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REPORT ON THE
Organization of the Land Forces
of the United States



WASHINGTON
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1912

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, August 10, 1912.

The accompanying report of the General Staff on "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States," contains the broad outlines of a comprehensive military policy. The General Staff has been directed to proceed with a detailed study of the plan with the view of securing specific recommendations for the Executive and legislative action necessary to carry the policy into effect. During the progress of this work comments and suggestions with the view of perfecting the policy are invited, and for this purpose the report is published for the consideration of the Army, the National Guard, and all others who are interested in the development of a sound military policy for the Nation.

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

I.

GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LAND AND NAVAL FORCES.

A general consideration of our responsibilities and our geographical position indicates that the maintenance of our policies and interests at home and abroad demand an adequate fleet and a well-organized and sufficient army. The function of the Navy is to secure and maintain the command of the sea. To accomplish this it must be free to seek and defeat the enemy. The use of any part of the fleet for local defense therefore defeats the chief object of naval power. The principal rôle of the Navy is offensive and the requirements of local defense must be met by other means. A fleet unsupported by an army is unable to secure the fruits of naval victory; a fleet defeated at sea is powerless to prevent invasion. The solution of the problem of national defense lies, therefore, in the provision of suitable land and sea forces and a due recognition of their coordinate relations.

II.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LAND FORCES AT HOME AND ABROAD.

Any plan for the organization of the land forces of the United States should be based upon a recognition of the fact that these forces are and must be divided into two distinct parts:

1. The Army on service beyond the territorial limits of the United States.
2. The Army within the territorial limits of the United States.

The Army on detached service beyond the territorial limits of the United States consists of the detachments required to meet the special military problems of the Philippines, Panama, Oahu, Alaska, Guantanamo, and Porto Rico. Each of these detachments has a distinct tactical and strategic mission and is to operate within a restricted terrain. All of them depend upon over-seas communication with the home country, and all of them may therefore be isolated for considerable periods, especially in the critical first stages of war. It is obvious that under these circumstances these detachments should be prepared to meet all military emergencies until reinforcements from the United States can reasonably be expected. They must, therefore, be organized with the view to being self-supporting until the Navy has accomplished its primary mission of securing the command of the sea.

The Army within the territorial limits of the United States is on an entirely different basis. It may or may not be given an adequate strength in time of peace, but it is supported by all of the resources of the Nation. It may be increased at the pleasure of Congress, and it may be reenforced by considerable forces of citizen soldiery. It follows from these considerations that the military establishment of the United States in time of peace should first provide effective and sufficient garrisons for the political and strategic outposts of the United States and that the residue at home should be organized with the

view to ultimate expansion into such war forces as national interests may require. The essential difference between the forces at home and the forces abroad is thus seen to be that they have different capacities with reference to expansion at the outbreak of war. The Army at home is expandible to the highest degree, while the detachments abroad are not expandible at all in the brief but critical period that marks the first stage of modern war.

1. THE DETACHMENTS ON FOREIGN SERVICE.

The minimum garrisons required for the maintenance of national interests beyond the limits of the United States are as follows:

The Philippines.—4 regiments of Infantry at maximum statutory strength (150 men per company), 2 regiments of Cavalry at maximum statutory strength (100 men per troop), 2 battalions of Field and Mountain Artillery (6 batteries), 2 companies of Engineers, 2 companies of Signal troops (one of these a field company), 24 companies of Coast Artillery, 52 companies of Philippine Scouts, 1 ambulance company, 1 field hospital, with detachments pertaining to the Ordnance Department and enlisted men of the Hospital Corps on duty with organizations.

It is the duty of this force to support the authority of the United States throughout the archipelago, and in war it must be prepared to hold the defenses of Manila Bay at all costs until our fleet is free to operate in eastern waters. The garrison of mobile troops proposed for the Philippines comprises substantially the same enlisted strength as has been included in the garrison maintained there for the past few years. It is proposed to increase its economy and effectiveness by concentrating the bulk of this garrison in the vicinity of Manila. It is also proposed to maintain organizations permanently or for long periods in the Philippines, thus avoiding the waste of money and loss of efficiency due to frequent changes of station between the islands and the United States. Until recently entire organizations have been shifted; under the new policy the personnel will gradually be changed as enlistments expire or as the officers complete their allotted tours, but the organizations will remain where they can prepare and train for their peculiar functions in peace and war. The expense of this garrison has further been reduced by replacing 12 regiments of Infantry and Cavalry at reduced strength by 6 regiments of Infantry and Cavalry at the maximum strength authorized by law. This materially reduces the per capita cost of the Philippines garrison and permits the withdrawal of six regiments for use at home or in the other foreign garrisons.

Oahu.—The maintenance of this naval base is essential to the defense of our Pacific coast and to securing the full military value of the Panama Canal as a strategic highway between the two oceans. Pearl Harbor will be covered by seacoast fortifications, which are now nearing completion; but as the coast defenses of Pearl Harbor will be unable to prevent hostile landings on the 100 miles of coast which lie beyond the range of their guns, the security of the island and of the naval base ultimately depends upon maintaining a mobile force sufficient to defeat such hostile forces as may succeed in landing at any place on the island. Under conditions of modern warfare we can not count with certainty upon reenforcing the peace garrison of the island after a declaration of war or while war is imminent. The security of our naval base in the Pacific therefore demands that the garrison of Oahu must be able to hold out at all hazards until our fleet can arrive in Hawaiian waters. This may be taken as 40 days, assuming that the fleet is not employed on another mission and that the Panama Canal is open to its use.

The minimum peace garrison of Oahu is therefore placed as follows: 6 regiments of Infantry at maximum statutory strength (150 men per company),

1 regiment of Cavalry at maximum statutory strength (100 men per troop), 3 battalions of Field Artillery (9 batteries), 1 company of Engineers, 1 field company of Signal troops, 10 companies of Coast Artillery, 1 ambulance company, 1 field hospital.

Plans are being made for the expansion of the Hawaiian National Guard and the organization of volunteers from the American population. But the foundation of the defense must rest upon trained regulars who are familiar with the complicated terrain of the island. Our naval base in the Pacific will never be attacked except by troops of the highest skill and training and the attack will be made before extemporized troops can be prepared or hardened for full military effectiveness.

Panama.—Upon its completion, the Panama Canal will be our most important strategic position. By our control of this highway between the two oceans the effectiveness of our fleet and our general military power will be enormously increased. It is therefore obvious that the unquestioned security of the canal is our most important military problem. The permanent garrison must be strong enough to guard the locks and other important works and to prevent a naval attack which under modern conditions may even precede a declaration of war. We must therefore be able, even in peace, to man the seacoast guns that cover the approach to the canal, and we must have enough mobile troops to protect the rear of the forts and to defeat naval raids. A modern fleet can land a raiding party of several thousand bluejackets, and such a force landing out of range of the seacoast guns could penetrate to some vulnerable part of the canal within a few hours. The permanent garrison must therefore include a mobile force strong enough to anticipate and defeat naval raids at the beginning of hostilities, and to secure the canal until reinforcements can be expected from the United States.

The minimum peace garrison necessary for the defense of the canal is as follows: 3 regiments of Infantry at the maximum strength recommended in Chapter VI of this report, 1 battalion of Field Artillery (3 batteries), 1 squadron of Cavalry, 1 signal company, 1 engineer company, 1 ambulance company, 1 field hospital, 18 companies of Coast Artillery.

By treaty with the Republic of Panama, this garrison should be given facilities, in time of peace, to operate beyond the Canal Zone, in order that the troops may be properly trained for their special mission and be made familiar with the terrain over which they may be called upon to operate in defending the canal.

Guantanamo.—The policy of the United States contemplates the establishment of a naval base at Guantanamo. It is most necessary that the garrisons of coast artillery and mobile troops necessary for its land defense should be determined with the least possible delay.

Alaska.—The present garrison of Alaska comprises 1 regiment of Infantry and 2 companies of Signal troops. As troops can be withdrawn from Alaska only during a part of the year, this garrison can not be included among the troops available for general military purposes. The assignment of one infantry regiment as the garrison for Alaska is not with any idea of the defense of the Territory in the event of war, but simply to furnish a police force to quell local disorders.

With the settled conditions that now obtain in the government of Alaska it is believed that the time has come to relieve the Army from this police duty and that a force of constabulary should be organized and charged with the police of the Territory. The two companies of the Signal Corps should also be withdrawn and the lines turned over to the proper civil authorities.

Porto Rico.—The garrison of this island is the Porto Rico regiment of Infantry, comprising 2 battalions or 8 companies. Its enlisted men are native

Porto Ricans. Its field officers are detailed from the United States Army, and its captains and lieutenants, some of whom are Porto Ricans, are specially commissioned for this regiment. This regiment might serve outside of Porto Rico under certain contingencies, but it can not be considered as available for general military purposes.

It is recommended that this regiment be completed so as to conform in organization to the infantry regiment recommended in this report and that promotion to the grade of major be authorized for the permanent officers of the regiment.

Passing through this regiment each year are a number of trained men. It is recommended that two regiments of National Guard be organized in Porto Rico, which with the regular regiment would form a brigade. The detailed colonel of the regular regiment should also be given the militia rank as brigadier general and be charged, under direction of the governor, with the administration and training of the National Guard of Porto Rico and with the command of the brigade whenever it operates as such.

The following table gives a summary of the minimum forces required for the maintenance of national interest in the outlying possessions of the United States:

	Philip- pines.	Oahu.	Panama.	Alaska.	Porto Rico.	Total for foreign service.
Regiments of Infantry.....	4	6	3	1	14
Regiments of Cavalry.....	2	1	3 ¹ / ₂	3 ³ / ₄
Battalions of Field Artillery.....	2	3	1 ¹ / ₂	1 ¹ / ₂
Companies of Coast Artillery.....	24	10	18	52
Companies of Philippine Scouts.....	52	52
Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry.....	1	1
Companies of Engineers.....	2	1	1	4
Field companies, Signal Corps.....	1	1	1	3
Other companies, Signal Corps.....	1	2	3
Field hospitals.....	1	1	1	3
Ambulance companies.....	1	1	1	3

¹ The equivalent of 3 regiments of Field and Mountain Artillery under the existing organization.

The following table gives the total numbers of organizations now existing in the Army of the United States, the total numbers required to meet the minimum requirements of the foreign garrisons, and the residues that will be available within the United States after providing the minimum requirements of the foreign garrisons:

	Total organiza- tions in Military Establish- ment.	Required for foreign service.	Organiza- tions remaining at home after pro- viding for the foreign garrisons.
Regiments of Infantry.....	30	14	16
Regiments of Cavalry.....	15	3 ³ / ₄	11 ³ / ₄
Regiments of Field and Mountain Artillery.....	5	3	2
Regiments of Horse Artillery.....	1	1
Companies of Philippine Scouts.....	52	52
Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry.....	1	1
Companies of Engineers.....	12	4	8
Field companies, Signal Corps.....	5	3	2
Other companies, Signal Corps.....	7	3	4
Field hospitals.....	4	3	1
Ambulance companies.....	4	3	1
Coast Artillery companies.....	170	52	118

2. SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED FROM A SEPARATE ORGANIZATION OF THE DETACHMENTS ON FOREIGN SERVICE.

The following advantages will result from the organization of the foreign garrisons as distinct and separate parts of the Military Establishment:

1. *Simplification of the problems of training and administration.*—Until recently the organizations have been shifted back and forth between home and foreign service. There has been in consequence a constant change of function and an incomplete or imperfect adaptation of the shifting units to either function.

2. *Simplification of problems of organization.*—Under the old system although there were distinct kinds of service and an actual separation of the Army into parts, yet the difference of function of these parts has not been recognized as the basis of organization. The Army has been treated as a homogeneous whole, with the same organization at home and abroad. Regiments that have been maintained at low strength at home on the theory of expansibility have been maintained at the same strength on foreign service, where expansion of any kind is impracticable.

3. *Greater economy.*—Keeping war strength units permanently on foreign service will reduce the per capita cost of the foreign garrisons. The reduction in cost for any given foreign garrison is due chiefly to the following causes:

(a) *Economies due to the maintenance of permanent organizations on foreign service.*—This necessarily results in reduced expenditure for transportation. With permanent regiments the transportation is limited to that required to maintain the desired strength; that is, the transportation of officers and enlisted men who return to the United States on account of disability or upon discharge, or upon the completion of the allotted time of foreign service, and the transportation of the officers and men who are sent out to fill vacancies. With shifting regiments, in addition to the above-described maintenance travel, entire organizations with all personnel and impedimenta must be transported at stated intervals.

(b) *Economies due to increased enlisted strength in existing organizations.*—This necessarily results in greatly reduced cost per effective combatant soldier. If 900 enlisted men be formed into a new regiment, the pay and allowances of additional officers and high-priced noncommissioned officers must be considered. But if the same number of men be added to organizations already in existence, there is no appreciable increase in overhead or administrative expenses, and it is only necessary to estimate for the pay and allowances of the privates added. In any given garrison the cost of barracks and quarters is determined largely by the number of companies. The per capita cost for housing is therefore a minimum when the enlisted strength per company is a maximum.

It is calculated that the annual cost of the proposed garrisons of the Philippines, Oahu, and Panama on the permanent war strength basis will be upward of \$4,000,000 per year less than the cost of garrisons of the same strength maintained under the old system of shifting low-strength regiments. Barracks and quarters for the proposed garrisons will cost at least \$6,000,000 less than barracks and quarters for the same enlisted strength organized as at present.

4. *Localization of regiments at home.*—As soon as we discontinue the transfer of organizations to and from foreign service we may localize the Army at home. This will result in further economies and in increased effectiveness. Problems of recruitment will be simplified and plans for the expansion of the home Army into an effective war force will become more definite. The important problems involving the relations of the Regular Army to the citizen soldiery may be worked out on a more definite basis and will receive more intelligent attention

when the functions and duties of the home Army are recognized as distinct from those of the detachments abroad. While serving abroad the war preparation of officers and men will be for the defense of an important but restricted local terrain. While serving at home the war preparation of officers and men will be for general military service.

5. As problems of administration will be simplified so will problems of executive policy and legislation. With the Army organized in distinct units, each with definite functions, it will be easier for Congress to determine the real military needs of the Nation. The complex problem of national defense will be simplified by a resolution into several distinct and separate problems, each to be met by a separate and distinct military organization.

III.

THE LAND FORCES WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

The problem of military organization has two aspects, a dynamic aspect and a political aspect. The measure of military force required to meet any given emergency is purely dynamic, while the form of military institutions must be determined on political grounds, with due regard to national genius and tradition. There can be no sound solution of the problem if either of these fundamental aspects be ignored. The military pedant may fail by proposing adequate and economical forces under forms that are intolerable to the national genius, while the political pedant may propose military systems which lack nothing except the necessary element of trained and disciplined military force. The practical military statesman must recognize both of these elements of the problem. He does not propose impracticable or foreign institutions, but seeks to develop the necessary vigor and energy within the familiar institutions that have grown with the national life. But the ultimate test is dynamic. In any military system the final test is capacity to exert superior military force in time to meet any given national emergency.

It is the traditional policy of the United States that the military establishment in time of peace is to be a small Regular Army and that the ultimate war force of the Nation is to be a great army of citizen soldiers. This fundamental theory of military organization is sound economically and politically. The maintenance of armies in time of peace imposes a heavy financial burden on the Nation, and the expenditure for this purpose should be kept at a minimum consistent with effectiveness for war. But reliance upon citizen soldiers is subject to the limitation that they can not be expected to meet a trained enemy until they, too, have been trained. Our history is full of the success of the volunteer soldier after he has been trained for war, but it contains no record of the successful employment of raw levies for general military purposes.

It is therefore our most important military problem to devise means for preparing great armies of citizen soldiers to meet the emergency of modern war. The organization of the Regular Army is but a smaller phase of this problem. It is simply the peace nucleus of the greater war army, and its strength and organization should always be considered with reference to its relation to the greater war force which can not be placed in the field until war is imminent. The problem is one of expansion from a small peace force to a great war force. Its solution therefore involves the provision of a sufficient peace nucleus, the partial organization and training of citizen soldiers in peace, and provisions for prompt and orderly expansion on the outbreak of war.

But the practical solution of the problem can not be met by the promulgation of a general theory. The Army at any time and place must be strong enough to defeat any enemy that may oppose it at that time and place. We are concerned more with the time required to raise the force of trained troops than with their ultimate numbers. If we need 60,000 soldiers in a given terrain within 30 days and can only deploy 50,000 soldiers in that time and place, we are not prepared for the emergency even if our plans provide for ten times that number at some period in the future. Whatever our military institutions may be, we must recognize the fundamental facts that victory is the reward of superior force, that modern wars are short and decisive, and that trained armies alone can defeat trained armies.

2. THE TIME REQUIRED TO RAISE ARMIES.

The time required for the training of extemporized armies depends largely on the presence or absence of trained instructors. If there be a corps of trained officers and noncommissioned officers and a tested organization of higher units with trained leaders and staff officers, the problem of training is limited to the training of the private soldier. This can be accomplished in a relatively short time, and under such conditions if arms and equipment are available a respectable army can be formed within six months. But where the leaders themselves are untrained and where officers and men must alike stumble toward efficiency without intelligent guidance, the formation of an efficient army is a question of years. Indeed, such a force can not become an army at all within the period of duration of modern war. As the American War of 1861-1865 presents the singular phenomenon of two extemporized armies gradually developing while in conflict with each other, it is a most remarkable record of the evolution of such forces. In the conflicts of 1861 both officers and men were untrained for the duties demanded of them. Even the companies were imperfectly organized as units of the regiment, and the lack of cohesion was still more apparent in the higher units. Bull Run disorganized both armies. One was demoralized by defeat and the other by victory. By 1862 effective regiments, brigades, and divisions had come into being, but the conduct and leading of higher units as a rule was still imperfect. It was not until 1863 that the armies confronted each other as complete and effective military teams. But even in the early stages of the war the influence of trained and able leaders was apparent. The time required to make an effective soldier depends very largely on the organization in which the recruit is enrolled. The recruit of 1861 could not become a good private until his captain became a good captain, but the recruit of 1863 was absorbed in a team already trained, and therefore became a trained soldier in a few months of active service. But while the history of the Civil War is instructive as a record of military evolution it can not be invoked as a guide of military policy, for we can count upon it that in our career as a world power no serious competitor will ever oppose us with extemporized armies.

In view of these considerations it is obvious that the citizen soldier must have some training in peace if he is to be effective in the sudden crisis of modern war. The organization in which he is to serve must exist and function in time of peace, and in view of the limited time available for training it should be a fundamental principle of American policy that no officer should be entrusted with the leadership of American soldiers who has not prepared himself for that responsibility in time of peace. The American soldier, whether regular or volunteer, is entitled to trained leadership in war.

It will never be possible for citizen soldiers to acquire thorough military training and experience in time of peace. Their training and hardening must

be completed after mobilization, but the period required for such final training will be reduced exactly in proportion to the amount of training already received in time of peace. If the total peace training of a National Guard company is equivalent to two months in the field, it will be available for duty at the front two months earlier than a company of raw men, assuming other conditions equal in each case. But in any event during the period of final training, which will vary for different companies and regiments, the Regular Army must meet the situation at the front. If our citizen soldiery is put on a proper basis as to organization and training—a basis on which it does not now rest—its regiments will soon reenforce the line. Even with their limited peace training they will soon be effective for defense, and after a short period of field practice the best-officered organizations will begin to expand the Army for general military purposes.

3. TWO CLASSES OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY, ORGANIZED AND UNORGANIZED.

The traditional army of citizen soldiery should be considered as divided into two distinct classes, as follows:

1. The organized citizen soldiery, comprising those who are enrolled in definite military organizations and are partially trained in peace. This force is now known as the National Guard, and is organized under the militia clause of the Constitution.

2. The unorganized citizen soldiery. Included in this class is the Reserve Militia, which is made up of all the able-bodied citizens liable for militia duty, but who are not enrolled as members of the National Guard.

In the past the citizens liable for military duty have served the Federal Government under three distinct conditions: First, by being enrolled into a militia regiment which had been or was to be mustered into the service of the United States; second, by being enrolled into a State volunteer regiment; third, by being enrolled into a United States volunteer regiment.

For the purpose of the present discussion the term "National Guard" will be applied to the citizen soldiery which is actually organized in time of peace, whether as a State force or a National force, and the term "Volunteers" to the additional citizen soldiery which will be organized upon the imminence of war. The defects of the National Guard system, as now organized under the militia clause of the Constitution, will be considered in Chapter IX of this report. For the present the term "National Guard" will be applied for convenience to the organized citizen soldiery without reference to its legal status.

As the trained armies of modern nations will seek a decision in the early stages of war, and as extemporized armies will rarely be fit for use within the brief duration of such a conflict, it is obvious that our military policy should aim at increasing the peace strength and efficiency of the organized citizen soldiery. Provisions should be made for the organization of such new volunteer units as may be necessary on the outbreak of war, but it should always be the goal of sound policy to form the proper units in peace so that the war contingent of raw recruits can be absorbed into trained teams already in existence. This policy must be based upon the principle that a nation's military power is to be measured not by the total number of its male citizens capable of bearing arms, but by the number of trained soldiers with which it can meet a given emergency.

4. RELATION OF THE REGULAR ARMY TO THE NATION'S WAR POWER.

From a general consideration of our institutions and the requirements of modern war, it thus appears that the Regular Army is simply the peace nucleus of the greater war Army of the Nation. Its strength and organization should

therefore be determined by its relation to the larger force. It must form a definite model for the organization and expansion of the great war Army, and it must also be prepared to meet sudden and special emergencies which can not be met by the Army of citizen soldiery. Some of the special functions of the Regular Army are indicated below:

1. The peace garrisons of the foreign possessions of the United States must be detachments of the Regular Army.

2. The peace garrisons of our fortified harbors and naval bases with a sufficient nucleus of the mobile army elements of coast defense must be regular troops, definitely organized in time of peace.

3. The peace establishment of the Regular Army must be sufficient to prevent naval raids, which under modern conditions may precede a declaration of war. A successful raid of this character may determine the initiative by giving the enemy a convenient base for future operations.

4. The Regular Army must form a mobile reserve prepared to reenforce the foreign garrisons during periods of insurrection and disorder.

5. The Regular Army must be prepared to furnish expeditionary forces for minor wars or for the occupation of foreign territory where treaty rights or fundamental national policies are threatened.

6. The Regular Army must be prepared to cooperate with the Navy in the formation of joint expeditions in support of the foreign interests of the United States and for the protection of American citizens abroad.

7. At the outbreak of war regular forces should be concentrated and ready to seize opportunities for important initial successes. Such opportunities will frequently be offered before the mobilization of the Army of citizen soldiers can be completed.

8. At the outbreak of war special regular detachments should be ready to seize important strategic positions before they can be occupied or adequately defended by the enemy and before the concentration of the Army of citizen soldiers is complete. Initial operations of this kind, such as seizing the crossings of a river frontier or a port of embarkation, frequently determine the future conduct of war and assure an early decision. Capacity to take the initiative with an effective force is the best preventive of war.

9. By its definite organization in peace the Regular Army becomes the nucleus of the greater war Army. By its peace practice, its varied experience on foreign service, and its participation in expeditions, the Regular Army becomes the experimental model of the Volunteer Army. It solves practical problems of equipment, armament, and supply, and makes its technical experience in these matters available for the larger force which is normally absorbed in peaceful occupations. It makes our war problem one of definite and orderly expansion instead of the vastly more difficult problem of extemporization.

10. The Regular Army will furnish a school of military theory and practice and will develop officers with special equipment and training for the higher staff duties in war.

11. Through its professional schools and General Staff the Regular Army will develop the unified military doctrine and policy which must permeate the entire National Army if it is to succeed in war.

12. Through its administrative and supply departments the Regular Army in peace will prepare in advance for the equipment, transportation, and supply of the great war Army of the Nation.

5. EMPLOYMENT OF REGULARS AND CITIZEN SOLDIERS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

The land forces of Great Britain have been completely reorganized as a result of the experience of the Boer War. As the English system is based on the

same principle of voluntary service as our own, and as her military establishment comprises a regular army for expeditionary purposes and a home defense army of citizen soldiery, it may be interesting to observe her solution of the problem of the mutual relations of the two forces. The British Army comprises the army in India and the colonies and the army at home. The latter is divided into the expeditionary force composed of regulars, and the territorial army composed of citizen soldiers. Both forces have appropriate reserves designed to raise their peace establishments to war strength and to replace wastage at the outbreak of war.

The expeditionary force comprises 6 infantry divisions and 4 cavalry brigades. Its function is to furnish immediate reenforcement to any of the foreign garrisons, to form expeditions in the conduct of small wars, and, at the outbreak of a great war, to form the strategic striking force by means of which Great Britain will profit by her naval command of the sea. The territorial army is composed of 14 infantry divisions and 14 cavalry brigades. It is composed entirely of citizen soldiers who enlist for four years and who have about the same amount of annual training as the best of our National Guard organizations.

Each division of either force comprises about 12,000 infantry with from 54 to 70 guns, about 320 divisional cavalry with engineers, sanitary units, and other special troops. Each cavalry brigade comprises about 1,500 sabers.

The territorial army is definitely organized in division districts and each of these districts contains an infantry division and a cavalry brigade. The men of the expeditionary force and their reserves are subject to service at any place where it may be necessary to send them in war. The divisions of the territorial army are primarily for home defense and can not be ordered out of the United Kingdom, though individual officers and men and particular organizations may volunteer for active service abroad. In this respect the mission of the British territorial army is more restricted than that of our citizen soldiery. The general limitation of the territorial army to home defense is possible because the United Kingdom has no land frontiers. The strategic position of the United States is different in this respect. Our citizen soldiery must be ready to expand the war Army for offensive operations, especially if an enemy should threaten us from either of our land frontiers.

The British territorial army is to be called out at the outbreak of war, and through the preponderance of the British fleet it is expected that the force will have time to complete its training in the interval between mobilization and actual contact with the enemy. It will be ready for defensive operations almost immediately, and it is estimated by the army authorities that it will be effective for general military purposes in about six months after mobilization. The officers of the territorial army, like the enlisted men, are citizen soldiers. Each regiment and artillery brigade, however, has a permanent routine staff consisting of an officer and instructor sergeants detailed from the regular forces. Each division district is commanded and inspected by a general officer and staff of two officers from the regular establishment. The permanent divisional staff keeps in touch with the progress of imperial war plans and is prepared at any moment to mobilize the division and place it in its allotted position in any particular military situation. This is in the interest of decentralization. The British war office thus deals with a limited number of divisions. Each division headquarters deals with the component units of its division. To concentrate a complete field army of regulars and volunteers at any threatened point on the British coast, it would only be necessary to send one brief telegram to each of three or four division commanders. Each division commander could simply issue orders already prepared by his staff, for details

of mobilization, concentration, supply, and transportation are always kept up to date by the permanent regular staff of the divisions. The advantage of such simplicity is obvious. Under our centralized system, instead of three or four units to deal with in cases of this kind, there would be a hundred or more units to deal with, a hundred or more telegrams to write, a hundred of more transportation and supply problems to solve, and all this at a time of diplomatic and political stress.

The simplicity of the British system is based on the fact that both regulars and citizen soldiers are organized in divisions in time of peace. Each division is simply a little army complete in itself, and the whole army or any given field army is simply an aggregation of divisions. The war office does not deal with all of the multitudinous units that comprise the force. An order to one division commander is an order to all of the component units of his division. Under this system the absolute minimum is left to extemporization. The citizen soldiers of Great Britain have a definite place in a machine which is as definitely organized as the regular army. With us the whole system must be extemporized. With us the Regular Army as well as the Volunteer Army is a complex of units without permanent grouping.

6. THE JOINT USE OF REGULARS AND CITIZEN SOLDIERY.

In the defense of Great Britain regular divisions and territorial divisions will be combined in field armies for joint action. Any group of two or more divisions will form a field army. This permits the two forces to cooperate fully in the national defense and yet bases the ultimate grouping of the divisions on the undoubted differences of function of the two forces. This is pointed out because a different theory of organization has been proposed in this country, based on the idea of mixing regular troops and citizen soldiery in the same divisions. It has been proposed to form divisions comprising two brigades of Regulars and one brigade of citizen soldiers or one brigade of Regulars and two brigades of citizen soldiers, with various other combinations of these two classes of troops. A slight consideration will show the fundamental defects of this system.

In the first place, regular troops may and frequently will be dispatched on special missions before the citizen soldiery is called out. If the normal division organization includes both classes of forces, every time the regular troops are detached to perform their special functions one or more of the divisions of the normal organization will be disrupted. Again, while trained volunteers will be fully effective in war, it can not be disputed that at the outbreak of war regular troops will have more training, greater endurance, and therefore higher maneuvering velocity. But a division is a fundamental army unit. If the regulars are formed in separate divisions, we will have a small force with the endurance and velocity necessary for the sudden strategic enterprises which determine the initiative in war. These divisions can move at once and may even be put in a favorable initial position for striking a blow at the very outbreak of war. They can be quietly concentrated in many cases before diplomatic and political conditions justify the calling out the National Guard or volunteers. But if these forces are the component parts of mixed divisions they can not move as divisions at all, until the citizen soldier contingents of the divisions are embodied, and when they do move, the velocity and endurance of the mixed divisions will be determined by the condition of their newly mobilized elements. Under such an organization it will be impossible to utilize the special qualities of the highly trained nucleus, except at the expense of disrupting the normal organization at the very outbreak of war.

It is presumed that the main reason for suggesting the placing of regiments of citizen soldiery in brigades with regular regiments, or the placing of citizen soldier brigades in divisions with regular brigades, is to give raw troops the example of trained troops on the march and in battle. This will undoubtedly be an advantage in special cases, but it should not be made the basis of permanent organization. It should be our policy to develop our citizen soldiers in peace, so that they will no longer be raw troops when they meet the enemy. But the acceptance of this policy will not preclude the adoption of special measures to meet special occasions where raw troops must be employed to the best advantage. Even on the defensive, where untrained troops have always shown to the best advantage, it would seem that regular troops should not be completely dispersed in the trenches, but should be used as a reserve to repulse the main attack or to make an offensive counterstroke if an opportunity offers. Jackson's troops at New Orleans were able to hold an intrenched position with protected flanks, but he had no troops with sufficient organization or training to complete the victory by a vigorous pursuit of the defeated enemy.

We may therefore accept the following general principles as the basis of correct organization of our mobile forces:

1. The mobile elements of the Regular Army should have a divisional organization in time of peace. This requires that it be organized in tactical divisions, even if these divisions be incomplete and insufficient in number. Even a small army should be correctly organized as an army.

2. Every effort should be made to give a divisional organization to the organized citizen soldiery in time of peace. If our citizen soldiers ever go to war, they must be organized into divisions before they can be employed effectively against the enemy. In order to employ them promptly, every possible detail of this organization should be settled in time of peace.

Whenever it becomes necessary to reenforce the Regular Army and the National Guard by volunteer organizations, it is important that they should be prepared for effective service in the minimum of time. This requires that they be formed by trained officers acting under prearranged plans. It is believed that this can best be accomplished by forming the new organizations as United States Volunteers under a national volunteer law like that proposed in S. 2518, known as the du Pont bill. (A copy of this bill, with a memorandum by Senator du Pont on the history of the volunteer forces, is appended to this report as Appendix I.)

So long as our National Guard is organized under the militia clause of the Constitution it will be impracticable to provide Federal division commanders in time of peace. But under the power to organize and inspect the militia it would seem feasible to organize definite districts, to encourage the formation of the necessary units, and to give each division an inspection staff, through which the war preparation can be kept up in peace.

Each division district should contain a complete division and all of the plans for its mobilization, supply,¹ and concentration should be prepared in peace and continually corrected to date. This can only be accomplished by assigning trained officers to arrange the details of organization under the supervision of the General Staff, which is intrusted by law with plans for war. Under present

¹The supply-depot system should be extended so that the matériel and equipment necessary to equip any organization to war strength would be centrally stored within the division district. Requisitions should be filled from these depots and the stores issued replaced, so that a minimum of deterioration would result. The ideal condition would be to have this additional war equipment actually in the hands of organizations, but this can not be accomplished generally with the National Guard until adequate storage facilities have been supplied.

conditions it would be necessary to organize the fundamental war units after mobilization. The War College can and has prepared plans for such mobilization, but in the absence of a definite policy embodied in the law there is no assurance that such plans can be carried into effect. Solid and stable arrangements for mobilization can not be based on a hypothetical policy. Until there is a legalized system our actual mobilization will depend upon political conditions at the time of the crisis. Gaps in our legislation will be filled in haste and no human agency will be able to predict what the law will be. Our traditional theory of a small Regular Army and a great war army of citizen soldiers is not yet embodied as a definite institution. The mobilization of our citizen soldiery to-day would not result in a well-knit national army. It would be an uncoordinated army of 50 allies, with all of the inherent weaknesses of allied forces, emphasized by the unusual number of the allies.

A more detailed discussion of the national citizen soldiery will be presented in Chapter IX, after a consideration of the organization and distribution of the regular forces.

IV.

THE PEACE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REGULAR LAND FORCES.

1. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COAST ARTILLERY AND THE MOBILE ARMY.

The land forces of the United States are divided into two distinct parts, the Coast Artillery and the Mobile Army. The coast fortifications are local in character and are designed to protect important seaports from direct naval attacks and naval raids, to prohibit hostile landings at particular places, to secure our naval bases in the absence of the fleet, to prohibit the use of certain harbors and waters as bases for naval operations against us, to secure safe havens for our vessels, and to release our fleet for offensive operations. The influence of coast fortifications is limited to the areas within the range of their guns, and while they must be recognized as of supreme importance, within the scope of their proper functions, it must not be supposed that they have any power to prevent invasion if we should lose command of the sea. The total length of our coast line is enormous, and the stretches covered by harbor defenses are and must remain very small compared with the unprotected intervals that lie between them. If we should lose the command of the sea an invader would simply land in one of these intervals. It therefore follows that our ultimate defense depends upon defeating a mobile army of invasion, and this can be done only by having a mobile army prepared to operate in any possible theater of war. The complete defense of our coasts is therefore a problem of cooperation between coast artillery and mobile forces.

2. ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF COAST ARTILLERY AND THE MOBILE ARMY IN PEACE AND WAR.

The general relations between the coast fortresses and the mobile troops have already been indicated. Their essential difference lies in the fact that the Coast Artillery is local and will remain local both in peace and in war. The mobile forces, however, will not be confined to a definite territory. They occupy peace stations for purposes of training, but it can never be predicted in what theater of war they may be employed. The coast batteries that cover the entrance to New York Harbor will remain in their present positions in any contingencies, but the mobile forces that may be stationed in the vicinity of New York may be employed at any place within the sphere of national interest.

A correct organization of the two forces should, therefore, be based upon a recognition of these essential differences. The Coast Artillery is territorialized and may properly have a territorial organization in war and peace.

The mobile army, however, must be free to move and should not be tied by its peace administration to any particular locality. The present organization of our Army violates this principle. The same brigadier general commands mobile troops and immobile troops under a system of administration which must necessarily break down in war.

The organization of the Department of the Gulf is a typical example of this illogical arrangement. This department comprises 1 regiment of Infantry, 1 regiment of Cavalry, and 27 companies of Coast Artillery. The organization seems to be based on some idea of convenience for peace administration, but is not designed to meet any military contingency. It is unsound, because the command itself is an illogical command, it being impossible to conceive any military situation which would properly place those units under a single commander in war. It is also unsound, because it must be immediately disrupted in war and the whole machinery of administration broken up at the very time when definite organization is of supreme importance. It would, therefore, seem that a correct organization of our land forces should provide homogeneous commands for our brigadier generals in time of peace. This can be accomplished by grouping the present Coast Artillery districts into three Coast Artillery Inspections and by giving a definite brigade and division organization to the mobile troops. Under this arrangement the eastern territorial region will comprise two Coast Artillery Inspections and the nucleus of the first division of the mobile army, with certain extra-divisional auxiliaries. The central territorial region will comprise the nucleus of the second division of the mobile army, with two or more Cavalry brigades and other extra-divisional troops. The western territorial region will comprise one Coast Artillery Inspection and the nucleus of the third division of the mobile army.

With the present distribution of our mobile army a strict administration by tactical units is not wholly practicable, but under the policy of concentration proposed by the Secretary of War it is expected that the mobile army will ultimately be segregated in strategic localities so that tactical units may be trained and administered as such. There must be a period of transition, however, before this ideal can be realized, but during this period of transition the organization should be based upon the idea of the military employment of the troops. Because a force is dispersed, can hardly be urged as a reason for an incorrect organization. The troops must ultimately receive a tactical organization before they can fight, and the fact that they are dispersed is really an additional reason for attempting to correct their organization in time of peace.

Even where mobile troops are concentrated the commander of the territorial region must perform certain territorial functions. In addition to the command of his tactical units he will generally have problems of recruitment and supply¹ and may be charged with the preparation of plans for the joint use of Regulars and National Guard in several possible theaters of war, but the territorial functions should be kept separated from the tactical functions. This can be accomplished by a proper organization of the staff. One part of the staff should deal with the mobile tactical units in the command and should be free to move when those units are assembled for war, while the other part of the staff should deal

¹ See note, page 18, in reference to supply depots. These supply depots should be under the control of the territorial commanders recommended in this report. All plans for mobilization should be so completely worked out that the equipping of a unit to war strength should simply mean the releasing of the necessary equipment from the proper depot.

with the territorial functions, such as the care of posts and supply, and should continue to perform those functions after the troops have gone into the field.

It is a matter of no little inconvenience that the word "division" is rendered ambiguous in our service by being applied to two entirely distinct things. In all languages the name "division" is applied to a force of all arms which is the fundamental mobile army unit. The word is used in this sense with us, and it is also applied to the territorial areas into which it has been considered convenient to divide the country for purpose of military administration. It would be in the interest of clearness to find some means of avoiding this ambiguity, and for this purpose it is recommended that the term "division" be restricted in the future to the tactical unit of that name; that the term "department" be applied to the present territorial "divisions," and to all other independent territorial commands, and that brigadier generals be assigned to the command of brigades of mobile troops or of Coast Artillery Inspections.

3. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MOBILE ARMY AND ITS RELATION TO TACTICAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION. THE POLICY OF SEGREGATION AS OUTLINED BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

The complete development of a tactical organization of the mobile army must depend upon a gradual correction of its present dispersion. The policy of the War Department with reference to this important question is given in the following extracts from the letter of the Secretary of War in reply to House resolution 343, second session Sixty-second Congress (H. R. Doc. No. 490):

If the mobile army is to be efficient, its distribution must meet the following requirements:

1. It must be favorable for the tactical training of the three arms combined (Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery).

2. It must be favorable for the rapid concentration of the Army upon our northern or southern frontier or upon our eastern or western seaboard.

3. It must favor the best use of the Army as a model for the general military training of the National Guard.

4. It must favor the use of the Regular Army as a nucleus for the war organization of the National Guard and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize to meet any possible military emergency.

5. The distribution must favor economical administration with the view of developing the maximum return for the money appropriated for military purposes.

6. The distribution must permit a peace organization which will also be effective in war; that is, an organization which will permit a prompt expansion in time of war by means of a system of reserves.

These requirements can best be met by correcting the present dispersion of the mobile army. The mobile army is now scattered in 49 posts. It should be segregated into detachments of all arms, each of which can be readily assembled for team training by reasonable marches of concentration. Each of the several tactical groups should be stationed in the vicinity of strategic centers where facilities are favorable for transportation, administration, and supply. The exact location of these centers should depend upon a careful study of many considerations, but they may be approximately indicated as follows:

1. Two, and possibly three, groups on the line between the St. Lawrence and Atlanta, covering the Atlantic seaboard.

2. Two, and possibly three, groups on the line between Puget Sound and Los Angeles, covering the Pacific seaboard.

3. At least two groups between the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande serving as first reserves for either seaboard and as nuclei for the development of the National Guard and volunteer forces to be organized in the interior of the continent.

The number of groups to be organized is primarily restricted by the total strength of the mobile army. No group should contain less than a brigade

of Infantry, with a proper proportion of Cavalry, Field Artillery, and special troops, and at least one group should contain a full tactical division. Proper tactical training demands the combined use of the three arms, and this can be secured only by massing the troops of each group in a single post or in several posts within marching distance of a common center. Without such concentration joint training can not be secured except at heavy expense for transportation. In addition to these detachments of all arms, there should be at least two independent Cavalry brigades.

A study of the question indicates that the stationing of our present mobile Army in more than eight or possibly nine such groups would be inconsistent with the demands of maximum economy and tactical efficiency.

The solution of this problem is apparently complicated by the fact that the posts now occupied by the mobile army represent a large investment which must be abandoned if an efficient plant is to be established. But while most of the posts now occupied have lost their military value, the national military reservations have acquired a great value as real estate. As a business proposition it should be possible to refund the investment and largely finance the relocation of the Army from the proceeds of the sale of the real estate which is no longer needed for military purposes. The project would be similar in many respects to the Reclamation Service as now established by Congress. In that service a fund is formed from the proceeds of the sale of certain public lands, and from this fund certain approved projects are successively executed under general rules prescribed by Congress.

It is believed that the Army can in this way be scientifically distributed at an expense little if any in excess of the proceeds of the sales of the properties to be abandoned.

Studies at the War College indicate that if the present mobile army were concentrated in eight posts, its cost would be reduced by about \$5,500,000 per annum. In six years this saving would pay for the new quartering of the mobile army, even if nothing could be realized from the sale of real estate no longer needed.

But in applying the principles outlined above so many practical difficulties must be encountered that the solution for any particular group of posts can not be stated dogmatically. In a region where there are now several widely scattered posts it is obvious that maximum economy and efficiency will be attained when all of the troops in the region are so concentrated that the entire command can be assembled by marching, and without the expense incident to rail transportation. But the actual plans for accomplishing such concentration should rest upon a careful and separate study of each region, with the view of ascertaining the best location in the particular region, and the extent to which existing posts can be retained without prejudice to the broader economic and military interests of the Government. While there may be decided practical limitations upon efforts to perfect the distribution of the present force, much can be accomplished by recognizing sound principles in making future locations. In the gradual development of the mobile army a station now occupied by an isolated regiment may ultimately become one of a group occupied by a force of all arms. Where such a post is favorably located strategically, the tactical isolation may thus be economically corrected by the expansion of existing plant instead of by relocation.

The problem is thus seen to be one of great complexity, but the ultimate solution is clearly indicated. Whether the mobile army be increased or not, it should gradually be segregated into tactical groups, each group containing a force of all arms or a Cavalry brigade. The loci of the several groups should be carefully worked out in conformity with the general policy of placing the force so that it can be promptly employed upon either seaboard or upon either the northern or the southern land frontier of the country. But the present faulty distribution can not be corrected at once. New stations must be provided before old stations can be abandoned, but future changes should always be made with the view of the gradual formation of proper tactical commands.

4. A PROPOSED ORGANIZATION FOR THE PEACE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REGULAR LAND FORCES.

The three territorial divisions under which the Army is now administered conform to the three main strategic regions referred to in the letter of the Secretary of War. Each of these territorial areas contains a proportion of mobile troops, and in each of them the forces are widely dispersed. Under the general policy of concentration these forces will ultimately be segregated into two or more centers in each strategic region, and the troops of the several centers when assembled will constitute the nucleus of a tactical division and one or more Cavalry brigades. The peace organization of the mobile army should be based on these general strategic principles.

The mobile troops in the three main geographical regions should be organized as distinct mobile commands, and in such future increases of the mobile army as Congress may authorize it should be the national policy successively to expand the nuclear divisions into complete tactical divisions. Thus in due time a complete tactical division and one or more Cavalry brigades may be provided for each of three main strategic regions and thereafter further expansion should be with the view of dividing the central region into two such territorial regions, so that complete tactical divisions each with proper extra-divisional troops, will eventually cover the northern and southern land frontiers and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

Having in mind the distinct functions of the mobile forces and the seacoast fortifications, the following peace organization of the regular land forces is recommended:

EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

This department conforms to the present Eastern Division. Within this area the mobile troops will constitute the nucleus of the first tactical division, with a Cavalry brigade and certain other extra-divisional troops of the mobile army considered as an expeditionary force. The Coast Artillery within the department should be organized as two Coast Artillery Inspections, as follows: 1. The North Atlantic Inspection, comprising the Coast Artillery districts from Maine to the Delaware River, both inclusive. 2. The South Atlantic Inspection, comprising the Coast Artillery districts from the Delaware River, exclusive, to Texas, inclusive.

CENTRAL DEPARTMENT.

This department conforms to the present Central Division. Within this area the mobile troops will constitute the nucleus of the second tactical division, with two or more Cavalry brigades and certain other extra-divisional troops of the mobile army regarded as an expeditionary force.

WESTERN DEPARTMENT.

This department conforms to the present Western Division. Within this area the mobile troops will constitute the nucleus of the third tactical division, with certain extra-divisional troops of the mobile army regarded as an expeditionary force. The Coast Artillery within the department should be organized as the Pacific Inspection, comprising the Coast Artillery districts from Washington to California, both inclusive.

THE FOREIGN COMMANDS.

The Philippines Department, comprising all the troops serving within the Philippines.

The Hawaiian Department, comprising all the troops serving within the Hawaiian Islands. At present this is a department of the western division, but its special functions make it properly a separate command.

The Panama Department, comprising all the troops serving within the Canal Zone. This, too, will be a separate command in war and to tie it to a territorial command within the United States would simply produce confusion by providing a peace organization which must be disrupted in war time. It is and must remain a distinct command strategically.

The Porto Rico Regiment.—The Porto Rico Regiment is now a part of the Department of the East, but this affiliation can not continue in war. The isolation of this garrison requires the formation of a separate administration for it, but the small size of the garrison does not appear to justify the establishment of a separate department. The permanent administration of the Porto Rico garrison and its relation to the home forces is a problem that awaits further study. For the present it will probably be necessary to leave it attached to the proposed Eastern Department.

5. THE DIFFICULTY OF SECURING A TACTICAL ORGANIZATION IN PEACE, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS IN THE PRESENT CENTRAL DIVISION.

The practical difficulties involved in providing a definite tactical organization in peace can be illustrated by considering the peace administration of the mobile forces now serving in the Central Division.

The troops in the Central Division were as follows, February 20, 1912:¹ 9 regiments of Infantry, 1 regiment of Mountain Artillery, 1 regiment Horse Artillery, 1½ regiments of Light Artillery, 6 regiments of Cavalry, 1 battalion of Engineers (1 company present, 3 companies under orders to join), 2 field companies Signal troops, 2 technical companies Signal troops, 1 field hospital, 2 ambulance companies.

It will be observed that the command comprised 1 Infantry division, substantially complete, and 2 Cavalry brigades. The tactical organization of these units would be as follows:

The Infantry Division.

- 3 brigades of Infantry, 3 regiments each.
- 1 brigade of Artillery, 1½ regiments Light and 1 regiment Mountain.
- 1 regiment of divisional Cavalry.
- 1 battalion of Engineers, 4 companies.
- 2 field companies Signal troops.
- 1 field hospital.
- 1 ambulance company.

The First Cavalry Brigade.

- 3 regiments of Cavalry.
- 1 battalion of Horse Artillery.

The Second Cavalry Brigade.

- 2 regiments of Cavalry.
- 1 battalion of Horse Artillery.

If these forces should remain in the central territorial region they would ultimately, under the policy proposed by the Secretary of War, be concentrated

¹ This strength is subject to change, as ultimately some of these organizations will be sent to Panama or Oahu.

in a few closely allied groups of stations, as follows: 3 Infantry brigade commands, each command comprising a full Infantry brigade and a detachment of divisional Field Artillery and Cavalry; 2 Cavalry brigade commands, each command comprising two or more regiments of Cavalry with one or more batteries of Horse Artillery.

The bulk of the divisional Artillery could be distributed among the brigade commands or could be concentrated at some place like Fort Sill, where experimental Artillery practice would be practicable. The Engineers, Sanitary troops, Signal troops, and other auxiliaries would be attached to groups where most convenient.

It is obvious that with this arrangement there would be a maximum economy of administration and maximum facilities for training. It is also obvious that under such an arrangement the division and cavalry brigades would be most promptly available for war or for expeditionary purposes. The territorial commander in his peace administration would be concerned with 6 or 7 stations instead of 22 stations, as at present. All of the troops could be concentrated for active service with a minimum of friction and all would be prepared for such service by their peace training. The Infantry division, when assembled, would assemble under the general officers who had trained the brigades in peace, and the Cavalry brigades would be definite organizations in peace and war.

But while the advantages of this organization are obvious it can serve as little more than a goal of future policy, for under actual conditions the troops are not only dispersed, but are so mixed that not even a reenforced brigade can be assembled without splitting up the peace organization and then extemporizing a new command. The situation becomes apparent upon an examination of the actual peace organization which follows:

6. THE PRESENT SUBDIVISION OF COMMANDS IN THE CENTRAL TERRITORIAL DIVISION.

On February 20, 1912, the mobile troops of the Central Division were subdivided for command as follows:

The Department of the Lakes.—4½ regiments of Infantry, 1 battery of Field Artillery, 1 squadron of Cavalry.

These troops are scattered in 6 posts extending from Michigan to North Dakota.

The Department of the Missouri.—2 regiments of Infantry (each regiment lacked 1 battalion, which was stationed in some other department), 2 regiments of Cavalry; 1 field company, signal troops; 2 technical companies, signal troops.

These troops are scattered in 6 posts, extending from Iowa to Wyoming.

The Department of Texas.—1½ regiments of Infantry; 1½ regiments of Cavalry; 1 regiment of Field Artillery (less 1 battalion); 1 regiment of Field Artillery (less 1 battery).

These troops are scattered in 6 posts, extending from Arkansas to New Mexico.

Brigade Post No. 1 (Fort D. A. Russell).—1 regiment of Infantry; 1 regiment of Cavalry; 1 regiment of Mountain Artillery; 1 field company, signal troops; 1 field hospital; 1 ambulance company.

Brigade Post No. 2 (Fort Riley).—1 regiment of Cavalry; 1 regiment of Horse Artillery.

Brigade Post No. 3 (Fort Leavenworth).—1 regiment of Infantry; 1 squadron of Cavalry; 1 battalion of Engineers (1 company present, the other 3 en route to join); 1 ambulance company.

Each of the above detachments is to be commanded by a brigadier general, but it will be observed that not a single detachment is the appropriate command for an officer of that rank. An Infantry brigade could be formed in the Department of the Lakes, but if it should go to the front under the department commander there would be a residue of $1\frac{1}{2}$ regiments of Infantry, 1 squadron of Cavalry, and 1 battery of Field Artillery left in the department without a department commander. To form a second Infantry brigade another department commander would leave his command, but in this case it would be necessary to disrupt 2 or more of the peace commands in order to find him a brigade.

Under the present policy of administration by territorial divisions all administration is concentrated in the hands of the division commander and the department commanders have been restricted to the tactical supervision and instruction of the troops assigned to them. This is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, for the difficulties of mobilization above indicated would be greatly increased if each of the brigadier generals were absorbed, as formerly, in purely administrative duties. The assignment of tactical duties to brigadier generals is sound in principle and conforms to the practice of all well-organized armies. But, in order to secure the desired advantages, it is essential that the brigadier general be assigned an appropriate command and one that he will continue to command in the field. If he be assigned such a command he will prepare it for war and the relation between the leader and troops will be established in peace. But to give him a command that can not approximate to war conditions, one in fact that must be disrupted on mobilization, is not a step toward sound organization.

An examination of the subdivision of command in the Central Division will show that the present organization does not meet the required conditions. The Department of the Missouri comprises four battalions of Infantry and two full regiments of Cavalry. No military situation is conceivable that would continue this affiliation in war. It is not a brigade, because it is not homogeneous. A brigadier general's proper command is a brigade of his own arm. If such a brigade is together, he can command it and instruct it to great advantage. But even if it be dispersed he can at least inspect it, supervise its instruction, and prepare the plans for its mobilization and concentration. The only thing definite that can be said of the force under the commander of the Department of the Missouri is that the peace-command unit will cease to exist when war comes. It is an organization without tactical stability, and it is not even a proper inspection unit for a brigadier general. A Cavalry brigadier general is the proper tactical inspector and instructor of a Cavalry brigade, and an Infantry brigadier general is the proper tactical inspector and instructor of an Infantry brigade.

7. A PLAN OF TACTICAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION ADAPTED TO THE PRESENT DISPERSION OF THE MOBILE ARMY.

Under the policy of concentration proposed by the Secretary of War the commands will ultimately be segregated so that they can be administered tactically, but the practical question is to find some method of administration that will preserve a logical tactical organization during the period of transition. The Infantry division and the two Cavalry brigades in the Central Division should be tactical entities, even if they are dispersed and mixed. There should be some means of forming an organization in which the several brigades can have the guidance and supervision of their appropriate commanders in time of peace. The solution seems to lie in a recognition of the fact that the territorial region ac-

tually contains three Infantry brigades, two Cavalry brigades, and one Field Artillery brigade. Here are the proper commands, or inspection districts, for six brigadier generals, three of Infantry, two of Cavalry, and one of Field Artillery. It is impracticable to segregate the six brigades immediately, but it is not impracticable to make each brigadier general the inspector and tactical supervisor of a brigade of his own arm. The territorial region now comprises precisely that number of brigade commanders, but not one of these brigade commanders is identified with a logical brigade unit.

The administration of the several posts is already in the hands of the territorial commander. The brigadier generals have become tactical inspectors, but are apportioned by geographical areas, and without reference to the composition of the troops under them. It would seem that a real tactical administration could be accomplished in the following manner:

1. Let each post be considered as a *detachment* directly under the territorial commander. This meets all administrative requirements.

2. Let the troops of the several arms be formed into brigades with a brigadier general or colonel of the proper arm assigned as the inspector of each brigade. While the brigade remains dispersed in several posts the brigade commander inspects it, supervises its tactical instruction under the orders of the territorial commander, and prepares to lead it into the field if it is called out for expeditionary purposes. As soon as the brigade is actually assembled under the policy of concentration, the brigade commander will be stationed with it, but during the transition he will at least keep the unit formed as an organized tactical entity.

3. The number of brigades should be determined by the number of regiments and not by the number of available brigadier generals. If not enough general officers are provided, the senior colonel of the brigade should perform the function of brigade inspector.

4. The organization of the staff of the territorial command should be based on a recognition of the separateness of the territorial and tactical functions of the commander. As a territorial commander he is concerned with posts, reservations, administrations, and supply. As a tactical commander he is concerned with the constituent brigades and special units of his command. One function is territorial and fixed, the other is mobile and goes with troops.

5. In the mobile army, the assignment of regiments to brigades for purposes of tactical supervision and inspection should supersede the present territorial departments. They are no longer necessary for administrative purposes, and as inspection districts they are illogical because they do not include logical tactical commands.

6. The only necessary territorial unit is the department proposed herein as a substitute for the "territorial division." The brigade commanders are the tactical assistants of this territorial commander. If a special tactical situation develops within a territorial command such as the recent crisis along the Mexican border, it is only necessary for the territorial commander to assign the local military problem to one of his brigadier generals. That officer will ordinarily employ all or part of his own brigade, but under such circumstances all the troops in the region will be assigned to his command and additional troops will be forwarded to him if necessary.

7. The brigade commander, in addition to inspecting and supervising the instruction of his brigade, should be responsible for its mobilization and concentration. The brigade under this plan is a continuing unit in peace and war. Under present conditions every organization above the regiment must be extemporized.

8. The proposed arrangement provides a tactical organization even under the present unsatisfactory distribution. As the distribution is corrected under the policy of the War Department, the brigade-inspection districts will become more compact and ultimately will become concentrated brigade commands.

9. The proposed arrangement provides the basis for an organization applicable alike to the Regular Army regarded as an expeditionary force and as the nucleus of the greater war army. Each brigadier general is definitely identified with a brigade of the expeditionary force and is also available to assist the territorial commander in the solution of the broader problems connected with the development of all the military resources within the limits of the territorial command.

It is therefore recommended:

(1) That the Coast Artillery districts within the United States be formed into three Coast Artillery Inspections, as outlined in this memorandum.

(2) That the territorial departments, as now organized within the United States, be abolished, that the term department be applied to the three large territorial commands now known as "divisions," and that the mobile troops now serving therein be organized for purposes of inspection, supervision, and mobilization into brigade inspections of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery.

(3) That there should be a brigade inspection for each tactical brigade of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery, and that to each brigade inspection there should be assigned a brigade commander or inspector of the rank of brigadier general or of colonel if sufficient general officers are not available.

(4) That the brigade commanders herein provided should be responsible for the tactical inspection and mobilization of their several brigades and should be available for such other duties as may be assigned to them by the commander of the territorial department.

(5) That the brigade commanders herein provided should be assigned to appropriate stations by the commander of the territorial department in which their brigades may be serving.

The application of these principles to the peace organization of the mobile army is shown in detail in Chapter VIII of this report.

S. QUARTERING AND ADMINISTERING THE MOBILE TROOPS IN PEACE.

Having properly organized the mobile troops and located the elements of brigades and divisions so that they may be periodically assembled for combined training, the next step is to simplify all details of administration and remove unnecessary distractions, so that attention may be concentrated on training. Administration becomes unduly cumbersome, and many distractions are caused, at the present time, on account of the fact that the troops are generally located in what may be called garrison villages, involving a most elaborate variety of buildings, parkways, roads, sewer and water systems, etc. A great deal of the energy of troops is required to care for these elaborate establishments. When our troops were scattered throughout the western country, it was necessary to provide these isolated posts. Under existing conditions it is believed that the rational and economic way of disposing of our troops in time of peace is to quarter them in simple, but substantial buildings in or near large towns, where all existing utilities may be made use of; and to build these quarters in such a manner that the minimum of time and attention will be required for their maintenance and upkeep. It is believed that if thus located and quartered, a better class of enlisted men may be secured for Army service; that all necessary elementary instruction can be given in the barrack yard, or within

a short marching distance of the barracks; and that for more advanced training the troops should be marched to places where a large amount of varied territory may be available.

CHAPTER V.

THE NECESSITY OF A RESERVE SYSTEM.

1. MAINTENANCE OF STRENGTH IN WAR.

An army is an expensive machine maintained in order to support national interests in time of emergency. The economic efficiency of an army should therefore be measured by the effective fighting power which it is proposed to develop and maintain in war. It must not only be able to develop a high fighting efficiency at the outbreak of war, but it must be able to maintain that efficiency during the progress of the campaign. As soon as war begins military forces are subject to heavy losses, and unless means are definitely provided for replacing these losses the military machine will immediately deteriorate. The losses in war are not only the losses in battle, but losses due to disease and losses due to the hardship of campaign. The Prussian Guard Corps in its marches to Sedan lost 5,000 men on the march alone. It was necessary for the corps to arrive at the battle field in time, and that required a velocity of march that was more destructive than battle. It should be remembered that the soldiers in this force were trained soldiers and that the guard corps arrived and fought at Sedan in spite of its march losses. A force of soft or raw troops could not have arrived at all. Careful training is necessary to prepare troops for war; but it must be recognized that wastage will occur and that if a really effective force is to be maintained trained men must be supplied to replace this wastage.

It is the experience of modern warfare that any given unit loses at least 50 per cent of its strength in the first six months of war. If this loss is not replaced, there is 50 per cent deterioration in the power of the unit; and if it is replaced by raw men, the quality of the force as a highly trained team is destroyed.

This problem has an important economic aspect that has been ignored throughout our military history. Military forces are maintained at great expense through long periods of peace in order to meet a brief emergency in war. Sound economics, therefore, demands that the peace expenditure be justified by unquestioned war efficiency. A company of Infantry with three officers should contain the maximum number of trained riflemen that three capable officers can command. This maximum appears to be about 150 men; but if the company starts in the campaign with 150 men, the natural wastage of war will immediately reduce it below that number. If the vacancies are not filled, it ceases to be an economical company, because under these conditions we have a less number of men than three trained officers should control; and, on the other hand, if the vacancies are filled by untrained men, the company ceases to be a trained team, as under these conditions the three officers can not effectively command 150 men in action.

The United States is the only nation that has no scientific means of meeting this situation. In all of our wars the companies first sent into the field have dwindled away in strength, and as these units have dwindled away new levies under untrained officers have been organized. The result has been that our wars have been long and protracted and attended by great sacrifices of blood and treasure. Each battle has generally been followed by a period of inactivity. Such an army has no power to keep up persistent military activity.

Without some solution of this problem there can be no definite military organization. The organization of divisions and other higher military units is based on the principle that the three arms should be combined in definite proportions. The Infantry division is differently organized in different countries, but in all countries it consists of from 10,000 to 15,000 infantrymen, with from 4 to 6 field guns per thousand rifles, and with similar definite proportions of cavalry, engineers, signal troops, and other auxiliaries. The infantry strength is the basis of organization. In every army except our own the number of infantrymen is definite and fixed, because means of replacing losses are provided in time of peace. With us, however, the infantry strength is an absolute variable. We can only predict that the effective strength of each unit will fall after war begins. Under these conditions the division is not a continuing unit. Its components are fluid and indefinite, and there can be no stable organization under such conditions.

2. THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

The solution of this problem is very simple, and it is a significant fact that the same solution has been adopted in all modern armies. It is only necessary to provide that a man's army service shall consist of two periods, one period with the colors and the other a period of war obligation for a limited time after leaving active service. Under these circumstances when war is declared the active army is at once sent into the field and the former soldiers having a war obligation are assembled in depots, where they can be forwarded to the front as needed. At the same time raw recruits are enlisted and trained at the depot. As losses occur at the front, they are filled first by forwarding trained men from the depot, and if the number of these is sufficient new recruits are not forwarded until after they have had a sufficient period of training. The result is that even in a long war, which would ultimately require the services of thousands of raw recruits, it is so arranged that no man goes to the front until he is trained for active service and sufficiently hardened and disciplined to bear the stress of modern war. Under such a system the full energy of military activity can be maintained up to the limit of available recruits. Each unit works at its maximum efficiency, and the war power of the nation is developed with a minimum expenditure of life and money.

It thus appears that an army reserve is not a means of creating new forces or new units in time of war, but is a necessary means of maintaining the war strength of the peace establishment, such as it may be.

3. POWER OF EXPANSION.

But while one of the primary and necessary functions of a reserve system is to replace losses during the period required for the training of raw recruits, the principal function is to furnish the trained men necessary to pass from a peace to a war footing. If we have a reserve of trained men upon whom we can count in war, it is possible greatly to reduce the cost of the military establishment by giving it a minimum peace strength. Under our system our units are maintained in peace at considerably less than war strength, but there are no means of expanding to the war strength except by the absorption of untrained men. In every other modern army the economical peace strength is maintained without loss of war efficiency because trained reserves are available for a prompt expansion with trained men.

The effect of the reserve system on the cost of peace establishments can be illustrated in the following way: Let us suppose that we require a regular army of 100,000 men on the outbreak of war and that we propose to maintain this force in full effectiveness throughout the campaign. This requires that means should be provided for avoiding a deterioration of the force due to the absorption of raw recruits to replace the first losses of the campaign. It may be predicted that the losses will be 50 per cent, or 50,000 men, in the first six months, but before the expiration of six months, if we begin training recruits at once, some of the new men will be prepared to go to the front. We may, therefore, adopt a factor of safety of 25 per cent instead of 50 per cent and assume that the maintenance of 100,000 men will require an initial organized strength of 125,000 men if there be no reserves. Under conditions prevailing in the United States this force would cost probably \$800 per man, or \$100,000,000 per year.

But, if we had a system of reserves, the same effective war strength could be maintained at a greatly reduced cost. If the military establishment comprised 75,000 men with the colors and 50,000 men with the reserve, its cost would not exceed \$65,000,000 per year, and yet its war effectiveness would be just as great as the more expensive force without the reserves.

The economic effect of a reserve system, therefore, is to reduce the per capita cost of any given army at the same time assuring maximum effectiveness in war. If we do not have reserves, we are committed to a policy of maximum cost. It has been urged that a reserve system for the Regular Army is essentially foreign to our institutions and connected in some way with compulsory military service. It is true that the nations having a system of compulsory service also have a reserve system, but it is also true that Great Britain regards her regular army reserve as an indispensable part of her system of voluntary service. Great Britain did not adopt the reserve system until after her army broke down in the Crimean War because reserves were lacking. Her highly trained, long-service army almost immediately melted away. There was no way of renewing its strength except with untrained men. She found that without reserves her army was not adapted to the requirements of war.

The provision of a regular army reserve is purely a business proposition. The economic value of the reserve does not depend in any way upon its size. It is to be hoped that we can develop a sufficient reserve, but even a small reserve will reduce the per capita cost of the army and increase its effectiveness.

If we had had only 6,000 men, that number would have been sufficient to have raised the recent San Antonio maneuver division to war strength. If we should have enough to replace the initial losses of war, we would be assured of sufficient time to train and harden raw recruits before forwarding them to the front. If we should have enough more to give us some power of expansion, we would be able to reduce the per capita cost of our peace establishment to a minimum without loss of war efficiency.

4. PROPOSED PLAN FOR A REGULAR ARMY RESERVE.

In adopting a new policy in our Army it is important that present conditions should not be disturbed more violently than necessary. The present term of enlistment is three years and our men are accustomed to enlisting for that period of active service. It is therefore believed that in adopting a reserve system the normal period with the colors should be taken as three years. It is also important that the enlistment contract should be definite in so far as it

affects the obligations assumed by the recruit. The important thing is to take a step toward the new policy, leaving its perfection to the experience of the future.

It is therefore recommended that the enlistment contract be for 6 years, with the understanding that the first three years are to be served with the colors and that during the last 3 years the man shall be furloughed to a reserve, where he shall be subject to duty in time of war only. It should be further understood that men so furloughed should not be included in the authorized peace strength of the Army.

But while the definite agreement is to be for three years with the colors and 3 with the reserve, the Government should have the option of modifying these periods in its discretion and upon the application of the man. The man should have the *privilege* of applying to go to the reserve *before* the expiration of three years, the granting of the privilege to be at the option of the Government. So far as the man is concerned, this is a privilege but not a right. The man should also have the *privilege* of applying to remain with the colors for *more* than three years, at the discretion of the Government. This is also a privilege and not a right. The right to go to the reserve at the end of three years is absolute, but the privilege of going at any other time or of remaining longer is to be at the option of the Government. If a man of good character desires to go to the reserve at the end of one year, if he has sufficient training to be a good reservist, and if recruiting conditions are favorable for replacing him by a new man, it is undoubtedly to the interest of the Government to pass him to the reserve.

On the other hand, if a man desires to remain longer than three years with the colors, it may be to the public interest to grant his request, especially if at the time considered there is difficulty in obtaining recruits. This system will give great flexibility without sacrificing definiteness in the recruiting contract. Practically under any system the number of men that may be passed to the reserve before the expiration of the three-year period will depend upon whether their vacancies can be filled by new recruits, for the peace strength must be maintained. If only a few men desire to enlist, it will only be practicable to send a few to the reserve before their regular term. If a large number desire to enlist, it will be practicable, at that time, to send the maximum number to the reserve, and it will always be in the public interest to send as many to the reserve as may be done without loss of the necessary peace strength. The ideal solution would be obtained if recruiting conditions should permit the adoption of the following policy:

1. No extension of the color period or reenlistment except for the noncommissioned officers, who must form part of the permanent machine for training purposes, with enough selected privates to maintain the corps of noncommissioned officers.

2. Reduction of the color period for all sufficiently trained men who apply to pass to the reserve before the expiration of the contract period of three years.

The actual conditions can be met by a definite contract of three years with the colors and three years with the reserve, with discretion in the President to prescribe regulations for the reduction or extension of the contract color period in order to meet the special requirements of the several arms of the service.

The President should also have the power, when funds for the purpose have been appropriated by Congress, to order reservists to military posts or camps for target practice or other instruction for not to exceed 10 days in any one year.

5. THE RELATION OF THE RESERVE SYSTEM TO FOREIGN SERVICE.

The proposed system will also meet the special circumstances of home service or foreign service. No new or special enlistment contract will be necessary, but as the Government interest is different in the two cases, there would simply be a difference in governmental policy. When a man enlists for service in the Philippines he would be held strictly to three years' color service. It would not be to the public interest in this case to pass him to the reserve before the full term of his contract has expired, and, on the other hand, in this case it would be to the public interest to permit him to extend his contract to the full 6 years if he applied to do so. In other words, a short color service and a long reserve service is desirable at home, because the home army must have power of expansion; and long color service and a short reserve service is desirable in the foreign garrisons, because they do not have power of expansion. Either condition is met by the flexible reserve system proposed. But while, as a general rule, it would not be desirable to shorten the period of color service in the foreign garrisons, it would probably be very desirable to do so in the case of those reservists who desire to settle in the foreign possession. If a soldier in Oahu should assume the reserve status in Oahu, it would be most decidedly to the public interest to encourage him to live there, and replace him by another recruit. This is true because in the event of war every former soldier residing in Oahu will positively increase our war power in that island.

6. UNORGANIZED RESERVES.

There are two aspects of the reserve problem. In order to have reserves we must have reserve material, and we must also provide some means of utilizing this material. Under present conditions the soldiers who pass into civil life are military reserves. No means are provided for utilizing them, but the fact that they exist in civil life is nevertheless a positive military asset. It is, therefore, evident that any policy which tends to reduce the total number of these men is prejudicial to our interest, whether we have an organized reserve system or not. For this reason a long enlistment period is contrary to the national military interest. An officer who has considered the enlistment question purely from the standpoint of his own company or regiment has only examined one phase, and a very minor one, of the question. So long as he approaches it from this point of view he naturally prefers a long enlistment and as many reenlistments as possible. This requires the minimum number of new recruits to train, and gives him a company which requires a minimum of effort on the part of the officer. But for lack of trained men to supply wastage such a company will rapidly deteriorate in war. It is not believed that any officer who has studied the question of enlistment from the standpoint of broad national interest will advocate a long enlistment without a reserve feature.

It has been urged that it is not necessary to organize a Regular Army reserve, because discharged soldiers can be used to best advantage in the National Guard or in Volunteers. But such use of them does not meet the real problem of maintaining losses in the Regular Army, and this is the true function of such men. As we maintain a Regular Army and expect to use it in war we must provide some means of keeping it at effective strength in war. We not only desire to use these men in war, but we should be able to control and predetermine the place where they are to be used. They have been trained by the Regular Army, they are accustomed to Regular Army service, and in most cases

they are not attracted to the National Guard. They should be available for immediate absorption in the strategic force with which we desire to secure the initiative in war.

7. STATUS OF THE RESERVIST.

The law should give the reserve soldier a status of furlough. He should be regarded as a regular soldier, who, after a period of training, is released except for war purposes. He should be required to report his address from time to time, and should be kept informed as to the place where he is to report upon mobilization. At the time of these stated reports he should receive a nominal pay, but the hold of the Government upon him should be based upon the furlough status rather than upon the money consideration. If he fails to comply with the conditions of the furlough status, the furlough should be revoked and he should be returned to the ordinary conditions of military service. It has been suggested that keeping track of reservists would involve great difficulties. There would no doubt be practical questions to solve, but none of the difficulties would seem to be insuperable. It is expected that these difficulties will be reduced in the future. With permanent regiments on foreign service, the regiments at home will be localized, and where regiments are stationed in populous districts, there is no reason why the reservists in such districts should not be assigned directly to regiments. In this way such organizations will keep in touch with their own reservists. If a reserve system is authorized, the means of carrying it into effect should be made as flexible as possible and left to the discretion of the Secretary of War.

8. SPECIAL RESERVES.

The main function of the Regular Army reserve is to raise the Regular Army to war strength and to maintain its war strength until raw recruits can be prepared for service at the front. Ordinarily, it should not be called out except when war is imminent, but it would be a great advantage if the President could be given the power to call out sufficient reserves at any time to raise a small expeditionary force to war strength.

While the reserves should normally contain only those men who are completing their Regular Army service, provision should be made for the voluntary reenlistment of reservists for another stated period, provided such volunteers have the necessary physical qualifications and training—regulations governing such reenlistments to be determined by the Secretary of War.

There should also be provisions for enlistment in the reserve of soldiers who may have been discharged from the Army before the inauguration of the reserve system. It is believed that a considerable number of these men would assume the war obligation if there were some definite means of offering their services. Such enlistments, of course, should be subject to medical examination and a scrutiny of the record of the particular man.

9. RESERVE OFFICERS.

The reserve system outlined above is designed to maintain the effective and economical enlisted strength, but it makes no provision for the increased number of officers that will become necessary in war. In modern military operations the loss of officers is fully as great as the loss of enlisted men, and further, under our system it will become necessary to detach officers from the regular establishment for staff duty and for employment with the citizen soldiery. The successful maintenance of large companies requires the presence of the full

quota of officers and the whole machine breaks down if suitable men are not forthcoming.

The lack of some provision of this kind is one of the greatest defects in our military system. This defect has been recognized to a certain extent in the amended militia law, which provides that individuals who pass certain examinations may be placed on a list of persons available for appointment as volunteer officers in war. In the volunteer bill (S. 2518) now pending in the Senate it is provided that when officers are detached from the Regular Army on duty with the Volunteers their vacancies may be filled by the assignment of a corresponding number of Volunteer officers to the regular organizations. But neither of these provisions meets the specific requirement of providing a reserve of junior officers for the organizations in the Regular Army. And yet there is an abundance of such material which can easily be made available. We maintain military instructors at a great many schools and colleges in the country on the theory that such military training will become a military asset in war, and yet the young men who graduate at such institutions pass out into civil life without any definite place for them in our military establishment. They may in some cases go into the National Guard, some of them may enter the regular service, and some of them, no doubt, may find a place in the volunteer armies of the future, but the prospect of employing them is vague and contingent upon a great variety of uncertain conditions.

It is believed that it would be in the interest of sound policy to utilize young men of this type as reserve lieutenants in the Regular Army. Upon their graduation opportunities could be given them to serve with regular organizations at camps of instruction or maneuvers. After such probationary service, if found to be properly qualified, they could be commissioned for a limited number of years under an obligation to serve in war. This class of reserve officers would be recruited mainly from the schools and colleges, but the appointments should be open to other suitable classes, such as former members of the Regular Army, Volunteers, and National Guard who comply with proper conditions to be determined by the Secretary of War. These reserve lieutenants would be analogous to the officers of the Medical Reserve Corps of the Army. They should be definitely commissioned, assigned to an arm, and authorized to wear the uniform of that arm. Their names should be carried in the Army Register, and under certain conditions they should be attached to definite organizations of the Regular Army, serving in the neighborhood of their homes. They should receive no pay except when called into the service, but should have the privilege of serving at maneuvers and of volunteering as members of expeditionary forces. They should also be regarded as a preferred class from which civilian appointments in the Regular Army should be made. The value of such a force in war would be incalculable. By having a full quota of officers it would always be possible to maintain the maximum economical strength of the Regular Army. They would replace losses due to the ordinary casualties in war and would enable the Regular Army to spare more officers for employment in the greater war force. On the outbreak of war the reserve lieutenants should mobilize with the reserves and should proceed to the front as the reserves are called to the front. At the depots they could assist in recruiting and in the training of recruits and would perform many functions which must be left to chance under our present system. It is also believed that such reserve commissions would be appreciated as an honor by the best type of young men and that it would be no more than a proper reward to them for giving a part of their college training to preparation for military service in war.

There are now over 300 lieutenants of the Army on detached service. If the law authorized the President to put on active duty not to exceed 300 of these reserve officers to fill the places of lieutenants necessarily absent on detached service it would enable these reserve officers to obtain practical instruction and it would facilitate the administration of the organizations concerned.

Attention is invited to the availability of the Military Academy at West Point as a source of supply of reserve officers and to the wisdom of making this source available. The Academy as now conducted handles between six and seven hundred cadets. Its capacity for efficient training is much more than that number and, like any investment, the institution is not making the returns it should to the country unless its output is the maximum possible. Existing or probable vacancies in the Regular Army should not be considered in this connection. Existing vacancies could be given to graduates under an equitable plan, while the remaining graduates could return to their homes under an obligation to serve in the Regular Army, National Guard, or Volunteers. They would have the foundation of an education for any walk in life. In a few years the country would have in these graduates a corps of reserve officers with uniform training and uniform ideas regarding efficiency and duty.

10. RESERVES FOR THE CITIZEN SOLDIERY.

When the citizen soldiery is called into the service of the United States, it, too, will encounter influences that will tend to reduce its strength. It should have sufficient reserves to maintain full strength until raw recruits can be prepared for the front, and unless its organizations are maintained at full strength in time of peace, it should have enough other reservists to cover the expansion upon mobilization. Under present law, however, the Organized Militia bases its organization upon that of the Regular Army, and until a reserve system is provided for the Regular Army, arguments for a National Guard reserve would not be convincing or effective.

Under present conditions the citizen soldiery will mobilize at greatly reduced enlisted strength. It must go to the front with an expensive excess of officers in proportion to its effective strength, or its employment must be deferred until it can absorb a great mass of untrained and undisciplined material. In Chapter IX of this report the advantages of a definite peace organization for the citizen soldiery will be presented. Among the objects to be sought through such an organization will be the provision of a uniform peace strength with arrangements for war expansion and for the replacement of losses during the initial stages of war. Through the lack of such arrangements in the past our armies of citizen soldiery have been maintained at maximum cost and minimum effectiveness.

11. PROLONGATION OF THE TERM OF SERVICE IN TIME OF EMERGENCY.

Under present laws, if war is declared, it is possible for many men to demand their discharges for expiration of term or service in the first crisis of war and before they can give the Government any real return for the cost of their training. Some nations meet this contingency by reserving the right to retain soldiers in times of emergency for a limited period beyond their ordinary term of service. While Great Britain has the same system of voluntary service as our own, she reserves the right to "prolong" the service of enlisted men for a limited period upon the imminence of war, this being a condition inserted in the enlistment contract. It is believed that such a provision should be embodied in our military law and that it should be made applicable to the Regular Army

and to the citizen soldiery. After training a man at great expense in time of peace, the Government should have the right to hold him in time of emergency, at least until a raw recruit can be trained to replace him.

12. THE RELATION OF LOCALIZATION TO THE RESERVE PROBLEM AND TO RECRUITMENT.

It has been indicated that the establishment of permanent foreign garrisons will permit localization of the units of the Regular Army at home. This will result in great economies of transportation and will lead to the development of many reforms which are almost impracticable so long as the organizations of the Army are shifted from place to place. The localization of the Army at home will facilitate the development of a reserve system, for where regiments are stationed in the populous parts of the country they will be able, in many cases, to keep in touch directly with their reserves, and also to obtain their recruits locally. The present recruiting system is based on recruiting for a shifting army. The service has been conducted with great ability and meets actual conditions, but it is wasteful and expensive as compared with a system of local recruiting for a localized army. Under present conditions the recruiting service comprises a total enlisted strength of 2,200 men. In addition there are not to exceed 4,800 recruits at the depots. These men are not immediately available as part of organized tactical units and constitute an element of waste in the military establishment. Wherever a regiment is so stationed that it can secure its own recruits in its own locality it is obvious that the enlisted strength of the recruiting service can be correspondingly reduced. If all of the regiments of the Army were able to obtain their recruits locally, it is obvious that all of these men could be restored to the effective strength of the Army. It is not contended that this reform can or should be attempted immediately, but as the Army becomes localized, it should be gradually accomplished. Under present conditions men are discharged at all periods of the year, and small detachments of recruits are received throughout the year. Under these conditions there can be no definite period of recruit training. Under ideal conditions, with a reserve system and localized recruiting, it would be possible for a regiment to pass all of its reservists to the reserve about the 1st of November, and then devote itself for a few weeks to the problem of obtaining new recruits. This would make the winter a period of recruiting and recruit training, and would make it possible to devote all of the summer and fall to higher military training without the evils of a continual influx of recruits. Practically, it may be impossible to recruit the whole Army in this way, but every step toward it will tend to increase the efficiency of the Army, and to diminish the large detachments of noneffectives, which, under present conditions, must be maintained in order to keep up the strength of the Army.

VI.

THE TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OF MOBILE TROOPS.

The division is the fundamental army unit in which the several arms are combined for joint action in the field. It is essentially a small army complete in itself and capable of independent action. Larger forces, such as field armies, are simply aggregations of two or more divisions, with such additional auxiliaries as may be required for the particular terrain and mission.

The details of division organization are different in different countries, but the essential idea is that a division is a force of Infantry provided with a proper proportion of field artillery and cavalry and supported by certain special units which are concerned with the special problems of field engineering, communication, transportation, supply, and sanitation.

1. INFANTRY.

Under our system the company of Infantry at war strength should comprise the maximum number of trained riflemen that can be handled effectively in action by three officers. This number appears to be about 128 men, or 16 squads of 8 men each. As there will always be losses from casualties, the total strength will not be available on the firing line, and for this reason 8 additional riflemen should be added to the war strength as a reasonable factor of safety. In order to give the desired strength the following is recommended as the war organization of the infantry company: 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1 first sergeant, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 6 sergeants, 16 corporals, 3 cooks, 1 artificer, 2 musicians, 120 privates; total commissioned, 3; total enlisted, 150.

The peace strength of the company of Infantry is governed by several considerations:

1. It is desirable for fiscal reasons to reduce the peace strength to a minimum. But such reductions of strength are fatal to war efficiency unless means are provided for expansion without the absorption of raw recruits. If the war expansion is to be by raw recruits, the war company will not be a trained company, and it will therefore be impracticable for three officers to control 150 men effectively.

2. Even if reserves are available, the peace strength of the company should be sufficient for purposes of instruction. The men who serve in the Army must become trained soldiers, and full Infantry training is not practicable if the peace strength be reduced too far. It is believed that for purposes of instruction the peace strength of the Infantry company should not be reduced below 100 enlisted men.

3. If trained reserves are not available, at least one division of the Regular Army should be maintained at war strength in order to provide an expeditionary force for sudden emergencies.

THE INFANTRY BATTALION.

The war strength of the Infantry battalion should be as follows: 1 major, 1 lieutenant (adjutant), 1 sergeant major, 4 companies, 2 ammunition wagons; total commissioned officers, 14; total enlisted, 601.

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY.

In order to avoid unnecessary detachments from the companies and to provide a definite organization for machine guns, scouts, and the regimental wagon train, a headquarters company is recommended for each regiment of Infantry, as follows: 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1 first sergeant, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 2 cooks, 2 musicians, 1 mechanic, 1 horseshoer; total enlisted, 8.

First section; machine-gun detachment.—4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 69 privates; total enlisted, 81.

Second section; scouts and orderlies.—1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 21 privates; total enlisted men, 24.

Third section; transportation section.—1 sergeant, 25 privates; total enlisted men, 26.¹

Total commissioned, headquarters company, 3; total enlisted, 139.

The three officers of the headquarters company may be provided without increasing the present commissioned strength of the regiment. As will be seen in the organization of the battalion and regimental staffs, three officers are released from staff duty. This gives a captain and two lieutenants for the headquarters company.

THE REGIMENTAL BAND.

The present authorized strength of the band is 28 enlisted. No change is recommended.

THE INFANTRY REGIMENT.

With the changes above proposed the war strength of the Infantry regiment would be as follows:

	Com- mis- sioned.	Enlisted.
1 colonel.....	1
1 lieutenant colonel.....	1
1 adjutant (captain).....	1
1 supply officer (captain).....	1
1 assistant supply officer (lieutenant).....	1
1 chaplain.....	1
1 sergeant major.....		1
2 supply sergeants.....		2
2 color sergeants.....		2
1 band.....		28
1 headquarters company.....	3	139
3 battalions.....	42	1,803
Total.....	51	1,975

The above table gives the approximate organization of the infantry regiment. The details of organization will be definitely and precisely determined in the experimental infantry regiment to be assembled in the Central Division during the present summer.

2. THE INFANTRY BRIGADE AND THE DIVISION.

In the Field Service Regulations the Infantry division comprises three brigades of three regiments each. The total Infantry strength in this division is 13,500 (1,500 enlisted per regiment), and the total number of effective riflemen is 10,890. Nine regiments of the size proposed in this report will give a total enlisted strength of 17,775 and 15,084 effective riflemen. As the larger regiment is justified on grounds of economy, the practical question arises as to whether we should retain nine regiments in the division or propose a new division organization. A division of two brigades of three regiments each would give a total Infantry strength of 11,850, or 10,056 effective rifles. But this organization would sacrifice tactical advantages inherent in the three brigades. In the attack of the division there are generally three subdivisions—the frontal attack, the enveloping attack, and the reserve. In a three-brigade division there is a general officer for each subdivision, even though the forces assigned to the several tasks are not kept equal.

¹The relation of these men to such service corps as may be established in the future requires careful consideration.

Another consideration which determines the strength of the division is the road space. In Europe, where the roads are excellent, an army corps of two divisions, each comprising 12,000 infantry, is found to be the maximum force that can deploy from column in time to bring all of its troops into battle on the same day. The same corps could not complete its deployment from a single road in the average American terrain until it was too late for the effective employment of a part of the force. The road space of the Field Service Regulations division is so great that two divisions could not effectively deploy from the same road in this manner; and, on the other hand, if one such division is assigned to one road, the road capacity is not fully utilized. But if we retain the nine-regiment division and increase the regimental strength from 1,500 men to 1,975, we increase the number of effective rifles by 38 per cent without increasing the road space by more than 16 per cent. We, therefore, find that a division of three brigades of three regiments each, with 1,975 enlisted men per regiment, is a more economical organization than the division described in the Field Service Regulations, and is better adapted to American terrains. The proportions of Cavalry, Field Artillery, and special troops will now be considered on the assumption that the division is to comprise three Infantry brigades of three regiments each, and that each regiment is to have an enlisted strength of approximately 1,975.

3. CAVALRY.

As far as Cavalry action of the future is concerned, the organization of this arm must facilitate (*a*) quick and powerful dismounted fire action and (*b*) equally quick and powerful mounted shock action. At the same time the organization must be so flexible that it will permit the assignment of proper units as divisional Cavalry—first, to meet the requirements of a division as part of a higher tactical organization and, second, with a division or smaller unit acting alone. In addition, the organization must be adapted to the formation of Cavalry brigades and divisions.

The amount of Cavalry assigned any particular command will depend upon many considerations, such as the nature of the particular mission, the character of the terrain, and the composition of the enemy's forces.

Of the Cavalry so assigned, the nature of the operations may require a minimum number of units as divisional Cavalry and a maximum number as independent Cavalry.

Not only must the organization of the Cavalry regiment be so flexible as to meet all these requirements, but the organization decided upon must possess a high degree of mobility, and must be adaptable to varying tactical situations.

The present Cavalry regiment has a total war strength of approximately 1,200 enlisted men. As now organized it is so flexible that it can be formed to meet almost any particular tactical situation. A squadron of four troops can be detached and the remainder will form an appropriate command for a colonel. If a detachment of three troops is all that is required, the remaining troops can be handled as three squadrons of three troops each. If it becomes necessary for the regiment to operate in two equal parts each part can consist of six troops organized into two squadrons.

The same number of troopers might be organized into a brigade of two regiments, each of six troops of 100 men, or each of four troops of 150 men. A regiment of three squadrons of three troops, each of 100 men, and with a depot troop, has also been proposed.

The regiment now authorized by law has the following maximum strength :

	Commis- sioned.	Veteri- narian.	Enlisted.
Officers (including chaplain).....	51		
Veterinarians.....		2	
Noncommissioned staff officers.....			8
Band.....			28
12 troops (organized as 3 squadrons).....			1,200
Total.....	51	2	1,236

It is believed that the President should be authorized to add an additional or headquarters troop analogous to that proposed for the Infantry regiment and officered in the same manner. If the maximum authorized strength of the headquarters troop is placed as that of the Cavalry troop now authorized, its actual strength can be determined by service requirements as determined experimentally. The headquarters troop should comprise a demolition section in lieu of the scout section of the infantry headquarters company.

The band might be dispensed with and a trumpet corps organized with the trumpeters of the troops.

With the larger regiment and the road space required for it, a brigade should normally consist of two regiments and a division of three such brigades, the proper auxiliary and special troops being added.

In view of the fact that there has been much discussion throughout the service on the subject of the organization of the cavalry regiment it is recommended that thorough practical experiments be undertaken to enable the General Staff to try out and decide upon the organization best adapted to meet the special requirements of this arm.

Peace strength of the Cavalry.—The permissible peace strength of Cavalry depends on the means of expansion. If reserves are available the troops may be kept at the minimum peace strength consistent with proper instruction. If such reserves are not available a low peace strength will involve a low war strength or serious deterioration in the early stages of a campaign. On the outbreak of war, the Cavalry will probably be used in initial strategic operations, and it is therefore very important that it should be capable of full activity without delay, from the very outset.

4. FIELD ARTILLERY.

The types of Field Artillery are classified as "horse," "light," "mountain," and "heavy."

Horse batteries are armed with the 3-inch gun.

Light batteries are armed with the 3-inch gun or the 3.8-inch howitzer.

Mountain batteries are armed with the 2.95 howitzer (to be replaced by the 3-inch howitzer).

Heavy batteries are armed with the 4.7 howitzer, the 4.7 gun, or the 6-inch howitzer.

The 4.7-inch howitzer, drawn by 8 horses, has very considerable mobility and is really intermediate between the light and heavy calibers.

Horse batteries are assigned for service with the Cavalry.

Light or mountain batteries and 4.7-inch howitzer batteries are assigned for service with Infantry divisions.

Heavy batteries (4.7-inch gun and 6-inch howitzer) are assigned as Army Artillery.

The organization of regiments must vary to fit the requirements of the particular types of guns or howitzers to be served. Hence legal enactments governing the organization of the Field Artillery should be worded so as to fix the maximum allowable establishment and leave it to the President to vary the strength of regiments, battalions, and batteries to meet the necessities of service.

The proposed maximum strengths of regiments, battalions, and batteries at war strength are shown below. The numbers of officers, noncommissioned officers, mechanics, trumpeters, cooks, and privates of any particular unit may, under the system suggested above, be varied as circumstances require, provided they are kept below the maximum allowed.

FIELD BATTERY.¹

1 captain, 3 lieutenants (first or second), 1 first sergeant, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 1 stable sergeant, 8 sergeants, 16 corporals, 1 chief mechanic, 7 mechanics, 3 trumpeters, 3 cooks, 149 privates; total commissioned, 4; total enlisted, 190.

*Field Artillery battalion.*²

	Commiss- ioned.	Enlisted.
Major.....	1
Captain (adjutant).....	1
Lieutenant (supply officer).....	1
Sergeant major.....	1
Quartermaster sergeant.....	1
Scouts and signal detail, mounted orderlies and wagoner:		
Corporals.....	4
Privates.....	10
Trumpeter.....	1
Batteries.....	12	570
Total.....	15	587

*Field Artillery regiment.*³

	Commiss- ioned.	Veteri- narians.	Enlisted.
Colonel.....	1
Lieutenant colonel.....	1
Captain (adjutant).....	1
Captain (supply officer).....	1
Captain (ordnance officer).....	1
Chaplain.....	1
Veterinarians.....	2
Sergeant major.....	1
Quartermaster sergeant.....	1
Commissary sergeant.....	1
Color sergeants.....	2
Trumpeter sergeant.....	1
Scouts and signal detail, mounted orderlies and wagoner:			
Sergeants.....	2
Corporals.....	2
Privates.....	12
Mechanics.....	3
Band.....	29
Battalions.....	45	1,761
Total.....	51	2	1,815

¹ The strength here given is the maximum and is required for heavy batteries only. The strength for batteries of all other types will be less than the maximum strength.

² The enlisted strengths given are for battalions and regiments of heavy field artillery. The strengths for other types will be less than the maximum and will be based on actual requirements.

³ The enlisted strengths given are for battalions and regiments of heavy field artillery. The strengths for other types will be less than the maximum and will be based on actual requirements.

The proposed normal assignment of Field Artillery to units of the other arms is as follows:

For each division:¹

Brigade—

1 regiment of 3 battalions—

1 battalion of 3 batteries of four 3-inch guns..... 12

1 battalion of 3 batteries of four 3-inch guns..... 12

1 battalion of 2 batteries of four 3.8-inch howitzers..... 8

1 regiment of 3 battalions—

1 battalion of 3 batteries of four 3-inch guns..... 12

1 battalion of 3 batteries of four 3-inch guns..... 12

1 battalion of 2 batteries of four 4.7-inch howitzers..... 8

1 ammunition column of 2 battalions.

For each field army in addition to the divisional artillery:

1 regiment of 2 battalions—

1 battalion of 2 batteries of four 4.7-inch guns..... 8

1 battalion of 2 batteries of four 6-inch howitzers..... 8

1 ammunition column of 1 battalion.

For each Cavalry division:

1 regiment of 3 battalions of 2 batteries of 4 guns each..... 24

1 ammunition column of 1 battalion.

The approximate war strengths proposed for each of the regiments above referred to are:

Divisional artillery, 1 regiment, 47 officers² and 1,438 men; 1 regiment 47² officers and 1,486 men.

Army Artillery, 1 regiment, 28² officers and 854 men.

Horse Artillery, 1 regiment, 39² officers and 1,160 men.

Thus the proposed maximum legal strength is not closely approached in any case. On the other hand, the maximum strength of batteries is very closely approached in the case of Heavy Artillery. As the exact combinations of batteries into battalions and regiments which it may be necessary to make in the future can not be foreseen the law should show merely the superior limit and leave to the Executive the power to utilize the available strength in the most useful way.

5. AMMUNITION SERVICE.

The personnel of this service is charged with receiving ammunition from the line of communication troops, transporting it up to the neighborhood of the combatant troops, and distributing it to the various combat trains of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery.

To insure the combatant troops deployed over a wide territory being promptly and regularly supplied with ammunition, an effective organization of this service is requisite. It will be necessary to establish close communication with the various commanders so as to learn what supplies are needed, to reconnoiter the country and find the best avenues of approach, to regulate the movements of elements of the train so as to meet the varying needs of different parts of the line of battle, and to maintain sure communication between all

¹The number of Infantry rifles in the division is increased by 38 per cent and the number of guns by 33½ per cent. The proposed divisional artillery comprises 48 field guns and 16 field howitzers.

²The number of officers here given are based on the proposed number of gun, or howitzer batteries, in each regiment. The difference between these numbers and the total commissioned strength, 51, is the number available in each case for duty with ammunition columns and other special Artillery service.

the elements of the train and with the supply depots. With a view to coordinating all these various duties and activities, it is proposed to charge the Field Artillery with this service and provide the necessary staff and organizations for the purpose.

To this end the law should empower the President to raise ammunition battalions, in the proportion of one per authorized Field Artillery regiment, whose maximum authorized strength should be that of a Field Artillery battalion. A certain personnel should be provided in each regiment as constituting the nucleus of this ammunition service, the same to be transferred to the appropriate divisional or Army ammunition column on mobilization. No other transfers should be made from the regiments; the additional personnel should be secured from reservists or by recruitment. To organize promptly an efficient ammunition service according to this plan a satisfactorily working reserve system must be in existence.

The regiments of divisional artillery, as proposed above, have only two batteries in the howitzer battalion. The third batteries of the howitzer battalions may be designated as the nucleus of the divisional ammunition service, their personnel to be transferred to the ammunition column on mobilization. In the heavy artillery and the horse artillery the third battery of each battalion may similarly be designated as the nucleus of the appropriate ammunition column.

In Appendix II hereto attached the organization of the Field Artillery and of the ammunition service is discussed in greater detail.

Peace strength of Artillery.—The permissible peace strength of Artillery depends on the means of expansion. If reserves are available the batteries may be kept at the minimum peace strength consistent with proper instruction. Much of the Artillery personnel in times of war is employed in the transportation and distribution of ammunition. With adequate reserves this service may be kept at greatly reduced strength without loss of efficiency.

6. COMPONENTS OF THE DIVISION AND THE FIELD ARMY.

Based upon the organization of Infantry, Cavalry, and field Artillery above indicated, the complete division should comprise the following units:

Division headquarters.

3 Infantry brigades of 3 regiments each.

1 regiment of Cavalry.

1 brigade of Field Artillery (2 regiments).

* 1 pioneer battalion of Engineers.

* 1 field company of Signal troops.

* Sanitary troops organized as field hospitals and ambulance companies.

* 1 ammunition column.

* 1 supply train.

* 1 pack train.

EXTRA-DIVISIONAL TROOPS.

In addition to the organizations comprised in the divisions the following additional units should be available for assignment to each field army of three divisions:

Cavalry: Three or more brigades to be employed as independent Cavalry brigades; or two or more Cavalry brigades may be combined with proper auxiliaries to form a Cavalry division.¹

¹This provision of extra-divisional Cavalry applies to a field army comprising the regular troops and regarded as available at any time as an expeditionary force. The quota for additional field armies of Volunteers or other citizen soldiery should be not more than 1 Cavalry brigade to each three divisions.

1 brigade of Infantry.

1 regiment of Heavy Artillery.

* 1 ponton battalion of Engineers (bridge train).

* 1 field army company of Signal troops (including wireless detachments).

* 1 base line telegraph company of Signal troops.

* 1 aeroplane company or detachment.

* 1 supply train.

* 1 ammunition column.

* Sanitary troops (additional field hospitals and ambulance companies, with the elements of the evacuation service).

The organizations marked (*) above have been tentatively outlined in the Field Service Regulations of 1910. But as changes are recommended in the fundamental units of Infantry and Field Artillery, it will be necessary to revise the organization of these auxiliaries to conform to the changes proposed in the combatant elements of the division. If the general policy of organization proposed in this report be approved, it is recommended that the General Staff be instructed to recommend a reorganization of the auxiliary services within the division in conformity with the following general principles:

(a) The divisions should habitually include the normal proportions of the three combatant arms and the special troops—that is, there should be a safe minimum of auxiliaries determined by average conditions.

(b) In addition to the divisions there should be a proper reservoir of extra-divisional troops.

(c) When it is desired to form an expeditionary force for any particular purpose, a field army should be organized by taking two or more divisions and adding the Army headquarters and such extra-divisional auxiliaries as may be appropriate for the particular terrain and mission.

(d) If one division is approximately sufficient for the particular expedition, the normal proportions can be modified, if necessary, by attaching such additional auxiliaries as may be required, or by detaching such auxiliaries as may be redundant in the particular situation.

(e) The proportions of auxiliaries in field armies and expeditionary forces should depend upon the mission of the particular force, the terrain in which it is to operate, and the character of opposition expected. Appropriate and sufficient auxiliaries aid the fighting power of the force, but redundant auxiliaries reduce its mobility, increase the difficulties of supply and administration, disturb the balance of the fighting team, and actually weaken the force by requiring additional measures for the security of the surplus units which in this case become burdensome impedimenta.

(f) The auxiliaries in the division should, therefore, be only those that will *always* be required in it. Exceptional units or exceptional proportions should be attached from the extra-divisional reservoir when needed.

In addition to the tactical reasons for the proposed policy which are given in paragraph (e) above, there is an important economic principle involved. If the division includes all of the auxiliary units which are required for every possible contingency, it will include many noncombatants and much impedimenta which it will not require for normal contingencies. These extra or reserve units must of course be available when needed, but it is more economical to retain them in rear of the Army as a reserve where they can be forwarded to such divisions as may temporarily require them. But these extra units will never be required at the same time by all of the divisions of a field army. They should normally be in the rear of the field army where the field army commander can forward them to the division or divisions which may require them at any particular time. Sound economic principle requires that the maximum

fighting power should be developed for any sum that may be appropriated for military purposes. This requires the maximum possible investment in combatant troops and the minimum possible investment in noncombatant troops. The cost of noncombatant auxiliaries can be reduced to a minimum by concentrating them so far as practicable in an extra-divisional reserve. To give each division the full quota required for all contingencies will increase the cost of the whole field army and will reduce the mobility and fighting efficiency of the several divisions.

VII.

THE RELATION OF PROMOTION TO ORGANIZATION.

The organization of the Army should be determined by strategical, political, and economic considerations, with the sole view of serving the public interest. In the past, however, questions of relative promotion have largely influenced the result. Proper promotion of the officers is essential in any military system, and parity of promotion under similar conditions is necessary if we are to have an effective force. Human nature is such that all officers desire their share of promotion. The result has been, however, that these questions of relative promotion have affected the proper consideration of all questions of organization. If an effort is made to secure an increase deemed necessary in any one arm, officers of the other arms are liable to oppose it unless by other increases, perhaps necessary and perhaps not, a parity of promotion is received. While, therefore, the question of promotion and rank is one that all officers are rightly interested in, it has interfered, and will continue to interfere, with any scientific and economical reorganization plans. It is therefore considered an absolutely necessary preliminary to any reorganization of the mobile Army to place promotion on an equitable basis independent of organization.

In order to accomplish this result in the simplest and most equitable manner, and with a minimum disturbance of existing conditions, it is suggested that the following rules governing rank and promotion should be incorporated in the military law of the United States:

1. Rank and eligibility to command in any grade of the Army below that of brigadier general shall be determined by length of continuous commissioned service as an officer of the Regular Army. The date of commencement of continuous service in the case of any officer shall be the date of rank given in his first commission, and it shall be known as the "date of precedence." In each grade below that of brigadier general all officers of the Regular Army shall be arranged in the order of their dates of precedence, and those originally appointed with the same date of rank in the order of precedence at the time of their appointments: *Provided*, That the Secretary of War shall assign constructive dates of precedence to all officers of the following classes who occupy anomalous positions on the lineal lists of their several arms.

- (a) Those officers of Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Infantry who were appointed under the act of February 2, 1901, and who had served as commissioned officers in the Regular Army or Volunteers prior to such appointment.

- (b) Those officers who have lost rank by reason of the sentence of court-martial or as the result of examination for promotion.

- (c) Those officers who have voluntarily transferred from one arm of the line to another or from a staff department to an arm of the line.

Each officer of class (a) above excepted shall be assigned a constructive date of precedence which will place him in the same position relative to officers of

his own arm or corps as he now occupies on the lineal list of his arm or corps, and with reference to officers of other arms or corps whose dates of precedence may lie between that of the officer next above him and the officer next below him in his own arm or corps, he shall take precedence in accordance with total length of commissioned service in the Regular Army and Volunteers, and his constructive date of precedence shall be fixed accordingly; and for this purpose the date of acceptance of commission shall be regarded as the date of commencement of service of officers of the Regular Army and of staff officers of volunteers appointed by the President, and the date of muster into service shall be regarded as the date of commencement of service of line officers of volunteers.

Each officer of class (b) and (c) above excepted shall be assigned a constructive date of precedence which will place his position for rank and eligibility to command next below the officer who immediately precedes him on the lineal list of his own arm or corps on the date of the passage of the act.

2. The order of promotion in each arm, department, or corps shall remain as now provided by law, subject to the exception described in paragraph 3 below, which applies to original vacancies in the Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry.

3. Whenever any part of the Infantry, Cavalry, or Field Artillery is increased or the number of officers in any of these arms is increased the original vacancies above the grade of second lieutenant due to the increase shall be filled from the next lower grade in the three arms, the number of officers promoted from each arm to be proportional to the number of officers of that grade in the three arms as nearly as may be practicable: *Provided*, That the order of promotion in any arm shall be in the order of the lineal list of that arm, as now provided by law: *Provided further*, That, so far as practicable, officers shall be promoted in their own arm: *Provided further*, That when any officer is nominated for promotion into an arm other than his own he may waive such promotion, and in this case the vacancy shall pass consecutively to the officers next below him in the lineal list of his own arm: *And provided also*, That whenever any officer is promoted to another arm under the provisions of this rule his position for subsequent promotion in that arm shall be fixed by his position on the list for rank and eligibility to command as determined by the date of precedence defined in paragraph 1 above.

4. Whenever any part of the Infantry, Cavalry, or Field Artillery is reduced or the total number of officers in one or more of the three arms is reduced the surplus officers should not be absorbed in the arm or arms in which the reduction occurs, but should be prorated for absorption throughout the three arms: *Provided*, That whenever any officer is transferred to another arm under the provisions of this rule his lineal position for promotion in that arm shall be fixed by his position on the list for rank and eligibility to command as determined by the date of precedence defined in paragraph 1 above.

COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED RULES FOR RELATIVE RANK AND PROMOTION.

Rule 1.—This rule does not affect promotion in any way, but provides that all officers shall take precedence in their respective grades in the order of their actual seniority, and not according to the date of last commission. On July 23 last Capt. W—, of the Cavalry, was promoted to the grade of major after 23 years 1 month and 12 days of commissioned service. Maj. W— is junior in rank to Maj. R—, of the Medical Corps, who, on the date of Maj. W—'s promotion, had served 9 years 8 months and 23 days. Maj

R—'s seniority is based on the fact that his commission as major antedates that of Maj. W— by 9 days, and this notwithstanding the fact that Maj. W— had served as a commissioned officer more than twice as long as Maj. R—. The proposed rule would not expedite Maj. W—'s promotion, nor would it retard that of Maj. R—. It would simply provide that after arriving in the same grade their precedence should depend upon actual seniority. Maj. R—'s rapid promotion has been due to special provisions of law, under which medical officers enter the Army with the grade of first lieutenant and are promoted to the grade of captain in five years after first commission. (The period is now three years.) These provisions are designed to compensate for the fact that such officers must acquire a special professional education before they can enter the Army. The proposed rule for relative rank would not interfere with such special rules of promotion, but would simply provide that after arriving in the same grade officers should take precedence in the order of actual seniority.

Among Maj. W—'s seniors under the present rule of precedence is Maj. C—, of the Coast Artillery, whose seniority is based on the fact that he was promoted to the grade of major 16 days before Maj. W—'s promotion, notwithstanding the fact that he was actually Maj. W—'s junior as a commissioned officer by nine years.

The difference in length of service in this case is due to the fact that under present conditions promotion in the cavalry is relatively slow, while promotion in the Coast Artillery is relatively rapid. The proposed rule of seniority would not affect promotion in either arm, but would simply tend to adjust relative rank on an equitable basis when officers arrive in the same grade. Relative rank determines the right to command, the right to choice of quarters, and precedence on boards and other duty, where officers of the different arms are required to serve together. Among officers in the same grade seniority for the purposes above indicated should be determined by actual seniority.

Rule 3.—This rule applies only to the Cavalry, Infantry, and Field Artillery. These are the combatant arms of the mobile army, and the rule is proposed in order to eliminate all questions of individual promotion from the problem of reorganization of the mobile army. With this rule in effect it is expected that questions of legislation affecting the mobile army can be considered purely on their merits from the standpoint of the public interest.

The application of the foregoing principles will tend to correct the present arbitrary inequalities in relative rank and promotion in the several branches of the Army. But it does not constitute a final solution of the promotion question.

At present there is no sufficient incentive to efficiency. The laggard and the hard-working, enthusiastic officer are advanced with equal steps and according to one cast-iron rule of promotion. It is important, on the one hand, to provide means for disposing of officers who, for one reason or another, have lost their usefulness; and it is necessary, on the other hand, to insure officers of ability arriving at command rank at a time of life when their usefulness is at a maximum. In either case action should be based upon the officer's record of achievement.

The essentials necessary to the ultimate solution of this problem are:

1. To put the Army on such an improved basis of organization and training that a common doctrine as to standards of military efficiency may be recognized throughout the service and applied to the professional records of all officers.
2. To provide positive and equitable means for advancing, retarding, or eliminating officers according to their several merits.

The difficulties of a practical solution of this problem are recognized. The matter should be made the subject of most careful and deliberate study in the future, and no step should be taken without adequate safeguards against the intrusion of favoritism and other abuses.

VIII.

AN INITIAL TACTICAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE MOBILE ARMY, WITH A PROGRAM OF GRADUAL EXPANSION INTO A FIELD ARMY.

1. THE TROOPS AVAILABLE AFTER PROVIDING FOR THE FOREIGN GARRISONS AND THE POLICY OF ORGANIZATION PROPOSED.

It was shown in Chapter II of this report that after the minimum requirements of the foreign garrisons have been provided for, the following organizations of the mobile Army will remain in the United States: 16 regiments of Infantry, 11½ regiments of Cavalry, 2 regiments of Field and Mountain Artillery, 1 regiment of Horse Artillery, 8 companies of Engineers, 2 field companies of signal troops, 4 companies of signal troops (other than field companies), 1 field hospital, 1 ambulance company.

It is important that this force should receive a tactical organization as a mobile army, even though it should remain incomplete. It is also important that organization tables should indicate the successive increments by means of which the force should be expanded if it should be the pleasure of Congress to form it ultimately into a well-balanced field army. The organization should favor the prompt mobilization of all or part of the mobile army as an expeditionary force. The distribution and administration should also be adapted to the effective use of the Army as a nucleus for the organization and training of national guard and volunteer forces.

These conditions can best be met by organizing a skeleton or nuclear division in each of the three territorial departments. After providing the divisional cavalry for each division, the remaining cavalry should be formed into cavalry brigades of two or three regiments each. When the tactical organizations thus formed have been completed, further expansion should be with a view of dividing the central territorial region into two, each containing a complete tactical division with the proper proportion of extra-divisional troops. In considering the details of this organization it is necessary to bear in mind that while an ultimate segregation of the mobile army into actual brigade commands is contemplated under the policy proposed by the Secretary of War, such segregation can not be accomplished at once, and during the period of transition the organization must be such as to meet the actual distribution of the mobile Army. *The essential object sought is to provide an organization in peace which will continue to exist in war.* The faulty distribution of the Army increases the practical difficulties of the problem, but can not be accepted as an argument for adopting a peace organization which must be replaced by a different extemporized organization on the outbreak of war.

2. THE PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF THE SKELETON FIELD ARMY.

The proposed organization of the units of the mobile army after providing for the foreign garrisons is shown in Table I which follows. The number of organizations shown in the table does not correspond exactly with the numbers now present in the United States, because certain regiments to be relieved from the Philippines have not returned and certain other organizations destined for Panama and Oahu have not yet been dispatched on foreign service.

The actual number of organizations within the United States and within the several territorial departments are therefore subject to fluctuation until the foreign garrisons are established.

The adoption of a peace organization like that shown in Table I will result in great decentralization. If it should be desired to assemble an expeditionary force at some place, as Galveston, no extemporization would be necessary. None of the divisions are complete, but a full division could be assembled promptly by a few brief orders like the following:

1. To the commanding general, Central Department, "Assemble the Second Division at Galveston."

2. To the commanding general, Eastern Department, "Send the First Brigade, First Division, to Galveston for duty with the Second Division."

Such simplicity is the result of decentralization and would be possible because there is no difference, except as to strength, between the proposed peace organization and the war organization. The preparation of mobilization and transportation plans would be a part of the routine duty of the several brigade and division commanders. At present such a force as this could not be assembled without complicated and difficult extemporization, and when assembled each of its general officers would be a stranger to his command and its problems of administration.

TABLE I.—*The skeleton field army as organized with existing troops.*

First division.	Second division.	Third division.	Army troops. ¹
(To be stationed in the Eastern Department.) <i>First Brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Second Brigade.</i> —1 regiment of infantry. <i>Divisional Artillery.</i> —1 battalion of field artillery. <i>Divisional Cavalry.</i> —(1 regiment less 1 squadron.) ² <i>Engineers.</i> —Provisional pioneer battalion (2 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i> —None available. <i>Sanitary troops.</i> —No field hospitals or ambulance companies available.	(To be stationed in Central Department.) <i>First Brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Second Brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Divisional Artillery.</i> —1 regiment of field artillery. <i>Divisional Cavalry.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Engineers.</i> —Provisional pioneer battalion (2 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i> —1 field company. <i>Sanitary troops.</i> —1 ambulance company and 1 field hospital.	(To be stationed in the Western Department.) <i>First Brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Second Brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Divisional Artillery.</i> —Headquarters, 1 battalion of field artillery. <i>Divisional Cavalry.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Engineers.</i> —Provisional pioneer battalion (2 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i> —1 field company. <i>Sanitary troops.</i> —No field hospitals or ambulance companies available.	(For the formation of a cavalry division or independent cavalry brigades, and to provide extra-divisional auxiliaries.) <i>Cavalry.</i> —9 regiments (formed in brigade in sections of 2 or 3 regiments). <i>Horse Artillery.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Engineers.</i> —Provisional ponton battalion (2 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i> —None available. <i>Sanitary troops.</i> —No field hospitals or ambulance companies available.

¹ The Army troops to be distributed in the three territorial departments.

² 1 squadron at Panama to be taken from one of the divisional cavalry regiments. For the purposes of this table it is assumed that this squadron is taken from the First Division.

NOTE.—In minor wars where the command of the sea is not involved or in a more serious war after the command of the sea has been definitely secured by our Navy, the troops of the Coast Artillery may be counted upon to reinforce the mobile army. In order to meet this contingency the peace organization and training of the Coast Artillery should include preparation for employment as auxiliary organizations of siege artillery, infantry, and other services. For purposes of field training such provisional organizations as may be formed in the Eastern Department should have opportunities for field training with the First Division. The provisional organizations formed in the Western Department should likewise train with the Third Division.

3. FIRST INCREMENT OF THE SKELETON FIELD ARMY.

The field army shown in Table I is incomplete in every particular, but it is the best organization that can be effected with the forces available. It is believed that the first increment of the Army that Congress may authorize should be applied in such a way as to give the three skeleton divisions a uniform proportion of the several arms. Table II shows the improvement in the organi-

zation that would result from adding the following organizations as the first future increment of the mobile army:

- 2 regiments of Infantry (to complete second brigade, first division).
- 6 battalions of Field Artillery (one to each regiment now existing) (a).
- 1 field company of Signal troops with sufficient additional personnel to form the nucleus of the field army aero and wireless service (b).
- 5 field hospitals (c).
- 5 ambulance companies (c).

(a) This would result in gaining one regiment of Field Artillery for home service, as after the change two 3-battalion regiments would replace three 2-battalion regiments on foreign service.

(b) In the organization of the Signal Corps every effort should be made to utilize as many as possible of the enlisted men now employed on technical duties and who are not included in field companies in time of peace. The plans for war expansion should also contemplate the fullest use of civilian aero operators, telegraphers, and other experts. These questions should be considered in connection with the revision of the field-service regulations.

(c) Every effort should be made to provide the necessary sanitary units for field service, but as much of their personnel as possible should be mobilized from the peace personnel on duty at posts. As the concentration policy progresses a greater percentage of hospital-corps men will be released from post duty on mobilization. The plans should also be based on the idea of a war expansion through the absorption of civilians whose ordinary occupations are analogous to those of the hospital corps. The peace strength of all noncombatant troops should be kept at a minimum consistent with proper peace service and effective war expansion.

TABLE II.—The skeleton field army as organized after the first increment.

First Division.	Second Division.	Third Division.	Army troops.
<i>First brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Second brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Divisional artillery.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Divisional cavalry.</i> —1 regiment (less 1 squadron) ¹ <i>Engineers.</i> —Provisional battalion (2 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i> —1 field company. <i>Sanitary troops.</i> —2 field hospitals and 2 ambulance companies. <i>Ammunition column.</i> ² <i>Supply train.</i> ³	<i>First brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Second brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Divisional artillery.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Divisional cavalry.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Engineers.</i> —Provisional battalion (2 companies) ¹ <i>Signal troops.</i> —1 field company. <i>Sanitary troops.</i> —2 field hospitals and 2 ambulance companies. <i>Ammunition column.</i> ² <i>Supply train.</i> ³	<i>First brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Second brigade.</i> —3 regiments of infantry. <i>Divisional artillery.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Divisional cavalry.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Engineers.</i> —Provisional battalion (2 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i> —1 field company. <i>Sanitary troops.</i> —2 field hospitals and 2 ambulance companies. <i>Ammunition column.</i> ² <i>Supply train.</i> ³	(For the formation of a cavalry division or independent cavalry brigades, and to provide extra-divisional auxiliaries.) <i>Cavalry.</i> —9 regiments (formed in brigade inspections of 2 or 3 regiments). <i>Horse artillery.</i> —1 regiment. <i>Engineers.</i> —Provisional battalion (2 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i> —Nucleus of field army units including base line, aero and wireless service. ⁴ <i>Sanitary troops.</i> —The field hospitals and ambulance companies assigned to the divisions will probably meet all requirements at this stage of development.

¹ See Table I.

² The proposed artillery organization furnishes a cadre for the ammunition column. The details of expansion will depend on whether reservists are provided. If not, the expansion must be by recruitment. In either event detailed plans must be worked out.

³ The cadre of the supply columns should be furnished by such service corps as may be authorized. The details of expansion must be worked out in connection with the service corps.

⁴ The details of organization to be worked out by the General Staff with the Signal Corps during the revision of the Field Service Regulations.

4. SUBSEQUENT INCREMENTS OF THE FIELD ARMY.

After forming the balanced skeleton field army shown in Table II, the next increments should successively expand the skeleton divisions of the field army

into complete divisions. The second increment, necessary to complete one of the divisions, is as follows:

1 brigade of Infantry (3 regiments).

1 regiment of Field Artillery.

1 pioneer company of Engineers (to complete the divisional battalion).

1 or more additional ambulance companies and field hospitals, the number to depend upon a determination of the number proper for the division and the number proper for the extra-divisional reservoir.

The third and fourth increments would be identical with the second increment and would each complete another division.

The fifth increment should complete the quota of Army troops necessary to furnish an auxiliary division if the whole mobile Army should be employed as a field army or expeditionary force. The additional units are as follows:

1 regiment of heavy artillery (*a*).

1 brigade of Infantry (3 regiments).

1 company of Engineers (to complete the field army pontoon battalion) and appropriate engineer units for the cavalry division.

Field Army Signal units (organization completed).

Sanitary troops (such additional ambulance companies, field hospitals, and evacuation hospitals as may be found necessary).

NOTE.—(*a*) Until a regiment of field-army heavy artillery can be provided one or more batteries or battalions of the divisional artillery will be equipped with the heavy types.

The complete field army with three divisions and army auxiliary troops as it would be organized after the fifth increment is shown in Table III.

TABLE III.—*The field army with three divisions and Army troops complete as organized after the fifth increment.*

First division.	Second division.	Third division.	Army troops.
<p><i>First brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Second brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Third brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Divisional Artillery.</i>—1 brigade of 2 regiments. <i>Divisional Cavalry.</i>—1 regiment (less 1 squadron).¹ <i>Engineers.</i>—1 pioneer battalion (3 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i>—1 field company. <i>Sanitary troops.</i>—3 field hospitals and 3 ambulance companies. <i>Ammunition column.</i> <i>Supply train.</i></p>	<p><i>First brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Second brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Third brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Divisional Artillery.</i>—1 brigade of 2 regiments. <i>Divisional Cavalry.</i>—1 regiment. <i>Engineers.</i>—1 pioneer battalion (3 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i>—1 field company. <i>Sanitary troops.</i>—3 field hospitals and 3 ambulance companies. <i>Ammunition column.</i> <i>Supply train.</i></p>	<p><i>First brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Second brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Third brigade.</i>—3 regiments of Infantry. <i>Divisional Artillery.</i>—1 brigade of 2 regiments. <i>Divisional Cavalry.</i>—1 regiment. <i>Engineers.</i>—1 pioneer battalion (3 companies). <i>Signal troops.</i>—1 field company. <i>Sanitary troops.</i>—3 field hospitals and 3 ambulance companies. <i>Ammunition column.</i> <i>Supply train.</i></p>	<p>(For the formation of a Cavalry division or independent Cavalry brigades, and to provide extra-divisional auxiliaries for expeditions or for a field army.) <i>Cavalry.</i>—9 regiments (formed in brigade inspections of 2 or 3 regiments). <i>Horse Artillery.</i>—1 regiment. <i>Heavy Artillery.</i>—1 regiment. <i>Infantry.</i>—1 brigade. <i>Engineers.</i>—Field Army battalion and proper additional units for the cavalry division. <i>Signal troops.</i>—Field Army units. <i>Sanitary troops.</i>—To include additional ambulance companies, field hospitals, and evacuation service, the details to be worked out after investigation as to proper distribution between the divisions and the extra-divisional reservoir with the Army troops.</p>

¹ See Table I.

With the sixth increment the fourth division should come into being, and successive increments should complete it. What further increments may be necessary can not be foretold, but it is certain that the future military needs of the country, as they are understood to-day, can not be met by a mobile force of less than four divisions, and this is the goal toward which all effort should be directed.

But in the preparation of this report every effort has been made to separate the question of organization from the question of possible increase. Tactical organization should be adopted without reference to possible increases, and such increases as may be authorized in the future should be applied to the development of a consistent tactical plan.

5. THE NUMBER OF GENERAL OFFICERS REQUIRED BY THE TACTICAL ORGANIZATION.

Brigadier generals.—Modern tactical organization requires a homogeneous unit higher than the regiment. This unit is the brigade, and its commander should be a brigadier general selected as a general rule from the arm which he commands. The number of brigadier generals of the mobile army should therefore be based on the number of regiments. For each arm there should be at least one brigadier general for each three regiments or major fraction thereof. With the present strength of the Army the quota of brigadier generals of the mobile army should therefore be as follows:

	Regi- ments.	Brigadier generals.
Infantry.....	30	10
Cavalry.....	15	5
Field Artillery.....	6	2
Total.....	51	17

This number of brigadier generals is based on the present peace strength of the mobile army and should be increased in proportion to future increments of the Army. In time of war there should be a brigadier general for each organized brigade.

The number of brigadier generals required for the Coast Artillery organization is four, viz, one for each Coast Artillery Inspection and one as chief of Coast Artillery.

Major generals.—The number of major generals should likewise be based upon the commands appropriate for such officers. The appropriate peace commands for major generals are as follows:

Territorial departments in the United States.....	3
Philippine Department.....	1
Hawaiian Department.....	1
Panama Department.....	1
Total major generals.....	6

In time of war there should be a major general for each organized division.

General officers required for duty on the General Staff and for other purposes.—The number of general officers authorized by law for detail to the General Staff should be in addition to those above enumerated for assignment to military commands. The additional general officers so required should be added in the grade of brigadier general. This will permit the assignment of general

officers of either grade to the General Staff without reducing the total number available as military commanders. When a major general is detached from his appropriate command for detail to the General Staff, the brigadier general assigned to the military command so vacated should have the temporary rank, pay, and allowances of major general during his continuance in such advanced command.

6. ADDITIONAL OFFICERS REQUIRED FOR DUTIES OTHER THAN REGIMENTAL.

When additional officers are required for duty with the citizen soldiery, or for other military duty peculiarly related to their respective arms of the service, the numbers of such officers allotted to each arm should be based upon the actual requirements of the arm and not upon a pro rata between the several arms. The number of Infantry officers required for duty with the National Guard depends upon the requirements of the National Guard infantry. Similarly the number of Cavalry officers required depends upon the needs of the National Guard cavalry. The relative numbers required from the two arms has no relation to the fact that the regular Infantry comprises twice as many officers as the regular Cavalry. It is recommended, therefore, that the number of such additional officers as may be authorized for purely tactical purposes in the future be based upon the actual needs of the several arms, with the understanding that the original vacancies due to any increase in the number of such extra-regimental officers in the Infantry, Cavalry, or Field Artillery be prorated among the three arms according to the principles governing the filling of original vacancies as outlined in Chapter VII of this report.

But when additional officers are required for administrative duties not peculiarly related to any one arm, the total number of such officers should be prorated among the several arms as at present.

Whenever the number of additional officers allotted to any arm is increased in any manner, the grades of the new officers should be so allotted as to keep the ratios between the numbers of officers in the several grades, as near as may be, the same in the Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Infantry.

IX.

RAISING AND ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL VOLUNTEER FORCES.

1. LIMITATIONS UPON THE AVAILABILITY OF THE STATE MILITIA AS A NATIONAL FORCE.

The Constitution provides that Congress shall have power—

to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion.

And further—

to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Under these provisions Congress passed the act of January 21, 1903, commonly known as the Dick bill. This act superseded practically all the militia law on the statute books. It has since been amended by the act of May 27, 1908, and the act of April 21, 1910. Under the provisions of these laws the

militia has been organized, uniformed, and equipped, and the President is authorized to employ the organized portion for the three purposes specified in the Constitution. Under the operation of these laws the general efficiency of the Organized Militia has been greatly improved, but no acts of Congress can extend the scope of its employment as militia or modify the restricted fundamental law upon which the whole militia structure is based.

The Regular Army is organized under the general and plenary power of Congress "to raise and support armies," and it can be used both at home and abroad for any national purpose. The militia may be employed to support the Regular Army for the limited purposes mentioned in the Constitution, but it can not be employed for the varied purposes for which a national Army may be required—for such purposes as our own history shows it is likely to be needed.

After the War of 1812 it seemed to be accepted as a settled policy that under existing constitutional limitations the militia should not be regarded as available for general military purposes.

In the Mexican War the Regular Army, supported by a Volunteer Army of national troops, achieved a series of victories unmarred by a single defeat. The battle of Buena Vista, fought at a time when nearly all the regular troops had been dispatched to take part in the campaign under Gen. Scott against the City of Mexico, was a triumph for the Volunteers. A force of some 12,000 militia was called out for three months in the first stages of the war, but they were returned to their homes without having fired a shot.

The Civil War opened with a call for 75,000 militia to serve for three months. The disaster which ensued at Bull Run practically put an end to the use of militia during the war. A great Volunteer Army of citizen soldiery was called into being which prosecuted the war as a national force.

After the Civil War there was a great development of Organized Militia throughout the country. Although national support was not liberally given, it was recognized that these State organizations furnished a valuable school of military training. When the Spanish War broke out a Volunteer Army was again organized, and under a provision of the law existing militia organizations were permitted to volunteer as complete units. These volunteer organizations were created under the power of Congress to raise and support armies. The militia upon volunteering completely lost its militia status as far as the Federal Government was concerned. The forces thus created were therefore available for general military purposes, and they were employed in Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippine Islands.

Under the legislation of 1898 regiments made up from militia organizations were received into the Federal service as volunteers, and with other new regiments of volunteers were formed into brigades, divisions, and Army corps. When a regiment or smaller organization volunteered as a body the governor of the State was authorized to appoint the militia officers of these units into corresponding grades in the same organizations when they were received into the service of the United States as part of the Volunteer Army; but the higher Army units, the brigades, divisions, and Army corps, were Federal units organized by the President and commanded by officers under his commission. Some of these general officers were appointed from the Regular Army, some were distinguished veterans of a former war, and some were appointed from the militia officers who volunteered from the States. But they all became Federal officers and were responsible to the constitutional Commander in Chief. This was in harmony with the national policy adopted in the Mexican War and continued throughout the War of 1861-1865.

The volunteer act of 1898 was drawn in haste and contained many defects, but in these two particulars it was based on our national experience and erected solidly upon the Constitution. It called for an army, a force that could be used at home or abroad, in attack or defense, and for general military purposes; it therefore did not attempt to use a force which the Constitution had restricted to three limited uses. It called for a National Army, and therefore its fundamental army units were Federal units. It did not favor repeating the folly committed in 1812, when we attempted to conquer Canada with groups of allied forces, rather than with a cohesive National Army.

The volunteers of 1898, like the volunteers of 1861, were citizen soldiers, but they were not militia. Our Constitution and our history alike confirm the dictum that citizen soldiers may be employed successfully for general military purposes, but that organized as militia they may not.

In the militia legislation of 1903 and 1908 we have departed from the sound policy based on the experience of 1812, 1846, 1861, and 1898. It is true that the Organized Militia of to-day is a more highly trained force than the militia of our early history, but the same constitutional limitations as to use and control prevent its full development as an effective national force, so long as it maintains its legal character as militia.

The present militia policy is erected on the theory that the militia may be used for general military purposes as militia. It provides that it shall enter the service as militia and remain militia, and yet contains the provision that it may serve either within or without the territory of the United States. With reference to this provision of the militia law, the Attorney General writes as follows in reply to a question from the Secretary of War:

It is true that the act of January 21, 1903, as amended by the act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat., pt. 1, 399), provides:

"That whenever the President calls forth the Organized Militia of any State or Territory, or of the District of Columbia, to be employed in the service of the United States, he may specify in his call the period for which such service is required, and the militia so called shall continue to serve during the term so specified, either within or without the territory of the United States, unless sooner relieved by order of the President."

But this must be read in view of the constitutional power of Congress to call forth the militia only to suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or to execute the laws of the Union. Congress can not, by its own enactment, enlarge the power conferred upon it by the Constitution; and if this provision were construed to authorize Congress to use the Organized Militia for any other than the three purposes specified it would be unconstitutional. This provision applies only to cases where, under the Constitution, said militia may be used outside of our own borders and was, doubtless, inserted as a matter of precaution and to prevent the possible recurrence of what took place in our last war with Great Britain, when portions of the militia refused to obey orders to cross the Canadian frontier.

I think that the constitutional provision here considered not only affords no warrant for the use of the militia by the General Government, except to suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or to execute the laws of the Union, but, by its careful enumeration of the three occasions or purposes for which the militia may be used, it forbids such use for any other purpose.

The opinion of the Attorney General in full is attached to this report as Appendix III.

We are thus brought squarely face to face with the problem of how we are to get the forces which we may need for purposes more general than those to which the Constitution restricts the use of militia. And this raises the whole question of how we are to go about providing for the great national volunteer force which in time of stress our country may need.

The Constitution provides two means whereby the National Government may draw upon the great body of potential national volunteers: directly under the power to raise and support armies; indirectly under the militia clause.

The first power is unrestricted, the second definitely restricted. Such troops as may be raised under the latter power must undergo a change of status before they can be employed for general military purposes. The procedure necessary for developing a national force under each of these two powers is discussed below.

A. UNDER THE POWER TO RAISE AND SUPPORT ARMIES.

The "power to raise and support armies" is construed as follows in *Tarble's Case*, 13 Wallace, 408:

FIELD, J. Now, among the powers assigned to the National Government, is the power "to raise and support armies" and the power "to provide for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." The execution of these powers falls within the line of its duties; and its control over the subject is plenary and exclusive. It can determine, without question from any State authority, how the armies shall be raised, whether by voluntary enlistment or forced draft, the age at which the soldier shall be received and the period for which he shall be taken, the compensation he shall be allowed, and the service to which he shall be assigned. And it can provide the rules for the government and regulation of the forces after they are raised, define what shall constitute military offences, and prescribe their punishment. No interference with the execution of this power of the National Government in the formation, organization, and government of its armies by any State officials could be permitted without greatly impairing the efficiency, if it did not utterly destroy, this branch of the public service.

In view of this language of the Supreme Court it would seem that Congress could organize a company or a battalion or a regiment of citizen soldiers in every congressional district if it chose to do so. It could limit the employment of the force to time of war only, or to other contingencies determined by itself. It could fix the period of instruction at 10 days a year, or 20 days a year, or 1 hour per week, or any other time that might be desirable. It could regulate the appointment of officers and provide for the voluntary transfer of officers and enlisted men from the present Organized Militia to the national force. It could organize battalions and regiments of the three arms and all of the auxiliaries that might be required for war purposes, and could combine them into properly proportioned divisions and field armies. It could organize it definitely as a territorial army uniformly distributed throughout the Union with all of the machinery of mobilization, concentration, and supply organized in time of peace. Congress could place any desired limit of strength upon its national army of citizen soldiers, or it could adopt the logical ideal of voluntary military service, and provide facilities for the military training of all patriotic young men who might volunteer to receive it.

By such means we would be enabled gradually to develop our military resources according to a definite and logical plan. Instead of trying to force upon the militia two duties which under the limitations of the Constitution are more or less incompatible we would recognize things as they are, and provide for two forces, each having its special function. This would afford obvious advantages to all concerned; the National Government would know upon what forces it could count; the States could proportion their forces to local needs; and individuals would have the choice of the particular kind of service they preferred; that is, State service with limited war liability, or war service only, under the National Government.

B. UNDER THE MILITIA CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.

But while a national citizen soldiery organized "Under the Power to Raise and Support Armies" is the most direct and the most complete solution of our problem, it must be recognized that the immediate provision of such a force

involves serious practical difficulties. It is unquestionably true that the present Organized Militia can not be employed for general military purposes, and that under the present law it can not be effectively trained for war as a homogeneous national force. On the other hand, it is a force actually in being and one composed largely of officers and men who have volunteered for military training because they desire to serve as soldiers in the event of war. The Organized Militia in short constitutes an existing organization. As it stands it is unsuited for national military uses; the question is, can this impediment be removed?

Congress may organize and discipline the militia, but must leave to the States the *appointment of its officers* and the *authority to train the force according to the discipline prescribed by Congress*. Congress is also authorized to *govern* the militia when it is actually in the service of the United States. Congress may, therefore, prescribe any peace organization, discipline, or system of training for the militia which does not deprive the States of the following reserved powers:

1. To appoint the officers.
2. To train the forces according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
3. To govern the militia when not actually in the service of the United States.

The practical question then is, can Congress, under these limitations, convert the Organized Militia into an effective military force and utilize it for general war purposes.

It is believed that the modified militia pay bill recently prepared by the Secretary of War, after consultation with the National Militia Board, furnishes the basis for a practical solution of this problem. (A copy of the bill is hereto attached as Appendix IV.)

The bill provides that officers and enlisted men of the National Guard who conform to certain standards of efficiency to be prescribed by the Secretary of War shall be entitled to Federal pay. In order to be entitled to pay a man must be qualified for military service under the standards to be prescribed by the Federal Government, and he must likewise be a member of a military command of standard organization, strength, and efficiency.

The bill also provides that all organizations and individuals receiving such pay may, in certain emergencies and with the consent of Congress, be transferred to and incorporated with the Army of the United States, and when so transferred such organizations and individuals shall be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Armies of the United States.

It is believed that such militia organizations as qualify for pay under the terms of the bill would be available for general military uses, because when transferred to and incorporated with the Army of the United States they would cease to be militia and would be as fully under the control of Congress as is the Regular Army. It is obvious that no individual or organization of the militia should be the recipient of pay from the Federal Government unless he or it is fully available for general military purposes. It is also believed that the enactment of the bill would give the Federal Government an effective influence over the organization, training, and discipline of the Organized Militia without invading the constitutional powers of the States.

The power to appoint officers would still be reserved to the States, but only those appointees would receive Federal pay who are found fit to perform a definite Federal function and who are obligated to perform that function. The power to train the militia would be reserved to the States, but Federal pay would go only to that part of the militia which is actually trained and prepared for incorporation in the organized war army of the Nation. Under this policy the Government would not extend its influence over *all* of the militia in a State,

but only over that portion which voluntarily engages to form a part of the national war army of citizen soldiery, and even over that portion the Federal influence would be indirect and without encroachment upon the powers reserved to the States by the Constitution.

A militiaman transferred to the Army of the United States under the provisions of the proposed bill should be required to serve until the expiration of his term of service or until a man could be trained to replace him in the event his term of enlistment expired soon after his transfer. The bill should therefore give the Federal Government the right to extend the term of enlistment of any man so transferred for a period of not to exceed 12 months; without some such provision the force created would begin to melt away on the day it was mobilized. (See also Sec. 11, Chap. 5.)

Whether the operation of the bill will result in developing the militia of the States into a thoroughly efficient, well-organized national force sufficient for all military purposes can be determined only by experience. In view of the importance, as stated above, of using for war this available military asset, it is considered that a trial should be made and from experience gained a final satisfactory solution obtained.

2. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIVISION DISTRICTS AS A MEANS FOR SYSTEMATICALLY RAISING AND ORGANIZING THE VOLUNTEER FORCES.

While the peace organization of the national citizen soldiery can not be indicated in detail until its legal status is more definitely settled, it is possible to point out some of the objects of peace organization and the general relation of such organization to mobilization and preparation for war. As the war organization of any army involves the establishment of divisions and field armies, and as these complex units can not be extemporized on the outbreak of war, it may be accepted that the Army of citizen soldiery should be made up of definitely organized divisions with the auxiliaries necessary to form complete field armies. Assuming that future legislation will provide for changing the status of the organized militia from a militia force of limited uses to a national force available for general military purposes, it will be possible to indicate a division organization based on the units now existing in the National Guard. An illustration may thus be made in a concrete way of the general objects to be attained.

The present strength of the National Guard is as follows:

Infantry, 139 regiments, 8 separate battalions, and 8 separate companies.

Cavalry, 74 troops.

Field Artillery, 48 batteries.

Engineers, 22 companies.

Coast Artillery, 120 companies.

It will be seen that we have the Infantry organizations for approximately 16 divisions, the Cavalry organizations for approximately 6 divisions, the Field Artillery for approximately 3 divisions, and the Engineer contingent for 7 divisions.

As we have here the Infantry organizations for 16 divisions, it will be assumed for purposes of illustration that our problem is to complete these divisions. For this purpose the territory of the United States should be divided into division districts, and it should be the policy of the Government to form a complete division in each division district by filling up the Infantry regiments and by encouraging the organization of the Artillery, Cavalry, and other divisional components which are now lacking.

To each of these division districts should be assigned a General Staff officer, with the necessary number of inspector instructors detailed from the Regular Army, whose function it should be to arrange for the many details of organization which should be planned in peace and not left to extemporization in time of war. Among the duties of this division staff would be the preparation of plans of mobilization in conformity with general plans prepared in the War College. Problems of supply could also be worked out in advance and plans for the transportation of a division or a part of it to any point of concentration could be prepared by trained officers on the ground. The division staff would also be able to keep the War Department advised of the needs of the district and would act as the agent of the War Department in the gradual development of the lacking components of the division. The General Staff officer would also coordinate the efforts of the inspector instructors on duty with the several regiments and battalions so that, through him, the general war policy of the Nation could be transmitted to the units organized in the several States.

These division districts would not only facilitate the development of the organized army of citizen soldiery and simplify its mobilization in war, but the division districts would continue to be useful, even after the troops have gone to the front. The organization provided for the district in peace would prepare regimental depots for recruits and reservists in war, and if it should be necessary to augment the peace force by new levies of volunteers the division districts would furnish the machinery for the raising, organization, administration, and supply of such volunteer forces.

Taking the National Guard force as it exists to-day, we find that most of the individual units are far below their proper war strength, and that the infantry of the National Guard is not provided with the proper proportion of cavalry, field artillery, and special troops required to form divisions. Efforts are being made to correct these conditions, and it is believed that the organization of definite division districts would facilitate this reform.

An examination of the problem indicates that there are two reasons why the mounted troops have not been developed as rapidly as the infantry. The first reason seems to be that, under our National Guard system, the troops are primarily State troops, and are presumably organized by the States in order to meet State requirements. It is obvious that the States will rarely have as much use for cavalry or field artillery as they have for infantry; and even if they need these forces, they will not need them in the proportion required for national purposes under conditions of modern warfare.

The second reason lies in the fact that cavalry and field artillery are more expensive to raise than infantry, and under present conditions Federal appropriations are not based on a recognition of this fact. For the minimum requirements of instruction, a battery of field artillery or a squadron of cavalry must have a certain proportion of mounts, and under present conditions these animals must either be provided by the organizations or must be obtained at the charge of the State. The development of divisions in the National Guard, therefore, requires that the United States should furnish not only the necessary war material, but also an allotment for the purchase or hire of a certain number of animals for the cavalry and field artillery. If the organized citizen soldiery is to be counted on in war, its field artillery and cavalry must be organized in time of peace and must have the same facilities for training as the infantry.

The only other solution of the problem is to maintain the cavalry and field artillery organizations in the permanent establishment of the Regular Army.

This solution, however, is not permissible economically, and in view of English experience with her territorial army, does not appear to be necessary. To maintain the divisional cavalry and field artillery of the National Guard on the permanent establishment of the Regular Army would cost upward of \$2,000,000 per year for each division of the National Guard, while the same forces could be economically maintained on a National Guard basis if less than one-tenth of that amount were allotted to cover cost of providing and maintaining a small quota of mounts to permit proper training.

It should, therefore, be the policy of the Government to develop the army of citizen soldiers in peace as an army of complete divisions, each division to contain its proper proportion of infantry, cavalry, field artillery, engineers, signal troops, and sanitary troops.

A correct organization of the military establishment will involve the organization of the Regular Mobile Army into a force of complete tactical divisions, and a similar policy should apply to the force of citizen soldiers. It is true that, on the adoption of the policy, both the regular force and the one composed of citizen soldiers would be incomplete; but the completion of the organization would furnish a goal for future administration and legislation. The attainment of the ideal might be a question of years and during the transition period, practical makeshifts would be necessary as emergencies arise. If a war should come before the divisions were complete it might be necessary to form a number of divisions by the consolidation of a greater number of incomplete divisions, but even this would involve less extemporization than would be necessary under present conditions. Or on the outbreak of war, if sufficient time should be available, the divisions might be completed by organizing new volunteer units to fill the gaps in the division organization. The existence of definite division districts would facilitate the organization of such forces. It would be understood that one of the peace problems of the incomplete divisions would be the preparation of plans for the completion of its organization in event of sudden emergency. Such new volunteers would be a logical expansion of the peace organization.

The fact that the present National Guard force lacks many of the units that would be necessary to convert it into a well-balanced war force is one of the principal arguments for legislation like that proposed in the volunteer bill now pending in the Senate (see Appendix I).

For the purposes of the foregoing discussion, divisional troops only have been considered. In working out a final plan the field army auxiliaries of cavalry, field artillery, and special troops, and the coast artillery reserves, must also be provided for.

The complete organization of the mobile land forces of the United States will, therefore, include three distinct forces.

1. A regular army organized in divisions and cavalry brigades and ready for immediate use as an expeditionary force or for other purposes for which the citizen soldiery is not available, or for employment in the first stages of war while the citizen soldiery is mobilizing and concentrating.

2. An army of national citizen soldiers organized in peace in complete divisions and prepared to reenforce the Regular Army in time of war.

3. An army of volunteers to be organized under prearranged plans when greater forces are required than can be furnished by the Regular Army and the organized citizen soldiery.

The peace establishment of the Regular Army with the organized division districts of the National Guard should include the machinery for the recruiting organization, and mobilization of this great third line of the national defense.

X.

CONSIDERATIONS DETERMINING THE STRENGTH, COMPOSITION,
AND ORGANIZATION OF THE LAND FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES.

1. Political conditions affecting our country have changed very materially in the past 20 years, but it can hardly be said that the development of our land forces has kept pace with these changing conditions. Until quite recently our people have been almost wholly occupied with the task of overrunning our continental possessions and taking full possession of them. The Regular Army has been the forerunner of this movement, and has been organized, distributed, and trained for the requirements thus involved. This has kept the bulk of the Regular Army scattered in small units in our western country. Conquest and settlement have been fairly completed now, however, and the civil authorities are capable of maintaining orderly conditions as well in one part of our country as in another. If domestic questions were still the only ones that claimed serious attention it would seem that to deal with such questions only the Army should be distributed more equitably with respect to density of population.

But gradually our external problems have been assuming larger and larger proportions. While we were expanding other nations have been doing the like, and within the past few years it is found that practically the whole earth is now divided up among the principal nations and held by them either as actual possessions or as spheres of influence. Hitherto the interests of nations or of small groups of nations have been more or less local. But due to this world-wide expansion the contact between great nations and races has already become close. It tends to become continually closer, due to the increase of population and national needs, and due especially to the vastly increased facilities for intercommunication. With this close contact thus so recently established comes a competition, commercial, national, and racial, whose ultimate seriousness current events already enable us to gauge. Since our conflict with Spain in 1898 practically all of the principal nations of the earth have either been actively engaged in war or else brought to the verge of actual war. The evidence is clear that the nations and races capable of maintaining and protecting themselves are the only ones who can flourish in this world competition.

We have been drawn from our state of isolation and are inevitably involved in this competition. We must consider what preparation we will make to meet this change in our national situation. It may be said that we claim the undisturbed enjoyment of our possessions at home and the protection of our interests abroad. Our military requirements may then be summed up as follows: (1) To secure our home country from invasion; (2) to protect our foreign interests; (3) to maintain domestic peace and good order. Our forces should be proportioned, organized, and trained to meet these requirements.

2. ESTIMATE OF THE LAND FORCES NEEDED IN THE UNITED STATES.

Our requirements in the way of land forces are certain to change as the years go on, but in the light of present-day conditions it is estimated that at the outbreak of war with a first-class power we should be capable of mobilizing at once in the United States an effective force of 460,000 mobile troops and 42,000 Coast Artillery; that this is the minimum number of first-line troops necessary; and that to augment this force and replace its losses we should have plans made for raising immediately an additional force of 300,000 men.

To meet requirements less vital than a great national war—as for example, the sending of expeditionary forces to protect certain foreign interests—it may be presumed that we would draw upon the forces thus enumerated; and as in the light of our recent experiences we can not possibly foretell to what places expeditions may have to be sent nor what numbers will be required, all of these forces should be available for service anywhere.

3. REGULAR AND VOLUNTEER TROOPS.

The Regular Army contingent of this total mobile force at home should be sufficient to provide an expeditionary force capable of acting with the utmost promptness and decision, and sufficient to furnish a training nucleus for the volunteer troops in peace and a stiffening element in war. To meet conditions we can now foresee it is believed the Regular Army should comprise four complete divisions and that it should furnish as extradivisional troops, a division of Cavalry and the quota of Heavy Field Artillery, Engineers, Signal, and sanitary troops appropriate for one field army. On this basis the regular contingent of mobile troops within the United States proper when raised to war strength, would comprise about 112,000 men. The remaining 348,000 mobile troops would be made up of citizen soldiers organized in divisions and in field army auxiliaries. Each group of three division districts should furnish three complete divisions of citizen soldiers and the extradivisional troops considered appropriate for a field army of three divisions. On this basis the quota of 348,000 citizen soldiers might be raised from 12 division districts¹ and they would be the equivalent of 4 normal type field armies. The regular and volunteer contingents taken together would then represent 5 field armies, but the exact number in which the various divisions and auxiliaries would actually be combined to make up field armies would depend entirely upon the necessities of the campaign in view.

The regular contingent of Coast Artillery troops in the United States should comprise 26,500 men when on war footing, leaving 21,000 to be furnished by the citizen soldiery. These figures are based on a complete regular personnel for mine companies and 50 per cent personnel of regulars for gun companies for authorized armament.

XI.

A COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

As war is but a phase of international politics, so military policy is but a phase of international policy. In its broadest sense the organization of the land forces is but a part of the national war organization, which includes the organization of the sea forces and of all other national resources.

A scientific solution of our military problem must include a determination and definition of national policy, and the provision of sufficient military and naval forces to support that policy against such adverse interests as may develop from time to time. As several departments of the Government are concerned in the settlement of this question, it is obvious that a sound policy must be predicated upon a comprehensive view of the whole problem with the view of coordinating and balancing its several elements.

¹As indicated in Chapter IX the detailed organization of the citizen soldiery will depend upon the extent to which the present organized militia can be utilized for general military purposes. The organization of 12 divisions, with the extra divisional troops for four field armies and with the necessary Coast Artillery companies, will absorb all of the units now organized in the National Guard.

In order to formulate a comprehensive policy for the consideration of Congress, it is believed that there should be a council of national defense similar to the one proposed in H. R. 1309. The function of this council, as defined in the bill, is to "report to the President, for transmission to Congress, a general policy of national defense and such recommendation of measures relating thereto as it shall deem necessary and expedient."

The members of the council, as provided in the bill, are as follows:

The President of the United States (ex officio president of the council).

The Secretary of State (to preside in the absence of the President).

The Secretary of War.

The Secretary of the Navy.

The chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Senate.

The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate.

The chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate.

The chairman of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives.

The chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

An officer of the Navy not below the rank of captain, to be selected by the Secretary of the Navy.

The president of the Army War College.

The president of the Navy War College.

It would seem that through the agency of this council the problem of national defense should receive the joint consideration of all of the branches of the Government which are responsible for its ultimate solution.

APPENDIX I.

S. 2518.

A BILL TO PROVIDE FOR RAISING THE VOLUNTEER FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN TIME OF ACTUAL OR THREATENED WAR.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, The land forces of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the Militia, and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize.

SEC. 2. That the volunteer forces shall be raised and organized as in this act provided, only during the existence of war, or while war is imminent, and only after Congress has or shall have authorized the President to raise such a force: *Provided*, That the term of enlistment in the volunteer forces shall be the same as that for the Regular Army, and all officers and enlisted men composing such volunteer forces shall be mustered out of the service of the United States as soon as practicable after the President shall have issued a proclamation announcing the termination of the war or the passing of the emergency.

SEC. 3. That when volunteer forces are to be raised the President shall issue his proclamation, stating the number of men desired for each arm, corps, and department, within such limits as may be fixed by law, and the Secretary of War shall prescribe such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the terms of this act, as may be necessary for the purpose of examining, organizing, and receiving into the service the men called for: *Provided*, That the power to organize shall include the power to provide the officers and enlisted men of all grades and classes, including trained nurses, male and female, that may be necessary in the various arms, corps, and departments: *Provided further*, That all enlisted men received into the service in the volunteer forces shall, as far as practicable, be taken from the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, in proportion to their respective populations: *Provided further*, That when the raising of a volunteer force shall have been authorized by Congress, and after the Organized Militia of any arm or class shall have been called into the service of the United States, volunteers of that particular arm or class may be raised and accepted into said service in accordance with the terms of this act regardless of the extent to which other arms or classes of said militia shall have been called into said service.

SEC. 4. That the volunteer forces shall be subject to the laws, orders, and regulations governing the Regular Army in so far as such laws, orders, and regulations are applicable to officers or enlisted men whose permanent retention in the military service, either on the active list or on the retired list, is not contemplated by existing law; and no distinction shall be made between the Regular Army and the volunteer forces in respect to the conferring upon officers or enlisted men of brevet rank, medals of honor, certificates of merit, or other rewards for distinguished service: *Provided*, That officers of the volunteer forces shall be competent to sit upon courts-martial for the trial of officers and soldiers of the Regular Army and of the National Guard, or Organized Militia, when the latter has been called into the service of the United States; that officers of the Regular Army shall be competent to sit upon courts-martial for the trial of officers and soldiers of the volunteer forces and of the National Guard, or Organized Militia, when the latter has been called into the service of the United States, unless objection be made by the accused, and that no distinction shall be made between the Regular Army and the volunteer forces in respect to the eligibility of any regular or volunteer officer for service in any court of inquiry or military commission: *Provided further*, That the organization of all units of the line and of the signal troops of the volunteer forces shall be the same as that prescribed by law and regulations for the corresponding units of the Regular Army: *Provided further*, That when mili-

tary conditions so require, the President may organize the land forces of the United States into brigades and divisions and such higher units as he may deem necessary, and the composition of units higher than the regiment shall be as he may prescribe: *Provided further*, That to each regiment of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and to each battalion of engineers and signal troops organized under this act, there shall be attached the same personnel of the Medical Department as are attached to like organizations of the Regular Army: *Provided further*, That the organization of the coast defenses, of machine-gun detachments, establishments of the Medical Department, remount depots, military trains, secret-service agencies, military prisons, lines of communication, including their supply depots, and of other adjuncts that may be necessary in the prosecution of war, and the organization of which is not otherwise provided for by law, shall be as the President may from time to time direct.

SEC. 5. That the President is authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint all officers required by this act; the number and grade of such officers not to exceed the number and grade of like officers provided for a like force of the Regular Army: *Provided*, That all appointments below the grade of brigadier general in the line of the volunteer forces shall be by commission in an arm of the service and not by commission in any particular regiment; and officers in each arm of the service shall be assigned to regiments, and transferred from one regiment to another, as the interests of the service may require, by orders from the Secretary of War: *Provided further*, That no officer above the grade of colonel shall be appointed under the provisions of this act.

SEC. 6. That to provide the staff officers that will be necessary in the various staff corps and departments in time of war or while war is imminent, and that are not otherwise provided for in this act, the President is authorized to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, such number of volunteer staff officers of the proper grades for such corps and departments as he may find necessary: *Provided*, That the total number of such officers so appointed, including all such officers of the National Guard called into the service of the United States, shall not exceed the ratio of one officer to two hundred enlisted men for all National Guard and volunteer forces called into the service of the United States: *Provided further*, That the number of officers appointed in each grade in such staff corps and departments shall not exceed in each staff corps or department the proportionate strength of the corresponding grade as established by law for like staff corps and departments of the Regular Army: *Provided further*, That the President may appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, volunteer chaplains at the rate of one for each regiment of volunteer infantry, cavalry, and field artillery, and one for every twelve companies of volunteer coast artillery raised, with rank corresponding to that established by law for chaplains in the Regular Army.

SEC. 7. That in appointing the volunteer officers authorized by this act the President may select them from the Regular Army, from those duly qualified and registered pursuant to section twenty-three of the act of Congress approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three, from the National Guard of the District of Columbia, and, upon the recommendation of the various governors, from the National Guard of the several States and Territories in proportion, as far as practicable, to their respective populations, and as near as may be from the localities from which the troops were recruited, and from the country at large: *Provided*, That in appointments from the country at large preference shall be given those who have had honorable service in the Regular Army, the National Guard, or the volunteer forces, or who have been graduated from educational institutions in which military instruction is compulsory: *Provided further*, That at the same time, not to exceed one Regular Army Officer shall hold a volunteer commission in any one battalion of volunteer engineers or signal troops, or in any one battalion of volunteer field artillery; and not to exceed four Regular Army officers shall hold commissions in any one regiment of volunteer cavalry, field artillery, or infantry, or in any twelve companies of coast artillery, including their field and staff, at the same time: *And provided further*, That Regular Army officers appointed as officers of Volunteers under this act shall not thereby vacate their Regular Army commissions or be prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing therein.

SEC. 8. That the temporary vacancies created in any grade not above that of colonel among the commissioned personnel of any arm, staff corps, or department of the Regular Army, through appointments of officers thereof to

higher volunteer rank, shall be filled by temporary promotion according to seniority in rank from officers holding commissions in the next lower grade in said arm, staff corps, or department; and all temporary vacancies created in any grade by temporary promotions shall in like manner be filled from, and thus create temporary vacancies in, the next lower grade; and the vacancies that remain thereafter in said arm, staff corps, or department that can not be filled by temporary promotions, as prescribed in this section, may be filled by the temporary appointment of officers of such number and grade or grades as shall maintain said arm, corps, or department at the full commissioned strength authorized by law: *Provided*, That in the staff corps and departments subject to the provisions of sections twenty-six and twenty-seven of the act of Congress, approved February second, nineteen hundred and one, and acts amendatory thereto, temporary vacancies that can not be filled by temporary promotions, as hereinbefore prescribed, shall be filled by temporary details made in the manner prescribed in said sections twenty-six and twenty-seven and acts amendatory thereto, and the resulting temporary vacancies in the branches of the Army from which the details are so made shall be filled as hereinbefore in this section prescribed: *Provided further*, That officers temporarily promoted or appointed under the terms of this section shall be so promoted or appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms that shall not extend beyond the termination of the war or the passing of the existing emergency as defined by the President's proclamation, whereupon the said officers shall be discharged from the positions held by them under their temporary promotions or appointments and officers detailed as herein authorized shall be relieved from their temporary details: *Provided further*, That officers temporarily promoted under the provisions of this section shall not vacate their permanent commissions nor be prejudiced in their lineal or relative standing in the Regular Army.

Sec. 9. That all returns and muster rolls of organizations of the volunteer forces and of militia organizations while in the service of the United States shall be rendered to The Adjutant General of the Army, and upon the muster out of such organizations the records pertaining to them shall be transferred to and filed in The Adjutant General's Office. And regimental and all other medical officers serving with volunteer troops, or with militia organizations in the service of the United States, in the field or elsewhere, shall keep a daily record of all soldiers reported sick or wounded, as shown by the morning calls or reports, and shall deposit such reports, with other reports provided for in this section, in The Adjutant General's Office, as provided for herein for other reports, returns, and muster rolls.

Sec. 10. That in time of war all organizations of the land forces shall be recruited, and maintained as near their prescribed strength as practicable. For this purpose the necessary rendezvous and depots shall be established by the Secretary of War for the enlistment and training of all recruits, and in order that officers may be available for recruiting duty the President is authorized, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint officers of Volunteers of the proper arm of the service, additional to those elsewhere herein authorized, in numbers not to exceed at the rate of one major, four captains, five first lieutenants, and five second lieutenants for each organized regiment of Cavalry, Field Artillery, or Infantry, each three battalions of Engineers, or each twelve companies of Coast Artillery; that for purposes of instruction and discipline the troops at recruit depots herein authorized may be organized into companies and battalions, at the discretion of the Secretary of War, with noncommissioned officers and privates of such grades and numbers as may be prescribed by the President. The recruit rendezvous and recruit depots herein prescribed shall be under the direct control of the Secretary of War, and shall render their reports and returns to The Adjutant General of the Army: *Provided*, That to maintain the National Guard organizations in the service of the United States at their maximum strength the recruiting rendezvous and depots in any State or Territory may, at the request of the governor thereof, enlist and train recruits for the National Guard organizations in the service of the United States from that State.

Sec. 11. That, in the organization of the recruiting system, the President is authorized to employ retired officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the Regular Army, either with their rank on the retired list or, in the case of enlisted men, with increased noncommissioned rank; or he may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint and employ retired officers below the grade of colonel, with increased volunteer commissioned rank not

to exceed one grade above that held by them upon the retired list, or retired enlisted men with volunteer commissioned rank not above the grade of first lieutenant: *Provided*, That retired officers and enlisted men while thus employed shall not be eligible for transfer to the field units, but shall receive the full pay and allowances of the respective grades in which they are serving, whether volunteer or regular, in lieu of their retired pay and allowances: *Provided further*, That upon the termination of the duty or, in case of those given volunteer rank, upon muster out as volunteers, the officers and men shall revert to their retired status.

SEC. 12. That, except as otherwise specifically prescribed by law, all officers provided for in this act are subject to such assignments of duty and such transfers as the President may direct: *Provided*, That medical officers of Volunteers when detailed as consulting surgeons shall not exercise command over the hospitals to which they may be assigned for duty, except that by virtue of their commissions they may command all enlisted men: *Provided further*, That medical inspectors shall be detailed for duty with each army, army corps, and division, and for the base and lines of communications, and that no officer shall be detailed for duty as a medical inspector except he be experienced in military sanitation.

SEC. 13. That all officers and enlisted men of the volunteer forces shall be in all respects on the same footing as to pay, allowances, and pensions as officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Regular Army: *Provided*, That enlisted men in the Quartermaster's Department and Subsistence Department of the volunteer forces shall receive the same pay and allowances as enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Engineer Corps.

SEC. 14. That the commander of a division or higher military unit is authorized to appoint, from time to time, military boards of not less than three nor more than five officers of the volunteer forces to examine into the capacity, qualifications, conduct, and efficiency of any commissioned officer of said forces within his command: *Provided*, That each member of the board shall be superior in rank to the officer whose qualifications are to be inquired into: *Provided further*, That if the report of such board is adverse to the continuance of any officer, and if the report be approved by the President, such officer shall be discharged from service in the volunteer forces, at the discretion of the President, with one month's pay and allowances.

SEC. 15. That the act approved April twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, entitled "An act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war, and for other purposes," is hereby repealed, and all other laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this act are, to the extent of such inconsistency only, hereby repealed.

MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS AND METHODS OF APPOINTING THEIR OFFICERS.

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DU PONT TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE BILL (S. 2518) FOR RAISING THE VOLUNTEER FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN TIME OF ACTUAL OR THREATENED WAR.

The land forces of the United States are divided into three separate and distinct classes, consisting—

(A) Of the Regular Army, which is the military establishment maintained during both peace and war, under the provisions of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, giving Congress power to raise and support armies, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the same.

(B) Of the militia of the different States and Territories and of the District of Columbia, when called into the service of the United States, under the provisions of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, giving Congress power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

(C) Of such volunteer forces as Congress shall authorize to be raised, under the provisions of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, giving Congress power to raise and support armies, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the same.

MILITIA.

Under the acts of Congress approved May 8, 1792, July 17, 1862, and March 2, 1867, the militia of the different States, Territories, and District of Columbia is composed of all able-bodied citizens between the ages of 18 and 45; but under the provisions of the act of Congress approved January 21, 1903, known as the Dick law, and amendments thereto, the militia, as above constituted, is classified under two heads:

First. The Organized Militia, often styled the National Guard, consisting of officers commissioned by the governors of the respective States and Territories and in the District of Columbia by the President and of enlisted men who have engaged to serve for such specified periods as may be determined by the laws of the different States and Territories. In the District of Columbia these periods are determined by the United States statutes.

Second. The reserve militia, consisting of the whole body of the militia not regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed.

The governors have power to call out the militia for service within their respective States and Territories, and Congress has power under section 8, Article I, of the Constitution, to call out the militia of the respective States and Territories to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

Congress, by the statute of 1795, made it lawful for the President to call out such numbers of the militia as he may deem necessary, and when properly mustered into the United States service such numbers as may be called out become a part of the land forces of the United States. It is evident, however, that it is not practicable for the President to call out such portions of the militia as do not possess a military organization. While the President has authority to determine the period for which the militia is to be called into the service of the United States, under the statutes he can not detain any officer or enlisted man beyond the term of his existing State commission or enlistment; and, except in the case of the militia of the District of Columbia, he can not make any appointments or promotions of commissioned officers of the Organized Militia of the States and Territories when called into the service of the United States, the authority to make such appointments being expressly reserved to the respective States under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution and given by statute to the governors of Territories.

VOLUNTEERS.

In general terms the word "volunteer" applies to a man who voluntarily engages in the military service of the United States, or of some particular State or Territory, and differentiates him from a man who is drafted compulsorily into the military service—a power which Congress has the right to exercise and did exercise during the Civil War. In this sense the term "volunteer" is just as much applicable to the officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army as to the officers and enlisted men of the so-called volunteer troops. It is equally applicable to the Organized Militia so far as concerns their relations to their respective States and Territories, but when called into the national service by the President they are in no sense Volunteers so far as the United States is concerned.

To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the term "volunteers," as applied technically to one of the three classes into which our land forces are divided, is used in a special or restricted sense and includes only the troops which have been raised and maintained for limited periods under authority of Congress as adjuncts to the Regular Army in times of actual or threatened war, or other emergency.

So far as the constitutional authority for their creation is concerned, the regular and the so-called volunteer forces are upon an identical footing, but are differentiated by the fact that the former are permanent and the latter temporary.

The term "volunteers," as applied to military organizations, appears for the first time in the act of May 28, 1798, which empowered the President to accept any company or companies of *Volunteers* who might associate and offer themselves for the service. This act authorized the President to appoint the commissioned officers of such company or companies, and the act of June 22, 1798, empowered him to organize the companies into legions, regiments, or battalions, and to appoint field officers for the same.

It will be noted that as the States or Territories are not mentioned in the act of May, 1798, the companies of Volunteers to be raised under its provisions were not in any sense State organizations, but could be taken from the country at large.

Volunteers are next mentioned in the act of March 2, 1799, which empowered the President to accept 23 regiments of such troops to be employed in the same manner as the militia, and to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the volunteer field officers.

In 1803, when difficulties arose with Spain, the President was authorized by the act of March 3 of that year to require the executives of such of the States as he might deem expedient to organize, arm, equip, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warning, detachments of militia, not exceeding in all 80,000 men; and the second section of this statute gave the President power to authorize the State executives to accept as part of such detachments any corps of Volunteers, the officers of whom were to be appointed by the State authorities.

The acts of February 24, 1807, and March 30, 1808, when trouble was anticipated with England, were practically repetitions of the statute of 1803, except that the number of men to be called out were not to exceed 30,000 and 100,000, respectively, including corps of Volunteers.

The act of February 6, 1812, was largely a reenactment of the statute of 1807, except that the number of Volunteers was not to exceed 50,000 men; but the act of July 6 of the same year repealed this statute so far as the appointment of officers was concerned and empowered the President to appoint and commission them, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The act of February 24, 1814, reenacted the legislation of 1812, except that the President was authorized to receive such proportion of Volunteers "as in his judgment the public service may require," who were to serve for five years, or during the war; and about a month later the act of March 30, 1814, empowered the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make all necessary appointments of officers and to fill all vacancies. During the following year there was still further legislation in regard to Volunteers. Sections 3 and 4 of the act approved January 27, 1815, empowered the President to receive into the service of the United States any Volunteers who might offer their services, not to exceed 40,000 men, and required that the officers should be commissioned by the President.

Passing now to the Florida War, the act of May 23, 1836, authorized the President to accept the services of not exceeding 10,000 Volunteers, the officers to be appointed in the manner prescribed by law in the several States and Territories to which such Volunteers belonged, and practically the same legislation was reenacted on March 3, 1839, when 50,000 Volunteers were authorized at the time of the dispute with Great Britain in regard to the Maine boundary line, and again on May 13, 1846, at the beginning of the Mexican War, 50,000 Volunteers were likewise authorized. It is to be observed, however, that the act of March 3, 1847, empowered the President to organize the Volunteers who might reenlist into companies, battalions, and regiments, and to commission the officers of the same.

Under the act of April 7, 1858, a regiment of Volunteers was organized for the defense and protection of the Texas frontier, and two regiments to quell the disturbances in Utah, the officers of the three regiments to be appointed in the manner prescribed by law in the several States and Territories, except the regimental quartermasters and commissaries, who were detailed from the Regular Army.

During the Civil War the first legislation in regard to Volunteers, enacted on the 22d of July, 1861, made a radical departure from either of the previous methods of appointing volunteer officers, inasmuch as it provided that the company officers were to be elected by the men, and the field officers by the company officers; but the act of the 6th of August following rescinded this and prescribed that the vacancies among the commissioned officers of volunteer regiments were to be filled by the State governors.

Under the act of July 17, 1862, colored troops were first organized in South Carolina and Louisiana, and later in many other places to the number of nearly 100,000 men. While the officers in most instances were not named directly by the President, they were appointed, after passing careful examinations, by the Adjutant General and other officials under his authority.

On April 28, 1863, an invalid corps was organized for garrison duty, made up of officers and enlisted men who had been wounded or otherwise disabled

for active field service, the officers, after passing satisfactory examinations, being appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. About the same time six regiments and one company of United States Volunteers were organized, the officers being all appointed by the Secretary of War after passing examinations; and on the 20th of May, 1864, a regiment of veteran volunteer engineers was raised in the Army of the Cumberland, the officers being appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the commander of the Army of the Cumberland.

The last act relating to Volunteers during the Civil War was that of November 28, 1864, which created a new Volunteer Army corps, consisting of not less than 20,000 men, and known as the United States Veteran Volunteers, the officers being appointed by the Secretary of War after rigid examination.

The first legislation in regard to Volunteers passed during the Spanish War was that of April 22, 1898, which gave the appointment of all regimental and company officers to the governors of the States in which their respective organizations were raised, except that the President was authorized to organize not exceeding 3,000 men possessing special qualifications, and to appoint the officers of the same. The act of May 11 of that year provided for a volunteer brigade of engineers and a force of 10,000 immunes, all of the officers to be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate.

The latest legislation on the statute books in regard to Volunteers is that of March 2, 1899, which authorized the raising from the country at large of a force not exceeding 35,000 men for service in the Philippine insurrection, and provided that the officers should be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. It is admitted by all that the troops mustered into the service under the provisions of this act became the best disciplined and best instructed, and were therefore the most efficient and most economical body of Volunteers that have ever formed a part of our national land forces.

It will be seen from the foregoing that there has been no uniform rule in the method of appointing officers of the volunteer forces, and that the legislation has often conferred this power wholly or in part upon the President, while at other times it has been vested in the governors of the States and Territories.

In all but two States of the Union militia officers below the rank of major are elected by the men and the field officers by the company officers. When the appointment of volunteer officers has been left to the State and Territorial executives, the usual practice has been—and particularly during the Spanish War—to make nearly all such appointments, and promotions as well, on analogous lines, the practical result being that the volunteer officers are elected by those whom they are to command. It is needless to point out that the appointment and promotion of officers on these lines is not only wholly wrong in principle but most pernicious in results, radically affecting, as it does, the discipline and efficiency of the troops and enormously increasing the expense to the Government by making it necessary to employ at least twice as large a number in order to secure the same result. In defense of this bad system it is claimed that the men would come forward more readily and in greater numbers, but when we consider the vast population from which the Volunteers can be drawn it is believed that this argument has but little weight. Within three months after the declaration of war with Spain no less than 56,258 men had enlisted in the Regular Army. If in 1898 such a large number of men were willing to enlist in the Regular Army with its reputation for strict discipline and where the men have no voice whatever in the selection of their officers, should another war occur it would seem reasonable to suppose (taking into consideration the large increase of our population) that the necessary men would be forthcoming for the volunteer regiments, even if the appointment of the officers were vested in the President. As a matter of fact, in 1899, although the climate was very hot and unhealthy and the seat of war was at the other end of the world, there was no difficulty whatever experienced in raising from the country at large 35,000 Volunteers for service in the Philippines, the officers being all appointed by the President.

Even if the contention above referred to were true, it is submitted that, in the judgment of all military experts, volunteer troops in which the officers are elected by those under them would not be as efficient as a much lesser number organized under the system proposed in the bill, under which the President appoints the officers subject to the restrictions and limitations therein contained, and this, too, with an immense diminution in the expense of the war.

APPENDIX II.

ORGANIZATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY—ORGANIZATION OF THE AMMUNITION SERVICE OF DIVISIONS AND ARMIES.

The proposed organization of the Field Artillery is:
For each division:

1 regiment of 3 battalions:	
1 battalion of 3 batteries of four 3-inch guns.....	12
1 battalion of 3 batteries of four 3-inch guns.....	12
1 battalion of 2 batteries of four 3.8-inch howitzers.....	8
1 regiment of 3 battalions:	
1 battalion of 3 batteries of four 3-inch guns.....	12
1 battalion of 3 batteries of four 3-inch guns.....	12
1 battalion of 2 batteries of four 4.7-inch howitzers.....	8
1 ammunition column of 2 battalions.	
For each field army in addition to the divisional Artillery:	
1 regiment of 2 battalions:	
1 battalion of 2 batteries of four 4.7 inch guns.....	8
1 battalion of 2 batteries of four 6-inch howitzers.....	8
1 ammunition column of 1 battalion.	
For each Cavalry division:	
1 regiment of 3 battalions of 2 batteries of four guns each, caliber 3-inch.	24
1 ammunition column of 1 battalion.	

The normal organization to be prescribed for the Field Artillery pertaining to divisions and field armies is complicated by the facts that several different calibers must be provided; that they must be provided in proper proportion, and that the various calibers must be grouped in organizations best adapted to employment in war and training in peace.

The choice of the proper organization for the divisional Artillery affords the principal difficulty. For the total number of Infantry and Cavalry in the division it is estimated that the total number of field pieces to be provided is about 60. It is regarded as necessary to have a certain number of howitzers included in this number, and it is regarded as desirable for purposes of training in peace and employment in war to group the various elements in definite regimental organizations.

After study of various combinations, the solution proposed above is regarded as best meeting the needs of our service. Each regiment is given a fair proportion of howitzers, and no more. With its three battalions—2 gun and 1 howitzer—the regiment is capable of meeting a variety of requirements in war and is well adapted to illustrating the varied uses of artillery during combined instruction with the other arms in the various parts of the country in time of peace. Each division is provided with a reduced number of both types of the fairly mobile howitzers (3.8-inch and 4.7-inch). This distribution is preferred to that of assigning one particular type to each division, since it may be impossible to foretell which division of a field army will need certain types most. It is, indeed, quite possible that all divisions, when deployed, will have use for a limited number of howitzers of both types.

The organization proposed for the horse Artillery is adapted to providing a two-battery battalion for each Cavalry brigade, which is believed to be the proper quota. If desirable, the third battery in each battalion may form the nucleus for ammunition service.

As for the Army Artillery, two batteries of 4.7-inch guns and two batteries of 6-inch howitzers are regarded as the proper quota for the normal type field army of three divisions. The third battery in each battalion may similarly be utilized as the nucleus of the ammunition service.

The strength and composition of batteries, battalions, and regiments of Field Artillery are determined by the characteristics of the particular types to be served, and hence it is not possible to provide a homogeneous organization. The organization, as prescribed in legal enactments, should hence be flexible, so as to permit varying the types assigned for any particular service to meet the requirements of the case and so as to permit a gradual evolution in normal organization, as our experience with the various types and calibers of guns becomes more extensive. The law covering the organization of Field Artillery should accordingly be worded so as to indicate the maximum number of brigades, regiments, and ammunition battalions allowable, the maximum number of battalions and batteries in each, and the maximum strength of each unit, and leave it to the President to fix within this limit the strength of regiments, battalions, and batteries.

The existing law permits the desired flexibility, with the exception that it fixes the minimum strength. If the law prescribed the maximum strength of a regiment of Field Artillery as three battalions of three batteries each and indicated only the total maximum number of officers and enlisted men, then the President could vary the organization of any particular regiment to meet the needs of service.

AMMUNITION SERVICE.

The proposed organization of the divisional ammunition service is as follows:

	Officers.	Veterinarians.	Men.	Vehicles.	Animals.
First Battalion:					
Staff.....	2	1	9	12
Gun ammunition company.....	3	149	27	182
Howitzer ammunition company.....	3	163	28	211
Infantry ammunition company.....	4	145	59	266
Total.....	12	1	466	114	671
Second Battalion:					
Staff.....	2	1	9	12
Artillery train company.....	5	181	56	345
Infantry train company.....	4	145	59	296
Total.....	11	1	335	115	653
Divisional ammunition service:					
Staff.....	2	1	8	11
Grand total.....	25	3	809	229	1,335

STAFF OF AN AMMUNITION OR TRAIN BATTALION :

- 1 major.
- 1 lieutenant.
- 1 veterinarian.
- 1 sergeant-major.
- 3 sergeants, } agents and scouts.
- 3 corporals, }
- 2 privates (horseholders and orderlies).

STAFF OF HEADQUARTERS DIVISIONAL AMMUNITION SERVICE :

- 1 colonel or lieutenant colonel.
- 1 lieutenant.
- 1 veterinarian.
- 3 sergeants, } agents and scouts.
- 3 corporals, }
- 2 privates (horseholders and orderlies).

The complement proposed for the Army ammunition service is a battalion of two batteries; the staff of the battalion to be similar to that of a divisional ammunition battalion; the strength of each company to be the same as that of the howitzer ammunition company given above.

If it is deemed desirable to provide a separate ammunition service for the cavalry division, the complement for this duty should comprise a battalion of three companies each having the strength of the gun ammunition company given above.

For economic reasons it is not considered desirable to maintain complete ammunition organizations in time of peace. A peace nucleus must be provided and all plans carefully worked out for securing the personnel necessary for passing to the war basis. To organize at once an effective service there must be a proper reserve system.

For the divisional ammunition service, a lieutenant colonel of one of the Artillery regiments should be designated as chief of the service and should be

charged, in peace, with the detailed preparations for passing to the enlarged war footing. The third batteries of the two howitzer battalions of the division should constitute the nucleus of the ammunition service. All the officers and a limited number of enlisted men of these batteries should be maintained in peace; they may be employed on militia or other duty, but should be assembled at maneuver camps periodically for practicing, on a reduced basis, their appropriate duties in the ammunition service. On mobilization, the captains of these two skeleton batteries should be given temporary commissions as majors; the six lieutenants should be given temporary commissions as captains. A major would thus be provided to command each battalion, and captains would be provided to command the three companies of the first battalion and the two companies of the second battalion. The extra captain would be staff officer for the lieutenant colonel. The remainder of the officers would be reserve officers, designated in time of peace for their particular positions. There should be enough enlisted men in the two skeletonized howitzer batteries to provide a staff sergeant for the lieutenant colonel and each of the two majors and at least six noncommissioned officers for each ammunition or train company, thus making a total of 33 men for the two companies.

An effort should be made to enroll reservists and volunteers in the particular district in which the division is serving to make up the remainder of the enlisted strength.

For the Army ammunition service the lieutenant colonel of the Heavy Artillery regiment should command the battalion, and the skeletonized batteries should have, on the peace basis, a nucleus of officers and men.

Similar arrangements may be made for the ammunition service of a Cavalry division.

DETAILS OF DIVISIONAL SERVICE.

FIELD ARTILLERY.

The experience of recent wars seems to indicate that for the light field piece (3-inch) there must be maintained on wheels, in front of the advance supply depot, approximately 500 rounds per gun.

The supply to be thus maintained for the howitzer and other heavier calibers is not so well established. In an important engagement their expenditure will be great also, but as each wheeled vehicle can carry but a very limited number of these heavier projectiles, and the number of such vehicles must be kept down to the very minimum in order to reduce length of trains, it is evidently impracticable to keep anything like 500 pounds per gun on wheels for these calibers. Similarly, the number to be so maintained on pack mules for the mountain howitzers must be less than 500.

The number to be maintained on wheels or packs for the different calibers is estimated as follows:

	Rounds.
For the 3-inch rifle.....	464
For the 3-inch mountain howitzer.....	290
For the 3.8-inch howitzer.....	312
For the 4.7-inch howitzer.....	180

As for the distribution of the foregoing ammunition, the best practice seems to be to keep with the guns and their combat trains a number sufficiently large to give them a reasonable insurance against exhaustion of ammunition before resupply commences and to keep in the ammunition column the remaining amount as a rolling reserve to be served out to the various battalions and batteries in accordance with their expenditures.

On the basis of 3 caissons or 17 pack-mules per gun the following are the amounts to be kept with the guns and their combat trains:

	Rounds per gun.
For the 3-inch gun.....	358
For the 3-inch mountain howitzer.....	170
For the 3.8-inch howitzer.....	168
For the 4.7-inch howitzer.....	90


The following, then, remain to be carried in the ammunition columns:

	Rounds per gun.
For the 3-inch gun.....	106
For the 3-inch mountain howitzer.....	120
For the 3.8-inch howitzer.....	144
For the 4.7-inch howitzer.....	90

Such being the amounts of ammunition to be carried by the divisional ammunition column, we may decide what the composition and organization of this column should be.

The function of the column is to receive ammunition from the line of communication troops and transfer it to the combat trains of the batteries. The distance to be covered in making this transfer may vary very considerably. The average distance to be traversed may be assumed as one-half day's march; this on the assumption that the advance supply depot will be located one day's march in rear of the combatant troops and that the line of communication troops will feed subdepots for each division a half day's march farther on. A day's march may be taken as 18 miles; hence we have 9 miles as the distance the division train will have to cover on the above hypothesis. If the distance is greater or less than this the amount of ammunition that can be delivered at the front each day will be proportionately diminished or increased.

The routes to be followed in transporting ammunition by the divisional train may be illustrated graphically as shown in the following diagram :



The first portion of the travel from the divisional subbase toward the front will be on some already existing road, or on one which will have to be immediately blazed out for all the divisional supply trains. On approaching the combatant troops, however, some point on this route will have to be selected from which elements of the column can be sent to the different combat trains. This point may be termed "the distributing point." From here the vehicles will have to move often across country to reach the vicinity of the combat trains. Each element will move up to a convenient point to which empty caissons from the combat trains may be sent to be refilled. It may be assumed that these points are ordinarily about 1 mile in rear of the fighting line, and that the distance to be covered from distributing point will be 3 or 4 miles.

The procedure above outlined seems to be the one that would naturally be followed in the average case. It suggests two things as to the organization and composition of the divisional train:

1. That the train should be divided into two échelons: The first to have the duty of transporting ammunition from the distributing point to the various combat trains; the second to have the duty of bringing ammunition up the road to the distributing point.

2. That ammunition should be carried in caissons in the first échelon, since all sorts of country may have to be negotiated; while for the second échelon Army wagons or motor trucks should be used, inasmuch as a great saving in men, animals, and length of train is thus insured, and inasmuch as wagons or trucks would be entirely suitable for the work to be done.

The foregoing may be accepted as fundamental considerations determining the organization of division trains. Both échelons should be capable of ready subdivision so that full subdivisions may be moving to the front while empty ones are moving to the rear to be filled. When the line occupied by the division is very extended, it may be desirable at times to split the leading échelon in two and send each part to establish a distributing point for supplying its part of the line.

The second échelon should have a section comprising the reserve of men, horses, matériel, and equipment and also the personnel and equipment for making minor repairs.

Reverting now to the amount of ammunition to be carried by the divisional ammunition column and accepting the fact that, so far as practicable, the total amount should be about equally divided between the two échelons, we have the following:

	First échelon.	Second échelon.
3-inch gun.....	53	53
3-inch mountain howitzer.....	40	80
3.8-inch howitzer.....	72	72
4.7-inch howitzer.....	45	45

From these figures we may now deduce the number of caissons, wagons, and packs to carry the amount of ammunition required in each échelon of the divisional ammunition column:

	First échelon— Caissons or packs.	Second échelon— Wagons.
3-inch gun.....	24	25
3-inch mountain howitzer.....	144	25
3.8-inch howitzer.....	12	10
4.7-inch howitzer.....	12	13

It thus appears that the first échelon of a divisional ammunition column must have—

- 24 caissons for 3-inch ammunition.
- 12 caissons for 3.8-inch ammunition.
- 12 caissons for 4.7-inch ammunition.

It is proposed to organize these into a gun ammunition company of 24 caissons and a howitzer ammunition company of 24 caissons, each as shown in tables appended hereto.

The second échelon requires 25 wagons for 3-inch, 10 for 3.8-inch, and 13 for 4.7-inch ammunition, or a total of 48 wagons.

It is proposed to organize these into an Artillery train company, as shown in table herewith. If it is found that motor trucks can be substituted for wagons, then the number of vehicles will be reduced and the personnel will be correspondingly reduced. Attached to the second échelon is the reserve section comprising spare men, animals, matériel, and repair outfits.

If mountain guns are assigned to a division, the composition of the ammunition trains will depend upon whether these guns constitute the only guns of the division or are only a portion of the divisional Artillery. The mountain ammunition company shown in the table attached will transport 40 rounds per gun for 36 guns, or 60 per gun for 24 guns. One company will suffice if only one regiment of the Artillery brigade is armed with mountain guns, but two must be taken if both regiments are so armed. If battalions of other calibers are present, suitable sections of their ammunition columns must be taken. The figures in tables, just above, are computed on the assumption that one full regiment of 36 guns accompanies the division. In such a case the other Artillery ammunition company would serve the ammunition for other calibers.

INFANTRY AND CAVALRY AMMUNITION.

The amount of ammunition to be carried per Infantry and Cavalry rifle is as follows:

- 90 rounds per rifle with each man.
- 120 rounds per rifle in combat trains.
- 120 rounds per rifle in divisional trains.

	Men.
In a division there will be 9 regiments of Infantry of approximately 2,000 men each, or-----	18,000
One regiment of Cavalry of 1,200 men-----	1,200
Making a grand total of-----	19,200

Multiply by 120=2,304,000 rounds=number of rounds in divisional train.
 For the machine guns it is estimated that there should be 17,500 rounds per gun with the mobile troops; 4,800 rounds per gun are to be carried with the new machine-gun equipment, thus leaving about 12,000 rounds to be carried in divisional train. There are 6 machine guns for each of the 10 regiments of Infantry and Cavalry, or 60 guns. For these we must have 720,000 rounds. Hence, we have for the total in the divisional train 2,304,000+720,000=3,024,000 rounds.

To carry this amount and the necessary revolver ammunition, we require 104 wagons for ammunition proper and 4 for other stores, or 108 in all.

It is proposed to organize these into: An Infantry ammunition company of 54 wagons for the first échelon; an Infantry train company of 54 wagons for the second échelon; the details of organization to be as shown in tables herewith.

SUMMARY OF DIVISIONAL SERVICE.

According to the foregoing analysis, the divisional ammunition service comprises:

- First battalion:
 - 1 gun ammunition company.
 - 1 howitzer ammunition company.
 - 1 Infantry ammunition company.
- Second battalion:
 - 1 Artillery train company.
 - 1 Infantry train company.

Each of these battalions should be commanded by a major—the battalion staff being as shown in table herewith.

A lieutenant colonel should be in charge of the entire divisional ammunition service, his function being to carry out the orders of the division commander as to resupply of ammunition, and to coordinate the workings of all the different elements.

ARMY AMMUNITION SERVICE.

The amount of ammunition to be maintained on wheels for the eight 4.7-inch guns and the eight 6-inch howitzers of the Army Artillery should be:

	Rounds per gun.
4.7-inch guns	336
6-inch howitzers.....	168

The amounts carried in the combat train are:

4.7-inch guns.....	168
6-inch howitzers.....	84

thus leaving for the ammunition column:

4.7-inch guns.....	168
6-inch howitzers.....	84

For these heavy calibers it is considered that there should be in the Army ammunition column 3 caissons per gun; the first échelon to comprise 1½ caissons per gun (that is, 24 caissons in all), drawn by horses; the second échelon to comprise 1½ caissons per gun (that is, 24 in all), drawn by horses or motors.

Gun ammunition company.

	Bat- tery staff.	First platoon.			Second platoon.			Sup- ply.	Total.
		First.	Sec- ond.	Third.	First.	Sec- ond.	Third.		
Captain.....	1								1
Lieutenant.....	1				1				2
Total commissioned.....	1	1			1				3
First sergeant.....	1								1
Quartermaster sergeant.....							1		1
Stable sergeant.....							1		1
Sergeants.....		1			1				3
Corporals.....	2	1	1	1	1	1	1		8
Horseshoers.....								3	3
Mechanics.....								2	2
Trumpeters.....	2								2
Cooks.....								3	3
Privates, drivers.....		12	12	12	12	12	12		75
Privates, cannoneers.....		8	8	8	8	8	8		48
Wagoners.....								2	2
Total enlisted.....	5	22	21	21	22	21	21	16	149
Caissons, 3-inch.....		4	4	4	4	4	4		24
Battery wagon.....								1	1
Field wagon.....								2	2
Total vehicles.....		4	4	4	4	4	4	3	27
Horses, draft.....		24	24	24	24	24	24	6	150
Horses, riding.....	6	3	1	1	3	1	1	8	24
Mules.....								8	8
Total animals.....	6	27	25	25	27	25	25	22	182

Howitzer ammunition company.

	Bat- tery staff.	First platoon.			Second platoon.			Sup- ply.	Total.
		First sec- tion.	Sec- ond sec- tion.	Third sec- tion.	First sec- tion.	Sec- ond sec- tion.	Third sec- tion.		
Captain.....	1							1	
Lieutenants.....		1			1			2	
Total commissioned.....	1	1			1			3	
First sergeant.....	1							1	
Quartermaster sergeant.....							1	1	
Stable sergeant.....							1	1	
Sergeants.....		1			1			3	
Corporals.....	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	
Horseshoers.....							4	4	
Trumpeters.....							2	2	
Musicians.....	2							2	
Cooks.....							3	3	
Privates:									
Drivers.....		12	12	12	16	16	16	87	
Cannoneers.....		8	8	8	8	8	8	48	
Wagoners.....							3	3	
Total enlisted.....	5	22	21	21	26	25	25	163	
Caissons:									
3.8-inch.....		4	4	4				12	
4.7-inch.....					4	4	4	12	
Battery wagon.....							1	1	
Field wagon.....							3	3	
Total vehicles.....		4	4	4	4	4	4	28	
Horses:									
Draft.....		24	24	24	32	32	32	174	
Riding.....	6	3	1	1	3	1	1	25	
Mules.....							12	12	
Total animals.....	6	27	25	25	35	33	33	211	

Mountain ammunition company.

	Bat- tery staff.	First platoon.			Second platoon.			Sup- ply.	Total
		First.	Sec- ond.	Third.	First.	Sec- ond.	Third.		
Captain	1							1	
Lieutenants		1			1			2	
Total commissioned	1	1			1			3	
First sergeant	1							1	
Quartermaster sergeant							1	1	
Stable sergeant							1	1	
Sergeants		1			1		1	3	
Corporals	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	8	
Horseshoers							4	4 ^m	
Mechanics							2	2 ^m	
Trumpeters	2							2	
Cooks							3	3 ^m	
Packers		6	6	6	6	6	6	41 ^m	
Packmaster							1	1 ^m	
Cargador							1	1 ^m	
Total enlisted	5	8	7	7	8	7	7	19	
Packs:									
Ammunition		24	24	24	24	24	24	144	
Forage and stores							4	4	
Supply and kit							20	20	
Total packs		24	24	24	24	24	24	168	
Mules:									
Pack		24	24	24	24	24	24	168	
Riding		6	6	6	6	6	6	52	
Horses	6	3	1	1	3	1	1	19	
Total animals	6	33	31	31	33	31	31	239	

Artillery train company.

	Battery staff.	First platoon.			Second platoon.			Third platoon.			Reserve and supply.	Total.
		First section.	Second section.	Third section.	First section.	Second section.	Third section.	First section.	Second section.	Third section.		
Captain.....	1				1			1				1
Lieutenants.....		1				1			1			1
Total commissioned..	1	1			1			1				5
First sergeant.....	1											1
Quartermaster sergeant.....											1	1
Stable sergeant.....											1	1
Sergeants.....		1			1			1			4	7
Corporals.....	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	16
Chief mechanic.....		1			1			1			1	1
Horseshoers.....											6	6
Mechanics.....											4	4
Trumpeters.....	2											2
Cooks.....											3	3
Drivers.....		9	8	8	4	3	3	5	4	4	31	79
Spare men.....											60	60
Total enlisted.....	5	11	9	9	6	4	4	7	5	5	116	181
3-inch wagons.....		9	8	8								25
3.8-inch wagons.....					4	3	3					10
4.7-inch wagons.....								5	4	4		13
Battery wagons.....											2	2
Store wagons.....											6	6
3-inch guns and limbers.....											1	1
Supply wagons.....											4	4
Total vehicles.....		9	8	8	4	3	3	5	4	4	13	61
Mules, draft.....		36	32	32	16	12	12	20	16	16	16	208
Horses:												
Draft.....											54	54
Riding.....	6	3	1	1	3	1	1	3	1	1	22	43
Spare horses.....											20	20
Spare mules.....											20	20
Total animals.....	6	39	33	33	19	13	13	23	17	17	132	345

Infantry ammunition or train company.

	Battery staff.	First platoon.			Second platoon.			Third platoon.			Reserve and supply.	Total.
		First section.	Second section.	Third section.	First section.	Second section.	Third section.	First section.	Second section.	Third section.		
Captain.....	1				1			1				1
Lieutenants.....		1										3
Total commissioned..	1	1			1			1				4
First sergeant.....	1											1
Quartermaster sergeant.....											1	1
Stable sergeant.....											1	1
Sergeants.....		1			1			1			1	4
Corporals.....	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11
Horseshoers.....											5	5
Mechanics.....											2	2
Trumpeters.....	2											2
Cooks.....											3	3
Privates, drivers.....		6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	61
Spare men.....											54	54
Total enlisted.....	5	8	7	7	8	7	7	8	7	7	74	145
Wagons.....		6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6		54
Battery wagon.....											1	1
Field wagons.....											4	4
Total vehicles.....		6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	59
Mules, draft.....		24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	16	232
Horses:												
Draft.....											3	3
Riding.....	6	3	1	1	3	1	1	3	1	1	10	31
Total animals.....	6	27	25	25	27	25	25	27	25	25	29	266

An infantry train company has 30 spare mules in addition to the strength given above.

APPENDIX III.

(War. Col. Div. G. S. 3709-51.)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, February 17, 1912.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR: I have the honor to respond to your note of the 5th instant, in which you ask my opinion upon the following question:

"Whether or not, under existing laws, the President has authority to call forth the Organized Militia of the States and send it into a foreign country with the Regular Army as a part of an army of occupation, especially should the United States intervene in the affairs of such country under conditions short of actual warfare?"

From very early times, in both England and this country, the militia has always been considered and treated as a military body quite distinct and different from the Regular or Standing Army, governed by different laws and rules, and equally different as to the time, place, or occasion of its service. One of the most notable points of difference is this: While the latter was in the continued service of the Government and might be called into active service at all times and in all places where armed force is required, for any purpose, the militia could be called into the actual service of the Government only in a few special cases provided for by law. Their service has always been considered as of a rather domestic character, for the protection and defense of their own country and the enforcement of its laws.

This has always been the English doctrine, and in some instances acts of Parliament have expressly forbidden the use of the militia outside of the Kingdom.

Our ancestors who framed and adopted our Constitution and early laws got their ideas of a militia, its nature, and purposes from this, and must be taken to have intended substantially the same military body, with the same limitations of the occasion and nature of their service. If they had intended to enlarge this they would have said so, just as they have when they intended to further limit or restrict the occasion or nature of their service.

When the Constitution gives to Congress the power "to raise and support armies" and to provide "for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions" and makes the President "the commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States," it is speaking of two different bodies: The one the Regular Army, in the continuous service of the Government, and liable to be called into active service at any time, or in any place where armed force is required; and the other a body for domestic service, and liable to be called into the service of the Government only upon the particular occasions named in the Constitution. And acts of Congress relating to the Army and the militia must have the same construction.

It is certain that it is only upon one or more of these three occasions—when it is necessary to suppress insurrections, repel invasions, or to execute the laws of the United States—that even Congress can call this militia into the service of the United States, or authorize it to be done.

As "insurrection" is necessarily internal and domestic, within the territorial limits of the nation, this portion of the sentence can afford no warrant for sending the militia to suppress it elsewhere. And even if an insurrection of our own citizens were set on foot and threateningly maintained in a foreign jurisdiction and upon our border, to send an armed force there to suppress it would be an act of war which the President can not rightfully do.

The term "to repel invasion" may be, in some respects, more elastic in its meaning. Thus, if the militia were called into the service of the General Government to repel an invasion it would not be necessary to discontinue their use at the boundary line, but they might (within certain limits, at least) pursue and

capture the invading force, even beyond that line: and just as the Regular Army might be used for that purpose. This may well be held to be within the meaning of the term "to repel invasion."

Then, too, if an armed force were assembled upon our border, so near and under circumstances which plainly indicated hostility and an intended invasion, this Government might attack and capture or defeat such forces, using either the Regular Army or the militia for that purpose. This, also, would be but one of the ways of repelling an invasion.

But this is quite different from and affords no warrant for sending the militia into a foreign country in time of peace and when no invasion is made or threatened.

The only remaining occasion for calling out the militia is "to execute the laws of the Union." But this certainly means to execute such laws where, and only where, they are in force and can be executed or enforced. The Constitution or laws of the United States have no extraterritorial force, and can not be compulsorily executed beyond or outside of the territorial limits of the United States.

It is true that treaties made in pursuance of the Constitution are, equally with acts of Congress, the supreme law of the land; but their observance, outside of our own jurisdiction, can not be enforced in the same way. The observance and performance, outside of our own jurisdiction, of treaty stipulations and obligations are left much to the honor, good faith, and comity of the other contracting party, reenforced at times by a regard for the consequences of a breach. We can not send either the Regular Army or the militia into a foreign country to execute such treaties or our laws. Such an invasion of a foreign country would be an act of war.

Outside of our own limits "the laws of the Union" are not executed by armed force, either regular or militia.

The Constitution had already given to Congress the unlimited power to declare war at any time and for whatever cause it chose. It did not, in this provision, attempt the useless thing of giving to Congress an additional power to declare war, or to afford an additional ground for doing so.

What is certainly meant by this provision is that Congress shall have power to call out the militia in aid of the civil power for the peaceful execution of the laws of the Union, wherever such laws are in force, and may be compulsorily executed, much as a sheriff may call upon the posse comitatus to peacefully disperse a riot or execute the laws.

Under our Constitution, as it has been uniformly construed from the first, the military is subordinate and subservient to the civil power, and it can be called upon to execute the laws of the Union only in aid of the civil power, and where the civil power has jurisdiction of such enforcement. Even the Regular Army can be thus called upon only on such occasions; and, certainly, the militia can not be thus called upon at any other.

Then, as the civil power is without force in a foreign country, and as even the Regular Army can not be sent into another country to there execute the laws of the Union, it follows that the Constitution confers no power to send the militia into a foreign country for the purpose stated in the question here considered. On the contrary, by its specific enumeration of the only occasions for calling out the militia, it clearly forbids this.

In all this I am not unmindful that nations sometimes do make hostile demonstrations and use armed force to compel the observance by another nation of its treaty obligations and sometimes send armed forces into another country to protect the lives and rights of its own citizens there.

I shall briefly notice these in their application to our own country, its Constitution, and laws. It will be observed, and as controlling and conclusive of the present question, that in case of a hostile demonstration against or a forcible attack upon another nation to enforce its treaty obligations or to punish their infraction there is no question involved of executing the laws of the invading nation, for such laws have no force or existence there. While the Constitution makes itself and the laws and treaties in pursuance thereof the supreme law of the land, it is only in our own land where such laws are supreme or of any force. As to the other contracting party, a treaty is a mere compact, depending for its observance upon the good faith, comity, or other moral considerations. The Constitution can not make itself or the treaties or laws made under it the supreme law of any other nation or give to either any force or existence beyond our own borders. So that when an armed force is used to compel the observance of treaty obligations or to punish or to obtain

compensation for their violation there is no question of executing any law of the Union, for there is no such law there. It is but the forcible compelling of the observance of an agreement or compensation for its breach. The provision referred to does not warrant the use of the militia for this purpose.

Just so it is when in troublous times an army of occupation, large or small, is sent into a foreign country to protect the lives and the rights of our own citizens. Here, too, no law of the Union is being executed by such invasion, for no law of the Union exists or can be enforced there.

While it is the duty of every nation to afford proper protection to foreigners who are lawfully within its borders, yet this is not because of any law of the nation of which such foreigners are subjects, for no such laws exist or have any force there. No one can say in such a case that we are executing or enforcing any law of the Union. We are but aiding or compelling the foreign government to execute its own laws and to perform its own duty. As no law of the Union is being executed by such invasion, the militia can not be called out under this provision to take part in it. As no law of the Union can exist or be in force in any foreign country, the militia can not be called out to enforce any such law there.

The plain and certain meaning and effect of this constitutional provision are to confer upon Congress the power to call out the militia "to execute the laws of the Union" within our own borders, where, and where only, they exist, have any force, or can be executed by anyone. This confers no power to send the militia into a foreign country to execute our laws, which have no existence or force there, and can not be there executed.

If authority is needed for the conclusion here reached, the following may suffice:

In *Ordronaux*, Constitutional Legislation, page 501, it is said:

"The Constitution distinctly enumerates the three exclusive purposes for which the militia may be called into service of the United States. These purposes are: First, to execute the laws of the Union; second, to suppress insurrection; and third, to repel invasions.

"These three occasions, representing necessities of a strictly domestic character, plainly indicate that the services required of the militia can be rendered only upon the soil of the United States or of its Territories * * *. In the history of this provision of the Constitution there is nothing indicating that it was even contemplated that such troops should be employed for purposes of offensive warfare outside the limits of the United States. And it is but just to infer that the enumeration of the specific occasions on which alone the militia can be called into the service of the General Government, was intended as a distinct limitation upon their employment.

"Being the ministers of the law to enforce its commands they can only be summoned by the law-making power to act within the extent of its jurisdiction and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. They can not consequently be used to invade the territory of a neighboring country or to enforce any public rights abroad * * *.

"The militia of the States, restricted to domestic purposes alone, are to be distinguished therefore from the Army proper of the United States, which, whether in the form of regular troops or volunteers, may be used to invade a foreign country as well as to repel the attack of foreign enemies."

And in *Von Holtz*, Constitutional Law, page 170, it is said, "the militia can not be taken out of the country."

In *Kneedler v. Lane* (45 Pa. St., 238) Judge Strong, speaking for the court, said:

"Apart from the obligations assumed by treaty it is well known that there are many other cases where the rights of a nation and of its citizens can not be protected or vindicated within its own boundaries. But the power conferred by Congress over the militia is insufficient to enable the fulfillment of the demands of such treaties, or to protect the rights of the Government, or its citizens, in those cases in which protection must be sought beyond the territorial limits of the country."

And see *Houston v. Moore* (5 Wheat., 1) and *Martin v. Mott* (12 Wheat., 19, 27).

It is true that the act of January 21, 1903, as amended by the act of May 27, 1908 (35 Stat., pt. 1, 399), provides:

"That whenever the President calls forth the Organized Militia of any State, Territory, or of the District of Columbia, to be employed in the service of the United States, he may specify in his call the period for which such service is

required, and the militia so called shall continue to serve during the term so specified, either within or without the territory of the United States, unless sooner relieved by order of the President."

But this must be read in view of the constitutional power of Congress to call forth the militia only to suppress insurrection, repel invasions, or to execute the laws of the Union. Congress can not, by its own enactment, enlarge the power conferred upon it by the Constitution; and if this provision were construed to authorize Congress to use the Organized Militia for any other than the three purposes specified it would be unconstitutional. This provision applies only to cases where, under the Constitution, said militia may be used outside of our own borders, and was, doubtless, inserted as a matter of precaution, and to prevent the possible recurrence of what took place in our last war with Great Britain, when portions of the militia refused to obey orders to cross the Canadian frontier.

I think that the constitutional provision here considered not only affords no warrant for the use of the militia by the General Government, except to suppress insurrection, repel invasions, or to execute the laws of the Union, but, by its careful enumeration of the three occasions or purposes for which the militia may be used, it forbids such use for any other purpose; and your question is answered in the negative.

Respectfully,

GEO. W. WICKERSHAM,
Attorney General.

APPENDIX IV.

A BILL To further increase the efficiency of the Organized Militia, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That under such regulations as the Secretary of War, after conference with the National Militia Board, shall prescribe, commissioned officers on the active list belonging to organizations of the Organized Militia of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation provided by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, shall receive compensation for their services, except during periods of service for which under existing law or the provisions of section five of this act they may become entitled to the same pay as officers of corresponding grades of the Regular Army, at the rate of certain percentages of the pay of officers of like grade in the Regular Army, not including longevity pay, as now provided by law, namely: Five per centum to all general officers commanding a division or brigade, the authorized officers constituting the division staff or brigade staff, including authorized officers detailed for duty therewith, the division and brigade inspectors of small arms practice, if any, the authorized aids, and chaplains; twenty per centum to commanding officers of companies, troops, batteries, and ambulance companies, and to adjutants and quartermasters of regiments, independent battalions or squadrons, or Coast Artillery districts; fifteen per centum to all other officers belonging to regiments or smaller tactical units or Coast Artillery districts, including medical officers detailed or assigned to and doing duty with regiments or smaller tactical units or Coast Artillery districts, medical officers serving with field hospitals, and veterinarians.

SEC. 2. That under such regulations as the Secretary of War, after conference with the National Militia Board, shall prescribe, each enlisted man on the active list belonging to organizations of the Organized Militia of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation provided by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, shall receive compensation for his services, except during periods of service for which under existing law or the provisions of section five of this act he may become entitled to the same pay as an enlisted man of corresponding grade in the Regular Army, at a rate equal to twenty-five per centum of the initial pay now provided by law for enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular Army: *Provided*, That such enlisted man shall receive the compensation herein provided if he shall have attended not less than forty-five regular drills during any one year, and a proportionate amount for attendance upon a lesser number of such drills, not less than twenty: *Provided further*, That the compensation provided herein shall be computed for semiannual periods, beginning the first day of January and the first day of July of each year, in proportion to the number of drills attended; and no compensation shall be paid to any enlisted man for the first semiannual period of any year unless he shall have attended during said period at least twenty drills, but any lesser number of drills attended during said period shall be reckoned with the drills attended during the second semiannual period in computing the compensation, if any, due him for that year: *Provided further*, That when any man enters into an enlistment other than an immediate reenlistment he shall be entitled to proportional compensation for that year if during the remainder of the year he shall attend a number of drills whose ratio to twenty is not less than the ratio of the part of the year so served to the whole year; and when any man's enlistment shall expire the compensation, if any, to which he may be entitled shall be determined in like manner: *And provided further*, That periods of any actual military duty equivalent to the drills herein prescribed, except those periods of service for which under existing law or the provisions of section five of this act members of the Organized Militia may become entitled to the same pay as officers and enlisted men of the corresponding grades in the Regular

Army, may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when so provided by the Secretary of War.

SEC. 3. That all amounts appropriated for the purposes of this act shall be disbursed and accounted for by the officers and agents of the Pay Department of the Army, and all disbursements under the provisions of the two preceding sections shall be made as soon as practicable after the thirty-first day of December and the thirtieth day of June of each year upon pay rolls prepared and authenticated in the manner prescribed by the Secretary of War: *Provided*, That stoppages may be made against the compensation payable to any officer or enlisted man hereunder to cover the cost of public property lost or destroyed by and chargeable to such officer or enlisted man.

SEC. 4. That no money appropriated under the provisions of this act shall be paid to any person not on the active list, nor to any person over sixty-four years of age, nor to any person who fails to qualify as to fitness for military service under such regulations as the Secretary of War, after conference with the National Militia Board, shall prescribe, and who has not voluntarily, in addition to his oath as a member of the Organized Militia, also agreed to render military service to the United States as hereinafter provided.

SEC. 5. That the President, with the consent of Congress, in time of war or when war is imminent, or in other grave emergency requiring the use of troops in excess of the Regular Army beyond the limits of the United States, may by order transfer to the Army of the United States any portion of the Organized Militia receiving or entitled to receive the benefits of this act to serve therein for the balance of their respective terms of enlistment or commission, unless sooner released by order of the President, and any Organized Militia so transferred shall from the date specified in the order of such transfer become for the time being a part of the Army of the United States and subject to the same laws in so far as the same may be applicable to them during their service under such transfer, excluding the retirement laws, and be entitled to the same pay, emoluments, and allowances as officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army of the same grade and the same prior service, and shall be available for any duty for which the Regular Army or Volunteer Army may be employed: *Provided*, That any member of the Organized Militia who, having agreed to render military service to the United States under the provisions of this act, neglects or refuses to present himself for service when so transferred, shall be subject to trial therefor by a duly constituted court-martial under such regulations as the President may prescribe: *Provided further*, That when in the discretion of the President the necessity for their further such use no longer exists, he shall release said organizations and the members thereof from liability to render further service under said order of transfer, and said organizations and the members thereof when so released shall cease to be a part of the Army of the United States.

SEC. 6. That whenever organizations are called into the service of the United States under existing law, or are transferred to the Army of the United States under the provisions of this act, those organizations only must be taken into such service or transferred to such Army which have already received compensation under the provisions of this act, and, in addition thereto, such other organizations as have become entitled to receive compensation hereunder between the time of the last semiannual disbursement and the time when such call or transfer is made. Organizations which, at the date when called into the service of the United States or transferred to the Army of the United States, are, in the judgment of the Secretary of War, organized so far as practicable as prescribed by law and regulations for like organizations of the Regular Army and are entitled to pay under this act, shall be taken by regiments, brigades, divisions, or independent and separate organizations, as the quota in each State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or major fraction thereof, may require, including all regimental, brigade, and division staff officers authorized by law and regulations for the corresponding units of the Regular Army or specially authorized by law for the Organized Militia: *Provided*, That divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions or squadrons may be organized by the President out of lesser separate units called into the service of the United States or transferred to the Army of the United States as herein provided, and the President may then appoint commanders of such organizations and their respective staffs from officers of the Regular Army or of the Organized Militia: *Provided further*, That the positions of chief of staff and assistant chief of staff shall be left vacant in each division headquarters entitled to pay hereunder, and such vacancies shall be filled by appointment by

the President when the division is called into the service of the United States or transferred to the Army of the United States.

Sec. 7. That when the Organized Militia is called into the service of the United States, or by transfer as hereinbefore provided becomes a part of the Army of the United States, and is employed in conjunction with the Regular or Volunteer forces of the United States, and military operations require the presence of two or more officers of the same grade in the same field, department, or command, or of organizations thereof, the President may assign the command of the forces of such field, department, or command, or of organizations thereof, without regard to seniority of rank in the same grade: *Provided*, That in the absence of such assignment by the President officers of the same grade shall rank and have precedence in the following order, without regard to the date of rank or commission as between officers of the different classes, viz: First, officers of the Regular Army and officers of the Marine Corps detached for service with the Army by orders of the President; second, officers of the Organized Militia transferred to the Army of the United States or called into the service of the United States; third, officers of the Volunteer forces: *Provided further*, That officers of the Regular Army holding commissions in the Organized Militia in the service of the United States or in organizations transferred to the Army of the United States as hereinbefore provided, or in the Volunteer forces, shall rank and have precedence under said commissions as if they were commissions in the Regular Army, but the rank of officers of the Regular Army under their commission in the Organized Militia shall not for the purpose of this section be held to antedate their formal entry into the service of the United States under said commissions.

Sec. 8. That all expenses necessary to the enforcement of this act, including the actual and necessary expense of travel of officers of the Army when traveling on duty pursuant to orders issued by the governors of the several States and Territories, or the commanding general of the Organized Militia of the District of Columbia, shall be payable out of any appropriation made to carry out the provisions of this act.

Sec. 9. That the Secretary of War shall cause to be annually estimated the amount necessary for carrying out the provisions in this act, and no money shall be expended hereunder except as shall from time to time be appropriated: *Provided*, That this act shall take effect July first, nineteen hundred and thirteen.









