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R E V I E W

OF THE

REMARKS

ON

DR. CHANNING'S SLAVERY

BY A CITIZEN OF MASSACHUSETTS.

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BOSTON:  
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY.  
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## S L A V E R Y .

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THE "Remarks on Dr. Channing's Slavery" are written in strong though not accurate language, with liveliness of illustration and general attractiveness of style. The subject is an all-interesting one: the book remarked upon is from a great and popular author. The Remarks are therefore read by many. C

This writing is a dangerous one; tending, if we mistake not, to do the community much harm.

It is so, first, because it is written in a spirit of skepticism with regard to moral means of influence. It treats the expectation of change to be wrought by appeals to men's consciences, to their sense of the right, to their love of the beautiful, of the pure, of the honest, as visionary and childish. We are taught to believe that no projects are practical, but those that appeal directly to interest, to selfishness,—that virtue in the abstract is well enough to talk about, to form a subject of sermons and poems, of the day-dreams of enthusiasts and the discussions of ministers, but that it has little to do with the actual, prosaic affairs of life.

Now moral means of influence are not vain. They are real. They are powerful. They have wrought great changes; they will work greater. They are, they always have been, they must necessarily be, of great efficacy in the history of the world. What revolutions in the opinions, the tastes, the habits of nations have been brought about by the writings of single men! How has the face of society been changed by the unseen, silent, sure influence of principles of religion, of philosophy, of politics, infused into the public mind by gifted writers and speakers! Our people's opinions are formed by what they read

and hear. The views they take of things, and thence their dispositions to act, are changed, without the operation of law, without alteration of the circumstances upon which their interests depend. The book that is made the family companion in the evening sends forth its members in the morning with minds imbued more or less with its spirit. It determines therefore in some measure the tone of society, and the actions of those who compose that society. How can it be otherwise? It is no matter of every day occurrence, that an individual's view of an important subject is materially changed by the writings or conversations of an able man. Indeed no one is so firm, so strongly prejudiced, so firmly entrenched behind error, as to be proof against these influences. Of the thousands who have read Dr. Channing's book, for instance, many have been persuaded of truths new to them, or warmed to a fuller recognition of those which before they speculatively admitted; all probably have been more or less affected. Each one of us feels that the operation of such minds upon him is real, strong, efficacious. He sees that it is the same with his neighbour. How then is it possible that such influences can be other than powerful upon a community of men like ourselves, having hearts, consciences, understandings, not indeed sound, but retaining in every instance some of the natural susceptibilities. No: moral influences are not weak; and it is no dream to expect great, though gradual, changes in the opinions, feelings, desires, of our countrymen, wrought by the writings of our great men, and by the conversations and moral action of the good. These it is that mould society. These it is that inspire into the busy mass new sentiments, new aspirations, and thereby in the end reform institutions, and make laws. It is because these are efficacious, that every man is bound to use his part of them well, to make every word, which he writes or speaks on the great questions by which the country is divided, help the right side.

We object then to the spirit of the Remarks, that it undervalues these moral means. It thereby loosens our obligations to think and speak and read and publish aright. If moral influences are unreal, then to use them well ceases to be a duty to the country. Convince men of this, and our strength

is sapped, — our foundations are fearfully shaken, — our confidence, our hope is gone, and society, deserted by its guides, will lose its way.

We object further to the spirit of the Remarks, that it is a wrangling spirit. The writer, as we shall see upon examination of his pages, fights for victory, not for the truth. By this he does great mischief. The question of Slavery demands all the coolness, all the elevation of mind and integrity of purpose which can be brought to it. It is at best a fearful, a dark question. The mind groans under it and is borne down. We are already too much harassed by the difficulties which beset us, too much posed by the magnitude of the evils threatened, too near being incapacitated for exertion at beholding the immensity of our task, the liveliness of the opposition, and the moral apathy of men. Perplex us not by ingenious sophistry. Let the spirit of contention prevail in the discussions of this subject, and we are lost: lost to the integrity of purpose which alone will merit, to the calmness of judgment which alone will ensure, success. No greater injury can be done to the community, than by encouraging them to make the subject of Slavery one of the many, upon which spleen is vented, men abused, vanity gratified, and truth neglected.

The tendency of the Remarks is harmful, again, in that they represent virtue, pure regard for right, unadulterated by views of immediate interest, as something speculative, unreal, something meant for the closet, not for business life. True it is, that among the mass of men, absorbed as they are in petty pursuits, the right, the good, is but little regarded as the one, the all-important end of existence. Rare enough are the examples of manly rectitude, of supreme regard to higher and better things than what we see and hear around us. The very good man rises an anomaly among his fellows, and is called a dreamer, a theorist. Yet none the less ought right to be the great standard of all actions, domestic and social: none the less for the boisterous voices and menacing brows of interested men, are the plans of virtue the most practical, though the least practised of all. Men are too apt to excuse themselves for grovelling views, by treating whatever life is purer and more elevated than their own, as speculation; and whoever helps

men thus to blind themselves to what should be their shining light, does a great injury, a great wrong.

And lastly we object to these Remarks, that they represent man as made for the law, and not the law for man. This is the error of the profession to which the writer belongs. The clergy regard man as made for the church, and judge of all measures according as they bear upon the forms of religion. Gentlemen of the bar regard man as made for the law, and judge of all measures, according to their bearing upon what they call civil society. Sentimental morality, they tell us, abstract reasoning upon the rights of human nature, enthusiastic appeals to imaginary motives, are good enough for theologians, but they have no practical bearing upon civil society. What do you mean by civil society? Moral reasonings have an effect upon individuals; and is not the community made up of individuals? The eloquence of good men does not, it is true, enact and abrogate laws; it does not work sudden changes, in manners or morals or establishments. But does it therefore produce no useful result? Civil institutions are but the garments, which society wears to protect itself from the warring of harsh elements. They are useful, they are right, only so far as they help men forward in physical and spiritual progress. They must be accommodated to individual wants; for for individuals they are devised. The great question then, with regard to the policy of a public discussion, is, not merely how it is to affect civil society, so called, but how it bears upon men, as such, upon individuals, whether directly or indirectly.

A professedly unprincipled author finds little welcome in New England. One who, at the same time that he advocates bad principles, shows them in all their ugliness, is comparatively an innoxious man. But he who, with apparent sense of duty and regard for the public weal, wags his head at the virtuous and sneers at well-laid plans of philanthropy, is, in our matter-of-fact times, of all citizens the most dangerous. That he is not emphatically a bad man is a misfortune. For vice unhelped by virtue falls dead upon society, whereas a mixture of principle makes a large mass of bad words acceptable.



It is because the pamphlet under consideration is of this baneful tendency, that we propose to review it; to examine the positions the writer assumes, and to assign the due weight to the considerations he brings forward. We shall not aim to bring him discomfort by exposing the literary and philosophical faults, of which he is guilty; our concern is with the book, not with the man; and with the book only so far as it has to do with certain great subjects.

We pass over the two first pages, as containing nothing requiring remark, and come to the propositions which the writer lays down as the several subjects of the subsequent chapters.

“First. Public sentiment in the free States, in relation to Slavery, is perfectly sound, and ought not to be altered.

“Second. Public sentiment in the Slave-holding States, whether right or not, cannot be altered.

“Third. An attempt to produce any alteration in the public sentiment of the country will cause great additional evil — moral, social, and political.”

We deny them all. Not only are these propositions not true, they bear the mark of falsehood on their very face. They are to be rejected *à priori*. That public sentiment is perfectly sound, and ought not to be altered, cannot be said of any country or of any time. That observer must have but a low standard of right, his ideal can have but little beauty and truth, who does not see everywhere lamentable deficiencies in the prevailing tone of society. Such a dominion do interest, passion, selfishness maintain in the world, that they make large encroachments upon honor, purity, and truth among every people. Public sentiment is more or less defective at its very root, all the world over. It is radically defective. It draws its life from wrong principles, from more or less base motives, from passions too much indulged. The reign of right is yet very far from being established. Much is to be done, much is to be suffered, much, much is to be contended for, before any honest man will be content with the opinions, which he observes men habitually maintaining, and hears them habitually express. And if this be true; nay, even if never so small a part of this be true, how false upon its very face is the proposition, that public sentiment is perfectly sound, either here or elsewhere.

To pass to the second proposition. That "Public sentiment cannot be altered," is not true of any country or any time. Public sentiment is always changing. It is characterized by fluctuation. Next year it may be very different from what it now is. It is Protean. The fickleness of the people's favor is a proverb. It is true, certain great principles often obtain in a nation, and for a long period give it a peculiar character. A spirit of liberty breathes through one people; a spirit of submission through another. A love of gain characterizes the subjects of that state; sentiment, and interest in the fine arts those of another; and an attachment to slavery, united with unusual irritability and haughtiness of temper, may be the deep-rooted peculiarity of yet a third class of men. But how has popular character changed under the influences of religion, philosophy, and enlightened views of interest! How often have we seen a people madly eager to destroy an institution, which a few years before they clung to with reverence! All things pass away, save truth. Ignorance, superstition, despotism, persecution, are gone or are going with the causes which produced and maintained them; and the attachment to, or tolerance of, slavery must pass away, now that the barbarous influences, from which it sprung, have failed. The awakened sympathies of men, the stern rebukes of upright truth, are pressing upon it and driving it to a closer refuge. Its circle is daily narrowing, and it will soon disappear like unsupplied waters under the beams of the summer sun. Radical changes in public feeling must necessarily be slow. But by wise and good means they are none the less sure to be wrought. However difficult, they are yet, to say the least, possible. The unqualified assertion, that public sentiment in the Slave-holding States, or in any States, cannot be altered, is evidently and extravagantly false. The position cannot be maintained for a moment, in the face of history, or of what we experience every day.

The third proposition, understood according to its words, would bind us to entire passiveness, with regard to public opinion in all cases. It would require men of character and talents, to refrain from attempting to influence in any way the public mind. It would rob the people of its leading men, of

those whose written and spoken opinions guide it aright. The writer means to refer to the subject of Slavery alone. And why are we to refrain from expressing opinions on Slavery? Is public sentiment perfectly sound on this subject? In the discussions of it, has there been so little mixture of passion, have men been so free from selfishness, from hardness of heart, from obstinacy, from all bias, and from every mental evil, as to insure a perfectly healthful state of public sentiment? — If, on the contrary, the minds of our countrymen on this point are boiling with false zeal, rage, and revenge; if conversations and writings on this point are virulent, fierce, and menacing; if the excitement is so great as to be thought to threaten the dissolution of the union or civil war; if, moreover, a large portion of our country is so thoroughly doomed to this inherited curse, as to be induced to continue what they cannot conscientiously maintain, as to be kept constantly in a state of jealousy, irritability, and unwillingness to be convinced, — how can it be that public sentiment, in this regard, is so faultless, that any attempt whatsoever to alter it, will cause, not only evil, but great evil, moral, social, and political? — The proposition like the two former is false on its very face. From the very circumstances of the case, it is morally impossible that it should be true. Erroneous feeling there must be, on the subject of Slavery. It would be a miracle that we should be free from it. In so far as such is the case, in so far as public sentiment is wrong, it should, if possible, be changed. Here as elsewhere, we must seek out the true, the right. This can be done only by looking into the merits of the case with coolness, conscientious integrity, and love of truth, feeling that in forming, uttering, and publishing opinions on this dark question, we incur a heavy responsibility. This Dr. Channing seems to us to have done. We cannot think so favorably of the author of the pamphlet we are examining.

After laying down the three propositions upon which we have commented, the writer proceeds to endeavour to establish the first. In order to show that “public sentiment in the northern States is perfectly sound,” he states what he believes that sentiment to be.

“ The doctrine of the Northern States is :

“ 1. That Domestic Slavery is a deep and dreadful evil.

“ 2. That its continuance or removal is solely within the power of the domestic legislation of the State in which it exists.

“ 3. That it is a breach of our highest political contract, and a violation of good faith and common honesty, to disturb the internal condition and domestic arrangements of the Slave-holding States.

Now, first, this is not the public sentiment of the northern States. Secondly, if it were, it does not go far enough.

1. We do not fully understand what is meant by the “ Doctrine of the Northern States.” It may be, it probably is, the case, that most of our leading men hold as doctrine what is here laid down. But we deny that such is the prevailing “ Public Sentiment in the free States.” A majority of our citizens think and speak of Slavery, if at all, as an evil. Yet how many of the majority extenuate the evil! How many tell us of the comfortable condition of the Slaves, in comparison of the poor peasantry of Europe, of the lightness of their toil, of the liberality with which their wants are supplied, indeed, of the general happiness of their lot, — forgetting that the very condition of being owned by a master, is an incomparably greater evil than subjection to all physical woes, to hunger and thirst, to poverty, torture, and death! How few make it the sentiment of their hearts, that Slavery is, not only an evil, but a deep and dreadful evil! Why is it that we hear so much lightness of remark on this imposing question? Why is it that we are sometimes told that the “ black rascals of the South ” are only fit to be Slaves, and that they were not made for a better lot? — Is the general tone of conversation, or even of writing, among us, such as coming from men under the consideration of a deep and dreadful evil? By no means. Our citizens believe Slavery to be an evil. But they do not feel the extent of the calamity. They do not wish, or they dare not, or they are not able, to look into its depths. They do not, as they should, dread it, for itself, with solemn anxiety.

2. If the public sentiment were such as the author represents it, it is not enough. Men must not only believe Slavery a deep and dreadful evil; they must feel it to be a deep and dreadful wrong. They must not merely be convinced of its

disadvantages; they must be persuaded of its astounding barbarity. And this feeling must not only obtain; it must prevail; it must become universal, before the assertion that "Public sentiment is perfectly sound," can be true.

The rest of the first chapter is given to illustrating the first tenet of what is called our doctrine. We are told that "it has been so long acknowledged and so recently repeated that it needs no additional enforcement." In reply to this, let it be asked; do long acknowledgment and recent repetition render additional enforcement of an important truth unnecessary? It has been acknowledged ever since the time of Moses, and is repeated to us every Sunday in some of our churches, that to love our neighbour, to steal not, to oppress no one, are fundamental duties of humanity; but has it therefore become needless to present these duties in new, striking, attractive points of view? Is it not still a patriot's best work, to labor to make them admired and loved and cherished by all? It has been long regarded as the duty of every man, to give his voice and his life to the side of truth and virtue; yet what constant enforcement of this truth is demanded! When was it denied, that an author is under an obligation to the community to use what power he may have, for their good,—and in all discussions of duty, to take up his pen with singleness and candor? Yet notwithstanding any recent statements of this obligation there may have been, would not he be doing the State service, who should by enforcement of it, help put a stop to the miserable sophistry and wretched wit, by which our people are played upon, and made sadly to err, even on matters of the gravest, the most solemn import?—Notice the looseness of thought, the want of logic, the inaccuracy, the helter-skelter style, which are apparent in this part of the Remarks. They will be found to pervade the whole.

It is asked, "what possible benefit is to be gained by repeating in every inflection of taste and style, and with all the gorgeousness of rhetoric, long-established truisms which nobody denies." Among these is classed the truth, which Dr. Channing makes it his object to prove, to enforce, and to illustrate, namely, that "by the moral law there can be no property in a human being." This, reader, is one of the long-

established truisms, which nobody denies. Yet turn to the eighteenth page, and we find the author himself denying it. We are there told that "it is true only with important qualifications and many limitations," that "it is declared to be false by the universal past legislation of the world." And from the last paragraph of the second chapter we are left to conclude generally, that to hold men as property is not a violation of the moral law. For the writer tells us that the Supreme Court, with whose decision he leads us to suppose he fully coincides, "would undoubtedly decide by an unanimous opinion, that human law can confer no right of property against the principles of sound morality;" and that they "would as readily decide that the law of Massachusetts before the constitution of 1780 did make property of a slave." Hence, since, "to make property" is used in these pages as synonymous with the phrase "to confer right of property," it follows, that the writer believes it to be the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court, and that it is his own, that by the principles of sound morality there may be a right of property in man. Yet the contrary of this is "the long-established truism," which needs no enforcement.

The truth which Dr. Channing makes so radiant, though indeed a truism to all who know the celestial faculties and destinies of the soul, is by no means so to the author of the Remarks, nor to those who agree with him in opinion. Dr. C. attempts to show, and to make felt, that this truth is to be received without any qualifications or limitations whatsoever, that it is a fundamental, immutable law, which courts, legislation, constitutions have no power to infringe.

Let any one who has thought it worth his while to read the Remarks, compare the different passages which have been indicated, and in their contradictions he will see evidences of a mind unsettled on the very fundamental point of the discussion. He will find something very far from that clear, consistent exposition of truth, which we want on the subject of Slavery.

The questions, which are put, are easy of answer. We shall be excused for omitting some amplification and epithet. "What benefit is to be gained by repeating long-established truisms which nobody denies?" Answer: That not only nobody

may deny, but all may assert and heartily feel them, and act according to their spirit. This end is not gained by bare repetition, but by an eloquent exposition of them. "Why are we told that, by the moral law, there can be no property in a human being, when, for more than half a century, the soil of New England has not been pressed by the foot of a domestic slave?" Answer: That the soil of South Carolina may be alike free. "Why are we told that man, every man, however obscure his condition, is a rational, moral, and immortal being, &c.?" Answer: That men, taught to prize their common nature more, may defend it with greater constancy from degradation in their fellows. "Why are we told in detail of the vast evils of Slavery, &c.?" Answer: That feeling them more strongly, we may, with solemn anxiety, set about removing their cause; or if that be impossible, strive to guard ourselves against the effects. "Addressed to us," says the pamphlet, "such glowing and exciting language is useless for conviction." Even allowing this; it must be remembered that people are not only to be convinced; they are to be persuaded. They must not merely acknowledge, they must feel.

In the next paragraph it is said that the South, as well as the North, maintains that man cannot be held as property; that a great part of "the best informed and well principled people" there "feel deeply and powerfully" "the moral, social, and political degradation that Slavery brings with it;" "the sin, misery and wretchedness in which, with retributive justice, it involves all classes of the community in which it is found." This needs no comment. Every reader perceives, without help, the extravagance of this statement. Such errors show either great incapacity, or culpable carelessness, in the writer.

It is not unfrequently said, that Dr. Channing harps upon truisms. This peculiarity, far from being a fault, is the great merit, the boast, of his writings. He founds his philosophy, his morality, his religion, his eloquence, upon no debatable ground. He establishes himself upon first principles, which find confirmation in the heart of every reader.

All true philosophy, all good argument, all sound logic is founded upon truisms. Every train of reasoning, which cannot be reduced to a self-evident proposition, is false. Of every truth, of a character to permit questioning, we may ask the reason; and in like manner we may ask the reason of this reason, and so on, demanding the why at every proposition, until finally we arrive at one which can be made no simpler, which needs no proof, which is its own reason. Such truths, and such as are, by the agreement of all the world, necessary deductions from them, form the basis of reasoning, and are called truisms. The more distinct and complete the chain of connexion between any thing maintained and these fundamental truths, the more convincing is the proof. The shorter this chain, the less the chance of error.

Among these truths, so simple, so evident, as either to need no proof, or to find their proof in every heart, are some of the greatest, the most fruitful of instruction, upon which our reflections can be engaged. Our obligations to God and man, our main rights, such as those of freedom and self-defence, are not merely evident to accomplished casuists, but are, in their main features, known instinctively by every mind. They need no ingenious reasoning. They are not to be sought in the dark. They blaze every where and form the light of life. The great laws of external nature are to be understood by those, only, who have skill and means to observe, and science to interpret what they observe. The astronomer must have his telescope and know how to direct it: he looks far into distant systems, with which he has nought to do but as a philosopher, and by patient observation, and long and difficult calculation, comes at a partial knowledge of the laws which they obey. The moral world, on the contrary, is not distant; it is all within us. Its great laws, the laws of duty, are not hard to be discovered; but since they are to bind all men, the ignorant as well as the instructed, the barbarous alike with the educated, the clown and the philosopher, they are plain, evident without search, to all. All that ingenuity and learning add to moral science is trifling, compared with that which is known by every boor, which the peasant reads in the oak leaf, and



hears preached by the bird. The great truths of our common nature find confirmation in every breast. They are truisms.

Metaphysicians and moralists have lost sight of this. Involved in learned mysteries, they have forgotten, or have never learned, that their subject, their witness, their judge, is every human mind; and in perusing their pages, we recognise any thing rather than a faithful delineation of what we feel within us. Their principles find no echo in our hearts. Their discussions are not animated and verified by that quick and profound philosophy, common sense. They do not appeal to universal man.

Moral truth is simple. Proposed nakedly to the mind, it is immediately received. It needs no confirmation from abroad. We see in it nothing novel, nothing strange. It appears as something not to be questioned, as something which every body admits.

What greater praise then can be given to a moral philosopher, than that he is simple, that he writes what every body admits, that he does not seek to surprise by paradox or by the subtilty of his logic, but that he speaks the great principles of human philosophy with such truth and power, that they harmonize with our feelings, and we recognise them, not as another's conclusions, but as our own?

If Dr. Channing merely repeats what every body knew before; if he adds no force to the moral truisms which he utters; if he supports them with no richness of illustration, and brightens them with no new ray of sanctified fancy; if he states them with no beauty of expression, with no copious flow of language; if they gather no grace, no power, no evidence, no life, no beauty, by passing through his page — then he is justly to be condemned for profitless repetitions. But if, on the contrary, familiar and neglected truths are made by him to rouse the attention, if dull common place becomes under his influences movingly eloquent, if those principles which every body recognises, and every body is repeating from day to day and from hour to hour, come from his pen, endued with new life, filled with new energy, wrapped around with glorious images, applied to new and important relations, — in short, regenerate, from a mind able fully to feel and strongly to express them, —

then he is to be praised that he has turned his great powers, not to the support of paradox or debatable truth, but to the illustration and enforcement of the great truisms of humanity.

Any attempt, say the Remarks, to bring the community to a stronger sense of the evils of Slavery, will only excite passion and foster ill-will; for there is no remedy, nothing proposed to be done. It cannot be said that nothing is proposed to be done, when men continue, not only proposing, but acting. In fact that very course is proposed, the pursuit of which is said by our author to be productive only of evil. It is proposed that our whole people should be made to feel on this momentous subject aright. Here is something very practical and worthy of our best endeavour. Every good man, every patriot, and every one who has an enlightened care for the welfare of himself and family, will engage in this work, not indeed with the expectation that it will be immediately effected, but with the hope that public opinion will be daily growing in some degree more correct, and with a thorough conviction, on the part of each, that he, as an individual member, and by his connexions, has some power, more or less, upon the judgments of the community, and that he is under a solemn responsibility to use this power well. Now, to pause here,—even if this were all, if nothing more were proposed, than to correct, purify, and strengthen public sentiment in this regard, the proposition would be definite, practical, and important. Each man has herein a duty laid before him, from which he cannot turn away. As a citizen, his opinions, feelings, expressions are one element in the great aggregate, which is so powerful in its operation. He is bound then, from this consideration, to think, speak, and act justly. Once let our people be persuaded of the magnitude of the evils of Slavery, of the bitterness of the wrong done to the Slave by retaining him in his bonds, once let Slavery be generally regarded in its true light, and relief from this “entailed curse” would be easy and prompt. Our nation would no longer permit this blot upon its character to remain; it would suffer humanity no more to be outraged under its sanction.

But more is proposed. The author of the Remarks strangely forgets, or puts out of view, Dr. Channing's Chapter on the "Means of removing Slavery," and alludes to it here only for the purpose of satirical embellishment. He is guilty of a misstatement, we will presume a careless one, which tends to blind the reader to the true view of the subject. That nothing is proposed, is not true, in any sense. Not only is it recommended and urged, in general, that each man should use his own judgment with soberness, but particular courses of conduct are counselled to the Slave-holders. Nor are the means suggested for doing justice to the Slave, or meliorating his lot, so void of "practical efficiency," as to deserve to be passed over so lightly. It is proposed that the labor of the slaves should be exchanged for labor of a freer and more animating kind, — that their rewards should be made to depend upon their own exertions, — that their families should be more under their care and protection, — and that buying and selling them should be prohibited by legislative enactment. Here are practical, definite proposals, which are, to say the least, not absurd. The discussion is not where the author of the Remarks would place it. The question is not a merely speculative one. It is of vital and immediate interest to our people. It bears on them; most practically. Their political existence perhaps depends upon the right decision of it. And we trust that few, under the infliction of such a scourge, will sit down with the pusillanimous exclamation: Leave the Slaves' rights to the ministers; there is nothing to be done.

And even if what the author here maintains were true, if nothing had been proposed, or to use the words of the pamphlet, which we do not fully understand, "If no human security had been suggested of the least practical efficiency," yet the author's point would by no means be made out, that an attempt to bring our people to a deeper sense of the evils of Slavery can be productive only of evil.

"If there is no known remedy, why instruct a man of his condition?" In order that he may find one. This is our answer, simple and decisive, though very different from that which the author leaves us to infer. Indeed it is a peculiarity of this pamphlet, that propositions are advanced as evidently

true, which are, on the contrary, evidently false, and that questions are put, apparently intended by the writer to be answered unhesitatingly in one way, which every intelligent reader must unhesitatingly answer in the other. "A practical moralist," says the pamphlet, "is bound to find a remedy for the evils he enumerates, or to keep silence till he can." This, we submit, is a false principle. An evil must necessarily be known before its remedy can be discovered and applied. To insist, therefore, upon remaining in ignorance of an evil, until the remedy be known, is to render the discovery of the remedy impossible. It is only by examining an evil that we can learn to cure it.

And finally, even making the violent supposition that there not only is no known remedy, but can in the nature of things be none, yet the writer's point is not made out. For there are many unavoidable evils, which ought to be known, and looked full in the face. Do we not warn an expiring friend of the approach of death, even though it be sure? If Slavery is to be the eternal curse of this country, if we have the dismal prospect of the continuance of this national affliction to the remotest posterity, still let our people feel fully the awful magnitude of the evil, and the heinousness of the wrong, that even if they may not mitigate them, they may at least not suffer their fundamental notions of policy and right to be corrupted by a wrong view of such an anomaly in the history of a republic.

"The *duty of Christianity*," says the pamphlet, "is not to excite strong abhorrence in one portion of the community which may lead them to break the bounds of moderation and prudence, nor to excite in another angry and hateful feelings and stir up their resentment and revenge." No. This is true. Every one must assent to this. The office of Christianity, and the duty of a Christian (if the writer will permit us to correct his rhetoric) is, not to excite hostility and resentment, — but on the contrary to foster benevolence, and to encourage an independent and unwavering pursuit of right on the part of every individual, — to infuse more and more of the spirit of philanthropy into all political proceedings, — to bring governors and the governed more and more into subjection to the

moral law. It is not for the blacks alone that we must act. "Sympathy is due to the white man as well as to the slave." Here Dr. C. and his censor agree. Not so, long. Objection is made "to the severe and indiscriminate reflections which this teacher of morals" throws on our Slave-holding countrymen. Next comes a definition of "malicious slander;" but Dr. C's. work, on account of failing of one essential of this definition, is stated to be exculpated from coming under that category. Indeed the paragraph seems to have been written only for the purpose of introducing the illustration with which it closes, namely, that Dr. Channing's book is a poisoned shaft from a weak bow. There are other writings, of which this simile is more illustrative than of that to which it is applied.

On the next page, the author caricatures in a few well-drawn traits the religious cant of the day, that pervading, that truly malignant bane of our country. We wish him and all his brothers of the pen God speed, in tearing the veil from the theological apes whose voices are all too much attended to and obeyed by the mass of our people, and who are a scandal to true morality and pure religion. Perhaps ridicule is the only weapon with which the men of the rueful visage and sepulchral tone can be successfully attacked. If so, let all good men and true, thus armed, have at them, till they be silenced or swept away. But it must be remembered that ridicule is a dangerous weapon, that its strokes are uncertain, that in aiming at hypocrisy, we may wound religion. We must beware of being too severe and too searching, lest we shatter the foundations upon which all that is best and most promising in the character of our people rests.

To return to the objection brought against "the indiscriminate reflection thrown on the Slave-holders," it is to be answered, that Dr. Channing's censures are by no means indiscriminate. He takes pains to guard himself, on this point, and to make his reader observe that he argues only from the necessary tendencies of Slavery, and its general effects. He does not, in the words used by the author of the Remarks, "note down all the faults of our Southern brethren, to cast them in their teeth." He writes not in the manner of one

seeking to calumniate or provoke. He exposes with calmness, and firmness, the suffering and vice which in his judgment are the necessary result of Slavery, and which we all know to have been the actual result of it in our Southern States. The expression "that a slave-country reeks with licentiousness," is a strong one, perhaps too strong. Yet what man, at all acquainted with the state of society in the Southern part of our country, does not know that the morals of the Slave-holding States are horribly corrupted by licentiousness. But in the opinion of the author, these accusations, whether true or false, are alike objectionable. "General accusations," he remarks, "are never true." This assertion, like others which we have before noticed, is entirely unfounded. Examine it by instances.—That the inferior clergy of the church of Rome, a century ago, were licentious, idle, and ignorant, is a general accusation, and is true. That the courtiers of Charles II. were extremely profligate, is a general accusation, and is true. That we are a money-getting people, and that intemperance was with us a national vice, are general accusations, and are true: but am I therefore to be up in arms, whenever these last charges are brought forward, as if I individually had been called drunkard and penny-splitter? "The national character, real or imputed," say the Remarks, "is felt to attach to every individual, whether he himself be or be not a partaker of the national vice." This is indeed a strange declaration. Why should it be so? Why is a charge of licentiousness brought against a people, felt to be made against an individual who has in no way contributed to give that charge foundation? There is, we all know, a foolish national vanity, which resents whatever may be said in disparagement of one's country's perfections, from which our people are not free, and of which the Remarks, it seems, attribute to the Southern gentlemen no common share. But what possible foundation for a personal application of impersonal strictures? Read the passage quoted from Dr. Channing, on the ninth page of the pamphlet. Is there any thing there which ought to offend the virtuous, the pure, the honorable of our Southern States? The people of the South must be held in very low estimation by those who believe that "scarcely a husband or father there

can fail to consider it a personal affront." Those only will so consider it, to whom the charge, even if it were personal, would be no affront.

The attempted exposition of the irritating tendency of Dr. Channing's statement of the evils of Slavery, with which the first chapter of the *Remarks* concludes, is a remarkable instance of extravagance and bad logic. We find in this exposition unsound principles and incorrect assertions. The writer seems not to have taken pains, as was his bounden duty, to understand the book upon which he has commented. This is the more inexcusable, as he evinces no such want of capacity as would have prevented him from comprehending the main points of so simple a work. Every attentive reader must be struck with his misrepresentation of the positions which he attacks. He represents Dr. Channing as charging the whole Southern population with degrading vice, whereas that gentleman does not enter at all into the consideration of the morals of any particular people, but confines his attention to the tendencies of Slavery, and to the corrupting influences which, in a greater or less degree, must always flow from it. And even supposing that Dr. C. had stated, what we all know to be true, that Slavery at the South had corrupted the public morals, how little foundation would such a statement afford for the sweeping application in the pamphlet, where we are told that "the charge is so general, that no one may consider himself exempted;" that "it is not made against the obscure, the low, the ignorant, the vulgar; but attaches to whatever in that country is deemed to be noble, elegant, refined, dignified, or accomplished," &c.; or for that indignant exclamation, in favor of the "educated, chivalrous, and high-minded" Slave-holders, the punctuation of which hints to the reader twice to admire,—“Their wives and daughters by their own impurity satiate the Slave's revenge, for the ignominy which, in the common course of events, taints his domestic joys!!” We have but an indefinite conception of the meaning of this passage; but we feel confident that, in so far as it means any thing, it means what Dr. C. has neither written nor implied.

Our pamphleteer is, in a degree, right in his anticipation of the probable effect of the work which gives occasion to his

Remarks. It will undoubtedly irritate; as what fearless examination of the subject of Slavery would not? - Most men have at heart the honor of their country, and it is, to say the least, exceedingly disagreeable, if not offensive, to hear imputations of vice brought, even by implication, against that portion of it in which we live. Besides, in the nature of things, there must be some at the South who will think themselves abused and insulted, by any assertion of the rights of the wretched beings whom they have the misfortune to hold as property; and there are probably some, upon whose conduct we could bring no severer criticism than is implied in an exposition of the duties of man to his fellows. There are those who think that we are bound on this account to refrain from discussing the question of Slavery. Many more, and it is trusted the great majority of New England freemen, think otherwise. It is time the question should be settled. Am I to close my lips upon the subject of Slavery, from fear of the irritable temper of the Slave-holders? Am I to be told — Beware of offending these gentlemen; you know their quick and resentful character; you know how exceedingly sensitive they are upon this point; you know with what distrust they already regard us of the North; they will be very angry at any reflections upon their character and institutions; they will answer you with threats of violence and of rebellion; do not dare to say a word in behalf of the Slave: there is nothing the master will resent so quickly; breathe not an imputation upon their morals: nothing comes more home to them than this? Am I to be told this; and am I therefore to be silent; am I therefore to cease from my enquiries into this great subject of national concern? No! If the gentlemen are irritated, we are sorry for it. But we cannot help it. Let each take heed that he speak no word of which an honest man can complain. Here is a question of unspeakable interest to our people; a question of policy, of humanity, of morals, of religion. It should be fully understood, and felt in its truth, by all. To this end, discussion must be free and fearless. And it will be so. The cries of selfishness will no longer scare it away.

It is to be observed, that, in this first chapter, no position of Dr. Channing's is attacked, nor argument answered. The



writer wanders into general considerations and discursive reasonings, upon the impracticability of doing away Slavery, and the danger of discussing it. But what has he shown? Has he demonstrated, or in any way made evident, the truth of the proposition, which was to form the subject of the chapter, namely, that Public Sentiment in the free States in relation to Slavery is perfectly sound, and ought not to be altered? Has he established any definite position? No. His remarks, indeed, inaccurate and loose as they are, may have some force, more or less, according to the reader's peculiar habits of mind. But the subject has not yet been grasped.

We now proceed to the second chapter, entitled "Power over Slavery," in which the author comments upon the remaining tenets of what he calls "our doctrine," endeavours to show their soundness, where it is necessary, and examines the work of Dr. Channing in reference to them.

We do not read far, before finding flagrant misrepresentations of his author.

"The means proposed are moral influences. To have any effect, they must find their way into the mind and heart of the Slave-holder. That which we call abolition, the Slave-holders consider a request to give up, waste, annihilate, what they estimate to be worth about five hundred millions of dollars."

"The moral influence, which is to work this stupendous miracle in their hearts, is first to commence by persuading them, that they are guilty of atrocious crime, &c. &c."

It is not so. Dr. C. does not accuse the Slave-holders of atrocious crime. He takes pains, although the reader may perhaps think the precaution unnecessary, to guard against being so understood. He maintains indeed, that the Slave suffers an unspeakable wrong, in being held as property, but he, at the same time, states, as a principle, that the guilt of the Slave-holder, if he be guilty, is not in proportion to the wrong suffered by the Slave, but to the violence done to conscience. "The wrong is the same to the Slave," he writes, "from whatever motive or spirit it may be inflicted. But this motive or spirit determines wholly the character of him who inflicts it. Because a great injury is done to another, it does not follow that he who does it, is a depraved man." "Slavery is an evil, not through any singular corruption in the Slave-holder, but

from its own nature, and in spite of all efforts to make it good." So prominent does he make his views on this point, that to falsify them is inexcusable; for they cannot be mistaken, without wilful blindness.

We object very much to the spirit of the next paragraph to the one we have quoted. But we leave it to the judgment of the reader. A little farther on, we read :

"An Unitarian clergyman goes on a desperate enterprise, when he attempts to awe men or frighten them into a compliance with his will. He may deride, if he pleases, the arrogance of the Slave-holder, and describe it as the consequence of power habitually maintained over one or two hundred dependents; but what will the Slave-holder say, in return, of that temper of mind which ventures to intimidate five millions of freemen, by menace, denunciation, and indignity?"

This passage is to be utterly condemned. Who, that has read Dr. Channing's work, does not feel that the imputations here made are entirely groundless? You find there no menace, no denunciation, and, we think, no indignity. The author arrogates no power, but that of truth and right. He makes use of no means, but those of persuasion. He fully states his own views, without fear, or shuffling, and leaves them to have such effect as they justly may. He does not presume to judge men, of any class. Much less does he threaten any. He appeals not to men's superstitious fears. Dr. Channing, recluse though he be, knows full well the folly of endeavouring to "intimidate" the Southern gentlemen into accordance with his views; and would be as sensible as any to the quixotic character of such an enterprise. He does not attempt it. His work is calm, full, energetic, and as inoffensive as it could be, in being true.

"If indeed," say the Remarks, "we mean to fight the Slaves free, it is of no moment how angry we make their masters;" but if our object be to persuade the Slave-holders, we should be careful not to irritate them. We reply: Our object is or ought to be, not by any means to fight the Slaves free, nor to induce any violent measures, on a subject exacting so much calmness and honesty, nor absolutely to persuade Slave-holders, but to persuade in so far only as persuasion can be effected by a manly, charitable exposition of truth. No honorable man can wish that we should lie, for the sake of soothing the feelings of our brethren of the Carolinas. And

what is it better than falsehood, to represent Slavery other than as a dreadful wrong, and its effects upon public morals and public principle, other than as exceedingly lamentable. It must be felt that we have something higher to do, than to assuage the irritation of Southern pride, that, in the discussion of this momentous question,—momentous to all men, to all nations, to all ages, and formidably so to ourselves and our posterity,—it is quite a secondary consideration, whether those, whose interests are concerned in the decision of it, are angry at what we say, or not. Needless irritation should by no means be caused. In the present excited state of public feeling, every man is bound to endeavour to smooth down, as he best may, consistently with other duties, the asperities of passion; to use, as much as possible, a calming and softening influence upon the community. But it cannot be expected that all irritation will be avoided; for the wrong and the evils of Slavery must be thoroughly understood and felt by our people, and in the discussion of these,—even in the most mild and prudent discussion of them,—facts must be referred to, and truths must be told, the statement of which some will choose to regard as injury or insult. The spirit of inquiry is daily increasing. It will not be repressed by violent threats. Slavery must be viewed in its true light.

The Remarks proceed to the consideration of the third tenet of the “Doctrine” of the Free States.

“3. It is a breach of our highest political contract, and a violation of good faith and common honesty, to disturb the internal condition and domestic arrangements of the Slave-holding States.”

“I assume this position to be self-evident.”

We repeat, what we have before said, that literary criticism is not our office. So, without questioning the propriety of the epithet “highest,” or asking how “common honesty” differs from honesty, or expressing a doubt whether a “position” can be said in any way to be “evident,” or whether this proposition be of a nature to be termed “self-evident,” we allow what the gentleman takes for granted, interpreting it, however, according to our views, not according to his.

“The first open question is, does this book and its doctrines interfere with the internal condition and domestic arrangement of the Slave-holding States?”

“First, I say, they are intended to do it. Slavery is established by law; and the object of this publication is to abolish it. If, in the opinion of our author, his book will not, and cannot disturb the existing relations of Slavery, it was a work of gratuitous folly to publish it.”

We here see how the writer construes the proposition, which he has affirmed, and in this sense, far from being evident, it is false. According to this interpretation, every thing written on the subject of Slavery, in which the right of holding man as property is denied, or the policy of abolition advocated, or the laws of the Slave-holding States criticised, or cruelty on the part of Slave-holders censured, is affirmed to be a violation of the Constitution, and of good faith and honesty; nay, in truth, every moral or philosophical work, every publication which tends to spread in society a knowledge of the natural rights of man, must be subject to the same charge; for, it cannot be denied, that with the progress of intelligence and morality, the security of Slavery is growing daily less, and that an extension of the knowledge of truth and right among the people, particularly among the Slaves, tends “to disturb the internal condition and domestic arrangements of the Slave-holding States.” Slavery cannot stand before advancing civilization. Every thing, of gain to the public mind, is hostile to it; and it is true, that Dr. Channing’s book, among others, is of this character. But the assertion, that it therefore violates the Constitution, (for this we understand the writer to mean by “our highest political contract,”) and good faith and common honesty, is quite unfounded. It does not stand to reason.

It is surprising to find from what insufficient premises, is drawn the declaration which we hear, not unfrequently, that Slavery is guaranteed by the Constitution. The word Slave does not stain the recorded Constitution of the United States; and the subject is referred to only twice;—once, in the second section of the first article, where it is provided, that “Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons,” and

again, in the second section of the fourth article, where we find — “No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.” How foolish an extravagance, to charge Dr. Channing with having violated either of these sections, by what he has written! If the publication of his book is not in violation of either of these sections, it is not in violation of the Constitution; it is not in violation of “our highest political contract.”

The Constitution does indeed recognise Slavery as established by law, and it is admitted on all hands, that the Free States would break their obligations by attempting to disturb the domestic arrangements of their Southern confederates; but, it is not admitted, that it is either illegal, or faithless, or in any way bad, to discuss freely and without reserve, the policy, or the humanity of any of our institutions, or the equity of any of our laws.

The North is under no other political compact with the South, than that of the Constitution. We violate it only when we act illegally. No sane man will maintain that Dr. Channing has done so in the publication of his work.

As to our moral obligation, it is but tautology to say, that this is only the obligation of conscience. We are morally bound to conduct ourselves towards our Southern brethren, not only with good intention, but with good judgment, in so far as reason is subject to will. Show that the consequences of Dr. C.’s public expression of his opinions are evidently injurious and he stands liable to your censure, — for his bad feeling, if he foresaw those consequences, — for his folly, if he did not. We regard Dr. C. as a public benefactor.

We have said that it is by no means to be admitted, that our compact with the South is such, that any thing which tends, in the remotest manner, to disturb the existing relations of Slavery is wrong. Carry out this principle, and you forbid the publication of the Declaration of Independence, of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, of the first chapter of Genesis; nay, of every improved spelling-book or primer, and of every magazine for

the diffusion of useful knowledge; for whatever diffuses information, strikes a blow at Slavery. Our political obligations are defined by the Constitution. We must not protect runaways, and we must permit the Slave population to be represented in Congress. For the rest, we are under no other obligation than that which binds us to act aright, with regard to every other object of public concern. The freedom of the press remains to us unabridged. We must firmly assert and maintain our rights in this respect.

Supposing it to be true, that the work, upon which the Remarks have been made, is of a character to make those Slaves who read or hear it more uneasy in their bondage; is it therefore to be condemned? It would be so, indeed, if there were means of addressing the white portion of our population, without at the same time being heard by the black. But there are no such means. What is printed therefore on this subject, must, always, so long as Slavery lasts, be perilous. Men, to be secured in bondage, must be held in ignorance—a heavier chain than any their bodies can bear. To hold them in this intellectual bondage will be daily growing a more and more difficult task. Rights understood and maintained by the rest of the community, will at last begin to be understood by the Slaves, and an imperfect understanding of them will be likely to lead to impolitic and barbarous violence. But does this tendency of things make it our duty to fetter our minds from all free action, and so seal our lips, that we may not utter a word of complaint, that our fellow man is made the degraded instrument of another's gain or pleasure? No. The time has come when it is for the highest interest of our people, as well as of humanity, that this matter should be publicly discussed; not that hot-headed, brainless men may be encouraged in their declamation and pseudo-philanthropy, but that the minds of our citizens may be cleared of those mists, which cloud their understanding of some most vital truths, and be brought to that prudent foresight, and firm energy of purpose, and power of will, which will ensure their final deliverance from the great national pest.

The pamphlet tells us that Dr. Channing “disavows the conclusions directly, plainly, irresistibly deduced from his

own positions, and appears to be oppressed with the horror, which no human being can escape from, who looks with steadiness and constancy on the immense moral evil, which, in the character of a Christian moralist, his doctrine is bringing on the country."

Our office, again let it be remembered, is not that of a literary censor. We ask, therefore, no question about the immense moral evil which comes to us "in the character of a Christian moralist," but proceed to discover what is this plain, direct, irresistible deduction from the Doctor's premises. "I charge him," continues our author, "in spite of his disclaimer, with the doctrine of insurrection. He inculcates the right of insurrection on the whole Slave population of the United States;" and we are next told, that this is not only a fair deduction from the argument, but the only proper deduction, — not only that, by all the rules of sound reasoning, insurrection is the end and aim of his book, but that all rational men, ay, even the stupidest Slave, must understand it to be so. Observe the generality, the full extent of this assertion. Every man in the possession of reason, as well as the stupidest Slave, must understand Dr. Channing to inculcate the right of insurrection on the whole slave population of the United States! There are men, understanding him differently, who would fain not be ranked among the irrationals.

"The whole doctrine of his book," says the pamphleteer, "is that man under no possible circumstances can be rightfully made a Slave." We do not understand how a whole doctrine differs from a doctrine. Such is undoubtedly the doctrine of the book. And if it be, as the writer so forcibly asserts, the plain direct, and irresistible deduction from this, that all Slaves have a right to rebel, why does he not show the falsity of the premises, which lead necessarily to the conclusion which so revolts him? Nay, why does he class those premises, in the first part of his book, among the long-established truisms which nobody denies? Here we might expect from the author, some clear statement of the grounds of his argument, some consideration of the main matter, some attempt to controvert the position upon which the work, which forms the subject of his remarks, rests. But nothing like this. The

great, all-important question, whether man can be rightfully owned, he leaves without any definite answer. He does not enter into a consideration of its merits. The reader remains in doubt as to his opinions on that point. His expressions are contradictory. On one page, that is said to be an undenied truism, which on another is declared to be the plain and irresistible proof of a dangerous falsity. How can a man presume to write on a subject of such vital importance, with a mind so entirely undecided on its chief point? Such shuffling compositions insult the public. They gratify the author's vanity at the expense of truth and honesty. They should be frowned upon.

The writer does not succeed in his attempt to show that his author preaches insurrection. Dr. Channing does not maintain that "acts of legislation, which have for their object to hold men in Slavery, are already made void by a power superior to all human constitutions and governments;" but that they are declared unjust and oppressive by that superior power. Like other unjust laws they are to be obeyed, so long as we are subject to that government which enacted and executes them. All good men, however, should use their influence to change them. Every voice should be raised against unholy and oppressive legislation, not with clamor, but in the tones of dignified and urgent expostulation. Still we are subject to government and must obey government, until revolution breaks our bonds.

The writer of the Remarks draws a parallel between the condition and the rights of Slaves, upon the supposition of their being unjustly held in servitude, and the condition and rights of white men in like manner unjustly enslaved. We cannot understand whether he means to say that it is permissible to hold blacks in servitude, while to enslave whites is in the highest degree wrong, or that the rights of the two races are equal in this respect. If the former, why does he not point out to us what there is, in or about the negro, whether his complexion, or his present condition, or his character, which makes slavery to him no wrong. If the latter, then he it is that "inculcates the right of rebellion," he is himself "the preacher of insurrection." For he writes :



“ Could we doubt a moment about this, if the law of Carolina should propose to detain every white traveller passing through its territory, and turn him out on a plantation as a slave? In such case, the law would be no more invalid and unjust than Dr. C. represents the laws about negro Slaves. But is there a heart in New England that would not beat high with sympathy for the abused white man? Is there an arm that would not reach him a dagger if it could? Is there a tribunal on earth, or any law of Heaven that would not excuse,—excuse did I say?—that would not command him to watch for his opportunity, and make himself free?”

Here we all feel with the writer. We should be unspeakably indignant, if one of our fellow-citizens were enslaved in a foreign country, because those who had him in their power expected to profit by his labor, and should hold him blameless in attempting to deliver himself from bondage by any means which afforded reasonable prospect of success. Now it cannot be admitted for a moment, that the rights of the African in like circumstances, would be at all less than those of the New Englander. And here it is necessary to be explicit. There is danger of being misunderstood, and any misunderstanding on this point would work mischief. Still the public welfare demands that the truth should be told.

Our slaves are oppressed, wronged men. Their right of self-defence remains undiminished. Like all other men under the weight of despotic power, they have a right to rise in rebellion against their oppressors, whenever they can better themselves thereby, whenever they have power to effect a revolution in government, and the chance of benefits to result from such a revolution outbalances its certain evils. The Slaves in the United States, however, have not power to revolutionize government. They cannot free themselves by force. In their situation, rebellion is utter madness. It can but increase their woes. Such superiority have their masters in numbers, in knowledge, in power, in situation, that insurrection on their part can but produce misery, alarm, and closer bondage. Their right then of self-vindication by arms ceases. No people, however oppressed, can rightfully rebel, when rebellion would afford them no relief. Such is the plain state of the case. The oppressor's safety lies always in his might. The Slave's condition is at present hopeless. He must wait to be helped to freedom by the humane and influential.

Dr. Channing inculcates the right of insurrection in so far as the right of insurrection is an inherent right of man. Undoubtedly Dr. Channing does not hold it to be on account of our complexion, or any physical trait, that we have liberty to use those means, which God and reason have put into our hands, to defend ourselves in the enjoyment of those goods, which God has bestowed. The right of self-defence is universal. To African, American, and European, it is alike given, and every where it is subject to limitation. Fortunately for the master, the slave in our country cannot defend himself. Let the philanthropist compassionate him in his feebleness, and endeavour to gradually prepare the way for his liberation. And may God help him !

Our Saviour did not forbid Slavery in so many words. He did not attempt to restore the bond to liberty ; for the minds of men were not then prepared for so great a change. He gave his religion to the world, to work the subversion of all wrong. The spirit of that religion has wrought many revolutions in the opinions and institutions of men, while yet but in the beginning of its operations. It will effect many more. By the light which it has thrown upon the character, the rights, the destiny of man, it has now prepared society for the removal of this greatest outrage upon that character and those rights, the degrading of our fellow to the condition of servile instrument of another. Slavery is now indignantly frowned upon by the civilized world. It is regarded as the great blot on our national institutions; and the apathy, which is supposed to exist among us with regard to it, as a dark stain on our national character. It cannot stand. It must fall. Society will not go back. Its course is ever onward. That Slavery should sustain itself in our country for a century, before the reason and refinement and humanity, which are pressing upon it with a daily increasing host, would be a miracle in the history of man. Our children's prospect will be less gloomy than ours.

The author of the Remarks now bids fair to come to a consideration of the main points of the work which he reviews.

“ The argument of Dr. C.,” he says, “ is as unsound in its logic, as it is refined, extravagant, and dangerous in its morality, and horrible in its consequences.”

“ His fallacy is one very common to enthusiasts. He assumes a proposition to be universally true, which is true only with important qualifications and many limitations.”

“ His conclusion is based on the premises, that no property can be made to exist in a human being.”

By no means. Dr. Channing’s premise is, that “ man cannot be *justly* held and used as property.” This correction made, the gentleman’s argument comes to nothing. The force of his Remarks, for several pages, depends wholly on a misrepresentation of his author’s views. He argues : man is *in fact* owned as property, and therefore property can be made to exist in a human being. This conclusion is correct, but has nothing to do with the question. Who is fool enough to dispute that Slaves can be and are owned by planters at the South? — But does it therefore follow that they are justly owned? — What a miserable expedient, when reasons fail and wit is exhausted, to falsify arguments which ought to be fairly met!

“ This is but partially true even in Massachusetts,” continue the Remarks. “ We admit a limited property in human beings. A father has a property in his child; a master in his apprentice; a ship-captain in his mariners; a general in his soldiers. Their labor belongs to him, and their services, like those of the slave, may be enforced by stripes.”

And if it be so, what follows? Suppose Slavery were completely, as well as partially, established in our State, does it follow that Slavery is just, that man can be rightfully held as property? — But it is not so. The parent does not own the child. The ship-captain does not own his sailors. The tradesman does not own the apprentice. We understand by property, something held, not for its own good, but for the good of its owner, — something transferable, — something that may be bought and sold. The child is not held as property by its father, but restrained for its own good, on account of its helplessness. The mariner and the apprentice do not owe service to their respective employers, on account of a right of property claimed by them, but by contract, made for mutual benefit. Their submission is for a definite term, at the expiration of which, their right to their own labor, which they had partially resigned, returns to them.

That there is such a thing as legal Slavery, every one will admit. From the fact, the writer of the pamphlet attempts to prove the right ; and uses these extraordinary words.

“Property is the creature of municipal law. It exists nowhere without law ; and every where, is inherent in every thing which is made property by law.”

This is by no means correct. Property is not the creature of municipal law, but precedes it ; and to protect men in the enjoyment of property is one of the chief reasons for the establishment of law. Were there but two individuals on the earth, and they should meet for the first time, the one would feel that he had exclusive right to the fish which he had caught, to the animal which he had killed, to the fruit which he had plucked, to the utensil which he had made, — and would defend himself in the enjoyment of these, against the encroachments of the other. All men feel thus. And it is upon this universal sentiment, that the right of property is founded. By nature, we own what our strength and our wit have procured for us. Municipal law protects us in the enjoyment of that which is by nature ours.

The proposition, then, that “property is the creature of municipal law,” does not stand, and with the failure of this premise, falls the whole train of remark by which our disputant thinks to strengthen his position.

“Where is the authority,” he asks, “for the declaration, that there can be no property in a human being ? In the Bible ? Slavery is recognised under the Mosaic and Christian dispensation, without censure. In History ? Slavery has existed, in all time, in the fairest regions of the earth, and among the most civilized portions of mankind.”

So has despotism. Despotism has been the calamity of the fairest countries and the most civilized people. It is not expressly censured in the New Testament. Yet it is wrong. — Correct the question, and the answer is easy. Where is the authority for the declaration, that “man cannot be *justly* held and used as property ? ” We answer : Not “in a refined and elaborate metaphysical subtilty,” — not in history, — not in any chapter and verse of the Bible, — but in the Christian spirit, and in every man’s own heart, in yours Mr. Pamphleteer, in yours reader, in mine, in the Slaveholder’s, in the Slave’s. We all feel that Slavery is essentially a grievous wrong, that

man cannot be justly owned, that he has a right to his own limbs, to the employment of his own time, to the enjoyment of domestic life. Our authority is nature, and reason, and the spirit of revealed truth. And the civilized world almost unanimously testify for us.

What remains of this chapter is cant ; and does not bear upon the question. In so far as it tends to any thing, it tends to illustrate the position, that property is a creature of law ; and whatever illustrates, must weaken, this position. The writer wishes to show, that the question of Slavery is solely a legal question. It is not so. The plain truth of the matter is this. Whether man is or is not held as property, is a question of fact. Whether man can or cannot be so held, is a question of law. Whether man ought to be so held, is a question of right. It is this last which Dr. Channing discusses ; and, strange to say, his reviewer opposes to him legislative and judicial authorities. There is a Law, which Courts affect not to decide, and which they cannot change. To this all men must bow, the legislator and the judge, the governor and the subject. Reason and conscience are its interpreters. God is its constitutor. According to this law human legislation should be squared. When once it is understood, man should not hesitate to obey. It is the law of right. This is the law which Slavery violates.

The author of the Remarks, however, acknowledges no higher law than that of human enactment. "This idea of going beyond and behind the law, he says, to find a rule for human action in civil society, is getting to be somewhat alarming." Now what is this intended to mean? It is true, that the law of the land is, in the sphere of its operation, supreme. Whatever philosophy inculcates, or excuses infraction of it, is extremely dangerous. Let our tribunals be despised, and our government is not worth preserving. Still the man, who has no higher rule of action than the law of the land, is a degraded being. He is unworthy of the privileges he enjoys. Obedience to the public authorities forms but a small branch of our duty. A very large part of our actions are such as do not come at all under their cognizance. If we would be worthy, then, we must go farther than the law, and apply to

our actions, stricter principles, than courts apply for us. We must also go above, as well as beyond, the law; for we, it must be remembered, we the people, are, by means of our representatives, the framers of laws; we supply their deficiencies; we correct them when they are unjust; we, for whose good they are made, are to see that they answer that end. It is evident, then, that, as legislators, we must find some higher rule of action than our own statutes. The citizen is not at liberty to maintain that an existing law is made void by superior authority; but he is at liberty to express freely and fully his opinions as to the justice of that law, and, if he believe it unjust, to use all his influence to have it changed.— There is a tendency, always prevalent, but particularly so in our business times, more dangerous than that to which the gentleman has referred, — a tendency to slight Reason and Conscience. We are deaf to the admonitions of our better spirits. We forget our responsibilities, as citizens, as legislators, and as brothers, to God, to the spiritual world. Legal right is getting to be the only right generally recognised. Honor no longer tempers selfishness. Chivalry, that noble, but imperfect, form of truth and manliness, is fallen before more complete views of man's relations, and with it have gone many of the charities, many of the humanities of life. Those strict principles of religion, which our forefathers brought with them over the ocean, are disappearing with the narrow doctrines, with which they were associated. All the influences, which have heretofore redeemed us and made us what we are, have failed of their wonted power. Times of skepticism, of coarseness, of prose, seem to be coming upon us. Oh, let us do what we may, to avert them! Let Religion take her sceptre, and Justice sit at her right hand!

The necessity of making virtue our highest law, is allowed by all unbiased men. The author of the Remarks himself maintains, in his next chapter, (as what man can deny?) that we have higher duties than those of mere obedience to public law. Here then we stand on common ground. Right is supreme. The first question then is: is Slavery right? This question, the pamphlet we review does not discuss.

The third chapter, entitled, "Right of Discussion," needs little comment. It is no longer a question, whether Slavery shall be discussed. The discussion has commenced, and it is evident that it will continue. It remains to be seen,—it remains to be decided, whether that discussion shall be temperate and wise. If it be so, the result will be knowledge of the truth, and right action. If, on the contrary, passion and prejudice and selfishness rule, error and disorder will follow. Let influential men strive to direct public sentiment aright. Let them remind the citizens frequently of their duty to think and speak and act conscientiously, and of the great calamities resulting to a people from want of moral principle. Let us be true to ourselves, and light will break in upon us.

There are some expressions, in this chapter, which need to be examined before we leave it. We read: "Whatever is clearly and palpably inexpedient, ceases for the time to be morally right." The words "clearly and palpably," add nothing to the meaning of this sentence. Either inexpediency renders an action not morally right, which would otherwise be so, or it does not. If it does, — then whatever appears to us, on the whole, inexpedient, whether clearly or obscurely so, is to us not morally right. For the rest, without expressing any doubts as to the soundness of utilitarian ethics, suffice it to say, that in order that this principle should be other than very unsafe to act upon, the expediency or inexpediency of our actions should be judged, by their effect, not upon the interests of a small number and for a limited time, but upon all men, and through all ages. Each man must regard himself as a citizen of the world, and as having an influence upon the fate of an unlimited posterity.

In this connexion, there is a phrase to be noticed, as telling more of the writer's meaning, than appears at first sight. He speaks of "the commands of honor, of conscience and of duty." It is not uncommon to read "the dictates of honor and conscience;" and this expression is not perhaps to be found fault with; for although strictly it is pleonastic, although what is right is always honorable, and the truly honorable always right, yet actions are viewed in different lights, according as they are regarded as the gentleman's, or

as the Christian's. The same apology is not to be made for the phrase which we have quoted from our pamphlet. "The commands of conscience and of duty" are in every respect the same; or rather, the commands of conscience are duty. The expression therefore is bad. But it is not as a rhetorical error that we notice it. As such it is not remarkable in the pages before us. We regard it as an indication of wrong ideas of duty; and we are supported in our construction by parallel passages. One of the chapters is intitled "Moral Duties," as if all duties were not moral; and society is spoken of as to be supported not by moral principle, but by "moral and prudential principle." Now these expressions, and many like, tell us that the author has fallen into the error, not infrequent among men who boast themselves practical, of regarding duty as of two kinds, one of conscience, the other of interest, — of regarding man as bound by two obligations, of right and of expediency. Now this is an error, and a bad one. Conscience has no divided empire. We must hold ourselves in subjection to it, not partially and with certain reserved rights, but fully and constantly. True it may be, that the right is always the expedient, even in its immediate results. True it certainly is, that, in the long run, right is policy. But whether it be so or not, whether interest do or do not seem, to our short-sighted vision, to coincide with virtue, still to conscience, if we would be men, must we refer every action and every word. It is a shame that this great truism is not kept in view.

This, it is answered, is verbiage; it has no practical bearing upon the matter in hand. But no, it is not verbiage. These words are full of meaning. What we have said is wholly practical. It aims to make clearer the truth, that our first question with regard to Slavery is, not whether the white portion of our population will gain or lose by a continuance of the poor negro's bondage, — but whether Slavery be or be not right. And if it be decided that Slavery is an infraction of man's Rights, vested in him by the Almighty, of inherent, inviolable Rights, — if it be decided that Slavery is essentially unjust, — then ask not whether it *shall*, but how it *can* be done away. A necessary injustice would be an anomaly in the world.



In the fourth chapter, we come to a consideration of the second main proposition, that "public sentiment in the Slaveholding States cannot be altered."

"This arises from a very melancholy consideration, but one which should be deeply considered.

"Domestic Slavery is, in the United States, so intimately connected with civil society, that it can never be removed but by one of those tremendous convulsions in which nations perish."

To the proof of this last, the author devotes many pages. He calls our attention in a striking manner to the immense difficulty of the task which the Abolitionist proposes to himself. He shows that Slavery is connected by numberless ramifications with the interests of the South, and makes evident that, in the opinion of the Slave-holders, the relinquishment of their slaves would be an immense pecuniary sacrifice. From considerations of this nature, he comes to the conclusion that "Domestic Slavery is the perpetual and immovable condition of our national existence." The question, why it should be so, he thus answers. —

"Possibly as a balance in the operations of Heaven, for the unparalleled blessings of our extensive and prosperous republic; possibly as a trial for those virtues, which need calamity as well as happiness; possibly as the mode by which our nation, like the mouldering empires of the elder world, shall come to its termination; possibly for some mysterious reasons yet to be developed in the wisdom of Providence; possibly for some cause, like the minor evils of life, never to be made manifest to human reason."

It is gratifying, in discussions of policy, to find reference to our relations with the Author and Ruler of the universe, the most important and the most affecting of all in which we stand. We cannot however agree with the spirit of this paragraph. Viewing Slavery merely as a political evil, we might believe that it was to us, for some reasons not fully to be understood, a national dispensation; but it is inconsistent with true ideas of God's Justice and Benevolence, to suppose that a wrong done to one class of men, is instituted by him to discipline the virtues, or humble the pride, of another. It cannot be that God makes injustice a means of his government. It cannot be, that he constituted millions of creatures with aspirations after freedom, imbued them with a strong sense of their right to this freedom, gave them faculties which could find development, a soul which could find true life,

only in freedom ; and then, giving the lie to his own work, degraded them into a bondage, where the heart is blighted, the intellect fettered, conscience perverted, — in order that the calamities resulting from this disorder of nature might be dispensations of his Providence to another portion of his creatures.

The task of removing Slavery is indeed of immense difficulty. Let our country bring to the work commensurate forces. It is not impracticable to a great and good nation. The accomplishment of it will not be despaired of, by those who have faith in the wonderful efficiency of man, when inspired by moral principle with all the energy of resolute manhood. There is cowardice in despair.

Towards the close of this chapter, the writer shows us the true ground of much of the opposition which is met with at the North by those who attempt to make the public appreciate the calamity under which they lie. Some of our people, we hope not many, are unwilling that Slavery should be in any way interfered with, lest their commercial interests should suffer, lest they should have to pay more, than they now do, for the produce of Slave labor, or be unable to obtain it at all. Such men boast themselves practical, and as a triumphant response to all argument in favor of the Slave's rights, bring forward tables of prices current of Southern produce and Northern manufacture, and estimates in dollars and cents of the value of the aggregate black limbs in the country. Dr. Channing addresses such a one, — 'Brother, here are two or three millions of our fellow men inexpressibly wronged, debarred from those enjoyments and means of improvement to which God destined them, claimed as property by those who have no right to a hair of their heads, and unable to defend themselves from oppression. Let us all use our influence to do away this injustice. The evil is great. The cure, though necessarily slow, may be effected.' 'But, good sir, sweet sir,' says the practical man, 'what is to become of our rice, our sugar, and our cottons?' — 'Perhaps they will be less abundant. It may be that Slavery adds to our riches ; but this is no reason for continuing oppression. By raising your voice in favor of the wronged, you may make yourself poorer : the

commendation of your conscience will repay you.' — 'But my sugar, my rice, my cottons!' — 'I am trying to convince you, friend, that these ought to be held trifles in a cause of virtue. You must do your duty as the first thing; and whatever enjoyments are inconsistent with this, you must be willing to relinquish.' — 'All this is very true,' rejoins the matter-of-fact man; 'but it is not practical. You are a theorist, a closet-mind; you know nothing of realities. You are dealing with clouds. Duty! why, my good Doctor, expediency is duty. Utility is my standard; and according to this standard, sugar, and rice, and cotton are no trifles.'

To such spirits we do not address ourselves. We will not descend to the grovelling task of convincing selfishness of its narrowness, and showing that what we recommend as right, recommends itself as gain. To do so would compromit the dignity of a moral cause.

There is a paragraph in the introduction to the chapter upon which we have been remarking, which we cannot forbear to quote, as it leads to considerations which we have desired to enter upon. The gentleman says:—

“ I speak to practical, experienced business men, who know, by actual contact, the force of human motives and the rage of human passion, and not to theoretical and secluded scholars, who would give lessons in their study for the measure of a whirlwind. I speak to the bold and venturous navigator on the great ocean of life, who has heard the roar of the elements and felt the strain of the cordage; and not to the little pilot of a pleasure-boat, who never ventures beyond the ripple of a summer's breeze.”

The last of these sentences is a very fine one. Strike out the second epithet in the first clause, and it is faultless. The words are well put together, and the images are striking and illustrative. Where it stands, it is mere rhetorical embellishment; it strengthens no position; it throws light upon no part of the subject. It leads, however, to reflections which are useful in this place.

Who are practical men? — As this phrase is generally received, — those who are acquainted with the exceptions, and ignorant of the rules, of human nature. We will make our meaning plainer.

It is a common remark, that human nature is the same, all the world over. It appears under different forms, in different lights, and variously veiled. Still it is essentially the same. Its great laws are of universal application. — The practical man, — he who takes a busy part in active life, whose daily employments carry him into contact with the multitude, — sees mankind only in certain of these forms, and under certain of these lights. He wishes to influence men, to bend them to his purposes; and to effect this object, he studies the peculiarities of the individuals, or families, or classes, with whom he has to deal. Upon this study depends his success. He therefore makes it his great employment. His whole life is spent in discovering by what motive this or that person is most ruled, how the favor of this or that circle may be obtained; and his occupations are of such a character, that his experience of man, which he so much values, is confined to a comparatively narrow circle where his interests centre. Human nature is to him the character of the inhabitants of the village, city, state, where he has lived; and he knows not that the peculiarities of his kinsman are not essential attributes of the human kind. Such a life does not make the man truly wise. It begets indeed a certain shrewdness which receives great credit in the world, and qualifies one to be a safe counsellor with regard to measures of limited and temporary operation; but its tendency is to narrow the mind, and to blind it to man as man. The power of generalizing is lost or weakened. The attention long confined to the peculiarities, the littlenesses of individuals, is unable to grasp the great truths, the great interests, the great motives, the great ends of humanity.

If it be true that there are certain universal truths, and certain universal laws of our kind, they are to be discovered, not by the bustling, but by the meditative. He is best fitted to discern, to understand, and to feel them, who having had intercourse with his fellows in some of the ordinary occupations of life, and having seen them under the influence of various governments, institutions, and climates, retires to reflect on what he has seen, mingling only enough with society, to keep his recollections and his sympathies fresh, and, through the medium of history, viewing men in masses, and observing the changes

which time, place, and circumstance work upon character. He carries always with him the subject of his examination, in his own breast. All the essentials of man's nature are there to be found. Free from the trammels of petty particular cares, he takes generous and impartial views of the race. Instead of going forth in the morning to speculate in lands, cloths, or stocks, endeavouring to anticipate the changes which are to take place in the state of the market, — or betaking himself to the halls of legislation to learn the art of detaching men from one party, to tie them to another, — or bending his whole mind to convincing a jury, and himself if necessary, of the justice of a client's cause, — instead of going into the world and having to deal with single and partial forms of humanity, — he sits in his study, and looks widely over the face of society, past and present, and acquaints himself with its generalities, with its substance, with the constantly observed laws of its motions. He rises in contemplation; the horizon which formerly limited his vision widens; he sees man in all his vast relations, of creature, brother, embryo angel; and from his elevation he casts a ray of light upon our otherwise benighted path. Such men are the truly wise. These are the men who solve the riddle and unravel the mystery of human life. They are a people's safest guides. National prosperity is progress along a narrow and difficult road, and in our journey, we cannot trust, for safe conduct, fellow farers, who mingle in the crowd, and are carried along with it, but must look to those who stand aloof, in advance of the multitude, and see their way.

(And in fact, the quiet, retired, contemplative minds are the most influential though the least credited of all. By changing society itself, they in the end change all which society has established. They prepare the way for all the great movements. Bustling, practical men are their instruments. The deep tones which come from their retreats are the commands of genius. Their influence is the stronger, and the surer, for being not immediately sensible. They do not change laws, increase crops, nor regulate commerce, but addressing themselves to individual minds, they correct errors of judgment, and awaken new aspirations and new principles of action. Public Sentiment, — in contradiction to which, in a free country like our own, institutions cannot long stand, — receives its tone

from men, who are not felt in the world, except by the eloquence they utter and the truths they tell.)

There are then certain great principles, a knowledge which is essential to practical wisdom, which are with difficulty understood by him who is called emphatically a practical man, by one whose attention is absorbed by transient interests and limited operations. These principles, though universal, are not universally recognised. He therefore who proposes considerations founded upon them, often meets with unwelcome reception, and is answered that what he propounds is very good theory, but no rule for practice. The answer is absurd. What is theory? It is a system of laws deduced from observation of what has taken place. It is good, it is true only so far as it conforms with facts. It is a rule for practice, or it is nothing. Whatever is proposed to your consideration, is either true, theoretically and practically, or false, theoretically and practically. It is either good philosophy and good fact, or it is bad philosophy and bad fact. "Truth is one." It is the part then, not of a wise, but of a foolish person, to answer to a proposition, that it is good theory, but not practical. This is merely a way of escape from the recognition of truths, which you ought frankly to acknowledge or fairly to disprove. By admitting it to be good theory, you admit that it ought to be your rule of practice; and by refusing to make it so, you only exercise your right of acting as a fool, while you judge as a sage.

And now apply what has been said, to the matter in hand. The proposition, that Slavery is a great wrong, and that a nation never prospers by wrong, are either true or false. Call them theory or fact, prose or poetry, or what you will, the question still recurs: Are they true or not? Tell us not that they are the speculations of closet-minds. No matter who found them. Are they true? Talk not of the difference between abstract and matter-of-fact reasoners, and of the vagueness of these propositions. Apply what epithet you choose to them. But are they true? Yes, good friends, they are true. And if true, not only are they practical; but the fate of our country depends upon their being blazed abroad. Slavery is a great wrong to the slave, and as such, not merely as an evil to ourselves, it must be done away. Were this object

to be attained only by sinking the half of our fair territory in the Atlantic, still the national interest would demand that the sacrifice should be made.

Retired men, we have said, are the best able to discover and to enforce the great truths which concern man. But with regard to particular applications, they need the advice of those who have made particulars their study. Dr. Channing would be an indifferent legislator. Such men know only the great ends of national existence, and the great rules of action, and are unable to judge of the expediency of measures, the effect of which depends upon circumstances, peculiar to the occasion, which the general thinker cannot well weigh.

He cannot, for the same reason, be expected always to time his observations well, or to assume, on all occasions, the most effectual tone of persuasion. We think, however, that in the publication of this work, he has judged well in these respects. We wanted just such a book. We needed to be strongly reminded of our duties to the Slave. Dr. Channing discusses the question as a question of right, not of interest. And this is well. There is more sense of justice in our community than our so called practical men give credit for.

It is true, as our author remarks, that "he is a poor teacher, who, in estimating the operation of motives and the causes of action, takes mankind as he would have them, and not as they are."—It is true that conscience has not her rightful dominion, and that those who go upon the supposition that men will never knowingly do wrong, will be woefully disappointed. Yet we believe, that the sense of right can, in no way, be thrown from the high place it holds in the minds of a people, and that, by an appeal to it on questions of duty, the heart is stirred much more powerfully, than by oblique and subtle addresses to selfishness. We call our people a moral people. We trust it is so, in a fuller sense than that which the phrase generally receives. Show our citizens the course of duty, and they will, in the end, pursue it.

Dr. Channing's work is not to be reproached, as not practical. It is practical in the highest degree. The subject of Slavery is so treated as to be brought home to every mind. His course is plain and direct; his style simple, unpretending. There is no mixture of any sort of pedantry. It is not at all

in place, to say, with the author of the *Remarks*, that "he argues out his positions with all the learning of the schools." Dr. Channing is not a learned man. He does not affect learning in his writings. He has lived the life of a thinker, not of a reader. His conclusions are those of a man, not of a scholar. True, he is, in the author's sarcastic words, "a mere talking clergyman." But in our days, the pulpit is, by no means, a bar to influence; and a "mere talking clergyman," so he have a great soul to prompt his tongue, and have filled it, by observing and meditation, with all wisdom and charities, is an efficient practical man. With us, speech is action, and though our logocratic sins are many, yet for that the more, is well-spoken truth welcome and powerful.

The author concludes that "all hope of exterminating Slavery,"—we use his words,— "is desperate by any other means than civil war;" and leaves us to infer that, since Slavery is, intimately as he has represented, bound up with the interests, domestic condition, and character, of the South,—"Public Sentiment, there, cannot be changed."—We notice, in passing, a want of logic in this implied inference. The impracticability of removing Slavery, makes out the inexpediency of attempting, not the impossibility of effecting, a change in Public Sentiment. At any rate, one who differs with the author in the premises, will come to a different conclusion.—Southern feeling, not only can be changed, but is daily changing. What signifies it to tell us, that "the Slave region has pronounced its decision," and that "within its borders Slavery shall not be discussed"? State decisions cannot shut out the spirit of civilization. Let books be printed, or suppressed; let men be hung and flayed, or honored, for speaking the truth: still we are freemen; we are thinking men; no part of our people will turn a deaf ear to reason and right.

The fifth chapter of the *Remarks* is a more particular consideration of "the modes of abolishing Slavery." The manner, in which this subject is treated, is quite unsatisfactory. There breathes through it, a cavilling, a petty, spirit, which does no credit to the author, whoever he be; and misrepresentations of the opinions which he opposes, are so



frequent and gross, that the reader cannot refrain from believing them, in part at least, intentional, — since, as the work is anonymous, there is nothing to forbid that unfavorable construction.

The loss, which would accrue to the Slave-holders from abolition, is much exaggerated by our writer. After giving estimates of the aggregate value of our Slaves, ranging from two hundred and fifty, to eight hundred, millions, — he says: “Before Slavery can cease in the United States, this vast property must be annihilated.” — This, we submit, is quite an incorrect statement of the case. If the Slaves were liberated, they would, from their very situation, be obliged to work for reasonable wages. The only difference would be, that the planter would then pay, for willing labor, a sum of money; whereas he now pays, for forced labor, clothes, food, and shelter. — This, however, is not to our main point.

However the question of the apparent practicability of abolishing Slavery may be decided, our duties remain, in great degree, the same. Whether there can, or cannot, be now pointed out any way of removing this evil, — still we must call up all our intelligence, all our sagacity, all our humanity and disinterestedness, in order to discover the path, if it be not yet found. From the very nature of the case, the impossibility of effecting our purpose cannot be shown; and our hopes receive so much confirmation from general considerations, — of the benignity of God, — and of the immense efficiency of man, when acting from great motives, — that we should be authorized, nay, commanded, — to summon all our resources for the attempt, even if not a ray of light had come to us from the dark cloud. To remove Slavery is not impossible. There is no excuse, then, for remissness or delay.

We must begin then from this point. *Slavery is wrong. The Slave is an oppressed man. He must be freed.* We are not to believe the impossibility of giving him freedom, till it shall have been proved by actual experiment. It has not been so proved. Far from it. The impracticability of plans already proposed, has by no means been made evident. — We have, it is true, a great work before us. But, let it be remembered, there is a great nation to effect it. The extent of the evil, the tenacity, with which Slave-holders cling to their

property, and the other considerations which have been advanced, go to prove, not that it is impracticable, but that it must be gradual and difficult,—gradual, because so great,—difficult, because the soul which animates men, is so different from what it should be. Our success is not only probable,—it is sure,—did there but breathe through our community, the spirit of Christians,—the spirit of men,—the spirit of true chivalry, a semblance of which is so often worn as a veil.

No prudent man expects or wishes immediate abolition. The slave cannot yet be liberated with safety. He must still be restrained. “He cannot rightfully, and should not, be owned by the individual. But, like every other citizen, he belongs to the community.”—Our author protests that he does “not understand this nice distinction.” He is “sure the slave would not comprehend it.” He does “not perceive how the slave can cease to be property and yet belong to the community.” How flimsy is this!—You, Mr Pamphleteer, we presume, are not a slave: yet you belong to the community, by the profession of your title-page. You are subject to the restraints of law. If, in the opinion of our courts, the good of the community shall require you to be confined, (which, if you continue to publish “Remarks on Slavery,” the public weal, in our estimation, will ere long demand)—you will be incarcerated. Yet you would not, we trust, in preparing another edition of your pamphlet from your cell, entitle it, “Remarks, &c. By a Slave of Massachusetts.”

Our humble work is finished. We have raked over this heap of bad arguments and offensive allusions, and picked out such parts as the public health required to be exposed. To ourselves, the task has been anything but agreeable. To point out the fallacy of palpable sophistry, is not a sufficiently active employment, to be interesting; and there are works with which one is reluctant, in any way, to meddle. Our object has not been to counsel the citizens; but only to attract the attention of careless readers to the weak points of the book we have reviewed, and by some considerations of the main subject, to cancel the injurious effects which might follow from a popular, and to a degree powerful and attractive, defence of pernicious errors.



