elegant classical writers, therefore, usually employed the Inf. ; but the later ones, even in those passages where it was unnecessary, used the particle *ἵνα* or *ὅπως*. On the other hand, even when the meaning of the Inf. would be somewhat doubtful, they still often employed it. Thus it came, that after verbs of asking, etc., the object asked for, etc., was expressed by the use of *ἵνα*. And this idiom occurs not merely in unlearned authors and those of the lower stamp, but also among those of an opposite character ; as is proved by the example of Lucian and others.

Even among authors of the higher rank, certain expressions occur, which seem clearly to develop the vulgar idiom in this respect. These are elliptical expressions, which have been taken from common parlance and transferred to books, and frequently occur in the dialogistic forms of speech.

I will not here appeal to the passage from Herodotus (I. 126), which Schaefer has adduced, viz., *τοῦ ἐσιόντος κ. τ. λ.*, although the words have the same construction ; for in this case there is no ellipsis. But I would adduce the formula : *τί θέλεις ποιήσω* ; in which they do not doubt that *ἵνα* is to be supplied ; comp. Matt. xx. 32. John xviii. 39, etc. I wish however

to know, in what way the idea of *purpose* or *design* is to be introduced.

Nothing is better known, than the construction of βούλομαι with the Future or Subjunctive; e. g. Aristoph. Ran. v. 420, βούλεσθε δῆτα κοινῆ σκώψωμεν Ἀρχέδημον; ‘Do you wish then, that we should make sport in common with Arche-demus?’ Aristoph. Equit. v. 52, βούλει παραδῶ σοι δόρυπον, ‘You wish me to present you with a supper.’ So very frequently in Lucian; Mort. Dial. X. 8, βούλει μικρὸν ἀφέλωμαι καὶ τῶν ὀφρῶων ‘You are desirous that I should take down arrogance a little.’ Dial. XX. 3, βούλει σοὶ ἐπι-δείξω καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς; ‘Do you wish me to shew you even the philosophers?’ Timon, 37, βούλει διαλόγισμαι (διαλογίσωμαι?) πρὸς σε; ‘Do you desire that I should talk with you?’ see Hemsterh. in loc. Deorum. Dial. XX. 16, βούλει ἀπομύ-σωμαι; ‘Do you not wish that I should take an oath?’

But there is no need of examples. A multitude of them occur in Xenophon and Plato; for, as it would seem, this elliptical mode of speaking was very common in conversation,^a

^a The ellipsis to which he refers here, is that of ἵνα after βούλει, etc., in the preceding quotations. βούλομαι expresses *desire* or *wish*, but does not indicate *ultimate purpose*, *end*, *final object*. In accordance with this, the author has intimated above, that all will see that ἵνα, if here inserted, would not be *telic*.—TR.

[viz. with the omission of *ἵνα*]; see Scholia ad Eurip. Phenis. v. 729. It seems to me now, that relics of popular usage are clearly discernible in this formula; but in this, as all will see, the idea of *end* or *purpose* is not expressed; see Hermann ad Viger. p. 884. But let us advance to the second particular.

ἵνα is said by some, to have a *chronic* sense, [i. e. to relate to time, or to signify *when*], in some passages of the evangelist John. E. g. John xii. 23, ἐλήλυθεν ἡ ὥρα, ἵνα δοξασθῇ κ. τ. λ. John xiii. 1; xvi. 2, 32. Nonnus has expressed *ἵνα* here by ὅτε, *when*. Grammarians have made the remark, that examples of this nature are found only in the sacred books of the New Testament. One passage is adduced from Aristophanes (Nub. v. 1235), καὶ ταῦτ' ἐδέλῃσεις ἀπομόσαι μοι τοὺς θεοὺς, "Ἴν' ἂν κελεύσω ἴγώ σε; ' Will you then be willing to take the gods to witness for me, as to these matters, *when* I shall demand it of you?' Here *ἵνα* may seem to mean *when*; and Henry Stephens, in accordance with an ancient lexicon, translates it *quando-cumque*.

But if we should concede now, that the particles significant of *place*, are often appropriated to the designation of *time*, (as is the case with the German *wo* and *da*, which an-

swer well to the *adverb ἵνα*), yet the construction of *ἵνα* with the Subj. mode, seems to stand in the way of its being taken *adverbially* [in the sense of *where*] in such passages. If *ἵνα*, moreover, referred to *place*, it would not be joined with the Subj., unless ἄν were inserted on which the Subj., would depend.

The passages which are adduced in our lexicons (e. g. Callim. Hymn. in Cer. v. 12. Hom. Il. vii. 353), in order to prove that *ἵνα* has such a meaning, are altogether inapposite. Two passages are also cited from Xenophon; but one of them in Memorab. II. i. 11, as emended, reads εἶναι τις μοι δοκεῖ, not ἵνα τις. In the other (De Venat. VI. 7), *ἵνα* is not *topic* but *telic*. I apprehend, therefore, that in the afore-cited passages of John, (elsewhere this sense is not assigned to *ἵνα*), this particle cannot have the meaning of *when* assigned to it. Nor do I find any passage in the New Testament, in which it means *where*. Consequently, in those passages I apprehend *ἵνα* is to be explained as indicating what is to happen in the ὥρα mentioned in John xii. 23. The Greeks usually employ the Inf. in such cases, e. g. καίρως καθεύδειν, ὥρα δειπνεῖν or else the Gen. case, unless perspicuity demands some periphrasis. John iv. 23 has ὥρα ὅτε so in v. 25; but in

v. 28, ὥρα ἐν ᾗ. But as we, in common parlance, when we designate the time in which any thing is to take place, sometimes employ particles of *place* and *time*, sometimes the relative pronoun, and sometimes the *causal* particle *that* (dass); as ‘the time is coming *wherein, therein, at which, that,* you will repent of it;’ so ὥρα ἴνα may be used in like manner, e. g. ‘the time is coming (when it will be) *that* etc.’ In the same manner the Latins express themselves. Nor is this destitute of a good reason, if we will only concede, (what examples from many writers prove), that ἴνα is not only *telic*, but likewise serves to indicate the thing which was the *consequence* of another, when a *causal* connection is conceived of as existing.

[The author closes his piece with adverting to the particular religious occasions on which it was delivered or published; which it is unnecessary here to insert, as it is not connected with the main object of the discussion. That parts of this discussion will not appear as being very explicit to the young reader, there is reason to apprehend. But there are so many things, and so important ones too, which he can understand, that I would hope he will not

be deterred from an attentive reading and consideration of the whole, by some paragraphs which may not appear to be sufficiently lucid. —[Tr.]

ON THE
FORCE OF THE GREEK PREPOSITIONS IN
COMPOUND VERBS,
AS EMPLOYED
IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

THE negligence and inconsideration with which lexicographers and grammarians in general have proceeded in assigning the force and significancy of the Greek particles, cannot have escaped the notice of any correct Greek scholar; and in no species of particles, perhaps, have these faults been more frequently conspicuous, than in respect to the prepositions. This would seem, at first view, the more surprising; since it is doubtless more easy to perceive and express the relations in which different things stand toward each other, which is the office of the preposition, than it is to explain the way in which an object of thought, or the act itself of thinking, stands connected with the

thinking mind, which is a principal use of the conjunction. There are, however, various causes, which have contributed to introduce confusion in respect to the force and use of the Greek prepositions. A principal one of these, no doubt, has been the circumstance, that where their power appeared to be somewhat uncertain, it has been customary to regard them as without any force, and pronounce them pleonastic. This has been very common among interpreters of the New Testament; who would seem almost to have been upon the watch for pleonasms, whenever any uncertainty or obscurity could be detected in the employment of prepositions. Hence the lexicons of the New Testament are filled with observations of this nature; and at the close of almost every article which treats of a preposition, we find the remark, "*haud raro redundat.*"

In regard, especially, to those prepositions which are compounded with verbs, it is a common and indeed a very general opinion, that such prepositions often do not at all affect the force of the verbs; and that therefore the force and meaning of a compound verb differs frequently in no respect from those of the simple verb. The source of this opinion is to be found, partly in a want of attention to the

niceties of language, and partly in the desire of avoiding some particular interpretations. Thus, in former times, when it was the fashion to look for an emphatic meaning in many verbs where there is none, the most false interpretations were not unfrequently brought forward on no ground whatever, except a certain supposed emphasis imparted to the compound verb by the accession of the preposition. Hence too it was, that other interpreters were led more decidedly to deny that the force of the verb was in all cases affected by the preposition; in many cases, at least they affirmed, no emphasis was to be sought in compound verbs. This was doubtless Ernesti's meaning, when he says,^a that "in Greek verbs we must take care not to suppose that any accession of meaning is *necessarily* made by the accession of prepositions, especially ἀνά, ἀπό, περί, σύν, ἐκ, περί, nor must we draw arguments from this supposed emphasis, as is done by many, and oftentimes very incongruously; inasmuch as use and observation sufficiently teach us, that these prepositions do not always affect the signification of the simple verbs, and indeed are very frequently redundant." The learned writer is

^a *Institutio Interp. N. T.* P. I. s. 2, c. 5, § 8. Stuart's Trans. § 168.

obviously here speaking of *emphasis*, which, it must be conceded, is not always produced by the prepositions. But still, the precept which he gives, is ambiguous ; for it is one thing to impart an *emphasis* ; another, to produce an *accession* to the force and meaning of the simple verb ; and still another, to *change* the meaning of the simple verb. It is this ambiguity, which seems to have led astray those who have since written on this topic ; especially Fischer, whose dissertation on the subject is devoid of every thing like fixed rule or settled principle.^b

It does not indeed require much study, to demonstrate by numerous examples, that prepositions in themselves *never* produce *emphasis*, and that they do not always *change* the signification of the simple verbs ; but it is more difficult to shew precisely what force such prepositions really have, either constantly or in certain circumstances. No one, so far as I know, has treated of this subject in such a manner, as to have reduced this part of grammar to certain and fixed laws ; and although individual authors have written on particular points with judgment and discrimination, still the subject of the Greek prepositions, as a

^b *Prologus, de Vitiis Lexicorum. N. T. Prologus. V. p. 119, sq.*

whole, has not yet been properly discussed, especially with reference to the writers of the New Testament. Some interpreters indeed, having adopted the opinion that the New Testament writers scarcely spoke the Greek language, and were at least total strangers to all its grammatical principles and laws, have not thought it worth their while even to look at the force of the particles, and more particularly of the prepositions; and hence it has arisen, that in most of the lexicons of the New Testament, the prepositions are treated of so ineptly and unskilfully. Another class of interpreters, supposing it to be the safest course to avoid a nice explication of every thing which they did not understand, or which seemed to them unsettled and indefinite, took refuge in pleonasm, and taught, with great confidence, that prepositions in composition with verbs are often redundant. This they did the more earnestly, because they recollected that many false interpretations and heterodox opinions rested for support solely on the emphasis alleged to exist in certain compound verbs, *e. g.* in *προσίζεῖν*, *προγινώσκειν*. Others again have admitted, that prepositions sometimes add no new signification to that of the simple verb, while yet they sometimes augment the latter; but

they have given no certain rules by which to distinguish, when the signification is thus augmented or when it remains unaffected.

Among the writers of this latter class, who are thus wavering and uncertain in regard to these particles, we may rank most of the ancient grammarians and scholiasts; who, when the force of a construction was not obvious to them, have not hesitated to declare, περιττήν εἶναι τὴν πρόθεσιν, “the proposition is redundant;” while yet, in other places, they have developed the force and meaning of the prepositions with far more subtlety than correctness. Thus, for instance,—to use the same examples which Fischer (l. c.) has adduced in support of his views,—the Scholiast on Aristophanes says of the verb παραιτησώμεθα, *ad Equit.* v. 37, περιττή ἢ παρά· ἔστι γὰρ αἰτησώμεθα, παρακαλέσωμεν. Πλεονάζουσι γὰρ καὶ ἐλλείπουσι ταῖς πρόθεσεσιν Ἀστικοί. “The παρά is superfluous; the verb is i. q. αἰτησώμεθα or παρακαλέσωμεν. The Attics often make pleonasms and ellipses with the prepositions.” But surely the preposition is never wholly superfluous in παραιτεῖν, and least of all in this place. Αἰτεῖν is simply *to ask for* any thing; but παραιτεῖν is so *to ask as to deprecate the opposite*; a meaning perfectly well adapted to this passage. The same

Scholias further says, *ad Plutum* v. 499, τὸ δὲ ἀνηρώτα ἢ περιπτῆν ἔχει τὴν πρόθεσιν ἢ δηλωτικὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ πολλάκις ἐρωτᾶν. “In ἀνηρώτα the preposition is either redundant, or else it indicates repeated questioning.” Fischer thought the first solution to be the true one, but incorrectly; for ἀνερωτᾶν is most appropriately employed in this place to mark *repeated* questioning, and not a simple interrogation (ἐρωτᾶν); as indeed the Scholiast explains it in the sequel. The same indefiniteness and want of consistency occurs in other grammarians, and even in Eustathius.^c This is certainly a grievous fault in the interpretation of any book; but ought to be more particularly avoided by an interpreter of the New Testament; inasmuch as the greatest care is here necessary, lest, by neglecting the real force and significance of the prepositions, either the sense should be deprived of its full weight, or at least the same idea should not be apprehended in the same manner as it was by the writer himself. From considerations like these, I have thought it would not be la-

^c Sop. 1039. 49. Προθέσεις παρέλκουσι ἐν παρενθέσει μηδὲν προστιθεῖσαι τῇ σημασίᾳ τῶν ἀπλῶν. ‘Prepositions are redundant in composition, adding nothing to the significations of the simple words.’ The contrary and more correct doctrine is given on p. 217, 18. 727, 19. 936, 48. 1553, 14.

hour lost, to give the subject a more careful discussion. But as the limits of this essay forbid a complete view, it will be proper to confine ourselves to a succinct exposition of the various ways in which the force of the prepositions is manifested in connexion with verbs.

Prepositions are usually connected with verbs in a threefold manner. They are either subjoined to the simple verb as a compliment, as ὀρμαῖν ἐπί τι,—or they are compounded with the verb, as ἐφορμαῖν,—or they are subjoined to a verb already compounded with the same or another preposition, as ἐφορμαῖν εἰς πόλεμον, ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας. The plan of this essay includes neither the first nor the last of these modes of expression; but only the second, in which the prepositions are so joined with the verbs, as to form with them one compound word.^d It will be proper, nevertheless, to pre-

^d One of the writers who has done most justice to the subject of prepositions in composition, is Abresch *ad Cattieri Gazophyl. Graec.* p. 60. But he appears not to have been sufficiently aware, that the different force which the *same* preposition exhibits when compounded with different verbs, arises out of the signification of the verb with which it is thus connected, while the preposition itself always retains its own proper force and significancy. I prefer to subjoin here some examples from Catier himself, in order the more clearly to illustrate my meaning; since in the text I have discussed the subject only in general terms.

mise a few remarks upon those other methods of connexion; because from the first of them we learn the cause why prepositions are connected with verbs at all; while from the third

Ἄμφί, according to Cattier, denotes in composition, *circum*, as in ἀμφιβάλλω, and also *dubitation*, as in ἀμφισβητέω. But in both these instances ἀμφί has its own proper signification; it denotes strictly, *utrimque*, *on both sides*, *on either hand*, as does also the adverb ἀμφίς. Hence ἀμφισβητεῖν is *to go or tend towards one side and the other*; as ἀμφιβάλλειν is *to cast on either side*; whence ἀμφίβολος, *wounded or attacked on both sides*, (Thucyd. 4. 32,) metaph. *fluctuating*, *dubious*, *uncertain*; and so also ἀμφιβάλλειν, *to fluctuate*, *be in doubt*. The reason why ἀμφισβητεῖν signifies *to be in doubt*, lies not in the preposition, but in the verb; for every one who is in doubt, inclines or tends first to one side and then the other, so long as he has not decided what to do.—We might affirm, with the same right, that ἀμφί signifies *defence*, as in ἀμφιβαίνειν, e. g. ὃς Χρῦσιν ἀμφιβέβηκας and other examples; but this no one would tolerate.—The proper signification of ἀμφί then is *utrimque*; and when this preposition is joined in composition with verbs, it superadds this sense to the idea expressed by the verb. Thus νοεῖν is *to think*, and ἀμφινοεῖν is *so to think that the mind wavers on one side and the other*, i. e. *to doubt*. The Scholiast on Sophocles therefore is incorrect, when he says *ad Antig. v. 376*, ἀμφινοῶ περισσὴ ἢ ἀμφί, ‘the ἀμφί is redundant.’ The author of the *Etymologicum* is therefore also wrong, when he says that ἀμφί and περί are synonymous; for περί is properly *circa* or *circum*, *about*, *around*. It therefore not only superadds a far different sense from that of ἀμφί to verbs with which it is connected; but it also not unfrequently simply augments or gives intensity to compre-

we may most clearly perceive how inconsiderately, in phrases of this sort, the lexicographers have so often recurred to pleonasm.

It is the nature of verbs, that they neces-

sarily attend to the meaning of the simple verb : because the simple action expressed by the verb is made, by the addition of *περί*, to comprehend as it were the *whole* of the object, as being affected on every side and in all its parts. Thus, as *ἀμφοιοῦν* is *to think waveringly*, so *περιοιοῦν* is *to think carefully, to consider on all sides, to excogitate* ; and *περίνοια*, *solertia, ingenuity*. Hence also both these prepositions are united with one verb, as *ἀμφιπεριπλάζουσθαι*, *to wander about hither and thither*, Orph. Lith. 80 ; and *ἀμφιπεριστροφῶν*, Iliad. VIII. 348, comp. Eustath. 716, 49 ; *ἀμφιπεριφθινύθειν*, Hom. Hymn. Ven. 271. In like manner they are also sometimes used together as separate prepositions ; e. g. Iliad. II. 305, XVII. 760, comp. Eusth. p. 1126, extr.

'Από in composition, Cattier says, signifies *negation*, as *ἀπόφημι* *despondency*, as *ἀπειπεῖν* *acquittal*, as *ἀποψηφίζειν* *completion*, as *ἀπεργάζεσθαι*. Abresch adds other significations ; but that which he first subjoins, (in *ἀπειναι*, *ἀποκοιμᾶσθαι*, *ἀποκρύπτειν*, etc.) he ought to have marked as being properly the primary and common sense of *ἀπό* in composition. In *ἀπόφημι* it is not the preposition that denotes *negation*, but the whole verb ; he who denies or refuses a thing, declares that thing to be remote from his mind or will (*ἀπονεύει*.) On the other hand, *κατάφημι* is *to affirm, to assent*, (*κατανεύειν*,) to annex or superadd, as it were, one's own views or feelings to a thing. So also *ἀποψηφίζειν* is *to set any one free by vote* ; not because *ἀπό* denotes *acquittal*, but because *ψηφίζειν* and *ψηφίζεσθαι* signify *to give one's suffrage concerning any thing* (*περί τινος*) ; and therefore, as *καταψηφίζειν τινά* is *to condemn by one's suffrage*, (*ψηφίζειν κατά τινος*),

sarily connect the notion of the thing which they express, with the conception of some other thing, which may stand to the former in the relation either of cause or effect. To point

so ἀποψηφίζειν τινά is to *acquit by suffrage*; because he who is thus acquitted, is conceived of as freed, taken away, from the sentence. Hence also ἀποψηφίζειν is construed with the accusative, although the preposition governs only the genitive; as also ἀπομάχεσθαι, ἀποδικάζειν, ἀπολογεῖσθαι, and others.

Διὰ retains everywhere its own signification, *through*, in composition; but still it gives a variety of modification to the meaning of verbs, according to the different sense which belongs to the verbs themselves. In διακωλύειν, and διατελεῖν, for example, it does not of itself signify *continuance*, nor in διέρχασθαι is it *praeter*, nor in διασώζεσθαι διὰ τινος is it *ex*, although it may be so rendered in Latin. Whoever διακωλύει, he κωλύει διὰ τινος, i. e. hinders *through* the whole time during which any thing is to be impeded; whoever διέρχεται, he ἔρχεται διὰ τινος, i. e. comes *through* something, leaves it wholly behind him, whence διέρχασθαι εἰς τι, to *arrive at*; whoever διασώζεται, he σωζεται διὰ τινος, i. e. is preserved *through* the whole time of his being in danger. Hence σώζεσθαι ὡς διὰ πυρός 1 Cor. iii. 15, and διασωθῆναι δι' ὕδατος 1 Pet. iii. 20, is to be *preserved through the midst of the fire and the water* by which they were surrounded; which, as to the sense, is indeed equivalent to being saved *EX igne vel aqua*. So Xenophon. *Anab.* V. 5. 7, διὰ πολλῶν καὶ δεινῶν πραγμάτων σετωσμένοι πάρεσθε, 'ye stand here, preserved through many and great evils;' but in III. 2. 7, σώζονται ἐκ πάντων δεινῶν, and *Hist. Graec.* VII. 1. 16, οἱ σωθέντες ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος. Thus also in all other verbs, διὰ fulfils its proper office, and signifies *through, per*; it denotes that the thing in question *exists or takes place* in such a way, that it

out the nature or mode of this relation, it is often necessary to employ prepositions; whose office it is, when thus used with simple verbs, to shew whither the notion of the thing ex-

must be conceived of as existing or taking place *through* something which is opposed or interposed. But since a thing may be regarded in a twofold manner, either as the subject on which the idea expressed by the verb depends, or as the object on which the idea expressed by the verb terminates, it follows that *διά* may require either the genitive (of the subject), or the accusative (of the object); and hence has arisen the twofold signification of *διά*, as denoting both manner and cause. And since that *through* which a thing is said to exist or take place, is to be conceived of as a sort of *medium*, which the whole thing has as it were pervaded or passed through, those verbs therefore which are compounded with *διά*, often express the notion of difference, perfection, dividing, distributing, dissipating, contending, and the like; in all which, nevertheless, the preposition itself retains its own proper force. Nor do I fear that any one will pronounce all this to be empty speculation; as if it were indifferent, whether we regard the preposition itself as having a different power, or consider the modification which takes place when a preposition is added, as arising out of the verbs themselves. Our lexicographers would surely not have described one and the same preposition as denoting every thing in composition, had they more closely observed the peculiar force and significancy of each.—But, to return to the preposition *διά*. It is said to have the signification of *excellence* in *διαφέρειν*. *δέχεν*. True. But still it is one and the same signification of *διά* which causes *διέρχασθαι* to mean *pervenire*; *διαβαίνειν*, *transgredi*; and also *διαφέρειν*, *to differ*; *δέχεν*, *to be prominent*. This is clearly established as to *δέχεν* by the passages in Homer, *Iliad* V 100. XX. 416.

pressed by the verb, is to be referred. Thus when one says, ἔχω τι, he indicates that the possession of a certain thing is to be conceived of in connexion with himself; but when it is

It is surprising that Abresch, in the place above cited, should follow the custom of so many writers, and attribute to the Greek prepositions almost as many significations as the Latin ones have, by which they are commonly rendered. Thus on p. 74 he writes, that ἐξ in composition sometimes denotes *in*; as ἐκπεσεῖν εἰς χάσμα γῆς in Pausanias; although the very passage of Lucian which he adduces, *Nigrin.* c. 36. ἐκ μίσης τῆς ὁδοῦ καταπίπτειν, might have shown him the true solution; for he who while walking along a path, falls into a ditch, falls *out of* the path, *ex via*, into the ditch. So the passage of Xenophon, *Hist. Gr.* V. 4. 17, ὄπλα ἀναρπασθέντα ἐξέπεσον εἰς θάλατταν. But the phrase ἐκ μίσης τῆς ὁδοῦ καταπίπτειν means, ‘to fall *out of* or *at* the middle of the way,’ *i. e.* after completing half the way.—The preposition παρά in composition, he says, signifies not only εἰς, πρὸς, σὺν, πρὸ, but also ἐξ and ἀπό. But in all the examples that are adduced, it signifies nothing more than *juxta*, *nigh*, *near to*, *neben*, in which is also implied the idea of *praeter*, *by*, *bey*, *vorbey*. But this signification does indeed give a different modification to verbs, according to their various simple meanings. Thus παρακλείειν is indeed to *shut out*, *exclude*, not surely because παρά signifies *ex*, but because when one is shut up not in this place, but in some place *beside* (*praeter*,) he is of course conceived of as *excluded* from this place. So in Aristophanis, *Eccles.* 129, παρίεναι may be rendered by *prodire*, *to come forth*, *to approach*, etc. [as if for προσιέναι,] for the connexion is, πάλιν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν, and immediately after we find κἀδιζε παριών. But still even here παρά is properly *juxta*, and παριέναι is *to come near*, *draw nigh*, etc. like πα-

inquired, what is the mode or *ratio* of this possession, then there is need of a preposition; whether it be to shew *from whom* he has the thing, ἔχειν ἀπό τινος vel παρά τινος, or to designate *where* he has it, as ἔχειν ἐν χειρῶν, or ἔχειν

εἰρησθαι. In the same author we read *Thesmophor*, 804, παρακύπτειν ἐκ τῆς θυρίδος, and a little before, ἐγκύπτειν. The former, they say, is here i. q. προκύπτειν, and παρά performs the office of πρό while the latter, they say, is for ἐκκύπτειν. But in this sportive passage, παρακύπτειν is not ‘to look out by thrusting the head through the window,’ but ‘to look out from within the window by inclining the head on one side,’ as is done by modest females who do not wish to be seen from without. The notion of πρό lies here in the verb κύπτειν itself. The poet therefore immediately subjoins: καὶν αἰσχυνθεῖσ’ ἀναχωρήσῃ, πολὺ μᾶλλον πᾶς ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐθις παρακύψαν ἰδεῖν. Neither is ἐγκύπτειν used for ἀνακύπτειν, as the Scholiast explains it, but it is ‘to look out by inclining towards (the window),’ and differs from παρακύπτειν, which the sacred writers have used to express the same idea, Luke xxiv. 12. John xx. 5, 11. The true force of the word is shown by the examples which Wetstein has given, *Nov. Test.* T. I. p. 823; and especially by the passage from Aristophanes, *Pac.* 981, sq.—For these reasons I much doubt whether παρακύψαι in James i. 25, means so much as ‘to consider *diligently*, to know *thoroughly* ;’ it seems to denote simply *to know*, *to have a knowledge of* the law. The apostle says: “He who has a knowledge of the law, *if* he be not (γενόμενος) a forgetful hearer, but does that which the law prescribes, οὗτος μακάριος ἔσται, he shall be blessed.” The word is also used of knowledge in general, not careful or perfect knowledge, in Lucian, *I. Rediviv.* p. 598. So also in 1 Pet. i. 12, it signifies nothing more than simply *to behold*, *to become acquainted with*.

μισθὸν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, Matt. vi. 1. Hence it is easy to see, how the entire difference of signification has arisen in the phrases ἔχειν ἀπό τινος, and ἀπέχειν or ἀπέχεσθαι. In these latter words, the preposition when thus compounded with the verb, occasions plainly a new signification, directly opposite to the meaning of the simple verb; the thing to which the preposition points being no longer conceived of as *conjoined* with the notion of the thing expressed by the verb, but as *disjoined* from it. The case is different when ἀπέχειν signifies *to have received*, (not *to receive*,) as ἀπέχειν μισθόν, Matt. vi. 2, 5, 16; for there ἀπό denotes not *disjunction*, but an accession made *from* some other quarter; so that those interpreters are in an error, who here make ἀπέχειν μισθόν signify nothing more than the simple ἔχειν. They differ in the same manner, as in English, *to have* and *to have away from*, *i. e.* *to have taken away from* another to one's self; *to have received*, as above. It might be more a matter of doubt, whether in the words ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπό τινος, the latter preposition is redundant or not; for the phrase expresses the same sense without the preposition; as Acts xv. 20 ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλισθημάτων τῶν εἰδωλῶν, and verse 29 ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων. But these forms of expression seem

to differ, not in the idea or thing itself, but merely in the mode of conceiving of it; just as they say in German, *sich von einer Sache enthalten* and also, *sich einer Sache enthalten*, (*i. e.* to abstain from any thing,) where in the former mode of expression the notion of disjunction is referred particularly to the thing, and in the latter to the person.

If now these remarks should seem to any one to be speculative and refined rather than true and well founded, let him remember, that it is the object of all language, not alone to excite the same thought in the mind of others, but also so to excite the same thought, that it may be conceived, and as it were felt, in the same manner. Hence, wherever language is most highly cultivated, the more does it abound in the use of particles; whose chief province it is to indicate modes and relations, and as it were render them obvious to the senses. Thus it is not surprising, that the Hebrew language should need to employ whole phrases, where in Greek one verb compounded or connected with a preposition, is sufficient.

We may farther remark, that when a preposition is subjoined to a verb already compounded with another preposition, it is done in order to designate more accurately the relations

of those things, the idea of which is conjoined with the verb, *i. e.* that the designation of all the adjuncts and circumstances of the verb may be complete. Thus in the phrases, καταβαίνειν ἀπὸ οὐρανοῦ, ἀναβαίνειν εἰς ὕψος, ἀπαναγαγεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, no one can doubt for a moment, that the prepositions are not redundant.

We turn now to the consideration of the various modes, in which the force of the prepositions is exhibited in compound verbs. Our examples, so far as possible, will all be drawn from the New Testament.

The force of the preposition in a compound verb, is in general of a twofold nature. It either *changes* the signification of the verb, so that the idea expressed by the compound is a different one from that of the simple verb; as in ἔχειν *to have*, ἀπέχειν *to abstain*, ἀνέχειν *to sustain*; αἰτεῖν *to ask*, ἀπαιτεῖν *to deprecate*; αλγεῖν *to sorrow*, ἀπαλγεῖν *to banish sorrow*; καλύπτειν *to conceal*, ἀποκαλύπτειν *to disclose*; σοφίζειν *to enlighten*, κατασοφίζειν *to delude*;—or else the preposition so *modifies* the meaning of the simple verb, that although the same idea is expressed, yet it is expressed under some certain relation and in a different manner. As to the first of these cases, there is no question; it is (so to speak) palpable, that such compounds have

significations different from those of the corresponding simple verbs. The only matter of dispute is, respecting the second class of compounds, viz., those in which the main idea is the same as in the simple verbs. And it is chiefly because the diversity in the relations of things is so manifold, and the modes of conception in respect to the same thing so various, and because these modes and relations again are sometimes so indefinite and abstruse, that the custom has arisen in regard to this class of verbs, of affirming as a rule, that compound verbs often signify nothing different from, or more than, the corresponding simple verbs. Hence also comes the habit of loosely affirming, sometimes that the prepositions do not change the meaning of the simple verbs, sometimes that no accession of meaning is made by them to the simple verbs, and again, that no emphasis is produced in such cases by prepositions. This ambiguity needs to be removed.

We suppose, then, that prepositions in this class of compound verbs, have this force, viz., that although the thing expressed by the compound verb is the same with that, the notion of which is contained in the simple verb, yet in the compound verb, it is conceived of or apprehended under a different relation, and in

a different mode. By *relation*, I here mean that relation which has place among the things or adjuncts which are connected with the verb; by *mode*, I understand the way or manner in which the conception or apprehension of these adjuncts affects the mind. We shall treat of both of these successively.

I. The causes or sources of the ideas of *relation*, are the same circumstances by which the things or adjuncts themselves are connected together, viz., time, place or space, and the connexion of cause and effect. It is, indeed, the peculiar province of the prepositions, to point out these relations.

1. When therefore a preposition is compounded with a verb, it may serve, in the first place, to mark the relation of *time* which exists between two things, or to indicate that one of them may be the antecedent of the other. Thus when one is said $\acute{\omicron}\zeta\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\iota$, he is indeed conceived of as having determined something, but *when* he determined it is left uncertain; although it might perhaps be conjectured from other circumstances. But when, for instance, it is to be so expressed as to imply, that he came to the determination before the persons whom it is to affect were alive, he would be properly said $\pi\rho\omicron\omicron\zeta\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$, to *fore-determine*; and

it is therefore entirely false to say, as very many do,^e that *προορίζειν* denotes nothing more than the simple *ορίζειν*. The same is the case with the verbs *γινώσκειν* and *προγινώσκειν*. When it is said of any one, *ἔγνων τι*, we conceive of something as having been his pleasure or determination; but as this may have been at any indefinite time, when we wish it to be understood as having been the fact a long time since, or of old, we must write *προέγνων*. Both these instances are found in Rom. viii. 29, 30. Indeed, if I mistake not, it is this very passage of Paul that has given the chief occasion to the rule about the like force and signification of compound and simple verbs. The authors of this precept wished to take away all ground from those, who thought they perceived in these words, traces of a special divine favour towards a certain class of persons.

2. The relation of *place* or of *space*, is three-fold. We may conceive of any thing as *in* a place, as being removed *from* a place, and as coming *to* a place. It is the office also of the prepositions, when joined with verbs, to indicate one or the other of these relations. Nothing can be more obvious than this; for who

^e Wahl has very properly abstained from precepts of this sort.—AUTHOR.

will deny that the compound verbs ἀναβαίνειν, καταβαίνειν, ἀναβάλλειν, καταβάλλειν, ἀνάγειν, κατάγειν, ἀπέργχεσθαι, προσέργχεσθαι, signify more than the corresponding simple ones? And yet, in respect to certain similar verbs in the New Testament, interpreters are accustomed to teach, that their signification does not differ from that of the simple verbs. Thus ἀναστενάζειν, Mark viii. 12, they say, has simply the meaning *to sigh*, and not *to sigh deeply*, and is therefore used here in the same sense as στενάζειν. But although we concede that ἀναστενάζειν does not in itself, *per se*, denote, *to sigh deeply*, yet it differs in signification from the simple στενάζειν. The latter indicates simply that one *sighs*; but the preposition being prefixed, causes us to conceive of him as drawing his sighs *upward* from the very bottom of his breast; just as we have in English the distinction between a *sigh* and a *deep* or *deep drawn sigh*. In this way the compound is much stronger than the simple verb. When the same interpreters also affirm, that ἀναπληροῦν means nothing more than πληροῦν, it is the same as if we should say in English, that there is no difference of meaning in the verbs *to fill*, *to fill up*, *to fill out*, *to fulfil*, &c.

The arguments by which this opinion has been usually supported, are chiefly two; *first*,

that both simple and compound verbs are employed promiscuously in the same or similar constructions and phrases, *e. g.*, στενάζειν and ἀναστενάζειν, πληροῦν τὸν νόμον and ἀναπληροῦν τὸν νόμον *secondly*, that both simple and compound verbs are employed promiscuously in the New Testament, as corresponding to the same Hebrew verbs. These arguments, however, are easily set aside. In the first place, although the simple verb contains the notion of the same thing, so that whether the simple or compound verb be employed, the mind receives the same general idea, and, on this account, in many phrases, both the simple and compound verb may be used promiscuously; yet this does not take place because the compound does not signify something more than the simple verb, but because the true force and meaning which the simple verb here expresses, is gathered from the other words of the sentence, or because the use of the simple verb, as is often the case, imparts strength to the expression. Although, therefore, we may concede, that ἀναπληροῦν τὸν νόμον and πληροῦν τὸν νόμον, may be said in the same sense, yet it does not thence follow, that ἀναπληροῦν and πληροῦν are synonymous, nor that the compound does not differ from the simple verb. If they were synonymous, then πληροῦν

might be employed wherever ἀναπληροῦν is used, which, however, no one would be ready to admit. When also it is said, that Mark uses sometimes στενάζειν, and sometimes ἀναστενάζειν, and that this is a sure proof that these verbs do not differ in sense, the assertion is too obviously unfounded to demand a refutation. In the second place, it is said that both simple and compound verbs often correspond to the same Hebrew verbs, and that the writers of the New Testament have everywhere translated the same Hebrew verbs, now by compound, and now by the corresponding simple verbs; so that it would appear that all verbs compounded with prepositions in the New Testament, are to be regarded as being, in themselves, of equal force and significancy with the simple verbs.^f Yet those who are skilled in both these languages, and know the comparative poverty of the Hebrew, will easily understand of themselves, that no other conclusion can justly be drawn from this circumstance, than that the Greek writer was able, by means of compound verbs, to express various relations of things, which the Hebrew writer could only indicate by one and the same simple verb, the

^f Fischer, l. c. p. 124.

Hebrew language being wholly destitute of compound verbs.

The truth of the remarks which we have made above, in regard to the relations of place, which the prepositions in compound verbs so often serve to designate, is most conspicuously exhibited in those verbs which are compounded with two or three prepositions. In verbs of this sort, two or three relations of place, with reference to the same thing, are presented at once to the mind, and, as it were, to the senses. And he would be in a great error who should suppose that one or two of these prepositions were redundant. The Scholiast on Apollon. Rhod. III. 665, says of the word ἐπιπρομολοῦσα very absurdly, περιττεύει ἢ ἐπὶ πρόθεις, ‘the preposition ἐπὶ is redundant;’ for the sense is, not only that she went out of doors (πρό), but that she also, at the sametime, *came up to or upon, supervenisse* (ἐπὶ); and the compound verb expresses both these relations. Very clear examples are also found in the Homeric compounds, ὑπεξαναδύς, Iliad XIII. 552, and ἐξυπανέστη, ib. II. 267, which led Eustathius himself (217, 17) to a fuller and more careful explanation of the force of the several prepositions. Many words of this kind are also found in the New Testament, but there are few of them

which have not been inconsiderately marked by lexicographers with the usual sign, *i. q.*, implying that they are merely synonymous with the simple verbs. We give here some examples.

Ἄνταναπληροῦν. This occurs once, Col. i. 24, where it is said to be the same as ἀναπληροῦν. But this is wrong, for ἀνταναπληροῦν is not simply *to fill up*, but it is *to fill up instead of* something else, *i. e.*, so as to supply the place of something which fails *to compensate*. So in the examples cited in the note below.⁵ Hence the words of Paul, ἀνταναπληρῶ τὰ ὑστερήματα τῶν θλίψεων τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐν σαρκί μου, are not properly to be translated as they are usually given, *I fill up what yet remaineth of afflictions, i. e.*, as they say, *I endure*. For ὑστερήμα, both in the Old and New Testament, does not denote *what remains, reliquum*, but *what fails, defectum*. Hence ὑστερήματα τῶν θλίψεων is literally the *deficiency of or in afflictions, i. e.*, the afflictions

⁵ Demosth. περὶ Συμμορ. p. 182, 29, τούτων δὲ τῶν συμμοριῶν ἐκάστην διελεῖν κελεύω πέντε μέρη κατὰ δῶδεκα ἀνδρας, ἀνταναπληροῦντας πρὸς τὸν εὐπορώτατον αἰεὶ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους. Dio Cass. XLIV. 48, ἴν' ὅσον καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐνέδει—τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων συντελείας ἀνταναπληρωθῆ. Apollon. Alex. de Synt. I. p. 19. Sylb. ἡ ἀντωνυμία—ἀνταναπληροῦσα καὶ τὴν θείσιν τοῦ ὀνόματος, καὶ τὴν ταῖζιν τοῦ ῥήματος. III. p. 255, ἴν' ἐκάτερα ἀνταναπληρωθῆ τοῦ λείποντος. Ibid. p. 330.

which are still deficient, or wanting, as in 1 Cor. xvi. 17, τὸ ὑμῶν ὑστέρημα οὗτοι ἀνεπλήρωσαν, *your deficiency these have supplied*, comp. Phil. ii. 30. In the passage before us, therefore, ἀνταναπληρῶ τὰ ὑστερήματα τῶν θλίψεων τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐν σαρκί μου, the sense is, ‘I supply, *i. e.*, compensate, make good, that which is yet wanting to me of the afflictions which I endure for Christ’s sake ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, in your behalf, or, τῶ ὑμῶν περισσεύματι, that ye may the more abound, 2 Cor. viii. 14. The apostle had just said, νῦν χαίρω τοῖς παθήμασιν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, *I now rejoice in suffering for you.*

Ἄνταποδίδωμι. Fischer, in treating of this word, endeavours to shew, that the preposition ἀντί often has no force in composition. But in all the passages of the New Testament where this word occurs, ἀντί has manifestly its own peculiar power, as denoting opposition or reciprocity. So, Rom. xi. 35, ἢ τίς προέδωκεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀνταποδοθήσεται αὐτῷ, *or who hath first given to him, and it shall be requited unto him.* 2 Thess. i. 6, ἀνταποδοῦναι τοῖς θλίβουσιν ὑμᾶς θλίψιν, *to requite affliction to those who afflict you.* The same force exists in the substantives ἀνταπόδομα and ἀνταπόδοσις. In Col. iii. 24, ἀνταπόδοσις τῆς κληρονομίας does not signify *the reward of piety*, for κληρονομία never has this sense; but the

genitive here, as elsewhere, expresses the thing itself in which ἡ ἀνταπόδοσις, *the reward, requital*, consists.

Ἀνταποκρίνομαι. This is not, as is often said, simply *to answer*, but carries the idea of reciprocity, *to answer in turn, to respond to the words of another, to reply*. So, Luke xiv. 6, οὐκ ἴσχυσαν ἀνταποκριθῆναι αὐτῷ πρὸς ταῦτα, *they were not able to reply to those things*, viz., which Jesus, answering, ἀποκριθεὶς, v. 5, had demanded of them. Hence, in Rom. ix. 20, it denotes *to contend*. Interpreters might have learned from this one passage, that the preposition in this word is not superfluous.

Ἀντιπαρέρχομαι. It is true that there is nothing *emphatic* in this word, Luke x. 31, 32, but it is false that it is the same as the simple παρέρχομαι. The sense is, that the priest and levite not only *passed by* the wounded man, but that they passed by on the *opposite side* of the way, *i. e.*, they did not even approach him, (comp. v. 34,) but, as soon as they saw him at a distance, took their course as far from him as possible.

Ἀπεκδέχομαι. Here is no emphasis; but the compound, of itself, signifies more than the simple verb. The latter means *to expect, to look out for, to wait for*, but the compound sig-

nifies *to wait for to the end, to wait out*, as I have shewn, *de Synonymis N. T.* c. VI.

Ἀπεκδύομαι. This is said to be the same with ἀποδύομαι and ἐκδύομαι. But the force of ἀπό and ἐκ here, is the same as in the preceding word. Both ἀποδύομαι and ἐκδύομαι signify *to put off, to strip off*, but with this difference, that in ἀποδύομαι, the attention is directed more to the *thing* which is put off, while in ἐκδύομαι, the *person* is more prominent, who puts off or lays aside any thing in which he was before enveloped. Comp. 2 Cor. v. 3, 4. In ἀπεκδύομαι therefore, both these ideas are combined, so that it signifies *to put or strip off wholly, excutere*. So, Col. ii. 15, ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὰς ἀρχάς, is (in the proper sense of the middle voice) *excutiens potestates, despoiling principalities*.^h The same sense occurs in Col. iii. 9, ἀπεκδυσάμενοι τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον, *i. e., wholly putting off, utterly renouncing* the old man and his deeds. There is here no need of having recourse to Hebraism.

Ἐπαναπαύομαι is not the same with ἀναπαύομαι. The latter is simply *to rest*, the former signi-

^h So Cicero, *Orat. pro Leg. Agrar.* II. 60 or 23, *imperatores excutiant*. The passages adduced by Perizonius, *ad Ælian.* II. 30, are of the same nature. More correctly Dresig, *de Verbis Med.* I. 17.

fies *to rest upon*, as Luke x. 6, then *to lean upon*, *to confide in*, as if *to rest secure*, e. g., τῷ νόμῳ, Rom. ii. 17. Ἀναπαύεσθαι is not used in this sense.¹

Ἐπανέρχεσθαι expresses more than ἀνέρχεσθαι. The latter signifies simply *to return* in general, but in the former there lies the idea of *returning to the same place*. So, Luke x. 35, ἐν τῷ ἐπανέρχεσθαί με, *when I shall return HITHER again*. Comp. Luke xix. 15.

Ἐπεκτείνεσθαι is incorrectly said to be the same with ἐκτείνειν. But it is more, for ἐκτείνειν is simply *to extend*, but ἐπεκτείνεσθαι is equivalent to ἐκτείνεσθαι πρὸς τι, *to extend one's self towards any thing*. So, in Phil. iii. 14, τοῖς δὲ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεκτεινόμενος, q. d., πρὸς τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκτεινόμενος, *reaching forth TOWARDS those things which are before*.

Προκαταγγέλλειν, *to announce before hand*, and προκαταρτίζειν, *to prepare before hand*, express more, as all concede, than the simple verbs καταγγέλλειν and καταρτίζειν. Why then, in the case of προγινώσκω and προορίζειν, should interpreters deny that the preposition adds any thing to the signification of the verb? Because, forsooth, there seems to be nothing emphatic.

¹ See Wetstein ad h. loc.

They are indeed safe as to emphasis, but they ought not to have taught so inconsiderately, that the same preposition is significant in some verbs, and superfluous in others.

These examples may serve to remind interpreters of the New Testament, that they ought to proceed with more caution and accuracy in investigating the force of prepositions in compound verbs.^k

^k It may be proper to remark here, for the sake of learners, that the Greeks, in compounding verbs with several prepositions at once, have taken care to place the prepositions in the order in which the ideas themselves naturally succeed one another. Thus, when ἀναδύειν, *to emerge*, is compounded with the two prepositions ὑπό and ἐξ, (not δύειν with three,) the former, ὑπό, is put first, because it is a more natural order of thought, first to conceive of the person emerging τὸν ἀναδύοντα as rising up *from a lower place*, and then as coming *out or forth*; to which then ἀναδύειν is also very nearly allied. So also ἐξάγω, ἐπιεξάγω, ἀντεπεξάγω.

I have here gone upon the supposition, that in verbs of this sort, (ὑπεξαναδύειν, ἀνταπεξάγειν,) only the two first prepositions are to be taken into account; and the same is the case with several of the verbs adduced in the text. The reason is, that the third preposition, which stands next to the simple verb, and is first compounded with it, has, in these instances, the effect of changing the meaning of the simple verb, *i. e.*, of expressing, in conjunction with the simple verb, a new and different meaning, which the verb would not bear without it; and therefore, in such cases, this preposition cannot be taken as distinct from this verb. It will be obvious to every one, that the full idea expressed by

3. In the last place, the force of prepositions in composition is further shewn, in that they serve to indicate the relation of *cause and effect*. This relation, however, is so extensive,

εξάγειν and ἀναδύειν, is not contained in ἄγειν and δύειν. Hence it may happen, that to verbs already compounded with a preposition, another preposition may be prefixed, which shall sometimes counterbalance or take away again the signification produced by the junction of the first preposition, *e. g.*, συνάγω, *to collect*, ἀποσυνάγω, *to disperse*, συσσιτίω, *to eat together*, ἀποσυσσιτίω, *not to eat together*. Still, however, the signification of the first compound must here be retained and regarded. [Indeed, the force of the preposition last added, goes to modify only this signification, and not that of the simple verb. Thus, in ἀποσυνάγω, the effect of ἀπό in composition is very different, according as it is prefixed to συνάγω or ἄγω in the latter case (ἀπάγω) it denotes merely *to lead away*; in the former (ἀποσυνάγω) it signifies ‘to lead or cause to go away that which had previously been brought together, *i. e.*, *to disperse*.—ED.]

It is on these grounds that the reading διαπαρατριβαί for παραδιατριβαί, I Tim vi. 5, which is found in some manuscripts, seems to me to be false. The verb παρατριβεῖν, *to rub upon or against*, is not used in the sense here required, but διατριβεῖν, *to rub in pieces, wear away*; whence διατριβή, *a wearing away e. g. of time, leisure occupation, listlessness*; and thence παραδιατριβή. I know, indeed, that Suidas has explained παρατριβή by λογομαχία, *disputation*, in the words of an uncertain author, τὴν γενομένην πρὸς αὐτὸν παρατριβὴν καὶ ζηλοτυπίαν. But it would seem rather to denote here *collision*, or, as we would say in common life, *rubs*. The apostle is speaking of the vain desires and tendencies (Theophylact very properly, ματαιίας σχολᾶς) of διεφθαρμένων ἀνθρώπων νοῦν,

that we cannot be surprised to find interpreters of the New Testament involved in various errors, while attempting to observe and to explain it. We have said that the relation of cause and effect, as here understood, is that re-

τῶν νομιζόντων πορισμὸν εἶναι τὴν εὐσέβειαν, *men of corrupt mind, who regard gain as godliness.* The idea of contention is foreign from his object. Indeed he expressly declares τὰς ζητήσεις καὶ λογομαχίας, *questionings and strifes about words,* to be the cause of these παραδιατριβαί, *listless occupations, empty employment of time.* On this account I prefer the common reading, although the other is found in many manuscripts. The reading appears to have already varied in the earliest ages, to judge from Chrysostom's exposition of the passage. He gives a double interpretation, one of which strictly pertains to παραδιατριβή, and the other to διαπαρατριβή. His words are found *Homil. xvii. in Ep. I. ad Tim. Tom. XI. 648,* διαπαρατριβαί· τουτέστι σχολή ἢ διατριβή· ἢ τοῦτό φησι διαπαρατριβαί· καθάπερ τὰ ψωραλῆα τῶν προβάτων παρατριβόμενα νόσου καὶ τὰ ὑγιαίνοντα ἐμπίπλησιν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ πονηροὶ ἄνδρες. 'The word διαπαρατριβαί signifies *leisure or leisure employment.* Or διαπαρατριβαί may mean thus: as the scabby part among the flocks, by coming in contact with the rest, (*παρατριβόμενα*, rubbing against them,) communicate disease to the healthy, so also these wicked men.' In this extract I can scarcely doubt, but that, instead of the first διαπαρατριβαί, we ought to read παραδιατριβαί. Theophylact also appears to have had both readings before him, but Œcumenius explains διαπαρατριβαί in the same manner as Chrysostom. But even granting that διαπαρατριβαί were the correct reading, it certainly does not here mean *perverse disputations,* but rather *pertinacious contentions or collisions.* Zonaras explains διαπαρατριβή by ἐνδιλεχία, *duration.*

lation in which the thing signified by the verb, whether action or condition, stands connected either with the object of the verb, or with the person or thing of which the condition or action expressed by the verb is predicated, *i. e.*, the subject of the verb. Of the former kind are the verbs καταγελάειν, καταγγέλλειν, κατακρίνειν, κατηγορεῖν, ἐπινοεῖν, κατανοεῖν, περινοεῖν, for in all these the preposition refers to the person or thing which is the object of the action. Of the latter kind are ἐννοεῖν, διανοεῖσθαι, ἐνεργεῖν, ἐνδυμεῖσθαι, where the preposition points to the subject of the verb. The distinction between these two modes of this relation, is not always easy to be observed. It is here, indeed, that we are to look for a great part of the nicety and elegance of language in general, and especially of the Greek, which abounds particularly in verbs of this sort. It is therefore not surprising, that, since the Hebrew is wholly destitute of such verbs, the writers of the New Testament should employ sometimes compound verbs, and sometimes the phrases by which the idea was circumscribed in Hebrew, *e. g.*, Rom. viii. 23, στενάζομεν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, but Mark viii. 12, ἀναστενάξασ τῷ πνεύματι. But it would be a false supposition to regard the preposition as merely pleonastic in constructions of this sort. There are also

verbs, and chiefly of the first kind above-mentioned, in which the preposition is to be referred to the very idea or thing expressed by the verb itself, more especially in verbs formed from a substantive or adjective; and in these, too, it would be a great mistake, to say that the preposition had no force at all. The verb ἀνασταυροῦν is an example, which some interpreters have absurdly rendered, *to fix again to the cross*; while others, with equal incorrectness, have affirmed that the preposition ἀνά is without any force. There is indeed no emphasis attached to the preposition; but yet it does as it were point to the thing or object contained in the verb itself, and thus cause it to be more vividly expressed; it points to the σταυρός, and indicates the very act by which any one is affixed to the cross; just as also ἀνασκολοπίζειν, *to impale*, is employed. Although, therefore, it may be conceded, that the same general idea might be expressed by the simple verb σταυροῦν, yet it would be less definite and lively; and the preposition is therefore not redundant, but indicates the relation between the action and the object of the action. In compound verbs of this sort, therefore, the preposition may be said to render the signification of the simple verbs more full and defi-

nite and vivid. This is clearly apparent in those verbs, whose proper signification is first produced by the junction of a preposition; as ἀνακεφαλαιοῦν *to arrange under one head*, προχειρίζειν *to cause to be at hand*, κατοικεῖν *to dwell*, καταρτίζειν *to repair*, and the like.

II. These examples lead us now to the consideration of that other species of force, which we have ascribed to prepositions in composition, viz. that through their influence *the same thing is conceived of or apprehended in a different mode*. By *mode* I here understand the way or manner in which the thing that is the object of thought or conception, affects the mind. Prepositions have then also this force, viz. that by changing the way or manner in which the mind itself is affected, they occasion a different mode of conception or of apprehension. For since the mind is variously affected according to the various ways in which the object of thought is presented to it, it follows that prepositions, which change the manner of presenting the object of thought, must also change the force of the verb itself. It is true indeed that another class of particles, the conjunctions, are the appropriate index of this relation between the object of thought and the mind; yet nevertheless the prepositions also

in compound verbs, have sometimes the same power, and render the thought or idea of the verb stronger and more vivid, by presenting it in such a way as more strongly to affect the mind.

There are various modes of this kind; of which we can designate only the principal. It would carry us too far, to enumerate them all in detail. But the nature and effect of any predicated action or condition presented to the mind, by which the mind is to be affected, may be said to stand connected with, and to be particularly dependent upon, the accessory notions of *inclination*, *time*, and *place*, and *proper efficiency*; and when the prepositions serve to indicate these, they augment by this means the power with which the main idea expressed by the simple verb, affects the mind; so that the *modus cogitandi*, the mode in which the idea of the verb is conceived or apprehended, is thus changed.

1. Certain prepositions, compounded with verbs, serve then, in the first place, to indicate a special *inclination*, or desire, as being conjoined with the action denoted by the verb; and although the signification itself is not increased nor extended by these prepositions, yet through their influence a thing is more

vividly conceived of, and as it were more felt, than if merely the simple verb had been employed. Those who have not been able to form a correct judgment in respect to compound verbs of this sort, may seem, perhaps, to have a partial excuse in the circumstance, that when the proper significations of the prepositions, drawn as they are from the relations of tangible objects, are transferred to the actions of the mind, they become often in usage so refined and attenuated, that their true nature and character are no longer always obvious. Of this kind is the verb *καταφιλέω*, in which there is manifestly a stronger meaning, than in the simple verb; although, as interpreters say, the evangelists have used both verbs promiscuously and without distinction. But I know not by what right they affirm, that this compound does not differ from the simple verb in the New Testament; when they concede that in other Greek writers the compound has a greater force.

2. Related to this is the second mode above pointed out; when prepositions which refer to *time and place* are compounded with verbs, and serve to show a greater force or degree of action, and thus indicate also greater *inclination*. Of this kind are many verbs compound-

ed with the preposition *διὰ*, as *διατηρεῖν*, *διακοῦειν*, *διαπρονεῖν*, *διαφυλάσσειν*. This preposition properly indicates motion *through* space, and is then also spoken of the time *during* the flow of which any thing is conceived of as being done or taking place; whence also it is likewise employed to designate a cause. These compound verbs therefore have a greater force and meaning, because they imply, that the action or condition expressed by the verb is not transient, but continues until the whole space and time to which it refers, shall have been covered by it; as *διασώζειν*, *διασαφεῖν*, *διαφθερίζειν*, *διίσχυρίζεσθαι*. Different from these are those compounds in which the proper notion of place is retained, as *διαγγέλλειν* which, nevertheless, some have said, is nothing more than synonymous with the simple *ἀγγέλλειν*.

3. The third, and not the least frequent mode above mentioned, includes those verbs in which the prepositions increase the significance of the simple verbs, by imparting the idea of *efficiency*; and this they do by indicating, that the condition or action signified by the verb, has reference to the *whole* thing, and will not cease until the whole is completed. Of this kind are *ἀποδνήσκειν*, *ἀποκτείνειν*, *ἀπολείχειν*, *ἀποδιλίβειν*, *ἐκφυγεῖν*, and the like, which are com-

monly said to signify nothing more than the corresponding simple verbs. We grant, indeed, that the simple verbs may present to the mind the same main idea, but yet all will feel, that it must affect the mind in a different manner; and also that the force of the verb is augmented and the conception itself rendered more vivid and intense by the preposition; since it represents the action designated by the simple verb as being consummated and finished. The verb ἀποκτείνειν, *to kill*, has therefore a stronger meaning; because, in consequence of ἀπό we conceive of the slayer, τὸν κτείναντα, as not desisting until he has accomplished his purpose. In like manner ἀποθνήσκειν, *to die*, is stronger, because it presents the idea of actual decease. It is also a mistake to say that ἀποθλίβειν is the same with the simple θλίβειν, *to press*; for it indicates, not only that a person or thing is *pressed*, which may be done on one side only; but that it is *pressed wholly, entirely*, on every side, in which sense it is spoken of grapes. It is likewise false to say that ἀπολείχειν does not differ from the simple λείχειν, *to lick*. Luke says elegantly, xvi. 21, οἱ κύνες ἀπέλειχον τὰ ἕλκη αὐτοῦ, *the dogs licked his sores*, sc. *clean*. Who does not perceive that something more is expressed here,

than if he had written ἔλειχον? The force which is thus imparted to the conception of the action, is also augmented by repeating the same preposition after the verb, as is said above.

There is still another class of verbs under this general head, which are very numerous, and in respect to which we must be very brief. Since now the mind is more excited, when it not only forms a conception of a thing, but also sees and feels it as it were delineated in all its parts, it is obvious, that those compound verbs will have the greatest force, in which the prepositions produce such a full and complete image of the thing signified. These are chiefly such verbs as are compounded with two or more prepositions. Indeed, it was necessary to provide, not only that the thing designated should be conceived of in *some* manner, but also that it should be conceived of in some *certain* manner; and that the mind should be filled with a clear image of it, by viewing all the circumstances accurately and as they took place. As therefore they greatly mistake, who affirm respecting the compounds ὑπεξαναδύς, ἐξυπανέστη, ἐπιπρομολούσα, that one or another of these prepositions are redundant; so also it is a false position, that παραπορεύεσθαι, παρίεναι, διο-

ὄψεσθαι, and other like verbs, of which we have spoken above, have no broader signification than the corresponding simple ones. For although the simple verbs may present to the mind the same general idea, yet the compounds describe it more accurately, so that we see it, as it were, with our eyes; and in this way they excite a more vivid and stronger conception in the mind.

Should these brief observations lead any who are devoted to Greek and sacred literature, to a closer investigation of the force of the prepositions, our labour will not have been in vain.

END OF VOL. II.







