



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*R. R. R.*

THE REPORTS  
ON THE  
PRESENT STATE OF THE UNITED PROVINCES  
OF  
SOUTH AMERICA ;

DRAWN UP BY

MESSRS. RODNEY AND GRAHAM,

COMMISSIONERS SENT TO BUENOS AYRES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF  
NORTH AMERICA,

*And laid before the Congress of the United States ;*

WITH

THEIR ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS ; OCCASIONAL  
NOTES BY THE EDITOR ;

AND

*AN INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE,*

INTENDED TO PRESENT, WITH THE REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS, A VIEW OF  
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE COUNTRY, AND OF THE PROGRESS  
OF THE INDEPENDENTS.

—◆—  
*WITH A MAP.*

London :

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## ADVERTISEMENT.

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THE observations prefixed to these Reports under the title of Preliminary Discourse, and the Notes added to them in illustration of their contents, were written, and the former printed, before the documents published in the Appendix had arrived in this country. The Reports themselves first reached Europe through the medium of the American journals, which did not contain the documents referred to, the latter not being considered of the same intrinsic importance, or at least not of the same popular interest as the former. They could only be obtained therefore by procuring a copy of the Reports and their accompanying papers as presented to Congress, and such a copy had not arrived when the present edition was first sent to press. The Editor did not think proper however to delay the publication on that account. Though divested of the documents which served as proofs and illustrations of some of their statements and reasonings, the Reports themselves conveyed information of such importance, and detailed facts, the authenticity of which was so well established through other sources, that he did not hesitate a moment about the propriety of re-

publishing them in a more convenient and durable form than in the pages of a newspaper, accompanied with such remarks and notices, as opportunities similar to those of the American Commissioners enabled him to supply. Had he seen the Appendix at the same time that he received the Reports, some of his own observations might have been shortened or rendered more precise; but upon re-perusing them along with this fresh accession of knowledge, no reason was seen for omitting, and few calls for correcting them. It has however been thought proper to mention the circumstance, to account for any repetitions that may occur, and as an apology for any trifling inconsistencies or contradictions that may be detected.

The Editor cannot help thinking that by this publication a benefit is conferred, both on the English public, and the Provinces to which these Reports relate. If the government of the United States, which has apparently so little interest compared with the English in the countries here described, was at the trouble and expense of appointing special commissioners to survey their physical and geographical position, and to report on their commercial and political situation and resources, it was not presuming too much on the curiosity of the latter to suppose that they would desire with some impatience, and receive with some satisfaction, accounts procured from such authentic sources and clothed with such an

official character. It was considered to be of the greatest importance that our prejudices should be dispelled, and our knowledge enlarged, regarding countries where the most interesting political changes have recently taken place, and with which our intercourse by these changes may in future become so extensive and so beneficial. With this idea the Editor proposed to collect into a general view the most important topics connected with the South American cause, in the preliminary discourse; and by notes on the Reports, to supply some of their omissions and to qualify some of their statements. After the documents in the Appendix came to hand the press was stopped, that by their insertion the work might be rendered more complete.

The History of the Revolution by Dr. Funes will be read with great interest. It is seldom that an author is able, with so much coolness, to describe scenes in which he himself acted, or to paint characters to whom he himself was opposed, or with whom he associated. In making this remark we cannot, however, refrain from expressing our fears that the worthy Dean has, in the execution of his task, in some degree verified the observations with which he sets out at the beginning of his History: some of the transactions, in our opinion, being represented under a colouring that shows how difficult it is for a contemporary historian to avoid all party feelings and preserve a strict impartiality.

This is not the proper place for making any remarks on the provisional constitution towards the end of the Appendix, but it will at least be allowed to be an object of great curiosity. But of all the papers in the Appendix, those which pleased the Editor the most, are the notes placed in the hands of the North American commissioners by the Secretary of State of the Buenos Ayres government, not so much for the information they contain, as the spirit with which they were communicated. The frankness with which the accounts were exhibited shows that the new republic affects no reserve or mystery; and that it wishes to derive no advantage from the concealment of its resources.



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## INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE.

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**T**HE object of this publication is to diffuse among our countrymen correct notions of the situation and resources of the provinces on the Rio de la Plata. The reports of Messrs. Rodney and Graham have already appeared in most of our newspapers. But a newspaper is seldom read with that degree of attention and reflection, which a subject so important as the present requires: and as those documents were printed in detached morsels on successive days, no person had the full extent of the Commissioners' views before him at once. Only a small part of their map of the political state of Buenos Ayres was unfolded to the general eye at any one given time. It has therefore been thought advisable to republish the reports of Messrs. Graham and Rodney, so as to enable the reader to take a connected survey of the whole subject, and in the hope that they may be perused at times admitting of more steady thought than the moments which are devoted to

the papers of the day. They will amply repay whatever labour may be bestowed on them. The information which they contain is valuable, and the language in which it is conveyed is clear and forcible: sometimes it even aspires to the praise of elegance.

There is no country which better deserves the attention of Britons than the provinces on the Rio de la Plata. They contain an immense extent of fertile soil, blessed with a salubrious climate, and fitted for the growth of every species of produce. Under a liberal government they must soon teem with inhabitants and wealth. They must every day abound more and more in all sorts of raw commodities, in exchange for which they must want manufactures for the consumption of a rapidly increasing population. To England, therefore, they open the prospect of a constantly increasing market for the sale of her goods. Without looking forward into the future, even our present commerce with them is considerable. It must surely be of importance to us that we should be well acquainted with the state of a region with which our commercial intercourse, already great, will probably in a few years be much greater. Every circumstance relating to it may lead to important results. No

one can foresee what benefits may result from knowledge ; no one can be certain that we may in any case be ignorant with safety. Friendship among nations, as well as among individuals, is best cemented by an intimate acquaintance with the situation and character of each other.

No man can doubt but that our government ought to possess the most accurate information concerning all that happens in the provinces of the Rio de la Plata. There is, however, no more effectual mode of inducing rulers to collect information with care, and to take their measures with wisdom, than to diffuse accurate knowledge of the subject through the nation at large. Official men partake in the benefits of the general illumination. Their minds are prepared for the reception of additional information, and for distinguishing intelligence which may be useful from what can be of no value. A great addition is at the same time made to the strength of the motives which lead them to be industrious in collecting, and wary in applying, all that can elucidate the probable event of their policy. They are aware that they are acting before the eyes of a community whom they cannot blind. The nation, they know, is too well acquainted with the subject to be easily deceived.

Whether it applauds or condemns, it will have reason for its decision. Public opinion, flowing from ignorance, may and should be braved : it is wavering in its tendency, unsteady in its direction, mischievous in its effects. But public opinion, founded on a knowledge of the truth, acts with a force which, in a country like Britain, nothing can long resist. If, therefore, it is of any importance that our ministers should exercise prudence in the management of our relations with Buenos Ayres, it must be of equal importance to diffuse through the nation the substance of what may be learned from the Reports of Messrs. Rodney and Graham. Whoever means to exert the privilege of a free man in praising or blaming our policy towards that government, is bound in duty to make himself so far familiar with the subject as to have a chance of bestowing his applause or condemnation correctly.

The Americans have here set us an example which we ought to imitate. They deem the transactions at Buenos Ayres so important, that they will not trust to the casual information obtained by commercial intercourse, or even to the intelligence that may be communicated by a regular commercial agent. Special commissioners are sent to survey the state of the country ; and

the result of their examination is promulgated through every part of the United States. What is important to them cannot be trifling to us. We have at least as great an interest as they in knowing accurately the situation of what once constituted the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres; and we have at least an equal need to spare no pains in collecting information.

The ignorance that prevails in England on the subject of South American affairs is truly wonderful. All feel a strong interest in the cause of the independents—all are aware that their success will be the source of inestimable advantages to ourselves; yet scarcely a man is to be found who has a distinct conception of the actual state of their fortunes, or of the series of successes and reverses which they have experienced. The names of one or two chiefs, or of the places which have been the scenes of bloody conflicts, are familiar to the public, but nothing more. South America, according to the conceptions of the generality, is one undivided kingdom, where the inhabitants are endeavouring to throw off the yoke of tyranny, while Spain is struggling to subdue them, and where it is difficult to say which party will ultimately prevail. No distinction is made between the different parts of that

continent. The successes obtained in one province are confounded with those in another; and circumstances which characterize the war in one quarter are rashly applied to very distant regions. The transactions in Venezuela, for instance, have had many features peculiar to themselves. Venezuela abounded in negro slaves; the royalists, to create a diversion, and fill their ranks, set the example of emancipating them, and they now constitute a great proportion of the armies. The patriots too have employed in their service many European adventurers, who, arriving at the scene of action with the hopes of dignity and wealth, but finding only danger or privation, returned home, disappointed in their expectations, with their fortunes impaired, and their constitutions shattered, to exècrate those whom they considered the instruments of their delusion. In Venezuela both parties may, perhaps, be accused of having proceeded to the utmost verge of cruelty and perfidy: treaties have been concluded only to be violated; and prisoners have been murdered by hundreds at a time. The contest has likewise been maintained with a greater variety of fortune than anywhere else. The independents have been masters of the whole province to day; to-morrow, they have been in possession of



scarcely a foot of ground, and have been compelled to limit their efforts to threatening expeditions along the coast, or unexpected descents from their vessels where an opportunity of success seemed to offer. Now it has happened, partly from the vicinity of Venezuela to our West Indian colonies, and partly from the number of English officers who have engaged in its service, that the events in it have been detailed by our daily press with more minuteness than the transactions of any other part of the New World. The consequence has been, that we meet with few who do not confound Venezuela and its revolution with the cause of independence throughout the whole of South America. They are aware that Venezuela is not Buenos Ayres; but their notions of the latter are derived from what they have heard of the former. Yet nothing can be more unlike than the state of these two regions. Venezuela has been laid waste by civil wars; the greater part of the territory of Buenos Ayres has never been violated by hostile armies: the authority of Spain is now predominant in the former; it has for eight years been completely disowned in the latter: there is only a provisional independent government in Guyana, one of the provinces of Venezuela; a steady administration has been

long established at Buenos Ayres: negroes and the mixed casts are now almost the only inhabitants of Venezuela; in Buenos Ayres these classes have never been numerous: in the one, war had been carried on with savage barbarity; in the other, it has been conducted on the side of the patriots at least according to the usage of civilized nations: Venezuela has held out encouragement to induce foreigners to enter into its service; Buenos Ayres has asserted her independence by her native officers and troops. Not only are these countries placed in circumstances totally different; there subsists not the slightest connexion between them. They are united by no treaties; they can lend no assistance to each other. For the most part indeed, Buenos Ayres knows nothing of what has happened in Venezuela except through the medium of English newspapers. The provinces of the river Plata have great reason to complain of the erroneous application to them of notions derived from the transactions of a country to which they bear no resemblance, and with which they have no intercourse. Tranquillity, order, humanity, have hitherto been maintained among them; the cause of independence has advanced with constantly increasing influence; and they have trusted for deliverance solely to their own efforts. Yet they

are confounded with the people of a region, whose misfortunes have rendered it the prey of anarchy and desolation, where the sword is the only lawgiver, where the slave has been armed against his master, and where the patriots have trusted for success in a great measure to the aid of foreigners. It is difficult to conceive how widely this error is extended. We do not mean to say that it exists in minds which have inquired into the subject : but we assert that few have inquired, and that the mass of the community form their conceptions of South American affairs from their indistinct recollection of what has happened in some one province.

Even those who have studied the affairs of the Spanish colonies with more than usual attention, do not always keep clear of this source of popular mistake. Its influence may be detected, for example, in a very judicious article in the thirty-fifth number of the Quarterly Review. "As few or no women," says the author of that article, "accompanied the first settlers, their intercourse with native females produced a race of successors, of a most anomalous character; and these in a few generations mixing with the slaves imported from Africa,

still further increased the different classes, who in process of time, more by the rules of society than by the influence of the laws, assumed a variety of ranks according to the greater or less affinity to the white race. From this mixture of colours and castes arose a degree of inequality in property scarcely to be paralleled in any other country, which has continued to the present period.”\* The representation is applied to the whole of Spanish America, but in reality holds true only of Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. In the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, there was less inequality of fortune than in any other country which had made equal advances on civilization. “That the Spanish colonies,” continues the same author, “if like those of North America they escape subjugation, must *therefore* necessarily like them start up into vigorous, steady, and mature states, is a proposition which no man will very confidently maintain, who recollects another more recent example of colonial revolution in St. Domingo. Far be it from us to anticipate such a consummation of the present struggle, though there can be no doubt, we think, in which of the two proto-

\* Quarterly Review, No. xxxv. p. 537.

types, that of North America or of St. Domingo, the elements of society were compounded in the manner more nearly resembling the South American colonies of Spain.”\* This remark, like that which we quoted before, is not devoid of truth when limited to Venezuela or Peru; but so far as the provinces of the River Plate are concerned, is altogether inaccurate.

That the error of confounding one part of Spanish America with another prevails to a great extent, is a matter of fact, which every one who is not himself infected with it must have observed. It has arisen naturally from the little knowledge, which the world had any means of acquiring concerning the colonies of Spain. The court of Madrid kept its foreign possessions shrouded in darkness, so that no distant eye could trace their distinguishing features. Spanish America seemed to present one uniform aspect. The generality of men were habituated to conceive of it as one great kingdom, because, shut out from communication with it, their thoughts had never been accustomed to dwell upon the peculiarities of its

\* Quarterly Review, No. xxxv. p. 510.

different parts. It is therefore by no means wonderful that ideas drawn from that division of it which of late years has chiefly attracted the attention of the English press, should have been extended to the whole.

South America is in fact an assemblage of kingdoms altogether dissimilar in character and in their respective local advantages, connected by no other tie than that of their common union to the crown of Castile, and resembling each other in few points except this, that they all have the capacity of becoming very rich, but have all been kept back in the career of improvement by the most flagrant misgovernment. Mexico, Peru, New Grenada, Venezuela, Chili, Buenos Ayres, differ as widely in the commodities which they are fitted to export, in the facilities which they exhibit for foreign trade, and in the dispositions and the intelligence of their inhabitants, as any six kingdoms of Europe: nor can any two of them be selected, in which the trains of events since 1808 have been at all parallel. Considerable revolutionary movements occurred early in Mexico, but they were soon suppressed. In that quarter Spain has ever maintained a decided superiority, and the opposition which she has met

with has been that of tumultuous assemblages of the lower orders rather than the resistance of regular warfare. At Lima, the authority of the Viceroy has hitherto remained so entire, that he has even been able to dispatch armies for the support of the cause of the mother country in the adjacent provinces. New Grenada has been the theatre of much bloodshed: the adverse parties have alternately prevailed; yet upon the whole the cause of independence is not there in a flourishing condition. Venezuela has been laid waste in the course of the war: the system of society is completely broken up, and the province in this state of desolation is chiefly in possession of the Spaniards. A new government was established in Chili: internal dissensions then arose; and in consequence of these, an army from Lima reduced the country to subjection, and that army was expelled only by the aid of Buenos Ayres, which, unlike any of her sister colonies, has maintained her independence steadily and successfully. From the formation of the junta, in 1810, order has been established throughout her territory, and the most cheerful disposition manifested to obey and support the new government. Spain has directed her attacks both

from the side of Montevideo and from that of Peru ; but Montevideo was compelled to capitulate, and though the royal troops have occasionally gained advantages on the Peruvian frontiers, they have never been able to advance far beyond Salta ; nor have they ever had more than military possession of the districts which they over-ran. They were masters of the ground covered by their encampments, but their victories gave them nothing more : the population never submitted. Not only has Buenos Ayres been able to defend herself ; she has even stretched out a helping arm to Chili, and delivered that kingdom from the yoke of Spain.

Nothing therefore can be more fallacious than to judge of one part of Spanish America, by what we know of another. The political features of each division of it are peculiar, and in each political events have moved in a peculiar course. Buenos Ayres, more especially, both in its circumstances and in its fortune, differs widely from the other possessions of Spain. If we mean to understand the situation of that state, we must study it apart, and we can no where study it with more profit, or with less expense of time, than in the reports of Messrs.



Rodney and Graham. That of Mr. Rodney, in particular, is drawn up with considerable talent, and comprises a great mass of information within a very small space. He has avoided a formal distribution of his matter under heads, perhaps, as too stiff for a document coming from a public envoy, and intended for the perusal of the supreme executive magistracy of his country. At the same time, however, he has observed a very strict arrangement. He begins with delineating the state of Spanish America, under the administration of the mother country. He then briefly traces the progress of the cause of independence in the New World, especially in the provinces of the river Plata. Thirdly, he presents us with a statistical survey of those provinces. Fourthly, he sketches their political situation, under the five topics of their government, their commercial connexions, their financial arrangements, their military establishments, their foreign relations; and points out the difficulties under which they at present labour. Lastly, he gives us a brief view of the effects which the revolution has already produced, or is likely to produce hereafter. To the information contained under these five heads, Mr. Graham makes no ad-

dition of much moment. Still his report deserves to be perused, both because it confirms the other, and because its style and arrangement are different, though the matter is in substance the same.

A political survey of a kingdom is an arduous task. The facts, of which it must consist, are not so much insulated events to be ascertained by testimony, as general conclusions deduced from a multitude of particulars difficult to be collected, and still more difficult to be kept steadily in the grasp of the understanding. What would be arduous to a native must be still more arduous to a foreigner. The reports, however, of the American commissioners are entitled to more credit than similar productions usually are; for the nature of the country, the form of government, and the state of society, afforded them very favourable opportunities of ascertaining the truth. In the capital and its vicinity are to be found all the foreign commerce, nearly all the talent, one-tenth of the population, and a much larger proportion of the wealth of the whole country: out of it, there is little to attract notice, except the topography and the physical geography of the region. He who knows the political situation of

Buenos Ayres knows the political situation of the United Provinces. The objects, therefore, which the Commissioners had to survey, were brought within a narrow compass. In obtaining the requisite information, they were further aided by the form of the government, which, though by no means a model of liberty, is yet extremely dependent on popular opinion. Every measure is freely discussed both in public meetings and through the public press. They who hold the reins of power are watched by a strong party, firm friends to the independence of their native land, who are eager to detect and expose every instance of misconduct in the administration. In such a state, information, if sought, may be acquired without much difficulty, especially as there is no place where foreigners find so easy access to society as at Buenos Ayres. There are in the town few families of respectability, who do not open their houses, one or more nights in the week, for the general reception of their acquaintance. An introduction is readily obtained into one of these companies; and he who is admitted to one, is soon invited to many more. In all of these, social intercourse is on an easy and agreeable footing; for there are no men of over-

grown fortunes, whose notions of their own superiority may inspire them with the wish, and whose wealth may give them sufficient influence, to introduce stiff and artificial forms. It is not, we admit, in such societies that a politician should collect his facts; but in occasionally frequenting them he cannot fail to improve his knowledge of the national character, and to correct the over hasty conclusions which he may have formed previously. Diplomatic men are too apt to live in a narrow circle of persons imbued with the same habits and modes of thinking as themselves, strangers to the people among whom they live, without the inclination to study, or the habit of observing, mankind, and unable to recognize the principles of human nature, unless when they are clothed in an external garb similar to that which their eyes have been accustomed to at home. The American Commissioners belong not to that feeble-minded class. They are obviously men of vigorous and enlightened intellect. They had the capacity, as well as an opportunity, to acquire accurate knowledge. Aware that their statements might be laid before Congress, they had motives to exert their talents to the utmost, and avail themselves of every means of procuring information.

Their reports, therefore, are much more deserving of credit, than expositions of the state of a nation usually are.

Some may be inclined to imagine that, as the government of Buenos Ayres would naturally exhibit every thing in the most powerful light to the agents of a foreign power, and as these agents would be disposed to magnify the importance of the country in which they exercised political functions, their reports may be presumed to present a very flattering picture. But the ruling party, as we have already stated, encounters a keen opposition from men of talents and influence, who would pull off any mask which might be used to disguise the actual state of the country. It is obvious likewise that Messrs. Rodney and Graham are far from agreeing in political sentiment. Mr. Rodney is well satisfied with what has been done towards the establishment of a regular system of freedom in the provinces of the Rio de la Plata; Mr. Graham, on the contrary, is of opinion that much more might have been effected, had not the present rulers been lukewarm in the holy cause. These circumstances give us a moral certainty that they will not paint South America in more flattering colours

than she deserves: and we have still another security for their veracity and correctness. At their departure they left their colleague Mr. Bland behind them, who has since made a report on the state of Buenos Ayres and Chili. Though the whole of that document has not been published, extracts from it have been given, which, if we assume them to be correct, would lead to a conclusion that Mr. Bland is by no means equal, either in prudence or penetration, to his coadjutors. He seems eager to embrace every opportunity of mixing actively in intrigues, and of prejudicing the South Americans against the English. What is of still more importance, he is obviously inclined to favour the faction of the Carreras in Chili. As that faction is adverse to the existing government, which was originally formed under the auspices of Buenos Ayres, no partisan of the Carreras can feel any partiality towards the state which prevented the three brothers from again ascending to power. Mr. Bland's predilections, therefore, are such as would incline him to delineate Buenos Ayres in a harsh rather than a flattering style: so that even if his colleagues had been under the influence of opposite feelings, his presence would have been a check

upon them. And in fact, wherever any mistake can be imputed to them, their error will be found to lie in exaggerating rather than in extenuating the imperfections and disadvantages under which the government of Buenos Ayres at present labours. Artigas, for example, is represented as a personage of much more consequence than he really is; and undue importance is ascribed to the defections of Santa Fé and Paraguay.

It was to correct these mistakes and a few others of a similar nature, that the Editor first thought it advisable to annex some explanatory notes. But as he advanced in his task he found, that even where the statements of Messrs. Rodney and Graham were perfectly accurate, several points were omitted, and others touched upon very lightly, which it is desirable for the purpose he has in view to unfold more fully. The objects with which the Reports were originally drawn up, and that with which they are now republished, are altogether different. They were drawn up to convey to the public functionaries of the United States such additional knowledge as might enable them to determine on the line of policy which they should pursue. They are republished with the view of affording



our countrymen the means of informing themselves with some accuracy concerning the state of Buenos Ayres. There are many topics proper to be explained fully to Englishmen, which it is prudent for America merely to hint at: many, which should be stated more copiously in a publication addressed to common readers, than in a document intended for the perusal of a few politicians. These are discussed in the notes. But there are four topics of paramount importance, which could not with propriety be thrown into the form of annotations. These are—the character of the revolution in the provinces of the Rio de la Plata—the mode in which it will probably terminate—the policy which England should pursue—and the system on which it is likely that the United States will act.

1. The character of the revolution in the ancient viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres ought to be observed with more than common attention, because in its origin and progress it has borne little resemblance to any other. There are men to whom the mere name of revolution is more than a sufficient recommendation. To subvert an old government is in their eyes an epitome of all virtue. Our mode of thinking is different. All



political convulsions are calamities, and can in no case be justified, except when the necessity of change is urgent, and the opportunity for effecting it is favourable. Now there never was a country where the necessity of change was so undeniable as in the Spanish colonies. The total annihilation of all commerce, except with the mother country—the restrictions by which domestic industry was checked—the royal monopolies which destroyed many valuable branches of trade—the despotic power with which the viceroys were invested—the suppression of all freedom of thinking or writing—the corrupt administration of justice—the exclusion of natives from offices of trust—these were a few of the prominent features of the Spanish administration in America. Partial abuses must exist everywhere; but here the essence of the system was abuse. The whole scheme was contrived with a view to bring money to the mother country without the slightest regard to the welfare of the colonies. It would be difficult to define in abstract terms the point at which a people have a right to refuse obedience to the authorities set over them by the laws. But here the greatest extreme of endurance was far exceeded; and it would be more difficult to

excuse submission than to justify resistance. Though the evil was such as could not be tolerated, there was no chance of its removal except by throwing off the sovereign power of Spain. Her prejudices were too strong, and the interests concerned too weighty, to allow any hope of curing the mischief by gentler means. The restrictions upon commerce, for instance, constituted one of the great grievances. They were of two classes : some of them fettered the intercourse with Spain ; others of them prevented intercourse with foreign countries. The mother-country for her own sake might have abolished the former ; but there was no chance that she would consent to the renunciation of the latter. Though the prosperity of the colonies would have been increased by such a measure, she herself would have been a loser. She would have lost the duties which she had been accustomed to derive from the merchandize which passed through her ports to her transatlantic possessions ; and the loss would not have been compensated to her by the extension of her trade ; for the state of industry in Spain was such that she would have had no share in the commerce of the New World, had that commerce been allowed to flow in its natural channel. It was not to be

expected, therefore, that she would ever be induced, except by force of arms, to allow her colonies a free trade with the world.

If this point is not sufficiently clear in itself, we may appeal for proof to what happened in 1811. The British minister at Cadiz had made several ineffectual attempts to obtain for England the benefit of a free trade with Spanish America. At last, in April, 1811, the subject was brought forward, and debated in the Cortes. Instantly the newspapers of Cadiz were filled with invectives against the demands of England; and the Consulado, or Board of Trade, having been assembled, published a manifesto, which declares, and attempts to prove, “ that a free trade with the American provinces would work a ruin greater than that which Spain then experienced—that those who were desirous of establishing it were impostors, deserving of exemplary punishment and of perpetual banishment—that the political existence of Spain depended on this question—that the names of those who proposed so disastrous a measure ought to be transmitted to posterity, that they might be mentioned by distant ages with the indignation they justly merited—that Spain would be ruined, and made the tool of foreigners—that her merchants and

manufacturers being destroyed, she herself would lose all freedom—that, in short, this commerce would be subversive of order, morality, religion, and society.” Accordingly, in the following August, the proposal was formally rejected. The impatience with which the mere mention of partial freedom of trade was heard, though at a time when all that remained of Spain depended for protection on England, shows how chimerical was the hope that a relaxation of her commercial system might be obtained by solicitation. There were others of the leading abuses in which the Court of Madrid had a more palpable and direct interest than in the restraints upon trade. It was, therefore, equally improbable that a voluntary sacrifice would have been made of them. Thus Spain had long abused her power over her transatlantic dominions: the abuse was gross; it pervaded every part of her system, and no remedy could be expected while her power remained entire. These grounds were more than sufficient to justify the people of Buenos Ayres in establishing a government of their own.

The establishment of a new government, however, was not the fruit of any long concerted design. Independence was not so much sought after by the people of Buenos Ayres,

as thrown in their way. Two years had elapsed since the commencement of the struggle between France and Spain; yet, except in the district of La Paz, no steps had been taken to disown the authority of the mother country: on the contrary, considerable sums of money had been sent to her aid. In 1810 intelligence arrived of the flight of the junta of Seville. The cause of Spain seemed desperate, and the Viceroy himself, confounded by the destruction of those from whom his authority emanated, did all but invite the inhabitants to free him from the burthen of government. Thus the revolution arose not so much from any plan as from the spontaneous course of events. It was the work of time and accident more than of man. In the generality of political convulsions it is easy to fix upon a few individuals, and say, These were the men from whom such and such changes originated, and had they not appeared, the old order of things might have continued unassailed. This cannot be affirmed of any who have taken an active share in the changes at Buenos Ayres. None of the actors there have done any thing, which might not, and which would not have been done, by any man of common understanding and common cou-

rage, placed in the same circumstances. They employed not cabal or intrigue: they only yielded to the impetuous current of events. They were in fact the heads of a people, not the leaders of a faction.

A revolution is for the most part the work of one class of the community. But at Buenos Ayres all the natives concurred in the changes that were effected: the Europeans alone made opposition. It was a struggle not of the poor against the rich, but of the rich and poor conjointly against the oppressors of their country. The men of property, as became them, have been conspicuous for their public spirit, and their sons have crowded to fill the ranks of the patriot armies.

When changes are the fruit of conspiracy, they are regulated by the views of ambitious individuals, and it is impossible to say where they will stop. All will be destroyed, that is the object of fear or dislike to the rulers of the revolutionary tempest. From this calamity, the greatest that can befall a nation, Buenos Ayres has escaped. As her inhabitants proceeded no further than they were led by events, they only threw off the Spanish yoke, and substituted another supreme authority in its stead. Every

thing else, in the internal administration of the country, remains as before. The rights of property have never once been infringed. The *cabildos* or municipalities have continued in the exercise of all their former prerogatives.

As a revolution frees men from the restraints of law, at the same time that it calls the most violent passions into operation, it exhibits in most cases a series of atrocious crimes. Buenos Ayres has not been deformed by any stains of this kind. Parties have of course arisen in its bosom, but their mutual fury has never terminated in bloodshed.

Thus the subversion of the Spanish authority in the provinces of the Rio de la Plata was justified by the strongest reasons; it was forced upon the inhabitants by events, rather than painfully accomplished by design or labour; it was the work, not of a party, but of all the native population, whether rich or poor; it was carried no further than necessity required, and it was not polluted by the perpetration of any enormities. In these respects it exhibits a striking contrast to the greater number of political changes, but more especially to that compound of all vice and all folly, the French Revolution. It would be a waste of time to enter into a comparison of two events so dissimilar



that they have no one feature alike, proceeding from opposite principles, conducted on opposite plans, and productive of opposite effects. There is more analogy between the transactions which have led to the independence of Buenos Ayres, and those which terminated in the acknowledgement of our own North American colonies as a sovereign state. Yet even here the comparison is decidedly in favour of the South Americans. For our colonies had been governed better perhaps than an equal number of men ever were before: they had enjoyed domestic tranquillity with the most perfect freedom; and the restraints to which, at a time when the maxims of political economy were ill understood, their commerce had been subjected, operated little to their disadvantage: because, from natural causes, independently of artificial regulations, nearly the whole of their commerce would have centred spontaneously in the mother country. The grievance of which they complained might be oppressive in principle, but could not be felt to be so in fact: for the taxes imposed on them by the British Parliament were extremely light. The assertion of an abstract doctrine was in truth the ground on which they flew to arms. The parent against whom they armed



was not in the decrepitude of old age. She abounded in all the resources of war, and, elated by the triumphs which she had obtained over foreign foes, was prepared to strain every nerve to crush what she deemed rebellion. If the North American colonies were justified in taking up arms for such a cause against so formidable an opponent, what praise is not due to the provinces of the Rio de la Plata for throwing off the yoke of Spain. They rose not against an abstract metaphysical principle, but against the extreme of practical oppression; not against a power strong to protect and to restrain, but against a state too feeble to render the issue of the contest doubtful, though sufficiently obstinate to make it long and tedious.

II. From the character of the revolution of Buenos Ayres, let us proceed to consider how it will probably end. It must terminate in the independence of the provinces. Let us look to their extent, to their situation, to their resources, to the intelligence and courage of the inhabitants: then let us turn our eyes to the languid, exhausted condition of the Spanish monarchy; and let us say whether it is within the compass of probability that the decrees of the Court of Madrid should again be received as oracles and

laws on the banks of the Parana. Upon surveying the history of the war in Upper Peru, we find that the utmost exertions of the Spaniards have given them only a few temporary successes; and that they have never been able to re-establish their authority in any district on a firm basis. But how immense the efforts which would be requisite to subdue the whole country! how vast the force which, after the completion of the conquest, would be necessary for retaining it! Spain could neither levy, nor pay, nor transport, nor feed armies, adequate to such a service; and if she could, she would gain possession of the country only for a time: the struggle would be continued; her strength could not always be kept so violently exerted, and she would at last be compelled to yield. Even if the people were, in a moment of infatuation, to acknowledge her sovereignty once more, and were to admit her viceroys quietly among them, her dominion would rest merely on the good pleasure of her subjects. It would be thrown off the moment it was found to press heavily. There is, therefore, no probability that Spain can either gain possession of the country, or keep it if gained.

The only conceivable mode in which her

authority can be re-established is by the spontaneous consent of the provinces. They, it may be imagined, will acknowledge her supremacy, and she in return will redress the grievances of which they complain. But these grievances are redressed already ; she can only promise not to introduce them anew ; and a promise to abstain from oppression is surely not the price with which an empire is to be bought. What proposal can be more extravagant than to say, “ Acknowledge my sovereignty, and I will not exert it tyrannically ! ” Spain asks much, and should, therefore, have something to give in exchange. The equivalent which she offers is already in the possession of the party with whom she has to deal. The people of Buenos Ayres now know the value of independence, and will not sell it for any consideration, much less make a gratuitous present of it to those who bear to them the most deadly enmity. Were any party or any individual to propose the acknowledgment of the supremacy of Spain, the power of that party or of that individual, however great it might be, would instantly expire. The subjection of the provinces of the Rio de la Plata to Spain is no longer a possible event : these provinces must be independent.

But after their independence ceases to be opposed, what will be their fate? Will the social system remain steadfast, or will it be torn up by the roots? Will the country be broken into separate states? or will it remain united under one supreme power? If one supreme power is acknowledged, by what species of union will the different parts be held together? Of these questions, the first is easily answered; the rest are perplexing and difficult.

The social system is in danger of destruction only when there exists from natural or accidental circumstances an irreconcilable enmity between the elements which enter into its composition. Such was the case in France and St. Domingo. But in Buenos Ayres, the utmost harmony prevails between the different orders of the people. There is little inequality of fortune compared with what exists in other civilized countries; and nowhere can the poor man so easily provide himself with all the necessaries, and even many of the comforts of life. The number of slaves is small; and such legislative measures have been adopted as in a few years will extinguish slavery altogether. Thus there is no class which has an interest in the depression or destruction of any other. Accordingly amid the relaxation of civil

power, which necessarily accompanies political changes, all orders have remained in their relative situations, and have co-operated zealously in promoting the public welfare. Of course we do not speak of those districts over which the sway of Artigas extends. Persons of property fly from a place which falls under the despotism of that barbarian chief, and law and order are annihilated together. But the disorganization of society which thus takes place is the work of external violence, and that violence proceeds from a power which must be of limited operation, and short continuance. There is not the slightest chance that the established order of civil life can be weakened through the country at large. Indeed we should not have thought it worth while to allude to the possibility of such an event, had it not been mentioned in some political disquisitions as a result which should not be thrown wholly out of contemplation. In a passage already quoted in the Quarterly Review, it is stated, that in the South American colonies of Spain, the elements of society are confounded in a manner more nearly resembling that of St. Domingo than that of North America; and the inference suggested, though not directly expressed, is, that we have some reason to dread

such a termination of their struggles for independence as we have witnessed in St. Domingo. The premises, as we have already remarked, are inaccurate. Nothing can be more unlike a West Indian colony than the provinces of the Rio de la Plata.

The second question cannot be answered with so much precision as the first. Upon the whole, the probabilities are, that the provinces will continue to form one empire. The only cause that would lead to separation, is that spirit of provincialism, the prevalence of which in South America we shall have more than one occasion to lament. From the low state of agriculture and manufacture, there is not much communication between the different parts of the country. A district does not feel so sensibly as in more advanced kingdoms, its dependance on its neighbours, or the benefits of mutual intercourse. At the same time, the ignorance in which the people were kept under the Spanish yoke, fostered those narrow views which lead each small assemblage of men to consider themselves as the criterion of excellence, and to despise all that differs from them as imperfect. These two causes have in some districts predisposed the minds of the inhabi-

tants to form an independent government for themselves; and they have met with powerful auxiliaries in the pride and ambition of individuals. In a large society the generality of men can view themselves only as subjects: they cannot hope to lay hold of the reins of power, or to taste the pleasures of dominion. But in a small state, each person is either one of the governors, or closely connected with those who are: so that all may at least flatter themselves with dreams of grandeur, and enjoy the present satisfaction of exerting an immediate controul over their rulers. Such are the sources of the predilection which exists in some provinces of South America for erecting separate governments. That predilection, if not counteracted, would doubtless have the effect of breaking down the ancient viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres into small communities, in some of which democracy, while in others aristocracy, might prevail. Such an arrangement would be a check to improvement, and a plentiful source of misery. There could not be the same freedom of intercourse between the different districts as if the whole were under one government; obstacles would thus be opposed to the ready exchange of the commodities of one place for those of another. Labour would



be less productive, because the industry of each republic, instead of being almost exclusively directed towards those objects for which it was best fitted, would be distributed in a great variety of less profitable branches. Wars and dissensions would be of frequent occurrence, and would be constantly dreaded. It is not easy to conceive the full extent of the private suffering which such a state of things occasions, or how much it retards the progress of improvement. Some of the most valuable physical advantages of the country would be in a great measure lost. The Parana, with its auxiliary streams, affords to each province the means of ready communication with every other. But the navigation of these rivers can never be fully enjoyed, if their banks are parcelled out among a multitude of petty states. That they may confer in commerce all the benefits which nature intended they should, they must flow through the territory of one great power. It is therefore fortunate that the spirit of political schism is likely to be kept within narrow bounds. A knowledge of the mischief to which it leads is one of the great antidotes to its operation. Many are already impressed with a sense of its baneful tendency; and the conviction of its



injurious consequences will become still more general, in proportion as time shall more clearly unfold the blessings of union. Habit too is here on the side of sound policy ; for provinces which have long been under the same government cannot be torn asunder without a violent effort. Lastly, the existing government must always possess considerable influence, and that influence will be exerted to the utmost to maintain and strengthen the bands of union.

But though the spirit of separation will not be strong enough to effect a total disunion, it will probably have influence sufficient to cause the preference of a federal to a consolidated government. As each considerable subdivision of territory will, under such a constitution, retain the management of its local concerns in its own hands, while the general administration is left to the supreme power, provincial ambition will have objects to aspire to, and provincial vanity will be flattered by the show of distinct existence. To reflecting minds this arrangement will be recommended by more solid benefits. One central power could scarcely pervade the whole extent of a region so thinly peopled ; for civil authority acts upon men only through their connexions with their fellow-crea-

tures, and meets with no greater obstacle than the interposition of immense wildernesses. It is for this reason advantageous to have a number of points, from which, as from so many centres, the rays of power may emanate. The local legislatures will be more efficacious than a consolidated government in preserving good order within their respective limits, and will be more zealous in promoting improvement in their own immediate neighbourhood. They will likewise train the people to habits of correct thought on political subjects, and will form excellent seminaries for the general legislature. These advantages of the federal government must recommend it strongly to a country situated like the provinces on the Rio de la Plata. The weakness arising from the division of the powers of sovereignty between the general government and the provincial assemblies, and the dissensions that cannot fail to be occasioned by the indefiniteness with which, from the very nature of the case, the departments of each must be marked out, constitute no doubt very weighty objections. In seasons of war and difficulty more especially these inconveniences will be strongly felt. But before the period arrives, when the feebleness of a federal government on

the river Plate might endanger the peace or the safety of the whole society, the circumstances which now recommend the adoption of that system will probably have vanished; the spirit of provincialism will have disappeared before the progress of information and the habits of extended intercourse; the country will have become more populous, so that a central civil authority will be enabled to act with increased energy; and rational sentiments of liberty will have been diffused among the inhabitants. All the provinces will then naturally tend to an indissoluble union under one consolidated legislature.

Revolutions have often terminated in a military despotism, and therefore some may be inclined to anticipate the same result here. Such an event, however, is to all appearance impossible. The people are so much on a level, the country is so extensive and so thinly inhabited, the military establishment is so small, and the number of persons who are not in easy circumstances is so few, that if a man were found mad enough to usurp despotic power, his attempt would most assuredly fail. He would be opposed by the whole population, and he would be unable to find in the country the materials

of an army suited to the purposes of a tyrant. The only case in which despotism could be introduced with a likelihood of success, would be after the division of the country into a multitude of petty states. These petty states might easily become the patrimony of an equal number of petty tyrants.

III. Since then there is scarcely a possibility that the provinces of the river Plate should fail in establishing their independence, and since there is every likelihood that they will form a flourishing nation under a free government, it becomes an important question to consider what line of policy Britain should pursue. Hitherto we have maintained a strict neutrality: we have given no assistance either to the mother country or to the colonies. We have acted thus cautiously, not because we contemplated with indifference the struggle for the deliverance of one of the fairest portions of the earth, or were blind to the favourable effect which the emancipation of South America will have on our own prosperity; but because there are few cases in which a foreign state ought to interpose between two contending parties of one empire, in any other way than by an offer of its good offices; because deference and respect

were due to our ally Spain ; and because our interference on one side would have created jealousy in Europe, and urged other powers to take the part of those whom we opposed. Of the prudence of adhering to the wise policy which we have hitherto followed, there can be no doubt : nor would the patriots themselves ask us to deviate from it. The government of Buenos Ayres has no need of foreign assistance ; the Spaniards are almost completely expelled, and the work of deliverance will soon be finished without the incumbrance of auxiliary forces. But though we ought not to take an active part in the hostilities of either side, would it not be prudent for us ere long to consider the expediency of taking some steps which ultimately might lead to a treaty of commerce with the new power ? Such a proceeding would be no deviation from our neutrality. We have all along been the ally of Spain ; yet that circumstance did not make us the enemy of Buenos Ayres : no more will a treaty with Buenos Ayres be a breach of friendship towards Spain. The provinces of the Rio de la Plata now are, and must remain, independent : at some time or other, therefore, we must mean to be connected with them by po-

sitive treaties ; so that the only question is, how long are we to delay, before we determine upon such a measure? In solving this doubt, we hope that they with whom the decision rests will recollect, that England has long claimed the proud pre-eminence of teaching nations how to do their duty. It becomes our dignity to set an example rather than to follow one. While Spain maintains the conflict actively, there may be some reasons for our reserve : but as soon as she can only make claims without prosecuting them effectively, we can have no reasonable motives to prevent us from forming specific connexions with a country which opens up the most brilliant prospects to our manufacturers and merchants.

A question has sometimes been started, whether the provinces of the river Plate should be *recognized* by England and the other kingdoms of Europe as an independent state, and whether, till so recognized, they have a claim to the privileges and rights usually considered as appertaining to a nation. The whole discussion seems to us entirely futile. The existence of a community as a sovereign state is determined by the circumstances of that community, and not by the will of strangers. The inhabitants of an

extensive territory, who live under a regular government, raise taxes, and maintain garrisons, fleets, and armies, *de ipso facto* constitute a nation, whatever may be said of them by men who live at the distance of many thousand miles. Is there any authority in any book of public law to prove that a community which exercises all the attributes of an independent government is not a sovereign state till it has been acknowledged as such by foreign nations? From how many kingdoms must this recognition be received? Will that of England alone suffice? Or must her suffrage be strengthened by that of a majority of the princes of Europe? In what assembly, and with what formalities, are these suffrages collected? From what source is this prerogative derived, which entitles one or more of the sovereigns of Europe to decide upon the condition of millions, in a distant quarter of the globe, over whom they do not even pretend to have any jurisdiction? In fact, the whole doctrine of recognition is a gross fallacy, without principle or precedent to support it. A community, which is, *de facto*, independent, is for the time being a sovereign state : what strangers may say of it is no part of the question. Were we to conclude a treaty with Buenos Ayres, her



title to be considered as a nation would not be derived from that compact. Treaties are agreements between nations : they suppose the parties to be nations, but cannot create nations : their only effect is to establish particular relations between those who enter into them. Our own ministers seem to have been of this way of thinking. They have sent a consul to Buenos Ayres ; they profess neutrality between her and Spain ; they forbid our cruizers to molest her flag. All these acts imply that they regard the inhabitants of the provinces of the river Plate as constituting a nation.

IV. Whatever doubts there may be with respect to the policy which we shall follow, we cannot help thinking that the views of North America may be conjectured with tolerable certainty. The appointment of commissioners to inquire and report concerning the situation of Buenos Ayres is a proof of the great interest which the American government takes in the affairs of the Spanish colonies ; and the voluntary promulgation of the facts collected, and the opinions expressed by the Commissioners, authorise us in imagining, that it is the wish of the rulers of the United States to direct the attention of their countrymen towards the same quarter. They



had as good means of information as any of the cabinets of Europe ; but they were not satisfied with this : the transactions seemed to them to be assuming so important a character, that they ought no longer to act without a complete and accurate survey of all the circumstances by which their conduct should be regulated. A special mission was, therefore, dispatched. The reports made by that mission might have been kept secret, like a light in a dark lanthorn, to guide their own steps without lending the assistance of a single ray to the rest of the world. Such a procedure would have been agreeable to the usual practice of cabinets, which are but too apt to believe that the wisdom of each is in proportion to the ignorance of the others. It would at the same time have been consistent with the constitutional law of America ; for there was no obligation upon the President to lay the documents transmitted to him before Congress. He, however, has followed a more frank and open system, with an intention, we cannot help suspecting, of disposing the public mind to a tone of feeling, which may lead speedily to a closer connexion than at present subsists between North America and Buenos Ayres, and to the

acquisition by the former of important commercial benefits.

There is, perhaps, no country which has so little interest in the independence and grandeur of the provinces of the river Plate as North America. The commerce of these provinces consists, and for many centuries must consist, in the exchange of their own raw produce for manufactured commodities. There is scarcely any likelihood that the United States will be able to supply the requisite manufactures at so cheap a rate as England. They have, therefore, little reason to expect a large share in the commerce of the river Plate, if that commerce is allowed to flow in its natural channel. On the other hand, a powerful state will have arisen in their own continent, capable of balancing their political ascendancy; jealous, perhaps, of their prosperity; and prepared to watch and retard all their movements, as often as they engage in the politics of Europe. It would, therefore, have been by no means surprising if they had looked with a suspicious eye at the steps of their southern neighbours to freedom and independence. That they have hitherto exhibited no symptom of so selfish a policy is to be ascribed

to the general diffusion of sentiments of liberty among them. Freemen cannot contemplate a struggle against despotism without entering warmly into the cause of the enemies of oppression: and in a popular constitution, sympathy, with the public feeling, always acts with more or less force on the measures of government. Hitherto, accordingly, the United States have professed a strict neutrality in the South American contest; but in some cases have shown, that in their hearts they are partial to the cause of independence. Questions have arisen before their public tribunals, which involved the claims of the existing government of Buenos Ayres to be considered as invested with national rights; and the decision has uniformly been, that the colonies of Spain, so long as they *de facto* govern themselves without foreign interference, are sovereign states; that they must be treated by the mother country as belligerent powers; and that third parties are not entitled to deny their national existence. Such decisions are not, perhaps, a recognition of their independence; but (for the word *recognition* seems to imply that the right recognized depends, in some degree, on the party recognizing) they are more than a recognition; they are an admission of it. Thus

far the United States have proceeded; and though the President, in his message to Congress, has recommended a steady adherence to the line of conduct which has been followed hitherto, we suspect, or rather as our partiality to British interests would lead us to say, we fear that they will now take a bolder step. They may connect themselves with Buenos Ayres by positive treaties. They will thus gain the advantage of exciting in the people of that country a sentiment of affection and partiality towards them, as being the first who were willing to enter into specific relations of amity with the newly-born power. Such a feeling of preference can hardly fail hereafter to promote the influence of those in whose favour it is exerted. This, however, is not all. They will not remain satisfied with remote and contingent advantages. The treaty will, of course, be a treaty of commerce; and by means of it they may place their trade with South America on a much more favourable footing than that on which it now stands.

In the present condition of manufacturing industry in the United States, we can scarcely imagine that any privileges which can be conferred on them, would materially increase the consumption of their commodities in the terri-

tories of Buenos Ayres. They have few or no articles for exportation, which suit the South American market, and a treaty would alter neither the nature of the demand nor the nature of what they have to dispose of. But political regulations might very easily increase their carrying trade, so as to add greatly to their naval power, and at the same time enable them to supply themselves with South American produce more easily than they now can. For this purpose all that would be necessary is, that they obtain from the government of Buenos Ayres, in return for their proffered friendship, a diminution of the duties on exportation and importation in American vessels. Such a boon would, probably, be granted without much difficulty, and would give them the command of the carrying trade both from and to Europe. Their ships, after having carried the bulky produce of their own soil to European ports, might take in cargoes of manufactures and transport them to the river Plate. Suppose similar cargoes to arrive in British bottoms, the advantage which the Americans would have in paying a lower rate of duty, would enable them to undersell every competitor; so that even our own manufactures would be exported in

their vessels. The freight which the American merchant would thus earn, together with the European commodities which would be carried out on speculation, by the persons who had an interest in the vessel, would supply funds for the purchase of a return cargo for home sale. The traders of the United States would thus be freed from the difficulty which they at present find in making up an assortment of articles to pay for the South American produce which their country requires, but which it cannot purchase in sufficient quantities with its own manufactures, or with raw commodities of its own growth. With the increased ease of purchasing the produce, the demand for it would probably increase too; and the connexions between Buenos Ayres and the United States would become closer and closer from the rapid augmentation, which would thus take place in the amount of their commercial transactions. While such would be the effect of the favour shown to the flag of the United States in duties on importation, a similar preference in duties on exportation would enable them to be the carriers of South American produce to almost every country in Europe. Some nations might, perhaps, endeavour to counterbalance these advan-

tages, by imposing taxes on importation in foreign bottoms. Such a regulation, however, could not be universally adopted, and even where adopted, would not always be effectual. It may, perhaps, be thought that the magnitude of the evil could never be very alarming, because the greater part of the exports from the river Plate are for the British market, and of this proportion we must, in consequence of our navigation laws, be the carriers. No such necessity exists. South American produce is not admitted into our ports in foreign vessels, nor from any country in Europe, except Spain: but by a late treaty with the United States, it may be imported from them in British vessels. Not satisfied with introducing this anomaly into our navigation laws, we give a direct bounty to encourage circuitous importation through a foreign country. For he who imports directly from Buenos Ayres is liable to the South Sea duty of two per cent. *ad valorem*, from which the merchant who brings the same commodities home through a port of the United States, is altogether exempt. If then the hides and tallow which are intended for our market can be exported from Buenos Ayres in American bottoms, at lower duties than in British, there



is no doubt but that they will be conveyed in the vessels, and deposited in the storehouses of that nation, whence they will be brought to us by ships of our own. In estimating the value of this branch of the carrying trade, we must not forget that the voyage from South America is very long, and the commodities which she furnishes are for the most part very bulky.

These are advantages of first rate importance, and may probably be obtained by the United States, at the easy price of being the first to propose a treaty of commerce with the government of Buenos Ayres. Not only are the advantages valuable in themselves—they are of the very class which America is disposed to prize the most. Her great ambition is to lay a strong and broad foundation for a mighty naval power, which may enable her to divide with her parent the empire of the ocean. This is best done by whatever increases her commercial tonnage. There are, therefore, weighty reasons to apprehend that she will not let slip so favourable an opportunity of promoting her favourite plans. And what motive has she to forbear grasping at that which is within her reach? If she can obtain commercial preferences in exchange for her amity, why should



she hesitate? Delicacy towards Spain, it may be imagined, will restrain her from entering into treaties with those whom that ancient kingdom holds to be rebellious subjects; and respect towards the powers of Europe will make her averse to being the first to enter into formal engagements with a government not recognized by them. America is not so scrupulous; she fears not Spain, nor any member of the holy alliance. Britain is the only power which could awe her; and we certainly should not be inclined to quarrel with her for openly declaring her favourable disposition towards those for whose success we ourselves must be anxious. America most assuredly will not be restrained, by false delicacy or hypocritical reverence, from appropriating to herself advantages which she knows to be valuable, and which none can justly blame her for making her own.

The declaration of the President, that he sees no reason for deviating from the line of policy which has been hitherto pursued, is far from being a proof that a very different system may not soon be adopted. In democratic states a little coquetry on the part of the executive power is usual, and even pardonable. The

President and Senate, though vested with the legal right, may think it hazardous to take so decisive a step as that of concluding an alliance with a people who, till lately, were in subjection to Spain. But if they are urged to that measure by the public voice loudly expressed by the people at large, and more formally pronounced in the House of Representatives, they would be exempted from all responsibility, and would with pleasure obey the general call. The executive, by the steps they have taken, seem to court a discussion of the system hitherto followed: to court discussion in a popular assembly is to invite attack; and in such questions they who invite attack may be suspected of a willingness to yield. Every thing is done to give publicity to the reports of Messrs. Graham and Rodney; and these are documents, the tendency of which most undoubtedly is, to exhibit the United Provinces of South America as not unworthy the alliance of the United States of the North.

In the mean time, if circumstances will not permit us to baffle the projects of the Americans by being ourselves the first to conclude a treaty with the provinces of the river Plate, let us at

least adhere strictly to our neutrality, and avoid whatever may excite sentiments of dissatisfaction in the minds of the South Americans. Justice requires, and our own interest too, that they should ultimately prevail : all measures are, therefore, improper which may throw difficulties in their way. The time must come when they will constitute a great people, whose friendship will be valuable to us ; consequently, it must be impolitic to give them any just cause of displeasure at present. Of some of our proceedings, they have already had too good reason to complain. Vessels sailing under their flag have been seized on frivolous pretences (though instructions from the Admiralty expressly enjoin that the independent flag be not molested), and made the subject of litigation in our courts, where some have even ventured to call in question the existence of Buenos Ayres as a nation. If a ship bearing the South American flag is more liable to be brought within our Admiralty jurisdiction, and stands there in less favourable circumstances, than if it belonged to Spain, our neutrality is an empty name ; for we are left at liberty to inflict all the evils of war without being ourselves exposed to any of them. The independent provinces must, in that case, consider

us in the light of enemies ; and though prudence may for a time restrain them from openly expressing their resentment, feelings of animosity cannot fail to rankle in their hearts.



P. S.—It may be proper to remark, as an apology for some inaccuracies of language which may be detected in the documents which follow the Reports, that they are not to be attributed to any negligence in their republication in this country, but belong, in a much higher degree, to the originals. The copy which we have used is that printed by order of Congress, which, though of course official, contained many errors in the orthography of names ; while omissions of words and inaccuracies of expression have rendered some passages almost unintelligible. The Editor alludes particularly to the narrative of the events of the revolution, translated from the work of Dr. Funes. The Translator seems to have been little acquainted with some of the most common idioms of the language which he undertook to interpret ; and the Commissioners had not, probably, leisure or opportunity to revise the translations which he had made, previously to their being laid before the President. Many of the inaccuracies in the names of places and persons have been corrected in the present edition ; and where the idiom allowed the Editor to judge of the cause of the Translator's mistake, some sentences, before obscure, have been, by the alteration of a phrase or a word, restored to sense and meaning.

THE REPORTS

OF

MESSRS. C. A. RODNEY AND JOHN GRAHAM,

COMMISSIONERS

SENT BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO INQUIRE

INTO THE STATE OF THE

REPUBLIC OF RIO DE LA PLATA.



## DOCUMENTS

REFERRED TO IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AT THE COMMENCEMENT  
OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS.

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MR. RODNEY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

SIR,

*Washington, Nov. 5, 1818.*

I have the honour to present the report herewith enclosed, agreeably to the desire of Mr. Graham, who, on reflection, preferred submitting some additional remarks in a separate paper. For this purpose, two of the documents referred to in the report, remain in his possession—Dr. Funes's Outline of Events in the United Provinces, since the Revolution; and the Manifesto of Independence by the Congress at Tucuman.

I have the honour to be,

With great respect,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) C. A. RODNEY.

*Hon. John Q. Adams,  
Secretary of State.*

MR. RODNEY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

SIR,

I have now the honour to submit to your consideration, my report on the subject of the late mission to South America, embracing the information derived from the various sources within my power, so far as I had an opportunity of improving the advantages possessed.

With the history of the conquest of the Spanish possessions in America, you must be familiar. They were principally, if not exclusively, achieved by private adventurers. When completed, a most oppressive system of government, or rather despotism, was established by the parent country.

These extensive regions were originally swayed by two viceroys. The dominions of Spain, in North America, were under the government of the Viceroy of Mexico; and all her possessions in South America were subject to the control of the Viceroy of Peru.

The remoteness of some parts of the country from the residence of the viceroy at Lima occasioned, in 1718, the establishment of another viceroyalty at Santa Fé de Bogota, in the kingdom of New Grenada. In 1731, New Grenada



was divided, and a number of the provinces composing that kingdom were separated from it. These were put under the jurisdiction of a captain-general and president, whose seat of government was at Caraccas.

In 1568, Chili was erected into a separate captain-generalship; in 1778, a new viceroyalty was established at Buenos Ayres, comprehending all the Spanish possessions to the east of the Western Cordilleras, and to the south of the river Marañon.

This immense empire seems, according to the laws of the Indies, to have been considered a distinct kingdom of itself, though united to Spain, and annexed to the crown of Castile. In this light it is viewed by Baron Humboldt, in his *Essay on New Spain*. (Note A.)

With some slight shades of difference in the regulations established in these governments, the prominent features of their political institutions exhibit a striking resemblance, as the general system was the same.

Their commerce was confined to the parent country and to Spanish vessels exclusively. They were prohibited, under the penalty of death, to trade with foreigners. The natives of Old Spain composed the body of their merchants.

(Note A.) See the notes at the end.

Though this part of the system had, previously to the revolution, been relaxed, in some degree, particularly by the statute of free commerce, as it is styled; the relief was partial, and the restrictions continued severe and oppressive.

✓ All access to the Spanish settlements was closed to foreigners; and even the inhabitants of the different provinces were prohibited from intercourse with one another, unless under the strictest regulations.

The various manufactures that might interfere with those of Spain were not permitted. They were prevented, under severe penalties, from raising flax, hemp, or saffron. In climates most congenial to them, the culture of the grape and the olive was prohibited. On account of the distance of Peru and Chili, and the difficulty of transporting oil and wine to these remote regions, they were permitted to plant vines and olives, but were prohibited the culture of tobacco. At Buenos Ayres, by special indulgence of the viceroys, they were allowed to cultivate grapes and olives merely for the use of the table.

They were compelled to procure from the mother country articles of the first necessity; and were thus rendered dependent on her for the conveniences of life, as well as luxuries. The

Crown possessed the monopoly of tobacco, salt, and gunpowder.

To these oppressive regulations and restrictions was added an odious system of taxation. From the Indians was exacted a tribute in the shape of a poll-tax, or a certain servitude in the mines, called the mita. A tenth part of the produce of cultivated lands was taken, under the denomination of tithes. The alcavala, a tax varying from two and a half to five per cent. on every sale and resale of all things moveable and immoveable, was rigidly exacted, though, in some cases, a commutation was allowed. Royal and municipal duties were laid on imports, and on the tonnage, entrance, and clearance of vessels, under the different appellations of al-moxarifasgo, sea-alcavala, corso, consulado, armada, and armadilla. To these may be added the royal fifths of the precious metals, the most important tax in the mining districts. Besides all these, there were stamp taxes, tavern licences, and sums paid for the sale of offices, of titles of nobility, papal bulls, the composition and confirmation of lands, with a number of others of inferior grade.

Under the Spanish monarchs, who had early obtained from the Pope the ecclesiastical dominion, and thus had united in their royal persons

all civil and religious authority, a most oppressive hierarchy was established, with its numerous train of offices and orders, succeeded by the inquisition.

The posts of honour and profit, from the highest to the lowest, were filled, almost exclusively, by natives of Old Spain.

The principal code of laws, thus maintaining the supremacy of Spain over those distant regions, almost locked up from the rest of the world, emanated from the Council of the Indies, established by the King, in which he was supposed to be always present. The royal rescripts, the recopilaciones of the Indies, and the partidas, furnished the general rules of decision; and when these were silent or doubtful, recourse was had to the opinions of professional men.

This system was generally executed by the viceroys, captains-general, and by the tribunals of justice, with a spirit corresponding with the rigorous policy that produced it. To this form of government, the country had for centuries submitted with implicit obedience, and probably would have continued to submit much longer but for events in this country, and the changes in Europe. The sagacious minds of many able writers, penetrating into the future, had predicted, at some distant date, a revolution

in South America, before that in North America had commenced. From the period of the successful termination of our own struggle for independence, that of the inhabitants of the South has been with more confidence foretold; and there is reason to believe it has been hastened by this fortunate event. The conduct of Spain, during the war of our revolution, was calculated to make a lasting impression on her colonies. This result was then foreseen by intelligent politicians; many were surprised that she could be so blind to her own interests, after she had on one occasion manifested the strongest suspicion of Paraguay; for to her scrupulous jealousy of this power the expulsion of the Jesuits from that country, in 1750, is to be attributed.

The wars that arose from the French Revolution have produced in Europe changes of the greatest magnitude, which have had an immense influence on the affairs of South America. When Spain joined France against the combined Princes, she exposed her distant possessions to British hostilities. The great naval power of England gave her ready access to the American colonies. Engaged in an arduous contest, she was prompted by her feelings and

interests to retaliate on Spain the conduct she experienced from her during the war of our independence. Encouraged, perhaps, by the counsels of her enemies, the first symptoms of insurrection in the continental possessions of Spain were exhibited in the year 1797, in Venezuela. These were succeeded by the attempts of Miranda in the same quarter, which were accompanied or were followed, since the vacillating state of the Spanish monarchy, by revolutionary movements in Mexico, Grenada, Peru, Chili, and Buenos Ayres; and from which scarcely any part of the Spanish dominions in America has been entirely exempt.

The occurrences that led the way to the subsequent important events in the provinces of La Plata, were the invasion of the British, under Popham and Beresford, in the year 1806, and their expulsion, a few months afterwards, by the collected forces of the country, under Liniers and Pueyrredon. These incidents fortunately gave to the people a just idea of their own strength; and they afterwards repelled, with a firmness and bravery that did them great honour, the formidable attack of the British under General Whitelock.

The wretched state to which Spain was re-

duced, by the policy, the power, and the arts of Napoleon; the resignation of Charles IV in favour of Ferdinand VII, and the renunciation of both in favour of Napoleon, were productive of the most important results. They threw the kingdom into the greatest confusion. The alternate successes and disasters of the French armies produced a new era in Spain. The people, generally, revolted at the idea of being governed by the brother of Napoleon, to whom he had transferred the crown. Juntas were established, who acted in the name of Ferdinand, then confined in France. These were substituted for the ancient Cortes, and the regular counsel of the nation, to which, in times of imminent danger, they ought to have recurred agreeably to their usages. Conflicting authorities produced a distracted state of affairs. In the scenes that ensued, the proper attention was not paid to the American provinces. Their conduct towards them was versatile and inconsistent: they were lost sight of or neglected, until it was too late. Conceiving they were abandoned by the parent state, they thought it justifiable to act for themselves. (Note B.) It was not very long before the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres, embracing the example of their



brethren in Spain, established a junta, which assumed the reins of government, and finally in the year 1810, sent off the Viceroy Cisneros, and his principal adherents. (Note c.) For a summary of events subsequent to this period, until the time of my departure, I beg leave to refer to the outline subjoined (Appendix A.), from the pen of Dr. Funes, drawn up, in part, at my request. Without vouching for the perfect accuracy of the work, I think, from the information received, it will probably be found to contain, in general, a correct and impartial sketch of the prominent transactions and occurrences.

In perusing this interesting document, I have to lament, that its pages are marked with some cases of severity and cruelty, which seem almost inseparable from great revolutions. It must, however, be consoling to observe, that they appear to have passed through the state which might possibly have rendered examples necessary, and to have arrived, perhaps, at that stage, when the passions becoming less turbulent, and the people more enlightened, a milder system may be expected to prevail. (Note D.)

Their dissensions have produced most of their calamities. In such seasons they were natu-



rally to be expected. But their disputes have been principally healed by the prudent and energetic measures of the Congress, which commenced its sittings in Tucuman in the year 1815, and adjourned in the year following from thence to Buenos Ayres, where it remained in session, occupied with the task of forming a permanent constitution. This respectable body, besides acting as a convention, or a constituent assembly, exercises temporarily legislative powers. Their sittings are public, with a gallery of audience for citizens and strangers. The debates are frequently interesting, and are conducted with ability and decorum; they are published every month for the information of the people.

The dispute with Artigas, the chief of the Orientals, has not been adjusted. This, with a certain jealousy of the superior influence of the city of Buenos Ayres on the general affairs of the provinces; the conduct of the government of Buenos Ayres towards the Portuguese, and the high tariff of duties, which I understand have been since reduced, appeared to constitute the principal causes of dissatisfaction at the time of my departure.

The declaration by Congress of that inde-

pendence which they had for many years previously maintained in fact, was a measure of the highest importance, and has been productive of an unanimity and a decision before unknown. This summit of their wishes was only to be reached by slow and gradual progress. The public mind had to be illumined on the subject by their pulpits, their presses, and their public orations. The people were to be prepared for the event. When the season arrived, they cut the knot which could not be untied. The declaration of independence was adopted in the directorship of Mr. Pueyrredon, on the 9th day of July, 1816. It was succeeded by an able exposition of the causes that extorted it, to justify, to their fellow-citizens and to the world, the measure they had deliberately voted to support with their fortunes and their lives.

Believing the latter paper might be thought worthy of perusal, a translation has been annexed. (Appendix B.)

The salutary influence of this bold and decisive step, was at once felt throughout the country. It gave new life and strength to the patriotic cause, and stability to the government. The victories of Chacabuco and Maipo,

achieved by the arms of Chili and Buenos Ayres, have produced and confirmed a similar declaration of independence by the people of Chili, which is also annexed (Appendix C.\*), and cemented the cordial union existing between the confederate states. (Note E.) The consequence has been, that, within these extensive territories, there is scarcely the vestige of a royal army to be found, except on the borders of Peru.

Having thus, in connexion with the succinct account given by Dr. Funes, traced the principal events, since the revolution in Buenos Ayres, I shall proceed to state the result of the information received, according to the best opinion I could form of the extent, population, government and resources of the united provinces, with their productions, imports and exports, trade and commerce.

The late viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, of which that city was the metropolis, was by many considered the largest, as well as the most valuable of all the Spanish dominions in South America, extending in a direct line, from its north to its south boundary, a distance of more than two thousand miles ; and from its

\* Not given in the original.

eastern to its western not less than eleven hundred.

It was composed, at the commencement of the revolution, of the nine provinces, or intendencies following:—Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, Cordova, Salta, Potosi, La Plata, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Puno.

Watered by the great river La Plata and its numerous tributary streams, which afford an easy communication with countries of an immense extent, and furnishing an easy access to the treasures of South America, it has always been regarded by Spain as one of her most precious acquisitions. Enjoying every variety of climate to be found between different and distant latitudes, and blessed with a large portion of fertile soil, it is capable of producing all that is to be found in the temperate or torrid zones. Immense herds of cattle and horses graze on its extensive plains, and constitute at this time their principal source of wealth.—The mines of Potosi are also included within its boundaries. There are no woods for a very considerable distance from Buenos Ayres. No forest trees are to be seen on the widely extended Pampas, except at intervals a solitary umboo. After passing the Saladillo in a northerly direction, the woods begin, and pro-

ceeding in the upper provinces, the hills appear, and mountains rise in succession, interspersed with rich valleys. On the east side of the rivers La Plata and Parana, the country is said to be very fine. The Entre Rios is represented as capable of being made a garden spot; and the Banda Oriental presents hills and dales, rich bottoms, fine streams of water, and at a distance from the great river, on the banks of the smaller streams, some excellent wood land. Between Maldonado and Montevideo, the east ridge of the Cordilleras terminates on the river La Plata.

Since the revolution, five more provinces have been erected, making in all fourteen within the limits of the ancient viceroyalty; viz. Tucuman, taken from Salta; Mendoza or Cuyo, taken from Cordova; Corrientes, Entre Rios, comprising the country between the Uruguay and the Parana, and the Banda Oriental, or eastern shore of the river La Plata. The two last were taken from the province of Buenos Ayres, which was thus reduced to the territory on the south side of that river. The subordinate divisions of the country, with the principal towns, will be found in the Appendix to this Report, with an account of the produce or

manufactures of the different districts. (Appendix D.)

Of the fourteen provinces into which the ancient viceroyalty is now divided, five were, at my departure, principally occupied by the royal forces (which, in consequence of the victory of Maipo, were expected soon to retreat to Lower Peru), or partially under their influence, viz. Potosi, La Plata, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Puno; and the nine following independent *de facto* of Spain, were in the possession of the patriots, viz. Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, Mendoza, Cordova, Tucuman, Salta, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and Banda Oriental. But Paraguay and the city of Santa Fé act independently of Buenos Ayres, though Paraguay is not on unfriendly terms with them, and it is hoped by some will before long join the union. Entre Rios and the Banda Oriental, under General Artigas, in the character of chief of the orientals, are in a state of hostility with Buenos Ayres.

Montevideo, the capital of the eastern shore, was occupied by a Portuguese army, and a squadron of ships of war from Brazil blockaded the ports of Colonia and Maldonado, and prohibited the entrance of neutral vessels, unless

they paid them the same duties on their cargoes, that were charged on the importation of the goods when landed in the country.

The territory of the United Provinces is computed to contain 150,000 square leagues, though it probably exceeds that quantity. The lands occupied in the country, remote from the cities, are generally converted by their owners into estancias, or large grazing farms for cattle, and chacras for growing grain. The small farms or quintas, in the neighbourhood of cities, are in fine order. Those around Buenos Ayres, which furnish their market with an ample supply of fruit and vegetables, are, by irrigation, in the highest state of culture.

The population, exclusive of the Indians, is now calculated at 1,300,000; but, adding the civilized Indians only, who are of great importance, it would in all probability exceed two millions. (Note F.)

The whole population consists of natives of Old Spain, and their descendants, born in the country, or, as they style themselves, South Americans; of Indians civilised, or unreclaimed, with different "castes," or mixed blood; of Africans, and their descendants, or Negroes and Mulattoes.



I could not ascertain, with satisfaction, the population of the different provinces: the province of Buenos Ayres contains about 120,000, whilst the population of Entre Rios, and Banda Oriental is computed at 50,000. (Note G.)

The city of Buenos Ayres contains a population of 60,000. The inhabitants of this place appear to be amiable, and an interesting people. They are considered brave and humane; possessing intelligence, capable of great exertions and perseverance, and manifesting a cheerful devotion to the cause of freedom and independence. (Note H.)

There is also a certain mediocrity and equality of fortune prevailing among them, extremely favourable to a union of the popular sentiment, in support of the common weal. Many industrious mechanics and enterprising merchants are, however, increasing their estates, and adding to the stock of capital in the country.

The people of the province of Buenos Ayres, residing out of the city, are, generally speaking, poor, and rather indolent, though a hardy race; and when excited to action, they become zealous defenders of the liberties of their country. They are capable of great improvement, and, under the influence of a good ex-



ample when a change takes place in their habits and manner of living, they bid fair to become useful and industrious citizens.

The inhabitants of Cordova are said to be more superstitious, and more industrious, but less patriotic. This is principally attributed to the loss of the trade with Peru, occasioned by the revolutionary war.

Tucuman, I was informed, possessed an excellent population. (Note 1.)

The people of Mendoza, or Cuyo, are moral, industrious, and patriotic. They have sacrificed largely at the shrine of independence, supporting with zeal and confidence the cause of their country; whilst the citizens of Santa Fé are represented as immoral and insubordinate, and manifesting, on most occasions, an extreme jealousy of their neighbours.

The population of Entre Rios and Banda Oriental is perhaps not inferior in valour to that of Buenos Ayres. Nor is it deficient in military skill, particularly in carrying on a partizan warfare, for which its troops are admirably adapted. (Note κ.) Their other good qualities have been probably somewhat impaired by the system pursued in that quarter, where they have been compelled to give up every thing like civil

avocations, and to continue without any regular kind of government, under the absolute control of a chief, who, whatever may be his political principles or professions, in practice concentrates all power, legislative, judicial, and executive, in himself.

The general Congress of the United Provinces, assembled at Buenos Ayres, on the 3d of December, of 1817, established, by a provisional statute, a temporary form of government, which will be found in Appendix marked E.

The Congress is comprised of deputies from the different provinces. It actually consists of twenty-six members. But, as a representative is allowed for every 15,000 citizens, it would be more numerous, if all the provinces had sent delegates in that ratio of population.

With some exceptions, and particularly of that palladium of our rights, which is unknown to the civil law, the trial by jury, the provisional constitution will be found, on an attentive perusal, to contain a distinct recognition of many of the vital principles of free government. A church establishment also, that of the Catholic faith, is contrary to our ideas of religious freedom; though a measure adopted from necessity, perhaps, by them.

It declares, that all power, legislative, judicial, and executive, resides in the nation. The Congress are to be chosen by electors, who are to be voted for by the people in the primary assemblies. The cabildos, or municipalities, are to be elected immediately by the citizens. It recognizes the independence of the judiciary, and declares the tenure of office, with respect to the superior judges, to be during good behaviour. It provides for the election of a chief magistrate by Congress, removable when they choose to appoint a successor, and responsible for the execution of the duties of his office, which are defined and limited. In the oath of office, he is sworn to preserve the integrity and independence of the country.

The three great departments of state, of the treasury, and of war, are distinctly marked out, and their respective powers and duties assigned.

On some subjects it enters more into detail than is usual with us, particularly in those of their army, navy, and militia. But this, perhaps, in their situation, was necessary.

It provides that no citizen shall accept a title of nobility, without forfeiting the character of citizenship.

It provides, also, against general warrants, and the arrest of individuals, unless on probable proof of guilt.

It contains a salutary provision, that a judge, having original jurisdiction, before taking cognizance of the cause, shall use all possible means of reconciling the parties. This constitution is but temporary. The Congress are engaged in the task of forming a permanent one. In the mean time, no alteration can be made in the present, unless with the consent of two thirds of the members. In this manner some alterations have been adopted.

The subject of a permanent constitution was before a committee of sixteen members of Congress. There was a difference of opinion prevailing among them on the point of a confederated or a consolidated government. If they should adopt the former, they will frame the constitution, in all probability, nearly after the model of that of the United States. Should they decide on the latter, it is highly probable they will incorporate the leading features of our system into their form of government. They seem to concur in the proposition to have a chief magistrate elected for a term of years, and a representative legislature, to consist of

two branches. A senate, to constitute the most permanent body, and a house of representatives, whose term of service shall be of shorter duration.

Perhaps it would be better for them to delay the completion of this all important task, after the example of the United States, until a period of peace. Their present provisional statute is an improvement on those which preceded it; and we may expect their proposed constitution will be still more perfect, as they advance in the knowledge of those principles on which republican governments are constituted.

But, however free in theory this provisional statute may be, it is undoubtedly true that, unless administered agreeably to its letter and spirit, it will not afford security to the citizen. Whether any infractions have occurred since the date of its existence, I cannot pretend to determine, not being in full possession of the facts.

When we recollect that they have the benefit of our example, it may reasonably be expected that they will, in general, adhere to the constitution. They have also the fatal result of the French Revolution, warning them of the dangers

of its excesses, of which they appear to be sensible.

The productions and the manufactures of the different provinces will be found in Appendix D; but I was unable to procure any satisfactory estimates of the probable value or amount in each province. There is, however, a considerable internal trade carried on in the interchange of various articles between the several provinces; cattle, horses, and mules, furnish a considerable source of barter: with the latter, Peru is usually supplied; the Paraguay tea is a great article of trade throughout the country. The brandy, wine, raisins, and figs, of Mendoza and San Juan, are becoming important; the hides of oxen, the skins of the vicuna and guanaco, with a number of fine furs, afford valuable articles of exchange. These, with the foreign goods transported in every direction from Buenos Ayres, very readily, by oxen and mules, which also furnish the means of carrying their native productions to their sea-ports, form a branch of trade of great magnitude, considering the population of the country. (Note L.)

Their exports are calculated, with some degree of accuracy, at ten millions of dollars. These consist principally of ox-hides, jerk beef, and

tallow, the present great staples of the country. A variety of furs and peltries, some grain, copper, mostly brought from Chili, with gold and silver, in bullion and coin, chiefly from the mines of Potosi.

The imports are computed to be about equal to their exports. British manufactures form the principal mass, and they are to be had in great abundance. They consist of woollen and cotton goods of every description; some of them wrought to imitate the manufactures of the country; ironmongery, cutlery, hardware, saddlery, hats, porter, ale, and cheese, are among the remaining articles.

From the United States they receive lumber of all kinds, and furniture of every description; coaches and carriages of all sorts, codfish, mackerel, shad, and herring, leather, boots, and shoes, powder, and munitions of war, and naval stores, ships and vessels, particularly those calculated for their navy, or for privateers.

From Brazils, they receive sugar, coffee, cotton, and rum.

From the north of Europe, they receive steel and iron; and from France, a number of articles of its manufacture.

Their foreign commerce is principally carried

on by British capitalists, though there are some Americans, a few French and other foreign merchants, also settled at Buenos Ayres ; they are all placed, I believe, on the same footing of equality.

The revenue of the state may be estimated at about three millions of dollars annually ; but their system of finance is very imperfect ; and, although their debt is small, their credit is low. They have hitherto avoided the issuing of paper money, and they have no established bank ; but they have sometimes anticipated their revenue, by giving due bills receivable in payment for duties or goods imported, or articles exported ; the impost furnishes the principal part of the revenue. A copy of their tariff, as at first established, was some time since transmitted, I believe, to the department of state ; in this, the duties were generally specific and high. I understand they have been lately reduced, as their exorbitancy had occasioned much smuggling.

Voluntary contributions from those friendly to the revolution, and forced loans from the Old Spaniards, have constituted another portion of their funds. To show the public capital adequate to all exigencies, their different civil, mili-



tary, and naval establishments have been taken into view, and are comprised in the estimate furnished—a thing unusual with us ; but they have omitted their public lands, which, if a prudent use be made of them, must, at no distant day, become a very productive source of revenue to the state.

The mines of Potosi, which, in all probability, will very soon fall into their hands again, may furnish them with a considerable supply of the precious metals. It is stated, on respectable authority, that so late as the year 1790, the amount of gold and silver coined at Potosi in that year was calculated to have been 299,846 dollars in gold, and 2,983,176 dollars in silver. The state of their army, and the condition of their navy, will be seen by a reference to the original return presented.—(Appendix F.\*)

Their army is composed of regular troops, *civicos*, and militia. In one or other of these classes, they are educated to the military art ; and, as far as I had an opportunity, and was capable of judging, they appeared to be well acquainted with the elements of their profession. Their forces, according to the paper furnished, are estimated at nearly 30,000 men. They are composed of 1,296 artillery, 13,693 infantry,

\* Not given in the original.

and 14,718 cavalry ; of which 12,143 are troops of the line, 7,041 are *civicos*, and 10,573 militia. These form the different armies of the centre of Peru, of the Andes, of Cordova, and the auxiliary forces in the *Entre Rios*. This statement, however, only includes the militia of the province of Buenos Ayres itself. Their supply of arms and munitions of war is ample, as will be seen by the statement annexed on that subject.

Their navy is small, and some of their vessels are laid up in ordinary. A list of them, as well as of their privateers, will be found in Appendix F.\* Their private armed vessels are subjected to very strict regulations, agreeably to their prize code, which is among the original papers presented and herewith delivered. It may be proper in this place to introduce the subject of the irregular conduct of the privateers under the patriot flag, against which the Commissioners were directed to remonstrate. Having taken an opportunity of explaining to Mr. Tagle, the Secretary of State, the proceedings of our government relative to Amelia Island and Galveston, agreeably to their instructions, the Commissioners embraced a suitable occasion to urge the just cause of complaint, which the malpractices of private armed vessels, wearing

\* Not given in the original.

the patriot colours, had furnished our government; on both topics they had long and interesting conversations. With the conduct of the government respecting Amelia Island and Galveston, Mr. Tagle expressed himself perfectly satisfied; and he disclaimed for his government any privity or participation in the lodgments made at those places, by persons acting in the name of the patriots of South America.

In reference to the acts of cruisers under the patriot flags, he said he was sensible that great irregularities had occurred, though his government had done every thing in their power to prevent them, and were willing, if any instance of aggression were pointed out, to direct an inquiry into the case, and if the facts were established, to punish those concerned, and redress the injured individuals. He professed his readiness to adopt any measures that would more effectually prevent a recurrence of such acts, in which he expressed his belief that the privateers of Buenos Ayres had rarely participated, though the character of the government had suffered from the conduct of others. He stated that they had on one occasion sent out some of their public vessels to examine all cruisers wearing the Buenos Ayrean flag, to see that they were

lawfully commissioned, and to ascertain whether they had violated their instructions.

Amongst the causes of dissatisfaction to which I have alluded, the preponderance of the capital has been mentioned. Its great weight in the scale of national affairs is to be ascribed to its greater exertions in the national cause. These are owing to its comparative wealth, and to its active, intelligent, and enterprising population. The armies that have been raised in this city and the neighbouring country, with the supplies in money, and munitions of war drawn from these sources, have been truly extraordinary.

It would be a difficult task to make an exact calculation, or to form even a probable estimate, but all seemed to concede the superior merit claimed on account of their exertions, when compared with their wealth and population; and it is not unlikely that Buenos Ayres has, in consequence, assumed a higher tone, and acquired a controlling influence, which she has sometimes abused. (Note M.)

Another source of discontent is the unfortunate dispute between the Banda Oriental and Buenos Ayres, which had an influence on the proceedings of the latter towards the Portuguese.

The original cause of division may be traced to a jealousy long subsisting between the rival cities of Montevideo and Buenos Ayres. This has become habitual, and has extended to the country. Private interests and personal views have also increased their dissensions.

General Artigas (who bears the character of chief of the Orientals, as has been already stated, and has also assumed that of Protector of the Entre Rios and Santa Fé) was originally in the royal service, a captain in a provincial corps. In this he continued for some time after the revolution had commenced at Buenos Ayres. But, in the year 1811, taking offence, as it is said, at some conduct of the Spanish commandant of Colonia, he abandoned the royal cause, and entered into the service of the patriots. So early as the year 1813, when acting against Montevideo, he became dissatisfied with Sarratea, the commander-in-chief from Buenos Ayres. On his removal from the head of the army, he quarrelled with General Rondeau, who, it was supposed, would have been acceptable to him, and finally withdrew, before the siege of Montevideo was finished under General Alvear. For this conduct, Posadas, when he succeeded to the government, treated him as a deserter from

their service. By a proclamation, he offered a reward for his apprehension, and set a price upon his head—an act which General Artigas never forgot or forgave.

During the subsequent directorship of Alvear, he induced the cabildo of Buenos Ayres to issue a similar proclamation against General Artigas. When Alvear was dismissed, the people of Buenos Ayres endeavoured to atone for their conduct, by burning, with every mark of ignominy, the degrading proclamation. They also addressed a conciliatory letter to the General, and received from him a corresponding answer. These were preliminary to a fruitless attempt at reconciliation, made by the director, *ad interim*, Colonel Alvares, who succeeded Alvear. The correspondence on this occasion is annexed (Appendix H). Other endeavours to reconcile him have failed, notwithstanding the changes in the office of director at Buenos Ayres. On one occasion the proposition was made, that the Banda Oriental should remain independent of Buenos Ayres, and merely send deputies to the General Congress, to concert measures against the common enemy. On another, when the Portuguese army was approaching the frontiers of the Banda Oriental, an effort was made by

Pueyrredon to reconcile him, and to unite him in the common defence. Ample supplies of arms and munitions of war were offered, and some furnished ; but this attempt also failed. (Note N.)

In order that a fuller view of this subject may be had, I have subjoined a translated copy of an animated letter from General Artigas to Mr. Pueyrredon. (Appendix I.) It is but justice to add, that General Artigas is thought, by persons entitled to credit, to be a firm friend to the independence of the country. To express a decided opinion on this delicate question would scarcely be expected of me, as my position did not command a view of the whole ground. I had not the satisfaction to be derived from a personal interview with General Artigas, who is, unquestionably, a man of rare and singular talents. But if I were to hazard a conjecture, I think it not improbable that in this, as in most family disputes, there have been faults on both sides. It is to be lamented that they are in open hostility. The war has been prosecuted with great animosity ; and, in two late engagements, the troops of Buenos Ayres have been defeated with great loss. By some it was said, that the inhabitants of the eastern shore were anxious that a reconci-



liation should take place, whilst the people in the country preferred their present state.

I must not omit to take a glance at the situation of Paraguay. This province presents a singular spectacle. It stands aloof from the rest. The people, with the aid of the few remaining royal troops, repulsed an army sent to compel them to join the common standard. Very soon afterwards they expelled the royalists, and set up for themselves. Since this period, they appear to have adopted a partial non-intercourse system. But Buenos Ayres, on one occasion, succeeded in obtaining an understanding with them. Some suspect that they are secretly inimical to the existing order of things, and wish to keep themselves within their shell, that, in case of a change, they may profit by future events; others calculate with some confidence on their ultimate union with Buenos Ayres, with which at present they indulge a limited and reluctant intercourse. Paraguay is under the immediate control of a person named Francia, who styles himself Director of Paraguay. (Note o.)

From the domestic concerns of the provinces, we naturally turn to their foreign relations. On this subject the Commissioners were informed,



that they had nothing more than a friendly understanding with any foreign nation. With the Portuguese government, they concluded an arrangement in 1812, under the mediation, it is said, of the British, with respect to the Banda Oriental. They have since had a correspondence with them on the subject of their entrance into that province, and the forcible occupation by the Portuguese army of the city of Monte Video, of which a copy is annexed (Appendix J). This will present the state of affairs between Buenos Ayres and the Brazils, which has been the theme of much discussion. The superior naval force of the Portuguese, stationed in the river La Plata, could have effectually blockaded all the ports of Buenos Ayres. By this means they would have prevented supplies of arms and munitions of war, and entirely destroyed the great source of revenue to the state, the duties on imports and tonnage, at a season when money was much wanted.

For about this period Buenos Ayres had a powerful army to contend with on the side of Peru, and had taken the burden of the renewed contest of Chili with Spain. Under such circumstances they were in some measure obliged to adopt a cautious and moderate policy. Their

conduct in this respect seems to have been coerced. Their unhappy state with the Orientals had also an influence on their measures; they alleged that the restless conduct of Artigas had furnished the Portuguese a pretext for the invasion; but it is probable that they will ultimately break with the government of Brazils. (Note P.)

The British government has, through their official agents, entered into commercial stipulations with General Artigas, as the chief of the Orientals, on the subject of their trade with the eastern shore. A copy of this instrument will be found in Appendix K.\*

The government of Buenos Ayres have a confidential person in Europe, soliciting from England and other Powers, it is said, assistance of every kind, and a recognition of their independence. (Note R.) England has a consul, who, with her naval commander on that station, appeared to conduct the confidential affairs of the British cabinet with the government of Buenos Ayres.

What effects the victory of Maipo will produce abroad, it would be hazardous in me to con-

\* Not given in the original.

jecture. Whether, like the capture of Burgoyne, it will procure for the United Provinces foreign alliances, I cannot pretend to say.

From a source which is entitled to credit, I was informed that the raising and embarkation of Osorio's army in Peru was not accomplished without serious difficulties. Alternate force and persuasion were used to collect them, and nothing but the name, character, and promises of their General, could have induced them to go on board of the vessels prepared for the purpose, at the port of Callao. Some of them were actually in a state of mutiny, notwithstanding they were told they would be received with open arms by their brethren in Chili.

The forces finally embarked, agreeably to an account furnished by a gentleman of undoubted veracity on the spot, consisting of the following troops:—

One company of artillery . . . . .	70
One ditto sappers and miners. . .	81
regiment of Burgos. . . . .	900
ditto of San Carlos infantry	907
ditto of Arequipa . . . . .	1,000
Arequipa dragoons . . . . .	160
Lamas. . . . .	144
	<hr/>
	3,262

This army was composed of all the regular soldiers they could spare from Lima, who were united, at Talcaguna, to the Royal forces left in Chili. By the battle of Maipo it has ceased to exist. The probable effects in Peru, and other parts of South America, may be conjectured, but cannot be affirmed. The same Gentleman who has been mentioned, and who is conversant in Peruvian affairs, apprehended that important changes would result.

I cannot conclude this paper without drawing your attention to a rapid survey of the reforms and improvements in the province of Buenos Ayres, produced by the Revolution, and its influence on knowledge, society, and manners.

The effects of the Revolution are visible in the changes produced in the state of society. The difference in the freedom of acting and thinking, which preceded the revolution, must necessarily be great. The freedom of commerce must have given a spring to exertions of native enterprize and intelligence, while the active scenes of war and politics, for the last ten years, have awakened the genius of the country, which had so long slumbered. The generation now on the stage may almost be

said to have been reared under a new order of things. The common stock of ideas among the people has been greatly augmented—the natural consequence of the important political events which daily transpire, and in which every man, like the citizen of Athens, feels an interest. The newspapers are every where circulated, together with the manifestos of the government, which is obliged to court the approbation of public opinion on all measures of moment. It is not very unusual for the same countryman, who, a few years ago, never troubled himself about any thing beyond the narrow circle of his domestic concerns, to purchase a newspaper on coming to town as a matter of course, and, if unable to read, to request the first one he meets to do him that favour. The country curates are, moreover, enjoined to read the newspapers and manifestos regularly to their flocks.—The spirit of improvement may be seen in every thing. Even some of those who are under the influence of strong prejudices against the revolution, frequently remark the changes for the better which have taken place. Their habits, manners, dress, and mode of living, have been improved by intercourse with strangers, and the free introduction of

foreign customs, particularly English, American, and French. Great prejudices prevail against whatever is Spanish. It is even offensive to them to be called by this name—they prefer to be identified with the aborigines of the country. The appellation which they have assumed, and in which they take a pride, is that of South Americans.

A powerful stimulus must necessarily have been given to their industry, by two important circumstances—the diminution in prices of foreign merchandize, and the great increase in value of the products of the country, with the consequent rise of property. Though the grounds in the neighbourhood of cities are highly improved, as I have already stated, agriculture, comparatively speaking, is in a low condition. In general the lands are badly tilled. The plough is rarely used, and the substitute is a very indifferent one. But notwithstanding the disadvantages of the present method of culture, I was informed by reputable persons, that the average crop of wheat is not less than fifty bushels per acre in good seasons.

On the subject of religion, especially, the change in the public mind has been very great. The Catholic faith is established as that of the

state, but there are many advocates, both in conversation and in writing, of universal toleration. Some members of congress are said to be strongly in favour of it; but the ignorant and superstitious part of the people, together with the regular clergy, would not be satisfied with such a measure—while the liberality prevailing among the better informed classes is such as to secure a virtual toleration for the present. Besides, from the circumstance of there being no sects in the country, such a provision may wait the progress of liberality in public opinion. In fact, the human mind has been set free on all matters of a general abstract nature, although the liberty of the press is circumscribed in some degree with respect to strictures on public measures and men, and the established religion; but there is neither inquisition nor previous licence. They acknowledge the Pope as a spiritual head merely, and do not think him entitled to any authority to interfere with their temporal concerns. His Bull in favour of the King of Spain against the colonies, which may be almost regarded as an excommunication, produced little or no sensation.



The number of monks and nuns was very great in Buenos Ayres, when compared with other portions of the Spanish dominions. They have diminished since the revolution. There was at one time a positive law passed, forbidding any one to become a monk or a nun; but they were obliged to repeal it, and it was afterwards passed with some modifications. The restrictions substituted, aided by public opinion, have nearly produced the desired effect. Few of the youth of the country apply themselves to the study of theology, since other occupations, much more tempting to their ambition, have been opened to their choice. Formerly the priesthood was the chief aim of young men of the best families, who were desirous of distinction; as, in fact, it constituted almost the only profession to which those who had received a liberal education could devote themselves; which will readily account for the circumstance of so many of the secular clergy directing their attention, at present, almost exclusively to politics. The regular clergy, who are not permitted by the nature of their profession, to take part in the business of the world, or to hold secular offices, are many of them Europeans;



but those of them who are natives, take the same lively interest in passing events, with the other classes of the community.

They have gone cautiously to work in reforms in the different branches of their municipal laws, and the administration of them. The number of offices has been considerably diminished, and responsibility rendered more direct and severe. The judiciary system has undergone many improvements, and nearly all the leading features of the law, which did not harmonize with the principles of free government, have been expunged, though some of the former evils still remain. The barbarous impositions on the aborigines have been abolished—the odious alcavala, and other obnoxious taxes, modified, so as to be no longer vexatious—slavery, and the slave trade, forbidden in future—and all titles of nobility prohibited, under the pain of loss of citizenship.—The law of primogeniture is also expunged from their system. In the provisional statute, as has already been stated, nearly all the principles of free representative government are recognized, accompanied, it is true, with certain drawbacks, for which they plead the necessity of the times, but which they profess their in-

tention to do away, on the final settlement of the government—a consummation anxiously desired by all classes of inhabitants. The example of France has warned them not to attempt too much at first; they have followed the plan of the United States in the introduction of gradual reforms, instead of resorting to violent and sudden innovations and revolutions.

Next to the establishment of their independence by arms, the education of their youth appears to be the subject of the most anxious interest. They complain that every possible impediment was thrown in the way of education previous to the revolution; that, so far from fostering public institutions for this purpose, several schools were actually prohibited in the capital, and the young men were not without restraint permitted to go abroad for their education. There was a college at Cordova, at which those destined for the bar, or the priesthood, completed their studies, upon the ancient monkish principles. Another, called San Carlos (now the Union of the South), had been opened at Buenos Ayres, but was afterwards converted into barracks for soldiers. It is an immense building, more extensive, perhaps, than any which has been dedicated to learning in this

country; and it has lately been fitted up at a very great expense. The school was to have opened in May or June last, on a more modern and liberal plan of discipline and instruction. The library of the state is kept in an adjoining building; it occupies a suite of six rooms, and contains nearly 20,000 volumes, the greater part rare and valuable. It is formed out of the library of the Jesuits, the books collected in the different monasteries, donations from individuals, and an annual appropriation by the government, and contains works on all subjects and in all the languages of the polished nations of Europe. A very valuable addition has been lately made of several thousand volumes, brought to Buenos Ayres by M. Bonpland, the companion of the celebrated Humboldt.

Besides the university of Cordova, at which there are about 150 students, there are public schools in all the principal towns, supported by their respective corporations. In Buenos Ayres, besides an academy in which are taught the higher branches, and the college before mentioned, there are eight public schools, for whose support the corporation contributes about seven thousand dollars annually; and, according to the returns of last year, the

number of scholars amounted to 864. There are five other schools exclusively for the benefit of the poor, and under the charge of the different monasteries. These are supplied with books and stationary at the public expense. There are also parish schools in the country, for the support of which a portion of the tithes has been lately set apart. It is rare to meet with a boy ten or twelve years of age, in the city of Buenos Ayres, who cannot read and write. Besides the scholars thus instructed, many have private tutors. In addition to all this, I must not omit to mention the military academies supported by government at Buenos Ayres and Tucuman, at which there are a considerable number of cadets.

There are no prohibited books of any kind ; all are permitted to circulate freely, or to be openly sold in the book stores ; among them is the New Testament in Spanish. This alone is a prodigious step towards the emancipation of their minds from prejudices. There are several book-stores, whose profits have rapidly increased ; a proof that the number of readers has augmented in the same proportion. There had been a large importation of English books, a language becoming daily more familiar to

them. Eight years ago, the mechanic art of printing was scarcely known in Buenos Ayres; at present there are three printing offices, one of them very extensive, containing four presses. The price of printing is, notwithstanding, at least three times higher than in the United States; but, as there is no trade or intercourse with Spain, all school books used in the country, some of them original, are published at Buenos Ayres; the business is, therefore, profitable and rapidly extending. There are many political essays, which, instead of being inserted in the newspapers, are published in loose sheets; there are also original pamphlets, as well as republications of foreign works. The constitutions of the United States, and of the different states, together with a very good history of our country, and many of our most important state papers, are widely circulated. The work of Dean Funes, the venerable historian of the country, comprised in three large octavo volumes, considering the infancy of the typographic art in this part of the world, may be regarded as an undertaking of some magnitude.

There are three weekly journals or newspapers published in the city, which have an extensive circulation through the United Pro-

vinces. They all advocate the principles of liberty and republican forms of government, as none other would suit the public taste. The year before last, it is true, one of the papers ventured to advocate the restoration of the Incas of Peru, with a limited monarchy, but it was badly received. No proposition for the restoration of hereditary power of any kind, as far as I could learn, will be seriously listened to for a moment by the people. Even the ordinary language has changed. They speak of "the state," "the people," "the public," "country," and use other terms, as in the United States, implying the interest that each man takes in what appertains to the community. The first principle constantly inculcated is, "that all power rightfully emanates from the people." This, and similar dogmas form a part of the education of the children, taught at the same time with their catechism. It is natural that the passion for free government should be continually increasing.

A fact may be mentioned to show the solid advancement they have made, which is, that the number of votes taken at their elections increases every year. In becoming habituated to this peaceful and orderly mode of exercising

their right of choosing those who are to be invested with authority, the tumultuous and irregular removal, by a kind of general oratory or acclamation, of those who have been chosen, will gradually cease.

Rather than disturb the order of society, they will endure with patience, until the time arrives for effecting a regular and constitutional change. Since the election of the present Director, none of these tumults, before so frequent, have occurred. These tumults have seldom been attended with bloodshed; yet they produce great confusion and disorder, and give rise to habits of insubordination, at the same time that they are ruinous to the character of a nation.

The viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres differed from the rest in one important particular. It contained no nobility, or, if any, very few. This may be regarded as a favourable circumstance in their society. Another favourable feature, very necessary to the successful administration of their affairs, is the conduct of many individuals who have filled the highest office of state, in descending from that dignified situation to inferior posts, and discharging their duties with alacrity. Thus we behold General A. Balcarce, who was formerly



Director, acting as second in command to Colonel San Martin. Colonel Alvarez, also a Director at one period, now serving in the staff under the chief of that department, General Azcuenaga, and General Rondeau, once elected to the chair of state, is at present employed in a minor office. There are others who have occupied the same elevated post, who have retired to the station of private citizens.

The general capacities of the United Provinces for national defence are also important in many respects. The nature and extent of the country afford the inhabitants numerous advantages over an invading army. The ease with which their herds of cattle may be driven to distant places, beyond the reach of an enemy, and the rapid movements which the troops of the country can make, from the ample supply of horses and mules, are circumstances of great consequence in a military view. Even the towns, not fortified, from the manner in which they are built, and from the construction of their houses, furnish powerful means of defence, as the British army, under General Whitelock, experienced in their attack on Buenos Ayres.

I am sensible that, in the course of these



statements and remarks, some inaccuracies and errors must have occurred, but they have been unintentional.

I have only to add, that the reception of the commissioners at Buenos Ayres, by the chief magistrate, was friendly and flattering. From every class they met with a cordial welcome. The people, in general, appeared to be very much attached to the American character, and to the Government and citizens of the United States.

Should any thing further occur, it shall be made the subject of a future paper.

I have the honour to be,

With great respect,

Your most obedient Servant,

(Signed) C. A. RODNEY.

MR. GRAHAM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

SIR,

*City of Washington, Nov. 5, 1818.*

Mr. Rodney having undertaken to draw up, for our joint signature, a report respecting the present situation of the country we recently visited under the orders of the President, and circumstances having prevented him from presenting it to me for perusal, until his late arrival in this city, I was not aware until then that I should have occasion to present to you my individual views on that subject. But on an attentive perusal of the paper he drew up, I found that although there was not perhaps any important fact on which we essentially differed, yet that some were stated of which I was not aware; and that we had taken views which it might be difficult to combine during the short time then allowed to us, and of which it might be proper that you should be put in possession. Under these circumstances, I thought it better to submit to the disadvantage of hastily throwing my observations together, and of presenting

them separately, than to ask him to derange the general tenour of his report by introducing them into it.

The arrival of Mr. Bland, who will necessarily make a separate report, will, I trust, reconcile the President to the course I have taken; as, from a combined view of what we individually state, he may perhaps be better enabled to draw his own inferences as to the actual situation and future prospects of the country we visited, than from any joint report in which we could all have agreed, as, under ordinary circumstances, that must have been the result of a compromise of opinions, and would probably have excluded some facts, or some views, which one or the other of us will, in the mode now adopted, present to you.

In my particular situation, however, I thought it less necessary to go into detail, as I knew that the report of Mr. Rodney would furnish information on points which I omit.

With great respect,

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

*The Hon. John Q. Adams,  
Secretary of State.*

JOHN GRAHAM.

The country formerly known as the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres, extending from the north-western sources of the river La Plata to the southern cape of America, and from the confines of Brazil and the ocean to the ridge of the Andes, may be considered that which is called "the United Provinces of South America."

Under the royal government, it was divided into the intendencies or provinces of Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, Cordova, Salta, Potosi, Plata, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Puno. Subsequently to the revolution, in the year 1814, another division was made, and from the provinces of Cordova, Salta, and Buenos Ayres, were taken those of Cuyo or Mendoza, Tucuman, Corientes, Entre Rios, and the Banda Oriental. The others, it is believed, retained their former boundaries, and, with the exception of Paraguay, are generally called "Upper Peru."

This widely extended country embraces almost every variety of climate and soil, and is capable of almost every variety of production. A large part of it, however, particularly on the west side of the river La Plata, and southerly towards Cape Horn, is deficient in wood, even

for fuel, and in water ; that which is found is generally brackish.

Although three centuries have passed by, since the Spaniards made their first settlement in this country, and some considerable towns and cities have grown in it, yet its general improvement and population have by no means kept pace with them ; for the lower provinces have been almost entirely abandoned to the immense herds of cattle which graze on their plains, and require only the partial care of a comparatively few herdsmen ; and the inhabitants of Upper Peru have been engaged more generally in the business of mining than was favourable to improvement or population. Certain small districts have peculiar advantages, are said to be well cultivated, and very productive : but agriculture has in general been very much neglected. It is, in a great degree, confined to the vicinity of the towns and cities, and may be said to limit its supplies to their demands. This state of things, combined with the regulations of the former government, the influence of climate, and the force of example, has stamped the character of indolence upon that class of society usually considered as the labouring class. The same causes have not

operated, at least with the same force, upon the other inhabitants of the country: hence they are more industrious, and more active; their manners are social, friendly, and polite. In native talents they are said to be inferior to no people; and they have given proofs that they are capable of great and persevering efforts; that they are ardently attached to their country, and warmly enlisted in the cause of its independence.

It is not necessary for me to enter into a detail of the causes which led to the revolution in 1810. The most immediate, perhaps, are to be found in the incidents connected with the two invasions of the country by the British, in the years 1805 and 1806, and in the subsequent events in Spain, as they had a direct tendency to show to these people their own strength, and the incapacity of Spain to give them protection or enforce obedience. The ground-work was, however, laid in the jealous and oppressive system adopted at a more early period by the kings of Spain, whose policy it seemed to be to keep within as narrow limits as circumstances would permit the intelligence, wealth, and population of that part of America subject to their dominion, as the surest means of pre-

servicing an empire which they considered the great source of their wealth and power.

The revolution having been auspiciously commenced in the city of Buenos Ayres, was warmly and zealously supported by the great mass of the people descended from the Spaniards ; but the native Spaniards, as well those domesticated in the country as those in the service of the king, were almost all opposed to it, particularly at the time and under the circumstances it took place. Dissensions were the immediate result, and their long standing jealousy and distrust of each other have, by subsequent events, been heightened into deadly hostility, which time alone can wear away. These dissensions have been considered as one of the causes that produced those which subsequently took place among the patriots themselves, and which have been most serious obstacles to the progress of the revolution. Other obstacles, however, have been presented by the royal government at Lima, which has hitherto not only been able to sustain itself there, but has found means, by enlisting the native Peruvians in its service, to send at different times considerable armies into the upper provinces of La Plata, where the war has been carried on from the commence-

ment of the revolution to the present day with various success ; the great extent and peculiar character of the country, and the want of resources, having prevented either party from making a blow decisive of the contest. When we came away, the advantage in that quarter was on the side of the Spaniards, as they were in possession of the provinces of Upper Peru, which had, to a certain degree at least, joined in the revolution, and some of which are represented in the Congress. Every where else they have been obliged to yield up the government and abandon the country, or submit to the ruling power. The peculiar situation of Montevideo, on the east side of the river La Plata, open to the sea, and strongly fortified, enabled the Spanish naval and military forces, at an early period in the revolution, to make a stand there ; they were ultimately obliged to surrender it ; not, however, until long-protracted, and perhaps ill-directed, efforts on the part of the assailants, had given rise to many jarring incidents between those that came from the opposite shores of the river ; probably the effect, in part at least, of ancient jealousies, kept alive by the individual interests of particular leaders ; these have been followed by events



calculated to produce a still greater alienation; and, although several attempts have been made to bring about a union, they have hitherto been unsuccessful. The provinces of the "Banda Oriental" and the "Entre Rios," on the eastern side of the river, under the direction of General Artigas, are now at war with those on the western side, under the government of the Congress at Buenos Ayres.

This war has originated from a combination of causes in which both parties have, perhaps, something to complain of, and something to blame themselves for.

General Artigas and his followers profess a belief that it is the intention of the government of Buenos Ayres to put them down, and oblige them to submit to such arrangements as will deprive them of the privileges of self-government, to which they claim to have a right. They say, however, that they are willing to unite with the people on the western side of the river; but not in such a way as will subject them to what they call the tyranny of the city of Buenos Ayres. On the other hand, it is stated that this is merely a pretext; that the real object of General Artigas, and of some of his principal officers, is to prevent a union on any

terms, and to preserve the power they have acquired, by giving an erroneous excitement to the people who follow them : that it is wished and intended to place these provinces on a footing with the others : that the respectable portion of their inhabitants are aware of this fact, and anxious for a union ; but are prevented from openly expressing their sentiments from a fear of General Artigas, whose power is uncontrolled by law or justice ; and hence the propriety and necessity of aiding them to resist it. Armies have accordingly been marched within the present year into these provinces ; but they were not joined by a number of the inhabitants, and were defeated with great loss.

This war is evidently a source of great injury and regret ; and, at the same time, of extraordinary irritation to both parties ; for, independently of other causes of recrimination, each accuses the other of having brought about that state of things which threatens to place a most important and valuable portion of their country in the hands of a foreign power, who has invaded it with a regular and well-appointed army, and is gradually taking possession of commanding points, from which it may be difficult for their united force hereafter to dislodge

them. That they will unite is, I think, to be calculated on, unless some event disastrous to the cause of the revolution itself takes place; for their mutual interest requires a union. But more of moderation and discretion may be necessary to bring it about than is at this time to be expected from the irritated feelings of some of the principal personages on both sides.

The city of Santa Fé, and a small district of country around it, also refuse to acknowledge the authority of the government of Buenos Ayres. (Note s.)

In Paraguay the events of the revolution have differed from those in any other province, as the inhabitants of that country have uniformly resisted the efforts of the other provinces to unite with them. After having aided the Spanish authorities placed over them, to repel a military force which had been sent to overthrow them, they themselves expelled from their country these authorities, and established a government of their own, totally unconnected with that of the other provinces, with whom they manifest an unwillingness to keep up even a commercial intercourse. This has given rise to a suspicion in the minds of some that there is a secret predilection among them for the ancient order of

things. But, from what is said of their cold and calculating character—from the safe position of their country, and its capacity to supply its own wants, it is probable that their object is to husband their resources, and profit by the exertions of others, without giving their own in aid of them; and possibly, in case of ultimate failure, to place their conduct in a less objectionable point of view before the government of Spain. Whatever may have been their motives, they have hitherto contrived to escape in a great measure the evils of war.

Their resources, in men and money, are said to be considerable, and no country is more independent of foreign supplies.

Their conduct furnishes a striking contrast to that of the people of Buenos Ayres, who entered into the revolution with unbounded zeal and energy, and have ever been ready to meet the difficulties of so great an undertaking. This circumstance connected with their local situation, greater resources, and more general information, and perhaps the fact of their having been the first to get power into their hands, have had the effect to give them a controlling influence over the revolutionary government, which has not failed to excite, in some

degree, the jealousy of the other provinces, and amongst themselves a feeling of superiority little calculated to allay that jealousy. Great evils were at one time apprehended from this state of things ; but the Congress which met at Tucuman, in March, 1816, composed of deputies from the several provinces then united, assumed the sovereign power of the country, boldly declared its absolute independence, and adopted a provisional form of government, which is understood to have the effect of allaying dissensions, and of introducing a more regular administration of public affairs.

It will be seen from the documents in your possession, that this provisional constitution recognizes many of the principles of free government : but with such drawbacks as are little calculated to enforce them in practice. Great allowances are doubtless to be made for the circumstances of the times, and the danger and difficulty of tearing up ancient institutions, or of adapting new principles to them. But, after due allowance for all these considerations, it did not appear to me that so much had been done for the cause of civil liberty as might have been expected, or that those in power were its strongest advocates. (Note T.) It is generally

admitted, however, that some changes for the better have been made. Much care seems to be taken to educate the rising generation, and as those who are now coming on the theatre of action have grown up since the commencement of the revolution, and have had the advantage of the light thrown in by it, it is fair to suppose that they will be better prepared to support and administer a free government than those whose habits were formed under the colonial government of Spain.

The commerce and manufactures of the country have grown beyond its agriculture. Various causes, however, have contributed to lessen some branches of manufacture since the revolution, but commerce is understood to have been increased by it. A much greater variety and quantity of foreign goods are imported, and a greater demand is opened for the productions of the country. The city of Buenos Ayres is the seat of this commerce. From it foreign and some domestic goods are spread through the interior, as far as Chili and Upper Peru; and, in return, the various productions are drawn to it. This trade is carried on principally by land, as is that between the different provinces, though some small portion of it finds

its way up and down the large rivers forming the La Plata, which is itself not so much a river as a great bay. The abundance of cattle, horses, and mules, and of some other animals peculiar to the country, which are used in the mountainous regions of Peru, furnish facilities for transportation not to be found in any other country so little improved; hence the price of transportation is very low, and the internal trade greater than it otherwise would be, though it had been materially lessened in some important branches by the war with Peru, and the system adopted in Paraguay.

The export and import trade is principally in the hands of the British, though the United States and other nations participate in it to a certain degree. It is depended on as the great source of revenue to the state; hence they have been tempted to make the duties very high, and to lay them upon both imports and exports, with the exception of lumber and military stores. This circumstance, connected with the fact that payment is demanded at the custom-house before the goods are delivered, has led to a regular system of smuggling, which is said to be carried to great excess, and doubtless occasions the official returns to fall short of



the actual amount of the trade. This may be the reason why they were not given to us. The articles imported are almost every variety of European and East India goods, principally from England; rum, sugar, coffee, tobacco, cotton, and timber from Brazil; lumber of almost every description, cod-fish, furniture, gin, and some smaller articles, from the United States, together with military stores; which, however, find their way into the country directly from Europe, and are thus furnished at a cheaper rate than we can sell them. The principal articles of export are taken from the various animals of the country, tame and wild, from the ox to the chinchilla; copper from Chili, and some of the precious metals, drawn principally from Peru; (Note v.) but as gold is worth seventeen dollars the doubloon, and passed by tale at that rate, very little of it is exported; hence the currency of the country is gold; for they have no paper money. The "Libranzas," or bills of credit, issued by the government, are, however, an article of traffic among the merchants, as they are received in payment of one half of the duties. No distinction is made in favour of the trade of any nation, save only that the British merchants have some



peculiar facilities granted them in relation to their letters, which are an object of taxation, at least so far as applies to those sent out of the country. (Note x.)

In the official statements given to us, and to which I beg leave generally to refer for information as to the foreign relations, the productions, military and naval force, revenue, and population, the latter is stated at 1,300,000, exclusive of Indians. This is understood as comprehending the population of all the provinces; but, as some of them are not under the government at Buenos Ayres, I have thought it proper to annex the several estimates I have collected of the population of each province, as they may serve to give some general information on that point. The most immediate difficulty felt by the government, whilst we were in the country, seemed to arise from the want of money: for, although the debt was small, their credit was low. It had not been found practicable to adopt a system of finance adequate to the exigencies of the times, though it would seem, from the statement given to us, that the revenue of the last year exceeded the expenses. The important events of the present year in Chili, of which you are informed, will doubtless

have the effect to raise the credit of the country, and to lessen the pressure upon it, at least for a time, and will probably leave the government more at leisure to attend to its internal affairs.

When we came away, it was understood that a committee of the congress was engaged in drafting a new constitution, the power of forming and adopting it being exclusively vested in the congress. Whether it will assume a federal or a national character, is somewhat doubtful, as there are evidently two parties in the country, whose views in this respect are very different, and it is believed that they are both represented in the congress. The one party is in favour of a consolidated or national government; the other wishes for a federal government, somewhat upon the principles of that of the United States. The probability seems to be, that, although there might be a majority of the people in the provinces generally in favour of the federal system, it would not be adopted upon the ground that it was not so well calculated as a national government to provide for the common defence, the great object now in view. The same general reason may be urged, perhaps, for giving to the latter, should it be

adopted, less of a republican character than probably would have been given to it in more quiet and peaceful times. There is danger too, as the power of forming and adopting the constitution is placed in the hands of a few, that the rights and privileges of the people may not be so well understood or attended to as they would have been had the people themselves had a more immediate agency in the affair. It is not to be doubted, however, that it will at least have a republican form, and be bottomed upon the principles of independence, which is contended for by all descriptions of politicians in the country who have taken part in the revolution, and will, it is believed, be supported by them, in any event, to the last extremity.

Their means of defence, of which they are fully aware, are, in proportion to their numbers, greater perhaps than those of almost any other people, and the duration and the events of the war have strengthened the general determination never to submit to Spain. This determination rests upon the recollection of former sufferings and deprivations; upon a conscientiousness of their ability to defend and to govern themselves; and upon a conviction that,

in case of submission on any terms, they would, sooner or later, be made to feel the vengeance of the mother country. These considerations doubtless have the most weight upon those who have taken a leading part. They, of course, use all their influence to enforce them, and thus to keep up the spirit of the revolution. In this they probably have had the less difficulty, as although the sufferings of the people have been great, particularly in military service, and in raising the contributions necessary for that service, yet the incubus of Spanish power being thrown off, and with it that train of followers who filled up almost every avenue to wealth and consequence, the higher classes have been awakened to a sense of advantages they did not before enjoy. They have seen their commerce freed from legal restraints, their articles of export become more valuable, their supplies furnished at a lower rate, and all the offices of government, or other employments, laid open to them as fair objects of competition. The lower classes have found their labour more in demand, and better paid for; and their importance in society greater than it formerly was.

They are yet, however, from their indolence, general want of education, and the great mix-

ture of "castes" among them, in a degraded state, but little felt in the affairs of the government. The stimulus now given will operate to produce a change in them for the better, and, it is to be presumed, will gradually have its effect, as their docility, intelligence, and activity, when called into service, give evidence that they are not deficient in natural or physical powers.

Labour, as it becomes more general, will become less irksome to individuals, and the gradual acquisition of property which must necessarily result from it in such a country, under a good government, will doubtless produce the happy effects there which it has uniformly produced elsewhere, and more especially in countries where the population is small when compared to the extent of territory.

I am very sensible that I may have been led into errors of fact, or inference. In that case I can plead honesty of intention, and the difficulty of collecting at a single point, and within a limited time, correct information; or of analyzing that which was collected, respecting a people in a state of revolution, who are spread over an immense country, and whose habits, institutions, and language, are so different from our own.

I have only to add, that we were politely received by the Supreme Director, who made every profession for our government, and every offer of accommodation to us, as its agents, which we had a right to expect, and that the people manifested on all occasions the most friendly dispositions.

*Estimate of the Population of the Provinces of Buenos Ayres, Cordova, Tucuman, Mendoza or Cuyo, and Salta, under the Names of the different Towns or Districts which send Representatives to the Congress.*

By an imperfect census, taken, it is believed, in 1815, Buenos Ayres contained 98,105, excluding troops and transient persons, and Indians.

		By more recent estimates,	
	Excluding Indians.	Excluding Indians.	Including Indians.
Buenos Ayres . . . . .	105,000 ..	120,000 ..	250,000
Cordova . . . . .	75,000 ..	75,000 ..	100,000
Tucuman . . . . .	45,000 ..	45,000 ..	20,000*
Santiago del Estero . . . .	45,000 ..	60,000	
Carried forward	270,000	300,000	

\* Probably the town only.

	Excluding Indians.	By more recent estimates,	
		Excluding Indians.	Including Indians.
Brought over	270,000	300,000	
Valle de Catamarca. ....	36,000 ..	40,000	
Rioja. ....	20,000 ..	20,000	
San Juan. ....	34,000 ..	34,000	
Mendoza. ....	38,000 ..	38,000	
San Luis. ....	16,000 ..	16,000	
Jujuy. ....	25,000 ..	25,000	
Salta. ....	50,000 ..	50,000	
	<u>489,000</u>	<u>523,000</u>	

## PROVINCES OF UPPER PERU.

Cochabamba. ....	100,000 ..	120,000 ..	200,000
Potosi. ....	112,000 ..	112,000 ..	250,000
Plata, or Charcas. ....	112,000 ..	112,000 ..	175,000
La Paz. ....	..	..	300,000
Puno { under the name of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. }	120,000 ..	..	150,000*
Oruro. ....	30,000† ..	..	50,000
Paraguay. ....	..	..	300,000
Banda Oriental and Entre Rios. .... }	.. 50,000		

*Note.*—It is not understood that any part of the province of Corrientes, or that of the city or district of Santa Fé, is included in this estimate; and some districts of some of the other provinces may be omitted.

\* Under the various names of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Mojos, and Chiquitos.

† Probably the town only.





# APPENDIX.

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## APPENDIX A.

*Historical Sketch of the Revolution of the United Provinces of South America, from the 25th of May, 1810, until the Opening of the National Congress, on the 25th of March, 1816, written by Dr. Gregorio Funes, and appended to his History of Buenos Ayres, Paraguay, and Tucuman.*

IT is the advice of a sage, that the history of revolutions should be written, neither so long after they have happened, that many of their events will be forgotten, nor so immediately after they have occurred, as to preclude it from being executed with the requisite impartiality. In the last case, all who read it, sitting in judgment upon it, approve or condemn according to their feelings, and in consequence it is deemed a chaos of uncertainties. We have, therefore, determined to give merely a sketch of the revolution, and to refrain from such narrative as would perhaps revive animosities which patriots wish never to see renewed.

1810.—A succession of reverses had deranged all the plans of defence adopted by Spain to resist the attacks of France. The pass of Sierra Morena being forced, the army of the enemy extended its conquests to the island of Leon. Affairs were in this desperate situation, when the timid Cisneros addressed his celebrated proclamation to the people, more for the sake of repelling the danger which menaced his authority, than of furnishing them with rules to regulate their conduct, in case of the French succeeding in their ambitious designs

against the mother country. A martyr to the suspicions, to which he had surrendered himself, as if he disdained artifice, he endeavoured to gain credit with the people for a noble sincerity, by palming upon them his statement of the utter imbecility of Spain, which they knew as well as he. In fine he descended to propose a plan of national representation, as remote from justice as from utility.

This was a conjuncture which the people of Buenos Ayres anxiously expected. The period had long passed away, when America, without any object with which to compare herself, had believed men bound implicitly to be guided by the maxims of their predecessors. The revolution of North America and the recent one of France, had revived among us a knowledge of the natural rights of man. The very regency itself, although thereby doing violence to its feelings, said to us, "that we were elevated to the dignity of freemen, that we were not like our ancestors oppressed by a yoke, rendered more galling by distance from the centre of power, viewed with distrust, and made vile by ignorance." In fine, in the re-conquest of Buenos Ayres, by expelling the English, we had made trial of our strength, and became convinced that we might now safely cast off the leading-strings of infancy. We believed that this was the time to shake off the authority of a decrepid and tyrannical mother. We were also impelled to this measure from its appearing probable that Napoleon would render permanent the government he had established in Spain.

A number of brave men \* united themselves secretly for the purpose of extirpating tyranny, and at the risk of their tranquillity, fortune, and life, formed the

\* These were Castelli, Belgrano, Chiclana, Paso, Vieytes, Pena, Darragueyra, Paso, Terrada, Tompson, Vieytes, Balcarce, Beruti-Rodriguez, Donado, Yrigoyen.

plan of this revolution. Though destitute of military force, they dared provoke a powerful viceroy; without experience, they yet lulled to sleep the vigilance of their governors; without money, they gained over many of the soldiery; without authority, they reigned in the hearts of their fellow citizens. This being the situation of things, the volcano at last burst forth; a junta of nine persons, with full powers,\* assembled on the 25th of May, 1810, agreeably to the summons of Cisneros, the viceroy. This was the first step in our revolution, a revolution effected without bloodshed, maintained by success, ardently desired by the good, and capable of producing the happiest effects.

Although the considerations we have mentioned, would have justified the declaration of independence, the capital did not proceed to this extremity; it considered, that to pass, at once, the immense interval between slavery and liberty would be a precipitate measure, and contrary to the inviolable law of nature, that improvement shall be gradual.

Besides this, although the Junta knew that the enjoyment of the social rights was an object so dear to the hearts of many Americans; they knew also, that there were among them some timid men, who, exposing themselves to universal derision, reprobated the good purchased by any other than pacific means; others, who, destitute of love of country, were strangers to the most heroic passions; and others, so unenlightened, as to deem servitude their natural and proper state.

Both for the purpose of making an experiment upon these dissimilar classes of men, and for leaving the great measure of declaring independence untried, till events should render it expedient; the capital limited itself, for the present, to the only plan sanctioned by

\* These were Colonel Saavedra, president, Castelli, Belgrano Azcuenaga, Alberti, Mateu, Larrea, Moreno, and Paso.

prudence. This was, that the provinces in the name of Ferdinand VII should assume the direction of public affairs. Every thing prompted us to this innovation: the peninsular government, its springs having lost their elasticity, appeared insufficient to secure the existence of the nation. The very provinces of Spain were, more or less, in open opposition to her authority: the orders of her government were either entirely violated or imperfectly obeyed: the monarchy was completely unhinged: the component parts of its vast body politic, were so widely dispersed, that they could have no tie capable of binding them together. The want of union rendered the nation weak; it was doubtful whether the central junta, could of itself, establish a regency; in fine, America was an integral part of the monarchy, and enjoyed equal rights with Spain.

This innovation excited greatly the feelings of the people, and gave birth to no little speculation. Men, who had submitted without a murmur to be treated as slaves, blessed the moment when, at last, they were no longer instrumental to their own sufferings. But on the other hand, interest and arrogance caused the European Spaniards to regard with displeasure the newly awakened energy of a people they had long contemned; an energy which menaced them with the deprivation of office and influence.

The *Oidores* of Buenos Ayres were the first who manifested a disgust, unbounded in itself, and leading to insubordination. The Junta excluded from the government certain individuals,\* regardless of every thing but self-interests; for them it substituted others more worthy.

The royal marine, characterized by ignorance, and

\* They were sent to the Canaries, and were Cisneros, Velazco, Reyes, Billota, Caspe, Darragueyra, Echavarria, Medrano, and Cosio, the fiscal.

obstinacy, also gave loose to selfish passions; it retired to Montevideo, endeavoured to stir up the people to insurrection; implored succours from Brazil, dispersed the army, imprisoned its chiefs, even sent them to Spain; in fine, threw all things into confusion.

The state was upon the eve of a civil war. Lima, Montevideo, Paraguay, the chiefs of Cordova, Potosi, and Charcas, prepared themselves for a bloody contest with the capital and its adherents. But their animosity excited vigilance in the government, and enthusiasm in the patriots.

To guide the people in the novel and daring career upon which they had entered, the government and the clergy furnished them with productions written with ability and with energy. To enlighten the public mind, and consequently to triumph over the errors of education, was deemed a sacred duty. The conduct of the ecclesiastics was particularly praiseworthy, since they acted in opposition to the bishops of their dioceses, more occupied with the advantages of dignities which they feared to lose, than interested for their flocks.

As the provincial chiefs, in opposition to the government, were deaf to persuasion, it determined to obtain by force for the people the enjoyment of their rights. It organized an auxiliary expedition to operate against the enemies of liberty in the interior provinces. At this very time, Concha, governor of Cordova, and the bishop Orellana, excited by the ardent Liniers, viewed the revolution as a criminal enterprise against the state, and excited the people to disobedience and to vengeance. To cure them of this frenzy, and to convince them that they were labouring for their own ruin, and that of the people, my opinion, delivered in a Junta,\* was in-

\* This Junta met at the house of the governor Concha; Liniers, Orellana, two Oidores Honorarios, Col. Allende, the Asesor Rodriguez, the Alcaldes Ordinarios, the Ministro de los Caxas, Moreno

effectual. At last, these deluded men discovered, to their cost, that they were struggling in an unknown sea, against a tempest they could not withstand. Abandoned by their own soldiers, who never heartily embraced their cause, they were taken prisoners.\*

The Junta determined to cement the revolutionary government, with the blood of those mistaken men, and thus to terrify into silence the enemies of freedom. When informed of this resolve, my surprise and grief were equally great. It was on the eve of its execution that I was informed of this determination. To avert from a cause, so far untainted by injustice, the imputation of atrocity, nay, even of sacrilege, which those accustomed to kneel before their bishops, would have deemed this act: to prevent the secession from the patriot cause of many reputable and influential families, † whose reputation and feelings, such an execution would have deeply wounded; in fine, from motives of humanity, I felt bound to urge these reasons upon Don Francisco Antonio Ocampo, and Don Hipolito Vieytes, chiefs of the expedition, and to supplicate the suspension of so odious a sentence. The impression which these reasons and others added by my brother, Don Ambrosio Funes, made upon their minds, produced the desired effect, a few hours before the time appointed for the infliction of the punishment. The government deemed this extreme moderation incompatible with the security of the state: the blockade of the capital by the royal marine from

and myself were present. Talone was in favour of the capital, my opinion may be seen in the *Gazeta de Buenos Ayres*, or in the *Periodico Espanol*.

\* Except the Oidores, and Alcaldes Ordinarios.

† Allende and Rodriguez were related to the principal families of Cordova, Liniers and Concha to the most respectable of Buenos Ayres; some of the relatives of the two last had taken part in the revolution.

Montevideo, the intrigues of the European Spaniards, ever on the alert; in fine, opinions in favour of Liniers, whispered among our troops, the companions of his dangers and his glory, compelled the government to choose, between the death of these conspirators, and the ruin of dawning liberty. Placed in this dilemma, from a sense of duty, it did violence to its feelings, and confirmed the sentence, except that part relating to the bishop. Thus died prematurely men, who in other times might have been useful citizens.\*

Among the chiefs, instigated by Concha and Liniers, the most conspicuous were Sans, governor of Potosi, and Nieto, president of Charcas. Nieto, licentious as was ever any minion of tyranny, oppressed with vexations each garrison under his command, imprisoning the soldiers in dungeons, and even condemning them to toil in bake-houses. Thus, this idiot expected to prop the tottering fabric of slavery, and to perpetuate degradation and misery. While these and other events agitated the centre of Peru, the Junta gave additional respectability to the auxiliary expedition. Castelli having resigned the command, Don Antonio Balcarce, was appointed in his stead. The victory of Suipacha put an end to the enterprises of certain rash men. The major general Cordoba, Sans, and Nieto, were shortly after put to death.

It was not so much from external obstacles, as from a weakness, common to all states in times of revolution, that our affairs were not always prosperous. It may be perceived, that we are now about to speak of intestine dissensions. When we threw off the yoke, we thought that in organizing a government, it was impossible to recede too much from the tyranny which had caused our

\* The execution took place between the Post Cabeza del Tigre, and that of Lobaton.



sufferings and our shame. A youth of talents and information, says a modern author, astonished at reading in each page of the ancients, a diary of what passed before his eyes in the late French revolution, happily thought of writing its history with passages extracted from these authors; and without any other labour, than that of citation, composed an original work. So true it is, adds he, that there are no annals, more authentic and instructive, than those of the human heart. When we attentively consider our dissensions, it appears as if Cicero, and Tacitus, and Sallust were their historians.

Governments, destitute of solid foundations, will always be the sport of accident. Scarcely had the first Junta begun to exercise its authority, when the clouds gathered and the lightnings flashed around them. One germ of discontent, not dissembled, was exclusion from a share in command of the deputies of the people, appointed to give a legal existence and form to the new political\* structure. This exclusion excited personal resentments; and those who deemed themselves injured, endeavoured to avenge themselves in the name of the public weal. The events which occurred in consequence will be narrated in the course of this sketch.

The provinces were now theatres of civil war. The Paraguayans had not yet resolved to sacrifice a tranquil slavery for a liberty precarious and *tumultuary*. The first Junta perceived that the state of that province was the consequence of fears, inspired by its governor Velasco, and felt it a sacred duty to open its eyes to its in-

\* To reunite the provinces in a congress by their representatives, was the first resolve of the capital. Circular letters having been written for this purpose by the Junta, elections were holden in the tranquil cities. In these letters it was stated, that the deputies, when elected, should be incorporated in the government. It was now the middle of December, and the deputies (of whom I was one, representing Cordova,) were not incorporated.



terest and honour. This was the object of another expedition commanded by Don Manuel Belgrano. It was at first unsuccessful; but what three bloody battles failed to win, was the fruit of a negotiation, most sagaciously conducted by the general. The Paraguayans began to be persuaded that the zeal of Velazco was refined selfishness; obedience to him, meanness of spirit; and submission to Spain contrary to the public good. The intrigues of the enemy at Montevideo, though seditious, were unimportant. The arrival there of a viceroy for Buenos Ayres inspired the hope of humbling us.— Idiots! to indulge such hope. We knew Elio, and counted upon his follies as most efficient auxiliaries. This soldier, whose motto was “boldness,” promised the Regency to convert the capital into a dungeon of slaves. It was natural that silly and extravagant expectations should be indulged by himself, and announced to his employers by a viceroy incompetent to fill the most petty office. Elio had the insolence to require the Junta to recognize him; but this body treated his demand with the contempt it deserved.

1811.—In consequence of this repulse, Elio declared the Junta rebellious and answerable for all the blood that might be shed in the contest.—His first effort was to reduce the Orientals to obedience. But these brave men taught him what daring spirits, in robust bodies, could effect. The conquest of Gualeguaichu, and the victory at Soriano, were merely preludes to actions more glorious.

Certainly the fury of Elio was far less dreadful to the state, than the internal dissensions which now convulsed it. While the Junta of deputies laboured in the performance of its duties, new plots were hatched, during a repose which was *compulsatory*, by a rival party. It was attempted, by black calumny, to abuse credulity, in order to render the deputies suspected. It was whispered

that they intended to sell their country to the Portuguese for money and office;—a base calumny\* which never would have obtained believers, were not blind deference to leaders at all times the great characteristic of party. The Junta did not yield to this persecution—but the deputies, stigmatized as traitors and tyrants, opposed no other shield against calumny, than a faithful discharge of duty.

Nevertheless they were still victims of detraction when a revolution, known as that of the 5th and 6th of April, in which the government had no share, took place. This event afforded no pleasure to the Junta.—It knew that in the ordinary course of the passions one revolution engenders others of the same kind, for when parties are once formed, interest and justice become with them convertible terms. The Junta had always been persuaded, that the true object of the revolution ought to be to secure to the people the advantages of a free government. It held the opinion, that persons in authority, if unrestrained by the jealous and unceasing attention of colleagues, invariably become corrupt;—that after being guilty of usurpations, to become despotic was necessary to insure impunity;—and that from violations of the laws to despotism, is but a step. Supported by these reasons, and the unanimous voice of the people, it introduced the government of juntas into all the provinces.

Animated by the same spirit, it introduced also *the liberty of the press*. The Junta was of opinion, that

\* In support of this calumny, a letter written by the English Captain Fleming to the government of Chili was triumphantly urged. But Lord Strangford, the British ambassador to the Prince Regent of Portugal, in his official letter of September 7 to the governor of Buenos Ayres, thus expresses himself: “I can in the most authentic manner, in the name of my court, disavow the letter of Captain Fleming.”

the time had arrived, when thought ought no longer to be imprisoned by the will of the magistrate, who, in the words of a celebrated genius, with the cord that binds it in his hand, measures and fixes the distance of its flight.

These events were succeeded by others of a different nature and importance. To excite the Orientals to resist their foe, and not to be at the mercy of the furious Elio and his rapacious followers, were the points that claimed a preference among the different objects, soliciting attention. By repeating frequently the words Sparta, Rome, Liberty, Patriotism, and by aid lavish and opportune, we had at last the consolation of interesting them in the salvation of the country. The taking of Canelones by Don Benancio Benavidez, and the victory of San Jose, gained by the troops of Don Jose Artigas, will always excite delightful feelings. But the Junta expected to gather the best fruits afterwards, from the policy of having transferred the command of the army, and sent reinforcements to Colonel Don Jose Rondeau; nor was it deceived. The towns of Minas, San Carlos, and Maldonado yielded successively to the conqueror Don Manuel Artigas; and the Orientals rising in mass invested the walls of Montevideo. Success so brilliant filled Elio with consternation, and made him deem it necessary to stop the patriots, in their prosperous career, by some great effort. Twelve hundred of his best troops, with a great train of artillery, occupied Piedras. Notwithstanding their superiority in numbers, arms, situation, and discipline, they were conquered by men, who, animated by the glory of conquering, forgot their nakedness, weariness, and all the horrors of death. The General, Don Jose Artigas, manifested on this occasion that ardour and coolness with which he inflamed or moderated the passions of his troops as circumstances required.

These victories and the removal of General Rondeau's head quarters to Mercedes, for the purpose of besieging Montevideo, filled Elio, till then over confident, with despair. He inquired of the Junta if an accommodation were possible, and offered to purchase it even with the humiliating sacrifice of his office. While the Junta was deliberating upon this proposal, it received intelligence that Paraguay had at last awakened from its lethargy, and turned against its oppressors arms placed in the hands of its sons, in order to be used against the country, thus profiting by its error. This pleasing information produced a reply to Elio, which showed him that nothing remained for him but submission.

This energetic reply lighted up anew the flame of war. Elio, hearkening only to the rage which filled his bosom, prepared to bombard the capital. Michilena, with a squadron of five ships, appeared off the harbour and informed the Junta of his hostile intent. This body, unintimidated, boldly answered in reply, "Proceed and receive practical lessons of the energy of a people, whose courage and resources are incalculable." The bombardment was executed, but with more injury to the enemy than to the capital.

It is now time to turn our eyes to the army of Peru. Hitherto it had been successful. Castelli, with 6,000 men under his command in the vicinity of the Desaguadero, expected decisive events, which would cover our arms with glory: \* but, instead of adopting measures suitable to his circumstances, he entered into useless negotiations, and obtained an armistice which Goyeneche perfidiously turned to his own advantage. Six days before it expired, the armies of the country were attacked in Guaqui and Chibiraga, points distinct and distant from each other. In the first battle the enemy was victorious;

\* As Castelli himself states in a dispatch.

in the second (at Chibiraga) neither party conquered; but the dispersion of our army left the foe master of the field of battle on the following day. Our auxiliary expedition being thus unfortunate, the enemies became masters of Upper Peru. The Junta was undismayed by their reverse of fortune. In its proclamation to the people, it reminded them that the Roman Senate, after the defeat at Cannæ, thanked the consul Varro for not despairing of the republic, and declared that it did not despair. This proclamation, circulated throughout the country, roused the people to generous exertions.

It is proper here to narrate the capture of the island of *Ratas*.—The besieging army of Montevideo was greatly in want of powder, and this island contained a quantity equal to what it required. Although the attack was extremely hazardous, it was made with sagacity and valour by Don Jose Quesada, commander of our troops, and crowned with success. He abandoned it after spiking the cannon, bringing with him twenty quintals of powder.

We had not only to contend against the Spanish troops, but also to be on our guard against foreigners, whose ambition was well known. Our revolution had early interested the policy of the Portuguese; and the court of Brazil, under the pretext of preserving, in favour of Ferdinand VII, the integrity of his dominions, desired to get possession of his South American territories, in order to secure the rights which might accrue to the Princess Carlotta. The Junta considered that if Portugal refrained from doing what both her fears and her ambition prompted, it would be a phenomenon in history. It therefore mistrusted this power, and took all the precautions prudence dictated to render Elio's demands for assistance unavailing.

The court of Brazil caused its troops to enter the territory of the state; but, before it resorted to arms,



made experiment of what it could effect by policy. Removing at last the veil that had enveloped its designs, it proposed to the Junta to purchase by voluntary submission its acknowledgment of the independence of La Plata, and its solemn engagement that, even if Ferdinand recovered the Spanish throne, it should not be again subjected to the authority of the mother country.\* The Junta considered that it would merit public hatred and vengeance, should it listen favourably to a proposal with which it could not comply without imbecility and baseness. Although, since the victory of Goyeneche, it was almost environed with foes, the Junta thought only of calling forth all the resources of the country, and when these failed, to bury itself beneath its ruins; a little less folly on the part of Elio would have placed him in a situation to open a negotiation (as he proposed) with the Junta, to have assisted and been assisted by it against the Portuguese, and to have settled satisfactorily all matters in controversy. From the various sources for bettering the situation of the country which suggested themselves to the Junta, it selected that of reforming the government. We had long experienced the evils of an unbalanced system, incapable of commanding means adequate to the ends to be effected, and destitute of the power necessary for putting in motion, and directing, the machine of government. The exclusion of the deputies from a share in the government, which we have before related, may have resulted from artifice, precipitation, or some similar cause; but it is certain, that to have admitted them all would have been incompatible with the secrecy, celerity, and vigour, without which to govern well is impossible. To obviate the inconveniences resulting from the want of these essentials, the Junta determined to create an executive power which, in

\* The Portuguese Contuchi was the agent in this negotiation.

the language of the sapient Necker, "should in the body politic represent that mysterious power which in man causes the action to correspond with the will." The consideration that when the executive authority has no just limits, the state is but a confused heap of oppressors and oppressed, induced the Junta, in order to temper it, to reserve to itself, with the title *guardian of the public rights*, the power of legislation, not however to its full extent, for it could be thus exercised only by a national congress, but merely to provide for exigencies, to restrain the operation of laws prejudicial to the state, to deliberate upon important affairs, and to calm the distrust in their governors with which growing fondness for liberty inspired the people.

With these limitations the Junta created an executive power, vested in three persons, who were Dr. Don Juan Jose Paso, Don Feliciano Chiclana, and Don Manuel Sarratea. If these new magistrates had respected the barriers that limited their power, they would have spared the capital a tumult, the deputies an affront, and their own reputations a death-wound. From a reprehensible desire of authority without the proper counterpoise, they stigmatized the regulation made by the deputies, in virtue of the power they had reserved, "as a code calculated to precipitate the country into the abyss of ruin." The deputies being made the victims of public disorder, their place in the government remained vacant. The manifestos issued in justification of this measure could easily have been refuted; but the deputies, aware that, when the feelings of the people are in a state of irritation, it is in vain to appeal to them for justice, wisely trusted their defence to events, which, they were confident, would sooner or later make apparent their innocence. They did not miscalculate: for the prosperity subsequently enjoyed by the country, under a political system very similar to the one they

proposed, has completely refuted the calumnies of their adversaries.

It is impossible, in a sketch like the present, to give a full view of the perturbed state in which this violent measure left the capital. It was divided into factions familiar with every kind of petty artifice. Bitter invectives, false relations, exaggerated fears, were employed to obtain whatever they deemed conducive to their interests. "Each party," says an intelligent observer, "strengthens itself by railing at, and calumniating, its opponents. Party zeal gives reputation to factions; and to be deemed by them a man of worth, it is sufficient to be one of them." The most despicable persons were selected for chiefs; for the absence of talent and honesty ensured impunity to their partisans. The situation of the capital was truly deplorable.

In this state of things, the sergeants, corporals, and soldiers, of the first regiment, openly mutinied and hazarded their safety, by indiscreetly attempting to prevail against their officers. The capital was converted into a field of battle. The mutineers were compelled to surrender, and eleven of their number were executed, to punish this outrage against the laws. The government did not confirm their sentence with dry eyes, but it knew that rulers invariably bring their authority into contempt by giving impunity to criminals.

Fear and trouble mingle with the very elements of unstable governments. The deputies of the people retired to their homes, after they were left at liberty to do so, by their exclusion on the 5th and 6th of April from the government. The intractable Bishop Orellana, by his hypocrisy, obtained his restoration to a chair from which his crimes excluded him. These occurrences augmented distrust and jealousy. When government adheres to a party, it makes, says a sage, the political bark to incline to one side, and accelerate a shipwreck in



which it is also lost. Yet it is true, adds he, that neutrality is not always warranted by justice, but rather by ambition, which, standing aloof from disorders, draws from them its greatest advantages.

While the bosom of the country was thus torn to pieces, the extremities were in no better condition. It is certain that, in consequence of an almost general insurrection of the Indians, the district of Paz was recovered, the city besieged, and the army of Lombrera routed: it is also true, that the brave Don Estevan Arce made himself master of Cochabamba. But notwithstanding these triumphs, the conqueror of Guaqui retained his conquest. The retreat made from Potosi by Colonel Don Juan Martin de Pueyrredon, with the remnant of the army and wealth of the country, was executed so heroically, that it deserves to be taken for a model. It is only given to intrepid spirits to make themselves respected in the hour of danger.

The Banda Oriental presented nothing which could tranquillize us. It is true, that the Portuguese, though acting with their accustomed dissimulation, had not gathered its expected fruits. Their troops had approached Montevideo, with the hope that, circumstances opening to them the gates, she would change her language even if her feelings remained unchanged. Experience showed that the projects of cabinets sometimes fail. A treaty of peace made between this city and the capital, by which it was agreed that, upon our troops raising the siege and retiring beyond the Uruguay, the Portuguese should evacuate the Banda Oriental, disconcerted all their plans. Still they did not despair. As remarkable for perfidy as we for good faith, by a scandalous invasion on their part, they renewed the war, and gave the troops of General Artigas an opportunity of showing these foes that none offended them with impunity. It was evident, that to obtain Montevideo

video was the object of the Portuguese. Their seductive influence induced her to break the treaty and renew the blockade of the capital.

It is only the pusillanimous that are disheartened by danger. *Men* count the number of their efforts by their reverses. Fortune enters into their calculations in doubtful cases, but they rely solely on virtue. The government, convinced that victory is not essential, and that brave men when reduced to the greatest straits are most efficient, undismayed, strained every nerve to save us. The scarcity of money was supplied by a confiscation of enemy's property, and an annual contribution of six hundred and thirty eight thousand dollars; a general staff was created; a methodical plan furnished for reforming the army; subordination was better established, the liberty of the press confirmed, the army of Peru reinforced, and additional troops opposed to the coalition of our enemies.

While these measures were adopting a new occurrence relighted the torch of discord in the capital. By a regulation of the executive power, an assembly to meet at stated periods was organized, for the object of deliberating, during a session positively limited to eight days, upon great state affairs, and of electing every six months a successor to the chief of the government, whose term of service expired. As love of liberty had generated inquietude and distrust, it was difficult to take any step without interrupting tranquillity. Don Juan Martin Puerreydon was elected. The assembly considered that it could not without imbecility refrain from assuming supremacy over the general government and all the provinces of the union. This was stigmatized by the executive as an excess subversive of the law which gave this body being. The assembly urged that the law cited against them was the work of force; force

terminated the contest, the assembly was dissolved, and the citizens became still more disunited.

Discord, the tendency of which is to subvert all authority, debilitates the state. But this does not happen when it is awakened by love of liberty. Nothing is more natural than that the people should observe with fear the hand which governs them, but it is a fear neither enervating their courage, nor weakening their understanding. The confusion into which General Arce, after the rout at Astete, and General Artigas, after a victory over a division of Portuguese, put the Generals Goyeneche and Sousa, ought to have made them know, that attempts against liberty are always vain. The court of Brazil, convinced of this truth, perceived that it would be best for it to be upon terms of amity with us. It therefore, by its plenipotentiary, Don Juan de Rademaker, submitted proposals to us, to which, under the guarantee of Great Britain, we acceded.

Although Goyeneche, in Upper Peru, was filled with grief by the desertion of his troops, and other repeated misfortunes, pride would not permit him to abandon his conquest. Thus circumstanced, availing himself of our retreat to Tucuman, from the right bank of the river Suipacha, he resolved to attempt the conquest of Cochabamba. With the greatest and best part of his troops, he marched, routed general Arce, and approached the city. Antezana, president of its junta, perceiving himself without resources, offered submission, and implored the clemency of the conqueror. This proceeding, though prudent, was viewed with extreme disgust by a magnanimous people, who had acquired so much glory. Although destitute of solid support, they preferred the horrors of war to the advantages of a humiliating peace, and commenced an irregular fight,

in which the women\* mixed with the men. The contest was very unequal: after some resistance, they yielded with considerable loss. This gallantry was sufficient to incite Goyeneche to the most base and cruel vengeance. The town was delivered up to plunder for three hours, which afforded opportunity for the commission of every sort of crime. That the soldiers should have been guilty of monstrous excess, is not surprising, since Goyeneche† himself incited them by his example. It is a fact, well authenticated, that, entering with one half of his cavalry the gate of the principal church, the sacrament being exposed, he killed, with a stroke of his sword, the Fiscal Lopez Andreu, who presented it trembling with terror.

He then pursued boldly the several precedents of tyrants: by banishments, confiscations, and executions, this homicide rivalled Nero in infamy. In the places subjected to his yoke, a gesture, a clouded visage, an indiscreet word, a tear stealing down the cheek, was a crime of state. It may be remembered, that eleven of the dispersed soldiers of General Arce were sacrificed to his vengeance at Chuquisaca. It was necessary for the timid to be encompassed by men like themselves, that they might not encounter, on whichever side they turned, this head of Medusa which froze the heart. But, in general, he failed to obtain the expected fruit from his barbarous policy. He inspired more hatred

\* To commemorate the heroism of these families, and as an incitement to patriotism, an *ayudante* in each corps of the army of Peru, at roll-calling in the evening, calls out the women of Cochabamba, as if they ought to be present, and a sergeant replies, they died in the field of honour.

† By the express orders of Goyeneche, the monastery of Santa Clara was not plundered, because he knew that the most valuable property of the town was there deposited, and wished to appropriate it to his own use.

than terror. On all sides his troops were attacked with fury.

While we are drawing near the moment, when the arms of the country achieved more important victories over the enemy, let us notice other successes, more nearly relating to the capital.

The measures of the Portuguese we last mentioned, and the obstinate resistance of Montevideo, induced the government to send Don Manuel Sarratea to the other side of the river, as its representative and general. The primary object of this mission, was to renew the siege of Montevideo, and to set limits to extravagant pride. The success of this undertaking depended upon the co-operation of the eastern with the western troops. But the appointment of Sarratea was not approved by General Artigas, and his jealousy impeded the execution of this project. At last, after some opposition from Agui and Salto Chico, the union, which should ever subsist between the several members of the same state, was in fact obtained. Some troops joined the army, though slowly, and bodies of men were stationed in the vicinity of Montevideo, by General Rondeau. The Governor, Vigodet, perceived that this new siege was about to produce inevitable misfortune. Knowing that all our forces had not united, he formed the design of surprising our camp, and executed it with vivacity, at the head of two thousand men. In this history are recorded few days more glorious than the 31st of December, 1812, in which our General, his subalterns, Soler, Ortiguera, Quintana, Escalada, and other officers, manifested a valour and intelligence worthy our cause. Their efforts turned the audacity of the enemy into cowardice. Being very roughly handled, the foe retreated, leaving dead on the field of battle Major-general Mueas, with many officers and soldiers. Many prisoners were taken.

It was decreed that our freedom should be purchased with blood and with danger. The rejoicings for this victory were mingled with astonishment at the discovery of a most atrocious plot. A considerable number of European Spaniards, resident in Buenos Ayres, had confederated to cover it with slaughter and mourning. These perfidious associates held their treasonable meetings in profound secrecy, and adjusted a plan so inhuman, that posterity will be unable to read the account of it without shuddering. The members of the government, the magistrates, the most zealous Americans, and even European Spaniards, friendly to independence, were to be beheaded on the scaffold. Those who escaped from the carnage were to be banished from their habitations, to make room for Spaniards from the interior. The provinces, these assassins expected, would speedily be subjugated to their authority. Martin de Alzaga, a man formed by nature for crimes of this sort, had the direction and execution of this atrocious conspiracy confided to him. For the sake of humanity, the tutelar genius of the country defeated the plan of these conspirators. At the very instant they were issuing forth to commence the work of desolation, they were discovered and arrested sword in hand. When this affair became public, indignation could be read in every countenance. By the assistance of the citizens, the principal criminals were apprehended. The government, subjecting these disturbers of the public peace to the utmost rigour of the law, inflicted on them the punishment they designed for others.

While we were rejoicing at our escape from so atrocious a plot, we were still apprehensive of being assailed by an army, which, considering our weakness as part of its strength, menaced us from Jujuy and Salta. Three thousand men, with three pieces of artillery, commanded by General Don Pio de Tristan, a native of



Arequipa, and second in command of Goyeneche, fell upon our army of Tucuman, amounting to only sixteen hundred soldiers, the greatest part of whom heard in this battle for the first time the whizzing of balls. Only the most daring could hope for victory. General Belgrano, who united the most insinuating sweetness of manners, with the most rigid justice, possessing the art of penetrating the designs of the enemy, and concealing his own, at the head of a patriotic band of the vicinity, decided the fortune of the day. Colonel Don Ramon Balcarce also signalized himself; where the battle most raged, there was he to be found. The other officers also entitled themselves to their country's gratitude. As if they had not been humbled in the action of the 24th of September, the enemy offered us a new insult on the following day. Conquered as they were, without artillery, munitions, or baggage, they dared demand the surrender of a town to which the infantry had retired with part of the cavalry. The Major-general Don Eustoquio Diaz Velez, who commanded there, was one of those men who live only for their country. His energetic reply put to flight the hope which the enemies were silly enough to indulge, and forced them to a disorderly and shameful retreat.

The news of this memorable victory reached the capital, when it was convulsed by a new commotion. The spirit of party we have so much lamented, on every change in the government produced some disturbance. In this state of things, says an elegant observer, no one grasped the command but an adventurer, destined to fall by reason of his very elevation. To give a successor to the chief of the government, whose term of service expired, the assembly met and chose Dr. Don Pedro Medrano—a popular commotion ensued. The consistorial assembly re-assumed the authorities of the people—a new government was appointed, composed of

the citizens Don Juan Jose Paso, Don Nicholas Peña, and Don Antonio Albares Jonte, and was recognized.

Power is a mere nullity, if those who ought to obey it think that in all cases they have a right to sit in judgment upon what it commands. This was the situation of the state. Instead of having recourse to the energetic measures necessary to support governments, the new government weakly resorted to decrying the one which had been subverted, and to the promise of great advantages from the subsisting one. It believed that a general assembly with unlimited powers was indispensably necessary to give constitutional existence to the state, and accordingly one was summoned.

This step being taken, it turned its attention to the internal and external security of the state. The European Spaniards had not taken warning from the exemplary chastisements we had inflicted upon them. More obstinate than ever, they confederated again for our destruction; the conspiracy was discovered, five of the traitors were executed, and their bodies exposed to public view, as a salutary warning to rash men.

1813.—This desperate plot originated in a criminal combination between the Spaniards resident in Buenos Ayres and Montevideo, who, terrified by the siege of the last mentioned place and goaded by pride, upon Don Manuel Sarratea's withdrawing from the command, brought to its height that quarrel, which, being the empoisoned source of a thousand evils, prevented the complete re-union of the Oriental troops with the besieging army. The besieged, who always retained the hope of profiting by our discord, were filled with consternation by the defeat of this conspiracy. Ever obstinate, they repeated their sallies, but the besiegers, headed by Soler, Villarino, Terrada, Cruz, Ortiguena, and French, repelled them all.

The possession of Montevideo was important to the



Spaniards, in prosecuting their scheme of subjugating us. Availing themselves of their marine they infested our coasts, and endeavoured to recover, by brutal inroads, the reputation they had lost in regular campaigns. With the confidence their superiority inspired, they landed 250 men in the vicinity of San Lorenzo. They speedily perceived that they had landed only to augment their misfortunes. Attacked by a force as inferior in numbers, as superior to them in bravery, by General San Martin, who, contemning death, knew how to win the favours of inconstant fortune, they were completely routed.

This victory was soon followed by that gained by the arms of the country, over the army of Tristan. This General, fortified in the city of Salta, perhaps hoped to repair his past misfortunes by future success in his criminal designs against his country. The conqueror of Tucuman sought him there with his army, filled with the enthusiasm liberty inspires. The signal for battle was given, and it continued for three hours and a half. The combatants availing themselves of all that genius, science, valour, nay even desperation, could supply; victory at last declared in our favour. In the heat of the fight, Major-general Diez Velez was severely wounded; but not prizing so much a prolongation of his days, as to risk for it the loss of the battle, he concealed his wound, and remained on the field until, his strength entirely failing him, he was forced to retire. In this action General Don Martin Rodriguez and the *Commandantes de division*, Dorrego, Saperi, Pico, Forest. Alvarez, Pedriel, Zelaga, Balcarce, Rodriguez, Arivalo, &c. were much distinguished. General Belgrano, being strongly urged by Tristan and his troops to set them at liberty, complied. This General, doubtless, thought it would be glorious to give freedom to men who had endeavoured to enslave us, and that it would

be impolitic to let slip an opportunity of conquering by clemency the hearts of those whose bodies his brave troops had by force subdued. For this and other generous acts, they made a base return. Freed from captivity, they employed, in seducing the people, the time they ought to have devoted to proclaiming our generosity, and manifesting their gratitude.

After the victory of Salta, the tyrant Goyeneche fled precipitately to Oruro, thus relieving from suffering Potosi, Charcas, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and other places. The fear this defeat inspired, caused him to supplicate General Belgrano for an armistice. The moderation of this officer, which no success could affect, induced him to grant it, but the perfidy of Goyeneche soon frustrated it.

Our country was now advancing by rapid strides to independence. We were led to think so from these victories, and principally because the national assembly was organized, and commenced its session on the 31st of January, 1813. This body thought it a glaring inconsistency for the nation to make such sacrifices for liberty, and still to shelter slavery in its bosom. The situation of the country not permitting this evil to be corrected at once, this assembly decreed, that from the day of its creation, all children of slaves should be born free; thus in part repairing the injury committed against nature, and immortalizing its birth day.

It did itself no less honour by the abolition of *tribute* and *mita*, which were odious permissions to commit every species of crime, and the abolition of which had been decreed in 1811. These beneficent measures were no less politic than just. The Indians, whose services we needed, were thus conciliated.

The celebrated victory of Salta filled with surprise the Viceroy of Lima, and made him resort to the usual measures of alarmed despotism. The General Pezuela

assumed the command of the army of Goyeneche, which, with a reinforcement, took up its head quarters at Oruro. Pezuela undoubtedly possessed military talents far superior to those of Goyeneche; and if towns which had sworn to be free could have been subdued, he would have achieved the odious victory.

All measures preparatory to a battle between the opposing armies were taken. The victory gained, and the flame kindled by the spark of liberty in all parts, not even excepting Lima, presaged a happy issue to the patriots. But, perhaps, to give us lessons of moderation and prudence, the Almighty decreed that we should lose the battles of Vilcapugio and Hayouma. Upper Peru was thus snatched from our hands. Pezuela extended his conquests even to Jujuy and Salta, and the remnant of our army took shelter in its former place of refuge, Tucuman.

But this imprudent contest could not impede nature in her course. Our good fortune was the offspring of reverses, which corrected our inexperience. From this fatal moment, a new enthusiasm for the country, and a new order of things gradually established, produced the happiest effects. The Cochabambinos, full of the fury desperation inspires, retired to Valle-Grande. Although by one of the reverses incident to warfare, the victory of Florida, gained over a body of 1000 men by General Warnes, in conjunction with his *crucenos*, checked the daring march of our forces, the flame was rapidly communicated. The same Warnes marched to Chiquitos, where he shut himself up with the royal troops. General Camargo defended himself in Chayanta, destroyed several detached parties, and preserved the province from the detested yoke.—Padilla established his head quarters at Yamparacuz, routed Tacon in many encounters, and changed the aspect of the enemy's affairs. The Indians made great exertions to prevent the yoke from which

they had escaped being again imposed upon them, and tasted the pure pleasures of liberty.

After garrisoning several places in Peru, Pezuela brought a force equal to what he left there, to Jujuy and Salta. Parties of the inhabitants under the orders of the Captain Seravia, and of the advance under their *Commandante* Guemez, after the droves of horses and provisions had been withdrawn to places inaccessible to the enemy, attacked them whenever they moved, and wherever they were posted. Those of the enemy, who imprudently left the main body of their forces, were instantly made prisoners by our parties. Never was partizan warfare better conducted, and more successful. General Pezuela saw with bitterness his laurels wither; and, to escape the ruin with which a half-starved army menaced him, retreated, first, to his ancient posts, and thence, filled with apprehension, retired to Peru to succour there the terrified royalists.

He misled some patriots by blandishments, places, and promises, but always distrusting them, kept them in subaltern stations, although the importance of their services entitled them to the first offices. One of these, Don Saturnino Castro, a native of Salta, whose efforts had cost his country dear, felt his indignation redoubled, when he cast his eyes upon his scars, and, impelled by wounded self-love, hearkened to the salutary councils of reason. In this state of mind, he determined to avenge his country and himself, by a plot against the oppressors. It was discovered, he was arrested, and condemned to death.

Pezuela was unnecessarily cruel and vindictive. Enthusiasm for the country daily gained ground. The city of Cuzco at last broke its chains, and new Peruvian heroes espoused the cause. Pinelo, the *presbitero*, Dr. Munecas, the king's brigadier, Pumakagua, and Angulo, joined the patriots, and caused an almost general

revolution in public opinion. The two first triumphed at La Paz; but their lives and those of their troops were more endangered after the victory, than during the battle. The enthusiastic Spaniards conceived the project of burying them under the ruins of their laurels. These barbarians had familiarized themselves with every species of crime. They poisoned the springs, and formed two mines, for the destruction of the patriots. Their foresight was not sufficient to apprise them of the horrors that environed them. One of these mines exploded, and the death of a hundred and fifty persons (some say three hundred) was the melancholy result of this treachery. The people who could only think of taking vengeance for this last and worst of their atrocities, put to the sword all the Spaniards, with their Governor Valdehoyos. In recompence for the risks they had incurred, these brave men deserved to be the arbiters of their fortune. But fortune is by nature a coquette, who denies her favours when most needed. Pinelo and Munechas left La Paz, and uniting at the Desaguadero, formed a body of 800 men, with which they opposed the troops of Pezuela, who marched in pursuit of them; battle was given, and the enemy was victorious, by reason of superiority of numbers.

The Indian Pumakagua marched upon Arequipa, that noble city, which, stifling its feelings, was enslaved. With manly courage, he quickly engaged an army of more than a thousand men, routed it, took prisoners its chief Picoaga, the Governor Moscozo, and Lavalle, who, being conducted to Cuzco, were put to death. More than two hundred Spaniards were sacrificed to a just indignation. The victor was compelled to march to Cuzco, by the defeat of Pinelo and Muncas. Ramirez, a name that will be eternally infamous, pursued the patriots furiously. The retreat of Pumakagua left the passage

to Arequipa open to the royalists, and afforded an opportunity to repeat the enormities perpetrated at La Paz.

Another of the Angulos had displayed his energy at Guamanga, routing 400 *talaverinos* detached by the Viceroy of Lima; but the capture of Arequipa by Ramirez called his attention to Cuzco. This great city was a prey to disorder. Nothing could support its wretched existence. There the three Angulos were beheaded, and their heads carried upon a pike to Sicuani.

A reform of the government, reducing it to a single director of the state, in the person of the citizen Don Gervasio Posadas, placed in the capital great obstacles to the vibrations of the passions. Titus Livius observes, that Rome would have perished, if from a premature love of liberty, it had in its infancy abolished regal power. The public authority was strengthened by the politic measure of trusting the affairs of the state to the activity of a single individual.

Our Oriental army rendered itself more respectable, by a stroke which proved its vigilance and its firmness. The Spaniards of Montevideo, losing the hope of advancing their cause by open warfare, had recourse to assassination. A conspiracy of their agents was discovered in our camp, and the traitors sacrificed to the public security.

1814.—But this fortunate discovery did not free the state from all peril; for in its bosom a storm was brewing, and ready to burst. General Artigas, that singular man, who united to extreme sensibility the appearance of coldness; a most insinuating urbanity to decent gravity; a daring frankness to courtesy; an exalted patriotism to a fidelity at times suspicious; the language of peace to a native inclination to discord; in fine, a lively love of independence to most extravagant notions as to the mode of achieving it; this man, we say, disgusted



with the government, because it bestowed rewards upon those whom he expected to see chastised, had already sowed the seeds of civil war among the troops. His great ascendancy over the Orientals compelled them either to seek his friendship, or to tremble at his enmity. Those citizens who loved order laboured, with zeal and dexterity, to extinguish a flame threatening ruin to the state. This end appeared to be obtained by an Oriental Congress, which General Rondeau convened, in the name of the government, for the purpose of nominating deputies for a national congress, and appointing a provincial governor. All was on the eve of being realized, when General Artigas, as chief of the Orientals, commanded, in the name of the same government, that the electors should present themselves at his headquarters in order to receive instructions from him. This proceeding, so strongly savouring of despotism, offended every one. The electors assembled in the chapel of Maciel, and fulfilled their trust. General Artigas, then discovering his real disposition, annulled the Congress, thus assuming absolute power; but this daring measure had no effect upon what that body had done. The selection of deputies, and a governor, was celebrated in all the encampments, and the last named officer began to exercise his functions. General Artigas, viewing these measures with a lively but dissembled hatred, prepared to avenge himself. Under various pretexts he withdrew his men, and at last, in the garb of a countryman, deserted his post, thus leaving exposed the right of our line. This rash proceeding made it apparent, that he preferred his own interests to those of his country. But many officers, and others of the Orientals, did not follow this pernicious example.

It is not easy to conceive the terrible confusion into which this event threw the besiegers. Three times orders were given to raise the siege, and as often they



were revoked, so great were the evils on each side. At last the encampments were abandoned with incalculable loss, and unutterable grief. The enemy, upon discovering this, were filled with surprise, though they did not abandon themselves to immoderate joy, because they feared it might be a feint; but the people less cautious, hurried away by the desire to breathe fresh air, went in crowds without the walls. From proper foresight, the redoubts of our advanced parties had not been abandoned; French, officer of the day, ordered a most unexpected discharge of cannon, which made the enemy attribute to stratagem what resulted, in truth, from our weakness. The terror this created in the city prevented sallies being made.

This advantage, combined with the lucky arrival, on the same day, of supplies, and the consolatory information that a small squadron was equipping to transport a reinforcement, changed the appearance of things. The public mind was tranquillized; the fugitives returned in parties; the people of the vicinity tendered their assistance, and General Rondeau knew how to profit by these inestimable advantages; the siege was renewed more efficiently than it ever had been.

The Director, Posadas, viewed the desertion of Gen. Artigas with a hatred carried beyond the bounds of prudence. Taking counsel from his anger, he thought that justice should take its course. By a solemn decree, he declared him infamous, deprived of his offices, and an outlaw, and incited the people to pursue him as a duty they owed the country; in fine, believing that he could extinguish rebellion in the blood of the rebel chief, he set a price upon his head, offering 6,000 dollars to whomsoever would bring him in, alive or dead. Experience has shown, that moderation would have been far wiser than this violence. The Director took a wrong course; whether Artigas was as guilty as he thought him, the reader

can decide. But even if he was so, what other effect could impotent rigour produce, than contempt of authority, and obstinacy in the delinquent? Even this was not all. The Orientals had enthroned Artigas in their hearts: as that which is abhorred is deemed always to be in the wrong, the very proofs upon which the Director founded his decree were, with the partisans of Artigas, so many evidences of his innocence. This proscription became that of a vast district, and reconciliation almost impossible. God grant that we may not see this sad truth perpetuated.

The army of the capital, and the naval force of the country, were at this time considerably augmented. The troops demanded to be led to battle; the fleet were eager to dispute with the enemy the command of the river. In short, the fortune of war gave us decisive successes. Two men, with all the talents required for the ends for which they were destined, the Secretary Larea, and Colonel Alvear, being substituted for Gen. Rondeau, concerted the capture of Montevideo, and all obstacles yielded to their activity, and the accuracy of their calculations. A naval battle, in which Brown commanded our ships, and defeated the Spaniards, who were stronger in vessels than we, made us masters of the port. To give the finishing stroke to their misfortunes, Montevideo shortly after yielded, notwithstanding a criminal correspondence between Vigodet and the patriot Otorquez. Thus was despotism deprived of its strong hold.

Our Peruvian army was now commanded by General Rondeau, who, having sustained with credit the siege of Montevideo, had not the glory of triumphing over it. The government transferred the command of this army from him to the conqueror of Montevideo. It is certain that Alvear united all the qualities of a warrior, and possessed a military experience which he owed more to genius than to years. But this change of command was

viewed by the chief of this army, as the result of a policy without forethought, and the evidence of an ambition without limit. Something further contributed to render it odious, and this was the alarming suspicion that the country was about to be shamefully betrayed by treachery. This suspicion was countenanced by the anticipated mission of Don Ventura Vasquez, confidential officer of the government, to place in the hands of Pezuela certain letters; his exclusive nomination to treat with this enemy; the sending commissioners to the Spanish court; and the appointment of new officers in this army. The public mind was thus distracted with doubts and apprehensions, when General Rondeau abdicated the command; notwithstanding which his subalterns coalesced, the regiments confederated, and Alvear was not admitted.

This event was foreseen: a general disgust portended and precipitated it. It has often happened that people have refused to submit to despotism, and not known how to use liberty. The General, thus rejected by the army, returned to the capital, and was created Director. This impolitic act challenged hatred, where there was already sufficient motive for vengeance.

This election caused an almost universal murmur, which presaged important commotions. The reasons assigned in justification of this dissatisfaction were, that as the army of Peru could not obey, as supreme Director, one whom they had refused to recognize as their chief, all the terrible effects of anarchy were about to be experienced; that the capital and other parts of the country felt too much animosity against the party to which the Director owed his elevation, to recognize him without discontent; and that under protection of the army of Peru and General Artigas, they might dissolve an assembly disgraced by intrigue, in their opinion, and prostrate an idol, to which the tongue paid homage,

which the heart disavowed: in fine, that the recollection of those acts, by which the provinces deemed themselves outraged, might induce them to push resentment further than they ought.

These apprehensions were, in a great measure, realized. The army of Peru refused obedience to the new Director. Cordova, listening more to anger than to prudence, preferred danger to ignominy, and withdrew from its connexion with the capital. Santa Fé, counting more upon its courage than strength, adhered to the system of independence it had adopted, since the troops of Artigas had invaded it.

The situation of the army of Peru was critical and dangerous. The anxiety which began to prevail as to the consequences of these dissensions; desertion veiled under the shadow of a new government; succours withdrawn; in fine, the unfortunate action of Tejar; multiplied cares, and alarmed the imagination. Nevertheless, General Rondeau did not lose his natural equanimity. He knew how to make the discontented hearken to reason, and to give a favourable beginning to an enterprise. Putting his army in motion, he opened an entrance into Peru, by the victories of Puesto Grande and Mochara.

1815.—The new Director perceived the cloud that had gathered over his head, and hastened to use all expedients in his power to avert it. Convinced that hope and fear are the great exciting principles of human actions, he endeavoured to operate upon the first by rewards, upon the other by chastisements. These instruments failed in his hands. The tragical death of the unfortunate Ubeda, on one of the most solemn days of worship, caused less terror than indignation; and the triumph over the Cabildo of the capital, by compelling it to subscribe an odious proclamation against General Artigas, served only to make it resolve to prolong its existence in spite of this usage.

On the eve of a political disorganization, the Director marched the veteran troops to subject the towns to a detested yoke. But the chief of the vanguard, Don Ignacio Alvarez, with 350 men under his command, ashamed of being the instrument of his exaltation and vengeance, declared in favour of those he was sent to attack, and arrested the suspected officers, among whom was General Viana, who came to take the command. He encamped, and was joined by several detachments from Mendoza. The Director, surrounded in his encampment, put into play whatever could contribute to save him in so critical a situation, but in vain; for fortune had determined to put an end to his glory and prosperity. The Cabildo of Buenos Ayres, instructed by Alvarez, and called by general acclamation to the command, assumed it. The civicos, with many officers of distinction, rallied round it, as its protectors. So many obstacles filled the Director with despair. At last he yielded, and, cast out of his country, was forced to beg an asylum in a foreign land. This cable being broken, the national assembly, with its system of favouritism and speculation, was involved in ruin. All, even the Orientals, irreconcilable enemies of the capital, applauded a success which appeared to be the beginning of order.

In order to give a successor to the deposed Director, a body of electors was constituted, who chose General Rondeau chief of the army of Peru, and named as his deputy, Colonel Alvarez, who took the lead in the recent subversion of Alvear's authority.

His election would not have secured the public tranquillity, if the causes which disturbed it had not been removed. It was perceived that, heretofore, the executive, availing itself of the distractions or patience of the people, had gradually rendered itself absolute. Reason required that this power should be balanced by another; therefore a *provisional statute* was formed, and

a junta of observation erected, *to watch the punctual fulfilment of this law, to protest against the least infraction, and to resist every thing prejudicial to the general good.* It was to be regretted that this statute gave more liberty than was compatible with the public good; but we had just escaped from one of those cruel situations, in which the excesses of oppression prevent us from seeing those of its relief. A system of distrust and restriction made authority a mere political skeleton: we shall see the disorders which arose in consequence.

One of the earliest advantages, expected to result from this new order of things, was the re-establishment of that fraternal union with the Orientals, the rupture of which had cost the country so many tears. The Cabildo of Buenos Ayres, regarding with indignation the proclamation Alvear had extorted from them, commanded it to be burned by the common executioner, in the Plaza de Victoria. The government also substituted moderation for the ancient system; and if the Orientals, with their chief, had been capable of perceiving the greatest enemy of the country and themselves to be anarchy, doubtless a reconciliation would have been effected. But experience has shown that they had determined to bury themselves in an abyss of evils rather than yield. Without doubt, too, General Artigas believed that a calm would diminish the authority with which he had been invested in tempestuous times.

The government, fearful of seeing civil war propagated in the centre of the neighbouring provinces, marched troops to Santa Fé, under the command of Don Juan Jose Viamont. This city was a key with which General Artigas opened at pleasure the door to his seditious communications. In order to remove the distrust, and to prevent the opposition of those in the vicinity of this city, the Deputy Director promised them perfect liberty, and engaged that the troops should not



meddle with their domestic affairs. The death of the Governor, Candioti, produced much disorder. Contradictory pretensions, well or ill founded, acrimonious debates, stratagems inseparable from party, all attended the selection of the Lieutenant-governor, Don Juan Francisco Tarragona. The city of Santa Fé was much incensed at this appointment. What resulted from it will be seen.

Grieved at the melancholy posture of affairs in this section of the country, we were consoled by pleasing prospects in Peru: we will give briefly the principal heads of General Rondeau's dispatches. Pezuela, filled with consternation, abandoned his positions, and retreated to the neighbourhood of Oruro. The desertion of his soldiers, and the difficulty of subsisting those that remained announced his weakness. Our troops improved in numbers, in arms, and discipline; the insurrection of La Costa by Penaranda and Reyes; the approach of Dr. Muncas; the state of fermentation in which all the provinces were; the aids on their march from the capital; all indicated a prosperous warfare.

It was necessary that the fortune of arms should be sometimes inconstant as a game of chance, to give the melancholy shading of misfortune to this picture. Our reverses commenced with the battle of Venta and Media, where a party of the enemy, attacking Brigadier Rodriguez, were most unexpectedly successful. This event seemed to give its character and colour to the succeeding ones. The active Pezuela fell upon our army with the rapidity of lightning. To avoid the encounter, General Rondeau removed his camp to a rocky situation, remote from Cochabamba. Here the enemy sought him, filled with the boldness which success inspires. Battle being inevitable, Rondeau took post at Sipesipi, forming a camp according to military rules: hostilities commenced. The enemy would not have had much



cause for boasting, if fortune, which a general cannot command, had not favoured his cause. His left wing outflanked, his right wing almost routed, his centre almost destroyed by our artillery—such, said Rondeau, was the state of the battle, when a series of inauspicious occurrences gave the victory to the foe, and deprived us of glory and of hope.

The victory of Sipesipi, by turning the brain of Pezuela, advanced the cause of liberty. Our situation was not so disastrous as that of the United Provinces of Holland, when they caused themselves to be represented under the image of a ship, without sails and without rudder, at the mercy of the waves, with this Latin inscription, *Incertum quo fata ferant*. General Rondeau placed his head-quarters at Tupiza with the remnant of his army, and endeavoured to reorganize it. Our government, as if foreseeing the unfortunate issue of the battle, had sent forward troops, arms, and munitions, nor were the towns of the union, at this distressful period, backward in extending assistance. The brave Camargo, La Medria, Padilla, Warnes, and Muncas, by rapid incursions, showed that the cause of liberty would prevail in spite of our misfortunes.

The accession of strength our cause seemed to gain even by reverses, ought to have made Pezuela see that his hopes of re-establishing despotism were chimerical, but he still cherished the delusion. He displayed his inhumanity by atrocious violations of the rights of his prisoners, appearing to think, that to become a rebel was to cease to be a man, and to forfeit all claims to justice and to compassion. Even that sex,\* regarded

\* Among many others, Dona Antonia Paredez, Dona Justa Varela, Dona Felipa Barrientes, ladies of the age of nineteen—Dona Teresa Bustos, the two sisters Malarias, and Dona Barbara Cevallos, were imprisoned—Dona Teresa perished in prison—Dona Barbara

with some respect by the most abandoned, was not exempt from his rage. Many women, among whom were the most circumspect matrons, were banished, or immured in dungeons.

The dangers which menaced the political existence of the country demanded an executive sufficiently energetic to maintain order, and to triumph over the enemy. Unfortunately the provisional statute had too much curtailed the executive power. It was embarrassed by so many restrictions, as to be prevented often from availing itself of circumstances upon which success depends, and which must be seized the instant they present themselves, or the opportunity is for ever lost. In a situation so critical, the *ad interim* Director appealed to the sovereign people, and asked for a reform of the constitution. The capital, always docile and provident when not misled by designing men, actuated by that prudence which dictates pacific measures, approved the proposed change, and, by direct vote, appointed reformers of the constitution.

One of the most urgent objects which claimed the attention of government was the city of Santa Fé. The disgust with which this city saw itself governed by a Lieutenant-governor whom it abhorred, the exile of many reputable citizens, the suggestions of the Oriental chief, all conducted to some violent measure. The inhabitants rising in mass under the citizen Don Mariano Vera, and aided by the troops of Baxada, civil war commenced. General Viamont was attacked by the disaffected, with all the fury that marks insurrections, and, after bloody contests, capitulated. We know not why the capitulation was not fulfilled. Cordoba adhered to its system of independence. La Rioja imitated its

was banished to Oruro, being forced to abandon nine infant children—the Malarias were also banished.

example, and the other cities became more or less anarchical.

1816.—All desired a tutelary authority, which, being created by common consent, should be powerful enough to make the laws respected. This authority could only be derived from representatives of the people. The people, convinced of the necessity of the change, elected them, and a sovereign congress was opened at Tucuman, on the 25th of March, 1816. Its principal care was to select a director, who would draw closely the cord of union, and direct the efforts of all to their darling object, independence. Don Juan Martin Pueyrredon was chosen Director.

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*Continuation made, at Mr. Rodney's request, by Dean Funes, bringing the Sketch down to the battle of Maipo.*

WITH many, the most desirable object was to obtain a moment of calm, during which the supreme authority might be consigned to able hands; it was however at the very moment that the national congress was deliberating on this matter that the tempest was heard to roar with the greatest violence.

In consequence of the resignation of the directorship *ad interim*, by Colonel Alvarez, the Junta of Observation, in conjunction with the Cabildo of the capital, elevated Brigadier-general Antonio Balcarce to that station as his successor. This remedy was momentary; the measure was by no means in consonance with the wishes of the people; and, by a kind of fatality which often presides over events, it was not long before an explosion was produced among materials so well prepared. The electors and elected were soon discovered figuring together on the theatre of discord.

In the mean while, the new Director *ad interim* used every exertion to destroy the seeds of discord, which had already produced so much opposition between the

Oriental and the capital, and to render all parties sensible of the advantages of living under the same law. Although the first attempt made by him for this laudable purpose promised a favourable result, every means were found in the end unavailing to bring about a reconciliation.

This discord had been propagated in the manner of a contagion, and the remedies applied to restrain its devastations were found to possess no efficacy. The city of Santa Fé,\* although just escaped from a bloody contest, and threatened by dangers of a more serious nature, still pursued its peculiar ideas of independence, with what may more properly be called obstinacy than constancy.

Cordova always devoted to the maxims of federalism, notwithstanding her having sent deputies to the general congress, considered her absolute submission to the capital as unworthy a free people, and still cherished the idea of this submission being temporary.

The other provinces, according to their respective situations and characters, expressed more or less their dislike to what they considered a species of subjection.

The causes of this political phenomenon, if sought for, will not be difficult to be found. The opinion most prevalent in the provinces was decidedly in favour of the federative system, and which they were desirous of seeing realized, even in anticipation of all the essential and first objects of their new career. It had been the darling wish of the provinces, almost from the commencement of the revolution;—one which had still greater charms for them, since they had seen it realized with so much glory in the United States of North America. For the present, however, the governments, the capital, and not a few of the more intelligent citizens, were opposed to this idea. Each of these parties supported its opinion by weighty reasons. From the state-

\* General Dias Velez, with a body of troops, was besieged at San Nicholas.

ment of these I am about to make, the enlightened reader may judge between them.

Those in favour of the government already established were of opinion that the federative system could not be legally substituted, until sanctioned by a general congress; assuming it as a principle, that the constitution of a state should receive its existence from the hand of the nation itself, and not from partial concurrence, and unconnected acts; that when the nation first regained its liberty, and all the provinces were united under the same government, the present was the form they adopted, and under this form it was, that the existence of the republic had been preserved in the midst of the most trying disasters; that until all the provinces could be again united, a thing by no means hopeless, it would be improper to deviate further than was absolutely unavoidable from what had before existed; and that at all events, if the preponderance of the capital was an evil, it was one which would soon be corrected, when that preponderance ceased to be necessary to the common safety. Further reasons, derived from views of policy, were added. According to the federative system, said they, each state is sovereign and independent as respects the rest; each may possess, and in reality does possess, separate interests: it is therefore to be feared that each will rather seek what it may conceive to be its own interests, than the interest which is common to all; and in consequence of this egotism and misplaced jealousy, be involved in a common ruin. That in the midst of the alarming dangers which threaten this new born state, the necessity of a complete union of all the parts, under the guidance of one head, for the better concentration and direction of its forces, is dictated by the plainest maxims of prudence; and where, it was asked, can this be placed with more propriety than in the capital, where the revolution itself received its origin, whence every

great effort in the general cause has emanated, and which, from its position, its enterprise and intelligence, is enabled to manage the common concerns of the nation, for the present at least, to the greatest possible advantage? The first thing to be done, continued they, is to place our independence out of danger; let this be accomplished before we disagree about the manner of using it. They further insisted, that it was not altogether safe, to confide in the example of the United States of North America, which had always been educated in the republican virtues, and to whom we were not to be compared, reared as we have been, under the rod of despotism; and that it would be unwise to trust the fate of the nation, in such dangerous times, to virtues which had not yet been sufficiently put to the trial. That it would be most prudent to leave to time and education, under the influence of a free government, to produce the same character of enlightened patriotism. Those of the federal party contended on different principles. They admitted that the government of Buenos Ayres, the capital of the former viceroyalty, had been the first to shake off the Spanish yoke, and by its influence had induced the provinces to follow its example; at the same time they alleged the repeated protestations on the part of this government, that its preponderance should be but momentary, that a general congress should be convened without delay, for the purpose of fixing the general government on a permanent basis. It was by these protestations that the provinces had been induced to enter into the views of the capital, and to place their resources at its disposal. They complained that so long a time had elapsed without performing this engagement, that their situation thus far was but little different from that under the Spanish monarchy, that they had obtained but little more than a change of masters. They did not deny the



difficulty of calling a national congress during the stormy period of the revolution; but said that in default of a congress, the general government of the capital ought to have ceased, and the provinces ceased to be swayed by it, seeing that the general voice was in favour of the federative system. Far from being inadequate to the exigencies of the times, and the objects of the revolution, they asserted that the individual acts of the provinces had contributed most to raise the character of the republic, and to advance the general cause. If our dissensions, said they, have caused us discredit with foreign nations, it is to be attributed to the clashing of the government of the capital with the feelings and wishes of the provinces. That as there can be no effect without a cause, the federative system, by putting an end to these odious rivalries and jealousies, would prevent the recurrence of scenes so disgraceful. It is true, said they, the tumultuous proceedings of the capital, had generally sprung from other causes; chiefly from the inordinate thirst for office in many of its inhabitants; the ambitious turning to their advantage, even the extreme jealousy of their liberties on the part of the people; was it just, it was asked, that the provinces should be compelled to follow these frequent and capricious changes, in which they took no part? But would not these evils have long since ceased with the establishment of the federative system? What temptations could there be to seduce the aspiring in the limited and definite powers which the federative system would present? On the contrary, what could be more tempting to the ambitious than a system which enabled those in power to be the masters and arbiters of the republic? One which would enable them to prefer their flatterers and favourites, and those who were neither, but merely happened to be about them, to able and meritorious citizens: and to consult their private wishes more than the public good. They alleged that, in fact, the capital



had thus far paid much more attention to its own peculiar interests, than to the rights of the provinces; that she had gratified the ambition and avarice of many in the provinces, in order, by enlisting the human frailties and passions on her side, to sow the seeds of discord and disunion in other parts of the confederacy; these persons engaging to repress the sentiments of the people, and draw them into a subordination which accorded only with their interested views. When these things, said they, are impartially considered, how can we draw closer the ties of union under a government like the present; which, by its oppressions as well as by its favours, weakens that love of country which the federative system has a tendency to foster; a system which, at the same time that it leaves the citizen in the full enjoyment of that portion of liberty which the good of society does not require him to surrender, imparts enough for all the purposes of the general safety and happiness. But let it not be said, continued they, that there are no republican virtues amongst us; to what else is to be attributed the noble resolution we have taken, and which we have sanctioned by our oaths, to die rather than not live free and independent? To what else that energetic and heroic resistance which has given so many days of glory to our country? And even if it be admitted that we do not possess those virtues, are they to be inculcated by the example of a government which teaches nothing but selfishness and corruption?

Thus reasoned the opposite parties. With respect to our own opinion, we should say, that from the impossibility of attaining this end without encountering the evils of anarchy and perhaps civil war, on account of the preponderating influence of the capital, it was perhaps the wisest course on the part of the provinces to make a sacrifice for the present, of their obedience, to that unity of action without which our ultimate success must be doubtful. It is to be expected, that our ene-

mies will labour without ceasing to regain their lost dominion, and, flattered by our dissensions, they will be continually engaged in forming new projects to enslave us, lured by the hope that we shall be able to bring forward but feeble and divided efforts in support of our liberties. I have thus traced without dissimulation the melancholy picture of our domestic discords.

A number of the citizens of Buenos Ayres, touched with the unfortunate antipathy of the provinces to join heartily in the cause of their common country, and fearing that our dissensions would form a bridge over which the enemy might pass to reduce us to subjection, united their wishes; and honestly confessing that the balance of public opinion inclined to federalism, petitioned the Governor-intendant of the province, to strip Buenos Ayres of its prerogative, and to place it on the same footing with the other provinces. They believed that this measure would put an end to their irritated jealousies, that a fraternal feeling would succeed, enabling them to complete the edifice which they had so gloriously begun. In an affair of so much importance, the Intendant, in order to ascertain with accuracy the sentiments of the people, decreed that the petition be taken into consideration in a general assembly or Cabildo to be convened for the purpose, and one was accordingly ordered to meet on the 19th of June, 1816. This unexpected event lighted up anew the imperfectly extinguished fire of discord. The Junta of Observation, although agreeing in opinion with the Intendant as to the propriety of taking the sense of the people, were not satisfied that this should be done by general suffrage, from apprehension of dangerous\* and tumultuous agitations; they thought it would be more adviseable to as-

\* Two petitions were presented, one with 101 signatures, the other with 110.

certain their will through deputies elected for the purpose. This contrariety of opinion divided the state into parties, whose disputes were conducted with so much heat and violence, that it was seriously feared they would not stop short of an appeal to arms. Had this subject been considered unmixed with private and personal feelings, it would scarcely have given rise to a difference in thinking.

This contest, although suffered to remain *in statu quo*, left the minds of the parties too sore to permit them to settle down in peace and harmony. It was at the same time so far aggravated by another dispute, that the Junta of Observation in concert with the Cabildo assuming the tone of authority proceeded to depose the Director *ad interim*. In his place was substituted a governing commission, composed of Don Francisco Antonio Escalada and Don Miguel Irigoyen.

While these things were taking place, the troops of Buenos Ayres, under the command of Colonel Don Eustacio Dias Veles, were approaching the city of Santa Fé, while at the same time a small squadron of vessels, under the command of colonel Don Mathias Irigoyen, placed it under blockade. The arms of these two cities rivalled each other in intrepidity and courage. It would be uncandid to conceal the admiration we feel in beholding a small town like Santa Fé, without disciplined troops, and with little assistance, causing itself to be respected by its enemy, and under the direction of its chief supporting the cause of its independence. It is true the Santafecinos abandoned their city, believing that they carried it along with them, wherever they could live free. It was not long before they besieged the invaders themselves, and caused them to experience the sufferings of famine; and by a lucky accident having made themselves masters of several of their enemies' vessels, together with the commander of

the squadron, there appeared but little likelihood of their being about to succumb to their invaders.

Two important occurrences which had taken place in the city of Tucuman, were of a nature to divert the current of dissension. The first was the election to the supreme directorship of Colonel Don Juan Martin Pueyrredon; but the exigencies of the war claimed the first attention of the Director, the cities of Salta and Jujui being menaced by the enemy: this of course delayed his return to the capital.

The other was the solemn declaration of our independence made by Congress on the memorable 9th of July, 1816. Six years had elapsed since that dark period, when we were regarded in no other light than as a flock tamely obedient to the will of its owner, in which we quietly looked on, while strangers directed the economy of our house, in which our own hands were employed to erect fortresses intended to enslave us; six years of the most profound and universal interest, felt, I might almost say, even by the infant in its mother's arms, had awakened a crowd of new ideas throughout all classes of society, and inspired a general wish to rise to that condition which nature herself seemed to point out to us. These provinces, ashamed of having so long delayed to declare their emancipation, raised at last the sublime voice of liberty.

It was thought sufficiently probable that those important occurrences would have quieted the provinces, and convinced them of the necessity of a well organized whole. Unfortunately this was not the case. "From Cordova," said the Director in his manifesto, "with what painful anxiety did I cast my eyes towards the agitated province of Buenos Ayres." And not without cause; for in going to enter upon his government, he was about to place himself on the summit of a volcanic mountain. It was, notwithstanding, his good fortune to succeed in conquering the antipathies of his most in-

veterate enemies. Would to God he had been equally successful in finding the means of restoring perfect tranquillity to the state! The wild and ungovernable Orientals and Santafecinos still however persisted in their restless and inconsiderate course. Over and above the numerous causes which rendered their rupture so calamitous, others followed of a nature to render them more lasting. The court of Brazil, about this time, raised the mask which had hitherto concealed the perfidious project it had long since formed of taking possession of the delightful countries on the eastern side of the river.

The court of Brazil had already made frequent attempts to obtain this territory, which for more than a hundred years it had coveted with so much greediness, but was so often compelled to abandon its prey, until our lamentable dissension at last seemed to guarantee the success of an invasion. The Director seized this opportunity to revive with General Artigas that ancient friendship, whose force had on former occasions frustrated the shameful designs of the Portuguese. A deputy was despatched to him, carrying a supply of arms and munitions of war, and requesting him to state with frankness what were his wants, that these should be the measure of the aid to be furnished. But to speak of reconciliation with Artigas was to speak to the desert. His obduracy could neither be softened by concession, nor his pride humbled by dangers. Although he received the donations, he heard the proposals with displeasure, preferring that history should accuse him of having sacrificed the occasion to his private hatred, his duties to his caprice, and his country to his interests.

With respect to the Santafecinos, the Director was not more actuated by a desire to prevent the disagreeable consequences of this city remaining in a state distinct and separate from all the other members of the republic, than anxious to place the forces under General Dias

Veles in security: with this view he despatched deputies with propositions highly advantageous to them, and which ought to have sufficed for the restoration of the ancient harmony and brotherhood. Before their arrival at Santa Fé, our army had already evacuated the place and descended the river. The late invasion was by no means calculated to dispose their minds to reconciliation. And even if the Santafecinos had given this proof of their love of order, it is probable they would soon have repented of an act which would have lessened them in the estimation of their protector, General Artigas; however this may be, the negotiation terminated without effect.

The city of Cordova, although with her deputies in congress, and submitting to the capital, inclined to the side of the Orientals and Santafecinos; her character would not permit her to abandon the latter in the period of adversity; the dangers which threatened her neighbour served but to draw more closely the ties of amity, and which increased in proportion to the risk she encountered. A body of Cordovians to the number of four hundred, under the command of Don Juan Pablo Bulnes, hastened as far as the city of Rosario in aid of the Santafecinos; but finding no enemies, they returned home without any material occurrence.

The expedition of Bulnes was not undertaken with the approbation of the governor of Cordova, Colonel Don Josef Dias; not because this officer was not inclined to the side of the Santafecinos, and the cause of federalism, but because it suited the political course he had resolved to follow, to give merely a negative consent; or perhaps seeing Bulnes at the head of a more considerable force than he himself could command, he did not think it prudent to oppose him. Be this as it may, it laid the foundation of a reciprocal animosity, as indiscreet as badly intended. While Bulnes was on his return to Cordova, Dias was collecting a force to receive him. He



was fearful that his rival might entertain the intention of deposing him, and placing himself at the head of the government. These two bodies were in a little while arrayed against each other, and after acting a military farce, a few shot fired in the air, Bulnes was left in possession of the field of battle, and entered the city in triumph.

These agitations and disorders were in direct violation of the public authority. They proceeded from an active force, supported by the opinion which was most prevalent; in their consequences they were to be dreaded both for the present and the future, as exhibiting the most dangerous examples. The rights claimed by the government and the congress were weighed in distinct scales from their own. The only remedy which the congress could apply to these evils was in appealing to the good sense of these people. A manifesto was published, breathing in eloquent language the sentiment of love of country, lamenting and severely censuring the public disorders, thundering anathemas against the disturbers of the public repose, and exhorting all to obedience and submission to the supreme authority, which had only for its object to secure the safety and happiness of the *republic*. As might have been expected, little impression was produced by this publication, amongst a people who considered themselves as betrayed, when denied the form of government which they preferred. In fact they regarded the manifesto like one of those autumnal clouds, which lighten much, but bring them no rain.

A more successful measure was adopted with respect to the province of Cordova, which was the placing its government in the hands of Don Antonio Funes, (brother of the author of this sketch), a native and inhabitant of the city of Cordova. This appointment, whether considered with a view to the capacity and virtues of the individual, or the prudence of the choice, was worthy of applause.



He was a citizen who possessed talents by no means common; of a mind refined by application to belles-lettres, and elevated by the study of the sciences, he was regarded as an honour to literature. A man of unusual nerve, of a character severe without austerity, more a lover of virtue, than of his fortune, his family, or his life. Exemplary in the fulfilment of his social duties, his house wore the appearance of a sanctuary, to which the unfortunate might resort for comfort and protection. From his politics, dark intrigues, cunning management, and all perfidious practices were excluded. A noble frankness characterised his deportment; detesting artifice, yet prudent and cautious in his speech, and in all times a friend of social order. Our revolution, on which justice had set her seal, could not fail to draw him to its side; he embraced its cause with sincerity, and propagated it with discretion; but the unsettled state of things which succeeded, had induced him to bury himself in a retirement where, without being exposed to the clashing of contending parties, he might pursue the stoical severity of his life, and indulge his passion for literary pursuits. With a firmness superior to the reverses of fortune, he supported without murmuring the \*loss of nearly all that he possessed, his credits to a great amount, and what was more severe, of two promising sons in the flower of youth, when the national congress cast its eyes upon him as the most suitable person to oppose the torrent of disorders of which Cordova had become the theatre.

To a common mind, the situation in which the Governor was placed would have presented almost insuperable difficulties; the city of Cordova being occupied by Bulnes, his son-in-law, and in the very first step he would have to take, it would be necessary that he should

\* This estimable man happened to possess property to a large amount in Peru, which on the breaking out of the revolution was confiscated by the royalists.—TRANSLATOR.

be armed with a severity which knows no relationship but that of reason and the law. In the course of the revolution he had not declared himself in favour of any of the forms of government which this republic might think proper to adopt. His opinion was in favour of that which the will of the nation, solemnly expressed in congress, should sanction; and until this could be known, he thought that no one, without violating the laws of order and just subordination, could forcibly resist the established authorities. In opposition to these sentiments Bulnes made a show of force before his eyes, and his conduct gave few or no indications of a sense of honour, respect, or deference. The Governor prudently concealed his determination, until he should be supported by a sufficient force to enable him to carry it into effect. It was not long before a body of veteran troops, under the command of Colonel Sayos, came down from Tucuman to his assistance. Bulnes had the arrogance to take the field against him, but Sayos, in the presence of the Governor himself, completely routed his forces and put him to flight. A common mind would have been pleased with a flight, which would have spared the painful conflict between the ties of relationship and the demands of justice. But this was a case calculated only to call forth the firmness and energy of the new Governor. He caused a diligent pursuit to be made, until, placed in his power, he should be delivered over to all the severity of the law. The fortitude required by such occasions allows of no mixture of human weakness; and as a celebrated orator has justly said, the magistrate who is not a hero scarcely deserves to be regarded as an honest man. The province for the present remained tranquil, and the cause of Bulnes was subjected to the legal forms by order of the congress.

From the volcanic eruptions of the provinces, which about this time, happily, became less frequent, let us di-

rect our attention to exterior affairs. The policy of assailing the enemy's commerce was found to operate as a powerful aid to our cause, and was about this time carried on with great success. The enemy's ports in the Pacific were greatly harassed by the flotilla under Commodore Brown.—Nothing could more fully prove the state of subjection to which the people were reduced by Spanish tyranny; under its vile domination, it seemed as if all the springs of the mind had been destroyed, and instead of national feeling there existed nothing but sordid personal interest. Near the isle of Ormigas, Brown captured five prizes; he dared even to brave the castles of the port of Callao, and to defy the Spanish armed ships. He found the port of Guayaquil in a still greater state of abandonment; here he entered in triumph, and carried off property to the amount of seven hundred thousand dollars.

While the Viceroy of Lima was thus harassed by sea, his armies in Peru and Salta experienced an almost uninterrupted series of disasters. Col. Don Manuel Asensio Padilla sustained with much glory the standard of our country against the inhuman Tacon. The valour and patriotism of this officer had attached to his person a considerable number of patriots, into whom he inspired confidence, activity, and courage. In order to throw some obstacles in the way of his triumphs, a body of about one thousand men was ordered to march towards Laguana. Here they were expected by Padilla, who had entrusted the defence of various posts to his captains, and one of them, which may sound somewhat singular to the reader, to the command of his wife, a very extraordinary woman, Dona Juana Azunduy. The enemy was completely repulsed, after having made a furious assault; and this heroic female had the satisfaction of presenting to her husband the banner of the enemy,

which she had taken with her own hands\*. Padilla did not go to sleep beneath his laurels; without giving time to the enemy to collect his forces, he pursued them in every direction, and shut up what remained of them in the town of Chuquisaca. Scarcely less glorious was the victory of Warnes, who destroyed another body of nearly one thousand men, commanded by Tacon in person.

The perils of the war in the district of Jujui and Salta, drew from the inhabitants proofs of heroism, in support of their independence, equal to what was exhibited in declaring it. General Guemes, formidable alike for his constancy and valour, continually presented a threatening front to Pezuela, and, by his activity, deprived him of his conquests as fast as they were made. Abandoning Jujui precipitately, Pezuela encountered losses of considerable moment. The Guerillas, led by Don Augustin Ribera, Don Diego Calla, Don Diego Tallangiani, Don Justo Gonzales, Don Joseph Miguel Valdiviesa, Don Francisco Guerreros, and Don Francisco Briondo, contributed much to diminish his credit, and the weight of his authority.

1817.—These advantages in some measure made amends for the mortification of seeing the troops of Portugal in the territory of the state. From the time it was known that the Prince Regent of Portugal had raised the colonies of Brazil to the pre-eminence of a metropolis, it was strongly suspected that he would attempt to aggrandize himself by the occupation of these countries. The powerful temptations which had con-

\* This was the celebrated banner under which the enemy had reconquered La Paz, Peru, Arequipa, and Cusco, and on which account it was distinguished by magnificent embroidery. For this action, the lady was rewarded by the State with the commission and emolument of lieutenant-colonel.

tinually attracted the Portuguese towards our territories had almost become one of the fixed principles of their policy; it was therefore not surprising that they should profit by an opportunity which seemed the most favourable for the gratification of their ambition. But as mere ambition furnishes no justification for the invasion of the territory of other nations, the Director considered it as his duty to remonstrate with General Lecor, commander of the Portuguese forces, on the step he was about to take, and to warn him of the consequences of the aggression. At the same time that he took this step, he communicated it to General Artigas, and the Cabildo of Montevideo, requesting that, at this moment of common danger, which required the combination of all their forces, their differences might be forgotten; and in order to fix upon the principles of reconciliation, he deputed, with full powers, the Alcaldes Don Juan Jose Duran and Don Juan Giro. In the preliminary conferences which took place, the errors of discord and the benefits of harmony between the two countries were represented in the most animated terms; and it was finally agreed, that the eastern shore (Banda Oriental) should acknowledge the sovereignty of Congress, and the authority of the Supreme Director of the state; that members in proportion to its population should be sent, and that the government should promptly furnish what assistance was necessary for its defence.

The joy produced by this event, which in putting an end to the unhappy disputes that divided the country appeared to restore its pristine strength and glory, was celebrated with pomp and magnificence. At the very moment, however, when the people were engaged in giving vent to their feelings, which were excited to a degree that might almost be considered immoderate, information was received that the Orientals had refused to ratify the convention, no doubt influenced by their

chief. Artigas considering the natural tendency of the connexion and dependance of the eastern shore as destructive to the absolute sway which he had so long been accustomed to exercise; in his opinion, the dangers and devastations of a war with the Portuguese were to be preferred to the influence of the capital.

The remonstrance of the Supreme Director with General Lecor did not produce the effect on his mind which it merited. This chief contented himself with declaring that, in order to place the Portuguese frontier out of danger from the contagion of anarchy which threatened it, it had become necessary to take possession of a country which, in becoming independent, had given itself up to every species of disorder and misrule. The futility of this pretext was fully exposed by the Director in his subsequent official letters, and also by the eloquent Editor of the ministerial Gazette, Don Julian Albares; nothing can be added to the force of their reasonings. Taking it for granted, that a sovereign has a right to interfere in the domestic quarrels of his neighbours, whenever he may think them of a nature to disturb the tranquillity of his own states, yet it is an undoubted principle of the law of nations, that he should first make suitable representations to the party offending, before actually resorting to the use of force. To occupy a country by force, under the mask of peace, can only be learned in the school of Machiavel. There is certainly some difference between acting the part of a centinel, to watch for the preservation of self, and thus intruding into the country of another, *hospite insalutato*, with no object in reality but that of conquest. The dispute of the Orientals and the capital was a family quarrel; but a quarrel which had not dissolved the ties of the first with the nation. These people, as well by their own will as by the constitution of the state, were integral parts of the American confederation. Common decency,



not less than respect for the laws of nations, would have forbidden this resort to violence, before all the proper measures had been taken without effect, to place in a state of security the nation which declared itself in danger; otherwise the world would be continually exposed to become the prey of the first occupant who could support his cause by force; like the ambitious Portuguese, there would never be wanting a pretext for invasion.

The management of the war, together with the other important cares of government, rendered it desirable that the Congress and the Director should be nearer each other, in order by their combined wisdom to conduct the affairs of the state with greater promptitude and judgment. Its removal to the capital was, however, a step of no small danger. The sound of discord was still heard, like the hollow murmuring of the waters after the tempest has subsided. It was much to be feared, in the agitations which might ensue, that this national assembly, which was considered by many of the friends of order as the last resort, would, like the similar attempts formerly made, prove abortive. Besides this, the provinces were desirous that the congress should hold its sessions at a distance from the capital, in order that being free from undue influence, and the fear which bayonets might cause, they would be able to pursue their course with the more perfect freedom. After much discussion, and important reasons urged on both sides of the question, they finally yielded to the solicitation of the Director, who strongly urged their removal to the capital; and accordingly carried the resolution into effect, in the midst of new commotions and disturbances.

One of them had its origin in the audacious mind of an inhabitant of Santiago del Estero, named Don Francisco Borges. This indiscreet man had been engaged for some time in secretly exciting the minds of those who entertained an aversion to the constituted authori-



ties. His intrigues engaged on his side not a few of his fellow-citizens, who, together with others in the neighbouring towns, raised the standard of rebellion under his command. A corps of veteran troops was immediately despatched against them from Tucuman. Borges, more skilled in forming factions than in profiting by them when formed, was unable to maintain his ground; beaten, pursued, and taken prisoner, he paid with his life the price of his temerity.

The Governor of Cordova, although possessing more prudence and foresight than his predecessor, was unable to provide against a conspiracy, which surprised him in his own house. Bulnes, from his prison colleaguings with some of those wretches who are every where to be found in an unsettled state of society, was enabled through this means to corrupt the garrison; and not satisfied with obtaining his release, he assailed the house of the governor, whom he seized and placed in confinement, together with the military commandant Sayos.

The chief of this plot was not possessed of sufficient talents to direct any important object, nor had the soldiers whom he had corrupted a sufficient interest to serve him. These were, with few or no exceptions, veteran Spanish troops, who had deserted to us, and who had been placed under the command of an European named Quintana, but who would willingly sell themselves to whoever offered most. Bulnes was deposed, and in his stead was chosen a certain Urtubei, a person in whom the conspirators fancied they could repose their confidence with greater safety. The situation of the conspirators was critical; they knew that their indecent and dishonest conduct was detested by the inhabitants of Cordova, and that their force was inadequate to sustain them; they therefore justly feared the punishment which the Congress and the Director would inflict upon their crimes. In this embarrassment, they fell

upon the plan of compelling Don Juan Andres de Pueyrredon, brother of the Director, to accept the office of governor of the province, in an open Cabildo or assembly, composed chiefly of the factious. It was not long before all those who were openly concerned in this disgraceful business were obliged to beg an asylum in Santa Fé, to which place they retreated. Colonel Sayos, who, with his officers, was ordered to be conducted to some remote place, contrived to gain over the guard to his side, at the end of a few days' march. At this moment, he was accidentally joined by Governor Funes, who, by the permission of Bulnes, was on his way to Buenos Ayres. They immediately set about collecting a force, for the purpose of returning to put down the insurrection. This consisted, however, of very indifferent militia, upon which little or no dependence could be placed. Notwithstanding this, and the obstacles thrown in the way by a handful of vicious, unprincipled men, the Governor succeeded in re-establishing order, and in entering upon the duties of his office.

The chief of the insurrection was arrested, and sent to Buenos Ayres, where, together with several of the European soldiers, he was tried, condemned, and executed.

These discords in the east, the west, and the north, contributed chiefly to flatter the hopes of our enemies, and encouraged them to form new plans for our subjugation. Ten thousand Portuguese, under the command of General Lecor, in three divisions, were marched into the territory of the eastern shore. The first consisted of five thousand men, under his immediate command, who directed his march by the way of Santa Teresa; the second, under the command of General Silveira, consisting of sixteen hundred, by the way of Cerro Largo; the third, which formed the right of the enemy, under Curao, proceeded towards the town newly found-

ed by Artigas, in the vicinity of the Uruguay. It was utterly impossible for the General to oppose this torrent. Although the Orientals were gifted with great strength of body and intrepidity of mind, yet neither their numbers, the nature of their arms, their discipline, nor their subordination, could enable them openly to take the field against invaders, in these respects so much superior. This superiority very soon manifested itself. General Pinto, with nine hundred men, advanced as far as India Muerta, where he was attacked by General Ribera, with eleven hundred; and although he sustained a vigorous fight, he was compelled to retire with less than one half his division; possessing, however, that coolness which characterises the brave in critical situations, he did not neglect to detach a part of his force to watch the operations of the enemy. Soon after this, a detachment, consisting of one hundred men, fell in with an equal number of Portuguese, who had marched out of Maldonado; stung by shame, and roused to desperation by the disgrace of the last affair, they rushed with irresistible fury upon their enemies, who were literally cut to pieces.

General Otorgues was opposed to General Silveira, at the head of eight hundred men, but was more distinguished for stratagem and astuteness than enterprise. It was of great importance to impede the march of Silveira, whose object was to form a junction with Lecor. Ribera having united his force to that of Otorgues, they determined to attack, but, through some unaccountable accident, the former retreated to Rio Negro. The Portuguese army, although continually harassed by Ribera, reached the Barra de Casupa, at Santa Lucia La Grande. Ribera did not despair of being able to defeat the enemy; but, considering the smallness of his force, he besought the town of Montevideo to send the delegate, Barcino, with a reinforcement of four hundred men. The only force that could be spared was the corps

of Libertos, commanded by Colonel B—; but, from a spirit of rivalry, ill becoming the times, this officer was unwilling to serve under Ribera. This reinforcement being thus denied, General Silveira effected a junction with General Lecor; after which they proceeded to the capture of Montevideo, on the 19th of January, 1817, Barcino having abandoned it in much disorder.

The fortune which had formerly attended the Orientals was now reversed. They fled the presence of those whom they had been before accustomed to repel, or, if they showed resolution, it usually degenerated into rashness. The right wing of the Portuguese army, commanded by Curao, directed its march towards the place at which the chief of the Orientals was stationed, and arrived at the Arroyo de los Catalanes. This frontier was defended by General La Torre with three thousand men. Full of an arrogant confidence, which did not permit him to calculate the risk, he determined on attacking the enemy. Mondragon, who commanded the cavalry, with more prudence, remonstrated against this step; alleging, that having had the good fortune to deprive the enemy of his horses, oxen, and carts, these ought first to be secured, before exposing himself anew to the chance of battle, which, considering the present situation of the Portuguese, must be extremely doubtful. La Torre, either not convinced by this reasoning, or despising it, exercised his authority, and imprudently fell upon the enemy with his whole force. The action was obstinate and bloody, but terminated in the most disastrous manner; General Artigas occupied a position some distance in the rear with a small corps of one hundred men. The consequence of this unfortunate affair reached even his encampment; here he was surprised by four hundred men, and was only enabled to escape with the assistance of a Charua Indian, but with the loss of all his baggage.

In the midst of the progress of Lecor, he found himself all at once shut up in Montevideo, suffering hunger and all the privations of a siege: his situation becoming intolerable, he marched with two thousand men in search of cattle and other provisions. The indefatigable Ribera, who closely watched his movements, prepared an ambuscade with much sagacity at the pass of San Lucia, and causing no small loss to the enemy, attained his object for the moment. Lecor was not compelled, however, to abandon his enterprise, but proceeded as far as the pass of Pinto, where he was again attacked by Ribera, and experienced a loss of two hundred men. These advantages were of too partial a nature to enable the Orientals to derive hopes from them in the face of an enemy so powerful. They contributed chiefly to raise the reputation of Ribera.

The cry now became universal on the part of the Orientals, and even of their chiefs, for a re-establishment of their union with Buenos Ayres, as the only means of finding shelter from the desolating tempest. In virtue of this state of mind, a communication was opened with the Director, who at once met so desirable a proposition, and immediately sent a supply of arms and munitions of war by way of Colonia.—Although Ribera had given his consent to the union, he stipulated to withdraw it in case it should not meet the approbation of Artigas.—For this purpose, he communicated the stipulation he had entered into in his absence to that chief. To Artigas it was of little importance that such an event would be advantageous to the *republic*; he saw in it nothing but a diminution of his own consequence and power. In order to prevent the discontent which his refusal might produce, at the same time that, with one hundred men, he went down to dissuade Ribera, he caused his partizans to circulate the most scandalous abuse of the capital and its intentions; proclaiming, that a union with



the capital would be a union with perfidy and robbery, and that it would be exchanging their liberty for a shameful and atrocious servitude. These odious imputations could not fail of producing an effect upon the simple, well-meaning people, who reposed implicit confidence in Artigas, as well as in the minds of those who had on former occasions been ill treated by the government of Buenos Ayres, of which number was Ribera. The party in favour of the union was, however, too strong to be easily dissuaded from its purpose. In fact, Barcinós, Bansa, Col. of the Libertos, Ramos, commander of the artillery, a body of chasseurs, and some corps of militia under the command of Don Tomas Garcia, having elected the latter as their commander, entered into articles of union with Buenos Ayres. Ribera, offended with an act which was very little short of a revolt against him, by a part of the troops under his command, hastened with three hundred chosen men to call them to an account for this procedure. After some warm altercation, Garcia being the strongest, remained with the command; and Ribera sending a copy of the offensive articles to Artigas, called for a detachment of five hundred men, for the purpose of attacking his opponents. It was well known that Artigas would destroy without mercy those who attempted to diminish his authority. In truth, this man taking counsel only from his ambition, and from a mischievous Franciscan friar, who for a long time had swayed him, resolved to comply with the request of Ribera with all possible expedition. General Forges, one of the most repute among the Orientals, opposed with energy a measure which was about to awaken the horrors of civil war, and declared for a union with the capital. Of the five hundred, only fifty were dispatched to Colonia, under the pretext of defending this place, which was threatened by a Portuguese flotilla, but with the real intention of uniting with Ribera, and to

make war upon those who should be in favour of the union. The party of Artigas prevailed. The Director had hoped that the Orientals, won over by his friendly conduct, would lower their pretensions, but his patience was wearied out by so much obstinacy.

While these clouds obscured the east, the west appeared more serene; the Governor of Cuyo, Colonel Don Jose de San Martin, a man bold enough to conceive great designs, sufficiently a lover of glory to devote himself to them, and not wanting good fortune in their execution, had for some time past meditated in silence the reconquest of Chili. This country had been completely subdued by the Spaniards; more than one hundred of the most influential people had been banished to the island of Juan Fernandez, the inhabitants completely disarmed and held under the most rigid subjection; their secret wishes, however, as may be readily supposed, were in favour of independence, and San Martin had every reason to believe that if he could cross the mountains with a respectable army, he would have none but the Spaniards to contend with, and would find the people, as far as was in their power, disposed to co-operate with him. The situation of the United Provinces, continually threatened from Chili and Peru, plainly pointed out the immense importance of expelling the Spaniards from the former, by which means, they would at the same time, strike the severest blow to their enemy, and gain a powerful ally: a sense of duty also called upon them to assist their brethren, those who on a former occasion, when Buenos Ayres was threatened by the Spanish general Elio, had contributed both men and money to her assistance. But the chief difficulty lay in procuring the means of raising such an army as would be adequate to the enterprise. The state, notwithstanding its recent declaration of independence, was at no time since the commencement of the war in a condition so deplorable; it might almost be said



to be drifting at the mercy of the winds and waves. The province of Cuyo, at the first glance, seemed to promise less; its soil but indifferent, its population small, its products of late much reduced in value, and as the frontier, continually exposed to the invasion of the Spaniards. But San Martin possessed the talent of winning the hearts of those with whom he was connected, of awakening the higher passions, and of enlisting them not by halves, but entirely in his plans. He had possessed himself so completely of the affections of the people of Cuyo, that they placed without reserve every thing they had at his disposal. They freely yielded up their male slaves to the number of six hundred, they furnished three thousand horses, ten thousand mules, and contributed their personal services for the construction of quarters, encampments, armories, and in conducting troops and munitions from Buenos Ayres. Much of this is doubtless to be attributed to the moderation and self-denial, both in public and private life, of the chief who commanded, the best security for the confidence of the people; but it is likewise to be attributed to a cause which does much honour to the province, to wit, its uniform patriotism and good conduct. Correct morals are most conducive to love of country, and love of country is not less conducive to good morals. Had they been less pure, this patriotism would have been less, and less also would have been the influence of San Martin. After twelve months spent in collecting, organizing, and disciplining his army, which at the same time afforded Marco an opportunity of making the necessary preparations to oppose him, San Martin put in execution his daring attempt to cross the Andes. The mere idea of such an undertaking is enough to strike the mind with astonishment, as amounting almost to a violation of the laws of nature. We can form but a faint idea of this enterprise, when we consider that the mountains to be crossed for one hundred leagues are the

highest on the globe, with defiles so narrow as not to admit two persons abreast along the giddy verge of frightful gulfs, while the severity of the climate seemed to contend with the ruggedness of the passage; added to these the difficulty of transporting artillery, at the same time embarrassed with the baggage and provisions for thirty days, and after all trusting to the uncertain chances of success, after the termination of these labours and fatigues; in truth, when every thing is considered fairly, this achievement may justly rank with the most celebrated of those recorded in history. In thirteen days the army effected its passage, with the loss of about five thousand horses and mules, and of a small number of men, chiefly blacks, who were unable to stand the cold. After some slight skirmishes, the army took up its position at Aconcagua.

The passage of the mountains was, in itself, an achievement of a nature to give assurances of the result. The heroic army which had vanquished the Andes, fighting under the banners of liberty and the country, could no more be resisted than a torrent of the mountains. The splendid triumph of Chacabuco, which took place soon after, raised San Martin to the pinnacle of glory, and gave a new aspect to the affairs of South America. "In twenty-four days," said the general, "we have terminated the campaign; we have crossed the most elevated mountains of the globe, put an end to the sway of tyrants, and given liberty to Chili." The President Marco was taken prisoner, and the remains of his forces took refuge in the fortress of Talcaguana. A junta of the Chilians was convened at Santiago; through gratitude to San Martin, they offered to invest him with the directorship, which he declined; they then elected Don Bernardo O'Higgins. The Chilians afterwards sought by various modes to express their gratitude to the *General of the Andes*, by which name San Martin, by a kind of involuntary concurrence,

was now distinguished; but considering these offers as incompatible with the notions of greatness which he entertained, they were positively declined. It would be improper not to mention the restoration of the banished Chilians to their families, which was almost the first act of the government. San Martin returned to Buenos Ayres, to receive new orders and to concert new plans with the government, all eyes being now turned towards Peru, as the quarter in which their long looked-for peace and liberty would be sealed. On approaching Mendoza, the capital of Cuyo, he was met by its inhabitants, the youth strewing roses in the road, and all demonstrating the most heart-felt expressions of regard: the inhabitants of Buenos Ayres were equally desirous of showing every mark of veneration for this hero; but San Martin, being apprised of their preparations, stole into the town unobserved. Some are disposed to condemn what appears to them an affected squeamishness, and false delicacy, in thus declining honours which are known in general to be grateful to the human heart; but for this very reason, in my opinion, it is great and noble to decline or despise them.

The cause of the state in Peru, when conducted by the virtues, experience, and abilities of Belgrano, who, on his return from his important mission to Europe had once more assumed the command, was again seen to revive. In the rencontres already related we have seen that victory had also returned to our side. General Serna, who succeeded Pezuela, was not possessed of the abilities of his predecessor; although the celebrated leaders Padilla and Munecas were killed, Warnes and Ganderilla and Fernandez supported the cause of their country. By these the sanguinary Tacon was pushed to the very verge of the precipice; but this victim was reserved for another hand; a ray of lightning, sent from heaven,

put an end to his days and his cruelties. His army was reduced almost to nothing.

General Serna discovered only a vain and arrogant confidence in his own powers. He had scarcely assumed the command, when he conceived the design of attempting the reconquest of Salta and Jujui and even of Tucuman. The history of his predecessor ought to have opened his eyes. These places had proved the sepulchres of the Spaniards, and he might cause them to be so again. These admonitions were disregarded by Serna, who, more haughty than the knight of La Mancha, entered Jujui at the head of an army of upwards of two thousand men. Governor Guemes rendered the possession of the place little better than a trap for his destruction. He and his brave countrymen invested him so closely, that he soon began to repent of his folly. His forces were incessantly harassed by a great number of guerillas, and much reduced by the actions of San Pedrita, Huniaquaca, Tarija el Barrada, and others. From the deserters, who were continually coming over with misery painted in their countenances, it appeared that they were perishing of famine in their trenches. Guemes, with his brave officers, Roxas A——, Tarenos, La Madrid, Cardad, &c. compelled Serna to retire at last with great loss, and to renounce his designs upon the cities before mentioned. These flattering occurrences were only interrupted by the lamentable rivalry of the Orientals with the capital. Although Artigas, by means of his chiefs, succeeded in gaining over the greatest part of those whom his conduct had alienated, there were still many who remained firm in their resolution of a separation from his authority, a conduct which they considered necessary to the safety of the republic. Of these, not a few who were of the province of Entre Rios, by their chiefs Erenu and Samanuego, lowering their tone, ac-

knowledgeed that they had been wrong, and sought the friendship of the Director. A circumstance which might possibly lead to the overthrow of an ambitious man, and assure the liberty of the country was not to be despised. Resentment for personal insult might also perhaps have had its influence with the Director; he had just received from Artigas a letter couched in the most declamatory and abusive language; accusing him of paying no regard to his offers by letter, of sending deputies to the union; charging him with connivance at the supplies furnished the Portuguese, with being in their interest, and threatening to pursue him even to the capital itself.

1818.—The Director, with a view of securing the Baxada de Santa Fé, which commands the interior country of Buenos Ayres, and at the same time of furnishing assistance to the inhabitants of Entre Rios, dispatched a body of troops under Montes de Oca. These were furiously attacked by a detachment from Artigas, and completely defeated. This unfavourable occurrence did not deter the Director from his design; he dispatched Col. Marcos Balcarce with reinforcements to take the field anew. The Orientals, inflamed by that rage which characterises civil wars, and the more on this occasion as they regarded themselves as ungenerously attacked by their countrymen at the moment they were fighting the enemies of the republic, with an impetuosity bordering on desperation, fell upon the army of Balcarce, and after a short but brave resistance on the part of the latter, victory declared itself for the Orientals. Let us deeply lament the fatal policy, or necessity, of delaying with our own hands the progress of events by which we are to gain our independence, and turning upon one another those arms which ought to be reserved only for our common enemies.

About the same time news of a much more serious nature reached the capital, and produced the most painful



sensations. While San Martin and O'Higgins were endeavouring to reduce the last strong hold of the Spaniards in Chili, the fortress of Talcaguana, the Viceroy of Lima, with all possible despatch, threw fifteen hundred men into that place, which in point of strength may be compared to Gibraltar. The army of Chili, under the command of San Martin, was increased to nearly double its number by the new levies among the Chilians; but time was requisite to train and discipline them. O'Higgins took possession of the town of Concepcion, of which Talcaguana is the sea-port. Here, a great part of the summer was passed away in skirmishes, in which the enemy were generally worsted. San Martin was, however, occupied in designs of greater magnitude; he was unremittingly engaged in preparing to strike the same blow in Peru which had so successfully paralyzed the power of Spain in Chili. The want of transports was the principal cause of delay, as a march through the desert of Atacama would be impracticable. The Viceroy dreading the enterprise of San Martin, and knowing the materials by which he was himself surrounded, conceived it most prudent to risk the fate of Peru in Chili. Accordingly after an effort, which in the present fallen state of the Spanish power might be considered great, he collected about five thousand men, which were hastily embarked for Talcaguana under Osorio, leaving Peru entirely defenceless. Osorio had scarcely reached that place, when he commenced preparations for proceeding directly to the capital of Chili: he calculated with confidence on the superiority of his troops over those whom experience had not yet taught him to respect; he also flattered himself with being able to overtake the army of O'Higgins, before it could form a junction with San Martin. Osorio, taking with him nearly all the garrison of Talcaguana, together with two thousand of the natives of Chili, marched rapidly through the province of Concepcion

with an army of nearly eight thousand men. Before he passed the Maule, the patriot army had already formed a junction, and consisted of an equal number of regulars, besides considerable bodies of the militia of the country. In a few days it was completely organized and consolidated; but so large a body of men, when collected, soon began to experience considerable wants. The capital of Chili confidently trusted to the abilities and valour of San Martin, while the circumstance of the wants of his army, when made known to them, afforded an opportunity of displaying a magnanimity which we have unjustly supposed to have been buried beneath the ruins of Greece and Rome. San Martin announced that his army was ready to take the field against the enemies of the country, and that all were willing to sacrifice their lives in its defence, but that it was in want of bread and other supplies. The effect which this intimation produced in the noble-minded people of Chili, is best displayed in the reply which they made through the different officers of the municipality and corporations.

“Your Excellency,” said they, “has just informed us that our brethren in the field of battle are in hourly expectation of being called upon to shed their blood and sacrifice their lives for our preservation. Your Excellency recalls to our recollection the sad image of Chili, laid waste for two years and an half, with an atrocity truly Spanish; whilst our children, our fathers, and our wives, who (terrified at the chains and gibbets preparing for them by the monsters that have reached the plains of Talca) turn their tearful eyes towards the brave that, on the banks of Tangeuca, have sworn to perish sooner than behold their desolation. But your Excellency, at the same time, intimates to us that these brave men are in want of bread and other supplies, in order to support with vigour the arms destined to exterminate our enemy, and that the public fund having been exhausted, there scarce-



ly remained a sufficiency for the hospital, where the wounds received for our defence are to be healed. And what does your Excellency expect will be the reply of the Chilians to a representation so mournful and affecting? That all our fortunes, without reserve, belong to *our country*. That from this moment we request your Excellency will be pleased to accept the spontaneous offer of whatever silver we have in our possession, together with the vow which we make before our country and the universe, that so long as the war shall last, and the wants of Chili may require it, there shall not be seen a single article of plate in our houses.

“The people of Chili are unwilling that the silver of the churches should be touched, until that which belongs to individuals shall be entirely exhausted, we shall then humbly say before the Supreme Being, *To preserve the precious gifts of life and liberty, which thou hast bestowed upon us, we present ourselves naked, to implore thy protection, while we endeavour to support thy ordinances with the aid of those things which we had set apart to adorn thy worship; our vows and ardent adoration shall henceforth be the most pure and becoming homage we can offer Thee.*

“In the mean while, will your Excellency be pleased to accept the offer on the part of the secular and regular clergy, of whatever articles of plate belong to them in particular, and which do not appertain to the ceremonies of religion, and whatever belongs to the magistrates and corporate bodies, which we offer in our name and in the name of the people of Santiago.

“Your Excellency will therefore be pleased to accept these offerings, and to inform our brethren that they may rely on the utmost exertions of our gratitude.”

This unexpected but sublime display of gratitude was replied to by the Director in a suitable manner: accepting their offer, he declared himself unable to find expressions sufficiently strong to do justice to the magnanimity of

their conduct ; but for the purpose of commemorating so glorious an action, he ordered the following inscriptions to be engraven on the two columns which adorn the eastern and western entrances of the city :

*“ On the 5th of March, 1818, the people of Santiago voluntarily stripped themselves of all their plate and utensils of silver, protesting that they would acquire no others, until their country shall be out of danger.*

*“ Nations of the universe ! Strangers who enter Chili, say whether such a people deserve to be slaves.”*

The patriot army lost no time after its junction, in marching to meet the enemy. The army of Osorio had already passed Talca ; it was not long before a continual skirmishing took place between the invaders and the patriots. These were kept up for several days, until the 19th, when an affair of some importance took place between the advanced corps under O'Higgins, and a part of the Spanish army, in which the latter was compelled to fall back with considerable loss, being pursued into the very streets of Talca. The whole Spanish force had been compelled to fall back upon its steps. Osorio now discovered that his contempt of San Martin's army had led him into error ; it was so much superior to his, particularly in cavalry, that the chances of success would be decidedly against him ; knowing that in all probability San Martin would attack him the next morning with his whole force, and that if defeated, with a large river and numerous bodies of militia in his rear, retreat would be no longer possible. In this critical situation, by the advance of General Ordones, he determined to select two thousand of his best troops, and try the fortune of a night attack, which, if successful, would enable him to retire without fear of pursuit. The principal part of the army had in the evening halted within a short distance of Talca : the remainder of the infantry having arrived, and the ground being reconnoitred, orders were given

about nine o'clock, for each division to occupy the position assigned to it. The right wing had already been posted, and the left was also in motion, when the enemy rushed upon them in the most furious and unexpected manner; the baggage and artillery were first thrown into confusion, which was soon communicated to the troops on their march; these, after a short resistance, broke and dispersed in every direction, in spite of the exertions of their leaders. The Director of Chili, who commanded in person, was severely wounded in the arm, in his efforts to rally them. The right, however, under the immediate command of that excellent officer, Colonel Las Heras, retired in good order, and together with some other bodies, collected by the exertions of San Martin and his officers, continued the contest for some time, but were compelled at last to give way. The next morning presented a spectacle truly melancholy: an army, of which the day before our country might justly have been proud, the best appointed that had ever taken the field on the side of independence in South America, stripped of its artillery and baggage, and more than one half dispersed, and this without having been beaten.

San Martin conducted the fragments of his army to the narrow pass of Angulemu, which lies on the route to Santiago, and which the enemy could not avoid without making a very considerable circuit. Here he remained in the most painful situation, deprived of his baggage, and his men in want of every thing. In the mean time the stragglers, dispersed through the valleys of Chili, spread the most disheartening accounts among the inhabitants, and so complete was supposed to have been the defeat of San Martin, that the partizans of Spain, wherever any of them happened to be, could scarcely refrain from openly declaring themselves. San Martin with the Director, whose presence was required in the capital, made it a hasty visit for the purpose of

inspiring confidence in the people, and of procuring the means of recomposing his army. He now judged it most prudent to fall back upon the capital, where his army could be recruited with greater celerity, and intending in case of defeat to retire into the city, which the Director was actively engaged in placing in a state of defence. The army, under the creative hand of San Martin, with a celerity almost incredible, in the course of a few days, and after a march of eighty leagues, once more presented a formidable front on the plains of *Maipo*. The most animated proclamations were circulated through the country by him and the Director; hope was seen to revive, and the patriot army was animated by a desperation gathered even from its late disgrace. The news of this lamentable occurrence, arriving at the same time with that of the misfortunes of the eastern shore, cast a gloomy shade over Buenos Ayres. The most melancholy anticipations filled the breast of every American, while the Spaniards among us discovered their joy, on some occasions, with very little discretion. Our apprehensions induced us to believe that the affairs of Chili were still worse than the government had been willing to communicate; the very importance of the contest in that country was enough to produce doubts in the minds of the most sanguine. Osorio finding the success of his attack to have so far exceeded his expectations, determined to follow up his blows, but having himself experienced a considerable loss, he was somewhat retarded in setting off; his march was notwithstanding rapid, having approached the *Maipo* in twelve days after the dispersion of the patriot army. On the 3d and 4th of April there were frequent skirmishes, and early in the morning of the fifth the two armies came in sight of each other; the body of the Spanish forces having crossed the *Maipo*. The whole morning was passed in manœuvring; each chief in vain endea-

voured to gain some advantage over his opponent. San Martin rode incessantly along his lines, addressing each individual corps, and infusing into them his own feelings, while the patriotic songs and marches resounded through the army. Seeing, at last, that there was no probability of his being attacked that day by the Spaniards, and finding his men roused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, he gave orders to advance. With the exception of a small height, which the enemy had occupied with some pieces of artillery, the ground was nearly level and well adapted to military manœuvres. The infantry was placed under the command of General Balcarce, Colonel Las Heras on the right wing, and Colonel Alvarado on the left; the artillery and cavalry posted on each wing, and a strong reserve in the rear under Colonel Quintana. In this order the army moved towards the enemy, who opened a dreadful fire from his infantry, and from several pieces of artillery posted on the small elevation before mentioned, but without arresting its progress; a body of the enemy's cavalry charged at the same time, but were driven back by that of the patriots who pursued them even under their guns. The action now became general and bloody; our line, at last, appeared to vacillate, but at this moment the reserve being ordered up, the whole returned to the charge, and with an irresistible impetus carried every thing before them. The resistance of the enemy was, however, so obstinate, that they had to be literally pushed from the ground with the bayonet. The regiment of Burgos, composed of the best troops of Spain and twelve hundred strong, was not broken until after repeated charges, which San Martin is said to have led in person. The remnant of the enemy's force then threw themselves into some narrow lanes, made by walls, and under their shelter commenced the contest anew, but were at length entirely overcome. This action lasted from noon until six

o'clock in the evening, and was contested on either side with a courage and firmness worthy of the great prize which was at stake; not merely the independence of Chili, but perhaps of South America. The history of wars furnishes us with few instances of a victory more complete; the whole Spanish army was annihilated; artillery, military chest, every thing belonging to it fell into the hands of San Martin. Its chief alone fled with some horsemen, when he saw that the day was lost. Ordonez, the second in command, 198 officers, 3,000 rank and file, surrendered their arms; and 2,000 of their dead covered the field of battle. The loss of the country did not exceed 1,000 in killed and wounded. The capital, from its extreme depression, was now elevated to the highest pitch of joy. The streets, before silent and fearful, were suddenly filled by the inhabitants, like the blood, which, after some moments of deep suspense and anxious fear, rushes again from the heart to the extremities of the body. The scene which ensued can only be conceived by those who have witnessed the sublime effusions of popular feeling, when each thinks his own happiness, that of his posterity, his friends, and his country, are entirely involved. There was a general and almost universal exclamation, "AT LAST WE ARE INDEPENDENT!" while San Martin was hailed as the genius of the revolution.

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## APPENDIX B.

*Manifesto directed to all Nations by the General Constituent Congress of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata.*

HONOUR is the jewel which mortals prize above existence itself, and which it is their duty to defend above every earthly good, however great and valuable. The



government of Spain has accused the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, before the nations of the world, of perfidy and rebellion, and has denounced as perfidious and rebellious, the memorable declaration of independence of the 9th of July, 1816, by the national Congress of Tucuman, imputing to them ideas of anarchy, and intentions of introducing seditious principles into other countries, at the very moment of soliciting the friendship of those countries, and their recognition of this declaration that they may assume a place among the nations of the earth. The first among the most sacred duties of the national congress is to do away so foul an imputation, and to justify the cause of our country by publishing to the world the motives which concurred to impel the declaration of independence. This is not a submission which concedes to any one the right to dispose of a condition purchased by America with torrents of blood, and every species of sacrifice and endurance. It is a duty of imperious obligation which it owes to its wounded honour, and to the respect due to other nations.

We shall wave all discussion with respect to the right of conquest, of papal grants, of other titles by which the Spaniards have supported their domination; it is unnecessary for us to recur to principles which may give rise to theoretic disputes, or to questions which have found advocates on both sides. We appeal to facts, forming a lamentable contrast between the sufferings endured by us, and the tyranny of the Spaniards. We shall expose to view the frightful abyss into which these provinces were about to be precipitated, had not the wall of their emancipation been interposed. We shall give reasons, the soundness of which no rational being can question, unless it be his aim to persuade a nation to renounce for ever all idea of felicity, and adopt for its system ruin, opprobrium, and shameful acquiescence. We shall exhibit this picture to the world, that no one may con-



template it without being deeply affected with the same feelings that belong to ourselves.

From the moment the Spaniards took possession of these countries, they thought only of securing their power, by exterminating and degrading. Their systems of devastation were immediately set on foot, and were continued without intermission for 300 years. They began by assassinating the Incas of Peru, and they afterwards treated in the same manner the other chiefs who fell into their power. The inhabitants of the country, attempting to repel these ferocious invaders, became victims to the sword by reason of the inferiority of their arms, while their cities and villages were consigned to the flames, every where applied without pity or discrimination.

The Spaniards then placed a barrier to the increase of the population of the country; they prohibited by vigorous laws the entrance of strangers into it, and in latter times they opened it to criminals, to convicts cast out of the Peninsula. Neither the vast but beautiful deserts, formed here by exterminating the natives; nor the benefits which might accrue to Spain herself, by the cultivation of plains fertile as they are extensive; nor the existence of minerals, the richest and most abundant of the globe; nor the attraction of innumerable productions, some until then unknown, others precious from their intrinsic value, and capable of animating industry and enlivening commerce, carrying the one to its highest pitch, and the other to the utmost extent of opulence; nor, in fine, the unceasing exertions necessary to keep the fairest regions of the earth submerged in wretchedness, had sufficient influence to change the dark and portentous policy of the court of Madrid. From one city to another of this country there are hundreds of leagues lying waste and uninhabited. Entire nations have disappeared, buried under the ruins of mines,

or perishing in an atmosphere poisoned with antimony, under the diabolical institution of the mitas. Neither the lamentations of all Peru, nor the energetic representations of the most zealous ministers, sufficed to put a stop to this system of extermination.

The science of working mines, regarded with indifference and neglect, has remained without undergoing those improvements common to other nations in an enlightened age; thus rudely wrought, their riches have disappeared, either by the falling in of excavated hills, or by the influx of water. Other rare and valuable productions of the country have remained in the great storehouse of nature without having excited the attention and zeal of the government; and if at any time an enlightened individual presumed to publish these advantages, he was sure to be reprehended by the court, and compelled to be silent, lest, possibly, a diminution of the demand for some of the productions of Spain might ensue.

It was forbidden to teach us the liberal sciences, we were only permitted to learn the Latin grammar, the philosophy of the schools, civil and ecclesiastical jurisprudence. The Viceroy, Don Joaquin Pinto, gave much offence by permitting a nautical school at Buenos Ayres, and in compliance with a mandate of the court, it was ordered to be shut; while at the same time it was strictly prohibited to send our youth to Paris for the purpose of studying the science of chemistry in order to teach it on their return.

Commerce was ever a monopoly in the hands of merchants of the Peninsula, and of their consignees sent by them to America. All public offices and employments belonged exclusively to the Spaniards; and although Americans were equally called to them by the laws, they were appointed only in rare instances, and even then not without satiating the cupidity of the court by enor-

mous sums of money. Of one hundred and seventy viceroys that have governed in this country but four have been Americans; and of six hundred and ten captains-general and governors all but fourteen have been Spaniards. The same took place in every other post of importance; and even amongst the common clerks of offices it was rare to meet with Americans.

Every thing was disposed on the part of Spain, in America, to effect the degradation of her sons. It did not suit the policy of Spain that sages should rise up amongst us, fearful lest men of genius should remind them of advancing the condition of their country, and of improving the morals and excellent capacities with which its sons have been gifted by their Creator. It was her policy incessantly to diminish and depress our population, lest one day we should imagine aught against her domination, guarded by a force too contemptible for keeping in subjection regions so various and vast. Commerce was exclusively confined to herself, from a mean suspicion that opulence would make us proud, and render us capable of aspiring to free ourselves from so many vexations. The growth of industry was checked, in order that the means of escaping from our wretchedness and poverty might be denied us; and we were excluded from all participation in public employments, in order that the natives of the Peninsula might have entire influence over the country, so as to form the inclinations and habits necessary for retaining us in a state of dependence, that would neither permit us to think or to act but in conformity to the modes dictated by the Spaniards.

This system was acted upon with the utmost rigour by the viceroys: each of them was invested with the authority of a vizier: their power was sufficient to annihilate all those who dared to displease them: however great the vexations they practised, we had to bear them with patience, while these were compared by their satel-

lites and worshippers to the effects of the wrath of God. The complaints which were addressed to the throne were either lost in the distance of many thousand leagues, over which they had to pass, or they were smothered in the offices at Madrid by the protectors of those who tyrannized over us. Not only was this system not softened, but there was no hope of its moderating in the course of time. We had no voice, direct or indirect, in legislating for our country: this was done for us in Spain, without conceding to us the privilege of sending delegates or counsellors, to be present, and to state what would be suitable or otherwise, as is practised by the cities of Spain. Neither did we possess such influence in the government set over us as might serve to temper the severity of its administration. We knew that there was no remedy for us but to bear with patience; and that for him who could not resign himself to every abuse, death was considered too light a punishment; for, in such cases, punishments have been invented of unheard-of cruelty, and revolting to every sentiment of humanity.

Less enormous, and less pertinaciously persevered in, were the outrages which compelled Holland to take up arms, and to free herself from Spain; those which induced Portugal to shake off the same yoke; those which placed the Swiss, under William Tell, in opposition to the emperor of Germany; those which induced the United States of North America to resist the encroachments of Great Britain; or those of many other countries, which, without being separated by nature from their parent-states, have separated themselves, in order to shake off an iron yoke, and to take into their own hands the care of their own felicity, than what we have experienced. We, however, separated by an immense ocean, inhabiting a country gifted with every variety of climate, possessing distinct wants, and treated like flocks and herds, have exhibited the singular example of pa-

tient endurance under such degradation: remaining obedient even when the most seducing circumstances presented themselves for casting off the yoke, and driving the Spanish power to the other side of the ocean.

We address ourselves to the nations of the world, whom it would be impossible to think of deceiving in matters to which they themselves have been witnesses. America remained tranquil during the whole war of the succession; and awaited the termination of the contest between the houses of Austria and Bourbon, in order to follow the fortunes of Spain. A favourable occasion then presented itself to free ourselves from so many vexations, but we did not seize it; on the contrary, we exerted ourselves in her defence, arming in her cause alone, and with a view of maintaining our connexion with her. Without having any concern in her differences with European nations, we have embarked in her wars; we have suffered the devastations, we have borne without a murmur all the privations to which we were exposed by her nullity on the ocean, one of which was the interruption of the usual communication with her.

In the year 1806, our country was invaded; an English expedition surprised and captured Buenos Ayres, the capital, through the imbecility of the Viceroy; who, though without European troops, had numerous resources fully adequate, which he knew not how to avail himself of. We prayed assistance from the court, to enable us to defend ourselves against a new expedition which threatened us, and the consolation we received, was a royal mandate to defend ourselves as we could. The following year, the eastern shore (Banda Oriental) was occupied by a new and more formidable expedition: the town of Montevideo was besieged, and taken by assault: here the British troops were augmented, and a powerful force prepared for making another attack on

the capital, and in fact the attack was made a few months afterwards; happily, the valour of our citizens triumphed over the enemy in the assault, compelling him, after a brilliant victory, to evacuate Montevideo, and the whole of the eastern shore.

A more favourable opportunity of rendering ourselves independent could not have been desired than that which now presented itself, if the spirit of rebellion or perfidy had been capable of moving us, or if we had been susceptible of those principles of anarchy and sedition imputed to us. At that time we had abundant cause for doing what we have since done. It was by no means our duty to be indifferent to the state of degradation in which we had so long existed. If at any time victory authorises the conqueror to be the arbiter of his own destinies, we might justly then have fixed ours; we were with arms in our hands, triumphant, and there was not a single Spanish regiment to oppose us; and if neither victory nor force can give right, ours was still greater no longer to tolerate the domination of Spain. We had nothing to apprehend from the forces of the Peninsula: its ports were blockaded, and the seas commanded by the fleets of Britain. Notwithstanding the favourable conjuncture thus presented to us by fortune, we chose to preserve our connexion with Spain, hoping, by this distinguished proof of loyalty, to effect a change in the system of the court, and render it sensible of its true interest.

But we flattered ourselves with vain hopes. Spain did not regard this conduct as an evidence of the generosity of our dispositions, but as a bare act of duty. America still continued to be ruled with the same tyranny, and our sacrifices, though most heroic, had no other effect than to add a few more pages to the history of that oppression under which we had so long groaned.

Such was the situation in which we were found by the



revolution of Spain. We, who were habituated to yield a blind obedience to all her mandates, readily acknowledged Ferdinand VII of Bourbon, although raised to the throne by a tumult at Aranjuez, which deposed his father. We saw him soon after pass over into France; we saw him there detained with his parents and brothers, and deprived of the crown which he had just usurped. We saw that Spain, every where occupied by French troops, was shaken to her centre; and that in her civil convulsions, the most distinguished individuals, who governed with wisdom in the provinces, or served with honour in her armies, fell victims to the insensate fury of rivals. That in the midst of these vibrations, governments rose up in each of those provinces, styling themselves supreme, and claiming sovereign authority over America. A junta of this kind, formed at Seville, had the presumption to be the first to demand our obedience, and we were obliged by our viceroys to recognize it and yield it submission. In less than two months, another, entitled the Supreme Junta of Galicia, pretended to the same right; and sent us a viceroy, with the indecent menace, that thirty thousand men should also be sent if necessary. The Junta Central next erected itself: we immediately obeyed it, without having had the slightest share in its formation, zealously and efficaciously complying with all its decrees. We sent succours of money, voluntary donations, and supplies of every kind, to prove that our fidelity would stand any trial to which it could be subjected.

We had been tempted by the agents of King Joseph Bonaparte, and great promises were held out to us of bettering our condition should we unite ourselves with his interests. We knew that the Spaniards of greatest note had already declared for him; that the nation was without armies, and without the vigorous direction requisite in moments of so much difficulty. We were in-



formed that the soldiers of Rio de la Plata, who were prisoners at London, after the first expedition of the English, had been conducted to Cadiz, and there treated with the greatest inhumanity, and that in a state of nakedness they had been sent off to fight against the French. Yet our situation continued unchanged until, Andalusia having been occupied by the French, the Junta Central was dispersed.

Under these circumstances there was published a paper, without date, and signed only by the Archbishop of Laodicea, who had been president of the extinguished Junta Central. By this paper a regency was ordered to be formed, and three persons, as those who should compose it, were designated. An occurrence so unexpected could not but cause us to hesitate and ponder over it seriously. Our situation became alarming, and we had reason to be apprehensive of being involved in the misfortunes of the capital. We reflected upon its uncertain and vibrating state, more especially as the French had already appeared before the gates of Cadiz and the island of Leon: we distrusted the new regents, who were unknown to us, the most distinguished Spaniards having passed over to the French, the Junta Central dissolved, its members denounced as traitors in the public papers. We saw the inefficacy of the decree published by the Archbishop of Laodicea, and the insufficiency of his powers for the establishment of a regency; we knew not but the French had taken possession of Cadiz, and completed the conquest of Spain in the interval which must elapse before those papers could come to our hands; and we doubted whether a government, formed out of the fragments of the Junta Central, would not soon meet with the same fate. Considering the perils which surrounded us, we resolved to take upon ourselves the care of our own safety, until we should obtain better information of the true condition of Spain, and whether her go-

vernment had acquired stability. Instead of discovering this stability, we soon learned the fall of the regency, and saw it succeeded by continual changes of government in moments the most arduous and critical.

In the meanwhile we formed our junta, in imitation of those of Spain. It was purely provisional, and in the name of our captive king. The viceroy Don Baltazar Hidalgo Cisneros dispatched circulars to the provisional governors, in order to light up the flames of civil war, and arm provinces against provinces.

The Rio de la Plata was immediately blockaded by a squadron: the Governor of Cordova immediately began to raise an army: the Governor of Potosi, and the President of Charcas, marched with another to the confines of Salta; and the President of Cusco, presenting himself with a third army on the banks of the Desaguadero, entered into an armistice of forty days, and before its term had elapsed re-commenced hostilities, attacked our troops, and a bloody battle ensued, in which he lost fifteen hundred men. Memory is horror-struck in recalling the abominable cruelties then perpetrated by Goyeneche in Cochabamba. Would to God it were possible to forget this ungrateful American, who, on the day of his entrance into the city, ordered the respectable Governor-intendant Antesana to be shot, and, observing with complacency, from the balcony of his house, this iniquitous assassination, ferociously cried out to his troops not to shoot the victim in the head, as it was wanted to be stuck upon a pike. When it was severed from the body, by his command the headless trunk was dragged through the streets, while at the same time the brutal soldiers were barbarously permitted to dispose at pleasure of the lives and property of the inhabitants during many successive days.

Posterity will be shocked by the ferocity manifested

towards us by men who ought to have been interested in the preservation of the Americans ; and they will regard with astonishment the madness of attempting to punish as a crime an act marked with the indelible seal of fidelity and love. The name of Ferdinand of Bourbon preceded all the acts of the government, and headed its public documents.—The Spanish flag waved on our vessels, and served to animate our soldiers. The provinces, seeing themselves reduced to a kind of orphanage by the dispersion of the national government, by the want of another of a legitimate character, and capable of commanding respect, and by the conquest of nearly the whole of the mother country, had raised up for themselves an Argus to watch for their safety, and to preserve them entire, so that they might be restored to the captive king, in case he should regain his liberty. This measure was sanctioned by the example of Spain herself, and produced by her declaration, that America was an integral part of the monarchy, possessing equal rights, and had already been adopted in Montevideo, at the instance of the Spaniards themselves. We offered to continue our pecuniary aids for the prosecution of the war, and a thousand times published the uprightness and sincerity of our intentions.—Great Britain, to which Spain was then so much indebted, interposed her mediation and good offices, to prevent our being treated in a manner so harsh and severe. But the Spaniards, fixed in their sanguinary purpose, rejected the mediation, and dispatched rigorous orders to all their generals to prosecute the chastisement of the Americans with redoubled activity ; scaffolds were every where erected, ingenuity was taxed for inventions to frighten and afflict.

From thenceforward no pains were spared, and no means left untried, to divide us, and engage us in mutual

extermination. They have spread abroad the most atrocious calumnies against us, attributing to us the intention of renouncing our holy religion, and of encouraging an unbounded licentiousness of manners. They have made a religious war against us, contriving by a thousand ways to disturb and alarm the conscience, and causing the Spanish bishop to publish ecclesiastical censures and excommunications, and to sow, through the means of some ignorant confessors, fanatical doctrines even in the penitential tribunal. By means of those religious discords, families have been divided against themselves; they have occasioned dissensions between father and son; they have broken asunder the delightful ties which unite husband and wife; they have sown rancour and hatred between the most affectionate brothers; they have, in fine, endeavoured to poison all the harmony of society.

They have adopted the dreadful system of putting men to death indiscriminately, for no other purpose than to diminish our numbers; and, on entering our towns, have been known to massacre even the unfortunate market-people, driving them into the public square in groups, and shooting them down with cold-blooded, wanton cruelty. The cities of Chuquisaca and Cochabamba have more than once been theatres of this shocking barbarity.

They have compelled our soldiers, taken prisoners, to serve against their wills in the ranks of their armies, carrying the officers in irons to distant outposts, where it was impossible for them to preserve health for a single year, while others have been starved to death in dungeons, and many have been forced to labour on the public works. They have wantonly shot the bearer of flags of truce, and have committed the utmost horrors upon chiefs after their surrender, and other principal person-

ages, notwithstanding the humanity that had been shown by us to those prisoners who fell into our hands; in proof of this assertion we need only mention the Deputy Matos of Potosi, Captain-general Pumacagua, General Angulo, and his brother, the Commandant Munecas, and other partizan chiefs, shot in cold blood, many days after having surrendered as prisoners.

In the district of Valle Grande they indulged themselves in the brutal sport of cutting off the ears of the natives, and then transmitting a panier full of them to head quarters; they afterwards destroyed the town by fire; burnt about forty populous villages of Peru; and took a hellish pleasure in shutting up the inhabitants in their houses before setting them on fire, in order that their unhappy victims might be burnt alive.

They have not only shown themselves cruel and implacable, in murdering our countrymen, but they have thrown aside all regard to decency and morality, parading old men of the religious profession and women in the public places made fast to a cannon, stripped naked, and their bodies exposed to shame.

They have established an inquisitorial system for all these punishments: they have dragged out peaceful inhabitants from their houses, and transported them across the ocean to be tried for pretended offences, and have executed without trial a multitude of citizens.

They have chased our vessels, sacked our sea-coasts, murdered defenceless inhabitants, without sparing clergymen, and those in extreme old age; by the order of General Pezuela, they burnt the town of Puno, and meeting with no others, they put to the sword old men, women, and children. They have excited atrocious conspiracies among the Spaniards residing in the midst

of us, imposing upon us the painful necessity of putting to death the fathers of numerous families.

They have compelled our brothers and sons to take up arms against us, and forming armies by the impressment of the natives of Peru, have compelled them, under the command of Spanish officers, to fight against our troops. They have excited domestic insurrections, corrupting with money, and every species of seduction, the pacific inhabitants of the country, in order to involve us in a frightful anarchy, and to enable them to attack us weakened and divided. They have displayed a new invention of horror, in poisoning fountains and food, when beaten in La Paz by General Pinelo; and the mildness with which they were treated, when compelled to surrender at discretion, was rewarded by the barbarous act of blowing up the barracks, which had been previously mined for the purpose.

They have had the baseness to attempt to tamper with our governors and generals; and, abusing the sacred privilege of flags of truce, they have repeatedly written letters inciting to treason. They have declared that the laws of war, recognized by civilized nations, ought not to be observed towards us, and with contemptuous indifference replied to General Belgrano, that treaties could not be entered into, or kept, with insurgents.

Such had been the conduct of Spaniards towards us when Ferdinand of Bourbon was restored to the throne. We then believed that the termination of our troubles had at last arrived; it seemed to us, that the king, who had been formed in adversity, would not be indifferent to the miseries of his people; we therefore dispatched a deputy to him, to make known our situation. We could not doubt but that he would give us a reception worthy a benign prince, and that he would feel an interest in our supplications, as well from gratitude as from that



beneficence which the Spanish countries had praised to the skies. But a new, and before unknown ingratitude was reserved to be experienced by the countries of America, surpassing all example that the history of the worst of tyrants can present.

Scarcely had he returned to Madrid, when he, without ceremony, at once, declared us insurgents. He disdained to listen to our complaints, or hearken to our supplications, tendering a pardon as the only favor he could offer. He confirmed in authority the viceroys, governors, and generals, who had perpetrated the bloody deeds before detailed. He declared as a crime of state, the having pretended to form a constitution for ourselves that we might be placed beyond the reach of the capricious, arbitrary, and tyrannic power, to which we had been subjected for three centuries; a measure which could displease none but a prince who is inimical to justice and beneficence, and consequently unworthy of ruling.

With the aid of his ministers, he at once set to work in collecting forces for the purpose of being sent against us. He caused numerous armies to be transported to this country, in order to complete the devastations, conflagrations, and robberies, so well begun. He availed himself of the moment when complimented by the principal European powers on his return from France, to engage them to deny us every succour, and to look on with indifference, while he was gratifying the cruelty of his disposition in destroying us.

He has established a peculiar regulation for the treatment of American privateers, barbarously ordering their crews to be hanged; he has forbidden the observance towards us of the Spanish naval ordinance, established in conformity with the laws of nations, and he has denied every thing to us which we invariably allow to his sub-



jects captured by our cruisers. He sent his generals with decrees of pardon, which they caused to be published, with no view but to deceive the simple and ignorant, in order to facilitate their entrance into cities and towns; but giving at the same time private instructions, authorizing and commanding them, after having thus obtained possession, to hang, burn, sack, confiscate, assassinate, and to inflict every possible suffering, on those who had availed themselves of such supposititious pardons. It is in the name of Ferdinand of Bourbon that the heads of captured patriot officers have been stuck up on the highways; that a distinguished partizan leader has been actually empaled; and that the monster Centano, after having murdered Colonel Gamargo in the same manner, cut off his head, and sent it as a present to General Pezuela, informing him that it was a miracle of the *Virgin del Carmen*.

It has been by a torrent of evils, and bitter afflictions such as these, that we have been compelled to take the only course that remained to us. We reflected deeply on our situation and future fate, and turning our eyes to every quarter, we were unable to see any thing but the three elements of which it must necessarily be composed, opprobrium, ruin, and abject submission. What could America expect from a king, actuated at the very moment of seating himself on the throne by sentiments so inhuman? Of a king, who, previous to commencing his devastations, hastened to prevent the interposition of any other prince to restrain the effects of his insensate fury? Of a king, who has no other rewards but chains and gibbets, for the immense sacrifices of his Spanish subjects in releasing him from captivity? Of subjects, who, at the expense of their blood, and of every privation, have redeemed him from a prison, in order to adorn his temples with a crown? If those men, to whom he owed so

much, thus received death, were doomed to perpetual imprisonment, or to base slavery, for no other crime than that of having framed a constitution, what might we not expect to be reserved for us. To hope for a benign treatment from him, and from his bloody ministers, would have been to seek among tigers for the mildness of the dove. Then, indeed, would have been repeated towards us the ensanguined scenes of Caracas, Carthagena, Quito, and New Granada; we should then have spurned the ashes of the 80,000 persons who have fallen victims to the fury of the enemy, and whose illustrious manes justly call for revenge; and we should have merited the execrations of every succeeding generation of our posterity, condemned to serve a master, always disposed to tyrannize over them while by his nullity on the sea he has become impotent to protect them from foreign invasion.

We therefore, thus impelled by the Spaniards and their King, having declared ourselves independent, and in self defence against tyranny, have staked our honours, our lives, and our fortunes. We have sworn before the Supreme Judge of the Universe, that we will never renounce the cause of justice; that we will not permit the country which he gave us to be buried beneath ruins, and submerged in blood by the hands of executioners; that we shall never forget the obligations that we owe to save her from the dangers which threaten her, nor the sacred right to require of us all necessary sacrifices to prevent her from being soiled by the foul footsteps of tyrants and usurpers. This declaration is engraven on our hearts, that we may never cease to combat in her cause. And at the same time that we unfold to the world the motives that have induced to this step, we have the honour to make known our desire of living in peace with all, and even with Spain herself

from the moment she thinks proper to accept our offer.

Given at the congressional hall in Buenos Ayres, 25th of October, 1816.

*Dr. Pedros Ignacio de Castro y Banos, President.*  
*Jose Eugenio de Elias, Secretary.*

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## APPENDIX D.

*Notes, which the Secretary of State, in the Department of the Government, and of Foreign Relations, places in the Hands of Messrs. the Deputies of the United States of North America for the Information of the President of those States.*

THE nation is styled the United Provinces of South America.

The number and denomination of each, with its intendencies and chief towns of districts (Cabezas de Partido), according to the former state of the viceroyalty, appears in Document No. 1.\*

In 1814, five more provinces were erected, whose names are, Tucuman, Mendoza or Cuyo, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and Oriental del Rio de la Plata.

The capitals of the two latter, are the town of Conception del Uruguay or Arroyo de la China, and the city of Montevideo.

Out of the fourteen provinces, into which the territory of the ancient viceroyalty is now subdivided, there are nine in the hands of the patriots, which are stated in said document under the title of free provinces; and

\* The table here referred to, from the mode in which it was printed in the papers laid before Congress, is so confused and unintelligible that the editor has thought proper to omit it altogether.

those occupied with troops or under the influence of the Spanish army, are the other five, whose names are, Potosi, Plata or Charcas, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Puno.

In all the territory of the ancient viceroyalty, there is but one archbishopric, which is that of La Plata, and six bishopricks, which are stated in said document under the denomination of Suffragans.

The territory of the United Provinces contains 145,000 square leagues. Their population, according to the nearest estimate, amounts to 1,300,000, without including the aborigines. Their productions, manufactures, and articles of commerce, will be seen in Statement No. 3.

The political state of the provinces called free, is quiet and tranquil; they are under the influence of the supreme direction of the state, which resides in Buenos Ayres. They have their governors in the intendencies, or capitals; lieutenant-governors in the chief towns, villages, &c. The province of Assumption del Paraguay is an independent state, as also the Oriental del Rio.

The funds, public revenues, and annual expenditures, will be seen in the Statement No. 3, with the notes on the same.

The land military force of the united territory appears in the Statements No. 4 and 5 \* the latter shows the amount of arms and munitions of war, which it possesses in its armies, parks, in its manufactories, and its armory.

The naval force will be seen in the Statements No. 6 and 7.

\* Not given in the original, but the regulations of the military force will be found in Appendix E, Section 6.

The authority of the supreme director, of his secretaries, and of the tribunals of justice, are detailed in the provisional regulations, a copy of which is annexed under No. 8.\*

There is a tribunal of prizes, which is composed of the secretary of the war department; the president of the chamber of appeals; the assessor del gobierno, and the auditor-general of war; there is another tribunal which takes cognizance of appeals from the decisions of the former, and is composed of the supreme director of the state, the secretary of state for the government and for foreign affairs, and the secretary of the treasury. This tribunal takes cognizance also in case of supplication, and all being subject to the reglamento del curso, No. 9, † and other special regulations, which, although not appearing in the provisional regulations established by Congress, have notwithstanding been approved by the same.

At the present moment the formation of a constitution for the state is in progress. A committee, consisting of members of congress, are assiduously engaged, and will soon present a project of the constitution.

The population of the city of Buenos Ayres, according to the census of 1815, amounted to 50,999 inhabitants. This census was inaccurate and underrated. Since then, the emigration of foreigners has been unusually great, as also the emigration of numerous families from the Banda Oriental, and Entre Rios, so that its population is at present estimated at 62,000 souls.

Besides other institutions, this capital has what is called the Colegio Seminario; another institution for the education of youth, called the Union of the South, will

\* Not given; but the substance will be found, more in detail, in Appendix E.

† Not given in the original.

be opened on the 25th May next, with a general plan of education, particularly of the languages and sciences: there is also an academy of jurisprudence: one of drawing, four for the study of medicine, and board for the examination of those who prepare to practise.

There are three printing offices; a public library with 20,000 volumes; schools for teaching the first elements in every parish: there is a society of men of taste for the stage; another of friends of the country; another of agriculture: a cannon foundery; a manufactory of small arms; one of swords; an armory; three parks of artillery; three powder magazines, and a variety of manufactories in different branches.

The independence of the state was declared at Tucuman the 9th of July, 1816, the congress being assembled at that place, and there sanctioning it. To obtain its acknowledgment by foreign powers, communications and invitations have been made to them; in Europe there is an envoy extraordinary to its several courts, he is Dr. Bernardino Rivadavia.

These provinces have been, *de facto*, independent of Spain since the year 1810, when they openly made war upon her in Peru, in Paraguay, and in Montevideo. Early in 1813, as soon as the province of Potosi was taken possession of by the patriots, they coined money there, impressed with arms of the state, hoisted the national flag, and took other public steps, which were equivalent to the most solemn declaration of the new rank which they assumed.

They armed a considerable number of privateers, which have ruined the Spanish trade, and they have even blockaded some ports in the Peninsula.

It was not the proclamation of independence which gave origin to the rights of the Americans; it merely recognized them as they had before existed, and had

been claimed since the memorable epoch of the 25th of May, 1810.

It appears unnecessary to make any further explanations of those facts and circumstances, which having come within the knowledge of the commissioners, particularly of late, must have afforded the information desired.

GREGORIO TAGLE.

*Buenos Ayres, April 21, 1818.*

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No. 2.

*Showing the productions, manufactures, and branches of commerce, of the free Intendencias and their dependencies.*

BUENOS AYRES.—Grain, hides, tallow, wool, hair, horns. These are an inexhaustible supply of commercial resources: the trade with the Pampas Indians alone in honey, wool, salt, bridles, reins, and feathers, exceed the sum of 100,000 dollars per annum.

PARAGUAY.—Wood of a superior quality, of many varieties; the herb mate, tobacco, guambe, and peasaba for cables, honey, and molasses, dried sweetmeats, sugar, rice, cotton cloths, various kinds of gums and resins, beautiful birds.

CORDOVA.—Grain, hides, woollen and cotton cloths, raising of mules and herds, excellent lime, minerals of gold and silver.

MENDOZA.—Dried fruits of many different kinds, wines and brandy, grain, cattle, woollen cloths, carriage of goods, and waggons for the transportation of commodities to Chili, Buenos Ayres, and other provinces, minerals of gold.

TUCUMAN.—Woods, grain, rice, oranges, mani, to-



bacco, honey, wax, excellent cheese, woollen and cotton cloths, raising of herds, transportation of merchandize, and waggons.

SALTA.—The raising of herds, mules, of which there is annually sent seventy or eighty thousand head to Peru, grain, sugar, honey, molasses, and brandies, wool of a superior quality, as also of the vicuna, cloths of it, woods, minerals of gold and silver, copper, iron, and tin, sulphur, alum, and vitriol.

CORIENTES.—Hides, hair, cotton, agi, mani of different kinds, honey, dried sweetmeats, sugar, charcoal, cotton and woollen cloths.

ENTRE RIOS AND BANDA ORIENTAL.—Ox hides, horse hides, deer skins, otter and chinchilla skins, tallow, dried and salt meat.

TAGLE.

*Buenos Ayres, April 21, 1818.*

## No. 3.

**GENERAL TABLE** furnished by the Secretary of the Treasury, in pursuance of the order of the Supreme Director of the State, showing the capitals or funds and branches, which compose the mass of the national revenue, its produce in the year 1817, the expenditures, and the balance remaining in the treasury at the end of the same year, with an account of the other funds and capitals of the state, debts, and credits, viz.

Branches of the Revenue --1st class.		Receipts, 1817.	Expenditures, 1817.	Balance.
Balance in the treasury, 1st	}	-	880	5½
January, 1817				
Tenths and old duty of 1 1-2	}	-	-	-
per cent. on silver				
Fifths of gold	-	-	-	-
Sales of land	-	-	823	4
First fruits of civil officers	-	1,508	7¼	
Stamp paper	-	17,563	2	
Tavern licenses	-	16,760	2	
Other treasuries	-	106,647	4	
Ninths of the state	-	4,276	6	
Invalidos, (or insolvencies)	-	-	-	260 5½
Bills of exchange	-	369,427	0¾	369,427 0¾
Ordinary revenue	-	885,074	1¼	65,143 5
Receipts of the custom house,	}	1,113,102	3¾	1,113,102 3¾
pledged in the same				
Idem idem	-	98,604	6	73,983 4¼
Receipts from the post office	-	336,890	3¾	336,558 7½
Idem of the police	-	510,156	2	49,484 4½
		<u>3,001,709</u>	<u>0½</u>	<u>2,007,965 7¼</u>
<i>Expenditures charged on the mass of the revenue.</i>				
Salaries of civil or political	}	-	-	56,164 3¾
officers				
Idem of ministers and fo-	}	-	-	9,581 5
reign agents				
Idem of the military, and	}	-	-	453,050 2¼
expenses of the war de-				
partment				
Contingent expenses	-	-	-	430,853 6¼
		<u>3,001,709</u>	<u>0½</u>	<u>2,957,619 0½</u>
<i>Branches of the second class.</i>				
Vacant benefices	-	17,215	3	6,509 7¼
Escheats	-	1,900		
Ecclesiastical first-fruits	-	75		
Ecclesiastical dues	-	111	5	
Temporalities (or glebes)	-	6,784	2½	8,959 4
Military fund	-	812	5	11,683 6
Ministerial id.	-	4,976	2	4,084 5
Surgeons' id.	-	93	5	
Municipal war	-	-	-	60 7½
Extraordinary	-	-	-	
Deposits	-	3,479	6	14,306 6
		<u>3,037,187</u>	<u>5½</u>	<u>3,003,224 4¼</u>
				<u>33,963 4¼</u>

## General Table continued.

<i>Result or summary.</i>		
Produce of all the branches, } 1847,	} - -	3,037,187 5½
Expenditures of the same, } in the same		3,003,224 4¼
<hr/>		
Remaining in the treasury, } in cash	} - -	33,963 1¼
In deposits - - - - -		6,429 2½
In capitals of temporalities, } placed at interest, redeem- } able at five per cent.	} - -	93,359 3¼
In good unsettled accounts } of former years		8,554,404 2½
<hr/>		
Amount in property, good } accounts, deposits, and } sums at interest	} - -	8,688,156 1¼
Idem, real and personal es- } tate of the commonwealth		9,310,472 5¼
In advances made by the } state treasuries	} - -	297,078 7¼
Balance on accounts liquidated		759,889 7
<hr/>		
Total of the funds of the state - -	- -	19,055,597 5½
Debts of the state .		1,438,054
<hr/>		
Balance in favour of the na- } tional fund	} - -	17,617,543 5¼

*Exposition of the property and funds of the State, in all their various classes.*

In cash, in the treasuries of the state, of the custom-house, post-office, and po- lice - - - - -		33,963 1¼
In good unsettled accounts of former years - - - - -		8,554,404 2½
Deposits - - - - -		6,429 2½
In capitals of temporalities, at 5 per cent. interest. - - - - -		93,359 3¼
		<hr/>
		8,688,156 1¼

*In Real and Moveable Estate of the Commonwealth.*

By value of the effects in the storehouses		
of the treasury - - - -	2,263,104	1¼
Of amount in custom-house chests	2,233	2¼
Of the custom-house and resguardia and		
fifteen vessels - - - -	12,197	
Of the marine and fifteen vessels -	188,199	
By value of the public library -	158,322	3½
By idem of the commissariat of clothing	53,462	3½
By idem of edifices belonging to the		
state, and under the direction of the		
secretary of the treasury -	928,625	4
By idem of others in which the state has		
an interest - - - -	70,000	
By idem of mathematical instruments	2,184	4
By idem of the articles belonging to the		
police - - - -	24,017	2½
By idem to the general of accounts	3,259	4
By idem of the proceeds of the post-of-		
fice and the buildings - -	60,895	4
By idem of the College de la Union,		
Temple, and adjacent buildings, &c.	2,000,000	
By idem of the edifice which serves as a		
military prison - - - -	45,000	
By idem of the furniture, &c. of the dif-		
ferent offices in the fort or govern-		
ment-house - - - -	15,000	
By idem of the arms, ordnance, and mu-		
nitions of war with the armies -	460,149	7
By idem of the general park in this		
capital - - - -	1,337,876	3½
By idem of the cannon foundery	59,312	3
By idem of the manufactory of small		
arms - - - -	88,206	¼
By idem of the arsenal - -	307,535	
By idem of military edifices in the capi-		
tal and at Eusenada - -	1,168,981	5½
By idem on the frontier - -	26,000	
By idem of the effects, &c. in the store-		
houses of the commissariat of war	29,652	4
By idem in that of the capital -	6,258	

*Advances.*

Those made from the state treasury -	297,078	7¼
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*Balances on Accounts settled.*

On those liquidated by the general treasury	-	-	-	62,908	2	}	759,889	$7\frac{1}{4}$	
Same at the custom-house	-	-	454,396	4					
Same at the post-office	-	-	16,039	1					
Same by the collectors of contributions from commerce, from different bodies, incomes, bread, and beef	-	-	176,200						
Same by the debt due from the state of Chili, as far as liquidated	-	-	50,346						
							Dollars	<u>19,055,597</u>	$5\frac{1}{2}$

## NOTES.

1st. The public lands of the state, which consist of hundreds of leagues in the vast extent of the provinces, and whose value may be estimated at many millions of dollars, is not included in this statement.

2d. The whole of the property and funds exhibited relates only to the province of Buenos Ayres, excluding those of Entre Ríos, Santa Fé, and Corrientes; without making mention of the estimates of the rest, which amount to many millions, in the produce of their peculiar branches and property of different kinds, on account of some of them being occupied by the enemy, and not possessing sufficient data to state the particulars with accuracy; nevertheless, according to the table of estimates made by the general of accounts, in the year 1810, taking the whole of the provinces of the ancient viceroyalty, which at present compose the union, it appears that at that date the liquidated estimates, without including incomes, lots of ground, capitals at interest, and other funds, but merely the administrable proceeds, amounted to six millions eleven thousand eight hundred and two dollars.

3d. No mention is made in this table of the annual revenues of the cabildo of this capital, which, in 1817,

amounted to 367,263 dollars, because, as municipal funds, they have their peculiar destination; leaving, however, a considerable residue, which, in case of necessity by the state, may be appropriated to its use, as also those of the other cabildos of the union, of which, from the distance and shortness of time, it has not been possible to give an exact account.

4th. The amount of public debt acknowledged by the state accrued in former years, until the close of last December, paid during the administration of the present director, is 1,135,483  $5\frac{3}{4}$  dollars.

5th. Although the post-office establishment produces at present, after deducting all expenses, a small balance in favour of the state, this is owing to the franks on ultramarine communications, and the interruption of intercourse with the provinces occupied by the enemy; but in case of their becoming free, the administration of this capital alone will produce a surplus of 30,000 dollars, and the interior provinces in proportion.

ESTEVAN A. GASCON.

*Buenos Ayres, 14th April, 1818.*

No. 6.—TABLE showing the vessels of war of the navy of the State which are at present in commission.

Vessels.	Officers.	Marines.	Seamen.	Guns.	Muskets.	Pistols.	Cutlasses.	Pikes.
Brig Belen	2 Comdt. & Secd.	20	26	12—2 of 18—8 of 8—2 Swivels.	34	12	10	20
Idem Aranzazu	2 Comdt. & Secd.	24	34	10—2 of 18—8 of 8.	20		12	18
Idem 25th May	2 Comdt. & Secd.	18	25	14—2 of 18—8 of 8—& 2 Car. of 8.	15	25	24	6
Galvez	2 Comdt. & Secd.	7	22	8 of 6—8.	8	4		
Chacabuco	2 Comdt. & Secd.	10	23	8 of 8—10 Car. of 10.	14			16
Cutter Invincible	2 Comdt. & Secd.	8	18	8 of 6.	8	3		
Fortune	1 Comdt.	7	17	8 of 8 Car.—6 of 6.	9			
Faluca St. Martin	1 Comdt.		20	1 of 8.	7		6	
Total, 8	14	94	185	69 different calibre.	115	44	52	60

*Note.*—There are, besides the above mentioned, two brigs, the Eole and the Rosario, which are at present engaged in procuring their crews; also, there are two gun-boats, a falucho, and a launch employed.

Buenos Ayres, March 13th, 1818,

MATIAS DE ALDADA.



## No. 7.

*Statement of the private armed vessels which have sailed from this port since the month of June, 1817.*

1817.

June 25,	Ship Argentina,	Captain Hippolito Buchard.
August 18,	Brig Atrevido del Sud,	Captain John D. Handell.
November 6,	Corvette Union,	Idem John Brown.
Idem 20,	Schooner Pueyrredon,	Idem Diego Barnes.
December 6,	Brig Independence,	Idem Juan Grinaldes.

1818.

January 19,	Schooner Tucuman,	Idem George Wilson.
Idem 3,	Schooner Cyripo,	Idem Adam Pond.
February 20,	Schooner Buenos Ayres,	Idem Juan Dester.
Idem 24,	Schooner Alerto,	Idem Daniel Chaytor.
Idem idem,	Ship Vigilancia,	Idem George Ross.
March 4,	{ Corvette Picado de Buenos Ayres, tra- ding and cruising. }	Captain Ebenezer H. Atis.

IRIGOYEN.

*Buenos Ayres, March, 1818.*

I send you, gentlemen, the statements and notes, which exhibit the present situation of the United Provinces of South America, in order that, with the information they may afford, his excellency the President of the United States of North America, may proceed in his steps in relation to these countries, in the way most conformable to his high intentions, and to the greater prosperity and aggrandizement of the new world.

God preserve you many years, &c.

GREGORIO TAGLE.

*Buenos Ayres, April 22, 1818.*

*Messrs. C. A. Rodney and J. Graham.*

## APPENDIX E.

*Provisional Regulations, sanctioned by the Sovereign Congress of the United Provinces of South America, for the Government of the State, to be observed until the Adoption of the Constitution.*

## SECTION I.

## OF MEN IN SOCIETY.

CHAPTER 1.—*Of the Rights which belong to all the Inhabitants of the State.*

Art. 1. The rights of the inhabitants of the state, are those of reputation, liberty, equality, property, and security.

Art. 2. The first has an acceptation so uniform as to render its explanation superfluous. The second, is the good opinion of his fellows, which every man strives to win by the rectitude of his conduct. The third, is the right of acting according to the dictates of a man's own will, so long as he neither violates the rights of the public, nor those of individuals. The fourth, consists in the law being equal to all, preserving alike the rights of the weak and the powerful. The fifth, is the right of full and unmolested enjoyment of property. The sixth is the guarantee granted by the state to every one, that his rights shall not be violated unless the conditions be broken, upon compliance with which their enjoyment is, by law, made to depend.

Art. 3. Every inhabitant of the state, be he American or foreigner, citizen or not, shall enjoy these rights.

CHAPTER 2.—*Of the Religion of the State.*

Art. 1. The Apostolical Roman Catholic religion shall be the religion of the state.

Art. 2. Every man ought to respect the public worship, and the holy religion of the state: the violation of this law shall be deemed an infraction of the fundamental laws of the country.

CHAPTER 3.—*Of Citizenship.*

Art. 1. All the municipalities of the provinces shall form immediately a public register, to consist of two books, in one of which it shall be an indispensable duty to write the names of all the citizens, with a statement of the age and origin of each: in the other, shall be written the names of those, who have lost the right of citizenship, or are suspended from its enjoyment.

Art. 2. Every citizen shall obtain a certificate, signed by the *alcalde ordinario de primer voto*, and attested by the notary of the municipality, of his enrolment in the register aforesaid, without which evidence he shall not vote at the elections hereinafter mentioned.

Art. 3. Every freeman born and resident in the territory of the state, is a citizen, but shall not exercise the rights of citizenship until he shall attain the age of twenty-five, or be emancipated.

Art. 4. Every foreigner, of the same age, who may have established himself in the country, with the intention of fixing there his domicile, and having been resident there for four years, shall have become possessed of four thousand dollars' worth of property, or not holding property to such amount, shall exercise some trade, or pursue some occupation useful to the state, shall enjoy the right of suffrage in the assemblies of the citizens, provided he know how to read and write.

Art 5. After ten years' residence he shall be eligible to all public employments, except those of the administration of the government; but to entitle him to the right of suffrage, and to render him eligible, he must first renounce all other citizenship.

Art. 6. No European Spaniard shall enjoy the right of suffrage, or be eligible to office, while the independence of these provinces is unacknowledged by the government of Spain.

Art. 7. With the exception of Spaniards of this class who have declared in favour of liberty, and have rendered distinguished services to the state—these shall enjoy citizenship, proper letters of naturalization being first obtained.

Art. 8. Those born in the country, of African blood, whose ancestors may have been slaves in this continent, shall have the right of suffrage, their fathers being freemen, and shall be eligible to office, provided they be in the fourth degree from said ancestors.

Art. 9. Those Spaniards, and other foreigners, who solicit citizenship, must first prove their good conduct.

Art. 10. They shall both swear to defend, even to the extent of sacrificing property and life, the independence of the United Provinces of South America, against that of the King of Spain, his successors, and the metropolis, and every other foreign power; the supreme director shall have the power to appoint one or more commissioners to administer the oath.

Art. 11. Letters of naturalization shall be granted only to those who have resided four years within the territories of the state, unless eminent merit, distinguished services, or the public weal, demands that such residence be dispensed with; it shall be left for the present to the wisdom of the supreme director to determine when it shall be expedient so to dispense with it.

Art. 12. The proofs of adhesion to the sacred cause of national independence, and other requisites expressed, shall be made before the governors or lieutenant governors of the provinces, in whose territories the applicant may reside, with formal hearing before the *sindico procurador*, on being notified by the municipality, and

the said governor; and in default of this, the application shall be rejected.—The letters of naturalization shall be published in the Ministerial Gazette.

CHAPTER 4.—*Of the Privileges of Citizenship.*

Art. 1. Every citizen is a component part of the national sovereignty.

Art 2 In virtue of which, he has the right of suffrage, and is eligible to office, in those cases designated by this provisional regulation.

CHAPTER 5.—*Of the several Modes in which Citizenship may be lost, and its Enjoyment suspended.*

Art. 1. Citizenship shall be lost by naturalization in a foreign country: by accepting offices, pensions, or titles of nobility, from another nation; by the illegal infliction of corporal or infamous punishments; by fraud in a debtor, until the reproach being wiped away a new qualification be obtained.

Art. 2. Citizenship shall be suspended when a debtor to the state is under execution: by accusation of a crime, provided it be well founded, and the punishment prescribed be corporal or infamous, by being a hired domestic servant, by not holding property or pursuing some occupation lucrative and useful to the country, by madness or insanity.

Art. 3. Any magistrate who deprives a citizen of his right of citizenship, except for the causes enumerated in article 2, shall be punished by being deprived of his own.

Art. 4. Those judges who shall neglect to convey to the several municipalities information of the names which ought to be erased from the register mentioned in art. 1, chap. 3, in consequence of legal conviction of crime shall be deprived of the right of suffrage, and be ineligible at two succeeding elections.

CHAPTER 6.—*Of the Duties of every Man in the State.*

Art. 1. Every man in the state owes in the first place complete submission to the law, doing the good which it enjoins, and avoiding the evil which it prohibits.

Art. 2. Obedience, honour, and respect, are due to the magistrates, as ministers of the law, and first citizens.

Art. 3. Every man, unless he be a foreigner, shall cheerfully make all the sacrifices required by the country in its necessities and dangers, not even excepting that of life.

Art. 4. It is his duty to contribute to the support and preservation of the rights of the citizen, and to the felicity of the state.

Art. 5. To deserve the delightful and honourable title of *man of worth*, being a good father of a family, a good son, a good brother, and a good friend.

CHAPTER 7.—*The Duties of Society.*

Art. 1. Society ought to secure to its members the enjoyment of the rights of man.

Art. 2. It ought to alleviate the misfortunes of the citizens, and to use adequate means for their prosperity and instruction.

Art. 3. Any regulation or statute contrary to the principles established in the preceding articles shall be of no effect.

SECTION II.

OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.

CHAPTER 1.

Art. 1. The legislative power is resident originally in the nation; its permanent exercise, the mode, and its limits, shall be established by the constitution of the state: in the interim this provisional regulation shall be in force, which shall be neither amended, interpreted,

or have any addition made it, except by the sovereign congress, two-thirds of its members concurring in the measure, and circumstances demanding its adoption.

Art. 2. Until the constitution makes proper provision, all the statutes and regulations, as well general, as particular, of the ancient Spanish government, which may not be hostile to the liberty of these provinces, nor in contrariety to this provisional regulation, and also such of the regulations, made since the 25th of May, 1810, as are in conformity with it, shall subsist.

Art. 3. The supreme director of the state, the judges, and public officers, of every denomination, may communicate to congress, and consult with that body upon the doubts that may occur in the application of the laws and regulations, general, or particular, whenever they consider them in conflict with declared rights and the actual system of the government; and the resolutions adopted in consequence shall be communicated to the executive power.

### SECTION III.

#### OF THE EXECUTIVE POWER.

##### CHAPTER I.—*Of the Mode of Choosing the Director of the State, and of his Powers.*

Art. 1. The supreme executive power, until by it elsewhere placed, is in the nation, and shall be exercised by a director of the state.

Art. 2. Until a constitution be adopted, the congress shall name, from among all the citizens of the provinces, him most worthy and best qualified for so high an office.

Art. 3. In case of the absence of the director, in the defence of the state, or of other legal impediment in the exercise of this office, the congress shall make suitable provision.

Art. 4. Those citizens who are natives of the country,



and who have resided in it at least five years immediately preceding the election, can only be elevated to the supreme directorship.

Art. 5. The compensation of the director of the state shall be twelve thousand dollars annually, and he shall receive no other emolument.

Art. 6. The person filling this office shall continue in it until a constitution be adopted, or until such time, anterior to it, as congress may deem proper.

Art. 7. His title shall be that of *Excellency*, his guard and honours those of a captain general of the army, respect being had to the ordinance.

Art. 8. Upon his entrance into office, he shall before the congress, or such commissioner, or commissioners, as they may appoint, assisted by all the corporations of the place, take the following oath:—

“ I——, do swear, by God our Lord, and the Holy Evangelists, that I will discharge faithfully, and conformably to law, the office of supreme director of the state to which I have been appointed: that I will observe the provisional regulation adopted by the sovereign congress the 3d of December, 1817: that I will protect the Apostolical Roman Catholic religion, being ever watchful to secure it respect, and observance: that I will defend the territory of the provinces of the union against all hostile aggression, adopting such measures as I may deem suitable to preserve its integrity and independence: and I will retire from this office when the sovereign congress shall so order. If I do thus, God prosper me; if not, to him and my country will I be accountable.”

Art. 9. He shall watch over the execution of the laws, and the right administration of justice, urging its functionaries thereto, and to the carrying into effect the regulations of congress, giving for the last object the necessary orders.

Art. 10. He shall submit to the consideration of the national representatives, projects and reforms, conducive to public happiness.

Art. 11. He shall be commander in chief of all the forces of the state; and shall have under his orders the navy, the army of the line, and the national militia of every description, for the protection of civil liberty, the defence, tranquillity, and good order of all the territory of the union.

Art. 12. He shall be the organ, and shall represent the United Provinces, for the purpose of treating with foreign powers.

Art. 13. When he deems a rupture with any foreign power inevitable, he shall submit to congress the causes which impel to it.

Art. 14. If upon a view of these, or for other reasons, congress should decree war, the supreme director shall proceed to its solemn declaration, being authorized to raise land and sea forces, to direct their movements, and to adopt all the measures necessary to the common defence, and the annoyance of the enemy, respect being always had to article 4, chap. 1, sec. 6, of the army and navy.

Art. 15. He shall have the power of commencing, conducting, and signing treaties of peace, alliance, commerce, and other foreign relations, which, however, to be valid, must be approved by the congress, within the time stipulated for their ratification, he transmitting in this stage of the negociation all the documents relating to it.

Art. 16. In those cases in which secrecy is not essential to the happy result of negotiations, he shall submit to congress their object, and their state, to procure from this body such assistance as may facilitate them.

Art. 17. He shall receive the ambassadors, envoys,

and consuls of other states, and shall nominate those whom it may be proper to send to foreign courts.

Art. 18. He shall appoint to all military offices, and employments, generalships of the army, and naval forces, conforming to the existing ordinances of the army and marine, so far as they may be applicable.

Art. 19. He shall have the power of rewarding meritorious officers by promotion, and by bestowing medals of such form, and design, as he may deem best, without any allowance in money however, independent of the pay.

Art. 20. He shall have the general superintendence over all the branches of the national property, and revenues, over mints, mines, posts, and highways.

Art. 21. He shall appoint for the present to all offices vacant in the cathedrals of the United Provinces, and to all other benefices, to which pertain the right of presentation.

Art. 23. He may suspend public officers for just cause; giving afterwards an account to congress.

Art. 24. If the suspension be merely for reasons of policy; the sovereign congress itself shall take it into consideration.

Art. 25. If it be for imputed criminality, the sovereign congress shall appoint a commission which shall not be of their body, before which the *Agente de la Camara* shall accuse the person suspended, and the said commission, having heard the parties, shall declare whether or not he deserves to be removed from office.

Art. 26. He shall have the power of removing officers to other offices, and if, in consequence, they should be greatly prejudiced, they may bring the affair before congress.

Art. 27. He shall nominate the three secretaries, of state—of the treasury—and of war, and their several

officers, being responsible for the bad selection of the first.

Art. 28. He shall grant passports for travelling from the provinces of the state by sea and land, and licences for the loading, unloading, and departure of vessels.

Art. 29. He shall be particularly careful to preserve unimpaired the credit of the state, being attentive to the collection of its revenues, and to the faithful payment of its debts, to the extent its exigencies will admit.

Art. 30. He may of his own authority expend freely the said revenues in defence of the state, during the war that is now waging for independence, with previous information in writing, from the secretaries of the treasury and of war.

Art. 31. He shall confirm or revoke in conformity to the opinion of his *asesor*, (who shall be the auditor general of war,) sentences passed on individuals by the military tribunals established in the armies, or in the capital, or by the ordinary councils of war in the other towns of the districts.

Art. 32. He shall have power of suspending the execution of the capital sentences, of pardoning or commuting punishments on the anniversary of the national independence, or on the occurrence of any signal event, which shall augment the glory of the state, hearing first the information communicated by the tribunal before which the convict has been tried.

Art. 34. He shall every year transmit to the national representation, an exact statement of all the receipts into the different treasuries of the state, and of the municipalities of the several provinces in money, or in credits, together with the expenditures, debts, and credits, giving timely orders to those who ought to prepare said statement.

Art. 35. The orders of the supreme director shall

be obeyed, exactly in the whole extent of the United Provinces.

Art. 36. He shall grant letters of naturalization for the present, and until a constitution be adopted.

CHAPTER 2.—*Limits of the Executive Power.*

Art. 1. The supreme director shall not send expeditions by water, or by land, against any of the provinces in congress united, or others of this continent, who are engaged in sustaining their independence, without the consent of congress previously obtained.

Art. 2. He may, nevertheless, do so in those cases in which it is absolutely necessary to act promptly, giving afterwards a particular account of such proceedings to the congress.

Art. 3. He shall, in no case, hold command of a particular regiment.

Art. 4. He shall not exercise any jurisdiction, civil or criminal, in virtue of his office, nor upon petition of the parties, he shall not alter the system prescribed by the law for the administration of justice.

Art. 5. He shall, in no way, interfere with the causes cognizable by the tribunals of justice either when pending, or when sentence has been pronounced, or carried into execution.

Art. 6. When the urgency of the case compels him to arrest any citizen, he shall, within the third day after, place him at the disposal of the proper officers of justice to await their judgment, giving, at the same time, a full statement of the motives of the arrest, and all other circumstances connected with it.

Art. 7. With the exception of those cases in which a compliance with what is required in the preceding article would endanger the public security, in which case he shall hold the arrested in custody with the consent of his

assessor, and the fiscal of the chamber of appeals, who shall share with him the responsibility for the time necessary to take the requisite measures for safety, placing him then at the judges' disposal.

Art. 8. He shall neither impose new taxes, contributions, nor loans, nor augment those subsisting directly, or indirectly, without a previous resolution of the congress.

Art. 9. He shall issue no order, nor make any communication without the previous subscription of the secretary of the department to which the business belongs, in defect of which subscription, the order, or communication, shall be void.

Art. 10. He shall not grant to any person in the state monopolies, or exclusive privileges, except to the inventors of arts, or to establishments of public utility, with the approbation of congress.

Art. 11. The epistolary correspondence of the citizen is a thing sacred, which the director shall neither violate, nor intercept without incurring responsibility.

Art. 12. In cases, nevertheless, of well founded fear of treason, or subversion of the public order, at the discretion of the director, the secretary of state, and *Sindico procurador*, jointly, who in this case shall each have a vote, being bound to secrecy and under equal responsibility, the former shall have the power of proceeding with his said associates, to open and examine correspondence. The same power, under the same responsibility, and like obligation to secrecy in the governors, and lieutenant-governors of the several provinces, with their secretaries, and *Sindico Procurador*, in defect of whom the two first capitularies shall act.

Art. 13. Those who, upon a scrutiny, as aforesaid, of correspondence, shall appear to be guilty of the crime of treason, or subversion of public order, shall be proceeded

against and secured according to the greater or less imminence of the danger.

Art. 14. Except in the cases mentioned in article 30 of the preceding chapter, the director shall not dispose of the funds of the state for extraordinary expenses, without the previous consent of the three secretaries, the assessor-general and the fiscal of the Camara, and without its being made appear before the Escribano de Hacienda, that the expenditure proposed is useful and necessary.

Art. 15. He shall not exercise the prerogative given him in article 33 of the preceding chapter, in case of treason, and other excepted cases.

Art. 16. He shall not bestow any office, civil or military, upon any person related to him in the third degree of consanguinity, or in the first of affinity, without the knowledge and approbation of congress.

Art. 17. With the exception of those who, being already in service, may have been recommended for promotion by their respective chiefs, respect being had to seniority according to their merits.

Art. 18. He shall not confer the grade of brigadier, or of colonel-major, without the knowledge and approbation of congress.

Art. 19. Excepting the case in which for some brilliant action in war, or extraordinary military service, it may be proper to reward immediately a chief whose grade is next to one of those above-mentioned.

### CHAPTER 3.—*Of the Secretaries of State.*

Art. 1. The three secretaries of state shall discharge all the duties assigned them in the last ordinance, regulating their offices, which shall be in force, except where in contrariety to these articles.

Art. 2. They shall not in any case, business, or cir-



cumstances, deliberate without the previous order and notification of the director.

Art. 3. They shall have the power of communicating of themselves the orders issued by government, in the affairs of men, or importance, being bound to make an entry thereof in the book of entries, as is provided.

Art. 4. They shall not attest decrees or regulations, contrary to the provisional regulation, not even at the request or command of the director; if compelled so to do, they shall make proper protests, and give immediate information of the affair to congress.

Art. 5. They shall be removable at the will of the director, equally with their subordinate officers.

Art. 6. When the removal is in consequence of inability, want of competent information, or any other defect compatible with integrity, they shall be indemnified with other employments suitable to their circumstances and merit. They shall incur no stigma by such removal.

Art. 7. When any one of these secretaries is removed for malversation, or upon petition of a party aggrieved, congress shall take cognizance of the case.

Art. 8. The supreme director may, *ex officio*, or upon accusation, proceed summarily against the secretaries, giving an account of the proceeding to congress.

Art. 9. For the trial of the secretaries, congress shall appoint a commission, either of their own members, or of others, or it shall be appointed by such other body as they may substitute.

Art. 10. Sentence of acquittal, pronounced by the commission, shall not necessarily be followed by a restoration to office.

Art. 11. The secretaries may, for good cause, challenge the commissioners, and they may appeal from the sentence to three individuals, to be chosen out of nine,

whom the congress, a second time nominating, shall appoint.

Art. 12. The salary of these secretaries shall be three thousand dollars annually, to each; the official title *Señoria*.

## SECTION IV.

### OF THE JUDICIAL POWER.

#### CHAPTER 1.

Art. 1. The judicial power is in the body of the nation, until by them elsewhere placed; it shall be exercised for the present, and until a constitution be adopted by the court established in article 14 of the following chapter, by the courts of appeal (*las camaras de apelaciones*), and by the other judges. For those cases which have no court assigned by the law, congress shall provide.

Art. 2. The judicial power shall be entirely independent of the executive; and its principles, its form and extent, shall be subject to the laws by which it is established.

#### CHAPTER 2.—*Of the Courts of Justice.*

Art. 1. The courts of appeal (*las camaras de apelaciones*) shall have the same territorial jurisdiction as heretofore; shall be composed of five individuals, and one fiscal; when united in a body shall have the title of Excellency, (*Excellencia*), individually, that of *Usted* simply; their salary shall be fifteen hundred dollars each, free from payment of first-fruits (*media annata*) and all other charges.

Art. 2. The presidency of the courts in the interior, and at certain public assemblages, shall be held in turn by the five members every four months according to seniority; the president shall take the votes, attend to

the dispatch of business, preservation of order, exercising all the powers of the ancient *regentes*, so far as they conform to this provisional regulation, and shall have the title of Senoria in official matters.

Art. 3. No one hereafter shall be named, even provisionally, for any of the offices of the courts of appeal, unless he be more than five-and-twenty years of age, and a lawyer who has practised at least six years.

Art. 4. When vacancies happen in these courts, no nominations of persons to fill them shall be made by the director; in each vacancy four persons, being selected by the same tribunals, from among the lawyers of the district, after examination and comparison of talents and services, shall be proposed to him.

Art. 5. The numerical order, in which the aforesaid four persons are proposed, shall give no preference; two of these shall be from the place where the court sits, the remaining two from other parts of the district.

Art. 6. These offices shall be holden during good behaviour, but there may be removal from one court to another; and these officers shall be subject to scrutiny in their conduct every five years, or oftener, if justice should require it.

Art. 7. The court shall have two *Relatores*, to be chosen after competition had; the salary of each shall be fifteen hundred dollars, and they shall have no other emolument.

Two assistants, one of the law civil, the other of the law criminal, dividing between them the business relating to the public revenues at the discretion of the fiscal. The salary of each shall be twelve hundred dollars, without the ancient perquisite of *vistas* (fees.)

Two bailiffs (porteros), who shall each have a salary of five hundred dollars, and who shall execute alternately, for a week, the office of *alquacil*.

Six attorneys (*procuradores*), whose intervention shall

extend, when parties choose, to the subaltern judges of original jurisdiction, but not to the consulado, and the Juzgados de Alzadas y Diputaciones de Comercio.

And two escribanos (notaries), who shall only receive fees for services actually rendered according to the regulation (arancel), without those called *tiras*, \* which are henceforth forbidden.

Art. 8. They shall take cognizance, not only of all causes and business of which, according to prior laws, the now abolished audiences had cognizance, but also of such as the provisional regulation designates.

Art. 9. Appeals from the decrees of the *Tribunal de Alzadas de Comercio* on account of their nullity, or notorious injustice, shall be decided in the aforesaid court of appeal (camaras).

Art. 10. The trial of appeals (alzadas) shall be taken in turn by the members of the court of the district in which the appeal occurs.

Art. 11. Questions that may occur between the ordinary and mercantile jurisdictions shall be decided by the aforesaid President (camarista presidente), conforming to the character by which the consulado is established.

Art. 12. They shall take cognizance, for the present, of first appeals in cases of smuggling, and other branches of the revenue, leaving their trial, in the first instance, to the intendentes de provincia; but in cases of capture, or detention of vessels by public or private armed ships, the cognizance shall continue in the tribunals in which it is already vested.

Art. 13. When a second appeal is taken, on account of nullity, or notorious injustice, the courts, after hearing had, shall transmit an account of the proceedings, with the documents, to the director.

\* Fees paid when appeals were taken.

Art. 14. Who, with the advice of his assessor-general (asesor-general), shall nominate immediately a commission of five lawyers, who shall decide the cause, and having done so, shall be dissolved; while exercising this office they shall have the title of Excellency.

Art. 15. There shall be named by the director of the state, in the capital of every province, upon the recommendation under oath of its court, a lawyer, who shall exercise the functions of judge of appeals throughout the said provinces.

Art. 16. His salary shall be eighteen hundred dollars, free from first-fruits, and other charges.

### CHAPTER 3.—*Of the Administration of Justice.*

Art. 1. Justice shall be administered according to the principles and method which have been heretofore observed, so far as is compatible with the subsequent provisions.

Art. 2. The judges of appeals in the several provinces shall take cognizance of all appeals in civil cases from the ordinary alcaldes, and other ministers of justice.

Art. 3. Appeals to the *camaras*, to the full extent given by law, shall be allowed to those interested in all cases, except those in which the amount of property involved is one thousand dollars, or less, when two similar sentences shall be conclusive.

Art. 4. They shall have cognizance of criminal causes of every kind, referring to the court of appeals (*los camaras*) those which according to law ought to be referred to them.

Art. 5. Parties in the said causes shall have the privilege of resorting directly to the courts of appeal (*los camaras*), passing by the provincial judge.

Art. 6. The ordinance of the twentieth of April, eighteen hundred and twelve, shall be abolished.

Art. 7. In criminal cases the accused shall have the

privilege of choosing a person to assist him (padrino), who shall be present at his examination, and at the examination of the witnesses, without prejudice to the lawyer established by law, and the practice of the courts.

Art. 8. The assistant mentioned in article 7 shall take care that the examination and deposition of the witnesses shall be heard by the notary, or judge, clearly and distinctly in the terms in which they may be expressed, without modification or alteration, assisting the accused, whenever from fear, want of intellect, or other cause, he is unable, unassisted, to make himself understood.

Art. 9. Criminal causes of all classes, which may be pending without this new mode of defence, shall be prosecuted according to the usual course of law.

Art. 10. The taking of oaths shall be restored without innovation in all cases, except that of the accused's confession of his own criminality.

Art. 11. Sentences to hard labour, to whipping, or banishment, shall not be executed without previous consultation with the courts of appeals (las camaras), under the penalty of two thousand dollars, and perpetual disqualification, to be inflicted upon the judge violating this important article.

Art. 12. Except in those extreme cases, in which the public safety is so greatly endangered by popular commotion, or other cause, as not to admit of executions being deferred; information being always given to the camaras.

Art. 13. All sentences in criminal causes, to be valid, must be pronounced according to the express letter of the law; the infraction of this article shall be a crime in the magistrate, punishable by the payment of costs, and all losses incurred in consequence.

Art. 14. By the last article, it is not intended to repeal the laws authorizing the infliction of punishment at the discretion of the judge, according to the nature and



circumstances of the offence; neither is it intended to re-establish any others which, from their cruelty, have been abolished or softened by the practice of the superior tribunals.

Art. 15. No individual shall be arrested without semi-plenary proof of guilt, at least, which shall be stated in the previous process.

Art. 16. At the end of the third day, the accused shall be informed of the cause of his arrest; and if the judge arresting be not authorized to take any further steps in the case, he shall refer it to the officer to whom its recognizance belongs.

Art. 17. No accused person shall be prevented from taking the Sacrament after his confession, nor at any time for more than ten days, without just cause, which shall be entered on record, information of the obstacle to his communicating being given to the accused every third day while it continues.

Art. 18. Persons being for safe keeping, and not for the punishment of the accused, whatever, under the pretext of securing, serves only maliciously to harass, shall be punished by the superior tribunals, and proper indemnity being given to the aggrieved.

Art. 19. To decree arrest, seizure of goods, and examination of papers, against any inhabitant of the state, his name, or the marks which distinguish his person, and the object of the proceeding, must be mentioned in the decree.

Art. 20. When goods are seized an inventory shall be carefully made of them in the presence of the accused; a duly attested copy of it shall be given to him, and they shall be placed for safe keeping in the custody of the notary employed in the case, or, in defect of him, of the judge decreeing the seizure, and two witnesses.

Art. 21. When, at the time of seizure, it is impracticable to make the aforesaid inventory, the goods shall be



secured under two keys, one of which shall be taken by the judge, the other by the accused; when this is not practicable, the chests shall be closed, and sealed in his presence, and the doors of the house, which, as soon as circumstances will admit, shall be opened in his presence, and the inventory made.

Art. 22. When the seizure must be made in the absence of the accused, the judge shall name a respectable and substantial citizen, who shall act for him, and be recompensed in proportion to his labour; but if the absence of the accused arises from sickness, he shall appoint such person as he pleases as his substitute.

Art. 23. The judge or deputy arresting any citizen (not being taken in the act), without conforming to article 15 of this chapter, shall be removed; he who fails to do what is prescribed when goods are seized, shall be responsible to the owner, and make good any loss accruing in consequence.

Art. 24. The *Tribunal de Concordia* being abolished, the judge having original jurisdiction, before taking cognizance of a cause, shall use all possible means of reconciling the parties.

Art. 25. Notaries shall serve personally notices on the parties who are to subscribe them. In case of resistance or incapacity to sign, the service shall be supplied by a witness, with a statement of the defect.

Art. 26. If the notary shall not find the party to be notified at his house, he shall seek him there twice more; if then he does not find him there, he shall leave a paper, signed by him, which shall contain the decree, or other matter he goes to serve; and it being made to appear in the process that due diligence has been used to execute it, the same effects shall result as if the party had been personally notified.

Art. 27. Every omission of the notaries in a matter so interesting shall be punished by the judge before whom

the cause is pending, according to the enormity and other circumstances of the case.

#### CHAPTER 4.—*Of the Governors of Provinces.*

Art. 1. The governors and lieutenant-governors shall not, in virtue of office, have any jurisdiction, civil or criminal, retaining however all the powers relating to revenue, police, and war.

Art. 2. The code of the intendencies shall be observed by them, and all other to whom it relates, save only what relates to the Junta Superior de Hacienda, which shall be abolished, and also what may be contrary to this provisional regulation.

Art. 3. Neither the governors nor lieutenant-governors shall use the power which the 15th article of the said code gives for confirming the decrees of the cabildos.

Art. 4. In those cases, however, of well-founded fear, that the public order will be subverted by executing said decrees, they may suspend them, being responsible should the director not previously approve the proceedings.

Art. 5. All that is prohibited in chapter 2, section 3, to the supreme director of the state, shall be also forbidden to the governors and lieutenant-governors, so far as it is applicable to their respective offices.

Art. 6. The office of deputy-assessor of the intendencies, as established by the code mentioned in art. 2, shall be suppressed. Those who have obtained this office shall be attended to by the courts (camaras) in their recommendations for other employments.

Art. 7. The governors, while in office, shall appoint, as secretary, such persons as they please, who must, however, be lawyers, and who shall assist them in the departments of government enumerated in article 1 of this chapter; they shall, when they have thus nominated,

inform the director, that he may grant proper commissions.

Art. 8. The salary of such secretary shall be, for the present, twelve hundred dollars a year, including the six hundred provided by the code mentioned in article 2 for the expenses of the secretaryship, free from first-fruits and other charges.

Art. 9. No public officer of the government, mentioned in the chapters of this section, shall receive any emoluments, except in case of services rendered in defect of the notary, other than those assigned by law to his office.

## SECTION V.

### THE MODE OF CHOOSING PUBLIC OFFICERS.

CHAPTER 1.—*Of the Manner in which the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and Sub-delegados shall be chosen.*

Art. 1. Governors, lieutenant-governors, and sub-delegados, shall be appointed by the director of the state from the lists of persons eligible, either within or without the particular province, which the several cabildos, the first month after election, shall form and transmit to him.

Art. 2. These lists, which shall be printed, shall not contain more than eight, nor less than four persons for each province.

Art. 3. Of those comprehended in one list, no more than two shall be chosen, unless a third should be included in the lists of another province.

Art. 4. The appointments of sub-delegates of districts having a numerous population, without cabildos, shall be made provisionally, until municipalities are established in them.

Art. 5. The aforesaid officers shall hold their offices

for the term of three years; at the expiration of which they shall be subject to scrutiny into their conduct (residencies).

Art. 6. The salary of governors of provinces, in territory actually free, shall be three thousand dollars; and that of lieutenant-governors, two thousand.

Art. 7. If any individual, by artifice, intrigue, bribery, or other unlawful means, procures the insertion of his name on the aforesaid list, it shall be erased therefrom by the director of the state, and he shall be declared incapable of holding any office, there being sufficient evidence of his guilt.

Art. 8. If the capitulares are in any way delinquent in forming the said lists, they shall incur the punishment in the last article mentioned.

#### CHAPTER 2.—*Election of Cabildos.*

Art. 1. Election to deliberative offices (empleos consules) shall be by the people, in the cities and towns where cabildos are established; but the notifications to electors shall not extend to those who reside beyond their precincts.

Art. 2. The citizens, nevertheless, of the vicinity and county in the exercise of the rights of suffrage, may vote, if they so think proper, at said election.

Art. 3. The city or town shall be divided into four sections, in each one of which, the citizens comprehended in it shall vote for as many electors as correspond to the number of inhabitants in said district, in the proportion of one elector to every five thousand souls.

Art. 4. In the cities and towns whose population may not be sufficient for the appointment of five electors, five shall, however, necessarily be chosen, each voter voting in his own section for such persons as he deems proper.

Art. 5. At this election, shall preside a capitular, as-

sociated with two *alcaldes de barrio*, and a notary, or, in defect of him, two inhabitants of the vicinity, in the quality of witnesses; and it shall be holden on the fifteenth day of November.

Art. 6. The voting being concluded in the several sections, all the votes shall be collected in the *Sala Capitul*ar; and being publicly counted by those who have presided as aforesaid, associated with the *alcalde de primer voto*, those shall be elected who have a majority in their favour.

Art. 7. The electors shall meet on the 15th of December, in the same *Sala Capitul*ar, to make the election for the ensuing year; and it being made, they shall notify the elected, in order that they may be ready to enter upon their offices, as soon as the term of service of the *cabildo* they are to succeed expires, information being given to the governor and to the director of the state.

Art. 8. The *cabildos*, the second day after entering into office, shall elect the *alcaldes de barrio hermandad* and *pedaneros*, who may be necessary to maintain order and administer justice, according to the powers vested in them, in all the curacies and departments of the country, comprehended in their respective territories.

Art. 9. They shall form a book for the said elections, which shall be made to fall upon persons of the best repute for talents and integrity, residents in the vicinity, and who know how to read and write; and they shall transmit a list of the persons elected to the governor or lieutenant-governor of the province, for his information.

Art. 10. They shall appoint an assessor (*letrado*), who must be of the corporation, and one of the *alcaldes ordinarios*.

Art. 11. The *cabildo* shall establish the salary of the assessor, it being charged upon the funds of the municipality, if it has not been previously established; when

such funds are inadequate, information shall be given to the supreme director, in order that he may make proper provision.

Art. 12. The governors and lieutenant-governors, and cabildos already established, under the highest responsibility, shall be required to inform the congress of the places in which, from their possessing the requisite population, it may be proper to erect new corporations, with the titles of cities or towns.

### CHAPTER 3.—*Mode of Appointing Ministerial Officers.*

Art. 1. Those public officers who are required to be lawyers, with the exception of the assessores de cabildo and secretarios, assessores de intendencias, shall be nominated by the director, upon the recommendation under oath, of the courts of appeal for the respective districts. The order in which persons may be named in the aforesaid recommendation shall give no preference.

Art. 2. Recommendations for appointments to military offices of every grade and description shall be strictly made, according to the order and scale, which the ordinansa general del exercito prescribes.

Art. 3. Appointments to offices relating to revenue, police, dock-yards, manufactories, the office of captain of the port, and the like, shall be made by the director, upon the recommendation of their respective chiefs, according to seniority, when there is an equality as to ability and services.

Art. 4. The list of persons recommended shall be published by the chief recommending in the office or department where the vacancy happens, at least eight days before he transmits it to the director, that opportunity may be afforded to those aggrieved by it to obtain suitable redress.

Art. 5. When his interposition is proper, the director shall interpose, and, proceeding summarily, declare

the recommendation just, if he so finds it, and go on to nominate, or return it to the chief, making it to be amended.

Art. 6. In commissions, the qualifications and condition of the person commissioned shall always be expressed, without which he shall not be enrolled in the tribunal of accounts and the offices which belong to it, nor receive the salary to which he would be otherwise entitled.

Art. 7. Appointments to the offices of chiefs of every description shall be made by the director, respect being had to the right of choice in those in the vicinity where the vacancy happens, if such right exist, and timely information being given, as far as the public interest will admit; the director shall be responsible for the bad selection of the said chiefs.

Art. 8. All other offices in the state, the appointment to which is not by law otherwise vested, shall be open to the director, to be filled by him with such citizens as he may deem most suitable.

Art. 9. All ministerial offices shall be holden during good behaviour.

#### CHAPTER 4.—*Of the Mode of Electing the Deputies from the Provinces to the General Congress.*

Art. 1. Prior to the meetings of the primary assemblies (asambleas primarias), to be holden for the election of the deputies of the provinces, there shall be taken an accurate census of all the inhabitants of each district, unless it has been already done, at least eight years from the present time, with a statement of that portion of the population inhabiting cities, towns, and villages.

Art. 2. The primary assemblies in the cities and towns which have municipalities, shall be held in four sections, in each of which shall preside one member of the municipality and two jueces de barrio, of the great-



est probity, assisted by a notary, if there be a competent number of these officers; if otherwise, in the presence of two witnesses.

Art. 3. In every section, the voters shall vote for so great a number of electors as shall correspond to the total of population, in such manner as that there shall be one elector for every five thousand souls; but if the city or town does not admit of division into four sections, all the citizens shall vote in one place.

Art. 4. In the country, the same proportion shall be observed at elections, but the method as to the sections shall be different.

Art. 5. In every primary assembly there shall be sections, and each citizen shall vote therein for an elector.

Art. 6. The principal judge of the curacy, and the curate, with three neighbours of probity, to be appointed by the municipality of the district, shall meet at the house of the first, and shall receive the votes as they are given in, depositing them immediately in a small chest, under three keys, which shall be distributed between the judge, the curate, and one of the aforesaid neighbours.

Art. 7. The vote may be given either verbally or in writing, open or closed, as may be most agreeable to the voter; in it he shall name such person for the office of elector as he shall think proper.

Art. 8. The voter, after he has given in his vote, and if verbally, after its insertion in a schedule, shall retire; the judge shall attend particularly to this to prevent confusion and altercation.

Art. 9. If any one be charged at such election, or afterwards, with either offering or taking a bribe, he shall immediately make verbal defence before the five judges of the section, the accuser and accused being confronted; and the charge being substantiated, he shall for ever after be incapable of voting, and be ineligible to any office; false accusers shall suffer the same punishment as

those which would have fallen on the accused had the charge been substantiated.

Art. 10. The voting shall positively be concluded at the end of two days. The votes of each section shall remain shut up; and the following day, the *alcalde*, with two of the three associated neighbours aforesaid, shall take the chest containing them to the *seccion de numero*, the curate then delivering that key which was entrusted to him.

Art. 11. The district of United Curacies, which shall include in its territory five thousand souls, shall be the *seccion de numero*.

Art. 12. If there should be no town in the district of the *seccion de numero*, the municipality of some neighbouring territory shall designate the curacy which shall be the head of the section, preferring always the most populous and deciding questions which may arise in it.

Art. 13. To the head of the *seccion de numero*, shall be brought the chests of the *secciones de proporcion*, and they shall be received by the judge, the curate, and the three associated neighbours aforesaid, who, opening them, shall count the votes, declaring and certifying the majority: *all this shall be done publicly*.

Art. 14. Those chosen electors shall be informed of their election, and shall immediately repair to the place where the electoral assembly is to be held.

#### CHAPTER 5.—*Of the Electoral Assemblies.*

Art. 1. The electoral assembly shall meet in the town-house of the city or town which has a municipality, where they shall assemble on the day appointed, according to distance and other circumstances, without delay.

Art. 2. The governor, lieutenant-governor, or sub-delegado, who may be at the head of the municipality, shall preside at the first act of the electors, which shall

be to nominate a president from among themselves to preserve order: he having the majority of votes shall be president; and, upon his election, the president, *pro tem.*, shall give place to him, and retire immediately.

Art. 3. The proceedings of the electoral assembly shall be put in writing by the notary (Escribano) of the municipality, and this assembly shall only have the power of doing, previously to the business for which they are chosen, such things as are necessary to establish the regularity and validity of its election, without occupying for such purpose more time than is necessary of four-and-twenty hours.

Art. 4. It shall proceed immediately to the election of deputies for the congress; and the election shall result, for the present, from a simple plurality of votes.

Art. 5. If the case should be such that, by the scattering of the votes, and adherence to them after the third voting, no simple majority results, then those between whom there is an equality of votes shall draw lots, and this shall decide.

Art. 6. No elector shall vote for himself: within three days, the elections shall positively be concluded, and the result published. The president shall immediately inform each person elected of his election, transmitting a proper certificate, authenticated by the notary, of the fact.

Art. 7. As the number of deputies to form the general congress must depend upon the census spoken of in article 1, chap. 4, there shall be such regulation that, for every fifteen thousand souls, there shall be one representative named.

Art. 8. Should there be any fractions, the following rules shall be observed: 1. If in the seccion de numero there should be any fraction, not exceeding two thousand five hundred souls, only one elector shall be voted for, but, if it exceed that number, two. 2. If in the

district of fifteen thousand souls, which each deputy shall represent, there should be any fraction exceeding seven thousand and five hundred souls, there shall be named for them in the electoral assembly *one* deputy; but, if the fraction should be less, they shall not have such additional representative, but be considered as represented by the deputies of the provinces.

Art. 9. Each province may lessen the number of its representatives, conferring the necessary powers, and giving the proper instructions to those they may deem sufficient, if the want of sufficient funds, distance, or other just cause, prevent their naming the number adequate to their population, with the express condition that, in such powers, the cause of the diminution be stated.

Art. 10. No one, while in the office of representative, shall hold any other public office, employment, or commission; if he accept any other, he shall lose the first; but if his constituents, after his so losing it, re-elect him, he may, in this case, hold the two offices, exercising the last by deputy.

## SECTION VI.

### OF THE ARMY AND NAVY.

#### CHAPTER 1.—*Of the Marine and Regular Troops.*

Art. 1. In all that relates to the naval forces, the last ordinance of marine (*ordinanza de marina*) shall be observed, so far as it is conformable to the actual circumstances of the state.

Art. 2. The director shall have the whole military authority, and be commander-in-chief of the navy, the army, and the militia; he shall appoint a commander of each, the general staff serving at present in lieu of them.

Art. 3. The provision in article 3, of the limits of

the executive power, shall extend equally to the chief of the general staff, and the generals of the army.

Art. 4. New regiments shall not be created, while those already created are not filled up.

Art. 5. The supernumerary officers of all descriptions, who at different epochs of the government may have been dismissed from active service, either with reason or without (which shall be ascertained), upon declaration of their readiness to serve, shall be classed for appointments to vacancies in the regiments, without prejudicing those actually serving in them, or to other vacancies suitable to the circumstances of the individual.

Art. 6. If the supernumeraries in the preceding articles mentioned should have received whole pay, or half, or one third, the Directors of the state shall require, from the officers of the treasury, a catalogue of them, and the orders that may have been received for their payment, correcting them according to what results from the provision in said preceding article.

Art. 7. Until there be a complete regulation on this head there shall be no appointment to offices of profit, except those of *escala natural*, in the regiment, upon the recommendation of their respective chiefs, according to the ordinance and through the medium of the general-staff, to whom the scale of classification, mentioned in article 5, shall be sent, that it may appear who are in service and who are not.

Art. 8. Until the establishment of the uniform systems, mentioned in article 17 of this chapter, the military tribunal, established under the regulation by which it was governed, shall continue in lieu of the ancient *commission*, it being the duty of the defender of the accused to be present at the examination.

Art. 9. That article of a prior regulation, which imposes upon deserters the punishment of death for the first offence, and which declares that the plea of pay

being withheld shall not avail, being abolished in future, the *ordinanza militar* shall govern, and the punishment it provides for in cases of desertion be alone imposed.

Throughout the state shall be observed the ordinance of 30th January, 1814, as to the supplying vacancies caused by desertion.

Art. 11.\* Governors, lieutenant governors, and subdelegados, shall be ever watchful for the apprehension of deserters; if they fail in this particular, it shall be one of the first duties when *residencia* † takes place, to inflict upon them exemplary punishment.

Art. 12. If neglect in this particular be proved against them before their offices expire, it shall be the indispensable duty of the director to remove them.

Art. 13. The *alcaldes de hermandad* and *pedancas de los curatos*, for like neglect, shall incur for the first offence a fine of 100 dollars, to be applied to defraying the expenses of recruiting; and upon the repetition thereof be removed.

Art. 14. The soldier who shall inform against a deserter shall, upon his apprehension, be rewarded with ten dollars and the abatement of two years of his term of service.

Art. 15. The subaltern officers shall read, frequently, to the soldiers of their respective companies, the ordinances of the penal laws from articles 26 to 43, inclusive, of Tit. 10, Trat. 8.

Art. 16. This ordinance being, in a great measure, altered, shall be without delay reduced to order by another, which shall be formed by a military commission of three individuals, to be named by the director, as-

\* The above article was in the original erroneously marked the 10th.

† *Residencia*—According to the Spanish law, officers at the expiration of term of service, are bound to reside for a certain period in the place where they exercised their office, to give an opportunity to proceed against their malversations.

sociated with the asesor-general of war, and being framed shall be transmitted to congress for its sanction.

Art. 17. The director shall also name another commission of five individuals, military men of the most extensive information, who shall form a uniform military system, embracing the regular forces of the state and national militia.

Art. 18. He shall also appoint another commission composed of as many individuals as he thinks proper, to form a uniform system for the regulation of the marine, in all branches embracing arrangements as to ports, the establishment of nautical and mathematical schools, and transmitting it when formed to Congress.

Art. 19. He shall establish, in the capital, a permanent academy, appointing its president for the instruction of cadets of the regiments of infantry and cavalry, upon a plan to be furnished by the general-staff, and approved by the director.

## CHAPTER 2.— *Of the National Militia.*

Art. 1. Every individual of the state being in America, every foreigner enjoying the right of suffrage, every European Spaniard, with letters of naturalization, and all free persons of African or mixed blood, inhabitants of the cities, towns, villages, and country, from the age of fifteen to sixty, unless incapacitated by infirmity, are soldiers of the state, bound to support the independence which has been declared.

Art. 2. From the aggregate of all these inhabitants shall be formed, with all possible speed, in all the respective provinces, by the respective governors, lieutenant-governors, and subdelegadoes, a body of national militia, of infantry or cavalry, according to the quota of the province, and upon that footing, as to force, which the director shall determine, by regiments, battalions, squa-



drons, or independent companies, subject to the regulation of the 14th January, 1801, made for the provincial militia, the general-staff giving information of variations and additions when deemed necessary.

Art. 3. The governor, lieutenant-governor, and subdelegado of each province, shall be commander-in-chief of its militia, while in office, and shall make all recommendations for promotion to the director, through the medium of the general-staff, in the department of Buenos Ayres; the governor shall in like manner command the militia, if he be a military man, if not, the commandant general de las armas shall command.

Art. 4. In the national militia shall be included all persons who have obtained commissions in it since the date of the last cited regulations, being Americans or European Spaniards, with letters of naturalization.

Art. 5. It shall be one of the first duties of the governors, lieutenant-governors, or subdelegados, to preserve the national militia in a state of good discipline.

Art. 6. The principal object of this militia shall be to defend the state, and to aid and reinforce the army of the line when it shall be necessary.

Art. 7. When it may be necessary to detach a portion of the militia to reinforce the army of the line, the above-mentioned chiefs shall do so with persons having no just ground to claim exemptions from the service, supplying immediately the place of the force detached, in order to preserve entire the national force of the province.

### CHAPTER 3.—*Of that Portion of the Militia termed Civicos.*

Art. 1. Of the inhabitants of the several cities, towns, and villages, shall be formed the corps of civicos, by regiments, battalions, or independent companies.

Art. 2. This militia shall be solely of such as have

property, worth one thousand dollars at least, of the owners of open shops, and of all who exercise a trade or pursue some public occupation.

Art. 3. In the department of Buenos Ayres, the *civicos* shall be subject to the *Cabildo* in subordination to the supreme director.

Art. 4. Of the residue of the inhabitants, the *Cabildos* shall have the command of as many as they can organize, without prejudice to what belongs to the governors, lieutenant-governors, and *subdelegados*, in virtue of their offices.

Art. 5. The appointment of officers, to captains inclusive, shall be made by the director upon the recommendations of the chiefs of regiments, which the *Cabildos* shall transmit through the medium of the general-staff. The *Cabildos* shall by themselves recommend for officers of higher grades.

Art. 6. Those persons only of the regular army incorporated as chiefs, as sergeants, or corporals, for the purpose of instruction, shall be out of the ordinary civil jurisdiction, in order better to prevent unjust imprisonment.

Art. 7. The principal duties of the *civicos* shall be to maintain good order in the towns, to assist in the administration of justice, and defend the country.

Art. 8. No soldier of the army, of the line, or militia, national or civic, to whom arms have been entrusted, shall use them factiously against any inhabitant of the state.

Art. 9. The persons thus misusing them shall be tried and punished within the third day, by the judge to whom the cognizance of the offence belongs, for the satisfaction of public justice, deeply interested in personal security.

## SECTION VII.

## PERSONAL SECURITY AND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.

Art. 1. For those actions offending neither against public order nor interfering with private rights, men are solely accountable to God.

Art. 2. No inhabitant of the state shall be obliged to do that which the law does not clearly and explicitly command, nor restrained from that which it does not in like manner prohibit.

Art. 3. Crime is solely the infraction of laws in full force, since, without this requisite, they are not obligatory.

Art. 4. No inhabitant of the state shall be punished without previous legal sentence and regular process.

Art. 5. All orders that shall be issued by magistrates in the regular exercise of authority, to promote public order, or to regulate the business pertaining to their office, shall be in writing.

Art. 6. Excepting orders relating to the army in matters belonging to the service, as to which the ordinance of the provinces of the Union shall be observed.

Art. 7. Every citizen may keep in his house powder and arms, for the defence of his person and property, in those urgent cases in which he cannot avail himself of the protection of the magistrate.

Art. 8. The government shall not take possession of such arms unless the public defence should require them, paying their just value.

Art. 9. The house of a citizen is a sanctuary, which it shall be a crime to violate; it shall not be forcibly entered, except in case of resistance to legal process.

Art. 10. The right of forcible entry, given by art. 9, shall be exercised with moderation, personally by the judge issuing the process, and in case of his being utterly

unable to act in person, the order delegating the power shall be in writing, with all necessary specifications, a copy being given to the individual when apprehended, and to the owner of the house, should he so require.

Art. 11. No citizen shall resist the arrest of his person or the seizure of his goods when decreed by a competent magistrate, but he shall have the right of claiming the full benefit of the provisions in favour of personal security, contained in chap. 3, sect. 4, of this provisional regulation.

Art. 12. Every man shall have the liberty of remaining in the territory of the state, or departing therefrom, as he thinks proper, so long as the public security is not thereby endangered or its interests prejudiced.

Art. 13. The preceding provisions in favour of personal liberty shall never be suspended.

Art. 14. Except in those extreme cases in which the public security may require such suspensions; the public authorities, driven by so lamentable a necessity to this measure, shall give an account of it to congress, who shall examine into its cause, and the time of its duration.

#### CHAPTER 2.—*Liberty of the Press.*

Art. 1. The decree concerning the liberty of the press, which was issued Oct. 26th, 1811, and which is incorporated in this chapter, shall be observed.

Art. 2. To facilitate the use of this liberty it is declared that any individual, be he native or foreigner, may freely erect printing presses in any city or town of the state, with this sole condition, that he shall give previous information to the provincial governor, lieutenant-governor, and cabildo, and that every thing printed shall bear the name of the printer, and of the place where the press is erected.

Art. 3. The intendentes de policia shall be particularly

careful that in periodical works, and public papers, the greatest possible decorum shall be preserved, without failure of the respect due to magistrates, to the public, and to individuals.

Art. 4. In cases of violations of article 3, it shall be the duty of the said intendentes to give notice to the tribunal of the liberty of the press, which, conformably to the laws establishing and regulating it, shall scrupulously examine the matter.

*Decree of the Liberty of the Press, of October 20th, 1811.*

Art. 1. Every man may publish his opinions freely, and without previous licence (*previa censura*); all laws and regulations contrary to this liberty shall be of no effect.

Art. 2. The abuse of this liberty is a crime, when it invades private rights; its prosecution belongs to the persons interested, and to all the citizens when it endangers the Roman Catholic religion, the public tranquillity, or the constitution of the state. The magistrates having cognizance shall impose the punishment according to law.

Art. 3. To guard against abuses in the classification and graduation of crimes of this kind, there shall be created a body of nine individuals, with the title of protectors of the liberty of the press. In order to its formation the cabildo shall present a list of fifty respectable persons not employed in the administration of the government; from these selections shall be made according to plurality of votes. The electors shall be the *prelado eclesiastico*, *alcalde de primer vote*, *sindico procurador*, *fiscal de la camera*, and two respectable persons of the vicinity nominated by the cabildo. The *escribano de pueblo* shall certify the election, and respective commissions, which shall be delivered to the elected without loss of time.

Art. 4. The power of these protectors shall be limited to determining whether or not there be criminal matter in such publications as may be submitted to them. The punishment of the crime after the evidence is declared shall belong to the magistrates. The protectors shall hold their offices for one year, at the expiration of which there shall be a new election.

Art. 5. The third of the votes in favour of the accused shall be a sentence of acquittal.

Art. 6. Any party interested appealing, the protectors shall choose by lot nine individuals of the forty-one remaining on the list, out of which they themselves were selected; these shall review the matter, and their sentence, if in favour of the accused, shall be irrevocable. In cases of challenge for just cause, the places of the challenged shall be supplied in the same manner.

Art. 7. The same method shall be followed in the provincial capitals, substituting for the prior de consulado, the deputado de comercio, and for the fiscal de la camera, the promotor fiscal.

Art. 8. Works which treat of religion shall not be published without scrutiny by the diocesan. In case of accusation the work shall be re-examined by the same ecclesiastic, assisted by four of the protectors, and the majority of votes shall constitute an irrevocable sentence.

Art. 9. Authors are responsible for their works, or the printers, not making it appear to whom they belong.

Art. 10. This decree shall be observed till congress otherwise determine.

#### FINAL CHAPTER.—*General Provisions.*

1. The reglamento de policia (regulation of police) issued the 22d day of December, 1812, for the capital and province of Buenos Ayres, shall subsist for the present under the following limitations: the powers of

the intendente de policia shall remain vested as they are in the governor of the province; the three commissaries, with the powers and duties designated in the said regulation, shall continue for the present under the inspection of the governor, and among them seniority as to the possession of office shall alone give preference; except their salaries, they shall receive no emolument for services performed in quality of commissaries. The governor shall undertake no work requiring expenditure of public money without previous consent of the cabildo and the approbation of the director. Every payment shall be made according to the mode prescribed in the said regulation. No payment shall be made at the treasury without the approbation of the supreme director, and the treasurer shall replace money paid by him contrary to this article. The 3d, 4th, and 5th articles, which establish an assessor, portero, and escribano de ramo, shall be repealed, the last office being exercised by a like officer of the general government. The 8th, 10th, and 14th, shall only have effect so far as they are compatible with personal security, liberty of the press, and other rights of man, which have been declared. The 41st of the circular instruction to the alcaldes de barrio, shall be observed so far as it is compatible with the chapter upon the liberty of the press. All the change that may have been made contrary to the said reglamentos de policia, and to what the estatuto provisional (provisional statute) of May 5th, 1815, in article 1, final chapter of general provision, provides, shall be amended, the office of four commissaries last established being suppressed.

2. The cabildos of the other cities and towns of the state shall appoint a commission of four persons of the vicinity, of the best information and the greatest zeal for the public good, who, keeping in mind the said



reglamentos of the capital, shall form one suitable to the circumstances of the place, transmitting it to congress for their approbation.

3. Securities for the due discharge of duty shall be required from all officers, according to the nature of each office; the laws formerly requiring them being hereby restored. Those exercising offices, for the due performance of which security ought to be given, are peremptorily required to give it within six months from the date of this provisional regulation, the director and governors attending to this, with the privilege of taking four securities, each security binding himself for one-fourth of the whole amount.

4. To the officers of the treasury (*ministros de hacienda*), and the officers of the custom-house, (*administradores de aduana*), shall be restored the coercive jurisdiction for the recovery and collection of debts, certain and liquidated, in favour of the state.

5. The laws and decrees made by the last convention (*asamblea*) as to religious profession shall be of no effect.

6. Contributions imposed in one province for its special benefit shall not extend to the other.

7. All the provinces in the union, cities, and towns, having *cabildos*, may, without the necessity of obtaining permission, giving, however, previous information to the director, make all the establishments they may deem useful and promotive of their industry, prosperity, arts, and sciences, without prejudice to the funds of the state.

8. All those in possession of letters of naturalization, which have not been issued by the former general constituent assembly, by the present congress, or the supreme director for the time being, in virtue of the decree of 29th August, shall present them to the pre-

sent one for ratification, should they deserve it, without which they shall be of no effect.

9. All the officers of the government, including the supreme director of the state and his secretaries, shall, upon termination of office, be liable to inquiry into their conduct; the director and his secretaries, before congress, the others before judges to be appointed by the congress, the last shall be liable to such secretary for four months after termination of office.

10. The present provisional regulation shall be observed throughout all the territory of the state from the time of publication, which the director shall cause to be made in a convenient form. Those articles of the provisional statute (estatuto provisorio) passed by the junta de observacion, not comprehended herein, being repealed, and all anterior laws, regulations, and decrees, in opposition to it, being in like manner repealed.

Sanctioned by the General Congress, sealed with the provisional seal, signed by the President, and countersigned by his Secretary in Buenos Ayres, the third day of December, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and seventeen.

PEDRO LEON GALLO, President.

DOCT. JOSE EUGENIO ELIAS, Secretary.

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## APPENDIX H.

(COPY.)

*The Director (ad interim) of the State, in Buenos Ayres, to the Citizens of all the Provinces.*

I COULD wish, by means of a detailed manifesto, to explain to the people every step which has been taken

for the purpose of establishing concord with the chief of the Orientals, and the difficulties which have constantly opposed themselves to so desirable an object; by this means, also, holding out a warning to all minds of the evils which must flow from these unfortunate differences. But for the present this is not possible, nor so necessary as the immediate communication to all of the results of our last negotiations.

No mystery has been attempted in this business, even the minutest particulars have been made known to all such as were desirous of being informed; but at a distance every thing is liable to misrepresentation; it is therefore my duty to provide against it. For this purpose I confine myself for the present to the publication of the documents necessary for the information that may be desired: these will save me the trouble of a statement, that might be subject to the imputation of being made with passion; while the citizens of all the provinces will thus be left at liberty to form their opinions according to the dictates of their reason, without being led astray by partial accounts.

It is notorious that I sent deputies to the chief of the Orientals, in order that we might fix upon some plan of establishing such an understanding and harmony as would be sufficient to avoid reciprocal aggressions, until the general congress should be assembled, and arrange our differences on permanent principles.

The propositions reciprocally made did not satisfy either; the decision was reserved for a future congress.

Such was the state of things when there appeared in this city four deputies sent from an assembly of the Orientals, and united with these, Cordova, Santa Fé, and Corientes, with official instructions from General Artigas, which authorized them to enter into stipulations. The documents subjoined have originated from this procedure.

Finally, after refusing to sign the statement No. 2, of the document No. 3, they returned, giving assurances by word, that they went in peace; and they were answered, "Peace be with you." People of the provinces, it is for you to judge; the case is yours, and your safety is the supreme law of the state.

(Signed)                   IGNACIO ALVAREZ.

*Buenos Ayres, 8th of August, 1815.*

GREGORIO TAGLE.

*Plan for the Establishment of Harmony, presented by the Deputation of the Chief of the Orientals to the Government of Buenos Ayres.*

There shall be an union, offensive and defensive, between the provinces under the direction of the Chief of the Orientals, and the Government of Buenos Ayres.

The troops of Buenos Ayres which passed over to the eastern shore of the Uruguay, shall be considered as purely auxiliary, until the occupation of Monte Video; there shall be restored of what was carried away from that place, three thousand stand of arms, one thousand swords, twelve pieces of light artillery, two, four, and six pounders. There shall be mounted on the fortifications the number of pieces of artillery that may be requisite, the principal portion to be brass, with the necessary material for all and each of said cannon; nine gun boats, with all requisite supplies: powder, fixed ammunition for cannon of every calibre, also for small arms, and fifty-five thousand flints; one half of the mortars taken away; the bombs, grenades, with every thing for using them, together with the printing press.

To Santa Fé, there shall be delivered five hundred stand of arms.

To Cordova, a like number.

The remainder of the articles withdrawn from the

Oriental province of the Uruguay shall remain in Buenos Ayres as a deposit, for the purpose of aiding the other provinces, to be used at the instance of the Chief of the Orientals, and for the aid of the province of Buenos Ayres itself, according to its future exigencies.

The Deputation has the honour to state to his Excellency, the Director of Buenos Ayres, that they will cheerfully enter into any discussions to which their propositions may give rise, with the magistracy of this capital, according to the 25th article of the 1st chapter, section 3, of the provisional statute.

(Signed)      MIGUEL BARRIERO,  
                   JOSE ANTONIO CABRERA,  
                   JOSE GARCIA DE COSSIO.

*Buenos Ayres, 3d July, 1815.*

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*Official Letter of his Excellency the Director of the State,  
 to the Chief of the Orientals.*

The deputation sent by your Excellency to this Government presented your esteemed communication of the 29th ultimo, which, at the same time that it served as the credentials of the mission, manifested the desire of conciliation which animates your Excellency. I was indeed induced to expect from this, that the mission had been directed to propose more reasonable grounds of accommodation than those offered by yourself to my deputies, Colonel Pico, and D. Riverola. Judging by my own heart, I considered the negotiation already ended. I requested the deputies to give me their proposals in writing, and the following day they reproduced in substance the same as before offered, with the addition of several supernumerary articles. I immediately took steps to assemble the authorities according to the provision in such cases of the 25th art. chap. 1st, sec. 3d, of the provisional statute, by whom the subject has been

maturely considered, and the plan, proposed anew on your part, duly weighed: they have resolved to give for answer, that the claims of your Excellency ought to be left to the supreme judgment of the General Congress of all the provinces: that if in reality the sovereignty of this august body is to be recognized, it is proper to wait for its determination, which will irrevocably terminate our differences. We concurred in our private opinions how injurious to the common cause these discords must be, particularly in this important portion of the country; the sending to your Excellency the before-mentioned deputies was an act dictated by the necessity of coming to an amicable understanding, so that the expedition expected from the Peninsula should find us acting in concert, as I have expressly stated in my communication of the 11th of May. In such circumstances it was plainly for the common interest that we should at least agree not to make war upon each other, even if we should be unable to agree upon any thing else; it never could be just to expose the fate of all the provinces by disputes between the Orientals and Buenos Ayres, for advantages reciprocally claimed over each other. But since the danger which threatened us is dissipated, let us await the decision of the Supreme Congress on our cause; if we are liberal in our principles, and are not disposed to wrong the other provinces, let us give them a share in the adjudication of rights, when it so properly belongs to them.

Buenos Ayres, by the sacrifices she has made, has been reduced to her present state of honourable poverty; her efforts were made as a member of the union, and as the capital of all; as a member, she has brought all her wealth into the common fund; as the capital, she has received contributions from the other members, without discrimination. But for none has there been so much expended as for Montevideo. Your Excellency, in

her name, demands those articles which have been taken away, and generously bestows a thousand stand of arms upon Cordova, and Santa Fé, the remainder to remain in deposit, in this place, to be used at your instance (intervention) to aid the other provinces. The difficulty consists in this, that if all the other provinces should follow the examples of the Orientals, and demand what they have contributed, Buenos Ayres will also come in for a share, and it will be her duty to make an equal distribution of the property which has been saved in the general bankruptcy, to each creditor, according to the amount of his credit. But Buenos Ayres cannot be both party and judge; it is therefore evident that the next Congress is the only tribunal for the decision of this important cause. Until then (aspiring still to the praise of acting with the same moderation you have shown in the midst of the severe trials experienced in the cause of liberty, as you have observed in your communication), your conduct will be such as to preclude the occurrence of unhappy contentions; while, on my part, I shall do nothing but to endeavour to prevent it. To this end, I have ordered a force to Santa Fé, with instructions to publish the proclamations herewith enclosed. The deputies of your Excellency have experienced some detention, because, having informed them of the measure before-mentioned, I was apprehensive that they would hasten to your Excellency in order to oppose the carrying it into effect with the necessary tranquillity. They have not with all persons observed the greatest prudence in their conversation, forgetful of their character in which they appeared, and of the frankness with which they were received in this city.

I ought not to omit, on this occasion, to satisfy your Excellency with respect to the surprise which you tell me in your letter, already noticed, of the 10th of July, was felt by you at my stating in mine of the 1st of the



same month, that your Excellency was unwilling to enter into details on the subject of the establishment of mutual harmony. This complaint, which, I confess, surprised me much, was made by your Excellency in your communication of the 18th of June, brought by my deputation. Your Excellency will please to examine the original, and I hope your Excellency will not persist in asserting officially, what can thus be refuted. Let us not be intolerant because we happen to differ in matters of opinion. Athens and Lacedæmon, under different forms of government, attained equal glory and felicity; we have differed as to what best suits us, we have not yet fixed on the kind of government that is to be adopted, and for this reason our differences appear to be interminable; so that in whatsoever mode the question is received, there is the greater reason for referring it to the decision of the General Congress; we shall otherwise be at variance without the possibility of coming to a compromise; may the day of its accomplishment, with the establishment of our ardently-desired liberty, soon arrive.

(Signed)

IGNATIO ALVAREZ.

*Buenos Ayres, 1st August, 1815.*

GREGORIO TAGLE, Secretary.

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*Official Letter of Don Antonio Saens, to the Director of the State, accompanied by the Notes designated 1 and 2.*

**MOST EXCELLENT SIR,**

I have entered into conference with the Deputies of the Chief of the Orientals, in pursuance of your Excellency's instructions. I considered it expedient not to defer it until they should produce sufficient credentials from the Congress of Paysandur, of which they declare themselves the deputies: it appeared to me that the in-

formality of their powers ought not to stand in the way of the establishment of an honourable peace, when the stipulations might afterwards be legalized by confirmation; and as it is not possible for them to obtain regular powers from the Congress which no longer exists, the adjustment may still be considered as made with the Chief of the Orientals. After protracted debates, it was finally agreed that peace should be established, and that the Orientals should renounce their pretensions. Without a moment's loss of time, I proposed the establishment of its basis according to the principles agreed upon, and to sanction it by our signatures. But I soon found that in their conceptions it was not so easy to sign as to promise. They then delivered me the signed paper No. 1. I saw that it was not in my power to affirm it, on account of the doubts which it presented, and the interpretations of which it was susceptible, the simple proposition which it contains being conceived in vague and indefinite terms, and the authority of the Supreme Director narrowed in an offensive manner, placing it even below that of the Chief of the Orientals, and being changed into the simple government of Buenos Ayres; and, finally, because it is not couched in the terms used among civilized nations. For these reasons I presented them the Note No. 2, and requested their sanction. They replied, that the articles were conformable to what had been argued upon in our conferences, but that they were all consequences of the single article establishing peace, &c.; they said they would religiously pledge their faith and honour for the true performance of them, but that they were unwilling to sign the paper; this is the only reason they have thought proper to give for a conduct so strange. They dropt something, it is true, about its not being expedient to sign at the present moment, although just to do so, and that they would give an explanation of the reasons more fully on their return home. Such have been the

subterfuges with which they have evaded signing the accommodation which I proposed them, and such also is the result of our protracted conferences. The most earnest and energetic representations have been unavailing to induce them to desist from a conduct so injurious. The conferences at length closed, without effecting any thing.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ANTONIO SAENS.

*Buenos Ayres, 4th August, 1815.*

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*To the Supreme Director.*

No. 1.

The citizens Don Jose Garcia de Cossio, Don Jose Antonio de Cabrera, Don Pasqual Andrino, and Don Miguel Barriero, Deputies from the Congress of the Orientals to treat of peace with the government of Buenos Ayres, have terminated a conference with citizen Don Antonio Saens, authorized by his Excellency for that purpose, with this on y proposition:—

There shall be peace between the territories under the government of the Chief of the Orientals, and his protection, and the government of Buenos Ayres.

(Signed) MIGUEL BARRIERO,  
DON JOSE GARCIA DE COSSIO,  
DON PASCAL ANDRINO,  
JOSE ANTONIO CABRERA.

*Signed at Buenos Ayres the 3d of August, 1815.*

No. 2.

The Commissioner, on behalf of his Excellency the Supreme Director of the State, appointed to treat of peace with the four Deputies who have come for this

purpose from Paysandur, sent by General Artigas, requires that the sole proposition of peace, which they have subscribed, should be reduced to a formal and solemn treaty, as expressed in the following articles.

First. There shall be perpetual peace, friendship, and alliance between the Chief of the Orientals, and the Government of Buenos Ayres.

Second. The same shall be established between the citizens who reside under the government and protection of each.

Third. Both territories and governments shall be independent of each other.

Fourth. The Parana shall be the line of demarcation between them.

Fifth. Each of the contracting parties shall renounce all claims to indemnity for what may have been attributed to the common cause.

Sixth. They likewise oblige themselves to send deputies to the Congress of Tucuman.

Seventh. The vessels which have left Buenos Ayres for Montevideo, or other ports under the Chief of the Orientals, shall be permitted to return.

Eighth. A veil shall be cast over the past, and no one be persecuted for his conduct heretofore.

Ninth. The four deputies of the Congress of Paysandur, shall produce sufficient powers to ratify the treaty.

Tenth. The present treaty shall be ratified by the competent authorities in three days, and by the Congress assembled at Paysandur, within twelve.

(Signed) ANTONIO SAENS.

*Buenos Ayres, 3d August, 1815.*

*Another Official Letter from his Excellency the Director of the State, to the Chief of the Orientals.*

After having delivered to the Deputies from your Excellency the communication dated the 1st of the present month, advising you of the result of the last negotiations, they proposed that some mode should be adopted to render negotiation less difficult. I immediately took steps for this purpose, in order that the deputies might depart in peace, and that the same should be with this government. I repeated that I should be unchangeable in my principles of moderation, and that I would preserve all possible harmony as far as was compatible with the honour and interests of the provinces over which I have the honour to preside. I expect the like sentiments on the part of your Excellency, and in this confidence, I pray you to permit the return of the vessels which have left this river in good faith to the ports of the eastern shore, and which suffer great prejudice in consequence of the detention. In this case, justice will acquire the credit of generosity, and variance of opinion on the part of the government will be less calamitous to the unfortunate citizens who have no part in their discords.

(Signed)      IGNACIO ALVAREZ.

*Buenos Ayres, August 7th, 1815.*

GREGORIO TAGLE.

*To General Jose Artigas, Chief of the Orientals.*

## APPENDIX I.

*General Artigas to the Supreme Director, Pueyrredon.*

(Translation.)

EXCELLENT SIR,

How long does your Excellency mean to sport with my forbearance? Eight years of revolution, of privations, of dangers, of reverses, and misfortunes, ought to have sufficed to establish the rectitude of my intentions, and the character of my government; the dignity of the Oriental people has more than once shone forth: they ought to know the delicacy I have manifested in reference to the inalienability of their sacred rights; and your Excellency has the boldness to insult them! Your Excellency is doing every thing in your power to provoke my moderation; the thought of this alone should cause your Excellency to tremble. However specious may be the motives alleged in support of such conduct, they are incompatible with the general interest assailed by the Portuguese aggression. Your Excellency is guilty of a criminal conduct in repeating those slanderous insults, under cover of which the enemy believe the success of their invasion to be certain.

It is in vain for your Excellency to attempt a display of the generosity of your sentiments; the course of events alone is sufficient to refute the attempt, and these prove that your Excellency is more zealously occupied in embroiling the nation, than inspiring freemen with the energy which should animate them against tyrants, otherwise, how could your Excellency have ventured to publish the pretended recognition of the government of Buenos Ayres by the Orientals? A crime of so revolting a nature could only be perpetrated by the most impure hands; and your Excellency has had the audacity to commit it! But it was in conformity with the mysterious

plans of your Excellency to destroy the firmest rampart opposed to their execution. A people enthusiastic in the cause of their liberties must be taken by surprise: the dangers are every moment increasing, and the recognition before mentioned was brought in aid of your Excellency's designs for our common destruction. Your Excellency knows sufficiently well the dignity of my character, and that the unjust reproaches heaped upon me are the offspring of your perfidy: and this is the foundation upon which your Excellency rests your disgraceful neutrality! But it is in vain to imagine that this paltry excuse can justify your Excellency in the treachery of supplying the enemy at Montevideo with wheat, while besieged by me. It is also a fact little to the honour of your Excellency, that you have made arrangements for a third expedition against Santa Fé, with a view to foment the intrigues of the Parana, and promote insurrection on the eastern shore. The same unfriendly disposition induced your Excellency to protect the Portuguese who fled from Soriano, sending them back to their general, while instead of practising a similar generosity toward the Chief of the Orientals, you did not think proper to return the arms and other articles, which those persons carried with them in the vessels on board of which they fled. It is thus that your Excellency has endeavoured to seize a favourable moment to light up the fire of discord, to plot with the Portuguese, and excite disaffection in the regiment of Libertos, seducing them to your side, and receiving them in triumph: an act of so gross a character cannot be mentioned without scandalizing the perpetrator; and your Excellency is still the Supreme Director of Buenos Ayres.

An officer, openly in the service of Portugal, could not have acted more faithfully for his king; and to the impartial mind it must have been evident that your con-



duct was dictated by motives much more black than the cold neutrality which you allege. But whatever may be the merit of our respective criminations, sound reason declares them to be out of place, in the presence of an ambitious stranger; more than once have I exhibited an example to your Excellency, of my determination to act up to this principle. Alas! it is but too true, that the road of virtuous patriotism is as rough as the name of country is delightful. Without proving a traitor to your own understanding, it is impossible for your Excellency to be indifferent upon the subject of the detestable incursion of General Lecor, into our territory. Your Excellency has already protested against his conduct, and how will your Excellency deny the work of your own hands? Are not the Portuguese of this year, the same as of the last? Do not the same complaints exist now as then? Has not your Excellency outraged the people of Santa Fé, and in them, those of the other provinces? Confess, Sir, that you have no other object in putting on this affected neutrality, but to conceal your intrigues. The Supreme Director of Buenos Ayres neither can nor ought to be neutral. Did not your Excellency accuse the Portuguese General of violating the laws of civilized warfare, in the threat he held out against the Orientals? And how can this be reconciled to the character of a neutral? Be then a neutral, an indifferent spectator, an enemy: but let me tell you to beware of the just indignation of those, who, having sacrificed every thing to the love of liberty, fear nothing but its loss.

Renounce the despicable expectation that on the ruin of the Orientals you may one day raise the lofty column of your glory, and our degradation. The greatness of the Orientals is only to be compared with itself. They know how to meet dangers, to subdue them, and to be reanimated by the presence of their oppressors. I,

at their head, shall march wherever danger threatens. Your Excellency knows me, and ought to fear the justice of my vengeance. Your Excellency does not cease to repeat insults, offensive to my moderation, and to the discredit of the common cause. Your Excellency ought not to think me insensible. While I am in the field, engaged in a bloody conflict with the invaders, you are labouring to weaken our force by mingling with it an affair which does not fail to excite well founded suspicions. While I am engaged in opposing the Portuguese, you are taking measures to favour them : would your Excellency in my place have regarded these things with a serene countenance? I acknowledge to your Excellency that I have made a sacrifice of my feelings to my country, which claimed a concentration of all its forces. It was this which induced me to seek a peace with your Excellency, while you were endeavouring to provoke me to a war. I opened the door, which, for weighty reasons, I ought to have kept shut. I sent back to you the officers taken prisoners, without subjecting them to the sufferings which ought to have followed the crime of their violent and cruel aggression against an innocent people. Your Excellency cannot deny those acts of generosity, and which, notwithstanding your repeated promises of reconciliation, you have not been able to equal.

It is true your Excellency did send some supply of arms to the Parana, but without giving me the least intimation of it : this deceitful act had for its object the exculpation of your Excellency from the charge of indifference in the eyes of the provinces, and evinces the fertility of your machinations ; but do not think that these shallow artifices will enable you to escape. We have just experienced the effects of this generosity, in the disturbance of the Parana and Entre Rios. Can it be concealed from the provinces with what views these arms

were distributed, when done without the knowledge of the chief? Let me pray your Excellency to cease your generosity, if such are to be its effects: let me beseech you to refrain from aiding the country, if you can do nothing but obscure its splendour by such hateful scenes. No, Sir, it is not from you, that our country can expect to be freed from the ambition of the Brazilian King: instead of boasting of having saved the country, your Excellency has nothing to boast of, but of having tortured my patience to the utmost point of endurance. I have suffered for my country, and yet your Excellency dares to criminate me in public and in private. I have no need, like your Excellency, of having defenders; incontrovertible facts speak in my behalf.

Sir, I am still ready to enter into an amicable adjustment of our difference, so as to unite our forces against the Portuguese; and I repeat the offer which I made in June last. I then requested that deputies should be sent, with full powers to draw closer and closer the ties of union. Your Excellency could not deny the importance of this request, and engaged to send them. In consequence of this, I announced to the people the pleasing hope of reconciliation; but until the present day, nothing but disappointment has been the result: your Excellency, it seems, has had the effrontery to announce that deputies were expected from the eastern shore, at Buenos Ayres. It is but little becoming in your Excellency to frustrate so desirable an object, and afterwards calumniate me: this is the last insult I am willing to bear, and henceforth must request your Excellency to be silent. Such imposture is not less injurious to the reciprocity of the country, than insulting to me. In opposing the reconciliation of the two shores, your Excellency can be regarded in no other light than as a criminal, and unworthy of consideration.

Your Excellency by this time must be wearied in hear-

ing truths, but you ought to be more so in giving cause for them. They are stamped with the characters of sincerity and justice. Your Excellency has occasionally provoked my moderation: my wounded honour will demand satisfaction. I speak for once and for all; your Excellency is responsible before the altars of the country, for an inaction incompatible with its interests, and the day will come, when its justice will call you to a severe account.

In the mean time, I challenge your Excellency to appear with me in front of the enemy, and to combat with a courage which will display all the virtues that render glorious the American name.

I have the honour to salute your Excellency with cordiality and respectful consideration.

FERNANDO JOSE ARTIGAS.

*Purification, November 13, 1817.*

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## APPENDIX J.

TRANSLATION.

*Extract from the Gazette of Buenos Ayres of the 5th of February, 1818.*

### INVASION OF THE PORTUGUESE.

IN the Gazette of the 1st of December last, we published the official letter of his Excellency the Director, to the Portuguese General in the Banda Oriental, requiring him to cease his march into a territory whose union with the United Provinces of the South had not been renounced, but accidentally suspended. The Portuguese General, in his reply, denied the principles on which this protest was founded, insisting on the pretext which had induced his court to a rupture so un-

justifiable; but as at the same time he referred for his justification to the orders of his prince, from which he was not at liberty to depart, there were reasons to suspect that from the slowness of his operations, and other circumstances, he might possibly have received instructions to suspend his marches, and evacuate the country unjustly invaded. This doubt has disappeared with the event, and the occupation of Montevideo has been preceded by an action, in which that precious soil has been moistened by the blood of its sons. We shall hereafter make some further observations upon this conduct; at present we shall insert the reply of the Portuguese general, as also an official letter of his Excellency the Director, transmitted by Don Manuel Roxas, who sailed for Montevideo the 2d of the present month.

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*Official Letter of the General of the Portuguese Army, in the Banda Oriental, in Reply to that of this Government, published in the Gazette of the 1st of December last.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

Taking into consideration what you have been pleased to communicate to me in your official letter of the 13th of October last \* past, delivered to me by Colonel Vedia, on the 24th of this month, November, I can assure your Excellency, that my marches have for their sole object the removal of the germ of disorder from the frontier of the kingdom of Brazil, and the occupation of a country abandoned to a state of anarchy.

This wise and necessary measure, ought in no respect to excite uneasiness in the government of Buenos Ayres, since it has been executed in a territory which has declared itself independent of the western side.

\* This letter has been mislaid.

The most scrupulous regard has been paid to the armistice concluded on the 26th of May, 1812, establishing amity between the two countries; and in case of being attacked, I shall only act on the defensive, until the receipt of further orders from my King and Sovereign.

The proclamation which I enclose to your Excellency [the same which has already appeared in our newspapers] will make known the spirit in which I come to this unfortunate country by the commands of my Sovereign.

I continue my marches, which can only be suspended by order of the King, my Sovereign; and it will shortly be in my power, to manifest to your Excellency the good faith of my military operations, by a better opportunity and from a nearer point.

I thank your Excellency for the occasion you have afforded me of being acquainted with Colonel Vedia.

God preserve your Excellency.

Head-quarters, in Paso of San Miguel, 27th November, 1816.

CARLOS FREDERICO LECOR,  
*Lieutenant-general.*

*Illmo. & Exmo.*

*D. Juan Martin Pueyrredon.*

*Reply to the foregoing Letter by the Supreme Director.*

MOST EXCELLENT SIR,

The suspension which I observed in the operations of the army under your command, after the receipt of your reply of the 27th of November last, together with the proclamation which it enclosed, gave me reason to hope that your Excellency, doing honour to the armistice concluded the 26th of May, 1812 between his H. F. M.

and this government, whose violent infraction I protested against under the date of the 31st of October last, would refrain from giving rise to the horrors of war; or, at least, that you would enter into some temporary arrangement, until the explanations of your court could be obtained, in an affair considered not less important to the inhabitants west of the Uruguay and the Parana, than to those of the Banda Oriental. Your Excellency, notwithstanding, at an unexpected moment, hastened your marches; and, under the sole justification of force, have gone so far as to oppress with your arms the place which you now occupy, but without any other effect than to convince you of the abhorrence with which its inhabitants regard every foreign yoke.

The assurances which your Excellency presents to this government, in your before-mentioned official letter, far from affording tranquillity, only excite our alarm; and the United Provinces, in the last steps of your Excellency, can discover nothing but the sad presage of the evils which threaten them, should they remain insensible to the aspirations of a foreign power over a constituent part of the nation.

In order to demand an explanation of this aggression upon the rights of the provinces, so notoriously unjust, I have determined to send an envoy extraordinary to H. F. M., as also to learn the origin and object of a war, into which a state at peace will be plunged in order to secure the integrity of the Banda Oriental.

Until the reply of H. F. M. shall have been received, I hope your Excellency will not prosecute the war in that territory, but immediately suspend the operation of your arms, under a provisional armistice, which may be entered into by means of a person whom I shall send with sufficient authority, so soon as your Excellency will inform me of your willingness to meet my proposal, as I hope



will be done by the hand of Colonel Manuel Roxas who is the bearer of this communication.

If your Excellency, in rigid obedience to the orders of your Sovereign, under these extraordinary circumstances should continue the war, your Excellency will be responsible to humanity for the blood that will be shed; and the impartial world will approve the means of indemnity that will be taken for the sacrifices of conquest, protesting, as I do, against any usurpation of territory, comprehended within the limits recognized before the opening of the campaign of your Excellency, and beyond the frontiers of the kingdom of Brazil. God preserve your Excellency many years.

JUAN MARTIN PUEYRREDON.

*House of the government of Buenos Ayres,  
1st February, 1817.*

GEN. FREDERICO LECOR.

## NOTES ON THE REPORTS, &c.

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### Note A.

THE Indies were, by a solemn decree, annexed to the Crown of Castile in 1519. They are expressly called a kingdom in documents of legal authority; and King of the Indies is one of the titles of the Spanish monarch. They, therefore, were not, as colonies usually are, mere appendages to the mother country, to be disposed of as she might please; but an integral part of the empire, no less than Castile itself. This distinction is of more importance than metaphysical subtleties usually are. Colonies, properly so called, are completely dependant on the state to which they belong: into whatever hands the government of it may pass, they, as a matter of course, follow its destiny: they may be allowed a share in the management of the details of their internal concerns, but they cannot determine their own external political relations: they may even be sold, or given in exchange, to a foreign power. We ourselves have ceded or exchanged some of our own colonies times without number. But neither Spain nor her sovereign had any right to alienate her possessions in the New World.

The Emperor Charles V, in a decree, incorporating Spanish America with the Crown of Castile, dated Barceloua, the 14th of September, 1519, after decreeing that all title, name, or notion, of conquest, should be erased from the laws of the Indies, and that the

Indians should be considered subjects of the king, in all respects the same as Castilians, concludes with the following declaration: "Considering the fidelity of our vassals, and the hardships which the discoverers and settlers experienced in making their discoveries and settlements; and in order that they may possess with more certainty and confidence the right of always remaining united to our royal Crown, we promise and pledge our faith and royal word, in behalf of ourselves and the kings our successors, for ever, that their cities and settlements, on no account or reason, or in favour of any person whatsoever, shall be alienated, or separated, wholly, or in part; and that if we or any of our successors should make any gift or alienation thereof, contrary to this our express declaration, the same shall be held as null and void."

South America never stood to Spain in a relation similar to that in which Tobago, for instance, stands to England. It was, as we have already stated, one of the integral parts of the empire; none of which could pretend to any superiority above the rest, since whatever powers were assumed by one, might, with equal reason, be claimed by all. In this respect, the connexion between it and Spain had a greater resemblance to what subsists between England, Scotland, and Ireland, than to the humble dependance of a colonial establishment on the mother country.

From the peculiarity which we have now stated in the character ascribed to South America by the laws of Spain, two important conclusions follow.

First; No junta, whether provincial or central—no cortes elected by Spain, possessed, or could by any proceeding of their own acquire, a legitimate authority over the South Americans. The inhabitants of the New World were no more bound by the acts of any or all of the provinces of Old Spain, than Valencia

was by those of Arragon, or Valencia and Arragon together by those of Castile. They had the same right to be governed by Juntas, or Cortes, of their own election, as those parts of the empire which were situated in Europe. The authorities, therefore, which existed in the mother country during the period of the war with France, had no legal right to the obedience of the colonies: so that, at the commencement of the South American revolution, the words of the law, as well as the principles of justice, were on the side of the patriots.

Secondly; it is an acknowledged principle of public law, that where a civil war exists, both parties are to be considered by each other, and by the rest of the world, as, for the time being, independent states. Had the provinces of the Rio de la Plata been a mere appendage to Spain, they would have been entitled, during the continuance of the revolutionary struggle, to all the privileges that belong to a nation. Surely then their title to national rights must appear much stronger, when we consider that they are not a dependency, but an integral part of the inheritance of the Spanish crown, and that they broke off not from what was superior to them, but from that which, conjunctly with themselves, was subject to one supreme authority.

#### Note B.

The Commissioners here do not convey a just idea either of the treatment which the colonies received, or of the grounds on which they resolved to govern themselves. The authorities that administered the affairs of Spain in a time of confusion and dismay, when an overwhelming enemy was at their gates, might have been forgiven, though they had now and then neglected provinces which were separated from

them by many thousand miles. But neglect was not the error into which they fell. The central junta did not reign long enough to embroil itself with the transatlantic dominions of the monarchy; it was satisfied with receiving their money, and sending Spaniards to govern them. Its decree of October, 1809, declaring the inhabitants of South America equal in rights to those of the Peninsula, was well calculated to sooth; yet its jurisdiction over the Indies was very generally denied. The Council of Regency succeeded it, and boldly asserted their authority over the New World. The Cortes, that soon afterwards assembled at Cadiz, were equally lofty in their pretensions; but, to give a show of justice to their claims, ordered a number of members to be chosen by lot from among the Americans who happened at the time to be resident in the Isle of Leon. Some of them protested against their farcical election, but were nevertheless compelled to take their seats. A very rancorous spirit against America pervaded the majority of this assembly. "If the Americans," said one member, "complain that they have been the victims of tyranny for 300 years, they will now feel what slavery is for 3000 years more." "I am rejoiced," said another, after the battle of Albuera, "at the advantage we have gained, because we can now send troops to reduce the insurgents." Some declared that they could not tell to what class of beasts the Americans belonged. The number of representatives allotted to them did not bear the same proportion to the population as those of Spain; and there was clearly no intention of freeing them from the burdens under which they groaned. During 1810, the American members made three several attempts, all equally ineffectual, to obtain redress of their principal grievances. In January, 1811, they again brought forward their claims in eleven propositions,

which amounted to little more than that their commerce should be freed from its shackles, and that half of the offices in America should be filled by natives of the country. To these propositions, the Cortes would not assent. England then made an offer of her mediation. Her offer was in appearance accepted, but in reality refused: for the Cortes would allow of her mediation only on condition that she would bind herself to assist in reducing the colonies by force of arms, if they did not agree to the terms which should be proposed; and yet they did not state what these terms were to be. In the following October, England again interposed her good offices, and specified terms of reconciliation: America was to acknowledge the Cortes, and give liberal supplies for the war: in return, an act of amnesty was to be passed; her natives were to be admitted to all offices; and freedom of commerce, modified by a certain degree of preference to the mother country, was to be granted to her. These conditions were rejected by the Cortes. They were guilty, therefore, of something more than neglect. They exhibited no versatility in their conduct: they adhered steadily to the plan of continuing the existing system of oppression.

Neither is it true that the colonies resolved to act for themselves, because they conceived that they were abandoned by the parent state. They acted for themselves, because neither the Central Junta, nor the Council of Regency, nor the Cortes,\* had any legitimate authority over them, and because they saw no reason for submitting to assemblies, which possessed only an usurped power, and yet seemed disposed to keep them in degradation and servitude.

\* See Note A.

## Note c.

It is of importance that the origin of the revolution should be clearly understood. Without, therefore, attempting to trace the history of the independent government after its firm establishment, we shall unfold the first stages of its progress more fully than Mr. Rodney has done.

Towards the end of July, 1808, a French brig reached Buenos Ayres with an envoy from Napoleon, who informed the Viceroy, Liniers, of the events which had occurred in the Peninsula. Liniers, it is clear, was by no means averse to the French dynasty; but doubts of his power to accomplish what he wished, restrained him from acting with decision. He assembled the Audiencia, and the Cabildo, or Municipality, to deliberate on the measures which ought to be adopted in so uncommon an emergency. These bodies, though one of them, we mean the Cabildo, was actuated by sentiments very different from the Viceroy's, seem to have been infected with his indecision; for they came to no resolution, except that what had happened in the mother country should be made known publicly. A proclamation was accordingly issued, in which Liniers mentioned, in very obscure terms, the changes which had lately taken place in Spain, reminded the people of the indifference with which their ancestors in the preceding century had regarded the war of the Spanish succession, assured them of the admiration which their triumphs over the English had excited in Napoleon, and in the name of that usurper exhorted them to remain quiet. He would have acted with more boldness, could he have been certain that the other existing authorities in the New World would have co-operated with him; but these authorities were then floating in uncertainty,



because they could not distinguish in what direction their interests pointed. Some of them were not unwilling that the provinces under their government should be declared independent, provided their own absolute power remained unimpaired. Others were inclined to acknowledge the Princess Charlotte, sister of Ferdinand VII, and consort of the Prince Regent of Portugal, who, to obtain the regency of Spanish America, was employing the most active emissaries, and all the resources of intrigue. By submitting to her, they seemed to gain the advantages of escaping the yoke of France, of adhering to their own royal family, and of securing the friendship of the Brazils. A third class thought, that it would be most prudent, as well as most easy, to do nothing whatsoever. America, in their opinion, had only to remain a passive spectator of the struggle in the Peninsula, and to submit, without resistance, to the dynasty which should ultimately prevail. But all were aware that their common interest required that they should take their measures in concert. An active correspondence was, therefore, carried on among them; and their final resolution was, that America was united, by indissoluble bonds, to Spain, and must follow her fortune. A legal opinion to this purpose of the Oydor Cañete of Charcas, approved by the viceroys, and accepted by them as their rule of conduct, was found in the course of the revolution among the archives of the government. The policy thus resolved upon, displayed a spirit of abject servility, but was, perhaps, not unnatural in men, many of whom possessed dignities and estates in Spain, which they of course were loath to hazard.

When Liniers' proclamation appeared, his personal enemy Don Xavier Elio, Governor of Montevideo,

seized the opportunity of charging him with disloyal practices; refused on that ground obedience to his commands; and while in reality he ruled with absolute power, pretended to imitate what had been done in Spain, by assembling, for the government of the district, a junta composed almost exclusively of Europeans. Goyeneche soon afterwards arrived with dispatches from the Junta of Seville. The ambition of a governor was less odious in the eyes of Spain than a leaning towards French interests, and, therefore, the envoy approved what Elio had done. That officer, in the mean time, was carrying on intrigues with some Spaniards of Buenos Ayres, who were eager to acknowledge and make common cause with the mother country; and of course detested the Viceroy for his willingness to submit to Bonaparte. At Elio's instigation, this faction attempted on the 1st of January, 1809, to depose Liniers; but the natives supported him, not because they were partial to him or his policy, but because they disliked and suspected his opponents. The conspiracy, therefore, failed; the Spaniards were disarmed; and the natives acquired an ascendancy which they never afterwards lost.

Another district, besides Montevideo, disowned the Viceroy's authority, though from motives very unlike those of Elio. La Paz is the capital of a tract of country included within the province of Charcas, and containing about 300,000 inhabitants. Conceiving that Spain had no chance of eluding the grasp of the French despot, the people, in the beginning of 1809, formed a government for themselves, and with this view elected the most respectable persons among them to constitute, what they styled, a junta intuitiva. To suppress this commotion, troops were dispatched both from Buenos Ayres and Peru. The armies of La

Paz were defeated in successive engagements, and the victors glutted their vengeance with the most barbarous executions.

Liniers was succeeded by Cisneros. The Spaniards still retained their factious spirit; so that the new viceroy, though not inclined, like his predecessor, to French interests, was obliged, for his own security, to avail himself of the influence of the native Americans more than in other circumstances he would have thought prudent. The events which, in the mean time, happened in Spain—the battle of Ocaña—the flight of the Junta of Seville, and the general confusion that ensued, threw him into dismay. In communicating the disastrous intelligence, he expressed some doubts concerning the maintenance of his own authority. The Cabildo, therefore, presented a petition, requesting that he would summon a general meeting of the inhabitants, to determine on the steps which should be taken in so delicate a crisis. The petition being granted, a meeting was held on the 22d May, 1810, in conformity to whose decision a junta, with the viceroy at its head, commenced its sittings. The Spaniards took no share in those proceedings; and it was soon discovered that Cisneros, in conjunction with them, was meditating the overthrow of the Junta. After a formal deposition, therefore, and sentence of exile, he was embarked for the Canary Islands, along with the members of the audiencia, who had all been deeply concerned in the plot. The greater number of the Spaniards, whether employed in civil offices, or in the army and navy, retired to Montevideo.

Hitherto there had been three parties in the country: those who regarded America as bound to share the fate of Spain, and who were therefore disposed to yield to the domineering power of France:

—those who were resolved not to submit to the French dynasty, but acknowledged the existing patriot authorities in the mother country:—those who, though loyal to Ferdinand, denied the right of those authorities to rule out of the limits of the Peninsula, and wished to be governed by juntas of their own election. This third party, which included all the natives, and was, therefore, by far the most numerous, though as none of its partisans filled high offices, it had as yet made little figure, was now predominant: and the other two, who till then had displayed the most violent animosity, forgetting their quarrels, joined to resist the common foe. The Governors of Cordova, Chuquisaca, and Paraguay, prepared for war. Liniers collected an army of 2,000 men, and, to prevent the approach of the Junta's forces, laid waste the environs of Cordova. But the greater part of his troops deserted him, and went over to the opposite party; he himself, and the governor of the province, were taken prisoners and executed, along with three others who had been eminently active in opposing the revolution. The royalists were equally unsuccessful in the vicinity of Chuquisaca; they were twice defeated; their general and the president of the audiencia, were made prisoners and were both shot. In Paraguay alone their resistance was effectual. The troops which had been sent thither, after sustaining a defeat, were allowed, in consequence of a compact between the commanders, to retreat without molestation.

The revolutionary government has from its commencement remained unshaken. At different times it has been differently modified, but it has never been supplanted by Spanish authority. Still Ferdinand was acknowledged as their king. But in 1815, Don Juan Martin de Pueyrredon was raised to the office

of Supreme Director by the General Congress; and, in July, 1816, the revolution was completed by the publication of a formal declaration of independence. Pueyrredon still remains in office: but his administration having already exceeded the usual period, the Congress may perhaps elect another Supreme Director.

Note D.

The instances of severity which have occurred in the revolution of Buenos Ayres, may be distributed into three classes.

1. In the beginning of the revolution several were executed for exciting war in support of the old government. To this class belong Liniers, Allende, Moreno, Rodriguez, the Governor of Cordova, the President of the Audiencia of Chuquisaca, and Colonel Cordova. Liniers had been permitted to retire to Cordova by Cisneros; but instead of remaining quiet, he had been most active in kindling the flames of civil war. The success with which he had a few years before resisted the English, joined to the affability of his manners, and the liberality of his spirit, both of which formed a strong contrast to the pride and avarice of Spanish viceroys, had endeared him to the lower classes. Such a man could not be allowed to live without danger to the state. Exile was impossible, for the roads were blockaded at the time by a Spanish squadron; his conduct proved that he was resolved not to remain idle. It had already been in his power to live peaceably as a private citizen. He spurned the gentle treatment which he had received, and made his appeal to the sword. He had therefore no great reason to complain, if, having been unsuccessful, he met the same fate which he would have inflicted upon his opponents.

With regard to the other individuals whose names we have specified, we are not sufficiently acquainted with the particulars of their respective cases to know what were the reasons of the severity which they experienced. That there were good reasons, we have strong inducements to believe. Cisneros and the members of the audiencia had been detected in a conspiracy to overthrow the Junta. As they had all acknowledged its authority, and as some of them belonged to it themselves, they had without doubt incurred the guilt and penalties of treason. Yet instead of proceeding to the extremes which the rigour of law and justice would have prescribed, the government was satisfied with sending the offenders out of the country. It is not likely that an administration which behaved mildly towards conspirators who first acknowledged and then plotted to subvert the existing order of things, would without good reason execute stricter vengeance upon men who had resisted from the very beginning. They who were merciful in one case would not from the mere wantonness of cruelty be sanguinary in another.

But whatever were the circumstances which led to the execution of the individuals whom we have named, we must not forget that in political revolutions there is generally a necessity for a degree of harshness, from which humanity recoils with aversion. The new establishment can be secured only by the ruin of those who are most able and best disposed to support the old. The turbulence of ambitious spirits must be checked by a few examples of rigorous punishment. One of the great mischiefs of political change, is the necessity which it brings along with it of shedding blood. If the change has originated from ambition or restlessness, the guilt of the promoters of it is enhanced by all the violations of humanity,

which, after the first step has been taken, cease too often to be matters of choice. If on the contrary the change is in itself justifiable, all the misery which is caused by the efforts to accomplish it, must be charged to the account, not of those who promoted, but of those whose misgovernment produced the necessity of change.

2. The second class of instances of severity includes the men who have suffered for conspiring to overthrow the existing government. Such was the lot of Alzaga and twenty of his associates in 1812. We may pity these unfortunate men, but we cannot say that their fate was more severe than they deserved. Every government has an undoubted right to defend itself. Whether it has newly begun to exist, or has existed for centuries, whether in its origin it be an usurpation or be legitimate, it is equally entitled to punish those who, while they live in its bosom, plot its destruction. No matter though their motives be of the most exalted kind; no matter though free from every stain of interested views, they should be actuated only by a regard to the good of their country: we may regret them as victims to the public welfare, yet we cannot blame the government against which their efforts were directed, and which for that reason doomed them to death. Alzaga and his associates, therefore, would have suffered justly, though they had been animated by the purest patriotism. But their motives had no connexion with patriotism. The plot was of a most atrocious character; it was to be accomplished by the murder of all the most eminent men in the city. Alzaga's ultimate object was to make himself absolute ruler of the country, while his associates had no other aim than the restoration of the old tyranny. The execution of such men cannot be called an act of severity.



Indeed, on that occasion the government exhibited remarkable prudence, lenity, and forbearance. The plot was found to extend much more widely than was at first supposed: there was scarcely a Spaniard in the city or neighbourhood, who was not concerned in it. Had the rulers of the state been actuated by feelings of animosity, or by a spirit of undue rigour, here was an opportunity of executing bitter vengeance upon the whole host of their enemies. But instead of seeking pretexts for severity, they sought only to avoid the necessity of numerous punishments. It might have been dangerous to allow those to escape whose guilt was clearly proved. As soon therefore as they had convicted the leaders, they refused to listen to further accusations, or to hear evidence which might implicate new delinquents. We must again say, that where a government which could act with such prudence and magnanimity is concerned, charges of improper severity must not be lightly taken up.

3. The third class of instances of severity comprehends those cases in which the prevailing party among the patriots have proceeded to harsh measures against their opponents. When Saavedra, for instance, obtained a decided ascendancy in April, 1811, Larrea, Pena, Pozadas, and other distinguished men, were driven into exile. So when Alvear was forced to resign in 1815, he was obliged with several of his partisans to withdraw to the Brazils. Banishment has always been a fashionable expedient in republics. It is supported by an uninterrupted train of precedents from Athens down to Florence: and therefore we need not be surprised that the new republic of Buenos Ayres should sometimes have resorted to the use of it. When we cannot silence an opponent, we have a strong temptation to send

him where at least we shall not hear him. We are however glad to observe that the fashion is getting into disuse on the shores of the river Plate.

Though a few judicial severities have been found necessary, it is worthy of notice that the revolution in Buenos Ayres has not been disgraced by those tumults, massacres, and assassinations which too often occur, when the authority of old establishments is subverted. Its warfare, too, has been exempt from the barbarities which have been practised in other parts of the new world: and for this they deserve the higher praise, that their adversaries are said on some occasions to have carried on hostilities in the manner of savages rather than according to the rules of civilized states. Goyeneche, it is reported, after his victory in 1811, whether from cruelty, or from a hope of conquering by terror, pursued a most ferocious system. He made no selection in his victims. All his prisoners were shot, and every partisan of the revolution that fell into his hands. The scene where these transactions are said to have taken place, is far in the interior, and there are few channels of communication with it. We, therefore, would not be hasty in believing reports of this nature. If, however, there is any truth in them, to have abstained from retaliation is an instance of almost unequalled lenity.

#### Note E.

Chili is bounded on the west by the Pacific Ocean; on the east it is separated from the territory of Buenos Ayres by the Cordillera de los Andes; on the north it is divided from the viceroyalty of Lima by the desert of Atacama; on the south its boundaries are not very accurately defined. Some geographers have extended it to Cape Horn, or at least to a parallel

with the Archipelago of the Chonos islands. In fact, however, the Spanish possessions, with the exception of the town and fortress of Valdivia and the island of Chiloe, terminated at the Biobio. The country to the south of that river is occupied by the independent Araucanian Indians, who have made some progress in agriculture and civilization.

Under the Spanish administration Chili was governed by a captain general. It was divided into two provinces; the province of Santiago, and the province of Conception. Strong jealousies prevailed between them. They were distributed into thirteen districts, each committed to the care of a subdelegado.

The population, including white people, the converted Indians, and the mixed races, is estimated at a million. Its productions are gold, silver, copper, wheat, wine, hides, tallow, and jerk beef. It exports the latter five articles principally to Peru, receiving in return sugar, rice, salt, and European goods. Paraguay tea and European goods are also imported from Buenos Ayres. Such has been its commerce hitherto; but what it will be no one can venture to foretell. The reality may exceed the expectations which the most sanguine could venture to express. So favourable is its climate, and so fertile its soil, that it has often been styled the garden of the world. The variety of its productions is boundless, and it enjoys one inestimable advantage, that no part of it is very remote from the sea.

The cordial union which the American commissioners speak of as subsisting between Buenos Ayres and Chili, began at a very early period in the revolution. The Junta of Buenos Ayres, soon after their formation, despatched to Santiago an envoy, who was well acquainted with the inhabitants of that capital, to hasten the deposition of the Spanish go-

vernors. On the 18th July, 1810, the Captain General was compelled to resign; and on the 18th of the following September, a new government was formed. Some time after the revolutionary authorities were established, they exhibited an instance of lenity in allowing six months to all Spaniards who were dissatisfied with the recent changes, in order to dispose of their property and leave the country. So entire was the good understanding maintained between the governments, that Chili at one time sent 300 troops to the assistance of her neighbour. In 1811, three brothers of the name of Carrera acquired the principal influence in public affairs. They gained their ascendancy by intrigue, and they employed it only for the gratification of themselves and their partisans, who consisted chiefly of the dissipated youth of the capital. The administration could not be well conducted in such hands. There was no skill to draw out the public resources, but there were ample causes of dissatisfaction and discord. Accordingly in 1813, an army from Lima took possession of Concepcion, and obtained several advantages. In the following spring some severe conflicts ensued; but in the autumn General Osorio with the royal forces obtained possession of the whole country, partly through the imbecility and cowardice of Carrera, and partly through the treacherous infraction of a treaty by the Viceroy of Lima. A small part of the army of Chili retreated to Mendoza, a frontier town of the provinces of the river Plata. These were joined by a considerable force, sent by the government of Buenos Ayres, so that the whole amounted to 4,000 men. San Martin, who in 1814 had distinguished himself by his prudent conduct whilst at the head of the army in Tucuman, was appointed to the command. Having disciplined them

with great care, he began to move in January, 1817. After crossing the Andes, he attacked and defeated the enemy in a strong position at Chacabuco, about thirty leagues from the capital. They there lost 1200 men. The Captain General was shortly afterwards made prisoner, the Spanish authorities disappeared from every part of the country, except the peninsula of Talcahuano, near the mouth of the Biobio, and the battle of Maipo, which was won by San Martin, secured the independence of Chili. A meeting of the principal inhabitants of Santiago, held soon after the victory of Chacabuco, testified their gratitude by electing San Martin to be supreme director; thus voluntarily adopting the same form of government which existed at Buenos Ayres, and placing at their head an officer of that state. San Martin however declined the honour. General O'Higgins was then elected to the office, and still continues to fill it. He is of Irish extraction, though his father was viceroy of Lima. He himself was educated in England, at the establishment of the Jesuits at Stoneyhurst, in Lancashire. He gained an honourable reputation by his conduct in the earlier part of the revolution. In politics he was opposed to the Carreras, and displayed great gallantry and talents in opposing the royal army in 1814. When Osorio overran the country, he was one of those who took refuge at Mendoza, and he commanded a division of San Martin's army during the successful campaign of 1817. He is attached to Buenos Ayres, under whose auspices he has attained his present dignity; and he sees clearly that the interests of both countries require that a good understanding should be maintained between them at present, and a more intimate union established hereafter. The recollection of the recent services of their neighbour has in

some degree reconciled the people of Chili to the influence of Buenos Ayres; and the necessity of co-operation in the intended attack upon Lima will cement the connexion of the two countries for some time longer. The ascendancy of the provinces of the Rio de la Plata in the affairs of its ally will thus probably acquire solidity from the length of its duration; that narrow-minded jealousy which pervades every province of America, and disposes each to separate from the districts around it, discouraged and checked by the public authority, will every day become weaker, and will gradually give way to a more enlarged spirit of patriotism. The people of Chili, it is to be hoped, will see that it is for their advantage, not merely to continue in alliance with the provinces of the river Plata, but to enter into intimate union with them, and to acknowledge one common authority. Each country may retain the management of its own local concerns; but they should both be subject to the legislative power of one and the same congress, and to the magistracy of the same great functionaries of state. All collision of interests, and all danger of future hostilities, would thus be removed; there would be complete unity, both in their domestic measures and in their external relations; the administration would be more economical than if they were governed separately; they would possess greater strength to resist attack, and, in the eyes of foreign nations, greater respectability. The intercourse between them would be much easier, and the mutual exchange of commodities on a much more sure and advantageous footing, than if they continued distinct, though friendly states: and consequently, their agriculture, commerce, manufactures, and population, would be promoted. Neither of them would lose any thing except the power of doing mischief to its neighbour; and both

would gain advantages, which time alone can teach them to estimate as highly as they ought.

#### Note F.

A population of a million and a half or two millions is extremely small for a country like that which was comprised in the ancient viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres. The extent of territory is great, the soil is fertile, the climate salubrious, the communication between different parts of it easy: there is a ready outlet for the surplus produce, a regular government has long subsisted, and there have been no destructive wars to retard the increase of the people. We should therefore have expected it to teem with inhabitants. The causes that checked the operation of so many natural advantages are to be found in the nature of the government, which, by preventing any considerable augmentation in the produce of the industry of the country, must have exercised an unfavourable influence on the number of the inhabitants. The revolution, by removing almost every clog that hindered the advancement of agriculture and commerce, has cured the radical mischief. Population may henceforth be expected to flow on in a rapidly increasing stream, till extensive districts, where the human voice is now but seldom heard, become the crowded abodes of assiduous labour. It is to the natural tendency of the human species to increase rapidly, unless checked by unfavourable circumstances, that we chiefly look for a rapid increase of inhabitants on the banks of the Parana. In the mean time emigration may co-operate with this natural principle. In many of the kingdoms of Europe, population increases so much more rapidly than the means of subsistence, that multitudes, if they remain



at home, become the lingering victims of disease and want, and therefore would be glad to remove to a region where bread may be so easily earned by the sweat of the brow. Some even of those who could live in tolerable comfort in their native land, are willing to become sojourners on a foreign soil, that they and their descendants may be removed still further from poverty, and that their present competence may be changed into abundance. Emigrants of both classes generally repair to North America; but the advantages of the regions in the vicinity of the Rio de la Plata are so great, that the current of emigration will probably ere long be directed thither. The soil is more fertile than in the United States; the climate is more favourable; and suited to a greater variety of productions; the land is not encumbered with woods; and it is understood the settler will receive an allotment proportionate to his means of cultivation, and without the payment of money, free from tithes, and for some time at least from taxes. Clothing likewise costs little, in consequence of the general mildness of the weather; and provisions can be attained for a mere trifle. The emigrant to the United States, on the contrary, pays two dollars for every acre of land: that which he has bought he probably finds to be part of an immense forest; many years must be wasted, and much money spent in clearing it, before it can be cultivated to advantage; and after all, the soil often turns out to be of a very poor quality.

There seems to be three circumstances which at present induce emigrants to prefer North America: the passage thither is shorter than to the Rio de la Plata, and consequently less expensive; there is not the same confidence in the government of Buenos Ayres as in that of the United States; and the preva-

lence of the Roman Catholic religion in the former is supposed to produce an intolerant bigotry, which would render it an unpleasant abode for foreign protestants. To counterbalance the greater expense of the passage, we must recollect that after the emigrant is landed on the shores of the Rio de la Plata, he has not so long a journey over land as the North American settler, for he finds large uncultivated tracts in its immediate vicinity. And even if the excess in the cost of the one voyage above the other were much greater than it is, the difference would be far more than counterbalanced by the ultimate advantages. The government too is, we admit, new; and therefore it is not unnatural that doubts of its stability should prevail for some time. But the country cannot again become subject to Spain; it must be independent; and the government must, to a certain degree, be founded on the principles of freedom: this is enough for the emigrant. The objection founded on the prevalence of the Roman Catholic religion is altogether visionary. In no country is there less bigotry than at Buenos Ayres; and it may be said, that a general toleration, if not formally sanctioned by law (which probably it soon will be), is at least tacitly admitted.

At present South America is scarcely known; and they who are disposed to leave their native home are unacquainted with the facilities which it presents to emigrants. In a few years, information concerning it will be more generally diffused through Europe; and a boundless extent of the richest soil, adapted to every species of European agriculture, as well as to the growth of tobacco, cotton, coffee, and other tropical produce, will not be allowed to remain a solitary wilderness. The government has already turned its attention to the subject, and is disposed to

grant every encouragement to emigrants. The first step, they have wisely thought, is to obtain an accurate statistical account of the districts which it would be desirable to colonise first; and for this purpose proper persons have been sent to visit them. The result of such a survey will be a guide both to the government and to emigrants. The wars, in which self-defence has hitherto involved the state, have reduced the treasury to a low ebb, so that some time must probably elapse, before pecuniary aid can be afforded to those who wish to become settlers. Such aid, however, it is said, the government is inclined to grant, the moment that it finds itself in possession of adequate means. This circumstance we mention rather as a proof of their desire to attract emigration towards their shores, and to accelerate the progress of improvement in their country, than that the wisdom of it is beyond dispute. For our own parts we are inclined to doubt, whether emigrants, who are so destitute that they must obtain from others funds to transport them, and to maintain them for some time after their arrival, can be of much use to the country in which they settle. They will add to the number of its poor; whether they will add to the produce of its agricultural and manufacturing industry is not equally clear. But if ever a government can act prudently in applying the money which it raises from its subjects to assist strangers to settle within its territory, that of Buenos Ayres undoubtedly does so. For provisions are so extremely cheap and abundant, while labour is at the same time so highly paid, that none, however destitute they may be, are in danger of starving.

## Note G.

This is one of the many circumstances which may enable us to calculate what chance Spain has of reconquering her lost dominions. The Portuguese army, sent by the court of the Brazils to extend their dominions to the river Plata, amounted at the lowest computation to 10,000 men, composed partly of veterans from the Peninsula, and partly of light troops well qualified for the warfare in which they were to be engaged. This force has scarcely been sufficient to retain military possession of the Banda Oriental. It has not been able to expel Artigas from the province, or to make itself master of any thing except the ground on which its divisions encamp. So very insecure is the footing which it has obtained in the country, that Maldonado, the best, indeed the only good port in the river, is under the power of Artigas, and a redoubt commanding the town and harbour of Montevideo was on one occasion seized by some of his Guerillas. The Portuguese have not even made an attempt to conquer Entre Rios, which is the district between the Uruguay and the Parana. Thus a well equipped army of 10,000 men, which was marched from the neighbouring territory of the Brazils, aided by a considerable naval force, has not been able to make itself completely master of the Banda Oriental, a district which, exclusive of Entre Rios, does not contain above 35,000 inhabitants. What exertions must be made before Spain, situated at an immense distance, can reduce even the single province of Buenos Ayres, which is nearly four times as populous as the Banda Oriental, and is infinitely better supplied with all the materials of war! How could she raise, or transport, or pay, or feed, or clothes a force adequate to this service? If such

would be the difficulty of reducing the single province of Buenos Ayres, it is easy to see how chimerical and extravagant must be her attempts to re-establish her authority over all the provinces of the Rio de la Plata.

#### Note II.

Every one who meets with natives of Buenos Ayres in Europe is struck with the superiority of character which they exhibit. They are, beyond doubt, preferable to the Spaniards. The general eulogy which is pronounced upon them by the American commissioner does not exceed their merit; but it will be proper to specify more minutely two features in their conduct which will deserve attention.

First, At some periods of the revolution, when the bands of authority were relaxed, the administration actually devolved into the hands of the inhabitants of the city. Hence, it might have been imagined, endless tumult and disorder would have sprung up, leading directly to pillage and bloodshed. Yet no such disturbances ever took place: all remained quiet. Property was never invaded; blood was never spilled. The people have in no instance demanded victims to satisfy their vengeance; on the contrary, they have sometimes, by the influence of public opinion, moderated the rigour with which their rulers were disposed to punish the guilty.

Secondly, The government, ever since the Revolution, has been engaged in very burdensome, though necessary wars. Great exertions have been demanded to withstand the royalists on the side of Peru, to deliver Chili, to expel the Spaniards from Montevideo, and, after their expulsion, to watch Artigas and the Portuguese. The funds expended for carrying on hostilities in so many countries must have been considerable, and they have been supplied almost wholly

by the city of Buenos Ayres. Occasionally money has been borrowed, but it has been always punctually repaid.

#### Note i.

Mr. Rodney has taken special notice of the good qualities of the people of Buenos Ayres and Mendoza: Tucuman is mentioned in more general terms. The inhabitants of the latter province have, however, distinguished themselves in the cause of independence as much as any of their countrymen. They are a bold and hardy race; they have given liberally whatever means their country afforded, not only in times of prosperity, but in moments of difficulty and danger. In their supplies of men they have been particularly lavish. Their patriotic conduct, in 1812, ought never to be forgotten. In that year the royalists, having been eminently successful in upper Peru, advanced to Salta. Belgrano, the general of the patriots, was compelled to retreat into Tucuman, and from a consciousness of his weakness was inclined to continue his retrograde movement still further. But the people of Tucuman implored him to face the enemy, and brought to him such reinforcements as enabled him to comply with their gallant desires. Having waited for the approach of the royalists, Belgrano was attacked on the 24th of September; but the assailants were completely defeated, and lost 1,100 men killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. The appellation of the Field of Honour has since designated the scene of this most opportune and most memorable victory.

#### Note κ.

The language of the American Commissioner is calculated to convey to European readers very in-

accurate ideas of the Banda Oriental, and to lead them to overrate its importance. The whole province does not contain more than 35,000 inhabitants, of whom 15,000 live in Montevideo. With the exception of that city, the population of which consists, or at least used to consist, chiefly of Spaniards, it has nothing that deserves the name of a town. Even the villages are few and insignificant. The population is widely scattered over the country, and is maintained principally by *estancias* or grazing farms. An *estancia* generally includes a large track of ground: the owner with his family resides near the centre, and thence superintends the *peones* whom he hires to take care of his cattle. The *peones* are provided with all necessaries from his stores, but are not bound to him by any tie. They are perfectly free and independent; they change their masters as often as they please, and remove from one part of the country to another. They constitute the chief part of the population of the province; for there are scarcely any black slaves in it; and the few who are there belong to the owners of grazing farms, by whom they are employed as domestic servants. The employment of the *peones*, which connects them neither with particular persons nor with particular places, but leads them to be constantly changing their abode, is extremely favourable to habits of vagrancy; and the evil thus occasioned is increased by the vicinity of the ill-defined frontier of the Brazils. Mutual incursions, for the purpose of stealing and driving away cattle, are of frequent occurrence. Hence has arisen a taste for robbery as well as vagrancy. Such a system is little favourable to the formation of domestic connexions. Accordingly it has been observed that the proportion of women is remarkably small, and that they generally take up their abode in Montevideo, or such of the villages



as will allow them to lead a sedentary life. All these circumstances discourage marriage and the increase of population, and, at the same time, promote the growth of savage and predatory habits. They prove also that there can be little connexion between the upper classes and the great body of the country people. In fact the former have little or no influence over the latter; nor is it easy to see how it is possible to have any hold of men who possess no property, have no fixed place of abode, follow no path of sedentary industry, and are little inclined to shackle themselves with permanent domestic ties.

The events of the revolution weakened the feeble union which subsisted between the different classes of society in the Banda Oriental. When the Spaniards, who had filled civil offices or held posts in the army and navy, fled from Buenos Ayres to throw themselves into the fortress of Montevideo, it was soon discovered that the people of the country were disposed to rise against Elio and his party. Regular troops were accordingly sent from Buenos Ayres to menace the Spanish garrison; and after two tedious sieges the fortress fell. Subsequent events compelled the government of Buenos Ayres to withdraw their forces from it. It was then occupied by the predatory bands of Artigas. As this event was foreseen, and as the character of the country people and their chief was sufficiently well known, many of the respectable inhabitants had previously emigrated to Buenos Ayres or the Brazils. Those who remained had reason to repent of their imprudent confidence in wandering plunderers; for many have been murdered, and others have been brought to poverty by repeated contributions. The town was reduced to the lowest ebb of distress, and anarchy and confusion prevailed throughout the province, when the invasion

of the Portuguese took place. The situation of Montevideo may possibly have been improved under their administration; but all beyond its walls is in the most wretched situation. The provincial irregulars infest every part of the country, so that it can be traversed only by large bodies of troops.

Note I.

Mr. Rodney, in his enumeration of the exports, has omitted Vicuña wool, sheep's wool, and horse hides. The latter find a market in England only. Wool will, probably, in the course of time, become one of the principal articles in the commerce of the country. The flocks of sheep, that wander over the immense plains, abandoned to nature, are innumerable; but no attention is paid to the breed and to the shearing, or to the washing of the fleeces. A landholder, not long since, gave public notice that he wished to have his flocks shorn on a certain day, and that all who might come to assist in the labour should have the wool and their victuals: strange to say, the bribe was not high enough; nobody came.

Mr. Rodney, in specifying the imports from Britain, omits the important articles of iron, steel, earthen ware, and sea coal. The importation of iron and steel from the North of Europe are trifling, because the same articles are procured from the British at a cheaper rate. In the South American market there is a preference for French and German linens. The trade in these might in a great measure be carried on by our merchants and in our vessels, and opportunities would occur of introducing our own linens along with them. But the mistaken ideas of the Irish manufacturers, and the too great pliancy of our ministers in yielding to fears, which they

themselves know to be absurd, deprive us of this branch of trade, and banish it to Hamburgh, Amsterdam, and the French ports; for we are not allowed to import foreign linens, even for the purpose of re-exporting them, without paying an enormous transit duty which amounts to a prohibition. The importance which we justly set on our commercial marine, as the source of our naval power, has usually induced us to encourage every species of the carrying trade. But in this singular instance we have, by a positive law, excluded ourselves from being the carriers of foreign commodities to foreign countries, though in carrying them we should have an opportunity of extending the sale of some of our own domestic manufactures.

The imports from America, notwithstanding Mr. Rodney's showy enumeration, are very trifling. Furniture is the most considerable article, but it is furniture of an ordinary kind. The number of coaches kept in the country is extremely small, and consequently the number annually imported can scarcely be worthy of notice. Naval and military stores, as Mr. Graham observes, are supplied cheaper directly from Europe. The river yields fresh fish in the greatest abundance; so that foreign dried fish is a luxury reserved for the tables of the rich, and is consumed only in a very inconsiderable quantity. Mr. Graham mentions spirituous liquors among the imports from America. Their importation, however, is discouraged by heavy duties, as there are abundance of distilleries in the country; foreign run, geneva, and brandy, are consequently too dear for the consumption of the lower classes. Thus the North Americans find it very difficult, or even impossible, to make up their outward cargoes of the produce and manufactures of the United States, and are obliged to pur-

chase what they want with British goods, or even with the precious metals.

Note m.

If Buenos Ayres has sometimes abused her controlling influence, it would be no more than must happen in every exercise of authority by human beings. But we are not aware of any particular instances of abuse which could justify Mr. Rodney's remark. She has, in no instance, sacrificed the interests of other parts of the country to her own; she has not even shown any undue eagerness to compel them to submit to the established government. Paraguay, and still more Santa Fé, have been dealt with, perhaps, too gently. The moderate policy which has been followed may have proceeded from prudence; but whatever be the motive from which it originates, it shows that the language of Mr. Rodney is rather too harsh.

The people of Buenos Ayres have sometimes interfered directly in the government; but this has happened only in cases of apparent necessity. They created the executive, in 1812, to put down the attempts of some deputies to continue in the exercise of that power which did not belong to them; and, in 1815, they were the principal agents in dissolving the administration of Alvear. In both cases their interference may have been beneficial, though of a nature that is not required, and ought not to be tolerated, in established governments.

The jealousy of the superior influence of Buenos Ayres does not arise from her having abused her power, but from the spirit of provincialism which pervades every part of South America, and of which the full operation may be seen in the proceedings of Paraguay, and the Banda Oriental. The

people of each district would fain govern themselves. In uniting with others, they seem to think they impair their own dignity. By forming separate states the general vanity is gratified, and each man, having a more intimate connexion with his rulers, becomes of more consequence in his own eyes, and can more plausibly flatter himself with ambitious hopes. Were this spirit allowed to predominate, the country, instead of constituting one flourishing empire, would exhibit the distracted, turbulent scene of a multitude of petty states, prosecuting severally their own miserable interests, subjecting the transit and exchange of commodities to heavy duties, filled with mutual suspicions, and often harassed by open wars.

#### Note N.

In a former note\* we stated that the American commissioners had overrated the present importance of the Banda Oriental. They seem also to have made Artigas a much more considerable personage than he really is. José Artigas is a native of Montevideo. It is said that, absconding from that town while very young, he joined the roving country people who bear the vulgar name of *Gauchos*, and so completely adopted their manners and habits, that his extraction and the place of his birth, were nearly obliterated from his memory. After the lapse of many years, chance brought him within the walls of Montevideo. A faint recollection of what had been familiar to him in his boyhood made him recognize the streets; inquiries and explanations ensued, which, at last, conducted him into the arms of his parents, who had long given him up for lost. These circumstances

\* See Note *n*.

came to the ears of the Governor; they were sufficiently romantic to command his attention, and he conceived that it would be sound policy to avail himself of the reputation and local knowledge which Artigas had acquired among his roving comrades. The lawless conduct of the Gauchos often occasioned disturbances altogether incompatible with good order. In checking or punishing these, Artigas, he thought, might be of great use. He therefore gave him the rank of captain in the corps of *blandengues*, a species of irregular light cavalry, to whom the police of the country was confided.

When the revolution broke out, the natural penetration of Artigas soon enabled him to discover the wide field which was now opened to his ambition. He immediately abandoned the cause of Spain, sought and obtained from Buenos Ayres the assistance of arms and ammunition, and putting himself at the head of the Gauchos, swept the country of Spaniards, plundered the villages, and advanced with General Rondeau to the siege of Montevideo. Towards the end of 1811, the siege was raised, in consequence of the approach of the Portuguese, and of Elio's proposals for peace. It was resumed in December, 1812; and Artigas, with his irregular forces, again co-operated with Rondeau. His ambition now began to display itself. The endeavours of Rondeau to preserve discipline, and to prevent excesses, were probably not palatable to the Gauchos or their leader. Hence dissensions arose, which soon assumed the most serious aspect; and at length Artigas insisted upon directing the siege as chief of the provincials, while the general of Buenos Ayres should serve under him as commander of the auxiliaries. To quell these disorders, which to a superficial observer seemed to arise from personal jealousy between the

two generals, Don M. Sarratea, at that time a member of the supreme government, was dispatched to the camp before Montevideo. He was directed to assume the supreme command, and to issue his orders, both to Rondeau and to Artigas. This, it was supposed, was a probable mode of allaying their private animosities, and preventing them from proving injurious to the public service. But the conduct of Artigas proceeded on deeper views than sentiments of dislike to this or that individual; and accordingly Sarratea's mission was unsuccessful. Rondeau resumed the command, and Artigas with his Gauchos withdrew; for it was not at that time his interest to expel the Spaniards. To keep the country under his control, it was necessary to maintain an equilibrium between Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, so that he might be feared and courted by both. Not satisfied with the removal of his troops, he proceeded to acts of direct hostility, by intercepting the provisions destined for the besiegers: they however retained their position. The defeat of the flotilla of the royalists, by that of Buenos Ayres, enabled the latter to blockade the harbour effectually. Provisions soon became very scarce in the fortress, and, at length, in June, 1814, Montevideo surrendered. When the garrison were on the eve of evacuating it, an officer was intercepted with a letter from Artigas, inviting the Governor and troops to put themselves under his protection, and make common cause against Buenos Ayres. This discovery induced Alvear, who commanded the besiegers, not to lose a moment in completing the embarkation of the Spaniards. He then turned his arms against Artigas. But the movements of that chief were too rapid for the pace of a regular army. He escaped with little loss; and after a march of many hundred miles, the pursuers were obliged to give up the chase. After



some months Montevideo was dismantled; all the stores, with the artillery, were embarked for Buenos Ayres, and the garrison, which had been left there, was withdrawn. Artigas, who, in the mean time, had gained some slight advantages over the troops of the government, immediately occupied that town. He then invaded the province of Buenos Ayres, and took Santa Fé. Various circumstances prevented vigorous measures from being adopted immediately. After several months had elapsed, some troops were sent to recover it. These Artigas defeated. His attention, however, was soon recalled to that province, of which he claimed the sovereignty; for towards the end of 1816, the Portuguese, who had long wished to extend their frontier to the Rio de la Plata, invaded the Banda Oriental with 10,000 men, under the command of General Lecor. Notwithstanding some partial advantages gained by Artigas, the Portuguese entered Montevideo on the 20th January, 1817, and still retain it. But they have published few and slight accounts of what has happened since; so that we do not know precisely the progress which they have made in reducing the country. Artigas is reported to have suffered severely in several encounters, and to have lost a great many of his followers. Still he keeps the field, and harasses the detachments of the invaders in their front, flank, and rear. They are masters of nothing beyond the ground on which their troops are stationed, and experience great difficulty in procuring supplies of provisions. It is said that they have no intention of crossing the Uruguay, and that, instead of advancing, they will probably be compelled, ere long, to retreat.

Artigas seems to have lost but little of his popularity or activity, though age begins to press on him,

accelerated by fatigues and the general vice of the Gauchos—excessive indulgence in the use of spirituous liquors. He lives among his people, and dresses as their equal. Stretched on a hide, and smoking his segar, he issues his mandates, and decides on life or death with the authority of an Eastern despot. He is so illiterate that he can scarcely write his own name; but those who have had opportunities of becoming well acquainted with his character, give him a high reputation for natural talents and quickness of perception. Though usually ferocious and cruel, there have been occasions in which he has acted with a magnanimous generosity.

From the account which we have given of this barbarian chief, it is clear, that his authority has never extended beyond the lowest classes of the population of the province which he lays waste. These he has attached to him by his knowledge of their character, and by adopting all their habits and sentiments. In their military employment they are not exposed to greater hardships or vicissitudes than in their ordinary course of life; and they can plunder to a greater extent, and with more security. It is soothing to their savage pride to consider themselves as a sovereign people; and natural for men trained up in their customs, to look upon all regular government as tyranny. Such are the sentiments on which the influence of Artigas rests, and such are the people over whom that influence extends. His reign has long since driven away every person of property or respectability to the other side of the river. He is not the chief magistrate of a province which separates from Buenos Ayres on plausible pretexts, and appoints a government of its own; he is merely the leader of some thousands of savages, accustomed to an unsettled, predatory life, who have completely

broken up the social system of an extensive district, whose sovereignty is merely disorganization and devastation; who refuse to submit to Buenos Ayres, not because it is a bad government, but because it is a government, and who can be compared only to the hordes that wander over the plains of Tartary, or to the hunting tribes of the North American forests.

#### Note o.

Soon after the revolution at Buenos Ayres, the Junta sent General Belgrano with 800 men to expel the Spanish authorities from Paraguay. Belgrano was opposed and defeated by the Paraguayans, who sided with the Spanish governor, but, in consequence of a compact with their commander, was allowed to withdraw unmolested. In the following year, the inhabitants of Assumption, the capital of the province, deposed the governor, and formed a junta of their own, which refused to acknowledge the authority, but did not reject the friendship, of Buenos Ayres. Since that time they have followed the line of conduct so clearly described in the Report, the object of which undoubtedly has been to gain independence without risk, and at the same time to leave the door open for reconciliation and submission, in case Spain should re-establish her authority on the Rio de la Plata.

Dr. Francia, an advocate, who under the name of supreme director has governed the province for the last seven years, was indebted for his elevation partly to his great family connexions, and still more to that spirit of provincialism which prevails in Paraguay to a higher degree than in any other part of South America. Abroad and at home, the Paraguayans look upon each other as children of a particular fa-

mily, distinct from the rest of mankind. Nothing interests them but what immediately concerns their own country, which, like most ignorant and uncultivated nations, they regard as the most favoured spot in the universe. A region so favoured, a race so far exalted above their fellows, could not, forsooth, without degradation acknowledge an authority whose seat was at Buenos Ayres. The non-intercourse system originated in similar sentiments. It was encouraged by Francia, because whatever broke off the connexion of Paraguay with the adjacent districts confirmed his power; and it was popular among the inhabitants, because, though strangers might gain by trading with Paraguay, it was not to be supposed, for one moment, that Paraguay could be in any degree dependant on foreigners.

That the Paraguayans themselves should believe that their prosperity flows from sources which cannot be affected by foreign commerce, is not surprising: but it is somewhat wonderful that the same unfounded conceit should have spread itself in South America, and should have been repeated without reflection, even by the better informed, till at last it has come to be viewed in the light of an established truth. To those who have reflected on the sources of national wealth, it is unnecessary to prove that no country can possess such equal advantages for every species of industry as to supply all its own wants at a cheaper rate than any of its neighbours could. There will always be some commodities which it is better fitted to produce than others; and it will be profitable for it to direct its labour to the former, and with them to purchase the latter from foreigners, than to attempt to furnish the necessary quantities of both. A nation can no more be independent of commerce than an individual. Commerce is merely an extension of the

division of labour; and the advantage of it is, that it enables us to procure an increased quantity of articles that contribute to enjoyment, at a diminished expense. Each nation applies itself to that species of industry for which it is best fitted; and thus the amount of the general stock is much larger, than if a proportion of its labour was employed on commodities for the production of which it was less advantageously circumstanced. These principles strike at the very root of the notion, that Paraguay, or any other region, can have within itself such abundant sources of wealth as to derive no benefit from intercourse with its neighbours. But as the minds in which this notion prevails may not be able to see the force of the general principles which we have opposed to it, we shall detail a few facts that lead to the same conclusion.

Paraguay was peopled by the Spaniards before any other part of the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres. Their descendants have increased considerably in numbers, but they have not advanced, so much as might have been expected, in the career of improvement, and industry has made little progress. The climate is well suited to tropical produce; and the rivers Parana and Paraguay afford convenient outlets for exportation: yet it has hitherto done little more than supply its own scanty population of 300,000 inhabitants. No more sugar has been made, no more cotton grown, than was consumed at home. Some tobacco was exported, but not in sufficient quantity to supply the viceroyalty; perhaps in consequence of the oppressive tendency of the monopoly possessed by the crown. It likewise sent to Buenos Ayres timber and the herb of Paraguay, whence the latter was transported to Chili and Peru. But both of these were the spontaneous produce of the forest. To cut

down trees, to lop off the branches, and to float them down the river, requires little labour; and the task of gathering the herb, of preparing it, and of packing it in bales, is equally easy. Hitherto, therefore, Paraguay has had little trade; and as the concomitant to this, instead of increasing rapidly in wealth and population, she has been nearly stationary.

In return for their tobacco, timber, and herb, the Paraguayans received flour, wine, and brandy. Sometimes too they took European goods in exchange, but in no great quantity; for little clothing is needed in that hot climate, and the lower classes are supplied by their domestic manufactures. They therefore are indebted to commerce for luxuries which are essential to their comfort. If they renounce trade, they must at the same time renounce wheaten bread, and be satisfied with Indian corn and plantains; instead of brandy and wine, they must drink rum distilled from home-grown canes. They must revert, in short, to the Indian mode of life. In return for all this self-denial, they will have the satisfaction of seeing more trees decaying in their forests, a greater quantity of their herb vegetating in vain, and more tobacco grown than is consumed at home, till some of the plantations are allowed to go to decay. While they thus injure themselves, do they, by adopting a non-intercourse system, inflict any serious inconvenience on their neighbours? None. The only market which they supply is that of Buenos Ayres; and timber and tobacco can be brought thither from the Brazils, as cheap as from Paraguay, if not cheaper. The herb indeed is not found elsewhere, but the use of it is every day giving way with so much rapidity, that perhaps in a few years, though offered in abundance, and at a low price, it will scarcely find a purchaser or a consumer. Paraguay, therefore, exports nothing



but what is either in little request, or can easily be obtained from other quarters: so that it is in fact much more dependant on its neighbours, than its neighbours are on it, and must be a greater sufferer than they by the discouragement of trade.

It is said that the people are already beginning to feel the inconvenience of the regulations which Francia established in order to check foreign commerce. They are deprived of enjoyments to which they were accustomed; and many of the poorer classes find that nothing can now be gained by those employments which formerly furnished them with the means of livelihood. They are therefore growing weary of Francia's arbitrary sway. This state of the public mind will probably lead to a change of government and of measures; the old intercourse and connexion of trade will be renewed with the adjacent country; and thus one important step will be gained towards the reunion of Paraguay with the other provinces of the Rio de la Plata.

#### Note P.

The policy of the court of Rio de Janeiro has to many persons in both hemispheres appeared incomprehensible. The truth is, that it has had one object constantly in view, but that circumstances have prevented it from proceeding steadily and directly towards its aim.

The Banda Oriental has long been coveted by the Portuguese, and has more than once occasioned wars between them and Spain. These wars were terminated by treaties of peace, none of which settled the dispute definitively, or clearly marked out the boundaries of the two parties. The ambition of the Por-



Portuguese court was still further stimulated by its emigration to the Brazils: for the Banda Oriental was now more within view, and therefore more highly prized. Motives were not wanting to induce some to magnify its importance. The courtiers were divided into two factions. Those whose possessions lay in Portugal, and whose names and families had long been revered in the Old World, wished their sovereign to consider himself chiefly as an European prince, to prosecute European objects, to view the New World as merely a temporary asylum, and to return to Lisbon the moment he could do so with safety. Opposed to these were the nobles whose families had no antiquity to boast of, and whose possessions were situated in America. In Europe they were persons of little consequence, compared with the ancient grandees; in the New World, where their property lay and their names were of course familiar to every one, they were not merely equal, but superior to their rivals. Their policy therefore was to dissuade their sovereign from returning to Portugal, and to make Brazil the permanent seat of the monarchy. To effect this purpose, they contrasted with the secondary rank which a king of Portugal must hold in European politics, the permanent influence which a monarch of the Brazils might acquire in the New World. They painted in brilliant colours the wealth and population which his present dominions would in a short time contain, and expatiated on the facility with which he might extend his limits in every direction, till all on the hither side of the Andes acknowledged his sway. They prevailed over their antagonists, and Portugal became an appendage to the Brazils. The plan of the Portuguese ministry, therefore, was to increase their influence in America

NOTE P.

by every possible means, and, as the first step towards this, to carry their frontier to the Rio de la Plata, or even to the Parana.

The revolution at Buenos Ayres seemed to present them with an opportunity which was not to be neglected. But the present queen of Portugal, as sister to Ferdinand VII, aspired to the regency of Spanish America; and precipitate encroachments upon the possessions of Spain might be fatal to the success of her pretensions. Besides, as the court of Rio de Janeiro owed its safety entirely to our protection, it might have been unsafe, as it would certainly be hopeless, to attack the territories of a power in alliance with us. These motives produced a temporary inaction, which some have too hastily construed into a proof that no purpose of extending the frontier of the Brazils was entertained.

In 1811, when the siege of Montevideo was keenly pressed by the troops of Buenos Ayres, Elio applied to the Portuguese for supplies of military stores and money. Instead of what he asked, they sent 4000 troops. Elio would not admit them within the walls, because, if admitted, they would have been masters of the place. Their approach, however, forced the besiegers to retreat. Britain interfered, and the troops were ordered to withdraw. In their march back they were harassed by the light cavalry of the country: but effective operations against them were prevented, by a convention proposed by the Portuguese and accepted by Buenos Ayres. The parties have since continued on a friendly footing; and in 1812, the Portuguese envoy at Buenos Ayres, instead of complying with the solicitations of Alzaga and his associates, to enter into their conspiracy, gave information of the plot to the government. He probably did not wish for the success of any measure which would

have united the existing authorities on the opposite banks of the river. It was only during the continuance of dissensions, that his country could hope to gain her object.

When Artigas in 1815 became master of the Banda Oriental, the motives which had hitherto imposed forbearance on the Brazils, ceased to operate. To dispossess that chief was neither to attack Spain nor to oppose the independence of Buenos Ayres. The Portuguese might, without much appearance of ambition, destroy a barbarian who was organizing a predatory power on their very frontiers, and whose followers had made, or were alleged to have made, plundering incursions into their territory. At the same time the recent events in Europe had given them the disposal of a well-disciplined, veteran army. Under the pretence of strengthening the government and preserving order in the Brazils, large bodies of troops were drawn from Portugal; and Lecor, as we have already stated in another note, invaded the Banda Oriental with 10,000 men. Buenos Ayres took no active measures to repel this invasion. She did wisely. It would not have been adviseable to have co-operated with Artigas; for no assistance could be given him without adding materially to his strength; and whatever increased his power, was necessarily injurious to them. There was no obligation upon them to defend a district in which their authority had been subverted for some time. The dictate of prudence, therefore, was to leave the invader and the usurper to fight their own battles. As it was evident that Artigas would not risk pitched battles, but would try to exhaust the enemy by desultory warfare, the struggle would most probably be tedious. If Artigas prevailed, it would then be time enough for Buenos Ayres to act against him: if he was subdued, they

would have time to consolidate and augment their resources, so as to make a vigorous attempt for the recovery of the Banda Oriental, if the object was deemed important enough to justify an open rupture with the Brazils. Hitherto no acts of hostility have been committed by either government against the other; and they remain, apparently at least, on friendly terms.

## Note R.

On this point the commissioners have been misinformed. The principal object of the mission was not to solicit assistance, or the recognition of independence. The South Americans know that their independence will be acknowledged as a matter of course, whenever the political state of the world shall render it expedient for any power to do so. Recognition, they are aware, is not to be procured by entreaties, but must proceed from views of interest. They will establish themselves as *de facto* an independent power; they may grant commercial advantages to the nation which first acknowledges them, and the recognition by one will soon draw after it the recognition of the rest. With respect to assistance, what species of aid could they hope to obtain? They could expect no money from any European state; for there is not one which does not find its own expenses more than sufficiently heavy for its revenue; and except money, there is nothing which Buenos Ayres needs. Ammunition of all kinds is so abundant, that it is selling under prime cost. The public and private stores are so filled with gunpowder, that it has been found necessary to prohibit the landing of more. The armoury is said to contain 70,000 stands of arms, besides those which are employed in actual service; and they have manufactories of cannon and muskets.

They are in no want of officers, and have never held out encouragement to induce foreigners to enter into their service: for the events of the five years which preceded the revolution, excited so strong a military spirit, that the sons of all the most respectable families are eager to serve in the army.

#### Note s.

Santa Fé is a town situated on the right bank of the Parana, about 240 miles north-west from Buenos Ayres. The river is here broad, and the force of the current is broken by the interposition of several islands; there is consequently an easy intercourse with the Baxada de Santa Fé on the opposite shore. This circumstance rendered the place an entrepôt for the commerce that was carried on with Entre Rios. Here also the river-craft, which had brought from Paraguay tobacco and the herb peculiar to that province, unladed their cargoes, which were frequently sent forward to Buenos Ayres in carts. The defection of Paraguay, and the establishment of the power of Artigas in the Banda Oriental and Entre Rios, put an end to the commerce of which Santa Fé had been the channel. The lower classes were thrown out of employment. They of course became dissatisfied; and at the same time sympathy with the people of the opposite bank, the influence of old connexions, desire of plunder, and to a certain degree similarity of habits, inclined them favourably towards the measures which had been adopted in their neighbourhood.

The opportunity which Santa Fé from its situation would give him of extending his depredations to the right bank of the river, did not escape the keen eye of Artigas. Emissaries were therefore dispatched to prepare the way by corrupting the populace, and

were soon followed by a body of his Gauchos. The more respectable part of the inhabitants sought refuge at Buenos Ayres; and the rabble under his auspices formed what they are pleased to call a government. At his departure he left a garrison, with which the mass of the people were incorporated. He thus established a sort of "tête de pont" on the right bank of the Parana.

It was the duty, as well as the interest, of the government of Buenos Ayres to reduce Santa Fé to obedience, and to expel the dangerous intruder. To allow every town to set up for an independent state, would be absurd; to allow the lowest of the populace to expel their superiors with impunity, would be criminal. Attempts were accordingly made to reduce it to obedience, but not with sufficient vigour. The war in Peru and Chili engrossed the attention and resources of the government; and a tenderness towards countrymen, which it is difficult to condemn, paralyzed in some degree their efforts against the rebels. But more decisive measures have been adopted lately. It is not long since intelligence reached us, that a considerable force was on the point of marching to quell the insurrection of Santa Fé. The population of the town, it is said, does not exceed 4,000; and that of the Baxada de Santa Fé, on the opposite side of the river, about 3,000.

## Note T.

The principal difference between Mr. Rodney and Mr. Graham consists in this, that the former is much better satisfied than the latter with what has been done at Buenos Ayres in behalf of liberty. Mr. Rodney thinks that the establishment of freedom is advanced as far as could be expected under the cir-

cumstances of the country; Mr. Graham is of opinion, that enough has not been done, and that the rulers are not disposed to do more. What Mr. Graham condemns, we should be disposed to applaud. We should judge unfavourably of any set of rulers who should busy themselves with the minute details of forming a constitution, while the independence of the country was still to be asserted by arms. Spain has not yet desisted from her mad efforts to re-establish her power: Artigas continues master of the eastern side of the river. These enemies remain to be subdued: and it would be criminal in the government to spend their time, like the Cortes of Cadiz, on discussing the theory of a free constitution, while an invader was rivetting a foreign yoke. When the time for fighting is past, the time for debating begins.

Note v.

The estimate which is generally formed of the mineral treasures of South America falls short of the truth, rather than exceeds it. No person can set a limit to the quantity of the precious metals which, by a proper application of labour and capital, may be drawn from the bowels of the earth in that quarter of the globe. The want of skill, of means, and of encouragement, which has stunted the growth of every species of industry under the Spanish dominion, has had a very striking operation on the working of the mines. Many mines have been discovered, from which it has never been attempted to derive advantage; others that were wrought for some time have been abandoned; and even in those which have been continued, the operations have been conducted in so rude and inartificial a manner, that their produce has never come near to the level which,



under better management, it would have attained. The mines of Famatina, for instance, situated between San Juan and Rioja, in a minor branch of the Cordillera, have long been known. They are so rich, that the ore obtained from them is nearly pure silver; yet no vigorous and well-conducted efforts have been made to turn them to profit. Since the revolution, the government advanced some money to miners of slender resources. They began to work them on a small scale, and in the old inadequate manner: yet so great has been their success, that they have been enabled in the course of a few years to pay what they had borrowed, and to continue to prosecute their enterprise. The government are peculiarly disposed to encourage this branch of industry, and wish to attract to it foreign capital and foreign skill. Indeed, the results of successful mining are so very dazzling, it makes so direct and palpable an addition to that which all regard as peculiarly valuable, that we are not without apprehensions, lest the government should be inclined to favour it too much. The mines, doubtless, should not be neglected; but capital and industry ought not to be diverted artificially into this channel. Agriculture and manufactures are more certain, more permanent, and more copious sources of wealth.

## Note x.

Mr. Graham's statement is not quite correct. The facilities which he supposes to constitute a distinction in favour of England, are nothing more than a regulation, by which letters received by British ships are delivered for distribution to the British Commercial Subscription Room, and letters are allowed to be sent on board British ships, after they have

been paid for and stamped at the post-office. A similar privilege would of course be granted to North Americans, or any other class of foreigners, if their numbers, and the extent of their commerce, rendered it expedient.

THE END.







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