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
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A review of Dr. J.P. Smith's  
Scripture testimony to the









**REVIEW**

**OF**

**DR. J. P. SMITH'S**

**SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY TO THE MESSIAH.**





A

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MESSIAH.

(FROM THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY FOR 1831.)

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ON

## THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

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DR. J. P. SMITH'S "Scripture Testimony to the Messiah," is a work which has attained to the highest reputation, not only within the pale of the particular sect to which the author belongs, but amongst all classes of believers in the doctrines of reputed orthodoxy. It is certainly to be ranked amongst the ablest defences of those doctrines which have ever appeared. Learned, ingenious, and laborious, it deserves the attention of all who are interested in the great controversy to which it relates: and if the irresistible tendency of the system he defends, and the perverting prejudices to which it gives occasion, have led the author often to treat his opponents with great real injustice, there are also indications of kind feelings, and of a desire to act towards them with candour and Christian meekness, which may with many persons give more weight to his censures, rendering them, when founded in error or misrepresentation, more dangerous, if not more offensive.

It has been a special object with Dr. Smith to furnish a reply to the "Calm Inquiry" of Mr. Belsham, and it is in reference more particularly (though by no means exclusively) to this object, that we now propose to examine his volumes—not that we would hold up Mr. Belsham's work as faultless either in plan or execution—not, certainly, that we consider the great body of Christians who adopt the sentiments he defends, as answerable for the mistakes into which he may have fallen or the improper spirit which he is accused of having manifested—but his work being honestly esteemed by us an able and satisfactory treatise on a very important subject, written under the influence of an enlightened, disinterested, and impartial love of truth; and the effect it has produced upon the minds of many intel-

ligent and sincere inquirers being well known to us, we were anxious to satisfy ourselves respecting a laboured attack upon it coming from an individual who stands so high both as to character and attainments as Dr. Smith : and having long since fully satisfied ourselves, we think it seasonable at this time, when our venerated friend has been taken from among us, and his work, in consequence of the very small number of copies remaining, may perhaps for the present have its circulation somewhat restrained, to call the attention of our readers to the true state of the controversy, and assist them in judging how far Dr. Smith has succeeded in invalidating Mr. Belsham's arguments, or in otherwise defending the prevailing doctrine respecting the person of our Lord.

Dr. Smith's work is divided into four books, of which the first is occupied with preliminary considerations ; the second is " On the Information to be obtained concerning the Person of the Messiah from the Prophetic Descriptions of the Old Testament ;" the third, " On the Information to be obtained concerning the Person of the Christ from the Narratives of the Evangelical History, and from our Lord's own Assertions and Intimations ;" and the fourth, " On the Doctrine taught by the Apostles in their Inspired Ministry concerning the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ." This distribution of the subject may probably be the most natural and useful for the impartial student, who, as he meets with each passage which may have a possible bearing on the point he is investigating, will refer to lexicographers, scholiasts, and commentators, without distinction of party or opinion, and having obtained all the aids he can, will form his own independent judgment. But where the object proposed is to set before our readers the *results* of our inquiries, and to compare these results with those obtained by others, we cannot help thinking that such an arrangement as Mr. Belsham's (who collects and examines in order the texts which have been adduced in support of each point of disputed doctrine) is more clear and satisfactory, as well as more favourable to conciseness. We do not think it the best method for the instruction of students, yet we were hardly prepared for the following remarks from any one possessing the least share of judgment or candour :

" The selection and arrangement of texts was certainly, so far as it went, a suitable means ; provided a due regard were had to the studying of each in its proper place and connexion. But to throw down before a company of inexperienced youths a regular set of rival and discordant expositions, ' in general without any additional, or at least doctrinal, comment of the compiler's own,' appears to me to have been a method not well calculated to lead into the path of convincing evidence and well-ascertained truth. It might excite party feeling, wordy disputation, unholy levity, and rash decision : but so far as either from the theory of the case or from experience I am able to form a judgment, I could not expect a better result, except in rare instances indeed."—Scripture Testimony, Vol. I. Chap. vi. p. 160, second edition.

On what grounds is it here insinuated that, under Mr. Belsham's guidance, a *due regard was not had to the connexion of texts*, in defiance of his own rule on the subject : " In order to judge of the true sense of a disputed text, it is necessary to consider the connexion in which it stands" ? (Calm Inquiry, Introd. p. 3, 2d ed.) So long as important passages of Scripture are differently understood by men of learning, who are able each to give some plausible reasons in favour of his own interpretation, what can the honest and impartial instructor do but lay before his pupils, or, in Dr. S.'s phraseology, " throw down before a company of inexperienced youths,"

*a set of rival and discordant expositions?* Or how would this be avoided by changing the plan of treating the subject from Mr. B.'s to Dr. Smith's, or to any other that may be suggested? A theological lecturer is certainly not bound to suppress the expression of his own opinions in his class; and provided that his pupils are prepared not to be the passive recipients of his sentiments, but to reflect on all that is laid before them, and draw conclusions for themselves, it is reasonable and natural that they should have the benefit of his thoughts on the subject before them, as well as those of others: but whilst he faithfully executes the duty of opening to them the existing sources of information, his own opinion cannot be essential, and there may be circumstances in which it is much better for him not to bring it forward at all. If Mr. Belsham had added doctrinal comments of his own, we may be sure that he would now be accused of having attempted unduly to bias the minds of his pupils. If the fair statement of whatever has been said most important on each side of a disputed question, be not "a method well calculated to lead into the path of convincing evidence and well-ascertained truth," we must presume that the plan preferred is making known only what has been said on one side; or, if they cannot be concealed, accompanying the arguments on the other side with such depreciating comments as may effectually prevent their receiving any real attention. Why the demand for profound and impartial thought on the most important topics of human inquiry, that which might be supposed to have, of all possible employments, most tendency to sober the mind and impress it with a feeling of solemn responsibility, should be judged likely to excite "party feeling, wordy disputation, unholy levity, and rash decision," is what we cannot understand, nor can we conceive how the *prerequisites* for the successful study of the Scriptures demanded by Dr. Smith in the passage immediately following that which we have quoted, should appear to him to be opposed to the views of his rival, or to be any thing different from what every theological instructor, whatever might be his peculiar opinions, must desire to find amongst those whose studies he is called upon to direct.

Guided by the arrangement of Dr. Smith's work, we shall now apply ourselves to notice such portions of it as the limits within which this article must necessarily be confined, will allow us to select for animadversion; and we must begin by exposing the sophistry of the first chapter, entitled, "On the Evidence proper to this Inquiry:"

"We cannot," says Dr. S., "reasonably doubt of the UNITY of God, in every sense in which unity is a perfection: but to the exact determination of that sense we are not competent. A manifest unity of intelligence, design, and active power, does not warrant the inference that *unity* in all respects, without modification, is to be attributed to the *Deity*. For any thing that we know, or are entitled to presume, there may be a sense of the term *unity* which implies restriction, and would be incompatible with the possession of all possible perfection."—P. 10.

We ascribe *unity* to the Deity. Unity is a word—a significant sound—a sound significant (like all words) only from the power of association, and having no sense inherent in itself which may remain unknown to those acquainted with its ordinary usage. It is not like many words, the notions corresponding to which in different minds are very different: on the contrary, the meaning it conveys, on all other subjects besides the one now under consideration, is definite, clear, and universally agreed upon. Why then do we employ it upon this subject? Either our meaning is the same as when we apply the same term to other subjects, or we use the word in a

loose sense to express some resemblance or approximation to the usual one, or we use it without any distinct meaning at all. It is very possible to use a word without meaning, as part of a formula which we have been early taught, and which, without having been reflected upon, is associated, as a whole, with certain notions of sanctity and duty; but we manifestly cannot so use a word as the result of our own observations or inquiries: it cannot, therefore, be in this manner that we ascribe unity to the Deity from the study of his works. Neither is it in the loose sense, for when we reason from unity of intelligence, design, and active power, to unity of mind, and therefore of being, the argument may or may not be conclusive; but it has no meaning, no existence whatever, if we change the sense of the term. It is plain, then, that the unity of the Deity, as a doctrine of *natural religion*, (whether established by sufficient evidence or not,) is unity in the obvious sense of the term, and is opposed to plurality of persons, hypostases, or distinctions, of whatsoever kind, in the Divine Nature.

After some farther argument on our ignorance of the essence and mode of existence of the Deity, Dr. Smith proceeds to say,

“These remarks have been made with a view to shew that there is *no antecedent incredibility* in the supposition, that the infinite and unknown essence of the Deity *may* comprise a plurality—not of separate beings—but of hypostases, subsistencies, persons; or, since many wise and good men deem it safest and most becoming to use no specific term for this ineffable subject,—of distinctions; always remembering that such distinctions alter not the unity of the Divine Nature. For any thing that we know, or have a right to assume, this may be one of the *unique* properties of the Divine Essence; a necessary part of that Sole Perfection which must include every real, every possible excellence; a circumstance peculiar to the Deity, and distinguishing the mode of His existence from that of the existence of all dependent beings.”

Now we have shewn that so far as the argument *from Nature* for the Divine Unity is good for any thing, (we will not press it as conclusive,) it is an argument for Unity, in the obvious and usual sense of that term, excluding and opposed to all plurality. No one can say that any appearance of Nature sanctions the doctrine which is contended for; and from the philosopher to the savage, no one possessing the use of his reason, ever heard it proposed for the first time, or first applied himself to study it, without feelings of surprise and of repugnance. It is hardly then too much to say, that there must exist in every unprejudiced mind a *justifiable indisposition* towards its reception—an indisposition which may indeed be overcome by evidence, but which must require to overcome it evidence *clear, direct, consistent, and abundant*. We are called upon to admit this notion of plurality in unity on the authority of *revelation*, whilst, inconsistently enough, we are told in the same breath that it cannot be understood. It is represented that we may conceive it *possible* that there *may be* a sense of the term *Unity* consistent with such plurality as exists in the Divine Nature, though the term Unity is an arbitrary sign, unmeaning, except as it excites by association a certain notion in the minds of those who hear it; and the notion which it thus represents is, with equal correctness, represented by the phrase “absence of plurality;” that is to say, we might as consistently affirm existence and non-existence of the same thing, at the same time, as unity and plurality: yet every attempt at rendering the ideas at all compatible is proscribed as heresy. We cannot even know what to call the distinctions in the Divine Nature: if we use the common term persons, we must consider that term as having a

special but inexplicable sense ; if we substitute any other word, we must equally remember that it is the sign of an idea, never possessed by any human mind, and is to us an unmeaning sound, or only reminds us at most of the existence of a mystery which we can never hope to penetrate. All this of a doctrine of *revelation*, a doctrine *revealed*, i. e. made known. *What* made known ? Is it the necessity of using a certain form of words ? Even thus the principal orthodox terms are not Scriptural—but no ! prescription of words is not revelation. There must be something for the understanding to embrace, and by meditation on which the practical benefits of *truth* or knowledge may be obtained. It is senseless to talk of that being revealed, which does not even remain unintelligible, but in respect to which we are obliged to substitute language which excites inconsistent and utterly irreconcilable ideas for the confession of ignorance. It is vain to refer us to the mysteries of Nature and Providence, and the incomprehensibility of all the Divine perfections. We are, indeed, blind and feeble-minded, and it would be strange if finite beings could fully comprehend the attributes or works of Him who is infinite ; but on all these subjects what we think that we know is intelligible and practically useful, what remains mysterious is so confessedly, and does not mock us with the pretence of being revealed in language which is either unmeaning or contradictory.

It cannot then be thought unreasonable to insist that there is a strong *antecedent improbability* attending the doctrine of the Trinity. For our own parts, so completely are we convinced of the sufficiency of the evidence for the Jewish and Christian revelations, and so deeply are we impressed with a sense of the importance of these dispensations to mankind, that whatever is proved from the records to be a genuine part of them we will submissively receive, and if we cannot understand it, we will believe that our *profession* of it is to do some good ; but we neither can nor ought to resist the feeling that peculiarly strong and clear evidence is necessary to support a doctrine such as this : nor, if persons who were fully satisfied that no trace of it is to be found in the records of the Divine communications have spoken of its absurdity and utter impossibility, can such language with any appearance of justice be attributed to impiety or contempt of revelation. We do not, however, justify such language ; what we have said has been merely in reply to Dr. Smith's attempt to set aside all antecedent improbability. We are persuaded that Unitarian Christians act most wisely in meeting the question simply as a Scriptural question. Other views of the subject may appear to them very striking, but they acknowledge the Sacred Records as the guides of their faith, and, firmly convinced that the Trinity is not taught or implied in them, they are anxious, in the first place, fairly and candidly to discuss that point with those who maintain the contrary position.

The next passage upon which we feel ourselves compelled to remark, and which is an example of the treatment Mr. Belsham uniformly receives from Dr. Smith, is the note (A) to Chapter III. which we must quote at length :

“ No writer can be more prompt to appeal to the original text than the author of the *Calm Inquiry* ; and for this, when reason and truth warrant the appeal, let him be commended. But a case happens in which the error of the Authorized Version affords a semblance of support to the Unitarian cause : and then he can argue from the *very inaccuracy* of the translation, with as comfortable a confidence as could be felt by the most illiterate of those lay-preachers, upon whom, on another occasion, he has poured unsparing contempt. (See a Letter to Lord Sidmouth, by the Rev. Thomas Belsham, 1811 ) This case is one in which, with a view to neutralize the passage, ‘ In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily,’ (Col. ii. 9,) he brings an

alleged instance of the application of similar language to Christians generally : 'In the Epistle to the Ephesians, chap. iii 19, the Apostle prays that they *may be filled with all the fulness of God*, i. e. with knowledge of the Divine will, and conformity to the Divine image.' P. 252.—But the Apostle's expression is, 'that ye may be filled *unto* all the fulness of God;' suggesting the sublime conception of an approximation to the Supreme perfection, which is begun by religion now, and shall be ever growing in the holiness and bliss of the future state; while the infinity of distance must for ever remain between Deity and the creature. This palpable error is retained in the text of the 'Improved Version,' and the true rendering is barely mentioned in a note with this vapid and silly interpretation—i. e. 'that ye may be admitted into the Christian Church.' As if the community of Ephesian Christians, which had flourished so many years in full organization (Acts xx.) and eminent stability (Ephes. i. 13—15), was not yet to be regarded as a part of the Christian Church!"

Now it happens, notwithstanding what we must call the bitterness of invective in this note, that the common version of Ephes. iii. 19, is not a *palpable error*, and was manifestly adhered to by Mr. Belsham, whether rightly or not, from conviction after examination. It will be sufficient for us to quote Dr. Bloomfield's note :

"In the interpretation of these words, the commentators, as on many other occasions, exceedingly differ. But, as often, the most natural, simple, and extensive application will be found the best. Now, as the Apostle had been speaking of the immense and inconceivable love of God and Christ, so here (I assent to Grotius, Whitby, Crellius, and Macknight) he means to say that by thus attaining the Holy Spirit, and having suitable conceptions of the great mystery of Redeeming love, they may be filled with all the spiritual gifts and blessings, both ordinary and extraordinary, that God can and will impart to his faithful worshippers. 'Εὐς is put for εὐ; than which nothing is more frequent in Scripture. Compare infra iv. 10, and Col. i. 9."—Bl. *Reversio Synoptica*, Vol. VII. p. 581.

This distinguished scholar, and the eminent critics whom he here follows, will, in the estimation of most persons, at least protect Mr. Belsham from the charges of retaining a *palpable error*, and ignorantly or unfaithfully arguing from the *inaccuracy* of a translation. In the Improved Version, it seems, Dr. Smith's *true rendering* is barely mentioned in a note, (two different translations, however doubtful the case, can hardly be both introduced into the text—one must be placed in a note, or else neglected,) with a *rapid* and *silly* interpretation. We will only say this interpretation is that of Schleusner, (in verb. *πληρωμα*, No. 7,) to whom Mr. Belsham refers; and no competent judge—no one who examines his references and reflects on what he says—will treat it with contempt, even if he should be induced ultimately to reject it.

We must now quote a paragraph from the fourth chapter, "On the Errors and Faults, in relation to this Controversy, attributable to Unitarian Writers," which, for its uncandid and illiberal spirit, we have hardly seen surpassed, even in the course of our attention to the Unitarian controversy :

"It has appeared to me," says Dr. S, "that one of the distinguishing failings of the Unitarian theology is a propensity to generalize too soon, and to conclude too hastily, both in criticism and in argumentation. It seems the habit of its advocates to assume a few of the broadest facts in the scheme of Christianity, which are obvious to the most rapid glance: and, with a sweeping hand, they either crush down all the rest, and leave them unregarded, or they force them into an unnatural and disfiguring subordination to the favourite assumptions. Unlike the cautious and patient spirit of true philoso-



phy, which is always open to the collection and the careful estimation of facts, and which regards nothing as more hostile to its objects than a precipitate and foreclosing generalization, the Unitarian spirit rather resembles that of the old scholasticism, which spurned laborious investigation and slow induction, and would force all nature into its ranks of predicaments and predicables. This may be one reason, among others, why these notions meet with so ready an acceptance in young minds, inexperienced, flirty, and ambitious, half-learned, and ill-disciplined. Here is a theology easily acquired, discarding mysteries, treading down difficulties, and answering the pleas of the orthodox with summary contempt: a theology complimentary to the pride of those who deem themselves endowed with superior discernment, and which in practice is not ungenerously rigid against any favourite passion or little foible that is decently compatible with *the world's* code of morals."

We suppose we must expect Dr. S. to speak slightly of our mode of reasoning, since he so little likes our conclusions, and we are very willing to leave our logic to its own defence; but we will venture, though the same thought will occur to most of our readers, to illustrate the character of mind—*young, inexperienced, flirty, and ambitious, half-learned, and ill-disciplined*—to which our doctrines have been found acceptable, by naming Milton, Newton, Locke, Lardner, Priestley—and Whitby and Watts, as the last resting-place of their minds, at the close of lives devoted to religious inquiries. We are tempted to enumerate others distinguished for their great attainments, their powers of mind, the prejudices with which they had to struggle, or the sacrifices they made to what they believed to be the truth, but it is needless. Dr. S. may have seen that Unitarianism recommends itself to *young* minds, ardent in the pursuit of truth, *ambitious* of being distinguished in promoting it, too *inexperienced* to be influenced by motives of worldly wisdom, not yet having their own thoughts lost and buried in a mass of ill-digested *learning*, too *ill-disciplined* to suppress as criminal the doubts which inquiry may suggest—and he forgets that the same views have satisfied the matured judgment of those whose fame he cannot injure, have been entertained with the fullest conviction by those whose genius, learning, and virtues, he cannot prevent the better part of mankind from admiring. We will not stop to compare Dr. S.'s own confidence in his superior discernment with our recollections of what we have seen manifested by Unitarian writers; but when our theology is described as "in practice not ungenerously rigid against any favourite passion or little foible that is decently compatible with the **WORLD'S** code of morals," we are called upon to reject the calumny; we are entitled to express the disgust with which it affects us. We ask first, what there is in the doctrines of Unitarian Christianity which should make their professors indulgent to sinful passions, and ready to conform their standard of duty to the merely prudential requisitions of the worldly-minded and irreligious? Like others, they are taught that they are constantly under the eye of an all-seeing God, perfect in holiness and purity, who has made known to them their duty, and who will *one day bring every work into judgment with every secret thought*. Is it then because they believe that this all-perfect Being has given them laws, not for his own glory, but for their happiness, and that the strict observance of these laws is essential to their attainment of any real or permanent good? Is it because they are assured that sin and suffering are inseparably connected, and that a death-bed repentance is vainly relied upon to avert the consequences of a life of wickedness? Is it because they are taught that they must "*work out THEIR OWN salvation with fear and trembling,*" and have not learned to put their trust in another's merits? Is it because, whilst they rely on

their heavenly Father and Friend mercifully accepting their faithful endeavours to perform their duty, to correct their faults, and to improve their characters, they feel certain that no rational hope can be founded on any thing less than earnest and prevailing endeavours to do right, accompanied by honest self-examination, sincere repentance of known faults, and constant efforts after improvement? On account of which of these characteristic doctrines is it that they should be judged likely as a body, rather than other professing Christians, to make light of the evil of sin, to find excuses for the indulgence of bad passions, and to join themselves with those who, thinking only of present pleasure, make the decencies of society, not the rules of duty, the standard by which they regulate their conduct?

We ask, again, are Unitarian Christians in fact distinguished from those amongst whom they live by being less strict in the government of their own appetites, less honest and liberal in their dealings with others, less kind and charitable towards their suffering fellow-creatures? We know that they are not generally thought so by those who differ from them most widely in sentiment. They are often, through misapprehension of their opinions, accused of relying on their good works, but seldom of any remarkable deficiency in performing them. We have no disposition to praise them highly. We lament that they do not come nearer to what, with their advantages, might reasonably be expected. We would to God we could see them more deeply imbued with their professed principles, and more uniformly acting as becomes their high and holy calling; but we cannot silently allow them to be unjustly and uncandidly condemned. We well know that the faults with which they are chargeable are not effects of their religious principles, but consequences of these not being cherished and felt as they deserve to be: and as the language of Dr. Smith has forcibly reminded us of those whom we have known most truly under the influence of the peculiar religious sentiments in which we rejoice, most firmly convinced of their truth, and most constantly applying them in practice—of those whose pure minds, elevated affections, warm and habitual piety, strict integrity, and active benevolence, have been to our conceptions a genuine and glowing representation of the Christian life—of some who yet remain to edify and bless their friends—of others who have already found their faith triumphant over death, and have closed their pilgrimage as became those who had spent it in preparation for that better world, of which through the gospel of Jesus they entertained an assured expectation—that language has appeared to us so inexcusably unjust, so entirely founded in culpable ignorance and prejudice, and dictated by so arrogantly censorious a spirit, that whilst we appeal from his judgment, we cannot help reminding him of the responsibility under which he has passed sentence upon us.

In his fifth chapter, Dr. S. makes somewhat more particular charges against the conduct of Unitarians, which, that we may not have to return to the subject, we shall here notice. He accuses them of being generally, “so far as station and circumstances afford opportunities,” devoted to “all the forms of gay amusement and fashionable dissipation;” of neglecting the ordinances of religion, and of not honouring the Lord’s-day. With respect to the first of these charges, we cannot tell what Dr. Smith may have seen, but from pretty extensive opportunities for observation, we feel ourselves warranted in giving the opinion, that the members of Unitarian congregations (meaning, of course, those who are of a rank to be within reach of the temptation) *generally* partake very moderately in the gaieties of life, and are not justly chargeable with dissipation. It is true they do not think every

thing which has the name of pleasure criminal, and consider it as a point of duty to abstain from it ; they do not affect that peculiar austerity which is so frequently characteristic either of the bigot or the hypocrite ; but we should describe them as concerning themselves little with the follies of fashion, entering very moderately into scenes devoted to amusement, pursuing the quiet walks of business, of social duty, and of innocent social enjoyment.

There is, however, no sect which exhibits any thing approaching to uniformity of excellence among its members : each has many connected with it who are considered by the better part as doing no credit to the principles they profess, and being by no means truly under their influence. Now, it should be observed that Unitarianism, as understood by the majority of its professors, not attaching to the externals of religion the same essential and inherent importance with most other systems, and affording no inducements to hypocrisy, a thoughtless devotion to the gaieties of the world is just the fault into which our less worthy and serious members are apt to fall ; not to mention that there are many partially connected with us, who, though disbelieving the doctrines of reputed Orthodoxy, and finding their remaining belief Unitarian, have never been brought to interest themselves on the subject, and are never acknowledged by us as those from whom a practical exhibition of the effects of our principles could be expected. On the contrary, among the orthodox sects, including those members of the Establishment who make any considerable pretensions to religion, a particular attention to all outward observances is essential to character : they consider abstinence from the gaieties of life as a direct requisition of duty, and the faults to which their situation most exposes them are hypocrisy and the vices which it may conveniently cloak. That they are not all free from these faults, is sufficiently notorious.

The Unitarian Christian does not in general feel himself under any obligation to such an observance of the Lord's-day as Dr. S. deems essential to a religious character, although not many, perhaps, may go so far the other way as Calvin or Mr. Belsham : but it certainly is not just to accuse men of irreligion because they wish to be influenced by their religion every day equally, when no precept applying the strict sabbatical law to Christians can possibly be produced, and its practical utility may, to say the least, be reasonably called in question.

It is not to be doubted, that among Unitarians the outward observances of religion are commonly regarded less as the performance of a direct duty, and more as means of improvement voluntarily resorted to, than amongst other sects. Those who think most of the absolute duty of paying a public homage to Almighty God, in the name of his chosen Messenger, will not, amongst us, pretend to determine how many times in one day this may be required ; and as on the question of expediency different opinions may be formed, those who think most seriously do not make the same point of attending worship several times on each Lord's-day with persons of a less degree of real religious feeling in other sects ; whilst indolence or carelessness more readily amongst us find excuses for the neglect of some valuable opportunities for improvement. We regret this result, because we are sure that all the services which are ever attempted by us, might be made useful and found interesting ; to some classes of society they are particularly important ; and that improvement of plan which would make them all that they might be, can hardly be expected, except under the sanction of a zealous and uniform attendance. We regret, then, much that our people, though

very many of them are exemplary, are not, speaking of them as a body, such regular frequenters of *all* the services of the house of God, (there are very few, we believe, who habitually or wantonly absent themselves from one service,) as the members of other sects; but we will not consent that what we both lament and blame should be considered as proving the absence of interest in religion, knowing, as we do, that many who will ordinarily attend but one service, will devoutly join in that one, and seriously endeavour to profit by it; knowing also that many will attend three or four services in a day, thinking that in so doing they are performing what is required or highly acceptable, and yet not seem much wiser or better for the whole. In short, we allow that Unitarians attach less importance to the ordinances and public exercises of religion, as *compared* with its feelings and its other duties, than their fellow-christians in general; that, in consequence, some may estimate their value at too low a rate, and indolence will more frequently tempt the less serious among them to a partial neglect of what ought, for our own good, and the good of our brethren, to be strictly observed by us all: but we deny that our body is chargeable with a general or habitual neglect of this kind of duties. There is a considerable proportion of it whose zeal for the public exercises of religion goes quite as far as is reasonable or useful; and we deny that the partial neglect (though an evil) by any means constantly implies indifference or impiety.

Dr. S. has shewn his want of any solid grounds for the accusations he has made, as well as the kind of spirit by which he was animated, in the most unfair use which he has made of a passage from an anonymous letter in the former series of this work. (Mon. Repos. December, 1817, p. 717.) The writer of that letter is evidently lamenting that persons belonging by *education* and *habit to the Establishment*, although brought to perceive the truth of our doctrines, as they are ready in conversation to avow, often cannot be induced so far to break through old habits and connexions as to join our worship, either continuing to frequent the church, or going nowhere. This Dr. S. represents as a testimony coming from ourselves to the neglect of religious ordinances amongst us. We give him credit for having mistaken, not wilfully falsified, the author's meaning; but with what views did he read, when he justified so serious a charge by evidence of such a character?

The following passage, being part of the additional matter with which our author has enriched his second edition, may, perhaps, be best noticed in this connexion; we feel it to be the more necessary to offer some remarks upon it, because the subject is one which has excited some uneasiness amongst ourselves, and Dr. S.'s information has probably been derived from papers inserted in a former volume of this work (Mon. Repos. Vol. XXI.):

“But I go farther, and make my appeal to intelligent and candid Unitarians themselves, whether they are not perfectly aware that a proportion, not inconsiderable or uninfluential, of their congregations, at the present time, throughout our country, consists of persons who do not disguise their scepticism or even settled disbelief with regard to the divine origin and paramount authority of the Christian religion? What has produced this coalition? Why does it continue, with every appearance of mutual contentment? Is not the undeniable cause a congeniality of spirit, and a conviction, on the part of those sceptics and infidels, that the theory of Unitarianism approaches so nearly to their own, that any remaining differences may be well accommodated to the satisfaction of each party?”

Exaggerated as we believe the statement here made to be, we acknowledge that it has a foundation in truth. We are aware that in some few

places Unitarian congregations contain a small number of persons either sceptical, or denying the divine origin and authority of Christianity: but before we feel any shame at this fact, or admit the justice of any unfavourable inferences from it, we must inquire, first, why such persons desire to join our societies; secondly, what is implied on our part in receiving them as fellow-worshippers; and, thirdly, what are the actual, or what will be the probable, effects of the union so far as it exists. Now, as to the first point, it is plain that no one will attend on Unitarian services from mere worldly motives, because the most open opposition to all religion is not more unpopular—is, indeed, by many even less severely condemned, than the testimony against its corruptions which is borne by Unitarians. Those who in rejecting revelation despise all religion, either frequent no place of worship, or go to the Established Church, from motives of interest or fashion. Those, on the contrary, who believe in the existence, perfections, and government of God, in the necessity of virtue to human happiness, and in a future retributory state—who consequently desire to pay public homage to God, and to listen to moral instructions and exhortations—if from any cause they find it not convenient to have services on their own principles, will, of course, wish to attend where they hear most of what they approve, and least of what they disapprove, and will thus be naturally led to Unitarian places of worship. They can have no motive for appearing there but what is creditable to themselves—the desire of shewing respect for practical religion, and in the purest form which circumstances admit of paying their social homage to the God of Nature and of Providence. If, as many do, though in our judgment inconsistently with the rejection of his divine authority, they regard the morality taught by Christ as most excellent, and his character as deserving of respect, they will hear in a Unitarian service nothing to disgust them, though a good deal which they cannot admit as true, and their coming can be taken only as a testimony of their desire to cultivate pious affections, and to promote their moral improvement. As no confession of faith is required, they are guilty of no insincerity, and cannot be accused of making any false professions—to which, indeed, no possible inducement is held out. What, then, let us next inquire, is implied on the part of Unitarian Christians in receiving as fellow-worshippers those who do not believe in the divine mission of him who is acknowledged as their Lord and Saviour? And here it is important to observe, that the English Presbyterian congregations, which form the great majority of those now entertaining Unitarian sentiments, in consequence at first of the impossibility of practically carrying into effect, in their circumstances, the mode of church government which they approved, and afterwards of a growing attachment to religious liberty, and jealousy of all interferences with it, have long been *entirely without any attempt at a church constitution or discipline*. A minister of the general religious sentiments of the majority of the people, and who is believed to possess suitable qualifications, is chosen, who, studying the Scriptures freely for himself, is to teach what he believes to be Gospel truth. All who desire to hear his instructions, constitute the congregation. There is no creed; no man is called in question by his brethren respecting his faith; the minister does not feel himself justified in going beyond friendly advice and such discussion as may seem to him likely to be useful. The ordinances of religion are closed against no one who satisfies his own conscience as to the propriety of his partaking in them, and no one is subjected to unpleasant proceedings if he think it right to absent himself from any of them; and thus, in fact, until new regulations are made for the purpose, it is not in the power of a con-

gregation of Unitarian Christians to prevent their being joined by any other persons who may desire to be numbered amongst them.

If congregations of Unitarian Christians were voluntary associations of persons deliberately making profession of certain common principles, and therefore, of course, excluding those who think differently, we know not that any one could question their right thus to constitute themselves, or, so long as there is no desire to inflict any injury on others thinking differently, could have any reasonable cause for complaint. In that case, though any one might come as a hearer, none could be a member of the society who could not make a solemn declaration of belief in the same sentiments. But what, let us now ask, should we gain as to the usefulness of our services by such a measure? We should discourage the conscientious Deist, or the yet hesitating Sceptic, from attending the only public services in which they can join with advantage, and which, we trust, have a tendency to correct what we regard as their very serious errors, as well as to encourage their juster sentiments and excite their better feelings; and we should do this from the selfish hope of standing some trifle higher in the estimation of those who, in the face of our most solemn declarations of our belief in the divine authority of our Saviour, and in the inestimable benefit of his mission, can still accuse us of congeniality of sentiment respecting the character and claims of the gospel with sceptics and infidels. Are we, then, ashamed because even those who cannot bring themselves to admit the revelation to which we gratefully ascribe all our light and all our hopes, yet acknowledge that our doctrines appear to them to be those of true and practical religion, and that they themselves are happier and better for listening to them? Are we grieved because *almost they are persuaded to be Christians*—because they allow the truth and goodness of our instructions, and the force of the additional arguments by which we recommend them, even whilst they call in question their having been communicated by divine authority? We must, indeed, think that those who reject Christianity, even if they make the most of Natural Religion, and much more than we can believe would ever have been made of it without the indirect aid of Revelation, are yet in an error, seriously pernicious to themselves, and fraught with dangerous consequences to others; and if, in consequence of the knowledge that some such persons came amongst us, we suppressed the expression of our own convictions, dwelling less earnestly on the claims of our Lord to our love and obedience, or on the blessed hopes which we found on his promises and resurrection, we might then justly be condemned; but so long as we are only rendered more anxious to establish the authority of our revered Master, more abundant in our labours to cause his name to be honoured, his commands respected, and his promises cherished, it would be difficult to say how our faith should be implicated in the homage which is paid to the purity and excellence of the system we teach, even by those who professedly do not join with us in attributing to it a divine original. It will be recollected that to such persons we make no concessions; we advance not one step to meet them. We rejoice that the Christianity which we derive from the Scriptures is not repulsive to the natural reason of man, in an age of accumulated knowledge and high intellectual culture; but we alter not one jot or one tittle of what we find in the Scriptures to satisfy either our own reason or that of others, because divine instruction is intended to supply the deficiencies of reason, and, if received at all, must be received as authoritative. We rejoice that any, who agree with us in any great principle, will come and worship along with us; and God forbid that we should

threaten them in consequence of the deficiencies of their faith, or pretend to identify the opinions, however erroneous in our judgment, which they have formed in a sincere desire to know the truth, with the corrupt and wicked opposition made to the Gospel by the unbelievers whom our Lord condemns.

We cannot wonder that those who, on grounds of Natural Religion exclusively, believe in essentially the same truths respecting the perfections, character, and government of God, the duties and expectations of man, which we rejoice in as revealed to us through Jesus Christ, should be better satisfied with our services than with those which are founded on doctrines believed by them to be absurd and pernicious; and we have no wish to close our doors against them. They are not of us; but they are willing to be with us—we hope they will not be the worse for joining with us. It remains to be inquired whether they do us any real injury. What are the effects of the union so far as it exists? We have shewn that it is not the result of any formal agreement between the parties, but simply the consequence of the constitution of our congregations. A place is set apart for Christian worship on Unitarian principles; there is no creed or test of any kind employed; no one claims a right to inquire into his neighbour's faith; the minister feels himself called upon to do all which circumstances will allow, publicly and privately to improve all his hearers in Christian knowledge and practice, but pretends to no authority to mark any with the sign of his approbation or censure; all may enter freely; and whoever thinks it right to contribute to the support of public worship becomes, by that act, a member of the congregation. Since, then, it is acknowledged that serious Deists must necessarily regard Unitarian Christians as teaching chiefly what is true and useful, and as much nearer to them in opinions than other Christians, it is plain why some such persons have joined Unitarian congregations; and it is evident that, though they are received in all kindness and friendship, there exists no formal or solid union between them and their fellow-worshippers; and that from their presence no conclusion can justly be drawn respecting the sentiments of any who profess themselves Unitarian *Christians*. By their presence we are certainly injured, inasmuch as it gives occasion for uncandid adversaries to misrepresent our opinions; but we trust that no consideration of this kind will ever induce us to change our conduct towards any of our fellow-creatures. Can they, then, cause the sentiments delivered in our pulpits to be less truly Christian sentiments? This is only possible either by their unfavourably influencing the choice of our ministers, or by their causing them, through fear of offence, not as much as they ought to support their instructions by Christian authority, or to dwell on those affections and hopes which peculiarly belong to the Gospel. With respect to the first of these means—it is a thing perfectly understood amongst all who frequent our worship, whatever may be their own particular views, that it is Christian worship to which they are giving their countenance: a very great majority in every congregation would be both dissatisfied and much shocked at the thought of any other. No open attempt could be made to substitute services founded on mere natural religion, without an immediate separation of those who approved from those who disapproved of the measure; that is, without the friends of the measure meeting avowedly as Deists, which they are at liberty to do, so far as we are concerned, whenever they judge it expedient. An attempt *artfully* to introduce, as a Christian minister, a person not really deserving of that name, would be inconsistent with that character and those views which alone can lead men to worship God at all, and is, therefore, not likely to be made; whilst it could hardly

fail to be detected, and consequently, if made, could only end in the disgrace of its authors. All who attend on the services of religion are equally interested in the minister who is to conduct them possessing such character, attainments, and address, as will give most weight to his instructions, most dignity and usefulness to his office. In the pursuit of these objects all may join, and theory combines with experience to prove that, in the case now under our consideration, no injurious consequences are to be apprehended. As to the other supposed means of injury—if ministers are capable of modifying their *doctrines* according to the supposed taste of any of their hearers, they may just as easily modify their *moral instructions* on the same principle, and the utility of their office is at an end. We think it is not without reason that better things are expected from them. We have great confidence in the effects of their peculiar studies and habits of thought, in ennobling, purifying, and strengthening the mind; we have great confidence in their knowledge, that, in a vast majority of cases, the honest and faithful performance of their duty is the way to secure the esteem and affection of the great body of their hearers, and there is abundant proof from experience that the confidence we express is justly placed. We conclude the whole subject with the observation, that it is notorious that Unitarianism has brought numbers to a joyful and grateful acknowledgement of revelation, who had been driven to reject it by the revolting character of more prevalent forms of Christianity, whilst very few pass from Unitarianism to Unbelief, and with those few it appears to be the result of peculiarities of individual character or circumstances, not of any natural current setting from the one doctrine towards the other. We are by no means sure that on this important subject we have expressed the general sentiments of the Unitarian body; though, believing that we have expressed the dictates of justice and charity, we would hope that our brethren do not widely differ from us. Many, no doubt, regard Unbelievers with a sort of horror—probably from an opinion that none become so but from wilful obstinacy and moral corruption. That these are the causes of a great deal of unbelief is unquestionable; but a sceptical turn of mind, unfavourable impressions made at the most critical period of life, and disgust at doctrines represented as essential, cause a good deal more; and those Unbelievers who shew any disposition to come amongst us, are generally persons possessing a real respect for religion, and desire to improve by its exercises. We do not, therefore, wish to see them condemned or rejected, and we have great doubt as to the advantage of the only measure which could secure a separation between us and them—the adoption of a profession of faith and a system of church-membership. We do not question the right to adopt this measure, and we do not venture to decide on its expediency, but we think we have abundantly shewn that there is nothing which either party need be ashamed of in the circumstance of our societies, open as they now are, having been in some places joined by individuals not professing to believe in revelation, nothing which throws the smallest imputation on the sincerity of our own faith, or gives the least cause for exultation to our adversaries.

Passing by much matter of a merely personal character, which, though in our opinion both unjust and illiberal, can hardly be thought to require the answer which it would occupy much space to give, we shall now offer a few remarks on Dr. Smith's "Observations on the Introduction to the *Calm Inquiry*."

Mr. Belsham very judiciously reminds his readers, that since "all Christians agree that Jesus of Nazareth was to outward appearance a man like



other men," and that his prophetic office, miracles, and resurrection, do not necessarily imply his superiority of nature, "it follows, that in this inquiry the whole burden of proof lies upon those who assert the pre-existence, the original dignity, and the divinity of Jesus Christ." The Unitarian finds nothing more in the Scriptures than what all acknowledge to be there—others imagine that much more is to be found—it is their business to bring forward their proofs: we establish our own doctrine, if we only shew those alleged proofs to be insufficient.

"In this controversy, therefore," continues Mr. B., "the proper province of the Arian and Trinitarian is to propose the evidence of their respective hypotheses; that is, to state those passages of Scripture which they conceive to be conclusive in favour of their doctrines. *The sole concern of the Unitarian is, to shew that these arguments are inconclusive.*"—(Calm Inquiry, p. 2.)

It would hardly seem possible to extract from these words any other meaning than that the Unitarian, himself fully convinced that his own is the doctrine of Scripture, will have done every thing required for convincing his opponents when he has shewn the inconclusiveness of the texts brought forward by them, since by general confession what remains, after the peculiar evidence for reputed orthodoxy is taken away, is Unitarianism. Yet upon this observation, perfectly just as a logical position, and, one might have thought, altogether inoffensive in its mode of expression, Dr. Smith has the following remarks:

"This might be proper, if controvertists had no love to truth, nor sense of its value; if they were theological prize-fighters, who cared for nothing but victory or the semblance of victory. But ill do such expressions comport with the mind and motives of a sincere and serious and 'calm inquirer' after an object so momentous as SACRED AND ETERNAL TRUTH. To obtain that object *ought* to be the *sole concern* of Unitarians, and of all other men; and it solemnly behoves those who are pleased with this consequential flippancy of assertion, to examine well the state of their own hearts before him who will not be mocked."

It is a strange misapprehension of Mr. B.'s meaning, which has given occasion to this vituperative language. We need not point out the dispositions to which the error may be traced.

Another very important caution of Mr. B., which has also excited Dr. Smith's wrath, is the following:

"Impartial and sincere inquirers after truth must be particularly upon their guard against what is called the natural signification of words and phrases. The connexion between words and ideas is perfectly arbitrary: so that the natural sense of any word to any person means nothing more than the sense in which he has been accustomed to understand it. But it is very possible that men who lived two thousand years ago might annex very different ideas to the same words and phrases; so that the sense which appears most foreign to us might be most natural to them."

"If," says Dr. S., "the Calm Inquirer means only to assert that the interpretation of a language must proceed on an enlightened acquaintance with its idioms, he has said no more than a school-boy knows and practises every day. But it is doing no service to the improvement of reason or the investigation of truth to represent the phrases 'natural signification,' and 'natural sense,' as if they were properly or usually applied to the bald and blundering methods of translation, which betray those who use them to be ignorant of the principles of language. I am greatly mistaken if the established use of those expressions, with correct speakers, is not to denote that sense of a word

or phrase which it would carry, at the time, and under all the circumstances, in the minds of the persons to whom it was originally addressed."

The author goes on to shew that the connexion between words and ideas depends on the laws of association, and that we are possessed of means by which a moral certainty may be attained as to the true meaning of words and phrases in ancient writings, all which is in perfect agreement with Mr. B.'s principles: indeed, it is acknowledged in a note "that the Calm Inquirer has, in another of his observations, recognized the principal rules of interpretation."

Mr. B. warns the impartial inquirer against "what is called the natural signification of words and phrases."

We read the Bible daily from childhood upwards, and it may be hoped that we do not read it without attaching some meaning to the words. The sense in which we first take its various parts must either be that which is suggested by parents and instructors, or that which occurs to ourselves at a time when neither our knowledge nor judgment is much to be relied upon. This sense is by frequent perusal strongly associated with the words and phrases, and immediately occurs to us as belonging to them whenever we consider them; it is *what is called* their *natural sense*, and is in general, to a great degree, the sense ascribed to them by those amongst whom we live: but if we are serious inquirers after divine truth, we shall examine and correct it by a faithful application of the just principles of interpretation, which will often shew us that the sense which seemed natural to us, has little pretensions to be accounted the true one. Now, there is nothing more common than to object to the best-founded and most valuable explanations of Scripture, that they are unnatural, that they give to the words a forced and unnatural sense, when nothing is really intended but that they are not familiar to us, and are opposed to our established associations. Dr. S. must, on reflection, be well aware that feelings of this kind are among the most formidable obstacles to the right understanding of Scripture, and he will hardly say that they do not furnish the most common answers to Unitarian expositions of Scripture: he certainly will not maintain that an answer founded on them is sufficient: let him then be ashamed of his angry declamation, and acknowledge that the Calm Inquirer's remark is neither "a mere truism," nor "a denial of all certainty in philological studies," but a useful practical caution of which most readers who are not critical scholars, and not a few who are, stand greatly in need.

Dr. S. is greatly scandalized at the expression, "the incarceration of the Creator of the world in the body of a helpless, puling infant," employed by Mr. B. in describing the orthodox doctrine. We do not wish to defend any thing which needlessly hurts the feelings of others, but as Dr. S. talks of *misrepresentation*, we must remind him that the language is justified by that seriously used by very orthodox writers. What is to be thought of the following language from Bacon?

"The Christian believes a Virgin to be the mother of a Son; and that very Son of hers her Maker. He believes him to have been shut up in a narrow cell, whom heaven and earth could not contain. He believes him to have been born in time, who was and is from eternity. He believes him to have been a weak child and carried in arms, who is Almighty; and him once to have died, who alone has life and immortality."

When such is the language of orthodox piety, the Unitarian may surely be excused some little strength of expression on the subject.

Dr. S. concludes his observations on Mr. B.'s introduction, and with them the first great division of his work, in these words :

“ It would have been no disparagement to the writer of the *Calm Inquiry*, had he urged the duty of cherishing impartiality, sincerity, and the love of truth, *by the means* of assiduous PRAYER to the Author of truth, a recollection of our amenableness to his tribunal, and a holy state of our mental feelings, in reference to his presence and perfections. Without these moral cautions, can it be expected that our inquiries will be really impartial or will terminate successfully? The principles of human nature and the righteousness of the Divine government equally forbid the expectation. Happy will those be who realize the devotion and faith of him who said, ‘ With THEE is the fountain of life ; in THY light we shall see light !’ But on such subjects the *Calm Inquiry* observes the silence of death.”

Mr. B. recommends impartiality, and the sincere, disinterested love of truth ; he does not enter on the means of attaining and cultivating these qualities, because those means are not unknown or much disputed : he was writing a controversial, not a practical work, and he meant to confine himself to one volume of moderate size, where he could not, like Dr. S., give 200 pages to introductory considerations. Nothing can be found in his book unfavourable to habits of devotion or feelings of piety. The impartiality which he recommends—the love of truth, without regard to external advantages, sensual pleasures, or the gratification of ambition and vanity—is itself a *holy state of the mental feelings*, and it is hard to reproach him with *the silence of death* when he speaks learnedly and ably on the subject he undertakes to discuss, because he does not digress into a practical treatise on devotion and faith. Sincere devotion, and prayer, its noblest exercise and best excitement, are most valuable means of producing the dispositions which aid us in the search for truth ; but it must be remembered, that there is a sort of prayer often employed in what is called religious inquiry, which is no more than a mustering of fears and prejudices against the admission of any new light, or an attempt to overpower the resistance of reason to popular opinions by an accumulation of distempered and enthusiastic feelings. There are many also who pray indeed for help from God in the understanding of his word ; but, entertaining the unfounded expectation of that help being afforded in the form of immediate and supernatural assistance, instead of improving by their pious exercises in the humble and diligent application of the means of knowledge, are puffed up with a vain conceit of their infallibility, and led to ascribe to their own crudest conceptions the authority of divine communication. As these are faults into which those who agree with Dr. S. are peculiarly apt to fall, we have at least as good reason for wondering that he did not guard against such common and dangerous abuses of what he justly recommends, as he had for reproaching Mr. B. with his silence on a subject which his plan did not oblige him to introduce.

We have been able to notice but a few of the more important passages in that portion of Dr. Smith's work which has now engaged our attention. There is hardly a page in which something does not call for animadversion, and there are some subjects of very high interest, as the Unitarian views of the perfections of God, and the inspiration of the Scriptures, which demand distinct essays to do them any justice. We hope, however, that what we have done may be sufficient to make known the true character of what is represented as a formidable attack on our opinions, to expose the treatment which Mr. Belsham has received from one who would willingly be thought a candid adversary, and to repel some charges which, though glaringly

false, may be said to be admitted, because Unitarians have not thought it needful to give them a distinct denial—because, in short, no one has yet undertaken the labour of a reply, which must occupy at least three volumes, and when finished, might probably be neglected—by our friends, because they are already fully satisfied—by our opponents, because very few of them desire to know any thing of our side of the question.

The Introduction to Dr. Smith's second book is chiefly occupied with an attack on Mr. Belsham for not having gone over all the same ground with the author, and for having dismissed the few passages he has noticed from the Old Testament, with an expression respecting their application in this controversy, nearly approaching to contempt.

It must be recollected that the object of Mr. B.'s work is not to collect every thing in Scripture relating to the Messiah, but to examine the principal arguments which have been adduced in support of the notions of his superhuman or divine nature. When we consider, therefore, not only how precarious are the grounds for applying to the Messiah at all many of the passages brought forward by Dr. S., but how small a proportion of them, granting the interpretation put upon them, supply any substantial argument respecting his nature, and that of those which are made to appear most important, many have not been insisted upon by the best writers in defence of reputed orthodoxy, previous to our learned and ingenious author, we cannot be much surprised that Mr. B. did not feel himself called upon to devote any distinct portion of his work to the Old Testament. As to his manner of expression, every writer feels himself authorized to express his opinion on the comparative force of the arguments which pass under his consideration: it is agreed, on all hands, that learned and able men have often been "imposed upon by miserable sophisms," and the statement of our belief that this has happened in a particular case, the whole matter being submitted to the judgment of the reader, cannot be considered as going beyond what is allowable in controversy. When, indeed, we attribute what we regard as the errors of our opponents to pride or other evil passions, or represent them as wilfully perverting the truth, and misrepresenting the Sacred Records, we are chargeable with passing the bounds of fair discussion, and contending for victory with unlawful weapons. Of any such charge as this, we think the "Calm Inquirer" must be acquitted even by his enemies. Dr. Smith, as appears from what we have already brought forward, by no means comes before the tribunal of the public with so good a case. We most sincerely give him credit for much amiable and truly Christian feeling, but a man who talks so much of candour as he does, can hardly be excused in so often forgetting its dictates.

The enumeration of passages is prefaced by the following statement:

"In this enumeration it is proposed to bring forwards, not every text which has been adduced by biblical interpreters as referring to the Messiah, but only those which, according to the criteria above (in the preceding chapter) laid down, carry certain, or, at least, probable evidence of having been so designed. The degrees of that evidence will of course be various: but if the passages which appear to be of the least convincing kind, be struck out of the following list, still it is apprehended that enough will remain to furnish a satisfactory conclusion. The number might be greatly reduced without at all diminishing the weight of the argument."

In reviewing this enumeration, our narrow limits will oblige us to pass by without notice all such passages, however interesting in themselves, as have no direct bearing on the questions concerning the person of the Messiah,

and the nature or mode of the deliverance he effected for mankind. Interpretations, however doubtful, or even in our estimation decidedly false, which might be received by a Unitarian consistently with his general views of Christian truth, we do not undertake now to examine, but we shall endeavour to neglect no passage among thirty-two (exclusive of the sections on the "angel of Jehovah," and on the plural names) which Dr. Smith produces, in which we could not, as Unitarians, receive his interpretation, without our characteristic opinions being in any degree affected. We may safely presume that Dr. Smith has not omitted any thing of much importance. We shall endeavour to assist the intelligent and candid reader in estimating the value of what he has produced.

Sect. ii. Gen. iv. 1: "I have obtained a man JEHOVAH." "From the special record of this exclamation of Eve on the birth of her first son, and from the very marked importance which is given to it," [it is preserved merely as an explanation of the name Cain, *acquisition*, and the signs of any very peculiar importance being attached to it are not obvious,] "it may reasonably be considered as the expression of her eager and pious, though mistaken, expectation that the promise, (ch. iii. 15,) which could not but have created the strongest feelings of interest and hope," [it is a matter, nevertheless, of very great doubt whether the words referred to imply any promise at all,] "was now beginning to be accomplished. The primary, proper, and usual force of the particle (אֵל) placed here before JEHOVAH, is to designate an object in the most demonstrative and emphatical manner." "It is true, that in subsequent periods of the language, this particle came to be used as a preposition, to denote *with* or *by the instrumentality of*; but this was but a secondary idiom, and many of its supposed instances, on a closer consideration, fall into the ordinary construction. There seems, therefore, no option to an interpreter who is resolved to follow faithfully the fair and strict grammatical signification of the words before him, but to translate the passage as it is given above."—Scrip. Test. Vol. I. p. 235.

What can Dr. S. mean by saying that the *primary* and *proper* sense of the particle [אֵל] is to designate an object "in the most demonstrative and emphatical manner"? For this purpose it is most usually employed: but it has, without doubt, *originally* been a noun independently significant, and all its uses as a particle, whether as the sign of a case, or mere emphatic accompaniment of a noun, or as a preposition, are but certain applications of the *original* and *proper* sense, of which, though one may have become much more common, we have no right on that account merely to say that it is either older or better established. It appears to be sufficiently proved, that אֵל, in at least two passages besides the one under consideration, bears the sense of *from*, and in several others *by means of*, either of which would remove all difficulty from this passage—in one of these ways too it has been understood by most of the ancient translators. Yet, because the particle is of much more frequent occurrence as an emphatic accompaniment of nouns, (an argument which, if consistently followed up, would never allow us to give to any word more than one sense,) we are called upon to admit a translation which, understood literally, is in the highest degree revolting and absurd, and from which no rational and probable meaning can be extracted. That the applications of the particle as a preposition are secondary and of a later age, is a mere arbitrary assumption; and, after all, how is it to be proved to us that the documents employed by Moses had not their expression in any degree altered by him, or even, as their antiquity must have been so extraordinary, that they had not previously to his time existed only in hieroglyphics? It is enough for us, however, that there is not the slightest

foundation for Dr. S.'s assertion as to the *necessity* of the extraordinary translation he has adopted. Eve said, "I have *acquired* a man *from* (or *through*) Jehovah;" she therefore called his name **CAIN** (acquisition). It was quite natural for her thus to express her joy at receiving what she could not but regard as a great comfort and blessing, and there is no reason for seeking any mystery in the words, or for supposing that whatever hopes they may be thought to imply related to the approaching fulfilment of any divine promises.

We pass to Sect. viii. 2 Sam. xxiii. 1—7. The passage contains what is believed to be the latest written of the poems of David. It apparently relates to his confidence in the fulfilment of God's promises respecting the future glory of his family, but is thought by many to be prophetic of the reign of the Messiah, in which view it is brought forward by our author. Its interpretation is attended with great difficulty, owing probably to the corrupt state of the text, and we cannot but think the sense at present too uncertain for it to be appealed to as of any importance in the support of a controverted doctrine. As, however, Dr. Smith finds in it the direct application of the name Jehovah to the Messiah, we shall just lay before our readers the true state of the fact. 2 Sam. xxiii. 4, the Authorized Version gives, "And *he shall be* as the light of the morning, *when* the sun riseth, even a morning without clouds; *as* the tender grass *springing* out of the earth by clear shining after rain." Dr. Smith, inserting the word **JEHOVAH** on the authority of a single Hebrew MS., (a valuable one certainly, yet only one,) doubtfully supported by the ancient Greek Version, translates thus :

- Ver. 3. " Ruling over man is a Righteous one  
Ruling in the fear of God :  
Ver. 4. Even as the light of the morning shall he arise,  
Jehovah the sun,  
A morning without clouds for brightness,  
(As) after rain the herbage from the earth."

Dr. Kennicott, who first brought to light the various reading, thus renders the words :

- Ver. 3. " The Just one ruleth among men,  
He ruleth by the fear of God !  
Ver. 4. As the light of the morning ariseth **JEHOVAH**  
A sun, without clouds, for brightness ;  
And as the grass from the earth after rain.  
Ver. 5. Verily thus is my house with God," &c.

Though no considerate man would build much on a passage so doubtful, we allow that the authority for inserting the word Jehovah is important, and we think that Dr. K.'s version (which we much prefer to our author's) gives a much clearer sense than we have seen derived from the common text ; but admitting this version, and admitting what is more doubtful, though we would not pretend positively to deny it, that the words are prophetic of the kingdom of the Messiah, the obvious and natural interpretation would be, not to regard **JEHOVAH** as a *name* given to the Messiah, but to consider the great events contemplated as the bright and glorious manifestation of his presence, the proofs of his fidelity to his covenant with David. It is found, then, that the passage is altogether very obscure ; that its application to the subject of the Messiah is not a little doubtful ; that its whole point in the controversy respecting the person of Christ, depends on an uncertain emendation of the text ; and that, admitting this, (which, as it is plausible, and seems

to clear the sense, we are willing to do, though without placing much reliance upon it,) still the words are naturally explained of God's display of his power and glory in the gospel; and the construction which makes "the just one" identical with JEHOVAH, is both needless and harsh—it is, indeed, absolutely inconsistent with the preceding and following clauses: "He ruleth *by the fear of God*"—"Thus is my house with God."

Sect. ix. Job xix. 23—27.

Dr. S.'s translation of this passage is very peculiar:

- Ver. 25. "I surely do know my REDEEMER, the LIVING ONE:  
And HE the LAST, will arise over the dust.  
Ver. 26. And after the disease has cut down my skin,  
Even from my flesh I shall see GOD."

It is represented as "a prophecy of the second coming of the only Redeemer and Judge of mankind," and as "unequivocally designating Him by the highest titles and attributes of Deity."

It may be sufficient for us to remark, that this passage is one of the most difficult in the Bible; that of the immense number of critics who have applied themselves particularly to the book of Job, scarcely any two agree respecting its sense, or at least respecting the mode of deriving the sense from the words; and that a large proportion, equal to any in learning and judgment, and many of them even in what is called orthodoxy of sentiment, have denied all reference of the words to a future state of existence; whilst amongst those who have contended for their application to this subject, our author stands almost alone in maintaining their direct application to the Messiah, interpreted so as to apply to him the titles and attributes of Deity. Unless, then, his version be so peculiarly clear and satisfactory, and established by such irresistible force of evidence, as to justify its decided preference to those of all his predecessors, no person of common sense will give the passage much weight in a controversy respecting the personal nature of one who appeared in the world so many ages after it was written.

Now, Dr. S. himself will hardly venture to deny that the words of the original may, with strict propriety, be rendered,

"For I know that my *deliverer* (or avenger) *liveth*,  
And that *hereafter* he will rise up over the dust," &c.:

where the epithets to which he attaches so much importance entirely disappear, and even if his version were admitted, the application to the Messiah would not, considering the connexion, be even probable. We should still agree with nearly all translators and commentators in supposing God himself to be referred to. We ourselves embrace with great confidence the opinion of those who maintain that Job here speaks only of a temporal deliverance, and that both the general object of the book and several remarkable passages in it, prove the author to have been ignorant of the doctrine of a future state: but whatever the reader may think on this point, we have made it evident that the application Dr. S. has made of the passage is utterly unfounded and indefensible.

Sect. x. Psalm ii.

"The last clause of the Psalm" (says Dr. Smith) "merits particular attention as demanding that TRUST and CONFIDENCE in the Messiah, which the general tenor of Scripture and many particular passages direct to be reposed only in the Almighty and Everlasting God. It is *religious* reliance that is required. If this powerful and victorious King were but a creature, such

confidence would be 'trusting in an arm of flesh,' and would mark 'a heart departing from the Lord.' But the *reason* upon which this confidence is called for is equally inapplicable to the idea of a mere creature. It is his *right* to the most absolute homage; it is his ability to bless; it is his *power* as shewn in the dreadful consequence of provoking his justice and incurring 'even but a little' of his righteous displeasure."—Scrip. Test., second edition, Vol. I. p. 307.

The last two verses of the Psalm are thus rendered by Dr. Smith :

11. " Serve Jehovah with reverence,  
And rejoice with trembling.
12. Do homage to the Son, lest he be angry  
And ye perish on the road;  
When his wrath is even for a moment kindled!  
Blessed are all who trust in HIM !"

Did it never occur to our author, that since "the general tenor of Scripture, and many particular passages direct (religious) trust and confidence to be reposed only in the Almighty and Everlasting God," it would be but reasonable to understand this passage in consistency with them, which may be done by a very obvious and altogether unobjectionable construction ?

" Do homage to the Son, lest He (*Jehovah*, referring to the preceding verse) be angry,  
And ye perish on the road (rather 'in your way');  
When His (*Jehovah's*) wrath is even for a moment kindled.  
Blessed are all who trust in *Him* (*Jehovah*)."

But, though all difficulty is even thus removed, we must not omit to observe that the original word, rendered by Dr. S. and most other translators, *Son*, and which truly has that meaning in the Chaldee dialect, cannot be proved to have it in pure Hebrew, but does signify *pure*, *sincere*, whence the words have been, with much probability of truth, translated, "Reverence sincerely," or, "offer sincere homage," "lest He be angry," &c., which makes the whole passage relate to God alone.

Another remark of Dr. S., that "the Messiah is clearly and plainly represented as an *existing* and *acting* person, at the time when the Psalm was written," is answered by observing, that there can be little doubt of the Psalm having had an immediate application to David himself, whatever secondary and prophetic reference to the reign of the Messiah may be found in it, and that, therefore, it must necessarily speak of the anointed king as living and acting, though not intending by that language to convey any extraordinary doctrine respecting the nature of a greater *Messiah* afterwards to be raised up, but already appointed in the Divine counsels.

Sect. xiii. Psa. xl. 6—10.

6. " Sacrifice and offering thou hast no delight in :  
Then a body thou hast prepared for me.  
Burnt-offering and sin-offering thou desirest not :
7. Then I said, Behold, I come !  
In the roll of the book it is written concerning me,
8. To execute thy pleasure, O God, I do delight," &c.

"The terms of the passage," says Dr. S., "appear to require absolutely the sense of the abrogation of animal sacrifices by a person who declares that the very book which described those sacrifices had its superior reference to him, and that he himself would present the only sacrifice that should be worthy of Deity to accept. I must despair of ever acquiring consistent know-



ledge, or satisfaction on any subject of rational inquiry ; I must give up the first principles of evidence as to prophecy and inspiration, and, renouncing all sober rules of interpretation, commit myself to the extravagance of fancy and arbitrary dictates,—if THIS be not a clear and characteristic description of the Messiah.”

Again,

“ That glorious Person is represented as, in a state of existence previous to his appearance among mortals, contemplating with supreme joy the designs of Divine benevolence, glowing with holy ardour to bear his part in the gracious plan, and ready to assume that human form, which in the appointed time would be prepared and adapted for this all-important design.”—Scrip. Test. Vol. I. p. 325, second edition.

We read with astonishment such confident assertions, resting on so very slight a foundation, and cannot repress the reflection, that the defenders of popular opinions could not attach much importance to passages like this, unless driven to them, by the entire absence of all really satisfactory evidence.

In the second clause of ver. 6, Dr. S. adopts the reading of the ancient Greek version, “ Then a body thou hast prepared for me,” chiefly because it has been so quoted in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The literal translation of the present Hebrew text is what is found in the Received Version : “ Mine ears thou hast opened.” There is no variation in the Hebrew MSS., and no ancient version, except those taken from the Greek, differs from the common reading ; for Dr. S.’s remark, that there exist MSS. of the very ancient Syriac Version, having the reading “ a body,” is of no importance, since these MSS., written by Christians, may have been corrected to the Epistle to the Hebrews, and there is no good reason to doubt the genuineness of the printed Syriac text, which follows the Hebrew reading. Independently, then, of the quotation in the Epistle to the Hebrews, no one would hesitate to prefer the reading of the present Hebrew copies. The Greek translation contains many strange blunders, and though of great interest and value, would not alone in a case of this kind be sufficient to shake our confidence in a reading which gives a good sense, and is supported by all other authorities. Many learned men suppose that the word “ body,” even in the Greek, is a later corruption, but for this we see no reason, as it has been shewn how, by mistaking a letter or two, they might have derived that sense from the Hebrew words, and it is not a solitary instance of their falling into such a mistake ; but no critic would hesitate (setting aside the Epistle to the Hebrews) to adhere to the received text in the Psalm. The question then is, whether the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who, as a Jew acquainted with the Greek language, would be familiar with the LXX. Greek translation, and disposed to quote from it, was protected by his inspiration from following any error that might be found in it, and does by his authority establish a reading which would otherwise be without hesitation rejected. Now, we do not know who was the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the ancient church differed greatly as to its value ; but granting it the highest authority, the writer quotes the passage from the Psalm, not as prophetic, but in the way of application, as a suitable mode of expressing his doctrine. That doctrine, we doubt not, he received on sufficient authority. Grant that he had it by direct personal inspiration, (which if Paul was the writer was true, and may have been true if it was written by others to whom it has been ascribed,) yet is it to be supposed, that he not only received the doc-

trine, but also the mode of expressing it, or that the light he had obtained respecting the meaning and purpose of the ancient Scriptures extended to the correction of every error in the version of those Scriptures with which he was familiar? We can neither find that such inspiration as this was pretended to, nor can we perceive its utility. The writer of the Epistle, teaching what he knew (probably by personal inspiration) to be genuine Christian doctrine, quoted the Psalm in the form in which it was familiar to him, using its words to express the sentiment he wished to convey. That sentiment is the abolition of the sacrifices of the law, of which the death of Christ, in obedience to the will of God, described as the offering "of his body," was the sign and seal. But we can find nothing resembling Dr. Smith's doctrine in the Epistle, and much less is it to be extracted from the Psalm, which indeed we can see no pretence for considering as at all prophetic. The following, we apprehend, to be a fair translation of the principal verses quoted, which we request the reader to compare with that which we have given from Dr. Smith:

- Ver. 6. "Sacrifice and meat-offering thou desirest not;  
 (My ears thou hast opened;) [i. e. thou hast made me willing to  
 attend to thy instructions]  
 Burnt-offering and sin-offering thou requirest not.
7. Then I said, 'Lo, I come; [I am ready to hear and obey thy  
 commands;]  
 In the roll of the book, it is prescribed to me,
8. 'To do what is acceptable to thee, O God, is my delight:  
 And thy law is within me.'"

WELLBELOVED'S *Bible*, Part VI.

Section xiv. Psalm xlv. 2—8. The important words are in ver. 6, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever!"

The Psalm is considered as a prophetic address to the Messiah, who is therefore here called God, and the use made of the words in Hebrews i. 8, "But to the Son (he saith), Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever," is regarded as establishing beyond all doubt the validity of this application. Some Unitarian expositors, as Mr. Belsham, adopt the translation, "God is thy throne," the support of thy throne, i. e. he will make thy dominion mighty and durable, which both the Hebrew of the Psalm and the Greek of the quotation in the Epistle will equally well bear, and which suits the connexion in both places: others suppose the word God to be here employed in an inferior sense. The prevailing and most probable opinion is, that the 45th Psalm was written on occasion of the marriage of Solomon with the daughter of the King of Egypt, and this opinion, as to its *primary* sense, is held by most of those who consider it as having a *secondary* reference to the Messiah and his kingdom, that is, by the great majority of Christian commentators. Some interpreters, indeed, of great learning, and whose opinions deserve much respect, have affirmed that the Psalm must be considered as primarily addressed to the Messiah, and is not properly applicable to Solomon or to any other person; but their chief arguments are drawn from the quotation in Heb. i. 8, (of which we shall speak presently,) and from the assumption of the point in dispute, that ver. 6 is an address to some individual as the Supreme God, whilst their application of other parts of the Psalm is figurative almost throughout, and in some instances extremely forced. The 9th and following verses may be explained *secondarily* of the church as the bride of the Messiah, but their direct and sole application in that sense is what the sober judgment of no unprejudiced reader can admit. The argu-

ment from the everlasting duration ascribed to the kingdom of the person addressed is of no weight, being a common oriental idiom : thus, for example, in Nathan's prophecy to David respecting Solomon, 1 Chron. xvii. 11—14 : " I will raise up thy seed after thee, which shall be of thy sons ; and I will stablish his kingdom. He shall build me an house, (plainly shewing that Solomon is the person spoken of,) and *I will stablish his throne FOR EVER*. I will be his father, and he shall be my son ; and I will not take my mercy away from him, as I took it from him that was before thee : but I will settle him in mine house and in my kingdom *for ever* ; and *his throne shall be established for evermore*." It is universally acknowledged that this magnificent, prophetic language was intended, and, according to the notions of the age and country, was well adapted, to express the promise of a long reign to Solomon, and of posterity to succeed him on his throne, but nothing more ; and we cannot but consider it as going far to justify the sense, " *God is thy throne, for ever and ever*," in the passage under our consideration, by shewing how peculiarly God had promised to establish and support the throne of the prince to whom that passage, beyond all reasonable doubt, immediately referred ; but supposing the common translation to be preferable, the use of the word *God*, in an inferior sense, is not unknown to Scripture, nor at variance with oriental idiom. It must be understood to mean (as Bishop Young has translated it) *prince*, and it is certain that what could with propriety be addressed to Solomon, could not be unsuitable to his great descendant, and could not possibly imply any thing inconsistent with the unrivalled *deity* and perfect *unity* of the Supreme Being ; indeed, any such abuse of the words is guarded against by the language of ver. 7 : " Therefore God, *thy God, hath anointed thee* with the oil of gladness above *thy fellows*," words which, if they have any meaning at all, ascribed to the person addressed *inferiority, derived and dependent authority, and equality of rank* with some *human beings*.

Referring to Mr. Belsham's statement, " It is well known that the words of the original will equally well bear to be translated *God is thy throne*"—a statement which, after due deliberation, we have ventured to adopt in the preceding remarks, Dr. S. says, " It is not quite consistent with fairness in argument, for the learned writer roundly to assert as *well known*, what he could not but know to be extremely disputable, and to have been in fact generally objected to." There is nothing so plain that it may not be disputed, and Mr. B. did not say or mean that nobody had denied what he asserted, but he certainly neither did think, nor ought in reason to have thought, it *extremely disputable*. He was safe in his assertion, 1st, because he was directly supported by the authority of Enjedenus and Crellius, Grotius,\* Dr. Samuel Clarke, Pierce, Sykes, J. G. Rosenmüller, and Wakefield,

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\* Dr. S. remarks, that Grotius " seems anxiously to avoid giving any *construction*, contenting himself with saying, " the *sense* is." Does Dr. S. then mean to insinuate that this great critic affirmed that to be the sense of a passage of Scripture which *he knew could not be derived from the words* ? Such seems to be his meaning, but such a charge neither needs nor deserves an answer. Grotius gives a reason why he thinks that the word " God" must, in this place, be understood of the Supreme Being himself, and adds, " Sensus ergo est : Deus ipse est sedes tua perpetua." He perceived no difficulty in this construction : he considered the original words as ambiguous, and not seeing reason to admit that Christ could be called God in the highest and proper sense ; having, besides, before observed that the Psalm primarily referred to Solomon, he thought the reason he had given for understanding the word God in its highest sense, a sufficient reason for not addressing it

not now to mention others, men certainly as competent to judge, and as little under the influence of prejudice, as any who have given an opinion on the subject; and 2dly, because, whilst the majority of commentators, adopting, in conformity with their own doctrinal views, the common construction, pass by this one without particular notice, those who have undertaken to give reasons against its grammatical propriety, have signally failed in their attempts.\*

Dr. S.'s objections to the propriety of the figure, "God is thy throne," seem to us to be either altogether unfounded, or at least greatly exaggerated. God is spoken of as a *rock*, a *tower*, a *fortress*, a *shield*, a *refuge*; and we do not find much truth in the remark, that the protection or aid implied in these terms has more dignity than that implied in calling him the throne, i. e. some emblem of dominion of a creature. If we consider that the word *throne* is not to be understood literally as a seat, but stands for the sovereign power and dignity of which it is the symbol, and compare the passage with Numb. xviii. 20, where God says to the house of Aaron, "I am *thy part* and *thy inheritance*," I will provide for thee a suitable maintenance; Psal. xvi. 5, "Jehovah is the portion of mine inheritance and of my cup," he allots to me and secures to me my portion; Psal. lxxiii. 26, "*God is my portion* for ever," he will provide for me, and to him I look for comfort; we cannot but perceive that to describe God as a throne, meaning the Giver and Upholder of its glory and dominion, is not inconsistent with the poetical style of the ancient Hebrews, and by no means deserves to be spoken of as irreverent, or as indicating the want of all correct feeling.

We do not decide in favour of Mr. Belsham's interpretation; we are in much doubt on the subject, and rather incline to favour the common translation, understanding "God" in the sense of "mighty prince;" but we have no doubt of the original words fully admitting the sense ascribed to them by Mr. B. and so many distinguished interpreters of Scripture: we think there is good reason for the inquiring mind to pause and hesitate between two highly probable explanations, and it only appears to us *certain* that the Psalm must have been originally an epithalamium addressed to some prince, (who is determined, with great probability, to have been Solomon,) and consequently that the words under consideration could not possibly have been designed to ascribe deity to the person addressed.

We proceed to consider the true character and intent of the quotation in

as a title to a created being. Dr. S. would, in like manner, detract from the value of the opinions on this point of Enjedin, Clarke, and Pierce: the former only says "the words will admit of this explication:" possunt sic commodè explicari. And this, we answer, is all that is wanted, as no one denies that they *may* be taken according to the other construction. Clarke, in a book written after his *Scripture Doctrine*, "follows the commonly-received construction;" but he does not retract his opinion that the other is perfectly allowable. Pierce only affirms, in a note, that it is *doubtful* which construction is preferable—i. e. precisely the sentiment for which he is quoted.

\* The ambiguity of the Hebrew cannot be denied: the objection to rendering the Greek words, "God is thy throne," is taken from the article being found in the predicate of the proposition; but though not of common occurrence, there are exceptions to the ordinary practice in this respect, and Mr. Yates, in his *Vindication of Unitarianism*, (p. 113,) has produced an instance of a precisely similar construction, which sufficiently justifies that translation:

Psal. lxxiii. 26: Ἡ μερίς μου ὁ Θεὸς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.

Psal. xlv. 6; Heb. i. 8: Ὁ θρόνος σου ὁ Θεὸς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.

the Epistle to the Hebrews, and our remarks will extend to the two passages which form the subjects of Dr. S.'s fifteenth and seventeenth sections, which are applied to the Messiah solely on the authority of the author of the Epistle.

Whoever was its author, which must probably always remain a matter of extreme uncertainty, there can be no doubt that this Epistle was written by a sincere and pious Christian before the destruction of Jerusalem; and from the general diffusion of miraculous gifts in that first period of the church, and his having been a person of sufficient importance to offer advice to others, we see no reason to doubt that he was one who had experienced personal divine communications, or displayed supernatural powers. What he wrote, then, cannot but be read by us with interest and respect, as being sure to contain just views of Christian doctrine, and valuable instructions which we may all apply to our own improvement. But we know not upon what authority any one can affirm that he made, or was entitled to make, any pretensions to divine guidance *as a writer*, and we think there is scarcely any portion of the sacred volume which requires to be read with more caution, lest we should pervert the meaning of the author through ignorance of the circumstances under which he wrote, and the customs or opinions of the age, and of the people whom he addressed. We are not bound always to assume, nor can we in all cases consistently with our own reason and knowledge admit, the soundness of the *arguments* employed even by writers to whose authority, as religious instructors, we implicitly defer, and this distinction has been often pointed out by learned and judicious divines. Thus Bishop Burnet :

“When divine writers argue upon any point, we are always bound to believe the conclusions that their reasonings end in, as parts of divine revelation; but we are not bound to be able to make out, or even to assent to, all the premises made use of by them in their whole extent; unless it appears plainly that they affirm the premises expressly as they do the conclusions proved by them.”

And Paley,

“In reading the apostolic writings we should carefully distinguish between their *doctrines* and their *arguments*. Their doctrines came to them by revelation, properly so called; yet in propounding these doctrines in their writings or discourses, they were wont to illustrate, support, and enforce them by such analogies, arguments, and considerations, as their own thoughts suggested.”

Again,

“St. Paul, I am apt to believe, has been sometimes accused of inconclusive reasoning, by our mistaking that for reasoning which was only intended for illustration. He is not to be read as a man whose own persuasion of the truth of what he taught always or solely depended on the views under which he represents it in his writings. Taking for granted the certainty of his doctrine as resting upon the revelation that had been imparted to him, he exhibits it *frequently* to the conceptions of his readers under images and *allegories*, in which if an *analogy* may be perceived, or even sometimes a *poetic resemblance* be found, it is all, perhaps, that is required.”

Now, there is no part of the New Testament where considerations such as these are so much required as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and there is no subject which demands more caution and care, if we wish not to be greatly misled, and to pervert the authorities to which we appeal, than the use made of passages from the Old Testament. The Jews, in our Lord's

time, considered the greatest part of their Scriptures as applicable in a secondary and mystical sense to their expected Messiah. The Christian writers often argued with them from their own concessions, or illustrated and recommended what they taught by expressing it in the words of the Old Testament. The Epistle to the Hebrews is altogether an attempt to render the gospel interesting to Jews by an application to its truths (much in the manner of the applications of Scripture which are now so common among most sects) of the words of the ancient sacred books, and by finding analogies between them and the principles or ceremonies of the law.

In this light it has been considered by some of the most distinguished theologians, and thus only it appears to us that we can obtain an intelligible and rational view of its character and purpose.

“Long before our Saviour’s time,” says Dr. Hey, late Norrisian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, “it seems probable that the Jews had some sort of traditions; traditional narratives, prophecies, or modes of interpreting prophecies; modes of arranging, construing, and applying the Psalms, and other parts of Holy Writ; methods of *allegorizing*; all these our Saviour and his apostles seem to have so far *adopted* as to *make use of them* in reasoning with the Jews.”

Le Clerc, in his edition of Hammond’s Paraphrase and Notes, says, (Heb. ix. 16,)

“All the principles of Christian doctrine which the author of this Epistle defends, are most true, and may be proved from other parts of Scripture; but the method by which he illustrates them, is manifestly conformed to the custom of those times, as we see it in Philo, whose works abound in this sort of accommodations of passages of Scripture, and in reasonings derived from them, in which there is no regard paid to the grammatical sense, nor is any thing else attended to but the truth of the principle thus illustrated.”

This passage is quoted with approbation by Rosenmüller; the same principle is defended by Sykes; and Paley’s opinion may be gathered from what he says of the epistle of Barnabas:

“It is in its subject, and general composition, *much like the Epistle to the Hebrews; an allegorical application* of divers passages of the Jewish history, of their law and ritual, to those parts of the Christian dispensation *in which the author perceived a resemblance.*”—(Evidences of Christianity, B. iii. Ch. v.)

But although we do not admit the Epistle to the Hebrews as an authority with respect to the original sense or prophetic character of the portions of ancient Scripture which it quotes, it should still, according to the principles we have laid down, be authoritative in favour of the Christian doctrines which *by means of these quotations* it conveys, and if it applies unreservedly to Christ the names God and Lord, (representing *Jehovah*,) there is at least the testimony of the Christian writer, if not of the passages from the Old Testament, to the deity of our Saviour. This is readily granted: but the very means which the writer employed to attract and conciliate those whom he immediately addressed have thrown such obscurity over his style that, perhaps unavoidably, we, in these distant times, are influenced in our mode of understanding him by the opinions we have formed on the great subjects of Christian doctrine from the study of other parts of Scripture. We have endeavoured to the utmost of our power to divest ourselves of prejudice, and to consider what is the most natural, consistent, and suitable sense: we are ourselves well satisfied that we have chosen the right interpretation, but we have little hope of convincing those who come to the subject impressed with

a firm belief of doctrines which we do not find in Scripture, but which the ambiguity of some of the language here employed may naturally enough seem to them to favour.

The first proposition of the writer seems to be the superiority of Christ's office to that of all previous messengers of God's will to his creatures, which he illustrates by fanciful applications of passages from the Old Testament, availing himself for this purpose of the double meaning of the word "*angel*," sometimes applied to *human*, sometimes to spiritual messengers; sometimes to the elements executing the purposes of the Almighty; sometimes to an order of superior intelligences ever ready to fulfil his commands. We shall give what we apprehend to be the sense of the passage (ch i. 4—14) which contains the quotations now under our consideration. "Being made so much better than those messengers," (the prophets by whom God had previously spoken,) "inasmuch as he hath by inheritance obtained" (acquired, as belonging naturally to his office) "a more excellent name than they" (they being only called messengers or servants, his superiority being marked by the name of *Son*). "For unto which of those messengers, said he, at any time, 'Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee?' And again, 'I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a Son.'"—(An appeal to the prevalent Jewish opinion that these words, taken from Ps. ii. and 2 Sam. vii. 14, were applicable in their highest sense to the Messiah, an opinion which, so far as relates to the last-mentioned passage, we can have no difficulty in pronouncing to be erroneous.) "And when he introduces again the first-begotten into the world," (a reference to the resurrection,) "he saith, 'Let all the angels of God worship him'" (rather, "do homage to him.") It is somewhat doubtful whence these words are taken. Dr. S. considers them as a loose quotation from Ps. xcvi. 7. "The difference of the words," he says, "is immaterial to the sense, and is not greater than occurs in some instances of passages from the Old Testament introduced into the New." It is possible he may be right. The literal translation from the Hebrew in that passage is, "Worship him, all ye *Gods*;" but the LXX. render it *αγγελοι*, *angels*. It is not certain whether the original here intends by "*Gods*," *princes*, *magistrates*, or *prophets*; but there is little reason to suppose that it can mean *angels* in our sense of that word. Whoever they are, it is clear that they are called upon to praise Jehovah, and there is no pretence for supposing any reference of the Psalm to the Messiah; nor will the opinion of certain Jews, at a period when they were disposed to refer every thing in their Scriptures to this expected prince, and which applies equally to all the neighbouring Psalms, be thought of much importance. Our author's attempt to explain the *introduction* of the *first-begotten into the world*, as implied in the Psalm, is, we should think, too far-fetched and fanciful to satisfy even those who are most willing to be led by him. But it is upon the whole the most probable supposition, adopted by Mr. Belsham after Sykes, that the words in the Epistle are taken from the LXX. version of Deut. xxxii. 43, where they are found exactly, though there is nothing corresponding in the purest Hebrew copies, or in the other ancient versions; and if we suppose the clause not to be genuine as a part of the passage in Deuteronomy, that is no reason why it may not have been quoted and applied by the author of the epistle, finding it, as we have no reason to doubt that he did, in his Greek copy, from whence he has drawn all his quotations.\*

\* Dr. Smith thinks "its variations in the different MSS. of the LXX. itself afford a presumption against its genuineness" (i. e. as a part of the original LXX.). May

Mr. Belsham agrees with Dr. Sykes in supposing that the *homage from all the messengers of God*, is, in the passage of Deut., required to be paid to the *chosen people*, whose father God is called in this very chapter, and who are elsewhere in the book of Exodus collectively spoken of as God's *first-born son*; that the *introducing again into the world* is the restoration of their prosperity after their afflictions, which is the subject of this part of the Song of Moses, and that the application of the words to the resurrection of Christ is an accommodation. Our doubt is, whether the writer of the epistle makes any reference at all to the original connexion of the words he quotes. He may mean merely, that by the resurrection of Christ he was so gloriously exalted, that those words of Scripture might well be applied to him, "Let all the messengers of God do homage to him." When he introduceth again the first-begotten (from the dead) into the world, he saith, the Scripture saith, i. e. we may apply the words of Scripture, "Let all the messengers of God do homage to him"). "And concerning these messengers *the Scripture* saith, 'Who maketh his messengers winds, and his ministers a flame of fire.'" (It represents them as mere servants fulfilling his commands, like the winds and the lightning. The quotation is from the LXX. version of the 104th Ps. The proper translation of the Hebrew seems to be, "who maketh the winds his messengers, and flames of fire, i. e. lightnings, his servants." The author of the epistle means no more than that the condition of previous messengers, as compared with that of the Son, might be expressed in these words of Scripture.) "But concerning the Son it saith, 'Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever,'" &c., (whichever construction of the words we adopt, the person referred to is spoken of as of exalted rank, and as distinguished by the favour of his God, treated not as a servant, but with distinguished honour, the passage being reputed among the Jews as a prophecy of the Messiah, and capable of being really so understood, though originally applied to Solomon, was the more to the writer's purpose,) "and 'Thou, Lord, in the beginning, hast laid the foundations of the earth,'" &c. (The 102nd Ps., from which this passage is taken, cannot, without extreme violence, be considered as applicable to Christ, and no authority possessed by the writer of this epistle could cause those who are not blinded by prejudice to understand it so. Some have supposed the words to be by accommodation employed to express, still more strongly than the preceding quotation had done, the permanence and glory of Christ's kingdom, and to ascribe to him a new and moral creation; but this is forced; and besides it is very unlikely, as Mr. Belsham justly observes, that any writer, addressing himself to Jews, should "presume to hold that language concerning a prophet, however dignified, which, in their sacred writings, was uniformly appropriated to the Deity." Much more probable is the interpretation of Emlyn and others, that "the immutability of God is here declared as a pledge of the immutability of the kingdom of Christ." "The God last mentioned," says Emlyn, "was Christ's God, who had anointed him; and the *author* thereupon, addressing himself to this God, breaks out into the celebration of his *power*, and especially his *unchangeable duration*; which he dwells upon as what he principally cites the

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it not be more justly said, looking at Dr. S.'s own comparison of the present Hebrew with the Aldine, Vatican, and Alexandrine editions of the LXX., that the parallelism between the two first sentences, one of which is retained in the Hebrew, the other in the Aldine Greek, is favourable to the genuineness of both, the same sort of parallelism being found in the following clauses, and that the difference between the Vatican and Alexandrine—"be strong in him"—"strengthen them," proves the existence of an original in another language, of which both these are translations?



text for; in order, I conceive, to prove the stability of the Son's kingdom before spoken of."—Emlyn's Works, Vol. II. p. 340. This deserves attention, but we are disposed to think that this passage should rather be connected with what follows than with what precedes it. The writer quotes a remarkable declaration of the power, majesty, and immutability of God, and then argues in confirmation of what he had before said, that this great Being condescended to place the Son at his right hand, to exalt him and cause him to triumph, whilst other messengers were but ministers of his will for the service of those who were "to become heirs of salvation,"—to be admitted to enjoy the blessings of the Gospel.) "But to which of those messengers, said he, at any time, 'Sit thou on my right hand till I make thine enemies thy footstool'?" (Applying a clause from the 2nd Ps., which, though originally relating to David, was believed to have a secondary application to the Messiah.) "Are not they all ministering spirits" (probably *ministering winds*—servants swift as winds, in allusion to ver. 7) "sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?"

We have given what we consider as the most consistent and satisfactory interpretation of the passage: respecting the author's mode of quoting and applying texts from the Old Testament, we feel no hesitation. With somewhat less confidence, though upon the whole with a feeling that the evidence for it decidedly preponderates, we follow Wakefield, Simson, and Belsham, in explaining "angels" as here meaning the ancient prophets. Dr. S.'s objection to this, from the change in the sense of the word in ch. ii. 5, we do not think of much weight as regards such a writer as the author of this epistle; but the comparison of Heb. ii. 2, with Gal. iii. 19, and (which reference he omits) Acts vii. 53, if those passages are to be understood according to the general opinion of commentators, apparently supported by Jewish traditions, is much more to the purpose; and as we have doubts on the subject, we request our readers to observe, that admitting, throughout, the translation "angels," and understanding the passage to affirm the superiority of Christ to spiritual beings employed in accomplishing the Divine purposes under the former dispensations, it is still the superiority of Christ's *office*, and the dignity to which God *has exalted him*, which are spoken of, and no inference can be thence fairly drawn respecting his nature.

Undoubtedly, if the New Testament distinctly teaches the Deity of Christ, the allusions of the writer to the Hebrews will be understood as confirming that doctrine. But the present question is, whether the doctrine is taught in the Old Testament, and what we hope we have proved is, that the passages treated of in Dr. S.'s xvth, xvth, and xvth sections, neither in themselves appear to teach it, nor are proved to contain it by the use made of them in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The xvth section is on Ps. cx., usually regarded as prophetic of the Messiah, and quoted by our Lord himself, to confound the Jews by the acknowledgment here made by David of his superiority. We cannot, however, perceive that this Psalm contains any thing which exalts the Messiah in any other sense than as all Christians believe that he is exalted. That, although the descendant of David, he was much greater than David, and might properly in prophetic vision be called by him Lord, and be represented as *his superior, his sovereign*, is universally acknowledged. Even the Jews would not have denied this. But the difficulty proposed was, how could David address, as his Lord, one not then existing, his own descendant in distant times? The Jews had no answer ready; the Orthodox now answer, because Christ, being God, then existed in heaven, as was well known to David.

In opposition to them is Mr. Belsham's judicious note : "The proper answer seems to be, that the Psalmist was transported in vision to the age of the Messiah, and speaks as though he were contemporary with Christ. This mode of writing was not unusual with the prophets." The Calm Inquirer's note does not then "proceed on a wrong assumption of the point under consideration," but is a solid answer to the argument usually drawn from our Lord's question in favour of his superiority of nature, and we do not see that Dr. Smith has made the case any stronger. The priesthood, according to the order of Melchisedek, of course refers to the office and work, not to the nature of the Messiah, and as explained by the writer to the Hebrews, implies nothing which Unitarians do not fully believe. It only remains for us to notice Dr. Smith's gloss on the fifth verse of the Psalm :

"The Lord (Adonai, which he afterwards observes is 'the name appropriated to the living and true God') is on thy right hand : (the address is now turned to Jehovah :) He smiteth kings in the day of his wrath," &c.

He would have us understand, that "the Lord" here is the same person spoken of by the Psalmist as "my Lord" in ver. 1st, and that he is here distinguished by a name peculiarly appropriated to the Supreme God. The reason, we presume, for this construction is, that "the Lord" is here said to be "on the right hand ;" whereas in the first verse we find "Jehovah said to my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand." "The Lord," therefore, in the second place, must signify the same person who was before placed at God's right hand, and the words addressed to Jehovah who called him there.

In opposition to this we observe, that as the whole of the rest of the Psalm (and manifestly both the preceding and following clauses) is addressed to the great personage who is its subject, it is most unreasonable and unnatural to suppose these few words to be differently addressed, and there is no occasion, as we have elsewhere the very expression here employed of GOD *being at the right hand of those whom he favoured*, and it is a different phrase from that in the first verse. Ps. xvi. 8 : "Because he (Jehovah) *is at my right hand*, I shall not be moved." Ps. cix. 31 : "He (Jehovah) shall *stand at the right hand* of the poor, to save him from those that condemn his soul." It is then evident, that ver. 5 is not addressed to Jehovah, but speaks of him as supporting that great personage whose exaltation had been described ; and to put this beyond doubt, the fact is, that for *Adonai*, a great many MSS. have *Jehovah*, which there is every reason to believe to be the true reading, and which is adopted by Dathe.

Section xviii. Isa. vi. 1—5. This passage relates a vision of Isaiah, by means of which he was commissioned to the prophetic office, and which consisted in a visible manifestation of the Divine presence, so that he said (ver. 5), "Mine eyes have seen the King, Jehovah of hosts." In John xii. 41, after quoting two passages from Isaiah, the last of them, respecting the obstinacy of the Jews in rejecting Christ, taken from this chapter, the Apostle writes, "These things said Isaiah when he saw his glory and spake of him," the person spoken of being apparently Christ, whence it has been concluded that Christ was Jehovah. The argument is generally employed by the defenders of the deity of Christ, and has been variously replied to by different Unitarian writers. The truth is, that if we believe on other grounds in the identity of Christ with Jehovah, this passage will appear to us to confirm that opinion, but a reference of this kind, which might so naturally and easily have been made without intending to teach such a doctrine, will never convince any one who finds that doctrine repugnant to the general tenor of

Scripture. Dr. S. speaks severely of the Unitarian interpretations, as “invented in order to serve a system,” “evasive, arbitrary, incongruous, and inadequate to the intention.” The first charge means that a full conviction, arising from the careful study of other parts of Scripture, that Christ and Jehovah were distinct beings, disposed the minds of Unitarian commentators to seek and accept a sense of the words, not implying their identity: which may be true, but is far from being a reproach to them, or an objection to the interpretation. The other charges are no more than unsupported assertions expressing the *feeling* of a writer on one side of the question. We quote an expression of feeling on the other side, from the note on Isa. vi., of the learned and excellent Michael Dodson. He gives the words of Bishops Lowth and Pearce, affirming Christ to be called Jehovah, and goes on thus:

“How absurd! Is Christ, who suffered death on the cross, the king **JEHOVAH**, God of hosts? Did the seraphims address themselves to him when they cried, saying,

Holy, holy, holy **JEHOVAH**, God of hosts!  
The whole earth is full of his glory!

“It is wonderful, indeed, that such learned and good men should have satisfied themselves in shutting their eyes against the clearest light; and in thus offering to the world an interpretation which they must have known to be liable to great objections. How easy and natural is the interpretation of John vii. 41, given by Dr. Clarke, in his ‘Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity!’”

He then gives the passage from Clarke, whom Unitarians in general follow:

“The true meaning is; when Esaias saw the glory of God the Father revealing to him the coming of Christ, he then saw the glory of him who was to come in the glory his Father (Matt. xvi. 27). Esaias, in beholding the glory of God, and in receiving from him a revelation of the coming of Christ, saw, (i. e. foresaw) the glory of Christ, just as Abraham saw (that is, foresaw) his day, and was glad.”—Clarke’s Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, No. 597.

The reader will find some valuable observations in Dr. Carpenter’s Unitarianism the Doctrine of the Gospel, third edition, p. 133. It is highly probable that the words, “these things said Isaiah,” refer to the passage quoted from Isa. liii. The dogmatism of Dr. Smith admits of no reply. The impartial inquirer will probably consider this as one of those passages, the just interpretation of which must be determined by our convictions as to the general tenor of Scripture, and which is too ambiguous to be safely appealed to as a *proof* of any doctrine respecting our Lord’s person.

On Dr. S.’s sixth section (Isaiah vii. 14) we need make no remark, as he himself maintains, that, most probably, the original Hebrew word does not necessarily denote virginity, but might be applied to a young woman lately married; “that the definitive appellation, ‘the Virgin,’ was at the moment applied to a known individual, who, at the proper time afterwards, became the mother of a distinguished child;” and that the name Emanuel is a “*commemorative and descriptive* title. It does not appear to have been intended as a proper name.” “In what I suppose,” he says, “to have been the primary and inferior reference, it would express no more than that, in the existing distresses of Judea and Jerusalem, God would be **WITH THEM** as their Almighty protector.”

In this sense, no doubt, whether originally prophetic of him or not, it is

applicable to the Messiah, and therefore, in denying any inference from it as to the divinity of his person, we are justified by Dr. S. himself.

The argument in the xxth section (on Isa. viii. 13, 14) is most extraordinary :

“ The evident design of this passage is to point out the True and Eternal God as the author of safety and deliverance from imminent danger ; that it is the duty of men to honour him and rely upon him in this capacity ; and that those who refuse to do so will be the objects of his awful displeasure, involved by their own unbelief and disobedience in the more terrible ruin. The middle clauses are introduced by the Apostles Peter and Paul, (Rom. ix. 33, 1 Pet. ii. 8,) with an explicit application to Christ. There is also a conformity of sentiment well worthy of being observed, with other declarations of the New Testament, on the opposite effects of obedient dependence on Jesus as the only Saviour and rejection of him.”—Vide Luke ii. 34 ; 1 Cor. i. 23.

Hence Dr. S. infers that Christ must have been the Jehovah who was to be the object of confidence and reverence to his people.

Isa. viii. 13, as he renders the words,

“ To Jehovah of hosts himself, pay holy homage,  
Even him your fear, and him your dread.”

The fact is, that the passage in Rom. ix. 33, is a mixed quotation, and merely in the way of accommodation, from this place and Isa. xxviii. 16 ; the form and chief substance being taken from the latter, but the expression “ stumbling-stone and rock of offence ” derived from this. 1 Pet. ii. 6 is a quotation of Isa. xxviii. 16, and vers. 7 and 8 contain an imperfect quotation of the words in this place mixed with Psa. cxviii. 22, and evidently only accommodated. The other passages referred to merely contain similar figurative language, which may have been suggested by what is here said, but will not afford the slightest ground for supposing that the subjects must be the same. In Isa. xxviii. 16, to which alone there is the appearance of appealing as an authority in the texts referred to, it is Jehovah who *lays the stone*, and consequently the person so designated must be distinct from, and inferior to, him.

We now come to a very important passage generally quoted by writers in defence of the deity of Christ, and upon which the advocates of Unitarianism have also frequently expressed their views, so that we may confine ourselves to a few remarks on our author’s mode of treating it. Section xxi. Isa. ix. 5, 6 :

“ For a child is born to us :

A son is given to us :

And the sovereignty is upon his shoulder ;

And his name is called Wonderful, Counsellor,

God the mighty, Everlasting, Prince of peace :

To the extent of [his] sovereignty and to [his] peace [shall be] no end,

Upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom,

To fix it and to establish it, in judgment and in righteousness

From henceforth and for ever.”

The important points are the epithets “ God the mighty ” and “ Everlasting.” Now we observe, that though Rosenmüller *interprets* the word as meaning GOD, he gives, even in his second edition, *fortis* as the proper sense of לָא, (which seems to have been the way it was understood by Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion,) noting also that the term is applied to Nebuchadnezzar (Ezek. xxxi. 11) ; and Gesenius, as well as Bauer, trans-

lates אל-גבור "strong hero," for which Dr. S. acknowledges that he has given a *weighty reason*, though *he* thinks it is *outweighed* by another consideration. But even not to press the argument from the use of the very same words in the plural אלי גבורים for *mighty heroes* (Ezek. xxxii. 21), and admitting that the form אל, when not used collectively, was appropriated to express deity, yet as its primitive meaning is the *mighty one* or the *ruler*, and it is not a peculiar name of the true and only God, there would be nothing at all surprising in its being used in poetry as an epithet of a mighty prince, whose power and greatness the writer was prophetically celebrating. Rosenmüller gives the following extract from the letter of a Persian king of a later age: "Chosroes, king of kings, sovereign of potentates, lord of the nations, *prince of peace*, saviour of men, in the estimation of gods a man, good, *eternal*; in the estimation of men a *god*, most illustrious, most glorious; conqueror rising with the sun, and lending his eyes to the night." We may here make allowance, in the spirit of Rosenmüller's caution, for some progress of the fashion of employing such appellations, and yet find enough to justify our interpreting all the titles in the text under consideration as fit to be applied to a royal and distinguished personage, without any reference to a nature different from that of other men, and this without altering the present Hebrew text or the generally-received construction of the words.

Where Dr. S. has the epithet "Everlasting," there are in the Hebrew two words which may be literally rendered "father of the age to come," as they are by the LXX. He maintains, indeed, that עד signifies "eternity;" but this he cannot establish by any good evidence.

"Enjedin," says our author, speaking of the manner in which different interpreters have treated this text, "*observes deep silence on this whole passage.*" Truly he does so: to him Dr. S. might without any want of candour have attributed in this instance "the silence of death," (Scrip. Test. p. 185, second edit. and our remarks on that place,) as it is well known that his work (which is posthumous) only wanted for its completion notes on the Prophets, when death interrupted his labours. Dr. S. might have perceived that not this text in particular, but all the prophetic books are passed by in his notes, or he might have read in the dedication, "Imperfectum quidem opus. Quoniam absolutâ locorum Novi Testamenti, ex quibus Trinitatis dogma extruitur explicacione, cum Vetus Testamentum aggressus eo usque processisset, ut solummodo prophetæ restarent, in medio opere ceu servus fidelis et vigilans, a Deo ad lætiora est avocatus, et antequam cursum absolvisset bravo donatus;"\* but he wished it to appear that Enjedin was unable by any contrivance to evade the force of the passage, and he did not seek far for any other way of explaining his silence.†

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\* "An imperfect work indeed. For, when, having completed the explanation of those passages of the New Testament from which the doctrine of the Trinity is derived, he had applied himself to the Old Testament, and had proceeded so far that only the *prophets* remained, in the midst of his labours, being found like a faithful and watchful servant, he was called away by God to a happier state, and before he had finished the course, received the prize of victory."—Enjedini, Explicaciones locorum, Epistola dedicatoria.

† With respect to the primary or, perhaps, entire reference of the passage to Hezekiah, the admission of which would put an end at once to any argument from it respecting the nature of Christ, we would refer to the papers by the Rev. Robert Wallace, of Chesterfield, in the Monthly Repository, (Old Series,) Vol. XIX. for 1824. This gentleman maintains, with much force of argument, that the prophecy was fulfilled in Hezekiah.

Section xxiii. Isaiah xl. 1—3, 9—11. What God, the Lord Jehovah, is said to do in this passage is attributed by our author to Christ, because what is said of *preparing a way for* JEHOVAH, is in the New Testament applied to John, the forerunner of our Lord. Matt. iii. 3; John i. 23; Luke i. 76, 16:

“To rebut this conclusion,” (viz. that the Messiah is the Lord Jehovah,) says Dr. S., “it is asserted that ‘John was the forerunner of the Lord their God, by being the forerunner of Jesus, the great messenger of God to mankind.’ It must be confessed that this interpretation is not destitute of apparent reasons, but after weighing the arguments on each side, I acknowledge that the evidence in favour of the other interpretation seems to me to preponderate.”

It would seem, then, that in this instance Dr. S. does not consider his own case *very* strong, and as he acknowledges that the prophecy in its primary sense predicted “the deliverance of the sons of Judah from their mournful slavery in Chaldæa,” consequently that it was, so far as concerned that primary sense, “fulfilled in a series of providential occurrences, without any thing properly miraculous,” it is truly extraordinary that he should not consider the manifestations of Divine power and goodness in the miracles and doctrines of Christ as a sufficient accomplishment, without looking for any reference to his person. The attempt to argue from our Lord’s application to himself of the same image of the *good Shepherd*, which the prophet employs to represent the care of Jehovah for his chosen people, is strange, and can hardly need refutation.

“Moses and David in the sacred writings,” says our author, “and other chieftains in the oldest records of Gentile language and manners, are called the *shepherds* of their people. But it is to the *distinguishing* and exalted manner in which this appellation and its attributes are given to Christ, that the attention of the serious reader is invited.”

Our Lord applies the image somewhat particularly, beautifully representing it by means of his dying for the good of mankind, and hinting at the call of the Gentiles, (“other sheep I have, which are not of this fold, them also I must bring,”) as well as indicating the grand doctrine which he came to reveal in the words, “I give unto them eternal life.” But Cyrus and the Jewish princes and rulers, as well as Moses and David, are compared to shepherds in the Old Testament, and the case of the bad as well as of the good shepherd is minutely applied, nor could any image be more natural. Any thing *distinguishing* and *exalted* in the manner in which the appellation is given to Christ, either belongs of necessity to the character of his mission or exists only in our author’s fancy. His own note, where he suggests as a possible objection, “that our Lord follows up this style of sovereignty with expressions of subordination and dependency,” is a sufficient answer to him; for the remark respecting *official* subordination united with the possession of “*Divine* dignity and power,” if it were not a mere quibble, would at least be in its application to the present purpose a gross *petitio principii*. What might we not prove if the use of the same image in two instances were to be taken as a sign of the identity of the subjects!

Section xxv. Isa. xlv. 21—25. The pretence for supposing this passage to relate to Christ, and hence that he is called *Jehovah, God, the Righteous, the Saviour*, is thus stated by Dr. S.:

“To urge the consideration that ‘we shall all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ,’ the Apostle Paul undeniably cites and argues from this pas-

sage; 'It is written, *As I live saith the Lord, unto me every knee shall bow; and every tongue shall render acknowledgment to God; so then every one of us shall give account of himself to God.*' (Rom. xiv. 4.) That here is an intended application of the passage to Christ is at least corroborated by another reference of the Apostle, '*That in the name of Jesus every knee may bow, of beings in heaven and on the earth and under the earth, and that every tongue may acknowledge that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father.*'" (Phil. ii. 10, 11.)

From Dr. S.'s own pages we take the sufficient answer to this argument, and we should have no fear, without saying a word more, of leaving the matter "to the reflecting and candid reader."

"The interpretation proposed by Faustus Socinus, and generally adopted by his followers, is perspicuously stated by Dr. Priestley. 'The judgment-seat of Christ, and that of God, are the same, not because Christ is God, but because he acts in the name and by the authority of God, which is fully expressed when it is said, that God will judge all the world by Jesus Christ; so that being judged by Christ and by God is in effect the same thing.' (Priestley's Notes on Scripture, Vol. IV. p. 330.) By this gratuitous assertion the difficulty is evaded; but whether it is not advanced to serve the purpose, whether it is not far-fetched, while the other sense is near and obvious, and whether it duly comports with the terms and scope of the passage, and with the argument of the citation—the reflecting and candid reader will judge."

The Scriptures speak in some places of God judging the world, in others, of our all appearing before the judgment-seat of Christ, and again of God judging the world *by that man whom he hath ordained*. Passages of the latter kind, preventing the possibility of the two former being taken as proving the identity of God and Christ, leave us no alternative but to say that "the judgment of Christ and of God are the same, because Christ acts in the name and by the authority of God." Yet this is called a *gratuitous* assertion. The explanation, it seems, is advanced *to serve a purpose*: the same *may be said* of every explanation as easily, and of none with more appearance of justice than of those contained in Dr. S.'s volume: it is an accusation of prejudice (for we will not suppose that artifice is insinuated)—prejudice, from which every one thinks himself free, and which each attributes to his opponent. *Far-fetched* often has reference only to the established associations of the person using the term, as *obvious* may only signify what readily occurs to him, having his mind preoccupied with a theory. It is clear that no one would have applied the original passage to our Lord, but for the Apostle's quotation: let us inquire then what was *his* meaning. He is urging those whom he addresses not to indulge in mutual censures, from the consideration of the future judgment to which they would all equally be called, and for which it would become them better to prepare, "since we must all present ourselves before the tribunal of Christ; for it is written, *As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall acknowledge God.* So then every one of us must give an account of himself to God." The Apostle quotes the words of the prophet as declaring that all should be judged. To shew that the judgment of God and of Christ are the same, is necessary to the sense of the passage: this is done satisfactorily by observing that God judges *through Christ*; it is not done satisfactorily by affirming that Christ is God, because that assertion is inconsistent with the declaration that "God will judge the world *by that man whom he hath appointed.*" But has Dr. S. never noticed, or does he regard as insignificant, a various reading in Rom. xiv. 10, where, for "we

shall all stand before the judgment-seat of *Christ*," a not inconsiderable number of copies read—"of *God*:" which, if admitted, would at once put an end to his argument? We are hardly prepared, as Mr. Belsham has done in his Translation of the Epistles, to introduce this reading into the text, but we cannot do less than pronounce it very probably true, and there ought to be little importance attached to an argument which rests on the correctness of *one* of two readings in so very doubtful a case. Our interpretation of Paul's meaning suits equally well to either.\*

The next Section (numbered, like the preceding, xxv. by an error continued from the first edition) relates to the expression Jer. xxiii. 5, 6, xxxiii. 15, 16, "Jehovah our righteousness." The Unitarian interpretation, also adopted by some "who have no prepossession in favour of Antitrinitarian doctrines," and by the best of the Jewish commentators, is, that the title is given not as a personal appellation, but as a descriptive name, like Immanuel, Isa. vii. 14; Maher-shalal-hash-baz, Isa. viii. 1; Ariel, Isa. xxix. 1; Magor-Missabib, Jer. xx. 3; El-Elohe-Israel, *God, the God of Israel*, the name of an altar, Gen. xxxiii. 20; Jehovah-nissi, *Jehovah my banner*, Exod. xvii. 15, an altar so called by Moses; Jehovah-shalom, *Jehovah of peace*, Judges vi. 29, an altar so named by Gideon, because God said to him, "Peace be to thee;" and Jehovah-Shammah, *Jehovah is there*, Ezek. xlvi. 35, the name of the predicted city. Many personal appellatives among the Hebrews were constructed on the same principle, as Elijah, *my God Jah*; ZEDEKIAH, the *righteousness of Jah*; Hiel, *the living God*, 1 Kings xvi. 34, the name of a Bethelite who rebuilt Jericho. That the name *Jehovah our righteousness*, meaning "Jehovah will give us justification through him, or in his time," should be used as descriptive of the blessings of the Messiah's kingdom, can seem strange to no one, whatever view of the nature of those blessings, and the person of him through whom they were bestowed, he may adopt. Dr. S., whilst acknowledging that "if the person of the Messiah were indubitably ascertained to be only human," which we think that it is by abundant evidence, "this appellation would be merely a descriptive proposition," maintains that "there is a consideration which especially belongs to the very phrase of this passage," corroborating the evidence for considering the name as strictly expressing the nature of Christ, which he supposes to be furnished by other parts of Scripture. This consideration is, that "*righteousness* (or justification) is the capital blessing of the gospel," and "is most definitively attributed to Jesus Christ. Every other righteousness is disowned and rejected in comparison with his." We

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\* Griesbach places Θεε in his inner margin with the secondary mark of probability (which he explains to mean that the reading is not to be despised, and is worthy of further examination, yet inferior to the received). It is found in the principal MSS. of the Western recension, as well as in the Alexandrian MS., which, in the epistles, more generally exhibits the Alexandrine recension. Griesbach prefers the reading of the received text, as belonging both to the Alexandrine and Byzantine recensions, and probably because he thought that Θεε might have been written for the sake of consistency with the following verse. We submit, with all due respect for so acute and impartial a judge, that it is more probable Χριστ was written instead of Θεε, in imitation of 2 Cor. v. 10, Τὸς γὰρ πάντας ἡμᾶς φανερωθῆναι δεῖ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ βήματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ; that the Western recension, however much to be distrusted respecting changes dependent on the mere substitution of letters, or respecting additions to the text, is less than either of the others to be suspected of a *critical* change; and that the Common or Byzantine text can in a case of this kind add nothing to the authority of the Alexandrine recension, so that the balance of probability *rather inclines* in favour of the reading Θεε.



should think this the very reason why the promise of righteousness or justification from God through him should be expressed, as being of eminent importance, by a descriptive name. But, perhaps, Dr. S. means by justification being *definitively attributed to HIM*, that it is attributed to him rather than to God the Father, that it *originated* with him, and is his peculiar work. Let us then see how far the passages to which he himself refers in the New Testament agree with this notion: Philipp. iii. 9, "And be found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is OF GOD by faith." 1 Cor. i. 30, "Christ Jesus, who OF GOD is made unto us wisdom, and *righteousness*, and sanctification;" add 2 Cor. v. 21, "For he hath made him to be sin (treated him as a sinner) for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made *the righteousness of GOD* in him," might obtain justification from God through him. It is strange to say, in the face of these passages, that the righteousness or justification belongs to Christ essentially as distinguished from the Father. To us they appear to agree most exactly with the interpretation of "Jehovah our righteousness," as a descriptive name of the Messiah given above. It may be added, that in the second passage, Jer. xxxiii. 16, some have supposed, not without considerable probability in their favour, that the epithet is given to Jerusalem, and that the learned Dr. Blayney (whom Dr. S. does not condescend to notice) translates the words, "Jehovah shall call his name 'our righteousness.'"

The argument in Section xxvi., on Dan. vii. 9, 10, 13, 14, is so fanciful, that even Dr. S. himself would hardly attribute to it much *independent* value, and we are sure that none of our readers will think it needs refutation. In the book of Revelation, the visionary scenes of which are every where expressed in language imitating, or borrowed from, the ancient prophets, the account of the vision of our glorified Lord contains some of the same words, and one descriptive circumstance, ("his head and his hair were white like wool," of radiant brightness,) the same as Daniel has used in representing "the Ancient of days," who is manifestly the Supreme Being himself. This is called so *definite* and *striking* a coincidence, "that the latter cannot but be regarded as designedly alluding to the former." Hence it is expected we should be ready to believe the identity of Christ with the Ancient of days. Now, when it is said (Dan. vii. 13) that "one like to a SON OF MAN approached to the ANCIENT OF DAYS, and was *brought near* to his presence," Dr. S. thinks the word rendered *was brought near*, though "it does not necessarily imply more than a near approach, may be justly extended to the expression of a personal union. Its radical idea is that of *very close contact*; and its different forms are applied to many instances of *conjunction, indwelling, and union*, the most *near and intimate that can exist* amongst men. Upon these grounds it is submitted as a fair and rational interpretation of the whole passage, to view it as declaring, in the symbolical language of prophecy, an *assumption* of the frail and humble nature of a child of man into an absolute union with the great ETERNAL."

The meaning of the Hebrew word is "to be, or be brought near." It is used equally of friendly and hostile approach, of nearness in *place, time, relationship, dignity, or favour*. By a very natural application of the idea of *nearness*, it is used as a name for what is within us, in reference either to the body or the mind. We can see nothing mysterious or abstruse in its applications, and the idea of extorting from the words, "one like to a son of man was *brought near* TO THE PRESENCE of the Ancient of days," a

declaration of the “absolute union of a child of man with the GREAT ETERNAL,” is perfectly monstrous. Yet our author is one who is ever ready to reproach Unitarians with *far-fetched* interpretations invented to serve a purpose.

The passage in Micah, which is treated of in the xxviii Section, contains the words, (according to Dr. S.’s translation,) “whose comings forth are from eternity, from the days of the everlasting period,” which he calls “*a clear assertion* (respecting the Messiah) *of prior and eternal existence.*” The literal version is, “whose *descent*\* is from ancient times, † from the days of old.” ‡ The passage is interpreted by Grotius, Dathe, and others, as applying primarily to Zerubbabel, affirming the ancient glory of his family. If belonging strictly and solely to the Messiah, it affirms his designation to his mission in the counsels of God, or perhaps, as it is connected with the mention of Bethlehem, his derivation from the family of David. What then becomes of the *clear* assertion of our Saviour’s prior and eternal existence?

Section xxx. Zech. xii. 8—10. “They shall look unto me (Jehovah, as appears from the connexion) whom they have pierced.” The words are applied to our Lord, John xix. 37, where they are quoted, “They shall look upon *him* whom they have pierced.” Dr. S. concludes that Christ is Jehovah. We hold it to be very evident that the Apostle John only accommodates to his purpose the words of Zechariah, as, according to the most judicious critics, he has done other passages of Scripture in the same narrative of our Lord’s death. With Grotius we understand the prophet to use the word *pierced* figuratively for “treated with insult and injury;” but if it should be thought that the passage in Zechariah is prophetic of the circumstances attending the death of Christ, many MSS., by the addition of only a letter, read “look on him,” instead of “on me,” which reading is preferred by Kennicott, Newcome, &c. One distinguished critic (Dr. Blayney, see his translation of Zechariah) thinks the present Hebrew words may be translated “look on him,” and others render them “look to me (i. e. for pardon) *with respect to him* whom they pierced.” So that there can be no necessity for supposing the prophet to have spoken of Jehovah being literally pierced, a sentiment which would have excited the indignation and horror of all his countrymen.

Section xxxi. Zech. xiii. 7. “Sword! awake against my shepherd, against the man of my resemblance, saith Jehovah of hosts.” So Dr. S.; our Common Version has “the man that is *my fellow*,” Archbishop Newcome, “the man that is *near unto me*,” Dr. Blayney, “that is next unto me,” observing in a note that it means “next unto me in power and authority, and corresponds with my shepherd in the parallel line; one that rules his flock or people under me by virtue of my commission,” and he quotes Calvin to the same purpose. The Hebrew word is explained in the lexicons a *friend, neighbour, or companion*. The radical meaning is *parti-*

\* מוצאתיו ortus, origines ejus.

† קדם the root, signifies to precede or go before; as a noun, what is before; as 1, the east, whence the sun seems to come; 2, former times, antiquity to an indefinite extent, but without the idea of eternity, except incidentally from the nature of the subject with which it is connected.

‡ עולם eternity, indefinite duration, past or future, often signifying former times: thus מות עולם “the days of old,” Deut. xxxii. 7; עם עולם “the people of former times,” Ezek. xxvi. 20; כמת עולם “as the dead of former times,” those who have been long dead, Psalm cxliii. 3, &c.

icipation, having something in common. Dr. S., as might be expected, contends for *equality of rank and identity of nature*. More modestly and justly Dr. Boothroyd :

“ I adhere to the version, *my fellow*, because I think there is the same *ambiguity* in the term, as in the original : it may mean ‘ his intimate friend and associate ;’ one engaged in that work which his wisdom had planned from eternity ; or it may signify the man who is at the same time a Divine person, ‘ *my equal*,’ as enjoying the same nature ”—Boothroyd, as quoted by Smith, *Script. Test.* p 477, note, 2nd ed.

The words, in truth, may be accommodated to, but *can never prove*, the doctrine of Christ's deity, and it is proof which we require.

We have now examined *every text* adduced by Dr. S. from the Old Testament, which, as translated and interpreted by him, contains any thing inconsistent with the Unitarian doctrine, and we submit our remarks to the inquiring and candid reader with great confidence as to the result. There may be a few passages which, supposing the Deity of Christ, and his participation in the peculiar and sacred name *Jehovah*, to be independently and incontestably established, might admit of interpretation conformably with those doctrines, but there is not one which does not admit of *ready and natural* explanation on other principles, and the greater number may perhaps seem to be *incapable of bearing* the sense which has been assigned to them. We have a few observations yet to offer on the remaining portions of Dr. S.'s Second Book. But we think we have already established solid ground for the conclusion, not only as has been admitted by many learned defenders of the Trinity, that no proof of that doctrine can be found in the Old Testament, but that nothing at all plausible can be thence produced in favour of the reputedly orthodox views respecting our Lord's person, and therefore that an examination of the evidence of the *New Testament* is abundantly sufficient to determine the controversy, and Mr. Belsham was by no means called upon to say any thing more on the passages appealed to from the Old Testament, than he has had the opportunity of saying conformably with the plan he has adopted.

“ In several parts of the Old-Testament Scriptures,” says Dr. Smith, “ a person is introduced under the name *angel of JEHOVAH*, in circumstances and with attributes and ascriptions so remarkable as to require a peculiar consideration.”

We need not at present enumerate the passages selected. Our author states that three modes for their explanation are proposed :

“ 1st. That the angel of the Divine presence was some eminent, celestial creature ; sent to convey the messages of the Divine will to those who were the immediate subjects of revelation ; acting, therefore, on the behalf of the Deity, and allowed to *personate* the Deity in the assumption of the attributes and forms of address which are distinctive of him.”

This, the hypothesis of Episcopius, Le Clerc, Dr. S. Clarke, and Henry Taylor, in *Ben Mordecai's Letters*, is examined and rejected by Dr. S., but it does not seem necessary for us, in reference to the object we have at present in view, to detain our readers by its discussion.

“ 2. That the expression is nothing but a Hebraism to denote God himself, or any peculiar token of the Divine presence, such as the burning bush was, or the pillar of cloud and fire, or the ark of the sanctuary. Thus Mr. Belsham says, ‘ The phrase *angel of Jehovah* means either the visible symbol of the Divine presence, or *Jehovah himself*.’ (*Calm Inquiry*, p. 308.) But

this hypothesis utterly fails, by its leaving unaccounted for the very strong attributions of *intelligence, will, power, moral action*, and all personal properties; which it would be perfectly absurd to apply to a visible splendour, or any symbolical phenomenon whatever; and by its overlooking the *essential* part of the case, the clear and marked **DISTINCTION** which is preserved between this personal angel and him who sent him. It is this distinction so widely different from the idea of either a symbolical token or a personal periphrasis, which makes the insuperable difficulty upon the Unitarian hypothesis."

"3 That the being eminently called the angel of Jehovah, is one who is in certain respects or properties *distinct* from God; and yet is at the same time truly and essentially **THE SAME** with God."

To our minds this latter hypothesis is encumbered with difficulties incomparably greater than any which can be supposed to belong to either of the others. It is in fact perfectly unintelligible, predicating *distinctness* or difference, and *sameness* or identity, at one time, of the same subjects, which, if words have their ordinary meaning, is absurd and contradictory, and if otherwise, can convey no useful instruction; but we must inquire a little into the alleged *utter failure* of the Unitarian hypothesis. It fails, according to our author, 1st, by leaving unaccounted for the attributions of intelligence, &c., which it would be perfectly absurd to apply to a visible splendour or any symbolical phenomenon. But is it absurd to apply them to the being whose immediate interference the outward symbol was intended to manifest, and to whom alone the acts and words accompanying it were alleged to belong? The question we apprehend to be, whether it can be shewn by sufficient examples that the phrase *angel of Jehovah* is used to signify any agent, animate or inanimate, which is specially employed to accomplish the Divine Will, or any sensible manifestation of his presence visible, audible, or both, in human form or otherwise, which God was pleased to make in accomplishing his purposes. It is nothing to our present argument if the word angel is sometimes applied to human messengers, sometimes to a superior order of created intelligences. If we can shew that it is used in the manner stated above, Dr. Smith's objection is answered, and his own explanation of the passages he has cited is rendered needless and improbable. Now, in Isa. xxxvii. 36, we read, "The *angel of Jehovah* went forth, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred and fourscore and five thousand: and when they arose early in the morning, they were all dead corpses," where, although there is some difference of opinion among the commentators whether God made use for the accomplishment of his purpose of a sudden plague, or of the Simoom, the pestilential wind of the desert, it is generally agreed that he employed some natural agent which is denominated the "angel of Jehovah," Ps. xxxv. 5. The angel of the Lord signifies any instrument of Divine vengeance. In Exod. iii. 2, the angel of Jehovah most plainly means the "*flame of fire* in the midst of the bush." It was a visible symbol of the Divine presence intended to fix the attention of Moses on the spot from which the voice was to proceed. Another indisputable instance of the symbol of the Divine presence being called the *angel of God*, is found Exod. xiv. 19, compared with xiii. 21, 22, "And the angel of God, which went before the camp of Israel, removed and went behind them, and (rather *even*) the pillar of cloud went from before their face and stood behind them." "And Jehovah went before them by day in a pillar of cloud to lead them the way, and by night in a pillar of fire to give them light, to go by day and night." Compare also Exod. xxiii. 20—22, xl. 33—38. The former of these passages is quoted

by Dr. S., and the clause, "for my name is within him," seems to be properly understood by him as identifying the angel with Jehovah; but he does not seem to be aware that this angel means *the pillar of cloud and fire* from which Jehovah talked with Moses, and gave manifestations of his peculiar presence and agency, not in any respect a distinct being or person. In the cases of the angel of Jehovah appearing to Hagar, to Abraham, and to Manoah and his wife in human form, the angel is in each case identified in the narrative with Jehovah himself; we therefore conclude that the human form was only a manifestation of the peculiar presence of God, not a being commissioned by him. Our author indeed affirms that the Unitarian hypothesis "overlooks the *essential* part of the case, the clear and marked DISTINCTION which is preserved between this personal angel and him who sent him." The assertion is positive, but it is unsupported by evidence. We have shewn that the use of the word angel is not of itself sufficient to establish such distinction; and after the most careful examination of all the passages we can find nothing else which even appears to indicate it. Dr. S. has himself quoted the words of Rosenmüller: "Thus very frequently in these books the names *Jehovah*, and *angel of Jehovah*, are used interchangeably, the latter signifying that visible symbol under which God allowed himself to be seen by men."

Dr. S., rightly we think, considers the passage in Gen. xviii., where three human figures appeared to Abraham, as of the same kind with the others which he produces, although the expression *angel of Jehovah* is not there employed; but we are at a loss to conceive how he could regard it as favouring his own views. The sacred historian commences by saying that *Jehovah appeared* to Abraham; the man who remained conversing with him spoke to him as Jehovah himself, not any distinct or inferior being; and the same thing may be observed of the one who spoke to Lot. As there were several different purposes to be accomplished, different manifestations of Divine agency were employed, strikingly representing to ignorant men the idea of sovereign power acting in different places and upon different affairs at the same time; but the language of the historian, taken strictly, identifies all the appearances with Jehovah; and upon the whole, this seems to us to be the explanation of the passage attended with least difficulty. Dr. S. quotes some of the Jewish commentaries, in order, as we understand him, to shew that the person who remained with Abraham, usually considered as the chief of the three, had a peculiar relation to Jehovah, yet a distinct personality.

"Upon this passage the Jerusalem Targum says, '*the word (mimra) of Jehovah appeared to him (i. e. Abraham) in the valley of vision.*' Other Jewish writings have the following explications:—'*The Shekinah was associated with them, and detained Abraham till the angels departed. He said not who he was, but in all these (appearances) it was the angel of the covenant.*'"

To understand these comments we must bear in mind that *mimra*, the word of any person, in the dialect of the Targums is only a fuller expression for the person himself, and is so used continually both of God and men, so that the words of the Jerusalem Targum express precisely the same as the words of the book of Genesis itself: "Jehovah appeared to him." A single example of this idiom we shall give for the satisfaction of our readers: the words *a covenant betwixt me and thee* are rendered in the Targum "a covenant between my word and thy word." So "the word of Jehovah" is a familiar expression for Jehovah himself. In like manner the word

Shekinah is constantly used in the Jewish writings for God himself—the manifestation of his presence any where on earth ; and the meaning of the second passage quoted is, that one of the persons was a manifestation of God himself, the other two were angels. With respect to the expression *angel of the covenant*, which our author would no doubt have us refer to our Lord Jesus Christ, we have the express testimony of an ancient Jewish writer, that wherever it occurs “the holy and blessed God himself is spoken of.” This testimony is taken from the same book as Dr. S.’s quotation ; (Sohar, Genes. fol. 63, col. 268;) but this is not all—will the reader believe it? the very passage which Dr. S. produces, and which it will be observed is broken off abruptly as he gives it, concludes, somewhat awkwardly for his argument, “and all these things are spoken of the holy and blessed God himself,” clearly shewing that the Jewish writer understood *the angel of the covenant*, as a name of God himself in reference to his manifestation of himself in establishing a covenant with his people. Lest our readers should, too naturally, conclude that Dr. S. intentionally suppressed the important explanatory clause, which we have here given—a subterfuge of which we hope he is incapable, we will mention that in the authority to which he refers, (Schoettg. Horæ Hebr. et Talm. Vol. II. p. 442,) the words of the original being inserted between the parts of the translation, the final clause would be very easily overlooked by one hastily consulting the passage, which, we conclude, must have been our author’s case. Dr. S. refers to passages in the prophecies of Zechariah, i. 8, 10—13, ii. 8—11, iii. 1—10, vi. 12, 13, 15,) in which, according to him, we find the great angel who is at once the messenger of Jehovah and Jehovah himself, “depicted in the appropriate and exclusive characteristics of the Messiah, the Saviour, the Priest upon his throne, the Intercessor : and not less certainly described as possessing the attributes, exercising the sovereignty, and wearing the holy and incommunicable name of JEHOVAH.” Unfortunately he has not stated how he derived all this from the words of the prophet, and as we can form no conception of the process we know not what remarks to offer, but Dr. S. requests “the serious inquirer to examine the whole”—and if he will do this, he will, we think, participate in our curiosity to know what the particular clauses are upon which the imagination of our author has been at work, and how his ingenuity could find in them any semblance of a foundation for his assertions.

In the passage quoted from Mal. iii. 1, we think it very clear that the last clause, “Behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts,” does not prove the person coming to be really or personally distinct from Jehovah himself. The prophecy is, that God will manifest himself amongst his people. They had vainly said, “Where is the God of judgment?” (Mal. ii. 17.) In due time they should be brought to acknowledge his presence, and special interference in their affairs. This manifestation may be rightly explained of the coming and kingdom of the Messiah, who exhibited the most convincing proofs of Divine power accompanying his works, and Divine authority sanctioning his words, but it by no means follows that he must be personally spoken of : on the contrary, that “*the Sovereign* אֲדֹנָי whom ye seek,” means God himself, seems to be justly inferred from the uniform use of אֲדֹנָי with the emphatic ה, and we have already given Jewish authority for understanding the “*angel of the covenant*” in the same sense, as the parallelism seems to require. We would compare with this expression Isa. lxiii. 9, “the *angel of his presence* saved them,” where the *angel of*

*his presence* is God himself, manifesting himself by some sensible sign, and cannot possibly be understood of any distinct being; and Gen. xlviii. 15, 16, "God before whom my fathers did walk, the God which fed me all my life long unto this day, *the angel which redeemed me from all evil*, bless the lads"—where no one can doubt that *the angel* means God himself, in reference to his sensible manifestations of himself to Jacob. Upon the whole, we do not hesitate to pronounce our author's attempt to identify our Lord Jesus Christ with the angel of Jehovah, and thence with Jehovah himself, to be a total failure, and incapable of affording satisfaction to any inquiring mind; whilst the general view of the nature of the passages referred to on the subject, which Mr. Belsham has given, is at once rational and consistent in itself, and abundantly established by their examination in detail.

The section on the pluralisms is highly creditable to Dr. S. for the candour and caution as well as the learning and ingenuity which it displays, and we think he has made the most that is possible of a very dubious and obscure argument. We must observe, however, that as he only contends for an *intimation* of plurality of persons, which may not, he acknowledges, have been understood by *the majority of the Jewish people*, which even *inspired prophets may not have fully comprehended*, and which he cannot prove to have been so understood by any of the ancient Jews, his argument at best is only applicable in confirmation of other evidence: but we deny that he has produced, or that any one can produce, any such evidence from the Old Testament, and we feel fully authorized in contenting ourselves with the information which is *directly* afforded us, without disturbing ourselves about fancied *intimations*, that is, obscure and uncertain hints, which we find opposed to the *plain* and (setting aside these supposed hints) *uniform* language of the Jewish sacred writings. And, moreover, though we think Dr. S. has shewn that the rule of Hebrew syntax respecting the use of the plural number to express dominion, dignity, or honour, is not very definitely established, or of very general application, we can by no means allow that he has sufficiently explained on other principles all the alleged instances, or even satisfactorily shewn, supposing that the idiom were observable only in the names of the true God, how it can support the Trinitarian doctrine, since if plurality is at all implied, it must be plurality of beings—plurality of Gods. The notion of different persons in one essence is one which would never occur to any mind without being very distinctly expressed, and of which no conception whatever could be obtained in the way of *intimation*.

The explanation proposed by our author of the frequent use of the word אֲדֹנָיִם, (adonim,) *lords*, (the plural for the singular,) as applied to human beings is, that the word was originally a name of God, and being *secondarily* applied to human possessors of authority, retained the form which belonged to its *primary* use: but no reason or authority whatever can be adduced to shew that the word was at first a peculiar name of the Supreme Being: its meaning would render it equally applicable to God and man, and it is applied to both in the singular form also; we are therefore justified in concluding, that whatever may have been the origin of the anomaly of the use of the plural form in a singular sense, it was something not peculiar to one application of the word, but common to all the cases in which the anomaly is observed.

The use of *Baalim*, (owners, masters, husbands,) in the plural, with a singular sense, is so exactly analogous to that of *Adonim*, that no one could have thought of finding a different explanation for it, except under the influence of a favourite hypothesis. That which our author has devised, how-

ever ingenious, will hardly be thought, by any competent judge, sufficiently probable to answer his purpose.\*

Dr. S.'s observations do not materially affect the probability that *Tannim*, the crocodile, Ezek. xxix. 3, is a plural form with a singular sense, and though he readily adopts the opinion of some modern Hebrew scholars that חכמות, (Chochmoth,) *wisdom* is singular, it seems to us that this opinion rests on very slight foundation, and that the generally-received doctrine of its being a plural form is by far the most probably correct. *Behemoth* we will lay no stress upon, though the Coptic derivation is not certainly established, but other instances of the use of a plural for a singular noun to give emphasis, or to produce the effect of a sort of superlative degree, all seem to belong to the same idiom. Thus *blindnesses* for total blindness, Gen. xix. 11; 2 Kings vi. 18. *Salvations* for complete salvation, Ps. xlii. 5, 11, liii. 6. *Vanities* for much vanity, Eccles. v. 7, &c. There seems, then, good reason for believing that the use of a plural for a singular was one of the various modes of giving emphasis, or marking eminence resorted to by the Hebrews; and that though not applied generally to all words expressive of authority or dignified office, but confined by early custom to a small number, selected in a way which appears to us arbitrary, it does occur in cases where the sense is indisputably singular, and might be used by the people to whom the idiom belonged without suggesting any idea of plurality.

In several of the instances of the application of plural names to the Supreme Being, the intention of augmenting the force of the epithet is sufficiently evident, as Prov. ix. 10, "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of Jehovah, and the knowledge of the *holy ones*, i. e. *most holy*, (as it has been properly rendered by Dathe,) is understanding." So in Hos. xii. 1. Of the same nature seems to be the Chaldee plural עליונין (Elionin), Dan. vii. 18. The word in the singular means *very high*, or might even be rendered *most high*; but the plural form increases the force of the epithet.

It has often been remarked that Jehovah, the peculiar and sacred name of the true God, is singular, whilst the plural name, Elohim, אלהים is one which is equally applied to idols, and is even given, without impropriety, to human objects of respect, and which, so far as we know or have any means of judging, may be supposed to be a word of human construction, signifying an object of adoration. Dr. S. indeed maintains, that when the word Elohim is applied to a single idol, it refers to something plural in its nature, and he reminds us of the multiform appearance of many idols; but this is a mere hypothesis, and it is more natural and reasonable to suppose that the plurality in the name had the same cause in all the cases of its occurrence. Dr. S. thinks that when it is said to Moses (Ex. iv. 16), "Thou shalt be to him (לאלהים) for, as or instead of Elohim," "The sense is palpably limited to his acting, on the occasion, as the immediate messenger and representative of the Most High," and in like manner Ex. vii. 1. It

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\* The word does not occur in the full plural form, but in construction with a pronominal suffix, בעליו. Dr. S. denies that this is plural at all, and supposes the י to be introduced in imitation of other names of relationship, אב a father, אביך thy father, אח a brother, אחיו his brother, חם a father-in-law, חמה her father-in-law. But in all these instances the primitive forms, as our author properly states, appear to have been אבי אחי אחי חמי which readily accounts for the insertion of the י before the suffix, and there is no reason why they should have been imitated in words of a different form; at the best the supposition is a mere conjecture, resorted to to suit a purpose, and not being a very plausible one, the more obvious explanation founded on the analogy of אדני will continue to be generally received.



certainly seems to us, on the contrary, that the only admissible sense is, "thou shalt be to him as a superior being delivering directions, which it shall be his business to obey;" that it is not being the organ of Jehovah, but exercising that kind of superiority and authority which the name *Elohim* implies, which is intended, and, therefore, that the word could not have been used had it been of the nature of a proper name, or had its plural form been considered as connected with any mystery. Again, in the passage adduced by Mr. Belsham from 1 Sam. xxviii. 13, "I see *Elohim olim* literally, *Gods ascending*, but supposed by Mr. B. to mean only the figure of Samuel," Dr. S. affirms, that

"Whatever the impostress saw or pretended to see, her words undeniably affirm a plurality of objects. The figure of Samuel could, therefore, have been only one form out of several; so that to regard *Elohim* as an appellation given to Samuel, is both begging the question, and a violation of the plain grammar of the passage."

Now this is pretty strong assertion, but it cannot alter the facts of the case. When the woman said to Saul, "I saw Gods ascending out of the earth, he said unto her, What form is HE of?" (Plainly shewing that Saul understood her to speak of *one* figure.) "She said, An old man cometh up and is covered with a mantle, and Saul perceived that it was Samuel." The connexion seems to us to prove, beyond all question, that only one figure is at all said to have appeared, and that this being considered as something supernatural, was called a God (*Elohim*) by the ignorant or artful woman. As to the grammar, the construction is precisely the same with *Elohim Shofetim*, (both plural,) "a God that judgeth," Ps. lviii. 12. *Elohim haiim*, (both plural,) the living God, &c. Mr. B.'s example, then, is a very clear and important one of this plural in a singular sense being used of one being recognized as distinct from and inferior to God, and consequently implying no mystery of the Divine nature. But, according to our author, *Elohim* not being limited like *Jehovah* to express the Supreme Being alone,

"For that very reason it became the more necessary to guard against possible and probable abuse. As the word was in ordinary use to designate the numerous false deities of the nations, it was the more likely, and even unavoidable that the Hebrews would understand its perpetual occurrence in the plural form as the designation of their own God to be an express intimation that plurality in some sense belonged to HIM."—(Script. Test. p. 517.)

We cannot, we confess, understand the logic of this passage. Because the word *Elohim*, a plural form, was in ordinary use to designate *any one* of the false deities of the nations, each one of which was known to be, and always considered to be *singular*, therefore the Hebrews would understand it to have a *plural* sense when applied to a Being, "of whose *essential unity*, (to use Dr. S.'s words,) from other infallible testimonies, they were certain." We surely only do justice to them in supposing that had any doubt been suggested they would have drawn the contrary conclusion, and *knowing* the *unity* of the object denoted by the plural term in the case of the idol, would have concluded the unity also, independently of any declaration of it, of that Being, concerning whose nature they could not have direct knowledge. We have enlarged upon this subject, not because we think the argument from the pluralisms likely to have much weight with any inquirer, rejected as it has been by many of the most learned defenders of the Trinity, and obscure and dubious as it appears, even admitting all that is affirmed—but because, being a curious subject and very ably treated by Dr. S., we imagined many

readers might be glad to see it noticed somewhat more fully than Unitarian controversialists in general deem necessary.

DR. S. devotes a chapter to "An Inquiry into the State of Opinion and Expectation with respect to the Messiah existing among the Jews in the period between the closing of the Old Testament and the dissolution of their National Establishment."

It is a subject to which many of the defenders of reputed orthodoxy attach much importance, and what our author has written upon it claims our notice as much on account of *concessions*, which, coming from one of his opinions, as well as his learning, deserve to be recorded, as on account of arguments which we are unwilling to pass by without an attempt to ascertain their real value.

The chapter contains five sections devoted to the inquiry, and a sixth stating the results. The subjects are, 1. The Syriac and Septuagint Versions; 2. The Chaldee Targums; 3. The Apocrypha; 4. The Works of Philo and Josephus; 5. The Rabbinical Writings.

"The Syriac Version of the Old Testament is considered by the critics as of an antiquity prior to the Christian era . . . . It is a strict version; and it is remarkably clear and strong in those passages which attribute characters of Deity to the Messiah."

In what degree Dr. S. has exaggerated the testimony of this version in his favour, we shall not now stop to inquire. We think we might trust our own cause to a fair examination of that version only; but we would ask what he means by asserting that it is "considered by critics as of an antiquity prior to the Christian era"? No doubt it is so considered by some writers; indeed, it has been affirmed to be as old as the time of Solomon; but a much later date has been assigned to it by critics of deservedly high authority in such matters, and we have been accustomed to consider its having been made some time after the Christian era so much as a settled point, that we were surprised at a contrary statement, unaccompanied by a hint of uncertainty or a particle of evidence. The most probable date of the Syriac Version of the Old Testament seems to be about the latter end of the second century after Christ. As to the Greek Version, Dr. S. avows that it gives him no assistance, and in consequence he treats, perhaps, with less than justice its venerable authors.

In the section on the Targums, or ancient Chaldee Paraphrases on the Old Testament, he insists, indeed, that the instances he has brought forward in speaking of the original texts, "*though the number of such is not great*, have sufficiently shewn that the writers did not refrain from ascribing to the Messiah the titles and attributes of the Supreme God;" but he, with evident reluctance, and much to the credit both of his judgment and his honesty, abandons the argument from the use of the phrase, *the word of the Lord*, giving the following, after a full illustration of the subject by examples, as "the results of impartially examining the question:"

"1. That the primary import of the Chaldee expression is *that*, whatever it may be, which is the MEDIUM of communicating the mind and intention of one person to another.

"2. That it thence assumed the sense of a reciprocal pronoun. 3. That when used in the latter sense, its most usual application is to the Divine Being; denoting, if we may use the expression, GOD, *his very self*; *Deus ipsissimus*; and is the synonyme and substitute of the most exclusive of all the appellatives of Deity, the name JEHOVAH. 4. That there is no certain proof of its being distinctly applied to the Messiah in any of the Targums

now extant; while, in very numerous places, it is so plainly used, with *personal* attributives, yet in distinction from the name of God, that an application to the Messiah cannot be held improbable." [This extorted acknowledgment is enough for our purpose, but we are prepared to contest the statement in the latter clause.] "5. That solely from the use of the phrase, *the memra of Jah*, or *the word of the Lord*, in those paraphrases, no absolute information can be deduced, concerning the doctrine of the Jews, in the interval between the Old Testament and the New, upon the person of their expected Messiah. I have said *solely* from the use of this phrase; but if we combine this fact with others, derived from the study of the Old Testament, it will, I conceive, appear a very rational conjecture, that the Rabbinical authors of the age referred to, had vague ideas of the *Word* as an intelligent agent, the medium of the Divine operations and communications to mankind. I cannot, however, make this opinion a ground of independent argument, as has been done by some writers,\* who have probably taken it from each other in succession, without much severity of examination."—Scripture Test. Ch. vii. Vol. I. pp. 561—563, 2d edition.

Although his conjecture as to the Rabbinical use of the term *Word* does not seem to us very *rational*, we can excuse Dr. S.'s anxiety to find in the phraseology of the Targums what his fancy may represent as relics of a faith, in his estimation purer, existing in earlier times, in consideration of the candour of his acknowledgment that the use of the phrase "Word of the Lord," can afford no absolute information concerning the doctrine of the Jews of that age upon the person of the expected Messiah. As to the alleged instances of titles and attributes of the Supreme God being ascribed in the Targums to the Messiah, we can only say that we are acquainted with *no such instances*, and that in the examples produced by Dr. S. he appears to us to have strangely misconceived the meaning of the author's words; of this we shall give one or two specimens in justification of what we have asserted. In Dr. S.'s supplementary note on 2 Sam. xxiii. 1—7, is the following passage :

"A part of this Targum or Chaldee Paraphrase of Jonathan deserves to be transcribed, as an interesting proof that the ancient Jews regarded the passage as certainly referring to the Messiah; and that in so applying it, they attributed to him the express characters of Deity. *The God of Israel spake with respect to me, the Rock of Israel, the Sovereign of the sons of men, the true Judge hath spoken to appoint me king, for He is the Messiah that shall be, who shall arise and rule in the fear of the Lord.*"

Now we venture to present what follows as a faithful translation of the words of the Targum as found in the London Polyglott, which we transcribe in the note :

"David said, The God of Israel hath spoken to me; the Rock of Israel, He who ruleth among the sons of men; the righteous Judge hath said, that he would appoint to me a king (i. e. as a successor). This is the Messiah who will arise and rule in the fear of the Lord." †

Whatever may be the sense of the original, it is perfectly evident that this Paraphrast considered the words of God to David to be the promise of a

\* "Particularly by Dr. Peter Allix, in his *Judgment of the Ancient Jewish Church*; a work not remarkable for accurate statement or judicious reasoning."—Author's note.

† אמר דוד אלהא דישראל עלי מלל תקיפא דישראל דשליט בבני אנשא קושטא דאן אמר למנא לי מלכא דהוא משיחא דעתיד דיקוט וישלוש בדחלתא Targum on 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, 4.—דין

king to sit on his throne, and explained that promise as applying to the Messiah, who was to rule *in the fear of Jehovah*, not to *be* the God of Israel. Dr. S.'s translation is unwarrantable, as the meaning he assigns to the passage is proposterous.

One other example, which we shall take from the xlvth Psalm, will suffice. Dr. S. quotes from the Targum,

“ Ver. 2. Thy beauty, O king Messiah, is pre-eminent above the sons of men: the spirit of prophecy is given unto thy lips: therefore God hath blessed thee for ever. (Ver. 7.) The throne of thy glory, O Jehovah, standeth for ever and ever; a righteous sceptre is the sceptre of thy kingdom. (Ver. 8.) Because thou hast loved righteousness, and hated wickedness, therefore thus hath Jehovah thy God anointed thee with the ointment of joy profusely above thy fellows.”

There is surely enough in this passage which is inconsistent with Deity in the person addressed, but the question is whether Dr. S. has rightly translated and applied the words of the Targum, ver. 7; and if we were obliged to admit without question the present pointing of the word קים, we could not object to his version, however much we might be astonished at the sense it seems to convey; but the Targums originally existed and long remained unpointed. The pointing was first performed by various and unknown individuals in a very inaccurate manner, and as now given, it has been reviewed and corrected by several Christians, especially by Buxtorf, who would, without doubt, point according to their own notion of the sense of the passage. Now, considering the word קים as a verb, and pointing it with a Treere instead of a Kametz under the ' , the translation is, “ *The throne of thy glory Jehovah hath established for ever,*” which exactly corresponds with the sense ascribed to the Hebrew original by Mr. Belsham and others. And if any one is scrupulous about altering the points, (though their authority is generally allowed to be exceedingly small,) we would refer him to the Targum on Ps. x. ver. 12, where the same word occurring *as a verb* is, nevertheless, pointed with the Kametz, probably by mistake, as there seems to be no doubt about the sense. The words are קים קים שבועת ירך, “ Arise, O Jehovah, *establish* the covenant of thy hand.” All other supposed cases of divine names being attributed to the Messiah in the Targums are susceptible of equally easy explanation.

In his chapter on the Apocrypha, Dr. S.'s utmost ingenuity can produce nothing more like evidence for his system than the expression “ Eternal Saviour” in the book of Baruch, a book the date of which is unknown, and which is entirely destitute of authority. Yet even here the Common Version, “ The *Everlasting*, our Saviour,” is to be preferred to his, because *the Everlasting* occurs frequently as a name of the Deity in the same book, and is even found in the same sentence.

From Philo our author quotes pretty largely. He identifies the *logos* of this writer with the *Messiah*, supposing him to have been led by his philosophical opinions to dwell chiefly on the *spiritual* part of the mixed nature, whilst he occasionally recognizes *personal* qualities rather through the influence of the prevailing opinions of the Jews in general, than in strict consistency with his own theories.

“ It appears to me,” says Dr. S, “ that there is a *real inconsistency* in the assertions and doctrines of Philo concerning the *Logos*; but such inconsistency as, though not excusable, is yet capable of being accounted for on the common principles of human infirmity.” . . . “ From all the circumstances, it seems to me the most reasonable conclusion, that the leading

acceptation of the *memra* or *logos*, among the Jews of this middle age, was to designate an *intelligent, intermediate agent*; that in the sense of a Mediator between God and man, it became a recognized appellative of the Messiah; that the *personal* doctrine of the word was the one generally received; and that the *conceptual* notion, which Philo interweaves with the other, was purely his own invention, the result of his theological philosophy, and the filling up, as it were, and finishing of a favourite theory."—Script. Test. Vol. I. pp. 599, 600, 2nd ed.

No one will be surprised that a sufficient number of passages may be found in the writings of Philo, in which the *logos* is so spoken of; that taken from their connexion, considered apart from the other doctrines of their author, and with the assumption of inconsistency and error on his part, whenever it may seem to be required, they may appear favourable to the doctrine which Dr. S. labours to defend; but a more particular examination of the opinions and language of the Jewish philosopher will, we think, prove that he has been greatly misunderstood by those who quote him as favouring the pre-existence or Deity of the Messiah, and that his writings can throw little light on Christian controversy, except as an example of that false philosophy which so early corrupted the church.

After rejecting the notion entertained by some, that Philo was a Christian, Dr. S. says,

"The coincidences of sentiment, and more frequently of phraseology, which occur in the writings of Philo with the language of Paul and of John in the New Testament, must be accounted for on some other principles. Yet it would be contrary to all the philosophy of human nature, not to ascribe these different but similar streams to one primary source. That source, I venture to propose, is not so much to be sought in the writings of Plato, or in the ethical lectures of the learned Jews of Alexandria, or in the sole speculations and invented diction of Philo himself;—as in the SACRED WRITINGS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT, transfused into the Alexandrian idiom, paraphrased and amplified in the terms and phrases which were vernacular to the Grecian Jews, and mixed in a very arbitrary manner with the speculations both of the Persian and the Greek philosophers."—Script. Test. Vol. I. p. 574, 2nd ed.

Dr. S. can hardly mean to deny that many of the most remarkable characteristics of the religious philosophy of Philo are derived from the school of Plato, and if due weight be given to his first remark in this passage, that the coincidences between the Jewish writer and the New Testament are *more frequently of phraseology than of sentiment*, and to the concluding one, that whatever was drawn from the Old Testament was *mixed in a very arbitrary manner with the speculations both of the Persian and Greek philosophers*, we see nothing in the rest to which we are disposed materially to object, or the full admission of which has any bearing on the points of difference between us and Dr. S.

There has been much discussion on the question, to what school of philosophy Philo ought to be considered as belonging; the general voice of antiquity declaring him a Platonist, whilst some learned moderns have maintained that he was an Eclectic; others have supposed him to represent the prevailing opinions of the Alexandrian Jews of his time; others, again, regard him as himself the founder of a sect, and the original author of the doctrines he delivered. It has been very justly remarked, that there is much less real difference between these several statements than would at first view appear, and than their authors supposed. If in insisting on the Platonism of Philo we must be understood to maintain that he professedly and exclusively addicted

himself to the Platonic school, against such an opinion arguments scarcely to be resisted might, without much difficulty, be adduced. Indeed, how could a Jew attached to his religion, disposed probably to regard as indirectly derived from the writings of his own lawgiver all that seemed excellent in the philosophy of other nations, and obliged to modify into at least apparent harmony with those writings all the doctrines which he embraced, profess unresisting submission to the dicta of any Pagan master? It is not to be denied, however, that some of the most striking peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine are adopted by Philo, and that he explains his meaning by phraseology and imagery derived from the works of Plato himself, and much used among his followers. If we call him an Eclectic, as there is no doubt that he occasionally quotes with approbation, and adopts without reserve, the sentiments of philosophers of different schools, still it is not the less manifest that his notions respecting the Divine Nature are Platonic. The later Platonists and Eclectics hardly differed except in name, the latter greatly admiring Plato and following him, especially on subjects relating to the nature of God and the mind.

Those who maintain that Philo only adopted the prevailing sentiments of the learned Jews at Alexandria, should recollect that these Jews studied in the schools of philosophy for which that city was celebrated, and in which a system, which, if not strictly Platonic, was very nearly allied to Platonism, was generally taught. It is probable enough that Philo may not have materially differed in opinion from the more learned of his countrymen in his native city, but it does not follow that his doctrines are Jewish traditions; it is rather evident how much the circumstances of their education led them to accommodate their religion to the wisdom of the age, explaining its simple truths according to the fanciful speculations of philosophy, and saving its historic details from the contempt with which they would otherwise have been inclined to treat them, by allegorizing them into the mystical expression of obscure and useless dogmas. Those who speak of Philo's philosophy as his own invention, and represent him rather as the founder of a sect than as a supporter of the doctrines of any former leader, can surely mean no more than that he made his *selection* of opinions for himself, that he adopted the *principle* of the Eclectics, but not satisfied with what was done in their schools, being, indeed, in a peculiar situation as a Jew, his doctrines did not sufficiently agree with theirs for him to be correctly described as belonging to their sect; all which is not, or need not be denied by those who call attention to the manifest signs of Platonism in the works of Philo, and clearly shew that much of his language, respecting the nature of the Deity, is derived, not from the principles of his own religion, or the traditions of his nation, but from the doctrines of the Greek philosopher, which, however, he has mixed with opinions derived from various other sources, and reduced into some sort of agreement with the principles of his own religion.

We cannot hope to understand the language of Philo respecting the *logos*, except by considering it in connexion with his whole doctrine concerning the Divine Nature. We ought, perhaps, hardly to expect perfect consistency from so obscure and mystical a writer, but it will help much to remove difficulties, if we keep in mind that many parts of his works are written *popularly*, according to that view of religion which he considered to be suited to the condition of mankind in general, whilst others are designed to express the more just and sublime sentiments to which only the learned and contemplative could attain, and which differ from the former so widely, that we might despair of harmonizing them, did we not meet with passages

in which the precepts and opinions of the popular religion are adapted to and explained by the sublimer theology.

That Philo, believing in one God, nevertheless frequently speaks of three divine principles, is a fact which has attracted much attention, and the proper explanation of which has been a subject of much discussion. By many he is considered as a believer in the Trinity, very nearly as it is received by most Christians. Others, sensible of the deviation of his doctrine from reputed orthodoxy, have, according to their own views, either condemned him as corrupting the traditions of his people with Platonism, or considered him as affording evidence favourable to the Arian doctrine; whilst a third party, much more justly, as it seems to us, have contended, that the three principles of Philo are not beings or persons, though sometimes figuratively spoken of with personal characters, but only *attributes*, and that he has derived them entirely from his philosophy, not at all from the traditionary religion of his nation.

Our first remark is, that this writer is not always content with making *three* principles in the Divine Nature, but sometimes appears to represent God himself as a distinct intelligence presiding over the three principles, and sometimes also increases the number of these principles. There is a very remarkable passage in the book *περι φυγαδων* (concerning fugitives) in which the author, allegorizing the precepts of the Mosaic law respecting the cities of refuge, absolutely speaks of *six* different principles in the Divine Nature all inferior to God himself, being really intended as no more than attributes, and yet having, apparently, distinct intelligence ascribed to them. The passage is long, but we think important: it is as follows:

“I must next explain which they are, and why their number is six. Is not, then, the most ancient, the strongest and best, not city only, but *Metropolis*, the *Divine Word* to which, above all, it is most profitable to flee? But the other five *colonies*, as it were, are powers of him who uttered the *word*, of which the chief is the *creative*, by means of which the *MAKER*, *by his word*, fabricated the world. The second is the *royal*, by means of which, having created, he rules what he has made: the third is the *benignant*, through which the Maker pities, and is merciful to, his own work: the fourth is the *legislative* quality, through which he forbids those things which ought not to be. Fair and well fortified cities all of them, excellent places of refuge for those who are worthy of being saved. Good and humane is the appointment, fitted to excite and encourage hope. Who else could have exhibited such an abundance of beneficial things, according to the variety of cases of persons sinning unintentionally, who have not all the same strength or the same weakness? The intention is, that he who is capable of running swiftly should press on, without stopping to take breath, to that supreme divine *word* which is the fountain of wisdom; that, drinking from its stream, instead of death he may find as a reward eternal life; that he who is not equally swift should flee to the *creative* power, which Moses names God, because all things were disposed and arranged by it . . . . but that he who is not sufficiently active for this should take refuge with the *royal* power. . . . . But to him who is not sufficiently quick to reach the above-mentioned stations, as being far removed, other nearer goals are fixed of useful powers, the *merciful*, and that which *prescribes what should be done*; and that which *forbids what ought not to be done* . . . . . These are the six cities which are called *places of refuge*, of which five are figuratively represented, and have their resemblance in the sacred things. The commanding and forbidding powers (have as their types) the copy of the laws laid up in the ark of the covenant; but the merciful power, the cover of the ark itself, which is called the *mercy-seat*; and the

*creative and royal powers*, the two winged cherubim placed over it. But the *divine word*, superior to all these, *has not taken any visible form, as bearing a resemblance to no object of sense*, being the very image of God, the most ancient of all objects of thought, placed nearest, there being no separating interval, to him who alone truly exists; (possesses an independent existence;) for it is said (he here quotes Exod. xxv. 22), ‘I will *speak* to thee from above the mercy-seat between the two cherubim,’ so that the *Word* should be, as it were, a charioteer *to the other powers*, but he that uttereth the word, as the person riding in the chariot, who gives his command to the charioteer in all things for the right direction of the whole. He, then, who is not only free from voluntary guilt, but has not even involuntarily committed crime, *having God himself as his inheritance, will dwell in him alone*; but they who not intentionally but undesignedly have sinned, will have, as places of refuge, the cities which have been spoken of, abounding in good things and wealthy. Of these cities of refuge three are beyond the river, far removed from our race. Which are these? The *Word* of our Ruler and his *creative and royal powers*. For to them belong the heaven and the whole world. But neighbouring and contiguous to us, placed near to the mortal race of men, which alone is liable to sin, are the three on this side of the river, the *merciful power, that which commands what should be done, and that which forbids things not to be done*. For these are close at hand to us.”—Philo de Profugis (pp. 464, 465, ed. Turnebi et Hoeschelii, Paris, 1640).

It is plain from this passage that Philo recognizes one Supreme and only true God, whom he placed above all those divine energies or attributes which he endowed with a sort of personality, much in the same manner as Proclus (Comm. in Timæum, Plat. Lib. ii.) contends that Plato himself considered the Supreme God as presiding over his three principles. Again, we see here that Philo is led by no better reason than the desire of allegorizing the six cities of refuge, to distinguish six divine principles instead of three, which he divides into two triads, one superior to the other, but both inferior to the Supreme God himself, whose qualities they all are. As to the nature of the *word*, we perceive that Philo had no conception whatever of its possible incarnation or sensible appearance among men; that he considered it as really nothing more than the utterance or expression of the will of the great Supreme; and that in figuratively giving it a personal character, he made it, though in some respects superior to the Divine attributes, yet inferior and subject to God himself. The following passage affords very distinct proof of the sense in which alone Philo attributed personal characters to the Divine perfections. It is an allegorization of the beginning of Gen. xviii. :

“For Abraham also coming with zeal, and haste, and great alacrity, orders Sarah, who represents virtue, to hasten and mix three measures of fine meal, and make hearth-cakes, when God, accompanied by his two principal powers, his *royalty* and his *goodness*, *He*, in the midst of them, being *one, produced three images in the visual soul*,” (i. e. caused the visible appearance of three persons, though the whole was but a manifestation of himself alone,) “each of which could by no means be measured, for God is incomprehensible, and his powers are incomprehensible; but he measures all things, for his *goodness* is the measure of good men, his power is the measure of obedient men, but he himself, the Sovereign, is the measure of all corporeal and incorporeal things. Wherefore, these powers, obtaining the nature of rules and precepts, are a means of estimating things inferior to them. These three measures, then, it is good to have mingled and worked together in the soul, that being persuaded that God is supremely exalted, *who rises above his own powers, and is either perceived without them, or manifested in them*, it may receive the impressions of his power and beneficence, and, being initiated into the most



perfect mysteries, may not readily utter those divine secrets, but using them cautiously, and preserving silence upon them, may keep them sacred.”—(Philo Jud. de Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, p. 139, ed. Turn. et Hoesch.)

It seems justly to be inferred from this strange passage, in which Sarah is made to represent the state of the wise man, virtue, and her action of mixing the meal into cakes what is done by the philosophic mind, that Philo considered the different personations of the Deity, as distinct in the eyes of the ignorant and vulgar, but as perceived by true wisdom, to be none of them any other than God himself, and to have no real separate existence. We suppose he here understands the appearance to Abraham, as we have in a preceding part of this article explained it, not of any three beings, human or angelic, but of a triple *manifestation* of the one only God, which he therefore fancifully represents as himself, and two of his attributes or powers; but his whole object is to establish that these powers, though seeming distinct from him, and apparently endowed with a separate personality, are perceived by the reflecting and contemplative mind to be really but one and the same being, and to be only the exhibitions or effects of his attributes. In farther illustration of this subject, we must lay before our readers another extract relating to the same portion of sacred history, though taken from a different work of Philo, which seems fitted to remove every doubt respecting his notion of persons or distinctions in the Divine Nature :

“ When, therefore, the mind is enlightened by God as if it were noon-day,” (shining upon it, as it were, with a noon-day brightness,) “ and, being altogether filled with a light of intelligence, is freed from shadows by the splendour diffused through it, it comprehends the three images of the one subject, *one* being *the reality*, (the real existence,) the other two, *shadows which it throws*, something like which happens also to objects in the light which is perceived by the senses, for things standing or moving in it often give two shadows. Let not, indeed, any one think that in speaking of God, the word shadows is employed literally; it is but a figurative use of the word for the clearer expression of the thing to be explained, since the truth is not thus. But any one approaching the nearest possible to the truth might say, that the middle one was the FATHER OF ALL, who in the sacred Scriptures is called by the peculiar name, HE WHO IS; (the *self-existent*, an interpretation of Jehovah;) but the powers on each side are the most ancient, and the most closely united to ‘Him who is,’ of which one is called the *creative*, the other the *royal*. And the *creative* power is GOD, for it established and arranged the whole; (deriving Θεός from Θεω, to *place* or *dispose*;) but the *royal* power is the LORD, for it is right that the Creator should rule over and govern that which is created. (This remark shews the essential identity, according to Philo, of the *creative* and *governing* powers.) He then that is in the middle, attended on each side by his powers, (or *attributes*,) affords to the acute understanding an image sometimes of *one*, sometimes of *three*. *Of one*, when the soul, being completely purified, having risen above not only the multitude of inferior, (powers,) but also that pair which is near to the one, (the Monad,) hastens to attain to the pure, simple, and in itself complete, idea. *Of three*, when not yet initiated in high mysteries, it is still occupied with inferior matters, and is not able to comprehend him who exists without any other, by himself alone, otherwise than by means of his acts, *creation* and *government*.”—(Philo de Abrahamo, pp. 366, 367, ed. Turnebi et Hoesch.)

It is very observable that the Divine word or *logos* is not at all mentioned in either of the two passages last quoted, although it is not easy to conceive how it could have been omitted, had Philo considered it as having a real and distinct existence as a part of the Divine Nature. We have now seen

him at one time representing two triads of different degrees of inferiority to the Supreme God, at the head of the first of which the *logos* was placed, at another, constituting a triad of God himself and two of his perfections, without at all introducing the *logos*; and what we have seen of his meaning in attributing personal characters to divine perfections, will prepare us for understanding the language which has been so confidently appealed to by the Christian defenders of mystical notions respecting the nature of him who is called the "Word of God." We shall first state what appears to be the true meaning of Philo in using the term *logos*, and shall then take such farther notice as may seem requisite of the supposition of his having employed the term in two different senses, the one derived from the Platonic philosophy, the other from the religious traditions of his countrymen, and of the epithets he has given to his *logos*, which are supposed to prove its identity with the Messiah predicted in the Jewish Scriptures. *First*, then, we believe that the *logos* of Philo really signifies the Divine *intelligence* or *wisdom*, a property or attribute of the Divine Nature, not a real person, or distinct subsistence, and has personal qualities ascribed to it only in the same sense in which other Divine perfections or energies, as the *creative* and *governing* powers, have a figurative personality ascribed to them by this fanciful writer. To his Platonism, not to his religion, we attribute his doctrine on this subject. The following passage may be considered as a very clear expression of his real meaning :

"For God perceiving before-hand, by means of his Deity, that there could never be a good copy without a good pattern, nor any sensible object, such as not to deserve censure, unless it should correspond to an idea in the understanding as its archetype, having determined to form this visible world, first formed an intellectual one, that using as a model that which was incorporeal and most divine in its nature, he might complete the corporeal and newer one as an exact resemblance of the older; containing in it as many species of sensible things as the other did of intellectual (i. e. of those which existed in the understanding only). The world, which consists of ideas only, it would not be right in speaking or thinking to confine to any place, *but we shall understand how it exists by considering a similitude taken from our own affairs.* When a city is about to be founded by the munificence of a king, or of any ruler possessing sovereign power, and adorning his good fortune by a disposition to liberality, there comes some person, skilful in architecture, and having considered the advantages which the situation affords, first delineates within himself almost all the parts of the intended city, its temples, gymnasia, &c. Then the images of each being impressed, as it were on wax, in his own mind, he thus forms an *intellectual* city, of which, exciting again the forms in the memory with which he is furnished by nature, and thus impressing them yet more strongly, like a good workman looking to his pattern, he begins to construct a proper union of stone and wood, conforming the material objects one to each of the immaterial ideas. And thus, in a great degree, are we to think concerning God, who having determined to found this great city, first conceived in his mind its forms, from which, having constructed an intellectual world, he made use of it as a pattern in forming the sensible world. In like manner, then, as in the case of the architect, the preconceived city has no external existence, but is only impressed on the mind of the artificer, so neither has the ideal world any other place than the Divine *word*, (*logos*, reason or intellect,) which arranged all things—for what other place could there be among the divine powers fit for receiving, I will not say all ideas, but even any one of the simplest? . . . *But if any one should wish to employ plainer words, he would say, that the intellectual world* (the world of ideas existing only in the Divine mind) *is nothing different from the Logos of God creating the world:* for neither is the intellectual city any thing

different from the reasoning (or meditation λογισμὸς) of the architect designing to build the city, conceived in his mind.”—(Philo de Mundi Opificio, pp. 3—5, ed. Turn. et Hoesch.)

We add a short extract from another treatise :

“ God is the first light : and he is not only light, but the archetype of all other light ; rather is elder and more exalted than the archetype, having the *word* as his copy—for the copy, his most perfect word, is light, but he himself is like no created thing.”—(De Somniis, p. 576, ed. T. et H.)

Again,

“ Moses says expressly that man was formed after the image of God, but if the part (i. e. man, who is but a small part of the world) is an image of *the image*, (i. e. of *the word*, which is an image or transcript of God himself, and which Philo means to say that Moses referred to, when he affirmed that man was made in the image of God,) without doubt the whole species, this whole sensible world is so too, which is a better resemblance than the human one of the Divine image ; but it is evident that the archetypal image, (image or reflection of God himself, giving form to all other things,) which we call the intellectual (or ideal) world, must itself be the pattern of the forms of things, the idea of ideas, the Word of God.”—(De Mundi Opificio, p. 5, ed. T. et H.)

Once more :

“ For nothing mortal can be formed after the image of the Supreme Being, the father of all, but after that of the second God, who is his *word*.”—Liber I. Questionum et Solutionum apud Eusebium, Præp. Evang. Lib. vii. Cap. xiii.

Comparing this last with the preceding passage in which the *logos* is said to be the God in whose image man was made, at the very moment when this same *logos* is explained to be the ideal world conceived by God before his creation of the sensible world, and, therefore, having no existence but as a distinct conception of the Divine mind, no deity but as identical with God himself, we obtain just notions as to the real meaning of this author's obscure and figurative mode of expression, and plainly perceive, that though this kind of language may have prepared the way for the corruption of Christianity, it is not used by Philo himself to express any thing analogous with the doctrines of reputed orthodoxy. We might confirm the view we have given of the figurative character of what he says of the *logos* by reference to several of his statements on kindred subjects, as his describing the world as the *only* and *beloved son* of God and his *wisdom*, (De Temulentia, p. 244, ed. T. et H.,) and his representing the *thoughts* and *determinations* of wise men as their *spiritual children* (de Vita Contemplativa, p. 899, ed. T. et H.), which surely afford a sufficient comment on his calling the *word* the son and the first-born son of God. It is observable, that although, in a passage just referred to, he calls the *sensible world* the son of God and his *Wisdom*, in another place he calls the *logos*, i. e. *the ideal world*, the pattern according to which the sensible one was formed, by the same name, which is enough to prove that the title is figuratively used. Many of Dr. S.'s extracts from Philo, which indeed include most of those we have produced, will be found strongly supporting the view we have given of his doctrine, and all of them, we think, when examined in their connexion, will harmonize with it. Dr. S. himself has fairly stated, that

“ The Word is represented as being the same to the Supreme Intellect that speech is to the human ; and as being the conception, idea, or purpose of the Creator, existing in the Divine mind previously to the actual formation

of his works.—If,” he proceeds, “this paragraph were to be taken absolutely and without restriction as a key to the other parts, our inquiry would be answered; and it would be summarily decided that all those other attributives are nothing but personifications and allegories, thus variously and fancifully representing the single idea of the original and eternal PLAN or DESIGN of the Infinite *Intelligence*.”—Script. Test. Vol. I. p. 595, 2nd ed.

Such has, in fact, been the decision of some of the ablest men who have applied themselves to the subject—of Basnage, Souverain, Nye, and, above all, of Mosheim,\* not now to mention others. What then is the argument by which Dr. S. attempts to resist this conclusion?

“This hypothesis,” he says, “would involve the charge on the writer before us of an extravagance and luxuriance of imagination and diction, which might challenge all parallel among authors having the smallest pretensions to sobriety of thought.—But Philo was no such preposterous writer. Unjustifiable and of injurious tendency as is his favourite principle of interpretation, that principle may be traced to the ambition of *moulding revealed theology according to his system of philosophy*. It is, likewise, observable that his doctrine concerning the WORD is, in a great measure, conveyed in the form of *interpretations* of the supposed allegories of Scripture: and those interpretations are *professedly* given as the *literal* meaning of the allegories. But no sane writer could give interpretations of alleged enigmas in terms equally enigmatical with the things to be interpreted, or even more so.”—Ibid. p. 596, 2nd ed.

We cannot say what may be the value of Philo’s pretensions to *sobriety of thought*, but we have quoted at length a passage in which he represents the six cities of refuge as really meaning the Divine Logos and five other divine attributes; yet we have also quoted his own declaration, that neither this divine logos nor these attributes are in any strict sense distinct from God himself, or have any existence but as properties of his nature. Perhaps to those who consider the distinction he draws between popular and philosophical modes of speaking on the subject, and who call to mind the extravagancies and inconsistencies with which his allegories abound, there may not appear any thing very wonderful in what Dr. S. regards as impossible; at all events, the fact is before us. In accommodation to a favourite system of philosophy, and under the idea that the doctrine of the pure and simple unity of God could only be comprehended by the most refined and contemplative minds, Philo habitually attributed to certain qualities and energies of the Divine nature a sort of figurative personality, and never scrupled in forming his allegories to speak of them as, *in a certain sense*, distinct; but we must take his own explanation of what he really meant by this language, from which we learn that the *word*, the *creative*, and other powers, stand in much the same relation to the Divine Mind, that thoughts and volitions do to the human mind.

The reason given by Dr. S. for identifying the *logos* of Philo with the Messiah, that “otherwise it must be admitted that this writer has made no mention of the Messiah at all,” is most extraordinary, the want of other notices than can be imagined to be conveyed by his use of this term being, in fact, a sufficient proof that he either was not much impressed with the hope of his countrymen, or had some reason for avoiding its introduction in his philosophical allegories.

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\* The learned reader will immediately perceive how much we are indebted to the note of this distinguished man on the opinions of Philo, in his edition of Cudworth’s Intellectual System.

The notion of a double sense of the term *logos*—a philosophic, in which it signifies the Divine intellect, or what is conceived in the Divine mind, and a religious, in which it refers to a divine person, cannot be defended otherwise than by shewing either that there are inconsistencies in the use of the term which cannot be reconciled without such an assumption, or that there are titles and epithets given to the *logos* which, necessarily implying distinct personality, cannot belong to the *same* *logos*, which the author affirms to have been no more than the conception or purpose of the Creator. Now the inconsistencies of Philo on this subject relate to no essential point, and are really very trifling, considering his character as a writer; and in the long train of titles ascribed to the *logos* in different parts of his work, we do not observe one which is really inconsistent with merely figurative personality. If the **WORD** is called God, so, more than once, is the *creative power*: all such expressions as the *shadow*, *image*, *express image of the seal of God*, are peculiarly appropriate to the view we have given of Philo's doctrine: the word *angel* is often used by this writer to signify only a manifestation or medium of action, and affords no proof whatever of real personal existence: other personal titles are merely figurative, illustrating the action or office of the personified *Word* in particular instances, and forming parts of particular allegories.

Upon the whole, the philosophy which appears in the writings of Philo may have been common among his more learned countrymen, especially at Alexandria; it may possibly have had some influence on the language of the New Testament, and we do not doubt its having been the original source of those corruptions of Christianity which now assume the name of orthodoxy; but that in the hands of the Jewish philosopher, or even of the earlier Christian fathers, it meant any thing resembling the modern doctrine, we must altogether deny, and we think we have justified this denial by abundant evidence.

Dr. S.'s remaining section is on the Rabbinical writings:

“That the Jews,” he says, “in the middle ages, and their successors of the present day, have looked for only a human Messiah, it would be superfluous to prove. . . . But it is not impossible that in the writings of this unhappy people, some remains may be discoverable of their better and earlier faith.”

It may be readily granted, that if we are determined to believe that their earlier faith was different from their present, and was more to our taste, we may in the examination of writings so mystical and obscure as theirs, find something like support for almost any doctrine which pleases us; but the consideration that the modern Jews, who respect these writings and have much better means for understanding them than we have, find nothing in them inconsistent with their own opinions, ought surely to have some little weight with us. Dr. S. proceeds to give an account of the *book Zohar* or *book of light*, said to have been compiled from the sayings of Rabbi Simeon, the son of Jochai, a celebrated Jew, supposed to have been born before the destruction of Jerusalem. “Being unable,” he tells us, “to read this book with sufficient intelligence, I have recourse to the more easy method of extracting passages from the ample collections of Schoettgenius.” Our own acquaintance with the *Zohar* being derived from the same source as Dr. S.'s, we shall not say a word on the controversy respecting its real age, or the extent to which it has been interpolated, but we are prepared to maintain, on his own evidence, that Schoettgenius was mistaken in attributing to the

author of this book, and to other Jewish writers, a belief in the Divine Nature of the Messiah, or in any of the mysteries of modern Christian orthodoxy. We take as a fair specimen of the whole the evidence of the application of the names *Jehovah*, *Shechinah*, and *Holy and blessed God*, to the Messiah. 1. *Jehovah*. "This essential name of God is applied to the Messiah, Jerem. xxiii. 6, (*Jehovah our righteousness*), upon which place see what is said in the 2nd book."\*

"Zohar Deuter, fol. 119, col. 473, '*In another place the learned in our traditions have taught that THE TEMPLE and the NAME of the MESSIAH may be called by the name of the Tetragrammaton (i. e. Jehovah).*'"—(Schoettgenius, *Horæ Hebr. et Talm.*, Vol. II. p. 4.) It is strange that the application of a name equally to the *temple* and the *name of the Messiah*, should be thought to prove any thing respecting the Messiah's *nature*. "Zohar, in Exod. fol. 21, col. 33. The words of Exod. xiii. 21, '*And Jehovah will go before them,*' are explained of the matron and the angel of the covenant, which I shall shew to be names of the Messiah."—(Schoettg. loc. cit.) We need not now inquire into the meaning of the mystical term *matron* in the Zohar. The object of the comment is the remark that it was not Jehovah himself, who could not be more in one place than another, but some symbol of his presence, or perhaps, in the estimation of the metaphysical commentator, some emanation from him which really accompanied the people. The next argument is a very strange one. "Midrasch Tehillim ad Ps. cvii. fol. 40, 1, in reference to the words of Isaiah xxxv. 10, '*And the redeemed of Jehovah shall return.*' *He does not say, the redeemed of Elias, nor the redeemed of the Messiah: but the redeemed of Jehovah.* It is evident here that the redeemed of the Messiah and the redeemed of Jehovah are considered as synonymous."—(Schoettg. loc. cit.) Doubtless the same persons would be intended by the redeemed, whether of Elias, the Messiah, or Jehovah, either of the former being able to redeem only by the aid and authority of Jehovah; but the identity of the Messiah and Jehovah no more follows than that of Elias and Jehovah. Lastly, "Midrasch Tehillim, fol. 57, 1, *Rabbi Huna said, the Messiah is called by eight names, which are, Jinnon, Jehovah, our righteousness, &c.*; because the words יהוה צדקנו (*Jehovah our righteousness*) are here counted as two names,

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\* On turning to the passage referred to we find several extracts from Jewish books. Echa rabbathi, fol. 59, 2: "What is the name of the king Messiah? Rabbi Abbas, the son of Cahana, said, Jehovah is his name." It is difficult to judge of this without seeing what precedes and follows it, but it probably refers to this very passage of Jeremiah, understood as explained in the following extracts: Rabbi Joseph Albo in Sepher Ikkarim: "The Scripture calls the name of the Messiah, *Jehovah our righteousness*, because he is the mediator of God, through whom we obtain justification from God." Kimchi: "The Israelites shall call their Messiah by the name *Jehovah our righteousness*, because in his times the righteousness of God towards us will be firm and well established." Midrasch Tehillim ad Psa. xxi. 1: "God calls the king Messiah by his own name. But what is his name? The answer is found Exod. xv. 3, *Jehovah is a man of war*. But it is said concerning the king Messiah, *and this is his name*" (referring to Jer. xxiii. 5). The meaning of this evidently is, that God himself could not properly be called a warrior; but the expected Messiah, expected by the Jews as a warlike deliverer, is said by Jeremiah to be called *Jehovah our righteousness*; he may, therefore, be intended by *Jehovah the warrior*, it being understood, of course, in both places, not that the Messiah *was* Jehovah, but that Jehovah *acted by him*. The argument for the application of the passage rests entirely on the Messiah *not being* Jehovah, but honoured with his *name* as his representative.

whereas in reality they are but one, perhaps the modern Jews have expunged one which might be ascertained by a collation of copies.”—(Schoettg. loc. cit.) If this remark be correct, the whole force of the passage is destroyed, since the object is to prove that the Messiah is called Jehovah, not by the symbolical name “Jehovah our righteousness,” which would not convey the least hint of identity with Jehovah. And whether the passage has been altered or not, it is evident from what has been already said, that the application of the name could not be intended to express participation in nature. This is the whole Rabbinical evidence adduced by Schoettgenius to prove that the Jews expected their Messiah to be Jehovah : it is perfectly worthless.

The word *Shechinah* was used by the Jews to express any manifestation of the Divine presence or energy. It is not a name of God, but of the symbols of his presence on earth, and might without impropriety be applied to men enabled by him to act in an extraordinary manner, as well as to a bright cloud or a burning bush. It will be enough for us to notice one passage from the Zohar, upon which Schoettgenius chiefly relies. “Zohar, Gen. fol. 88, col. 343 : “ This son is the faithful shepherd. Concerning thee it is said, Ps. ii. 12, ‘*kiss the son,*’ and ver. 7, ‘*thou art my son.*’ But he is the Prince of Israel, the Lord of things below, the chief of ministering angels, the Son of the Most High, the Son of the holy and blessed God, and *the gracious Shechinah.*”—(Schoettg. Horæ Heb. et Talm. Vol. II. p. 6.) The last expression means the gracious manifestation of God’s favours to his people. It is not a personal appellation, and is therefore no proof of the Messiah’s participation in divine names. With respect to the third title, “Zohar, Genes. fol. 63, col. 249,” is quoted thus : “And the King Messiah, who is called by the name of the holy and blessed God.” (Schoettg. Horæ Heb. et Talm. Vol. II. p. 8.) It may be enough in illustration of the sense in which this is said, to quote from Bava-bathra, fol. 75, 2, words elsewhere alleged by Schoettgenius : “There are three things which receive the name of the holy and blessed God himself, namely, *the Just, the Messiah, and Jerusalem.*”—(Apud Schoettg. Vol. II. p. 205.) After reading this, will any man in his senses suppose that Jewish writers understood being called by the name of the Most High to imply any participation in his nature ?

We conclude that there has been no proof afforded either from the Zohar or from other Rabbinical works, that the Jews at any period expected their Messiah to be a partaker in the Divine Nature. We think we have shewn that Dr. S. has totally failed in his endeavours to deduce, either from the Old Testament or from Jewish writings of a later date, any evidence favourable to his doctrine ; and that he cannot carry forward to the examination of the Christian Scriptures themselves, even the slightest reasonable presumption in behalf of the views which he so ingeniously and learnedly labours to establish.

## PART II.

## THE NEW TESTAMENT.

DR. S.'s third book, which occupies the whole of his second volume, is employed in considering the "Information to be obtained concerning the Person of THE CHRIST from the Narratives of the Evangelical History, and from our Lord's own Assertions and Intimations." It is not possible for us to enter as minutely into the examination of the remaining as we have done of the preceding parts, nor do we think that it is at all required. We shall produce sufficient specimens relating to important points, and bringing into view, in some instances at least, the claims of Mr. Belsham, as well as the general merits of the controversy.

Among Dr. S.'s introductory observations we find the following :

"That Jesus Christ was and is really and properly a *man*, is maintained by the orthodox as strenuously as by the Unitarians. To bring evidence in proof of this point is, on either side, unnecessary; unless it were conceded that proper humanity implies necessarily a mere humanity; or in other words, that it is *impossible* for the Deity to assume the human nature into an indissoluble union with himself. Such a union, let it be carefully remembered, is not a transmutation of either nature into the other; nor a destruction of the essential properties of either; nor a confusion of the one with the other. The question of such a union is a question of *fact*: and its proper, its only evidence, is Divine Revelation."

The question of such a union *is* a question of *fact*: by Unitarians it is always so treated. They cannot be blind to the strangeness and antecedent improbability of the doctrine, but their difficulties will be overcome by the clear and direct evidence of Divine Revelation. What they allege is, that no such evidence has been or can be produced, that in fact the contrary doctrine is as plainly *taught* in Scripture as any thing can be taught which had never been denied, and can therefore only be incidentally recognized as true. When they quote passages in which our Lord is spoken of as a man, they produce them not merely as testimonies to real and proper humanity, but as instances in which, from the nature of the case, it is *impossible to conceive* of one who believed him to have also had a divine nature, having withheld the expression of that belief, and *therefore* as proofs that no such belief was entertained by those to whom alone we can look for information. The argument is not merely that Jesus is called a man, but that, whilst God-man and all equivalent expressions are unknown to Scripture, he is called a man *in immediate reference to his most extraordinary powers and most exalted offices*, without a hint being added in those places of any superior nature united with the human; and this we contend



is absolutely inconsistent with the reputedly orthodox doctrine. We may distinguish as nicely as we please what is or is not implied in the union of natures, but it is evident that either all that is ascribed to Jesus belongs to his whole person including both natures, which is altogether inconsistent with his declared ignorance respecting the day of judgment, his inability to do any thing of himself, the merely human affections at times attributed to him, and, in short, with almost every page of his history; or else we need some sufficient test for distinguishing what belongs to each nature, and must in every instance apply it so as to determine whether one or the other or both together be in that place intended—a position which involves the Scriptures in inextricable confusion, and would almost reduce to nonsense some of its most interesting and instructive pages. To offer separate proofs of the divine and human natures of our Lord, even if it were possible, would not be sufficient. Such passages standing by themselves could only be considered as either unintelligible or contradictory. We are bound to require direct and positive evidence of the union of the two natures, and we reasonably expect this to be accompanied by abundant indirect indications of the influence of that doctrine on the minds of those who have recorded our Lord's actions and discourses. Nothing, certainly, of this kind has been produced, and without it there is no other species of evidence, even if much better in quality than it actually is, which can be sufficient to establish the orthodox doctrine.

We must now direct the reader's attention to the 4th section of our author's 3rd chapter. It is intended to shew that "the person of Christ, equally with that of the Father, surpasses human knowledge." The argument is drawn from Matt. xi. 27, thus translated by Dr. S. : "All things have been committed to me by my Father; and no one knoweth perfectly the Son except the Father; neither doth any one know perfectly the Father, except the Son, and he to whom the Son may be pleased to unveil [this knowledge];" and John x. 15, "As the Father knows me, even so I know the Father."

From the passage in the Gospel of Luke parallel to that here quoted from Matthew, ("No man knoweth *who the Son is* except the Father, and who the Father is except the Son,") Dr. S. concludes that the knowledge spoken of "refers primarily to the *nature* and *person* of the Father and the Son," which, he says, "nullifies the Calm Inquirer's interpretation of the words." He considers the passages quoted as "including *statements of truth*," of which we shall endeavour to give the substance.

"1. That the communication to mankind of the doctrines which refer to their highest interest in knowledge, holiness, and happiness, is, by a constitution of Divine Wisdom, made the province of the Messiah, as the Mediator between God and man." "2. That this knowledge of the Father and knowledge of Christ are expressed in the way of a perfect *reciprocity*. The description and properties of the one are the description and properties of the other; without limitation on the one side, or extension on the other." "3. That in relation both to the Father and the Son this knowledge is not attainable by the ordinary means of human investigation; it is fundamental to a saving and practical knowledge of true religion; it has its seat in the affections as well as in the intellect; and it is here affirmed to be a special communication of Divine influence." "4. That this knowledge, as existing in the state of communication from Christ to any of mankind *to whom the Son may be pleased to reveal it*, though the same in kind, cannot be imagined to be the same in *degree* or *extent*; unless it be assumed that the capacity and attainment of the instructed must, as a matter of course, be equal to those of

the INSTRUCTOR." "5. Had the member of the sentence which introduces the Son as the object of knowledge been wanting," the remaining part of the passage would have been supposed to refer "to the peculiar glories of the Divine Being, or THAT which distinctively constitutes him God." It would have been understood "that the Infinite Majesty and Perfection of the Adorable Supreme, as distinguished from the imaginary deities of the Heathen world, were revealed and demonstrated by the Christian religion alone. Restore, then, the clause which has been withdrawn; and will not fairness of interpretation require us to accept it as *equally* attributing to the Son *the same* Infinite Majesty and Perfection?"

On a very slight foundation a considerable superstructure is here raised. We admire the ingenuity of the artist, but it is our business to try the stability of the work. In the first place, let us refer to the *nullified* comment of Mr. Belsham on Matt. xi. 27, and Luke x. 22.

"It is plain that he to whom the Son reveals the Father, knows the Father. But what can a man thus learn of God? Nothing, surely, but his revealed will. In the same sense, precisely, the Son knows the Father, i. e. he knows his will, his thoughts, and purposes of mercy to mankind. And the Father alone knows the Son, knows the nature, the object, and the extent of his mission. See John i. 18, x. 14, 15."

Mr. Belsham here manifestly uses *will* rather to express the design of God's providence, that which he intends to accomplish, than what he requires from his creatures, or at least he includes what Dr. S. calls the *decretive* as well as the *preceptive* part of the Divine will. To the objection that this is not all which a man can learn of God by revelation, we might reply, that the knowledge of the excellencies and perfections of God's nature being only interesting and useful to us in connexion with his commands and his designs respecting us, and being only in this way necessary to piety and happiness, it is not to be accounted distinct from the *will* of God in the general sense in which the Calm Inquirer used that term, and was in fact included by him, *revealed will* being opposed to metaphysical nature and essence; but it is sufficient to shew that Mr. Belsham's interpretation of the Evangelist's meaning is approved by the most judicious commentators, and is not in the least affected by our author's objections to it. We quote first from Rosenmüller's Scholia :

"Πάντα μοι παρεδόθη ὑπὸ τῆς πατρὸς μου (All things are delivered unto me of my Father)—*All things* which are to be done or taught for the salvation of men, *my Father hath made known unto me*. I have no doubt that *παρεδιδόναι* in this place means *to teach, to reveal*, [in which sense the Heb. *יָרָא* very frequently occurs in the Rabbinical writings,] on account of the following words, for Christ says that the revelation of all mysteries relating to human salvation is entrusted to him : *οὐδεὶς ἐπιγινώσκει τὸν υἱόν, εἰ μὴ ὁ πατήρ* (and no man knoweth the Son but the Father)—*No one hath yet understood the nature of the office committed to the Messiah but the Father*. *Τίς (the Son)* is here put concisely for that which was committed by the Father to the Son to be done or taught : and *ἐπιγινώσκειν* here denotes accurate knowledge. *Οὐδὲ τὸν πατέρα τίς ἐπιγινώσκει εἰ μὴ ὁ υἱός* (neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son)—*Nor does any man except the Son fully understand the decrees and counsels of the Father*, relating to the salvation of the human race. Respecting the sense of *τὸν πατέρα* (the Father) the same thing is to be remarked which we have before observed of *the Son*. Even the prophets had but a very imperfect view of the things which they predicted on these subjects : *καὶ ὅ ἐὰν βούληται ὁ υἱὸς ἀποκαλύψαι* (and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him). This is to be referred equally to what

is known of the Father and of the Son. For it was left to the wisdom of the Son both to what persons, and to what extent, and at what time, he would communicate this knowledge.”—J. G. Rosenmüller, Schol. in Nov. Test. ed. 3d, Vol. II. p. 169.

We shall next give the principal points in Kuinoel’s annotation :

“ *My Father hath delivered all things to me.* The discourse is here concerning divine instruction and the explanation of the divine counsels, as the whole connexion shews—the sense of the words is, ‘ those things which I teach I owe entirely to my Father: he hath delivered to me his own instruction in all its parts.’ *And no one hath so accurately known the Son*, what sort of a person I am, and what is the nature of the office entrusted to me, *except the Father; nor hath any one so accurately known the Father*, what is the degree of intercourse between me and my Father, what are the plans of my Father concerning the salvation of men to be effected through me, *except the Son, and he on whom the Son shall choose to bestow this knowledge*, which last words must be referred to each of the preceding clauses. No one, Jesus declares, can know these things unless taught by me. Whence he establishes that he is the true teacher, from whom every one is able, and ought, to receive salutary instruction.”—Kuinoel, Comm. in Nov. Test. Vol. I. pp. 355, 356.

And in like manner Wetstein :

“ Although those Jewish doctors despise my humble condition, you think more justly: you believe that I am the only partaker in the secret things of God, and have been sent by him that I might shew the way of salvation; that those who depart from me depart from the light, and cannot truly understand God the Father, though they boast that they know him.”\*

But Dr. S. thinks that the words of the parallel passage in Luke, *who the Son is, who the Father is*, prove that the text must be understood of knowledge of the *nature and person* of the Father and the Son. Cannot then the words, *who the Son is*, be at least as readily understood—what are his *character, office, and the nature of his mission*, as what are his *nature and person*? Does not the context direct us to that interpretation? And is not the other evidently suggested, not by the words and connexion, but by the opinion received as true, that there is some mystery respecting the person of Christ? A judicious and learned commentator, whom we have quoted above, thus explains the words of Luke: “ *Who the Son is*, for what purpose and with what power he is sent. *Who the Father is*, how good, how just, how wise he is, what are his plans in giving salvation to men, or at least depriving them of excuse, if they should reject it.”—J. G. Rosenmüller, Scholia in Nov. Test. Vol. II. p. 102.

In the passage quoted from John x. 15, the word *know* is most probably to be understood in the sense of *love, regard with distinguishing affection*, a sense derived from the Hebrew, (see Bloomfield, Recens. Synopt. and Kuinoel in loc.,) and the 15th verse must be taken in connexion with the 14th, thus: “ I am the good shepherd: and I know my sheep, and am known of mine, as the Father knoweth me, and I know the Father: and I lay down my life for the sheep.”

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\* We add Grotius’s note: “ *No one knoweth the Son but the Father*—the Father only who hath ordained it from eternity, knoweth what the Son is to do and suffer, and what glory is reserved for him. *Nor doth any one know the Father save the Son*—the Son only partakes in the counsels of the Father as to the manner in which he will arrange the calling of the Jews first, and then of the Gentiles.”

It appears, then, that Mr. Belsham's note gives an excellent sense, such as the connexion would seem to require, is confirmed by a fair consideration of the parallel passage, and is in accordance with the sentiments of the most judicious and generally approved commentators, whilst it is our author who is here chargeable with giving an unusual, far-fetched, and forced interpretation. We will now offer one or two remarks *on the statements of truth* which he finds included in the passages under consideration, and first as to the *perfect reciprocity* of the knowledge of the Father and the knowledge of Christ.

“Is it conceivable,” asks Dr. S., “that a wise and good teacher, conscious of no dignity above that which was strictly and merely human, would select, for the purpose of conveying what might have been expressed in plain words, language which unquestionably describes himself and the Eternal Being by *equivalent* and *convertible* terms?”

We answer, all Christians believe their Lord to have been *conscious of a dignity NOT MERELY human*, though we understand it to have been a dignity of *office and powers*, not of *nature*. Nevertheless, we insist that the meaning we ascribe to the words of Christ, could *not* have been well expressed *more plainly* according to the idiom of his country, and is by no means difficult to be discerned in our times. Precisely in the same manner as when the disciples were exhorted to *be perfect as their Father in heaven is perfect*, they and the Eternal are described in equivalent and convertible terms; our Lord and the God who sent him are certainly here so spoken of; but no conclusion can be drawn in the one case which would not be equally just in the other, and the attempt to infer the identity of the knowledge spoken of in kind and extent, is altogether unreasonable and extravagant.

It is perfectly true that the knowledge here spoken of is represented as not attainable by the ordinary means of human investigation: it is the subject of Revelation: but when Dr. S. says, that “it is here affirmed to be a special communication of *Divine influence*,” he affirms that for which he has no warrant in the fair interpretation of the passage. Jesus spoke of the actual state of things. Certain knowledge respecting the Messiah's office and the Father's plans, was not then possessed at all justly and correctly by those who made great pretensions to it. The Father had reserved to himself the exact knowledge of the nature of the Son's mission: the Son alone was admitted to the full understanding of the Father's designs, and this he was to communicate to whom he pleased, to his chosen followers; but being communicated, and the communication recorded for the benefit of mankind at large, no farther revelation to individuals is to be expected, or is at all hinted at in our Lord's words. Again, in reference to our author's fourth position, it was the actual knowledge respecting the true character of the gospel dispensation, which had hitherto been kept secret, which our Lord undertook to reveal to such as he should choose for that purpose. Dr. S., who had just before been contending for a perfect reciprocity and co-extension of the knowledge of God and Christ, now finds room for differences in *degree* and *extent*, according to the different capacities of the *instructed* and *instructor*. Of course, the truths communicated would not be equally well apprehended by all, but the plain sense of the passage is, that it was the very knowledge, and the whole of it, respecting the true nature of the Messiah's office, and the Divine purposes in his mission for the salvation of men, which had not before been possessed,

which Christ undertook now to communicate to his disciples, and which they afterwards gave proofs of their having received and fully understood. Lastly, if the clause respecting the Son, as the object of knowledge, were removed, and, of course, the passage were taken entirely out of its connexion, Dr. S. thinks it would be understood, "that the Infinite Majesty and perfection of the adorable Supreme, as distinguished from the imaginary deities of the Heathen world, were revealed and demonstrated by the Christian religion alone;" and, therefore, he argues, when the clause respecting the knowledge of the Son is inserted, the passage must be taken "as *equally* attributing to him the *same* Infinite Majesty and Perfection." Now leaving out the clause respecting the Father's knowledge of the Son, the kind of knowledge of God intended, would be to be inferred, in a considerable degree, from the connexion, and the words being addressed to Jews, and spoken in reference to Jews, could not certainly be explained of the knowledge of the Great Supreme as distinguished from Heathen deities, but must have been interpreted of the real and correct knowledge of his character and dispensations in opposition to errors prevailing among those who supposed that they understood these subjects; but granting Dr. S.'s interpretation in *the supposed case*, what sort of logic is it which argues that because, leaving out an important member of a sentence, and considering what remains, independently of its context, it might be supposed to have a certain meaning, therefore that is the true meaning, and must be applied to explain the very member, without removing which it could not have been found out? We are astonished that any man can pretend, by such a mockery of reasoning, to afford support to a doctrine so manifestly requiring the clearest and most direct evidence to overcome our justifiable scruples, so stupendous in itself, and so important in all its consequences.

We will now turn to the 6th section of the same chapter, John x. 24—38, including the words, "I and my Father are one." We will first endeavour correctly to represent the nature of Dr. S.'s argument, and to note his concessions, after which but few remarks from us will be needed.

"In this portion of the doctrine of Jesus we find the following particulars: 1. The avowal, so often made, on other occasions, of his *official subordination* to the Father."—[We do not find any such expression as *official subordination* in Scripture: to our apprehension the language of the New Testament expresses *real* and *complete* subordination, the sense of authority which was only derived, powers which were only communicated, and of a course of prescribed duty which must be accomplished. We have read of a feudal prince doing homage for a portion of his territories to a sovereign whom he equalled or exceeded in real power, and whom he shewed that he considered himself at least to equal, even whilst rendering to him a formal act of obeisance; this is our idea of merely *official* subordination, but it is not our understanding of the words of Christ, when he ascribes all his works to his Father, declares that he can do nothing of himself, and expressly affirms that his Father is greater than he. If it were, we could hardly retain our reverence for his character or our confidence in his instructions.] "2. The assertion of *his own power to confer* the blessings of salvation—the bestowment of which implies the attribute of All-sufficiency in the donor."—[We deny that there is here any assertion of our Lord's *own*, i. e. his independent, power to communicate any blessings, at least we find ourselves utterly incapable of perceiving any such meaning of what seem to us very plain words: *The works which I do IN THE NAME OF MY FATHER, they testify concerning me. But*

*ye believe not : for ye are not of my sheep. As I said unto you, my sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me ; and I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand.* MY FATHER, who gave them to me, IS GREATER THAN ALL; and no one is able to snatch them out of the hand of my Father. It is surely evident that Christ gives as the ground of his confidence, that his sheep should never perish, that his Father is greater than all. He felt that he could give a positive assurance, for he knew that he was supported by the power of God himself. This is the natural and sufficient meaning of the words ; and to suppose that he claims *independent* power, is arbitrary with respect to this passage, as it is directly opposed to others.]—“ 3. This assurance of security is repeated, with a confirmatory declaration that the *Omnipotence* of the Almighty Father is pledged to the same object.”—[As there can be nothing stronger than omnipotence, Christ’s own omnipotence was abundantly sufficient, had he claimed or possessed this attribute.]—“ 4. These two assurances are consolidated into the proposition, *I and my Father ARE ONE.*”

Dr. S. here joins himself with those who take this expression as *implying* at least the co-equality and union of nature of Christ and the Father. He concedes, indeed, that in every other passage of the New Testament, where the expression “to be one” is used, (there are two distinct passages, in one of which it occurs several times,) union of affection, or of design and co-operation, is intended. He even grants that if we were to argue from the spurious passage, 1 John v. 7, we should interpret it of CONSENT or union of testimony, but he thinks “that the grammatical sense of the phrase will not, of itself, determine the precise import; and that the meaning must be ascertained in every instance, by our attention to the *nature and circumstances* of the given case.” The mode of expression in John xvii. 21, &c., and all the circumstances of the case, are so very similar to those in the passage before us, that we can hardly help considering the one as a key to the other: *That they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us..... THAT THEY MAY BE ONE AS WE ARE ONE:* and the only other instance, 1 Cor. iii. 8, *He that planteth and he that watereth are one,* is a case of exactly the same kind; yet we have no objection to decide the question by attention merely to the nature and connexion of the words immediately under our consideration. Dr. S. goes on,

“What then is the kind of union which the nature and circumstances of the case point out? It is a union for the bestowment of the most important blessings, for the averting of the greatest evils, for a sovereign and effectual preservation from spiritual danger and eternal ruin. *These* are the plain facts of the case. It is, therefore, a union of POWER. *No one shall snatch them out of MY hand—No one can snatch them out of MY FATHER’S hand—I and the Father are ONE.* The argumentative connexion of the clause requires also to be attended to. Jesus had affirmed the adequacy of *his own* power for the certain salvation of his sincere followers, as well as that of God his Father. Therefore, to shew that he had not exceeded the bounds of truth in the assertion, and to furnish a sufficient ground of reason for it, he adds, *I and the Father are one.* The union of power is thus shewn to be a real *identity* of power.”

Our author’s argument is pretty exactly expressed by Euthymius:—*ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατήρ ἐν ἑσμεν ταυτοδύναμοι, ἐ. δε ἐν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, ἐν ἄρα καὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ἕσταν, καὶ φύσιν—I and the Father are one, equal in*

power, and if one in power, then one also in godhead, and essence, and nature. The answer is, that Jesus himself *denies* his having the same power with the Father, and describes himself as exercising a communicated and dependent power. His reasoning is, No one shall snatch them out of my hand, for no one can snatch them out of my Father's hand; but I and the Father are one. I know his will; I act entirely by his direction; I have reason fully to depend on his support in all that I do.

It is affirmed, that the acts here attributed to Christ require "a power which could be neither communicated to, nor exercised by, any being merely a creature;" but this is mere assumption. Jesus simply declares that, whilst those who *were not of his sheep*, could not be convinced by any evidence offered to them, those who were, would receive and adhere to his religion, and would surely enjoy its eternal blessings, and his confidence in this is expressly founded on his Father's power.

It is farther argued, from the accusation immediately brought by the Jews and our Lord's answer to it, that he must have made some extraordinary assertion of the divinity of his nature. "The hearers of Jesus instantly accused him of assuming DIVINE honours—whether their alarm was sincere or affected, it is clear that there must have been an *apparent* ground for it." The hearers of Jesus took up stones threatening to stone him, and, on being asked the reason, answered, *for blasphemy, and because, thou, being a man, makest thyself God*. Now, considering the character of those who brought it, there can be no doubt that sufficient ground would have been afforded for this charge by our Lord speaking of God as his Father in such a manner as to imply that he was pre-eminently the Son of God. The reply of Jesus shews that he understood this to be the sole ground of the accusation; and had it not been so, his enemies would not have failed to remind him that he had offered no defence of his most offensive expression.

"But," says Dr. S., "upon the Unitarian hypothesis, no motive can be imagined why [our Lord] should not have met the accusation with the clearest and most pointed denial. Though he saw it not to be proper, as yet, to avow himself publicly to be the Messiah, there could be no reason why he should omit to protest that he was merely a man such as other men; and every consideration of piety and veracity and all other good principles, demanded the most prompt and unambiguous declaration against the blasphemy with which he was charged. This course, however, he did not take."

We shall reply to this, by calling attention to the course which Jesus *did* take. He was unwarrantably, maliciously, and notwithstanding that his expressions might easily have been understood, accused of blasphemy, because his calling God *his* Father was represented as a sort of assumption of divinity. The sum of his defence is, "Judges and magistrates are called gods in Scripture, because the word of God was with them, or was addressed to them—because they had to administer justice in his name, or because he had commanded them to plead the cause of the destitute and fatherless, and to govern and protect the poor; this would be allowed to be certainly right, for the Scriptures cannot be made void; how, then, should he, whom the Father had selected as his chosen servant, and sent forth on a mission of grace and truth, which was proved by so many miracles, be accused of impiety for only calling himself *the Son of God*?" The defence clearly shews that he had called himself no more than *the Son of God*, and knew this expression to be the cause of offence, and it justi-

fies the use of it by an eminent servant of God on the supposition of his being, like the magistrates who had been of old called Gods, a human being, in the most satisfactory manner. Since, then, his exculpation was complete, and included a disclaimer of any pretensions founded on any other grounds than having been chosen, authorized, and peculiarly employed by God, it would be great presumption in us to say that it ought to have been made in any terms which might seem to us more precise. It answered its purpose at the time, and if we give it our candid attention we shall not now mistake its meaning. We will notice one more attempt which our author has made to strengthen his case :

“ He (Jesus) then appeals to his unquestionable miracles, as the attestation of his truth in again affirming *the very thing* which had created the offence ; in terms different, indeed, but clearly of the same import, and most strongly expressive, *not of a union of power merely*, though that involved a claim of omnipotence, [precisely as an officer who arrests a man in the king’s name claims for himself the royal authority,] but of a union in the very *nature and manner* of existence : *IN ME is the Father and I IN HIM.*”

Dr. S. is right, that this expression is of the same import with the other, and he has himself brought forward the unanswerable and irresistible objection to his interpretation of it, in the examples of its use in other places. *In that day*, says our Lord, John xiv. 20, *ye shall know that I am in my Father, and YE IN ME and I IN YOU. That they all may be one ; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us.....I in them, and thou in me, that they may be completed into one.* John xvii. 21, 23. *By this we know that we abide in him, and he in us, that he hath given us of his spirit.....God is love ; and he who abideth in love abideth in God, and God in him.* 1 John iv. 13, 16. Our author attempts to resist this objection, by an appeal to the circumstances of the particular case in which “ a oneness of *power* for the performance of works which imply omnipotence,” is the subject. We have already shewn that the circumstances of the case imply nothing of this kind. Our Lord is establishing his authority, and he proves it by an appeal to his miracles ; but if we interpret the words in which he declares his knowledge of the Divine counsels, and the extraordinary aid he receives from God, of a union of nature, we must in consistency believe also in a union of nature between Christ and his followers, and even between the all-perfect God himself and some of his creatures.

We are astonished at the hardihood with which, in the face of such declarations as these, *As the Father gave me commandment even so I do ; The Son can do nothing of himself ; I can of mine own self do nothing ; The Father that dwelleth in me HE DOETH the works ;* Dr. S. asserts that “ Jesus Christ constantly speaks of himself as being, not an instrument only, but the *AGENT*, in works of miraculous power.” Again, “ The apostles ascribed the final agency,” in the miracles which sanctioned their ministry, “ to Christ as readily as to God the Father,” which is justified only by the words of Paul, in Rom. xv. 18, “ Christ wrought them through me ;” although it is expressly declared that Christ, in his exalted state, had *received of God* the power of communicating miraculous gifts to his disciples, which gifts might, therefore, be in a certain sense properly ascribed to him, though known to be manifestations of the power of God his Father. We must not repeat the evidence, that all who saw the miracles of our Lord considered them as proofs only that *God was with him*, and that his disciples ascribed his and their own powers ultimately to God



alone, but we cannot suppress the expression of unfeigned wonder, that statements should be made in opposition, as it appears to us, to the plainest facts, and yet almost without the appearance of offering any thing in their justification; and that on no better grounds, that we can perceive, than bold and unsupported assertion, Dr. S. should oppose himself to that interpretation of the passage we have been considering, which has been approved, not by Unitarians only, but by Erasmus, Calvin, Bucer, and the great majority of *learned* commentators, however sincere in their attachment to the doctrines of reputed orthodoxy.

We select one more passage, and it is all that our limits will allow, from the volume now before us. It is the first section respecting Christ's descent from heaven, on John iii. 13, "No one hath ascended into heaven, except he who descended from heaven, the Son of Man, who is in heaven." These words, together with the preceding verse, are thus paraphrased by Dr. S. :

"If ye are so averse from apprehending and embracing my testimony with respect to those subjects of religion which refer to your own reason and conscience in the present state, how will ye be capable of understanding those more sublime truths, the knowledge of which is entirely dependent on a revelation from the Deity himself? Yet doubt not my ability to give you correct information even on these exalted themes. No human being, indeed, has ever been, or could be, admitted to that most immediate and perfect manifestation of the Divine Presence, which would communicate to him that knowledge. But the Messiah, whose superior nature is Eternal, Omniscient, and in every respect Divine, has assumed the nature of man for the express purpose of bringing this knowledge and all other divine blessings to your enjoyment."

Here it will be observed, that the first clause is made to contain an absolute assertion, admitting of no exception, to which the remaining part is opposed in the way of contrast. No merely human being hath ascended into heaven, i. e. hath had the opportunity of obtaining divine knowledge. On the contrary, the Messiah, who, as to one part of his nature, is not human, who is in heaven, hath descended from heaven, i. e. hath manifested himself in the flesh on earth to bring this knowledge: but the construction of the original requires that the latter part should be considered as an exception to the general declaration in the first clause, and οὐδεὶς (no one) cannot have the emphatic sense, "no human being," forced upon it. We *must take it*, "No one hath ascended to heaven, except he who came down from heaven." Since, therefore, he who came down, first ascended, was enabled by some means to *attain to* "that most immediate and perfect manifestation of the Divine Presence, which would communicate to him (divine) knowledge," he could not have possessed it naturally and originally, consequently could not be in nature "Eternal, Omniscient, and Divine." Dr. S. appears to consider the phrases as expressing a real being in heaven, and coming from heaven, but as including and implying the possessing and communicating divine truths. The obvious defect of his interpretation is, that, as he cannot allow Christ to have *ascended* to the place where his divine nature always existed, or to have acquired knowledge which inherently belonged to him, he is obliged to refer the first clause exclusively to others, whereas the original clearly expresses, that though no other ascended to heaven, Christ did ascend; that whatever is meant by being in heaven, whether it is to be taken literally or figuratively, the state it expresses did not always belong to him, but he was enabled to

reach it, and having first ascended, he then descended. This objection, we apprehend, to be fatal to Dr. S.'s peculiar view of the subject; we must, however, consider other modes of explaining the passage, and endeavour to estimate the force of his objections to that generally adopted by Unitarians. We can conceive it possible that all three clauses might be intended literally, all three figuratively, or part literally and part figuratively. Dr. S.'s hypothesis, which we have just considered, takes them all literally so far as supposing them to express an actual *being in heaven*, though as *connoting* the possession of that divine knowledge which is there obtained. The Unitarian explanation takes them all figuratively, supposing the ascent into heaven merely to express being admitted to the knowledge of divine things; the descent from heaven, going forth into the world as an authorized divine messenger to communicate heavenly truths; and being in heaven, the continued reception of divine communications and powers. Most commentators interpret the first clause figuratively in the same manner as the Unitarians do, many take the second, and many the third, literally. The mixture of the literal and figurative senses, though not altogether impossible, is harsh, and not to be resorted to without very strong reasons. In describing the Unitarian scheme, Dr. S. very needlessly introduces the objections made by some to the notion of a *local* heaven, which objections he answers in a manner satisfactory to us; but the question has no more than an accidental connexion with the present subject, and the acknowledgment that there may probably exist a place designated peculiarly as heaven, will not be supposed to imply that that place must be always literally meant whenever the word is used. But Dr. S. says,

“The statement of the Calm Inquirer is not correct when he says, ‘*To ascend to heaven* is a Hebrew form of expression, to denote the knowledge of things mysterious and remote from common apprehension.’ The four passages referred to by him and other writers, evidently signify a real and local ascent, with a view to obtain the knowledge, or other blessing, adverted to in the connexion of each.”

The first of these passages is Deut. xxx. 11—13 :

“This commandment is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven that thou shouldst say, Who shall ascend for us to heaven and bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?”

Our author contends that the succeeding sentence, which in the same manner affirms that the Israelites needed not to make long journeys or perilous voyages to acquire the knowledge of the Divine Will, proves that the words of the former question intend an actual ascent to some celestial region.

It proves that they believed heaven to be a place to which it was *conceivable* that men might ascend, and by reaching which the knowledge which is here unattainable might be supposed to be acquired; but the expressions in both sentences are evidently figurative. Moses illustrates the position that the commandment was neither unintelligible, nor kept from their study, by telling them that they need not inquire after impossible or very difficult means of gaining the knowledge of it; *ascending to heaven* represents the means of obtaining the knowledge of things mysterious, the commandment *being in heaven* signifies being *unintelligible*, beyond the reach of human faculties. 2. Prov. xxx. 4 : “That the ascending and descending are here assumed as undoubted properties of the Most High, is manifest from the succeeding question.” So says Dr. S.,

but we think a proper consideration of the passage will shew that the majority of commentators who have taken it differently are right. The intention of the writer seems to be to represent the knowledge of God as unattainable by human faculties, and to recommend humility from the consideration of his inconceivable majesty. "Who hath ascended up into heaven or descended?" What mortal hath immediately contemplated the glories of God, and attained to the knowledge of divine things, or hath brought forth such knowledge and communicated it to others? You know that there is none. "Who hath gathered the wind in his fists? Who hath bound the waters in a garment? Who hath established all the ends of the earth?" Is there any man that hath done these things? Or is it not known to all that they are such as the Almighty himself alone can accomplish? If there be man who can perform such wonders, "what is his name, and what is his son's name?" that they may obtain the admiration and celebrity which they deserve. (Vide Job xxxviii. 4, &c.; Isa. xl. 12—14.) This passage, then, is exactly to the purpose, ascending up to heaven and descending being figurative expressions for *acquiring* and *communicating* divine knowledge. 3. Rom. x. 6: "But the justification by faith speaketh thus: Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? that is, to bring Christ down." The meaning is: Do not entertain any doubt concerning the divine authority of Christ; do not say, Who shall go to heaven to fetch the Christ down? as if he had not yet been manifested to the world. Do not ask, Who shall obtain for us the blessings of divine knowledge? which you already possess. Lastly, Baruch iii. 29: "Who hath gone up into heaven and taken her, i. e. wisdom, and brought her down from the clouds?" Here the form of expression and the sense are exactly similar to the passage in Exodus. Dr. S. produces other instances of ascent into heaven being spoken of in Scripture, where a real translation to heaven as a place seems to be intended, but these are not to the purpose, as it is not denied that such is the original and proper meaning of the words; it is only contended that they may also bear the figurative meaning assigned, which Mr. B.'s examples appear sufficient to prove.

But Dr. S. continues:

"The Calm Inquirer, on the authority of Dr. Whitby, affirms that 'the Jews in the Targum say in honour of Moses, that *he ascended into the high heavens*, by which they could mean no more than his admission to the divine counsels.' Whitby, perhaps copying from some other author, has not understood the passage, nor even referred to it rightly. It is evident that neither he nor the Calm Inquirer, who borrows it from him, took the pains to consult the Targum. The place is in the paraphrase on Cant. iii. 3, and it very plainly refers to Moses's going up to the top of Mount Sinai to intercede for the people on their having made the golden calf."

He then makes large quotations from the Targum, of which the following specimen is sufficient:

"Moses their leader ascended *to the firmament*, and made peace between them and their king—Moses the chief scribe of Israel answered and spoke thus, *I will ascend to the heavens on high*, and I will pray before Jah, if perhaps he may be propitiated on account of your offences."

No doubt the reference is to ascending the mount, but why is it called ascending *to heaven*? Not, assuredly, as Dr. S. suggests, because the word for *heaven* is sometimes applied to a moderate elevation in the atmosphere,

but because God peculiarly manifested himself on the mount, because Moses was admitted to peculiar intercourse with him, the great purpose of which was that he might learn and communicate his will. We think therefore that, notwithstanding our author's hasty censure of others, and somewhat affected display of his own accurate learning, he has not shewn Whitby to have been in error; Moses' *ascending* certainly meant his going up into the mount, but its being called the *heavens on high*, as certainly meant that it was the immediate presence of Jehovah, admission to his counsels, the power of learning his will, and addressing him with a peculiar assurance of being attended to. The surprise of our author "that Schoettgenius and the other learned persons should not have perceived that they were putting the result for the operation, the consequent for the antecedent, the end for the means to which that end was attributed," is also, we think, much misplaced. *To be in heaven* is to be where we have the opportunity of attaining to the wonders of Divine knowledge, and is hence put for the possession of that knowledge by a figure of a kind than which none can be more common or natural; and it follows of course that to *ascend into heaven*, must mean to be admitted to the means of acquiring such knowledge. Our Lord in using the phrase most probably had the application of it to Moses in his thoughts, meaning to affirm that no prophet or messenger of God, not even the great lawgiver, had been admitted to that complete knowledge of God's purposes and will which he possessed, and which it was the object of his mission to communicate. The figure was the less liable to be misunderstood, as the contrast of *heavenly* and *earthly* things, in the preceding verse, for things familiar, which might be expected to be known, and those which were new, having hitherto remained mysteries, would almost preclude the possibility of mistake. Accordingly there is, as Mr. Belsham observes, a remarkable agreement of commentators of all parties in the interpretation of this first clause, and we cannot anticipate that Dr. S.'s remarks will interrupt its continuance.

The second clause being correlate to the first, it is very harsh to take, as many do, the one figuratively, the other literally; they should certainly be interpreted in reference to one another, and on the same principle. If to ascend into heaven is to obtain the complete knowledge of divine things, to come down from heaven, is to communicate that knowledge by divine authority, to come forth as an authorized teacher of heavenly truth. Dr. S.'s statement, that "from a careful examination of the scriptural use of the expressions *from heaven*, and *being, coming*, or *descending from heaven*, it appears that the idea intended is A DIVINE ORIGIN, which is, of course, applied variously according to the nature of the subject," is nearly coincident with Mr. Belsham's, and is sufficient for our purpose, since *divine origin*, the idea being applied according to the nature of the case under our consideration, must mean *divine authority*, as Matt. xxi. 25, "The baptism of John, was it *from heaven or of men?*" It is objected that there is no other instance of a person being said to come from heaven, meaning to bring and communicate truth, or to teach by divine authority. Prov. xxx. 4, as we have explained it, is an example of this use of the phrase; but if there were none, it arises so completely from the connexion and the sense of the preceding clause, that no difficulty need be felt.

The figurative sense of the third clause, *who is in heaven*, "who has received divine communications perfectly qualifying him for his office," follows, of course, (allowing its genuineness, which is not certain, as it is

omitted by some important authorities,) from that of the others, and Dr. S.'s interpretation of it, "who as to his superior nature is in heaven, even whilst he speaks to you on earth," is far more difficult and strange than any figurative one. We have now carefully examined our author's remarks on this very important passage, and we hope it will be perceived that he has done nothing to weaken the force of the criticisms of Mr. Belsham and other eminent men, who have contended for its interpretation as figurative language, but that a full consideration of the subject only confirms and establishes the justness of their views.

With regret we pass by other portions of Dr. S.'s volume, which certainly deserve attention. We have preferred the plan of carefully examining a few articles to that of merely touching upon many, and we venture to assure the reader (we hope that some such will be found) who is, upon the whole, satisfied with what we have done, so far as it goes, that we have not chosen the least difficult portions, and that, should he not possess the requisite knowledge for personal examination, he may judge of the controversial value of the whole from what has been laid before him.

The fourth part of Dr. Smith's work, to which we now proceed, is devoted to the consideration of "the doctrine taught by the Apostles in their inspired ministry, concerning the person of the Lord Jesus Christ." The subjects of the four chapters are, the book of Acts; the testimony of the Apostle John; the testimonies of the Apostles Peter, Jude, and James; and the testimony of the Apostle Paul.

The anxiety shewn by Dr. S., lest the book of Acts should be expected by the reader to contain *a body of Christian doctrine*, appears to us a strong extorted testimony to the impossibility of finding, in this important portion of Scripture, any thing like a satisfactory expression of his favourite sentiments, though he does not fail afterwards to adduce passages which he seems to regard as affording countenance to them.

"The annunciation of his design, which Luke gives in the preface to his Gospel, seems very justly to comprehend both parts of his work: and if this be admitted, it will supply us with a sufficient reason why the book called *the Acts* was drawn up in its particular manner and order; and it will prevent our *disappointment at not meeting* with those statements in either history or *doctrine*, which an incorrect estimate of its intention might lead us to expect. Whoever Theophilus, to whom the two books are inscribed, was, it is plain that the writer's design was, not to make him acquainted with the fundamental truths of Christianity, for in them he had been already instructed; but to furnish him with a selection of facts relative to the actions, discourses, and sufferings of the Lord Jesus, and the diffusion of his religion in some particular places, and by some particular persons. Those places and persons, it is highly probable, had some connexion with Theophilus more than other places or persons would have had: and thus some speciality of circumstances was the principle which guided the selection." . . . . .  
 "As we are not to regard the book of Acts in the light of a regular history, so this view of its design will prevent our expecting from it a body of Christian doctrine. *It supposes the reader to be*, like Theophilus, *already acquainted with the great principles of that doctrine*, and it is therefore occupied in giving him the facts which formed the basis of evidence for those principles, or which were examples of their diffusion and influence among men."—Script. Test. Vol. III. p. 6.

The book of Acts can certainly pretend to no more than being a faithful narrative of some interesting and important particulars respecting the first

preaching of the Gospel by the Apostles and their companions after their Lord's resurrection. Our author's conjecture, as to the principle on which the facts were selected, appears to us arbitrary and fanciful, but it is not material to the argument whether it be true or false. Whether chosen from amongst others, on account of some peculiar power they possessed, from incidental associations, of interesting Theophilus individually, or, as seems far more probable, on account of their intrinsic value, and their suitability for convincing men's minds, and giving them just views of the religion of Christ, it seems abundantly certain that the facts and discourses recorded by the Evangelist must be sufficient means of making known to any body the fundamental truths of Christianity. It is true, Theophilus had already acquired some knowledge of the Gospel from other sources, but the purpose of the Evangelist was to confirm and establish him in the truth, and to give him a record on which he might rely of authoritative instructions and remarkable facts, containing the principles and the evidence of the religion he had received. No book of Scripture contains any thing which can be called "a body of Christian doctrine."

Our divine religion has been, by the wisdom of God, conveyed to us *historically*: we are to collect its principles and their influences from the study of the discourses and actions of our Lord and his chosen followers. But that there should be a single narrative of any considerable portion of the public ministry of Christ himself, or of his apostles, which should not exhibit the leading and essential truths of his religion, seems altogether incredible and almost inconceivable. All the evangelists wrote their histories for the immediate information of those who had already been convinced of the truth of Christianity and instructed in its doctrines, but it was necessary to give them an authentic record, and it is not to be for a moment supposed that *what were esteemed sufficient*, though very imperfect, memoirs of the words and actions of Christ, could leave untouched any *peculiar and characteristic doctrines* of his religion. The same reasoning applies to the book of Acts. It contains only *specimens* of apostolic instruction, but they are fair and sufficient specimens, and we must expect them to put us in possession of the substance of Christian teaching: not to re-state all which was adopted from Judaism, and assumed, as known by Christian preachers, but to give us the peculiarities of the gospel, and to explain the opinions of its promulgators on those points which, from their novelty, their extensive influence, or the prevalence of erroneous views, they deemed it most important to press upon the attention of their hearers. Are the doctrines respecting the person and work of Christ, which now assume the name of orthodoxy, to be classed in this number? If they are, let the plain fact that they are not made *the subjects of instruction* in any part of the book of Acts be accounted for; if they are not, then, even supposing them not to be altogether false and unscriptural, why do modern divines presume to attach to them an importance which apostles and evangelists evidently did not attribute to them?

It is chiefly in an indirect manner that Dr. S. supposes the book of Acts to support his opinions. He has collected its testimony under nine heads. Some of his statements excite our extreme surprise, but we are under the necessity of confining our remarks at present to one or two points. He tells us, first, that the *real humanity* of Christ is here "stated in the clearest terms." This, it seems, is perfectly consistent with the reputedly orthodox doctrine. Yet we certainly feel at a loss to understand how some of the texts here quoted are to be reconciled with that doctrine. We

know it is held that our Lord was truly man as well as truly God, and, therefore, we might expect to find him on some occasions called man, but what is to be thought when he is said to be “a man proved to you to be from God by miracles, wonders, and signs, which God did by him amongst you?” *A man from God—not a God-man—proved to be sent from God by miracles—which were not his own—were not effected by any part of his own nature, but which God (plainly spoken of as a distinct being) did through him.* To us these words seem absolutely irreconcilable with the doctrine of the two natures, as directly opposed to it as if they had been designed to contradict it. Of this at least we are certain, that if the most perspicuous and appropriate language for designating a *human prophet, divinely commissioned and attested*, were carefully sought out, no words could be found fitter for the purpose than those which the Apostle Peter has employed in this passage, according to common supposition, with so very different a meaning.

Were it necessary, we might apply a similar argument to other remarkable instances in which our Lord is called *a man*, but it would be useless to go on; for those who do not see the force of the reasoning in the case we have been considering, will not be impressed by any thing we might add respecting other passages. We hope it is clear to every reader that here and elsewhere our argument is drawn not from Christ being called a man, but from his being so called *under circumstances, and with explanations, which appear to us inconsistent with the notion of his having been more than man.* It is, therefore, no reply on the part of believers in his deity to say that they also acknowledge his humanity. They are called upon to shew, by suitable and consistent explanation, that we have not good grounds for affirming *the incompatibility of the language used with the admission of any other besides a human nature.* This is what is required, but what we have seen no attempt to accomplish, and firmly believe that no ingenuity can accomplish.

We must now pass to our author's 9th head, which is introduced by the following general statement :

“This book of Acts represents the first Christians as paying religious worship to the Lord Jesus Christ, and that this was a known and acknowledged characteristic of their profession.” The particular cases upon which this general statement is founded are, i. the passages which contain the expression, *calling upon the name of the Lord*; ii. the dying words of Stephen; iii. the prayer of the eleven apostles, Acts i. 24; and, iv. the conduct of Paul and Barnabas, Acts. xiv. 23. If the book of Acts does plainly represent the first disciples as paying religious worship to Christ, let its authority have due weight, but we must frankly declare that it is not by any *ambiguous* expressions, or by any circumstances which admit of rational explanation in other ways, that we are to be induced to believe any thing so extraordinary as that he who, whilst on earth, addressed his own prayers to his Father in heaven, and directed the prayers of his disciples to the same great Being, *HIS Father and their Father, his God and their God*; he whom with full conviction we believe to be uniformly described in Scripture as distinct from and inferior to God, and as elevated above men, not by his nature, but by appointed office and communicated powers, ever accepted or allowed that worship from his followers, which it is not pretended to justify by any express injunction of himself or his apostle. We do not profess to come to this inquiry as if it were to be decided by the exclusive consideration of the texts now before us; we openly declare that we shall

avail ourselves, as we feel bound to do, of any uncertainty as to a commonly received construction, or doubt as to the meaning which has been usually assigned to a phrase, to vindicate the *consistency* as well as the reasonableness of what is contained in the Sacred Records, and to avoid placing the doctrine of a few passages in direct contradiction to the general tenor both of precept and example in the evangelical narratives.

The passages first offered to our notice in proof that the worship of Christ is recognized in the book of Acts, are those which contain the phrase, (according to the common translation) *calling upon thy name*, or *upon his name*, applied to Christ. "The Calm Inquirer," says Dr. S., "with the general body of those who hold the same system, besides some other writers inclined to lax opinions,\* affirms that 'these words may be rendered, *who are called*, or *who call themselves after thy name*, i. e. who profess themselves thy disciples.'"

It is generally agreed that the expression referred to is a periphrasis for *disciples of Christ*: the question is, how it comes to convey this meaning?—how the sense is to be derived from the words?

If any man, of any sentiments, can honestly declare that after the best attention he can give to the reasoning, precepts, and narratives, found in the New Testament, *he is prepared* to find Christians familiarly spoken of as those who *worship* Christ, we can only express our unfeigned astonishment. We can entertain no doubt that the majority of reflecting readers will well understand the feeling which has led many truly pious and learned men, some of them even believers in the divinity of our Lord's person, to pause and consider whether a phrase, which is manifestly idiomatical and of Hebrew origin, must necessarily be understood as implying so startling a fact as that the disciples addressed *religious worship and supplication* to their glorified Master. There is no doubt that the word *ἐπικαλέωμαι*, literally meaning "to call upon," and hence often, very naturally, "to call for aid," "to implore," is frequently used of *religious supplication* to the Supreme Being. To *call upon God*, or *upon his name*, frequently signifies to *pray to him*—does it thence follow that the notion of *religious supplication* is implied in the word, and that to call upon a man is to worship him? Far from it—the peculiar modification of the signification belongs *not to the word*, but *to the connexion*, and we must be cautious how we apply it. Now it happens that the Greek word, imitating the Hebrew קרא, which it very often represents in the ancient Greek version of the Old Testament, has sometimes the sense of *celebrating, praising, honouring*, and thence *acknowledging the authority* of the person spoken of. It is in these significations that, joined with (*ὄνομα*) name, it is, we think, often applied to the Supreme Being, and in the same way it may, with strict propriety, be applied to an eminent servant of God. This, we are inclined to think, (agreeing, in the main, with our learned and excellent friend Dr. Carpenter, though we do not like his translation, *who APPEAL to the name of Christ*,) is the true sense of the passages under consideration. The other way of taking them, noticed by Dr. S., has, however, strong claims on our attention, and, whether we look to the great authorities by which it is supported,

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\* *Lax opinions!* Of what sort are they? or, if the term is meant as a reproach, where is the authoritative rule to which these writers are accused of not strictly adhering, and how will our author justify his presumption in such a censure whilst he affects to encourage freedom of inquiry?



or to the force of the argument adduced in its favour, is not to be lightly rejected.

The verb ἐπικαλέομαι, though generally used actively *to call upon*, is also capable of meaning *to call oneself*, or *be called*, (Phavorinus apud Schleusner,) which would give an excellent sense to all the passages. The commonness of the expression, with the verb in the *passive* form, applied to *persons* as well as things, *having the name of the Lord called upon them*, for being distinguished as his property, devoted to his service, makes it highly probable that persons might be said to *call upon themselves a name*, in the sense—not of actually bearing that name, as Dr. S., from one of his remarks, (Scrip. Test. Vol. III. p. 36,) seems to have understood it, and which is not at all implied in the phrase—but of openly acknowledging the authority of the person, or numbering ourselves as of his party. It is true, that no precise instance of this use of ἐπικαλέομαι can be found in the ancient Greek version of the Old Testament, but there is an analogous expression with a verb of *the same* form, and nearly *the same* sense, where indeed this verb might be substituted without altering the meaning, in Isa. xlv. 5. The words of the authorized translation are, “One shall say, I am the Lord’s; and another shall call himself by the name of Jacob; and another shall subscribe with his hand unto the Lord, and surname himself by the name of Israel.” Here, in the second and last clauses, we have in the Hebrew יקרא in the unquestionable sense of *calling oneself*, and כנני as equivalent with it. Both these words are expressed in the LXX. Greek by βόησεται will *call himself*, or *be called*, and in each case followed by ὄνομα. This goes very far towards justifying the translation of the New-Testament phrase ἐπικαλέμενοι το ὄνομα, *calling themselves by the name*, in the sense of acknowledging the authority; but there is one other circumstance: the phrase is found in the opening of the 1st epistle to the Corinthians: “Unto the church of God which is at Corinth . . . . with all that in every place *call upon the name* of Jesus Christ our Lord, both theirs and ours.” Now, in the conclusion of his 1st epistle to the Corinthians, Clement of Rome has evidently imitated this apostolic phrase: “May the God who seeth all things, the sovereign of spirits and lord of all flesh, *who hath chosen the Lord Jesus Christ*, and us through him, to be a peculiar people, give to every soul that is *called by his excellent and holy name*, faith, fear, peace,” &c.—πάση ψυχῇ ἐπικεκλημένη το μεγαλοπρεπές καὶ ἅγιον ὄνομα αὐτῆ, κ. τ. λ. Here there is no ambiguity. The *passive* participle places the sense beyond doubt, but if Clement is imitating the apostle, he has expressed the same sense by an equivalent form of words—and we are forcibly led to the translation *called themselves by the name*—profess adherence to—in the passage of the apostolic epistle, and, of course, in other similar places. To all this it is replied in substance, that there is no certain example of ἐπικαλεῖσθαι το ὄνομα, with the passive or reciprocal sense of the verb, signifying *to call upon oneself*, or *be called by the name*, whilst there are many unquestionable ones where the same phrase signifies *to call upon the name*; that the other mode of expression referred to—*having a name called upon a person or thing*, is the appropriate one in Scripture for conveying the idea of assuming a name; and that as Acts ii. 21, which cannot be denied to be a key to the other instances in the New Testament, is a quotation from Joel, where the sense certainly is *call upon the name of the Lord*, we cannot fairly refuse to render the other examples in the same manner. We are led by these arguments, though with some little hesitation, to prefer giving

an active sense to the word ἐπικαλέομαι; but we have already stated that this by no means necessarily implies *religious supplication*, and is not happily rendered in English by *call upon*. The passage from Clement is abundant evidence of the equivalence of the passive and active formulas, and therefore leads us to understand the latter, *acknowledging* the name of Christ, viz. that he is our divine Master, deliverer, and instructor. *Calling on the name of the Lord*, in the Old Testament, often means *celebrating*, not *praying* to him, and this sense is ascribed by the best lexicographers to קָרָא, which ἐπικαλέομαι represents: examples are, *Psa. cv. 1*, "O give thanks unto the Lord, call upon, i. e. *celebrate* his name;" and *Isa. xii. 4*, "Praise the Lord, *celebrate* his name, declare his doings," &c. From this readily follows the sense of *owning as a master, admitting the authority of, addressing in acknowledgment of his power*, which seems to be clearly found in *Psa. xiv. 4*, "Who eat up my people as they eat bread, and *call not* upon the Lord"—do not acknowledge him. *Psa. lxxx. 18*, "Quicken us and we will call upon thy name"—acknowledge ourselves thy servants. *Jer. x. 25*, "Pour out thy fury upon the Heathen that know thee not, and upon the families that call not on thy name"—that do not acknowledge thy authority—address thee as their Lord. *Zeph. iii. 9*, "For then will I change the language of the people to purity, that they may all *call upon the name* of the Lord"—acknowledge the authority of Jehovah—to serve him with one consent. This is the sense most applicable to *Joel ii. 31*, which is accommodated to his purpose by Peter, *Acts ii. 21*.

In all these examples, it is true that the phrase is applied to the Supreme God himself, but there is nothing in its nature which should prevent its equally proper application in such a case as that of our Lord; and as the occasional for the use of such a phrase could not be frequent, it is nothing wonderful that we do not meet with more varied examples. We conclude then confidently, that the periphrasis for Christians—"those who call on the name of the Lord," does not imply the worship of Christ.

We proceed to the words of Stephen, upon which, however, we hardly need detain our readers. Ἐπικαλούμενον does not at all imply that he *called* in prayer; it is simply *called upon, entreated*; and the word *God* here introduced in our common Bibles, being printed in italics, is understood by all attentive readers to be introduced on the translator's own judgment, and to have no authority whatever. Let it be considered, then, how, in the first age, our Lord held constant communication with his church, ruling its affairs, and immediately directing the course and services of his principal disciples; let due account be taken of the vision of the glorified Jesus which the martyr had just before enjoyed, which was probably continued to him at the very time; and let the marked difference be observed between this address and the prayer immediately offered by Stephen to God himself, when *he fell on his knees* and said, "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge;" and we think the entire futility of any argument founded on this passage for the religious worship of Christ, must be abundantly manifest.

Respecting the third of Dr. S.'s examples, the prayer of the apostles, *Acts i. 24*, but one remark can be needful—that most assuredly this prayer was addressed not to Christ, but to God himself, his Father and his God. Dr. S. states the matter thus:

"In the narrative of the proceedings of the eleven apostles, for supplying the vacancy in their number occasioned by the defection of Judas, we find that Peter, *after applying to Jesus, in an emphatical manner*, the epithet 'the

Lord,' *proceeded* to pray, 'Thou, Lord, who knowest the hearts, shew whom thou hast chosen.'"—Script. Test. Vol. III. p. 52

Now, in fact, Peter, in his discourse, applied the epithet to him whom all his followers call their *Lord* in the accustomed manner, without any sign of peculiar emphasis, and it is related that after he had concluded, when, in consequence of his advice, two proper persons had been selected, Barnabas and Matthias, which selection must have occupied some time, "they," the assembled apostles, (it is not said, nor do we know, that Peter spoke for them,) "prayed and said, 'Thou, Lord, which knowest the hearts of all men, shew which of these two thou hast chosen;'" using a title elsewhere given only to the All-seeing God the Father himself, and which, as there is evidently no ground in this passage, so there is none elsewhere, for applying to Christ. It is even observable that respectable orthodox writers do not generally press for this application. With a candour, courtesy, and kindness, which ought, for the sake of truth and justice, to be known and duly estimated, Dr. S. has called the natural and, we think, just remarks of some eminent Unitarian critics, that Stephen, witnessing the presence of Christ, and knowing that the government of the Church, in its first period, was immediately carried on by him, might entreat his aid in an awful moment, without praying to him as God, or sanctioning religious addresses to him, a *childish* and *imbecile subterfuge*. We neither choose to retort in any case such insulting and unwarrantable language, nor do we believe Dr. S. capable of using a subterfuge; but we do think that, if influenced by no higher motive, he ought at least to have been more cautious respecting the character of his own arguments, than he has shewn himself in the instance we have just been noticing, before he ventured to make such reflections on those of others.

There remains one other passage, Acts xiv. 23, "Having prayed, with fasting, they commended them, the disciples, to the Lord on whom they had believed." This is thought by Dr. S. to imply religious address to Christ. Let it only be observed that Paul and Barnabas prayed first as a distinct thing from commending the churches to the Lord, and that as the word *commend* means to commit to the care and direction of another, if Christ exercised controul and government over the churches, which is stated in Scripture to have been the fact, nothing could be more proper than, in taking leave, to wish that they might be under his special care, and if he is elsewhere plainly stated to have exercised this controul by the appointment, and in fulfilling the will of God his Father, then commending to his care, cannot imply making him God, or worshipping him as such. We have now gone through Dr. S.'s proofs that the book of Acts represents the first Christians as paying religious worship to the Lord Jesus Christ, and offered to the judgment of our readers what we hope they will esteem sufficient reasons for resisting his conclusion.

We must, in the next place, take a specimen from the chapter on the testimony of the Apostle John. The elaborate dissertation on the introduction to the gospel we must not touch, because we cannot now occupy the space necessary for doing any thing like justice to the subject. After all that has been written upon it, much may probably yet remain to reward farther investigation. We acknowledge that there is difficulty, but we sincerely think that the difficulty presses harder, on the whole, upon the orthodox than the Unitarian methods of interpretation, and we feel no doubt as to the general tendency of the passage.

But we turn at present to our author's remarks on a text in the 1st Epistle of John v. 20 : " And we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding that we may know him that is true : and we are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life." On the reference of the demonstrative pronoun *this*, in the last clause, to its nearest possible antecedent, Jesus Christ, a favourite argument for his deity is constructed. Our author commences by stating that the interpretation of the words " is attended with considerable difficulty." He, however, decides with sufficient confidence in favour of orthodoxy.

We follow, without feeling that we have much ground for hesitation, the interpretation usually given by Unitarians, and supported as being the most natural and suitable construction by not a few writers of unquestioned *orthodoxy* of sentiments. On the first part we adopt the paraphrase of Dr. Bloomfield, who leaves the application of the pronoun in the last clause doubtful, but clearly admitting the possibility and propriety of referring it to the Father. " We, moreover, assuredly know that the Son of God (the Messiah) is come, and hath given us this understanding that we may know him that is true (i. e. the true God, and the most acceptable way of obeying and worshipping him). And, indeed, we are *in union with* the true God, by means of his Son Jesus Christ." As to the remaining clause, since the reference of the pronoun to the more remote antecedent is acknowledged by all to be allowable *when necessary to the sense*, and since our blessed Lord himself, as recorded by the very apostle who writes this letter, addressed his Father as " the ONLY true God," consequently, cannot himself be here so called without the most direct contradiction, we hardly need seek any better authority for the only construction which frees us from the contradiction. Dr. S. objects to the translation, " We are in (ἐν) the true God, *by or through* (ἐν) his Son Jesus Christ." He cannot say it is inadmissible, but he likes the other best, and he thinks it " harsh to suppose that a change" (of the sense of ἐν) " was intended in so close and continuous a clause." In truth, it hardly is a *change* of sense : it is a slight modification of the same sense required by the connexion, which we happen to express in English by a different word. Dr. Bloomfield says, " The ἐν in ἐν τῷ υἱῷ is by most rendered *in*, as in the former clause. But the best commentators, from Grotius to Rosenmüller, assign to it the sense *per* (through). And so Tyndal. Certainly this sense is more apt : and Benson has shewn from several examples that ἐν may have two significations in the same sentence."

The expression *eternal life* is much relied upon as always belonging to Jesus Christ. But Christ is spoken of as the communicator and establisher of the doctrine of eternal life, not as the original author of the blessing. Let Rom. vi. 23, be recollected—*eternal life* is " the *gift of God* through Jesus Christ ;" and in John xvii. 3, which the author probably had in his mind when he wrote the words we are now examining, *eternal life* is said to consist in *knowing the only true God* and Jesus Christ whom he had sent. What more natural, then, than for the apostle, after glorying in the knowledge of the true God obtained through his Son, to exclaim, " This is the true God, and eternal life"—the Author and Source of that eternal life, which is made known to us by his Son ! It may now be sufficiently apparent that the argument for the deity of Christ from this text might as well have been abandoned by our author, as it has been by some of the most learned and respectable supporters of the doctrine.

In the chapter on the "Testimonies of the Apostles Peter, Jude, and James," all the most important arguments are derived from the rule respecting the use of the Greek article, to which public attention was first called by Mr. Granville Sharpe, and which has been corrected, explained, and illustrated, by the late Bishop Middleton.

Dr. S. employs very triumphant language on this subject, but it is astonishing that he and others should venture on such slight grounds to assume so confident a tone. Mr. Granville Sharp applied to his purpose what he observed to be a general fact, without very well understanding the nature of the phenomenon, or noting the exceptions with sufficient nicety. Dr. Middleton exhibited the rule as resulting from the true nature, origin, and purpose of the Greek article, and pointed out its limitations and exceptions, accounting for them with great skill and general success; but his previously fixed theological opinions did not allow him to perceive that the texts to which the rule is applied in the New Testament may be so considered as to fall within his own exceptions, which are quite as certain and well established as the rule itself.

If, indeed, it were not so, we should still remain unconvinced, because a few clear examples have been brought forward of deviation from the general rule which cannot be accounted for upon any known principle. Such irregularities are most likely to be found in works written in a foreign dialect. Even the learned Philo Judæus is accused of not having in all respects understood the proper use of the article, and it is much more probable, that there should be found in such works as the writings of the New Testament departures from the niceties of Greek construction than from self-contradictions, and assertions which, judging from what they have elsewhere said, the authors must have considered as impious. Such would be the state of our feelings if we could do no more than to point to the *unexplained* exceptions to the rule referred to; but our case is a much stronger one. Our position is, that the very principles of exception laid down and illustrated by Dr. Middleton, will be found capable of being applied with the strictest propriety to the passages which are the subjects of this inquiry.

It might, perhaps, be fairly said, that, explaining the general principles both of the rule and its exceptions, his statements in effect leave the particular cases to be determined by custom and authority; but we will not insist on this point. We shall give the rule in his own words, detail its acknowledged limitations and exceptions, explain its application to the class of passages in question, and shew on what grounds that application may be denied.

The rule is, "When two or more Attributives, joined by a Copulative or Copulatives, are *assumed* of the *same* person or thing, before the first Attributive the Article is *inserted*; before the remaining ones it is *omitted*;" of which it is taken for granted that the converse must be equally true: that *whenever* the article is *inserted* before the first attributive, and *omitted* before the remaining ones, they all belong to the *same* person or thing. But exceptions are made for names of substances, considered as substances, *proper names*, and names of abstract ideas: also for all such attributives, both singular and plural, as *by their nature cannot be predicated of the same subject without the most evident and direct contradiction*. Dr. Middleton is content with stating that, in this latter case, the perspicuity of the passage does not require the rule to be accurately observed; we think it, however, scarcely doubtful that the omission of the second article marks

some common relation of the objects, qualities, or persons, to the subject in hand. Certainly it can never shew those persons, things, or ideas, to be identical which are *notoriously distinct*, and this admission is all we require. Examples of the application of the rule in theological controversy are the following: Eph. v. 5, ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ—"In the kingdom of Christ and of God:" common translation. "In the kingdom of *him who is* Christ and God:" translation contended for by Middleton, &c. Titus ii. 13, τοῦ μεγάλου Θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ—"Of the Great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ:" common translation, which is usually understood to make God and Christ distinct. "Of Jesus Christ our great God and Saviour:" translation according to the rule. 2 Thess. i. 12, κατὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ—"According to the grace of our God, and the Lord Jesus Christ:" common translation. "According to the grace of our God and Lord Jesus Christ:" translation according to the rule, the application of which, however, in this case, Dr. Middleton considers as doubtful.

It will be seen that the construction contended for, in the first example, makes *being anointed* and *being God* two attributes of one person, to whom the kingdom belongs. But it must be noted that *Christ* is very frequently used in Scripture (as it is familiarly by us) as a proper name of him who was pre-eminently God's *anointed*. Dr. Middleton has very properly limited his exception for names of substances to the case *when considered as substances*, and pointed out that such names are not unfrequently used to mark, not the object itself, but *some quality which it eminently possesses*, in which case they are properly attributives and come within the rule. He should have stated also that words which are, strictly speaking, attributives, when frequently applied to an individual person or object, eminently possessing the attribute, may become truly of the nature of names of substances and proper names, and so may be *excluded from the operation of the rule*. We judge this to be the case with *Χριστός* (Christ) here, and when joined to the name *Jesus*, it is as to the construction a part of the proper name. It is also true that *Θεός* (God) without or with the article—God absolutely, or *He who is the God*, i. e. the only true God, is continually used in Scripture as *the name* of the Supreme Being, and, so employed, is to all intents and purposes a *proper name*. The translation, therefore, "in the kingdom of Christ and of God," may be justified on the same principle as that of the words ἦν ἔμοσσε Κύριος τῷ Ἀβραάμ καὶ Ἰσαακ καὶ Ἰακώβ, "which the Lord swore to Abraham, and to Isaac, and to Jacob," making them three persons, not one; and this translation is supported not only by the distinction constantly marked in Scripture between God and Christ, but by the unambiguous parallel expression, Rev. xii. 10, "The kingdom of our God, and the dominion of his Christ," both names of the same state of things, but marking the relation of that state to two distinct beings—the great Ruler of all things, and him whom he had appointed. It remains for us to ascertain whether the principle here maintained is applicable to the other cases. They are distinguished from that we have examined by the word *God* (which in them comes first) being accompanied by an adjective or pronoun, (2 Pet. i. 1,) and the word *Christ* being joined to *Jesus* and having *before* it either *Κύριος* (Lord) or *Σωτήριος* (Saviour). The construction contended for as required by the rule makes the being *the great God* or *our God*, and being *our Lord* or *our Saviour*, attributes of the one person *Jesus Christ*; but either of the attributives *Lord* and *Saviour* being very frequently applied to *Christ*, and pre-eminently above all beings, *God himself* excepted,

both of them being in fact *recognized titles* of Christ, the connected words "Lord Jesus Christ," or "our Saviour Jesus Christ," may form together *one personal appellation* or proper name, and the "Great God," or "our God," being incapable of designating any being but one, is likewise of the nature of a proper name, and thus the rule is inapplicable in these cases. No doubt the construction which makes *God* and *Saviour* or *Lord* both attributes of Jesus Christ, is allowable *as a construction*, but if Jesus was generally spoken of at the time as "the Lord Jesus Christ," or "our Saviour Jesus Christ," and his being entirely distinct from God was universally and without hesitation acknowledged, so that no ambiguity could arise, which is what we maintain on the authority of the general tenor of Scripture, and of numerous distinct testimonies; then it is evident that Dr. Middleton's exception for *proper i. e. personal names* and *other cases where the subjects of the attributes could not be confounded*, exactly applies to the texts under consideration; so that the question as to the *possibility* of the proposed new translation is to be settled by considerations arising, not out of the words of these texts *taken by themselves*, but out of the study of other parts of Scripture. Such expressions as follow where there is no ambiguity in the construction, and where the terms "God the Father," or "our Father," and "the Lord Jesus Christ," or "Jesus Christ our Saviour," are manifestly *complex personal appellations*, render it, we fearlessly say, *certain* that the corresponding terms must be so considered in the disputed texts, and shew the impossibility of their having been misunderstood or deemed ambiguous in the purest age of the church: "Favour be to you, and peace from God our Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ," 2 Cor. i. 2. "Favour, mercy, and peace, from God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ our Saviour," Titus i. 4. "Favour and peace be multiplied unto you through the knowledge of God and of Jesus who is our Lord," 2 Pet. i. 2, immediately following one of the contested texts, which it therefore may be taken as explaining. Here the name *Lord* being *especially attributed to Jesus*, not used as a known and established title, is placed *after*, with its own article; but this passage is a clear example of *God* having the nature of a *proper name*, and it shews the Being intended by that term (not here characterized as *the Father* only, but including the whole of what the term expresses) to be distinct from Jesus. Dr. S. speaks as if the Unitarians rested their defence in this part of the controversy entirely on the occurrence of unexplained exceptions to the rule, and he says, "Dr. Middleton contends that all the exceptions are such in appearance only, and may be accounted for on principles, not assumed to serve the purpose, but rational and necessary." On the contrary, Dr. Middleton has himself produced a remarkable exception to the rule which he acknowledges he cannot account for, (nor has he accounted for all those produced by others,) and the Unitarians contend that the disputed texts, properly considered, come within his own exceptions from the rule, and therefore exhibit no irregularity when translated in the usual manner. In reference to Dr. S.'s last paragraph on this subject, (Vol. III. p. 207,) we repeat that the difference between the expressions ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ and ΤΟΥ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is, that ΘΕΟΣ being a *personal appellation* is not in this instance an *assumable attributive*. His being called *our God*, does not recognize any others as true gods, but marks our sense of our relationship to him. He is still God pre-eminently, *the God* recognized as having no equal, and therefore *Lord* is at once understood as a title forming part of the name of Jesus Christ, as 2 Cor. i. 2;

Titus i. 4, &c. On the contrary, in the second sentence, but one word which can be the name of a person occurring, the other words *must* be taken as attributes here specially ascribed to that person, and this appears to us to be perfectly consistent with the much-boasted rule, as explained and properly limited by Dr. Middleton, though not with that learned writer's own application of it.\*

No doubt, one who thinks we have *elsewhere* sufficient proof of the deity of Christ, may with propriety adopt the proposed translations, but it is equally certain that one who believes that elsewhere God and Christ are always distinguished, may with equal propriety resist them, and consequently no independent argument in favour of the orthodox doctrine can be derived from the passages.

We now come to the testimony of the Apostle Paul. Dr. S. begins with a common rhetorical artifice. He calls our attention to all the enmity against the Apostle of the Gentiles, which has existed in ancient or in modern times, from the opposition of the first Judaizers down to the "Not Paul but Jesus" of Gamaliel Smith, and, without taking the slightest notice of the very obvious circumstances which account for both the one and the other—Jewish bigotry in the one case; horror of the unnatural system of Calvinism, commonly reputed to be especially contained in the writings of Paul, in the other—by a quiet assumption of the very thing which he undertakes to prove, he offers to explain the whole. Paul, according to his account, was "the *chosen vessel* of the Divine Spirit for completing the archives of Christian doctrine, by a clear and bold, a copious and uncompromising testimony to the *Divine person* and the redemption of Christ, the reign of his *grace*, and the conformity of its subjects to his *holiness*." Those who cannot, after the most patient investigation, see any thing of the testimony here referred to, but who can readily account for the enmity which has existed against the apostle, without at all recurring to it, have a double objection to Dr. S.'s statement, as being neither *true*, nor even apparently *required* for the explanation of the facts, which are detailed and commented upon in a declamatory style, fitted to excite or foster prejudices, and most unlike that of a calm inquirer after truth. A large portion of what Dr. S. has been pleased to call the testimony of this apostle "concerning the *Person* of the Redeemer and Saviour of men," does not really

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\* In Jude i. 5, the word God being a gloss and rejected from the text, we are in this dilemma: either the term *δεσποτης* "sovereign," was, as some think, peculiarly and exclusively applied by the Jews of our Lord's time to the Deity, or it was not: if it was, that peculiar use, by altogether forbidding its application to a person recognized as distinct from Deity or to any other than *the one being*, made it a personal appellation, and the text comes under the exception; if it was not, then Jesus Christ might with the most perfect propriety be called our only Sovereign and Lord, meaning to exclude all other pretenders to divine commission and consequent authority over us in God's name, and the rule is applied, but does not prove the Deity of Christ. Of course this argument assumes the decision of the question, respecting which no Unitarian feels any doubt, whether God and Christ are plainly and uniformly spoken of in Scripture as two distinct beings, but our object is to shew that no independent proof of the Deity of Christ can be drawn from the use of the article. In this passage of Jude, on either supposition, but especially on the latter, religious obedience is, as Dr. S. observes, required to Christ, "thus verifying his own word, that *all may honour the Son, even as they honour the Father*," in its only admissible interpretation—honouring the Son because they wish to honour the Father, because in honouring the Son they do best honour his Father who sent him. Vide Mon. Repos. Vol. I. New Series, p. 60.



relate to his *person* at all, but to the blessings of his religion, and, in a controversial point of view, can be nothing to our author's purpose, inasmuch as it presents no difficulty whatever on the Unitarian scheme;—thus the first article states, that “the Lord Jesus Christ is constantly celebrated, either by the mention of him alone, or in conjunction with the Divine Father, as the *author* and *bestower* of the greatest possible blessings, the supreme good of everlasting possession and enjoyment.” What is here said is in the main true, and is acknowledged and felt to be so as much by Unitarians as by any other class of professing Christians.

Of the blessings of the gospel we cannot think too highly, and Jesus Christ is constantly celebrated as the communicator, in a very proper sense of the term, the *bestower* of these blessings. Taking, indeed, the word *author* strictly as meaning *the original source*, it cannot be applied to Christ; but every reader surely must observe that not one of the texts quoted justifies such an application, whilst the words of the same Apostle afford the strongest and clearest evidence against it: “Christ Jesus, who OF GOD is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption,” 1 Cor. i. 30. “Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, WHO hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ Jesus,” Eph. i. 3. “GOD, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ, (by grace ye are saved,) and hath raised us up together and made us to sit in heavenly places in Christ Jesus: that in the ages to come HE might shew the exceeding riches of HIS grace, in HIS kindness towards us, through Christ Jesus.” Who will pretend to reconcile these plain and positive declarations with the doctrine that Jesus was the *author* of gospel blessings? Let Dr. S.'s testimonies to “*parity* of power and influence with the Almighty Father” (which are no more than the conjunction of the name of Jesus with that of God in respect to the communication of those spiritual blessings which are elsewhere said to be given *through* him) be compared with these, and what doubt can there be as to the result? It is, indeed, strange that the following passages could be thought to afford proof of parity of power, even if that doctrine were not excluded by express declarations to the contrary—yet they are all which it has been thought expedient to produce: “Grace and peace be unto you, from God our Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ!” Rom. i. 7. “Grace, mercy, and peace, from God the Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ our Saviour!” Tit. i. 4. “Our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and our God and Father, (who hath loved us and hath given everlasting consolation and good hope by grace,) comfort your hearts and establish you in every good word and work!” 2 Thess. ii. 16, 17. All that can be inferred from these passages is, that God and Christ are two beings, from both of whom something is to be expected respecting the desired gifts. He who believes what is elsewhere abundantly declared, knows that from God all blessings proceed, and that *through* Christ the inestimable blessings of the gospel were communicated, in the first age at least, by his express intermediation. To him, therefore, these passages present no difficulty; and he wonders at those who infer any thing from the distinction between the author and communicator of the gift, so often clearly marked, and naturally so little subject to doubt, not being repeated every time the blessing is thankfully celebrated or earnestly desired.

We must here notice a most uncandid and unjust reflection on Mr.

Belsham, introduced in connexion with the article we have been examining :

“ Mr. B.,” says Dr. S., “ does indeed, (i. e. in his work on the Epistles,) as his plan necessarily required, give his interpretation of the passages which have been above quoted. He adopts various methods of *altering their meaning or evading their application.*” (This, reader, is said of a man of known and tried integrity, respecting a work which professes to expound to the best of his judgment the *true meaning* of the Apostle, and in which he was bound by the most solemn obligations of public duty and of personal fidelity to the Master whom he professed to serve, to introduce nothing which he did not conscientiously believe would conduce to that object! But such accusations are easily made, and by the majority of Dr. S.’s readers will be readily believed, without much inquiry, as to their foundation.) “ In one place, he (Mr. B.) takes into his text a different reading, upon evidence which Griesbach did not think amounted to even his lowest degree of probability, and which Heinrichs, Knapp, and Vater, have not thought worthy of noticing:” viz. as stated in a note, Col. iii. 13, “ *The Lord* freely forgave you,” instead of *Christ*.

Now, it is intended here to insinuate that Mr. Belsham made this alteration to serve a controversial purpose, whereas it is evident that no material point is gained by the change, and that Mr. B. could not have felt at all embarrassed by the reading of the received text. It is declared (Eph. iv. 32), that “ God, *through Christ*, hath forgiven us.” Whether, therefore, God or Christ, at the suggestion of the context, is named as affording us forgiveness, we know what is meant. But Mr. B. exercises his own judgment freely. He does not profess to follow Griesbach’s text; he sometimes (and we regret it, as an incautious and unjustifiable course) even adopts conjectures which have recommended themselves to his own mind. In the present instance, he takes up as more suitable in his opinion to the context, and as being, to the best of his judgment, most probably what the Apostle wrote, a reading which certainly is in the situation which Dr. S. describes; but the inattention of even celebrated critics is no proof that a reading deserves neglect. The authorities followed by Mr. Belsham are the Alexandrian MS., which in the epistles exhibits pretty purely the Alexandrine recension of the sacred text, the Clermont, Augian, and Boernerian—all remarkable copies of the Western recension, with one other MS., and the Latin versions. *Κυριε* was then an *ancient Western* reading, not completely excluded from early copies containing the Alexandrine text. Griesbach probably thought that it was introduced to avoid something unusual, and that might be offensive in the expression “ Christ forgave us;” and from comparison of the passage with Eph. iv. 32, or in consequence of the compound reading, “ the God of Christ,” found in the Armenian version, and “ God in Christ,” used by Augustine, in a seeming quotation of the words. But is not Mr. Belsham right, as a critic, in judging that *Χριστος* was more likely to arise as an interpretation of *Κυριε*, than the contrary change, which would be to substitute the indefinite for the clear; that the compound readings only shew the authors to have been acquainted both with “ Lord” interpreted of God, and “ Christ,” and rather create a presumption that the word Christ, coming after, had been taken in from the margin? To the discussion, however, we attach little importance: what *is* important, is, that Mr. B. has been wantonly and without even a plausible pretence, charged with *wilfully corrupting* the text of Scripture. Yet Dr. S. has expressed himself so well on the duties of candour towards

opponents, and of maintaining a Christian spirit in controversy, that, sincerely believing these passages to represent the genuine sentiments and feelings of his mind when uninfluenced by peculiar prejudices, we cannot but hope that he will, on reflection, regret and be anxious to recall charges which are equally injurious and unfounded.

The 7th article of this chapter relates to the *name of Jesus*, from which we make the following extract :

“ Here a very important passage may be considered, which not only gives information on the honour proper to the name of Christ, but comprehends *a full view* of a subject which has an intimate relation to our inquiry, the **MEDIATORIAL KINGDOM** of Christ. ‘ Wherefore also God hath highly exalted him, and hath bestowed upon him **THE NAME** which is above every name; that in the name of Jesus every knee may bow, of heavenly and earthly and infernal beings; and that every tongue may confess that Jesus Christ is the Lord, unto the glory of God the Father.’ . . . The *object* or thing bestowed, is the transcendent exaltation, the **NAME** of dignity and authority *above every created name*. This object appears to comprehend several important particulars: and the termination of the period of the Messiah’s humbled condition . . . ii. The renewed manifestation of his Divine Perfections and Majesty to holy intelligences: the **NAME** *which is above every name*. iii. The acknowledgment, on the part of the intelligent universe, celestial and human, in the present state, and in the state of the dead, of his supremacy and authority . . . iv. In the respect which this exaltation has to the human nature, faculties, and enjoyments of the Messiah, it probably includes the following as principal circumstances: (1) His resurrection from the dead. (2) His being locally translated to . . . *heaven* . . . (3) The possession of the highest perfection, natural and moral, of which created existence is susceptible. (4) The especial and unparalleled dignity, happiness, and delight, resulting to the human nature, in all its capacities and feelings, from its conjunction with the Divine Nature of Christ; a union immortal, unique, and intimate, beyond all created capacity to conceive. v. The possession of a peculiar **KINGDOM** or **REIGN**.”—Script. Test. Vol. III. pp. 250—253.

Now all this is little better than pure fancy; and it is a most characteristic specimen of that unjustifiable refinement on the words of Scripture, by grafting upon them our own thoughts and opinions, for which Dr. S. is remarkable as a commentator. It cannot be needful for us to point out how many distinct particulars have nothing at all answering to them in the text, but in opposition to such strange perversion, it may be useful for us to explain what we take to be the full, real, and simple meaning of the Apostle. “ Wherefore,” i. e. as the *reward* of his humility and voluntary submission to suffering, “ also **GOD** hath highly exalted him, and bestowed upon him that name\* which is above every name.” *Name* here stands for *title, dignity*, like the corresponding word in Hebrew and Latin: examples of the usage are given by Wetstein, Schleusner, and others. “ That *at* the name of Jesus every knee may bow.” Dr. S., like Mr. Belsham, after Secker, translates ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ, “ in the name of Jesus,” of which version we think Mr. Belsham’s note expresses the true sense: “ that men should be taught by Jesus the worship

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\* Το ὄνομα το, κ. τ. λ. “ that name,” which we here adopt from Griesbach, may be the true reading, though supported only by Alexandrine authorities, and, perhaps, just the sort of verbal nicety to have originated in that recension. It does not, however, alter the sense of the passage.

of the true God:" but surely *ev*, answering to the Hebrew **ב**, here signifies *at*, and the intention is not literally to require the act specified, the performance of which in these times is absurd, if not idolatrous, but to express the authority of Jesus over his church, by the mention of a usual sign among oriental nations, of supreme authority, namely, bending the knee as an act of homage on the name being proclaimed. (Vid. Bloomfield, Rec. Syn. in loc.) "Of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth;" or better with Mr. B., according to the generally-acknowledged sense, "of those who are in heaven, and upon the earth, and under the earth," understood by most modern commentators "of angels, of men now living, and of departed men;" more probably, perhaps, signifying "in whatever state they may hitherto have been with respect to religious privileges and knowledge." "And that every tongue may confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father." These last words teach plainly enough that whilst Christ was to be honoured and acknowledged as a Prince and a Saviour, he was not to be thought of as equal with God his Father, by whom his dignity was conferred, and whose glory was displayed in his elevation. In reading the whole passage, we find it so strongly expressing those opinions which we receive as scriptural and true—that the exaltation of Christ is derived from the Father's power, and acknowledged to his glory—as to be led to inquire with some curiosity how it could happen to be quoted in support of opposite doctrines, and the result of our reflection on the subject leads us to notice a very common fallacy which we must attribute to Dr. S. He never appears to us to make it his consideration, whether a text *necessarily implies* or *directly teaches* a certain doctrine; but, *supposing the truth* of the doctrine, how it will apply to the text. He sets out with a general conviction that his views are scriptural, and then applies as certain truths to the interpretation of *each* passage what he supposes that he has found in a number of others, though when distinct assertions are required, he is unable to produce them. His general convictions, which *may* not—for he is, like all men, liable to prejudice—have been originally derived from the study of the Scriptures, but from education and the influences of those around him, constitute *the chief reason* for the application he makes of each text, and suggest those strained and fanciful philological criticisms, and those developments of the supposed sense of a passage in which so many matters are introduced, unconnected with the words, that we wonder whence they were obtained, or why they were placed where they stand rather than any where else, which characterize his work. On the contrary, the true method of scriptural investigation appears to be, as we read the successive portions of the Sacred Volume, to observe what each book and each remarkable passage teaches, *considered in itself alone*, or with reference only to other *plainer* uses of the same phraseology, or expressions of the same thoughts, and having thus arrived at a general conclusion, to interpret the ambiguous or difficult passages in conformity with those which are liable to no misapprehension. Had Dr. S. pursued this method, he would hardly, we presume to think, either have thought so much to be derived from many passages he has quoted, or, in what professes to be a collection of *all* the testimonies of Scripture respecting the person of Christ, have omitted so many of those which are most intelligible and most decisive.

Conscious as we are of having already exceeded the limits which convenience would prescribe for this paper, we must say a few words on Dr.

S.'s mode of treating that celebrated text, considered as "the principal passage in Paul's Epistles which treats on the Deity of Christ,"\* (Rom. ix. 5,) and which certainly appears to be valued in proportion to the rarity of such a supposed testimony by all the defenders of the doctrine. Dr. S. has taken due pains to guard against the supposition of the word *God* not being genuine, as well as against the conjectural emendation of Slichtingius and Taylor, which we lament to see adopted by Mr. Belsham, of *ὁ ὦν* instead of *ὁ ἄν*. Thus far he has our entire concurrence, as well as that, we suppose, of nearly the whole body of Unitarians in the present day. The question is, whether the words in the text, as they now stand, clearly and unambiguously express or teach the doctrine of the deity of Christ. The Unitarians contend that the words *may* indeed be so explained without *grammatical* impropriety, but that they may *as well* be explained differently, and that no early Christian could have thought of so taking them as to make them express this doctrine. It is, and *it must be* to serve their purpose, insisted on the other side that the words will properly admit of no other construction than that which makes them expressive of the doctrine. We shall spend no time in considering the plan adopted by Mr. Locke, of placing the point after *παντων*, because, though he may have shewn his accustomed sagacity in discovering the Apostle's general meaning in the passage, it is now pretty well agreed that the construction he supposes would not be a good one; and the other being esteemed most plausible by our adversaries, we may, with perfect fairness, confine our attention to it.

We translate the words then—"Whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ, as it respects the flesh," i. e. as to his descent. "God who is over all be blessed for ever. Amen." To this it is objected by Dr. S., first, that "it is an evasion to serve a purpose; for every Greek scholar must admit that the fair and just construction of the sentence is that which is generally received." We admit nothing of the kind. Many of those whose opinion we adopt are usually esteemed Greek scholars, and Wetstein's quotations seem to prove, beyond contradiction, that in the earliest times our construction was generally followed. That the Fathers afterwards, with the growing corruption of the Church, came to patronise the construction now generally received, is nothing to the purpose, since we do not deny it to be grammatically good, nor do we doubt the disposition of those Fathers to find or make evidence for the deity of Christ; but the numerous testimonies against Christ having ever been called in scripture "God over all," shew how the words were understood by those whose authority is most valuable. *Secondly*, it is objected that our construction "is contrary to grammatical propriety, for *ὁ ἄν* must refer to the *foregoing* noun as the subject, while that which follows is the predicate; except in cases in which there is no preceding nominative, but the article contains the predicate and becomes in effect a pronoun. To render the construction tenable, the form of the sentence must have been considerably different;" either, it is added in a note, 'Ὁ δε Θεος ὁ ἄν ἐπὶ πάντων εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας ὁ εὐλογητὸς ὁ Θεος ὁ ἄν ἐπὶ πάντων, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, whereas the present words are 'Ὁ ἄν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεος εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας. It is supposed, then, that another article is required, that Θεος ought to be placed before ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, and that the ὁ ἄν coming as it does first, must necessarily refer to the nominative in the preceding clause; and, lastly, that εὐλογητὸς ought, on

\* Michaelis, Anmerkungen., apud Smith, Script. Test. Vol. III. p. 377.

our supposition, to come first in the sentence. To prove that another article is not required, (which indeed Dr. Middleton does not contend for, only suggesting as the *more probable* expression of the sense we contend for, εὐλογητὸς ὁ ἄν ἐπὶ πάντων Θεός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας,) we quote from Philo, p. 860, Ed. 1640, (apud Middleton,) του προς ἀληθειαν ὄντος Θεου · Clem. Rom. ad Cor. Cap. xxxii. ὁ παντοκράτωρ Θεός. The first is a case precisely in point; and in the second, παντοκράτωρ is equivalent with ἄν ἐπὶ πάντων. No doubt *if* θεός had been placed first, it would have had a separate article, and the clause would have resembled, for instance, that of the Epistle of Barnabas, Ὁ Θεός ὁ παντός του κόσμου κυριεύων, δαη ὕμιν, κ. τ. λ.; but there is no ground whatever for asserting that such an arrangement is *necessary* to give the sense, or would be on any account preferable in the present instance. Again, that ὁ ἄν must refer to a nominative in the preceding sentence, whenever there is one, is altogether an arbitrary assertion, and a rule made for the occasion. When it is at the beginning of a sentence, it refers of course to a nominative following, of which there are many examples in the New Testament. The question is whether, in the example before us, it does begin a sentence or not, which would in general be very easily determined by the connexion, as we think that it may be in this instance. Lastly, before it is asserted that εὐλογητὸς must stand first for the proper expression of what we take to be the sense of the passage, let it be considered that there is one clear example in the LXX., Ps. lxxviii. 19, (which Dr. S. vainly endeavours to set aside by an unfounded attack on the text,) of εὐλογητὸς coming last in a doxology, and that in all the instances in the Old Testament there is but one in which εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα is appended to εὐλογητὸς, and there only ὁ Θεός comes between them. On the other hand, in the New Testament, the words εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας occur three times, *always immediately following one another*; and if they had been here separated, it must have been not by one, but several words, which would have been a harsh construction; there appears, therefore, to be a sufficient reason for the somewhat unusual position of εὐλογητὸς on our construction, and it cannot be affirmed that it violates any rule. Middleton, indeed, puts the objection to it very modestly; but Dr. S., in copying him, has not thought it necessary to observe the same caution. We would add here, that ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων being a recognized title of the “Supreme God,” expressly appropriated by the early Christian writers to *the Father*, the grammatical ambiguity would cause no doubt in any mind as to the true sense, until after the structure of modern orthodoxy had been nearly completed by a corrupt age. Mr. Yates justly appeals to the remarkable imitation of the passage, by Clem. Rom. ad Cor. Cap. xxxii., where even the words “from him, (meaning Jacob,) as concerning the flesh, (τὸ κατὰ σάρκα,) came the Lord Jesus,” are found, but where the doxology is omitted as having no connexion with the other part, a decisive proof how the text was understood in a very early age, since it is hardly conceivable that Clement should not have added the final clause, or something to the same purpose, if he had thought it applicable to Christ.

But farther, and finally, Dr. S. “conceives that there is reason in the observation that the clause, *as it respects the flesh*, is one part of an antithesis, the other member of which is to be sought in the sequel of the paragraph.” There is truly a sort of antithesis, but the other member is here, as in ver. 3 of the same chapter, to be sought in the Apostle’s mind, and in the minds of his readers. He speaks of “his kinsmen according to the flesh” in contrast with his spiritual relationship to all Christians. He describes the Lord Jesus

as descended from the Israelites, “according to the flesh,” in contrast with his appointment to be *the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness*, or holy spirit. See Rom. i. 3, 4, and the Monthly Repos. New Series, Vol. IV. pp. 661—664.

We are now obliged to bring this critique to a conclusion. It is our hope that our remarks are calculated to assist the honest inquirer in justly estimating a work which is esteemed one of the bulwarks of orthodoxy. Dr. S. himself we regard with respect, both on account of the learning and ability he has displayed, and of the spirit which he often manifests. For all, and it is not a little, which he has said kindly, liberally, and as became a Christian, of our body and our supposed errors, we sincerely thank him; and if, when we have met with uncandid reflections, with unfounded and injurious accusations, we have presumed to hold the language of rebuke, we have done so not in anger against him, but in justice to our fellow-believers and our friends, in defence of what we are fully convinced is Christian truth and the grand means for the promotion of human happiness, which we hope will appear to him and to others a sufficient apology.

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#### ERRATUM.

Page 88, line 37, the first word, for “and” read *or*.

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