




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REVIEW

OF

"THE NEW DIVINITY TRIED;"

OR AN

EXAMINATION OF REV. MR. RAND'S STRICTURES

ON A

SERMON

DELIVERED BY THE REV. C. G. FINNEY,

ON

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MAKING A NEW HEART.

C
BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY PEIRCE AND PARKER,
No. 9, Cornhill.
1832.

REVIEW.

The New Divinity Tried, being an Examination of a Sermon delivered by the Rev. C. G. Finney, on Making a New Heart. First published in the Volunteer. By Asa Rand. Boston: Lyceum Press. Light & Harris, No. 3, Cornhill, 1832.

The first thing that strikes the considerate reader of this pamphlet is *the novelty and impropriety of the course pursued by its author.* The Rev. Mr. Finney, in his ordinary routine of ministerial duty, delivered in this city, on a sabbath evening in October or November last, an extemporaneous discourse on the making a new heart enjoined in Ezek. xviii. 31. The editor of the *Volunteer*, it seems, was present, and took notes of the sermon; and without asking the permission of the preacher, or even informing him of what he was about to do, the editor, in his next number, occupied three pages and a portion of a fourth with an "Abstract of the Sermon," and thirteen pages with "Strictures." This is, in this country at least, an entirely novel course. We recollect but two instances in which abstracts of sermons made from notes taken while listening to them, have been printed, without the consent of the preachers, and made the subject of condemnatory remarks. Sometime since a clergyman of this city delivered, on a weekday evening, after previous notice, in a neighboring town, a discourse designed, and announced, as an attack on the system of the Universalists. Three Universalist ministers, including the editor of the *Trumpet and Universalist Magazine*, attended, and took notes of the sermon. Subsequently inquiry was made of the preacher, whether the sermon would be published, accompanied with a notification, that, if it were not published, the abstract which had been taken of it would be printed in the *Trumpet*, with remarks in reply. The sermon was not published, and the abstract and remarks were printed in the *Trumpet*. And another weekly paper printed in Boston, and styling itself religious, which, in the severity and abuse with which it treats those from whom it differs, even on points admitted to be not fundamental, is but little behind the *Trumpet*, has, we are told, in a few instan-

ces, pursued the very course taken by the editor of the *Volunteer* in the case before us. Such are the precedents he has chosen to follow, and the sources from which they are derived. Precedents and sources which, all who have a regard for fairness and decency in controversy will agree with us, do not at all invalidate the correctness of the assertion that the course which the author of the pamphlet before us has taken is an entirely novel one, at least in this country.

It is also an extremely improper one. What right had the editor of the *Volunteer* to publish an abstract of Mr. Finney's sermon without his consent? The discourse as prepared by its author was solely his property, to dispose of it as he should think proper. He chose to preach it for the oral instruction of his hearers. But his doing this neither contained nor implied a permission to any one of his hearers to publish what he could retain of it, much less to make such an abstract the subject of strictures in a periodical. To do so, the usage in regard to such things being what it is, as truly violates personal rights as it would to publish in a periodical, what could be recollected of a conversation of a clergyman, with accompanying strictures. But, says the editor (*Volunteer* p. 188) in replying to a hint that had been given by a correspondent, of the impropriety and unfairness of his course. "Editors publish abstracts of addresses and sermons before benevolent societies, almost every week in the year, and sometimes make them the ground of critical remark. The same practice prevails respecting speeches in Congress and other Legislatures." We do not agree that the usage is as here stated in regard to critical remarks on abstracts of addresses and sermons before benevolent societies. But admitting it to be so, in these cases the speaker understands beforehand that what he shall say may be so used, and therefore in delivering his address, or sermon, in such circumstances, gives an implied consent to such a course being taken in regard to it, if any of his hearers shall see fit to take it. But there is nothing like this in the case of a discourse delivered, as was that of Mr. Finney, in the course of the ordinary instructions of the pulpit. This ground of justification, therefore, entirely fails. The editor has alledged another, equally unfounded. He says (*Volunteer* p. 188), "Our justification in this instance is, that sentiments which we deem subversive of the Gospel in their results, are frequently *preached* before this community, which have not been *printed*; and, feeling necessity laid upon us to examine them, and vindicate the truth, we took the only method which was left us." The sentiments referred to are, of course, those advanced in this sermon. And so far is this statement in regard to them from being correct, that the same sentiments have been, not only preached, but also *printed*, in a sermon on the same text in the *Christian Spectator*, vol. vi. p. 241; and in a sermon on Regeneration by the Rev. Dr. Cox of New York, published in October 1829, which has been extensively circulated, and reviewed in different religious periodicals. And various articles inserted in the *Christian Spectator* during the last two or three years advocate similar views. Thus the pleas, and all the pleas, of justification the editor has offered are found to be unavailing.

And how utterly impossible in this way to institute a fair and thorough examination of the sentiments of a preacher? Little more than the heads and sub-divisions of his sermon can, of course, be given. And no one needs be told how different the meaning of these often appears, and is in reality, when stated in the abstract form of a skeleton, from their obvious import when heard or read with their accompanying illustrations. In the case before us, there were three whole classes of important omissions in the abstract as first printed, which were supplied by a correspondent in the next number of the *Volunteer*, and have been incorporated into the Abstract as given in the pamphlet; omissions so important that the editor is constrained to express his "regret" that they occurred, and to "grant that a recollection" of them "would have precluded some of his remarks;"* and it ought to have precluded the principal charges of "unscriptural and dangerous" error which he has preferred.

Fairness, moreover, requires that unfavorable representations and condemnatory remarks, concerning the statements of their opinions by others, should be made only in a similar form to that in which the statements were made. It would be evidently wrong to comment upon and condemn in a sermon or public address, statements and reasonings which have been offered only in private conversation. No less unfair is it to comment upon and condemn, in print, and thus, it may be, before the whole community, statements and reasonings offered in an oral discourse to a single congregation. And if the editor of the *Volunteer* may pursue this course in regard to the preaching of Mr. Finney, he and other editors may pursue it, as they can, in regard to all the sermons, on the sabbath and at other times, of all the clergymen throughout the country. And what would be the effect upon the preaching of our country, prepared for and delivered with the feeling of constant exposedness to such a course of proceeding? What would be the influence upon the occupations and the usefulness of ministers, to be looking after continually and endeavoring to counteract, as they would be constrained to, the innumerable misapprehensions and misrepresentations of them that would be spread through the land? The practice ought, manifestly, to be met at once, and put down, by the marked reprobation of an enlightened and honorable community.

But the whole of the impropriety of the editor's course in regard to this sermon of Mr. Finney is not yet stated. On the back of the pamphlet is printed an "Advertisement," in which is the following sentence. "Since its [the article's] first appearance, the abstract of the sermon has been amended from the skeleton used by the preacher on its delivery." Now what would a person, who has not seen the two articles in the *Volunteer* in relation to this sermon, and has only read the pamphlet, understand by this assertion? Why, clearly, that Mr. Finney had seen the abstract, and corrected it by his skeleton, or had lent his skeleton to the editor for him to supply the needful corrections; so that the abstract as published in the

* *Volunteer*, p. 189.

pamphlet has his sanction. But the facts were, that the editor never had or sought any intercourse with Mr. F. on the subject. A third person, who had heard the sermon, after reading the abstract as at first published and noting in it some important deficiencies, determined to supply them in a communication to the Volunteer; and to aid his memory in doing it, borrowed of Mr. Finney the skeleton he had used in delivering the sermon—such brief notes as can be written, in a hand not remarkably small, upon one side of a blank card. The communication thus prepared was not shown to Mr. Finney, nor did he ever see it till it appeared in the Volunteer. So that, in fact, he never in any way, directly or indirectly, sanctioned the correctness of the abstract, or its publication.

But the course, unjustifiable and improper as it is, has been taken. And in this way the grave charge of “frequently preaching before this community sentiments subversive of the Gospel in their results,” has been publicly preferred against Mr. Finney. (Volunteer, p. 188.) Other Orthodox Congregational ministers in the city are implicated in the charge. And these “unscriptural and dangerous views,” it is said, (pamphlet, p. 13,) “are somewhat prevalent in Orthodox congregations at the present time.” Weighty assertions, truly; which ought, most certainly, to be made only by one who perfectly understands the subjects on which he speaks, makes his statements with clearness and consistency, supports them by the most conclusive proof, and has an evident call of duty to make and publish them. Qualifications all of which we shall proceed to show are not found in the instance before us.

In doing this, however, we would say distinctly, that we are not to be understood as defending or approving every shade of theological opinion, or mode of statement and illustration, advanced and employed by Mr. Finney, in his preaching generally, or in the sermon commented on in this pamphlet. With the sermon as delivered, and as presented in this abstract, we should have been better pleased if the preacher had somewhere, perhaps in the beginning of his sixth remark, *stated formally and distinctly*, (what Mr. F. fully believes, and often asserts in his preaching, and what was plainly implied in this sermon,) that, notwithstanding the perfect ability and obligation of men to make themselves new hearts, not one of them ever has done it, or ever will do it, without the special and efficacious influence of the Holy Ghost. We could have wished also that in speaking, in his second remark, of “the idea of a sinner’s being passive in regeneration,” he had been careful to exempt from the censure he pronounces, those who use such language (as many do) meaning by it, not at all that men are not active in turning from sin to holiness, but simply that they are *undeserving recipients* of the influence of the Holy Ghost which brings them to turn. And we dislike the attempt, in the sixth remark, to explain the mode of the Spirit’s operation in changing the heart. We do not object to the declaration, The Spirit “does not come, and take right hold of the heart, and perform an operation upon it;” nor did we object, when listening to the sermon, to the lucid expansion and illustration that were given of this thought; for we know that many sinners

quiet themselves in their inexcusable stupidity and unbelief, with the imagination that there must be something like the Spirit's "taking right hold of their hearts and performing an operation upon them," before they can have any power to repent; and this dreadful delusion must, if possible, be torn from them. But we cannot accord with the addition, "Many have supposed that he [the Spirit] moves by a direct and immediate act, either upon the *motive* to give it efficiency, or upon the *mind* to make it willing. But there is no mystery about it." No mystery about it, when the Saviour expressly declares that the *method* of it is as unknown as were the principles which regulate the changes of the wind to the Jews of his time! It is, indeed, certain that the ground of the necessity of the Spirit's influence and the mode of his operation, whatever they may be, are such as not at all to interfere with the sinner's agency or responsibility. But who can say that the omniscient Spirit may not "move," in perfect consistency with these, by an "immediate act upon the mind;"* not to create in it certain exercises, but to excite and increase its susceptibilities to the truth presented? No man can prove that he cannot. And if we were under the necessity of adopting a theory in regard to the mode of the Spirit's operation, we should adopt this, for it seems to us most consonant with those numerous passages of Scripture which speak of our being God's workmanship, quickened by the Spirit, created in Christ Jesus, &c. But we admit that these representations do not decide the point. Nor do the Scriptures, we believe, any where decide it. And, we think, our Saviour has plainly intimated that it is not to be decided, by declaring, "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, nor whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." And how obvious is it that, as unembodied spirits influence one another in ways different from those which embodied spirits use, so the uncreated Spirit may, not to say must, operate in moving created minds in ways different from both? If, then, you have discovered and stated a method of the Spirit's operation which seems to correspond with all the phenomena of conversion and sanctification that come under our observation, there is no *certainty* that it is the true method. On this point, therefore, we cordially adopt the language of the author of the pamphlet before us on p. 16. "If we are required to say what kind of influence the Spirit *does* exert in effecting this change [the conversion of a sinner], we can only refer the reader to John iii. 8. We are satisfied, knowing that he does not infringe human liberty; that he does not excuse human guilt; that he vindicates the work of the Mediator and all the ways of God to man; that his wonderful grace affords a ground of hope to the guilty, and enslaved, and despairing sinner; and that every converted soul will joyfully adore the Agent who made him willing in the day of power." We wish we could as fully and sincerely accord with the other representations of the pamphlet. But this we cannot do, and must now return to the unwelcome task of pointing out its defects and errors.

* To move upon the motive—the truth or reason presented, (though such language is sometimes heard) evidently has no consistent meaning.

II. *There is a want of distinctness and accuracy in respect to the meaning and use of theological terms.* The necessity of this in all important discussions is obvious. But in no departments is it so indispensable as in mental philosophy and doctrinal theology, as these sciences are of higher importance than any others, and there is great variety in the usage of their technical terms, which is a principal cause of the unhappy divisions which exist among the friends and promoters of vital piety; they use the same terms in very different senses, and thence conclude that there is between them a wide difference of meaning, when, in many cases, a few moments employed in settling definitions would satisfy them that they are in fact of one opinion. Hence every man who undertakes to discuss questions in mental philosophy, and especially in doctrinal theology, is bound, where important terms have a well understood and commonly received meaning, to adopt that meaning; or, if he is under a necessity to adopt a different meaning, to notify his readers of the fact, and give an accurate statement of the sense which he attaches to the terms; or, if terms have different senses among theologians, to state definitely which he adopts: and he must be careful to use important terms in the same sense throughout his discussion, unless he is under unavoidable necessity as he proceeds to take a different sense, and gives distinct notice of the change. There are fundamental rules of theological disquisition, and especially of theological controversy. They have not been observed by the author of the pamphlet under review.

1. He states it, p. 4, to be one of "the most prominent views in mental philosophy presented in this discourse, that *a nature cannot be either holy or sinful.*" And page 7, he pronounces the representations of Mr. Finney that "the nature of Adam at his creation was not holy," and "that the nature of God is not holy," "an arrogant assumption of knowledge." And he follows up the condemnation with this severe and indignant rebuke,

Hast thou seen God at any time, and soared beyond the display of his attributes and the revelation of his counsels, into the ineffable secrets of his eternal nature? When he laid the foundations of the earth and formed man upon it, and made him a living soul, *wast thou there?* Dost thou know that Adam had no moral direction given to his primeval powers, which ensured his love and obedience to his Creator, when he saw his glory, and began to will and to do?

An awe comes over our minds as we listen to these majestic and authoritative appeals, for they seem to indicate that the Almighty is speaking, and pronouncing sentence upon some rebellious worm. But no; it is the decision and rebuke of a mortal upon a fellow mortal. And we venture to inquire, What is the meaning here attached to the word *nature*? Does the editor use it in the same sense in which it was used by Mr. Finney? Has Mr. F. in fact advanced any *sentiment* in regard to it which the editor does not hold? The pamphlet furnishes no answer to these vitally important questions, for it does not even intimate that there are different senses of the word *nature* as applied to moral beings, and says nothing about the sense in which it was used by Mr. Finney, and is used by the editor. We must look elsewhere, therefore, for aid in the

solution of the questions just proposed. And, fortunately, there is no great difficulty in finding it. The word *nature* is used in three well understood senses as applied to moral beings.

First, it indicates something which is an original and essential part of their constitution, not resulting at all from their choice and agency, and necessarily found in them of whatever character and in whatever circumstances. Thus, it is the nature of all minds to think, and will, and feel. The natural perfections of God are self-existence, eternity, &c. which involve no moral quality. Angels are immaterial in their nature. It is the nature of men, during their existence in this world, to hunger, and thirst. Men have natural ability, i. e. all the faculties requisite, to repent, and love God, &c.

A second sense in which the term is often used is chiefly negative, indicating that the persons to whom it is applied are not regenerated by the Holy Spirit, designating the period of their moral existence prior to their conversion. Thus Paul says, of himself and all Christians, "We were, by nature," i. e. in our unregenerate state, "the children of wrath, even as others; but God hath quickened us:" and again, "The natural man," i. e. an unregenerate man, "receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; but he that is spiritual judgeth all things." And we frequently speak of persons as 'in a state of nature,' meaning that they are unconverted. In all such cases of the application of the term, however, there is an implied reference to yet another meaning now to be stated.

A third sense of the term is, an expression of the *fact* that there is something in the being or thing spoken of, which is the ground or occasion of a certainty that it will, in all its appropriate circumstances, exhibit the result or quality predicated of it. Thus when we say of a particular species of tree, that its nature is to bear a certain kind of fruit, we mean that there is something in that species of tree which is the ground or occasion of the certainty that it will, in every soil and however treated, while it bears any thing, produce that kind of fruit. So when we say of men, since the fall, that they are sinful by nature, or naturally depraved, we mean that there is something in all human beings since the fall, which is a ground or occasion of the certainty that, until they are renewed by the Holy Ghost, they will only sin in all the various circumstances of their moral existence. And so we may say of God, that it is his nature to be just and good; of angels, that it is their nature to love God; of fallen spirits, that it is their nature to hate God; meaning that there is in them some ground or occasion of the certainty that they will, in all circumstances appropriate for such manifestations, exhibit these moral qualities, or put forth these moral acts.*

* See Edwards on Original Sin, Part 1, Chap. 1, Sect. 2. Dr Woods' Reply to Dr. Ware's Letters to Trinitarians and Calvinists, Chap. 3. Dr Taylor's Censura ad Clerum, 1828, pp. 13, 14. Christian Spectator for 1823, p. 197. &c. President Edwards states very clearly, what it is, in his view, that is the ground or occasion of the certainty that all human beings sin, and only sin, till renewed by the Holy Spirit. "In order to account," he says, "for a sinful corruption of nature, yea a total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality infused, implanted or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive cause or influence whatsoever, either from God or the creature; or of supposing that man is conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart, such as is anything positive. I think a little attention to the nature of things

Now in which of these senses did Mr. Finney use the word *nature* when he said "the nature of Adam at his creation was not holy," "the nature of God is not holy"? Did he mean that in Adam at his creation, there was no ground or occasion of *certainty* that his first moral actions would be holy; that in God there is no ground or occasion of *certainty* that he will continue to be holy? Certainly not. And in the sense of unregeneracy he did not use the term, for unregeneracy is not predicable of the subjects of which he was speaking. He did mean, and only mean, (what he expressly said he meant, when he preached the sermon) that holiness was not an essential part of Adam's constitution, at his creation, so as not to result at all from his choice and agency, like hunger or thirst; and that God's holiness is not such an attribute of his very being, as not to flow at all from his choice and agency, like his self-existence, eternity, &c. And surely there is nothing erroneous in this opinion. While the fact, in which we have the only consistent meaning which can be attached to the editor's assertions that "the nature of God is holy," "the nature of Adam at his creation was holy," viz. that there was in Adam as created a ground or occasion of certainty that his first moral acts would be holy, and that there is in God a ground or occasion of certainty that he will always be holy; this fact Mr. Finney has not denied, and doubtless firmly believes. Where then is the ground of the editor's condemnation and indignant rebuke of Mr. F. for his declarations concerning the original nature of Adam, and the nature of God?

2. The term *motive*, it is well known to those who are conversant with metaphysical and theological discussions, has two different meanings. Sometimes it means the outward reason which influences the choice. This is the sense in which the word has been almost universally used by theologians in New-England since the days of Edwards. Its other meaning is, the feeling excited by the outward reason presented, or the design which induces to an action. The former has been called the objective, and the latter the subjective motive. And, says a distinguished New England divine,* "There is as great a difference between the objective, and subjective motive [of a miser,] as there is between money and the love of money. Those writers, therefore, who use the word motive, in moral disquisitions, without marking the precise meaning of it, are chargeable with ambiguity and obscurity." The author of the pam-

will be sufficient to satisfy any impartial, considerate inquirer, that the absence of positive good principles, leaving *the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, &c.* (*which were in man in innocence.*) leaving these; I say, to themselves, without the government of superior principles, will certainly be followed with the corruption, yea, the total corruption of the heart, without occasion for any positive influence at all, and that *it was thus, indeed, that corruption of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall, and comes on all his posterity, as sinning in him and falling with him.*" And more to the same purpose. Original Sin, Part iv, Chap. 2. The same view is given by Dr. Appleton, in his Lectures, page 132, and by many other standard Orthodox theological writers. The propensity to sin, thus held to be in human nature since the fall, has been often called a *sinful propensity*. But when so called, the meaning is not that it is itself sin, for to attach such a meaning to the language would be, to charge upon those who use it the absurdity of representing that to be sin, which is the cause of *all* sin. The meaning is simply *tendency*, or as Edwards expresses it (Original Sin, Part 1, Chap. 1, Section i.) "a prevailing exposedness or liability, to sin."

* Dr. Samuel Spring, Disquisitions, first edition, p. 52.

phlet we are examining has frequent occasion to use this word. He condemns the preacher's views of the influence and use of motives in conversion, and employs the term several times in the course of his reasonings. But he never intimates that there is any difference of meaning attached to the word, nor inquires whether Mr. F. and he attach to it the same meaning. Yet we find Mr. Finney saying, God "can have no new ideas, and consequently no new motive;" "many suppose that the Spirit moves by a direct and immediate act, either upon the motive to give it efficiency, or upon the mind to make it willing," &c. And the editor we find saying, "We are conscious that these *affections* and *desires* are antecedent to the determinations of the will, and that *they* operate powerfully as *motives* to fix our choice or decide our volitions, in view of the objects which are presented to the mind, and which excite feelings or affections." The preacher uniformly used the word in the objective sense. The editor uniformly uses it in the subjective sense.

3. Page 10, Mr. F. is censured for having said, "*It is as easy to purpose right as wrong;*" and p. 11, he is represented as "reducing depravity to a trifling matter, - - *put off as easily* as persons change their plans of business." But there are two different senses in which a moral act may be said to be easy or difficult to a man; the one referring to the nature of the act, and the capacity of the agent i. e. his possession of the requisite powers for its performance; the other referring to the disposition and habit of his mind in reference to the act. Thus we might say, in reference to an avaricious man, using the language in the former sense, 'It is as easy to be generous as covetous'; and, using it in the latter sense, 'It is extremely difficult for him to perform a generous act.' And there would be no contradiction in these assertions, because the language is used in different senses; nor would there be any danger of being misunderstood, for the difference of meaning is perfectly obvious. Now, in which of these senses did Mr. F. employ this mode of expression, when he said, "*It is as easy to purpose right as wrong?*" Manifestly, in the former sense. And in that sense, the editor, doubtless, accords with the assertion. But he seems not to have been aware that the language is susceptible of any such meaning, and assumes that it must have been used in the latter sense; for he adds,

Most certainly as easy for a holy being, who is inclined only to holy purposes; but is it as easy for one who is dead in trespasses and sins, every imagination of the thoughts of whose heart is only evil continually? Did Paul find it as easy, even long after he was born again? Do sinners find it as easy when they try? Why do they, from the rising of the sun to his going down, turn away from God and rush upon destruction, till God arrests them by his grace? Why did not one sinner ever have mercy upon his own soul, till God stretched out his almighty arm, and drew him from the horrible pit? If Adam had been immediately commanded to repent, he would have been without excuse for disobeying; but being under the dominion of sin, it was not easy to do it, because he would not purpose to do it. p. 10.

All very true, using the language in the second of the senses explained; but, evidently, having no reference to what Mr. F. was speaking of when he said, "*It is as easy to purpose right as wrong.*"

4. Page 12, the editor "submits whether the scheme" presented in Mr. F.'s sermon "*differs materially from the Arminian or Wesleyan system.*" Did he mean to include under the phrase "Arminian system" the Arminianism which was opposed by Edwards and the subsequent Calvinistic writers generally in New England? Certainly, for he is professedly contrasting the "scheme" of the preacher, with what he styles the "old fashioned principles" of the Calvinists. The Arminianism which Edwards and his successors considered as subversive of the "old fashioned principles" they defended, is regarded as the same with "the Wesleyan system," as related to the topics considered in this sermon. But every one who has any accurate acquaintance with the history of theological opinions, knows that there is a material difference. The Arminian views in relation to depravity and conversion which Edwards and others opposed, were those stated in Dr. John Taylor's Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin; *some of the prominent principles of which are expressly denied and condemned in Mr. Wesley's Treatise on Original Sin*; and to the editions of Dr. Taylor's work published after the appearance of Mr. Wesley's Treatise, was appended "A Reply to the Rev. John Wesley's Remarks on Dr. Taylor's Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin." Dr. Taylor and the Arminians of his class, denied that the fall had corrupted human nature, or in *any way* affected the ability or freedom of men to obey the law and the Gospel. The Wesleyan doctrine on this point is thus stated in the standard writings of the Methodists. John Wesley himself says, in his Treatise on Original Sin, "By this one man [Adam] sin entered into the world, and passed upon all men. And through the infection which they derive from him, all men are, and ever were, by nature, entirely alienated from the life of God." "Our nature is deeply corrupted, inclined to evil, and disinclined to all that is spiritually good, so that without supernatural grace, *we can neither will nor do what is pleasing to God.*" "*Men have not this power by nature, [sufficient power to do their duty.] But they have, or may have it, by grace.*"* In "the Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church," it is said, (Chap. iii. Sect. 3. ¶ 27.) "Man hath this *freedom of will not naturally*, but by grace. We believe, that in the moment Adam fell, he had *no freedom of will left*; but that God, when of his own free grace, he gave the promise of a Saviour to him and his posterity, graciously restored to mankind a liberty and power to accept of proffered salvation." And the Rev. Dr. Fisk, President of the Wesleyan University at Middletown, Conn. says, in a sermon in the Methodist Preacher for January 1830, "This is the Gospel grace, through Christ, that *constitutes the transgressor a free, moral agent, and restores to him the power of choice, which he lost through sin*, and thus lays the foundation for all the commands, invitations and directions that are given to the sinner."

5. Page 11, the editor says, "The preacher totally discards the doctrine of '*original sin.*'" A serious charge, truly; for, by many, it will be understood as meaning that Mr. Finney has denied the

* Works, New York edition, 1827. ix. 218, 228, 269.

native and entire moral depravity of mankind, which is a fundamental doctrine, and indeed the foundation doctrine, of the evangelical-system. But how is the charge sustained? Why, by simply assuming that the only meaning of the phrase 'original sin' is 'transmitted pollution.' "The preacher totally discards the doctrine of 'original sin' or transmitted pollution." The dogma of 'transmitted pollution' Mr. F. does deny, believing that individuals would be no more to blame for it than for transmitted color. And his denying this, the editor takes for granted is, of course, the same thing as denying 'original sin!' But did he not know, that there are various other senses, besides that of 'transmitted pollution,' in which the phrase 'original sin' has been used in Orthodox Confessions and standard writings, in some one of which other Orthodox senses Mr. F. may, and doubtless does, hold to 'original sin?' There is, in fact, scarcely a term or phrase of frequent occurrence in the whole science of theology, which has had attached to it greater diversity of meaning, among those agreed on all hands to have been Orthodox in regard to the doctrine of depravity. The phrase was introduced into theological discussion by Augustine, in his controversy with the Pelagians.* As used by the Reformers, the phrase had different meanings; some making it include the imputed guilt of Adam's first sin and inherent corruption, and others confining it to inherent corruption alone. In the former sense it was used by Ursinus, Zanchius, and others; in the latter, by Bucer, Bullinger, Calvin, &c.† The definition of the Augsburg or Lutheran Confession is as follows, "We mean by original sin that which the holy fathers, and all of sound judgment and learning in the Church, do so call, viz. that guilt whereby all that come into the world are, through Adam's fall, subject to God's wrath and eternal death, and that very corruption of man's nature derived from Adam: and this corruption of man's nature comprehendeth both the defect of original justice, integrity or obedience, and also concupiscence."‡ The French Confession says, "We believe that all the offspring of Adam is infected with this contagion which we call original sin, that is, a stain spreading itself by propagation, and not by imitation only, as the Pelagians thought, all whose errors we do detest."|| The ninth Article of the Church of England says, "Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam, (as the Pelagians do vainly talk;) but it is the fault and corruption of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone [in the Latin original *quam longissime*, gone as far as possible, gone wholly] from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit." In the authorized standards of the Church of Scotland, the history of the form of stating the doctrine of the fall and depravity of man is exceedingly instructive to those who would confine Orthodoxy on this subject to any one form of statement. The first Confession of Faith

* De Moor Commentarius in Markii Compendium Theologiæ, iii. 202.

† Ibid iii. 203., F. Turretin. Theol. Elenct. Loc. 9. Quæst. 10. Sect. 2.

‡ Harmony of Confessions, 4to. London, 1643, p. 71.

|| Ibid p. 68.

adopted by this Church, in the beginning of the Reformation, was that used by the English Church at Geneva, in which it was thought sufficient to say, "Through our Father Adam's transgression, we are become children of perdition." The Confession of the Protestants of Scotland authorized in 1560 says, "Man and woman did both fall" by eating of the forbidden tree, "by *which transgression, commonly called Original Sin*, was the image of God utterly defaced in man, and he and his posterity of nature became enemies of God." In 1591 the Form of Examination before the Communion of the Kirk of Scotland asks, "What things came to us by that fall? Ans. *Original Sin, and natural corruption*," distinguishing original sin from natural corruption, and excluding it. And, finally, in 1648, the Church of Scotland adopted the Westminster Confession and Catechisms, which, among the four things which they represent as constituting "the sinfulness of the estate wherinto man fell," mention "*the corruption of his nature, which is commonly called original sin.*"* Among modern writers, acknowledged to be Orthodox in regard to the native character of man, we find a similar variety in the use of this phrase, Edwards' definition is as follows: "By Original Sin, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the innate sinful depravity of the heart." And to this definition he adds, "But yet, when the doctrine of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, which includes not only the depravity of nature, but the imputation of Adam's first sin;" and says that "most of those who have held one of these, have maintained the other, - - that the arguments which establish the one establish the other, and that there are no more difficulties attending the allowing of one, than the other."† Dr. Hopkins, after giving a detailed account of "the Apostacy of Man, and the Evil Consequence to him," says, "None but" certain persons whom he describes "can have any objection to the doctrine of *original sin*, as it has been stated above, which asserts the universal sinfulness of Adam's posterity to be connected with his first sin by a just, wise and good constitution, made by God when he created man."‡ Dr. Emmons says, "Adam was the only person who committed, and who was guilty, of *original sin*."||

In these quotations we have the following different meanings of the phrase *Original Sin*. 1. The first sin of the first man. This is the meaning adopted by Dr. Emmons and his followers. 2. The first sin of the first man and woman; Scotch Confession of 1560. 3. Natural or inherent corruption; Calvin, Bucer, Bullinger, and the French and Westminster Confessions. 4. Want of original righteousness and inclination to evil; Articles of the Church of England, and of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States. 5. The imputation of Adam's first sin, and the innate sinful depravity of the heart; President Edwards, Ursinus, Zanchius and others. 6. Something not described, but distinct from natural corruption,.

* For these facts in regard to the Church of Scotland we are indebted to the Philadelphian of Sept. 25, 1831.

† Original Sin, Part 1, Chap. 1, Sec. 1.

‡ System, Part 1, Chap. 8.

|| Sermons, i, 239.

and that came to us by the fall of Adam; Form of Examination before the Communion in the Kirk of Scotland in 1591. 7. The guilt of Adam's first sin, the defect of original justice, and concupiscence; Augsburg Confession. 8. The universal sinfulness of Adam's posterity as connected with his first sin by divine constitution; Dr. Hopkins. Here are no less than eight different meanings of the phrase *Original Sin*, (and the list might, doubtless, be extended,) attached to it by theologians and churches, all acknowledged to be Orthodox on the subject of man's native character, because they all held to the *fact* that, since the fall of Adam, and somehow in consequence of it, men universally sin and only sin, till renewed by the Holy Ghost. But the author we are reviewing, who deems himself fully qualified to bring "the new divinity" to the trial, knows of but one meaning of the phrase *Original Sin*, that of "transmitted pollution;" and, of course, decides that all who do not believe in "transmitted pollution," "discard the doctrine of original sin!"

6. And yet another class of terms there is, his want of knowledge or his disregard of the usage in respect to which is even more glaring, and more fatal to his reasonings, than those which have been noticed. We mean the terms *will, heart, purpose, volition, &c.* In the use of these terms in metaphysical and theological writings there has been no little variety, which has been a fruitful source of misunderstanding, and of real or supposed differences of views, among those who were agreed as to the great facts of religion.

Some understand by the *faculty of will, the power of the mind to determine to pursue or not pursue a particular train of thought, or perform or not perform some contemplated action of which it judges itself capable*; and by acts of the will, or the *purposes and volitions* of the mind, they understand, *its determinations* to put forth or not put forth such mental and bodily acts. This is Reid's use of the terms, who describes an act of will as "a determination of the mind to do or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power." And this is the use of the term by a large portion of the class of theologians who style themselves "Old School" Calvinists, and of that class distinguished in New England as "advocates of the Taste Scheme."* By these the appetites, affections, desires, &c. are regarded as distinct from the will and its exercises, as really so as are the understanding and its operations. And the term *heart* they use as a comprehensive designation of the appetites, affections, desires, &c., both constitutional and moral; "the advocates of the Taste Scheme," using the word *taste* as synonymous with *heart*. Thus Dr. Burton, the great authority with this class, says, (Essays, p. 55,) "*The taste, or the heart, is a feeling faculty.*"

Another class, having in view the general classification of the faculties and operations of the mind by metaphysicians into those of the understanding and of the will, use the term *will* as comprehending all our appetites, affections, passions, &c., both constitutional

* So denominated from their holding that there must be in the mind some *taste* for an object before it can choose it, and which is the cause of its choosing it. See Burton's Essays.

and moral, as well as our determinations; and the term *volition* they employ to express any exercise of appetite, affection, passion, &c. as well as a determination. This usage of the terms is mentioned by Reid as one "which tends to confound things which are very different in their nature;" and is not unfrequent with theologians, in writing and speaking, who are not discriminating and accurate in their use of terms. With these, the terms *heart* and *will* are entirely synonymous.

A third class mean by the term *will*, the *power to choose or prefer*; and by acts of the will, or *volitions* or *purposes* (which are with them synonymous), they mean, *acts of choice or preference*. Thus Locke says, "The will is a power or faculty to prefer or choose." And President Edwards says, "The will is that by which the mind chooses any thing;" and "an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice." And this has been the common use of the terms among theologians in New England since the time of Edwards, except with the few who have belonged to the classes mentioned above as adopting the first of the three usages here described. With those who adopt this third usage, no exercise of the mind is attributed to the will, or called an act of the will or a volition or purpose, unless it is itself or involves a choice or preference, and every exercise of the mind which is itself or involves a choice or preference, they attribute to the will, and call an act of the will or a volition. Of course, our constitutional propensities, which belong to us as intellectual and sentient beings, such as the natural appetites of hunger, thirst, &c.; the social affections, as love of parents and of children, sensibility to the kindness or injury of others, sympathy with their sufferings, &c.; the desire of happiness; the dread of pain, &c. &c.—all these they do not attribute to the will, nor call the excitement or exercise of them volitions or voluntary, till they involve a preference or choice; and when they do involve a preference or choice, they attribute such exercises of them to the will, and call them volitions and voluntary. Thus, for example, Dr. Samuel Spring, (who makes all moral exercises to consist in acts of will) says, "Indifferent exercises are those which are merely intellectual or animal; such as natural conscience, natural understanding, and the mere sensations of bodily pain and pleasure," which, he says, "are not of the moral kind," because they do not belong to the will.* And Dr. Woods says, concerning "the natural appetites, affections and passions," "I am as ready as Dr. Ware to affirm that these, considered as original properties of human nature, are not sinful, and imply no guilt." "Man's actually *choosing* wrong makes him a sinner." "If a man has a propensity or disposition to disregard the divine command, and to pursue the gratification of his own passions, as his *hightest object*, he has what I mean by a propensity or disposition to sin"† And the conductors of the Christian Spectator say, Besides fixed purposes or settled preferences of the soul, "there are likewise in the constitution of the mind certain other

* Disquisitions, p. 167; and more to the same effect, on the following pages to p. 172, respecting "natural affection," "animal sensations," &c.

† Remarks on Dr. Ware's Answer, pp. 46, 44, 47.

propensities, tendencies, or principles, which lie back of moral action, and belong to us simply as intellectual and sentient beings. Of this class are the natural appetites, as hunger, thirst, &c., the social affections, as love of children, sensibility to the opinions of others, a feeling of injury when wronged, sympathy with the sufferings of others, &c.; and connected with them all is the desire of happiness, which belongs to us in common with all sentient beings. Now these, from the nature of the case, are neither sinful nor holy. They result from the inevitable constitution of our being; and we can no more cease to be subjects of them, than we can cease to exist. All that is demanded by the claims of duty is, to keep them in strict subjection to the rights of other beings—to our obligations to God and to our fellow creatures." "What is *revenge*? Not the mere instinctive *sense of injury*, which results from a consciousness that we are wronged. It is only when the *will* comes in, and decides on retaliation, that the mind is in that state which we denominate *revenge*. What is *pride*? Not the mere estimation of ourselves, but an undue *preference* of our own claims, when brought in competition with those of others." "Avarice, ambition, pride, &c., are voluntary states of mind. We do not call the *instinctive feelings* from which they spring by these names. It is only when the *will* comes in, when a *preference* is established, and the *purpose* of gratification is formed, that pride, ambition or avarice exists."* According to the usage of this class then, (and it has been the usage of all accurate New England theologians from the time of Edwards, except the advocates of "Old School" Calvinism, and of the "Taste Scheme,") the will is the faculty or power of choosing or preferring; and a volition, purpose or voluntary act, is every exercise of the mind which is itself or involves a choice or preference.—They too use the word *heart* as synonymous with their sense of the word will, and acts or exercises of the heart as synonymous with acts of the will or volitions. Thus Dr. Hopkins says, "Moral depravity is wholly in the *will or heart*." "The understanding, in these instances, is not considered and spoken of as mere intellect, distinct from the *will or heart*."† Dr. Samuel Spring says, "A moral action is an exercise of the *will or heart*."‡ Dr. Emmons says, "The *heart and will* are essentially the same."§ Dr. Griffin speaks of the renovation of men by the Spirit of God as "a conquest of their *wills or hearts*."|| And (to refer to no more) the conductors of the Christian Spectator constantly use the terms in the same manner: e. g. volume for 1829, page 19, "that act of the *will or heart* in which God is preferred to every other object;" "before the act of the *will or heart* in which God is preferred to every other object;" and vol. for 1830, p. 181, "acts directly associated with a change of the *will or heart*," "in union with this change of the *will or heart*."—The preferences or volitions thus ascribed to the will or heart by this class, some of them distinguish into *principal, ultimate, and subordinate*; and some

* Christian Spectator, 1829, pp. 263, 257, 361

† System, second edition, p. 454.

‡ Disquisitions, p. 54.

§ Sermons, i. 257.

|| Park Street Lectures, 3d edition, p. 109.

into *primary* or *governing*, and *subordinate* or *executive*, purposes or acts of choice. Thus Dr. Samuel Spring says, "There is a subordinate motive, an ultimate motive, and a chief motive. In the subjective sense, a subordinative motive is any choice which the agent possesses for the sake of another exercise; an ultimate motive is any choice which he indulges for its own sake; a chief motive is that choice or volition which affords him the most pleasure: and, in the objective sense of the term, subordinate, ultimate and chief objects, respectively, correspond with *subordinate, ultimate and principle volitions*. For instance, a man purchases a valuable library, that he may acquire knowledge, for the sake of being extensively useful to the public."* Or, adopting the other form of the distinction, we might say, in the execution of his primary or governing purpose of being extensively useful, he forms the subordinate purposes to acquire knowledge, and to purchase a valuable library. "Some," says Wines,† "have made a distinction between the moral affections and exercises of the will,—or between the *immanent* and *imperate* volitions. The *primary* moral affections, or *immanent* exercises of the will, are such as love and hatred of moral objects." "By *imperate* exercises of the will, are intended those volitions which produce bodily motions. Saints love God, delight supremely in the highest good of his kingdom, and are pleased with his law and government. These are their immanent exercises. Saints choose to worship God, to read his word, and to do many things to promote his glory. These volitions are their imperate or executive exercises of will. The unrenewed sinner is wholly attached to his own private good, which is his ultimate, supreme end. His affection for this object is his *primary*, immanent volition. He chooses to perform a bodily action to gratify his selfishness. This choice is his executive act of will." Dr. Emmons makes the same distinction. See Sermons, i, 257. We must distinguish, say the conductors of the Christian Spectator, "between the *governing purpose* of the soul, and *subordinate* acts of choice. Avarice, for example, may be considered as a *governing* purpose to those particular acts of choice by which avarice selects the means of gratification. These specific acts are all *subordinate*, and may change perpetually as new objects are presented. But the *preference* of wealth, and the *purpose* to attain it, may remain fixed and unalterable."‡ And the same distinction is implied in the language of Dr. Woods before quoted, where he speaks of a man's having "a propensity or disposition to disregard the divine command, and to pursue the gratification of his own passions, as his *highest object*."§

* Disquisitions, p 53.

† The Rev. Abijah Wines, first professor of theology in the Theological Seminary at Bangor, Me. The quotation here given is from pp. 3, 4, of his "Inquiry into the Nature of the Sinners Inability to make a New Heart, or to become holy," which contains a lucid statement and able defence of the views of "the friends of the Exercise Scheme," and a triumphant refutation of "the Taste Scheme."

‡ Vol. for 1829, p 361.

§ This ruling choice or governing purpose, it is important to remember, is regarded as being, till it gives place to an opposite choice, in reference to its object, a *permanent* state of the heart or will, the *continuous, habitual preference, or prevailing inclination*, of the soul.

What now is the use of these important terms in the pamphlet before us? A few quotations will furnish the answer.

"We are conscious that these affections and desires [which, he had said, are constantly springing up within us, and constitute a large portion of the exercises of the ever busy soul] are antecedent to the *determinations* of the *will*, and that they operate powerfully as *motives* to *fix* our choice or *decide* our *volitions*, in view of the objects which are presented to the mind, and which excite feelings or affections," p. 4. "The preacher confines the term heart to a single volition, to that *volition* by which a man *determines* on his governing purpose." "We hold that the ruling affection of a man, not his 'ruling choice or governing purpose' gives a character to his other 'moral exercises,' either sinful or holy; and that the 'governing purpose' or *resolution* will be conformed to his ruling affection." "The heart is the fountain or source of all the moral affections or feelings, and all the volitions of a man correspond with his feelings and affections." p. 5. "The heart, therefore, is something far more extensive than the ruling purpose, and comprehends all the moral affections or feelings of the soul. Love to kindred, love to the world, love to Christians, love to God, are predicated of the heart, rather than of the will when separated from the heart. We love an object not so much because we *resolve* to love it, as because it is congenial with our heart or affections. We hate those things which are disagreeable, even when we *resolve* to overcome our aversion." "Are the exercises of the heart, when they do not partake of the decisive character of volitions, of a moral kind?" "The angels, doubtless, love God, on the simple discovery of his glory, without the formality of *resolving* or *willing* to do it" "That love produces holy volitions in quick succession." p. 7. "That perverse *will* controlled by a wicked heart or vile affections." "On the principles of this sermon conversion is simply an act of the sinners own will, without an antecedant or even simultaneous change of affections." p. 11. "If we may be allowed to include in the actions of the man the affections of the heart, as well as the decisive and *determinate* volitions of the will." "The instant after conversion, or if you please at the instant, holy exercises of penitence, or love, or faith, spring up in the new born soul, and very soon, perhaps immediately, *determinate* holy volitions also." p. 13. "It is necessary that the affections themselves be sanctified, or the volitions, which are always influenced by the affections, will not be truly directed to the service of God. How can a holy *resolution* to serve God be formed, while there are none but unholy affections to control the will? A change of character originates in the change of the affections or heart. It is easy to *resolve* right when the heart is first given to him in love." p. 15.

These quotations, viewed in connexion with the account given above of the different usages in regard to the terms, *will*, *heart*, *purpose*, *volition*, &c., make it perfectly manifest what is the editor's use of these terms. HE IS ONE OF "THE ADVOCATES OF THE TASTE SCHEME." And he understands by acts of will, simply and only *determinations* of the mind. The term heart, he, of course, employs as not at all synonymous with the will; but means by it a something as distinct from the will as is the understanding; a something which he calls "the source of all the affections, emotions or desires," which are, with him, exercises of this distinct and separate faculty. And these exercises are not controlled by the will, but the will is controlled by them in all its operations. And he seems not to know that any body had ever used the terms, and described these faculties and acts of mind, in any other way. He had, indeed, heard that some varied a little in their form of statement; for he says, "Whether these operations of the mind [the affections, emotions and desires] belong to the *will*, or to a distinct faculty termed the *heart*, is not agreed." "The advocates of the 'Taste Scheme'

ascribe the feelings or affections to a distinct faculty, which they denominate the *taste* or *heart*. The friends of the 'Exercise Scheme' arrange both feelings and volitions in one class, under the general name of *exerciscs*, and ascribe both to the same faculty, the *will*." But so entirely without a just understanding does he seem to have been, of the views, reasonings and objects of "the friends of the Exercise Scheme" as to say, that "it is not very important, whether the affections, emotions and desires, belong to the *will*, or to a *distinct faculty* termed the *heart*:" and that "both sects are agreed that feelings or affections are in some sense distinct from volitions!" p. 4. When the facts are, that "the friends of the Exercise Scheme," as (we had almost said) every one knows, do not admit that feelings and affections are distinct from volitions; that they habitually use the terms *will* and *heart* as synonymous; and that the very object of their spirited and triumphant contest, some years since, with "the advocates of the 'Taste Scheme'" was to prove, that there is no such faculty as *taste* or *heart* distinct from, and by its exercises controlling, the will. And, throughout his strictures, the editor criticises and comments on Mr. F.'s sermon on the supposition that he attaches the meaning to the terms referred to which the editor attaches to them, except the term heart; and to this he all along assumes that no other consistent meaning can be attached than his. Thus he constantly speaks of "the governing purpose" several times mentioned in the sermon, as a mere *determination* of the mind, "a simple act of his own will, without an antecedent, or even simultaneous change of the affections." Whereas the preacher meant by the new "governing purpose" in which he represented a change of heart to consist, such an entire and radical change of the affections as to constitute the *controlling and habitual preference or choice* of the soul; a change from the preference of self, to a preference of God and the happiness of the universe. Mr. F., as is apparent to every one who has noted the different usages above described of the terms *will*, *heart*, &c. and read even the few extracts just given from the editor's strictures upon him—much more who has read the Abstract which the editor has given of his sermon, uses these terms in the third of the senses which have been explained—as they are used by President Edwards, Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Woods, &c. But the editor, being unacquainted with this usage, or not recurring to it in his recollection, applies continually to the preacher's language the first sense, that of Reid, "the advocates of the 'Taste Scheme,'" &c.—By this mistake he has been led into several palpable and very injurious misrepresentations of Mr. F., which, with some that have proceeded from other sources, will now be pointed out.

III. *There are in the pamphlet before us various misrepresentations of Mr. F.'s views of religious truth, as presented in the very abstract of his sermon on which it comments.*

1. We have seen, p. 10, that from not discriminating between, the different senses of the word *nature* as applied to moral beings, the editor represents Mr. F. as denying that there was in Adam, at his creation, any ground or occasion of *certainty* that his first moral acts would be holy, and that there is in God any ground or occasion of

certainty that he will continue to be holy ; neither of which Mr. F. has denied ; but only asserted that holiness was no part of A l m's *constitution* at his creation, as were his bodily appetites, his social propensities, &c., and that God's holiness is not such an attribute of his very being as not to flow at all from his choice and agency, like his self-existence, eternity, &c.

2. From the same want of discrimination in regard to the senses of the word *nature* as applied to moral beings, in connexion with his "Taste Scheme" notion that there must be a sinful bias, appetite or inclination independent of volition and prior to it, as the immediate impelling cause of a sinful choice, the editor represents Mr. F. as virtually *denying that God made man upright*. "We," says he, contrasting his own views with those he attributes to Mr. F., "We must still believe that God made man upright." p. 7.—But in the Abstract he has reported Mr. F. as having said, that "when Adam began to act, he made it his governing purpose to serve God," p. 2. That is, clearly, as he came from the hands of his Creator, his grand, all-comprehensive choice, (and, of course, all his subordinate and specific choices, affections, &c.) was of God and the happiness of the universe instead of his own exclusive gratification. Mr. F. denies that God created Adam with any physical appetite for holiness as a part of his constitution, like his appetites for food, drink, &c. ; but he believes and teaches that as God created him, and placed him at his creation, there was a *certainty* that his first moral acts would be holy, and that, in this sense, he made him upright.

3. Page 10, the editor represents the preacher as accounting for Adam's first sin by the assertion, "The tempter appealed to his '*ambition*.'" The word '*ambition*' is included in marks of quotation, and printed in Italics, to call attention to it, and implying that Mr. F. had used it. But what was the preacher's language on this point, as reported by the editor himself? It was this. "When Adam began to act, he made it his governing purpose [his ruling preference or choice] to serve God. He was afterwards induced to change his purpose, through the suggestions of Satan, who told him he would become like God. Wishing to enjoy that distinction, he chose to gratify himself; and in doing this, he transgressed a divine command, and became a selfish being, or a sinner." p. 2. Here is not found word '*ambition*.' Nor is the thing implied, for the love of distinction is not ambition till it prefers the elevation of self to the claims of other beings. Ambition, according to Mr. F.'s use of terms (and, we have shewn, the most common use among Orthodox theologians, at least in New England) is a preference of one's own elevation to the just claims of others. To represent him, therefore, as accounting for Adam's first sin by an appeal to his '*ambition*,' is not only to make a false representation, but to attribute to him the palpable absurdity of supposing a sin in Adam to appeal to previous to his first sin.

4. We have seen, p. 12, that the editor incorrectly represents Mr. F. as "totally discarding the doctrine of original sin," merely because he does not believe in "transmitted pollution," when there

are at least seven other senses in which that phrase has been used among Orthodox churches and writers.

5. Applying to Mr. F. his own use of the terms *will, purpose, &c.*, as meaning simple acts of determination, and his "Taste Scheme" philosophy—that there must be a depraved or sinful bias or inclination distinct from the will and prior to it to produce sinful volitions, the editor represents Mr. F. as having "made off with the doctrine of *entire depravity*," p. 11; when he himself represents Mr. F. as saying, that Adam, by "choosing to gratify himself, and in doing this transgressing a divine command, became a *selfish being*," p. 2; and all the descendants of Adam, "when they begin to act, make their hearts wicked, by setting out with a purpose [a governing purpose, an all-comprehending, abiding preference] of *self-gratification*," and continue it till "the Spirit produces conversion." p. 3.

6. By the same process—applying to the preacher's language his own "Taste Scheme" philosophy and use of terms, assuming that affection must be distinct from and independent of the will, he represents Mr. F., on p. 5, as maintaining the absurdity that "*the ruling affection of a man*" does not "*give a character to his other moral exercises, as holy or sinful*." Whereas by a man's "ruling choice or governing purpose," Mr. F. means his "ruling affection;" which, in the very terms "*ruling choice or governing purpose*," he implies, if he does not assert, does "*give a character to his other moral exercises, either holy or sinful*."

7. On the same page, and in other parts of the pamphlet, the editor represents the preacher as *excluding from divine requirement and human duty the social and relative affections, so far as those affections have a moral character, and a multitude of other subordinate exercises.*

"*We* should include," he says, printing *we* in Italics, and thus indicating that in this he differs from Mr. F.. "*We* should include in the same class [of divine requirement and human duty] those expressions where the term [heart] is put for the social or relative affections, so far as those affections have a moral character." "*We* should also include those instances where the word expresses all the affections or exercises of our minds; for surely among them all, there must be many which are comprehended in the divine requirement or prohibition, and which pertain to human duty or transgression." "*We* say that such a choice or purpose [the ruling choice or governing purpose of the mind] constitutes but an exceedingly small portion of any man's moral exercises from day to day;—and here we are at issue with the preacher." "*We* believe that where such a ruling exercise comes into being once, especially in the instance of a secure sinner, there are at least a million of subordinate exercises, which equally belong to the heart, which are comprehended in divine requirement and human duty, which are registered in the book of remembrance, of which man must give account in the judgment, and which, together with his ruling passion and governing purpose, go to make up his whole moral character in the sight of God. These innumerable exercises surely, should be embraced in the definition of a term, which, to use the preacher's own phraseology, designates 'the fountain of our moral exercises.'" p. 5. "By the principles of this sermon, the governing purpose includes all the depravity of man. What, then, becomes of all those 'vile affections' whose name is legion, which are entirely separate from that purpose? What becomes of those millions of *subordinate* and *separate* purposes which every man is conscious of forming every day he lives? What becomes of that 'body of death' under which every Christian 'groans,

being burdened,' and which subjects him to a dreadful conflict from his conversion to his removal to glory? Are these to be *included* in the governing purpose or heart? The preacher does not include, but altogether *excludes* them." p. 10.

Does the reader ask, in astonishment, how could a man write thus about a sermon, the very quotations from which that he has woven into the representation, speak of a *ruling* choice or *governing* purpose, and assert expressly that this ruling choice or governing purpose is "the *fountain* of our moral exercises;" and the Abstract of which, given by himself, asserts, that the purpose or choice required of the sinner is to be "the governing purpose of *his life*"; illustrates it by "a man's resolving to be a lawyer, and *directing all his plans and efforts* to effect that object": says that Adam, after his transgression, was "a *selfish* being, and all his children, set out with a *purpose of self-gratification*," and continue it till "the Spirit produces their conversion"; that Christians, "though they never give up their governing purpose to serve God, pursue it inconstantly, and this accounts for their instability," &c. ? pp. 2, 3 How could such a representation be made in such circumstances? Why, by a very easy process. By *assuming* that "the ruling choice or governing purpose" spoken of does *not* mean, what the preacher did mean by it, and what the very language he used expresses as plainly as can be expressed, *an habitual state of preference in the mind*, which, of course, in proportion to its strength and constancy, directs and controls the other subordinate purposes and affections: but that it must and does mean, the "*Taste Scheme*" sense, a simple, individual act of *determination*, which is "entirely separate from" the affections.

8. By the same process the editor is brought to say of Mr. F. that his position that, in requiring men to make to themselves new hearts, God requires them to change the ruling choice or governing purpose of their lives, *is at war with both the "Taste" and the "Exercise" schemes*. p. 5. Whereas it has already been made apparent, by the exhibition, p. 15, of the different usages in regard to the terms *will, heart, &c.*, that, in the particular referred to, Mr. F. accords perfectly with "the friends of the Exercise Scheme." With them he accords in utterly rejecting the cardinal dogma of the "Taste Scheme," that there is, in man, a *faculty*, distinct from the will, and originating all moral exercises, and by them controlling the will. With them he agrees that the will and heart are the same thing; that all moral exercises are exercises of the will or heart; and that of the acts of the will or heart, some are primary or governing, and some subordinate. Dr. Emmons, the ablest defender of "the Exercise Scheme," has published a sermon, in his second volume, p. 170, on the same subject and text as the discourse of Mr. F. commented on in the pamphlet before us. In that sermon Dr. E. says, "A new heart does not mean any new power or faculty of the soul. It does not mean any natural appetite, instinct or passion. Nor does it mean any dormant, inactive principle in the mind, which is often supposed to be the foundation of all virtuous or holy exercises. But a new heart does consist in gracious exercises themselves, [or as he, in the next paragraph but one, calls them, free, voluntary ex-

ercises;] which are called new, because they never existed in the sinner before he became a new creature, or turned from sin to holiness." And "all the sinner has to do," he says, "to make himself a new heart is, to exercise benevolence instead of selfishness, or to put forth holy instead of unholy exercises." How exactly coincident with the main positions of Mr. F.'s discourse.*

9. By assuming that ruling choice or governing purpose must mean, and that therefore the preacher meant by it, a simple determination of the mind, "entirely separate" from affections or moral exercises, the editor makes out a charge against Mr. F. of being inconsistent with himself in saying that that which he describes as "the ruling choice or governing purpose," is "the fountain of our exercises." p. 5. But as Mr. F. uses the terms there is no inconsistency, for the ruling choice or governing purpose *is* the fountain of our exercises.

10. On p. 14, the preacher is represented as having said, in substance, that the heart or governing purpose *changes itself*. "It is said, 'But it may *change* itself, and put away enmity for love.'" And then, with an air of triumph, it is asked "in reply, Will Satan cast out Satan? Will a wicked heart make *itself* humble, penitent and believing?"—But Mr. F. had no where said that the governing *purpose* changes *itself*. His uniform representation was that the *agent* does it; "that the *sinner* should change the governing purpose of his life," "Adam changed his heart or governing purpose," &c. p. 2.

11. Another misrepresentation of Mr. F., as having virtually affirmed that depravity is "put off as easily as persons change their plans of business," has been already pointed out, p. 11.

12. We have also seen, p. 12, that the editor represents Mr. F.'s "scheme" as not "differing materially from the Arminian or Wesleyan system," in relation to the sinfulness and conversion of men. But, on these subjects, the old Arminians held, that men by the fall are not wholly depraved; that there is not in them any inability, even a moral one, to repent; that they have a self-determining power of will, which chooses in accordance with motives, or without them, or against them: in all which particulars Mr. F. differs from them entirely. The Wesleyans hold that the fall destroyed man's free-agency; that 'sufficient grace' is given to all unrenewed men, which restores their free-agency; that, having this sufficient grace, unconverted men are not utterly destitute of moral goodness; that depravity is an 'infection,' a 'taste,' bias or inclination to sin, independent of and prior to choice or volition, and directing and giving character to it; and that conversion consists in putting an end to the governing power of this taste, and creating another, of opposite character, but having the same relations to the will: in all which

* On this whole subject of moral exercises in man, Mr. Finney agrees perfectly with "the friends of the Exercise Scheme" or the Hopkians, except only in relation to the originating agency in these exercises; Mr. F. believing that man is a dependent, but *real* AGENT; sustained continually in the possession and exercise of his faculties by the power of God, influenced in all his acts, by motives, and, in all his holy exercises, by the effectual grace of the Spirit, but truly *originating* and putting forth his own mental and bodily acts. The Hopkians deny that there is any such agency, and maintain that all the "motions, exercises or actions of men" bad and good, "originate from a divine efficiency." See Emmons' Sermons, ii. pp. 31, 41.

particulars Mr. F. differs from them entirely; and *in the last two the editor accords with them perfectly!* *

13. On page 12, the editor says of the preacher, "*Omitting* gospel motives, he says, 'To obey the command is indispensable to their own good; it is only, in other words, commanding them to be happy.'" The word '*omitting*' he underscored in his manuscript, and had printed in Italics. He, therefore, *deliberately* charged Mr. F. with "*omitting gospel motives.*" But is not men's happiness, obtained in obedience to divine requirement, a gospel motive? Did not our Lord himself say, "Come to me, and I will give you *rest*," "He that believeth shall be *saved*?" And is not the command of God a gospel motive? Did not Paul urge, "God now *commandeth* all men to repent?" And both these motives are represented as mentioned by Mr. F., in the very sentence in which the editor deliberately charges him with "*omitting gospel motives!*"

14. *Assuming* that a governing purpose is a simple individual act of determination, entirely separate from affection, and that there must be a 'taste' or 'inclination' distinct from and prior to volition, to direct it and give it character, and, consequently, that there must be such a 'taste' for holiness created in the soul, or infused into it, before there can be a holy purpose, and finding that Mr. F. wholly discards this philosophy, the editor charges him with advocating a *selfish* conversion, that makes *selfish* Christians. "This doctrine," he says, "gives it [religion] the character of *self-interest.*" "We say, [of the person changed as the preacher had described] he is a *selfish* Christian, and yet in his sins, with the superadded danger of indulging a fatal and false hope." "The new creature so formed is a *selfish* being still, a *selfish* Christian, a Christian whose governing purpose is *selfishness*, and who must of consequence be still dead in trespasses and sins." pp. 11, 14. And so confident is he in the correctness of this representation, that he presumes to pass judgment upon the thousands and tens of thousands who have been hopefully converted under such doctrine. "We look," he says, "to *fruit* which such seed will produce, and WE FIND that '*that which is born of the flesh, is flesh*' still!" p. 14. But what is "this doctrine," according to this writer's own statement of it? Why, it is, that, in his conversion, "the sinner *changes the governing purpose of his life*;" a change in sinners FROM "a governing purpose *to seek their own happiness,*" to a choice of "*the service of God*;" a change FROM a controlling "purpose of *self-gratification*" and "*seeking their own happiness,*" to a *preference of God and the happiness of the universe!* pp. 2, 3. "This doctrine gives religion the character of *self-interest,*" and makes only "*selfish* Christians!" What transformations may we work, with perfect ease, by the sim-

* If some other excellent Orthodox persons besides the editor of the Volunteer, ministers and laymen, who charge with Arminianism professedly Orthodox brethren, whom they hear urging strongly the natural ability of men to comply with the divine requirements, and the duty of immediate compliance, would settle definitely in their minds what are the principles of their own philosophy in regard to the doctrines of depravity and conversion, and inform themselves accurately what is the philosophy of modern Arminians in regard to those doctrines, they would find that they are themselves much nearer Arminianism and Methodism on these subjects, than those whom they accuse.

ple process of looking at the opinions and statements of others only through the medium of our own philosophy ?

15. On p. 6, the editor professes to bring the preacher's description of the new heart which God requires to the test of Scripture, by quoting a large number of passages in which the word *heart* occurs, and substituting in its place the phrase "governing purpose." And he concludes the enumeration with the following sentences. "It is abundantly manifest that by this definition the sense of the sacred writers would be strangely altered, and the very *heart* of the Bible taken away. Substitute 'fountain or source of the moral affections,' instead of 'governing purpose,' and the sense remains good, although the word 'heart' makes better phraseology."—But Mr. F., as the editor himself reports him, had said that the word 'heart' in the Scriptures, in all cases where it means "the ruling choice or governing purpose," is "the fountain of our moral exercises." But this is not the whole of this case of misrepresentation. In perusing this whole page, the reader would not get the idea that Mr. F. had given any other sense of the word 'heart' as used in the Bible, than that of 'governing purpose.' Indeed the examination here instituted by citing various passages of Scripture, derives all its apparent force from the assumption on which it *seems* to proceed, that Mr. F. must, according to the account he had given of the meaning of the word 'heart' in the Bible, apply to it, in all the passages quoted, the sense of "ruling choice or governing purpose." And, in fact, as the Abstract was first published in the Volunteer, the preacher was represented as having given but two senses of the word 'heart' in the Scriptures, viz. "the *soul or spirit*," and "the *ruling choice or governing purpose of the mind*." And with this account of the sermon before him, the editor instituted this trial of the definition by applying it to various texts, in none of which it meant "soul or spirit," and in all of which, therefore, he might safely assume his readers would take for granted, Mr. F. *must* understand it in the sense of 'governing purpose,' when, in a number of the passages, it obviously has various other meanings. But the fact was, Mr. F. had stated all, or nearly all, these other meanings when delivering the sermon. Besides naming the two senses just mentioned, he said, "Sometimes it means *the whole mind*, and sometimes *the understanding*, and sometimes *the conscience*; in some places it seems to mean *the constitutional propensities* which belong to human nature, whether holy or sinful; sometimes it seems to refer to the *social or relative affections*; often it expresses all the *affections and exercises of the mind*" [intellectual, constitutional and moral:] and this, he intimated, was not a complete enumeration. A correspondent informed the editor of these important omissions, and hinted to him the misrepresentation, into which he had been led by them, of Mr. F., when testing his account of the Scripture meaning of the word *heart*, by applying it to a variety of passages. The editor published the communication, supplied the omissions in the Abstract as given in the pamphlet, p. 1, and left his application of various texts of Scripture to Mr. F.'s definition as it had stood before! For the convenience of our readers the passages quoted by

the editor are inserted in the margin. By substituting, in reading them, as the editor has done in printing them, the phrase 'governing purpose,' for the word 'heart' wherever it occurs, and then reading them as they stand, with the eight different senses in view which Mr. F. is represented in the Abstract to have given of the word 'heart' as used in the Bible, viz. *the soul or spirit, the whole mind, the understanding, the conscience, the constitutional propensities which belong to human nature whether holy or sinful, the social or relative affections, all the affections and exercises of the mind* of every description, the *ruling choice or governing purpose* and so the *fountain of subordinate moral exercises*,—the misrepresentation and unfairness of the author of the Strictures in this case will be apparent.*

16. The Strictures represent Mr. F. as denying the necessity and agency of the Holy Spirit in conversion. "On the principles of this sermon there can be no true conversion. Conversion is *simply an act of his own will*, without an antecedent or even simultaneous change of affections, to which the sinner is induced by motives, alone." "This appears from what is above said of a sinner's *self-conversion*." On "this scheme," "the sinner *converts himself* very easily, *by a simple act of his own will*." "Suppose it [the conversion] is genuine, *it is made to rest on the will of man, and NOT on the promise and upholding grace of God, NOT on the intercession of Christ that his faith fail not, or on THAT SPIRIT* which is to be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life." p. 11. But the Abstract of the sermon, as given by the editor himself, represents Mr. F. as having said, "This view illustrates the nature of the *sinner's dependence on the Spirit of God*." "*The Spirit* uses means in *producing conversion*." "Conversion is *ascribed*, in the Bible, *to God, or the Spirit; they are born again by the Spirit*." "There is a sense in which *God makes a new heart*." p. 3.

17. To illustrate the different senses in which making a new heart may be ascribed to God, to the preacher, to the truth or word

* "O ye simple, understand wisdom; and ye fools, be ye of an understanding heart. The Lord is nigh unto them that are of a broken heart; and saveth such as be of a contrite spirit. This people's heart is waxed gross, - - - lest they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them. The whole land is made desolate, because no man layeth it to heart. The heart of her husband doth safely trust in her. He is a Jew who is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter. Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witnesses, blasphemies. He upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they believed not them which had seen him after he was risen. Now when they heard this, they were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and to the rest of the apostles, Men and brethren, what shall we do? Ye are the epistle of Christ, - - - written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart. Daniel purposed in his heart that he would not defile himself. Every man, according as he purposeth in his heart, so let him give. Barnabas exhorted them all that with purpose of heart they would cleave unto the Lord. The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart. Why hath Satan filled thy heart to lie to the Holy Ghost? Why hast thou conceived this thing in thy heart? But Hezekiah rendered not again according to the benefit done unto him, for his heart was lifted up; - - - nevertheless Hezekiah humbled himself for the pride of his heart; - - - and God left him, to try him, that he might know all that was in his heart. Thou hast put gladness in my heart. The troubles of my heart are enlarged. My heart shall not fear, though war shall rise up against me. From the end of the earth will I cry unto thee, when my heart is overwhelmed."

of God, and to the sinner himself, Mr. F. supposed the case of a man arrested, when about to step over a precipice, by a person's crying to him, *Stop*. And said, "This illustrates the use of the four kinds of expression in the Bible, in reference to the conversion of a sinner, with one exception. In the case supposed, there was only the voice of the man who gave the alarm; but in conversion, there is both the voice of the preacher, and the voice of the Spirit; the preacher cries '*Stop*,' and the Spirit cries "*Stop*' too." p. 3. On this passage the author of the *Strictures* suffered himself to remark, "If the Spirit *only* cries to the sinner, *Stop*, and does not *stop* him, he will go on to destruction." p. 12. Is it possible that the apprehensions of this writer were so affected by looking through the medium of his "Taste Scheme" philosophy, as to have really supposed that the preacher meant that the Spirit of God in "*producing conversion*," "*only* cries to the sinner, *stop*, and does not *stop* him?"

These are the principal misrepresentations, seventeen in number, contained in the *Strictures* before us; misrepresentations which might, nearly all, have been avoided had the editor been able so far to put aside the "Taste Scheme" medium through which he looks at every thing, as to see the plain meaning of the preacher's statements as the editor himself has given them. But this he could not, or did not, do; and hence the most of these perversions; *none of them*, we fully believe, *intentional*.

IV. *In the Strictures before us there are several instances of inconsistency, and some of direct or implied contradiction.* We now speak of the *Strictures* alone: most of the specifications under the last head, are instances of inconsistency between the *Strictures* and their authors own Abstract of the sermon.

1. We have seen that a chief ground of condemnation of Mr. F. in this pamphlet is, that he represents a new governing purpose as all that is required to make a new heart. But, p. 10, the editor himself says, "If Adam had been immediately commanded to repent, he would have been without excuse for disobeying; but, being under the dominion of sin, it was not easy to do it, *because he would not purpose to do it.*" That is, all that was requisite to his repenting was his purposing to do it.

2. On page 11, the author of the *Strictures*, as we have seen, declares his belief of the dogma of "*transmitted pollution.*" But, in the very next sentence but one, he says, "All children *become early depraved.*"

3. In the next paragraph, in giving what *he* considers Mr. F.'s representation of conversion, the editor says, "On the principles of this sermon, conversion is simply an act of his own will, *without any antecedent or even simultaneous change of affections*, to which the sinner is induced by motives alone. *He renounces the world and chooses the service of God.*" And the very next sentence is, "Before he does this, and *when* he does it, *he is supremely and only selfish.*" No change of affections in the sinner, and he is supremely and only selfish, *when* he renounces the world and chooses the service of God! Strange that finding himself using such inconsistent language, did not excite in his mind the suspicion that he had

totally misapprehended the sentiment he was professing to describe.

4. Page 13, he mentions among the views which, he says, "are somewhat prevalent in Orthodox congregations at the present time, and which we believe to be unscriptural and dangerous," the opinion "that the sinner must be active in conversion, and change his governing purpose by his own act." But a few sentences after, he says, "We believe also, that the instant after conversion, or if you please, *at the instant*, holy exercises of penitence, or love, or faith, spring up in the new-born soul, and very soon, perhaps *immediately*, determinate *holy volitions* also." And then, after devoting a few sentences to stating his notion of a taking away of a sinful taste and substituting a holy one, distinct from, and prior to, acts of will, when the Spirit regenerates a soul, and saying (what those whom he is opposing hold as firmly as he) that the "divine influence is *first in order* and the sinner is a *recipient* of it," he says, "whether he were *active* or *passive* in receiving it, when it came suddenly as the lightning from heaven, *we neither know, nor care to know.*" That is, it is an unscriptural and dangerous opinion that the sinner is active in conversion; yet at the instant of his conversion he puts forth holy acts; but still, whether he is active or not, is wholly unknown and unimportant!

5. On page 9, the editor says, The sinner "*can* turn to God, but *will not.*" "He has the control of his powers for this purpose, *if he will*, as fully as in changing his purpose about worldly affairs where he is in the habit of controlling them; but the mischief is, *he will not.*" That is, clearly, all that is wanting is, his *willing* to do it; if he would only *will* to do it, it would be sufficient. But on p. 14, he says, "It is *not* sufficient that a sinner, on the whole, makes up his mind to be religious and act for God."

6. Again on p. 9, he says, "All the preacher has said of the freedom and power of men is perfectly true when applied to man *as God made him*. But it is quite another thing to speak of man in a state of revolt and moral ruin." What the preacher had said of the freedom and power of man was, in substance, that he has complete natural ability and perfect freedom to do what God requires. The sentences just quoted, then, import that, in the view of their author, man, in his "state of revolt and moral ruin," has *not* complete natural ability and perfect freedom to do what God requires. But only a few sentences after he says, "*Antecedently* to this change [when the sinner is born of the Spirit] he *may*, and *can*, do all that God requires."

7. It is not possible to express more clearly and strongly than the author of the Strictures has stated, *in terms*, what is called among theologians the natural ability of unrenewed men to make themselves new hearts, and repent, and believe in Christ, and love and serve God. He says, as we have just seen, that the sinner "*can* turn to God," and "*antecedently* to his change when born of the Spirit, he *may*, and *can*, do all that God requires." And elsewhere he says,—

"Man is under infinite obligations to *desist* from his rebellion, to change his affections, to love God supremely, to mourn for sin with godly sorrow, to believe with the heart on the Lord Jesus Christ, or with that faith that worketh

by love, and to make it his governing purpose to glorify God in his body and spirit all the days of his life. . . . He ought to do this because he has the control of his powers on other subjects, and is in the habit of exercising it; and because he has all the powers that are necessary for *this* great purpose, *if he will use them*; and if he will *not*, that unwillingness is not his *excuse*, but his *greater sin*." p. 8.

The sinner "*may*," then, clearly, "*and can*" "*desist*" at once from "that unwillingness." "*Antecedently* to his change by being born of the Spirit," he *may* and *can* WILL to "*use*" his "*powers*" for the "*great purpose*" so well described. Yet, while the editor has thus lucidly and forcibly stated this all important truth, he, throughout his *Strictures*, advocates the "*Taste Scheme*," which teaches that there is in sinners, *distinct* from, and in its exercises *prior* to, the will, a sinful taste or heart, which, says Dr. Burton, the *will cannot change*.* And the disciple of Dr. Burton whom we are reviewing asks, in circumstances implying a strong negation, "But was he active, and *voluntary*, and influenced by his own motives merely, in affecting that instantaneous change?" p. 14. And says, "It is necessary that the *affections* themselves be sanctified, or the *volitions*, which are *always influenced by the affections*, will not be truly directed to the service of God. How *can* a holy resolution to serve God be formed, while there are none but unholy affections to *control the will*? A change of character *originates* in a change of the affections or heart." p. 15. Surely this language, fairly interpreted, *asserts that an unrenewed sinner cannot* "*change his affections, love God,*" &c." as strongly as that before quoted asserts that he can.

V. We now proceed to examine *the allegation of novelty* in the views presented in the sermon commented on in the pamphlet before us, and said to have become "*somewhat prevalent in Orthodox congregations at the present time*." The title of the pamphlet, it will be remembered, is "*The New Divinity Tried*;" and in closing his remarks which directly refer to the sermon the editor says, "*We will now submit the matter to the candid inquirer, whether this new scheme*" &c.

Novelties in *doctrine* will be pretty certain to be errors; and novelties in the philosophy of the doctrines of the Bible should always be viewed with caution, and not received unless they will evidently contribute to the defence and power of the truths of religion. Open-eyed, candid, honest watchfulness in regard to both classes of novelties is, therefore, to be commended. But we should not lightly bring the charge of broaching novelties in religion; and never, most certainly, should we bring it, without having become satisfied, upon intelligent and careful examination, that it is well founded. This charge has been brought, and published to the world, by the author of the pamphlet before us, against the preacher of the sermon on which he comments, and, by implication, against other ministers and Christians. Is it well founded?

To what does it refer, to the *doctrines* of religion, or to the *phil-*

* "*The will of man produces many effects; some it cannot produce. And this change in the heart is one of the latter.*" *Essays*, p. 19.

osophy of the doctrines? This question presents a most important distinction, which it is of the highest moment should be understood, and properly applied. *The doctrines of religion are the simple facts of Christianity. The philosophy of the doctrines is the mode adopted of stating and illustrating those facts, in their relations to each other, to the human mind, to the whole character and government of God.* From this distinction results the following most important practical principle of Christian fellowship and of theological discussion. *All who believe and teach the leading facts or doctrines of Christianity, are Orthodox, though they may differ greatly in their philosophy of those doctrines, or in their mode of stating and illustrating them, in their relations to each other, to the human mind, to the whole character and government of God.* The philosophy of some of them may be erroneous. It may be dangerous, tending to the subversion of the doctrines to which it relates, and of other and even all the important facts of Christianity. Still their error is in their philosophy, not in their doctrines. They cannot be charged with error in doctrine or heresy, without incurring the sin of bringing against a brother a false accusation. It may be a duty to exhibit and oppose their errors, true zeal for the faith once delivered to the saints may require it. But he who deems himself called upon to do this, should be careful to state, that he makes no charge of error in doctrine, that it is the error and the bad tendency of their philosophy of religion that he is about to expose. This distinction, and the principle or rule resulting from it are of such vital importance, that we shall illustrate them by a reference to a few particulars.

All are Orthodox, or correct in doctrine, in regard to the divine nature, and are to be so treated, who receive the great Scriptural fact, that the divine Being exists in a threefold distinction, commonly called persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, partaking alike of all the attributes of Deity, and entitled to receive divine worship, and together constituting the one living and true God. Yet of those who have received this great fact, the large majority hitherto, at least since the time of Athanasius, have adopted the statement, of most of the Protestant Confessions, of the eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of the Spirit. And not a few, including Ridgeley, author of the *Body of Divinity* once used at Harvard University, Dr. Thomas Scott, author of the *Family Bible*, the late Dr. Samuel Worcester, Dr. Emmons, Professor Stuart, and a large portion of the present New England clergy, have discarded this statement; some thinking that the terms Father, Son and Holy Ghost express the official relations resulting from the work of redemption, others that they indicate the *unknown* essential relations of the three persons. Some have thought the mystery in relation to this subject is in the unity—how the three persons are *one* God; others that it is in the Trinity—how in the one God there can be *three* distinctions or persons. And other differences there have been as to the philosophy or mode of stating this subject, among those whom all acknowledge to be Trinitarians.

All Orthodox Christians agree that sin exists, and is a dreadful

evil, which God forbids and abhors, and for which the creature is alone and wholly to blame. But some of them think, with Dr. Bellamy, Dr. Woods, &c. that its existence was the direct object of God's choice, as *a necessary means of the greatest good*: others think, with the celebrated Puritan John Howe, some of the "old school" Calvinists of the present day, the conductors of the *Christian Spectator*, and some of the modern evangelical theologians of Germany, that it is *incidental* to the moral system which the wisdom and benevolence of God have chosen and his power has brought into existence: and others still profess to take the *fact*, without any theory in regard to its relations to God and his moral kingdom.

The Orthodox doctrine in respect to the native character of man is, that in consequence of the fall of Adam, all his descendants sin and only sin, in all the various circumstances of their moral existence, till they are renewed by the Holy Spirit. But there may be various and quite different, statements of the doctrine, or modes of accounting for the fact, without a denial or doubt of the fact or doctrine itself. Thus one may suppose, with Calvin, the framers of the Westminster Confession, President Edwards, and others, that Adam and all his posterity so constituted one moral person, that, in relation to the law and its penalty, his act in committing his first sin was their act, and that for the guilt thus incurred by each individual, he is condemned to abandonment by God, issuing in his want of original righteousness, inclination only to evil and actual transgression, ending, if grace do not prevent, in his eternal punishment. Or, with most of those at the present day who style themselves "Old School" Calvinists, discarding this oneness of moral personality of the whole human race, he may assume that the first sin of Adam is so set over to the account of his posterity, in the view of God's law, that they are considered and treated as justly liable to its consequences, and abandoned of God, and so on, as before. Or, rejecting both our moral identity with Adam in his first act of sin and such an imputation of it to us as has just been described, he may hold, with the author of the pamphlet we are reviewing, and all "advocates of the Taste Scheme," that from our fallen progenitor we have derived a *taste, bias, inclination*, which is not the choice of the mind, but determines the choice, as does hunger or thirst, yet possesses a sinful quality, and justly exposes to punishment. Or, with Dr. Emmons and other "friends of the Exercise Scheme," he may suppose, that depravity consists wholly in voluntary exercises, produced in the mind, at the very commencement of its moral existence, by a direct divine efficiency, exerted in a way which is deemed consistent with man's free-agency. Or, believing with those last referred to that depravity is a voluntary exercise of the mind, he may, with President Edwards when describing the nature of our innate depravity, with the late President Appleton of Bowdoin College, and many others, maintain that the ground or occasion of the certainty that all the descendants of Adam do and will, at the very commencement of their moral agency, form, and give themselves wholly up to, the governing choice or preference of their own gratification to the authority and favor of God and the

general good, is in the constitutional appetites, propensities, &c which they inherit from their first parents, and which have no moral quality previous to and distinct from voluntary exercise.—All these modes of stating the doctrine, and accounting for the fact, of the universal and entire sinfulness of unrenewed men, have been adopted by those whose Orthodoxy in regard to this doctrine has not been, and will not be, questioned.

And so, to notice but a single instance more, one may maintain, with “the friends of the Exercise Scheme,” that the divine influence in producing human character is not confined to holy exercises, but extends also, and without any difference in the mode of operation, to sinful exercises. Others may maintain with the great body of the Orthodox, that divine influence is employed only in the production of holy exercises; and of these last, some may maintain, that the Spirit exerts his influence directly on the mind itself in view of the truth; others, that he exerts it indirectly and only through the medium of the truth; and others still, that we are wholly ignorant of the manner in which it is exerted. And yet all these may hold to the fact that all holiness in fallen men is a result of a special, efficacious influence of the Spirit; and, holding this fact, all of them are Orthodox in regard to the doctrine of divine influence in the renovation and sanctification of men.

The philosophy of a doctrine is, then, manifestly, a distinct and very different thing from the doctrine itself. And there may be, in regard to the former, great variety, and great and even dangerous error, while, in regard to the latter, there is entire agreement, and perfect soundness of faith.*

It is, therefore, a pertinent and most important inquiry which we have proposed, To which does the charge of novelty of views, brought in the pamphlet before us, refer, to the doctrines, or to the philosophy of the doctrines, advanced in Mr. F.’s sermon?

What are the doctrines advanced in the sermon? They are the perfect ability and obligation of sinners to cease from their rebellion against God, and comply with the requirements of the Gospel; their utter inexcusableness in delaying to do so a single moment; that the sinner’s compliance with the requirement of the Gospel is his own act, to which he is fully competent, though his performance of it is always brought about by the agency of the Spirit; and that, consequently, every sinner is infinitely guilty for not making him-

* It is not to be inferred from what has been said of the doctrines and the philosophy of religion, that philosophy is of no importance in religion, and should be wholly discarded from it. So far from this, the doctrine of repentance cannot be explained, or directions given for growing in grace, or a false refuge of a sinner exposed, or a cavil of an objector repelled, without using some part of some system of philosophy. All the errors of the various classes of errorists who profess to admit the authority of the Bible, all the excuses of indolent Christians and of careless, delaying sinners, are based on false philosophy. To quote texts will not, in a multitude of cases, convince them of their errors, and tear from them their excuses; for they have false interpretations of your texts, based on their false philosophy. You must, therefore, expose the falseness of their philosophy, and state and illustrate the truth in a way which commends itself to their reason and consciousness and common sense. In no other way can you get an entrance for the truth to their consciences and hearts. And to do this, you must know correctly the relations of the truths of Scripture to the human mind, to one another, to the character and government of God. In other words, you must have and skilfully use a correct system of philosophy of religion.

self a new heart ; that it is the sinner's obstinacy alone that renders necessary the influence of the Spirit for his conversion ; that the Spirit uses means in conversion ; that there is a sense in which the sinner makes himself a new heart, a sense in which the Spirit changes his heart, a sense in which it is changed by the truth, and a sense in which it is changed by the preacher ; that if sinners do not yield to the truth they must perish ; that it is consistent and proper for ministers and Christians to use means for the conversion of sinners ; that conversion is more probable while listening to the preaching of the word than afterwards ; that sinners are to expect no agency for their conversion but that which accompanies the means ; that the eternal destiny of every impenitent sinner is this moment suspended on his at once submitting to God. These are the doctrines, at least all the material ones, advanced in the sermon. Is it against these, or any of them, that the editor of the Volunteer prefers his charge of novelty ? He does, indeed, speak of the preacher's errors and innovations in "doctrine." p. 11. But he did not mean "doctrine" in the proper sense of that term ; for he has expressly told us, that in all the doctrines just stated as those of the sermon, he perfectly accords. He says,

"We perfectly accord with many things in this sermon, which are forcibly exhibited. Man is under infinite obligations to desist from his rebellion ; to change his affections ; to love God supremely ; to mourn for sin with godly sorrow ; to believe with the heart on the Lord Jesus Christ, or with that faith that worketh by love ; and to make it his governing purpose to glorify God in his body and his spirit all the days of his life. . . . He ought to do this immediately, on the first annunciation of the Gospel in his ears ; and is utterly without excuse for delaying it a single moment, under any pretence of inability, or indisposition, or dependence on divine agency, or mercy, or sovereignty ; since he has all the powers that are necessary for this great purpose, if he will use them, and if he will not, that unwillingness is not his excuse, but his greater sin. . . . We believe further, that when sinners are converted, it is through the exercise of their own powers, by the agency of the Spirit, and by the application of truth through the ministry of reconciliation. We can therefore fully accord with most of the "Remarks" made in the concluding part of the above sermon. Every sinner is infinitely guilty for not making himself a new heart ; to say 'I can't love God and repent,' is to plead one sin for the commission of another ; the only necessity for the aid of the Spirit arises from the sinner's 'pertinacious obstinacy ;' the Spirit uses means in producing conversion ; there is a sense in which a penitent sinner does make a new heart ; if sinners will not yield to truth, they will inevitably perish ; we see the consistency of using means to convert sinners ; it is more probable that they will be converted under the voice of the living minister, than after they have retired, refusing to yield ; if they are expecting any other agency than that which now operates, they will [probably] wait in vain ; and to submit right to God at once is the great point of their responsibility."

What doctrine is there of any importance, advanced in the sermon, which is not embraced in this statement, and with which, consequently, the editor does not perfectly accord, as among "the old-fashioned principles" which he professes to maintain ? Not a single one.

Why, then, has he sounded the alarm of "new divinity," and of "views unscriptural and dangerous," and "subversive of the Gospel in their results ?" On account, and solely on account, of the

philosophy of the doctrines—the mode of stating and illustrating them, employed in the sermon. What, then, are these philosophical views? And are they indeed novelties in stating and illustrating the doctrines of the Gospel? Let us look at them, as given in the Strictures, and see how stands the evidence in regard to their novelty.

I. It is stated as one of “the most prominent views in mental philosophy presented in this discourse,” and is, of course, regarded by the editor as a prominent article of “the new divinity,” “that a moral character is to be ascribed to voluntary exercises alone.” But from as old a book as Augustine De Vera Religione, we have seen the following quotation, “Usque adeo voluntarium malum esse peccatum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium.” “Sin is so far a voluntary evil, that it would not be sin, if it were not voluntary.”* And Calvin we find, when opposing those who falsely argue against the certainty of sin in fallen men from the fact that it is voluntary, conceding that it is voluntary—“voluntarium est;” and saying, “Nego consequi quod inferunt, evitabile esse, quia voluntarium sit,” and “Pateret non minus voluntarie peccare, qui necessario peccat;” “I deny the consequence which they derive, that sin is avoidable [may not occur,] because it is voluntary;” “It is manifest that he who sins necessarily [from a moral necessity i. e. certainly,] sins no less voluntarily.”† President Edwards says, “It is a certain beauty or deformity that are inherent in that good or evil will, which is the soul of virtue and vice, which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise, according to the common sense of mankind.”‡ Dr. Bellamy says, “All wicked men are voluntary in their bad temper. The temper of the mind is nothing but the habitual inclination of the heart; but an involuntary inclination of the heart is a contradiction.”§ Dr. Hopkins says, “It must also be observed and kept in mind, that sin, as does holiness, consists in the motions or exercises of the heart or will, and in NOTHING else.”|| Dr. Witherspoon asks, “Does any man commit sin but from his own choice? Or is he hindered from any duty to which he is sincerely and heartily inclined? If this were indeed the case, it would not be true, what we are told in the sacred oracles, that God will be just when he speaketh, and clear when he judgeth.”¶ Dr. Samuel Spring says, “What is moral action? A moral action is an exercise of the will or heart of man.” “A moral action is the volition of a moral agent.” “Nothing is moral which is not voluntary.” “Destitute of volition, and consequently destitute of morality.” “It is as absurd to talk of sin separate from moral exercise or volition, as it is to talk of whiteness separate from any thing which is white, of greatness separate from any thing which is great, or of deformity separate from any deformed subject.”** Andrew Fuller says, “To suppose that any sin can be strictly and absolutely involuntary

* Quoted in De Moor Commentar. in Marc. Compend. iii. 132, from August. de Vera Relig. cap. 14.

† Institut. Lib. II. cap. 5. § 1.

‡ On the Will, Part iv. Sect. i.

§ Works, i. 154. The works of Dr. Bellamy were recommended by twelve distinguished clergymen, of whom are still living, Dr. Miller, Dr. Griffin, Prof. Stuart, Dr. Woods, Dr. Richards.

|| System, i, 289, 290.

¶ Works, ii, 56.

** Disquisitions, 54, 56, 57, 124, 125.

in its operations, is contrary to every dictate of common sense."* Dr. Dwight says, "Sin universally is no other than selfishness, or a preference of one's self to all other beings," &c. And "selfishness consists in a preference of ourselves to others and to all others, to the universe and to God. This is sin, and all that in the Scriptures is meant by sin. In every individual sin, this will invariably be found to be the essential and guilty character."† Dr. Emmons says, "There is no morally corrupt nature, distinct from free, voluntary, sinful exercises."‡ Dr. Griffin says, Men "in all their wickedness are voluntary and free."§ Dr. Woods says of man, "The power of choosing right or wrong makes him a moral agent. His actually choosing wrong makes him a sinner."|| So much for the allegation of novelty in the view "that moral character is to be ascribed to voluntary exercises alone." As this is the main point, the truth of the allegation in application to other particulars may be tested with more brevity.

2. The second "prominent view in mental philosophy" represented by the author of the *Strictures* before us as characterizing "the new divinity" is, that "a nature cannot be holy or sinful." p. 4. In what sense the preacher used this language has been shown, p. 10. We are now to show that such statements have been common with the best Orthodox theologians. Calvin says, "Neque enim in substantia carnis aut animæ causam habet contagio." "The cause of the contagion [or corruption of mankind] is not in the substance of the body or the soul," i. e. is not a constitutional property of the body or the mind.¶ President Edwards says, of the supposition that the doctrine of original sin implies "that nature must be corrupted by some positive influence, something, by some means or other, infused into the human nature, some quality or other not from the choice of our minds, but like a taint, tincture or infection, altering the natural constitution, faculties and dispositions of our souls," . . . "truly" he says, "our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing."*** Dr. Bellamy, says, of the native selfish dispositions of men, "they are not natural in the same sense as the faculties of our souls are; for they are not the workmanship of God, but are our native choice, and the voluntary, free spontaneous bent of our hearts."†† And Dr. Emmons says, "Righteousness and true holiness belong to the heart, and are free, voluntary exercises." "There is no morally corrupt nature, distinct from free, voluntary,

* Works, iv. 31.

† Theology, first American edition, iii, 467, 162.

‡ Sermons, i, 234.

§ Park Street Lectures, p. 10.

¶ Remarks on Dr. Ware's Answer, p. 44. Places may be found in the works of many or all of the authors referred to on this topic, in which they speak of *disposition, inclination, relish, &c.* without calling them, or intimating that they regard them, as acts of will. But either they do so regard them, meaning to express by these terms *habitual governing preferences of the mind for the objects referred to*, or they are justly chargeable with self-contradiction. There is a statement of Edwards which casts a flood of light on such instances of obscurity and apparent inconsistency. The faculty of will, he says, is, "that by which the soul is some way *inclined* with respect to the things it views or considers; or it is the faculty by which the soul beholds things, not as an indifferent spectator, but as *liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting.*" This faculty is called by various names: it is sometimes called the *inclination*; and, as it respects the actions determined and governed by it, the *will*; and the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, is called the *heart.*" Affections, Part I Section 1.

† Institut. Lib. II. cap. 1. § 7. ***Original Sin. Part IV. Chap. 2. †† Works, i. 201. 205

sinful exercises.* And indeed all the quotations under the last head imply the same thing.

3. A third view represented as distinctive of "the new divinity" is, "that *the heart when considered in relation to God, is nothing but the governing purpose of the mind,*" p. 4. What, then, did the preacher mean by this expression? He meant, as has been shewn, that the grand ruling preference of the soul, when the heart is changed, is of God and the happiness of the universe, instead, as it was before, of his own imagined exclusive good. And is there any thing new in this "view"? Is it not as old as the delivery of the command, at Sinai, if not in Paradise, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me?" Was it not the "view" of Joshua, when he said, "Choose you this day whom ye will serve?" Of the incarnate Saviour, when he said of Jerusalem, "How often would I have gathered you, but ye would not?" Of the glorified Redeemer, when he says, "Whosoever is willing, let him take the water of life?" And as to the usage of uninspired men, we have already seen, that by most theologians in New England, since the time of Edwards, the terms *will* and *heart* have been used as perfectly synonymous, both when referring to the faculty and to its exercises. And a numerous class of them, we have also seen, have distinguished the exercises of the will into *primary* or *immanent*, and *subordinate* or *imperate*. And when observing this distinction, they have applied the term *heart*, precisely as Mr. F. has done in his sermon, to the former class of exercises. Thus says Wines, "By the term *heart* is commonly understood all the exercises of the will, whether immanent or executive. But in the restricted sense, the term heart expresses the immanent [the primary or governing] exercises." "The *new heart* imports all holy exercises in man after he is regenerated; but in a more definite sense, the phrase denotes the beginning of holiness in regeneration. As therefore, the new heart is the beginning of holiness, nothing more is intended by *making a new heart* than beginning to be holy, or exercising holy love."† And to the same effect Dr. Emmons says, "All the sinner has to do to make him a new heart is to exercise benevolence instead of selfishness,"‡ i. e. to come to a primary, governing choice of the general good to his own private interest. And how common is it for theologians and ministers, who hold, as the great majority of them in New England have long held, that all holiness and sin consists in voluntary exercises, to express conversion, or the sinners choosing or preferring God and the general good to his own private interest, by the phrase "giving the heart to God?" Only let it be remembered, that purpose, as used in Mr. F.'s sermon, means the choice or preference of the will or heart, and that governing purpose means the primary, ruling preference or choice of the will or heart; and no one well informed on theological subjects will suspect any novelty in his assertion that, by the command to the sinner to make him a new heart, "is intended that he should change the governing purpose of his life."

4. Another thing mentioned by the author of the *Strictures* as one of "the most prominent views in mental philosophy presented

* Sermons, i. 177, 234.

† Inquiry, pp. 4, 5.

‡ Sermons ii. 174.

in this discourse," and characterising "the new divinity," is "that *the depravity or moral ruin of man has not abridged his power of choosing right, with the same ease that he chooses wrong.*" p. 4. This statement we have already seen, p. 11, the editor would not have made had he not misapprehended the meaning of the declaration to which it refers; for in the sense in which the preacher used the expression, "It is as easy to purpose right as wrong," the editor, no doubt, entirely agrees with him. And the form of expression which Mr. F. used has been, very common among those who believe and teach men's natural ability. Thus Dr. Emmons says, in a single sermon, Sinners "are as able to do right as to do wrong, to do their duty as to neglect their duty, to love God as to hate God, to choose life as to choose death, to walk in the narrow way to heaven as to walk in the broad way to hell, and to turn from sin to holiness as to perfect holiness in the fear of the Lord." "Sinners are as able to *turn* from sin, to *change* their hearts, or to *begin* to be holy, as to perform any other religious duty or common action." "Every sinner is as able to embrace the Gospel, as a thirsty man is to drink water, or an hungry man to eat the most delicious food." "Sinners are as able to come to the Gospel feast, as to come to any other to which they are kindly invited." "Sinners are as able to return to their heavenly Father, as an undutiful, wandering child is to return to its earthly parent." "Sinners are as able to work out their own salvation with fear and trembling, as to perform the most common and ordinary actions of life." "They can love God, repent of sin, believe in Christ, and perform every religious duty, as well as they can think, or speak, or walk."* And Dr. Samuel Spring says, "Why should men think that they have more natural ability to walk than they have to love Christ?" "We cannot plead that sinners have less natural ability to repent than they have to perform common actions, without opposing his [Christ's] divine instructions."† And the very Strictures we are examining contain language not very dissimilar. Page 8, it is said, "The sinner ought immediately to desist from his rebellion, to change his affections, to love God supremely, &c., because he has the control of his powers on other subjects, and is in the habit of exercising it; and because he has all the powers that are necessary for this great purpose, if he will use them." And again, p. 9, "He has the control of his powers for this purpose[turning to God,] if he will, as fully as in changing his purpose about worldly affairs, where he is in the habit of controlling them." Is not this the very same, in meaning, as to say "that the depravity or moral ruin of man has not abridged his *power* of choosing right with the same ease that he chooses wrong?"

5. A fifth "prominent view in mental philosophy," said to be "presented in this discourse," and represented as characterizing "the new divinity," is, "that *conversion is effected only by moral suasion or the influence of motives.*" p. 4. If this statement is to be taken as implying, (what is not unequivocally asserted in other places in the Strictures,) that the preacher had taught that conversion is effected without the special influence of the Spirit, it is, as

* Sermons, i. 184, 185, 186, 189.

† Disquisitions, pp. 204, 205.

has already been shown, p. 27, a gross misrepresentation. But perhaps in this place the editor only meant to assert, that Mr. F.'s view of the philosophy of this subject is, that the Holy Ghost always effects conversion by moral suasion or the influence of motives alone. This is Mr. F.'s view of the philosophy of this subject; see the Abstract, p. 3. But it is not, it seems the editor needs to be informed, the view of all, probably not of the majority, of those whom he regards as teachers and disciples of "the new divinity." Among this class he would, doubtless, assign a prominent place to the conductors of the Christian Spectator. But they say expressly, that it is an article of Dr. Taylor's "creed," and speak of it in such a manner as to leave no doubt that it is also of their own, "That regeneration is never effected by *moral suasion*, but is dependent on the *direct and special* influences of the Holy Spirit, operating in consistency with the laws of moral agency."* Mr. F.'s philosophy of this subject is somewhat different. He thinks there is no "*direct and immediate act*" of the Spirit in effecting conversion, "either upon the *motive* to give it efficiency, or upon the *mind* to make it willing." And what the Spirit does he describes thus, "He presents motives by means of the truth; he persuades, and the sinner yields to his persuasion." p. 3. This very language, the reader will observe, ascribes the result to the agency of the Spirit. And elsewhere, he will remember, Mr. F. has said expressly, "*the Spirit produces conversion;*" men "*are born again by the Spirit,*" "*God makes the new heart.*" p. 3.

But the question now before us relates to the allegation of the *novelty* of the "view" given by Mr. F. of the manner of the Spirit's operation in effecting conversion, that it is by "presenting motives by means of the truth, and thus effectually persuading the sinner to turn to God." And in relation to this question, a single reference will be sufficient. If the reader will look into Ridgley's Body of Divinity, and turn to his discussion of Effectual Calling, he will find the author denying that "the presenting the word in an objective way is the instrument whereby God produces the internal principle by which we are enabled to embrace it." And in this connexion he will find the following statement, "I am sorry that I am obliged, in this assertion, to oppose what *has been maintained by many divines of great worth, who have, in all other respects, explained the doctrine of regeneration agreeably to the mind and will of God, and the analogy of faith.*" And in the margin is a reference to Char-nock, and Cole, on Regeneration.†

6. Another alleged item of "the new divinity" condemned in these Strictures, is Mr. F.'s *method of "accounting for the fall of man."* p. 10. The account is thus given in the Abstract. "When Adam began to act, he made it his governing purpose to serve God. He was afterwards induced to change his purpose, through the suggestions of Satan, who told him he would become like God. Wishing to enjoy that distinction, he chose to gratify himself; and in doing this he transgressed a divine command, and became a selfish being or a sinner." Dr. Dwight's account of the same event is as

* Vol. for 1830, p. 576.

† American edition, 8vo. iii. 46.

follows. "God created a moral being, capable in the nature of things of either sin or holiness. Originally this being was holy; that is, disposed to obey the will of God; possessing a state of mind propense to virtuous, and opposed to sinful, conduct. Fitted by his moral nature to be operated on by motives, as all moral beings are, he was placed in a world filled with motives; of which some induced to obedience, and others to disobedience. Wherever the means of happiness and misery exist, such motives exist of course, and of both kinds; for these means themselves are the motives; or, perhaps more properly, the happiness and misery are the motives. Now it is plain that in such a world, (and all possible worlds, except a world of perfect misery must be such,) motives of both kinds must, at times, be present to the view of such a being. It is equally evident, that some of the motives to sin may, considered by themselves, become to such a being, stronger inducements to action than some of the motives to holiness. In other words, higher enjoyment may be found or expected, in some course of sin, than in some course of holiness. - - - Angels, though entirely holy, yielded to such motives; as did our first parents also, who possessed the same virtuous character."* What material difference is there between this account and that in Mr. F.'s sermon?

7. It is represented in the Strictures as one of the novelties "advanced in this discourse" and belonging to "the new divinity," that *there is no holy or sinful taste, bias or affection, distinct from and prior to volitions, and "controlling the will;"* and the contrary notion is expressly styled "the old doctrine." pp. 15, 19. The erroneousness of this representation has been sufficiently evinced already by the citations, pp. 35, 36, from various standard Orthodox writers, which represent sin and holiness as exclusively voluntary, and not attributable to nature or constitution as distinct from volition. Only two or three more direct testimonies will be added. President Edwards says, "The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties: *the affections are not essentially distinct from the will; nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination,* but only in the liveliness and sensibility of the exercise."† "Some suppose," says Dr. Emmons, "that a good heart essentially consists in a good principle, taste or relish, which is totally independent of the will." "But *this sentiment is totally repugnant to the law of love.*" And then he goes on to notice the counterpart of the theory, "that a bad heart consists in a bad principle, disposition or inclination, which is entirely distinct from sinful, voluntary exercises;" and pronounces it false, and contrary to every man's intuitive knowledge.‡ And very frequently in his sermons he makes similar statements.§ Indeed so far is the opinion of Mr. F. on this point from being, at this time, new, and that of the editor of the Volunteer "the old doctrine," that, (so completely was his theory exploded by "the friends of the Exercise Scheme" in their controversy with "the advocates of the Taste Scheme,") for

* Theology, i. 457, 458.

† On the Affections, Part 1, Sect. 1.

‡ Sermons, i. 203, 204.

§ As in Sermons, i. 344. ii. 162, 172, 194, &c. See also Wine's Inquiry, passim.

the last twenty years, no man has ventured publicly to advocate such an opinion.

So much for the allegation of novelty in the views presented in Mr. F.'s sermon.

VI. It remains only to state, very briefly, what are the *real differences* between the theological views of Mr. F. as presented in the Abstract, and of the editor of the Volunteer as presented in his Strictures. To the editor, looking as he did through the medium of his peculiar philosophy, they appeared to be very numerous. But to the readers of this Review it has, we trust, been made apparent, that, when the Abstract and the Strictures are examined through the medium of the obvious distinction between the doctrines and the philosophy of religion, and an accurate knowledge of the different philosophical systems that have been embraced by theologians, and their various usage of theological terms, these numerous supposed differences nearly all vanish away. *In doctrine, there is no disagreement. And in philosophy, there remain only the three following differences.*

1. Mr. F. holds that "a moral character is to be ascribed to voluntary exercises alone;" and in this agrees with Augustine, Calvin, President Edwards, Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Woods, and the great majority of Orthodox divines in New England from Edwards to the present time. The editor of the Volunteer holds that a moral character is to be ascribed, in part at least, to something else besides voluntary exercises; and in this differs from Augustine, Calvin, President Edwards, Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Woods, and the great majority of Orthodox divines in New England from Edwards till the present time. Which opinion is most consonant with the Scriptures the reader can easily determine by calling to mind these declarations of our Saviour, "*If ye were blind, ye should have no sin.*" "*Ye will not come [are not willing to come] unto me that ye might have life.*"* And which is most consonant with common sense and with fact he can as easily determine, by asking himself whether he can be to blame, or deserve praise, for that which in no degree depended on his choice.

2. Mr. F. holds that the Spirit in converting men does not move them "by a direct and immediate act," but "presents motives by means of the truth," and so "persuades" them, and they yield to his persuasion. The editor of the Volunteer thinks that the method of the Spirit's operation in converting and sanctifying men is not and cannot be certainly known; and if he must adopt a theory, would incline to the opinion that it is by an immediate influence on the mind, exciting, in a way perfectly consistent with its agency and accountability, its susceptibilities to the truth. Of these views we have expressed our preference for that of the editor, and with it Dr. Taylor and the conductors of the Christian Spectator accord more nearly than with the other. And Mr. F.'s view, Ridgley testifies "has been maintained by many divines of great worth, who have, in all other respects, explained the doctrine of regeneration agreeably to the mind and will of God, and the analogy of faith."

* John ix. 41. v. 40.

Both views are held in connexion with a firm belief of the absolute necessity, and the universal fact, of the special agency of the Holy Spirit in producing conversion; and neither has any necessary tendency to subvert that fundamental doctrine. The holding and the teaching of either, therefore, need give no occasion for alarm in reference to soundness in the faith.

3. The only remaining point of difference is, the very important one, in regard to a holy or sinful taste, bias, or affection, distinct from the will and prior to its exercises, and "controlling" volitions. The editor believes there is, and must be, such a thing in every moral being. Mr. F. wholly denies and discards such an opinion. And, in this particular, he agrees with President Edwards, and all who have adopted his general views in theology and mental philosophy from his time to the present, particularly with that class of them in New England who have been "friends of the Exercise Scheme;" and the editor agrees, with a portion of "the Old School" Calvinists, and with the small class in New England who have been "advocates of the Taste Scheme," and with the Methodists.

This, and the one first named in this enumeration, are the principal differences. And that is so closely allied to this, that it wholly depends upon it, and stands or falls with it. Let us, then, test a little, by the application of common sense, this fundamental principle of the editor's whole philosophical system. There is, and must be, it is held, in all moral beings, a taste or bias, either holy or sinful, distinct from and independent of volitions, "controlling" the exercises of the will, and giving to them its moral character. How, then, was it possible for Satan and his companions, and for our first parents, to sin? Their taste or bias was perfectly holy, and, of course, controlled and gave its character to all their moral acts. "How," then, "could" the "motive" to sin that was addressed to them "influence a holy mind?" "How was it possible that such a wicked motive could influence a holy mind?" These are the editor's own questions in reference to "the fall of man,"* which he has not answered; and to which, on his principles, it is plain, no answer can be returned but this, It was not possible, and could never have been. And, therefore, to a demonstration, either the fallen angels and our first parents did not sin, as is represented in Scripture; or God, by a creative act, substituted for their holy taste a sinful one, to be influenced by a motive to sin, and control and give its character to their voluntary acts, and thus was, in truth, the direct cause or author of their sin; or this philosophy is false.

Again, it is agreed that men have "*all the powers* that are necessary to desist from their rebellion, change their affections, love God supremely, mourn for sin with godly sorrow, believe with the heart on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make it their governing purpose to glorify God in body and spirit all the days of their life," p. 8. But it is maintained, by the editor, that their will has not the control of the affections, but the affections, taste or bias uniformly and certainly "control" the exercises of the will, and give character to its volitions. How then can they "change their affections, desist from

* pp. 10, 11.

their rebellion," &c.? "How is it possible that a motive." to holiness "could influence a" sinful "mind?" p. 11. On the principles of this philosophy, it is plainly impossible. And therefore, conclusively, men, on these principles, have *not* "all the powers that are necessary to desist from their rebellion, change their affections," &c. But God certainly requires this of men, of those to whom he has not given converting grace; and condemns and punishes them for not complying. That is, according to the principles of this philosophy fairly carried out, he condemns and punishes them for not doing what they have not all the power which is requisite to perform; which is palpably unjust. Either, then, God does not require un-renewed men "to desist from their rebellion, change their affections" &c., and condemn and punish them for not doing it; or he is unjust; or this philosophy is false.

Once more, it is agreed that the gift of the Spirit to bring men to repentance is not an act of justice, but of pure grace; and that their need of the Spirit for this purpose, "is not an excuse, but their greater sin," for continuing impenitent, p. 8. But it is plainly the demand of justice that men be not required to do, and condemned and punished for not doing, what they have not all the requisite power to perform; and if they have not all that power, and such a requisition is made, it is obviously a debt of justice to them to give them the requisite power. But from the philosophy we are examining, it results, directly and fairly, as we have seen, that unrenewed men have not the power of actually willing to serve God, for their will is under the "control" of a sinful taste or bias, which it cannot change: and they need the grace of the Spirit to change that taste to an opposite one, to "control" their will aright. Clearly, then, the gift of the Spirit to effect such a change, is not an act of pure grace, but of simple justice; and their need of the Spirit for that purpose is a valid excuse for their not complying with the Gospel call. Either this is so, and God is unjust in not dealing with sinners on these principles; or this philosophy is false.*

Now take the other view, held by the great body of Orthodox ministers in New England since the time of Edwards, and bring it to the same tests of common sense. Holiness and sin are to be ascribed in no degree to any thing but voluntary exercises, and consist in acts of choice or preference; and all moral beings, both holy and sinful, have all the powers, (including the power of actually willing,) to choose the service of God and the happiness of the universe, or their own supposed and exclusive advantage. Their present choice is, indeed, from a law of their nature, more likely to continue than the opposite one to be formed. It may be so established, and strong, and cherished, that nothing short of a divine influence will in fact ever change it. But still they have all the powers, including the power actually to will, to change it any moment. What then follows? Why, plainly, that the angels that fell and our first parents could and did, freely, and by their own act, choose their

* The Methodists, assuming that the philosophy of the editor of the *Volunteer* is the true philosophy, argue, in the very way here pursued, to prove the necessity and the reality of universal sufficient grace, to restore "to fallen men the power of choice, and thus lay the foundation for all the commands, invitations and directions that are given to the sinner." And, on the principles of this philosophy, their reasoning can never be overthrown.

own gratification to the exclusion of the service of God, and thus became selfish and sinful, without any change in the constitution or laws of their moral nature, or any act of God creating in them a sinful taste or bias or exerting any direct influence upon their choice,—in the free, voluntary exercise of their own moral powers. And fallen and unrenewed men have, not in name only, but in reality, full power, at any moment, “to desist from sin, change their affections, and love God;” and they may actually do it, and thus comply with the call of the Gospel, and obtain its eternal benefits. They are, therefore, utterly inexcusable and justly condemned for not doing it; and if they persist in not doing it, will, for not doing it, be justly punished. And if, as is the fact, their obstinacy in persisting in their free, unconstrained, wicked choice is such, that the interposition of almighty grace alone will ever overcome it, the very necessity of that interposition, so far from constituting an excuse or an extenuation, is the strongest and most overwhelming evidence of their utter inexcusableness and their most aggravated guilt. Consequently, that interposition, if it shall be granted, will not be to them an act of justice, in any form or degree, but solely an act of pure and sovereign grace.

Which of these two views is most consonant with the known constitution of moral beings, with the plain and immutable principles of equity and of mercy; which best accords with and illustrates and enforces the doctrines and duties of the Bible; which will enable its advocate most plainly, honestly, and pointedly to preach the Gospel, and aid most effectually in stripping men of their guilty excuses, and bring the truth of God most directly and powerfully in contact with the heart, and therefore be most likely to be attended with the efficacious influence of the Spirit; which is the true, and which is the false, philosophy, let the discerning and the candid decide.

And now we have done. Such is the pamphlet we have been reviewing. If doctrines and the philosophy of doctrines are properly distinguished, it does not even prefer any charge of error in doctrine. And the charges it makes of erroneous philosophy, when its misapprehensions and misrepresentations are corrected, are only three in number. Of these, one—the mode of the Spirit’s operation, has no necessary bearing upon the truth of the doctrine to which it relates, and the view dissented from “has been maintained by many divines of great worth, who have in all other respects,” if not in this, “explained the doctrine of regeneration agreeably to the mind and will of God, and the analogy of faith.” And the other two philosophical views which it condemns, may be reduced to one; and that one has been discarded by the great body of Orthodox ministers and Christians in New England for fifty years, and is the manifest absurdity which has just been exposed. The religious public will now judge what ground or occasion there has been for sounding an alarm about “new divinity,” and publicly bringing the charge against Mr. Finney, and by implication against other ministers, of “preaching before this community sentiments subversive of the Gospel in their results,” and proclaiming that “unscriptural and dangerous views are somewhat prevalent in Orthodox congregations at the present time.” That public have the case fairly before them and to them we submit the decision.

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