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Lope's Use of Foreshadowing in *La imperial de Otón*

Sonia Jones

Despite what he may have said in the *Arte nuevo de hacer comedias,* Lope often allowed his audience to foresee the outcome of his plays. In many of his serious dramas the characters were tormented by dreams and omens, they spoke with ghosts or heard strange voices, or astrologers gave solemn predictions about things to come, yet the audience rarely left the theatre before the play was over. On the contrary, Lope's technique of foreshadowing served to involve the spectators more than ever in the drama they saw unfolding before them, for their foreknowledge caused them to feel pride in the destinies of national heroes, cruel pleasure in the future punishments of villains, and sentimental pity for the innocent victims of an unjust fate.[1]

Lope's talent for manipulating the emotions of his audience was no doubt partially responsible for his great popularity, but the protagonists of his better plays did not pattern themselves along the lines of commonplace heroes, villains, and victims. These protagonists were neither perfect nor evil nor entirely innocent; instead, they came much closer to the Aristotelian concept of the hero driven by his *hamartia* to commit the sort of human follies that would inevitably lead to a tragic conclusion. They were all incited by passions they could not control: pride forced them to seek revenge, ambition made them long to wage an unjust war, erotic desire moved them to court an unobtainable lady, or jealousy led them to their eventual downfall. Many of the characters were heroes with a tragic flaw in their battle against a world whose rules they understood, but could not, or would not, accept. In these cases foreshadowing was not used merely to excite an emotional response from the audience, but also to force the protagonist himself to foresee some of the consequences of his actions, and gain a greater awareness of his own motives and desires.

Lope stresses the irony of Otón's tragic destiny from the first moment he appears on the stage. He enters with his servants in a state of great agitation, for he has just learned that one of his favorite falcons was ignominiously killed during the hunt by another more humble bird of prey.[2] This scene naturally brings to mind the famous episode of the goldfinch and the hawk in *El caballero de Olmedo,* and Lope uses it to achieve a very similar purpose. The spectators are warned by this omen of what lies in store for Otón, for they already know that Count Rodulfo has been elected Emperor. Neither the King nor the Queen, however, has yet been informed of the outcome of the elections, so their reactions to the strange hunting accident are full of ironic overtones which are, of course, understood only by the audience. Queen Etelfrida, however, correctly guesses the meaning of the ominous accident, and she tells her husband that she fears he has lost the election. Otón's response is almost predictable if we keep in mind the way in which Lope generally handles omens and the reactions that they elicit: one character is always troubled by the implications of the omen, while the other one always reacts with skepticism and disbelief. This dramatic stratagem serves the same purpose every time: the doubts of the troubled character forewarn the audience and sometimes raise conflicts in the character himself, while the skeptical character's carefree attitude serves to deceive both himself and the other characters into acting with the sort of false confidence which ironically leads them right into the trap. Otón's reaction, then, is one of disbelief, but a disbelief which is touching because it reveals a disarming trust in human nature. He insists on believing that the best man must

win, a false notion which leads him to interpret the omen in a way which is favorable to his case: the falcon, he says, represents the Kings of England and Spain, two proud and capable men who have been competing for the Empire; but the "ave ratera" represents himself, for he has been humble and retiring in his struggle for the Empire (with the expectation that he would be elected for his own intrinsic worth), so the victory of the "ave ratera" over the falcon is a good omen, indicating his own imminent election (576a). The irony of Otón's misinterpretation of the omen is clearly evident to the audience; perhaps somewhat less evident is the fact that his apparent humility is really an inverted hubris, so sure is he that the Empire will soon belong to him.

Shortly after this episode a messenger presents himself before the King and Queen and announces that Count Rodulfo has been elected Emperor. Otón is practically speechless, but the Queen is by no means at a loss for words. After the inevitable "I told you so" ("no era, señor, mi recelo/ tan vanamente creído" 576b), she goes on to demand that her husband take up arms against Rodulfo, threatening to lead the army herself if he should refuse. He immediately complies with this extraordinary ultimatum, rallying his troops to march against the new Emperor for the sake of Bohemia's "honor". The humility of which he boasted earlier seems to melt away in the excitement of his speech ("la corona imperial tendrá mi frente,/ y el sacro Imperio mis valientes hombros,/ que yo tengo hombros y hombros para todo" 577b). The Queen knows exactly how to manipulate him by promising to love him only if he carries out her ambitious and unjust demands, claiming all the while that what moves her is his display of "courage" and "honrada cólera". Lope, aware no doubt that his portrayal of Otón's overly-obliging character might be poorly received by his spectators who had their own ideas of what a king should be, quickly began to emphasize Otón's role as lover over his role as King, so that his complaisance should not be mistaken for a sort of weakness unbefitting a royal personage. As a lover, Otón was naturally concerned about Etelfrida's opinion of him, and he was, of course, willing to do anything at all to gain her respect and admiration, so he served her and dutifully carried out her wishes just as any courtly lover would have served his lady. Lope's emphasis of Otón's passionate love for Etelfrida accomplishes another purpose as well, for it helps to explain the King's initial blindness to the morally questionable goal of his military enterprise. Having been asked by his ambitious and unscrupulous wife to attack the new Emperor, the devoted King Otón marched off to battle without a thought as to whether or not he was undertaking a just cause. As a lover, he is blind to the injustice of his military aggression, but as a King, he will be unable to disregard either its implications or its possible consequences. This conflict soon becomes the core of the dramatic tension, and ultimately, leads to his tragic death.

When the two armies are finally lined up for battle, Merlin appears on stage dressed as an old hermit, and he announces to Rodulfo that he has nothing to fear from his enemy. He will not only win the battle, but he will some day bring glory to Spain through his progeny, many of whom will belong to the House of Hapsburg. Merlin's prophecy clearly invites the audience to place its sympathy with Rodulfo, who now becomes the prototype of the fearless warrior-king who appealed so much to the average spectator. Once again Lope has found a way to liberate himself from the necessity of presenting Otón as a stock character for the purpose of pleasing his audience and fulfilling its expectations: now that Rodulfo can play the part of "national hero", Lope is free to develop those aspects of Otón's behavior that would otherwise be unacceptable in an admired King: confusion,

fear, indecision, and, of course, the eager complaisance mentioned before. Thus Otón emerges as one of the most interesting and original characters in Lope's entire repertory, as well as one of the most sympathetic, for it is love that inspires complaisance, a strong conscience that makes him indecisive, a sense of justice that causes him to fear the implications of his actions, and a courageous self-awareness that makes him prey to the forebodings that are to worry him until his death.

These many conflicting emotions merge in a crisis of dramatic tension immediately after Merlin foreshadows the ending with his prediction, for just as Otón is readying himself for battle, there appears before him a silent *sombra*, "con su espada ceñida" (585b–586b). Although this scene does not have the poetic depth of the episode of the silent *sombra* in *El caballero de Olmedo*, it is nevertheless the one which sheds the most light on the function and meaning of the various silent *sombras* who mysteriously appear before the terrified protagonists of other Lopean dramas. In each case the characters who saw the specters were already troubled by an uneasy awareness of their guilt, so their initial fear is not so much a reaction to the supernatural as it is a manifestation of their own inner conflict when faced with an "accuser". On the one hand they brazenly challenge the *sombra* in an attempt to protest their innocence; on the other hand the presence of the ghost causes them to face with greater honesty the conflict they were hoping to deny or overlook. Thus Otón, after calling his servants to help him banish the specter, ends up acquiring real insight into the meaning of his fear and oppression: he clearly understands that he has no right to challenge his just opponent, and he correctly interprets the *sombra* as being a heavenly warning to this effect.

There was a definite moment of *anagnōrisis* for King Otón when he was forced by the silent *sombra* to recognize the underlying truth of his situation. He saw beyond the immediate problem of his own passion, and perceived, finally, both the nobility and the absurdity of human strivings. Lope's characters were often brought to their moment of Recognition as a result of this rather graphically symbolic form of self-confrontation with the silent *sombra* (as opposed to the talkative variety whose function was entirely different). The *sombra* was seen by the hero as a representation of himself, an extension of his own being, and the experience filled him with a feeling of dread, inspired by his self-knowledge and loss of innocence. From that moment on he began to lose his character as ironic dupe, and acquired the tragic dimensions of the hero who knows, but cannot accept or even admit his knowledge.

This moment of insight is dramatically emphasized in a curious conversation between Otón and his confidant Alberto at the beginning of the third act. They are trying to discover some "scientific" explanation for the appearance of the silent *sombra*, and Alberto comes up with a certain Aristotelian (according to him) theory which describes how men, when they are very weak or frightened, sometimes see a mirror-image of themselves before their eyes[3] (587b–588a). Otón's extreme emotional stress before the battle might certainly account for his having seen his double, but in Lope's plays it would seem that the mirror-image reflects much more than the physical self or an emotional state. It seems, indeed, to reflect what could be called the viewer's "true" self, or perhaps his "higher nature". In every case the protagonist emerged from this experience with a new self-awareness that was lacking before the *sombra* appeared. Siquén *(El robo de Dina)* became conscious for the first time of his "agravio", Jelando *(Las justas de Tebas)* realized that his love was doomed, King Alfonso *(Las paces de los reyes)* admitted "y perdida la razón,/ conozco el

daño, y le sigo" (*Aguilar,* I, 526). Otón's case is original in that he has the courage to act immediately on his new insight by refusing to fight, whereas the other lovers were unable to come to terms with their knowledge, a fact which directly or indirectly brought about tragic results. What is even more tragic about Otón, however, is that he ultimately turns his back on what he had once accepted as a just and righteous decision, and he pays the consequences with the full knowledge of what he has done.

In the light of what has been said about the function of silent *sombras*, then, it would be difficult to accept Menéndez Pelayo's hasty assertion that "esta sombra is el *deus ex machina* que determina la súbita cobardía de Otón, el cual sin combatir se entrega a Rodulfo".[4] He seems to agree with Farinelli's general position on the subject of Otón's so-called cowardice,[5] but Vossler correctly interprets the *sombra* as being a symbol of remorse.[6] It is not cowardice but moral conviction which prompts Otón to abandon his plans to take up arms against his enemy. In continuing to act according to his conscience, he must necessarily go against the honor code that dictated the behavior of his dramatic counterparts in the Golden Age theatre, and in so doing he inevitably invites the spectators to take a scornful view of what they must consider to be his abject cowardice. This ready-made explanation of Otón's behavior has already been voiced by the arrogant Don Juan de Toledo, and it will be repeated by the warlike Etelfrida, but these characters are limited creatures, products of a literary and theatrical convention whose rules they never hesitate to follow. Otón, however, is a highly original character who challenges convention by refusing to obey the rules, but unlike other defiant characters in Lope's theatre, his challenge probably fails to capture the sympathy of the audience. Commoners who stood up to their oppressors in defiance of rigid social conventions were enthusiastically supported by their theatre viewers; countless lovers whose passion led them to violate the marital conventions were appreciated and forgiven by the spectators (even though the play itself demanded that justice be served), but a leader who chose not to engage the enemy, no matter what his reasons might be, was bound to be misunderstood in Lope's day.

Thus Otón is constantly excoriated by the characters who represent traditional heroism: Toledo deserts him after declaring that such a "pusilánime príncipe y cobarde/ no hará cosa jamás que buena sea" (586b), and Rodulfo accuses him of "infamia y cobardía" (590a). But the most scathing vituperation of all comes from Queen Etelfrida, who has mounted one of the turrets of the castle and appears before him dressed in full armor. She refuses to allow him and his men to enter the castle, claiming that their very presence within its walls would rob her of her honor; she calls him an "hombre vil", fit only for sewing and other household chores; he is infamous, cowardly, dishonorable, weak, effeminate, not worthy of being a King . . . finally she ends up threatening to lead his army herself if he cannot, or will not, attack Rodulfo. Her words have their intended effect on Otón, who once again promises to do her bidding. This time his change of mind is an act of love, and if he appears to have quickly forgotten the moral insight the silent *sombra* inspired in him, it is because lovers very often tend to see themselves through the eyes of the loved-one. He had been called a coward and weakling before, but now that Etelfrida has repeated the accusation, he accepts her judgment without question, anxious only to prove to her that he can overcome his "cowardice" and live up to the image of what she would like him to be, even though he foresees that it will cost him his life. One cannot help but see in this almost desperate about-face another example of King Alfonso's *(Las paces de los reyes)* "y perdida la razón/ conozco el daño, y le sigo" (*Aguilar,* I, 526), an

insight which could well serve as a leitmotiv for almost every one of Lope's tragic figures, endowed as they are with a foreknowledge which nevertheless cannot prevent them from becoming victims of their own *hamartia.*

The concepts of "courage" and "cowardice" are not easy to define, nor is it always possible to keep the two qualities from merging with each other within the same character. A man can be courageous and decisive when inspired by hope or insight, and yet totally lack even the slightest vestige of courage on another occasion when he feels deeply confused or threatened. So it is with Otón, whose initial courage gave him the strength not to attack Rodulfo even after being insulted in front of both armies, and despite full knowledge of the honor code; but his second sally, like his first, was prompted not so much by a sudden mustering of "courage" as it was by a passionate need to be loved and respected by the Queen. The very fact that his decision to attack is so hasty and compulsive makes his underlying fear and frustration almost self-evident. He must go against his better judgment for the sake of the woman he loves, and the only way to do this is to take a sudden plunge, a decision which is ironically applauded by even his closest confidant. Ataúlfo assures him that "ese valor es digno de tu pecho" (594a), and the Queen once more praises him: "Ahora quiero yo darte mis brazos,/ ahora eres, Otón, mi bien y esposo" (594a). The mere decision to act is too easily mistaken for courage, while a refusal to do so is often interpreted as cowardice. In Otón's case, however, the very opposite is true, a fact which constitutes the central irony of the entire play. What moves us to the classical pity and terror is our knowledge that Otón himself shares our insight.

The clear-sighted self-recognition of the forewarned protagonist is perhaps better expressed in this play than in any other, as evidenced by the weary yet passionate soliloquey delivered by Otón as the battle surges around him (595b). He is pitifully aware of the inadvisability of this second attack; he recognizes the uselessness of bloodshed, he mourns the loss of his men whom he has led to the battlefield as "lambs to the slaughter", he knows the power of passion-love against which reason has only rarely been known to prevail. Above all he understands that his dilemma is part of the human condition, as his wide perspective and historical sense make clear to him. He is a philosopher miscast in the role of a general, a poet who is forced against his will to undertake a campaign which is repugnant to him. Finally, he is a lover resigned to his fate, and willing to sacrifice everything for his beloved.

Just as he is about to enter the fray, the silent *sombra* suddenly appears again, but Otón is unwilling to pay any further attention to its urgent warnings. One cannot help feeling that Otón is not only physically worn out by his trips back and forth from castle to battleground, but also emotionally exhausted from weighing moral subtleties in his mind, a task which entailed as many different decisions as trips. While in a state of exhaustion men can be driven to undertake wreckless or "heroic" deeds, resigned as they are by sheer fatigue to accept whatever consequences may result, and it is in this frame of mind that Otón, spurred by his passion, goes to meet his death. Neither the *sombra*, nor reason, nor the demands of his conscience hold any sway now over his tragic resignation.

Shortly afterwards he is mortally wounded by a lowly solider who does not even realize that he is the King, and so the prophecy predicted in the episode of the falcon and the "ave vil" is fulfilled. Lope treats his death with evident sympathy, inserting in his last soliloquy certain verses from a ballad about the Marqués de Mantua (595b).

It is as if Otón himself were trying to explain what happened in terms of a literary des-

tiny, a quixotic tendency which is also shared by Don Alonso in *El caballero de Olmedo.* Etelfrida arrives just as he is commending his soul to God, too late for him to recognize her or receive any comfort from her presence, but his thoughts were with her to the end. He has sacrificed his life for her sake and for her honor, a gift which does not go unappreciated by the Queen. The rigorous rules of the honor code required that he die, but perhaps the most ironic aspect of his death lies in the fact that he was only then able to win his wife's affection. His marriage was not a marriage in the conventional sense, but rather a long and often tormented courtship in which the hopeful yet despairing lover woos his *belle dame sans merci*, for whom he willingly undertakes even the most impossible deeds. Etelfrida must be one of the most demanding and least merciful ladies in Lope's entire theatre, awesome qualities for which she is rewarded by the dedicated service of her admiring husband. The various devices of foreshadowing constantly warn him of the risks involved in carrying out his lady's demands, yet despite full knowledge of these dangers, (and to some extent *because* of them), he is driven by his passion to make the supreme sacrifice. This he does willingly, and lovingly, but he cannot forget that he is not only a lover but also a King, for which reason he sorrowfully laments the loss of his soldiers who died for the sake of a woman (595b). Although he has proven to be a noble and even a heroic lover, he has nevertheless failed as a King, for he has sacrificed the lives of his men to a cause which he had always recognized as unjust. The honor code exonerates him, no doubt, but his experience with the *sombra* has led him to see deeper than convention, and so he becomes the tragic victim of a fate he foresaw but could not, and would not, attempt to modify.

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Notes

1 For a fuller explanation of the topics covered in this article, see my unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Devices of Foreshadowing in Lope de Vega's *Comedia*." Harvard, 1971.

2 Sáinz de Robles, Federico C., editor, *Obras Escogidas,* Lope Félix de Vega Carpio. Madrid : M. Aguilar, 1946, Vol. I, p. 575b. All other page numbers refer to this edition.

3 Irving Babbitt (*Rousseau and Romanticism,* 1919; rpt. Meridian Books, Ohio, 1966) mentions the fascination that the phenomenon of the double (Doppelgängerei) had for Hoffmann and other German romanticists (p. 204). He refers the reader to Brandes, *The Romantic School in Germany,* ch. XI, and also makes the following observations: "Alfred de Musset saw his double in the stress of his affair with George Sand (see *Nuit de Décembre),* Jean Valjean sees his double in the stress of his conversion. Peter Bell also sees his double at the emotional crisis in Wordsworth's poem of that name" (n. 18, p. 313).

4. *Estudios sobre el teatro de Lope de Vega,* vol. II, (Madrid, 1919–1927), p. 292.

5. *Grillparzer und Lope de Vega* (Berlin, 1894), pp. 65–78.

6. Karl Vossler, *Lope de Vega y su tiempo,* trans. Ramón de la Serna, 2nd ed. (Madrid, 1940), p. 316.

The Conspiracy and Tragedy of Charles Duke of Byron: The Evaporation of Honour

Patricia Demers

> . . . see in his revolt how honour's flood
> Ebbs into air, when men are great, not good.[1]

Charles de Gontaut, Duke of Byron, is no reincarnation of Bussy D'Ambois. The superficial similarities he bears to Chapman's earlier hero only serve to outline more clearly the distance between them. The Prologue awards him the status of an autumnal star (1. 12) and a fanfare of loud music (I. ii) announces his entrance – so unlike the posthumous stellification and quiet choric self-introduction of Bussy. Byron approaches the discontented La Fin, "alone, and heavy countenanc'd" (II. i. 54), in a way reminiscent of Monsieur's approach to Bussy, just as La Fin's description of the chaotic influence of the moon (III. i. 6-16) recalls the lunar control of Monsieur's imagistic delineation of Bussy's "great heart" (*Bussy D'Ambois,* I. ii. 138-146). But in *The Conspiracy* the roles of victimizer and prey are reversed, and the mention of the moon is not part of an ominous encomium but of an admitted lure. It is Byron who is played upon when he commiserates with La Fin as surely as it is he who falls the victim of this Machiavel's "feigned passion" (III. i. 1). His heroic vaunts about leaving his statue eternally rooted on a mountain (III. ii. 141-55),[2] being a "law rational" (III. iii. 145), and filling his sails "with a lusty wind" (III. iii. 136) are quite removed from Bussy's marbled death stance as "a Roman statue" (V. iii. 144), his defense of that kingly prerogative to "do a justice which exceeds the law" (III. i. 199), and his humble reliance on (or appearance as) a virtuous guide to prevent "shipwreck in our safest port" (I. i. 33). *The Tragedy* casts Byron's pronouncements in an even less sympathetic light. Unlike Bussy's eventual joining with Hercules (V. iii. 270) and his rugged stand as a box-tree (IV. i. 85), Byron appropriates the Atlas-like role of Hercules (III. i. 151) and considers himself a lofty and unbeaten "cedar on Mount Lebanon" (V. iii. 13) disdaining the box-tree lowliness of his judges. But, as Henry remarks, Byron's eventual port is only "despair and ruin" (III. ii. 69), and, in Epernon's view, his outcome is a disappointment of previous stellar potential, comparable to "An exhalation that would be a star . . . which fell, when the sun forsook it, in a sink" (IV. ii. 292-3). Self-pitying hyperbole seems to dominate his conclusion that "virtue in great men must be small and slight, / For poor stars rule where she is exquisite" (V. ii. 186-7) and hence to distinguish it also from the detached choric utterance of Monsieur about the fate of "this full creature (who) now shall reel and fall" (*Bussy D'Ambois,* V. iii. 46). Although similar features, such as a shared encomiastic treatment of Elizabeth, outbursts of viciousness, riddles, chess games, and forms of choric commentary, may appear to link the plays more closely together, in reality such similarities separate them even more. While Bussy's King praises Elizabeth's court, Byron's King proposes an educative sojourn there to calm his splenative Duke (III. ii. 274-84). The viciousness of the honest assessments which Bussy and Monsieur engage in resides wholly in verbal power; in contrast, the revelation of La Brosse[3] adds to the tension of *The Conspiracy* by unleashing the Duke's physical rashness and extracting his confession about a pitiful preference of flattery, so foreign to the searing truth of Bussy's encounter with Monsieur. The riddle of the easily won Pero about

chastity is fitting to the information she offers in *Bussy D'Ambois* yet far removed from the equally appropriate riddle of good fame which the masquers present in *The Tragedy of Byron.* While Henry III and the Guise are playing chess at the time of Bussy's noticeable initiation at court, Henry IV proposes "a battle at the chess" (IV. ii. 95) to the fiery Duke as a prelude to his arrest for treason. Though the chorus of Guise and Monsieur underscores the tragic irony of fullness and solidity, the observations of Epernon which recount "of what contraries consists a man!" (*Tragedy,* V. iii. 189) seem more tailored to the fluctuations and paradoxes of character which have created Byron's tragedy. Both worlds are "quite inverted" (*Tragedy,* I. ii. 14), but the reader might find the inversions which account for the tragedy of Byron to be self-created, explicable, and distinct from the external and inscrutable forces which appear to dominate Bussy's universe.

If these inversions seem intelligible, however, the images which depict Byron's status and dilemmas seem more compacted than those of *Bussy D'Ambois.* Although their picturing power still makes them generally emblematic, they function more as part of a deliberate cluster and less as independent images. The Prologue itself provides an example of such an imagistic conglomerate and also introduces one of the key metaphors of Chapman's play. Just as the wealthy autumnal star, having been "Wash'd in the lofty ocean, thence ariseth, / Illustrates heaven, and all his other fires / Out-shines and darkens" (II. 13-15), Byron's rise involves a similarly scintillating ascent to the ocean of the sky. But the thirst for "his country s love" (I. 18) leads him to the empoisoning spring of Policy whose effects reverse inflation into deflation, ascent into descent: "He bursts in growing great, and, rising, sinks" (I. 21)' His flood of honour evaporates, or as Chapman expresses it, "Ebbs into air" as testimony of the outcome "when men are great, not good" (1. 24). In addition to its warning about the hero's character, such an introduction also indicates the working of an image unit which with varying degrees of lucidity and coherence will reappear throughout *The Conspiracy and Tragedy of Charles Duke of Byron.*

The sharing of the same lead roles links these two parts together as a single play in an even more remarkable and necessary[4] fashion than *I* and *II Tamburlaine.* In fact, *The Conspiracy* seems only a prelude to *The Tragedy.* While Tamburlaine emerges from Part One as an undeniable cosmic power, the only issue of *The Conspiracy* is the overhasty and indeed tenuous reunion of King and subject, soon to be shattered by the opening lines of *The Tragedy.* The closest link – actually, the lifeline – between the two parts is the imagery which in *The Conspiracy* always seems about to receive the final punctuation which *The Tragedy* ultimately bestows.

Perhaps the image of evaporation contains the keynote for the whole play. It provides Byron, Henry, and the observant Janin with revealingly different explanations. In attempting to calm the "feigned passion" (III. i. 1) of La Fin, Byron uses the simile of the supposedly temperate air:

> That evenly interpos'd betwixt the seas
> And the opposed element of fire,
> At either toucheth, but partakes with neither;
> Is neither hot nor cold, but with a slight
> And harmless temper mix'd of both th' extremes. (III. i. 42-6)

It seems indicative of Byron's own naiveté that he should consider air remaining harmlessly unaffected when stretched between such extremities as fire and water, heat and cold. In his passage "through things call'd good and bad" (1. 41), according to Byron, man is

Figure 1
Παξ πδι §ειδν, from a 1551 edition of Horapollo's *Hieroglyphics.* Cf. *Byron's Tragedy,* III. i. 210-11.

similarly untouched; yet his own tragedy testifies powerfully to the contrary. One of the glories of Elizabeth's court and thus of her kingdom is its openness and amplitude, fittingly conveyed as "unbounded as the ample air" (IV. i. 12); and later Henry comments that we can only expect impartial judgement when "the air contain'd within our ears" (V. ii. 58) refrains from "offensive sounds" (1. 60) and its own tumult within in order to perceive and moderate "differences without them" (1. 66). Although in *The Tragedy* even La Fin cautions Byron to "give temperate Air / To his unmatch'd and more than human wind" (I. ii. 44-5), the Duke's rashness and its resultant criminality prevail and reach their drizzling[5] nadir in Janin's observation. Byron's cloud-like eminence (I. ii. 56) as he proudly hawks at kingdoms either evaporates or condenses into an abrupt and inglorious end:

> . . . suddenly, the fowl that hawk'd so fair,
> Stoops in a puddle, or consumes in air. (III. i. 210-11)

Such Byronic condensation is surely quite removed from Horapollo's instructive hieroglyph about heavenly learning (Figure 1).[6]

The air that images such an ignominious end also allows for the beginning of deceptive inflation. Flattery can be just as misleading as the heart-deadening accumulation of knowledge which the Lyonese bluestocking, Georgette de Montenay, lamented in her emblem, *"Scientia inflat,"*[7] for its inflation is as insubstantial and fictionally regressive as Donne's "superficies of air."[8] Recalling the Prologue's image of the man who "bursts in growing great" (1. 21), Henry cautions Byron against a credulous acceptance of the "empty breath" (III. ii. 259) and "passions of wind" (1. 260) of hired flatterers. The praises they bestow, like the empty vaunts of the eulogistic verses prefacing a volume of poetry,[9] are worthless; in Henry's deprecation (which could also be a backhanded compliment for Byron), they are "fitter to blow up bladders than full men" (1. 266). The foremost reason why Byron has such a difficult time convincing his audience of the rightness of his cause resides in the calm, sagacious, and deservedly respected figure of Henry IV. The King's

wisdom throws his subject's spleen into unflattering relief. Henry remains undaunted in his efforts to convince Byron of the false inflation of flatterers:

> . . . who in swelling
> Your veins with empty hopes of much, yet able
> To perform nothing, are like shallow streams
> That make themselves so many heavens to sight. (V. ii. 69-72)

This monarch goes as far as to suggest the remedy of deflation, to "pierce them to the very earth" (1. 78), and graciously extends a clement yet curt invitation to "leave them and be true to me / Or you'll be left by all" (11. 79-80). Following the King's condemnation of him as "an atheist . . . and a traitor / Both foul and damnable" (*Tragedy,* IV. ii. 250-1), Byron's reaction of injured innocence is hardly credible. He pictures himself as an abused anvil, "the seed and wombs of others' honours" (1. 272), and the slave of a tyrannical bellows, "A property for a tyrant to set up / And puff down with the vapour of his breath" (11. 273-4). Significantly, now that his once-clandestine anvil is no longer "lin'd with wool" (*Tragedy,* I. ii. 54), Byron has still to realize the identity of the harmoniously flattering blacksmith who has inflated his own bellows. This frenzied metaphor of the accused is both predictably misinformed and damningly revealing.

The two elements found in the Prologue, air and water, afford workable analogues for Byron's tragedy. Just as the air which stretches to heaven yet holds evaporated honour, the water can form a flood yet also ebb into air. The flow of smaller into larger bodies of water is a central image for it does more that illustrate the play's chain of command; it depicts a threat as constant as evaporation – envelopment. Savoy uses this image to describe the position of the newly exiled La Fin, likened to a greedy little river, in face of his King, who is the roaring devouring sea (I. i. 183-192). Later he uses the image of "a little brook being overrun/ With a black torrent" (II. ii. 188-9) to taunt Henry in a different way about the defeat of the rebellious Du Maine at the hands of the singularly superior torrential force of Byron. Henry counters with his comparison of Byron to "the wild and slippery element" (1. 234) in water which is carried in open vessels and prevented from overflowing by the presence of "treen cups" (1. 233), comparable to the Duke's assistance by Colonel Williams, who "Swum in Byron, and held him but to right" (1. 238). Indicative of the unhealthy surreptitiousness of his policy for gaining support, Byron suggests that he winds about his prospects "like a subtle river" searching for "the easiest parts of entry on the shore" (III. i. 68, 71). He seems more of a forecasting of Webster's Flamineo who would be as "engaged to mischief . . . / As rivers to find out the ocean"[10] and less of an example of a nationally admired Duke. Imperceptive as well, he proposes joining his stream with La Fin's (1. 75) and openly warms to this piece of Savoy's questionable geography and purposeful obsequiousness: "All honours flow to me, in you their ocean" (III. ii. 24). Byron's torrential pride is easily harnessed to feed the subtle streams of Savoy and La Fin. As the Duke previews his mountain statue, his description of one particular feature makes clear the successful manipulation of his flatterers; interestingly, this comparison recalls the earlier position of Savoy himself:

> I'll pour an endless flood into a sea
> Raging beneath me, which shall intimate
> My ceaseless service drunk up by the King,
> As th' ocean drinks up rivers and makes all
> Bear his proud title (11 170-74)

But Byron's bruised pride cannot match the politic guile and elasticity of Savoy's volte-face, as he turns his "streams another way" (1. 196) at the entry of the King's nobles, Nemours and Soissons.

The full extent of Byron's victimization becomes apparent in *The Tragedy* wherein he attempts to justify himself from a standpoint noticeably different from the confident and lofty height of his envisioned statue. No longer is he the nutritive source but the inundated "Stygian flood" (IV. i. 62) whose enemies are attempting to drown in itself. The very rivers who have fed him and are hiding in his seas, "since their deserts / Are far from such a deluge" (11. 63-4), are trying to flood him by denouncing him to the King. Turbid though his metaphorical justification may be, it is an incomplete explanation of his position as victim, for it exonerates the principal victimizer. As he mounts the scaffold, he uses the image one last time in delivering his comments on death, a compendium of pitiable narcissism and willful blindness. Apparently this traitor considers himself one "Whose ends will make him greatest, and not best" (V. iv. 145) – predictably superlative extensions of the Prologue's epithets. He advises those about him to "imitate streams, / That run below the valleys and do yield / To every molehill" (11. 152-4). Yet despite such compliant yielding, these streams evidence an unsettling reaction to torrents which have previously been compared to Byron's force:

. . . when torrents come,
That swell and raise them past their natural height,
How mad they are, and troubled! (11. 155-7)

Then Byron seems to reverse the attractiveness of the streams and the uproar of the torrents by concluding with this puzzling view of kingship:

. . . Like low (streams)
With torrents crown'd, are men with diadems. (11. 157-8)

These frenetic images mirror their speaker and outline the appalling extent of his self-victimization.

Along with the images depicting the flow of rivers and currents, specifically marine imagery also appears. Like the vastness of the body of water it describes, this sea imagery usually denotes the greatness – genuine, proposed, or illusory – of its speaker. The exiled La Fin's boast which he enjoins Byron to carry to his King is a significant recasting of the Prologue's praise of the Duke as an autumnal star "in the lofty ocean" (1. 13). La Fin's promise "to lift the sea/ Up to the stars" (*Conspiracy*, III. i. 119-20) begins his account of paradoxical future feats which closes with this noteworthy blend of ranting anarchy and flunking logic:

. . . to dissolve all laws
Of nature and of order, argue power
Able to work all, I can make all good. (11. 125-7)

Surely such raving reflects just as unfavourably on La Fin's impossible yet envenomed plans for vindication as it does on the ease with which his imperceptive interlocutor is duped into supporting him, to "put off from this dull shore of (ease) / Into industrious and high-going seas" (11. 149-50). True, the Duke is awarded flattering plaudits about his sea-going abilities. For Henry's benefit, Savoy pictures Byron "on his brave beast Pastrana" sitting "like a full-sail'd Argosy / Danc'd with a lofty billow" (II. ii. 67-9), and later, still for Henry's edification, describes the battle deeds of this superior subject by attributing to such a warrior Peacham's virtue of "manlie constancie,"[11] as he breaks his enemies

"like billows 'gainst a rock" (1. 131). Byron himself is quite adept at previewing his own marine activities; the endless flood pouring from his statue will feed a supposedly voracious kingly sea to indicate his "lasting worth" (III. ii. 176), while, following La Brosse's unhappy revelation, his forced exuberance about untrussing the slaveries of "all worthy spirits" (III. iii. 130) takes the form of setting out on "life's rough sea" with "his sails fill'd with a lusty wind" (11. 135-6). He proceeds to outline the perils similar to those endured by Peacham's storm-tossed galleon;[12] the description of "his rapt ship run on her side so low / That she drinks water, and her keel plows air" (11. 138-9) merely prefaces his confident pronouncement[13] that "there is no danger to a man that knows / What life and death is" (11. 140-1). But there is a great difference between proposing marine activities and actually "being a sea" (IV. i. 30), just as there can be as much danger as grandeur in being "a mighty promontory" (1. 190). Elizabeth's speech seems to contain the sobering antidote for Byron's projected eminence. In addressing her visitor, she draws a comparison between a vast, overhanging, but eroded promontory and those corrupted great ones who by "building out / Too swelling fronts for their foundations, / When most they should be propp'd are most forsaken" (11. 196-8). But her advice evidently goes unheeded for *The Tragedy* not only recalls the "turbulent sea" (I. i. 117) of civil war but also focuses finally on the rude tumult of Byron's own uncalm sea (V. iv. 203-4).

Although this play does not appear to move through a series of tableaux in the same fashion as *Bussy D'Ambois*, it creates its own aura of the stately presence and political confrontations which coexist almost expectedly in courts and embassies. Utilizing such a backdrop, *The Conspiracy* presents two outstanding pictures at its exhibition of Byron. Both deserve the name hieroglyphics, as, with true pictographic and moral ardour, they interpret their sights as signs of Byron's quixotic potential. Savoy's picture of the Duke on his horse easily becomes a Golden Age recasting:

> They do the best present the state of man
> In his first royalty ruling and of beasts
> In their first loyalty serving. (II. ii. 72-4)

Neither duress nor subjugation inheres in this idyllic situation, only willing co-operation. The speaker loses no time in elevating his picture to the status of "a doctrinal and witty hieroglyphic / Of a blest kingdom" (11. 78-9), particularly significant in terms of the lesson it bluntly delivers to its royal audience:

> . . . to express and teach
> Kings to command as they could serve, and subjects
> To serve as if they had power to command. (11. 79-81)

Though Henry's unventuresome comment about Savoy's wit "That can make anything of anything" (1. 85) signals this pupil's adroit halt to his lesson, Savoy's hieroglyphic has been an aptly timed and strangely revealing device.[14] Though his description began with Byron as the kingly rider, it closes not only with the suggestion of Henry as rider but also, and more importantly, with the impossibly ideal intimation of the interchangeability of bearer and rider. The mental picture it suggests recalls Whitney's comparable emblem (Figure 2) in praise of Sir Philip Sidney, who by virtue of being one of those "men of judgement graue, / Of learning, witte, and eeke of conscience cleare"[15] controls his tramping steed; interchangeability would be as inapt here as it is fitting in Chapman's context. In addition to its appropriateness as a political figuration, Savoy's hieroglyphic provides a subtle yet strong base for his purposeful insinuations to Henry about his subject's inflating pride.

Figure 2
"Non locus vir, sed vir locum ornat," from Whitney's *Choice of Emblemes*, p. 38. Cf. *Byron's Conspiracy*, II. ii. 67-81.

Elizabeth's speech contains the second hieroglyphic which also delivers a lesson, but one specifically designed to benefit her French visitor. Having explained the analogy between the eroded promontory and corrupted men, she concludes her teaching with a description of the heavens as "Aperfect hieroglyphic to express / The idleness of such security" (IV. i. 207-8) as that provided by the apparent sturdiness of the promontory. She supports "the grave labour of a wise distrust, / In both sorts of the all-including stars" (11. 209-210) by clarifying how the appearance of the stars to the earth-bound observer need not indicate their astronomical position: "The fixed stars waver, and the erring stand" (1. 213). Twinkling results not from movement but fixity, while steady shining emanates from erring or wandering planets.[16] Perhaps her lesson is either too direct or too obscure, for, while he admits that "the stars / . . . are divine books to us" (11. 216-7), Byron politely dismisses the Queen's counsel with the confident assessment, "I need it not" (1. 220). However, when he faces the condemnation of the Chancellor, Byron shows how much he was in need of such advice, for all he now can rely on is a sacrilegiously self-appropriated acquittal from God. The basis for such a vindication is his tragically unsound view of himself as one of God's "truest images" (*Tragedy*, V. iii. 100).

With this tragedy, in particular, the reader is quickly impressed by the amount of natural analogues and the ease with which they work. Such correspondences find their best explanations in extended image units, in agglomerations like those describing the hieroglyphics. Perhaps the most outstanding is Byron's account of the effects of the self-exiled Duke d'Aumale's treason. As d'Aumale was fleeing France, he

> . . . had his statue torn
> Piece-meal with horses, all his goods confiscate,
> His arms of honour kick'd about the streets,
> His goodly house at Annet raz'd to th' earth,
> And (for strange reproach of his foul treason)
> His trees about it cut off by their waists. (*Conspiracy*, I. ii. 148-53)

The ducal narrator, full of the integrity of a loyal subject at this point, carefully adduces a series of moral positions to explain each of these justifiable assaults against traitors:

To seek without them that which is not theirs,
The forms of all their comforts are distracted,
The riches of their freedoms forfeited,
Their human noblesse sham'd, the mansions
Of their cold spirits eaten down with cares,
And all their ornaments of wit and valour,
Learning, and judgement, cut from all their fruits, (11. 158-64)

Tree analogues are especially prominent. In addition to this concluding correspondence, Byron later prefaces his enquiry at the house of the astrologer with an observation about the doom that awaits fortunate men who, "like trees that broadest sprout, / Their own too top heavy state grubs up their root" (III. iii. 29-30). *The Tragedy* traces the distance Byron moves away from his initial stand and the growing inevitability of his second. The King and his infant heir are left to defend their own "tree of rule" and to cut from it "all trait'rous branches" (I. i. 113), for, while Byron laments the withering of the "goodly tree" (III. i. 27) of religion, a scion from the no longer vital tree of empire, he also proposes to be a hardy weather-beaten "blackthorn" (1. 127) and a loftily pristine "cedar on Mount Lebanon" (V. iii. 13). However, despite their box-tree lowliness, his judges manage to reduce his proud eminence with awesome finality. Following the Prologue's example, stars provide a workable analogue too. Although La Brosse indicates the curious difference separating the ignorant yet fatal stars from sapient yet helpless men (III. iii. 5-8), his reckless client assumes that he is "a nobler substance than the stars" (1. 109), and continues with this arrogant clarification:

I have a will and faculties of choice,
To do, or not to do: and reason why
I do, or not do this: the stars have none;
They know not why they shine, more than this taper. (11. 112-15)

Epernon's later comments on Byron's unfulfilled stellar potential (*Tragedy,* IV. ii. 291-5), though, bring proposals of superiority and treasonous actions into closer alignment, while Byron's self-protective righteousness about the "envious stars" (V. ii. 203) of his accusers remains a pathetically inadequate ploy. Clouds also run an analogue gamut, extending from the thoughtful adjuration of Picoté to the unwilling involvement of Byron. Although Picoté advises the admittedly superior Duke to avoid destroying himself by adopting an emblematic[17] position (Figure 3) of unsullied height, "Like those steep hills that will admit no clouds, / No dews, nor least fumes bound about their brows, / Because their tops pierce into purest air" (*Conspiracy,* I. ii. 104-7), Byron's tragedy is proof either of the inadequacy of his height or of the susceptibility of his lowness. When imprisoned, he wishes to escape his uncertain status as a cloud, but despite his visions about "recovering heat and lightness' and being "by the sun / Made fresh and glorious" *(Tragedy,* V. iii. 46-8), his re-ascendancy is not only doubtful: it remains impossible.

Earlier when Byron had considered how "immortal" it would be "to die aspiring" *(Conspiracy,* I. ii. 31), he cited the example of "happy Semele" / That died compress'd with glory!" (11. 37-8); and before his execution he makes the claim to have been "Like Orpheus casting reins on savage beasts" (*Tragedy,* V. ii. 10). Such extravagant boasts must cause the reader to question both the perceptiveness and the credibility of this Chapman hero. As surely as Faustus recognized a difference between happy and hapless Semele,"[18]



Figure 3
"Te stante, virebo," from Whitney's *Choice of Emblemes,* p. 1. Cf. *Byron's Conspiracy,* I. ii. 104-7.

there would seem to be a comparable expanse separating the fanfare of Byron's supposedly Orphic skills from the quietly circular suasiveness of Whitney's emblem (Figure 4) celebrating "Orpheus with his harpe, that savage kinde did tame."[19] And, if his boasts seem wide of the truth, so also do his logical powers seem wanting. It is in the least foreboding to hear a protagonist declare about Fortune that "I will win it though I lose my self" (*Conspiracy,* II. i. 146), and far from indicating ameliorative intent when, in talking of the country he has repaired, such a hero vows to "ruin it again to re-advance it" (*Tragedy,* I. ii. 35). Yet Byron's deficiencies have not eluded hisKing. Henry announces early enough that his subject has been surpassed in terms of experience and brain (*Conspiracy,* II. ii. 219), and diagnoses that Byron's "adust and melancholy choler" (1. 43) warrants the prescription of "temperate English air" (1. 49). Yet temperance never seems to be associated with Byron. Rather, from his first to his final appearance, the rashness of a chameleon temperament and the ineffable hauteur of the self-destructive overreacher seem to characterize his behaviour. Despite its predictability, one senses the tragic waste when the

Figure 4
"Orphei Musica," from Whitney's *Choice of Emblemes,* p. 186. Cf. *Byron's Tragedy,* V. ii. 10.

Duke, who had previously argued that "To have stuff and form, / And to lie idle, fearful, and unus'd, / Nor form nor stuff shows" (*Conspiracy*, I. ii. 35-7), meets the "decretal end" (*Tragedy*, V. iv. 229) of his death. His form has been blasted, his cannon outshot, his stuff abused. Furthermore, his final sermon[20] relies on his own negative example to preach the worthlessness of once-prominent statues (11. 254-5). Yet, in his own inimitable "Byronic" manner, Chapman allows flashes of inconsistency to mar such penitence and thus to hinder the resolution of his hero's puzzle. On the scaffold this traitor enjoins his relatives "To keep their faiths that bind them to the King" (1. 233), and the man Henry has condemned as an atheist commands his soul to "Bear the eternal victory of Death" (1. 261). The spectrum of diverse critical views[21] that such a creation has provoked, varying from outright condemnation to a realization of this foreseeable tragedy with a difference, are not entirely surprising; for, as my examination of its imagery has attempted to illustrate, a play in which heroic vaunt evaporates pitifully and word and deed oppose one another so palpably, continues to exercise the attraction of a puzzling certainity.

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Notes

1 *"Prologue,"* 11. 23-4, *The Conspiracy and Tragedy of Charles Duke of Byron, The Plays of George Chapman: The Tragedies* (1914; rpt. New York: Russell & Russell, 1961). All subsequent references to the tragedies will be based on this edition, with the exception of *Bussy D'Ambois*, ed. N. Brooke (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1964).

2 Millar MacLure aptly comments on Byron's "giantism prefiguring the meglomania of Mount Rushmore," *George Chapman: A Critical Study* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), p. 139. In his doctoral thesis, "The Animate Glass: Chapman's Dramatic Evolution" (Diss. University of Rochester, 1964), James E. Parsons threads his theme of destructive posture into this obserfation: "Byron's hallucinatory mental statuary is the master builder of the self-destructive monuments of pose" (p. 317).

3 Johnston Parr cites several popular booklets to validate his contention that "everyone learned in astrological lore in Chapman's day knew that a malignant *Caput Algol* in one's horoscope presaged one's decapitation," in his article "The Duke of Byron's Malignant 'Caput Algol'," *SP*, 43 (1946), 198.

4 Not a subscriber to the view of *Tamburlaine* as a ten-act moral play which Roy Battenhouse advances in his book *Marlowe's Tamburlaine: A Study in Renaissance Moral Philosophy* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1941), I prefer the structural analyses of distinct parallels and differences between *I* and *II Tamburlaine* which are the concerns of G.I. Duthie, "The Dramatic Structure of Marlowe's 'Tamburlaine the Great,' Parts I and II," *ES*, 1(1948), 101-126; and Clifford Leech, "The Structure of Tamburlaine," *TDR*, 8(1964), 34-46.

5 L. C. Stagg points out how Byron, "the once proud cloud, drizzles himself ignominiously out of existence," in his article "Characterization Through Nature Imagery in the Tragedies of George Chapman," *Ball State University Forum*, 9(1968), 43.

6 D. J. Gordon explains that in composing his *Hieroglyphica* Valeriano borrowed Horapollo's image of dew falling and extended it into a distinction "between profane learning (*Doctrina gentium)* which is like bitter waters that bring forth no fruit and heavenly learning (*Doctrina Coelestis*) which brings forth much fruit."
He offers this explanation along with a copy of Horapollo's hieroglyph in his article "The Imagery of Ben Johnson's *The Masque of Blackness and The Masque of Beautie*," *JWCI*, 6(1943), 126, 136.

7 Robert J. Clements quotes from *Emblèmes, ou devises chrestiennes* (Lyon, 1571), p. 87, *Picta Poesis: Literary and Humanistic Theory in Renaissance Emblem Books* (Roma: Edizioni Di Storia E Letteratura, 1960), p. 71; one line in particular of de Montenay's accompanying verse, "Ouvre le sens & le coeur mortifie," is much in the spirit of Chapman's later deprecation of walking dictionaries, *Euthymiae Raptus,* 1. 531.

8 Donne considers the transience of time and place with this airy ramification: "How thin and fluid a thing is air, and how thin a film is a superficies, and a superficies of air! ," XIV. Meditation, *Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions Together With Death's Duel* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,1959), pp. 88-9.

9 See Parrott's note, *Tragedies,* II, 606.

10 John Webster, *The White Devil,* I. ii. 335-6, *John Webster and Cyril Tourneur: Four Plays,* ed. J. A. Symonds (New York: Hill and Wang, 1956).

11 Henry Peacham, *"Nec igne, nec unde," Minerva Britanna 1612,* A Scolar Press Facsimile (Leeds: The Scolar Press, 1966), p. 158.

12 Peacham, *"His graviora," Minerva Britanna,* p. 165.

13 In *The Jacobean Drama: An Interpretation* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1936), Una Ellis-Fermor explains the "defiance and tension" of Byron's speech as "the measure of Chapman's resistance to the fatalism more common in his age" (p. 64); however, she concludes that this hero must fall in the face of "Chapman's stern sense of public responsibility and knowledge of the instability of human fortune" (pp. 65-6).

Parrott notes that Shelley chose lines 140-143 as the motto for his *Laon and Cythna, Tragedies,* II, 607.

14 Rosemary Freeman calls this passage (II. ii. 66-81) "a speaking picture" with "its interpretation and its moral lesson . . . all present," *English Emblem Books* (1948: rpt. London: Chatto & Windus, 1967), p. 6. Clements views Byron and his horse as "symbols of royalty ruling and loyalty serving," *Picta Poesis,* p. 79. Mario Praz uses Savoy's description as illustrative of Chapman's "emblematical bias," *Studies in Seventeenth-Century Imagery,* Second Edition (Roma: Edizioni Di Storia E Letteratura, 1964), p. 220.

15 Geoffrey Whitney, *"Non locus vir, sed vir locum ornat,* "To The Honorable Sir Phillip Sidney Knight," *A Choice of Emblems,* ed. H. Green (London: Lovell & Reeve Co., 1866), p. 38, 11. 7-8.

16 See Parrott's gloss, *Tragedies,* II, 608.

17 Though Whitney pictures "A mightie Spyre, whose toppe dothe pierce the skie" (1.1), and not a steep hill, the key notion of loftiness obtains both in the emblematist's figure of the inter-relationship of Church and State and in the Frenchman's simile for Byron's absoluteness. See *"Te stante, virebo," A Choice of Emblemes,* p. 1.

18 Of course, Faustus's desire of Helen invests his perception with quirks too; he even admits that this fabled dame is "Brighter . . . than flaming Jupiter / When he appeared to hapless Semele," *Doctor Faustus,* V. i. 114-5, *The Complete Plays of Christopher Marlowe,* ed. I. Ribner (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1963).

19 "Orphei Musica," *A Choice of Emblemes,* p. 186, 1. 1.

20 Commenting on what he termed the "classics" of the Byron plays, Algernon C. Swinburne remarks about the "pathos of a high and masculine order in the last appeals and struggles of the ruined spirit and the fallen pride which yet retain some traces and likeness of the hero and the patriot that has been," *George Chapman: A Critical Essay* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1875), pp. 92, 95. In his essay "Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca," T. S. Eliot mentions the "conspicuous . . . self-dramatization" with which such Chapman heroes as Bussy Byron, and Clermont die; see *Selected Essays* (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), p. 129.

21 Foremost in the condemning vanguard is Ennis Rees with his views on the wrongness of Byron's cause, his lack of integrity, and his godlessness; see *The Tragedies of George Chapman: Renaissance Ethics in Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 52, 60, 66. John William Wieler earlier defended the position that Byron was "doomed because of discontent," *George Chapman — The Effect of Stoicism*

Upon His Tragedies (1949; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, 1969), p. 58.

Several scholars adduce reasons for qualifying Chapman's success in *The Conspiracy and Tragedy of Charles Duke Of Byron*. In *An Introduction to Stuart Drama* (London: Oxford University press, 1946), Frederick S. Boas finds it overloaded with historical detail (p. 33). When comparing the heroes of Chapman's first two tragedies, Jean Jacquot judges Byron to be more static than Bussy and concludes that he is mainly "un personnage passif dominé par l'orgeuil et manoeuvré par quelques intrigants;" see *George Chapman (1559-1634) sa vie, sa poésie, son théâtre, sa pensée* (Paris: Société D'Editions Les Belles Lettres, 1951), p. 194. In *Endeavours of Art* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954), Madeleine Doran sees "irresolution" as the "fault of the Byron plays" (p. 356). Robert Ornstein laments the victory of morality over drama, while Irving Ribner considers Byron more blackened by sin than Bussy; see *The Moral Vision of Jacobean Tragedy* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), p. 60, and *Jacobean Tragedy, The Quest For Moral Order* (London: Methuen & Co., 1962), p. 22.

Others, however, have recorded the contradictions and complexities which make Chapman's tragedy engaging fare. Janet Spens was an early praiser of its hero's eminence; her monograph, "Chapman's Ethical Thought," *Essays and Studies*, 11 (1925), describes Chapman's "greatest creation" as "a soldier of genius" whose personality is on a Titanic scale" and whose hallmark consists of "overflowing vitality" (p. 155). Peter Ure has advanced at least three worthwhile views on separate occasions, in "The Main Outline of Chapman's Byron", *SP*, 47(1950), he describes Byron as "an Alexandrian hero of corrupted virtue" (p. 571) who also resembles "those Renaissance toys of pleated paper" (p. 568); in "Chapman's Tragedies," *Jacobean Theatre, Stratford-upon-Avon Studies*, 1(1960), he recognizes that this play bursts the "cerements of moralized drama" (p. 229), but he also labels its hero as a "wildfire without a centre" (p. 240); in "A Note on 'Opinion' in Daniel, Greville and Chapman," *MLR*, 46(1951), he explains that the ruin of Byron lies in his following of opinion (p. 335). At least two other scholars have continued to stress the importance of this tragedy in more recent articles. G. R. Hibbard confidently asserts that it is a better play than *Bussy* because Chapman's attitude was "more mature and ambivalent," in "Goodness and Greatness: An Essay on the Tragedies of Ben Johnson and George Chapman," *Renaissance and Modern Studies*, 11(1967), 41; and Sidney Homan is in agreement, finding that "Chapman's lingering fascination with the superman type" leads to a creation that is more "complex" than Bussy because of its more numerous "contradictions," in "Chapman and Marlowe: The Paradoxical Hero and the Divided Response," *JEGP*, 68(1969), 392, 405.

Douglas H. Parker

If an anthology of influential and factual Reformation literature were produced to-day, the *Letters of Obscure Men* would hardly find a place in it. The work would undoubtedly contain a good deal of Tyndale, Erasmus, and Luther, probably some Melancthon and Oecolampadius, and quite possibly snippets from the precursors, Wycliffe and Huss. But it would be a presumptuous editor indeed who would include a work whose authorship is still unsettled, whose issues and personal portraits are exaggerated and calumnious, and whose historical authenticity is often suspect. Such a work is the *Letters of Obscure Men.*[1] But to say this is not to deny its importance as a document which in many ways captures the emotion, the spirit, and the temper of the times better, and even more precisely, than the more factual and authentic reformation tracts that we still possess. In many ways it is in the tradition of Erasmus's *Moriae Encomium.* Although considerably less artful and more clumsy in its satire than Erasmus's *Folly,* the *Letters* still shows some indebtedness to that work. The creation of the naive narrator unwittingly speaking stupidity and nonsense and thereby tinging all that he mentions in good faith with ridicule, is not unlike Folly in one of her many poses. The issues attacked – clerical worldliness, monastic institutions, the stultifying hair-splitting of scholasticism, and so on – find many of their roots not only in the general dispute between the old order and the new, but also in the *Praise of Folly.* However, unlike *Folly,* we are always sure where we stand in the *Letters.* The narrative technique is simplistic and straight-forward; whatever the correspondent lauds and praises to Ortwin Gratius, the recipient of most of the letters, we are supposed to condemn and laugh at. The numerous narrators are types rather than individuals, and their letters are all similar in theme and tone. They are the reactionaries tenaciously clinging to the old order and strongly opposing social, educational, and most importantly, Christian progress.

In the light of this basic narrative simplicity, it is almost beyond belief that anyone could read the *Letters* in any way other than the one so obviously intended. And yet the renowned Steele, writing in *The Tatler* (197), demonstrates total unawareness of their simple satirical intent. He writes:

> It seems this is a collection of letters, which some profound blockheads, who lived before our times, have written in honour of each other, and for their mutual information in each other's absurdities. . . . It is, methinks, wonderful that fellows could be awake, and utter such incoherent conceptions, and converse with great gravity like learned men, without the least taste of knowledge or good sense.[2]

It would be instructive and probably amusing to know how Steele would have responded to the labyrinthine complexities of narration in the *Praise of Folly.*

Unlike *Folly* as well, the *Letters* is not averse to slander and character defamation of the most pernicious kind. This thorough and often unjust assassination of anyone who happened to rouse the furor of the authors was what Erasmus seemed to object to most of all. His anger had some justification; in the second volume in particular, he is associated with those who carry out these personal attacks upon their enemies. His attitude is expressed in a letter to Hermann, Count of Nuenar, 25 August 1517:

> It is well known to all the Basel society, that I always disapproved of the book, which has for title, *The Epistles of Obscure Men.* It is not that I have any aversion to a lively

jest, but that I dislike the precedent of injury to the good name of another – a wrong which anyone may so easily commit. We did ourselves, long ago, make sport in the *Moria*, but no one was attacked by name. These writers, whoever they may be, not contented with the trifles already produced, have added a similar sheet in which – for some reason which I cannot guess – they have thought fit to bring in my name over and over again.[3]

From this excerpt it is clear that Erasmus did not approve of at least three elements in the *Letters*. First of all, he resented the kind and degree of direct personal slander. Secondly, he saw the work, written in a style that he would have considered crude and tasteless, as a direct threat to the cause of peaceful religious reform and the advancement of good letters. And finally, because of these two elements, he resented the mention of his own name in the work and attempted to dissociate himself as much as possible from the crudities of the *Letters*. In this letter he mentions the *Praise of Folly* as a work which spoke generally of faults and errors in existing institutions without descending to the level of personal invective. This, in large part, is true. However, one cannot help remembering the *Julius exclusis e coelis*[4] and the degree to which Erasmus's general criticism could descend into personal vituperation. Although one cannot disagree with the viewpoint expressed by Erasmus in this letter, at the same time it is understandable how the authors of the *Letters of Obscure Men* could feel confident that they were mustering an ally in Erasmus and not creating a foe. Indeed, that Erasmus himself must have felt that he had established an infelicitous precedent for the authors of the *Letters* through the writing of the *Julius* is clear in at least two of his own epistles. In the letter cited above, immediately after scolding the authors of the second volume of the *Letters of Obscure Men*, he adds:

My James, on his late return from Cologne, has brought me back a sort of pamphlet, which he found in circulation in your neighbourhood, in which the late Pope Julius is introduced in a ludicrous fashion.

. . . . . .

James added however, – though I scarcely suppose it to be the fact, – that there were some people who supsected, that the thing was an invention of mine, because – so he said, – the Latinity was fairly good.

Now, I really have not leisure enough, to spend an hour upon any such nonsense; neither is my mind so irreverent as to wish to throw ridicule upon a Pope, or so silly as to write against persons, who have it in their power to proscribe the writer.[5]

Further, in another letter written some eleven days earlier to John Caesarius, Erasmus once again yokes together the *Letters of Obscure Men* and the *Julius*. One is forced to conclude that Erasmus himself, despite his protestations, clearly recognized his unintentional association with the authors of the *Letters* and their recognition of his as an ally because of his irreverent and mocking *Julius*. He protests too much again in this manner:

I highly disapprove of the *Epistles of Obscure Men*. Their pleasantry might amuse at first glance, if such a precedent had not been too aggressive. I have no objection to the ludicrous, provided it be without insult to any one. But it was more annoying, when in the second edition my name was mixed up in it: as if it were not enough to play the fool, without exposing us to prejudice, and in a great measure destroying the fruit obtained by so much laborious study.

. . . . . .

But of all such incidents none has given me so much annoyance, as the report (if

true), which has been brought me by my servant James, that there is some sort of publication in the hands of many persons at Cologne, directed against Pope Julius, and representing him as excluded by St. Peter from heaven. I had heard some time ago of some such play being acted in France, where there has always been an excessive licence with respect to nonsense of this kind; and I suppose that somebody has turned it into Latin. I wonder what people are thinking of, when they waste their leisure and their labour in such a way. But I am still more surprised to find that there are persons who suspect that such signal folly has proceeded from me. I attribute this to the fact that the language used is perhaps not such bad Latin! [6]

As well as sharing general similarities in tone with some of Erasmus's writings and in the attacks made upon the corruptness of the old order by him, the authors of the *Letters* must also have seen him as an ally in the event which, ostensibly at least, sparked the writing of the work, the Reuchlin-Pfefferkorn controversy. This controversy is important not only because it establishes the context for the work, but also because it is in large part responsible for both Erasmus's appearance in the book and the portrait of him which emerges from it.[7] The *Letters of Obscure Men* developed out of an extended dispute between two principal characters, Johannes Pfefferkorn, a Jewish convert to Christianity, and Johannes Reuchlin, a lawyer by profession and one of Europe's most prominent Hebrew scholars. In 1508, the zealous convert Pfefferkorn denounced in writing the Jewish practice of usury and the Jews' hatred of Christians and set about trying to have Jewish books taken out of public hands and general circulation. In August 1509, the first positive step in this direction was taken by the Emperor Maximilian who issued a mandate ordering the collection of all Jewish books. When the archbishop of Mainz objected to this action, Maximilian ordered the archbishop to solicit the opinions of the universities of Mainz, Cologne, Erfurt and Heidelburg and to seek the aid of experts on the matter. Three of the four universities came out in overwhelming support of Pfefferkorn. One of the experts, Jakob von Hochstraten, the Dominican inquisitor general in the archdioceses of Cologne, Mainz and Trier, agreed with the three universities and the case was decided in favour of Pfefferkorn.

However, another of the experts, Reuchlin himself, decided against Pfefferkorn and made his opinions felt in a work which not only explained his case, but also questioned the sincerity of Pfefferkorn's conversion to Christianity. Reuchlin's actions thus initiated a controversy of no small proportions in which a number of prominent persons including Erasmus himself were to become involved. Pfefferkorn replied to Reuchlin's work in the spring of 1511 and accused the Hebrew scholar of being bribed by the Jews. Pfefferkorn's work entitled *Hand Mirror,* was answered by Reuchlin in August of the same year. In his book entitled *Eye Mirror* he not only violently attacked Pfefferkorn, but also the theological faculty of the University of Cologne. This work so angered the theological faculty that they too now actively joined the fray and Reuchlin found himself attacked by both Pfefferkorn and the Dominicans. Pfefferkorn kept up his barrage of insults in a work entitled *Brand Mirror.* Reuchlin was quick to respond with his *Defense* which he presented to Maximilian. The Cologne theologians now moved quickly and used their influence to have Reuchlin's *Defense* condemned and supressed. Meanwhile Hochstraten, working behind the scenes, tried to defeat Reuchlin by calling him before a court of inquisition presided over by the Dominicans. The archbishop of Mainz however ordered such proceedings stopped and Reuchlin appealed to Pope Leo X. Rome commissioned the bishop of Speyer to decide the case and on March 29, 1514 he decided the issue in favour of Reuchlin. However, the end of the dispute was

far from over. The issue sprang up again soon after Reuchlin's exoneration by the bishop of Speyer and it quickly became clear that the dispute was becoming one between humanists on the one hand and monks on the other. Erasmus's position in this fracas clearly shows his own humanistic leanings and his desire to uphold the cause of good letters against the barbarisms of the scholastic theologians. Erasmus first met Reuchlin at Frankfort in 1515[8] and thus began a relationship that was to last until Reuchlin's death in 1522. However, as early as 1514 he had heard about the Reuchlin-Pfefferkorn controversy probably from Ulrich von Hutten who was involved in defending Reuchlin against his detractors.[9] In the same year, Erasmus wrote to Reuchlin from Basle expressing his own sympathy with his cause as well as the sympathy of John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester, and John Colet.[10] In 1515 he corresponded with Cardinals Riario and Grimani and spoke out in favour of Reuchlin and his cause.[11] Throughout this period he continued to defend Reuchlin and in one letter he denounced and attacked Pfefferkorn and those who were supporting him.[12] As Preserved Smith has pointed out, "Reuchlin received so many testimonials from eminent supporters that he published them under the title of *Letters of Famous Men.*[13] This volume of laudatory epistles plus the entire controversy on which it was based set the stage for the appearance of the satirical and biting *Letters of Obscure Men* – a work designed in part at least to serve as a commentary on the stupidity and incredible arrogance of Reuchlin's opponents. Hence, such issues as the advancement of the new learning and the spread of humanism, the attacks upon scholasticism, the call for religious reform, and finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Reuchlin-Pfefferkorn controversy, indicate to some extent why the name of Erasmus appears as often as it does in the *Letters of Obscure Men.* The authors were including in their work a kindred spirit who shared a good many of their beliefs and who had supported their views (or so they thought) both in his own writings and in his defense of and sympathy with Reuchlin.

It now remains to consider the view of Erasmus as it emerges from the *Letters.* Although many of the elements in the work cannot be seen as a factual and accurate picture of the times, nevertheless, the drawing of Erasmus's portrait by these German reformers allows one a candid view of their attitude towards a person whom many considered the champion of religious reform and humanism. By far the largest number of references to Erasmus occur in the second volume of the *Letters.* In the first volume he appears only twice; in the second he is referred to nine times.

Erasmus's first appearance in volume I occurs in letters XLII. The letter, addressed to Ortwin Gratius, is sent by one who describes himself as "Anton N., of the Art of Medicine almost Doctor Licentiate." This opening description of the letter writer gives one a good indication of how Erasmus is about to be depicted and what aspects of his thought are to be attacked. Apparently Anton hears of Erasmus at Strasburg; Erasmus is described as "one who is profoundly skilled in all knowledge and in every branch of learning." Probably Erasmus himself would have denied this fact; Anton does so, but in the process reveals his own stupidity. He "could not believe. . . that a man so small as he is could know so much." Anton earnestly requests a meeting with Erasmus to test his knowledge and prepares thorny and "subtle questions concerning the medical art." The description of the preparation of these questions – "Out of this notebook, therefore, I called me a question with all the comments thereon, and the arguments *pro* and *con,* and armed with these I purposed to beset this man . . . ." – suggests the general form of discussion for which Anton is preparing. The format is quite obviously to be the scholastic one of interminable definition, classification and division. Anton will probably ransack his precursors, the medieval scholastic theoreticians, with their incomprehensible quiddi-

ties. To make matters worse, Anton's friend is to prepare a feast and invite "speculative Theologians and Jurists of high renown" to participate in the discussion. The very mention of "speculative Theologians" makes explicit the conflict which the authors of the *Letters* are establishing here. The champion of humanism is to be pitted against charlatinism as represented by the Schoolmen who rangle and fight over nonsense until they have turned truth upside down and appropriated it to themselves alone. The day of the feast arrives, and Erasmus begins the discussion with "a mightly long preamble." Anton is incapable of understanding anything Erasmus says "by reason that he had such a wee small voice." More probably, however, Anton cannot understand Erasmus because he is a blockhead and unable to comprehend anything outside of a scholastic framework. After a discussion with a "Magister Noster"[14] the conversation turns to poetry. Here again, Anton demonstrates his scholastic preoccupation by applying the form of a syllogism to an analysis of classical poetry. The result is, of course, a classic example of *reductio ad absurdum:*

> Our host therefore, who is a humanist of parts, fell to some discourse on Poetry, and greatly belauded *Julius Caesar,* as touching both his writings and his valorous deeds. So soon as I heard this, I perceived my opportunity, for I had studied much, and learned much under you in the matter of Poetry, when I was at *Cologne,* and I said, "Forasmuch as you have begun to speak concerning Poetry, I can therefore no longer hide my light under a bushel, and I roundly aver that I believe not that Caesar wrote those *Commentaries,* and I will prove my position with argument following, which runneth thus: Whosoever hath business with arms and is occupied in labour unceasing cannot learn Latin; but *Caesar* was ever at War and in labours manifold; therefore he could not become lettered and get Latin.

This statement is perhaps one of the best examples of unwitting deflation in the work. Here the scholastics are not only seen as out of touch with the practical aspects of life, they are also depicted as narrow-minded and totally obsessed with the be-all and end-all of their existence. Erasmus's attitude towards Anton's absurdity is typical of the author of the *Praise of Folly.* He says nothing to refute what has been said and merely laughs. Anton interprets Erasmus's refusal to respond as total victory; he has "overthrown [Erasmus] by the subtlety of [his] argument." The letter closes with a final attack on poetry and classical revivalists. Erasmus may be a poet and know "fair Latin" but what is this in comparison to a thorough knowledge "of the philosophic sciences, such as Theology and Medicine . . . ."

The other appearance of Erasmus in this first volume occurs in letter XLVIII. The letter discussed above was primarily concerned with depicting Erasmus as a defender of good letters against the Schoolmen; this letter indirectly demonstrates his contribution to the cause of a renewed and revitalized Christianity. The correspondent, Jakob Van Hoogstraeten, presents Erasmus in this way:

> It is said that *Erasmus of Rotterdam* hath composed many treatises on Theology; I cannot believe he hath avoided error. He beginneth by writing a tract to vex the theologians, and now he writeth theologically himself — so that it passeth! If I come back to *Germany* and read his scribblements, and find in them the very smallest jot on which he hath gone astray — or which I do not understand — let him take heed to his skin! He hath also written in Greek; this is not well, for we are Latins and not Greeks. If he would fain to write what no man can understand, why doth he not use Italian, or Bohemian, or Hungarian? For then none could understand him. In the name of a hundred devils let him conform to us Theologians, and dispute in his writings with *Utrum,* and *Contra,* and *Arguitur,* and *Replica,* and such formal conclusions, as all Theologians are wont to do, and then we could read them.

Hoogstraeten's objections to Erasmus's kind and method of theology is not clearly presented in this passage, but it is possible to piece together what he means from Erasmus's works principally devoted to an explanation of his theological position. Probably the best theoretical explanation of Erasmus's attitude towards theology is found in the *Paraclesis,*[15] the preface to his *Novum Instrumentum;* its practical application is outlined in the *Enchiridion Militis Christiani.*[16] Whereas the Schoolmen were primarily concerned with the intricacies of dogma and doctrine, Erasmus's greatest contribution to theology was his emphasis on the inculcation of a Christian ethic and the practical application of the few simple truths of the faith as found in the New Testament. For Erasmus, all men had the potential to be theologians. For him theology probably meant little more than a way of life modelled upon the example set by Christ in the Gospels. On the other hand, the Schoolmen saw it as the exclusive property of a select few who had been trained in the rigid methods of formal scholastic debate. Erasmus regarded this view as wrong-headed and ultimately detrimental to the cause of Christian progress. The Incarnation took place for all men and all were directed to one final goal. Erasmus's task, as he saw it, was to cast aside the veils and remove the obscurities that for so long had kept in darkness the *philosophia Christi,* the essence of Christianity. While remaining steadfast in this belief Erasmus always maintained his orthodoxy often in the face of overwhelming opposition. His objections to scholasticism were not so much based upon dogma or fundamental truth – indeed he always maintained that his mind was ill-equipped to argue about such matters – but only with the manner in which they conveyed the truth and obscured it with *adiaphora.* It was finally this attitude of doctrinal orthodoxy coupled with his desire for Christian unity which would not allow him to become an active supporter of the reformers when they presumptuously, he must have thought, moved outside the pale of the Roman Church on doctrinal grounds.[17]

The tract written by Erasmus to vex the theologians is probably *Antibarbarorum.*[18] This work was originally intended to be made up of two parts. The first book was to be an attack upon the scholastic theologians, designated as barbarians; the second, a defence of good letters.[19] Of these two only the first book has survived.

In this letter as well, reference is made to Erasmus's use of Greek in his writings. Hoogstraeten objects to it and by so doing defines himself, in Erasmus's frame of reference, as a barbarian. The barbarism evident in his disdain for Erasmus's kind of theology is also apparent in his dislike for Greek and good letters in general.

Erasmus's portrait in the first volume of the *Letters* can perhaps best be compared to cameo appearances. He is outside of the mainstream of the majority of the *Letters* and is called upon, one feels, only to give the work a certain general self-justification as satire with a desperately serious moral intent. His two appearances, although detailed enough in their own context, suggest a kind of hesitancy or reluctance on the part of the author or authors of this first volume to call to their aid a person whose position on certain crucial matters of the day often defied precise definition because of the complexity of his thought and his restraining doctrinal conservatism. In contrast to the singlemindedness of the German reformers, Erasmus's thought was always subject to nice introspection resulting in the establishment of firm priorities and, often enough, qualification of earlier positions. His aims at reform were tempered by prudence. Reform could lead to revolution, and revolution to disunity, his greatest fear. In short, his vision was a long term one which allowed him to project a present course of action into the future and determine its effect on the future. While passionately concerned with reform in his own day,

he was also wise enough to realize the sometimes lethal effects of time on present expedient positions.

Erasmus's appearances in the second volume however, point to a total unawareness on the author's part to realize what can be described as Erasmus's intellectual aloofness. Rather than appearing only occasionally, he becomes more like a permanent fixture in this volume and is associated, without qualification, with a definite faction that because of its radicalness, was soon to lose his sympathy altogether. This presumption manifests itself not only in the frequency with which Erasmus's name is mentioned, but also in the varying contexts in which it appears. The rather unfortunate appearance of this volume in the spring of 1517 must also have given Erasmus some disturbing moments. Luther's *Theses* were to appear later in the same year and it did not take a great deal of prescience to realize that a serious religious conflict was inevitable. Moreover, from one of Erasmus's letters, it seems that there were some at least who maintained that he not only supported the content and tone of the *Letters,* but wrote them as well.[20] Such inflammatory issues as Indulgences (VI), Masses (XII), and Confession (XII), are satirized in this volume in varying degrees. To suggest that Erasmus was not concerned with these issues and their abuses would be an open denial of many of the things that he said about them in his writings. But at the same time, to maintain that he whole-heartedly supported the views expressed by a radical group would be tantamount to saying that his thought never went beyond pure criticism. In the final analysis this is perhaps what distinguished him from the authors of the *Letters.* Their intent was to satirize existing abuses and to this end they mustered Erasmus as one of their supporters. But by so doing, they abstracted one small part of the man's thought from his total view. This attempt to re-create him in their own image led to infelicitous distortions and perhaps to greater calumny, albeit unintentional, than that brought upon any other person in the work.

It would be impossible to describe in detail the varying views of Erasmus in this second volume of the *Letters.* However, a simple list suggests the many angles from which he is seen. In six of the nine letters in which he appears, he is depicted as a stalwart supporter of Reuchlin against Pfefferkorn (XII, XX, XXXVIII, XLIX, LIX, LXIV). Moreover, three of the letters refer to his influential epistles to Leo X in support of Reuchlin. Five of the letters attack his theological writings (XII, XX, XLIX, L, LI). In two (XLIX, LI) he is seen as a heretic, and in one of these he is described as a "mock Christian." In four letters (XX, XXXVIII, LXIV, LXVIII) he is scorned as a poet and in one of these (XXXVIII) his Proverbs are described as worthless next to Solomon's. Unlike his more general appearance in the first volume, this second makes mention of many of his works and writings in general. We have already seen the references to his letters to Leo and the Proverbs. In addition to these, mention is made of the *Antibarbarorum,* the *Moriae Encomium,* purposely re-titled *Moria Erasmi,* his *Novum Instrumentum,* his edition of Jerome, his commentary on Jerome, and Sebastian Brandt's *Ship of Fools,* wrongly attributed to him.

This cavalier invocation of Erasmus's name and works which wrongly suggests his allegiance to the radical German reform movement is, in one instance, made even more intolerable by what can only be seen as an attack upon his integrity and honesty. In letter LIX, Erasmus's name is employed by the narrator in a characteristic way to demonstrate the former's abhorrence of scholasticism and his distrust of monasticism. At the same time, the author takes this opportunity to articulate, through the narrator, his scepticism towards Erasmus's sincerity. The context of the letter is, as usual, the Reuchlin-Pfefferkorn controversy. Johann Loffenholz,

the narrator, is engaged in seeking out those who are defending Reuchlin. A list of names is produced and the narrator adds,

> Then I enquired in other quarters whether *Erasmus of Rotterdam* taketh their part? And a certain merchant saying. *Erasmus* taketh his own part; but he assured he will never be the friend of those Theologians and Friars; and he hath evidently, in his words and writings, defended and vindicated *Johann Reuchlin* and hath addressed letters to the Pope on his behalf.

The important phrase here is "Erasmus taketh his own part." As the Reformation movement became more critical, increasingly Erasmus was to see himself as an outsider and as one who could not, in all conscience, support any faction that threatened to divide Christendom. Ulrich von Hutten, the probable author of this second volume of the *Letters,* was to become more aware of this as the situation became graver, and his view of Erasmus's position was not one of admiration. Perhaps even at this early stage he recognized the road that Erasmus was determined to follow and saw this as a kind of cowardice.[21] The Reuchlin-Pfefferkorn controversy and the way it is expressed in this volume suggests and anticipates the future polarization of the conservatives and the reformers, just as Erasmus, taking his own part, predicts in many ways the course that he felt obliged to follow.

One letter in particular in this second volume (LXVIII) stands out as an interesting one for examination because of its partial view of Erasmus. Even though the narrator of this passage is not to be regarded as objective, nevertheless the elements of Erasmus's thought which he extrapolates from the entire picture, present Erasmus in a most unfavourable light. Because of the deliberate selectivity of the passage, Erasmus emerges as little more than a ranting anarchist intent upon the destruction of Christian unity and peace. Perhaps even more annoying — and here again we come to what must be seen as the basis of Erasmus's legitimate complaint — the author is endorsing the opposite of the narrator and thereby employing the narrator's objections against Erasmus to give support to his own position. The passage reads:

> Now, not to be tedious. I avouch that I have no good opinion of *Erasmus.* He is an enemy of the monks: he speaketh much ill of them; he saith they are clumsy jackasses, who hate polite letters, and they can do naught save guzzle, and swill, and mumble psalms. Yet he lieth in his throat when he saith these things. He himself is the jackass. He is a sound Latinist, and writeth fair Latin — but he knoweth naught else. He hath written many books — notably the *Ship of Fools* and a commentary on Jerome — and in these he doeth not but belabour the Regulars. I warn him, pardy, that if he refrain not his hands from them we will do to him as to *Reuchlin,* though he were in a hundred ways favoured by the Pope and King *Charles.* We have seen many men as arrogant as he, and yet we have suppressed them. I will tell you somewhat — but blab not thereof, or the devil may confound me. Doctor *Jacob van Hoogstraeten* and all the Doctors in Cologne and *Cambridge* are now examining his commentary on *Jerome,* and I hear that it will go woundily hard with him. . . . . I cannot call to mind all that they found, but I remember somewhat; he declareth that Saint *Jerome* was not a Cardinal — and this is high treason; he is heterodox concerning *St. George* and *St. Christopher,* and relics of Saints, and candles, and the Sacraments of Confession; moreover in many passages he speaketh blasphemy, inasmuch as he speaketh against the Holy Doctor and the Subtle Doctor. He declareth that their Theology is nothing worth.

It should be obvious from this long excerpt that the narrator's negative bias against Erasmus is the author's positive prejudice. What the narrator deplores, the author praises. Erasmus is

associated with a book that he did not write; he is a deadly enemy of the monks and casts aspersions on them; all he knows is Latin; some of his writings are treasonous; accusations against saints, relics, and Confession amount to heresy; he denies the validity of traditional theology. Certainly Erasmus's criticism of the established institutions involved a good number of these things, but many accusations made against him here are overstated and some are total fabrications. His numerous positive contributions are not critically articulated and his criticisms are seen as destructive and similar to the captiousness of the German radical group. Erasmus, of course, realized the abuse he was suffering at the hands of the authors of the *Letters* and found it difficult to understand how on the one hand they could admire and respect him and on the other, subject him to such unfair treatment. In a letter written in August 1517, a few months after the publication of the second volume of the *Letters,* he questions the authors' motives for including his name in the work:

> If they wish me well, why expose me to so much prejudice? If ill, why put me in a different class from that against which their publication is aimed.[22]

Increasingly in this second volume of the *Letters,* Erasmus's views are being associated, in quite a false manner, with the more extreme views of the reformers. To presume to propagate this unfair identity in belief and attitude was, to Erasmus's way of thinking, unjustified because it ignored his firm insistence upon his doctrinal orthodoxy, the totality of his thought, and his attempts to work for gradual and peaceful reform while remaining within the fold of the Catholic Church.

The general picture of Erasmus in the *Letters of Obscure Men* should not come as too much of a surprise to anyone aware of his precarious position during the years of religious revolt. Many of his writings suffered the same fate.[23] Much of what he said and wrote could be used as support for all sides in the religious struggle, and where firm approbation for opinion could not be found, many did not hesitate to resort to radical "decontextualization." The religious controversy of the sixteenth century was, like most wars, a battle involving extremists, who, ironically, called upon Erasmus and used his works to support their views, and at the same time, failed to heed his most recurring call for tolerance, unity and peace.

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Notes

1 All quotations from the *Letters* are taken from *Epistolas Obscurorum Virorum,* intro. and trans. Francis Griffin Stokes (London, 1909).

2 Quoted in Stokes, VIII.

3 Francis M. Nichols, *The Epistles of Erasmus* (New York, 1901; reprinted, 1962), vol. III, p. 19.

4 Wallace K. Ferguson, *Erasmi Opuscula* (The Hague, 1933). Ferguson presents a convincing case to show that the *Julius* was Erasmus's brain-child.

5 Nichols, III, p. 20.

6 Nichols, II, pp. 610-11.

7 A much fuller description of the Reuchlin-Pfefferkorn controversy as well as the authorship and details of publication of the *Letters* can be found in Stockes' Introduction as well as in *On the Eve of the Reformation,* "Letters of Obscure Men," intro. Hajo Holborn (New York, 1954), XII-XIV.

8 Preserved Smith, *Erasmus, A Study of His Life, Ideals, and Place in History* (New York, 1922; reprinted, 1962), p. 132.

9 Smith, p. 132. Hutten had, in fact, defended Reuchlin in print in a work entitled *The Triumph of Reuchlin.*

10 In the following excerpt, Erasmus praises Reuchlin's *Eye Mirror:* "While I was staying in England I received your letter, with the Bishop of Spires' judgment of acquittal, which

I communicated to several friends, of whom there is none that fails to respect your fertile and happy genius. They laughed; and urgently demanded to see the condemned book, concluding that it was something splendid from the character of its opponents. I refer especially to the Bishop of Rochester, a man of the highest integrity and a consummate theologian, and John Colet, dean of St. Pauls's in London" (Nichols, II, pp. 156-57). In this passage Reuchlin's association with eminent English humanists is made clear: "I cannot find words to express, in what affection and veneration your name is held by that great chieftain of literature and piety, the Bishop of Rochester, insomuch that, whereas Erasmus has been hitherto in high esteem, he is now almost despised in comparison with Reuchlin . . . . Do not fail to write frequently to him, and also to Colet. Both take a great interest in you" (Nichols, II, pp. 373-74). And finally, in the following excerpt, the learned teacher Reuchlin is emphasized: "The Bishop of Rochester almost adores you; to John Colet your name is sacred . . . . I was visiting lately a very old Carthusian Monastery at St. Omer. The Prior of that house, by reading your books, without any other instructor, had obtained a very considerable acquaintance with Hebrew, and was so devoted to you that your very name was an object of reverence" (Nichols, II, pp. 395-96).

11 Nichols, II, pp. 189-93 passim. To Grimani he complains that Envy is the cause of the complaints against Reuchlin: "For you know how old a story it is, that Envy, more noxious than a serpent, meets every extraordinary effort with a discordant hiss. An example of this we have lately seen to our great sorrow in the case of that eminent man, John Reuchlin. It was time, that a man of venerable age should enjoy his noble studies, and reap an agreeable harvest from the glorious field of his youthful labours". To Riario he states: "I do earnestly beseech and adjure you for the sake of good Letters, which your Eminence has always loved, that that distinguished man, Doctor John Reuchlin, may enjoy your protection and good-will in the business in which he is concerned."

12 Writing to Reuchlin in 1517, Erasmus states: "That circumcised creature, who from a wicked Jew has become a still more reprobate — I will not say Christian, but professor of Christianity, — has published a book, and that in the vulgar tongue, so as to be intelligible to his own class of people, in which, as I am told, he tears to pieces all the learned, naming them by name. But in my judgment it is a monster, that does not at all deserve to be mentioned in the letters of accomplished persons. Good heavens, what a tool it is in the hands of those masked enemies of Religion! That one man, half-Jew, half-Christian, has done more mischief to Christianity than a whole sink of Jews. He is simply doing, if I am not mistaken, the same service to his trible as Zopyrus did to Darius, but is much more wicked than he. It is us for, my Reuchlin, to turn our backs upon such portents, and to find our pleasure in Christ, and in the enjoyment of honourable studies" (Nichols, III, pp. 148-49).

13 Smith, p. 134.

14 That the *Praise of Folly* is not far from the authors' minds here is evident in their choice of the expression "Magister Noster". In one part of the *Folly* Erasmus pokes fun at the scholastic theologians in this manner: " . . . they think themselves nearest to the gods whenever they are reverently addressed as 'our masters', a title which holds as much meaning for them as the 'tetgram' does for the Jews. Consequently, they say it's unlawful to write MAGISTER NOSTER except in capital letters, and if anyone inverts the order and says *noster magister* he destroys the entire majesty of the theologians' title at a single blow" *Praise of Folly,* trans. Betty Radice (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1971), section 53, p. 163.

15 *Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami Opera Omnia,* V (Lugduni Batavorum, 1704), 137-43. Hereafter cited as L.B.

16 *Ibid.,* 1-66.

17 For a more detailed view of Erasmus's theological position and the *philosophia Christi* see James K. McConica, *English Humanists and Reformation Politics Under Henry VIII and Edward VI* (Oxford, 1965); also B. Hall, "Erasmus, Biblical Scholar and Reformer", *Erasmus,* ed. T.A. Dorey (London, 1970), 81-113.

18 *L.B.* X, 1691-1743.

19 *Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami,* ed. P.S. and H.M. Allen, I, 37 (Oxford, 1913), p. 136. For further bibliographical details on

Antibarbarorum see *The Correspondence of Erasmus*, vol. I, trans. R.A.B. Mynors and D.F.S. Thomson; annotated by Wallace K. Ferguson (Toronto, 1974), p. 55 (note).

20 Allen III, 808, p. 263.

21 This view was by no means restricted to the German reformers. William Roy the eccentric author of *Rede me and be not wroth*, (STC 21427) views Erasmus in this way in his vicious little dialogue:

> He feareth greatly some men saye/
> Yf masse shulde vtterly decay/
> Least he shulde lose his pension.
>
> b_7^v

And again:

> Also he hath geven soche a laudacion/
> Vnto the ydols of abhominaction/
> In his glosynge pistles before tyme.
> That yf he shulde wother wyse reclame/
> Men wolde impute vnto his blame
> Of vnstable inconstancy the cryme.
>
> b_8^r

Hutten's statement, and to a greater degree Roy's as well, suggest that there were some at least who seriously questioned the sincerity of Erasmus's motives.
A more detailed view of Erasmus's attempts to defend himself against allegations made by Hutten is found in his *Spongia*, a work in which his defence of Reuchlin is again explained. *L.B. X*, 1631-72.

22 Nichols, III, p. 19.

23 A classic example of the suitability of many of Erasmus's writings to serve particular causes can be seen in the numerous editions of the first translation of the English *Enchiridion*. The work was published throughout the sixteenth century from 1533 to 1576. As the years advanced and the political and religious situation in England became more solidly Erastian and Protestant, the content of the *Enchiridion* was altered, sometimes drastically, in order to bring the work more in line with government policy.

Benoit Beaulieu. *Visage littéraire d'Erasme:* Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1973. Pp. 230.

Ce livre pourrait aussi bien s'intituler: *Idées littéraires et pédagogiques d'erasme.* Sans doute l'auteur a-t-il préféré *Visage littéraire d'Erasme* pour étudier un aspect de "Ce Prométhée aux cent visages," selon le mot bien connu de Luther sur le prince des humanistes de la Renaissance. En fait il s'agit ici d'un essai limpide, bien écrit, solidement charpenté et documenté, sur les idées à la fois esthétiques et littéraires, éducatives et religieuses d'Erasme; celles-ci forment un tout indissoluble dans son esprit. Sa pensée porte sur une pléthore de sujets; on la trouve dispersée dans les dix tomes de l'édition de Leyde et les onze volumes de correspondance selon l'édition Allen. Autant dire qu'elle n'est past toujours facile à cerner et à résumer. D'autant plus qu'elle n'est ni professorale ni systématique. Elle court plutôt à bride abbatue, au fil de la plume. De sorte que Holbein a eu parfaitement raison de le peindre la plume à la main; à l'instar des gens de XVI[e] siècle, nous ne pouvons, nous, le représenter autrement. En effet, bien avant saint François de Sales, Erasme écrivait en moyenne quarante lettres par jour; bien avant Voltaire, il fut le premier écrivain en Europe à écrire toute sa vie et à vivre de sa plume: il a écrit pour vivre, il a vécu pour écrire.

Il l'a fait à une époque où l'Europe était bouleversée par une profonde crise religieuse. Partout où la Réforme sévissait, elle tendait à mettre un frein à la restauration des lettres anciennes, à l'étude de l'antiquité gréco-romaine dans les collèges et les universités. Erasme, dont la royauté intellectuelle fut incontestable pendant vingt ans, surtout de 1510 à 1530, réclama sans cesse des réformes pédagogiques, ne manqua jamais une occasion de définir l'espirit et la fin des études littéraires, répéta à l'envi son idée fondamentale, qui est celle de l'union de la littérature et de la théologie, des lettres et de la morale. Il n'est donc pas surprenant qu'il décrive son programme d'étude principalement dans les six ouvrages qui suivent: *De ratione studii* (1511), *De copia verborum ac rerum* (1512), *Institutio principis christiani* (1516), *De libero arbitrio* (1524), *Ciceronianus* (1528), *Declamatio de pueris* (1529). Les *quatre* principales sources de ses idées littéraires sont: Quintilien, saint Augustin, saint *Jérôme* et saint Grégoire de Nazianze. C'est principalement à ces esprits qu'il emprunte la plupart de ses vues sur l'art et l'imitation, la langue et le style, la prose et la poésie, la littérature et les différents genres littéraires.

Pour lui, l'esprit humain est un. Il n'existe point de solution de continuité entre le passé en la perfectibilité et la permanence de l'homme. L'homme devient ce qu'il est, comme l'a si bien dit Pindare; on ne naît point homme, on le devient. Erasme croit en l'homme, en sa nature et en son salut, comme il croit en la grâce; il se fait le champion de l'homme, qu'il place bien au-dessus de la nature. Totale est sa confiance dans l'homme.

Totale aussi est sa vision du passé de l'homme. Pour lui, l'Antiquité comprend: les auteurs grecs et latins, païens et chrétiens, l'Ancien et le Nouveau Testament, les premiers écrivains chrétiens et les Pères de l'Eglise. Pour lui, nourri des lettres antiques, bibliste et patrologue, la Bible n'est pas seulement le livre de base de la théologie; elle est aussi le terme des connaissances littéraires. Ce qu'il prêche à cor et à cri, c'est le retour, non pas aux belles lettres, mais aux bonnes lettres païennes et chrétiennes; il prône la synthèse de l'Antiquité, de l'humanisme gréco-latin, de la foi et de la piété évangélique. C'est que les vérités

découvertes par les païens ne sont pas le monopole exclusif de ces derniers; elles appartiennent aussi aux chrétiens qui peuvent s'en servir pour se former. Le passé est contenu dans le présent, et rien ne s'oppose à ce que la pensée antique soit au service de la pensée moderne. La restauration des bonnes lettres païennes et chrétiennes est tenue par Erasme comme une excellente et nécessaire préparation à l'intelligence de la Bible et des Pères; la Bible est mieux comprise sous l'éclairage des Pères de l'Eglise.

Telle est l'idée maîtresse d'Erasme, que de bons esprits partagent encore aujourd'hui même. Elle circule dans les quatre chapitres de cette étude, où Benoit Beaulieu analyse tour à tour les sources d'Erasme, son esthétique, ses idées littéraires, sa défense et sa restauration des bonnes lettres. L'introduction (pp. 1-9) fait ressortir avec justesse le courage tranquille et l'originalité audacieuse d'Erasme en présence de Luther et de Calvin, qui ne voyaient guère l'utilité du message de l'Antiquité. L'auteur y justifie aussi l'abondance des citations, qu'il a presque toutes traduites lui-même en français. Et c'est là une des grandes qualités de son livre: il repose sur le texte même d'Erasme, aujourd'hui accessible "au lecteur que le latin rebuterait." Ce dernier ferait bien aussi de consulter l'appendice "concernant les passages traduits" (pp. 197-201), où le traducteur, fidèle à la théorie de son maître, avoue s'être montré "scrupuleux plutôt qu'audacieux."

Loin de moi l'idée de vouloir résumer ce volume, lequel est d'ailleurs lui-même une vivante synthèse des principales idées érasmiennes sur l'art et l'imitation, la littérature et la restauration des bonnes lettres, l'Antiquité et la patristique, la traduction et l'adaptation de la pensée antique, la morale et la religion, l'éducation et la culture intellectuelle. Je me contenterai de les dégager et de les commenter brièvement dans l'espoir que mes propos inciteront le lecteur à lire l'ouvrage et à se familiariser ainsi avec la pensée même d'Erasme, car ce livre est truffé de citations érasmiennes, dont la traduction est à la fois exacte, précise et élégante.

Près d'un siècle avant François de Sales, évêque de Genève, Erasme a eu le courage de placer l'idéal de la vie chrétienne, non seulement dans les abbayes, les couvents et les monastères, mais aussi dans la vie quotidienne des laïcs, car tous les chrétiens, quels qu'ils soient, doivent être religieux: le terme de religieux, loin d'être le monopole du clergé, appartient à tous les chrétiens. Erasme, en soutenant ce point de vue, est en avance sur son temps; il est même à cet égard tout près de nous. Il l'est aussi, ce grand voyageur qui a écrit l'*Eloge de la folie* en voyage, par ses vues sur les voyages qu'il a bien raison de tenir

> comme une greffe des esprits, qui les adoucit
> et leur fait perdre ce qu'il peut y avoir de
> sauvage en leur nature. Rien, en général,
> de plus renfrogné que les hommes qui ont
> vieilli dans leur patrie, qui haïssent les
> étrangers et qui réprouvent tout ce qui
> s'é carte des usages de leur pays.

La traduction de Benoit Beaulieu (p. 18) colle si bien au texte qu'Erasme lui-même ne l'eût pas désavouée.

A l'instar des Pères grecs, Erasme commet à dessein un archaïsme en employant l'expression "la philosophie du Christ"; Budé s'en sert aussi constamment. Saint Paul parle plutôt de la sagesse du Christ, qui était folie pour les Grecs et scandale pour les Juifs. Au rebours de Calvin, pourtant helléniste distingué, qui est porté, sinon à désespérer de

l'homme, du moins à l'accabler et à l'humilier—son *Institution chrétienne* est l'antithèse de la conception érasmienne de l'homme—Erasme a écrit *Le Libre Arbitre* pour assurer l'avenir de l'humanisme chrétien: à cet égard, ce livre est, avec le *De transitu hellenismi ad christianismum* de Budé, le manifeste le plus important de l'humanisme chrétien, où la conception—intégration: antiquité, humanisme, foi, est exprimée par l'auteur avec autant de fierté que d'énergie. Pour lui, "la personne du Christ formant le lien et l'unité de l'histoire," il n'existe point de contradiction entre l'Antiquité et le christianisme, entre la sagesse antique et le message évangélique. Cette idée, Paul Claudel l'a faite sienne en plusieurs de ses drames au XX^{e} siècle.

Le Christ lui-même a jugé bon de s'exprimer en paraboles, ce qui est propre aux poètes. Aussi Erasme tient-il une initiation poétique pour nécessaire à l'intelligence de l'*Ecriture.* Pour lui la poésie est absolument indispensable à la culture libérale, elle en constitue même la partie principale. C'est que la poésie est un art difficile, exigeant, fort sérieux. Il était d'ailleurs lui-même très sensible au plaisir esthétique que procure la poésie. Non content de l'enseigner à Louvain pendant plusieurs années, de 1493 à 1500, il a inséré 10,000 poèmes dans ses *Adages,* il a été même poète à ses heures; on le voit, par exemple, composer un beau poème sur la mort de son vieil ami, Sir Thomas More, en 1535. Il a beaucoup pratiqué les poèmes de Grégoire Nazianze et tout particulièrement ceux de Prudence, un obscur poète latin du V^{e} siècle à qui il doit énormément; une étude sur les rapports entre Erasme et Prudence se fait toujours attendre. Il y aurait lieu aussi d'étudier la traduction latine faite par Erasme de deux tragédies d'Euripide: *Hécube* et *Iphigénie en Aulide;* à traduire les choeurs d'*Hécube,* il a eu, je le sais de certitude, beaucoup de fil à retordre. De plus, il a imité de très près le rythme ou le style de Grégoire de Nazianze, lequel avait été formé à l'école de Lysias et d'Isocrate. Quel beau sujet de recherche!

Remarquables de densité et de plénitude sont les pages consacrées par Benoit Beaulieu aux idées littéraires et à l'esthétique d'Erasme. Les vues du grand humaniste sur le beau, le laid, l'art, l'imitation, la nature, la campagne, le monde visible, les choses et les réalitiés, le génie spécifique de chaque homme, les différents genres littéraires, les langues et les littératures anciennes, la traduction et la restauration des textes: tous ces thèmes sont finement passés en revue et analysés par l'auteur. L'authenticité, le réalisme et l'utilité caractérisent l'esthétique d'Erasme. Il avait conscience de faire oeuvre utile en consacrant la moitié de ses journées à la correspondance. C'est le même sentiment qu'il éprouvait, c'est le même objectif utilitaire qu'il poursuivait en traduisant, éditant et commentant des textes anciens. Il valait mieux pour lui, en traduction, peser les idées que compter les mots, respecter la fidélité aux idées, puis à l'expression de la langue traduite, que rechercher l'élégance à tout prix.

L'auteur analyse avec soin le *Ciceronianus,* dont l'actualité de la doctrine littéraire n'échappera à personne. On peut tenir ce livre d'Erasme pour un plaidoyer en faveur de l'utilité à la fois individuelle et sociale. Erasme ne croit pas du tout à la beauté pure, à l'art pur, à l'art pour l'art, encore moins à l'inspiration gratuite: pour lui, il n'y a point d'inspiration sans transpiration, ce en quoi il a vu fort juste. Homme d'action et de pensée—les deux ne font qu'un chez lui—homme pratique, il veut que la littérature soit utile et s'occupe sérieusement de la réalité. Il exprime sans cesse le critère de l'utilité; on ne saurait être plus à la page. Et cela aussi bien dans l'action pratique et la perfection individuelle que dans la dévotion et la vie intérieure. Il conçoit l'esthétique comme une méthode destinée à agir sur les émotions et les sentiments du public et à diriger le public

dans une voie précise et déterminée. Pour lui, l'utilité sociale doit l'emporter sur l'art pur; la pensée antique doit servir à la pensée moderne. La fin des bonnes lettres est d'établir une équation entre la culture intellectuelle et la culture morale; la véritable culture, loin de se limiter au beau, doit aussi être utile et conduire à l'honnêteté; à l'instar de saint Grégoire de Nazianze, il est convaincu que les études littéraires, dont la poursuite en soi est tout à fait inestimable, peuvent devenir dangereuses, voire mortelles, aux esprits vaniteux et non avertis. En bref, sa conception de l'art est avant tout utilitaire; il subordonne l'esthétique des lettres à leur utilité.

Il est aussi opposé à la mémoire mécanique qu'à l'imitation servile. Au plan pédagogique, il est partisan de la mémoire intelligente, logique, réfléchie, qui repense, fait sienne l'idée et reconstitue l'argumentation. Il tient l'imitation des auteurs anciens pour un moyen ou un instrument, et non pour une fin en soi; la littérature, loin d'être un art d'imitation, est avant tout un art d'expression de l'écrivain et de la réalité. La beauté artistique la mieux réussie est celle qui se rapproche le plus de la nature. Les écrivains doivent adapter au présent le contenu et les formes de la pensée antique au lieu de s'ingénier à les copier servilement. C'est pour la même raison qu'il s'oppose énergiquement au pédantisme mythologique du siècle qui aboutit au verbalisme, au jeu des mots, au clinquant artistique de la Rome de son temps où poètes et prosateurs se piquent d'écrire comme des antiquaires.

Le *Ciceronianus* et le *De copia verborum ac rerum* contiennent le fond de sa pensée sur les mots et sur le style. Longtemps avant Malherbe, il demande aux écrivains de prendre les mots partout où ils les relèvent, même dans le peuple, au besoin; ils doivent aussi prendre tous les mots employés par les auteurs reconnus. Erasme n'est pas du tout opposé à l'emploi des mots nouveaux. Il est plutôt l'adversaire acharné du purisme exclusif et de convention. A lire certains écrivains à la mode, je me demande cependant s'il pourrait soutenir aujourd'hui ce qui suit: "Si tu ne comprends pas tel mot, tu peux conclure que les obscurités sont en toi, non dans l'auteur." Hélas! plus d'un écrivain contemporain prend un évident plaisir, par snobisme surtout, à pratiquer l'obscurité comme un dandy à porter une fleur à la boutonnière.

Bien avant Boileau et La Bruyère, Erasme insiste sur l'importance et l'efficacité du mot bien placé au bon endroit. A l'instar de Rabelais, il goûte la joie du mot, il savoure la richesse du vocabulaire, il s'exprime avec une abondante allégresse. Plus de trois siècles avant Ernest Hello, il soutient que "le style est l'âme même." "Le langage est le miroir de l'âme." "L'âme a une certaine physionomie qui se reflète dans le discours comme dans un miroir." L'expression doit être adéquatement adaptée à l'idée. La brièveté, loin de consister à écrire en peu de mots, vise plutôt à enchâsser dans peu de mots la plus forte densité d'expression possible, et cela, sans le faire voir, car le comble de l'art est de dissimuler l'art et de subordonner l'art à l'efficacité.

Erasme prend nettement position. Loin d'être neutre ou impassible, ou conciliant, il croit en la valeur morale chrétienne de l'art, comme il croit au progrès historique et à la perfectibilité de l'homme. Il croit en son message. Il met sa plume au service de l'homme. Vivrait-il au XX^{e} siècle, il ne manquerait pas d'ajouter au moins deux paragraphes substantiels à son *Eloge de la folie*, le premier, pour vilipender ceux qui soutiennent que "Dieu n'existe pas" (Nietzsche), que "L'homme n'existe pas" (Foucault), le second, pour mettre au pilori ceux qui tiennent le langage pour suspect et l'accusent de trahir la pensée individuelle, ceux qui parlent et écrivent pour prouver qu'ils ne parlent pas et n'écrivent pas. De la folie pure, quoi! au millième.

Partisan de l'évolution historique et de l'évolution littéraire, Erasme est loin d'attribuer à l'Antiquité une valeur absolue d'archétype: toute époque comprend trois phases: ascension, apogée, déclin. D'une part, il s'oppose à la tyrannie de la tradition figée, à l'usure de la coutume; d'autre part, il s'élève contre une rupture brutale avec toute tradition ou valeur qui se réclame du passé. Pour lui, la nature et l'histoire ne connaissent point de sauts: une révolution n'est qu'une évolution accélérée. Champion d'une tradition non figée, en voie de développement, il garde l'esprit ouvert aux nouveautés. Sa vision, loin d'être alourdie ou arrêtée par sa connaissance du passé, brûle de s'exercer dans le présent. Il veut être utile. Il écrit comme s'il parlait au lecteur. Son esthétique et son éthique sont étroitement liées; elles forment un tout inséparable.

S'il crée des mots nouveaux, c'est pour exprimer des idées nouvelles ou pour décrire des objets, des institutions, des usages qui prenaient forme à son époque. S'il ressuscite le dialogue, c'est pour ranimer l'humanisme et marquer un nouveau tournant de la mentalité du siècle. S'il prend plaisir à écrire sur la folie, ce n'est pas seulement pour faire la critique de la scolastique: c'est aussi pour développer une idée lourde d'avenir: la folie est innée à l'homme au même titre que ses faiblesses, ses illusions et ses rêves: elle fait partie de la condition humaine, le jargon du jour ayant remplacé celui de la scolastique. De sorte que son *Eloge de la folie,* portant concurrence à l'état civil, comme les romans de Balzac ou de Dickens, fait défiler sous nos yeux tous les personnages de la comédie humaine. S'il écrit sa *Raio verae theologiae,* c'est pour renouveler l'étude et l'enseignement de la théologie, et il soutient alors, après saint Grégoire de Nazianze, que l'étude du grec, du latin et de l'hébreu est absolument indispensable à quiconque désire arriver à une connaissance éclairée de l'*Ecriture;* c'est aussi pour employer la critique scientifique, appliquer le sens de l'histoire à la vie et à la pensée du christianisme des premiers siècles; c'est enfin pour étudier les problèmes moraux loin de la scolastique et faire de l'exégèse positive une force de mouvement et de progrès.

Tout chercheur, tant soit peu versé dans l'humanisme de la Renaissance, ne peut lire ce livre sans penser aux travaux de recherche qu'on pourrait entreprendre sur Erasme. Prodigieuse est son érudition patristique. Il ne s'est pas contenté d'éditer les oeuvres d'une douzaine de Pères grecs et latins: il a assimilé aussi, par exemple, Augustin et Jérôme, Origène et Grégoire de Nazianze. On ne dira jamais trop tout ce qu'il doit à saint Jérôme, son maître, son modèle, son patron; il existe de profondes affinités intellectuelles et spirituelles entre ces deux esprits. S'il est un aspect encore très négligé de l'humanisme du XVI^{e} siècle, c'est bien celui de la résurrection de la patristique grecque et des premiers Pères latins. Erasme et l'*Imitation de Jésus-Christ:* voilà autant de sujets neufs. Une étude comparée s'impose sur les écrits consacrés au prince, depuis *Le Prince* (1513) de Machiavel jusqu'au *Prince* (1631) de Guez de Balzac en passant par l'*Institution du prince chrétien* (1516) d'Erasme et l'*Institution du Prince* (1547) de Budé; les *Lettres* d'Isocrate à Evagoras et à Nicoclès n'étaient certes pas étrangères aux auteurs de ces ouvrages. Le moment est arrivé de faire une étude des traductions de l'*Eloge de la folie.* Je songe, pour ma part, à comparer les traductions françaises de l'*Enchiridion militis christiani* (1504) par Berquin (1526), Du Bosc (1711) et A. J. Festugière (1971).

Au chapitre des lacunes et des vétilles qu'on peut relever dans ce volume, mentionnons les points suivants. Le *De transitu hellenismi ad christianismum* de Guillaume Budé date de 1535 et non de 1534. On aimerait savoir de façon certaine si c'est à Saint Omer (p. 26) ou à Anvers (p. 205) qu'a paru *l'Enchiridion militis christiani.* L'Index ne comprend pas

la *Declamatio de pueris,* qui est pourtant abondamment citée (Pp. 26, 50, 58, 60, 61, 79, 89, 105, 131, 141, 149, 150, 162, 164, 191, 196). Quel dommage aussi que l'auteur n'ait pas dressé la liste des nombreux passages des ouvrages d'Erasme qu'il a si finement traduits! Je ne vois pas non plus le nom de A. J. Festugière dans l'Index.

Mais, je me hâte de le dire, ces imperfections n'enlèvent rien à cet ouvrage de qualité, qui nous fait mieux connaître le visage littéraire du prince des humanistes de la Renaissance.

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Collected Works of Erasmus, Volume 1, The Correspondence of Erasmus, Letters 1 to 141 (1484 to 1500), translated by R.A.B. Mynors and D.F.S. Thomson, annotated by Wallace K. Ferguson. University of Toronto Press, 1974. Pp. xxviii, 368. $25.00.

This volume launches Toronto's impressive edition of the *Collected Works of Erasmus,* a project which, when completed, will include some forty-five volumes, making it one of the most ambitious pieces of translation in the field of Renaissance literature and culture. Fortunately, editorial problems have been greatly simplified by fine editions of the Latin works already in existence or in progress. Consequently, the twenty-five volumes devoted to Erasmus' literary, educational and religious works may draw upon the scholarship of the new *Opera Omnia* currently being published by the Royal Academy of Holland (Amsterdam, 1969-) and, where necessary, upon the *Opera Omnia* edited by J. LeClerc (10 volumes, Leiden, 1703-1706), or the *Opuscula* edited by Wallace K. Ferguson (The Hague, 1933). In similar fashion the *Opus Epistolarum* edited by P.S. Allen, H.M. Allen and H.W. Garrod (12 volumes, Clarendon Press, 1906-1958) will serve as "authoritative canon" for the twenty volumes of correspondence.

In the prefatory material to Volume One of the *Correspondence* the various editors all acknowledge their debt to Allen's edition. This indebtedness extends to many aspects of Allen's work, but especially to his dating of the letters. In earlier collections or manuscripts Erasmus' letters were frequently found with missing or unreliable dates, but through careful analyses of contents and comparison of one letter with another, Allen was able to provide reasonably accurate dates of composition. Though it is generally acknowledged that his work on this problem was a remarkable piece of scholarship, his ascriptions cannot be regarded in every case as final. For instance, on the basis of critical material supplied with the edition of the *Antibarbari* in Volume One of the new *Opera Omnia,* Albert Rabil, in *Erasmus and the New Testament: the Mind of a Christian Humanist* (San Antonio, 1972, p. 20n.), has suggested that epistle 37 dated 1494 might better be dated 1489; and epistle 30 dated 1489 might more suitably be placed in 1494. The editors of the *Correspondence* offer no discussion of these suggestions, nor do they advance additional justification for Allen's ascription of dates in the case of these or any other letters. The consistent adoption of Allen's dating has, however, enabled the editors to employ his system of numbering the correspondence. Two letters unnumbered or overlooked by Allen have been added, but they are identified by an alphabetical letter (e.g. 65A) without changing the general numerical pattern. This makes it very convenient to compare Latin text and English translation.

In assessing the amount of supplementary information to be provided in the *Correspondence,* the editors have attempted to provide such material as is required "to make each letter intelligible and to place it in its proper context." They have assumed, however, that their readers will not be specialists but "scholars with a general interest in the sixteenth century." Inevitably, the distinction between information appropriate to general and specialized forms of study proves difficult, and some of the omissions it encourages are unfortunate. For instance, the editors have not used Allen's device for identifying the various sources of the letters, though such knowledge would help the reader to distinguish between genuinely casual and private letters and those more carefully considered products Erasmus selected for publication. In other areas, however, the volume provides a useful range of information. It includes a twelve-page introduction by Wallace Ferguson which provides an economical but very useful outline of Erasmus' whole correspondence, its publication and reception; introductions to individual letters; and a thirty-six-page glossary by John H. Munro explaining coinage in the age of Erasmus and money-value in the period 1498-1500. There is also an index which lists most names in the volume though it ignores subjects. To this material will be added a separate volume, edited by Peter Bietenholz, which will provide biographical information about persons with whom Erasmus corresponded or who are mentioned in his letters.

Footnotes in the volume are generally very brief. Though most draw upon material available in Allen, there are some valuable new additions. A considerable number of these discover previously unidentified classical allusions, a matter of particular importance when we consider the purpose of many of these letters and the manner of their composition. Quite early in his career Erasmus' letters came to be regarded as desirable and therefore collectable models of Latin style. In fact Erasmus frequently had this use in mind and designed much of his correspondence to illustrate various epistolary styles or demonstrate his mastery of them (cf. Allen, IV, 1206: 20-24). These styles were thoroughly traditional and demanded the scrupulous recovery of classical modes of thought and expression—in short, a method of scholarship, as Erasmus himself insisted in the *De conscribendis epistolis (Opera Omnia,* Leiden, I, col. 349 C-D). It is the quality of this scholarship that is measured in the allusions with which these letters (like the *Adages* to which they are related) seem so richly stocked. Through the detailed and familiar erudition which they demonstrate, they confirm for us the devotion to classical studies which Erasmus so frequently protested.

This matter is worth emphasizing because a careful examination of Erasmus' theological scholarship discovers something very different. Though it was the ostensible field of his studies during his early years, Erasmus was never stimulated by it. After two years at Paris he wrote to his friend Thomas Grey and described the impression it made upon him: "If only you could see your Erasmus sitting agape among the glorified Scotists, while 'Gryllard' lectures from a lofty throne. If you could but observe his furrowed brow, his uncomprehending look and worried expression, you would say it was another man. They say the secrets of this branch of learning cannot be grasped by a person who has anything at all to do with the Muses or the Graces" (Ep. 64: 80-86). Generally Erasmus' indifference is presented in a jesting fashion, but the difficulties it produced were serious enough. To begin with, it discouraged the kind of careful and extensive reading that distinguished his classical scholarship. One notes, for instance, that in the letters belonging to this period there is a very slender body of theological allusions, and those chiefly to Jerome's letters. Editors of the *Correspondence* have corrected one of Allen's oversights by identifying a passage from Jerome's commen-

taries (*In Matt.* IV, on 26: 39; P.L. 26, 205), cited by Colet and Erasmus in their interesting debate upon the nature of Christ's personal fear and sorrow at the hour of his death (Epp. 108-111). However, readers would find it easier to understand and assess the uncertain nature of Erasmus' theology if they were offered a fuller treatment of the scholarship that lay behind such references.

In a prefatory note the two translators, D.F.S. Thomson and R.A.B. Mynors, indicate the nature and purpose of the few alterations they admitted to the literal meaning of Erasmus' Latin. Most of these are of a minor nature, serving chiefly to accommodate Erasmus' intentions to modern English usage. There are also a considerable number of instances where a single word is rendered with two, and in a manner not demanded by the meaning. However, this device makes possible the creation of more elegant rhythms, the refinements of which offer some counterpart to the gracefully paralleled sounds and structures that characterize Erasmus' style. Occasionally there are more radical changes, in almost every instance affecting an adage. These are evidently attempts to reproduce the casual and familiar quality of Erasmus' allusions, but they are not always successful. In some instances the proverbial quality of a phrase is lost altogether: "in utramvis aurem dormire licere putarem," literally, "to sleep on which every ear you choose," becomes "to sleep easily" (Ep. 80:96). In other cases a familiar adage is less satisfactory than its classical counterpart: "Conabamur de una fidelia duos linere parietes," literally, "I was trying to whitewash two walls from one pot," becomes "I was trying to kill two birds with one stone" (Ep. 113:69). In yet others biblical or classical allusions are lost: "Mihi hic neque seritur neque metitur," literally, "here I neither sow nor reap," becomes "I have no axe to grind" (Ep. 137:52): and "Si . . . ut Harpocrati satisfacias admoneam," literally, "if I remind you to give satisfaction to Harpocrates," becomes "if I tell you to keep to yourself (Ep. 78: 18-19). These alterations, it should be added, are carefully footnoted and do not detract from the impression of careful accuracy in the translation. Moreover, every change, whether major or minor, serves the general purpose of reproducing the "colour" of Erasmus' Latin prose, a task the translators have managed with remarkable success. In fact the whole range of Erasmus' literary manner has effectively been reproduced. There are letters in which we can detect the strained, tasteless, or even frivolous rhetoric of which Cornelis, Gaguin and Colet complained; others are charged with the austere power of bitter frustration, or the unadorned simplicity of personal remorse; and there are letters at once casual and elegant, courtly and engaging, filled with the informal sophistication Erasmus called "Attic charm." In capturing all this the translators have achieved what mattered most to Erasmus himself: a style suited to the man (Ep. 54).

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Sister Geraldine Thompson. ***Under Pretext of Praise: Satiric Mode in Erasmus's Fiction.*** Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973. Pp. xvi, 198. $12.50.

This is a remarkable and invaluable volume on some of Erasmus' writings if only because it introduces the reader to an aspect of Erasmus' works which, up till now at least, has had precious little attention paid to it. By definition all generalizations are indeed danger-

ous, but it may be safe to say that the majority of Erasmian scholars have devoted their time and energies to a study of the great Dutch humanist's role as an educator or instructor and have, in the process, ignored his literary talents and abilities. That Erasmus' educative role, and as a consequence of this, his thought, should be one's primary concern is quite beyond dispute; the *locus classicus* of Erasmus the mentor is, of course, his *Enchiridion militis Christiani,* a work in which he himself apologizes for his literary unconcern by pointing to his function as teacher. Such a stance by the author himself has encouraged scholars, both past and present, to emphasize the moralistic Erasmus at the expense of the literary one.

The importance of Sister Geraldine's study lies in the fact that, while recognizing Erasmus' primary importance as teacher, she nonetheless stresses his sometimes remarkable literary abilities through a systematic and closely argued study of his "fiction." Her work, as the title suggests, is concerned with the literary device of satire as found in the *Praise of Folly,* the *Colloquies, Julius secundus exclusis* and *Ciceronianus.* The study is a significant and complex one largely because it confronts head-on the irresolvable tension in Erasmus' fiction between the literary and the moralistic—a tension which Erasmus assuredly would not have felt by virtue of his primary self-proclaimed role as teacher. Indeed, it is highly likely that he would have bristled at the term "fiction" as applied to some of his writings if, by it, he understood "untruth." Unfortunately, however, matters of little or no concern to Erasmus become, for the critic and scholar, areas of enormous complexity. In the final analysis, the problem that Sister Geraldine works on deals with means and end in Erasmus' fiction. With one notable exception Erasmus' literary abilities vary in inverse proportion with his didactic role—as the teacher waxes the *literatus* wanes. The notable exception is, of course, Erasmus' literary masterpiece the *Praise of Folly*—a work in which the literary devices of satire and irony and the dramatic *persona* of Folly complement, rather than contend with, the didactic nature of the work. The *Praise* is the centrepiece of all of Erasmus' fiction because of its skilful blend of matter and manner. Sister Geraldine's chapter on *Folly* elucidates the complexities of the work by pointing out tones and shades of satire and irony and their relation to the various narrative stances of the *persona.* In my opinion, this chapter is certainly the final word on the fine balance between literary and didactic technique in the *Praise of Folly.*

If *Folly* is the Platonic essence, all of Erasmus' other fictive pieces suffer by comparison and become mere shadows of the ideal. Certain of the *Colloquies* approach *Folly* but, with the *Praise,* Erasmus reached the pinnacle of his *literary* career and would never again attain and sustain the supreme balance of matter and form that he reached with *Folly.* For example, in the *Ciceronianus* and *Julius exclusis,* the scales are tipped in favour of the moralist with the result that satire and irony are transformed into simple invective and dramatic flesh and blood characters into cardboard propagandists.

In conclusion, no review can do justice to any book and this principle is certainly true of Sister Geraldine's study. Suffice it to say that *Under Pretext of Praise* is an essential book for those interested in the study of the relationship between Erasmus as a literary figure and Erasmus as an explicator of the *philosophia Christi.*

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Emile V. Telle. *L'Erasmianus Sive Ciceronianus d'Etienne Dolet (1535).* Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1974. Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance, vol. CXXXVIII. Pp. 9-479. 95 francs.

With this book Monsieur Telle has again made a significant contribution to the study of French humanism. Etienne Dolet's *De Imitatione Ciceroniana,* one of those known but all too frequently neglected humanist treatises, has not up to this point received the attention it merits. As analysed here it emerges as a contemporary document important not only for a greater understanding of Dolet himself, but also for the light it sheds on certain aspects of Erasmus, at least on how he was perceived by some contemporaries, and on the Ciceronian movement in general Containing as it does Dolet's *De Imitatione Ciceroniana* in a facsimile reproduction of the original 1535 edition, a lengthy introduction, ample explanatory notes and appendices, and an exhaustive bibliography, the book is extremely useful as an aid to further research. From the standpoint of sheer information it is even at times overwhelming but none the less welcome for that. The spiritual climate of Toulouse around 1530, humanist alliances and rivalries, the furor and agitation following the publication of Erasmus' *Ciceronianus,* all are documented in great detail, albeit often in the cramped print of the footnotes. As a source of information the book is invaluable.

The lengthy introduction raises several interesting questions about the nature and scope of the debate rekindled by Erasmus' *Ciceronianus.* It is argued that far from being confined to literary questions the debate had clear philosophic and religious overtones. In a period in which questions of style and meaning frequently became intertwined, Erasmus is seen as often attracting charges of religious heresy on the grounds of his linguistic heterodoxy. He of course in his *Ciceronianus* retaliates against the disciples of Bembo or Sadolet, charging them with hiding a neo-paganism under a mantle of Ciceronianism. There is certainly much work to be done in this area before all the various ramifications of Ciceronianism can be understood. Dolet's treatise does, however, elucidate certain of its aspects and lends credence to those who would elaborate on the religious significance of the movement, the Ciceronians being seen to some extent as the upholders of religious orthodoxy and stylists in the manner of Erasmus as inadvertently subverting the Christian ideal. As did R C. Christie—in his *Etienne Dolet, The Martyr of the Renaissance, 1508-1546,* London, 1899—Telle attributes some of the motivation for Dolet's treatise to such factors as the latter's youth, his impetuosity, a desire for renown, a wish to uphold Longueil's name, but also, and more significantly one feels, to a reaction against Erasmus' religious as well as stylistic liberality. Dolet, portrayed by Telle as an idealist in the Platonic sense, criticizes Erasmus the stylist for having failed to espouse the ideal of Ciceronianism and faults Erasmus the philosopher again for having failed to rise to an ideal, for having "institué une sorte d'école de découragement rationnel et logique et d'en avoir fait une philosophie" (p. 95). These failings are seen as originating in Erasmus' character and as exemplified in his style. It is this last point which is intriguing and Telle signals the need for an extensive, serious study of Erasmus' style and language.

In his treatise Dolet emerges as a man who consciously tries to separate for himself religious and ethical considerations from those of style One is surprised to find in the third section of the *De Imitatione* that Dolet, when he talks of the qualities of an ideal orator, is careful to attribute them to professional competence and to set aside considerations of a moral nature. As Monsieur Telle points out, this separation of "le domaine des valeurs morales intrinsèques des qualités extrinsèques" (p. 56) is unexpected at this early

date. Dolet also has little patience with Erasmus' brand of humanism: how presumptuous and foolish it is, he writes in section one of his treatise, to think that man's exhortations can help us understand the word of God. Dolet's humanism is seen not as anti-Christian but as exterior to the religious preoccupations of a Christian — "c'est déjà un scientisme philosophique: une philosophie sans théologie" (p. 63) — and herein is seen the key to his downfall.

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Ludovico Ariosto. *Orlando Furioso.* A new prose translation by Guido Waldman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974. Pp. xvii, 650. $8.85.

The year 1974 marked the five hundredth anniversary of the birth of Ludovico Ariosto, a date which inspired a number of publications, among them a new prose translation of the *Orlando Furioso.* In his note on the *Orlando Furioso* in English, Guido Waldman cites earlier translations of the poem and contends that no existing version is entirely satisfactory.

Waldman points out that twelve versions of the poem had appeared in France before Sir John Harington's in 1591 but that this delay was not a serious one for the educated Englishman, who included a knowledge of Italian among his accomplishments. Harington's version was republished in 1607, and again in 1634 with numerous changes, attesting to the popularity of Ariosto and of the translation in England. For sake of completeness, however, Waldman should perhaps have added in his short survey that in 1963 Rodolf Gottfried brought out for the Indiana University Press selections of the Harington translation, designed to serve as background reading for Spenser's *The Faerie Queene.* For the same reason, Waldman might also have noted that in 1972 Robert McNulty published for the Oxford University Press a critical edition of the first complete English version of Ariosto's epic, based on a comparison of two incomplete manuscripts in Harington's own hand and the first three editions of Harington's translation.

Despite his popularity, Harington was severely censured by William Stuart Rose, a later translator, who had been urged by Sir Walter Scott, an admirer of Ariosto's, who read Italian, to produce his own version of the *Orlando Furioso.* Waldman then goes on to say that "Rose dismisses Harington's version as inaccurate, mercilessly condensed, pedestrian where the original was poetic, dreary where the original was witty." In partial defense of Harington, it should be remembered that he was simply following contemporary practice concerning translations, contracting or expanding the original at will or adding moral truisms of his own to please the reader. Not only does Waldman condemn the eighteenth-century translations by J. Hoole, the Huggins-Croker partnership and H. Bent but he also includes Rose's version: "Where Harington presented the English reader with a pedestrian Orlando, Rose's, if more accurate, was merely whimsical."

According to Waldman, Ariosto's octaves are untranslatable into English and those of Harington, Bent, and Rose do no justice to Ariosto, conveying neither the magic nor the delicate nuances of the original. This is Waldman's apology for attempting a translation of Ariosto's poetry into prose. Waldman's is not the first English prose version as he appears to assume. Allan H. Gilbert's prose translation has been available in English since 1954 when it was published in New York by S. F. Vanni. As for Waldman's translation

itself, there is no doubt that it successfully captures the spirit of the *Orlando Furioso*. Waldman has followed current English usage avoiding archaic as well as popular language, which, in his opinion, is likely soon to lose favour. Waldman's prose translation of the *Orlando Furioso* is clear and lively, and renders subtle shades of meaning with great finesse and ingenuity.

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Stillman Drake. *Galileo: Two New Sciences* (Including Centers of Gravity and Force of Percussion). Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. Pp. xxxix, 323. $12.50 cloth, $4.50 paper.

Since its appearance in 1914, the Henry Crew and Alfonso De Salvo translation of Galileo's *Two New Sciences* has been the commonly used edition of this work in the Anglophone world. With the appearance of Stillman Drake's new translation, the usefulness of the edition of 1914 belongs to the past. This judgment could be justified, if need be, on the basis of the fact that Drake's edition makes available to English readers, for the first time, the "Added Day"—Galileo's dialogue on the force of percussion which he had intended to publish as part of *Two New Sciences* in its original appearance in the Leyden Edition, 1638.

Let me add immediately that such a judgment could not be justified in terms of the other addition to the 1914 edition, namely, Galileo's work on Centers of Gravity. In fact, the addition of this part of Galileo's work, in some twenty pages of text between the "Fourth Day" and the "Added Day," is puzzling. This material, which was written some fifty years before the final composition of *Two New Sciences* and twenty-five years before the latter's first results were obtained, "has no immediate connection with the subjects treated" in the rest of the work and was here inserted" by Galileo in the Leyden Edition "only to save them from oblivion" (to use Antonio Favaro's words from the Introduction to the 1914 English edition, pp. xii–xiii). Since their presence in the Leyden Edition secured Galileo's objective, I see no reason for their reappearance in this context. In particular, I see no reason to interpose this material between the "Fourth Day" and the "Added Day."

Justification for a new translation is given by Drake on pp. xvii–xix of his Introduction. I need not recapitulate the various good reasons given there. Apart from the need of a new translation and the publication in English of the "Added Day," this new edition is further justified by the incorporation of Galileo's marginal notes and dictated additions, the helpful glossary and footnotes, the manner in which the diagrams have been placed relevant to the argument, and the interesting and helpful Introduction. I will comment on some of these in following paragraphs. One useful feature of the 1914 edition, which Drake has retained, is the page references to Antonio Favaro's *Le Opere di Galileo Galilei*, Edizione Nazionale, Florence, 1898. I will, in what follows, identify my references to the text in terms of the pagination of the *Opere*.

Perhaps the most interesting part of Drake's Introduction is on pp. xxvi–xxx, a provocative section in which it is argued that Galileo adopted as a principle that inquiries

about causes are of no help in the development of physics, and that this position has important consequences for an interpretation of the role of experimentation in Galileo's work. The conclusion drawn is that experimentation is intended to show that there is a conformity between the order found in mathematical reasoning and the order found in nature. The attempt to show the presence of this position in *Two New Sciences* is made in, e.g., some of the notes to the "Third Day" (see notes 8, 9, 12, 22).

Throughout the more than two hundred footnotes, Drake has been consistently successful in his choice of passages which warrant annotation. Many of the notes are either elucidations of the argument or draw attention to important differences between Galileo's work and that of influential predecessors or successors. Especially helpful in the latter category are some of the references to Aristotle (e.g., notes 27 to p. 80 and 12 to p. 335) and Descartes (e.g., notes 32 to p. 311, and 11 to p. 334). These notes not only help to put Galileo's arguments in a clear historical perspective; they also have the effect of making the arguments themselves stand out vividly.

The diagrams, although often less than half the size of those of the 1914 edition, are clear. Following Galileo's arguments is made easier by the reproduction of the diagrams on each of the pages on which the argument illustrated by that particular diagram is found. This feature, absent from the 1914 edition, is particularly helpful when the diagram is somewhat complex.

The translation, by design, is not strictly literal. In the main, Drake has succeeded in providing a highly readable translation which is free from overly-long or obscure sentences. Some passages are, however, stylistically marred. In a few others, the translation perhaps reflects a philosophical bias.

For example, the last thirteen lines of p. 66 are marred through the unnecessary substitution of "heat" for "fire." This substitution is all the more puzzling because it takes place in only two of the three occurrences of "fire" in that part of Galileo's text. Also, it results in having the action of heat described by means of a metaphor usually reserved for the action of fire: it "goes snaking among the minimum particles . . ." The Italian gives good grounds for the use of this metaphor.

More serious questions are the following. What, in the opening phrase of the third paragraph of p. 197, is the justification for translating *osservo* by "consider" in "Thus when I consider that a stone . . ." And why, in Sagredo's second speech on p. 130, is there the awkward, confusing and misleading phrase "which we deduce by seeing with our own eyes that . . ."? The 1914 translation, "the fact observed is that . . .," is far simpler and clearer, and catches at least as well the meaning of a literal translation: "which one gathers by seeing with our own eyes." Finally, from the translation of Salviati's speech on p. 212, " . . . musicians, and others who confirm their principles with sensory experiences that are the foundations of all the resulting structure," one may fairly take it that sensory experiences are the foundations of the sciences. The Italian, however, seems to imply a different doctrine: *"li quali con sensate esperienze confermano i principii loro, che sono i fondamenti di tutta la sequente struttura." Che,* which usually refers to what immediately precedes it, would refer to *principii* rather than to *sensate esperienze.* If, in the second part of this quotation, Galileo would have wanted to refer to *sensate esperienze,* would he not have done so through the use of *le quali* instead of *che*? Again, it appears that in this case the 1914 version is superior: " . . . and others where the principles, once established

by well-chosen experiments, become the foundation . . ." (I am indebted to Professor M. Sabatini, of the University of Alberta's Department of Romance Languages, for confirmation of these points.)

These issues are not raised in order to detract from the value of this new translation. Rather, raising them is meant as an implementation of Professor Drake's injunction implicit in the last sentence of his Introduction. "For how can a reader gain more from another's words than by forcing himself to arrive at the best which he can conceive?"

PETER A. SCHOULS, *University of Alberta*

Dudley Shapere. *Galileo: A Philosophical Study.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974. Pp. xi, 161. Cloth: $9.75; paper: $2.95.

Professor Shapere introduces this work as "the first of a projected series of detailed studies, by the present author, of important episodes in the development of science," which "will involve an attempt . . . to give coherent interpretations of the cases . . . to extract any available generalizations and systematizations from those cases, . . . to provide critical analyses of interpretations of the cases by philosophers and historians." One subdivision of the last of these three tasks is " . . . to show how the historian's (and the scientist's) interpretations of the historical record are frequently distorted by conceptual presuppositions or confusions" (p. x). I will assume that the second of these tasks—to extract generalizations and systematizations—is one not undertaken in the present study (if it is, I don't know where) because I assume it to be a project which can be tackled only after a number of the "projected series of detailed studies" have appeared. What one can therefore expect from the present study is a coherent interpretation of Galileo's work, as well as a critical analysis of interpretations of Galileo's work by some philosophers and historians. The consistent attempt to provide both of these, in the context of two questions which are dealt with in the major portion of this study, constitutes its content. The two questions, or really sets of questions, are the following: (i) What, in Galileo's thought, is "the role . . . of the principle of inertia?" (Did he actually enunciate this principle? or "was he well on his way towards it"? "to the extent that he had not attained it, what, if anything, was characteristically new and 'modern' in his thought? "); (ii) What is "the 'method' by which Galileo arrived at his substantive conclusions? To what extent did he obtain his result by experiment? . . . What methodological doctrines were involved in his use of mathematics . . .? " Was he a "Platonic rationalist" or an (Aristotelian) "empiricist"? (pp. 9-10).

The first two chapters, "Galileo and the Interpretation of Science" and "The Intellectual Background," provide the setting within which Shapere deals with these two sets of questions. The presentation of a coherent interpretation is handled mainly through an attempt to answer the first of these. Its specific context is chapter 3, "The Early Development of Galileo's Thought." The major portion of this part of the argument is found in chapter 4, "Galileo and the Principle of Inertia." This chapter also brings into focus the critical analysis of interpretations of Galileo's work by some philosophers and historians, particularly those of Koyré and Drake. Chapter 5, "Reason and Experience in Galileo's

Thought," attempts to deal more particularly with the question of methodology. Again, attention is given to diverse interpretations of scholars, in this case, to those of Mach (who takes Galileo to be an empiricist) and Koyré (who portrays him as a Platonic rationalist).

The argument, especially in the important fourth and fifth chapters, has been interestingly developed. The different themes have been intertwined in such a way that their relevance to one another, their interconnectedness, is constantly apparent without any belabouring of this point. When the different themes of a study are thus intertwined, it is important that the various strands of the argument be, nonetheless, kept clearly distinct. Without it, lack of clarity is inevitable. Throughout most of this study, Shapere has succeeded in presenting a clear case. There are, however, a few instances in which the clarity of the line of argument leaves something to be desired.

One way through which unclarity tends to sneak in is through the copious use of parentheses. For example, on pp. 53-54, three important versions of the "Impetus Theory" are distinguished. The third of these distinctions, "the self-corrupting impetus view," is made seemingly as an afterthought in a lengthy parenthesis at the end of a paragraph which deals with difficulties inherent in a second version of the "Impetus Theory," that of the *inclinatio ad quietem.* This way of drawing a distinction is hardly conducive to signalling the importance of the distinction made. Yet it is "the self-corrupting impetus view" which, because adopted by Galileo, becomes of greatest importance (cf. pp. 75, 78) as the argument is developed.

The part of the argument which, in terms of a discussion of the concept of inertia, attempts to present a coherent interpretation of Galileo's position seems to me the most successful. Of interest is the conclusion, drawn on p. 125, that the different interpretations of Galileo by Drake and Koyré do not come about because of obscurity on Galileo's part but because of a disagreement between Drake and Koyré about what is, and what is not, essential to the modern concept of inertia.

The weakness of this book lies in its inadequate discussion of the "cluster of questions regarding the 'method' by which Galileo arrived at his substantive conclusions." It is hardly excusable in a work that announces the question of methodology as one of the "two questions which will prove to be central to the issues" (p. 9) to read that "For reasons of space, we have ignored . . . the development of the Aristotelian conception of scientific method, which was an important movement at the University of Padua in the years before Galileo's arrival there" (p. 60). Certainly inexcusable is a statement like: "There are three other main aspects of Galileo's discussions of scientific method which have not been considered in this book: his distinction between methods of 'resolution' and 'composition'; his distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities; and his advocacy of atomism . . . . their importance (and especially that of the discussions of method in *The Assayer*) for understanding Galileo and his work seems to me to have been greatly exaggerated." This out-of-hand dismissal of both context and content may well be indicative of Shapere's own "conceptual presuppositions or confusions" which, in this instance, seem to "distort" his "interpretation of the historical record." This impression is strengthened by the all-too-easy identification of "rationalism" with "Platonic rationalism," specifically that of Plato's *Timaeus* period. It is further strengthened by the sometimes uncritical use of concepts (as in "Bradwardine's mathematical approach to the analysis of motion . . ."; p. 57) which, in a context of a discussion of the "new science," have acquired specific technical meanings.

Shapere's *Galileo* makes worthwhile reading. However, it does not present one with a coherent interpretation of "the 'method' by which Galileo arrived at his substantive conclusions."

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André Rochon. *Les écrivains et la pouvoir en Italie à l'époque de la Renaissance.* Paris: Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1974. Pp. 325.

The volume is composed of five chapters entitled: "Empirisme ou égotisme. La politique dans 'La Cassaria' et les 'Suppositi' de l'Arioste," "Les fêtes à Urbin dans 1513 et la 'Calandria' de Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena," "Machiavel historiographe des Medicis," "Culture et politique à Florence de 1542 à 1551," and "Idéologie monarchique et propagande dynastique dans l'oeuvre de Gianbattista Giraldi Cinzio."

In the essay on Ariosto, the author strives to determine the extent to which Ariosto's early theatre was predisposed to the authority of the Este family. To this end, Mon. Clouet diligently correlates the essential themes of the plays, "La Cassaria" and "I Suppositi," and the political conditions dominant in Ferrara in 1508-1509. The relationship between these two elements is based on certain elements of dialogue within the plays; that is to say, certain remarks are interpreted as expressions of Ariosto's attitude towards his sovereigns. Mon. Clouet focuses on those scenes which present a veiled critique of the Este opulence to sustain his thesis that Ariosto allowed himself to be intimidated, to the point of restricting himself to making certain pusillanimous gestures of defiance through his characters. Ultimately, Mon. Clouet chastises Ariosto for effetely refusing to defy his "protectors" by suggesting a doctrine of reform.

The second essay, written by A. Fontes-Baratto, refers to a similar dilemma in Urbino during the years 1512-1515, while it discusses papal interference in the actual presentation of plays (and of "La Calandria" in particular) during the 1512 carnival. Madame Baratto documents extremely well Bibbiena's posture, precariously perched between artistic integrity on the one hand and the censorship of Pope Julius II on the other. Not unlike her colleague, Mme. Baratto exploits the role of the play's central character to verify her premise, which is that Bibbiena, like Ariosto, saw fit to criticize the corruption of Church and State but in an extremely delicate fashion.

Perhaps the study on Machiavelli is best, simply because there is an attempt made to preserve the statesman's integrity throughout the degrading episodes which preceded the composition of the *Istorie Fiorentine.* Mlle. Marietti initiates her thesis with an outline of the political status of Florence in 1512, placing special weight on the collapse of the Soderini government, Machiavelli's abrupt dismissal and his subsequent efforts to have himself reinstated through Vettori. Machiavelli's overriding concern for the welfare of the Republic is not understated.

This biographical synopsis is followed by a perfunctory examination of some of the political innuendos contained in "La Mandragola," performed in Florence in 1518. And, in keeping with the leitmotif of the entire text, the *Istorie Fiorentine* are then surveyed to establish the precise quantity of bias present in Machiavelli's depiction of the role played by the Medici dynasty in shaping fifteenth-century Florence's history. Such a pro-

gram naturally leads to a consideration of problems which the writer encountered in endeavouring to compose some semblance of an objective history of Florence, when the two most conspicuous spheres of influence at the time, the Church and the State, were securely in the hands of those who had commissioned the work.

The panoramic view is expanded in the fourth chapter, to embrace the decade 1542-1552. Mon. Plaissance here treats the genesis of the Florentine Academy illustrating clearly how it became, increasingly, an instrument of the Cosimo de Medici government, imposing on its members a severe censorship in matters relevant to the State. In this chapter are presented the personal views of many of the principal figures involved in the seemingly constant struggles over policy (such notables as Martelli, Giambullari, Lasca and Varchi). The nature of their work is studied in the light of periodic manifestos issued by the Academy after each election. As the author himself contends, there is an effort made to equate the evolution of the Academy with various phases in the Medici rule. A useful appendix containing key correspondence of many of the prominent personalities is also included, such letters corroborate many of the observations made.

The final essay on Cinzio is a résumé of his career with particular emphasis on his relationship with the Este family of Ferrara. The article's interest lies mainly in Mon. Lebatteux's discussion of the similarities and differences in attitude between Cinzio and Boiardo and Ariosto, who preceded him at the court of Ferrara. Cinzio's harmonious relationship with power is the basic point expounded.

In conclusion, the text is a well conceived clarification of a critical question in Renaissance literature and a thoroughly researched treatise. Each chapter complements the others, providing essential information on the first half of the sixteenth century and its most conspicuous achievers.

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Alfredo Bonadeo, *Corruption, Conflict and Power in the Works and Times of Niccolò Machiavelli*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: U. of California Press, 1973, Pp. x, 127. Peter E. Bondanella, *Machiavelli and the Art of Renaissance History*. Detroit: Wayne State U. Press, 1973. Pp. 186. $10.95.

Unlike some political thinkers, Machiavelli has yet to suffer much from over-documentation. Indeed, the variety of interpretations of his thought has been startling, and few other figures have suffered so much from misleading, but influential, accounts of their ideas and intentions. These two studies attempt to set the record straight in relation to various aspects of the story. Thus they contribute to that general re-assessment of Machiavelli stimulated by Professor Allan Gilbert's edition of the *Works* and by the growing body of Renaissance scholarship published by Princeton and other centres. It is rather surprising that until recently even scholarly judgments about Machiavelli were excessively focused on *The Prince*. Now, however, that famous book has receded somewhat into a complex environment formed by an enhanced awareness of the political life of northern Italy and of the entire corpus of the Florentine's writings.

Professor Bonadeo's book is addressed to those themes in Machiavelli's political thought—corruption, conflict and the shaping of a political order—that have most con-

cerned recent students of civic humanism. Happily, he brings to the task a sound knowledge of the relevant political history and a sure feel for what is still relevant in the rather inchoate texts. Rarely have commentaries in English dealt effectively with what Machiavelli meant by corruption, and Bonadeo's insistence that an uncorrupt people had, above all, to enjoy "freedom from absolute power" sets the stage for a number of illuminating comments.

Especially interesting is the observation that Machiavelli appreciated the inadequacy either of laws or of institutions (e.g., a militia) in effecting the moral regeneration of a corrupt polity, that indeed the adherence to legal forms might serve even to fix the chains of corruption more securely. The point is crucial, since it provides the rationale for Machiavelli's vigorous prescription of extra-legal violence in the name of liberty.

Considering the importance of this theme in Bonadeo's interpretation of Machiavelli, it seems a pity that he did not tell us more of Machiavelli's opinions about the relations of forms and realities in political life. Any student of Roman history would know of the sinister potential of a tyranny masquerading under the appearances of freedom—even one who favoured Livy over Tacitus—and the experiences of Machiavelli's time gave further evidence of the danger. So Machiavelli had opinions on the matter, and his thoughts on the relationship between laws and manners—a major theme in the political thought of later centuries—are still of interest. There seems to be a problem in formulating Machiavelli's thoughts on such matters. For, in eighteenth-century England people invented Machiavellian dicta about illusions of legality and "legal tyranny," because the texts did not say the right things. Other scholars who join Bonadeo in raising the issue but treating it obliquely include Giuseppe Prezzolini.

The treatment of conflict is perhaps less interesting if only because others—Neal Wood and Harvey Mansfield Jr.—have cleared away some of the difficulties. Bonadeo is perfectly correct in saying that most of Machiavelli's comments on conflict are negative in tone; certainly all the positive comments are qualified as to appropriate circumstances. One wonders, however, whether Bonadeo pays quite enough attention to the remarkable fact that Machiavelli had anything at all good to say about divisions and conflict. The consequences of Machiavelli's qualified approval for the quarrels of republican Rome seem to have been momentous, for Machiavelli appears to have been responsible for the later opinion that a healthy commonwealth might well be divided.

Scholars seem not to have concerned themselves much with such questions, but it seems probable that Machiavelli had a very profound effect on later thinkers, such as the Englishman Henry Wright, who claimed in 1616 that factions were permissible and fruitful in a commonwealth. Of course Bonadeo's choice of emphasis is dictated by his argument, and that calls for noting the dangers inherent in factional struggles between Guelf and Ghibelline. Undoubtedly it is important to establish the basis of Machiavelli's distaste for the selfish nobility, but sometimes the argument seems to be pressed too hard. Thus Bonadeo stresses that the fomenting of factions was perceived by Machiavelli as a cynical instrument of absolute rule, neglecting those passages where Machiavelli said that only weak rulers would employ such measures because of their danger to all concerned.

In his final two chapters Bonadeo spells out the implications of his skilfully constructed case. It is a very sympathetic and rather satisfying interpretation of Machiavelli, one that argues that he was both an idealistic republican and simultaneously an advocate of ruthless measures. This assimilates the figure of the legislator to Machiavelli's *Prince* and effects a

plausible reconciliation between the ostensibly different concerns of Machiavelli's two major political works. The argument that *The Prince* was only a manual for aspiring tyrants is ably refuted, although Bonadeo's opponents here seem to include few major figures.

This is a valuable book for students of political ideas. It is not intended as a complete survey of Machiavelli's political thought, but it serves its limited purpose admirably. The author showed commendable restraint in not making more use of his own useful article on the role of the "people." Probably it was a wise choice not to add it as a chapter, though it would have assisted the argument. One surprising slip, arising in that article, persists in the book. It is odd that a Renaissance scholar should adhere so resolutely to the notion that there is such a body as the "Warburg and Courtland *(sic)* Institute."

Professor Bondanella's book is a literary study of Machiavelli as a master of historical portraiture, so the focus of concern is the "humanism" in the tradition of civic humanism.

Though the study is no mere appreciation, the subject matter does not seem to allow for so pointed an hypothesis as one finds in Bonadeo's monograph. The theme that is best sustained through the various essays—several of which have appeared as articles—is that Machiavelli must not be dismissed as no more than a public person who occasionally amused himself by writing. The point emerges in most of the chapters. It seems significant that in the course of noting the literary merit of Machiavelli's novella *Belfagor,* Bondanella quotes from Hales's edition of Machiavelli's *Literary Works.* True enough, it is unfortunate that these writings are frequently "picked over for material that will help in the erection of some monument to his [Machiavelli's] fame as a political, military, or historical writer," rather than being judged as artistic creations. But the judgment has already been voiced by literary scholars, while the source of their distress—the judgment of time—has pronounced rather conclusively that Machiavelli is most to be honoured for substance rather than form. This accounts for the absence of any very novel arguments in this careful and scholarly book.

The author certainly takes issue, gently but effectively, with a number of scholarly opinions about Machiavelli. There is, for instance, the well-argued refutation of the views of J. H. Whitfield and others about Machiavelli's *Life of Castruccio Castracani.* Showing that Machiavelli was being neither careless nor disingenuous in distorting the facts in the life of this *condottiere,* Bondanella argues, with an abundance of evidence, that historical portraits of the period were intended as archetypal and recognized as such. An appreciation of this fact is obviously essential to historical or literary pursuits in the period, and this chapter does a service to both. Comparable insight into Renaissance literary conventions is afforded by the claim that private letters were very often consciously fashioned with a wide audience in mind.

No doubt Professor Bondanella would feel that his worst fears had been confirmed if a student of political ideas were to express most interest in his incidental comments on Machiavelli's opinions—especially the views on luxury contained in the *Description of German Affairs,* a work with which this reader was not previously familiar. It is less easy to express much useful reaction to the major point of the book—that Machiavelli was a serious, indeed a masterly, artist. In the absence of major errors of interpretation that may have followed from the past neglect of this point, there is little to add. The historian, who perhaps needed the advice, still does not have his concerns greatly illuminated, while the

student of literature was perhaps in less need of the advice in the first place. One feels that one has been usefully instructed and resolves to read Machiavelli again with this book in mind.

The notes are ample and most informative. An especially valuable feature is the use of English translations in the text with the Italian original in the notes. This allows us to discover, for example, what Machiavelli actually said when he is credited with having written of "national character." The absence of such apparatus occasionally leads to problems in Bonadeo's book.

Machiavelli and the Art of Renaissance History is a useful, brief and unpretentious study. Perhaps my only complaint about it—discounting those that arise from a very different set of interests—is a slight sense of dismay (Fowler notwithstanding) at the author's recurrent habit of using "none" as though it were always a plural.

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Francesco Petrarca. *Petrarch's Book without a Name: A Translation of the* Liber sine nomine. Tr. with introduction and notes by Norman P. Zacour. Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1973. Pp. 128. $3.00.

Petrarch's *Liber sine nomine* is a collection of nineteen letters on the corruption of the papal court at Avignon and, secondarily, on Petrarch's hopes for the reestablishment of the temporal and spiritual preeminence of Rome. The title suggests the fact that this collection was revised and rearranged before publication even more carefully than the *Familiares*. The virulence of his attacks on the papacy, which led Petrarch to withhold these letters for posthumous publication, led him also to delete the names of the addressees, most other clues to their identities, and indeed all names of contemporaries.

Professor Zacour's editorial work is unpretentious, as befits an epistolary collection that is relatively slight both in length and in content. A sixteen-page introduction includes material on the relation between the *Liber* and the *Familiares,* some of the sources of Petrarch's feelings toward Avignon and Rome, and the nature of the *Liber*. Introductory notes to individual letters offer information about the presumptive addressees, likeliest dates, and occasions. (None of this material goes beyond previous biographical studies.) Footnotes, in addition to identifying quotations, occasionally illuminate features of the text—e.g., Petrarch's Latin word play and his use of conventional wisdom of the period—that the reader would otherwise miss. The translation is the first complete English version of the letters and is straightforward and clear. I wonder, however, whether the occasional use of contractions and other informalities (e.g., "So what?" for "quid ad me?" [p. 28]) is appropriate. If Petrarch's language, translated literally, seems formal and flowery now, so did the original in the fourteenth century, when classicizing Latin was by no means common.

Zacour points out that the book exhibits "a marked thematic unity": "In effect the work treats of two cities, Rome and Avignon, two women, so to speak, the one majestic, dignified, slowly rousing herself from long slumber, soberly reaching out to reclaim her sceptre, the other a cheeky harlot queening it over the world, heedless of her impending doom" (p. 23). One may add that stylistic unity is equally apparent. Petrarch views his

function here as like that of the Hebrew prophets, and the letters are accordingly filled with quotations from the Old Testament, especially from Psalms. Allusions to the opening of Psalm 137 ("By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion") occur several times, and the verse could serve as an epigraph for the *Liber*. Biblical allusions far outnumber classical allusions, and in general this is one of the works in which Petrarch more clearly anticipates Northern humanists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than his immediate, often secular, Italian successors. Stylistic unity is also imparted by an impressive use of imagery. In addition to employing the imagery of queen and whore, Petrarch repeatedly images Avignon as a western Babylon, a new Labyrinth, Hades, a wasteland, and an Egypt ruled by a Biblical Pharoah. These images harmonize with one another and powerfully evoke the pompous and sinister world of Avignon as Petrarch sees it. "Here is the dreadful prison, the aimless wandering in the dwelling place of shadows, the urn in which Fate stirs the lots of men, tyrannical Minos, and the voracious Minotaur, memorial of forbidden love—but no healing medicine, no love, no charity, no promises worthy of trust, no friendly counsel, no thread as a silent guide to mark the twisted path, no Ariadne, no Daedalus" (pp. 72-73).

Despite its literary successes, the *Liber* is not as a whole very satisfactory. In part, dissatisfaction stems from the genre: we have lost the taste for fictionalized, rhetorically self-conscious letters. Beyond this fact, the letters do not entirely succeed on their own terms. In Letter 6, Petrarch says that he would like to write a tragedy on Avignon. "I shall write, Truth will dictate, all mankind will be witness. You, Posterity, you be the judge, unless, as it happens, you are so overwhelmed by the evils of your own day that you cannot be bothered with ours" (p. 63). Posterity has been busy enough, but the neglect that the letters have suffered has resulted not only from this circumstance but also from their failure, as a consequence of Petrarch's careful deletion of names and facts, to provide the specifics that would sustain interest and would constitute the necessary foundations for Posterity's judgment. The three instances in which Petrarch gives detailed anecdotes of curial corruption stand out vividly. Almost denuded of particulars, the letters become repetitious in their generalities. Indeed, as Zacour observes, the interest of the book lies principally in its embodiment of Petrarch's personality. As always, Petrarch is able to make his artificial Latin come suddenly alive, through ingenuously-stated perceptions and direct, unembarrassed personal admissions.

Finally, if the letters are of limited use as factual data for social or ecclesiastical history, they are of considerable interest in the history of ideas, since they illustrate one of the ways in which Renaissance humanism represents not a continuation of medieval humanism but a conservative, religious reaction against it. The complaints that Petrarch utters against the curia centre in its secularism, its realpolitik, its greed, and its religious skepticism. This church will admit Judas "if he brings with him his thirty pieces of blood money, while Christ the pauper will be turned away from the gate" (p. 106). Passages of this kind anticipate the middle section of *The Praise of Folly*, and they place Petrarch in opposition to precisely the tendencies in later medieval thought that R. W. Southern identifies as the defining characteristics of medieval humanism: secularism, rationalism, the justification of private property and war.

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Sergio Bertelli. *Ribelli, libertini e ortodossi nella storiografia barocca.* Firenze: "La Nuova Italia" Editrice, 1973. Pp. xviii, 377. Lire 3600.

This is a history of historiography during the Baroque era, i.e., c. 1550 to c. 1700. But the author defines Baroque as more than a chronological period; it signifies an intellectual reaction against Renaissance values, especially those values identified with Florence and its great historians, Machiavelli and Guicciardini. For Bertelli the Renaissance was the lay secular world of the Florentine citizen. But then came the religious thrust of the Baroque with its own creativity and artistic expression, both in Catholic Italy and the Protestant north. Bertelli's history is an account of the historiography (in the broadest sense) of the Baroque in reaction to the Renaissance. But at the same time, he argues, some historians in Italy and abroad continued to write a lay and rational historiography. These are the rebels and libertines whose work led directly to the Enlightenment.

The author devotes about 60% of his narrative to the Italian scene, beginning with the *ars historica* discussion of the mid-sixteenth century. He then turns to Germany where he analyzes Protestant historiography of the Reformation, which he sees as a total reversal of Italian Renaissance historiography. In their efforts to justify the Reformation, Protestant historians became extremely apologetic and turned to a medieval supernatural causality, in Bertelli's judgment. Its counterpart in the Catholic world was the work of Baronius and others, which, despite the important discoveries of antique Christianity and the catacombs, suffered from similar defects. After Baronius and his generation, Italian Catholic historiography degenerated into a kind of sacred localism, i.e., accounts of individual saints, orders, and dioceses. Other Italian developments described by Bertelli include the debate over the history of Trent (Sarpi vs. Pallavicino), the rediscovery of the Italian barbarian past (Carlo Sigonio), the popular historians of the sixteenth century, and the irreverent dissenters, notably Gregorio Leti and Secondo Lancellotti. In Bertelli's judgment, Italian scholarly historiography exhausted itself in the seventeenth century, although the continuing desire for universality, to know what was transpiring elsewhere in Europe, produced some useful journalistic historiography.

Bertelli finds most of the rebels and libertines of Clio's tribe in France, the Netherlands, and England. He analyzes the Gallic historians and a group of English dissenters, including Milton and the Levellers. Bertelli is particularly interested in the development of skeptical histories of Christianity. The mixture of Cartesianism and greater, but not absolute, freedom of expression in the Netherlands provided a hospitable climate for this development. At the same time, Bossuet's history of Protestantism provoked a similar movement in the Protestant world toward an undogmatic and rationalist historiography. Huet, Leibniz, and Spinoza are three key figures who point the way to the great historians of the Enlightenment, Hume and Gibbon, as Bertelli brings his account to a close on the eve of the eighteenth century.

The author provides a real service in this survey of major and minor historians. Criticisms are minor; Bertelli's sympathies are clearly with the rebels and libertines, and perhaps he sometimes fails to give sufficient credit to the orthodox. One can also argue that his distinction between Renaissance and Baroque is overdrawn, that Renaissance historiography was not quite so secular and lay, the Baroque not exclusively religious and clerical. Since this is a survey, the author provides quick sketches and key quotes (always drawn from the primary sources) rather than extended analyses; sometimes the reader wishes for

more information. Overall, the author has accomplished his purpose, that of giving us a reliable survey of a fascinating era of intellectual history.

PAUL F. GRENDLER, *University of Toronto*

Michael Baxandall. *Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. 165, ill. $11.95.

The purpose of this concise and tightly written book is to show "how the *style* of pictures is a proper material of social history." Mr. Baxandall's argument is this. Believing that the symbolic structures used by a society at any given moment are reflected in all the modes of expression that appear in that society, Mr. Baxandall is concerned to show how our understanding of painting—which in the Renaissance was an obviously important expressive language—can be enriched by reference to material derived from other areas of activity. And it is a highly rewarding investigation.

He begins with an account of the forms of patronage recorded in the fifteenth century, these being, in his words, the customer's participation in the creation of the work of art. And he concludes with an interpretation of the critical terms to be found in three somewhat different late fifteenth-century texts on art—the *Trattato di pittura* (1509) of Francesco Lancilotti, the *Cronaca rimata* (after 1482) of Giovanni Santi, the father of Raphael, and, most importantly, those parts of the *Comento . . . sopra la comedia di Dante Alighieri* (1481) where the author, Cristoforo Landino, includes a lengthy and modestly ambitious account of the state of the arts in Florence. But it is in the second section of the book, entitled "The Period Eye," that Mr. Baxandall keeps closest to his brief, recalling one by one the assumptions by which the fifteenth-century viewer, while realising with Boccaccio that painting is "actually just a little colour applied with skill to a panel," still wished to interpret the expressive meaning of the panel placed before him. Some of this material might seem to be obvious. We know, of course, of the representational conventions that allowed the structure of space to be defined as it was in the Brunelleschian system of "artificial perspective." And we are aware, if perhaps to a lesser extent, of the religious traditions that the painter, "the professional visualiser of holy stories," could draw upon to express the themes that his commission laid upon him. But the extreme virtue of this book lies in the material that Mr. Baxandall has been able to assemble to give evidence of these conventions, and the acute comment with which he interprets it. We read, for example, in the anonymous *Zardino de Oracion* (1494), of the suggestion that the pious recreate in familiar surroundings the events of the life of Christ, and we might think immediately of a work like the *Pitti tondo* of Fra Filippo Lippi. Or we read, in the *Prediche vulgbare* (1491) of Fra Roberto Caracciolo, of the almost pedantically precise analysis of the various stages of the Annunciation by which the varied representations of this subject could be interpreted. We read in the *De arte saltanti et choreas ducendi* by Domenico da Piacenza of a scheme by which we might interpret the language of gesture in Quattrocento painting. And finally, in a commonplace treatise on mensuration like the *De arimethica* (1481) by Filippo Calandri, we read of techniques that seem to speak in more mundane circumstances of the feeling for solids and voids that, in the work of Giotto or Masaccio, was baptised as evidence of a "tactile sensibility."

Little of this is easy reading. The chapters of this book are derived from lectures that Mr. Baxandall prepared for students of history at London University, and there is a certain casualness about the language that makes some of the reasoning a little elusive. And we may not entirely agree with the point of his thesis. But what Mr. Baxandall is talking about in this book is new and important material, and there are few readers who will not find their comprehension of Renaissance painting sharpened and enriched by the material included here and the analysis that Mr. Baxandall provides for it.

DAVID CAST, *Yale University*

Andrew Martindale. *The Rise of the Artist in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972. Pp. 144, Ill. $6.75 (softcover edition $4.75).

This is a brief, concise book. The material in it appeared first as part of a large, lavish volume entitled *The Flowering of the Middle Ages* that was published by Thames and Hudson in 1966. Since then the text, in the words of the editor, has been "roused, stretched and shaken into a new and somewhat enlarged shape," the plates have been rearranged and the whole is now presented as an independent contribution to the study of the complex problem of the social position of art and of artists at the end of the Middle Ages onwards, that is to say from about 1250 to 1400.

In one immediate way such an enterprise is obviously worthwhile, for it places material in the hands of readers who could hardly have expected to buy the larger and more expensive book. And the plates in this new version are not, on the whole, inferior to those of the original. But judged as an independent book, it is only partly successful. It is not possible to fault the general account Mr. Martindale provides of the gradual and patchy accumulation of authority that artists enjoyed from the end of the thirteenth century onwards. Nor the divisions—Town, Court, Cloister—under which he presents his evidence. Nor the careful and precise interpretation with which he brings his facts before us. But he is caught by the terms of his own brief. The material he uses is haphazard and generally unfamiliar—names like Jacques Cavael or Girart d'Orléans appear as frequently as do more familiar ones like Giotto, Gislebertus and Melchior Broederlam. And his interpretations are often drawn from appropriate, but difficult sources such as inventories, or the terminology of court offices, or the statutes of the guilds of painters. This leads, I think, to a disturbing imbalance. For the general reader—someone like the "mediocriter literatus" envisaged by Erasmus in his *Adagia*—there is too much taken for granted in our knowledge of social history and social structures. And for the scholar, to whom such matters would be known, there are suggestions and connections made here by Mr. Martindale that without documentation are a little frustrating. Obviously this is not to say that Mr. Martindale's text is without interest. Given to readers sufficiently acquainted with the social history of the late Middle Ages—let us say, advanced undergraduates—this book could well be used to open up a range of possible questions for study. But despite Mr. Martindale's modest claims, this is not merely a survey of the available material; it is more than that. And it is to be hoped that at some time Mr. Martindale will produce a larger, more expansive book on this interesting subject. What we have here is merely a

brief sketch that may have sufficed as part of the original volume for which it was intended. But standing as an independent book, it only makes us wish for more.

DAVID CAST, *Yale University*

Arthur J. Slavin, ed., *Tudor Men and Institutions.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. viii, 294. $11.95.

Tudor Men and Institutions is dedicated to Walter C. Richardson, and appropriately enough most of the ten contributors throw "some light on the nature of Tudor rituals of rule." The first three contributors apply themselves to Tudor men. Mortimer Levine has studied the Duke of Buckingham, or more particularly his trial in 1521, which provides an excellent example of Henry VIII's ruthless ability to manipulate the law to his own advantage. The duke was denied trial by his peers in Parliament, and instead was tried by the Duke of Norfolk and nineteen other peers in the Court of the Lord High Steward. The court found him guilty of treason for words uttered even though no treasonable act had been committed. Buckingham had to die because Henry was already worried about the lack of an heir and the duke possessed too strong a claim to the throne for comfort. Henry used the law, therefore, to implement his policies of the moment. Yet he also needed tools to operate the machinery of the law to kill his victims. One such tool was Sir Thomas Audley, who succeeded Sir Thomas More as Lord Chancellor and presided over his trial as well as that of Anne Boleyn. Stanford E. Lehmberg makes a valiant but unsuccessful attempt to polish Audley's tarnished image. This is a formidable task for if, as is suspected, Audley wrote his own epitaph, in which the black marble of the tomb is described as "not blacker than the soul, nor harder than the heart" of the occupant, Audley seems to have shared the judgment most historians have passed on his character. Professor Lehmberg argues that we should avoid moral judgments, but then tries to shift the blame for Audley's behaviour to Henry. Whatever Henry's failings, the picture of Audley that remains is of a self-seeking, greedy opportunist who would do virtually anything he was told if it helped his advancement. Arthur J. Slavin has no compunction about describing Audley's successor, Thomas Wriothesley, as an ambitious clerk "who rose to high office through cleverness and lack of scruple." Yet for Wriothesley a strong case is made for an element of principle being mixed with the self-interest. Wriothesley, in resisting the 1547 scheme to enhance the power of the Court of Augmentations, wished to preserve not only his own position, but the authority of the crown and the common law as well.

Four contributors are primarily concerned with courts. DeLloyd J. Guth concludes that the Exchequer of Pleas played a "very minor and narrow role in royal justice." Similarly, Jay P. Anglin shows that puritans in Essex had little to fear from the local church courts. W. J. Jones tries to balance our view of Tudor government by looking at a court on the fringe rather than in the centre, in this case the Exchequer of Chester. Finally, R. W. Heinze examines the failure of the special court set up by the Statute of Proclamations of 1539.

The three remaining articles are less easy to classify. J. R. Lander steps out of the Tudor period entirely and looks back to "The Hundred Years War and Edward IV's 1475 campaign in France." He challenges the opinions that Edward's preparations for

war were largely bluff and that there was much enthusiasm in England for the campaign. Louis A. Knafla, on the other hand, looks at Elizabeth's reign in a stimulating and valuable article on the admissions to the Inns of Court, which clarifies, indeed modifies, Lawrence Stone's educational "revolution." It is a pity that a work of such quality should be marred by the use, if not the invention, of such a clumsy term as "antihumanism."

In his concluding article on the rule of law, G. R. Elton surveys the whole Tudor period, and is concerned once again to dispell the tenacious concept of Tudor despotism. In true Eltonian style he slays the paradox that has been found in sixteenth-century England of a deference to sovereign law accompanied by an augmentation of regal power. There is no paradox once it is recognized that regal power only grows by means of statute. The prerogative, though perhaps growing in effectiveness, remained subordinate to parliament. Less successful is Professor Elton's encounter with Professor Hurstfield, who has pointed out that the existence of the rule of law does not preclude despotism. As the earlier essay in this book on the Duke of Buckingham illustrated well, the law could be wielded in a despotic manner. Even Cromwell may have been guilty of despotic behaviour, and it is a weak defense of his handling of the 1536 Canterbury election to say that evidence we do not possess might well vindicate him. The question of whether the Tudors were or were not despotic cannot, of course, be resolved until there is an agreed definition of despotism. It may be accepted that under the Tudors England enjoyed a more representative government than virtually any other European country; Tudor monarchs, moreover, generally operated within the law; yet, as Professor Elton observes, "Tudor law, like Tudor life, was often savage." Ought we then to substitute the term "Tudor savagery" for "Tudor despotism"? Surely not!

M. PERCEVAL-MAXWELL, *McGill University*

Elizabeth W. Pomeroy. *The Elizabethan Miscellanies.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. x, 145. 5. Richard F. Hardin, *Michael Drayton and the Passing of Elizabethan England.* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973. Pp. xii, 181.

For those who accept the validity of periodization in literary studies, the character of an age or even a decade is often better recognized in minor writers who reflect or conserve fashions than in those whose innovations or audacities create them. Two demonstrations of this assertion are provided by Elizabeth Pomeroy's study of the verse anthologies which, at least chronologically, define the Elizabethan period, since "the first and last of them . . . nearly coincide with the dates of Elizabeth's reign"; and Richard Harding's renovative account of Michael Drayton, whose poetical longevity and retrospective idealism established him as the last of the Elizabethans in a Jacobean age. As Hardin suggests, Drayton's burial in Westminster Abbey was probably earned not by his poetic reputation but by his personal legend "among young poets and writers who had never seen Sidney or Spenser or Marlowe."

The miscellany compilers were conservative by occupation and *de facto;* Drayton, it seems, by nature and upbringing. *Tottel's Miscellany* throve on the poetry of Wyatt, some

years dead; *England's Helicon* (1600) gave a last-minute summary of the pastoral ideal when it had already succumbed to self-parody, in *As You Like It* and elsewhere. *A Poetical Rhapsody* (1602) was reprinting a large number of love sonnets when the main vogue for them was already over. Similarly, Drayton's own *Idea*, continually revised up to 1619 and only then containing his most famous sonnet, "Since there's no help, come let us kiss and part," must have seemed "terribly dated" to his contemporaries; while his return in 1630 to a simple-minded pastoralism may have looked more like a poetic second childhood than the oblique criticism of Jacobean politics and morality it was presumably intended to be.

But whereas the miscellanies provide a fairly reliable index to fashions in short poetry, a decade or two after they had occurred, Drayton's gift to the literary historian is of a more complex nature. He was at times innovative, as in nationalizing Ovid's *Heroides* in *England's Heroical Epistles*, or in anticipating the seventeenth-century trends to encyclopaedic history (*Poly-Olbion*) and biblical epic (*Noah's Flood*). But he also provides one of the most ostentatious examples of deference to current fashions, in his wholesale revision of *Mortimeriados* (1596) into *The Barons' Wars* (1603), including the shift from the seven-line rhyme royal to the modish Italian octave. (Hardin's discussion of these poems seems to me to obscure this remarkable feat, and the influence on Drayton of Daniel's *Civil Wars*, and behind Daniel, of Tasso.) What made Drayton definitive of the Elizabethan Age were not his generic choices, in which he looked sometimes back, sometimes forward, and sometimes seemed caught in a slightly absurd race for contemporaneity; it was his consistent belief in the idea of a nation with a historical past, a strong sense of geographical place, and an imperialistic future, a belief which, by its very anachronism in the 1620's and 30's, also helps to define negatively what we mean by Jacobean. Using four of Drayton's odes for an opening definition of this idealism, Professor Hardin proves its centrality even in Drayton's most negative poetic statements.

The reader of this review will by this time have surmised that the two studies, though comparable, are not of equal value. Professor Pomeroy's analysis of the miscellanies bears all the marks of a thesis courageously handled, but somewhat short of matter, especially given the pre-existence of fine editions by Hyder E. Rollins. Much of its value consists in reproducing in an economical format the present sum of bibliographical knowledge about these collections. There is considerable repetition between the introductory chapter and those describing individual miscellanies of special significance; and the author has had to fall back on accounts of metries for filler. There is also an unconvincing hypothesis that all the poems in the *Phoenix Nest* constitute an "extended elegy" for Sidney. Professor Hardin's book, on the other hand, though equally dependent on the pre-existence of fine editing, makes a considerable contribution to the literature on a rather neglected poet. He develops a totally convincing relationship between Drayton's unchanging temperament and the kind of poems he wrote as the times changed around him. Hardin *almost* manages, also, to provide a chronological account of a poet whose constant revisions and delayed publication of earlier work defy chronology; and he makes one want to go back and read Drayton again. The same cannot be said of the miscellanies.

ANNABEL PATTERSON, *York University*

Louis Marin. *Utopiques: Jeux D'Espaces.* Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, Collection "Critique," 1973. Pp. 358.

This is a book which has nothing to offer anyone interested in Sir Thomas More or in the Renaissance as a period. This is not to say that the book has failed in what it set out to do, as it quite clearly does not purport to deal with either of the above. Unfortunately, however, it is much easier to characterise what the book is not than to evaluate what it is.

On one level the book is an extended analysis, on semantic and structuralist lines, of the concept of Utopia, or of "utopies"—a distinction the author insists upon initially but seems to abandon in his concluding chapters. For this purpose, More's *Utopia* serves essentially as a text, the semantic analysis of certain parts of which permits the author to define and flesh out aspects of his philosophical conceptions. Whether or not the book succeeds as a contribution to the field of semantics must be judged by someone competent to meet it on its own terms and to follow all aspects of the author's intricate and very technical analysis of a purely linguistic nature, but if a layman in this area may be permitted an observation, it is a pity to see "la clarté française" reduced, as it is all too often in this book, to the level of a practically incomprehensible jargon. One hails quotations from the *Utopia,* where they appear, as a welcome relief and a "descent" into intelligibility. Raphael is a lot clearer than Monsieur Marin.

On another level the book is an example of neo-Marxist criticism. The idea for it arose, according to the author, from the revolutionary climate of the France of May 1968, and it represents an attempt to conceptualise the direct experience of "une pratique utopique dans la production des discours et des situations, expérience qu'il s'agissait de conceptualiser pour matrîser une tactique à venir en possédant sa stragégie et son système"(p.16). Seen from this perspective More's *Utopia* inevitably coincides historically with the emergence of a capitalist form of production and represents ideologically a "prise de conscience" of the conflict between bourgeois productive forces and feudal conditions of production. If on the level of semantic analysis the book is frequently unnecessarily obscure, on this level the book is unnecessarily self-serving. Judgments of a social, political and intellectual nature are made with blissful disregard of the weighty "corpus" of More scholarship and the book moves inexorably forward, from More, through Disneyland—an example of Utopic degenerescence—to its conclusion in which the author agrees with the views expressed by Karl Marx in an article of 1858, that Utopia is not a political project. Utopia, as has been shown in this book, is no-place, is empty space. Utopia is "la praxis socialiste." One has to agree with a logic which sees the futility of waging class war in empty space and in this sense one can agree with the conclusion- "Travaillons et luttons ici."

In this book one does not sense an honest attempt to view More's *Utopia* dispassionately, critically, to meet it on its own terms. On the contrary, the writer's aim is essentially an ideological one and because of this his book does not make a serious contribution to the field of Renaissance studies. At times the insights are interesting, the perspective intriguing, as for instance when he deals with the philosophical and semantic connotations of the neuter, and when he analyses "neutral space" in various areas of More's creation. In the last analysis, however, what could have been a worthwhile linguistic analysis of the *Utopia* fails because of a lack of objectivity.

GWENDA ECHARD, *York University*

Patrick Cullen. *Infernal Triad.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Pp. xxxvi, 267. $13.50.

In *Infernal Triad* Patrick Cullen has written a book which must be of value to all those interested in the Elizabethan period of English literature and in particular in the two major poets, Spenser and Milton.

The author examines the recurring patterns in the first two books of *The Faerie Queene,* in *Paradise Lost, Paradise Regained,* and *Samson Agonistes,* showing the struggles of the heroes against the Flesh, the World and the Devil—the infernal triad inherited from the Middle Ages. In his study he stresses Milton's significant debt to Spenser.

The Introduction indicates the importance placed throughout the Middle Ages on the idea of parallel temptations of the Old Adam and the New Adam, as revealed by such theologians as Gregory, Ambrose and Augustine, as well as by the Miracle plays. This idea was of course modified somewhat during the Reformation. Professor Cullen goes on to outline the basic patterns in the temptations faced by Red Crosse and Guyon. He shows, for example, the connections between the House of Pride and the Cave of Mammon, both leading to the kingdoms-temptation in *Paradise Regained.*

In the final three chapters the author makes it clear to the reader that the infernal triad lies at the very centre of Milton's three great poems. Dealing with *Paradise Lost*, he reiterates the accepted distinction between the sin of Satan and the sin of Adam. The fallen archangels, having succumbed to self-persuasion, cannot hope for salvation. Since Adam's sin was less, man shall eventually find grace. By his use of the Flesh-World-Devil scheme, Milton emphasizes this distinction and paves the way for the same structure in Christ's temptation in the wilderness, adding to it Christ's three roles of Prophet, King and Priest, and also the tetradic book structure.

Professor Cullen thus traces the line of literary development from Spenser, particularly in Book I of *The Faerie Queene*, and Giles Fletcher in *Christ's Victory on Earth* to *Paradise Regained.* He then draws the relationship (in both structure and theme) between *Paradise Regained* and *Samson Agonistes.* Christ struggles in the darkness of the wilderness and Samson struggles in the darkness of his physical and psychological blindness. We see Samson in the fallen world, restrained by his Adamic limitations, facing the temptations of the Flesh, the World and the Devil in his encounters with Manoa, Dalila, and Harapha. Gradually through the struggle he begins to understand his guilt and Heaven's justice and so is made ready for his regeneration and his subsequent victory, assuming finally his role of *imitatio Christi.*

Thus in his last three poems Milton has shown the progression from the fall to the redemption, Samson taking his place as a fore-shadowing of Christ. He sees, however, that Christ's sacrifice on the cross does not bring an end to the struggles, which will continue in the world.

In *Samson Agonistes* Milton has transformed the classical idea of heroic tragedy to the Christian concept; the play does not finish with the fall of Samson, but through his struggle and regeneration he is able to imitate Christ's triumph.

The author concludes his study by showing that Milton makes use of Spenser's triadic structure to portray the fall of the first Adam and the triumph of the second.

This is a book of insight and sensitive appreciation. Besides his own significant contri-

bution, Professor Cullen has summarized earlier criticism and has given full credit to others who have dealt with similar themes, at the same time showing carefully where his opinions differ.

K. HARPER, *Bishop's University*

C. R. Dodwell, ed. *Essays on Dürer.* Manchester Studies in the History of Art, No. 2. Manchester: Manchester University Press; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973. Pp. viii, 154. $11.50.

The year 1971, the 500th anniversary of Albrecht Dürer's birth (1471-1528), witnessed an overwhelming number of exhibitions and publications devoted to Dürer's artistic oeuvre, theoretical writings, contemporaries, and his later cult in Germany. The slim volume of seven essays presently under review comprises the public lectures originally presented in conjunction with the Dürer Festival held in the fall of 1971 at the Whitworth Art Gallery of the University of Manchester in collaboration with the Goethe Institute.

As published, the order of these papers moves smoothly from the general context of the times to more circumscribed issues and finally to aspects of Dürer's afterlife. In the first essay entitled, "Dürer and the Renaissance," Michael Levey challenges not only the parochial understanding of the Renaissance, peculiar to many engaged in the history of art, as essentially an artistic style or even a movement like Impressionism but also the superficial equation of "Renaissance" with "Italian Renaissance." He maintains in brief that the word "Renaissance" stands "for an historical attitude during a particular period of European history." Within the expanded perimeters set forth, Dürer's attitudes and achievements take on indeed an eminently commanding position. Readers familiar with the author's other writings will find these deceptively simple perceptions a complement to his *Early Renaissance* in the Pelican series *Style and Civilization.*

Drawing on similar assumptions, Peter Skrine outlines Dürer's relationship to the vital religious and humanist questions of the day in "Dürer and the Temper of his Age," of which the most interesting section centers on Dürer's 1508 altarpiece *Martyrdom of 10,000 Christians* commissioned by the Elector of Saxony to embellish the Schlosskirche in Wittenberg which housed his zealously assembled collection of over 5,000 sacred relics. Dürer has painted himself moving calmly through this scene of mass torture and execution accompanied by a figure identified by Skrine as Conrad Celtis. If this is so, this rather neglected painting documents one of the significant junctures in Dürer's work. Here as elsewhere in this volume, some notes and bibliographical references are already out of date or rather incomplete—due not to negligence but rather to the swift, widespread acceptance of such 1971 publications as F. Anzelewsky's *Albrecht Dürer, Das malerische Werk,* hardly available in time for consultation.

Perhaps in consequence of the public nature of the original series, the resulting papers are addressed to divergent audiences. James Byam Shaw's general exposition on "Dürer the Engraver" remains isolated among essays intended for the more knowledgeable student, while considerations on "Dürer and Thomas Mann" presented as the final essay by Ulrich

Finke can only be fully appreciated by those enjoying a thorough familiarity with Mann's work.

The two intervening essays are focused as well on Dürer's afterlife. In "Dürer and the 17th Century" Henry Ley offers a productive commentary on Joachim von Sandrart's extensive biography of "Germany's glory" in his *Teutsche Academie* (Nuremberg, 1675, 1679), followed by a sketch of Dürer collecting, active enthusiasm for which had subsided by 1625. Keith Andrews surveys the various manifestations of "Dürer's Posthumous Fame" from the petulant criticisms of sixteenth-century Italian writers to the sober scholarship and dime-store reproductions of our own time. Marring this remarkably orchestrated overview is a confusing passage on the preservation of Dürer's physical image; the author stresses that the self-portraits, both drawn and painted, "all date from the early years of his life." Then he asks, "Does this mean that the older Dürer found it impossible, or no longer necessary, to present himself to the outside world?" Unless Andrews has in mind a personal, unstated definition of self-portraiture, this is a very odd question. It is precisely this quality of probing self-exposure which characterizes the famous *Self-Portrait as the Man of Sorrows* (formerly in Bremen), a drawing signed and dated 1522, when the artist was 51. While the included instruments of Christ's Passion are variously interpreted in reference to Dürer's mental and physical health (it is thought that he may have contracted malaria in the Netherlands), these do not obscure the penetrating analysis of his own face and sagging body. This passage is especially puzzling since this drawing is specifically discussed and illustrated in the preceding essay by Alistair Smith on "Dürer as a Portraitist" in which the author turns, among other points, to Dürer's development of a *persona* as a technique of self-expression. This rather disconcerting discrepancy might well have been clarified, if not eliminated, by the editor, along with other minor irritants such as two mutually exclusive datings for an engraving within the same essay (*Holy Family*, p. 53 and caption to fig. 12).

The disparate intentions of these essays distinguish this collection from the thematic concentration of the important symposium held in Nuremberg in 1971 on Dürer's achievements in the years 1490-1500 (see *Kunstchronik*, XXV, July, 1972, entire issue) and the papers on the artist's relationship to his times gathered in *Albrecht Dürers Umwelt* (Nürnburger Forchungen XV, 1971), *Albrecht Dürer: Kunst einer Zeitenwende*, ed. H. Schade (Regensburg, 1971), *Albrecht Dürer: Kunst im Aufbruch*, ed. E. Ullmann (Leipzig, 1972). For broad commentary on these and other publications including the major exhibition catalogues (Nuremberg, Dresden, Washington, etc.) issued in connection with the anniversary year, see the comprehensive reviews in *Art Bulletin*, June, 1974 (W. Stechow), *Revue de l'Art* 19, 1973 (P. Vaisse), and *Burlington Magazine*, February, 1972 (M. Levey).

JOANEATH SPICER DURHAM, *University of Toronto*

Laura Calvert. *Francisco de Osuna and the Spirit of the Letter.* North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages and Literatures 133. Chapel Hill, N.C.: U.N.C. Department of Romance Languages; Portland, Ore.: International Scholarly Book Services Inc., 1973. Pp. 175. $6.50.

Francisco de Osuna, a Spanish Franciscan of the early sixteenth century who wrote a series of popular spiritual guides in the form of "alphabets," has been more admired than studied by posterity. His name appears in all histories of Spanish mysticism as a primary influence on St. Teresa, and his importance for Spanish secular literature is also admitted. The only two modern editions of his work are not readily available, however, and the only full-length study prior to this one was published in French by Fidèle de Ros in 1936. The appearance of the Calvert study is therefore timely.

Osuna's obscurity is due, one suspects, not to fortuitous neglect but to inherent difficulties of access for modern readers. The problem is not so much the unfamiliarity of the genre or any opacity of style as the lack of any obvious consistency either in organization or in the use of images. Calvert attributes this apparent aimlessness, behind which she claims to detect an orderly sequence, to Osuna's intention of providing not elements of a linear argument but rather figures for contemplation. Whatever the difficulties of approach, one soon becomes aware that Osuna was a man both of uncommon perception and of independent judgment. One is not surprised that he criticizes the ecclesiastical hierarchy, for such criticism was neither unusual nor particularly risky. His boldness becomes impressive, however, when one finds him defending converts when they were automatically suspect to the Inquisition, urging persuasion as the best means of dealing with heretics, and openly espousing democracy as preferable to monarchy. Osuna took a lively interest in scientific matters, sprinkling observations about natural phenomena throughout his writings. By his speculations about the heart and the blood he may have contributed to the discovery of the circulation of the blood, as he certainly helped to foster devotion to the Sacred Heart.

The author's primary interest—in this book at least, for she apparently has another on the way—is in Osuna's use of myth, symbolism, and allegory. His general approach, based on the medieval search for levels of meaning within texts, was not particularly original. In his use of traditional methods, however, he was capable of considerable innovation. Calvert calls attention particularly to his extensive drawing on nature as a book capable of providing letters for his alphabets, a book inferior indeed to Scripture but not radically different in kind. In numerous "meditations on the creatures" he used the natural order as a fertile source of analogies. These analogies were more often directed to the intellect than to the imagination, moving by abstraction from the functions of things rather than by description from their appearances, for the path to contemplation was through knowledge formed by love rather than through images appealing to the senses. What Osuna sought was thus "the spirit of the letter"; and he did so with considerable freedom, convinced that fidelity to one faith was consistent with many interpretations either of the book of nature or of Holy Scripture. One wonders how different relations between scientists and the church might have been in succeeding centuries if Osuna's approach had prevailed.

Students of the Renaissance will naturally be interested in possible connections between leading humanists and one who shared their spirit in such measure. A number of parallels are pointed out, notably with Erasmus and Ficino, but they are all fairly general and the trails soon peter out. More promising is the author's suggestion that medieval traditions of rhetoric and homiletics, still very much alive in Osuna and transmitted through him and others to modern secular writers, would repay more study than they have yet re-

ceived. Among influences of Osuna on later writers, that on the metaphysical poets seems most important.

The author has performed a welcome service and done so with skill and subtlety. Specialists in Spanish literature or in mysticism will derive the most benefits, but the few non-specialists who are likely to pick up a book with such a title will find unexpected rewards. The book does not make easy reading, to be sure, as in the case of Osuna himself not through the obscurity of the subject or through deficiencies in style but through complexities in the sequence of thought. Is this evidence of some lack of clarity, or is it a necessary reflection of Osuna's own complexities? It is difficult to know without a mastery of Osuna's thought, and the author seems to be practically the only expert. By restricting herself to certain aspects of Osuna's use of figures she could undoubtedly have written a neater and more approachable book. But then we should have learned less about Osuna, and this in the present state of research we could ill afford.

JOHN WEBSTER GRANT, *Victoria University*

Gareth A. Davies, *A Poet at Court: Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza (1586-1644).* Oxford: The Dolphin Book Co. Ltd., 1971. Pp. 367. £4.50.

In this work Dr. Davies offers the first comprehensive study of a writer who, although now virtually ignored, in his day figured prominently among the *littérateurs* of the court of Philip III. Davies's interest in Mendoza was awakened by the contradiction between Gracián's admiration, expressed in his *Agudeza y arte de ingenio,* and the subsequent demise of the poet's fame.

A Poet at Court is a splendid work. The approach is that of a literary historian and critic, with well-appointed judgments succinctly expounded. Following Mendoza's biography—his relationship with Olivares and his participation in court life make fascinating reading—Dr. Davies discusses Mendoza's reputation among his literary contemporaries. Although Mendoza's position at court may have elicited some exaggerated eulogies, there is little doubt that he was highly regarded not only as an outstanding poet but also as an accomplished *entremesista* and dramatist. Among his acquaintances he could count such luminaries as Quevedo, Lope de Vega, Luis Vélez de Guevara, even collaborating with Quevedo in the composition of dramas.

The discussion of Mendoza's verse and drama is detailed (Chapters V-VI, IX-XII). As poet Mendoza excelled in the use of traditional forms: the *romances, coplas, redondillas, endechas,* and above all the *décima* (in the use of which Lope acclaimed him as unequalled). Davies attributes Mendoza's predilection for the *décima* to his love of the conceit, the intellectual exercise so favoured by seventeenth-century Spanish writers, and the basis of Gracián's admiration. As dramatist Mendoza composed some twelve works, a small number considering the enormous output of some of his contemporaries. His greatest success appears to have been in his social comedies and his spectacle play, *Querer por sólo querer.* Nevertheless, Davies concludes that Mendoza's plays, although interesting, are of secondary order in the Spanish theatre of the seventeenth century.

Dr. Davies's major contribution for those whose interest in Mendoza is marginal is to

be found in Chapters III, IV, and VIII. The first, "Mendoza and *Conceptismo*," contains a discussion of what is understood by the conceit and, more important, traces some of the possible parallels that might have contributed to the *conceptista* vogue. For instance, Davies examines the relationship between the emblem and the epigram, the cult of the device, the admiration for the epigrammatists Martial and John Owen, the importance of the Belgian humanist Justus Lipsius, the possible influence of Jesuit sermons, the *cancionero* tradition. These, as Davies correctly argues, are not individually the sources of the conceit, but they reflect a habit of mind conducive to the ready acceptance of the *concepto:* they exercised the mind and demanded the participation of the *ingenio.* This excellent chapter is followed by "Poetry, a Courtly Art," a splendid analysis of the emergence of a literature responding to the demands of the court, where wit, elegance and decorum were esteemed traits. Such courtly preoccupations burst forth in Philip III's reign (Philip II, austere and strong-willed, had directed his attention almost entirely to matters of state). Davies sees this period as the culmination of a number of factors existent in the sixteenth century: the knightly ideal, the courtier perfection elucidated by Castiglione, the expression of Platonic love, the debates of love, and the vogue of the pastoral novel (frequently *romans à clef*), which proved so popular that the king and queen acquired the pastoral pseudonyms of Fileno and Belisa.

Chapter VIII ("A Poet and his Audience") describes the kind of audiences that a poet/dramatist had at his disposal in the seventeenth century, and also examines the much underestimated question of music in the formation of lyrics—whether a work was intended as a poem or as a musical composition.

A Poet at Court not only is an excellent analysis of Mendoza's life and work, and the demise of his fame (attributed largely to a change in poetic sensibility away from courtly wit), but also provides substantial and illuminating material on the poetic and dramatic practices of the day. We are reminded that *conceptismo* is not a sudden literary phenomenon; it is the culmination of earlier manifestations in the same way that *culteranismo* marks the extreme of preceding tendencies. For anyone interested in the development of *conceptismo* and in the literary atmosphere of Philip III's court Dr. Davies's book will be an invaluable source. It is a scholarly work, but Dr. Davies displays his erudition modestly. Translations of Spanish quotations at the foot of corresponding pages substantiate Dr. Davies's desire to reach a wider audience; success in this aim is further enhanced by pertinent and judicious references to contemporary events or writers in English and French literatures.

GETHIN HUGHES, *University of Toronto*

Germaine Lafeuille. *Cinq Hymnes de Ronsard.* Genève: Librairie Droz, 1973. Pp. 239. Fr.s. 54,—

This important dissertation, written at Harvard University between 1950 and 1952 under the direction of Herbert Dieckmann, has finally found its way into print. Those who have followed Ronsard scholarship were not ignorant of the existence of this work, principally because of the considerable place I. Silver gave to it in his "Ronsard Studies" for the peri-

od 1951-1966, *BHR,* XXII (1960), 253-254. In his appraisal of this "valuable and searching" work, Silver did, however, take issue with one of Prof. Lafeuille's conclusions which suggested that the "poeta philosophus" was inclined to give poetic form precedence over "science" and philosophic content. In another context—but one that has a direct bearing upon the subject treated by G. Lafeuille—Silver pointed out that the thesis in question contains a very well reasoned explanation as to "why Ronsard preferred the Ptolemaic astronomy as the basis for his cosmological poetry" (in Silver's article "Ronsard's Reflections on the Heavens and Time," *PMLA*, LXXX (1965), 345). What Silver had found on p. 45 of the typescript can now be read on p. 20 of the printed version, with variations that are significant enough to indicate that the author was not satisfied to leave unrevised what she had written twenty years earlier, although, as we read in the brief preamble, "Les chapitres I-V conservent dans l'ensemble le texte de l'original, avec une large addition à la fin du dernier."

The statement in the first chapter of *Cinq Hymnes de Ronsard, "Hymne du Ciel,"* which showed that Ronsard was looking backward rather than forward in his concept of the universe, was concluded by Prof. Lafeuille in the following manner (in the earlier version, from which Silver quoted): "Que Ronsard, loin de chercher les nouveautés, les ait fuies, qu'il se soit tourné vers la plus vieille représentation . . . révèle son objet: chanter, non pas informer, composer un hymne et non un traité," or, according to the variant in the printed version, "faire oeuvre de poète, non de savant." A few pages later on we read, à propos of the same *Hymne:* "Trois grandes questions: origine du monde, cause de la création, singularité ou pluralité des mondes, sont touchées: mais . . . sans qu'il y ait le moindre signe que le poète ait vu le problème et considéré ses solutions" (pp. 29-30). We can pick up the trail in Silver's article: "Most of the elements of [Einstein's] description of the geocentric theory are present in Ronsard's *Hymne du Ciel* . . ." (p. 345).

Of the numerous hymns that Ronsard wrote, the most significant of which were gathered in the two collections of 1555 and 1556, Germaine Lafeuille has chosen, besides the *Hymne du Ciel,* four other "hymnes philosophiques" written in "vers graves," the *Hymne de l'Eternité*, where Ronsard gave a vast *amplificatio* to the hymn *Aeternitati* by Marullus (reproduced by L. on pp. 216-217 of the *Appendices,* not on p. 215, as is stated in n. 4 on p. 42); the *Hymne de la Philosophie,* where the poet introduced "un abrégé d'encyclopédie médiévale" (p. 61); the *Hymne de la Justice,* which the poet dedicated to Charles Cardinal de Lorraine and which is mainly concerned with the "idée divine antérieure aux sociétés humaines" (J. Frappier, quoted by L. on p. 83, n. 1); finally, *Les Daimons,* which was not designated as a hymn by Ronsard, although Albert-Marie Schmidt took it upon himself to underline the pertinence of this poem by calling his critical edition and commentary *Hymne des Daimons.* In fact, one could say that Schmidt's "thèse complémentaire" (which accompanied his *La Poésie scientifique en France au XVI^e siècle)* has helped considerably to call our attention to the beauties and complexities of this poem, even if we are not won over by Schmidt's somewhat sensationalist references to "criminologie démoniaque" or "La névrose des procès de sorcellerie" (p. 7).

It would seem fair to say that Germaine Lafeuille has done for the five compositions she discusses what Schmidt had already done in his way for the *Daimons,* with the notable difference that she does not offer the complete text (which is not to be regretted, with the critical editions now at our disposal, practical considerations aside). In many respects chapter V, "*Les Daimons,*" is the most arresting, not only because of its length and

"l'étrangeté de la matière, la vigueur et l'éclat de la forme," but also because Lafeuille is in continuous discourse with Schmidt, with whom there is more disagreement than agreement, mainly because the earlier interpreter "prend, à son accoutumé, ses termes de comparaison dans la doctrine démonologique ou religieuse" (p. 178), even where it is idle to look for the arcanum of occultism, as in connection with Ronsard's gallery of "démons rustiques." On the other hand, among the bookish sources, we find here nearly thirty references to a work that Schmidt disregarded entirely, the Greek treatise on demonology by Michael Psellus (A.D. 1018-78/9), which was translated into French in 1576 by Pierre Moreau (although Cioranesco gives the year 1573). This work is considered by L. to be one of the two main sources of *Les Daimons,* the other being *De deo Socratis* of Apuleius, "a flamboyant declamation on the δαιμόνιον of Socrates, probably based on a Greek original" (*Oxford Classical Dict.*). At the beginning of the tenth section of the discussion of *Les Daimons,* the "Conclusion," we read: "On pourra lire dans le *Commentaire* [of Schmidt] une analyse complexe des vingt derniers vers du poème. Cette complexité est due au fait que le critique a méconnu l'unité de ce morceau qui, à mon avis, est bâti sur l'idée d'exorcisme" (p. 188).

This remark brings into relief one salient trait of G. Lafeuille's work: she is consistently concerned with the poetic "chant," while one could hardly say that she is neglecting "la fable." We are alerted to this interest in aesthetic values by the early references to René Char and Victor Hugo. Several analyses of Ronsard's verse reveal a fine sensibility that is couched in a language that has its own élan, like "les points névralgiques de la période" and "l'accompagnement d'une basse continue qui rappelle l'allure de la marche solennelle" (p. 45) or the poetic assessment of vv. 369-370 of *Les Daimons,* where the frightened poet brandishes his sword and cuts the surrounding air to bits, as if the evil spirits were indeed corporeal: "vers serrés, contractés comme les mâchoires d'un homme terrorisé (prédominance des monosyllabes: saccades du geste bref, mélange d'explosives et de nasales labiales . . .)." At this point, and especially with regard to the verses that follow immediately, a mention of Hugo's "Les Djinns" might not have been inappropriate.

Thus a careful evaluation of Ronsard's sources, hitherto known or unknown, combined with a perceptive appraisal of Ronsard's *mise en scène* of these sources, characterizes the study of Germaine Lafeuille. As one would expect, the visual aspects are not overlooked where the musical ones are lent such a sensitive ear. However, in the area of iconography I felt a certain disappointment. The apocalyptic vision in the *Hymne de la Justice* quite appropriately summons a scene from Dürer's *Apocalypse* (but why 80 pp. removed from the place where it comes into play?). The other illustrations, portraits of Ronsard, Odet de Coligny, and Michel de l'Hospital really do not have much bearing. It is of course hazardous to connect certain "scenes" in Ronsard with pictorial representations belonging to the Renaissance period, although Professors Graham and McAllister Johnson of the University of Toronto are shedding more and more light on these elusive interrelations. G. Lafeuille is reasonably sure about the contributions of Cesare Ripa's *Iconologia* to Ronsard's furbishing of "La Cour d'Eternité" (Chap. II, ii, pp. 47-48), but why not reproduce one of Ripa's "virtù" or one of the woodcuts in Francesco Colonna's *Hypnerotomachia Polyphili (Le Songe de Poliphile)?* And there surely could have been a useful and easily accessible illustration in support of the "Notions scientifiques" which serve as a preamble to the *Hymne du Ciel.*

The fact that the author wished to take cognizance of recent scholarship is evident in

the Conclusion and in the Bibliography, which goes to 1970, including the relatively recent works of Gendre, Gordon, and the first volume of Silver's *The Intellectual Evolution of Ronsard.* D.P. Walker's *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella* and Gadoffre's *Ronsard par lui-même* came upon the scene about ten years earlier, but it is these rather disparate authors whom Prof. Lafeuille engages in order to update her research and certain of her attitudes. The unfortunate effect is that the very end of her book suggests some hasty collage work that blurs the edges of the vast canvas that she has put before us. It may be perfectly safe to call Ronsard "un génie solaire," but I think it is precarious to let ourselves be ensnared too readily by black or white magic and to take a belated look at Jungian archetypes, only to get lost in an ever-repetitive hall of mirrors. At least, this does not effectively round out a work that was written with rather different principles in mind. And these principles, partly historical, partly aesthetic, were united by Germaine Lafeuille in a manner that promises for her *Cinq Hymnes de Ronsard* an important and permanent place in the still rapidly growing literature on Ronsard. Beyond the horizons contemplated by the poet, we are taken to the outer reaches of Renaissance thought, where stars yet unknown perform their "dançe ordonnée."[1]

Note

1 I have noted the following errors. On p. 62: la cadre: le cadre; p. 64: ou Hésiode: où Hésiode; p. 78, in the quotation from "L'Inne de Bacus," d'hommes: d'homes; p. 99: suivrs: suivre; p'Ovide: d'Ovide; p. 115, n. 29: y.: v.; p. 133, in the first quotation from *Les Daimons:* on ne voir rien cassé: on ne voit rien cassé; p. 174, n. 33: consonnantiques: consonantiques; p. 193, in the first quotation from the third *Folastrie,* where the verses should have been numbered (45-46): Or, se voyant: Or' se voyant. In the longer passage underneath, the period after "le mécredi." should have been omitted. Here again the verses should have been indicated, rather than the pages (V, 24-25), which is a method that could easily mislead where poetry is concerned. There is no proper differentiation between the designation of verses and pages throughout the work and punctuation and diactric marks are handled rather carelessly. In the Bibliography, where 1970 is the *terminus ad quem,* all the 8 vols. of Silver's crit. ed. of the 1587 text should have been mentioned, rather than "4 vols." which might also lead one to believe that vols. I-IV comprise everything.

BODO L.O. RICHTER, *State University of New York at Buffalo*

Marcel Tetel. *Marguerite de Navarre's "Heptameron": Themes, Language, and Structure.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1973. Pp. 217. $7.50.

Like George Sand and Colette, the Queen of Navarre achieved more through her influence on others than by her own literary production. Her role in persuading her beloved brother François Ier, to found the institution of the Lecteurs Royaux (later the Collège de France) is recognized as decisive. Her apparently unceasing philosophical and religious enquiry, more subjective than systematic, bears witness to a relatively uninhibited mind: in contemporary jargon she was "into" Neo-Platonism, moderate Protestantism, and mystical Christianity at various times, not as a dilettante but as a genuine eclectic whose dissatisfaction stemmed from the failure of any system to pursue its logic to a finality. The *Mouvement de la libération de la femme* would have certainly found in her a champion of

its causes (*mutatis mutandis*), and it is perhaps as an activist that we should think of her today, though certainly not as a radical.

Her surviving literary *corpus* comprises a deal of poetry, some *comédies* (neither verse nor plays are read now by other than curiosity seekers), and a collection of seventy-two tales (presumably the original plan, cut short by death, called for one hundred) entitled the *Heptameron*. This is the work most closely linked with Marguerite's name—though it is probably not the monument she would have desired—and is available to the modern reader in no fewer than four editions currently in print, including a new critical edition (1967) and a Slatkine reprint (1969) of a late nineteenth-century edition.

The bawdiness and scatology of these tales, which are closely reminiscent of Boccaccio and *les Cent Nouvelles Nouvelles*, surprise the reader who does not quite expect a pious queen to compose stories of this sort. What differentiates them from their models is the seriousness of the discussion which follows each. The ten participants are no mere Florentine fashion-plates but people of a more serious turn of mind who use the (often) vulgar tales of the popular tradition as the basis of an enquiry into morals, taste, and human nature.

Professor Tetel's goal has wisely not been that of "placing Marguerite de Navarre among the foremost prose writers of French literature" since "such a classification would be both erroneous and pointless" (p. 205). His task, more limited and more valuable, has been to understand the functioning of the text on the levels indicated by the three parts of his title. He concludes judiciously that the work, alternatively scabrous and *moraliste*, is emblematic of the fundamental dichotomy Marguerite observed and keenly felt between the aspiration for the ideal and the base nature of much of human life. That the *Heptameron* presents no solution to the problem is a sign that Marguerite herself could find none, not even in faith; indeed there may be some evidence that as the work progressed she grew more despondent over the impossibility of discovering a way out. The text seems to point finally to the view that the individual is responsible for finding his own road to salvation.

I shall not bother to indicate the few misprints or what I take to be trivial errors in interpretation (except to say that the burning candle in Tale 63 seems to me to be inescapably phallic). One could have wished that the bibliography showed signs of a wider range of readings in linguistics, thematics, and structuralism, but then I am perhaps assuming more than Professor Tetel wished to accomplish.

JOHN McCLELLAND, *University of Toronto*

Victor E. Graham and W. McAllister Johnson. *Estienne Jodelle. LE RECUEIL DES INSCRIPTIONS. A literary and iconographical exegesis.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. Pp. vii, 215. $16.50.

Scholars of Renaissance poetry have long recognized the fundamental but complex relationships which exist between the visual arts and the perceptions of reality characteristic of the poetry of the period. Panofsky's admirable studies have helped the intrigued and often baffled reader to understand the curious angle of vision of the Renaissance poet. There has not been, however, enough of the interdisciplinary collaboration illustrated by this handsome volume. Professors Graham and Johnson are to be congratulated.

Le Recueil des inscriptions is an account of an entertainment commissioned by the city of Paris to honour the king and celebrate the recapture by the French of Calais on January 8, 1558. It is also a description of the trials and frustrations of the author and stage manager, Estienne Jodelle. We are provided with the most minute details concerning the decorations of the entrance, staircase and hall, the mythological allusions and emblems, as well as the Latin inscriptions. Finally, the intended staging and costumes are described, and we witness with both sympathy and amusement the helpless outrage of the creator in the face of unco-operative co-workers and limitations of time. The text is, in effect, an apology for a work which had become an embarrassment for Jodelle. Not only had he been obliged to cut corners in the production but on the night of the performance things had gone wrong. It was, therefore, important to describe what he had intended and to demonstrate the artistic unity of a "divertissement" which Jodelle, and possibly more important, his critics judged to have been less than successful.

The published account of the performance, which took place at the Hôtel de Ville on Thursday, February 17, 1558, was accompanied by a collection of Latin *Icones,* short inscriptions in praise of Henry II, the royal family, and other notables of France and Europe, including Mary and Philip, enemies of France in the recent military engagement. Finally, there appeared in this part of the work an introductory Latin elegy addressed to Madame Marguerite, a concluding elegy to Claude de Kerquefiren, also in Latin, and a poem in French, *A sa muse.*

The edition prepared by Professors Graham and Johnson is in three parts: an introduction which examines the unique significance of this unusual work, the Jodelle text with English translations of the inscriptions and of the *Icones,*[1] and finally an admirable collection of illustrative material—sketches, engravings, frontispieces and medals which support the arguments of the editors, illuminate Jodelle's text and help the reader to make the associations necessary to an understanding of a rather complex texture of emblems, symbols and literary and historical allusions.

In the Introduction the authors have addressed themselves to the problem of the relationship between the seemingly unrelated *Recueil* and the *Icones* and have concluded "that the book, as Jodelle published it, has an organic unity which stands up to the closest scrutiny and which reveals, the more one studies it, an increasingly complex texture of cross-references" (p.12). In fact, Professors Graham and Johnson make a good case for their claim that the book is "virtually unique in that it is an iconographical laboratory which instructs us, exemplar by exemplar, of the working procedures of one of the more important literary figures of the French Renaissance" (p.21).

Through supportive texts and through drawings and paintings of the period sources and points of reference are sought. The authors consider the question of inference, the problem of discretion in dealing with political issues, the infinite elaborations of a particular conceit—and their discussion is clearly and exhaustively explicated. The Jodelle text is also carefully annotated and each inscription in the *Recueil* is followed by the most complete identification notes and suggested bibliography. In the case of the *Icones* I should have liked to see a typescript for the notes which contrasted more sharply with the Latin text and English translation.

This criticism is, however, minor, for the edition is beautiful and is a mine of scholarly information. It is, above all, a book which clearly and frankly outlines its problem and the

[1]The translations have been done by Professor D.F.S. Thomson of the University of Toronto.

solutions proposed. The authors have characterized their methodology as "investigatory speculation" and they wisely assert: "It is the unexpected source which sheds most light upon familiar ground rather than the manipulation of extant texts so as to display neglected meanings" (pp. 40-41). This is the reward of interdisciplinary co-operation of which this work is so fine an example.

To conclude his work, Jodelle had addressed his muse in a mood of discouragement:

> Tu sçais que plus je suis prodigue de ton bien,
> Pour enrichir des grands l'ingrate renommée,
> Et plus je pers le tens, ton espoir et le mien.

Thanks to Professors Graham and Johnson, this curious homage to the great and noble has served not only to illuminate a literary moment but also to reveal a complex and sensitive artist. Jodelle's time was not wasted.

C. EDWARD RATHÉ, *York University*

Jehan Marot. *Le Voyage de Gênes.* Edited by Giovanna Trisolini. Geneva: Droz, 1974. Pp. 171.

Father of Clément and grandfather to the minor verse artisan, Marcel, Jehan Marot here receives a far more professional handling from his modern editor than he did from his son, who treated this work in a cavalier fashion. *Le Voyage de Gênes* is a restrained and mercifully only moderately patriotic verse chronicle of Louis XII's 1507 expedition. The author, neglecting the potential for instant self-assertion via the printing press, was content to offer the volume to his protectress, Anne de Bretagne. The manuscript presented is probably that extant as B.N. ms fr. 5091, used by the editor as the basis for the present text. Regrettably we are now given only 2 of the original 11 illustrations, once attributed to J. Perréal: the first shows the ceremonial offering of the volume to the queen, as usual surrounded by her ladies-in-waiting (though the text makes few concessions to feminism) and the second, inconveniently set in the modern version on page 96, depicts the royal entry delayed in print until page 107.

The *Voyage de Gênes* is one of a number of eulogistic chronicles spawned by the capture of Genoa. It is without many of the irritating tricks of style which one might be tempted to identify as *rhétoriqueur* had not Jodogne raised such pertinent questions over the aptness of a term that the editor uses here with circumspection. We are fortunate to have in such a convenient format a well-edited version of Jehan Marot's contribution, though it is arguable whether the claims for artistic merit need have been proposed with an appearance of finality, lapses in taste being ascribed to the "*legs du passé.*" The chief literary interest would seem to be in the judicious mythological cadre, the effective pruning of detail and the mosaic of sharply differentiated metrical forms. Investigation into these forms and the distribution of metrical features has been made with evident care and will be of special concern to students of transitional verse phenomena. It might have also been useful to compare the *variatio metrica* in this context with the precepts of Andrelinus, Balbus and Vitellius. But the absence of perspective here and the avoidance of current questions on the typographical representation

of rondeaux should not detract from the unusually thorough analysis of the text itself, which apparently includes tabulation of all major metrical points except the distribution of hiatus in general. The remainder of the critical apparatus is also characterized by patient in-depth examination into the genesis and history of the text, marred only by occasional over-repetition of unenlightening asides in the introduction—*"c'est qu'il appartient tout entier à son temps," "en tant qu'homme de son temps."* For the student, the description of language will prove a neat introduction, although the claim that *"l'analyse morphologique et syntaxique appliquée au Voyage de Gênes ne décèle aucun trait qui en différencie la langue de celle des autres écrivains de l'époque"* and the subsequent remark that the use of mood and tense *"correspond exactement à celle des écrivains de son temps"* make one wonder at whom the exposition and glossary are aimed at this point.

Several minor modifications are required. Authors are referred to with or without initials or surnames in the footnotes and bibliography—Murarasu, Moreri, Maugain, Curtius are shorn. Goujet wrongly appears as "Goujet, Abbé C. P.," while other names are arbitrarily given in full, e.g., "Ehrlich, Arwed"—sometimes, one suspects, because of type-setting exigencies. Apart from the coexistence of Jehan, Jean, Genes and Gênes, the representation of titles in the main body of the text is careful, which can not be said of other spelling: *"prééminance"* (p. 27) and *"inombrables"* (p. 77) are untypical of Droz. Students consulting the glossary for some of the entries listed would also need information on the changes in meaning of *soudars* and *fier* and explanation of *faire beau beau* (345), *cient* (873), *dourras* (1000). "*Accessoire*" (639) is given as "*danger*" where "*malheur*" is presumably also implied.

One of the most helpful sections is the bibliography, and to this Keuter on Clément Marot's versification and Poirion on patronage might be usefully added. Publishers and recent reprints are not always given and emendations are needed for the entries under Brunet's *Manuel du libraire et du bibliophile* (*sic*) and Chamard's work on the origins of Renaissance poetry, dated at 1920 for 1932. M. White's article is misquoted and the Slatkine reprint of Thurot given as 1969, 3 vol. Confusion is compounded at page 149 of the Notes, where the comte de Ravestein (*sic*) appears to have been joined with a deputy "Philippe de Clèves Roquebertin." Apparently verification of the dating for the arrival of Alessandria (? 24th April) and the beheading of Paolo da Novi (? 5th June) is needed, since other sources give the 22nd and the 16th, respectively.

J. HARE, *Memorial University*

Malcolm Smith. *Joachim du Bellay's Veiled Victim with an edition of the Xenia, seu illustrium quorundam nominum allusiones.* Genève: Librairie Droz, 1974, Pp. x, 124.

In the concise foreword to this study of Du Bellay and the Cardinal of Lorraine, Charles de Guise, Professor Smith reminds us that the satirical sonnets in *Les Regrets* describe the character or actions of particular individuals, but without naming them. The identity of the victims (often occupying the highest positions in church and state), is sometimes covered with a thin veil, easily pierced, but in other cases, the veil is "more tantalisingly opaque" (p. viii). The study is, in part, an attempt to explain some of the veiled references to people and events which abound in *Les Regrets.* As regards the Cardinal of Lorraine, the specific concerns

of the study are summarized as follows:

> (1) to show why Du Bellay concealed the identity of the victims of most of his satirical sonnets; (2) to identify the very eminent Frenchman against whom sonnet 63 is directed; (3) to offer evidence that several other sonnets concern the same man; to show (4) how, after his return from Rome, Du Bellay's need for patronage dictated a radical change in his attitude towards this man and (5) how this change was probably also influenced by the religious climate; (6) to show how Du Bellay's views on this man are complemented by those of Ronsard and (7) to stress the historical interest of poets' verdicts on great men of their day (p. viii).

The chief aim of the study, however, "is to stress the importance of the topical material in Du Bellay's masterpiece and to indicate ways in which that material can, even at a great distance in time, be discerned" (p. viii). The study thus illustrates a method of identifying and explaining the topical content of Renaissance poetry. The main features of the method have a familiar ring: the critic must assess texts in the light of the contemporary social, political and religious climate; draw on the poet's biography where relevant; examine the poet's own statements as to why he wrote; take into account the conventions of the genre in which he was writing; and especially, the critic must use a knowledge of the poet's mind based on close study of his whole *oeuvre* (p. ix). The reader is forewarned that such a method is very difficult to apply to literary texts, but the author rightly maintains that the results obtained by such a study, properly conducted, are well worth the risk, for this historical approach deals with material which often contains "a key to the understanding of Renaissance texts" (p. ix).

Proof of Professor Smith's success in applying his method lies in the fact that considerable new light is shed on *Les Regrets,* and that the most difficult problems facing the reader of Du Bellay's famous sonnet sequence are solved for sonnet 63 and partially solved for about a dozen others: What do the obscure allusions mean? Is the poem about a type or a specific individual? If the latter, who was he? Should the sonnet be read ironically? In fact, nothing less than the very meaning of the sonnets is at stake. In sonnets 42 and 48, for example, when Du Bellay complains he has no freedom to express himself, we now know that such a statement must be taken with a grain of salt in view of Professor Smith's reading of sonnet 63, which shows he had a good measure of the freedom he supposedly lacked.

Beyond the sharpened readings of specific sonnets, a number of well-known general truths, always worth repeating, emerge from the study. For instance, poetry of this nature may be topical, but in the eyes of the Pléiade poets, at least, it had an eternal function to perform as well. Poetry played a political rôle of great importance but was written for posterity as well as for a contemporary audience. The ultimate purpose of such poetry, however tied to the times, was to "illustrate universal truths and values" (p. 69).

By reading the sonnets in their historical setting, patiently reconstructed, Professor Smith's traditional method illuminates the substance of the poems, as no newfangled method could. This is a model study of text in context, and the author has made a valuable contribution to the study of Renaissance poetry in general by reaffirming the value of a purely historical approach to the texts, and to the fuller understanding of Du Bellay's *Regrets* in particular by bringing to light the relations between Du Bellay and the Cardinal of Lorraine. The study embodies the historical method as applied to topical Renaissance

poetry, and illustrates what that method, rigorously applied, can do. Demonstrating impeccable scholarship throughout the work, Professor Smith has shown the serious reader of Du Bellay a way of studying *Les Regrets* and other Renaissance texts. More fashionable critical approaches ignore this method at their peril.

The study is usefully supplemented for scholars by the inclusion of Du Bellay's *Poematum libri quatuor,* the *Tumulus Henrici secundi* (relatively inaccessible Latin poems, provided with English translations), the *Xenia, seu illustrium quorundam nominum allusiones,* and finally, an important autobiographical elegy, all of which considerably enhance the value of this addition to the series of "Etudes de philologie et d'histoire" published by the Librairie Droz.

LANE M. HELLER, *The University of Western Ontario*

Isaac Casaubon. *De satyrica Graecorum poesi et Romanorum satira.* Ed. Peter E. Medine. 1605; facsimile rpt. Delmar, N.Y.: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1973. Pp. xvii, 356. $20.

In the absence of any modern edition or English translation of Casaubon's treatise on satire and the satyr-play, a facsimile reproduction serves primarily to increase accessibility, as Peter E. Medine has clearly been aware in preparing this volume, which contains a highly readable text, handsomely reproduced, and a brief businesslike introduction. Medine provides a sketch of Casaubon's life, understandably indebted to Mark Pattison's authoritative biography, as well as a cursory account of the controversy over the origin of satire to which this essay, conclusively identifying satire as a native Roman genre, constitutes the definitive contribution. Apart from a rather capricious outline, no substitute for Casaubon's comprehensive chapter headings, there is little concerning the work itself. For the most part, the reader is left on his own with the text, and while this satisfies the main object of getting it into his hands, he might be forgiven for wondering whether the editor believes that the essay deserves a wider readership for any but historical reasons.

Despite its substantial influence, direct and indirect, upon literary theory, as manifested most notably in Dryden's *Discourse* on satire, when the work is judged, as it must be, from the vantage point of modern scholarship, its importance is indeed strictly historical. Many of its arguments have long since been taken for granted (a measure of its impact), others superseded. Yet in practice an active historical sense need not be sustained as a reminder that the essay is still worth reading, and herein lies the reason why its reissue is to be welcomed warmly rather than dutifully.

Casaubon's treatise shows us a mind of extraordinary capacity and sensitivity presiding over its subject with unobtrusive mastery. Not only does he have the full range of classical literature and scholarship at his fingertips, as the resourcefulness and aptness of his citations demonstrate, but he organizes his unwieldy material with such skill that his thoughts seem to unfold spontaneously. And because the argument is so carefully controlled, he can digress to emend an obscure text, for example—without distorting the shape of the whole. The general harmony of form and content is typified by the dichotomous structure: the case for the independence of satyr-drama and satire is fundamentally reinforced by treating each

in a separate book. But there are formal effects with less obvious influence on the presentation: thus Aristotle's *Poetics* figures in both the opening and concluding chapters.

The keen aesthetic sense which this subtle management of structure reveals expresses itself in other ways. Despite the heavily antiquarian emphasis, one occasionally meets with genuine critical insights, such as the observation concerning Euripides' *Cyclops* that the intermediate *ethos* of the satyrs (between Odysseus and Polyphemus) is reflected in the action, since they are set free, but "aliena virtute" and "casu fortuito" (p. 216). Also remarkable is Casaubon's power of description. The first chapter's account of the origin of satyr-drama, for example, contains some singularly vivid passages, and when he subsequently analyzes a classical engraving of a Bacchic scene in relation to written authorities—an unconventional and imaginative undertaking—he proves adept at depicting intricate detail with absolute clarity.

A strong case might be made, I think, allowing for the peculiarities of Renaissance Latin, in support of Scaliger's opinion (as reported by Pattison) that Casaubon's style is excellent. Within the limits set by its purpose, it is energetic and various, frequently elegant, and always fluent. His command of idiom is impressive, and he is capable of using figures of speech sensitively to influence tone, as when he dismisses Isidorus' misunderstanding of satire with good-humoured tolerance: "sed e faece haurit bonus Isidorus, ut saepe" (p. 279).

The almost personal relation with Isidorus palpable here implies not only intimacy, but involvement, and there are more direct expressions of the personal elsewhere: religious references, evincing a strong but not overbearing piety; occasional flashes of humour, apparently for its own sake; and, particularly, passionate though judicious indignation against fellow scholars, usually those who have espoused the derivation of satire from the satyr-play. When such outbursts employ, as they sometimes do, irony and other rhetorical devices, they acquire a satirical quality, and this suggests another dimension to Casaubon's involvement in his material.

It is hard to resist the impression that his scholarly interest in satire has its roots in temperament. Certainly it extends beyond this essay, which indeed was written to accompany his edition of Persius. Casaubon planned an edition of Juvenal; he also edited Theophrastus' *Characters* and Suetonius' *Lives,* works which, while hardly satire, do deal in manners and morals, the stuff of satire. This proves nothing, of course: all sorts of authors received his scholarly attention. Towards the end of his life, however, Casaubon became, briefly, a religious pamphleteer, and while the role was not of his own choosing, one suspects that it may have suited him better than he would have cared to admit. He would probably have been similarly displeased to think that, for all the soundness and originality of his scholarship in his own day, his special affinity with his subject would play the greatest part in keeping his essay on satire alive for future readers. But perhaps not.

RICHARD W. HILLMAN, *University of Toronto*

Harry Loewen. *Luther and the Radicals.* Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Publications, 1974. Pp. 208. $3.50 (paper). $5.95 (cloth).

In his conclusion Professor Loewen of Wilfred Laurier University gives a succinct statement of the purpose of his book: "to see the struggle between Luther and the dissidents in its historical and theological perspectives and to remind scholars of Anabaptism that in their zeal to correct the image of the radical reformers they sometimes become one-sided and less than charitable toward the mainline reformers who in good faith could not tolerate what they considered alien views." Loewen distinguishes five groups of radicals whom Luther confronted: (1) the "Wittenberg radicals" (Zwickau Prophets and Carlstadt), (2) the "revolutionary radicals" (Müntzer and the rebellious peasants), (3) the "Evangelical Anabaptists," (4) the "revolutionary Anabaptists" (Münsterites), and (5) Spiritualists (Denck and Schwenckfeld), Antinomians (Agricola) and Antitrinitarians (Campanus). The book contains a scene-setting introduction, six substantive chapters on Luther's confrontation with each of the five groups and on the various attitudes to religious liberty, and a short concluding chapter.

As Professor Walter Klaassen noted in a Foreword to the book, this topic has been repeatedly viewed from various perspectives before. The purpose of the book seems to be the irenic one of understanding the controversy from both sides, which Professor Loewen as a Mennonite teaching at a university with a Lutheran tradition would seem well situated to do. That purpose is reflected in the continual softening of the harsh judgments of previous historians, and in conciliatory conclusions like the following: "Had both sides been patient with each other they would have been able to see that the Lutheran and Anabaptist positions were not mutually exclusive" (p. 93). The best parts of Loewen's book are his expositions of Luther's theological grounds for seeing in both sacramentarianism and Anabaptism an attack on the tangible, sacramental action of the Word, and in Anabaptism a reintroduction of moralism that violated his fundamental doctrine of *sola fide.* One could argue from Loewen's own evidence that his irenic conclusions are better ecumenical churchmanship than history.

Loewen recognizes that, although Luther had explicable theological reasons for regarding the radicals as cut from one cloth, each of the various groups had its own identity (as well as some noteworthy connections with each other). To succeed in his commendable ambition to differentiate among the radical groups the author would have needed to acquaint himself more thoroughly with the ample published sources and interpretations of the Radical Reformation than he has in fact done. The critical edition of Luther's works is used continually, but the *Täuferakten* only in the case of Hans Denck. The discussion of the radicals is good in the treatment of the Spiritualists or of Grebel's letter to Müntzer, where it has a sound foundation in the sources. However, in dealing with Müntzer and the Münsterites Loewen betrays both a lack of sympathy and a deficiency of research. In the treatment of Müntzer the standard critical edition of the works was not used, although it has been available since 1968, and the exposition brings together opposed interpretations (such as those of Gritsch and Goertz) in a misleading eclecticism. The Münster narrative contains a very significant factual error (that 1400 people submitted to adult baptism in 1533, when actually the adult baptisms began only in 1534) and is based on no apparent source research and on the secondary work of John Horsch, rather than more substantial interpretations such as those of Krahn, Blanke, Mellink or Kirchhoff. Revolutionary Anabaptists, although not in the majority, canno be dismissed as "a little group of fanatics" (p. 142). If Professor Loewen had been aware of Frank Wray's work showing the dependence of Markpeck's *Vermanung* on Rothmann's *Bekennisse,* he would certainly have hesitated to conclude that "the only thing that the Münsterites

and the evangelical Anabaptists had in common was the outward form of baptism" (p. 103).

In its haste to make a dubious peace between Luther and the "Evangelical Anabaptists" Professor Loewen's book betrays inadequate historical empathy for and historical research on Müntzer and the revolutionary Anabaptists.

JAMES M. STAYER, *Zurich, Switzerland*

Joachim Staedtke, ed. *Bullinger's Werke, Band 1.* Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972. Pp. xxiv, 322.

It is of enormous benefit to the scholarly world to have available a volume enumerating and describing briefly the printed works of Heinrich Bullinger. A second volume, published a year after the first, includes Bullinger's most important correspondence between the years 1524-1531. The original theological and his historiographical works are to comprise parts three and four of this gigantic enterprise.

The importance of Bullinger's influence on the Reformation, both on a theoretical and practical level, is reasonably well-known to a limited scholarly audience, particularly in Switzerland. But outside Switzerland his role in the Reformation has been unheralded—largely, I suppose, because of the sheer religious power of Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin and Zwingli. Bullinger was Zwingli's successor in Zürich at the Grossmünster. A less political man than Zwingli, he nonetheless was responsible for the consolidation and spread of the Evangelical reform. He took part in the Bern disputation with Zwingli in 1528—a disputation that formally introduced Reformation principles in Bern. He was responsible for the understanding with Calvin that produced the Zürich consensus. And he was instrumental in forming in 1566 the Second Helvetic Confession which ultimately became the most widely held Reformed confession of faith.

Bullinger's correspondence (including answers) is more extensive than that of Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin combined. The 12,000 or more total indicates, of course, that letter writing was a large-scale activity as well as an art. Therefore the letter was the vehicle not only of random sentiments or haphazard information but of theoretical and historical issues that in a later day would, I suppose, be expressed in monographs, journals and texts. Thus the correspondence not only discusses the meaning of faith, justification, baptism, patristic and biblical terms, eucharist, preaching, free-will, images, and vows and provides some exegesis, etc. (which might be described as theology *in fieri*), but also concerns the actual practice of religion, the experience at the source of religion. In the letters one can perceive the development of reform theology, particularly in its emphasis on *sola Scriptura.* The reader will note an unction present not only because of personal convictions of the writers but also because the historical-critical method was still several hundred years away.

It is very helpful for the reader to have extensive footnotes describing the recipients and writers of the correspondence. These figures are pastors, theologians, learned people as well as rather ordinary types. Thus one comes to an intimate knowledge of the culture of sixteenth-century Switzerland. It is not without significance that among Bullinger's longest and most serious letters are those written to Anna Adlischwyler. One even wonders if these letters do not deserve separate treatment at some later date. It is in these letters that Bullinger's persua-

sive powers, buttressed by scriptural and theological arguments, appear at their best. This is particularly true of the 26th letter, in which Bullinger attempts to overcome the opposition of Anna's mother to their marriage.

More than anything else, one acquires from these Swiss dialect, German and Latin letters a sense and taste for the reform movement and an acquaintance with its principal figures. The first two volumes are excellently done in every respect. Hopefully, a much more accurate portrait of Bullinger will result. The editor and his assistants deserve congratulations for putting their work before the scholarly world. This is *wissenschaftliche Forschung* at its very best.

P. JOSEPH CAHILL, *University of Alberta*

James M. Stayer. *Anabaptists and the Sword.* Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press, 1972. Pp. ix, 375. $10.00

This book is already one of the standard works on Anabaptism. While it deals with one subject, it is the most comprehensive book on Anabaptism with the exception of George Williams' *Radical Reformation.*

Stayer sets out to portray the view of the sword and its functions as held by the various Anabaptist groups, the Swiss, the Upper German sects, and the Melchiorites. The work is introduced by a chapter on the early Protestant context of the teaching on the sword. He gives special attention to Luther, Zwingli, and Müntzer.

Stayer has deliberately left behind some main assumptions of traditional Mennonite and non-Mennonite scholarship. He takes a new look at the old sources and clearly shows that Swiss Anabaptism before Schleitheim was not consistently nonresistant. Although some of his evidence, like Blaurock's usurpation of the pulpit at Zollikon and Hinwil, comes close to nit-picking, his case can be regarded as established. Similar conclusions are reached regarding South German and Dutch Anabaptism. His findings parallel the reviewer's own discovery that Anabaptism in Tyrol in 1526-27 was also ambivalent on the issue.

Stayer comes down hard on much Mennonite scholarship as being determined by the arbitrary category of "evangelical Anabaptism" and his censure is justified. However, he is then himself an example of special pleading when in the case of the Swiss Brethren he asserts without firm evidence that ambivalence on the question of the sword was the majority position. Similarly, evidence he himself adduces should have made him more cautious in asserting that violence was adopted by the "clear majority" of the Melchiorites. He is determined to prove Mennonite historiography wrong—hardly an unbiased position.

However, the author also demonstrates that among the Swiss, as among the majority of the South German Anabaptists, the nonresistant position ultimately became normative. Similarly, although over a longer period of time, the Melchiorites, turned Mennonite, for the most part adopted the Schleitheim position.

The main harvest of this book is its demonstration that Anabaptism was much more acquainted with violence than had been thought, especially by Mennonites. Still, Stayer asserts that it was not, as G. R. Elton said, "a violent phenomenon." "The balance in early Anabaptism is on the side of the peaceful," writes Stayer, "not the revolutionary." Never-

theless, "the mistake of those who say that all 'true' Anabaptists are nonresistant is that they miss the movement's inherent illegitimacy and radicalism, which is in some cases compatible with violence."

Although it is indisputably a useful term, this reviewer is not convinced of Stayer's use of the term "apolitical." For while most Anabaptists refused to participate in government one may ask whether participating is the only way to be engaged in the polis. Most Anabaptists accepted the legitimacy of government and its authority over them. Their refusal to swear oaths and to participate in military service were clearly political acts which bore political consequences. It is entirely legitimate to speak of an Anabaptist political ethic as Hillerbrand does. If one can speak of *Realpolitik* one could perhaps also speak of *Idealpolitik* and use that term to describe the Anabaptist political ethic.

Stayer convincingly shows that there were major differences among Anabaptist views of the sword, all the way from Hubmaier's *Realpolitik* through the apoliticism of the Swiss after Schleitheim to the revolutionary view of the Melchiorites, and further subdivisions among the main groups. To speak of the Anabaptist view of the sword is therefore to be imprecise. Such a statement needs to be qualified by time, place, theology, and the inner dynamics of the several movements.

The book is clearly and concisely written, a delight to read. It is comprehensive, extremely well documented and reliable. It contains an excellent bibliography and index.

WALTER KLAASSEN, *University of Waterloo*

Alodia Kawecka-Gryczowa. *Les Imprimeurs des antitrinitaires polonais Rodecki et Sternacki: histoire et bibliographie.* Genève: Droz, 1974. Pp. 371, 34 plates. Or *Ariańskie oficyny wydawnicze Rodeckiego i Sternackiego: dzieje i bibliografia.* Wroclaw, etc.: Ossolińskich, 1974.

In form this is a rather strange book. The first major section is a history written in Polish of Rodecki and Sternacki, the official printers of the Minor Reformed Church (Socinians) in Poland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The second section is another history of the same printers written in French.

What is odd is that the Polish and French versions are not the same. Even though I know no Polish, this soon became obvious when I compared names, dates, and footnotes in the two versions. Professor Andrew Pernal of Brandon University, who is fluent in Polish, confirmed that Kawecka-Gryczowa has written two parallel histories of the Socinian printers. Sometimes the French section is more detailed and sometimes the Polish; only occasionally do paragraphs simply repeat what was said in the other language. My comments on the history will be limited to the French version.

The history treats the Socinian press from its inception in 1574 in Krakow with Rodecki as the proprietor, through its moving to Rakow around 1600 when it was taken over by Rodecki's son-in-law Sternacki, to its suppression in 1638. As the fortune of the Socinians ebbed and flowed with the political tide, so too did the fortune of the press. Rodecki was imprisoned twice and in many years the climate of repression was so severe that the output of the press was greatly reduced. Kawecka-Gryczowa's study, which is carefully documented

from original and the best secondary sources, is an important addition to our knowledge about the political and religious climate of Poland in the time of the Reformation.

Much information from studies in Polish is made available to a wider public in this book. For example, I learned that from around 1600 there was a tendency for the Socinians, the Calvinists, and the Greek Orthodox to band together in common defense against Catholic attacks. Furthermore, I had not been aware that the Socinians, who are noted for their liberalism and tolerance, imposed a very strict censorship upon their printers.

The third section of the book is a bibliography, based on painstaking research in the libraries of Eastern and Western Europe and North America, of all the known items printed by Rodecki and Sternacki. Each item is described fully with a complete transcription of the title page. Anonymous and undated works have generally been identified. The current location of extant copies is also noted and there are even indices of former owners of the individual items and of annotations made in them to the end of the eighteenth century. These last features give very concrete evidence of the extent and rapidity of the dissemination of Socinian literature throughout Europe.

Later translations and editions are also noted. Furthermore, books printed clandestinely outside Poland that were falsely attributed to Rodecki and Sternacki are included along with their proper identification insofar as known. The bibliographical section alone of Kawecka-Gryczowa's study is of tremendous importance. It enables the scholar to find out quickly just what the early Socinians published and to locate the material for further study. This will be an essential tool for anyone working in this field.

The *Racovian Catechism* is generally acknowledged to be the single most important Socinian book as it put the essentials of the faith together in compact form and had the widest circulation of any Socinian publication. Kawecka-Gryczowa notes two editions of the *Racovian Catechism* (90a, 90b) not recorded in earlier standard studies. Both of these were London reprints of the 1609 Racovian edition and appeared around 1614 and 1623. This is extremely important as the earliest London edition had been thought to be that of 1651. It seems clear, then, that the impact of Socinianism in England in the early part of the seventeenth century must be rethought.

The fourth section of this book consists of 34 plates of scenes of modern Rakow, Socinus's tomb, typographical figures, and above all many sample pages of Rodecki's and Sternacki's work. Plates 22 and 23 are of the title pages of the "new" London editions of the *Racovian Catechism* (90a, 90b). The plates are all clearly reproduced on coated paper. Indeed, the entire book is very well printed and pleasant to the eye.

All in all, this is quite a good book, which I expect will become a standard reference volume for anyone doing Socinian studies. It is further evidence of the high quality of scholarly work done in Poland on the Reformation. In fact, I think I might have to learn Polish.

R. E. FLORIDA, *Brandon University*

Johannes Trithemius. *In Praise of Scribes (De Laude Scriptorum)*, ed. Klaus Arnold. Lawrence Kansas: Coronado Press, 1974. Pp. ix, 111. $6.50.

Johannes Trithemius, who derived his name from the little town of Trittenheim on the Mosell river, is probably best remembered for his interest in witchcraft and the occult which connect-

ed him with the Faust legend. Moreover, he has been the object of scholarly interest because of his historical falsifications, which, unfortunately, distract from the fact that his contributions as a historiographer have really been quite significant. Also noteworthy among his more than eighty books are his literary biographies and his treatise on cryptography, which he presented to Emperor Maximilian I in person. *In Praise of Scribes* is neither very original nor in any way controversial. At first glance, its subject matter may seem rather absurd: an exhortation to and some advice about the copying of books at a time when the art of printing was rapidly growing out of its infancy; in addition, it came from a man who had active relationships with the printers at nearby Mainz, where most of his books were printed. Nevertheless, this treatise will serve well to complement our picture of the religious leader and scholar Trithemius, who was held in high esteem by such illustrious contemporaries as Celtis, Reuchlin and Paracelsus.

Klaus Arnold, who prepared this edition of *In Praise of Scribes,* has already some publications on the life and work of Trithemius to his credit. In a twenty-five-page introduction he gives a brief biographical sketch and also deals with such questions as the origin, sources and transmission of the text. There are also five plates, including an autograph of Trithemius. The Latin text, *De Laude Scriptorum,* is based on the first printed edition of 1494 and presented with a side-by-side English translation prepared by Roland Behrendt, O.S.B. A critical apparatus underneath the Latin text lists variants and sources, and a rather useful index of quotations,as well as a general index, completes the little volume. It is regrettable that there is no bibliography and no references to other studies on Trithemius and relevant subjects except for a reference to Arnold's own publications.

The factual and rather bland introduction only hints at what must have been a very interesting life at a time when western civilization was at a turning point. The decisive moment in Trithemius' life came when on his way home from Heidelberg he sought shelter from a winter storm in the Benedictine monastery at Sponheim; he stayed on and emerged as its abbot less than two years later, not yet twenty-three years old. After such a promising beginning he never climbed any higher in the ecclesiastical hierarchy and devoted the rest of his life to the goals of monastic reform, the promotion of learning and the collection of books.

All three of these concerns are reflected in the treatise *In Praise of Scribes.* In the sixteen brief chapters various aspects of scribal practices are discussed in some detail. But his interest is not limited to Scripture and the writings of the holy fathers: "By no means do we wish to exclude books on secular sciences" (73). There is an attempt by Trithemius to justify the efforts and expenditures of his constant search for books which eventually increased the holdings of Sponheim monastery from 48 to nearly 2000 volumes and made it a centre of learning. Finally, he raises the obvious question as to why books should be copied at all when printing can do the job so much more efficiently. His repeated argument here is that the printed book is made of paper and "will quickly disappear. But the scribe working with parchment ensures lasting remembrance for himself and for his text" (35). Such an argument becomes more convincing when we consider that his library contained codices which even then were more than 600 years old.

It seems, however, that not all the monks shared his "enthusiasm for books," and they appear to have needed a great deal of persuasion: "Let no one dare to shun copying if he wants to escape the punishment of idlers" (71). Trithemius repeatedly refers to the Rule of St. Benedict, "which so stresses labor that lazy monks are not recognized as monks at all," and quotes from Scripture that "the man who will not work shall not eat" (83). Thus it becomes quite clear that the copying of books which seemed so desirable to the humanist and scholar also tied in

with the goals of the reform-minded abbot to improve morale in the monasteries: "And so, being too indolent to pray, not well enough trained for contemplation, and exposed to the risk of being distracted by idle desires, we can best compensate for all these deficiencies by zealously copying books which will serve the edification of many" (55). But opposition to Trithemius finally became so strong that in 1506 he left Sponheim and spent the rest of his life as Abbot of St. James, a small monastery outside Würzburg.

It probably can be said that Trithemius was more of a conserver than an innovator. He died shortly before the era of change and turmoil during which the printing press became such an effective medium for so many new voices and messages. Yet his *In Praise of Scribes* will still strike a responsive chord with many who share his love of learning and believe with him that "No book is so poor that some profit cannot be derived from it" (95).

H. K. KRAUSSE, *Queen's University*

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AUTHORS

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