

A REVIEW
OF THE
DOCTRINES
OF
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
OF THE
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
ON THE
RELATIONS OF THE CHURCH

The General Interests

OF THE CHURCH AND THE STATE.

C. A. VAUGHAN,
PASTOR WEST END EPYSCOPAL CHURCH,
LEXINGTON, VA.

Able arguments on opposite sides & one of the
great questions now agitating the Protestant
Church

XLVIII.

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EDUCATION.

BY

C. R. VAUGHAN,

PASTOR FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,

LYNCHBURG, VA.



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PREFACE.

THE following review was originally published in a series of articles in the Watchman and Observer newspaper, of Richmond, over the signature of "Theta." Wishing to secure a more particular consideration of the views herein presented, than is usually given to a discussion of the sort in a weekly newspaper, and not wishing to even seem to shrink from responsibility under the cover of a fictitious signature, the writer has determined to send forth his review of the doctrines of the Board of Education, in a form more likely to attract attention and awaken the interest of the Church at large. The question at issue, in his humble judgment, is one of sufficient importance to be thoroughly sifted; even though the final judgment of the Church should settle upon conclusions adverse to those which seem to him to be accordant with the truth. The disposition which is exhibited in many parts of the Church to avoid the discussion of the issues raised upon this subject is most remarkable. The doctrines of the Board are either true or false: if *true*, why should there be any unwillingness to make it as manifest as possible: if *false*, why should not their falsehood be exposed? It is contrary to the bold, honest spirit of the Presbyterian Church to allow great questions to be settled without inquiry, or errors to go without correction because they have been committed. Whatever others may do the writer has no course to follow but the honest dictates of his own convictions, and solemnly believing that dangerous errors have been inculcated by the Board of Education in regard to the relation of the Church of Christ to the interests of education, he can only raise the protestation uttered in this publication, and thus endeavor to satisfy the strong sense of duty by which he is animated. It is a policy altogether mistaken to endeavor to suppress discussion on this subject: it cannot be suppressed, and the only result of the attempt will be to accelerate and deepen the tide of opposition until it becomes absolutely resistless. In truth, it is obvious that one great reason why the advocates of the views expressed in the reports and papers of the Board, are silent under the attacks made upon them is the consciousness that they cannot be defended. This is irresistably proved, by the fact that the brief discussion already elicited, has compelled a modification of their views as announced by Dr. Hodge in the late Assembly and in his recent article in the Princeton Review—a modification im-

material it is true—immaterial in the sense that it merely moves from one extreme false position, to another less extreme but equally false—but a modification which clearly confesses that the original positions of the Board could not be maintained. In fact this modification is rather a modification of *the logical conclusion* from the arguments of the Board in support of their policy, than a modification of *the actual conclusion* which they announce, especially in their later reports. We have not yet had the pleasure of reading the article of Dr. Hodge in the Repertory, but from the extracts we have seen, we understand it to maintain that while the church is not *the party* to control the general interests of education *to the exclusion* of others it is nevertheless *a party* to it, either conjunct or co-ordinate with other recognized sources of control over it. This view is not new in reality: it was announced by the Board itself in the report of 1852. The whole course of argument previously, *logically* resulted in the conclusion that *the church was the only safe and appropriate depository of power* over the subject, and this seems to have been the conclusion they wished to establish. But it was found necessary to modify this result and hence the statement in the last two reports that the church is *a party*, but not *the exclusive party* of supervision and control over the general interests of education. This modification of the claims of the Board will not meet the requirements of the truth: we deny it as emphatically as we do the logical conclusion of their original arguments. The whole argument which we submit in the following pamphlet is as good against the claim of the church in her organized capacity to be *a party* as against her claim to be *the party* to control the interests of education. The claim is that the church, as such, has the right to become, not *merely an alternate* agency where others fail to attend to the subject, but also, a *co-ordinate* agency where others are attending to it; that she may become *a party*, not only to the erection of a secular school as an exceptional instance and as a preliminary basis for teaching the gospel, but to the general system of educational interests, as they always will exist—one of the permanent and universal interests of civilized society; that she may come into the field with her system of schools, as a rival to schools created on another principle, and appeal to all the motives which lead men to confide in the Church of God to enable her to become a *successful rival*. In short, the present modification of the views of the Board, present the church, not indeed as an exclusive *claimant* of the patronage of the people, but as a great educational *rival* of other agencies of concern in the subject, enforcing her appeal still by the sacred grandeur of her character as the visible kingdom of the blessed God, and still insisting on the greater security or the higher value of schools under her control. We regard this attitude of the matter as but just a little more respectable than the other.

The Church cannot lawfully become a *party* to the general interests of education in civilized society—a *great, permanent and universal bidder*—for the management of this great interest of human life, any more than she can claim to be *the only* lawful and safe agency for its management. The modification of the claim makes it less arrogant but not less unfounded: the argument which follows will we hope make this clear to every candid and patient examiner into the nature of the views presented. We have only to add, in conclusion, that the name and title of the writer will show that others besides officers of non-ecclesiastical colleges, who are charitably supposed to be altogether selfish in their opposition to the Board when such gentlemen are so unfortunate as to doubt the propriety of the policy of its officers—that others are equally disposed to seek for the logic not less than for the modesty of their claims. We have no connection with any college or school which might appear to rival the schools of *the church*; we never have had, nor do we ever expect or desire to have such a connection. We oppose the views of the Board and its advocates, because we do conscientiously believe them to be false and unfounded, derogatory to the honor of the church, and injurious to its interests, hostile *in fact* if not *in form* to valuable institutions already endeared by long service to the friends of the Gospel, and particularly objectionable, as unfriendly to the purer and sounder principles of educational policy upon which those institutions were founded. For these reasons we give this publication to the light. If it should advance the interests of the truth and promote the prosperity of the Church of God even in a remote degree though it may be destined to refutation and oblivion itself, we shall rejoice in the honor of being permitted to send it forth to contribute its quota to the advantage of interests so great, and so important.

C. R. VAUGHAN.

LYNCHBURG, VA., September 2, 1854.

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION.



THERE is a maxim in the philosophy of republicanism which is of equal value in relation to the church. If the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, it is equally the bulwark of a pure church and a spiritual religion. The tendencies of the depraved heart are exerted with an uniformity so absolute, under all conditions and in every relation which fallen man can sustain, that it is one of the absolute conditions of our preservation from evil and progress in good that we *watch and be sober*. This is true of man as an individual, and true of him in every relation he sustains. It is as true of him in the church as it is in the State: it is as true of him in his speculative opinions, as it is in his growth in grace. Unless the mind is perpetually kept in the posture of armed and resolute vigilance, it is in constant peril of evil. Unless man guards the approaches to the public liberties, it will not be long before the tumult of successful tyranny will be heard in the land. Unless he watches against the influences of wealth and luxury, he will insensibly slide into those soft and corrupting tempers of mind which are at once the surest indexes and the most rapid precursors of social ruin and degradation. Unless his soul is girded up for the long and painful vigil against the powers of darkness, which must be incessantly maintained from the beginning to the end of the life of faith, he must fall under the malignant arts of the adversary. Unless he surveys with intense and perpetual vigilance the movements of the church, he must behold the small beginnings of evil gradually expand into more and more formidable calamities; and unless they are checked in time, he must witness the universal desolation of the house of Christ, by means of subtle and specious evils, growing up from seed scattered as it were by the wind in the night. This fact or law of the nature of man must prove our apology, for calling the attention of the church more seriously to the movements of the Board of Education. It is time

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- 1.—Annual Reports of Board of Education for 1848, '49, '50, '52, '53.
 - 2.—Report of Board of Education on Parochial Schools, presented in 1847.
 - 3.—Denominational Education in Parochial Schools by Rev. Thos. Smyth, D. D.
 - 4.—The Home, The School and The Church, vols. 1, 2, 3.

some more active and severe scrutiny were made into the doctrines and policy of that Board. It is time for the Presbyterian Church to begin to consider the correctness of those principles, upon which she has been launched on a grand scheme of secular education and upon which, if true, she is to engraft an entirely new department of ecclesiastical action. It is time for her to say whether the doctrines advocated in the Reports of the Board and the Education Repository issued by its Secretary, are the doctrines of the Presbyterian church. Nor shall we deem ourselves far from the path of duty, in inviting her to an examination of those doctrines as impartially severe as is demanded by the immensity of the interests at stake.

It is unquestionable that the movements of the Board of Education have been watched by some parts of the church with a growing suspicion for several years past. Publications in the newspapers and periodicals of the church speeches on the floor of ecclesiastical bodies, half-developed movements towards open opposition, have all exposed the uneasiness with which certain parts of the church have viewed the doctrines of the Board and the claims to practical power and influence built upon those doctrines. This feeling was growing rapidly and strongly towards an open declaration in the Synod of Virginia, some two or three years ago, when the Board first began its cautious and hesitating announcement, that henceforward, the church should be applied to, for funds for the support of the secular schools, which it had been persuaded to establish. The announcement created a sort of electric shock in the minds of the people. Many minds who could see nothing objectionable in the doctrines, of the Board while they lay couched in the dim magnificence of the style of the Secretary, became wonderfully acute as soon as those doctrines were pushed to one of their legitimate issues and made their appearance in the clear and singularly expressive form of a demand for money. The warning which had been raised by the able and vigilant pen of J. G. S., and treated without a tithe of the attention demanded by the ability with which it was made, now begun to wear an aspect of threatening reality. There was a movement in the camp. Resolutions reflecting strongly on the policy of the Board were presented in the Presbytery of West Hanover, and seemed on the point of passing almost by acclamation, when the action of the body was suspended for more decided developments on the part of the Board. When the Synod met the same fall in the city of Norfolk, the feeling of discontent was rapidly rising to the point of expression, and would no doubt have been expressed in language of decided opposition, but for the opportune arrival of the Secretary of the Board in person. That gentleman by invitation addressed the Synod on matters connected with his office. In reply to direct interrogatories, he announced that the Board

had retreated from her position on that subject, modified her policy and was content to go on as she had been. This explanation dissipated the rising resentment of the body and resolutions strongly commending the Board of Education passed without dissent. Good feeling was restored by the assurance of the Secretary *that the Board had abandoned the idea of applying to the church for money to support her secular schools.* This was the declaration made on the floor of Synod by the Secretary in person, and if it had not been made, there can be little doubt but what the Synod of Virginia would have taken strong ground—in opposition to the Board. The declaration of the Secretary was understood by a majority of the Synod, to refer to a *permanent modification of the policy of the Board*, and to bind them not to repeat the same offensive claim of pecuniary support in all times to come. Some were even so far deluded as to interpret the declaration of the Secretary as a retraction of all the offensive doctrines of the Board about the connection of the church, with secular education. The impressions of the writer, however, were different from either.—He was then and is now of the opinion, that the Secretary designed to be understood, as merely announcing a *temporary suspension of this claim of the Board, until public opinion in the church should be sufficiently matured to allow the safe reproduction of the suspended claim.* This was his opinion at the time and everything bearing on the subject since has only confirmed the conviction. Although he does not recollect the exact language of the Secretary, he does distinctly recollect the impression which it created. Indeed this is the only interpretation which is really admissible in the case. It is absurd to suppose that the Secretary of the Board would announce in a few indeterminate sentences, the entire revolution of the cherished principles of the Board without any preliminary by way of explanation or any appendix in the shape of reasons. It is the only interpretation which can give even a decent apology of consistency to the views of the Board. That body through its publications and reports has for years diligently inculcated on the church that she was commissioned by her divine head to teach secular learning. Now if it is the business of the church to teach, it is the business of the people to give her all funds necessary to the full and complete discharge of the obligation. If it is the business of the church to demand these funds, it would have been a gross delinquency in duty for her agents to have flinched from the duty of demanding it. This claim for money which created such an alarm was nothing more than the legitimate and necessary development of the doctrines of the Board. The Secretary was bound to ask for the necessary funds, and if he failed to do it, he was guilty of a breach of his honorable trust and the laws of duty which grew out of it. If then we allow him any credit for consistency or

even for common sense, we might have expected this call for money. If the Secretary should fail to demand money for the support of ministerial education, we should see at once the extent of his delinquency. But if his doctrines are true, that it is as much the business of the church to conduct the education of her baptized children as of her candidates for orders, then it is as much the duty of the people to give money for the one as for the other, and it was as much the duty of the Secretary to call upon the church for their contributions to the one, as to the other. Anything like a supposition that he totally relinquished the application for money for secular education for all time to come is the very same thing as to suppose him deliberately guilty, of a palpable breach of the great commission of his office. The only supposition as to the meaning of his retraxit before the Synod of Virginia, which is compatible with the official fidelity of the Secretary, is that the modification of the demand for money was *merely temporary*, to allow the public sentiment of the church to be matured to the degree of allowing it. This is the only conceivable interpretation. It answers all the previous and succeeding hints in the documents of the Board, and must have been the meaning of the distinguished gentleman whose language we review.

Whatever doubt may overlay this subject, one thing is certain: and that is that if the Synod of Virginia had not *mistaken* his meaning and interpreted it as going to a *permanent retraxit* of this offensive demand, it would never have relinquished its attitude of suspicion or passed the complimentary resolutions about the Board to which we have already alluded. To have done otherwise would have been foolish to an extremity of folly. But the Synod could not have been satisfied with less than a deliberate and permanent retraxit of a claim which it felt to be monstrous. It is only to be regretted that it did not require more explicit statements as to the true nature of the retraxit of the Secretary and satisfy itself with distinct and unmistakeable declarations of his policy. A mere suspension of the offence, to secure its more safe and permanent reproduction hereafter, could not have been satisfactory to a body like the Synod of Virginia. It would have argued a degree of simplicity on their parts, which no one who knows them, would be at all willing to impute.

But if we have not misread the signs as displayed in the action of the Board for some months past, that action is becoming more and more palpably consistent with its doctrines, and advancing more openly to the legitimate consequences of its creed. The claim to pecuniary support is brought into notice with increasing confidence. The monthly reports of the Secretary complain of the state of the secular treasury, illustrate the necessity of contributions, appeal to the liberality of the friends of religion and most pathetically insinuates that the church must not suffer its

schools to perish. Why this guarded and gingerly mode of expression if the doctrines of the Board are true, unless it is designed to gradually mould the sentiment of the church to admit of more decided and outspoken declarations on the subject? If the Board means to maintain its position that the church is a party to Education, no matter whether *exclusively* of other parties or not, it ought to come out boldly and insist on all the necessary and legitimate claims growing out of it. The application for funds now so cautiously insinuated, ought to be an appeal to the conscience of the church as boldly and confidently uttered as any appeal based on the clearest and least equivocal obligations of the gospel. We shall then see the Board of Education acting fully in the functions of that grand office it has claimed for itself, and dispensing the pecuniary contributions of the whole church from Maine to the Pacific, for the support of secular schools all over the land. This Board will then *appear* what it *has really become*, not a simple agency of the church to facilitate the education of her ministry, but a Board of General Education invested with absolute control over the whole secular and religious education of the children of the church, holding the destiny of a thousand schools at its breath, and wielding an amount of power which, even if it were legitimately claimed for the church ought not to be consigned to one or two or less than a half dozen agencies. The church must either support the claims of this Board or repudiate its doctrines. She must either take up regular collections for secular purposes, or deny that she owes such a duty to secular learning as its absolute control. The alternative is absolute. The claim of money is the legitimate and necessary result of the doctrines of the Board; it is the logical development of the *education creed* of the Board; and the church cannot admit one and deny the other. Certainly if it is the duty of the church to teach all the various branches of secular learning, it is the duty of the people to give every necessary facility to the performance of her duty. If it be true that the control of secular education is the duty of the church as much as the preaching of the gospel, it is as much the duty of the people to pay for the one as to pay for the other. The *Board have as much right to demand money at the hands of the church, for the one* as it has for the other, and no church within the limits of the Presbyterian body is doing its duty unless it has a distinct collection taken up for secular education, as regularly and on the identical principles as its collection for the education of the ministry. Both these great aims are claimed to be guarded by the apostolic commission. Both are equally divine in their original and equally authoritative in their obligation. Both must be supported, and supported with a degree of liberality equal to the necessities of the case. In other words the Presbyterian church from one end to the other is to raise the funds necessary to the

complete establishment of a full system of the means of education, for the people. The church is to be turned into a great educational institute. Presbyteries and Synods are to introduce a new and entirely distinct branch of business, from the ordinary ecclesiastical functions, and discuss books and primers, modes of discipline, and improvements in education, just as a convention of teachers or an assembly of friends of free schools.* While the church is actively employed in collecting funds for missionary purposes of all sorts, she is to establish a second great line of contributions for promoting secular education. These are the necessary consequences of the doctrines of the Board. Now if these are true and just conclusions, it is time the church knew it and was employed in carrying them into effect. The issues are too great to be allowed to go by default. They must be seized, considered and actively put into operation, if it is the duty of the church to do it. There is no reason for flinching from the question, if it be true. But if these cherished views of the Board are not true; if it is a breach of the apostolic commission for the church to pass her strictly spiritual bounds and claim an unlimited jurisdiction over the whole system of secular education; and if the Board are really laboriously inculcating false views upon the church, it is time to interfere and prevent the officers of that Board from turning their whole machinery into implements of evil. This matter is a serious business. These doctrines are true or false: they involve a *breach* or a *compliance* with the *great commission* of the church. If they are really a violation of the apostolic charter, every man who acknowledges the authority of Christ must come out of these schools; he must cease to patronize or recognize them; he must cleanse his hands from all contact with a system built upon the prostrate charter of the church of God. There is no alternative. These views of the Board are right and must be sustained, or they are wrong and must be repudiated by the entire body of the church: else a solemn responsibility will be incurred. On the contrary if these views are correct, all opposition to them is wrong. If the apostolic commission really charges the church with the duty of controlling secular education, the man who resists her claim is as guilty as he who should resist her claim to preach the gospel. There may be degrees in his wickedness according as his opposition is honest or dishonest: but still he will be rebelling against the authority of God and resisting the great aims for which he has established a church. The issue is plain and it is a serious issue. We feel it to be so, and under a profound conviction of this fact we would attempt to scrutinize the doctrines of the Board in that spirit of calm and resolute candor, which is equally distant from all misrepresentation on one hand and all fear on the other. If

* Report on Parochial Schools, 1847, p. 6.

these doctrines are right, we certainly do not mean to resist them for one instant after that fact is made manifest. We have no interest in being wrong on any subject, and we hold ourselves bound by a law anterior in existence and superior in force to any personal pledge upon our own part, to abandon any position which can be shown to be wrong. If the Board or its advocates can maintain its views, we shall unhesitatingly and in defiance of all charges of inconsistency, abandon our opposition as frankly as it has been made. But if they are wrong no effort should be spared to secure the entire reversal of all the positions assumed by the courts and agents of the church on this subject. To the investigation of these issues we shall endeavor to concentrate such an amount of exertion as may satisfy the strong sense of duty by which we are animated. We shall subject the doctrines of the Board to a fearless scrutiny. We shall test the arguments which support them by as rigid a logic as we can bring to bear upon the investigation. But while we mean to be thus candid and fearless in the expression of our opinions, we would distinctly repudiate all design to reflect on the integrity of the Board. This must be distinctly understood. We believe them honest though *mistaken*, sincerely animated with a desire for the prosperity of the church, though dangerously at fault as to the means of securing it. We have no personal acquaintance with the Secretary of the Board, but from the uniform reports we have heard of him, we are fully persuaded that we should do great injustice to the noble and princely generosity of his character, should we place it on the same level with the correctness of his views on this subject. We hope therefore that in the discussion of this great question so long delayed, all parties will practically recognize the mutual title to esteem which is founded upon purity of motive and sincere desire to know and obey the truth, whatever may be thought of the views which may be actually entertained. We rejoice in the recent signs of awakened interest in this subject. We hope that it will not be suffered to expire until the subject has been searched to the bottom and the truth fully elicited. To the contribution of our own part of this work, a purpose which has been fully entertained for many months past, we now address ourselves with infinitely more hope of a successful issue of the discussion than we dared to indulge when this purpose was originally formed.

It is essential to the clear investigation of any question, that the point in issue should be distinctly understood. We wish to place the question raised in the reports of the Board of Education and supported by the advocates of its doctrines, clearly before the minds of our readers. To enable us to do this, we beg their attention to a few preliminary remarks on the several current theories as to the nature and agencies of education.

Education consists of the acquisition of knowledge and the de-

velopment of the soul: these are its two great aims. Of these the development of the powers and susceptibilities of the soul is the most important. Perhaps it would not be wrong to deny that the ends of education are two-fold, and to assert that the acquisition of knowledge bears to the development of the faculties, the subordinate relation of a means to an end. The expansion of nature, the enlargement of the plan impressed upon the soul by the hand of the Creator according to the great law of improvement by exertion, is the great purpose of education. The nature of man is multiform in its unity; it is composed of an intellectual, moral and physical department. It is the end of education therefore to educe, to draw out, to develop all these parts. None are to be omitted: all are to be developed together under the laws and conditions, moral and positive which are issued for the regulation of each separate power or capacity of the complex nature subjected to the process. Education can only be complete or symmetrical, when *all the powers* of human nature are symmetrically developed. The *mind* with its various faculties must be developed; the development of which must be conducted on principles suited to the nature of each of them. The discovery, application, modification and improvement of these rules and principles, spread before us one great collateral branch of this vast and complicated subject. The *heart* must also be developed with all its wealth of hope and fear, desire and affection. The *moral* instincts of human nature, *conscience*, the sense of justice, the power by which all moral distinctions are perceived and maintained to be authoritative, must also be expanded and improved. These capacities of the soul and the laws that govern their development, the agencies to be employed and the conditions of time, place and circumstance to be observed in their employment, form another great branch of the great question of education. The development of man's physical constitution and the laws that govern it, form another. This development ought obviously to proceed simultaneously, as far as possible, so that the unity as well as the diversity of nature may be preserved.

It follows from these views that any neglect to educate the moral nature of man is to pervert the very end and aim of education, and thus presents a conclusive answer to one of the questions raised in relation to this subject. This is, whether the end of education does not properly terminate upon the intellectual powers to the exclusion of the moral susceptibilities and faculties of the soul. On this question there can be no issue between Christian disputants on the subject of education, or indeed between any investigators of the subject, who have formed the first just conception of its true ends. If education is the development of the nature of man, a symmetrical and complete development is absolutely indispensable to the attainment of this end; for to develop but a

part of the soul would defeat it altogether. To develop *one part* to the neglect of the others, would be to disturb the harmony of nature, disarrange the order which God has established, and as the result, produce man a creature of education, distorted from his true proportions, enlarged in some faculties and dwarfed in others and miserably compensated by the enlarged capacity of his educated faculties for the distortion of the symmetry of his nature, and the dishonor and neglect of the faculties left without development.

There is another question which rises in this posture of the subject. It is this: admitting that the development of the moral and religious capacities of the soul ought to keep pace with the development of the intellect, is this double development to be sought *from the same agency*, or are they *to be accomplished simultaneously by different agencies?* This is a *question of means not of ends—of instruments—not of objects*: and upon it, there may be a difference of opinion maintained consistently both by those who support and by those who oppose the doctrines of the Board of Education. One party contend that both of these ends, the development of the moral and intellectual nature, ought to be sought from the *same agency*, and that the school which provides the necessary instruments for the education of the intellect ought to provide equally the instruments for the education of the heart, and to seek both with equal solicitude as the two great departments of the same end. The other party—the party who are principally identified with the policy of State education—contend that while both these ends are to be sought, yet there are reasons which require that *they ought not to be sought of the same agency*: that they ought to be *carried forward simultaneously by different agencies*: and that while the day school is singly devoted to the development of the intellect, the development of the moral powers is to be sought from the independent and co-ordinate agencies of home, the pulpit, the press, and all other means by which the moral nature of man may be affected. Now it is obvious that a school based on either of these opposing views might be founded *without the intervention of the church*, and therefore a holder of either view is not necessarily committed either for or against the doctrine of ecclesiastical intervention. It is conceivable at least, that a number of parents, Presbyterian parents for example, holding the opinion that the development of the moral nature ought to be sought of the same agency charged with the development of the intellect, should determine to unite and secure a school in which religion should be directly intermingled with the course of secular studies. This would be altogether possible, and it is not only possible, but *this is the true scheme of education in opposition to the doctrines of the Board on the one hand, and the advocates of the State policy on the other*. In other words, although the reports

of the Board argue upon it as a fixed and admitted logical connection, there is in fact no sort of connection whatever between the premise that religion may be taught in a day-school and the conclusion, that *the church may properly undertake to establish it*. This argument assumes that wherever religion may be properly taught, *the church may properly undertake to control it*. The question as to *the nature of the school* is one thing, and the question as to *the proper agency in establishing it* is another. It may be proper to mingle religion directly in the exercises of a day-school; yet it may not be proper for *the church* to undertake to mingle it: that might be left with equal, and some are disposed to think, with much more propriety to the parent. A man may consistently hold that religion ought to be mingled in the regular exercises of the day-school, and yet deny the right of the church to meddle with it. This is precisely the relation we hold to the doctrines of the Board of Education. The Board teaches the doctrine that religion should be intermingled in the ordinary routine of the scholastic course, and we are happy to co-incide with this view so far as we have been able to balance the contending considerations that control this part of the subject, although it is likely that we would allow of the modification of this doctrine from the force of circumstances, beyond the point at which the Board would stop. We wish it then to be distinctly understood we raise no issue with the Board of Education touching the value of Christian education or the propriety of seeking to secure it by the intermixture of religion with the secular course. It is not a question of objects, but of *agencies, not of ends, but of means, not of moral or prudential propriety, but of ecclesiastical power*.

There is a third question which claims our attention in the investigation of this subject: the presentation of this question will present the issue between us and the Board of Education so clearly that fatuity itself cannot fail to comprehend it. Admitting with the Board what is denied by the advocates of the State education policy, that religion ought to be directly intermingled with the exercises of the day-school and that the development of the moral powers should be sought at the hands of the schoolmaster, just as much as the development of the intellect, *is the church of Christ, in consequence of this or for any other reason, the proper agency to establish and maintain, to govern and to stand officially responsible for such a school?* This is the plain and single issue which we make with the Board. It is a question, not of the propriety of Christian education or of any of the subordinate questions of the instrumental means or conditions to be used in attaining it. *It is purely a question of ecclesiastical power*, involving as all questions of governmental power must do, issues of individual right and personal liberty, together with those graver and more commanding issues of the honor and authority of the great Head, of

the church which are involved in all questions of the compliance or non-compliance of the church, with the limitations and requirements of his will. The Board affirms and we deny. The Board affirms, not only that religion ought to be intermingled with the exercises of the day-school, but also that for this and for other reasons, *the church* in her organic and official capacity is the proper and even divinely appointed agency to establish and supervise a whole series of schools of various grades, embodying that peculiarity. We admit the first part of this doctrine and deny the second: we contend that the one result is not the necessary or logical consequence of the other, and that before it can be admitted that the church may interfere because religion may be properly taught in the day-school, it must first be distinctly proved that such a school can be founded by no other agency but the church. If the true law of education require such a school, and no agency but the church can establish it, it would then be required by consistency to admit the lawfulness of ecclesiastical interference, and not only its lawfulness, but its necessity. But before this conclusion can be reached, it is obvious that it must be first proved that the church alone can establish it. If any other agency beside the church can do it, the conclusion fails. The question we raise then with the Board of Education is, *whether* the church of Christ is the proper agency to manage the interests and control the fortunes of secular or civil education. We deny the claim as a whole and in all its parts—claiming on the contrary that such a school if required by the true law of education, ought to be established—not by the church—but by the people—not by the Presbyterian church in her organized capacity—but by Presbyterian people in the exercise of their rights and duties as parents.

We affirm that the church, as such, can take part in such business only *by influence, not by the direct exertion of power*; and that any claim on the part of the church to *granted or incidental power* to control the general interests of secular learning, or the secular education of her baptized children, is a claim unwarranted by the word of God, by the structure of the church, or by any necessity or propriety whatever; that it is an usurpation and a sinful trespass of the church beyond her appointed limits, to which she ought to be turned back by all who regard the authority of Christ and the binding force of the limits he has placed upon all the grand divisions of human duty. To the discussion of this issue we now invite the attention of the public.

If we rightly understand the doctrines of the Board, they place the right of the church to establish a great system of secular education on several different and to us palpably ill-connected grounds. They seem to argue in some parts of their official papers, that the church has a right to control the interests of secular education in virtue of a *distinct and independent grant of power in the apos-*

to teach secular learning as a co-ordinate, yet independent branch of her commission to teach. This seems to be the ground assumed in all comments which are made on the terms of that commission and the use of the word *teacher* in the Epistles of the New Testament. This is the ground taken also by Dr. Smyth of Charleston in the extraordinary pamphlet issued by him several years ago, in which he not only claims a divine injunction of the most positive character for the intervention of the church, but boldly pushes the doctrines of his party to their utmost application and unequivocally claims for the church the power to control the professional and business education of all under her reach, as well as their ordinary classical and scientific training.*

They argue again as if the right of the church resulted as an incident to the direct grant of power to teach the doctrines of religion and that as it is competent to the church through her authorized teachers to explain the secular allusions of the Sacred Record, she may therefore enter to any conceivable or possible extent into the inculcation of literature and science. It is supposed that inasmuch as the Bible contains various allusions which cannot be comprehended without the assistance of secular learning, and as the church must be supposed competent to give all instruction necessary to the elucidation of the Scriptures, it may therefore lawfully undertake to instruct in everything necessary or appropriate to the understanding of the gospel. This seems to be the doctrine of Dr. Hodge's address, that the Bible including all forms of truth, the right to teach the Bible, includes the right to teach all truth and that it is not only the business of the church to teach, but to teach in all ways by which the truth can be conveyed. †

Again, they seem to rest the whole issue on the *incidental and auxiliary powers of the government of the church*, powers which result, not from any direct grant, but from the obvious principles of constitutional law and common sense, that when a party is vested with a grant of powers, he is necessarily equally vested with whatever powers may be necessary to carry out the powers with which he was originally clothed. This seems to be the foundation of all the arguments, alleging first the *necessity of the case* and second, *the interest of the church*, as justifying ecclesiastical intervention. The claim is likewise argued as resulting from the relation of baptized children to the church, and again, from the dictates of prudence seeking all possible safe-guards to education, the argument alleging that such a protection is to be found in the supervision of the church in its courts. It is obvious that if the first of these pleas is correct, there can be no necessity for the

* Smyth on Parochial Schools, p. 7, 15, 19.

† Home, The School and the Church, Vol. 3, p. 45.

others or indeed any propriety in the allegation of some of them. If the right of the church results from a specific grant in the apostolic commission giving the church the control of secular learning as a co-ordinate and independent grant, with the right to control the teaching of the gospel, it is clear, there is no use in claiming her right merely as an incident to her spiritual functions, or in placing it among the incidental powers of her government. If the right exist as a direct grant, it does not exist as an incident. If it exists as an incident, it does not exist as a direct grant. The pleas are mutually destructive, and no matter which may be finally adopted as the foundation of the claim set up for the church, it is certain the other must be abandoned. We shall endeavor, however, to show that neither of them are founded in truth and that no other plea presented by the Board will justify the church in so enormous and unwarrantable an extension of its functions.

The pleas of the Board running through various publications are too numerous to receive a distinct notice of each: we shall therefore select the most striking and important of them for the purpose of investigation.

One of the most imposing and unfounded of these pleas is the claim to direct power over the whole subject of secular learning from the terms of the Apostolic commission. It is alleged that the language of that great charter of the church, *Go teach all nations*, embraces the right alleged to exist in the church. A similar argument is founded upon the word, *teacher*, used in the New Testament. It is alleged that the broad terms of the commission and the acknowledged character of the church as a teaching institute, are not to be limited to any one class of topics, but must be interpreted to embrace all forms of truth, thus securing to the church the right to teach secular learning among the other forms of truth. It is also alleged that the right of the church *to teach*, implies a right to teach *in all ways* in which the truth can be conveyed to the understanding. The church is held up as mainly the responsible and authoritative party vested with the control of the child and his fortunes; and while in one place it is alleged *the parent* is the original and highest source of authority on this subject, it is unequivocally asserted in another that *the parent is the special agent of the church in planting the seeds of intellectual and moral culture in the minds of his children.** Without pretending to select all the instances in which these views are asserted, we call the attention of the reader to the following quotations from the reports and other official papers of the Board.

The report of the Board for 1848 declares in relation to certain statements quoted from the history of the first centuries of the Christian church :

"These statements serve to give a specimen of the spirit that existed in the primitive church, feeling its way under the guidance of religion towards the god-

* Compare Rep. 1850, p. 68, with Rep. 1852, pp. 23: 35.

ly education of youth. The value of such instructions became of course, impaired as Christianity degenerated, but their origin was undoubtedly in the great commission, *Go teach all nations. This commission includes the training of the young, as well as the general proclamation of the word of life.*"*

It also affirms that *the plurality of presbyters* in the early church gives support to a very common opinion that a part of them were engaged in giving instruction. *Various texts of Scripture seem to intimate that the office of teacher was a distinct and separate office provided by divine appointment.*†

The Board argue at length in their Report for 1852, that "the church is a party to education, because teaching is one of the functions of the church."‡ They present us also with the following extraordinary argument among others to support this claim.—They tell us with inimitable simplicity that the scriptures lay no stress on *secular* education, but abound in exhortations in favor of *religious nurture*. If the religious so far exceeds the secular, if the two naturally go together, and if the religious belongs to the church, than the right and duty of the church to include the whole within its proper sphere is no unnatural inference." We defer comment for the present.

Dr. Hodge in his address on the teaching office of the church, published in the *Home, the School and the Church*, gives expression to the following views to which we shall again have occasion to call the attention of the reader.¶

"Let it however be distinctly understood, that we advocate no exclusive method of instruction. The business of the church is to teach and to teach in all the ways by which the truth of God can be conveyed to the understanding; but that work must be accomplished."

"We have endeavored to show that teaching is the great duty of the church and how she ought to teach; the only other question is *what is she to teach?*—Is she to teach secular knowledge? The proper answer to this question undoubtedly is, that the church is bound to teach the Bible and other things only so far as they are necessary or important to the right understanding of the Bible. *This exception however covers the whole field of human knowledge.*"

Comment is scarcely necessary. Similar to these, only advancing with more boldness to the full extent of the principles inculcated, are the views of Dr. Smyth:

"This duty of the church as 'the Teacher' of every creature in all nations by whom they are to be 'trained up in the way they should go'—covers the whole period of human life, from infancy to old age, from birth to the grave; and the teaching or training therefore which it is to impart, must run parallel and be found adapted to every age and period of human life."§

The inference from these positions is that as the church is appointed to *teach* in general terms it may teach anything and everything, and in all ways by which truth can be conveyed to the

* Rep. 1848, p. 11.

† Ib. p. 10.

‡ Rep. 1852, pp. 37: 33.

¶ Vol. 3, pp. 45: 46.

§ Smyth on Parochial Schools.

understanding. As the exception admitted by Dr. Hodge covers the whole field of human knowledge, the church may lawfully undertake the ecclesiastical control and teach any department of the whole field incidentally brought under its review. As the church is "the Teacher" in the most unlimited and unqualified sense, as contended by Dr. Smyth, she can teach anything if she pleases, and all things if she can.

To these views the reply is obvious. The church is charged by her commission to *teach*, not in general, but with a specific and limited reference to one grand class of topics. She is appointed to teach the *gospel*, to inculcate the will of God, to expound the Scriptures. Nor is the great field of her work more definitely prescribed than the mode in which she is to do it. She is to teach through a specified class of officers invested with official functions for this very purpose, and she is as much bound to teach through her proper officers as she is bound to teach at all. The inviolability of this office is as good against any encroachment from the church itself in any of its agencies, as against encroachment from without. No member of the church, no officer or agent of the church belonging to another rank, no part of the government of the church have any right to invade the office prescribed for the exercise of the teaching function of the church, or to interfere with any of the duties attached to it. Now let us allow the interpretation put by the Board on the apostolic commission and on the term *teacher* used in the Epistles. It is worthy of notice, we may remark in passing, that while the Board in some parts of their official papers, argue for a direct obligation of duty resting upon the church to control the interests of education, binding beyond all discretion whatever, they argue in other parts of their reports as if the matter was subject to the discretion of the church, that it was one of these things about which it might or might not employ its powers, and that all idea of *improper interference* on the part of the church was annihilated by the fact that though not *bound*, it was at least at liberty to act, if it should appear to be expedient. But admit their interpretation of the apostolic commission and we not only have a *permission*, but a *commend*. Nay more, we have the officer, who is to teach both classes of the truth alleged to be included in the commission, *distinctly specified*. The *same office* is charged with both; and the result flowing irresistibly from the interpretation of the Board, is that the *ministry of the gospel* are charged by Christ with two distinct and co-ordinate functions as a teacher of science and a preacher of the Cross! The *obligation* is the same for both, and by divine command he is *ex officio* a pedagogue not less than a pastor, and both offices equally authoritative and equally divine. Are the Board ready to admit these conclusions? If not, they must surrender their argument from the apostolic

commission : the conclusion is wedded to the premise, and both must stand or fall together.

It is a matter of curious speculation to observe the extent to which inconsistency can go in an honest mind, and few instances of it would be found more remarkable, than the inconsistency between the views entertained by the Board about the meaning of the commission and their hesitating denial that the *teacher* is an *ecclesiastical* officer. They apply the term *teacher* to schoolmasters : they say that the plurality of presbyters in the early church was probably occasioned by the demand for school teachers ; yet they say he is not an *ecclesiastical officer*. This would be rather dangerous experiment : it would indicate a claim to create new officers in the church which it might not be safe to bring too clearly before the world, so long as certain stern old paragraphs stand in the Confession of Faith making Christ alone the Head of the church and the authorized source of all its official arrangements. But what is *the teacher* of one of the institutions of the Board?—They labor hard to define him : they deny him to be *ecclesiastical* and call him *religious* ; while they argue that he is invested with his *official* though not *ecclesiastical* character by the very terms of the apostolic commission. How would the Board prove from the commission, the ecclesiastical character of a preacher of the gospel? Evidently by showing that the church had been charged with the preaching of the Gospel, and as a matter of course the office specified in the commission as charged with the business is and must be ecclesiastical. Now if it be true that the church is equally charged with the interests of secular knowledge as with the preaching of the gospel it will follow on precisely the same grounds, that the officer charged with the care of the secular department of the commission of the church, must also be ecclesiastical. He must occupy a co-ordinate rank with the minister and ruling elder, as an officer of the church. If the office of schoolmaster is not ecclesiastical, the business attached to it is not ecclesiastical. If the office is ecclesiastical what do the Board mean by denying it! It is impossible to avoid two conclusions from this argument of the Board on the Apostolic commission : *first that the office of a teacher of secular learning is equally ecclesiastical and divine with the office of a minister ; and second that these two offices are really the same, or to speak with more precision of language, the teaching of secular knowledge and the teaching of the gospel are two co-ordinate functions of the same office.* According to the commentaries of the Board on the commission the school-master is charged with the performance of one of the great duties of the church, yet they assert that it is impossible for him to discharge his duty *in an official capacity*. There is an evident absurdity in claiming on one side the entire control of secular learning for the church, and yet in depriving the church

of an officer to discharge the duty resulting from the claim.—What is an official character or capacity but the investiture of an individual with power to do certain acts peculiar to a certain relation, and which he could not lawfully do as an individual? If the doctrine be true that secular learning has been equally committed to the church with the doctrines of religion it follows resistlessly that the school-master is as much an ecclesiastical officer as a minister of the gospel, and that if any one undertakes to teach secular knowledge unless in an ecclesiastical capacity he is as guilty as if he undertook to discharge the functions of the ministry without being invested with the office. These conclusions are absolutely resistless from the interpretation put by the Board on the commission of the apostles and by their advocates on the *teaching* character of the church of Christ.

The plea for ecclesiastical intervention set up by the Board and its advocates drawn from the *incidental relation* of secular knowledge to the truths of religion, though sufficiently discriminated in its own nature from the *claim to direct power* granted in the apostolic commission, is hardly perhaps sufficiently discriminated in the papers of the Board to have laid the foundation for our division of the pleas into two separate and distinct arguments. We have done so, not only because there was a distinction between the pleas in the nature of the case, but also to enable us to examine them with more distinctness. We shall now call the attention of the reader to the argument founded upon *the incidental relation of secular knowledge to the truths of the gospel*, as set forth in the reports and other official papers of the Board. The following extract is from the Report for 1852, p. 37.

“The church is a party to education, because *teaching is one of the functions of the church*. This position in the abstract will scarcely be denied. God makes use of his church to “teach all nations.” It is her very vocation to instruct in divine things. The great practical question here for consideration is, how far the teachings of other things besides pure religion is embraced within the scope of ecclesiastical authority?

In answering this question so as to bring *general learning* within the lawful sphere of the church, it is important to remember in the first place, that *the proper knowledge of the Bible calls into requisition learning of every kind*.—History, geography, astronomy, mental philosophy, general literature, and in short *every department of knowledge is fairly subject to the demands of every one who desires thoroughly to understand the Scriptures*. On the principle, therefore, that *the greater includes the less, the church has a right to teach the general branches of education as auxiliary to the interpretation and knowledge of the divine word*.”

There can be no mistake about the import of this paragraph: on the incidental relation of secular to religious knowledge it is unequivocally claimed to be within the lawful sphere of the church, to teach history, general literature and in fact *every department of knowledge*! A conclusion so sweeping, annihilating everything like a limited and specific character in the church of Christ, drawn from such an argument certainly deserves the utmost attention.

Nor is the Board single in the assertion of this view. The great and distinguished Professor of Didactic Theology in the Seminary at Princeton, takes precisely similar grounds. He says.

"Let it, however be distinctly understood that we advocate no exclusive method of instruction. The business of the church is to teach, and to teach in all the ways by which the truth of God can be conveyed to the understanding; but that work must be accomplished.

We have endeavored to show that teaching is the great duty of the church, and how she ought to teach: the only other question is *what* is she to teach? Is she to teach *secular knowledge*? The proper answer to this question undoubtedly is, that the church is bound to teach the Bible, and other things only so far as they are necessary or important to the right understanding of the Bible. *This exception, however, covers the whole field of human knowledge.* The Bible is a wonderful book. It brings everything within its sweep. Its truths radiate in every direction, and become implicated with all other truth, so that no form of knowledge—nothing which serves to illustrate the nature of God, the constitution of the universe, or the powers of the human soul, fails to do homage and render service to the book of God. We can not teach the doctrines of creation and providence, without teaching the true theory of the universe, and the proper office of the laws of nature; we cannot teach the laws of God without teaching moral Philosophy; we cannot teach the doctrines of sin and regeneration, without teaching the nature and faculties of the soul. *Christianity, as the highest form of knowledge, comprehends all forms of truth.*"*

Hence the church may teach *all forms of truth!* The whole field of human knowledge being *necessary or important* to the understanding of the Bible, therefore the church may lawfully reduce the whole of that field under her own control and teach any branch of human knowledge that may be *necessary or important to the understanding of the Bible!*

It would seem that inasmuch as Christianity comprehends all forms of truth, the maxim that the greater includes the less, gives the church an infrangible right to teach any branch of science or art: the right to teach the greater and more important truth, implies necessarily the right to teach any that is less so. If she can be trusted with the one why not with the other? Such is the argument: let us test it.

The legitimate mode of testing the validity of vague and comprehensive propositions laying claims to extensive jurisdiction is to apply them to particular instances and observe the results. Apply this claim and see the extent to which it would extend the power of the church. The Bible alludes to law: the church may therefore, set up a law-school and inculcate law and religion together. The Bible alludes to medicine: the church may therefore establish a series of medical schools, and deliver ecclesiastical lectures on all branches of the medical art. It alludes to the business of the carpenter and other crafts: the church may therefore lawfully establish schools for instruction in the mechanic arts.—If the allusions of the Bible to law and medicine are not allowed to justify the ecclesiastical establishment of law and medical

* Home, The School and the Church, Vol. 3. p. 45.

schools, neither will similar incidental allusions to other forms of truth not purely religious, justify the establishment of schools for secular education in science and the classics. To such extravagances will the argument extend, and if the reader wishes to see these conclusions not only admitted to be legitimate consequences of the doctrine, but actually urged as part and parcel of the great ecclesiastical system of education, we have only to call his attention to the following paragraph taken from a publication of a distinguished supporter of the views of the Board. Dr. Smyth declares:

"Again there is nothing, we affirm really proper, useful, or essential to the education of a child, that is not commanded by Christ and *enjoined upon his church*; and whatever therefore is necessary to a complete education *ought to be provided and imparted under the teaching and supervision of the church.*—*In whatever way they should go when old—whether as men of business or men of letters or men of professional occupation—in that way, is it the business and the duty of the church to train up the youth brought within her influence.*"*

There is the legitimate result of the doctrine of ecclesiastical intervention boldly traced out to its utmost boundary, and it is unequivocally claimed that in *whatever way*, not the moral and religious way in which men of all callings ought to pursue them, but in whatever professional or business way it is lawful for men to engage, it is the solemn duty of the church to train them to go! But the assertion of this incidental claim over all form of truth is utterly fallacious, in the extent and for the purposes for which it is employed. There is a degree of truth in it; but by no means such a degree of it as will justify the enormous superstructure of ecclesiastical usurpation erected upon it. It is true that there are secular allusions intermingled in the instructions of the Bible, which may be properly explained by the expounder of the Scriptures: but the idea of basing upon this capacity in the minister of the gospel to explain incidental allusions in the sacred text, a right in the church in her organic capacity to establish a universal system of secular education, is perfectly preposterous. In the first place the power to explain the secular allusions of the Scriptures pertains solely to the minister of the gospel; for it is clear that the *teaching function* of the church, no matter whether employed on the incidental allusions or direct statements of the sacred text, pertains exclusively to the ministry of the gospel. Now the functions of that office are good against all usurpation in or out of the church; and if this be so no part of the government of the church, no agency individual or corporate, no officer of another ecclesiastical rank has the remotest conceivable right to interfere with the functions of the ministry and claim the power ecclesiastically to instruct in the knowledge of incidental or direct statements of the Scriptures. *The admitted capacity of the church to explain the secular allusions of the scriptures is confined to the officer of the*

* Smyth on Parochial Schools, p. 13.

church charged with the exercise of her teaching functions: it belongs to the minister of the gospel; and as such is excluded from the jurisdiction or control of the church in its organized or governmental capacity, as much as from any other intruder whatever.

In the next place this admitted capacity in the ministry of the gospel to explain the secular allusions of the sacred records is a *strictly limited and defined right*. It is only lawful when strictly confined to its incidental and allusive character. No minister of the gospel has the right under pretence of exercising this capacity of his office, to pass beyond the exigency of the explanation before him, to lose sight of his true business as an expounder of the Scripture and launch out on a purely secular address. For instance, it may be proper for a minister of the gospel, to explain in the pulpit, the principal qualities of the camel or dromedary alluded to in the Bible; but if he were to branch off into a general lecture upon natural history and defend himself by saying it was as lawful to talk of English race-horses as of Arabian camels, and by urging that the incidental right to allude to the camel gave him the right of unlimited disquisition on natural history, it would be difficult to say which would be the most remarkable, his impudence or his logic. The truth is, this capacity pertains only to the ministry as a teaching function, and only in this office in a purely limited form. It is only allowable even in the ministry when purely and absolutely incidental to an explanation of the Scriptures. It will not justify a minister in going beyond its incidental and subordinate character: much less will it authorize the church in its organized capacity to establish a boundless system of secular instruction. Such a conclusion from such a premise is absolutely monstrous. It had just as well be said that the right of the church to collect funds for the prosecution of her business, implies and confers the right of unlimited entry upon commercial speculations. The church has the right to raise money, but not to raise it in every way in which money may be lawfully made. So she has a right to explain secular allusions incidental to the exposition of the Scriptures; but she is equally bound to observe the incidental character of the allusion and to make the explanation only through her authorized officers for the exposition of the Scriptures. This capacity of instructing in secular knowledge is incidental and limited, and must be kept within its proper sphere.—It is not legitimate to plead an *incidental* capacity to justify a course from which everything of a truly incidental character has been banished.

The argument from the *incidental* relation of secular to religious truth, may be still more clearly evinced to be fallacious by a brief series of parallel suppositions. It had just as well be argued for a professor of law, that because ecclesiastical ideas are

necessarily, incidentally touched in the course of his lectures, he might therefore lawfully stretch this incidental capacity of his office, and assume all the functions of a teacher of religion, in virtue of his right to explain the religious ideas incidentally attached to his legitimate course of instruction. Equally legitimate would be the claim of a medical lecturer, to the character of professor of law, because he could lawfully inculcate the principles of medical jurisprudence. The truth is that all forms of truth bear some relation to other forms of truth; but this fact by no means places all truth on a common level as to importance or sanctity of authority, neither does it authorize the erasure of all the lines of distinction which have been drawn by prudence or by positive law, round the different authorized sources, for the investigation and inculcation of the truth. The church has no business to enter into scientific or philosophical investigations, in her organized capacity, simply because she has been limited by the law of her existence to the custody of but one great branch of truth. That the church is equally at liberty or equally bound to teach all forms of truth, is, with all respect to the distinguished gentleman who makes the assertion, absolutely incredible. If it be true then it follows that it is equally lawful for a minister of the gospel, to preach the gospel or lecture on law, or explain the principles of the magnetic telegraph, or enter upon a discourse on any topic sacred or secular, serious or amusing, sublime or ridiculous. It would also follow that the church might as lawfully ordain a Professor of mathematics, as a preacher of the gospel; for if she is lawfully charged with the interests of both secular and religious truth, she is equally bound to provide the teachers of both. Black smithing is one form of truth: hatting is another: the manufacture of buckets and the management of horses, are other forms of it; and if the church is charged with the control of all forms of truth, she is bound as Dr. Smyth does not hesitate to say, to provide for instruction in these and all other conceivable branches of the mechanic and domestic arts. The fates of poultry and the fortunes of knitting and darning will all depend on the perfection of ecclesiastical supervision. It follows moreover that a mistake in science is subject to ecclesiastical control, and it thus turns out that Galileo was imprisoned by the Papists, not because the legitimate power was not employed, but because an indiscreet use was made of a lawful and appropriate power.

What then is the limit on the power of the church to inculcate truth, not directly religious? It is very plain: the church has only the right to teach by her appropriate officers the truths of the gospel, and she is only permitted to touch truth purely secular, so far as it exists as a pure and absolute incident, to her appointed subjects of instruction. She has no right to teach but by her appropriate officers, by men charged with her functions, by minis-

ters of the gospel charged with her functions *as a teacher*, and by agents, men, charged with her functions of government, teaching the truth not as *teachers*, but as agents and as a means of carrying out their legitimate business. This is the power—this general auxiliary power incident to the *government* of the church, under which the Board of Publication, the Theological Schools, and the system of Colportage have been lawfully set in operation by ecclesiastical action; and it affords a complete answer to those who think that the great scheme of secular education by the church is equally lawful. It will be asked if the *teaching* function of the church is confined *solely to the ministry*, how do we justify the erection of Theological schools or the inculcation of religious truth by the Boards of the church? The answer is clear: the church does not appoint a Theological school or erect the Board of Publication *in virtue of her power to teach*: she does it under her powers of *government*, in virtue of her general auxiliary power to take all steps, not otherwise limited to carry out her great end as the promulgator of the gospel. The right of the church to teach Greek and Hebrew in the education of her ministry, does not result from the right to teach classical or oriental learning, as such, for if this were the case, then indeed the question of how much, or in what ways she might teach them, would no longer involve a question of *right*; but a simple question of *expediency*. But the right of the church to teach the elements of secular learning in her Theological schools *results as an incident to the right to superintend or provide for the education of her ministry*. This is a proper subject for the exercise of the incidental and auxiliary powers of the government of the church, and if she has the right to make such provision, she has the right to use what means may be necessary for the purpose, and consequently to teach classical and oriental learning. But this right to teach secular learning, existing merely as an incident to another right *must be limited in its application to the right to which it is attached*. It can only be done as the means of carrying out another end, which the church may properly seek to accomplish, and when this end is attained, the right to use the means alluded to ceases to exist. An incidental right can only exist as attached to its principal, and is limited in its range to the range of its principal by the very nature and tenure of its existence. Destroy the principal and you destroy the incident: the latter cannot possibly exist when the former is destroyed, or go beyond the exigencies of it while it exists. It is therefore utterly unwarrantable to infer from the right of the church to teach classical learning as incidental to her right to educate her ministry, that she has the right to teach it as a general interest and apart from any specific reference to her proper objects of pursuit. Her right to teach it is incidental to this specific end—the education of the ministry, and is cou-

fined to this alone: she may teach it for this purpose and for no other. *Nor do the men charged with the business of giving this instruction do it in the exercise of the teaching functions of the church: they do it merely as the agents to carry out the governmental power employed in the case: they instruct in the knowledge of the gospel, teaching officially, not as teachers, but as agents, giving instruction in religious knowledge, merely as a means of carrying out their business, as the agents for carrying into effect the ecclesiastical power that gave them existence.* The teaching function of the church is confined in its purely official character to the ministry alone: they may allude incidentally to secular truths as illustrative of the sacred lore they are set to inculcate; but they can go no further in the exercise of their public official functions. All other instruction given by the church is not given in the exercise of her function as a teacher, but merely as one mode of carrying into effect some of the incidental or auxiliary powers of her government. It is therefore manifest that even admitting that secular education might be lawfully controlled by the church under its incidental and auxiliary powers, it is altogether untenable to claim the right to do it under the teaching function of the church. But she is not authorized to control secular learning as a general interest, under either a granted or an implied power; for her granted power so far as it is a power to teach, centres on religious truth alone, and on secular truth in the absolutely incidental and limited sense which we have already defined; nor has she any shadow of right to use her incidental powers beyond the limits of the great circles of human duty. There must be some limit to the exercise of the incidental powers of the government of the church. What is this, but an intelligent regard to her own specific sphere of action as a spiritual body, and to the positive limitations imposed upon the great divisions of the relative rights and duties of man by the law of God. We shall have occasion again to recur to this view of the subject, which in fact affords by far the most plausible ground on which the claims of the Board of Education can be placed. The view with which we are concerned is the argument from the teaching character of the church; and we flatter ourselves that we have at least given some reason to believe that this plea will not sustain the claims that are founded upon it. In fact the pith of the plea as it is stated in the report for 1852, displays an obvious sophism. It states that *"the proper knowledge of the Bible calls into requisition learning of every kind. History, Geography, Astronomy, Mental Philosophy, General Literature, and in short every department of knowledge is fairly subject to the demands of every one who desires thoroughly to understand the Scriptures."* It then infers that *the church has a right to teach the general branches of education as auxiliary to the interpretation and knowledge of the divine word.**

* Rep. 1852, p. 37.

The premise in this argument is true; but the inference is false. It is true that every department of knowledge is subject to the demands of the student of the Bible; but surely the right of an individual, a right inhering among his personal and private rights, to seek for illustrations of Bible truth, in all departments of secular knowledge, is not to be made the basis of a claim *for the church as such*, to control them all? We close our reply to the argument on this point by the following remarks, premising that we shall again have occasion to recur to the plea of necessity.

Admitting it to be true that the church in *her organized capacity* has the right to teach everything necessary to the understanding of the Bible, *has she the right to teach more?* If the church has the right to teach the history of Cyrus, as implicated in the prophecies, has she *therefore*, a right to set up lectures on universal history or the history of England in particular? The inference is to us most astonishing, that the church, from her right to explain a secular fact or truth connected with her religious functions, derives the right to enter fully as a general enterprise on the teaching of that department of truth, to which the fact alluded to belongs. Or as a similar instance, that because she may teach Greek and Hebrew in her Theological schools in aid of her ministry, she may claim the right to teach Greek and all other branches classical or scientific learning as a general enterprise, and without the specific or confined reference of her classical instructions to candidates for the ministry.

We remark again that the church is *not bound to teach all that is necessary to the understanding of the Scriptures*. There are some things necessary for this purpose; which are to be taught *by other agencies*. The church fully admits this, when she requires a vow of the *parent* at the baptism of his child, that he will teach it to read and instruct it in the principles of religion. This requisition on the parent fully recognizes parental responsibility? The knowledge of the classics may be necessary to the understanding of the Scriptures in one sense; but if it were true in every sense, it would not follow that the church might lawfully take the control of it. We remark lastly, that in the sense in which it is true that the church may teach what is necessary to the understanding of the Scriptures, she can only do it as strictly and absolutely subsidiary to her own business, as incidental to her true sphere *as a teacher*, or to some just exercise of the powers of *her government*.

The next argument employed by the Board to which we shall attend, is that "*the church is a party to education, because she has a great interest in the work.*"* It is also claimed on the ground of necessity; first, as secular education is in itself essential to the highest and most rapid success of the church; and second, necessary to enable the church to compete with other denominations.†

* Report 1851, p. 41.

† Report 1852, p. 20.

These two applications of the idea of necessity are different from each other, the latter being merely circumstantial in its force as dependent on the example of other churches; but the first application of it is good for all times and under all circumstances, and if it is sound, justifies the church in controlling secular education, whether other sects are implicated or not, under all possible conditions of things.

We shall reply first, to this latter view of the necessity of the case, because it is more easily despatched. The reply is brief. It is wrong to imitate a bad example; admitting then that other sections of the church have gone beyond the proper bounds of ecclesiastical action, no necessity growing out of their wrong act can justify the Presbyterian church in following their example. It must be first clearly shown that such action on the part of the church is *not wrong*, before this plea of necessity becomes allowable; and consequently to make it before such fact is made out is an exceptionable use of the plea. If such action of the church is wrong, no matter how much she may suffer from the less scrupulous regard of sister churches to the will of Christ, she may not follow their wrong example. But let us admit the necessity for the schools inculcating Presbyterian views of the gospel which the Board claims. Now, admitting that these schools of all grades are necessary, *why may not Presbyterian parents unite to found them?* What necessity is there for the interference of the church? There is force in the plea of necessity, but not force to give aid to the conclusions of the Board; this force is altogether misdirected logically and morally when used to justify ecclesiastical intervention. It will prove that there ought to be Presbyterian schools; but it will not prove that *the church* ought to establish them. Why may not the *necessity* be met by schools of a type precisely similar to those that are said to create it? There are schools taught by Episcopal men, which are powerful sources of Episcopal influence, yet not the creatures of the Episcopal church or at all responsible to the authorities of the church. Why may not the necessity, alleged in this plea of the Board, be met by similar Presbyterian schools, taught by Presbyterians, conveying Presbyterian influences, teaching Calvinistic views of the gospel, yet not having one solitary feature of *an ecclesiastical school*. Now, *necessity* knows no alternative, and the Board are not at liberty to use such a plea, until the alleged necessity is more clearly defined as requiring not only schools of the alleged description, *but also the interference of the church to establish and maintain them*.

The other plea of necessity is but a modification of the plea drawn from *the interest of the church in the matter of secular training*, and we shall argue them together. We do not deny that the church has a great interest in the matter; but we do deny that the church may control everything in which she has an interest,

or that she has been invested with dominion, over everything which is absolutely and in a high and material sense, *necessary* to her welfare and success in her work. The church may seek to sustain her interest in the business by her legitimate modes of operation, but not beyond them. She is bound to consult her interests; but she is equally bound to consult them in the right and appointed way; nor can she any more lawfully use illegitimate means to promote her interests, than she can properly neglect them altogether. She may lawfully affect the subject of secular education, *by influence, but not by power*—by a clear *in-culcation of the duty of parents*, to secure the secular and religious education of their children—not by usurping the power to control it herself. The argument that the church may control the interests of secular learning *because she has an interest in it*, would extend the control of the church over all the great interests of society, and in fact introduce universal confusion between all the great combinations of the relative rights and duties of man. The church has a tremendous interest in the laws and government of the country; but this does not authorize the church to control the State. The State has an equal interest in the successful issue of the business of the church; but this does not justify the union of church and State, or the subjection of the church to the State according to the mistaken conceptions of European speculators in the science of government. Neither does the interest of the church in the advancement of science and in the mental improvement of her members, authorize her to seek the control of secular education or the pursuits of science. The argument is the same in application and force to all of these cases: and if it proves the legitimacy of the one it will also prove the legitimacy of the others. The truth is that the doctrine of *Laissez Faire* or the control of education by the State is precisely analogous to the doctrines of church and State. The arguments for both are exactly analogous: Mr. Webster argues them as parallel cases;* their general grounds of necessity and mutual interest are the same precisely. There are various circles of duty which have been made obligatory on man by the laws of God. The titles, family, church and State, mark the existence and determine the bounds of these divisions. These are all mutually dependent upon each other to the extent of an *absolute necessity*. The Family is necessary to the church, the church to the State, and the State to both the others; but the necessity does not operate to the extinction of the metes and bounds which God has seen proper to place upon each of them and has ordered to be observed. All men are bound to discharge the duties of these relations whenever they are placed in them and to discharge them *within the limits* that guard them; they are as much bound to observe the

* Webster's Works, vol. 3, p. 18.

limitation upon the duty, as the duty itself; in fact the limitation is a part of the duty and to neglect it on pretence of duty is to make the observance of duty the pretext for its violation. Whenever then a duty appertains to one of these great divisions or departments of duty, it must be performed in the proper capacity of the agent, suitable to the duty to be performed; he dares not undertake to transfer his duties and to perform the obligations incident to one position, under the capacity appropriate to another, although the two capacities may exist in the same person. It is lawful for a person to do a thing in one capacity which it is not lawful for him to do in another. For example, a man may be an elder in the church and a justice of the peace; he may discharge the duties of both so long as he is careful to keep them separate; but as soon as he begins to blend and confound them, and claim the right to use the functions of the one in discharge of the duties of the other, his usurpation and guilt is manifest. He has no right to try an offender against the church in his character as magistrate and send him to jail for an ecclesiastical offence. So if he owes a duty as a citizen, he cannot discharge it in his character as a member of the church. If he *owes a duty as a parent*, he cannot discharge it as a citizen or as a member of the church: he must discharge it as a parent, upon parental responsibility, providing all means and agents to discharge it in his parental character, apart entirely from all interference of either church or State, seeking no direct interference from either to do his work for him, and determining all that is necessary to the discharge of the duty *on precisely the same general principles on which he provides for the medical or other wants of the child*. The illustrations just presented show that the distinctions which guard the great combinations of the rights and duties of man are of vital importance, nor will any plea of *necessity* justify the erasure and neglect of these limitations and distinctions. Each of these great aggregations of particular duties must remain in its own sphere and do its own work in its own place. The dependence of other great interests besides its own, on the successful discharge of its legitimate functions, is a powerful additional inducement to each, to be faithful to its own ends. But if one is faithless to its obligations, that does not give the others the right to interfere to control it, on plea of their interest in the matter. If the State goes wrong the church has no business to usurp its functions on pretence of its interest in the right administration of civil government. If the church neglects its duty the State has no right, to attempt to control it, and make it do right. If the parent neglects his duty to his children, neither the church nor State have the right to compel him to do it, except in a limited and specific sense; and that is when the violation of his duty as a parent becomes a public offence against the civil law in the one case, or incompatible with Christian charac-

ter in the other. If one great circle of duty fails to come up to its allotted sphere, the others must suffer what loss accrues to them from the negligence of of the defaulter, except so far as they are able to repair the past and stem the tide of disaster for the future *by the legitimate use of their own lawful and necessary powers.* If the State goes wrong the church may interfere by the inculcation of the political duties made obligatory by the laws of God and by appealing to the sanctions of that law to secure the fulfilment of those duties; but it can do no more. If the parent neglects his duty, the church may interfere by her instructions in one direction and by her discipline in another, if the negligence should be of a nature to justify it. But the church may not on pretence of her interest in the matter, and on the alleged want of fidelity in the parent, lay hands on the whole interests of secular education and reduce them absolutely under her control. The church may interfere; but she must interfere in the right way and this by *instruction, not by control, by pastoral rather than ecclesiastical intervention, or by discipline not by a general governmental or official interference with the whole class of duties properly incident to the parental relation.* The argument * of the Board that all "officers of the church, especially ministers," are bound to watch over the youth of their charge, will not sustain the inference sought, *the interference of the church, in her organized capacity.* They are bound to watch over youth; but only so far as it comes within the legitimate functions of their office. Their superintendence is for a specified purpose and within certain defined limits, and beyond these they are not at liberty to act; it is no matter of *discretion* with them to act or not to act; but they are bound not to go beyond their proper bounds and not to trespass one iota on the rights and duties of the parent. No plea of *interest or necessity can ever justify Church or State in passing the metes and bounds of the Divine law, and in interfering with the rights or the duties incident to any relations distinct from themselves.* The plea is suicidal; it would equally justify ecclesiastical interference with civil government, the pursuits of literature and science, and the private charities of individual Christians, as with secular education. It proves too much and becomes an acknowledged sophism, proving nothing in fact. This alleged *necessity* itself will not bear examination. If by the necessity of secular education to the success of the church, it is meant that the church cannot possibly succeed without it, and that secular learning is an indispensable preliminary to the successful issue of the gospel, *we deny it,* and appeal to the triumphs of the gospel over the ignorant and illiterate of all times and countries to support the denial. But if by *necessity* in this connection, is meant that a certain amount of training is necessary to

* Report 1848, p. 90.

enable a man to read the Bible and attend other means of grace with an increased prospect of benefit, we have no disposition to question the necessity itself, however we might differ about the proper agent to undertake to supply it. Or if by *necessity* is meant that the enlargement of the intellectual faculties and the increase of knowledge, are necessary to the *full display* of what the gospel can do in the soul, or in other words, whether education and refinement will not lay the foundation for the increase or lend an embellishment to the influence of piety, which it could not get from ignorance and want of cultivation, we would be equally ready to admit it. But the necessity of all the great divisions of human duty to each other, is but a modified necessity even when most absolute; it is a necessity that reaches mainly to the *fulness and perfection* of each other's work, and not to the performance of it at all. The church might grow, as it has done in the face of resolute opposition by the State. This proves that the protection of the State is not indispensable to the very existence of the church: but it does not disprove the equally clear and indisputable fact that the full protection of the church in the discharge of her functions, by the arm of the State is necessary to the fulness, completeness and perfection of her work. The *necessity* of secular education to the interests of the church is of the same general description, not essential to its existence, but most materially essential to the fulness and completeness of its business. But the admission of this necessity in the highest sense in which it is claimed, does not draw after it the admission *that the church* ought to control it. The necessity of secular learning to the interests of the gospel is one thing; the necessity of *ecclesiastical interference* with secular education is another. If secular learning can be so promoted by other agencies besides the church as to supply the alleged necessity of learning to religion, it is manifest that the admission of this necessity does not admit the *additional and distinct idea of the necessity for ecclesiastical intervention*.

Now the control of the secular education of children is *a duty incident to the parental or family relation*; nor can *either church or State* lawfully interfere with it. We are aware that this is contrary to the received opinions. The contest is waged between the contesting claims of church and State, as if there were no other possible claimant. But ridiculous and impracticable as it may seem, we do not hesitate to assert that *neither* is the right responsible and controlling party in the case. The time is coming when it will be *practically* admitted that the doctrines of the Bible dictate the true policy of men and that the limits and prescriptions of the law of God, point out unmistakably the true decisions of all sound philosophy. God separated the church and the State; but the wisdom of man arrogating practical superiority to the wisdom of God, pleading the necessity and propriety of the case, urging the

great advantage which religion would have when patronized by the government, reversed the decision of God and united the two. It has taken a long time for men to unlearn that folly and to this day large sections of the Christian world cannot endorse the policy of God in the separation of church and State. The question of the relation of the State to the interests of education is precisely similar, defended on the same grounds and ultimately destined to the same fate. Nor do we hesitate to predict that no solution will ever be found for the difficulties that attach to both the plans of ecclesiastical and State education, until the whole system of popular instruction ceases to be *either an ecclesiastical or governmental affair*, and sinks into the position reserved to it, by the law of God. The State cannot interfere with it without violating either the true law of education on one hand, or the principles of religious liberty and the equality of the citizen under all State regulations on the other. The church cannot do it without a palpable departure from her true spiritual limits. Let parents feel their responsibility, and let them unite, if it be best on any principle, civil, scientific or religious, which may be supposed to be expedient; and let them seek within the shadow of the great social body, distinct from church and State, on the great principle of supply and demand, for the agents and instruments to accomplish it. Let school-masters be provided by the exigencies of social necessity in the same general way in which doctors, lawyers, merchants and mechanics are obtained. It is only by thus committing to the parent under his responsibility to God, the entire business of educating his children, and of course of providing the proper agencies to accomplish it, it is only by such a complete return to the doctrines of the gospel, and the limitations of the law of God, in the full and practical way in which its prescriptions were designed to be observed that this great subject will be divested of its difficulties and placed upon its true foundations. Let the church do her duty in the case by instructing the parent in the knowledge of his duty and in the enforcement of all the motives which urge to its performance. Let the State render the incidental and circumstantial aid, in the grant of charters and other assistances which may be proper in themselves and appropriate to its own sphere and degree of concern in the matter. Let the parent then learn to act upon his own responsibility, and all will be accomplished, the interests of learning will be advanced, the mutual interests of church and State will be fully sustained without their interference, and the harmonious working of these great divisions of the rights and duties of man, will demonstrate the superiority of the wisdom of God over the wisdom of man. We shall recur to this subject again, for a more extended expression of our views on the relations of the State to the subject of education. In the meantime our chief concern is with the relations of the church to it.

We claimed in our last argument *secular education as a duty incident to the parental relation*. Is it true? We will just abduce a brief statement of evidence on the point, to illustrate the truth of the position. In one of the reports of the Board, Dr. Lord, of Buffalo, is introduced as inquiring in an attack on the State theory of education, "what the State had to do with the education of his child?" We reply by the inquiry, what has the church to do with the education of ours? The State is interested in it, and so is the church: but the question is a question of *power*, not of *interest*, of *authority*, not of *concern*, of *control*, not of *implication*. Dr. Lord inquires as to the right of the State* to educate his child. Our inquiry relates to the *right of the church*.—It is perfectly obvious that the remark made by Dr. Lord and endorsed by the Board in the publication of his speech, *takes for granted the right of the parent to control it*, and the intimation of complaint embodied in the question is based upon the fact that the *attempt of the State to control it was a direct usurpation of the rights of the parent*. This is true; but it is *equally good against the claim of the church*: it is an *usurpation by both equally incompatible with the rights of the parent*. Nor does it make an appreciable difference in the nature of the usurpation, although it does in the enormity of the offence, that the usurper is the State set for the protection of individual rights in the one case, and the church of the living God in the other.

The report for 1852, distinctly and fully recognizes "Parents as the chief parties in the whole work." This is a declaration far more agreeable to the dictates of reason and the Scriptures; than the claim put forth in the report on Parochial Schools, † where we were informed that "the church could not trust her children exclusively to parental fidelity, nor would it be her duty to do so, even if that fidelity could be relied on." The implication in this paragraph is the most Popish sentiment ever uttered in a Protestant journal. *The church could not trust her children to parental fidelity*; as if the original seat of responsibility for children and the highest title of property in them vested *in the church*, who is responsible for all the agents concerned in their training parents among others. This is precisely the tone of Holy Mother. We have waited patiently to see if the Board did really mean to reiterate this doctrine and abide by it, and we were glad for the honor of Protestant moderation to read the declaration of the report of 1852 on this point. The Board there tells us ‡ that, "Parents are the chief parties in the whole work. They are at the head of authority and of obligation throughout the entire process of training private and public, and are always to be recognized as divinely instituted guardians of the children" whom God has graciously given "to them." But what now becomes of the claims of the

* Report 1852, p. 71.

† Report Parochial Schools, p. 14.

‡ Report 1852, p. 63.

church to the authoritative direction of the education of children? Perhaps it will be said that parents are the divinely authorized agents for the sending of children to school, and the church is the divinely authorized teacher to teach them. But what portion of *authority* or responsibility in selecting agencies for the education of his children, this leaves to the parent, it is not easy to conceive. He is bound to send to one divinely authorized agency and to no other. The church is as much commissioned to teach as he is to send. It is obvious that the admission of parental authority, over the education of children, coupled with a claim for the church as the only authorized teacher is perfectly nugatory. Suppose the church should want to teach the child, some views which the parent did not approve. On the theory under discussion, he has no right to interfere: the church has been commissioned to teach and consequently to decide what she shall teach: he cannot therefore complain. It will require infinitely clearer and more powerful demonstrations than the Board have yet given us, to make us relinquish the old and settled view on this subject, that it is the prerogative of the parent to decide under God what truth shall be taught to his children. No church has the right to claim power to teach Arminianism or Calvinism, or Popery or Prelacy to the child of any parent who does not agree that it shall be done. It is the business of the parent under his individual responsibility to God to decide this question; it is an outrage and a high misdemeanor for the church to claim to wrest this decision from his hands. Let every parent put the case for himself; suppose as a Presbyterian, you should wish Calvinistic views to be taught your child, and the church should claim the right to teach it Arminianism. Is there a parent in the land who would not spurn the officious interference of ecclesiastical ambition? It is perfectly obvious the admission of the parent as "*the head of authority*" over the subject, places it entirely under his control; nor has either church or State power to intermeddle with it.

The admission of the Board concedes a point which goes infinitely further in its just meaning than is supposed by those who make it. It does not mean merely that the parent is the mere formal agent of management in the matter. The term Parent is used here as a term of classification: it expresses a source and seat of authority with a whole suit of rights and duties annexed: it expresses, not a mere individual, but one of the great circles or divisions of relative duty, and the admission concedes secular education, and the training of children to be a duty incident to the Parental relation. The parent then is responsible: he is to provide all the necessary means and agencies to accomplish the work; and no other party secular or religious can dare to interfere with him. Taking the term *Parent* as a term of classification, embracing all the peculiar rights, duties, and responsibilities inci-

dent to the parental relation, and the admission of the parent as "the head of authority" over the subject, excludes the control of secular education from both church and State, and leaves it standing as one of the great interests of society, resting upon its own foundation, apart from both the rival claimants for control over it, and seeking to attain its ends, just as other great interests of life in a similar state of independence of church and State, are supplied and supported.

But we now approach an entirely distinct and a most important ground upon which the Board place the claim of the church to manage the interests of secular learning. It is alleged that *the church owes the duty and is possessed of the right to control the secular education of her baptised children.* This is a claim which deserves the closest attention.

The true nature of the relation held by a baptised child to the church of Christ is a subject upon which more information is needed, at the present day, than any other connected with the organic arrangements of the visible church. There is a wide-spread consent to the *validity* of the relation; but there is very little known of the true nature and limits of the relation when admitted to be valid. Much of the plausibility which attaches to Anti-pædo Baptist objections rises altogether from confused conceptions of the relation itself. What is this relation, what are its limits, what rights does it confer on the church and what on the infant, what obligations does it impose on both, what are the limits of a just pastoral and ecclesiastical supervision, how far may and ought discipline be applied, what advantages grow out of the relation to both the parties to it; these are some of the questions which do imperiously demand an answer at the hands of the church. A just exposition of the nature, limits and sequents of the relation of infant members to the church of Christ, would be a publication absolutely invaluable. It is a pity that the great journals of the church cannot condescend "to quit their learned and useless commentaries on German foolishness and address themselves to the settlement of practical questions, like the question we have started. The man who will give us such an exposition, will not have lived in vain. We do not pretend to be able to expound this relation in all its bearings; but the Board of Education have claimed an ecclesiastical capacity growing out of it, which compels us to examine it, so far as it bears on the issue before us. The report of 1852 thus explains the views of the Board:

"Another circumstance throwing light upon the position of the church respecting education, is that *her children are members of the church.*"*

"In the fourth place. *The ordinance of baptism, justifies the church in acting as a party in education and in establishing for her children religious institutions, where their training may be conducted on principles which recognize their immortality.*"

"Two prominent ideas in the sacrament of baptism are first, the dedication of the child to God, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit; and secondly, the openly assumed obligations

* Report 1852, p. 39.

of the parents to use every available and proper method to imbue the child with the spirit and knowledge of religion. These two ideas cover the whole ground of church education. The sacrament makes the church a party to the instruction of her youth."*

The reader will probably think the conclusion in this paragraph most singularly allied to the premises. The report quotes the words of the Book: "The minister is also to exhort *the parents* to the careful performance of their duty, requiring, *that they teach the child to read the word of God*" &c, and then follows the above exposition of the elements of meaning and obligation in the ordinance. In both, the *duty of the parent* in the case is distinctly recognized. But in what manner the *duty of the parent* can impose an obligation on the church is certainly very hard to comprehend. It would seem that the language of our book and *the nature of the sacrament* as expounded by the Board, recognizes the duty and right of the Parent in terms too plain to be misunderstood, and consequently asserts that right and duty of the Parent against all claimants civil or ecclesiastic. What sort of logic is it that from the admitted right of one party, infers the right of another to interfere with it? If the two ideas of dedication and parental obligation do cover the whole ground of church education, it must be admitted we think, there is very little space left for the intrusion of the church in her organized capacity. We think the Board have conclusively answered their own argument from the ordinance of baptism by showing that *the ordinance vests the obligation to instruct, not in the church, but in the parent.*

But let us advance closer to the relation of the baptized child to the church and see if it implies anything at war with the rights of the parent or the rights of the child.

All the members of the church of God sustain a relation to that church, corresponding with the two great functions which pertain to it: they are under its *instruction* and its *government*. The church possesses a *teaching* and a *governmental* capacity: to each of these, its members hold a relation. All members of the church, whether baptized or communing, sustain this relation. The infant member then just as well as the communing member is under the *teaching* and *government* of the church. He is *as much* under both of these functions of the church as the adult; *but no more, if indeed so much.* He is under the *teaching* function of the church, just as that *function exists and no more.* He is under the spiritual instruction of the minister of the gospel exercising all the lawful functions of his office, public and private, pastoral and didactic. But the infant member is not under the *teaching* capacity of the church *except in the legitimate sphere in which that capacity is designed to act.* It is equally so in relation to the *government* and discipline of the church acting through its proper officers and *within its proper sphere*, but not beyond it.—

* Report 1852, p. 40.

If the church, in either of its great functions of teaching and governing passes its limits and trespasses upon *the teaching and governing function* of the great co ordinate institute of the Family or Parental relation, its power expires and no member adult or infant is subject to its direction.

The question now arises, how far may the church interfere with the private rights and duties of its members either infant or adult. To this inquiry we answer in general terms that the very nature of the question, touching as it does by its own terms the *personal and private rights* of the member, declares that the church cannot lawfully claim any *direct and unlimited control* over them and confines her interference to a power, purely incidental in its nature and limited in its application. The church is an organization of the people of God for specific purposes, and the question at issue in this discussion is whether the education of children is one of them. Beyond the circle defined by the specific purposes of the ecclesiastical organization, the people of God are possessed of rights and are bound by duties, for which they are responsible in their individual capacity. For some of these they are responsible to God only; for others, they are also responsible to the church in its official capacity; but to whoever they may be responsible for the breach of duty, not lying directly within the specific sphere of the church, the responsibility is purely personal.—For the breach of the great duties of morality, they are not only responsible to God, but to the church as an agency of God, and the church may under this power discipline for the neglect or violation of duties over which it has no direct control. But this power of the church to discipline for the violation of duties over which it has no direct control is by its terms an indirect and limited power. It is a power necessary for the purification and defence of the church. It was given for this purpose: and can only be exercised for this purpose. It is a power to *modify* the exercise of the private and personal rights of the church member, to the specific extent of securing that the exercise of those rights shall not bring scandal and reproach upon the church. Nor can there be conceived a more outrageous instance of tyranny and usurpation, than for the church in virtue of this incidental and limited right of preventing public scandal by the interposition of its authority in the private affairs of its members, to claim a specific and unlimited power of ordering and controlling these affairs altogether. For example the choice of a profession in life belongs to the private and individual rights and responsibilities of the church member. The Church has no right to dictate to him, what profession he shall follow; *but it does have the right to say to him, that he shall not pursue any immoral or disreputable profession.* It can say this, *not in virtue of any power to dictate a professional career to its members, but in virtue of the power to protect itself*

from disrepute and to maintain the purity of its commission.— But it is obvious, that any claim on the part of the church to expand this *incidental and limited power* to say what business its members shall pursue, into a power to dictate their professional career in general is utterly enormous. The power was given for a specific purpose and beyond the exigencies of the necessity for which it was given, it ceases to exist, and any attempt to extend it, is an usurpation upon the rights of the individual and rebellion against the limitations of the law of God. So it is with the right of the church to control the secular education of her baptized children. The church has no more right to control the general secular education of her baptized children than to dictate and control their professional career, or to interfere with any other personal right of the parent or the child. It can interfere with it so far as to prevent a baptized child being educated in vicious or infidel literature, because this would be a violation of parental duty sufficiently grave to call for the discipline of the church. But beyond the power to say that the parent shall not educate the child in a way scandalous to the church of which he is a member, and inconsistent with piety, the church has nothing to do with it. It can interfere this far, *not in virtue of the power claimed by the Board to control the education of the infant member; but in virtue of her power to discipline for scandalous and immoral conduct.*— Any argument that would prove the power of the church to control the secular education of her infant members would equally prove her right to dictate their professional pursuits or to interfere with any other private or personal right whatever. The church is to see that parents do their duty in this matter, and this *mainly* by pastoral and not by *ecclesiastical* supervision. The church is also to teach them only on subjects appropriate to herself, and by her own specific officers in the exercise of their legitimate functions.

To sum up the argument in reply to this plea of the Board: the church has *no direct control* over the private and personal rights of its members, *whether infant or adult.* The control which it may exert over them is purely incidental to the exercise of some admitted power, and must be entirely limited in its range. The secular education of children, whether baptized or not belongs to the *parental relation*: it appertains to this relation *to the exclusion of all claimants*; nor is there anything in baptism to alter the arrangement of the natural and revealed law of God which attaches the duty to the family combination. The vow required of the parent distinctly recognizes his right to control not only the secular, but the *religious* education of the child. Hence if the church has no direct control over the private rights and privileges of its members, the claim set up by the Board of Education for a direct intervention and control of the church over the secular education

of its baptized children is utterly unfounded. There is nothing in the relation of an infant member to the church of God, which authorizes ecclesiastical interference with private rights, any more than there is in the relation of any other member, to authorize such a thing.

The Board again support the propriety of an unlimited series of schools and colleges under the control of the church from the example of the Mission schools established among the heathen. It is claimed that the same power is exercised in both cases, and if legitimate in one case, it is legitimate in the other. As this is one of the principal pleas of the truly great and venerable Professor of Theology in Princeton Seminary, we shall devote our most respectful attention to its merits.* The reports of the Board occupy the same ground. They tell us

"In the third place, light may be thrown upon this subject by inquiring into the natural method of propagating religion among the ignorant and the heathen. Is it by education or by simply preaching the word, or by a union of the two? Certainly by a union of the two. All our missionary stations have elementary schools and higher academies as indispensable auxiliaries in the work of teaching religion. These institutions cannot be trusted to foreign hands. The church herself must superintend them with a religious interest which does not slumber." †

Upon this argument we beg leave to submit the following remarks. We have already explained with a degree of clearness sufficient to satisfy all thoughtful readers who have honored us with their attention, the general view we entertain of the nature and extent of the incidental and auxiliary powers which appertain to the church just as to other organic bodies, by virtue of the necessities of the case. Every body, individual or associated, vested with specific powers for the accomplishment of a given end, is also vested with the power to *do everything necessary to the exercise of the specific powers of the commission which it bears*. To convey a power, and yet to prohibit what may be necessary to its exercise, is to nullify the grant. But the terms *everything* and *necessary* are not *unlimited*, and the limitation is to be found with sufficient precision for all practical purposes. It is to be ascertained by a due regard to the sphere of action assigned to the party bearing the grant, and to the spheres of action occupied by other co-ordinate agencies holding power under the great source of all authority? There is a proviso attached to all the incidental powers of the church and other organic bodies, and this is that all necessary to the exercise of its powers and essential to the successful issue of the end in view may be set in operation by the holder of the trust, provided it does not trench upon the limits of other bodies or involve a contradiction or a gross departure from its own specific and clearly defined sphere of action. The terms of the proposition defining the legitimate range of the incidental

* Home, the school and the church, Vol. 3, pp. 41, 44. Also his remarks in the late General Assembly.

† Report for 1852, p. 27.

powers of the church, are thus rendered by this proviso, sufficiently broad to allow of all proper enterprises under the control of the church, yet sufficiently guarded to give no warrant to any departure of the church from her true and lawful spiritual sphere, or to any interference with the rights or duties which belong to man in the other capacities with which he may be invested. The term *necessary* is not to be confined to the most rigid possible conception of necessity, excluding all regard to what may be important and appropriate yet not strictly of absolute essentiality to the discharge of the duties of the church; nor is it to be expanded to the fullest range of which it is capable, so as to authorize an invasion of any and all of the other circles of duty, or to reduce the consideration of such an invasion to a mere question of expediency, not of right. The church may lawfully do what is necessary or important to her ends, provided she observes the limitations already defined. She may appoint a Board of Publication and a system of Colportage, which, although not essential to her existence, are yet of such importance in their ultimate results upon the success of the gospel as to be warrantably created by the church, in the exercise of her auxiliary powers, as things in a sense necessary to the fullest and most unabated exercise of her granted powers. But she may not establish a great system of secular education or establish investigations in science or seek the control of the government or the arts, simply because these things though in a sense *necessary* to the existence of the church and to her success, are confided to other agencies or depositories of power, and the control of them by the church must therefore necessarily involve not only a trespass upon the rights of these co-ordinate agencies, but also a palpable departure from her own sphere of action.—None of these agencies have the right to alter their functions, to increase or diminish the range of their specific responsibilities. To apply these general principles to the argument before us.

Since the church has the right to do everything *necessary* to her own success, under the general limitations already explained, giving the latitude which we have done to the term *necessary*, *much more has she the right to do what may be absolutely an indispensable condition to the successful preaching of the gospel.* But what may be necessary in one place may not be in another: what may be necessary among the heathen, may not be in a Christian country; *and therefore what may be properly done in one place and among one people, may not be properly done in another place and among another people.* The power is created by the *necessity* of the case, no matter whether broadly or rigidly interpreted, and *must exist or cease to exist with that necessity.*—Now it may be that the education of the heathen in secular schools may be necessary to the understanding of the gospel and there being no other agency in the land to give this education, it

might be admitted fully that it was competent to the church to establish such a school. But this fact would not warrant the inference of the Board or attain the end for which this argument was adduced. It will not do to infer that because the church may establish schools for the heathen because absolutely necessary to the teaching of the gospel, therefore she may establish a general system of secular education in a land *where no such necessity exists*. It must be first proved that there is in this land *a similar necessity for secular schools as necessary precedent foundations for teaching the gospel*, before the argument from Missionary schools will sustain the views of the Board. The argument fails utterly unless it can establish an identity in the necessity of the two cases of the foreign and domestic field. But this identity cannot be established, simply because a secular school, is not the necessary precedent or preliminary basis for the preaching of the gospel in the domestic, as it may be supposed to be in the foreign field. It is perfectly obvious that no such necessity can be pleaded in this country as at our missionary stations and consequently the argument from the one to the other, entirely fails. Dr. Hodge fully admits the radical nature of the difference in the circumstances of the case.* To use his own language, "we ought to make due allowance for the difference between the state of the heathen and that of our own people." This difference in the condition of affairs in the two fields is such as to render it impossible to argue fairly from what may be done in the one, to what may be done in the other. The church having the power to do what may be necessary to her success may exercise a power in one case that she *may not* in another, simply because what may be necessary to her success in one case, may not be in another: the power is based upon the necessity, and lives or dies with the exigency that calls for it. But suppose it should be said by an objector, you admit that the term *necessary* in this connection has *a broader and a narrower signification*: now admitting that there is *no such rigid and absolute necessity* for schools of the church in a Christian as there is in a heathen land, why may not the church consult its necessities under the broader sense in which the term may be interpreted, and in the exercise of its more remote auxiliary powers create a system of schools to meet these necessities, or in other words does not the power to erect a secular school among the heathen *under one sense of necessity*, imply the power to erect one at home *under another less stringent, but equally legitimate sense of necessity*? The one sense of necessity may impose an *absolute obligation*; but does not the other at least confer a *discretionary power on the church* to erect such schools, which she may exercise or not as she may deem to be expedient. We admit fully

* Home, The School and the Church, Vol. 3. p. 44.

that *the church as such*, is vested by such a necessity, a necessity so stringent and inflexible as that created by the exigencies of the heathen field, with the power to create the school necessary to meet it; but this admission will not draw after it the admission of a discretionary power to create similar schools in the home field. Let us test the argument by an application to experience. It will be admitted, we presume, that the church has the right to establish a *mission farm* where it is necessary to enable her to raise a degraded heathen population from the depths of social degradation; but will the authority to establish such a farm under the necessity of the case imply the right to enter generally upon agricultural pursuits in the home field under a totally different though legitimate sense of *necessity*? It is perfectly obvious that the radical nature of the difference between the two senses of the term *necessity* vitiates all identity or similarity of inference from them. The one sense of it indicates a *real and absolute necessity*: the other indicates merely what may be *important but still not essential*. The one is *absolute and inflexible*: the other far more remote and variable in its claims. The one leaves no alternative: it *must* be done; and hence closes all questions of right, as well as all considerations of prudence. The other does not exclude the consideration of an alternative, and not only leaves open for discussion the question of right, as well as the question of prudence, but it leaves the way open for the controlling and decisive influence of the question of right over-ruling all mere considerations of expediency. The one *must* be met, over-rides all considerations, and *erases within the limits of the exigency*, the limitations which are authoritative *as a general proposition*, and in the *ordinary* course of affairs. The other *may* be met, *provided* as we have already repeatedly explained, it observe the limits of other spheres of duty, which, *though they may be set aside by an imperious necessity within its own limits, may not be set aside by the consideration of an important, but not essential auxiliary aid*. These two senses of *necessity*, although both may be legitimate, are not so allied that the one implies the other, and that rights created by the one are also created by the other. There are some things which the church *may or may not do*, in the ordinary course of affairs just according to her own sense of expediency. Among these we would rank the Board of Publication and the system of colportage. There are other things which she *may do under the pressure of an exigency, which she may not do in the ordinary and regular course of affairs*. Thus she may establish a mission farm, where it is necessary to lift up a brutal and degraded pagan population from the pollutions of cannibalism or other criminal or improper modes of sustenance: but she may not go into a regular system of agriculture in the home field and plead her mission farms as a precedent, claiming that the power exercised

is the same in both cases and if legitimate in the one, it is legitimate in the other. It is *precisely so with schools for secular education*; nor can she any more lawfully plead her mission schools, *built upon a similar absolute and unavoidable necessity* as a precedent for a grand system of secular education in the home field, *built upon a necessity entirely different in its nature and demands, claiming that the same power is used in both cases, and with equal propriety in both.* We may admit then that *the church* in her organic capacity and in the exercise of her incidental and auxiliary powers may erect a secular institution with a religious department, among the heathen, or in the domestic field, where a similar imperious necessity can be shown and at the same time, utterly deny the right of the church to create such an institute, either at home or abroad, where no such absolute and uncompromising necessity demands it. The cases in which the creation of such an institute by the church would be proper are in their own nature *exceptional*: they are created altogether by peculiar and stringent circumstances; and as exceptional cases, they cannot possibly justify any general and unlimited claim, to the power with which they invest the church. If the church can create a secular school at all it can only do it as the case of a particular instance, not as a part of a general system. It is not the same power employed according to the views of the Board in creating the mission and the Parochial school, or rather it is the exercise of a power, dependent upon circumstances for the ascertainment of its own lawful application, and it may therefore be lawfully exercised in one case, and not in another. It would be obviously a sophism to say of such a power, to justify its exercise under one set of circumstances that it was lawfully employed under a totally different set of circumstances. The power to do what is necessary is not an unlimited power: it is limited by its own terms and of variable operation by its very nature. The necessity of the case must control its exercise and distinguish that exercise as proper or improper. It seems perfectly clear that the right of the church to provide a preliminary basis for the teaching of the gospel, does not and cannot involve the right subject to her own discretion, to enter the field as a permanent and universally recognized agency to provide for meeting the great social demand for the means of education. The right to create a secular school among the heathen, is by its very nature a limited and exceptional right, created by an exigency and expiring with it. The provision of the means and agencies of education is one of the demands of civilized society, which stands apart from the sphere of the church, and though in a material sense *necessary* to the success of the gospel, we have already seen that the *mutual necessity* of the great divisions of duty to each other, does not authorize the mutual encroachment, and interference of one with another. A

stringent necessity may authorize an exceptional use of the functions of one by another within the limits of a peculiar condition of things, *but no necessity however stringent can authorize such action as a general and permanent policy.* If an absolute necessity will not do it, *much less will a less stringent, even though legitimate sense of necessity fail to authorize it.* We reply then to the question just propounded, as to the conveyance of at least a discretionary power in the home field by the power to create such a school among the heathen *that the most absolute sense of necessity conveys only a limited power; a power limited by the exigency, and that much less will not a less stringent sense of necessity the consideration of a valuable, but still not essential auxiliary aid, convey a general and permanent power of control over the general system of education.* It is a monstrous fallacy to argue from what may be done as an *isolated or exceptional act under the pressure of an unavoidable necessity, to what may be done as a general system under a necessity, which merely means a valuable, but yet not indispensable assistance.*

We may except again to the argument of the Board from the precedent of the foreign missionary schools, *from the nature of the schools* actually erected in the foreign field as well as from the *nature of the power* employed in erecting them. We have argued hitherto on the supposition that these mission schools were really what they are assumed to be by the advocates of the Board, *secular institutions with a religious department.* Admitting them to be so, we have explained the principle of an absolute necessity, which would authorize the church to create them; but this admission was merely hypothetical. It is an *assumption* and we hope to demonstrate an *unfounded* assumption to take for granted in this discussion that the schools of the mission stations were truly secular institutions, more particularly, the schools of lower grades. We assert that there is a radical and essential difference between the missionary schools in foreign parts, and the parochial schools advocated by the Board of education. We affirm the one to be a *secular* school and the other to be a *religious* school, the one identical with ordinary schools for secular instruction, the other analagous, though not absolutely identical with the Sabbath school organization: The mission school is strictly a *religious* school: it is the field in which *the minister of the gospel* may exercise *the functions of his office*, which never can be said of the *parochial school*: it may bear the very same relations to the official character of the missionary, that is borne by the public assemblies of the people to the ministry at home. It is in a sense entirely different from the parochial school, a *religious* school: *the teaching of the gospel* is in fact and in form, the great business and end of the school; and the secular instruction which is communicated in them is purely incidental and subordinate. But in a

parochial school, the main business is and must be the inculcation of secular learning, and religious knowledge subordinate to this, nor can it possibly be taught by a minister of the gospel in his official capacity. Let us examine this distinction. Suppose the church should be pleased to require that her ministers instead of or in addition to their public instructions in the sanctuary, should also gather the children and members of their charges into schools, and teach them religion in a school, as well as in a public congregation; whatever might be said of the prudence or expediency of the move, no one would probably deny its essential propriety. Such a school would be *something*, though not exactly like a Sunday-School taught in the week, if such a solecism may be allowed, and whatever might be thought of the enterprize in other respects, no one would deny that the minister would be lawfully exercising the functions of his office as a teacher of the gospel in teaching such a school. Now suppose that in order to secure such a school he finds it necessary or expedient to teach something besides the gospel, say science and the classics. The minister of the gospel having also, the rights of a secular teacher, may lawfully admit of such a modification of his religious school, and teach secular knowledge. *Nor does the engrafting of the secular feature, at all alter the essential nature of the school, as a religious school, an assembly where the gospel is to be taught, provided the secular purposes and department of the school are kept truly subordinate to the original and controlling character of the institution as a religious institution.* This proviso must be observed in order to maintain the original character of the school; for, unless it is done—if the secular department is suffered to mount up into the main business of the school, it is obvious that, however, *the same name* may still be retained, yet the real character of the school will have been essentially altered. It is clear that a *real religious* school, a school the grand design of which is to teach religion, no matter whether it be a place where a minister of the gospel may exercise his official functions, or a school in which private individuals may seek to do a work of charity and devotion such a school does not lose its principal character as a religious school by the ingrafting of a secular feature upon it, if that secular feature is kept in a really subordinate position. Such, we understand, a greater portion of the Mission schools to be. *A school like this stands discriminated from a parochial school, as advocated by the Board of Education, by the boldest and strongest marks of distinction.* The schools are utterly distinct, both *in nature and in design.* The parochial school is a *secular institute, with a religious department.* The Mission school is a *religious institute, with a secular department.* The one finds its parallel in the ordinary school for secular instruction; the other finds its analogy in the Sabbath-school institution. The one is a *reli-*

gious school, teaching science subordinately; the other is a secular school, teaching religion subordinately. The one is a school for the teaching of the gospel, either *by the Minister officially, or by private persons as a work of piety, similar to the work of a Sabbath school.* The other is a school for secular learning, *taught by teachers of secular learning, not as a work of piety, but simply to secure the secular education of youth, with subordinate instruction in religion.* *The design of the two schools is utterly different. The one is designed as a precedent or preliminary basis for teaching the gospel, and aims to supply a deficiency of means and opportunities to do so.* The other aims to supply *one general branch of the social necessities of civilized man; that is the demand for liberal education, on principles designed to secure this supply from tendencies to evil.* The nature, design and official conduct of these two species of school, being so radically different, it follows that the right of the church to establish the one, does not imply or involve the right to establish the other. If all these distinctions are not sufficient to discriminate the mission, from the parochial school, and thus annihilate the argument from the one to the other, we must confess our inability to perceive either distinctions or resemblances between any two things in the universe. We do earnestly insist upon it that the right of the church to *teach the gospel in a religious school, does not involve the right to teach secular learning, in a secular school.* We insist upon it that what the church may do when absolutely and indispensably necessary as a preliminary basis for teaching the gospel and carrying out the purposes of her organization, she may not do when only important to the embellishment or enlargement of her work in its higher stages of advancement.

A summary notice of a few of the principal remaining arguments which deserve to be examined will close our review of the doctrines of the Board.

The first in the series is the argument drawn from the alleged right of the church to provide candidates for the ministry. The Board argue*, "that the parochial system will with the blessing of God, *give the church a wider range from which to expect ministerial supplies,*" and they also declare, "there cannot be a doubt that our whole system of ministerial education depends upon parochial schools as its natural, essential and well ordered basis."† The Board complain through several of their reports of the lack of candidates for the ministry: they urge that the church in her organic capacity is bound to provide candidates and to supply this deficiency, and therefore that the church may use all means, the establishment of a great and complete system of secular education among others for the accomplishment of this end. They assert

* Report on Parochial Schools, p. 14.

† Ibid.

with a sophistical misapprehension of the true point to be determined, a truth which nobody will deny that "a strong religious influence at these institutions would be in the providence of God, the means of increasing, not only the number of the followers of Christ, but the number of those who would appreciate the usefulness and honor of the ministerial office."* Certainly a strong religious influence in our Colleges would be likely to result in giving us ministers as well as members of the church, and we should be careful to put such an influence into our Colleges as far as it is practicable by proper agencies; but we ought to be equally careful not to clog the action of this influence by putting the church into a false position on the subject or in a unwarrantable relation to the institution. God may bless such an influence, even when attended by an objectionable condition attached to it, but it will be *in spite* and *not in consequence of it*, and this fact will illustrate the danger of continuing that objectionable feature, especially in the face of light and knowledge. The blessing which God may send upon a school holding an improper relation to the church is not to be argued as endorsing such relation, any more than his blessing upon churches holding an incomplete system of truth is to be interpreted as endorsing the errors mingled with their creeds. It can certainly be no matter of indifference to the great Head of the church, whether that church continues within its sphere or not, and when by a mistaken conception of duty, she does depart from her limits, it is unwarrantable reasoning to infer from the fact that her Lord does not withdraw all the manifestations of his favor, that he does thereby endorse and sanctify the wrong. That the control of the general interests of science and the classics, by the church, is a departure from her true sphere, is to us most palpable and obvious: nor can we reconcile the manifestations of his favor, which the Board allege to have been made, though in but a limited form, towards their system of ecclesiastical schools, on any other principle than that God will honor the influence of his gospel and his truth, even though it may have been attended with something which he could not approve. But the Board give no great reason to believe that their system of schools has as yet begun to add materially to the number of candidates: they continue to complain of the want of candidates; nor do we deem it a question inappropriate to ask in this view of the subject, how far this dearth of candidates, may not have been aggravated and made more difficult of removal by the enormous expansion of ecclesiastical power, by which the Board have sought to remove it? The church may seek to supply candidates for the ministry; but she must seek to do it in the right way, by her proper and legitimate agencies, nor can she indulge

* Report 1848, p. 57.

any other anticipation than an anticipation of disappointment, when she seeks to attain the end by illegitimate means. Disappointment is the natural retribution of wrong, and unless the church uses the right means to attain her ends, a degree of disappointment answering to the weight of the evil committed, may be naturally expected. The church may seek to increase candidates for the ministry by the instructions of the ministry to parents and children, by the warning and hortatory epistles of her courts on the subject, and by other means which may be lawfully employed to quicken the conscience of the people to their duty; but, it is not lawful for the church to use the need of candidates and her admitted *but limited* right to supply them as a pretext for laying her hands upon the whole system of secular education. The church had as well claim to control the professional education of her youth according to the theory of Dr. Smyth, because in exercising this control, she might exert a religious influence over candidates for professional qualifications, and divert some of them from law and medicine into the ministry of the gospel. The church has no right to control everything which may afford her an opportunity of doing good; for this idea would lay every interest of society at her feet. It is really a curious argument, which the Board urges to justify its claim to control secular education on the relations of such a control to candidates for the ministry. They endeavor to fortify the plea and meet an obvious question rising on the alternative that the pupil of the church, should not see proper to enter the ministry, by saying that in that case, the church would reap the benefit in pious members of other callings. It is not so sure that they would be pious at all, or that the church would reap any benefit at all. But there is really, great confusion of ideas in this argument. The Board claim a direct control over secular learning: why then not educate for other professions, in virtue of that claim, in the direct exercise of that power, which they allege to have been bestowed upon the church. If this claim be true, why resort to an indirect and contingent matter, to justify a practical assertion of it? Why not say, we will educate these boys, because it is our business to do it; and not attempt to justify the effort to do it, by the mere incidental results of an attempt to secure candidates for the ministry? In a word it is a conclusive reply to the argument, from the supply of candidates for the ministry, that the right of the church to provide candidates, does not imply the concession of a right to use all means whatever, which may afford some prospect of furnishing a supply. This is a question of means, which we are seeking to determine. Conceding that the church may seek for candidates for the ministry, does it follow, therefore, that the church may take any step whatever, in order to accomplish it, or is she not still bound to observe the limits of her own legitimate sphere of action? The question is so plain as to suggest its own answer without farther remark.

The next argument of the Board is derived *from the history of the church*. Their reports quote largely from the history of the ancient and modern churches, particularly from the churches of Protestant Europe and America, showing that the inculcation of a pure gospel, has always been attended with a corresponding zeal, for the interests of letters and general education. We are obliged to the Board, for the summary they have furnished of the evidence, for the universal recognition of the value of knowledge, by the followers of an evangelical religion. They have shown, that in every age to a greater or less degree, the friends of the gospel, have been the friends of education. They have shown that, at the time of the Reformation, and in the various localities where Presbyterianism has been established, that the erection of the school-house has been co-temporaneous with the erection of the church, and that in the hands of believers in Christ, and particularly in the hands of Calvinistic Presbyterians, the two great interests of a pure gospel and an elevated intellectual discipline have been urged forward together. But this is all they have proved, and *this is not enough for their purposes*: it must be also shown in order to support the doctrines of the Board, that these two interests were carried forward, as being *subject to ecclesiastical control*. But this cannot be done; for it is obvious that all the great movements of the followers of Christ, in relation to religion, on one hand, and education, on the other, have been *two distinct, but cotemporaneous* movements, in which the conscience, feeling the weight of two distinct, but co-existent obligations, prompted to an effort to discharge them both. Roused by the energies of divine grace to the knowledge and love of their duty, the people of God have set themselves, first to secure the ordinances of the house of God and the organization of themselves and their children, into a church of Christ; and secondly, to provide for the discharge of their duty to their children, by securing the means of a liberal education. Hence, they erected the school and the church, not as parts and parcels of the same enterprise, but as two distinct, yet co-ordinate movements for the discharge of two distinct, yet co-existent duties. The church was erected to secure the use of ecclesiastical privileges, and the discharge of ecclesiastical duties. The school was erected by the side of it, *by the people*, not in an ecclesiastical capacity, but in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties as parents.—The church as such, asserted no right to interfere in the matter, much less to control it. It was true that ecclesiastical bodies did consult on the general interests of learning, as on other great branches of Christian, but individual duty. Nay, some of them did actually erect schools and academies; but *they did not do it upon any such claim to control secular learning as is now urged by the Board*: and consequently, the action of these courts was

a virtual, though not formal exchange of their ecclesiastical capacity, leaving them acting really, though not in form in their private capacity as friends of learning, and as individual parents responsible for the proper education of their children, and not as a court of the church. If these courts did act in their ecclesiastical capacity they had no right to establish the schools, and their example is no precedent for us. But, although there may have been no formal resolution of the body from its ecclesiastical capacity, into the associated form of individual responsibility, *yet, the absence of any claim to ecclesiastical supervision gives a chance to vindicate their conduct, as the effect of a tacit but real exchange of the ecclesiastical character for the private associated capacity of Presbyterian people.* We have no idea of relinquishing the splendid renown of the Presbyterian church, for its zealous promotion of learning and science; but to preserve it uncontaminated from suspicions of undue extension of ecclesiastical power, we must protest against the use which has been made of it by the Board of Education. Hitherto all that *the church in her organic capacity, has done on this subject, has been done by her proper agencies and in her proper sphere: she taught the people their duty and urged them to discharge it. The people giving heed to her instructions set to work to discharge their duty, and hence the long and noble story of the devotion of Presbyterians, to the cause of liberal learning.* But the Board of Education have at last placed the church in a false position in relation to the subject.—*For the first time, claims of ecclesiastical power over it have been advanced. The reports and documents of the Board, and the acts of the Assembly, affirming these doctrines, have essentially altered the past relations of the church to the interests of education, and it is indispensably necessary to the maintenance of the pure glory, which the church has gained by her former modes of action on the subject, to reverse her modern policy and return to the old ways. Formerly she stood in her lot, performing her true duty to the interests of education, showing herself the wise and faithful friend of all the great interests of life, urging the advancement of the cause by her legitimate agencies, but not passing beyond her legitimate bounds. Now she is the claimant of power, not delegated to her, the usurper of rights pertaining to other depositories of authority, alike negligent of the sphere of others and forgetful of her own. It is the solemn duty of all who regard the true honor of the church, to see to it that no effort is spared to reverse the present posture of the church, and replace it in its appropriate relations to the subject.*

This can be easily done. The remarks which we have just made indicate the mode in which the Board can retreat from its false positions and yet secure its schools under a sufficiently active and guarded supervision to accomplish every practical purpose

which could possibly be gained under the vicious principle of *ecclesiastical control*. Let them deny the doctrine of ecclesiastical interference and begin to urge upon the Presbyterian people the duty of establishing a grand series of schools, in which their children may be educated on Christian and Presbyterian principles.— Let the sessions abandon the parochial schools; *let the people of the congregation* become responsible for them, *in the exercise of their individual rights and duties as parents*. If they choose to appoint the members of session, trustees to manage the schools, let them do it, not in their sessional capacity, but as the committee or agency of the congregation. Such a school would be free from all the objections that lie against the parochial principle.— Let the Presbyteries *systematically sink their ecclesiastical capacity* and resolve themselves into a private association for educational purposes. The obnoxious principle of ecclesiastical interference will thus be repudiated, and no injury will be done even to any school, already in existence under the parochial principle: its relation to the church will be changed, but the school itself will remain untouched only in a more correct and scriptural position.

The Board* argue that organization is necessary to secure the interests of education, and infer the legality of ecclesiastical interference, from the fact that the church is an existing organization, well adapted to the purpose. It is not for us to say what other purposes the church is adapted to secure: her ends have been specifically defined, and she must keep to her limits, no matter how well she may be able to manage other things. Organization is necessary to secure anything like a general or effective system of educational institutions; and although we should not approve without reservation the adoption of such a policy, yet we can, consistently at least, admit of the management of such a system of education by the individuals, composing the courts of the church, provided they systematically sink their ecclesiastical character, and claim to exercise control on the subject, not in their ecclesiastical capacity, but as an educational convention of the friends of Christian education. To some people this distinction will appear frivolous and immaterial; but all who are able to discriminate on an issue like this, will perceive that the distinction involves a question of principle, which itself involves the very nature of the church as a purely spiritual institute, and the personal rights of every one of its members. Consequences like these are too infinitely important, to be suffered to occur, without an effort to prevent them, and in spite of the clamors of those who are too feeble to comprehend or too prejudiced to admit the real weight of the distinctions that control the subject. Let the Board of Education retrace their steps, take the secular education

* Report 1851, p. 57.

of children, out of the hands of the Presbyterian church and put it in the hands of the Presbyterian people, and the union of the church, on the subject of Education, will be far more complete than it is at present.

We would add a few words in the close of these articles, giving a brief and necessarily incomplete statement of our views as to the true relations of the State, to the subject of education, the proper extent of its interference, and the reasons that render it improper for the State to become the great controlling agent of the instruments of education. We will make a statement of general principles, which we presume no one will deny. The great end for which civil government was erected, is the protection of the reserved rights of the individual citizen. A portion of the rights vested in the individual, is delegated to government, in consideration of the protection which he can thus procure for the rights he has reserved. Among these reserved rights are the rights of conscience, the rights of family discipline and control, and all other personal rights, not specifically embraced in the grant to government. Protection for personal and property rights is the great and controlling aim of civil government. This, we presume, will not be disputed. It will also be admitted that any collateral or secondary end, which interferes with the primary end of any organization, is an illegitimate object for the pursuit of such a body. Indeed, the great struggle of liberty on one side has been to limit the action of government as much as possible to the single purpose of its organization: it has been the aim of despotism on the other, to extend the control of government over as many of the great collateral interests of life as could be drawn under its control. It is unquestionably, the true policy of the science of government to reduce the purposes and the powers of civil government, to the simplest and most isolated form, compatible with the attainment of its ends. The end of government is specific, not multiform: it is not the welfare of the citizen in general, and consequently, involving powers to control that welfare in everything that concerns it; but it is the welfare of the citizen in one particular and specific modification, and consequently, only involving the powers suitable to the end in view. Many suppose government to be, not an institute with one general and comprehensive, yet sufficiently defined and limited purpose; but an institute with a variety of ends, if not equal in importance, yet equally the objects of governmental control; or, as others might express it, an institute with one main end, and various collateral ends, among which might be enumerated popular education, the promotion of art and science, the preservation of morals and the general social advancement of the race. To one construction of this last statement we should have no objection. If these collateral ends are really kept such as they are, and not advanced from

a nominally collateral into a real principal end, we have no desire to question the propriety of asserting them. Kept in this position, it may be appropriate for government to give an occasional support to them; but this assistance can only be incidental and occasional: it would never do for government to expand this mere occasional and incidental capacity, to aid these interests into a general and permanent power, to control them without any limit but its own discretion. For example, government may use political power so as to affect morals, and it is bound to do so, so as to affect them virtuously: it may also prohibit the sale of articles, that may affect public morals for the worse; but government cannot undertake the general supervision of the private vices of the citizen. It has no legitimate authority to interfere with them except when they become more or less public and offensive to the rights of others. But this limited and defined right of government to interfere with the private morals of the citizen, by no means involves the general supervisory power of a moral censor. Of the same general description, is the legitimate connection of government, with science and art: a mere incidental, limited, and occasional thing. As a general interest, they must be pursued as other branches of human pursuit are pursued, amid the great mass of society, sheltered, but not controlled by the civil arm.— But still as an encouragement to act, and for the promotion of the public benefits springing out of scientific investigations, more particularly such as concern the interests of manufactures, commerce and navigation, it is lawful for government to give an occasional support to scientific investigations. But here again, this limited power does not involve the general power, co-ordinate with political power in government, to undertake the entire control of scientific pursuits. It is precisely so, with regard to popular education, as in the instances just cited. Government may exert a similar incidental and occasional control over the interests of general education: it may grant charters, aid the parties concerned in controlling it as a general interest, by such legislative assistance as may contribute best to securing their ends. It may also establish occasionally a great school auxiliary to the great social system of education, or provide schools for the education of those whose parents are incompetent to educate them, on a principle precisely similar in nature and extent of application, to the principle on which it undertakes to feed those children, when parents are incompetent to feed them. But this limited right and duty of government, to educate children of incompetent parents, no more involves the general right and duty of the government to control the education of all children in the commonwealth, than the limited right and duty of government to feed and clothe the children of incompetent parents, involves a general corresponding obligation, to feed and clothe the children of

all citizens, without distinction. The very moment the interference of government passes beyond a mere occasional and incidental thing, a vast variety of important consequences begin to appear. The true law of the existence of civil government is violated; for the ends of government are now enlarged from one specific end to more than one; and this is an evil, if it is indeed the true policy of government to simplify its aims and purge itself from all collateral matters, as far as possible. Thus, the interests of civil liberty are injured by it. But again: it results that the right duties of the great Parental Commonwealth are invaded. Lastly, but not leastly, State interference involves as we have said before, either a violation of the true law of education on one side, or the religious rights and civil equality of the citizen on the other. If the true law of education require the direct instruction of the pupil in the doctrines of religion as a part of the course of studies, it is obvious that some phase of religion must be taught to the exclusion of others, and it is equally obvious that *the State* cannot do this without a discrimination against the religious views and the equal rights of some of her citizens. The introduction of the Scriptures into the public schools of some of the States has been attended with great and real difficulty just upon this ground. The Catholic and the skeptical citizen protested against the authority of the State requiring their children to be instructed in a book which they did not approve. The Protestant party on the other hand insisted upon the use of the Scriptures. The one side inquired why their children should be forced to submit to what they deemed an injury and the other demanded why the wicked and unreasonable scruples of the opposers of the word of God, should deprive their children of what they deemed an inestimable advantage? Both had an equal right to complain. The Protestant had no right to insist that his views should prevail to the exclusion of his Catholic neighbor, nor had the Catholic any more right to insist that his opposition should dictate the policy to be pursued in the case. The sole cause of the difficulty lay *in the false relations of the State to the subject*. It is clear that the only possible way of settling the difficulty is to put the responsibility of educating their children into the hands of the parents leaving each party to decide on his responsibility to God, whether to reject or accept the word of God as an agency in the instruction of his children. It is perfectly clear that the moment *the State undertakes to determine the question* and to decide whether the Bible shall or shall not be used in the schools, it must decide for and against one of these parties, and by this decision, either driving one party from the benefits of the public schools altogether, or forcing them to submit to what they must consider a grievous oppression thus violates the fundamental equality of the citizens of the commonwealth. The right of the State to decide in favor of

the Protestant, involves the right to decide against him. The right to say that religion shall be taught in the public schools involves the right to say *what* religion be taught in them and how much shall be taught there. The right to introduce the Bible to the exclusion of the Catholic, involves the right to introduce Calvinistic interpretations of the Bible to the exclusion of Arminians, or Episcopal principles to the exclusion of Presbyterians. To allow *the State* any such right is to violate the fundamental maxims of equality among the citizens and to invest the government with the dangerous power against which the American opposers of church and State have always protested, *the power to decide what religion shall be taught by the authority of the State*—an idea clearly at war with every conception of the religious rights and equality of the citizen. The grand reason why so much opposition has been made to the introduction of the Scriptures into the public schools, has been because it was felt that *the State* in undertaking to determine this question, had passed its bounds and violated the equality of the citizen. But certainly the right to determine this question, necessarily follows from the right of State control at all. The only way in which the State can avoid these consequences, is to abandon the introduction of religion into the schools altogether, the reading of the Scriptures among other modes of teaching it—a course which would violate the fundamental law of education: or it must abandon all connection with popular education as a general system, and leave it to be supplied by the parent under his individual responsibility to God alone.

With this exposition of our views of the conflicting theories on the subject of education, we abandon the subject to the candid consideration of the reader. The views we have expressed we conscientiously believe to be correct; but we are not so wedded to any opinion as to be determined to adhere to it in spite of evidence, and in the face of conviction. If these views can be shown to be incorrect, we shall unhesitatingly abandon them; but we shall never do it until new light is thrown upon the subject. While it is altogether possible that circumstances may call for the modification and even the important modification of these principles in their application to actual events, we are still satisfied of the correctness of the principles themselves. The modification of general principles of policy and duty by the force of circumstances is only *temporary*, dependent upon the existence or change of the circumstances that demand it; but these principles themselves are of unspeakable value as they point out the true, fixed and eternal line towards which the law of progressive improvement directs that the votaries of the science, or art, or truth in question, should struggle in their efforts to perfect it. To ascertain the correct principles which amid all the modifications demanded by change of time and place, should control all efforts to perfect the

system of education, would be a work worthy the honorable ambition of any man. If we have said anything which may aid in the discovery of them, even though we may have misapprehended them ourselves we shall still have reason to thank God that he has condescended to use even our honest mistakes, for the discovery and maintenance of truths so important.





