




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280



*Hawaiian
Islands*

68



El Hierro
8220'

Maudslayi
15675'

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**REVOLT IN
PARADISE**

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REVOLT IN PARADISE

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION
IN HAWAII AFTER
PEARL HARBOR

By
ALEXANDER MACDONALD

NEW YORK
STEPHEN DAYE, INC.



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TO BETTY, CASSIE, AND DAN



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FOREWORD

In all the world there's no lovelier place to live than the islands of Hawaii.

It may seem strange to have read this, when you have begun the pages which follow; for the story they tell is an ugly one. But it is not the story of the physical charms of Hawaii. That—*Aloha Oe!*—has been written by more gracious writers, many hundreds of them. This is an attempt to tell about the men of Hawaii and to describe the incredible conflict which, under a cloak of tropic calm, has been taking place among them. It is told now because their struggle has reached a turning point. The suddenness of the impact of war was enough to set long-smoldering elements of conflict into violent motion. And now a new order is being established in Hawaii, replacing the old system of polite tyranny which ruled the Islands for more than a century.

The handful of men whose word hitherto had been almighty in Hawaii may seem to emerge out of the following pages as ogres full-blown, evil men without scruple. That is not their nature. Almost without exception, the autocrats who ruled Hawaii are men with a highly inbred sense of righteousness. They are men with too deeply inherent a conscience to depart one iota from their code. But that, precisely, was the key to their wickedness.

It was this code and the ruthless manner in which they enforced it that made of Hawaii a community in chains.

The code was harsh and on the surface it was outdated. At first glance it seemed to be a remnant of the fire and brimstone fervor with which the missionary forebears of these autocrats ruled the Islands after their arrival in 1820. Missionary descendants kept their tight grip on the island community because they had discovered it was something worth holding on to. Destiny had passed their role on to them, and their task was a holy one which kept them tremendously rich.

So, by the Twentieth Century, there was more than religious zeal behind their code. Something very ominous had been added. It was something which reached out and vitally influenced the lives of every one of Hawaii's half-million people; it had become a coldly-calculated system of political, economic, and social control. What they had developed in these lush tropic surroundings was a near-perfect blueprint for—no, not merely for fascism; it was more deceptive, yet more inclusive than that. It was a process of rule by the few so foreign to democracy that it will seem incredible for it to have survived so long under the American flag.

This book is an inspection of that process; it is an informal study report of the methods by which a tiny minority can almost completely dictate the individual lives of the mass. Unwittingly, Hawaii lent herself as an ideal laboratory for such a study. Her natural isolation set her enough apart for a detached, clinical examination. Yet she was cosmopolitan enough so that it could not be argued that her unhealthy condition sprang from some single cultural heritage.

That is what gives the study meaning. This was no rare hot-house variety of the rule-by-the-few system. It was

one cultivated specifically as a species *Americanus*. It was raised to thrive on American soil. The tools so skilfully used were modern and scientific ones. The process, as it was so nearly perfected in Hawaii, was one which might readily have been transplanted to any section, or to all, of America.

That may sound like a warning, as though this were something which could threaten the whole nation. It is meant to be exactly that. What had taken place in Hawaii was not so isolated, after all. This was something which could challenge the people of any American community. What is important is that, should their rights be similarly usurped, they be ready to recognize this usurpation and should know how to deal with it.

The pages which follow tell what Hawaii did, and still is doing, to throw off the yoke. They were written with the conviction that Hawaii has already won her victory. This record, therefore, is a kind of guidebook for community action. It is presented, not with the purpose of indicting the men, living and dead, who ruled the Islands, but with the hope that those who cherish the ideals of democracy may find some profit in the lessons that the people of Hawaii have been learning.

A. M.

**REVOLT IN
PARADISE**



THIS WAS HAWAII

*“Ko luna e iho ana ilalo, ko lalo e pii ana iluna.”
“It is prophesied that the rulers will come down,
the commoners go up.”*

—Old Hawaiian Proverb.

Had any one of the Japanese pilots who flew in over Oahu on December 7, 1941, been of a philosophic turn of mind, he might have reflected upon the beauty of the island and the swift metamorphosis he and his bombing mates were about to effect on the peaceful Sunday scene below. He might have had an eye that morning for the green surf which moved in sparkling, regimented lines across the coral reefs. Or for the slim coco palms, thoughtfully spaced, which waved in the north-northeast trades. Perhaps he noticed how everything, from the beaches across the plains to the backdrop of mountains, was the same discreet shade of green. He might have sensed the pleasant early morning haze that hung over all. He might even have sighed a bit as he raced on to Pearl Harbor.

The probability is not so far-fetched as it seems. The physical charm of Hawaii—and that morning it was more than living up to the superlatives of the tourist advertisements—has just such a talent for unhinging purpose, for subtle hypnosis. It was that siren stuff to which the Hawaii Tourist Bureau used to expose prospective vacationers. “Sail the ocean trails to fair Hawaii!” . . . “Forget the

world's cares in the sun-kissed surf at Waikiki." . . .
"Dance under the stars at the Royal Hawaiian." . . .

Blandishments like these lured visitors to Hawaii. Surprisingly enough, they usually found the island had not sold them short. The average vacationer started back for his home town dreaming of Polynesian songs, the waves of Waikiki, moonlit coco palms. . . . Hawaiian charm was a pleasant-taking drug that dulled the tourists' senses to the fact that all was not quite well in the Islands. Even long-time residents did not escape that magic. Most of them were hardly aware that, beneath this surface haze of charm, a boiling was going on in this "melting-pot of the Pacific" more potent than the fires of the volcanoes. By Pearl Harbor it was ready to bubble over.

This struggle which the Islands fairly successfully shielded from visitors and from the eyes and ears of continental America, was no family squabble. It was, and is, a clash of forces whose outcome will decide if this abundant territory is in actuality to become a part of democratic America, or if it is to continue on its way as a tough little oligarchy flying the American flag. It is a strange struggle to be taking place on American soil, for the issue at stake is one—in fact, the only one—for which Americans have gone to war: Freedom of the individual.

For nearly a century there had been no true freedom for the individual in languorous Hawaii. Save for a small, top-drawer group of autocrats, the economy of the individual was almost completely governed by a special type of tyranny. This may seem too harsh a word, but it is the only one to describe a system of control which governed not only individual economy, but reached also into nearly every other sphere of individual life in the Islands.

This strangle-hold on a community of a half-million people did not come by any overt act of aggression. It came rather by accumulation and by heritage. It began with the remarkable industry of the first Americans who came to Hawaii a century and a half ago. The pioneers were missionaries but they were, also, men who knew a good thing when they saw it.

These hardy New Englanders had not been long in the islands before some of them turned from evangelizing to staking out claims upon the resources of Hawaii. When they did, they went at the job scientifically. They asked themselves some questions.

"In a field so fruitful as this, what industry had we best choose?"

"What, of all the crops we might raise, will yield the biggest cash return?"

After a few years of experimentation, of careful elimination, they made their decision. It was sugar. By another generation, nearly every arable acre was grown with cane. They just didn't leave room for competition.

The few sugar planters at the top of the industry soon became the feudal barons of Hawaii. Down at the bottom of the social structure were their laborers—Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese and Filipino immigrants brought over in recruiting ships. Bound to the plantations by penal labor contracts, their social rating could be described as somewhere between serf and slave. Midway in the scale were white collar workers and owners of small businesses. But the businesses had to be small. If any business was attractive enough the plantation owners saw that it was financed with sugar money.

Profits from the plantations took care of all big business.

They financed the steamship lines which brought food and supplies to Hawaii and took sugar back, began each of the public utilities, and bought up any enterprise which, in other hands, might challenge their monopoly control. Over a period of a century, by a process of inter-marriage and inheritance, this control was zealously kept within a restricted circle of families descended largely from the original missionary pioneers. However, an industrious "outsider" who rose to an eminent enough executive position with one of the island firms, was sometimes favored with the hand of an eligible daughter of one of the established families. Then he moved into the charmed circle.

But tight-fisted control did not come without occasional struggles. Some of these were of major consequence. Just before the turn of the century, the sugar interests toppled over the throne of the kingdom of Hawaii because the native monarchs were meddling in state affairs which breathed too hotly on their economy. Hawaii strove to become a Territory of the United States when it did, largely because it was the best thing for sugar. When feudal rule was threatened by a plan for a commission form of government, and when Congress later proposed that a Mainland governor be sent to snap the whip over the islands, it was the sugar leaders who rose to their fullest fury and fought down the challenges.

The most serious challenge, however, came in recent years, and it came from within. Some segments of Hawaii finally seemed to be getting stalwart enough to slip out of the stranglehold of sugar. Into the base of the feudal structure several strong forces had been added. Men in the middle classes began to take a more vital part in island industry and finance. New blood arrived from the Main-

land; there were some new leaders who recognized a bit of autocracy when they saw it. Island labor, prodded by organizers from the West Coast, began to flex its muscles. New capital, that literally had to be smuggled into the territory, bought into local business. From far-off Washington the New Deal—bitterest gall of all to take—forced a few social reforms into the feudal design. And the Army and Navy, whose encroachments had from the first been bitterly resented, began to demand more and more concessions for their sugar-coated fortress.

As these new forces began to test their strength, sugar answered by tightening its grip in its somewhat disarming way. Even in their wickedest moments, the Islands' paternal rulers reasoned always that what they were doing was for the best interests of Hawaii Nei. Semi-benevolent in public deeds, they saw themselves as waging a constant crusade against Labor, Foreigners and the Military—all arch-enemies of the people of Hawaii. Destiny had selected them for this role.

But whatever moral suasion was behind it, their system did not lack any of the refinements which go into well-planned rule by "hidden" government. To the task of controlling the community they applied much the same spirit of scientific thoroughness which had gone into the task of building up island industry. They saw that a deciding financial, personal or moral influence was brought to bear on every instrument moulding or expressing public opinion in the territory—on politics, the press, radio, the schools, social agencies, even the churches. Considerable time, money and effort had gone into preparing these institutions for a defense of their regime.

So there was little prospect that the vested interests would

let their sugar kingdom melt away without an until-death struggle. And they pulled no punches in striking out at their enemies. Labor espionage, politics by intimidation, gestapo police methods, cut-throat business methods, and browbeating of the press became accepted strategical operations.

Labor, in turn, began to hit back harder. Foreign capital moved in more boldly. The Army and Navy, fortified with their first liberal appropriations, began to sweep everything before them as they moved into billion-dollar-scale production.

Caught in this snarl of interests was still another highly questionable faction—the Japanese. Composing a third of the Territory's population, they were watched resentfully by island industry because so many of them had drifted away from the plantations into little trades and businesses of their own, because they were making their voices heard more and more loudly in island politics, and because—and this hurt most of all—the planters had only themselves to blame for the crucial Japanese problem. It was the planters, and they alone, who had opened the Pandora's box of Japanese immigration. Now they squirmed as they felt the eyes of all America turned on their Hawaii, openly questioning the presence of 159,000 potential enemies within the fortress of the Pacific.

Even more distrustful of these Japanese were the Army and Navy officers stationed in Hawaii. They had little doubt that America's next war was going to be with Japan, so Hawaii's Japanese problem for them was tactical, rather than political. Now, with war on the threshold, they could denounce Hawaii for so bitterly opposing the earlier plans for government by military commission. That sys-

tem, they grimly noted, would have long before settled the question of the island Japanese.

Such was the tense state of affairs in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor. While our strategists were considering the strengths and weaknesses of this island bastion as the key to the whole U. S. system of defense in the Pacific, the Islands themselves were smouldering with private little sessions of internecine strife.

By 1941, the "melting-pot" was bubbling high.

When the explosion came on December 7th, a great deal more than the ships and docks and airfields on Oahu were blown to kingdom come. The Japanese bombs did what otherwise might have taken years of economic and social evolution in the doing. On that eventful Sunday morning, they wrecked Hawaii's whole feudal structure.

The effect came indirectly, of course. Specifically, the collapse of the century-old system came when martial law put the military in complete control of Hawaii. On top of that the Army took over from the sugar companies their whole fleet of ships. Army provost marshals replaced civilian judges in the island courts. The Army and Navy sat down at the controls of island communications and gave every public utility a good combing over. They censored the radio and the press. There wasn't a large scale activity which was not in some way affected.

The discomfiture of the traditional island leaders gave fresh heart to labor. Soon after Pearl Harbor new unions began to blossom, new demands for wages were made—and met. The grip that the big companies held on everything imported into the Islands was made to loosen, as federal agencies took over food control, fixed consumer

prices and decided what goods could be bought and sold.

Thousands upon thousands of civilian workers—executives, skilled tradesmen, laborers—poured into the Islands, already signed up for defense projects. Within a year these new residents were entitled to Hawaii votes. The smoothly regulated city and county and territorial politics were due for an upset.

This was revolution; there could be no other name for it. In few other chapters of American history has revolution come so definitely and so swiftly.

After two years of war, Hawaii was still in the throes of its revolution. There were no sure signs yet as to what final course it would take but one thing was certain: the military was in the driver's seat. But would the military continue to hold the reins until the war was over—and afterwards?

Would island labor be able to consolidate their wartime gains and hold on permanently to the powers they had wrested from their masters?

Would real leaders emerge out of the new "immigrant" population?

Would the old order be able to make a post-war comeback?

What about the Territory's Japanese?

These are questions which are bound to become more and more the concern of all America, as U. S. forces push westward in the Pacific. With the fighting done Hawaii would still be sitting strategically there, dominating an area whose control might well swing the balance of American influence in the post-war world.

2

BEGINNINGS OF FEUDALISM

"The foreigners are creeping in among the natives, getting their largest and best lands, water privileges, building lots, etc. . . . Honolulu never looked so green and pleasant. . . . Our large plain of sand is now covered with vegetation and is laid out into lots. I am proposing, ere long, to purchase some of them. . . ."

—Letter of Amos Starr Cooke, Missionary to Hawaii, June 3, 1851.

The harshest critic of the manner in which Hawaii's ruling families came into power would not outrightly charge that the motive which steered the first shipload of missionaries to the Islands was worldly gain. Rather, he would point out that there were fourteen mission bands altogether sent from New England by the American Board of Missions and that it was the group as a whole which did pretty well by itself.

Their venture a century ago to the Sandwich Islands won for their descendants—still bound together in a tightly cohesive, inter-related group—a pretty solid share in the virtual mastery of Hawaii's \$250,000,000 annual commerce.

What, in contrast, do Christianity's accounts show today as the reward of their missionary labor?

The balance is not so favorable. A mere handful of the native Hawaiian population today profess the faith first

brought to their "heathen" forebears in 1820. Today there are but 14,246 pure Hawaiians. The bulk of them belong to the Mormon and Catholic churches.

It is interesting to reflect on how the Reverends Hiram Bingham and Asa Thurston might have accepted this. Hardy, granite-willed men of the Gospel, they were leaders of the first missionary group which arrived off Kailua, Hawaii, on April 4, 1820, aboard the brig *Thaddeus*. With them were their wives and a handful of assistants. A grueling 157-day trip from Boston around Cape Horn had brought them to their mission goal.

Though it had not knowingly been so timed, the New Englanders arrived at a propitious moment. Just the year before, the Hawaiian natives had decided voluntarily to overthrow their ancient system of tabus and idol worship. This was chiefly at the instance of Kaahumanu and Keopualani, widows of the famed Kamehameha I, who rebelled particularly against the tabu provisions which denied the rights of women. Native females, for instance, were not allowed to eat with their menfolk; nor might they eat such foods as pork, bananas, coconuts and certain kinds of fish. Now, having flouted the wrath of the old gods and suffered no vengeance, the natives were open to evangelizing from new sources.

The band from the *Thaddeus* wasted little time. The Rev. Mr. Thurston remained at Kailua, where the young king, Kamehameha II, was staying, and the Rev. Mr. Bingham went on aboard the brig to Honolulu, on the island of Oahu, 200 miles northward.

The missionaries did famously with native royalty. At Kailua the king ordered all his chiefs to study the new religion and his own younger brother, who was to become

Kamehameha III, was placed under Thurston's personal care. At Honolulu, Governor Boki of Oahu took daily Bible lessons from Mr. Bingham. So enthusiastically did the Hawaiian chieftain embrace the new faith that a few years later he donated the lands of Punahou to his tutor. Oahu College was afterwards built on these several thousand acres.

The newcomers got along so well, in fact, that protest was aroused. When the king, at the behest of his new advisers, began to issue blue laws straight from the books of old New England, the hard-fisted traders down along Honolulu's waterfront revolted. They attacked the missionaries, charging them with taking substantial parcels of land from the natives.

When word of this conflict reached the American Mission Board back in Boston, a note of rebuke was dispatched to their enterprising representatives in Hawaii. It said, in part:

"If any of your number shall be betrayed into a spirit of worldliness and by that means acquire property, the fact would have great notoriety in this country and become a most painful source of scandal."

Nevertheless the missionaries became more and more closely associated with the administration of the kingdom. Mr. Bingham was now royal interpreter for the king—he served both Kamehameha II and III in this office—and it became his duty to greet all official visitors. There was more than one lively clash between the visitors and this stern mission leader with the sharp features and even sharper temper.

One of these skirmishes was perhaps symbolic of the dif-

ferences which, years later, were to come between the island families and the services. In 1832 Mr. Bingham had it out with Commodore Downes of the U. S. Frigate *Potomac* over the exclusion of Catholic missionaries from Hawaii. Five years earlier there had come to the Islands from California two Catholic priests. They began to draw the natives in great numbers. The native Council of Chiefs, however, disapproved of these conversions and the priests were banished. Their converts were sentenced to hard labor. They were still under sentence when Commodore Downes, who was the first U. S. naval officer to point out the worth of the Islands as a naval base, arrived in 1832. He protested the matter of the priests and their converts but Mr. Bingham insisted that the New England missionaries had nothing to do with the sentence. The officer went then to native rulers, who almost immediately ordered the prisoners released.

Five years later, the episode was repeated when two French Catholic missionaries were forcibly returned to the vessel upon which they had arrived. One of the priests, in feeble health, died at sea a few days later. This was enough for the French Government to start action. A French frigate carrying sixty guns arrived off Honolulu in 1839 and sent an ultimatum ashore, demanding reparations and a promise of religious freedom in the future. The demand was backed up by a specific threat.

“If these terms are not met in forty-eight hours,” the note concluded, “Honolulu will be under bombardment.”

That did it. A treaty was signed on the same day and a package containing \$20,000 was sent aboard. Thereafter

the Islands enjoyed religious freedom. (Seven years later, a French admiral stopped at Hawaii and returned the \$20,000 in the original package, with the seals unbroken, thus settling the fate of the money.)

But it was the New England missionaries who remained closest to the crown. Only during the brief reign of Kamehameha IV, from 1854 to 1863, was their position somewhat weakened. Englishmen in Honolulu had from the start resented the influence of the American newcomers and themselves sought to win royal favor. With Kamehameha IV they succeeded. The new sovereign surrounded himself with British advisers and borrowed for his court many of the customs of Buckingham Palace. Hawaiians had, in fact, long nourished a strangely close kinship with England. In 1794 the first Kamehameha had signed a paper for Vancouver, the great English explorer, which virtually turned over his kingdom to Britain. Because it was known the native monarch could not read, the cession was never formally recognized. There were many chiefs, however, who for long regarded themselves as subjects of England's King George. When the Hawaiian flag, still flown with the Stars and Stripes, was designed, it included in one corner a replica of the Union Jack.

After Kamehameha IV, the missionaries took over where they had left off. Besides serving as governmental advisers, many of them now turned to secular pursuits; the American Mission Board had hinted that the mission field was overcrowded. In all, sixty-one men and sixty-seven women had arrived in the fourteen missionary groups, although up to 1842 the adult total never exceeded eighty. But some measure of their productivity may be gained from the fact that in 1849 the thirty-five resident missionaries and their

wives had a total of one hundred and thirty-four children.

One of the most successful early businesses in the Islands was started one day in 1851 when Amos Starr Cooke, a mission teacher from Connecticut, resigned from the mission to begin a wholesale and retail partnership with Samuel N. Castle, another former missionary. As Hawaii prospered, so did their modest partnership. Today the firm of Castle & Cooke, Ltd., is the Territory's most prosperous and influential business.

Other missionaries resigned to do nearly as well. The opportunities were limitless. When their business ventures were going well to provide a surplus of profits there was no better investment than land. Up to 1848, most of the land acquired by the missionaries was that donated by the kingdom for mission purposes; but in that year the way was cleared—no one can say with deliberate purpose—for white men to “buy in.” Relying on a plan worked out by Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, a former missionary who by then was the kingdom's Minister of the Interior, Kamehameha III announced the Great Mahele, or division of the lands. One third of the kingdom was reserved for the king and government, another third was granted to the chiefs and the remaining third went to the Hawaiian people.

Even before “The Great Mahele,” this Dr. Judd had been roundly scolded by the home office of the Board of Missions which in April 1846 sent a letter to the Honolulu mission reading, in part:

“We have from the beginning lamented that Dr. Judd suffered himself to go into government—a step which he will much regret, should he live a few years.”

The Hawaiians, for whom land values had little meaning because of the traditional custom of living off the king's property, now had their own parcels, in fee simple. Furthermore, the "Great Mahele" provided that after 1850 "foreigners," or non-natives, could acquire land in fee simple. Hawaii was getting set for a real land rush of her own.

Some of the business-venturing missionaries had early become interested in the production of sugar, and the prospect of land was an interesting one. So when thousands of fertile acres became available—and cheap, too—they joined the rush. Several sugar plantations had their origin in that year of opportunism. Today many big landholders in Hawaii are sensitive about the origin of how they acquired their holdings. A few years ago one missionary scion went to the extent of subsidizing research and publication of a book—which it was hoped would be accepted as popular non-fiction—that defended the manner in which his forebears obtained their land.

What may have been a commentary upon the tactics of the Hawaiian missionaries came soon after. In 1853, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions announced that the Hawaiian Mission would no longer represent the Board but would henceforth operate independently. Enemies in the Islands interpreted this to mean that the parent organization was washing its hands of the Hawaiian group. They claimed the Board was thoroughly embarrassed by the more worldly aspects of the success attained by its men in this field. The missionaries themselves pointed to their divorce from the parent board as evidence only that the Islands had been christianized well enough to take care of themselves. Whatever the sentiment

behind the action, the American Board knew that the process of Hawaii's conversion had been an expensive one. The accounts showed that up to that time it had expended \$608,865 in bringing the Gospel to the Sandwich Isles.

By 1860, there seemed little doubt that Hawaii's future lay in large scale production of sugar. For several decades whalers had been stopped in Honolulu between seasons in the Arctic and the Antarctic. They provided the lifeblood of island commerce. During the Civil War years, however, a roaming Confederate cruiser, the *Shenandoah*, wiped out scores of Yankee whalers. A few years later, most of the rest of the fleet was lost in the Arctic ice disasters.

Fortune smiled more favorably on sugar and by the close of the war, production had mounted to more than a thousand tons a year. The United States bought this sugar and now, at the behest of the planters, Hawaii began to make overtures for a treaty of reciprocity.

America was not much interested until 1870. In that year, however, when the Hawaiian planters began to ship their sugar southward to Australia, Washington began to take notice. When King Kalakaua arrived in the United States capital in 1875 and argued personally in Congress for the treaty, the arrangements were made. Mainly, the treaty allowed for exchange of produce free of duties. Part of the agreement, signed in 1876, provided that Pearl Harbor was to be reserved as a coaling station exclusively for the United States Navy.

The biggest snag struck by Hawaii's sugar pioneers was the problem of labor. In their search for cheap manpower they scoured the world. First they brought in Chinese

coolies from Hongkong; that was in 1852. Next favored was a group of Gilbert Island natives, rounded up by "blackbirders" whose methods of recruiting were, to put it charitably, open to question. In fact, the British government did question rather sharply Hawaii's use of their black subjects and, partially as a result of their investigation and partially because the natives were pretty useless anyway, they were returned to their own islands.

The planters turned again to Chinese; then in the half century which followed they brought in successive waves of Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos and Japanese. The Japanese, who came with the blessing of their Imperial government, proved most satisfactory as sugar laborers. So, until United States annexation when the planters were to be hampered by the federal law against importation of contract laborers, they lured Japanese by the thousands. By 1893 there were 22,000 Japanese in Hawaii. In the next seven years 50,000 more arrived, the biggest batch 26,000 being hurried in in 1899 just before adoption of the new Territory's Organic Act put up the bars against further importation of labor.

With these waves of plantation immigrants the base of Hawaii's feudal system of society was built up. The process gave to Hawaii a name by which it came to be known throughout the world.—*The melting pot of the Pacific*. There was a democratic ring to it, that pleased the sugar planters.

As the sugar industry pushed ahead, something else new was introduced into the economic scheme of things. In Honolulu two or three new firms began business solely to handle the affairs of the scattered plantations. They began by acting as selling agents for the planters. Gradually they

took over other functions: financing crops, importing labor, purchasing machinery for the planters and serving in all ways as their business agents. The new businesses soon found themselves running the sugar industry.

Five of these concerns, called factors, eventually dominated the field. All but one, an English firm, were owned by Americans. By the eighties the Big Five had acquired control of many of the plantations. They branched out into other businesses. To squeeze additional profits out of the sugar trade, they started their own refinery in California; it was to become the largest in the world. They built up a fleet of ships, the Matson line, to carry the sugar away and to bring back goods and passengers. They developed inter-island shipping, built hotels, put capital into insurance, cattle, pineapples, banking. They took over bodily the wholesaling of goods coming into the Islands; ninety percent of retail stock came from their warehouses. Their capital started the public utilities. Their street railway transported Hawaiians, their gas and electric plants lighted the city, they acquired the communications systems. The Big Five became the core of Hawaii's expanding feudal system.

The men who began the factors (two of them were founded by missionary families) were also busy, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, shoving the Hawaiian ship of state around in its uneasy political waters. By 1881 there was little doubt that the United States was very interested in the future of these mid-Pacific islands. That year Secretary of State Blaine said that Hawaii was of such importance to United States safety that no other nation could be allowed to have her.

But it was with the running of the kingdom itself that

the self-appointed guardians of Hawaii were having trouble. The cause was King Kalakaua, a pleasure-loving, power-seeking monarch with a mind, however erratic, of his own. Kalakaua, who had won the treaty of reciprocity for the planters, didn't like to have these same planters interfering in his way of running the kingdom. A dozen times during his madcap reign, he tried to throw them overboard. He never quite succeeded.

The American missionary families had little *aloha* for Kalakaua. In their mission paper they once printed what few of the king's subjects would have dared to breathe: that the portly monarch sprang from noble stock only upon his mother's side, that his real father was not the man who gave him his name but a well-known and interloping character around town called John Blossom, a negro blacksmith. Nevertheless these missionary families were willing to help him to the throne in 1875—largely because his opponent, Queen Emma, widow of Kamehameha V, was avowedly pro-British. She had gone to England, had sponsored establishment of the Anglican Church in the kingdom, and might well have turned the Islands over to the British crown. That would have been fatal to the budding sugar trade.

A favorite of the native Hawaiians, Emma was narrowly defeated by Kalakaua in an election that hit an all-time high in political skullduggery. After the election, enraged Hawaiian subjects demonstrated their feelings toward their new sovereign by staging a riot, during which the legislators who elected him were seriously mauled. Kalakaua was enthroned the following day under protection of a company of American troops.

The new king went almost immediately to Washington

on his reciprocity errand, to pay off his debt to the group which helped him in. From then on, however, he gave his erstwhile supporters some uneasy years.

After his return he saddled himself with a pair of flighty adventurers as his counselors—one a discredited Mormon missionary, the other an Italian lobbyist well known in Washington and California.

Kalakaua first plunged a dagger into the planters' hearts in 1878 when—though he had to fire his cabinet to do it—he signed a deed giving choice water privileges on the island of Maui to Colonel Claus Spreckels, the California sugar king and a fiery rival of the local planters. Spreckels had secretly bought up, for almost nothing, thousands of acres of dry plains on Maui. With the water Kalakaua gave him, Spreckels developed his plains into one of Hawaii's most fertile sugar areas.

With his two hare-brained advisers, Kalakaua then sought to push through his legislature a bill for a \$1,000,000 loan.

They asked him what it was for.

"For military purposes," he answered. He would not elaborate. But everyone around the Palace knew the king had long dreamed of having his own private army. The bill was killed. Also killed was a bill giving Kalakaua power to award licenses for opium sales in the kingdom. Another one defeated would have loaned Moreno, his Italian adviser, a million dollars for laying a trans-Pacific cable. In the squabble over these bills the legislature forced the ousting of Kalakaua's cabinet. The new members drove his two counselors out of the Islands.

Partially to recover from these disappointments, Kalakaua decided on a tour of the world in 1880. His cabinet saw that two of their members went along to keep him out

of trouble. They were William N. Armstrong and Col. C. H. Judd, both of prominent missionary families.

In London, Kalakaua became the lion of the Buckingham Palace set, the royal family holding a series of receptions and military reviews in his honor. Throughout Europe and Asia he was accorded honors reserved for crowned heads of the great nations. The whole tour was a succession of alternate social triumphs and embarrassing escapades. In Japan the king's two guardians almost let their charge get out of hand. They discovered one night that Kalakaua had made a secret visit to the Imperial Palace, without benefit of their chaperonage.

Upon his return later in the evening, the king blandly announced that he had been discussing with the Emperor a plan for a matrimonial alliance which would unite the thrones of Hawaii and Japan.

"You discussed what?" his incredulous ministers demanded.

"I proposed," the king explained calmly, "a marriage between one of the imperial princes and my niece, Princess Kaiulani."

Thunderstruck, Judd and Armstrong had a quick horrible vision of how this would be received back home in Hawaii, where plans were already under way for applying for annexation to the United States. Their anxiety was relieved next day, however, when the Emperor's chamberlain told them privately that the Empire could not seriously consider Kalakaua's plan.

A finale to the episode was written some months later when the Imperial chamberlain arrived in Hawaii on a secret mission. He bore a letter from the Emperor respectfully declining Kalakaua's proposition.

“Japan could not aid in any scheme which impaired the sphere of American influence over Hawaii,” the note said tactfully.

Home again in 1881, Kalakaua, impressed by what he had seen abroad, began to plan an empire in the Pacific. While his advisers chafed, he had a sailing ship outfitted as a man-of-war and then dispatched her to Samoa and other island kingdoms to enlist them into his projected empire. In Samoa his emissaries and crew went ashore for a program of riotous marathon drinking. The native king complained. The United States, the German and the British governments, becoming alarmed that the status quo in the Pacific might be upset, hurried warships to the scene. Eventually the Hawaiian ship and her befuddled crew staggered home in disgrace.

The succession of royal escapades was very vexing to sugar interests and they decided to take Kalakaua in hand. In 1887 the time seemed opportune. The king was caught red-handed trading off to a Chinese the right to sell opium throughout the kingdom. His price was \$74,000 which he needed to pay off some gambling debts. Kalakaua might have got away with it, but he greedily tried to sell the franchise at the same price to still another Chinese. When the Chinese found they had been duped, they protested to the cabinet.

The ministers, all white men, now had Kalakaua where they wanted him. Threatening exposure, they demanded that he sign a new constitution which would virtually strip him of sovereign powers. The king, broken in spirit, signed after a not too lusty struggle. From then on, he steadily declined and a few years later, in 1891, died in San Francisco during a trip for his health.

Kalakaua was succeeded by his sister, Liliuokalani. Almost immediately the strong-willed queen set to work to throw off some of the influence of her white ministerial advisers. She wanted a new constitution and busied herself rounding up political support to get it.

"Why, she's more irresponsible than her brother," the worried sugar men told themselves.

For two stormy years they battled constantly with the queen. No political intrigue was too low for either side to employ. Then the missionary-industrialists decided they would have to take stern action. After a series of secret meetings a Committee of Public Safety was formed—its members inevitably drawn from the inner circle—and plans were begun for a new form of government. On January 14, 1893, the committee called out the citizens' militia, took over control of public buildings, and declared monarchical rule was done in Hawaii.

The provisional government that was formed wasted no time in petitioning Washington for United States annexation. President Harrison had already declared himself in support of the move but, before action could be taken, President Cleveland succeeded him. The latter refused to recognize the overthrow of the monarchy. The sugar leaders now named as head of their provisional government, Sanford B. Dole. They gave him the title of President of the Republic of Hawaii.

The infant republic survived a weak attempt at insurrection in January, 1895. Fighting was confined to skirmishes in the hills. A few men on both sides were killed before the rebel leaders, who would not admit they had been recruited by the deposed queen, were captured and placed under arrest. (The ringleader was soon released and sub-

sequently was elected a member of the first Territorial Legislature.) Leaders of the republican government had Liliuokalani arrested as instigator of the rebellion and imprisoned her in her palace. She was fined \$5,000 and sentenced to five years of hard labor, although the sentence was never carried out.

While Hawaii was enacting this bit of *opera bouffe* to the entertainment of a chuckling audience in the United States, something happened which brought a note of seriousness into the play. America and Spain went to war.

As United States troops began to embark for the Philippines, plans were hastily prepared for the annexation of Hawaii. In June, 1898, President McKinley sent the papers to the Senate which, after some little debate, ratified the treaty. A month later the American flag was raised over Iolani Palace in Honolulu. Nearly two years elapsed, however, before Congress passed the Hawaii Organic Act, which established the Islands as a Territory of the United States. The act, basic law of the new Territory, provided for a bicameral legislature and for other governmental functions much like those of a state.

The Territory lacked, however, the privileges of a full-fledged state. Hawaii could vote, but not for the president of the United States, nor for her own governor, who was appointed by the president. She had no voting power in Congress, either. A delegate to Congress could be chosen during the territorial elections, but he went to Washington without a vote on the floor of either house. He was privileged only to sit on Congressional committees, to introduce bills and to speak before either House. His role in Washington was little more than that of observer and authorized lobbyist.

But annexation was undoubtedly what Hawaii's real rulers wanted. No matter the shape and texture of the machinery of government, they were confident they could fit their own political-economic necessities into its framework—or vice versa.

The names of each form—monarch, provisional government, republic, territory—were principally identification tags for a system which could be moulded into suitable shape for their needs. Sugar, after all, was king. The society it supported was still essentially feudal.

3

THE BIG FIVE IN 1941

"As has been emphasized again and again, the primary function of our plantations is not to produce sugar but to pay dividends."

—Richard A. Cooke, Annual HSPA Meeting, 1929

The year 1941 was to be for Hawaii—to use the tidy phrase reserved for historians—the end of a golden era. But certainly there were few surface indications in the early, vibrant months of that year that anything at all was ailing the tight structure which sugar had reared.

Least of all was it apparent in the breezy commercial life of Honolulu's downtown in 1941. Men stopped at the corner of Fort and Merchant Streets—men in cool linen suits and wearing wide Panamas with Hawaiian-made feather hatbands—to chat reservedly of the times.

"See you're getting in on some of those fat contracts out at the Navy Yard, old man."

"Nice the way sugar's been holding up. At these prices we can afford a little more war. Over in Europe, of course."

"And have you noticed what it's done for our tourist business?"

Great trucks lumbered by them from the nearby piers. In the stores lining the street, harried clerks found it impossible to keep up with the trade. The narrow sidewalks were crowded, an increasingly large proportion of the

passersby were men in uniform. There was a restless clatter about the downtown scene.

Honolulu's business life was concentrated in these few blocks which ramped the city's waterfront. And around one of those blocks—the one beginning near the base of Aloha Tower, which reached up finger-like from the waterfront—five stolid stone buildings stood shoulder above the rest. They were within shadow reach of each other, two of them inside the one block, the others facing it from three sides; there was seated the power that governed every detail of the Territory's commerce.

At the directors' tables in these five buildings sat the handful of men who governed a feudal, island empire. They numbered about a dozen. The names of the Big Five, chipped in stone, on the buildings, are: Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., American Factors Ltd., Castle & Cooke, Ltd., C. Brewer & Company, Ltd., and Theo. H. Davies Company, Ltd.

Some years ago an anonymous critic, aware of their growing dominance, gave the Big Five their name. Within the quintet of companies the term was frowned upon from the beginning, so for some years the words were spoken in whispers—at least within earshot of the five buildings. By 1941 they were beginning to be shouted from housetops.

Castle & Cooke, Ltd., was the modern descendant of the little trading firm that was started in 1851 by the two missionaries, S. N. Castle and Amos Starr Cooke. In ninety years it had progressed through many cycles of island business to find itself, in 1941, the dominant member of the group. It had early entered into the sugar business as a factor for several plantations. Gradually it bought and finally controlled several of the plantations. So profitably

had it handled the insurance needs of the plantations, and the thousands of workers connected with them, that some years ago it sloughed off this activity as a separate, independent business. Hawaii's largest insurance firm was thus a Castle & Cooke subsidiary. It was Castle & Cooke that caught up the several shipping services in and out of Hawaii and incorporated them into the Matson Line which, by 1941, held indisputable control of nearly every ton of cargo coming in or out of the Islands. Castle & Cooke sponsored Hawaii's highly promoted tourist business and made it the Islands' third ranking industry. In 1932 Castle & Cooke money bought up much of Hawaii's pineapple industry; by 1941 that was a \$50,000,000 a year enterprise. Castle & Cooke capital went into most of the other investments that the Big Five made in every segment of island commercial life.

In 1941 the "take" from this enormous investment was still going largely to the descendants of the two original missionary tycoons. Inheritance and inter-marriage had kept the bulk of the income well within the two families. Only by an occasional "outside" marriage, or the rewarding of a few Castle & Cooke executives who through the years had helped build the company structure up, had there been any appreciable thinning out of the returns. Direct descendants not only shared the income but they took their many places in executive positions and saw to the actual operation of the corporate machinery which poured out the plentiful dividends. More than that, it was much this same tight circle which by 1941, as will be shown, was actually running three of the other four ruling companies.

The second member of the Big Five was a firm which began earlier, in 1826, when Captain James Hunnewell, a

shrewd Yankee skipper, came out of Boston as master of one of the missionary ships. After landing the missionaries, Hunnewell stopped over in the whaling port of Honolulu to start a general merchandise and hardware business. In 1836 his thriving business was bought by Captain Charles Brewer from whom it derived its name, C. Brewer & Company, Ltd. This firm, too, began to serve as agent for the sugar planters and as the industry prospered it devoted itself more and more to this business. In 1941 it was the only member of the Big Five dealing exclusively in sugar. It had become an \$8,000,000 agency and it was owned by the dominant Big Five group, Captain Brewer having sold most of his interest in the middle of the last century.

Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., the third of the Big Five, was another direct product of missionary endeavor. It was started by Samuel T. Alexander and Henry P. Baldwin, sons of missionary elders who began planting cane as an extra-curricular activity while preaching on the island of Maui. The two ministers' sons confined themselves to a partnership in sugar production until 1900 when they incorporated with a capital of \$1,500,000. The other two incorporators were J. P. Cooke and James B. Castle, sons of the Castle & Cooke founders. It was the same way in which the pattern of Big Five ownership had for long been taking shape. It was this group which led the movement to establish a California refinery for Hawaiian sugar, a project that was realized in 1906 when they pooled \$5,000,000 and established the California & Hawaiian Sugar Refinery Co., Ltd. at Crockett, California. It soon became the largest sugar refinery in the world.

The fourth Big Five member, American Factors, Ltd., had its beginning with the arrival of Captain Henry Hack-

feld, a bluff German capitalist-trader. In 1849 Hackfeld began a mercantile business but, like other merchants of the time, he saw the possibilities offered by the sugar trade.

“Why shouldn’t *my* firm act as agent for some of these growing plantations?”

Hackfeld answered his own question by coming to terms with several of the sugar planters. By 1879 H. Hackfeld & Co. was financing eighteen sugar plantations. Much of his investment came from Germany. The firm specialized, too, in importing and gradually became the largest general wholesale house in the Islands. With German money, it also established Honolulu’s largest department store—indeed, the city’s only large department store.

This was severe competition—particularly as profits were going so far overseas—and it was regarded by the entrenched interests with a somewhat jaundiced eye. A bolt strictly out of the blue found the awkward situation ending quite happily, however, for the more deeply-rooted island industrialists. In 1917 America entered the World War against Germany and the Alien Property Custodian effected a quick seizure of the immense Hackfeld interests. During the war and after, a complicated legal struggle raged over disposition of the Hackfeld assets. When the smoke cleared, two thriving new companies had supplanted the late H. Hackfeld firms. Grateful patriotism undoubtedly inspired the names of the new firms. One was American Factors, Ltd., sugar and insurance factors and general wholesalers. The other was The Liberty House department store. A list of the new owners showed virtually the same names as dominated other Big Five interests.

Last of the Big Five was Theo. H. Davies Co., Ltd. This British-owned firm was founded upon a merchandise busi-

ness started in Honolulu in 1845 by the representative of a Liverpool trading concern. The man who gave it its name was one Theophilus H. Davies who, during two periods of residence in the Islands, laid the groundwork for the firm's success. Besides representing and partially owning several plantations and serving as shipping and insurance agents, the Davies firm carried on a respectable wholesale merchandise and hardware business. All its stock was British owned, but the company survived by working hand in hand with other strong interests in the Islands, particularly in the sugar trade.

These were the five companies which, in 1941, almost unqualifiedly controlled Hawaii's flow of commerce. For that year it amounted to \$238,217,506. They took their percentage not only coming and going—out of the \$47,266,417 in sugar and the \$45,899,359 in pineapples that was sent to Mainland ports, and out of the \$127,439,539 in goods coming back—but in the thousand and one comings and goings in between. That is, by ownership of the many agencies in the Islands, the utilities, the rental properties, and the amusement places through which the money was over and over again spent.

How effectively the Big Five could band together as one against outside forces—whether the enemy was foreign capital, insects, labor, competing products or disease—was well demonstrated by their Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, more familiarly known as the HSPA. This group organization for Hawaii's sugar industry was founded in 1882 as the Planters' Labor and Supply Company when the planters found they had common problems in irrigating the sugar lands, growing the cane, and finding labor. That

was its immediate official purpose. But it took only another step to bring the same group into other provinces where they could thrash out common problems. Politics, for example. They soon found that the pooling of their resources gave them influence in almost any sphere of island life.

Thus, in 1882, formed the nucleus for control by the few. Since its founding, a roll call of the association's directors in any year would have shown the names of the men who really ruled Hawaii. It was their decisions that wrote the history of the Islands.

"Anything can happen to island business, to our sugar, with a madcap king on the throne," they discovered. "Kalakaua must be controlled." So they drew up the terms of Hawaii's Bayonet Constitution.

"Queen Liliuokalani will ruin us all. She'll have to step down." Monarchy was ruled out and island republic born.

"With annexation we wouldn't need any reciprocity treaty." So Hawaii became a territory, an integral part of the United States.

And in the half century since, a considerable portion of the legislation passed and action taken by the Territory's government was inspired by decisions made at the business meetings of the HSPA.

In recent years the HSPA, which had brought plantation labor into the Islands, was much concerned with keeping that labor in line. In 1920, for example, when sugar workers on plantations on the island of Kauai struck, the Kauai plantations lost thousands upon thousands of dollars before it was able to break the strike which, finally, it did. It was revealed later that it was not just the Kauai plantations paying the anti-strike expenses. Every plantation member

of the HSPA had been assessed a portion of the expenses, for this was a threat to all of them. In the next Territorial Legislature after this disagreeable experience with labor, a law was passed which forbade picketing, a measure which subsequently became an effective weapon against the threat of strikes.

The HSPA made no pretense of being anything but a means of making as much money as it was possible to make out of sugar. Planters themselves were reminded of this at the annual meeting in 1929, in the words of their president, Richard A. Cooke. In his annual report Mr. Cooke, also president of C. Brewer and Co. said:

“As has been emphasized again and again, the primary function of our plantations is not to produce sugar, but to pay dividends.”

Fundamentally, the HSPA's work was in the field of science, carried on chiefly by its experimental station which was granted an annual budget of \$500,000. And, indeed, the association performed practical miracles in the way of developing breeds of cane, in combatting insect pests, in perfecting labor-saving devices, and in marketing their produce.

A dramatic example of the station's work was the conquest of the sugar cane borer, which some years ago threatened to wipe out the industry. For years HSPA scientists scoured the wilds of South America, Australia and Malaya to find a parasite that would be fatal to the borer and harmless to the cane. And after it had been found it took four years to transport the parasite and land it alive in Hawaii; but in a few years more, when it had sufficiently multiplied, it was able to bring the cane borer under control.

Just as practically the HSPA performed other chores for island planters. A well-staffed office was maintained in

Washington where one of the most capable sugar executives had a year-round job as lobbyist, working closely with the delegates the territory sent to the capital.

The effectiveness of Hawaii's sugar lobby has moved many islanders to ask themselves a question. "Which is our real representative in Washington—the one the HSPA appoints, or the one we elect every two years by popular vote?"

The more cynical told themselves it was a toss-up. In each case, they said, the man was more or less hand-picked by the HSPA.

In 1941 the HSPA was throwing the bulk of its political efforts into the campaign to obtain statehood for Hawaii. For the Islands were beginning to go into another cycle which to sugar men seemed to indicate a need for some kind of governmental change. The increasing productivity of beet sugar and cane plantations on the Mainland was beginning to show results in legislation passed by Congress. It favored the growing Mainland industries, and of course the Hawaiian planters felt such legislation was highly discriminatory. The most—indeed, the only—effective way of fighting such discrimination would be with congressional votes. Statehood, which would put two senators and at least one representative in Congress, seemed to be the solution. The HSPA put into the statehood campaign the same thoroughness, patience, and zeal which had conquered the cane borer.

Only the year before, they had learned by bitter experience how futile for their cause was anything short of congressional votes in hand. In 1940 they had appealed to Mainland business associates for help in Hawaii's fight against discrimination. Lists had been made of the firms

which profited by Hawaii's huge annual imports. To these firms form letters were sent, reminding them of the considerable business the Islands gave them.

"It would certainly be helpful to us and certainly beneficial to your business here if you would write or contact the congressmen of your area and the senators of your state. . . . Suggest to them that their constituents have an interest in equal treatment for these islands."

There was no threat of switching island business over to other firms. The theme of the letters was, rather, that Mainland firms would suffer in proportion as island buying power was reduced by lower sugar profits. The campaign didn't seem to take hold, however, and nothing much came of it.

The Big Five, in surveying its economic realm as of 1941, could reflect with particular satisfaction upon its sure grasp on Hawaii's second ranking industry—the \$50,000,000 pineapple trade. A backward glance at the growth of the trade will indicate the manner in which the Big Five added this enterprise to its domain.

It was not until the turn of the century that pineapples were even worthy of the attention of men who were building their fortunes in sugar. The first large scale production of the fruit had been started by a Captain John Kidwell who exported 14,000 cases from 1892 to 1899. Attracted by this scale of business, the five factors began to invest money in small pineapple plantations on the various islands. One thing that appealed to them was the comparatively little capital needed for the production of pines. Pineapple plantations, for instance, required none of the extensive water resources necessary for sugar. In recent years, even when

the crop value of pineapples had nearly caught up with that of sugar, the capital investment in pineapples was only \$25,000,000, compared to sugar's \$175,000,000.

James D. Dole, a newcomer in the Islands, breathed life into the pineapple business after 1900. He saw that the industry had barely scratched the surface of its possibilities.

"What you need is promotion," he told the pineapple pioneers. "Pineapples have to be advertised and your canneries ought to be speeded up."

He showed them how to do it, and in a very short time Mr. Dole was a dominant figure in the industry. His name became a household word in the many parts of the world where canned pineapples were shipped.

One of his slogans was particularly successful. "Look for Dole on the Can." However, it lived to plague Dole's party-loving sons when in later years American slang provided a new connotation for the word "can."

By 1910, largely as a result of Dole's enterprise, there were 5,300 acres under pineapple cultivation, and 7,800 employees at work on the pineapple plantation. In 1940 there were 78,000 acres, 35,000 employees, and the crop was worth \$50,522,533. But the expansion had not come without some violent growing pains. They were particularly painful for Mr. Dole.

In 1930 the pineapple industry was hit by double disaster when the world-wide depression caught the plantations with an over-supply of fruit, nearly enough already in inventory to take care of the next year's needs. Dole's firm, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, was ready to go under if funds in plenty were not advanced. The two other large packing concerns, Libby, McNeill and Libby and the California Packing Company, were kept afloat when these

two Mainland interests poured fresh capital into the business. Hawaiian Pine found its "savior," in the Big Five. Castle & Cooke capital tided the struggling firm over. But when the crisis was past, it was apparent that a considerable change had taken place in the picture of stock ownership. Dole found he had become a very minor shareholder in the industry he had brought up so well from its infancy. Castle & Cooke was now in control of the stock. From 1932 on, Hawaiian Pine was strictly a Big Five business.

With traditional thoroughness, the Big Five set about to protect its stake in the pineapple trade. That same year the well-trained Hawaiian legislature passed a very special law which allowed for the incorporation of co-operative associations. The law made it legal to set up "co-operatives to protect, control and stabilize the marketing of agricultural product, . . . prevent inefficient and wasteful methods of distribution, . . . prevent surpluses in excess of requirements and avoid undue and excessive fluctuations or depressions in prices therefor . . ."

This paved the way for formation of the Pineapple Producers Co-Operative Association. Here was something patterned after the HSPA, but something which had infinitely finer possibilities for monopoly than the sugar pool. The six island companies (besides the two Mainland packers and Hawaiian Pine there were three smaller firms controlled by Alexander & Baldwin and American Factors) virtually monopolized the world pineapple trade. The HSPA, though all-powerful in Hawaii, was a relatively puny creature against the lusty competition of world sugar markets.

The new pineapple co-operative members lost little time in adjusting their business to the pleasant boundaries of the custom-built law. In 1932, and each year thereafter, they

decided in advance just what the annual pack of canned fruit would be. Each member company was assigned its share of that agreed-upon total. This was not exactly monopoly price fixing, but even if someone were to press such a charge, members could point to that section of their 1932 Territorial law which read: "such co-operatives shall be deemed not to be a conspiracy nor a combination in restraint of trade nor illegal monopoly; nor an attempt to lessen competition or to fix prices arbitrarily to create a combination or monopoly."

It was not strange that the pineapple industry, favored by gifts like that, was blossoming so well in 1941.

In that year the twin industries, sugar and pines, could look upon the character and composition of life in Hawaii and say, were they disposed to use so dramatic a phrase: "All this, we have wrought."

Looking further upon the nature of the Islands' social makeup—the incredible melting pot which resulted from their frantic search for cheap labor—they might well have reflected with uneasiness upon this that they had wrought. In 1941 Hawaii's population was sociologically a varicolored human pyramid which reached upwards to a tiny group of white families at the top. The broad base of the feudal social structure was made up of 323,712 Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino and Puerto Rican immigrants and their descendants. Tragically enough, the mass also included the pitiful remnant of the Islands' Polynesian race, 14,246 pure Hawaiians. In between were 141,627 Caucasians. But 60,000 of these were men of the armed forces, and thousands more were Portuguese plantation immigrants and their descendants whose economic status was little higher than that of the imported Orientals. So it will be seen that

the total of white men who could be regarded as a white-collar middle class was something in the very few thousands.

By the 1930's it was evident that island planters had not been thinking of the social—much less the military—consequences when they continued to import more and more thousands of laborers. They did not seem aware that their system of filling labor needs had been something like trying to fill a bottomless bag. Ever since 1900 when incorporation of Hawaii as a Territory had nullified penal labor contracts, thousands of laborers had begun to drift from the plantations. It seemed that laborers brought in went through a process of acclimatization on the plantations, then moved on to the more fruitful, or at least more comfortable, sphere of urban or independent agricultural work. Perhaps the planters thought, when they dwelt upon the problem at all, that laborers would return to their homelands when they left the plantations. It was rarely that they did.

Nevertheless, by the 1930's there was no doubt that a limit to the expansion of sugar production had been reached. World over-production, then the introduction of quota systems brought sharply to the attention of short-sighted sugar industrialists that perhaps they didn't need more labor, that maybe they already had enough. The advances their technologists had been making in the field of labor-saving devices only heightened the problem. Plantations began to turn away labor.

But the sugar technologists could not solve the social problem bred by their masters. By the middle of the thirties unemployment, even the threat of starvation was beginning to pile an exasperatingly heavy load upon the paternalistic, private system of charity sponsored by the sugar and pineapple profits.

By 1937 the sugar leaders saw what looked like the solution. The New Deal's Social Security program was then claiming considerable attention.

"Why not switch this relief load from our local private charities," they asked themselves, "to the federal government's national welfare program? Uncle Sam can easily take care of this out of United States taxes."

It sounded like a capital idea and executives of the private charity agencies jumped to the task of framing a bill setting up a Territorial Social Security System. With Big Five support behind it, the formality of passing the bill was soon over with, and within a year the new Department of Welfare was cheerily handling island relief problems. The public relief budget soared to a million dollars a year. This left as the immediate responsibility of the sugar planters in 1941 only the 40,000 laborers, mostly Japanese and Filipinos, who remained on their plantations. Social Security and Hawaii of the future would take care of the other 300,000 progeny whom sugar had bequeathed. Luckily, the need for labor on the great new island defense projects was temporarily solving the relief and unemployment problems that social security could not meet.

But in any event, the men who dealt in sugar and pines were busy in 1941 with their other interests. One of these was shipping. Great cargoes of defense materials waited on West Coast docks for space to the Islands; they competed so successfully against the normal shipments that Honolulu merchants started agitation for a system of priorities. But the Big Five was mad at nobody. They made money, no matter what was shipped.

Although the United States Maritime Commission had begun to nose around, the Big Five still held a vise-like grip

on all trade that touched the Islands. It was more than a figure of speech to say that the Matson Navigation Co., Ltd., a Big Five enterprise, got its cut out of every passenger and ton of goods entering or leaving Hawaii. Big Five tactics had seen to this.

By 1929 the Matson Line had cornered all shipping touching Hawaii except what business the struggling Dollar Line did at the port as part of its transpacific and around-the-world runs. What Matson did not like was the bargain rates Dollar charged for both cargo and passengers. Matson decided to lop off this trade by throwing a scare into Dollar. The line put two ships up against Dollar's transpacific trade, at a heavy but anticipated loss. It had the desired effect. The Matson ships had operated on the new run only long enough to drop \$164,000 before Dollar was ready to call it quits. If Matson would keep out of the transpacific trade, Dollar would be willing to lift its prices on Honolulu traffic up to the Matson level. When the agreement was finally signed, the Dollar Line had also agreed that out of every dollar of gross income on its Mainland-Hawaii business—freight or passenger—it would turn over to the Matson Line fifty cents.

Even when the Matson Line in 1930 discontinued third class passenger rates to confine itself to the better-paying first and second class business and Dollar ships took over the traffic, Matson got half the price of every third-class ticket sold by Dollar. The Dollar Line even had to split fifty-fifty on freight shipments Matson turned over when it was too busy.

By 1941 the Matson Line had a fleet of 43 ships, including four sleek luxury liners, and had upped the tourist trade to Hawaii's third ranking business. Here, in this \$12,000,000

a year trade was the Big Five's giddiest money-making enterprise.

It had its really serious beginning in 1927 when the Matson Line decided to go into the tourist business on a big scale. That year the line donated most of the \$2,000,000 necessary to build the sprawling pink stucco Royal Hawaiian Hotel. The hotel described by some as the world's finest resort, by others as an architectural monstrosity, was set on the edge of Waikiki Beach. With this as its largest prop, the Big Five set about dressing up the other trimmings which would help lure visitors to their enchanted islands. With the Hawaii Tourist Bureau and later the Pan-Pacific Press Bureau as high pressure publicity mills grinding out the lyrics, the tourist interests joined in singing seductive songs of the Islands. The theme of their advertising campaign was early Polynesian. Modern Hawaii was painted as a palm-shaded Eden peopled only by soft-skinned hula maidens and by bronzed native men who were perpetually either riding in from the sea on surf-boards or standing poised with fish nets along its shore. In 1941 the tourist bureau placed \$125,000 worth of magazine advertising featuring pictures such as these.

The reception of the incoming tourists was highly organized. They were met at the dock by a staff of hula girls—they grow more and more like theatre ushers—who adorned them with flower *leis*. Then they were whisked through busy, downtown Honolulu and dropped among the palms of the Royal Hawaiian's little tropical settlement at Waikiki. There every care was taken to keep the tropic illusion intact. There was the beach outside, edged by a thinning line of despairing coco palms, and the famed surf upon which they could ride on native canoe or board with

beach boy escorts at \$2.50 per three waves. There was dancing under the stars, with entertainment by hula girls in special cellophane skirts. There were even *luaus*, native feasts, where the visitors—with appropriate shudders—could sample raw fish, cooked octopus tentacles and paste-like *poi*, native delicacies which most Hawaiians long ago began to eschew in favor of medium-rare steaks, ice cream and whole wheat bread. And the visitors could take home proof of all these primitive, Polynesian experiences, as a special service, for the island branch of Eastman-Kodak provided an agile group of coconut tree climbers, hula dancers, and net fishermen, all properly costumed. This service was arranged once a week, the day after the Matson boat arrived.

The seat of much of Hawaii's synthetic tropic glamour was at Lalani Village, an area much resembling a set for one of Hollywood's immortal classics of the South Sea. Two blocks away from the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, the "village" included a couple of bedraggled grass huts, a tent for native feasts, and a pile of rocks with red lights underneath, made up to resemble an active volcano. The volcano, which reminded one of nothing so much as a pile of those fake fireplace logs, was tricked up to spew fire like a Roman candle. This show of fireworks usually featured the hula "Dance of the Fire Gods" which climaxed the village's nightly side-show for tourists.

Illustrated posters outside the village added a commercial touch to the Polynesian themes the Pan-Pacific Press had promoted—

"Sing the ancient chants of old Hawaii." . . .

"Enjoy a native *luau*. Admission: \$2.50." . . .

"Learn to dance the hula. Three dollars a lesson." . . .

Almost any promoter less dogged would have been dis-

couraged at the task of trying to keep alive the illusion of simple native life on the one hand and the picture of a progressive American community that they were sponsoring for statehood purposes, on the other. But the Big Five, measuring such things by the yardstick of income, was content. The tourist business was doing nicely, with its annual gross of \$12,000,000. The statehood drive just needed a little time.

Of all their interests, the Big Five perhaps had the least trouble with the public utilities. In a field like that there is no competition for the early birds, and the Big Five were so early there wouldn't have been time to whisper "John Sherman." By 1941 every time a native Hawaiian switched on his light, turned on the gas, or rode on a street car, he paid a tiny tribute into Big Five coffers. That year a Castle was president of the Honolulu Gas Company, Ltd., a Cooke was president of the Hawaiian Electric Co., Ltd., and a Castle was president of the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co.

Only in the latter field did the Big Five have to fight off any competition. By some oversight, the public utilities commission did not grant a public carrier franchise restrictive enough to keep small independent firms from moving into the more productive transportation areas. Hence, in the middle thirties, the Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. with its antiquated system of little trolley cars, was plagued by a number of independent jitney lines which ran along its lucrative Waikiki-Downtown Honolulu route. For a couple of years the company battled it out with the "wildcat" operators. Most of them were gradually knocked out by fresh, custom-built city-county regulations governing taxicab operations. The process was something like swatting at flies, for as quickly as one shoestring company expired an-

other sprang up. But by 1938 only one operator remained with assets enough to challenge the HRT, a taxicab owner named Rosecrans.

This operator had built up a line of swift rickety busses which rocketed from the beach to the city and back. His busses were generously patronized by Honolu'ans, not only because they outsped the lumbering trolley cars, but because the customers enjoyed the needling that HRT was so obviously taking. As Rosecrans began to add more and more busses to his fleet, Rapid Transit desperately launched into a program of modernization, changing over from trolley cars to gasoline, and then electrically-operated silver busses. The first bus route it opened was, quite naturally, on the Waikiki run. Overpowered by this new competition, Rosecrans in 1940 declared himself willing to talk compromise. Hurriedly, the HRT bought up his business and sold his gallant fleet to the Navy, which promptly confined them to Pearl Harbor. Rosecrans, pocketing the profitable payoff, retired to his taxicab business. In the minds of Honolulu commuters he lives today as something of a savior, "The man who modernized Honolulu's street car system."

That the profits resulting from marketing the \$127,439,-439 worth of goods brought into Hawaii during 1941 went largely into Big Five pockets was a foregone conclusion. The Big Five, through a score of subsidiary interests, dealt heavily in the merchandising field. Having taken their percentage from the top of this commerce by reason of having shipped it to the Islands, they saw that more cuts were taken out of it during the several processes it went through before reaching the consumer. The ultimate consumer saw plentiful evidence of this when he began to think of building a

home, and ran into the Big Five's lumber trust. This ring, a dominant member of which was Lewers & Cooke, Ltd., controlled 91% of the island lumber business. By the time the islander's new home was complete, he was ready to ask some angry questions.

"Why should this house, which is no better than the one my brother Ed built in California, run into such a figure? His cost \$5,000. Mine comes to nearly twice that much!"

A report on Hawaii's lumber trade for 1941 that was published in a national magazine partially told why. It revealed that lumber which cost \$15 a thousand board feet on the West Coast was marked up to a neat \$28.50 when it reached Honolulu docks. This was to cover "shipping costs." By the time it reached the prospective homebuilder, it was \$78 a thousand board feet.

If this process were carried out with other products, the total Big Five take could be nothing short of staggering. For the Big Five similarly stocked their plantation stores, which did as much as a million-dollar-a-year business, stocked their own chain of wholesale and retail stores, Hawaii's largest department store, The Liberty House, and a thousand small, independent shops throughout the Islands.

Added to this merchandising activity were the commissions which the Big Five made as agents for hundreds of Mainland corporations. Through the five island companies these corporations released their multitude of products—from golf balls to tractors, insurance travel tickets, medical supplies. Little of the territory's stream of commerce was not channeled through Big Five holdings.

By keeping a firm finger on the political pulse, the Big Five had little trouble in controlling the sale of goods to local governments. A few years ago, when some of this

business began to go to independent Honolulu branches of Mainland concerns, the Territorial Legislature passed a bill reorganizing city-county departments under bureaus, each with a purchasing agent. There was little surprise when these purchasing agents directed government business back into Big Five channels. One businessman who tried to break into this well-protected field, pointed out to the city-county board of supervisors that, while his bids on medical supply contracts were turned down, the bureau agent was purchasing the same supplies from a Big Five affiliate at five and six times his price. Nothing was done about it.

Nor were any government economies realized when the city-county auditor reported in a public statement that a local Big Five-controlled firm was charging the government many times the price charged at their store for identical products. Instead, the auditor was subsequently offered a full-time, lifelong trusteeship of one of Hawaii's largest estates, tightly linked with the Big Five. He accepted.

Usually such a purely political problem would have been handled with much less grace, for the straight power tactics which always had characterized Big Five statesmanship were still operative as late as 1941. A handy start toward Big Five domination of politics was the fact that in the 1941 Territorial Legislature, as for session after session before, the president of the Senate was George P. Cooke, a ranking member of the well-distributed missionary family. And the speaker of the House was Roy A. Vitousek, head of the HSPA's legal department. It was not surprising that bills sometimes were patterned, cut and tailored within the inner sanctums of the Big Five downtown, then were sent up to the legislature to become, forthwith, laws of the Territory.

One such measure, however, came a cropper during the 1941 session. This was when Walter Dillingham, a young newly-elected representative and scion of an island family which had had several brushes with Big Five interests, brashly challenged a Big Five bill calling for construction of a new \$3,000,000 pier in Honolulu harbor, with territorial funds.

The bill had been dutifully introduced by George Eguchi, a Japanese member of the House who, when not legislating, worked as a chemist for the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. Young Dillingham claimed that harbor facilities already were ample enough, and quoted a survey to that effect made less than two years before by the United States district engineer. He charged that the bill was a scheme to mulct the public for private interest. Castle & Cooke sent its president armed with maps and statistics, into the legislature to fight for the bill. The *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, pro-Big Five, printed a page one picture showing five ships waiting outside Honolulu harbor, with the caption: "Why We Need New Pier."

Next day the United States customs collector angrily revealed this as misrepresentation. He pointed out that the ships had just arrived off port and were waiting, as was customary, for customs and quarantine clearance. There was plenty of docking space inside the harbor, he said. The opposing young representative made the most of such tactics. He won the support of the more liberal-minded men in the legislature, and stubbornly resisted all attempts to force the measure through.

Meanwhile Hawaii's M-Day bill, drafted with the aid of Army and Navy officials as critical to Hawaii and United States defense, had not been acted upon. It was tied up in

the House judiciary committee, the chairman of which was another young HSPA attorney. Though other legislators clamored for action on the measure, and the public stormed the local papers with letters protesting against the delay, it remained in committee day after day of the brief, two-months' session. The legislature busied itself hearing arguments on the pier bill. It was to no avail, however, for when it finally came up for a vote, the pier measure was killed. No vote at all was taken on the M-Day bill and the session ended with it unacted upon . . . Pearl Harbor was then only a few months away.

The full power of pressure politics was more successfully applied when the Big Five breathed fire during the bitterly contested elections of 1932. There had been growing signs of independence, it was felt, among the political leaders they had put into office. Most amazing was the conduct of Hawaii's delegate to Congress, the Hon. Victor Houston. When the Filipino Exclusion Bill, prohibiting further immigration from the Philippines to the United States, came up in Congress in 1931, sugar leaders hastily ordered Houston to work for insertion of a rider exempting Hawaii because of her need for plantation laborers.

Houston was of a different mind. "Hasn't sugar by now imported more than enough labor?" he asked. "The men are here and they would do plantation work if the wages were attractive enough."

To the sugar planters such an attitude was outright heresy. Luckily for them, the November elections came along before the Exclusion Bill was acted upon.

By that time the angry island industrialists were determined upon a clean sweep. The regular stable of poli-

ticians was considerably surprised, when they staged the usual rallies at the big plantations. They found themselves addressing empty seats. Inquiries revealed that workers, from field hands to executives, had been advised to stay away. Plantation votes were not coming their way that year. Nor did many others. When the returns were in it was discovered that a whole new slate had been elected in the Islands. Houston himself was defeated by Lincoln L. McCandless, an island capitalist who, though a democrat, could be relied upon to vote for "the best interests of Hawaii." And the new delegate fulfilled his promise. When the Johnson Act prohibiting Filipino immigration was passed in 1933 it had attached to it the desired rider granting exemption to the Territory of Hawaii.

If a few liberal voices were raised in protest against the constrictive system that was binding up nearly every phase of their life, they might have found difficulty in making themselves heard. The island newspapers and at least one of the two Honolulu radio stations were too dependent upon Big Five finances or advertising to countenance any really serious attack on the set-up. The Territory's largest newspaper, the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, had enough Big Five capital behind it to espouse the gilt-edged side of any island controversy. The *Honolulu Advertiser*, its morning rival, struck a more liberal pose but always recapitulated toward Big Five conservatism when the chips were down. *Advertiser* staff members were a long time recovering after their publisher, in 1939, accepted the sugar interests' invitation to make a reportorial junket through Mainland cane and sugar beet areas to compare conditions there to Hawaii plantation life. The copy the publisher sent back did not come directly to the desk editors of his paper; it

first went to the Pan-Pacific Press Bureau, the Big Five publicity mill, to undergo careful editing. The tone of the completed product was that the Hawaii plantations surpassed anything on the Mainland, insofar as employee benefits were concerned.

But Big Five aggressiveness reached even farther than the press in the attempt to muzzle free speech. By the middle thirties, the growing rumble of protests against island monopoly became serious enough to call for an organized counter-movement. The plan was for a large scale system of industrial and community espionage. On the plantations the campaign tactics called for secret recruiting of trusted employees who would report on their fellows. They were to report regularly on how other workers felt and spoke about labor, politics, monopolies. Representatives for the various racial groups were assigned.

Even the executives of Big Five companies were not free of this system. One of the Territory's leading statesmen, Senator William Heen, a former circuit court judge, commented upon the situation in a published statement. He told of standing on a street corner talking to an official of one of the five firms, when the president of the company approached.

"Sorry," said the executive, "you're a Democrat and I can't afford to be seen talking with you."

And with that he hurriedly took off.

Headquarters for the espionage campaign was in a little office in the Castle & Cooke building. There the records of malcontents were kept. Sometimes the staff passed the word along to plantation officials to warn such and such a worker against loose talk. Sometimes a worker was summarily discharged for "inefficiency" or "neglect of duty."

When a Joint Congressional Committee from Washington came to Hawaii in 1937, to study the question of statehood, they heard of this system. A committee member, Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney, of Wyoming, solicited information from a witness who testified before the Committee.

"Can you give us the name of anyone employed by the sugar industry collecting information on private activities of employees?" the Senator inquired. The hearing was being conducted in the Senate chamber of the Territory's Legislature in Honolulu. A capacity crowd jammed the room.

The witness hesitated a moment before replying: "Yes. Lawrence M. Judd."

Though this was by no means a revelation to most of the islanders present, a stir of excitement ran through the spectators. Lawrence M. Judd was a former governor of Hawaii. He had immediately preceded the incumbent Governor Poindexter.

Judd, the witness testified, was head of a Big Five organization gathering confidential material on plantation labor. The group, which bore the title of the Industrial Relations Committee, had headquarters in the Castle & Cooke building.

The investigating senators were amazed to discover that the same system was reported active in Honolulu business offices, in banks, stores and among the waterfront stevedores. They had little success, however, in flushing out specific examples of intimidation at their committee meetings. The hearings were public and many witnesses who started boldly with the intention of naming names and citing cases confined themselves only to generalities when their turns came to speak. They reasoned, undoubtedly, that they had nothing to gain by their disclosures and much to lose. There

were many ways in which they could be "reached" for reprisal.

It was the Big Five men, their board members and executives, who filled most public board and commission seats, and thus dictated the policies for channels of influence that reached into nearly every island home. They decided how the police administration, the public schools, social agencies, government institutions should be run. They put a lot of extra-curricular time in on it too. Thus, a vice-president of Alexander & Baldwin at one and the same time was president of the Board of Public Instruction, president of the Territorial Department of Social Security, president of the Honolulu Council of Social Agencies, president of the Children's Aid Association and director of a half dozen other such community organizations.

In their role as guardians of Hawaii's destiny, Big Five members naturally championed the cause of private charity. Their firms gave elaborately to Honolulu's Community Chest, even agreeing upon a tax-free contribution from sugar profits on a ratio based upon each plantation's production that year. The Community Chest was the particular "baby" of the Big Five and each year its board membership represented the entrenched interests as consistently—and as exclusively—as did the board of the HSPA. In their enthusiasm for this system of welfare financing, the Chest committee planned its campaign goal by fixing the amount each business house in town must raise. The business firm, in turn, told each employee what he must donate to attain their house quota. A payroll deduction plan was generally used. Anyone who took exception to the system, and said so, became a likely candidate for the Big Five's roll of malcontents.

Thus, through a bewilderingly intricate system of controls, the handful of men who in 1941 occupied top place in this amazing little kingdom of sugar and spite could, if they wanted, reach out and determine the success or failure of any one of a half million vassal people.

But that year there were things happening, within and without their tight domain, which were beginning very seriously to threaten their rule.

Within, there were a half dozen regions of discord. There were men in Hawaii, outside the inner circle, who were capable of leadership and who for long had chafed under the many unnatural restrictions of Big Five dominance; they were men who had long been ready to assert themselves and needed only a first show of weakness to act. There was the rising voice of labor, finally becoming articulate in the Islands. There were the Army and the Navy with enough strength, and now with enough reason, to speak in a voice of authority.

From the outside, there was approaching something great enough to have the effect of changing the whole stature of Hawaii—changing it from that of an economic entity, a prosperous civilian community, to a war role as a forward garrison in the nation's system of military defense and offense. Hawaii happened to be sitting exactly midway between two antagonists who were thinking seriously during 1941 of taking a swipe at each other.

Japan got in the first blow on December 7th.

It was something too big even for the Big Five to handle.

4

ERUPTION ON DECEMBER 7

"The Governor has called upon me to prevent invasion, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and to place the Territory under martial law. I have this day assumed the position as military governor of Hawaii."

—Lieut. General Walter D. Short,
U. S. Army, Dec. 7, 1941.

Hawaii—despite the early labors of fourteen shiploads of missionaries—was largely a hard-drinking, non-churchgoing community in 1941. Sunday morning was a time of leisure best spent abed or, if the flesh were strong, at gardening, on the golf links or at the beach. For most *kamaaina*, or long-time residents, it was the easiest and most pleasurable time of the week. Army and Navy officers, when they had been in the Islands any time at all, usually agreed wholeheartedly with this *kamaaina* way of life.

So the Japanese attack at 7:55 A.M. on Sunday, December 7, came at a time when the civilian population, at least, was particularly vulnerable. It was too blue, too placid a morning for such horror. Nor would many Honolu'ans accept first reports of the attack, which in some cases was taking place before their very eyes. Even on a Sunday morning it was no new thing for them to watch waves of bombers flying over the Islands, to see planes realistically dog-fighting, to hear the practice roar of coast defense guns

and anti-aircraft batteries. They would need more than one piece of evidence to convince them that the Japs actually had come over.

Radio announcers, who were the first to break the news to the bulk of the population, knew they had to overcome this general spirit of incredulousness. Their warnings would have to be persuasive. So when they broadcast the first announcement, they did not merely report the Islands were being bombed. "Oahu is under attack! *This is not a practice!* Take cover!". . . "Oahu is under attack! *This is the real McCoy!* Take cover!". . . They repeated this over and over.

Until they could get further details of the air raid, local stations for some time turned back to their regular programs between the repeated warnings. One station was broadcasting a transcribed Mormon church service from Salt Lake City. Just as the announcer broke in with the first news bulletin on the bombing the minister was saying his concluding words.

". . . and may Peace be with you on this day." The swelling voices of the Tabernacle Choir were closing the service as the announcer cut in with his bulletin. "This station has just been advised that the island of Oahu is under attack. Enemy planes were shot down. The Rising Sun has been sighted on their wing tips."

Even then thousands of unbelievers flooded the police and newspaper switchboards with calls for verification. Most of those calling the police station wanted the operator to assure them that the radio reports were not true. The Chinese-Hawaiian sergeant on the board had a stock, brief answer for all of them.

"The hell it ain't, Brother! Find shelter!"

It was not until the radio announcers began to cite damage, to give the first details of the carnage taking place at Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, five miles outside the city, that most Honolulu'ans became convinced. Or until bombs or anti-aircraft shells shattered close by in their own neighborhoods.

In a matter of minutes after the full truth of the event exploded through the community, Honolulu became a city convulsed by great emotion. People who had been in the street ran inside. Those in homes or stores ran out. Fire engines, trucks, ambulances tore screaming through the city. There was no normal motion. Everything seemed to move with the jerky, blurred effect of a long-ago moving picture. The distant action at the navy yard became a dull roar. Underfoot the ground trembled. Planes shot by overhead; but few were aware which were friendly, which enemy.

Bombs and shells fell only sporadically on the city. The first crashed into the yard of Thomas Fujimoto, a Japanese carpenter, but none of his family was hurt. One, probably directed at Iolani Palace, the Territory's Capitol, landed by the yard of the governor's residence at Washington Place. The blast killed an old Chinese man standing on the sidewalk. Another exploded in the *Nisei* Club on School Street, headquarters of young Japanese-Americans. Only an aged Japanese woman working in the kitchen was hurt. Four Japanese-American youths, members of a championship club boxing team, were talking on a street corner when a bomb exploded on the drug store behind them. Three of them were killed. Ironically, of the first thirty-six civilians killed by shrapnel and fire, twenty were Japanese.

Also ironically, the only business building struck down-

town was the big Lewers & Cooke store, home of the lumber trust. The bomb crashed through the roof, exploded on the third floor. Besides wrecking that part of the building, it smashed the water system, causing a destructive flood throughout the store.

Scores of Honolu'ans hurried to the top of the Punch-bowl, the extinct crater which overlooks the city, for a panoramic view of the whole terrifying show. They could see the Japs coming in—single lines of dive bombers. The planes flew over to Pearl Harbor where at what seemed a predetermined spot in the sky, they nosed directly earthward and screamed down to targets below. They kept going down until they disappeared in the smoke that was billowing up from earlier hits. Then there would be a mushroom of flame below and the boom of new explosions. From Hickam Field, just in front of the naval base, a great shaft of fire reached into the sky. Below were the blazing hangars and wrecked barracks.

Occasionally a ship would work itself out of the fury of gunfire and smoke in Pearl Harbor and race out of the channel for the comparative safety of open water. Several slim destroyers could be seen getting through, then deploying to hunt out the enemy.

Overhead the sky was polka-dotted with the black puffs of anti-aircraft fire.

At the emergency hospital in Honolulu, the gory score of bomb hits and shrapnel blasts was being taken. In the morgue several ambulance loads of victims had been laid out on the floor. By the operating room a line of wounded, some in ambulances, some in litters, waited for treatment. Makeshift ambulances arrived with more victims. One was a bakery wagon loaded with men from Hickam Field, some

wounded, some dead. A field station had been set up there, for on the foreheads of some was scrawled a letter "T" meaning that they had been given tetanus shots. The clothes had been burned or blasted from most of them. Some bodies had no arms, some no legs.

A private car stopped at the hospital driveway and a frantic Hawaiian man jumped out. He came running up the stairs, carrying a girl eight or ten years old in his arms. He pushed into the group crowded around the hospital entrance.

"Please, somebody. Please help her. My girl . . . she's hurt."

Someone took the child from his arms. It was obvious she was dead. She had been playing jump rope when the bomb fell. The rope itself had been burned away but in her charred hands the wooden handles for the cord were still tightly clenched.

Throughout the day the island community struggled, like a fighter beaten to his knees, to recover from the brutal suddenness of the attack. Wave after wave of raiders having come over, there was no telling when the next bombs would fall. Nor was there any let-up in the noise, the mad traffic, or black rumor.

Coastal defense guns and anti-aircraft weapons continued to blast into the sky. Ambulances and fire engines raced to and from places of disaster. The islanders, groping for news, were easy victims for each fresh rumor.

"Transports have been sighted. They're landing troops on the beaches!"

"All the other islands have been taken!"

"Oahu's surrounded by enemy subs!"

"Jap parachutists have landed up in the hills!"

This last report was even published as news in the first extra of the *Honolulu Advertiser*.

But descriptions of these events have gone into a hundred stories of that December day. The newspaper correspondents and radio commentators who were on hand covered in detail all the carnage, the heroics, and the military meanings of what happened that Sunday on Oahu. Few of them, however, told of what Hawaii itself—the willful little sugar kingdom—was going through. No one then interpreted the attack as the end of an era in Hawaiian history. The devastation that the Japanese had wrought was too patent at that time for many to note the first crumbling of a structure that had been nearly a century in the building.

To those sensitive to this less obvious effect of the Japanese bombing—and they would certainly include the handful of men behind the Big Five—the first tokens of what was to come became apparent soon after the bombs began to fall. One of these was the voice of the Army coming over island radios. It was easy enough to detect a new note of authority. There was no mistaking it when an officer of G-2, the Army's intelligence section, made the first official announcement of the attack and gave out first instructions.

“Oahu is under a sporadic air raid. Civilians are ordered to stay off the streets.”

“Civilians are ordered!” There it was. This was no police order, backed up by locally-made, easily amenable statutes. This was the Army, speaking straight out to Hawaii's civilians for the first time. It was the voice of the new boss of the Islands.

A couple of hours later the official routine effecting the transfer of sovereignty was begun. At 10:55 A.M. Governor Joseph B. Poindexter announced over local radio stations, his voice still shaky, that he had signed the M-Day measure preparatory to placing Hawaii under martial law. This was the bill the regular session of the Legislature had *not* passed in 1941. Just two months before December 7, a special session had been called for the single purpose of acting on the M-Day bill which the regular spring session had ignored. With an aroused community watching closely and suspiciously, the legislators had hastily voted the measure into law.

Poindexter, a former federal judge from Montana with a consummate talent for cautious statesmanship, had rarely acted with the alacrity he showed in turning Hawaii's cares over to the military. In invoking the M-Day law he proclaimed a defense period to exist, effective as of 10 A.M. that day.

Early Sunday afternoon Lieut.-General Walter D. Short, commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army, called upon the public for co-operation with the army forces. He stated that martial law would soon be in effect.

At 4:30 P.M. Governor Poindexter issued the formal proclamation of martial law, citing the section of Hawaii's Organic Act which allowed turning of the Islands over to the military in the event of invasion. He announced that he had authorized and requested General Short "to exercise all the powers normally exercised by me as the governor."

General Short's formal acceptance seemed to have a certain grim promise in it. In part, he said to the commu-

nity: "Pursuant to Section 67 of the Organic Law of the Territory of Hawaii, approved April 30, 1900, the Governor has called upon me to prevent invasion, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to place the Territory under martial law. I have this day assumed the position as military governor of Hawaii."

That made it official. The transfer was consummated. With a stroke of his pen, Poindexter had written off the power of Hawaii's traditional rulers, just as effectively as sugar's Committee of Safety had written off the power of the native monarchy in 1893. For the governor had signed away something more far-reaching than his own, closely circumscribed executive powers. He had turned over, lock, stock and barrel, the whole elaborately interlaced system of controls that the Big Five exercised over their island realm. On the face of it the transfer was political. Actually, it was a surrender of nearly all the economic and social powers that the Big Five had wielded. The events of the days which followed soon confirmed this.

It was no political transfer, for instance, when the Army at once took over the control of all shipping in and out of the isles. A discreet Castle & Cooke announcement in the paper on December 8 said that all Matson Line bookings were being cancelled indefinitely. What that meant was that henceforth the military was going to decide who and what was going to travel on ships touching Hawaii. The Army Transport Service took charge of the comings and goings of all merchant vessels touching port. The Matson Line as such was out for the duration.

Khaki-clad officers moved into Castle & Cooke's sumptuous Merchant St. office. The building's new electric-ray doors operated their magic opening and closing now

for army privates and sergeants coming to work; they were to replace many of the white collar workers in the august halls of this handsome monument to the enterprise of S. N. Castle and Amos Starr Cooke.

Meantime, over on the West Coast, the Army began making troop ships of the Matson's newest luxury liners, *Monterey* and *Mariposa*. Army workmen carried ornate glass chandeliers, rich paintings, and paneled mahogany beds down the gangplanks and went back aboard bearing metal three-decker bunks, gun mountings, and ammunition.

The *Lurline*, en route to San Francisco on December 7, was likewise seized upon her arrival and put through similar alteration. When the \$8,000,000 ships were built several years before, the United States Government had put up \$6,000,000 for each one, so that they might be taken over in time of war. But there was more disturbing news to come. In the first week of war the Matson freighter *Maliko*, bound for the Islands from the Northwest Coast with her holds full of cargo, piled up on the Oregon shore. Then on December 11 the Navy announced from Washington that the Matson freighter *Lahaina* had been sunk, en route from Hawaii to San Francisco, by a Japanese submarine. Luckily, all but four of the crew got safely back to the island of Maui. On December 17 another Matson freighter, the *Manini*, was sunk.

The Inter-Island Navigation Company's prosperous trade was similarly upset. On December 8 the company's president announced that all schedules had been cancelled; the Army was taking over. When inter-island traffic was resumed later, it was almost exclusively by air. Six weeks after Pearl Harbor, the wisdom of this step was shown; for on January 29 the inter-island army transport, the

Royal T. Frank, was sunk by a Japanese submarine. She was on her way to Honolulu from the island of Hawaii, crowded with newly-inducted U. S. soldiers from the city of Hilo. All aboard were lost.

Loss of their shipping had an immediate effect upon the Big Five's sugar and pineapple trade. Sometimes, under Army Transport Service command, arrangements could not be made for picking up shiploads and pineapples. Ships were traveling from Hawaii to the West Coast under convoy, so there was often not time to send freighters around to the small island ports to pick up plantation produce. Raw sugar shipments sometimes piled up. A few months after Pearl Harbor the Hawaiian Pineapple Company had thousands upon thousands of cases of canned fruit waiting to be shipped. The Islands' basic economy was greatly upset.

When Big Five executives ventured down to their offices on Monday morning, December 8, they saw at once with what thoroughness the military had assumed control of the Territory. It was not a pleasant revelation, after the horrors of the night before. Hawaii's first night of blackout had been an unqualified nightmare for more than the shaken military commanders of the isles. All during the dark hours guns had continued to blast. Planes, which might have been the enemy searching for bombing objectives, droned through the black sky. Bands of armed civilians and soldiers noisily patrolled the streets. Lights inadvertently left on, particularly store lights with automatic time switches, were broken or shot out. Several night walkers out on defense assignments were killed or wounded by jittery sentries. Up in Nuuanu Valley three wardens beat to death a fellow warden they encountered in the night because they mistook him for an enemy parachute trooper.

The Monday morning scene was only slightly reassuring. Businessmen found armed guards standing watch in front of their buildings. On street corners machine gun nests had been hastily erected; they were pill boxes made of bags filled with sand. Big Five executives who looked closely saw that they were bags marked in large block letters with the word "Sugar."

Outside the Hawaiian Electric Power plant, the Mutual Telephone Company, and the Honolulu Gas plant were barbed-wire barricades. No one, not even the utility executives, were admitted without passing inspection. Outside the buildings soldiers on guard stopped them.

"Let me see your pass!"

The passes had to be signed by army authorities. Later, identification badges with the picture of the identified were required.

Down in Aloha Tower, overlooking Honolulu harbor, naval officers were setting up offices, to take over control of ship movements in the port.

The U. S. Engineers' Department jumped to the task of taking over a thousand and one semi-military projects which the war set into motion. With the startled trustees of Punahou School, the preparatory school which the Rev. Hiram Bingham founded on land given him by the Hawaiians, the department signed terms for a lease giving it use of the buildings and campus for the duration. At once the quiet palm-shaded campus was transformed into a bustling headquarters for the many jobs of war construction. It was perhaps inevitable that the transformation and the overnight recruitment of a huge army of USED workers be accompanied by tales of waste and ineptitude. Punahou trustees were horrified, for instance, to hear that brusque

USED foremen, clearing out one of the study halls for office space ordered the arms on a statue of "The Discus Thrower" broken off so that it could be taken through a narrow doorway. Another of the many USED classics was the story of a department plumber trying to rig up water pipelines for new drinking fountains. The plumbers, unfamiliar either with the campus' pipe system or with plumbing blueprints, ran a line to the new fountains straight from Punahou school's famed lily pond. For generations the muddy little pool had been used for traditional "dunking" of the losers in interclass contests. This was the first attempt—a short-lived one—to use it for drinking purposes.

Down at the Honolulu police station Military Police and Shore Patrol officers moved into larger quarters, sat down with the civilian chief to decide how the Islands would henceforth be policed.

From General Short's headquarters came word that civil court functions had ceased, that the military governor had assumed all court powers. The writ of habeas corpus was suspended. There was little doubt that this vital American privilege was no longer on the Territory's books. All the day before, through the night and for days to come, the FBI, Army and Navy intelligence men and civilian police were busily rounding up alien and citizen suspects, hurrying them out to a new detention camp set up at Sand Island, in Honolulu harbor. There was not time then for hearings, for trials.

When Governor Poindexter called President Roosevelt on the radio telephone Sunday noon to make his report on the raid, a naval censor was listening in.

On other calls the censor cut in: "Your call must be restricted to purely non-military matters."

He then described a long list of topics which would be interpreted as military. No one could use the transpacific telephone until he had thoroughly identified himself, the person he was calling and outlined what he planned to talk about.

Similarly a force of army reserves had moved into the Honolulu post office, to begin the censoring of every bit of mail leaving the Islands.

After setting up an office at Iolani Palace, where kings, queens, a president and eight territorial governors had preceded him, Hawaii's new military governor began to show how the Army intended to govern the domain over which sugar had been king for nearly a century.

The first military order out of General Short's offices appointed an advisory committee of civilians. The members were Governor Poindexter; Charles M. Hite, and Ernest K. Kai, Secretary and acting Attorney-General of the Territory; Major Lester Petrie of Honolulu; Frank H. Locey, director of civilian defense; and Charles R. Hemenway, president of the Hawaiian Trust Co. The latter was the only one of the group who could be said to represent the Big Five.

The second order closed all saloons and liquor establishments in the Islands. On the heels of that came the military's substitute for Hawaii's civil courts. A board of seven men—three civilians and four army officers—was named as a military commission with authority to pass sentence of death. The same order set up provost courts, whose judges sat with power to imprison up to five years and to fine up to \$5,000.

In quick succession other orders, all hinging upon military security, were issued. Restrictions were imposed on aliens. All schools were told to remain closed until further notice. Gasoline distribution was placed in the hands of the Office of Civilian Defense. Censorship regulations were announced for press and radio; several newspapers were shut down. Rent, wage and food control was set up. All men, and later all women, were ordered to appear for fingerprinting and registration. A program of compulsory smallpox and typhoid vaccination was ordered for all.

But these were merely restrictions upon the individual's life. How completely the military was taking over was not really revealed until January when the military governor announced the manner in which the economy of the Islands was henceforth to be governed. At that time he explained how the government of the Territory of Hawaii was going to operate under martial law.

In the meantime, a new personality had stepped in as Hawaii's military-civil ruler. On December 17 the Army and Navy Departments in Washington announced their shakeup of island commands. General Short and Rear-Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet, had been ordered to return to Washington, charged with dereliction of duty. To succeed General Short as commanding officer of the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army, and, as such, military governor of the Territory, Lieut. General Delos C. Emmons, U. S. Air Corps, was appointed. Admiral Kimmel was succeeded by Rear-Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who subsequently was made a full admiral and chief of the unified command of the Pacific Ocean area. This meant he outranked the Army's Hawaiian commander.

Within a month General Emmons had decided the makeup of his Hawaiian government. The core of the organization was an executive section of army officers headed by Lieut-Col. Thomas H. Green. (The Lieutenant-Colonel flourished so notably at this pioneer effort in applied martial law that within six months he had rocketed to the rank of Brigadier-General.) The executive section actually carried out the policies and operation of martial law, leaving General Emmons free to work on the weightier problems of military defense.

Under the executive session came six control bodies whose influence reached out into every sector of Hawaii's industrial and commercial life.

Through these boards for the final decisions of the governing army officers was channeled all the tributaries making up the life stream of island commerce.

Perhaps most important, economically, was the Office of the Director of Material and Supplies Control. This section had charge of the importation, exportation and distribution of building supplies, fuels, chemicals, electrical and radio supplies, cloth, and medical supplies. Importation and exportation—that was the lush trade upon which the Matson Line had thrived. Now it was Army-controlled on Army-operated ships. Distribution—that would be the stranglehold the Big Five held on the building trades. This spelled the end of their lumber trust. Here, in this section, was lost a huge slice of the profits made from the Territory's incoming \$137,000,000 commerce.

A second major bureau was the Office of the Director of Food Control. This section saw to the feeding of the civilian community. It took over control of all food imports and the production of foods on the Islands. Foods

could not be brought into or taken out of the Islands except through this office. Of the Big Five, that hit American Factors the hardest. Control of food distribution had been its almost exclusive province.

Another governing section was the Office of the Director of Labor Control. Its function was to see to the procurement and distribution of labor, to act in labor disputes and to decide upon questions of wages and hours. Policies were to be established by an advisory board upon which sat a representative of the Army, the Navy, the federal government, the territorial labor board, the CIO, the AFL and the sugar and pineapple trades. Here was a new deal for island labor. Here, for the first time, they were given some voice in a plan of control which looked as though it really had teeth in it. Under such a setup unionism, no longer over-awed by two-fisted paternalism, could become articulate, and did. It was a rich opportunity and with dismay the Big Five interests watched labor make the most of it in the months that followed. Labor began to flourish under army rule.

Another office was that of the Director of Cargo and Passenger Control, in charge of waterfront problems, inter-island cargo and passenger traffic. The Director of Land Transportation was in charge of gasoline and tire rationing, motor vehicles and transport systems. The last officer in the military governor's "cabinet" was the Director of Civilian Defense who, with a federal appropriation of \$15,000,000 got under way a program of bomb shelter construction, air raid defense, evacuation, emergency medical aid, civilian registration and other defense projects.

Within the governor's executive section were retained special controls, including disposition of internment cases,

liquor distribution and the custody of alien property. The Internment Hearing Board was made up of civilians and military officers whose function was to decide upon the detention and internment of subversive suspects picked up by investigatory agencies.

Many islanders who looked over the new military system of government were moved to comment half admiringly on its all-inclusiveness. "The army didn't leave any leftover authority lying around loose—that's a cinch!"

Executives of the Big Five were not inclined to be so liberal in their criticism. "They've taken over everything including the kitchen sink," one Castle & Cooke man was quoted as saying.

Added gall for Big Five individualists was the blossoming of a new bureaucracy under Army sponsorship. Perhaps by virtue of its distance from the national capital, Hawaii had been singularly free of many of the myriad federal agencies which had for years been taking root in other U. S. communities. The Territory's most intimate association with federal bureaucracy had been with the agricultural agencies, particularly the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which had given the sugar planters nearly as much trouble as did the cane borer. Island industrialists shuddered each time a visitor arrived from Washington to survey their federal needs.

But now there came a host of agency men from Washington. Most distasteful was a representative of the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation who came blessed with a \$10,000,000 appropriation for Hawaii's food needs, signed the week before by President Roosevelt. This gentleman fitted neatly into the military governor's cabinet as a right hand man for his Director of Good Control.

The action was looked upon as an ominous one by island businessmen. "This thing's beginning to look a bit too permanent," they told themselves.

They saw almost immediately what good reason they had for misgivings, for in January General Emmons announced that the FSCC man would be the sole procurer for Hawaii's basic foods. No one else, not even the food control director, could order such staples as rice, flour, potatoes, canned milk, certain canned meats, vegetables, fruits and cattle feed.

On the heels of the FSCC came the man from the Office of Price Administration. The military governor set up a new price control section and a general order went out that the Army was ready to crack down hard on any violation of the new maximum price schedules. For the nation, price control might have been an attempt to control inflation; but for Hawaii it looked like liberation of the ultimate consumer. No more would lumber prices rocket from \$15 to \$78 a thousand board feet.

A bureau of the War Manpower Commission was set up in the Islands and incorporated into the military governor's plan to control labor. This, too, had something of the ring of permanency.

By the time the military governor had completed his plan of organization, there was no doubt that new hands were in control of all the resources which had given the real sovereignty of the Islands to the Big Five. The traditional interests had been stripped of their control of shipping, of consumer goods, of labor, of property and supplies, of politics, of individual lives. The Army and federal bureaus had now succeeded to most of the seats of authority

that the Big Five's interlocking directorates had so long held down.

This transfer of sovereignty had immediate effects upon the complexion of island life and upon the nature of island economy. The first two years of army rule considerably altered the native forces that were gearing themselves for the struggle for control of post-war Hawaii. This can be seen best by looking at the war's effect on each of the various elements separately. More obviously than upon anything else, were these effects shown upon the checkered political life of the Territory of Hawaii.

5

POLITICAL CARTS ARE UPSET

"Someone has adroitly outlined the situation here to give the impression that Hawaii has risen en masse against the military. Any belief that there has been a popular mandate for repeal (of martial law) is untrue and is putting Hawaii in a false light before the nation."

—Editorial, Honolulu Advertiser, Dec. 30, 1942.

A few hours after the first bombs fell on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, Hawaii's civil government with all the haste possible—in fact, almost as soon as signatures could be put to the documents making it legal—had handed over island sovereignty to the U. S. Army. While the bombs were still falling, no one in the Territory was ready to question Governor Poindexter's action. The protecting arms of the military were more than welcome so long as there was the threat of a Japanese invasion fleet hovering near the Islands.

However, in the weeks and months that followed Pearl Harbor, and particularly after the victory at Midway the following June, some few voices in the community began to question the need for continuance of martial law. In the relative peace which came after the December 7 attack, some even found themselves free enough of the distractions of war to write critical, documentary pieces on the unconstitutionality of government by martial law.

The army stuck to its guns. It was by no means ready to begin making concessions.

"There's going to be martial law," said General Emons, "until Japan's fleet lies at the bottom of the Pacific."

Other army spokesmen explained why it wasn't a matter of Hawaii's sovereignty. They said it was a matter of national security. Hawaii was no longer an independent island community. Its principal role now was that of a forward bastion in the defense of the United States; and, besides that, it was the heart and core of U. S. offensives in the Pacific. The archipelago must consider itself a huge arsenal, the supply base and staging area for America's military operations against Japan.

Abolishment of martial law would be gambling dangerously with the security of this role. Without martial law the military would lose control of such specific items as: blackout and curfew; restricted areas, communications; 35,000 enemy aliens and their prohibited possessions such as firearms, cameras and short wave sets; internment of persons suspected of subversive activities, and labor necessary to the upkeep and strengthening of this Pacific fortress.

Hawaii might chafe under the continued blackout and 10 P.M. curfew, but both were highly essential to security, the Army pointed out. If there were no blackout the Islands would be constantly vulnerable to attack by Japanese submarine and planes.

A half dozen such sporadic raids after Pearl Harbor—night shellings of the island ports by submarines, one as late as October, 1943—illustrated this menace, they said. Without the curfew, 159,000 Japanese, including 35,000 aliens, could be at large all night.

Military control of shipping and communications was just as vital, the army explained, not only to keep these lines open for strategic military purposes but as a check on the movements and operations of possible enemies of the nation. Only under martial law would they have been able to intern the 1,479 people of Hawaii, who had been picked up on suspicion of subversive activity.

Control of labor was administered purely as a matter of security and had evoked a few complaints from labor itself, the Army claimed. Strikes on war projects were not permitted and men in such work were frozen to their jobs. This control allowed for identification and investigation of all war workers and for the pooling of the labor supply so that the vast job of construction and maintenance in this vital area could be done with maximum efficiency.

"This is a military situation and it's going to be run according to military rules."

That was the way army officers summed it up.

Hawaii accepted these arguments almost without question. A good deal of the little grumbling that did occur could be traced pretty directly to the community's legal fraternity.

Island attorneys found themselves bereft of a place to practice their profession. Martial law had closed the civil and criminal courts of Hawaii and, except for their retaining fees and the limited practice later allowed in court, lawyers generally were finding life under army rule highly unprofitable. It was not surprising then, that the first articulate challenge to martial law should come from an attorney.

In the *California Law Review* of May, 1942, a lengthy article by J. Garner Anthony, onetime president of the

Bar Association of Hawaii, questioned the constitutionality of martial law in the Territory. Specifically, the young attorney claimed that the complete delegation by Governor Poindexter of his gubernatorial powers and authority to an army general was illegal.

In the next month's issue of the *Harvard Law Review*, an army spokesman entered a rebuttal to Anthony's argument. Written by Major Charles Fairman of the Army's judge advocate division, the article specified the unprecedented conditions which made martial law not only legal but necessary in Hawaii.

A slight political shade came into this question of martial law later in 1942 as the central committee of Island Democrats began to draw up its platform for the fall elections. It is worth noting that, once Hawaii party platforms were written, they were largely ignored by all candidates in the catch-as-catch-can turmoil of the island political campaigns. But the memory of one plank was conspicuously absent from the subsequent speeches of Democratic candidates. It said, "We deplore a system of government whereby citizens of the Territory of Hawaii can be arrested and held without bail for offenses that have nothing to do with operations of the military establishments."

The Republican party discreetly overlooked the whole question of martial law in its 1942 platform.

But, constitutional or not, the new deal in crack-down justice meted out by the Army's provost courts was almost unanimously acclaimed by the average man in the Islands. With these streamlined tribunals there was none of the myriad circumventions which a well-paid attorney could contrive before Hawaii's own courts. Here in the provost courts the Castles and the Cookes got the same medicine as

the Kananuis and the Crowleys. Big Five names were not at all sacred to army judges.

Many a Honolu'an was reminded by their brusque justice of the attempt an island grand jury had made in 1939 to dig into the matter of county government purchases. The presiding judge had quickly squelched their investigatory ardor.

"I will not tolerate any action by the jury which would take issue with the court as to whether it was right or wrong," the judge said. "It will be a very rare case indeed which will require your own initiative."

When a juror asked if grand jury procedures of New York or other states would not be applicable in Hawaii, the judge replied, "Actions of Mainland grand juries are not applicable in Hawaii because of different conditions here." Few had any doubt as to what the "different conditions" might be.

There were no bypasses in the provost courts. A glimpse into one of the court's typical daily sessions was enough to convince any Honolu'an of this.

The busiest court was in the Honolulu Police Station. The judge, an army major, sat on the bench in coatless uniform. There were no legal trimmings as the defendant was brought before him. Another officer, a lieutenant, read the charge, sometimes merely reading the facts of the case from the arrest sheet. The army judge might ask the defendant a few questions.

One such defendant was a liquor dealer, charged with illegal sale.

"You knew the military orders froze all liquor?" questioned the judge.

"Yes, sir."

"You read of this in public announcements and you received notice of the stoppage of sales?"

"Yes, sir."

"This court finds you guilty. You will pay a fine of \$1,000. You will serve four years in prison, at hard labor."

There was no appeal. The court's finding was final. The wholesaler who supplied the dealer from stocks which had been hidden and not registered, as required by military order, was fined \$5,000 and sent to prison for five years.

A merchant seaman was brought in after a scrape with Honolulu police.

"Witnesses report that you publicly described the military government in the Territory as a little dictatorship. Is that true?" the provost judge queried.

The defendant admitted it was.

"One hundred dollars fine, three months in jail."

Another defendant, charged with fighting a policeman while drunk, was sentenced to three years in prison at hard labor.

At one provost court session the defendant was Judge Francis M. Brooks of Hawaii's circuit court. He had been arrested after a brush with a military traffic policeman. Driving on the wrong side of the street, he was told by the motorcycle officer to pull over. He refused. The policeman, an army private, threatened to shoot his tires if he didn't stop.

According to court testimony, the judge then invited the policeman to drop into his home, near by. "Come and have a cigar. I don't mean it as a bribe," he is alleged to have said.

Instead, the policeman took down the judge's name and license number.

A few days later Judge Brooks was before the provost court. The judge was not fined or jailed, but he did make a full apology.

If such turnabout tactics came as a surprise to island residents, they were in for something even more startling. The provost courts now began to take "blood fines" from those they found guilty. When a person was found guilty of a minor charge he usually was given the choice, instead of paying a fine or going to jail, of making a blood donation to Honolulu's plasma bank, which had been drained on December 7. For hundreds of guilty, the suggestion seemed an inexpensive and somehow logical way of paying for their wrong against society, or military security. Red Cross workers at the blood bank from then on noted a pleasing increase in the plasma supply on hand. On Christmas Day, 1941, they welcomed a batch of 60 new donors, young gamblers who had been rounded up in a Honolulu crap game.

There could be no charge that the Army profited by its control of the courts, save in the matter of military security. Financially, Hawaii itself was the beneficiary of the healthy fines the provost judges imposed; for in August, 1942, the Army announced that it was turning over all revenue from the courts to civilian governments. With this announcement went more than \$732,000 that had been collected in fines since December 7.

Justice had become big business in Hawaii. But it was another business in which the Big Five had been stripped of its influence.

Businessmen who might have been reflecting on this turn of events were due for another bit of unpleasantness shortly

after Pearl Harbor. This was in the matter of Hawaii's civil governorship. For many years, the White House in Washington had usually listened attentively to the suggestions of island industrialists when it became time for the President to pick the top civil official for the Islands, as provided by Hawaii's Organic Act. In March, 1942, the term of Joseph Boyd Poindexter, governor of the Territory since 1933, automatically expired. Poindexter, though a Democrat, had become highly acceptable to the men of the Big Five; he had proved himself to be very cooperative with big business. A cautious statesman with little political adroitness in matters of public relations, Poindexter's policy of procrastination had earned for himself the sobriquet, "Mahope Joe," by which he was familiarly called, sometimes, even in the press. "Mahope" was the Polynesian equivalent of Mexico's "mañana."

March came and went but no reappointment was announced for Governor Poindexter. It was reported that back in Washington Harold Ickes, who, as Secretary of the Interior, was the man delegated to suggest a nominee to the President, was thinking of anyone but J. B. Poindexter. Secretary Ickes had not been at all pleased, it was said, when Poindexter on December 7 practically flung into the War Department's hands the guardianship of Ickes' favorite territorial charge. It was further reported that Ickes was even thinking of reviving the hated Rankin Bill, defeated in Congress in 1933, which would allow the President to appoint a non-resident of the Islands as Hawaii's governor.

This was enough to make strong men of the Big Five quail. During the spring and through the long summer they bombarded the Interior Department, the State Department,

the White House and all their contacts in Washington with recommendations for the reappointment of Poindexter. Even the Republican party joined with the island Democrats in protestations for Poindexter who was, of course, a Democratic appointee. But when months passed and no action was taken, the island powers started off on another tack. They began to suggest new names, invariably men high in the ranks of island big business. Several of these unofficial nominees allowed the press to quote them as being willing to accept the office should it be thrust upon them.

In August the White House announced its appointment. It was not Poindexter and it was not anyone of the Big Five men who had fancied the office. It was Ingram M. Stainback.

"Stainback? Now who on earth is Ingram M. Stainback?" More than one islander asked that question.

Even the White House seemed anything but certain of the new appointee's identity. In the announcement of his nomination, Stainback had been identified as "the U. S. District Attorney in Hawaii." Stainback was not U. S. attorney in the Territory. He had been, once, but for more than two years he had been sitting, unpublicized, as a judge on a federal court bench in Honolulu.

Ingram Stainback was a native Tennessean who had come to the Islands direct from law school in Chicago and, after two years' private practice, had begun the slow climb up the ladder of appointments in the federal court in Hawaii. That was nearly thirty years ago but the entrenched islanders still thought of him in 1942 as a *malihini*, a newcomer. Didn't he still speak with a southern accent? Hadn't he been known to regard the native Hawai-

ians as Black Crow folk? What public service had he ever rendered in thirty years of residence?

The appointment was not a popular one. In downtown Honolulu, businessmen muttered about "carpetbag appointments."

A Democratic party leader was quoted as saying, "We could hardly be expected to rush forward the congratulations."

The morning *Advertiser* on its editorial page snidely noted:

"If Stainback's appointment were dependent on the will of the people as expressed by popular vote he'd have to wait some time before assuming this high office."

The afternoon *Star-Bulletin*, which had espoused several good candidates of its own, was too indignant to speak.

The Hawaiians had an angle of their own.

"In Iolani Palace," they said, "the *kabilis* are whispering."

They referred to the two ten-foot high standards, mounted with headpieces of bird feathers, which stood by the throne of Queen Liliuokalani in the Palace and which guards of honor had carried beside her on state occasions. According to Hawaiian superstition, ever since the ill-starred queen died in the palace in 1917, the feathered *kabilis* rustled and whispered among themselves when something unpleasant for Hawaii happened.

But Stainback soon showed that he meant real business and that he was starting from scratch. Following his inauguration in August, 1942, one of his first appointments to his cabinet was that of Ernest K. Kai, the popular Chinese-Hawaiian president of the Hawaiian Civic Club, as Secretary of the Territory. He began to clean house, so far as his powers of appointment allowed. He asked all

members of the governor's cabinet to submit their resignations. Some were reappointed, some replaced. When the new government had been formed, the man in the street was ready to admit that Stainback had chosen very well.

Perhaps the new governor's most significant appointment was that of the territory's Attorney-General, young J. Garner Anthony, author of the anti-martial law article in the *California Law Review*. That, among other things, indicated that Governor Stainback was going to put up a fight for the return of civilian government in Hawaii.

Seeing this, the military in Hawaii hastened to act. On the heels of the two civil officials, General Emmons and Colonel Green, executive officer of his governmental organization, embarked for the national capital. It looked as though the civil-military scrap was going to be staged in a Washington ring.

To islanders, it appeared that the civilians had landed the first blow. For one thing, it was evident that they had obtained the hearty collaboration of Hawaii's delegate to Congress, the Hon. Joseph R. Farrington, publisher of the conservative *Star-Bulletin*. Apparently inspired by their arguments, there came back to the Islands a highly-colored newspaper report of conditions in Hawaii under martial law, in the form of a "Merry-Go-Round" column by Drew Pearson, widely syndicated throughout the country. The column described Green, martial law executive, and a university law graduate, as "a former stable sergeant." It also claimed the *Star-Bulletin* had been warned by the Army that criticism of the military "would not be tolerated." (Islanders sniggered at the attempt to picture this paper as a champion of the rights of the man in the street.) The column listed various military orders that placed re-

strictions upon the people of the Islands. There was no attempt to note the relationship of the orders to military security.

Indignant extremists muttered that their new delegate should be impeached for misrepresentation of his constituents. No formal action, however, was taken upon this suggestion.

At this juncture came another amazing development. Big business in Hawaii suddenly decided that it was on the military's side. A hasty radiogram was dispatched to Washington by the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce informing President Roosevelt that the Chamber did not believe martial law should be suspended at this time. Here was unprecedented division in the ranks. The new governor and whoever were to follow his leadership were on one side. Big business and the military were on the other.

There was some question about the position of the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*. Its owner, Delegate Farrington, had started out unqualifiedly against the military. In the *Washington Post* he was quoted at the time as saying:

“Continuance of military rule and complete domination over civilians not only is contrary to every tradition of Americanism since early days but is a positive detriment to the total war effort. This military rule is without precedent in history except in conquered or rebellious territory and is without constitutional or legal foundation.”

But once the island interests had thrown their weight on the side of the military, the *Star-Bulletin's* editorial page began a strategic retreat. A week or so of rope-walking editorial logic ended with the paper standing, not for suspension of martial law, but for the return merely of some few, non-security-violating civilian rights.

The islander now tried to analyze what had happened. There was no doubt that for months the Big Five had chafed under military rule. More than anything else they wanted to get back control of their ships, of labor, municipal affairs, consumer markets—of all the economic resources which martial law had turned over to the military. But now they were declining this possible privilege. Why?

Some who might have been more astute than the rest thought they saw the answer in Hawaii's new governor. Much as they knew big business hated military rule and suffered under it, big business must fear Stainback more. Many a Big Five businessman had voiced this fear. There were rumors downtown that when Ingram Stainback took over, he was going to embark on a campaign of trust-busting of his own. What Thurman Arnold had been doing in the Mainland United States, that Stainback was going to do in Hawaii. So the rumor went. The island industrialists might have believed this. They might have envisioned a hard-hitting iconoclastic reformer thwacking around among the interlocking directorates and the monopolistic combinations of their economic realm. It was a chilling vision. At any rate, they declared themselves firmly as having no part in Stainback's civil rights crusade.

They should have been somewhat disconcerted, then, when a week or two later the erstwhile antagonists came back to Hawaii virtually arm in arm. It seemed that they had amicably thrashed out most of their differences at the national capitol. At a joint conference held in early February in Iolani Palace shortly after their return, General Emmons and Governor Stainback announced that they had arrived at a very agreeable compromise. Effective March 10, certain functions would be returned to civilian government

with restrictions relating only to purely military matters continuing in effect. Their amiable conference was hailed as an historic one. Military and civilian officials and members of the press attended. The two governors sat side by side at a table, each allowing the other his turn to speak. Each had his own printed proclamation, and each proclamation was distributed to the press.

Both Honolulu papers hit at once upon the idea of calling March 10 "Restoration Day"; they made quite a thing of the return of some civilian rights. The "restoration" gave back to civilians control over the following: commodity prices and rationing, food production, rents, public health, licensing of business, judicial proceedings except against military personnel and except in violations of military orders, imports for civilian consumption, custody of alien property, civilian defense, labor, and the collection and disposition of garbage.

At first, it looked like a lot. But when local big business looked closer, it saw that what it had feared had come upon it.

True civilians had won back the control of importing goods—so vital to Big Five merchandising—but the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation was still designated as controller of all basic supplies that came in. Private businessmen could order non-basic foods and materials, but they knew there were few of these they could get. In fact, the proclamations pointed out that civilian shipping, including FSCC imports, would be allowed only in cargo space not required by the military in Hawaii.

True, control of labor had been returned to civilians; but the War Manpower Commission had been designated as the controller.

True, control of prices had been restored, but Big Five firms were not going to fix them. The Office of Price Administration had set up in business in Hawaii, and was already at work.

Among other powers, the Army retained the right to control shipping, the waterfronts, the public utilities, communications, and a score of such vital things. Significantly, it also pointed out that the privilege of writs of habeas corpus still was suspended. And, as something of a joker, the proclamations provided that the military governor could recall any of the restored powers whenever he deemed a state of emergency existed.

It was apparent that what concessions the Army had made went largely to the new federal bureaus. The traditional island rulers had won back little or none of their private realm.

For the man in the street, "Restoration Day" was a concession at least to his constitutional rights. His normal American way of living was to be restricted only insofar as it related to military security. But for the man in the Big Five, it was obvious that the hands which had for so long freely juggled the economy of the Islands were still tied tightly. More than that, about the only islander who seemed to be prospering under the new order of things was the new governor. Stainback, popular or not, wore the mantle of leadership far too well.

The new governor's accomplishments were all the more begrudged when the ertswhile island autocrats looked upon the sorry state into which their own political creature, the Territorial Legislature, had declined. That the influence of the legislative branch of island government had gone

into a nearly total eclipse was first evident when the rolls for fall election were being made up in the summer of 1942. As the same old troupe came trundling out for the biennial political carnival, it must have occurred to even the most hopeful among the Big Five that these were a pretty seedy lot of performers.

At any rate this was the public's opinion, for never had Hawaiian political rallies drawn such pitifully small audiences as in September and October, 1942.

When a troupe of Republican candidates ended a week's tour of island communities and had drawn a total of only seventy-five voters at its largest rally, the *Star-Bulletin* editorially scolded the people for their apathy. A news story in the same paper noted that sometimes large groups of non-voting soldiers had appeared at the rallies but that they hung around the platforms only while the hula girls accompanying the candidates did their dances.

Worried men of the Big Five saw other disturbing signs as the campaign desultorily progressed. They were particularly disturbed over what island labor might do.

One day in October, 1942, as the campaign was drawing to a close, a Republican worker burst into party headquarters. "Boys," he announced excitedly, "it looks as though labor's lining up solid against us!"

They asked what he meant.

"Well, I just came from Democratic headquarters. Rutledge, the CIO agent, went in there as I passed by. You know what he wanted? He asked them for five thousand membership blanks. Five thousand! Looks like labor's going over to their side, and I mean wholesale!"

Labor didn't do quite that, but there was little doubt that labor was getting ready to make its voice heard in

politics. And, for the immediate future, it seemed as though the Democratic party was favored.

Another campaign incident that disturbed island Republicans was when two of their favorite candidates, certain of election, switched their allegiance to the Democratic party.

It was not that the Republicans feared the Democrats would soon take over. The GOP was still too firmly entrenched and Democratic leadership was still too bungling to threaten their control of legislative votes. But it all looked too much like the beginning of a trend away from the well-adjusted political norm.

The war gave the Big Five group an even break at least so far as two seats in the Legislature were concerned. They noted with satisfaction the young Rep. Dillingham, who had given them so much trouble on the pier bill in the 1941 session would not be on hand in 1943. He had gone off to war, a major in the Army Air Corps. But offsetting this was the loss of Representative Eguchi, of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, who had discreetly declined to run. Eguchi was one of nearly a dozen Japanese who did not run for reappointment or for assured seats in territorial or county government in 1942, chiefly because of the embarrassment it would cause Hawaii in the eyes of the rest of the nation.

The Japanese officeholder who held out longest was a Republican member of the Legislature, Senator Sanji Abe of the island of Hawaii. Elected in 1940, Senator Abe was entitled to sit in the 1943 session. If he planned to stick it out, it was somewhat of a blow for his plans when, in August, 1942, he was arrested by FBI men, charged with possession of a Japanese flag, a violation of military orders.

From some place of internment Senator Abe dispatched a letter to the Secretary of the Territory in February, 1943, resigning from the Legislature.

Perhaps another portent of the changing political times came in the election itself. The Republicans' star candidate, Roy A. Vitousek the HSPA attorney who had been speaker of the House for so many sessions, got back into the Legislature by the narrowest margin of any candidate. The startled favorite, who had always been among the leading vote getters, won the last place on his district ticket, nosing out a newcomer to politics, Herbert K. Lee, a Chinese lawyer, by the scant margin of forty-eight votes.

The session that convened the following April was a remarkably subdued one, in contrast with the usual hijinks of an Hawaiian Legislature. Entrenched business interests sponsored only two measures that were worthy of note. One—no one could say they gave up easily!—was a resolution memorializing the U. S. Congress to grant statehood to Hawaii. Those members of the Legislature with any conscience at all, when they looked upon this proposition coming even while troops were crawling all over the Islands and fighting ships were shuttling in and out of Pearl Harbor from scenes of combat, must have given their vote just out of sheer fascination with the persistence shown by the devotees of statehood.

The other measure was an anti-labor bill, legislation which the nearness of war may have made seem opportune. Introduced by a well-recognized plowhorse for downtown interests, the bill placed restrictions upon the registration of labor unions and upon their methods of keeping accounts. The bill was pushed through with little trouble and was sent to the governor's office for signature.

Here, again, something unprecedented occurred. Governor Stainback vetoed the measure. More than that, he told in a public statement why the bill was a bad one.

"Support was won for the bill," he pointed out, "partially by citing a single instance of embezzlement by a union agent. This territory has laws to take care of cases like that. All labor in the Islands must not be penalized for one man's crime."

Those endorsing the governor's action noted that the record of island unions in the first year of war had been an outstanding one, not deserving what they called "a political stab in the back."

A bill that the 1943 session did not pass was one prohibiting the existence of Japanese language schools in Hawaii. Described by the military as breeding places of disloyalty, the language schools were closed only for the duration, with nothing to interfere with their reopening after the war. The bill that proposed permanent closing was killed. A bill which forbade the teaching of foreign languages to any child under nine was substituted instead, and passed.

During the session a Hawaiian member of the Senate won enough support to put through a bill charging members of the board of trustees of the Bishop Estate, which controlled \$15,000,000 worth of land holdings in the Territory, with failing to live up to provisions of the will which they were supposed to be fulfilling. This was the board on which the former city-county auditor who stumbled on to Big Five methods was comfortably sitting. The Hawaiian legislator charged that the trustees were pocketing as much as \$16,000 a year apiece for themselves from the estate. The bill cut the fees down to a couple of thousand dollars a year. It also called upon the Attorney-General to bring

ouster proceedings against the board. The trustees subsequently forestalled the proceedings, however, by conducting hasty reforms of their own; these were accepted by the Attorney-General's office. As a life time career the trustee positions thenceforth were not so alluring.

"Next session," they told one another, "there are going to be plenty of new faces in the Hawaiian legislature."

It was a prophesy requiring no great store of political acumen.

Hardly was the 1943 spring legislature over than a fresh skirmish broke out in an entirely unexpected sector, this time in the field of civil-military relations. It was the much publicized "Habeas Corpus Case." Dramatis personae were Hawaii's new military governor and a hard-bitten judge of the U. S. District Court in Honolulu. There was some difference of opinion as to which was the villain in the piece.

The general was Lieutenant-General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., who in the summer of 1943 succeeded General Emmons as commander of army forces in the island. The judge was Delbert E. Metzger, one-time Kansas engineer who had come to Hawaii as a well driller in 1899.

The action got under way one day in July when Albert Glockner, aged 43, and Edward R. Seifert, aged 29, German Americans who had been placed in detention by the Army authorities, decided to see what might happen if they filed a writ of habeas corpus. They would demand that they be brought before a civil court to see on what charges they were being held.

On August 2 their counsel, Herbert Lee, who so narrowly missed election to the Legislature, filed the petitions in Honolulu's federal court. No one paid much attention.

Exactly two weeks later, however, the Army was astounded to hear that Judge Metzger had issued the writs. The judge contended that the proclamations of March 10, 1943 had, despite the Army's several exceptions, lifted the suspension of the habeas corpus privilege which had been invoked by General Short on December 7. He apparently was ready to do battle for this civil privilege.

Aghast, the Army thought of the hundreds of other internees, mostly Japanese, in their custody. What was to stop every one of them from demanding, perhaps winning, their release? What if this developed into a full-dress court hearing on the necessity of martial law?

If the Army and the Navy had to defend martial law in a public court they would conceivably have to reveal phases of their war plans and their knowledge of enemy military dispositions. This could never do.

But meanwhile a rheumatic deputy U. S. Marshal was on his way from the federal court to the military governor's office, a summons ordering General Richardson to produce Glockner and Seifert in court by August 21.

Outside the general's office a military policeman held the marshal off. He could not see the governor. When the messenger from Metzger displayed his badge, demanding the right to serve the summons, the guard took him by the arm and firmly escorted him off the premises.

Back in federal court the deputy marshal reported to Judge Metzger that he had been "manhandled." The report went into court record.

Next day the faithful marshal was back in action. For days he stalked the military governor, but to no avail. Most of that time General Richardson remained close to his headquarters at Fort Shafter, on the outskirts of Honolulu. This

stratagem was a sound one, for the marshal, as a civilian, was not allowed on the reservation.

Only occasionally did the general, in his role as military governor, have to go down to his other office on Iolani Palace. When he did, he was whisked in and out of the palace grounds in his three-starred official car, with a guard of military police on hand when he got out. At each appearance the marshal could only stand by the driveway and curse the ways of generals.

But General Richardson had good reasons for avoiding service of the writ.

For one thing, he had received word from Washington to await instructions from the War Department. And, besides that, he knew that acceptance of the service might start a "run" of internees upon the federal court.

But the best reason was that at just that inopportune time the general was playing host to Assistant Secretary of War Patterson who had arrived from Washington on an official inspection tour of his area. This was military posts, there was every possibility of the marshal blundering in with his summons. The general found himself hard put to fill his role of official host gracefully.

On the day before Judge Metzger's August 21 deadline, General Richardson accepted service of the writs. But he did not abide by their orders. He did not appear in court the next, nor did he have the internees produced.

On August 25 Judge Metzger declared the military governor guilty of contempt of court.

"General Richardson," he announced in his charge, "has shown open and notorious defiance of the mandate of this court." The penalty would be a fine of \$5,000.

The news spread quickly and Honolulu buzzed with

excitement as the report made the rounds. But the court clerk had hardly entered the findings on the court record before a messenger arrived in the courthouse with a freshly issued decree from the military governor's office.

Officially, it was Military Order 31, but delighted islanders almost immediately dubbed it "The Court Plaster Order." It summarily prohibited any further issuance of writs of habeas corpus. Moreover, it tied Judge Metzger's hands by specifically forbidding any further action in the Glockner-Seifert case. Violation of the order would bring a penalty to \$5,000 fine or five years in prison.

At this point it seemed to be even all for the general and the judge.

Back in Washington, action was taken to break the impasse. It was reported in Honolulu that officials of the War Department, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Justice were sitting down to unravel this snarl in Hawaiian affairs. They were some time about it. Not until the middle of October was a representative of the U. S. Attorney General's office dispatched to the Islands with instructions on how to make peace.

The stage then was set for the climax. It came on October 21, when Ernest J. Ennis, the representative from Washington, appeared in Judge Metzger's Honolulu court with his plan for peace. At first glance it looked as though Ennis had prepared for anything but peace. He arrived armed with a brief case bulging with documents. With him were Angus Taylor, acting U. S. District Attorney, and a sober group of army legal officers. He seemed ready to have it out, hot and heavy.

But almost at once he revealed that the Army was to talk compromise.

"General Richardson," he began, "has authorized me to announce that General Order 31 is being rescinded." He paused, as though for dramatic effect.

One of the army officers coughed. Judge Metzger said nothing, waiting for more.

"I am also able to announce that some time ago army authorities transferred the two internees, Albert Glockner and Edward Seifert, to the Mainland. Both men were released there."

This definitely came as a surprise. Judge Metzger glanced sharply at the army officers, as though to confirm the intelligence.

"It is the feeling of the Army and of government officials whom I represent that these developments bring to a close the present habeas corpus issue." Mr. Ennis studied the judge's face now, seeking some trace of concurrence. There was none.

Mr. Ennis pushed on. He explained that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had never applied to anyone except persons held by the military. Hence, he added, there had never been any actual prohibition against habeas corpus suits involving domestic relations or other matters of no interest to the military authority.

Mr. Ennis now played his trump card. "All these concessions having been made by the Army, it was felt that concessions might be made, in turn, by this court. Specifically, might your honor not see fit to drop the contempt of court charges against General Richardson and waive the \$5,000 fine?"

Grizzled Judge Metzger deliberated. He shifted his gaze from the group before him to the open court window, looked thoughtfully out upon the mountain vista beyond

the town. There was no doubt that he was mightily tickled by the turn of events.

It was some moments before he turned back to the group. "It is the feeling of the court that it can be lenient in this case," he said, dryly. "But the court still holds that General Richardson was in contempt. Therefore the motion to dismiss the charge is denied. The court, however, orders that the \$5,000 fine be reduced to \$1.00. Thank you gentlemen."

Mr. Ennis started to speak, as though in protest. Changing his mind, he reached for his brief case. "Thank you, your honor." Then, followed by the Army emissaries, he strode out of the courtroom.

The habeas corpus case was the only issue upon which the military and civilian authorities came to actual grips and the latter had by no means fared badly. In fact, up to 1944 there were few instances where the general public expressed themselves against the restrictions of martial law. The *Honolulu Advertiser* stated the general opinion editorially in September, 1943. "It is a most inopportune time to oppose and object to military control. Such crusading is ill-timed. The spectre of military government hovers more closely if our mixed population interferes with military or naval authorities."

That was advice which the average Honolu'an found not too difficult to take. The restrictions which martial law made in his public and private activity could easily be dismissed as minor sacrifices of war. He could take them in his stride.

It was a different story for Hawaii's industrialists. War had not hit their interests just a glancing, casual blow; it had shaken their whole economic system to its foundations. It had toppled over the whole intricate structure of com-

munity control that they had been so diligently building for nearly a century. An inventory of Big Five war losses will show at once how thoroughly their tight realm had been overturned.

6

BIG FIVE DECLINE

"The chief objective of industry is not the accumulation of wealth for a few, but providing a way for the social order to be more successful as a whole."

—Pres. David L. Crawford, University of Hawaii, 1936.

The military's wartime seizure of economic and political control of Hawaii was a dramatic overturn of the order set up by the entrenched industrial interests, but it was by no means the only setback suffered by the Big Five coincident with the outbreak of war. There were several instances just before and after December 7, 1941, where the tight grip of Hawaii's autocratic few had been loosened. The first two years of war afforded many more evidences, beyond the necessary capitulations to the military, that their hold on the Islands was slipping.

Fundamentally, Big Five influence in the Territory's economy was vested in control of the triumvirate—land, labor, and water supply. By the end of 1943 there was no question that military demands for land, such as the need for new army posts and forts to house the increasing thousands of servicemen being brought to the Islands and for more and more airfields, had seriously cut down the sugar acreage. By that time, too, both the sugar and pineapple in-

dustries found that they had not nearly enough manpower to plant, cultivate and harvest their crops. Thousands of laborers had drifted away to take highly-paid jobs on defense projects. And the Big Five found that what labor they did retain was becoming more and more difficult as a problem of "control." Through unionism, island labor was beginning to find its voice. Only the control of water supply could still be said to be well in hand.

The loss of Big Five influence was even more apparent in a dozen other sectors. Big Five control of shipping, for instance, was threatened by more than the wartime demands of the military. As far back as 1938 it began to be evident that the factor of open competition was going to enter for the first time into modern Hawaii's shipping picture. At that time federal authorities brought up for closer scrutiny the Matson Line's pact with the Dollar Line which gave it a stranglehold on trade to and from the Islands.

On August 17, 1938 the U. S. Maritime Commission summarized the results of this competition-killing agreement. The records showed that from April, 1930, when the pact began, until August, 1938, the Dollar Line had turned over to Matson a total of \$1,248,605 that it had picked up in trade in the latter's "territory." During that time Matson had paid the Dollar Line as its part of the agreement a total of \$7,031. The commission's report pointed out that in those eight years Matson had been able to buy out the Los Angeles Steamship Company, its only serious competitor, while the Dollar Line in its field had faced many new competitors. As a result by 1938, the Dollar Line was nearly bankrupt; it had been kept afloat by federal loans of \$4,500,000.

The commission's summary of the shipping pact did not

spare the feelings of the Matson people. "The record leaves little doubt that the agreement is unfair to Dollar, and therefore is detrimental to U. S. commerce. . . . Most unfair of the provisions is the fifty per cent clause under which Dollar is apparently condemned to conduct its Hawaiian trade at a loss." They ruled that henceforth the agreement was invalid and that no further payments would have to be made to Matson by the Dollar Line.

As a sort of side comment, the commission report also noted that the Matson Line, through interlocking directorates, was tied in with fifty-eight Hawaiian companies, all Big Five affiliates, and that the line carried ninety-eight per cent of all cargo between Hawaii and the Mainland.

Soon thereafter the Maritime Commission itself took over the struggling Dollar Line, renamed it the American President Line and started out to recoup some of the money it had for eight years pressed up in the Pacific trade. However, it did not seriously encroach on Matson's island trade for, until the outbreak of war, its ships were concerned almost solely with the evacuation of thousands of Americans from ports in the Orient. The Matson fleet of thirty-nine ships, meanwhile, piled up record earnings. For 1940 the line reported earnings of \$5,372,243, over and above taxes. For 1941, earnings were \$4,753,287.

Some months before December 7, Matson realized that war was going to do evil things to this trade. In August, 1941, two Matson ships, the *Erwa* and the *Mobile City*, were seized by the government to make runs down to Malaya for tin and rubber cargoes. The line strenuously protested the move.

"What about our export business? How are we going to move our sugar?"

The protests fell on unlistening ears. In November two of Matson's luxury ships, the *Monterey* and the *Mariposa*, were also taken over.

Upon the outbreak of war the Army Transport Service and the War Shipping Administration took over Matson's remaining twenty-nine ships. Three others had been sunk by Japanese submarines and one was wrecked off Oregon.

Under the War Shipping Administration all business was conducted under U. S. Maritime Commission auditing. Castle & Cooke, former agent and virtual owner of the Matson fleet, now became agent for the WSA, on a straight fee basis. By the end of 1943 there had been a two hundred per cent increase in cargo to the Islands, largely due to military shipments. But the only share going to Matson, which under peacetime conditions would have had a ninety-eight per cent cut in the business, was the modest fee collected by Castle & Cooke. Matson had not only lost her stranglehold on Hawaiian trade; the line was barely holding on by its finger tips.

As part of the shipping picture, Matson found itself faced with a new competitor in the island stevedoring business, which had been exclusively a Big Five enterprise before the war. Early in 1943, a new firm, American Stevedores, Ltd., was organized with capital outside the circle of Big Five interests. Employing five hundred longshoremen, it got the bulk of the defense cargoes coming to the Islands.

There was every indication now that once the war was over, Matson would be forced to fight for its share in island shipping. True, the line still was assured of the all-important sugar and pineapple exports; but even there, as will be shown, the monopoly hold was slipping. With her wartime fleet of merchant ships, particularly the innumerable Vic-

tory freighters, America was back in the shipping business stronger than ever and with every indication of staying. Whether under WSA, or its peacetime equivalent, or under private operation, new shipping lanes would criss-cross the Pacific, throwing island traffic open to wide and free competition. The rejuvenated American President Line would be one of the strongest rivals, and now Big Five stevedores would be ready to handle the cargoes.

Inter-island shipping, however, was another matter. Though threatened, that was still very much in Big Five hands. The most serious threat to the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company's monopoly of this trade came soon after December 7 when a pair of San Francisco yachtsmen, George and Judy Hall, became interested in running food to isolated settlements on the outside islands. When the Army ordered temporary suspension of steamer runs between the islands, the couple got permission to run supplies in their sailing boats to ports that were deprived of regular ship service. Gradually the business developed so that they were able to charter a small motor ship to bring out food supplies and bring back sorely-needed fresh vegetables to Honolulu. By 1943, fortified by independent capital, they became the Hawaiian Shipping Company. They were ready to build a fleet of four 120 foot ships to take care of all outside island truck garden business for Honolulu. Now, however, they began hitting snags. Plans were completed for the ships and arrangements made for their building, but the company still needed priorities for purchase of the engines.

The priority application was turned down and the boats were not built.

The financial backer of the Hawaiian Shipping Company explained why.

"In the first place," he said, "the fellow we went to, who was supposed to authorize the priority application, was an official of the Inter-Island Navigation Company loaned to do war services. I'm afraid he was a little prejudiced.

"On top of that, we discovered that someone had gone over and organized the vegetable farmers on the island of Hawaii, where we were getting most of our trade, into a marketing association. It turned out that unless a farmer joined the association he wasn't given the extra gas and tire allotments he needed to truck his produce. Then came the payoff, the old one-two. The association ruled that all its produce had to be taken down to the port of Hilo, to be picked up there by ships of the Inter-Island Navigation Line.

"You just can't lick a setup like that. It's what I call totalitarian competition."

A week or so later his Hawaiian Shipping Company was liquidated.

"What hurt most," said the erstwhile shipping man, in recalling his venture some months later, "was the way they let the farmers down once we were forced out. People coming back from the outside islands often told me about seeing tons of vegetables rotting on the docks. When you hear stuff like that, it's really hard to take."

His story indicated that Big Five tactics could still be effective in the limited sphere of island commerce, even if they had suffered a setback in the major league shipping competition. This could have been little solace, however, when they began to consider the prospects for control of another field of transportation—that of air transport to Hawaii.

When air transportation over the Pacific first loomed as

a rival to its Hawaiian shipping trade, the Matson Line with characteristic foresight assured itself of a share in this business. In 1935 when Pan-American Airways charted its air route across the Pacific, touching at Hawaii, Midway, Wake, Guam and Manila, the Matson Line promptly invested \$500,000 in the proposed system, in return for certain privileges. Pan-American undoubtedly did not need and probably did not want this junior partner in the Hawaiian air trade; but it recognized Matson's air tight control of the many things the new line needed in the Islands, such as fueling accommodations, hotels, etc., so the investments offer was readily accepted. Matson entered the agreement with the understanding that ultimately local service from the West Coast to Hawaii would be segregated from the through service to the Orient and placed under the contract of a company which Matson and PAA would be jointly interested.

The authorities in Washington looked askance at this pact. It was generally agreed that the Matson monopoly was being spread a bit too thick. The Civil Aeronautics Board thereupon announced that the new agreement would not be approved. Subsequently the Board induced Congress to pass a law prohibiting steamship companies from owning airlines.

Nevertheless Matson was able to work hand in hand with PAA until 1941. Nor did the Inter-Island Steam Navigation's control of the Inter-Island Airways seem affected by the Board's law. There was no pretense that the two companies were one and the same interest. One man, Stanley C. Kennedy, was president of both the shipping and the air line.

With the outbreak of war PAA's pioneering Clipper

service across the Pacific was cut down to a shuttle line to the West Coast and back, and this was taken over by the Navy. There was nothing now for air-minded industrialists to do but work on plans for post-war trade. And this a dozen interests did. First on deck was an application to the Civil Aeronautics Board for a shuttle service between Hawaii and the Mainland, made jointly by Matson, PAA and Inter-Island Airways. In July, 1942, the board very firmly turned this down.

"Such a pooling of resources would stifle competition in air transport between Hawaii and the West Coast not only for present, but for years to come," its members agreed.

Another reference to the application revealed that the board was somewhat cynical about the motives behind it. "This application indicates that the elimination of PAA's most likely competition in that part of the Pacific area was one of the principal reasons Pan-American entered into the agreement."

The members also noted that the clause which gave Matson and Inter-Island the exclusive traffic agency for PAA in Hawaii, Samoa, the South Pacific and the Antipodes was very objectionable to the development of air transportation.

Knowing now that there was little hope of cornering Pacific air trade with Pan-American as a partner, Hawaiian interests set out to make it purely an island enterprise. A few months later Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company filed an application with the CAB for a new Hawaiian Airlines route between Los Angeles and Honolulu. In September, 1943, the Matson Company broadened the challenge. They put in for no less than four commercial lines from the West Coast to Hawaii, planning a daily shuttle service

from San Francisco and Los Angeles and a tri-weekly service from Seattle and Portland, Oregon. In addition they applied for rights to start a service from Hawaii down to New Zealand and Australia, over routes the Matson steamers had sailed to the Antipodes. With the CAB ruling against steamship companies owning airlines still on the books, a campaign to get rid of the law was launched.

In October the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* printed a confident note from its Washington bureau stating, "it is expected that Congressional action will be taken shortly offering an amendment to cancel the 1938 Civil Aeronautics ban against steamship lines owning airlines."

The *Honolulu Advertiser*, in a signed article by its publisher, became almost lyrical about Matson's aviation plans. It said: "The Advertiser extends its congratulations to W. P. Roth and executives of the Matson Company . . . may the efforts of the Matson Company to serve be crowned with success!"

By the year's end, however, the Civil Aeronautics Board had taken action on neither Inter-Island's nor the Matson Line's application. And the steamship ban was still on the books. Furthermore, there came disquieting reports that nearly all of the major American transcontinental lines were preparing bids for the trade to Hawaii. Transcontinental & Western Air, and Consolidated, and United Airlines were specifically mentioned. Pan-American, of course, was ready to continue its route to Hawaii and to reopen its through routes to the Orient and the Antipodes. Then there was every expectation that Dutch, British, Chinese and Russian lines would move into the transpacific trade. The chances for Hawaiian interests monopolizing or dominating post-war air traffic in the Pacific looked rather

slim. There was even the horrible prospect, if the CAB steamship ban was not lifted, that Big Five capital which was so inextricably linked in with Matson interests, might not cut into the Pacific aviation melon at all.

It could be seen that the undermining of the Big Five's domination of shipping and air transportation came from external forces—largely the war and the government's desire to protect its people against the evils of monopoly and restraint of competitive trade. This was not so with the revolutionary changes which in the space of two or three years jeopardized the Big Five's smooth control of Hawaii's second ranking industry, the \$50,000,000 pineapple trade.

Here the revolution came strictly from within. It began back in 1940 when, to the dismay of others of the Islands' economic hierarchy, one of their junior members opened a one-man rebellion against the tight, established order. This phenomenon among the current crop of missionary descendants was young Atherton Richards, one of the few members of his generation who seemed to have inherited any of the business acumen and talent for organization which had gone into the development of Hawaii's industries.

As a man in his thirties, Richards had taken over the presidency of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company after its reorganization in 1932 and had guided the faltering business to overwhelming leadership in the trade. Older associates in Big Five circles who publicly admitted that Richards was something of an industrial genius, privately grumbled that something had to be done about the young man's independence and liberal attitude toward some of the cold facts of business. Richards, on the other hand, chafed under the

traditional system of control imposed on island enterprise. Particularly he resented the interference of Big Five executives into Hawaiian Pineapple matters, which often resulted in that firm serving as a pawn for other Big Five interests. In mid-July of 1940, Richards called for a showdown.

His one-man crusade took the form of an attack against that citadel of Big Five strength, Castle & Cooke, Ltd., of whose board of directors he was a member. To understand his motives and to reveal something of the control exercised by the few in Hawaii, a picture of Castle & Cooke ownership should be enlightening. Until 1938 two estates controlled fifty-eight per cent of the firm's stock, the J. B. Atherton Estate, Ltd., holding thirty-one per cent and the S. N. Castle Estate, Ltd., holding twenty-seven and one-half per cent. When in 1938 the Castle estate was dissolved and divided among about seventy-five shareholders, to throw off some of the load of federal taxation, the Atherton Estate, in which the Richards' family held twenty-five per cent of the stock, became the largest single Castle & Cooke shareholder.

One day in July Richards sent to the hundred and seventy Castle & Cooke stockholders a detailed memorandum warning them that the inner circle of Big Five executives was scheming to freeze their grip on the multifarious interests controlled through Castle & Cooke, Ltd., including the Hawaiian Pineapple Company. Specifically he charged that the agency's three senior officers including his uncle, Frank C. Atherton, were promoting a plan to round up enough irrevocable five-year proxies so that the three could control all Castle & Cooke enterprises. The senior officers could control Hawaiian Pineapple because on the latter board they represented not only Castle & Cooke, which

held eighteen per cent of the pineapple stock, but also the Waialua Agricultural Company, another Castle & Cooke holding, which owned thirty-six per cent of the pineapple stock. This gave them a total of sixty-one per cent control. Such a situation was inimical to the interests of most of the 5,246 Hawaiian Pineapple stockholders, Richards charged, because Castle & Cooke could "bleed" the pineapple firm for the benefit of some of their other interests.

"What is to stop them, for example, from boosting the rental for huge pineapple lands leased from Waialua Agricultural Company?" he asked. "Or consider their control of island shipping, upon which the pineapple industry must depend."

The annual report of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company for the year ending May 31, 1940, issued that summer revealed that Richards already had declared war on Castle & Cooke by terminating the Hapco contract which made Castle & Cooke its agent for several functions, such as for the shipping of ten to fifteen million cases of pineapple to the Mainland annually on Matson ships. This was business which could well go to the Dollar line, now freed of its restrictive shipping agreement with the Matson line.

Another of Richards' plans which threatened to upset the status quo was his announced intention of breaking up the pineapple marketing agreement which, he said, was not only restraining trade but serving as a brake upon independent Hawaiian Pine development.

The net result of Richards' assault upon traditional Big Five organization was a counter-attack upon his own business methods and personal life. Honolulu merchant houses buzzed with talk about this ingrate who had turned upon the system by which he had been reared. One of the senior

officers wrote a published statement to Richards picturing him as leading island business on a wild ride.

"It's like that of a stagecoach careening along a narrow road," the critic wrote. "What is needed is a steady old timer holding the reins, with his foot on the brake."

When the annual meeting of Hawaiian Pine was held on August 29, there was no doubt that the senior officers had rounded up enough voting strength to crush Richards' "pineapple rebellion." Moreover, members of the island families concerned had induced Richards to retract some of the charges he had brought against his uncle and other officers. This was the price he paid for keeping his job as president of the world's largest pineapple cannery, for after the meeting the directors reappointed him to office—solely on the condition that he would in the future "stay in line."

That, however, was apparently more than an independent spirit could stand. Richards' further insistence for liberalization in the pineapple business brought him again to blows with the company directors. In March, 1941, the board demanded his resignation. When he declined to submit it, they voted his discharge the next month. A Castle & Cooke vice-president, one of the rising executives "imported" from Mainland business, was named to succeed him as president. Thus, for the time being at least, ended the business career of the young industrialist who had led Hawaiian Pine after its 1932 depression to world dominance in the field. In 1941, with Hawaiian Pine in the lead, Hawaii's pineapple industry had climbed to a \$50,822,533 high. It may not be fair to make the comparison, but in the next year island pineapple production dropped to \$45,899,359.

Later in 1941 Richards left Hawaii to join one of Washington's special military agencies and after the outbreak of

war did service overseas. But this did not mean he was going to accept continued Big Five domination without a struggle. In August, 1942, he called again upon island stockholders to put down autocratic control of Hawaii's business. In individual letters sent to Hawaiian Pine shareholders Richards urged that they enter suits charging Big Five firms with violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act "because conspiracy, illegal marketing agreements and interlocking directorates have caused huge losses to the Hawaiian Pineapple Co." He claimed that they should sue for recovery of hundreds of thousands of dollars lost through "a conspiracy encouraged by Castle & Cooke, Ltd., controlling stockholders in the pineapple company." He claimed that it would have been for the better interest of the company to buy lands of the American Sugar Company on Molokai, but that Castle & Cooke officers forced through continued leasing of the Waialua plantation lands, in which Castle & Cooke had a large interest. He charged that their interest in the Matson Line brought a "conflict of interest" when it came to pineapple shipping and again urged that the shareholders compel the directors to withdraw from the pineapple marketing agreement.

This time Richards' charges seem to have had effect. Although no suits were filed, pressure was brought on Hawaiian Pine directors. On May 27, 1943, the board announced that effective May 31 the firm was withdrawing from the ten-year-old pineapple trust. The directors did it, stockholders were informed, "because we have been advised by attorneys that the cooperative marketing or pooling contract is a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act." Coolly they added that the company would continue to contribute its pro rata share of the cost of marketing pine-

apples still on hand. On June 14 directors of the Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association, Ltd., formally dissolved the organization. The association having been admitted by its sponsors as a violation of anti-trust laws, many a shareholder began now to think seriously of Richards' plan that they sue for recovery of the millions they had forfeited because of the agreement.

If the loss of Richards' leadership had had a damaging effect upon the pineapple trade, then the demands of war accelerated the decline in the industry's profits. Plantations lost more and more acreage to the military, and more and more equipment and men. The shortage of tin supplies hampered canning and disrupted shipping schedules and cut 1942 exporting down considerably. The bad straits of the industry in the first year of war was reflected in territorial tax figures. The pineapple canning base set for collection of gross income taxes for the first half of 1941, which itself was a decline from 1940, was \$19,571,189. In 1942 this base, a dependable barometer of island commerce, was down to \$9,659,551, a cut of more than half.

There was no such figure as Richards to challenge the Big Five's hold on the sugar industry, but a number of other forces were brought into play, largely because of war, which indicated that this older of Hawaii's ranking trades was undergoing a process of change. The war was, indeed, raising havoc with production figures. In 1940, the island plantations had produced 977,000 tons. In 1941 the Agricultural Adjustment Administration boosted this quota to 1,166,554 tons, which would have been an all-time record crop for the industry. But Hawaii's preparation for war was already making inroads on plantation resources. Because

of new limitations on land and labor, they were able to raise and ship only 947,190 tons in 1941.

When the United States entered the war and when it was seen that the Philippines' annual production of nearly a million tons would be lost to the American market, all AAA ceilings on sugar production were cancelled and the price frozen at a lucrative 3.74 cents a pound. Hawaii was told to raise as much cane as she could. It looked like a chance for the island planters to make new war fortunes in sugar. But the offer proved to be a bitter sweet one. In 1942 there was a further shrinking of their land and labor resources. That year the island sugar crop went down to 758,000 tons, the lowest production in decades. It was a heart-wrenching experience for the planters.

There was another sobering thought in their industry's war trade. Sugar interests had always contended that the territory's 500,000 population depended, almost to a man, upon sugar prosperity. As sugar went, they said, so went the welfare of the people. War dissipated the theory, for the duration at least. Although sugar income slumped drastically in the first two years of war, the people of Hawaii never had been so prosperous. Defense industries had more than taken up the slack. They had taken nearly half of the sugar plantations' 35,000 workers. And as a result civilian payrolls bulged larger than ever. Territorial tax figures showed that incomes went from \$194,000,000 in 1941 to \$290,000,000 in 1942, nearly a hundred million dollars' gain in one year. Even the men who remained on the plantations shared in the war prosperity. So that they would not be lured away to defense jobs, too, they had been given general pay increases. It seemed that reduced sugar profits hit only the plantation stockholders and the Big Five, which

controlled so many of the shares. The common people were doing all right.

Just before the outbreak of war the HSPA had been planning to import 5000 more plantation laborers from the Philippines. The plan had aroused a storm of protest from island labor leaders and from those who had been aware of the results of earlier cheap labor importation. Opponents of the plan united in demanding that instead of importing more laborers the HSPA call for the closing down of marginal plantations which had been kept alive for years despite chronic losses. HSPA men replied that formerly these plantations were kept going to keep men from being thrown out of employment, an answer which did not hold water after Hawaii had been suffering a labor shortage for nearly three years.

When the military took over the sugar acreage there was a further demand that production be concentrated on the more fertile areas. Still the marginal plantations hung on. Those who knew something of the relationships between the five sugar agencies and the plantations understood why. Even when the plantations operated at a loss—borne by comparatively widely spread shareholders—the agencies could make money from them. Agency fees were based on gross receipts of the plantations, not on profits. Moreover, even a losing plantation had to buy hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of equipment and supplies—from fertilizers to giant harvesters—all of which meant additional income for the Big Five who were their buying agents.

Islanders were not speaking figuratively when they said the Big Five were forever taking money out of one pocket and putting it in the other.

Sugar financing was traditionally conducted in this

opportunistic way and the custom so attracted a member of the University of Hawaii faculty that he devoted his doctorate thesis to the subject. Plantation stock, he found, had been "watered" as assiduously as plantation cane. Lihue Plantation, for example, had a capital stock of \$700,000 in 1898. This was doubled when the plantation was incorporated in 1892. In 1910 a second stock dividend of 100 per cent was paid, and in 1916 a sixty per cent stock dividend. In 38 years the plantation paid its stockholders, aside from its cash disbursements, stock dividends in the proportion of 260 per cent of its original stock. Hawaiian Commercial Sugar Company, in the twenty-year period from 1913 to 1933, paid an average of sixteen per cent on declared capital, sixty-nine per cent on actual invested capital.

A missionary historian, E. Damon, somewhat naively condoned the practice when he wrote in 1898, "The capitalization of Lihue is to be increased, a necessary measure to stop the continued cries against big dividends."

"Under such disguise," the university professor's thesis noted, "the Hawaiian industry had constantly beseeched U. S. Congress to continue protection on the grounds of the comparative non-profitability of the industry."

He went further and estimated what this protection had cost the American consumer. "In the decade following annexation," he wrote, "the subsidy amounted to between ten and fifteen million a year. In 1932 and 1933 it was forty million. For the doubtful privilege of obtaining sugar from an American possession, the people have been forced to 'pay the piper' and between 1898 and 1933 the total benefits accruing to the Hawaiian interests because of the tariff have been not less than \$670,000,000 on a total value

of sugar shipped to the United States of about \$1,820,000,-000."

The tie-in of island plantations with the five Honolulu sugar factors was generally recognized as being so fundamental a necessity of operation that a plantation which broke off relations with its agency was virtually announcing that it was going out of business. This was the case with a plantation on the island of Kauai. In March, 1941, the Kauai planter, Charles Rice, decided that the only party benefiting from his sugar production was American Factors, Ltd.

"My plantation's become too much a factory in the field from which the cream goes to the agency and the skim milk to the planter," Rice said, in a public statement. He added that he was going to use his acreage henceforth for cattle raising.

Rice's plantation was a small one, but his action was one which must have given every Big Five executive cause for thought.

For island sugar men who had already seen so much of their land and labor taken from them, there were other omens which raised the chilling possibility that by the war's end Hawaii's sugar industry might be not only crippled but actually on the way to its demise. For one thing, war was proving a boon to the Mainland beet sugar and cane interests. While Hawaii was plagued by shipping, land, and labor problems, those areas were relatively unaffected by such evils and were boosting production to new records. How much chance would Hawaii have, after the war, of influencing Washington to cut down this Mainland production so that the island plantations could get

back on their feet? Sugar-producing southern states had many Congressional votes to back up their demands in the national capital. Hawaii had none.

Then there was the fear that war shortages would have the effect of weaning consumers away from sugar. It was a prospect which the sugar interests took very seriously. They recognized the danger soon after America announced its program of sugar rationing. In 1941 the per capita consumption of sugar in the United States was 114 pounds. In 1942 it dropped to less than 75 pounds. As though this were not enough, government nutritionists and professional medical men went on record as asserting that on the whole the shrinkage in consumer use was a good thing. The average American, they indicated, had been eating far too much sweets.

This naturally brought the sugar interests to their feet, fighting. In a series of bulletins which were put out as part of a quickly-organized promotional campaign defending sugar, they assailed the staid American Medical Association, which had supported the anti-sugar statement. Growers from Hawaii joined those of other U. S. areas in establishing and financing the "Sugar Research Foundation" to carry out their counter attack. They announced that one of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's most famous chemists would conduct a "broad program of research into the chemical and nutritional properties of sugar."

The prospect of reduced sugar activity inevitably pushed the question of diversified crops into the spotlight. Sugar planters had always been somewhat allergic to the suggestion, so shortly after the war started, it began to be suggested to the territorial land commission and among some

politicians that the Territory force the plantations to use more acreage for diversified foodstuffs. They urged this so that the Islands might be self-supporting. For many years before the war Hawaii had imported on Matson ships eighty-five per cent of its foodstuffs, more than sixty per cent of which was fresh produce which could be grown on the fertile soil of the Islands. Under prodding of the military, and because of new AAA soil conservation requirements, the plantations war did turn additional acreage over to vegetable farming after the outbreak of war, but it was felt that the surface had only been scratched.

One member of the Legislature had a plan of his own. He was not ready to present it, he said, until there were enough independent legislators elected to guarantee some support for his bill.

"The Territory itself," he pointed out, "is Hawaii's largest land owner, with title to thirty-eight per cent of the lands. Much of the sugar industry's 250,000 acres are leased from the Territory. The Legislature, under the terms of Hawaii's Organic Act, can break any of these leases for the purpose of turning the lands over to Hawaiian homesteaders. Well, some day enough legislators are going to wake up and use this power as a threat to make the sugar people toe the line. I'm ready to do it now for the sake of diversified agriculture."

Innumerable educators and economists had pointed out that Hawaii was essentially an agricultural community, and should at least be self-supporting. In a volume that amounted to a diplomatic indictment of sugar industry policies, Dr. David L. Crawford, when president of the University of Hawaii, had pointed out the paradox of the Territory's agricultural destiny and the failure to prepare itself as an

agricultural community. His inference was that plantation life and the prospects offered by the sugar industry were hardly enough to lure present or future generations to agriculture. It was time, he said, that new conceptions of economy were put in the Islands.

“Rugged individualism,” as he put it, “was a noble characteristic of the nineteenth century, but it scarcely fits the twentieth.”

His patient thesis seemed primarily an effort to convert island leadership away from the social patterns handed down from the missionaries through generations of sugar men. He even reminded Hawaii that “the chief objective of industry is not the accumulation of wealth for a few, but the providing of a way for the social order to be more successful as a whole.”

Dr. Crawford’s book and many of his advanced ideas on education did not sit well with the island industrialists. Nor did they serve to improve his relations with some members of the University Board of Regents, notably Regent S. N. Castle. In the fall of 1941 President Crawford charged Castle with deliberately obstructing the progress of the university program. Shortly afterwards Dr. Crawford resigned, over the protests of the student body, the general community and even the local newspapers. After returning to the Mainland he impressed the Board of Economic Warfare enough with his views on agricultural economy to be appointed a foreign advisor for this key war organization.

Perhaps as revolutionary as any of the changes Hawaii was then undergoing was the emergence of an entirely new trade as the Territory’s basic industry. By the end of 1943 sugar and pineapples were no longer the dominating giants

of Hawaiian industry. The new wartime colossus was construction. Tax figures for 1942 and 1943 showed how thoroughly the defense industry overshadowed Hawaii's traditionally ranking industries. For the first half of 1943 the tax base fixed for sugar was \$27,727,722 and for pineapples, \$14,771,927. The base for contracting was \$49,756,487 more than the original industries combined. And there was no doubt that construction was going to continue in the lead for the duration and probably for some years after.

This development was a significant one, for the defense industry thrust several new important forces into island economy. For one thing, it was fresh capital, imported from big Mainland firms, which financed these projects. The returns, in profits and wages, went back overseas to home offices and to the families of men on these jobs. And the projects were controlled by new leaders, executives from large Mainland cities who were experienced in modern industrial and labor relations. The men who worked for them—estimated at around 60,000 in number—were largely imported Mainlanders, skilled workmen whose presence altered considerably the traditional feudal structure of the islands' population. These were forces—new capital, leadership and labor—which were bound to be directed to whatever opportunities the island community offered after the war. In whatever enterprise they turned to, they would be under no obligation to favor Big Five interests. Their influence was bound to have a refreshing effect on island business, politics, and community life.

Even within the ranks of Big Five leadership itself there seemed to be the beginning of a new order of things. This was being brought about by the exit from the stage of several members of the inner circle. Just before the war

death removed Richard A. Cooke, president of C. Brewer Co., Ltd., and also president of nearly a score of sugar plantations, island public utilities, and other concerns. Mr. Cooke symbolized, more than any other figure in island life, the ideals handed down by the early missionary-industrialists. He was succeeded as president of the Big Five agency by C. Brewer's vice-president, Philip Spalding, a man born on the Mainland who came to the islands with a background of Mainland business experience.

Other senior members of the inner Big Five circle were withdrawing from active business. These included Frank C. Atherton, former president of Castle & Cooke and a dominant figure in a dozen other Big Five enterprises; John Waterhouse, president of Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., and Alfred Castle, president of the Honolulu Rapid Transit, the Honolulu Gas Company, and also an officer of several other key businesses.

Significantly, these men were turning over their tasks to successors who, in nearly every instance, were executives imported from the Mainland. Among today's generation of the Castles, Cookes and other missionary families there was hardly a man prepared to step to the controls of the industries their forebears had founded.

Another significant change was the notable reduction of multiple officeholding. Several men were ready to succeed to the several offices which traditionally one man had held. The four Big Five executives named above had held offices and directorships in thirty or forty island enterprises; but now a dozen or two men were slated to succeed them.

The extent of interlocking directorates in Hawaiian business was well illustrated by the case of American Factors, Ltd. The fifteen officers of this ten million dollar agency

sat as officers or directors in no less than sixty-nine other island corporations. These included twenty-eight sugar corporations, four pineapple firms, three irrigation companies, seven public utilities, four Matson and Inter-Island affiliations, two newspapers, etc. Capitalization of the commercial domain in which this one Big Five agency was represented totaled \$241,485,522. The holdings and directorate relations of the other four agencies made up much the same amazing picture.

One Honolulu businessman described the transfer of leadership taking place in Hawaiian industry as "the emergence of the hired man." For a decade or two the executives imported by officers of the old order had been gradually moving closer to the inner circle. When they began actually to take over the reins of firms like Castle & Cooke, C. Brewer, the Hawaiian Pineapple Company and their affiliates, it could literally be said that this was economic revolution.

The transfer from ownership control to managerial control *was* revolutionary.

For the future of Hawaii's economy it was bound to have far-reaching results, some good, some not so good. One possible effect was that the new manager type of business leader might be even more ruthless because his success would be measured by each fiscal year's balance sheet, whereas the former paternalistic owner-leaders could very well stand a year or two of losses so long as substantial earnings were sighted ahead. Several of the new and prospective manager-leaders had for years been recognized as little more than "top sergeants" for senior officers of the Big Five. In some cases there was small likelihood that promotion would broaden their social vision. On the other

hand some of the new leaders had already spoken out for liberalization of Big Five policies.

The need for such liberalization cannot be better illustrated than by the history of the Big Five's industrial relations and how labor in Hawaii, so long bound down by hard-knuckled paternalism, finally forged ahead in its struggle for recognition.

7

LABOR VERSUS PATERNALISM

"I can see little difference between the importation of foreign laborers and the importation of jute bags from India."

—Richard A. Cooke, HSPA President, 1930.

The industrialists of Hawaii, most of them reared in the traditions handed down by missionary forebears, almost without exception looked upon labor unionism as a malignant, foreign menace to island enterprise. Unionism, to them, was synonymous with dangerous radicalism; it must be relentlessly fought, if their own economy was to survive. This was a policy they accepted as something of a sacred duty, part of their role as guardians of Hawaii's future.

Accordingly every attempt to organize labor met the full fury of aroused paternalism. In few parts of the nation has labor had to contend with a more stubborn or ruthless foe.

A number of studies made by impartial investigators support this. U. S. Department of Labor in 1939, came right to the point. "Hawaiian management has used every influence at its command to restrict labor organization," it said.

The history of labor organization in Hawaii contains many ugly chapters. Beatings, shootings, conspiracy and coercion marked the defense that island industry threw up against the threat of unionism. In addition, they used the

more subtle weapons of their control of politics, little business, and the press.

Yet labor progressed in the Territory. Before the outbreak of war unionism finally won recognition along several industrial fronts. Many employers had been forced to yield ground, forced to give some small voice to the people who made up the broad base of the Islands' social structure. But they had resisted every inch of the way. They knew that the first cracks in their defense would eventually bring the whole structure tumbling down.

Immediately after December 7, 1941, business interests of Hawaii, particularly the sugar industries, made every effort to regain the ground they had lost. For a time they made some progress. Then, as the impact of war industry began to be felt, they saw that new strength was infused into the ranks of Hawaii's workers. They heard labor asking for rights in the Islands which had been enjoyed for years on the Mainland. Worse still, they saw that among the ranks of organized labor were thousands of the sons of men whom they had imported to work their plantations. Young Japanese carpenters, electricians, painters and common laborers had joined with the Hawaiian, Chinese, and Caucasian workers to ask a more equitable share in the profits of island trade.

Unions had sprung up in nearly every industry. Only the plantations, bound to be a last line of defense, had effectively held off labor organization. Yet even there a start had been made, and in 1943 some plantation managers were ready to acknowledge that complete unionization was only a matter of time.

Such an admission was a far cry from the fierce resoluteness with which past generations of island planters had

fought the demands of the sugar workers. In 1895 when the Labor Commissioner of the Republic reported on plantation strikes during the year, he spoke of "agitators, evil disposed, thriftless and dangerous people who are mischief-makers and inciters to strikes and disputes."

Plantation managers of those days knew how to take care of such unrest. "About a dozen lashes with a black-snake and you will soon stop this strike business," one was quoted as saying.

At that time, of course, plantation workers were regarded simply as chattel, illiterate Asiatics brought to Hawaii under penal contract. A threat of group action from such as these was something to confound the average sugar pioneer. The Hawaiian Planters Monthly, their trade paper, stated their attitude in 1882. "The industrial condition of these islands requires people as laborers who are accustomed to subordination, to permanency of abode and who have moderate expectations in regard to a livelihood." There it was, in a nutshell.

It was somewhat of a shock in 1909 when 7,000 Oahu sugar workers walked off their plantations in a strike for better living conditions and higher wages. The field hands, most of them Japanese, wanted an eight dollar raise over the \$15 to \$26 a month they were being paid. Penal contracts had been voided by annexation to the United States and the workers pointed out that they were not now forced to work on the plantations, but were voluntarily staying on as members of the community. As such, they were expected to accept community responsibilities, including support of their churches and their schools. The Japanese were backed up in their demands by Japanese newspapers and business firms, who raised \$42,000 as a strike fund.

The plantations were ready to spend much more than that, however, to break the strike. They immediately recruited hundreds of Hawaiian and Chinese laborers, paying them substantially more than the strikers got or were asking for. The planters were pursuing their usually successful policy of racial "divide and rule." And again it worked. The field hands stayed out from May to August, then went back without their raises. It cost the sugar association, which divided the loss among its membership, \$2,000,000, but labor had been successfully held down.

After the 1909 strike the sugar planters tried desperately but with little success to get fresh laborers from Russia, Portugal and the Philippines as protection against the threat of more strikes. Also, they started a general program of welfare work on the plantations and announced bonus payments. For the next ten years they had no trouble.

In January, 1920, Filipino and Japanese workers on six Oahu plantations joined in demanding \$1.25 a day for an eight-hour working day. To planters used to paying less than a dollar for a ten or twelve-hour day, the demand was preposterous. Three times they turned it down. When the workers struck, 12,000 of them were evicted from plantation houses. About six thousand went to Honolulu. An epidemic of influenza was raging there and it killed off 1,500 of them. In February the Filipinos went back to the fields but the Japanese stayed out until July, when enough of them returned to break the strike. Again they had won no concessions. This time the plantations had spent \$12,000,000 to beat them back.

The plantations succeeded in killing off another strike in 1924, but this time blood was added to the millions it cost. In April 13,000 Filipinos went on strike, asking two dollars

for an eight-hour day. Throughout the summer the HSPA brought in thousands more workers from the Philippines, assigned spies to the various plantations, and systematically deported strike leaders as undesirables.

At the annual meeting of the association that summer the HSPA president bemoaned the demands of labor.

"The cry for increased compensation is but the frenzied howl of self-appointed leaders," he reminded his fellow planters.

Bloodshed in the 1924 strike came in September when strikers on a Kauai plantation kidnapped two Filipino strike breakers to make sure they would quit work. A force of police led by the deputy sheriff swooped down on their plantation camp and a pitched battle ensued. When it was over, sixteen laborers and four policemen were dead. Many more were wounded. The National Guard was called over from Honolulu and sixty-seven strikers were arrested; sixty of them were sentenced to four years in prison. The camp leader was banished from the Territory. Upon the urging of a special commissioner sent from the Philippines, backed by the Governor-General of the Philippines, the field hands returned to work, having won nothing by their long hold-out. This was the last serious strike the plantations had to combat.

In the meantime, more conservative labor organization had been taking place among craftsmen in Hawaii. As early as 1857 a union had been formed—Hawaiian Mechanics Benefit Union; however, it was designed for fraternal, rather than bargaining purposes. It was dissolved in 1873. By 1903 there were unions of boilermakers, electrical workers, machinists, plumbers, blacksmiths, carpenters, hack-

men, and longshoremen. During a building boom around the turn of the century several of these groups went out on strikes and won them.

If they thought, however, that the island industries would make a custom of gracefully yielding demands henceforth, they were to be thoroughly disillusioned. When the conservative American Association of Master, Mates and Pilots struck against the Inter-Island Steamship Co. in 1912, demanding a fifteen per cent pay increase, the company president imported sixteen masters and mates from New York at a cost far greater than the strikers' demands. Those who had gone on strike were not re-employed. Here was evidence that industry was still ready to fight unionism, regardless of the cost.

About that time Japanese workers in the Islands determined where their loyalties should lie in this controversy between labor and capital. In October, 1916, when island shippers discharged sixteen Japanese workers, more than a thousand members of the International Longshoremen's Union, mostly Hawaiians, went on strike. A parade of three thousand workers and sympathizers was held in their behalf. The united stand of the longshoremen, regardless of race, induced the shippers to settle the strike by returning most of the discharged Japanese to work. On the other hand in August, of 1918, when workers of the Oahu Railway Company asked for a thirty per cent wage increase, the company discharged nine foremen and seventy wharf workers as agitators. All these were Japanese. Workers of other races were employed in their place and employment of Japanese was discontinued. Island Japanese became staunch labor men, when they could.

Public utilities in Hawaii successfully resisted attempts at

organization among their workers in 1920, when strikes were broken at both the Mutual Telephone Company and the Honolulu Rapid Transit Company. The HRT met the strike threat by firing its leaders, granting a general pay increase, and forming a controlled company union. The telephone company, where workers were notoriously ill-paid, broke a three months' strike without giving in. Among those returning to their jobs was a worker who had been getting \$75 a month for eighteen years.

Island industry had pretty well established that it was ready to go to any financial lengths rather than accede to strike demands. For more than a decade the spirit of labor organization was apparently broken. So thorough was the defeat that a member of the Territorial Legislature, Rep. William Gozier, was moved to mention the matter to some visiting Congressmen. "Any workingman who tries to organize," he told them, "is looked upon as a communist, a radical and a red. Employers discharge men in the Territory of Hawaii for joining unions."

In those years island business strengthened its defenses against labor by having the Legislature pass three anti-labor laws. However, they were each so palpably unconstitutional that violations, no matter how flagrant, were never brought to court.

First of these acts was a "Criminal Syndicalism" law, passed in 1919. It provided that anyone advocating crime, violence, sabotage or other unlawful methods of terrorism as "a means of accomplishing industrial or political ends" would be liable to a fine of up to \$5,000, or ten years in prison, or both. The measure was broad enough to cover almost any labor meeting.

The second, known as the "Anarchistic Publication" law,

passed in 1921, prohibited the publication in any language of material which aimed to restrain persons "from freely engaging in lawful business or employment" or "creating distrust or dissension between peoples of different races." This obviously was sugar's answer to the assistance that Japanese language newspapers had given in the 1920 plantation strike. It, too, was never invoked.

The third of the laws, passed in 1923, was known as the anti-picketing law. It was introduced in the Legislature by the Speaker of the House, a prominent HSPA attorney, as a measure "to protect labor." One labor leader had his own description of this act. "It prohibited anybody from talking to anybody during labor trouble," he said.

During the shipping strikes of 1936-37 this law was openly defied by seamen who picketed the Honolulu waterfront and Castle & Cooke's office building without an arrest being made. Shortly afterwards the proprietresses of two Oahu houses of ill-fame similarly defied the law. Their houses had been closed by the Honolulu police because they were not among the recognized places of business, so the two women picketed the police station in protest. Both of them carried placards. "Honolulu Police Are Unfair." They marched around the police building daily without being molested. This failed to reopen business.

Legalities, however, were not to hold down the campaign that began in a new sector of Honolulu labor in 1935. This was the movement for an improvement of labor standards in the vital waterfront trades. It was begun by the long-shoremen after their San Francisco unions had won better wages and working conditions along the Embarcadero in 1934. Several West Coast labor leaders came to Honolulu

in August of 1935, and on October 15 they held the first meeting of waterfront workers. The very next day Castle & Cooke, the largest employer of stevedores, announced that a ten cents an hour pay increase was to begin "forthwith" for all its longshoremen. Soon after that it was announced that turkeys and a bonus would be given all stevedores at Christmas, the first time such gifts had befallen the waterfront men. The Big Five's dominant member was trying hard to woo her workers away from the labor organizations.

One of the union agents from San Francisco, Joseph Blue, of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, was not allowed to even go near the waterfront; the Honolulu police saw to that. He soon departed to tell the incredible story to union men back on the coast. But another of the San Francisco organizers was a former Honolulu man, Maxie Weisbarth, a part Hawaiian, who was not so easily intimidated. Soon after his arrival Weisbarth received a threatening note, advising him to get out of town. A hardened veteran of labor warfare along the San Francisco waterfront, Weisbarth paid little attention to the warning. A few days later, however, he thought of the note when a friend of his, member of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, was badly beaten up, his nose broken and skull fractured.

Honolulu newspapers ignored these goings-on until December 17, when the manager of the Honolulu Seaman's Institute, a Community Chest and a Big Five supported home for merchantmen, was arraigned in circuit court and found guilty of conspiracy. Court testimony was that the manager, Garnet Burum, had hired two thugs (both of whom pleaded guilty and were given suspended sentences of thirteen months) to beat up Weisbarth and Charles Post, another union agent. The hired goons went about their job

industriously enough but they mistook one Carl Olson, the SUP man, for Post. When they were arrested later, the thugs testified they had been promised \$150, the services of a lawyer, if needed, and the personal protection of Honolulu's chief of police.

At a subsequent National Labor Relations Board hearing, Burum told more details of the conspiracy. Somewhere along the way he had undergone a change of heart.

"Why did you want Post and Weisbarth beaten up?" Burum was asked.

"I was paid to arrange a reception party for them," he replied.

"By whom?"

"Frank E. Thompson."

Thompson was the Matson Line's legal representative in Hawaii.

"What did you get for the job?"

"He paid my \$400 fine and gave me \$300 for lawyer's fees."

In October, 1937, Burum repeated this testimony before a meeting of the Congressional committee studying Hawaii's plea for statehood.

Meanwhile, on the paternalistic side, the Matson line was still attempting to bring waterfront workers around. In February, 1936, an attractive recreational program was arranged for the stevedores. The Matson Athletic Club was formed, and a new personnel officer made visits to the homes of workers. Wages remained the same.

But the longshoremen continued to sign up in the new CIO union that was being organized. A Hawaiian stevedore, Harry Kealoha, led the movement. And toward the end of 1936 when the West Coast waterfront strike was

called, more than eight hundred Honolulu and Hilo long-shoremen joined the 40,000 Coast men in striking.

During the ninety-eight day strike, more Honolulu stevedores were signing up with the new ILWU. The long-shoremen found out during the strike that they were no longer allowed in the Seaman's Institute, the home which public funds supported and where a convicted labor conspirator was still employed as manager.

Several incidents during the maritime strike were evidence of what most Honolu'ans already knew: that, for the Honolulu police, any desire of the Big Five was a command. At one time when Castle & Cooke wanted to move some of their strike-bound ships from dock to dock, a score of members of the Honolulu police force were sworn in as special U. S. marshals (to keep within the Maritime Commission regulations) and served as crew to shift the vessels.

Later a *Star-Bulletin* reporter who went out to a ship that was standing off port to avoid getting tied up in the strike, obliged the crew by taking ashore \$1,500 they had contributed toward Honolulu's strike fund. Upon reaching shore, the reporter was apprehended by police and the money taken from him. He was soon released and the money was later turned over to the union, but it was evident that the police were acting on special orders throughout.

Again, a part-Hawaiian waterfront policeman without apparent cause assaulted a union agent. The policeman was haled into court where nearly fifty Hawaiian waterfront men testified against him, but he was acquitted. It was well known around the waterfront that this policeman made

regular reports, not only to the Honolulu police station, but to the shipping department manager of Castle & Cooke, Ltd.

A bloodier campaign than Castle & Cooke's was the struggle which its affiliate, the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., had in trying to hold down the demands of waterfront labor. In May, 1938, the Inland Boatmen's Union and the ILWU jointly protested against wages and practices of the Inter-Island Line. One of the principal complaints was that the company made crew members do, without pay, the work in various ports which longshoremen should be doing. A strike was called which carried on through June and July.

On August 1 one of the company's ships, the *Waialeale*, was to arrive in the port of Hilo with a strike-breaking crew. As a demonstration against the company and the strike-breakers, various unions in the little city of Hilo decided they would parade down to the dock and greet the ship.

Nearly five hundred men and women of a dozen Hilo union organizations gathered in downtown Hilo on the morning of August 1. When they were a block from the waterfront they were challenged by firemen, lined up with equipment intended to douse the crowd, and by another line of policemen armed with tear gas bombs. The fire hoses fizzled out; they could not throw enough water to reach the paraders. And when the policemen threw their bombs, the union people tossed them back.

At the dock, where the *Waialeale* was just berthing, sixty policemen, with guns and drawn bayonets, were waiting. A police lieutenant jostled the front line of demonstrators back with his bayoneted gun. One of the line was slow in

stepping back. The officer tapped him on the face with the broad side of the bayonet. Some in the crowd growled warnings and someone reached out to grab the rifle stock. No one was able to describe what happened next. Some said the lieutenant "lost his head," and lunged out at one of the union men, stabbing him through the back. That seemed a signal for action. Police guns blazed into the crowd. The demonstrators fell back, without resisting. Some dropped, wounded.

When the firing was over, thirty-six of the union crowd had been shot. Five were seriously wounded.

The Attorney-General of the Territory made a formal investigation into the shootings. The sheriff testified that he had ordered his men to fill their guns with birdshot, but slugs larger than that were dug out of the wounded. The grand jury prepared to bring charges. The bayonet victim filed a damage suit of \$25,000. Nothing, however, came of any of the actions. Two weeks later the Inter-Island union resumed work, most of their demands granted.

There were several developments at this time which gave fresh heart to labor, and there followed a period of unprecedented union successes which carried through to the outbreak of war. On the heels of all the publicity given unionism during the maritime controversies came the appointment of a full time National Labor Relations Board director for the Islands. Spokesmen for various labor groups discovered that here they could find an unprejudiced, authoritative audience for their grievances. NLRB hearings flushed out into the open dozens of labor-employer feuds and uncovered many unsavory labor practices. These hearings served as an educational process, not only for the cases under study but for all island employers and work-

ers. Every labor-management problem that was solved served to show that more than paternalism was needed in modern labor relations.

To some employers this was something of a revelation. There was, for instance, the owner of Young Brothers, Ltd., a prosperous tug and barge concern. When employees of his firm announced that they had organized, he could hardly believe it. "This is like a bombshell in our happy family. I've treated my men just like a daddy!"

In the three years before the war a wave of unionism swept through island industries. Brewery workers, laundry workers, teamsters, quarrymen, taxicab drivers, dairy workers and metal tradesmen signed up, mostly with conservative American Federation of Labor unions. Clerks in the Kress five-and-ten-cent stores, getting one of the lowest wage scales of any business, affiliated with the United Retail and Wholesale Workers' Association, a CIO unit. Hotel and restaurant employees and bartenders organized one of the largest unions of all. Even public utility workers joined the movement. Honolulu Rapid Transit drivers signed up with the AFL's Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America. Honolulu Gas Company men joined the AFL United Electrical and Gas Workers Union.

When the 1939 Legislature came around it looked as though even big business had jumped on the bandwagon. In that session the legislators passed a bill establishing a Territorial Department of Labor, purportedly to campaign against unfair labor practices.

After Governor Poindexter appointed the members of the department's board and a director was picked, it became

apparent that labor was not going to benefit much from the program. The chairman was an obscure personal friend of the governor's, with no background of labor or industrial relations. Of the four other board members, one was an officer of the Pacific Guano & Fertilizer Co., a Big-Five subsidiary and a prime mover in the labor-baiting Industrial Association of Hawaii, and the third was a ukelele-playing member of the Hawaii Musicians' Union. The latter was supposed to represent labor on the board. The new department director had been a minor civil service official on the little island of Maui.

With the department organized, it was discovered that there were few laws beneficial to labor which it was in a position to enforce except musty child labor regulations and the accepted compensation procedure. But the Territory's spineless department at least did not hinder the expanding organization of labor. Within another year unionism had spread even within the gates of the plantations themselves. In October, 1940, the McBryde Sugar Co. of Hauai signed a wage contract with its employees, organized as a unit of the CIO's United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing & Allied Workers of America.

Then another Big Five stronghold weakened. In June, 1941, Castle & Cooke Terminals and McCabe, Hamilton & Renny, Honolulu's two stevedoring firms, gave up the six-year struggle they had waged so bitterly and signed contracts with the CIO's International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, representing 1,400 Honolulu waterfront workers. Next, the stevedoring firms for the Kauai and Hilo waterfronts signed similar contracts.

It seemed that labor, which had for so long been held helpless in the tight grip of a feudal paternalism, was march-

ing on to a more equitable share in Hawaii's economy. Nor were the gains merely economic. In finding its voice through unions, labor was beginning to find, too, that it was to have a voice in various forms of democratic process. For the first time its representatives were being given places on community boards and commissions. In 1940 even the ultra-conservative Honolulu Community Chest decided that a representative of labor might sit in with the board which distributed the funds collected in the community welfare drive. And labor began to form political clubs planned to put up men for office.

The war brought a wave of reaction. At first glance this might seem natural, but a closer look revealed that some of the Island interests were taking advantage of the opportunity to crack down on labor organization. A common technique was to reproach union groups with the charge that war time was no time to be starting labor disputes. Plantation executives, taking their prearranged places in semi-military defense organizations, found the opportunity ripe to hack away at labor leadership.

A case in point was the arrest in Kauai of Ichiro Izuka, young president of island's longshore union. Kauai's civilian board of investigation, made up largely of plantation officials, charged that Izuka by distributing labor literature during lunch hours was "delaying the war effort." There was no attempt to charge him with subversive activities, for the young labor leader was too well-known as the island's most militant spokesman against Japanese aggression. Nevertheless, Izuka spent five months under detention. He was finally released when labor men in Honolulu brought the case to the attention of the intelligence section of the mili-

tary government, which after an investigation of the case ordered his immediate release.

It was the Army, however, which stepped in when it looked as though Castle & Cooke Terminals was setting out to smash the waterfront unions in Honolulu immediately after war was declared. Army officials decided that the vital work of unloading war cargoes could best be handled through union leadership. Word was given that the long-shore unions were to be left strictly alone.

The Army subsequently found it had decided well. In the first two years of war, Honolulu's 2,000 stevedores, thirty per cent of whom were Japanese, established the highest rating for any port in the world for rapid turn around of ships. Moreover, in the latter part of 1943, the office of the military governor was presented with a plan worked out by Jack H. Kawano, young Japanese president of the Honolulu ILWU. This plan was designed to improve the port's efficiency and to cut down on absenteeism among waterfront workers. It called for appointment of a labor-management committee by the military governor to work on production schedules. It also proposed the pooling of the three Honolulu stevedoring company's workers and equipment as a way of speeding up the handling of cargoes. Kawano had already suggested his plan to the three companies. The American Stevedores, Ltd., recently formed to handle only defense cargoes, immediately agreed with the plan. McCabe, Hamilton & Renny declared itself ready to consider the proposal. Castle & Cooke turned it down.

The military governor's office still had the plan under consideration at the end of the year.

Generally, labor found that after the initial paralysis following the December 7 attack, it had a respectable voice in

war industry in the Islands. This was because the military saw that labor was represented on each of the boards set up to handle manpower problems. In the Office of Labor Control organized by General Emmons, a seven man board was appointed to oversee essential war industries, such as army and navy defense projects, the public utilities and all waterfront work. Four of the men represented the services and employers, three of them represented labor. The longshoremen's CIO agent, the AFL agent, and a worker from the defense job unions were labor's spokesmen on the control board. Soon after being organized this board allowed an increase in defense work wages, which had been frozen as of December 7, 1941. Utility and waterfront workers, however, were not included in the increase.

Labor was also well represented on the special manpower board appointed by Governor Stainback to govern other essential industries. The Hawaii representative of the Social Security Board served as chairman of this board, upon which sat three representatives of industry and three of labor. Kawano, the ILWU president, the AFL agent and the secretary of the Hotel, Restaurant and Bartenders' Union represented labor. Executives of one of the pineapple canneries, the Waialua sugar plantation and the Oahu Railway Company represented employers.

In addition to these two controls, national labor policies were carried out under supervision of the Hawaii representative of the War Manpower Commission.

It would seem that with such representation Island labor might be able to breathe more easily. But any such assumption would overlook the tenacity with which the industrialists defended their control of local economy. In the spring of 1943, during the regular session of the Legislature, there

came an attempt to legislate against unionism. It was a thrust which only the veto action of Governor Stainback staved off.

In September the magazine *Hawaii*, supported largely by Big Five advertising, editorially pictured labor as insidiously leagued with the federal administration in an attempt to bankrupt the nation. "If there is any sincerity in the President's and the Congress' announced determination to fight inflation," the magazine's lead article suggested, "they will get to the source—high wages." The editorial cited high wages and boom time prices in Honolulu as evidence that the nation was going to pot.

Another Big Five stratagem which labor interpreted as a dodge to avoid the development of labor-management committees (sponsored in other parts of the nation by the War Production Board) was a movement called the "Governor's Work to Win Committee." On the surface this movement, started in 1943, was a spontaneous, patriotic one led by a voluntary committee appointed by the civilian governor for the purpose of building up defense work morale and preventing absenteeism in local industry. Actually, the campaign, organized and financed by Honolulu's big business firms, seemed more concerned with keeping Hawaiian trades up to production standards. The firms had pooled \$100,000 to promote the movement. This would obviously have been a plum for Sydney Bowman in the giddy, pre-war days. And, sure enough, out of the ashes of the old Bowman, Holst, Macfarlane & Richardson partnership stepped the one remaining member of the firm, Milton Holst, to take over the job. Assembling a staff of publicity specialists much as Mr. Bowman would have done, Mr. Holst prepared a program of newspaper and radio publicity

calculated to boost production and reduce absenteeism.

The "Work to Win" program provided the sugar and pineapple interests with an opportunity they had long desired: to get island youth back to the soil. In peacetime diverse methods had been tried to win over the young people of the Islands—largely the children and grandchildren of men these industries had brought to Hawaii—to an interest in sugar and pineapple labor; but the results had been lean. Now the commissioners of public instruction obliged. They ruled that the tenth day of every school student over twelve years old would be a work day. If he did not join the field gangs transported to the plantation fields, he would have to work around the school building or perform at some task assigned by the teachers. The plan was one which the Hawaii Congress of Parents and Teachers had violently opposed. Later they changed their minds and endorsed it officially. Truckloads of boys and girls on their way to the fields soon became a common sight.

Labor leaders did not oppose this effort to boost war production, not even the employment of child workers, but they criticized the manner in which it was done. For a wartime, patriotic effort, it smacked too much of behind-the-scenes pressure of the sort that island interests exerted, for example, during the statehood campaign. The problem of production and absenteeism was one, labor leaders felt, which could best be handled by labor-management committees such as were set up in war industries on the Mainland.

Labor likewise eyed with suspicion the organization of a Hawaii Employers' Council late in 1943. Some interpreted formation of the Council as an outright declaration of war against labor. Others postponed judgment until organiza-

tion of the Council was complete and its operation begun. If properly administered it might be the beginning of closer and better relationship between island management and labor.

There was another enemy which island labor had to combat during the war, one that had cropped up ever since the original plantation workers made their first demands a generation before. This was the red fly of "race domination" which was waved seemingly every time labor sought better standards of work and compensation. In September, 1943, when truckmen of the Big Five agency, Theo. H. Davies & Co. Ltd., staged a 48-hour walkout to protest the company's refusal to negotiate a new contract, the fact that the majority of the union members were young Japanese-Americans gave rise to more controversy in Honolulu than any of the issues involved in the walkout itself. A whispering campaign to the effect that this was another attempt at racial bloc organization got under way throughout the city.

The *Honolulu Advertiser* pulled no punches in describing the racial aspects of the labor controversy. Editorially it said: "Hawaii wants no recurrence of the scene that was presented at a local business house Tuesday, when, while the wife of the president of the United States walked into the Davies building through one door, a group of smirking Japanese-blood employees were walking out of it and off the job through another door."

Members of the Davies union thereupon invited the *Advertiser* and *Star-Bulletin* editors to sit with them at a public forum and thrash out the question of to what extent they as Japanese-Americans should or could participate in labor activity. The *Advertiser's* editor refused the invita-

tion. The *Star-Bulletin* editor came, and spent a half hour urging them never to leave their jobs.

The keenest summary of the Davies controversy came from Governor Stainback himself. He said: "Those of your union who are of Japanese ancestry have a hard role to perform. Actions which otherwise would be attributed to ordinary labor motives are easily tagged as subversive actions by persons who wish to further that idea."

When he offered to appoint a federal judge to sit with the company and union as arbitrator in the contract dispute, the union readily accepted the proposal. At the hearings the union won the right to begin negotiations for a new contract.

Labor found that not only in the civil governor, but also in the new military governor, General Richardson, they had a fair, unbiased judge of industrial relations. The following month, when the Territory's largest fish canning firm, Hawaiian Tuna Packers, refused to negotiate with their marine workers, the union presented the facts to General Richardson. The military governor reminded the company that federal laws obliged them to negotiate with their workers. The following day negotiations were started.

Other more important unions began to win contracts. In November, after three months of negotiations, the largest dairy in the Territory signed a contract. Provision was made for the payment of \$40,000 in back pay. This company, the Dairymen's Association, had been paying wages as low as \$50 a month for a 12-hour day; they had one employee who had been with the company thirty-five years and was only getting \$120 a month. Employees reported to the NLRB that the management had offered them as much as \$50 raises if they would forget all about unionism and

contracts. Also in November the Mutual Telephone Company, last of the public utilities to hold out, signed a union contract.

There was little doubt that labor was advancing on every front. Not only had the workers won higher wages and better hours by organizing but they had won recognition for themselves as having a place in island affairs. Representatives of labor were being appointed to government and municipal committees. As a direct result of labor protestations, the Territory's Department of Labor had been completely revitalized after the outbreak of war; it now began to serve as a respectable clearing house for problems of industrial relations and for the enforcement of labor legislation. Industry itself was beginning to bring labor in on problems of production by appointments of labor-management committees. In 1943 even traditionally reactionary firms such as the Inter-Island Navigation Company, the Mutual Telephone and the Honolulu Rapid Transit decided to give labor-management committees a trial.

Labor, with half an eye on the 60,000 prospective new voters who were working on defense projects, began to give more and more thought to politics. Representation in the Territorial Legislature would do something to weaken that institution as a tool for reactionary holdouts of the Big Five. Unions on the island of Kauai began to set the pace for other island organizations. Political clubs were formed in each precinct, and these soon resulted in an organization on the Island that far outstripped the Democratic party in voting strength. To AFL membership in the Territory came a letter from William Green, federation president, urging them to become politically active.

The position of labor in Hawaii by 1943 was far removed

from the lot of those hapless field hands who, a quarter of a century before, had been forced back to the plantations after their struggle for a dollar a day.

Another force in island life which had often found itself at odds with the established order discovered that the advent of war had given it even more spectacular dominance over the Big Five. This was the military. The century-old feud between the U. S. Army and Navy on the one side and the island interests on the other makes another strange chapter in Hawaii's history of inner conflict.

8

THE MILITARY TAKES OVER

"In Honolulu, where the nation's neck is definitely out 2,000 miles, if citizens remain unconscious of the needs of defense, no words of mine can rouse them from their coma."

—Capt. Claude S. Gillette, U.S.N.,
Pearl Harbor, 1940.

Over a period of nearly a century there ran through the history of Hawaii a striking parallelism between the growth of industries founded by the missionaries and the development of the military in the Islands. Both missionary and military representatives originally arrived in Hawaii in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Both early realized the potentialities of the mid-Pacific archipelago, one from an economic, the other from a strategic standpoint. Through the years each gradually developed its original stake, always somewhat resentful of the other. Island missionary-industrialists never lost sight of the military's threat to take over sovereignty of the Islands; usually they magnified this threat in terms of what the result would be on the economy they were working so diligently to establish. The military, in turn, resented the *kamaaina's* passive resistance each time it sought to bring a closer alliance with civilian life; it was irritated particularly by the social aloofness of the better established families.

This backstage play of forces was something akin to the conflict which existed nationally between the two schools of opinion broadly labelled as isolationist and interventionist. In Hawaii, the military logically saw the Islands in the light of an overall plan of defense strategy. Islanders usually failed to project their own community and lives into this broader perspective, and were ready to oppose and resent any policy which affected their local interests unfavorably. "Let us work out our own destiny and be responsible for it" was their attitude.

What happened on December 7, 1941, pretty definitely settled the issue. Hawaii was immediately thrust into the role for which the military had so long been preparing her. The whole question of the Territory's sugar and pineapple trade became a matter of secondary interest. Even according to island industrialists' own standards gross business—sugar and pines—now began to play second fiddle to the defense industry. They had to admit that for the duration at least the armed services were in the saddle.

But before examining their wartime growth, it should be interesting to review briefly some of the steps which brought the U. S. Army and Navy into the Islands and how they built up this outpost into a stronghold of military power in the Pacific.

Hawaii saw her first American naval ship during the War of 1812 when one day in May, 1814, a battered craft mounting twelve guns hove to off Honolulu harbor. She was the *Sir Andrew Hammond*, a former British merchant ship which a band of Americans had captured down in the South Seas, and which was now on her way to the West Coast. Beaten by terrific storms, the survivor of a mutiny, and out of food, the ship could barely reach port. After

three weeks of repairs, the *Hammond* set sail, only to run into a British man-of-war two days out. The British warship recaptured the *Hammond* and took the crew as prisoners of war. It was not until more than a year later that the Americans arrived on their native soil.

In 1826, the USS *Dolphin* arrived in the Sandwich Isles; she was the first of a succession of American vessels sent to the South Pacific. These ships were sent out during the latter part of the century to regular stations to protect the standard of Hawaii's monarchy.

By the time King Kalakaua signed the reciprocity treaty in 1876, giving the U. S. Navy coaling rights at Pearl Harbor, it was evident that America's military power would henceforth be ready to protect its interests in the Islands. Just as the missionaries were doing, the Navy took a more and more active part in Hawaiian affairs. White-uniformed officers became familiar figures around Iolani Palace and sat at many a royal conference where matters of state or commerce were decided. Some became favored companions of Kalakaua at parties in the palace and joined in poker games at the Royal Boat Club. During such sessions, at least, the Navy men were closer to His Majesty's ear than the ever-present missionaries.

It was not until 1898 that the U. S. Army was first represented in Hawaii. In June of that year troops engaged in the Spanish-American War on their way to the Philippines stopped off in the Islands. Hawaii was still a republic then, but after annexation, two months later, a regiment of New York volunteers arrived to set up the first Army post, Camp McKinley, at Waikiki. Officially Hawaii had become America's military outpost.

When the Great White Fleet of sixteen battleships which

the first President Roosevelt sent around the world stopped in Hawaii in 1908, the need for development of the long-projected naval station at Pearl Harbor was forcibly realized. Ten years later when America went in with the Allies to fight Germany work on the naval base was slowly progressing. Just before that, a minor but interesting incident of the war was enacted a few miles from Pearl Harbor. Early in 1917 one of Germany's south Pacific raiders, the *Geier*, sought refuge in the neutral port of Honolulu. It was closely followed by two Japanese warships which, under international law, could not pursue her. The Japanese vessels lay off port, waiting to pounce on the German raider when it came out. While this game of cat and mouse was being played, America declared the existence of a state of war. Immediately the Germans tried to scuttle their ship, but the dock guards anticipated them. The enemy crew was captured and held for a while at Schofield Barracks; later they were transferred to an internment camp in Utah.

It was ironic that for services such as this as well as for a few minor victories over other small German vessels in the Pacific, Japan was mandated authority over the former German possessions in the west Pacific, the Caroline and Marshall Islands. Despite treaty promises to the contrary, Japan almost at once began to build up these islands as part of her network of insular fortresses. The mandated islands became key bases in what Japan was pleased to call her "anchored carriers" in the Pacific.

During the post-war years when the isolationist spirit ran high in the United States, the work of developing army and navy positions in Hawaii progressed slowly. It was not until 1931, when Japan opened her career of Pacific aggres-

sion with the march into Manchuria, that notable efforts were made to improve the base.

The great Army post at Schofield Barracks then began to be developed on the central plain running through Oahu, flanked on both sides by high mountain ranges. This was to be the hub of mobile forces which the Army held ready to defend the island from attack. At strategic points around Oahu's coastline, particularly at Pearl Harbor, the Army implanted powerful coastal defense armament.

Up to this point there had been little conflict of interest between the growing military and the sugar industrialists. The latter were then well entrenched behind the commercial battlements of the Big Five. Each had kept a careful eye on the other, but it was in 1932 that civilian and military interests came into collision. The clash had its origin in the celebrated Massie case in which much of the Island community, including people of all races, took the side of the local defendants—principally, because they felt the Navy had taken the law into its own hands. More practically, many took issue with the Navy because they saw the situation as one which offered an opening wedge for establishment of local government by military commission. Nor were their fears without basis. Later that year when the Attorney-General sent Seth Richardson to Honolulu to investigate law enforcement conditions in the Islands, he was presented with a lengthy statement by Rear Admiral Yates Stirling, Jr., commanding officer of all naval forces in Hawaii. Admiral Stirling recommended an outright military government. He bitterly denounced the civilian attitude toward the armed forces, and said, in part: "May it not be stated as fundamental that the rights of any group

of people must of necessity be subordinated to the national interests in order that the exercise of such rights may in no way weaken the control a national government must have over important strategical military positions?

"There appears to be a tendency among those who have spent their lives in Hawaii to forget that the major importance of the Hawaiian Islands lies in their situation as an outpost in the Pacific and not in their agricultural or industrial wealth. Their value to the United States as a commercial port depends entirely upon their security. Another element of discord, unfortunately, is a vague belief among a considerable number of the people that the Army and Navy here are an encumbrance that, except for their financial help, should be removed from the islands in any way possible.

"When we come to a full realization of the vital value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States it would appear that the only remedy that seems logical consists of some form of government control that will fit the situation as it actually exists now and not as we would like it to be. The situation here is unique throughout the world and requires remedies that, while foreign to our ideas of government of civil population, will be probably the only ones practical under present conditions. . . .

"Present governmental control should be by men primarily of the Caucasian race, specially selected for the most important positions in the government of the Islands; by men who are not imbued too deeply with the peculiar atmosphere of the Islands or with the predominance of inter-family connections; by men without preconceived ideas of the value and success of the melting pot. . . .

"Should the logic of the situation decide for a govern-

ment of limited suffrage with a considerable measure of control by the national government, the constitution of such controlling government . . . should include an officer of the United States Army and an officer of the United States Navy, specially selected . . . for the advice of these officers would be of value in deciding questions of relative civil and military importance. . . .”

Had the Admiral personally taken a tin of high explosives from his flagship, gone into Honolulu and in front of the offices of the Big Five on the square at Merchant and Bishop Streets, he could not have set off more shattering repercussions among the citizens of Honolulu. Thunderstruck, the community at first recoiled, then swept back in a bitter outburst of indignation. Withering abuse was heaped upon Admiral Stirling specifically and the Navy generally. Honolulu papers boiled over with angry editorials. “Letters to the Editor” columns sizzled as wrathful subscribers spoke for the aroused citizenry.

“Is the Navy ready to throw the whole territory into the brig?”

“Are we in for brasshat dictatorship?”

“We thought Hawaii was part of a democracy!”

Such was the tenor of the comments.

Gradually their anger cooled, but resentment now took the form of what was best described as passive resistance. What cordiality had existed between the families of officers and civilian society pretty generally froze solid. Even officers of the Army reported a heightened reserve among islanders with whom they came in contact. The strained feeling reached down to enlisted men of the services and the lesser island folk. Honolulu youth had always referred contemptuously to soldiers as “horse blankets,” and to

sailors as "white potatoes." The Stirling controversy did nothing toward improving their regard.

The islanders were somewhat mollified when the Richardson report came out and did not insist upon setting up a commission government. Yet, spurred on by the many unsavory revelations Richardson's investigation had unearthed, they went to considerable pains to form municipal organizations such as the police department and the district courts—which the report had criticized. The Navy, on its part, particularly after one of the customary changes in commandants had been made, deliberately set out on a policy of smoothing out relations with the civilian population. Despite differences of opinion, it was recognized that in times of emergency some concessions would have to be made.

Late in 1936 the need of cooperation was forcibly brought to the attention of the civilian and service community by the paralyzing maritime strike which tied up all shipping to the Islands from the West Coast. As the strike lengthened into weeks and months, Hawaii found her food stores diminishing at a dangerous rate. As certain commodities became short, prices bounded up. Oranges went to \$1.35 a dozen. Potato, onion, and flour prices increased from thirty to a hundred and fifteen per cent. Canned milk and other staples began to give out. When the strike ended and shipping was resumed in February, 1937, the Army had a grim announcement to make—food supplies available in the Islands would have sufficed only another two weeks.

More significant than this official statement was the reminder that during the three-month strike, the bulk of what foods were received had been brought in from Japan—on Japanese ships!

The Army went to work immediately on plans which it hoped would insure adequate food for troops and civilians in the event of war or any other emergency. This was left largely in the hands of the Army's Service Command.

Calling upon island agencies such as the agricultural station of the University of Hawaii, the federal and territorial Agricultural Extension Services and the OSPA's experiment station, the Service Command mapped out a program for food production which would be incorporated in the Army's M-day plan. In certain areas on the Islands it began to experiment with quick-growing food crops. On its production charts it plotted out 25,000 acres which would be ready to go into production when the time came. It found that the most likely area for a major part of this production would be in the fertile cane fields of the Oahu Sugar Company, between Pearl Harbor and Schofield Barracks. In the event of war Oahu certainly could not rely upon its normal import of eighty-five per cent of its food.

The Army found little enthusiasm among Big Five officials or plantation managers for its food plans. These men ran industries on the principle that sugar and pines went out of the islands; foodstuffs and supplies came in. Since the rise of sugar, Hawaii had been an important export community. It had entertained no plans for self-sufficiency.

"If we try to change over now, it's going to mean considerable losses," they argued. Usually they added, "Moreover, Hawaii's iron-impregnated soil, though satisfactory for sugar, lacks the minerals essential for worth-while vegetable production."

Prospective farmers on the various islands had already found their efforts discouraged by this attitude. No guarantee could be obtained from the Inter-Island Steamship

Line for delivery of their goods. Some who had gone ahead with their farming dropped out after undependable steamer service had ruined too many shipments of their perishable goods.

If the Army was disappointed by its peace time progress in developing local food production—some officers frankly described the attempt as a failure—it perhaps contented itself with the expectation that in time of war there could be no question about cooperation.

As bedeviling as the problem of promoting civilian relations was the assignment of safeguarding the Territory against the potential threat of 159,000 resident Japanese. That was a job which naturally fell into the laps of the Army and Navy's intelligence sections. Had U. S. Congressmen realized exactly what this meant in the nineteen thirties, they might have liberalized the appropriations made to the services in those isolationist days.

Until the late thirties, the Intelligence Section of the Fourteenth Naval District, which is made up of the Hawaiian Islands and adjacent areas, was a cubbyhole office in the Federal Building in downtown Honolulu. There a lone naval officer, sometimes assisted by a junior officer, and a single yeoman came daily to contemplate the problem of making the Islands secure from threats such as espionage. It was not until a very few years before the outbreak of war that appropriations for the Navy or the District allowed the section to expand to anything more respectable than the proportions of a private detective agency.

The Hawaiian Department's Army Intelligence Section, G-2, was little better endowed with personnel or funds during this period. So obviously undermanned was the

Army office that in 1936 a civilian, Lorrin P. Thursday, publisher of the *Honolulu Advertiser*, went personally to Major-General Hugh A. Drum, commander of the Hawaiian Department, to see about the matter. Mr. Thurston's particular complaint was that every two years the Army sent a fresh officer to the Islands to head the department's intelligence section. "It is a criminal weakness in the Army setup here," he told the General, "to have men coming here who know nothing of Hawaii or its problems, then in two years to be replaced."

Perhaps to the publisher's surprise, General Drum agreed. "Mr. Thurston," he said. "I wish you'd go to Washington and report the very same thing to G-2."

The publisher took him at his word, and a few weeks later he was in Washington talking with the colonel in charge of G-2.

When he had finished the colonel rang a buzzer that brought three other officers of his staff.

"I want you to hear an observation by this citizen from Hawaii," he told them.

When Mr. Thurston had finished the colonel said, in effect: "What he reports is absolutely correct. But there is nothing we can do about it as no remedy is provided in the rules and regulations governing our actions."

Working within such limitations, the military intelligence offices could have been expected to accomplish little in combatting the espionage activity that was undoubtedly being conducted by enemy agents many years before the war. It was enough to deal just with the obvious surface threats to military security which existed in the Islands.

One of these dangers was Hawaii's sampan fleet. The sampan is a hybrid fishing craft, powered with Diesel en-

gines, with which the Islands' Japanese fishermen roamed the Pacific in their quest for schools of tuna. Varying in length from twenty to eighty feet, the sampans were capable of a cruising range of more than a thousand miles. Most of their Japanese skippers and crews were aliens with strong loyalties for their homeland overseas. The disclosure that more than one of the "fishermen" was a reserve officer of the Japanese Navy was enough to make suspects of the entire fleet crew of three hundred or so.

It was generally rumored that the sampans met Japanese ships far out at sea and brought "guests" ashore at various points in the Islands. For years the federal authorities unsuccessfully dogged the sampan fleet's activities, intent on linking them with opium smuggling, which had long been a lively trade in the Territory. But the suspected role of the sampans as "eyes" for Japan in the observation of U. S. Fleet activities was a far more serious consideration.

Military intelligence officers, particularly those new to the area, might well have been staggered by contemplation of the Japanese "threat" as it existed in the Islands. Among those 159,000 Japanese, 35,000 of them aliens, there unquestionably was some small percentage actively engaged in working for the interests of Japan. Yet there was little that could outwardly distinguish loyal Americans from loyal Japanese. As an interrelated whole, the community supported its own newspapers, its Buddhist churches, its language schools, even its own hospital.

"Well, there they are, a hundred and fifty-nine thousand of them. But how do you pick out the bad ones?" That was the poser that confronted every new intelligence officer.

For some years the military considered that the best answer to this question was the indiscriminate rounding up of

every Japanese alien, including some of the citizen Japanese, and transporting them wholesale to an internment camp in case of emergency. Honolulu citizens knowingly told one another that the site had already been chosen—on the plains of the island of Molokai. But by the middle thirties military officers told themselves that mere concentration of aliens would not work. There would still be more than a hundred thousand Japanese at liberty, and among them would be many whose loyalty would be undermined by the internment of relatives. So the internment plan was abandoned in favor of a policy of closer surveillance and of identifying those community leaders who had given cause for suspicion and who would be summarily detained when M-Day came.

In checking over the activities of the local Japanese, some intelligence officers noted the marked enthusiasm with which young American-Japanese students applied themselves to the Reserve Officers Training courses in the schools. Military drill was part of the curricula of all the high schools, public and private; it was compulsory for freshmen and sophomore students at the University of Hawaii. ROTC instructors reported that none of the boys applied themselves to the courses with more diligence than the Japanese students, with the result that to them went the great majority of student company commands and the privilege of taking advanced Officer's Training in their junior and senior years at the University. Here was a veritable army of young Japanese being trained as soldiers—at McKinley High School nearly all of the 4,000 students were Japanese—on the site of what would be practically the front lines of the war with Japan, when and if it came.

Officers of Hawaii's own units of the National Guard

obviously shared their misgivings, for there it was tacitly understood that young Americans of Japanese ancestry were not welcome. Few found their way into the Guard's ranks.

A similar position was taken by the War Department itself when Congress was preparing the Selective Service bill in 1940. Department spokesmen objected to amendments to the bill which granted equality of status to all volunteers, regardless of race, color or religion. Specifically they pointed out the danger of inducting Hawaiian Japanese into the U. S. Army. They noted that at least a third of the 75,000 young men who would be eligible for the draft in Hawaii were of Japanese descent. Nevertheless, the bill was passed with the amendments included.

In Honolulu itself military men had a fund of stories about Japanese disloyalty which made lively dinner table gossip. A favorite among these was an incident recounted by a naval officer. At a dinner given for a group of naval officers and their wives, the talk turned to the families' subject of how far the island Japanese could be trusted.

By way of getting a new point of view, the hostess turned to the Japanese maid who stood by the table, in a colorful kimono, and asked her what she would do should Japan invade the Islands.

Instantly, so the story went, she replied: "I'd poison you all!"

Shortly after the war in Europe opened and affairs in the Pacific became more tense, the Navy in Hawaii decided that its officers should have as little as possible to do with the local Japanese. The Fourteenth District had never countenanced the employment of Japanese construction

workers at Pearl Harbor; but now they ruled that navy families within the confines of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard or other naval facilities must not employ Japanese as domestic servants.

By 1940 war had drawn close enough in the Pacific to warrant the Army and Navy's conducting separate maneuvers in Hawaii that were more extensive and exacting than any war games in our military history.

These games served to emphasize the Navy's constant blunt reminders that the United States could not escape war with Japan. Though editorial writers ranted and isolationist congressman called for courts-martial, Navy spokesmen insistently warned that Japan was committed to a program of conquest—of conquest, not only of American possessions in the Pacific, including Hawaii, but of the Mainland itself.

In April, 1940, Rear Admiral Joseph K. Taussig reaped a wild harvest of criticism when he told the Senate Naval Affairs Committee what he thought about Japan.

"War with Japan is inevitable," the blunt-spoken admiral told the group. "Japan has already prepared her plan for crushing the United States."

The press labelled Admiral Taussig's remarks as "fantastic." Senator Bennett Champ Clark recommended court martial; he charged that the Admiral made his sensational statement merely to support a claim for larger naval appropriations.

In Hawaii in the late thirties, much the same reception greeted the repeated warnings of Major General Hugh A. Drum during his tour of duty as commander of the Hawaiian Department. Civilian leaders privately spoke of the General as an unmitigated war monger. Many of them ob-

jected to his organization of civilian resources under the Service Command. He described this unit, which was later to be the framework of the military governor's war organization, as one which had "the specific duty of planning participation of the citizenry and non-military elements," and added: "From the beginning of any war we are involved in, every man, woman and child in Hawaii becomes interested to the extent of life itself in the defense of the Islands."

To such realistic thinking islanders generally observed: "Poppycock!"

This was the temper of most of the nation as the Army and Navy grimly carried out their 1940 maneuvers in the Central Pacific. The fleet, made up of 130 ships, 350 planes and 43,000 men, swept down to the Southwest Pacific on a nine-day operation which was carried out under conditions of the utmost secrecy. For the first time, newspaper correspondents were not allowed to witness the maneuvers. When the ships filed back into Pearl Harbor they were placed under assumed wartime conditions. Men were given shore liberty only on alternate days. Aircraft carriers prowled outside the Islands, their planes keeping constant patrol, and a destroyer squadron ranged up and down the Oahu coast. Across the mouth of the Pearl Harbor channel, the anti-submarine boom was lowered. The assumption was that America was at war with Japan and that the enemy might close in at any time to cripple our harbor facilities and ships.

The Army went at its 1940 games with the utmost realism, too. Its problem assumed a general invasion of the Islands by enemy force. It was perhaps significant that in nearly every Army and Navy maneuver problem, it was stated that it was assumed the United States had declared a

state of war to exist between it and the "enemy." To meet the invasion threat the entire Hawaiian Department went into the field on a wartime basis. All the functions of supply, air support and engineering were realistically simulated, as infantry and artillery forces moved into defense positions.

For twelve days the troops carried out defense maneuvers against the simulated invasion. Then, on May 23, the game came to a climax with a country-wide blackout, the greatest ever attempted in any area of the United States. For several weeks the Army and civilian volunteers had prepared the community for co-operation in the experiment. By newspaper and radio instructions had been drilled into the residents and thousands of leaflets, written in four languages, had been distributed throughout the Islands. Shortly after 8:30 P.M. on the twenty-third, the wail of sirens shrieked the black-out warning. Within the next minute, it seemed as though all life had been blotted out. In another few minutes "enemy" planes raced in over the Islands, only to be greeted with the blinding beams of searchlights and the rattle of anti-aircraft guns.

The "invaders" were soon beaten off. As the lights came on again, the Army announced the Islands "saved."

One little incident in the Army's blackout experiment served to indicate that there was still a feeling of conflict with civilian interests. When it was announced that descriptions of the blackout would be broadcast under Army auspices from Honolulu's two stations over a national network, a wail of protest rose from Honolulu businessmen.

"Here we're spending thousands of dollars trying to build up the picture of Hawaii as a peaceful vacation spot," the Hawaii Tourist Bureau pleaded. "This invasion broad-

cast could have a reaction like the one Orson Welles' got. Our tourist trade would be bound to suffer."

From other sources, too, came demands that the broadcast be cancelled.

The Army promised to take every precaution to make it clear that the broadcast was merely part of their games. But the program went on as scheduled.

Some of the realism was taken out of the Army's maneuvers, however, just as they were getting under way when Major General Charles D. Herron, then commanding the Hawaiian Department, made an announcement, probably to reassure the community. "Oahu will never be exposed to a blitzkrieg attack," he said. "This is why: We are more than 2,000 miles away from land whichever way you look, which is a long way for an enemy force to steam. And besides, it would have to smash through our Navy."

This, together with the fact that both services predicated their maneuvers upon the assumption that war had been declared, might have had something to do with the psychological temper which existed in Hawaii, among both military and civilians, in 1940 and 1941.

Nevertheless, the two years saw an unprecedented period of military preparations in the Islands. In 1940 General George C. Marshall, the Army's first chief of staff to visit the Territory, made an inspection of the military resources. Cargo ships arrived deeply laden with additional troops and supplies and equipment. Every army post was strengthened. New airfields were put under construction. Work on the Army's vast new Hickam Field, comprising 2,200 acres out by Pearl Harbor was rushed. Twenty million dollars was allotted for the project. Construction of giant hangars and machine shops and barracks, some of them housing

3,000 was begun. New bombing planes were ferried down from the coasts; fighters came over on the decks of nearly every arriving freighter.

At Pearl Harbor millions were being spent on the development of underground storage facilities for the huge fuel supply needed by the fleet. At Kaneohe Bay, on the opposite side of Oahu, the Navy was busy on its new \$5,800,000 air base. Then, most significant of all, came the announcement that the fleet would remain "indefinitely" at Pearl Harbor.

This announcement followed the 1940 Pacific maneuvers. It brought various repercussions in the civilian community. Businessmen were divided between joy and despair. Commercially, the fleet's stay would mean something like an annual \$20,000,000 in additional trade. But politically, its presence only brought closer the threat of domination by the military and raised anew the dreaded bogie of commission government.

Kiichi Gunji, then Japanese consul general in Hawaii, had a different slant. Mr. Gunji seethed with indignation. "If the decision of the Navy to remain longer in Hawaiian waters," he said, "is meant to solve the differences between the United States and Japan by a display of arms, or to force us to accept an American offer for a new trade treaty which we think is unfavorable to us, then I think the move is an unwise one."

By 1941 it seemed as though Hawaii was prepared for whatever might come. Up to then something like \$750,000,000—\$500,000,000 for the Army and \$250,000,000 at Pearl Harbor—had been poured into the project of making the Islands ready. Both the Army and the Navy had precau-

tioned themselves against any attack they thought the enemy could conceive. That, it seemed to at least one spokesman for the Navy, was more than could be said for the Territory's civilians.

Capt. Claude S. Gillette, head of the industrial department at Pearl Harbor, in announcing further Navy expansion at the base in 1940, took occasion to censure the community's seeming apathy toward defense preparations. "In Honolulu," he said, "where the nation's neck is definitely out 2,000 miles, if citizens remain unconscious of the need for defense, no words of mine can rouse them from their coma. . . ."

Strengthening of the fortress, however, continued throughout another year. Then, without the declaration of war that was to have been the key for action, it happened.

Out of the wreckage and the death of that monstrous Sunday in December of 1941 there emerged the realization that must have come to numberless minds at once, overwhelming, dismaying. This was the moment, this was the thing for which we had been preparing for nearly a century!

That thought, as terrible in some ways as the thought of the dead and of the ships that were lost, assailed the minds of many men who were close to the Pearl Harbor disaster. Few, however, expressed it. Islanders, in a sense as guilty of dereliction as anyone, could not look accusingly toward the services and say it. The Army and Navy, moving among the thousands of dead at Pearl Harbor, Wheeler Field, Kaneohe and Hickam, realized it only too well.

Once the shock of the attack was over and Hawaii turned to the task of avenging Pearl Harbor, some military men looked back upon the eventful day and speculated upon

how much worse it might have been. It was something like Sunday morning quarterbacking, but it was a popular topic of conversation for many weeks after the attack. Typical of such discussions was one among a group of young naval officers gathered in a Waikiki hotel lounge.

It started when one of the men observed that Japan had been as surprised as anyone by the success of the raid.

"I'm sure they were," a lieutenant agreed. "I was thinking myself what might have happened had it been an out-and-out invasion, instead of a quick thrust at our naval and air power here."

"Their carriers could just as well have been followed up by transports loaded down with fifty or a hundred thousand Japs," another added.

"They'd never have taken Oahu, though," the first speaker put in. "The Army could surely have held them off."

"Right!" agreed the lieutenant. "But what if they had gone to, say, Maui, instead. We had relatively small ground forces there and it's only sixty miles away. What if they had landed their fifty thousand men there, then sent their carrier planes ashore to use island airfields? For my money, they could have taken their time then about capturing Oahu. Remember, we were just about stripped of airpower at that time."

In the days after Pearl Harbor, Honolulu heard swivel chair strategists fight the battle over again in a hundred different ways. Practical militarists of the Army and the Navy were, however, too busy for theorizing. Military construction had been tremendous in 1941 but now it really slid into high gear. Land, equipment and labor were re-

cruited from every source. Each week saw hundreds of acres of Oahu taken over for military purposes. New airfields went under construction, old ones were expanded. Navy buildings, mostly housing for labor and warehousing for supplies, spread out from Pearl Harbor in all directions. The Honolulu Sugar Plantation, adjoining the naval base, saw acres and acres of its land taken over. Within a few months after December 7, it was estimated that the services had appropriated nearly 3,000 acres of plantation land on Oahu alone. Ships, arriving in huge convoys, brought hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies and equipment and thousands of new defense workers.

Troop ships, carrying as many as five thousand men, arrived one after the other to discharge their human cargo. It became obvious that Hawaii was to be the jumping off place for troops destined for all parts of the Pacific. Tent cities sprang up all over rural Oahu. Inland highways were glutted with trucks transporting men and supplies.

After the establishment of martial law, the military had served notice that it was taking over, politically and economically. By the very force of numbers, it showed how completely the purely local interests were being subordinated to the Islands' war role.

As part of its assumption of territorial control, the military made short shrift of disposing of the much-publicized Japanese problem. Now that it had come to a showdown, after years of empty controversial discussion, much of it poked into flame by alarmist magazine writers, the job was done with little fuss and less formality. Within a day or two Army and Navy intelligence men, aided by FBI agents and special police, rounded up leaders of Japanese activities whom they had singled out long before. Little trouble was

expected, nor did any materialize, from the rest. Among those detained were most of the skippers and crews of Hawaii's sampan fleet; that put the quietus upon them. The sampan fleet was tied up under Army guard at Kewalo basin, presumably for the duration. Both the Army and Navy intelligence sections, incidentally, had blossomed remarkably in the year or two preceding the outbreak of war and directly after. The Navy office moved to new commodious downtown offices and both it, as well as the Army's staff, were increased many times over.

While Hawaii draft boards busied themselves inducting young island men in 1942, the Army saw to it that no Japanese were taken into the service even if such policy were at variance with amendments to the National Selective Service law. Early in 1943 it seemed that Hawaii's Japanese no longer constituted an active military problem. To give them a chance to show their loyalty, and in response to the demands of young American-Japanese the Army announced plans for recruiting a special force of American-Japanese troops to be sent over to Europe for combat duty. The spontaneity of young Japanese in volunteering and their subsequent record of gallant service in the African and Italian campaigns, launched what seemed like a new era of understanding between the services and the so-long-suspect island Japanese. It would have astonished the pre-war "Japanese threat" alarmists.

On the surface, it seemed that the same rapprochement had been arrived at with other elements of the civilian population. A score of business executives had been recruited, as General Drum had envisioned ten years before, to work with the military governor's office on problems of transportation, equipment and supplies, labor and food con-

trol. Younger business men who had signed up in the Army and Navy reserves went immediately to work on specialized tasks such as communications, supply, intelligence, etc. Hundreds of others worked closely with the Army as officers and members of the Office of Civilian Defense.

Yet there were persistent reports that civilians—particularly industrial leaders—were still holding back when it came to something touching their island economy. Islanders passed among themselves the word that the military was having a time with the Big Five. They pointed to the record of food production as evidence.

The solution of this problem had not been very reassuring, at that. Some years before Pearl Harbor, in its plans for wartime food production in the islands, the Army Service Command reported having plotted 25,000 acres of plantation land for food crops, on Oahu alone.

Acre after acre of plantation land was scheduled to be ploughed under and potatoes and other vegetables planted in time of emergency.

The wartime record showed that at the end of the first year of war, the island of Oahu was still dependent upon outside produce for approximately 85% of its foods. Indeed, both in acreage and in tonnage, food production had decreased by December, 1942! In December, 1941, a total of 1,242 tons of food crops had been produced on 1,690 acres. A year later 1,080 tons were produced on 1,577 acres. Similarly, production for the entire Territory had decreased during the year. Food crops in December, 1941, amounted to 2,600 tons, compared with 2,345 produced during the same month the year before.

Most of this food production was turned out by the 3,600 small farmers in the area. Plantations were still con-

centrating nearly one hundred per cent on their sugar and pineapples. Approximately 250,000 acres were still being grown with sugar, 75,000 with pines. In December, 1942, the food crop production of all sugar and pineapple plantations in Hawaii totaled less than 400 tons, grown on 447 acres of their land.

The Territory's new Office of Food Production found better co-operation with its program among the common folk of the Islands. By the end of 1942, volunteer Victory Gardens, including community, home and school plots, were raising more than 200 tons of fresh fruits and vegetables.

It was generally recognized that much of the food problem could be solved by increased production on the "outside" islands, if it were not for the bottleneck of transportation. By the end of 1942, inter-island shipping still gave no promise that it could regularly transport outside crops into Honolulu. The December issue of *Agricultural Outlook*, the organ of the University of Hawaii's Agricultural Extension Service, offered this solution of the inter-island transportation problem:

"Wooden boats of a type and draft that will be unimportant targets for torpedoes can be built locally, and it should never be forgotten that, to a group of islands, shipping is of first importance, and that to territorial economy these boats are now as important as are Liberty ships to the nation."

This looked like editorial support for the group in Honolulu which was trying to establish its little fleet for inter-island trade, in minor competition with the Big Five's Inter-Island Navigation Company. But, as has been shown, the Hawaiian Shipping Company died stillborn.

Another year of war went by. Hawaii was still dependent upon Mainland sources for the great bulk of its food. In 1943, according to a report of the Office of Food Production, a total of only 385 additional acres had gone into food crops. Total crop production had been increased by only 596 tons a month.

A statement supplemental to that officer's report was perhaps as revealing as any comment on the situation:

"There is no thought of displacing growing production of the major agricultural crops (sugar and pineapples). This would be wasteful of manpower and would require excessive expenditures for results of dubious value."

Hawaii had been forthright enough in opposing the military when it came to protesting the continuance of martial law in the Territory. Here the Army had capitulated to the extent of restoring, on March 10, 1943, rights which had little to do with matters of military security.

The authorities had come off second best in that other tiff with the civilian interests: the habeas corpus case. By this time there were many in the Territory, long resentful of Big Five domination, who feared that the services were perhaps being brought to heel by island industrialists. When Governor Stainback left for Washington late in 1943, it was reported that his trip had been partially inspired by this situation; and that he was going to present a report to the Department of the Interior on local pressure which had been brought to bear against the war effort in the Islands.

A review of the situation, however, did not seem to bear out these apprehensions. At the end of 1943 the military was conspicuously in the ascendant. The office of the mili-

tary governor was still in control, not only of every activity relating to the war effort, but of every force which shaped civilian community life. More than once it had thrown its weight in favor of interests opposed to the Big Five.

The judgment of this office in labor-industrial relations—support of stevedore organization, labor representation in military rule, enforcement of labor contract negotiations—was evidence enough. The military governor had begun a personal investigation of labor relations in the Islands, which labor leaders felt assured would result in increased support of their cause.

There was one element in the Territory of Hawaii which would seem most unlikely to benefit from military control—the Island Japanese. Yet strangely enough, it appears that even they gained, and surely with a more clear-cut definition of their status in the community. To understand this we must look into the story of the arrival of these immigrant people in Hawaii. We must review the efforts for and against their assimilation into the none too receptive melting pot of the Pacific.

WHAT ABOUT THE JAPANESE?

“Up to now the Asiatic has had only an economic value in the social equation. So far as the institutions, laws, customs and language of the permanent population go, his presence is no more felt than is that of the cattle on the ranges.”

—Royal Mead, HSPA Secretary, in *“The Sugar Industry and Hawaii,”* 1910.

For a quarter of a century before the war, the spectre of Japanese domination of Hawaii haunted the men who ruled the Islands. But their fear had little to do with the doubts harbored by military minds. Theirs was primarily a concern about economic loss. It was seriously aroused for the first time when Japanese plantation workers staged a six-months' strike on Oahu in 1920. The Honolulu *Star-Bulletin* at that time put into words what the industrialists were thinking: “Is control of the industrialism of Hawaii to remain in the hands of Anglo-Saxons or is it to pass into those of alien Japanese?”

The accent was on the economic blow. There was no mention of what the Islands meant in terms of national welfare.

This economic danger of the Japanese “threat” was the aspect always stressed by big business in Hawaii. Naturally, the military looked upon the growing population of Japanese in the Territory with an eye to strategic consequences.

But the industrialists concerned themselves only with safeguarding their economic holdings. By and large, their defense was successful. True, the thousands of Japanese drifting from the plantations, and the thousands more born to the original immigrants, gradually took over much of the smaller island trades. Nevertheless Big Five interests were able to see that these Japanese interests never materialized.

The anxiety of the military, however, was pretty well justified by the attack upon Pearl Harbor, and by the events of the months which followed. For years the whole question—"What about Hawaii's Japanese?" had been dealt with in the light of what might happen if the Islands were attacked or invaded by the Imperial forces of Japan. That was to be the ultimate test. Well, Hawaii *was* attacked by the Japanese.

On the whole, the results were inconclusive.

Those islanders who never were convinced of the loyalty of their Japanese neighbors had varied proofs of the treachery they expected. "Just look what happened at the Japanese consulate," they pointed out. "There's your proof."

But these are the facts:

While bombs were still falling on the morning of December 7, Honolulu police broke into the spacious residence of the consul on Nuuanu Street. Inside they found chunky Nagao Kitta, consul-general, and his staff tending a brisk fire of papers burning in the bathtub. Documentary evidence of their guilt went up in flames. But intelligence officers later revealed that unquestionably Kitta had been active in espionage leadership. A short time before the attack he had hired a German agent, one Fritz Keuhn, to report on dispositions of the U. S. fleet in the Pacific, and of its

strength in Pearl Harbor at the time. The same agent had arranged for Kitta a system of signals which would give information of U. S. fleet movements to Japanese submarine commanders lying off Oahu.

Kitta undeniably was out to help lick America. Yet he was being paid to do just that job. And he was not an island Japanese.

"Then, what about Harada and Shintani of Niihau? They were island Japanese and they weren't paid agents. What about them?"

On Niihau, a tiny island 175 miles north of Oahu, one of the attacking bombers made a crash landing on its way in to Pearl Harbor. After being captured by native Hawaiians, the lone pilot was set free by Harada and Shintani, two Japanese beekeepers. In a week's reign of terror on the island they served as the desperate flyer's aides. They kept the people of the little community at bay with machine guns stripped from the wrecked bomber. When a lone Hawaiian, overpowered and killed the armed pilot, Harada committed *hara-kiri*. Shintani and Harada's wife were taken off to an internment camp. There was no doubt that these island Japanese had betrayed Hawaii, as predicted of so many of their countrymen.

There were other instances of disloyalty. Honolulu police picked up a drunken Japanese, thirty-three years old, who boasted to officers of his allegiance to Japan. "Me a Tojo man soldier, big shot all same you," he told them.

Another young second-generation Japanese arrested on Kauai told a group of soldiers that they were fighting on the wrong side. "The United States Army is no good and democracy is no good," he said.

Then there were the four hundred and seventy-three,

mostly island Japanese, arrested on December 7 by FBI and military authorities on suspicion of subversive activity.

But more than overbalancing the isolated cases of outright disloyalty was the record of positive conduct of the island Japanese, arrested on December 7. On the morning of the attack it was a Japanese member of the Territorial Guard who captured and turned in the officer of a Jap midget submarine which grounded on the windward side of Oahu.

Many Japanese-American civilian workers were killed at Pearl Harbor. None who came through uninjured attempted sabotage which, under the circumstances, would not have been very difficult. Two of the navy yard workers were cited for bravery. They were near a heavy machine gun when the attack came. They rushed over to help man the gun. A Jap plane strafed the volunteer crew, spattering bullets close by. They continued to feed ammunition, working until their hands were burned raw. Another attacker who came down too low, was caught in their fire. He crashed.

Running forward, the young Japanese-American workers pulled the pilot and gunner from the fallen plane, ripped the insignia from their uniforms. Later, after being treated for burns at the emergency hospital, they brought these to the Naval Intelligence office at Pearl Harbor. Someone asked where they got the trophies.

"Off the damned Jap fliers," they replied.

At the Honolulu Gas Company plant, a group of Japanese who were discharged soon after the attack began were being led from the grounds when a Jap bomb hit and ignited a million cubic foot gas holder. The entire group dashed back and risked their lives to help control the blaze which

threatened to destroy the vital plant. Hundreds of other Japanese volunteered for all kinds of war service within an hour after the first bombs fell.

Also on the credit side, were the official reports of the War Department, the Navy and the FBI, absolving local Japanese of the commission of any sabotage, whatsoever. J. Edgar Hoover himself cleared them.

There was no sabotage committed in Hawaii prior to December 7, on that fateful day, or subsequent to that time, he stated.

"Many who did not distinguish between espionage and sabotage refused to accept the findings of sources even so authoritative as these. Unquestionably there was espionage, but the extent, if any, to which island Japanese aided paid enemy agents will probably never be known."

Military authorities undoubtedly arrived at conclusions of their own in the matter as they continued to round up subversive suspects in the two years following Pearl Harbor. Toward the end of 1943, a total of 1,479 persons, nearly all Japanese, had been taken into custody. At that time the knotty problems of just whom among Hawaii's 159,000 Japanese might be disloyal was still harassing officials in the Islands and, no doubt, would continue to for the war's duration.

The racial problem was one bequeathed to the military by the early sugar planters when they began to import Japanese laborers for work in the fields. That was in 1868. And if immigration of the Japanese was to have military, as well as economic and political effects upon the development of Hawaii, then it was a possibility which certainly did not discourage the planters. They continued to import

Japanese by the thousands until the federal Immigration Act put a stop to the practice in 1924. Up to that time the sugar industry brought into Hawaii an estimated total of 180,000 Japanese, the largest body of emigrants Japan sent to any foreign land.

The early sugar men were apparently confident they could hold their Japanese workers in their original peonage status. Until annexation, all the immigrants came over on a penal labor contract, which gave the planters virtual mastery over their lives. In 1887 the "Bayonet Constitution" they forced on King Kalakaua provided that all orientals would be denied the right to vote. Plantation pay was eighteen dollars a month, most of which the workers spent at plantation stores, so that there seemed little chance of financial advancement of the Japanese. All these controls seemed to give a firm enough grip on the workers.

Nor were the planters planning any voluntary liberation for their Japanese workers. Their attitude was perhaps well summarized in 1910 by Royal Mead, secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, in his book, *The Sugar Industry and Hawaii*. "Up to now," he wrote, "the Asiatic has had only an economic value in the social equation. So far as the institutions, laws, customs and language of the permanent population go, his presence is no more felt than is that of the cattle on the ranges."

But when Hawaii's Organic Act making her a Territory was drawn up in 1890, the planters knew their importation policy had indeed opened a Pandora's box of trouble. For one thing, the Organic Act voided all penal contracts entered into since 1898. This meant that the 26,000 Japanese they had rushed into the Islands in 1899 were free workers.

The Japanese took the cue. Almost at once they began to leave the plantations to migrate into urban communities, to take up small trades. Those left on the plantations began a series of strikes. In 1900 plantation laborers staged twenty strikes, not only for higher wages but for a multitude of new privileges. In 1909 the plantation workers on Oahu went on a four months' strike which cost the planters an estimated \$2,000,000 and netted the laborers wage increases, a bonus system and improved housing facilities.

A large portion of the 180,000 Japanese brought into Hawaii migrated later to the Mainland United States—40,000 left between 1902 and 1907—and returned to their homeland. Their countrymen who remained, however, managed to keep up the Japanese population. In 1920 there were 109,000 Japanese in the area, 49,000 of them native born. At that time they made up forty-three per cent of the total island population.

The children born to these immigrant Japanese grew up in a conflicting mixture of cultures. In their school and playtime associations, these *Nisei*, or second generation Japanese, were exposed to the normal American customs experienced by the youth of any average American community. In the homes of their *Issei*, or first generation, parents, however, they were touched by a number of influences which brought them close to the land of their ancestors. Japanese was the common tongue in the home, for few of the older folk had learned to speak English. Most immigrant households had their Buddha and Shinto shelves and kept up their daily religious rites. Nearly every alien home bought a daily Japanese language newspaper and listened to the Japanese language programs which were

broadcast from the Hawaii stations prior to the war, or which came direct from Tokyo via short wave. Furthermore, the average *Nisei* went to a Japanese language school after public school hours. There were 175 of these Japanese schools in the Territory. As late as 1940, eighty per cent of Japanese children took the eighth grade course at schools where customs of the old country were taught as part of the curriculum. The great majority of the seven hundred language school teachers were aliens; a considerable portion of them were Buddhist and Shinto priests.

It was not strange that American-Japanese citizens in Hawaii found it difficult to convince the sceptical of their loyalty to U. S. ideals. Most of the younger people found themselves caught in a whirlpool of conflicting interests. Diligent students by nature, they made the most of their opportunities for learning. At the University of Hawaii, they were a large majority in every class. They trained themselves there for white collar jobs, and listened to much talk about American ideals of the equality of opportunity. Upon graduating, however, they found that most of the opportunities for employment were agricultural—back on the plantations. Many of the newspaper advertisements they searched for business office employment carried the qualification, "Japanese need not apply."

Many university graduates went to work as clerks in the tiny shops their parents had started. More farsighted students who had taken professional training, however, found plenty of clients among their own Japanese communities. The 1940 census showed that nearly fifteen per cent of gainfully employed Japanese were in preferred professional occupations.

It might have seemed that a career in politics would have

attracted the younger, educated Japanese. By 1940, Hawaii had 40,000 Japanese eligible to vote in territory and county elections. This was nearly half of the registered voters. But relatively few Japanese candidates appeared on the rolls of the biennial elections. Only on county boards of supervisors in the outside islands (those other than Oahu) were Japanese elected to any notable extent. The Honolulu board has never had a Japanese member.

Only a sprinkling of Japanese were sent to the biennial sessions of the Legislature at Iolani Palace. Some islanders believed that they purposely held back, for fear of exposing their community to criticism. More practical observers claimed that the Japanese vote was controlled by political bosses who preferred to take the returns out in minor appointive plums in both county and territorial government. It was true that the government administrative staffs were heavily peopled with orientals.

Nevertheless Japanese votes had long been a bugaboo to the proponents of statehood. Sceptics pointed out that enfranchized Japanese by "plunking" might well elect an all-Japanese ticket. "Plunking," not uncommon in island elections, meant voting for only a limited group of candidates, rather than filling out the entire ticket. This stratagem threw extra weight toward the favored candidates. Up to 1943 the Japanese voters had not taken advantage of the opportunity, but some sceptics were still unconvinced.

"You know what they're waiting for," they charged. "They're waiting until Hawaii becomes a state. Then they'll do plenty of plunking, and it'll be to elect a Japanese governor and a couple of Jap senators."

Hawaii big business, perhaps seeking to remove some of the onus from this inherited problem, had, for many years

before the war, sponsored a territory-wide movement to Americanize the young Japanese of the Islands. This was the "New Americans" organization, made up of Japanese student leaders from native schools. Each year a convention of "New American" delegates was held, with speeches by executives of the Big Five. This movement, strenuously promoted by the Honolulu *Star-Bulletin*, was practically ignored by the rival *Advertiser*.

Warnings about unionism usually crept into the speeches and discussions at the convention. At the 1939 session these allusions resulted in something of an intellectual free-for-all.

Harold L. Varney, whom the Big Five had brought to the Islands to head the editorial staff of the Pan-Pacific-Press, was leader of a labor discussion group. Before coming to Hawaii, Varney had been editor of the reactionary anti-Jewish magazine *Awakener*, which the German Nazi party had put on its list of recommended reading.

"One thing I must warn you young men," Varney was saying, as part of a speech made up largely of arguments against labor organization "you're only running into trouble when you affiliate with minority groups like the AFL and CIO."

At that, Prof. John Reinecke, of the University of Hawaii, another guest speaker at the convention, leaped to his feet. "That's just about enough of this red-baiting," he shouted. "I demand that the speaker be barred from further part in this discussion."

The thunderstruck young delegates, most of whom had caught little of the message Varney was trying to get over, did not vote summary ejection of the speaker. They agreed, however, that further discussion should be confined to

practical problems of island labor, rather than to philosophies for or against unionism.

Shortly afterwards another discordant note was sounded when a young delegate made a comment of his own on the subject of unionism. "It is my belief," he said, "that it is only a matter of time before all plantation labor here is organized."

Many islanders believed that the "New Americans" movement only tended to heighten—because it suggested the need for special education—the feeling of young island Japanese that they were outside the pale of acceptance as good Americans. Little was heard of the movement after December 7.

Regardless of their Americanism, it was evident in 1941 that the Japanese immigrants to Hawaii and their children had done very well for themselves. Though originally from peasant stock, their wholesale migration away from agriculture showed that they could adapt themselves well to skilled trades and commercial life. Occupational statistics in 1940 revealed that the Japanese, who made up more than one-third of all the gainfully employed people in the Islands, included more than one-half of the Territory's craftsmen. They were the painters, the electricians, plumbers, and carpenters. They constituted more than half of the proprietors of small retail food stores; they owned half the restaurants. More than two thousands were in automobile sales and repair work. Another two thousand owned their own vegetable and hog farms. Japanese girls made up eighty per cent of the household servants and were employed by the hundreds in downtown stores. Japanese controlled the Territory's fishing trade, amounting to a million and a half dollars each year.

Since 1909 a strong Japanese Chamber of Commerce had been operated in Honolulu to guide Japanese business concerns. In 1940 a total of \$2,246,000 worth of goods had been imported from Japan; this was only a part of the produce handled by these concerns. In that year Japanese interests founded a half-million dollar Honolulu branch of the famed Mitsukoshi department store of Tokyo. A staff of merchandising specialists came from Japan to help set up the store and Honolulu apprentices went to the Tokyo store to study Japanese merchandising methods. Another new venture was the \$120,000 Tokyo theater erected to show Japanese films. In 1941 there was \$11,000,000 on deposit in Honolulu's three Japanese banks.

Economically, the plantation immigrants from Japan had come a long way since their arrival in 1868 to work for eighteen dollars a month and keep.

The result of the Jap bombings on December 7 upon the security of the Japanese in Hawaii was infinitely more far reaching than its effect upon people of other races. The attack exposed them not only to the same perils that all the other residents suffered but also to hostile forces which moved in on them from all sides on the home front. It was perhaps natural that the wave of revulsion and anger which swept the community immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor should be directed partly toward these island people who visibly were so much akin with the enemy. In a community which did not have Hawaii's long background of racial assimilation there undoubtedly would have been ugly mob action. But for the background and but for the effective police and military action, many island Japanese would have been victims of sudden hate.

There were isolated instances which showed how explo-

sive the situation was. One took place on the afternoon of December 7 among spectators gathered outside a Waikiki school, which had been damaged in the attack.

Several neighbors were telling their experiences. Usually something was added about the treachery of the enemy Japanese. One woman who had recently arrived from the Mainland was engaged in a violent outburst against the Japanese, whom she described in stereotyped bad phrases as "dirty slant-eyes" and "yellow bellies."

An aged Japanese woman in kimono came by, her wooden *geta* clacking on the cement sidewalk. The *malihini* (newly arrived) woman rushed at the old Japanese, grabbing furiously at her kimono.

"Take that damned thing off!" she yelled.

The others ran over and managed to pull her away.

"Make her take it off!" she shouted hysterically. The others forced her to let go and held her, while the terrified old woman hurried off.

There was no doubt that the Hawaiian Japanese were immediately "on the spot." Young *Nisei* workers on an Oahu defense project were rounded up by a detachment of guards and marched off the grounds at the point of bayonets. Japanese-American medical attendants who offered their services during the height of the attack were refused. Domestic servants, and in some cases business employees, were summarily discharged from work after Pearl Harbor. Those who were sincere Americans could see that their loyalty was going to be sorely tried.

The more official consequences on island Japanese became known when the military announced the restrictions imposed under martial law. A 25-year-old *Nisei* rather eloquently expressed his feeling at the time.

"The agitated voice of the governor declaring martial

law almost made me weep," he said. "Then the awful silence when the radio went off the air shortly afterward seemed like death itself. I got to thinking, *now with the Army and Navy in charge here, with their prejudiced attitude toward the Japanese, we will surely all be deported to Molokai, or perhaps to a Mainland concentration camp. We must at least expect some pretty rough treatment.*"

But the Army had no plans for mass evacuation of the Japanese. One of the first Army announcements after the bombing was that the authorities did not plan to organize mass concentration camps.

Army restrictions, however, effectively broke down the traditional system of social organization among the island Japanese. Aliens were ordered not to gather in numbers of more than ten. Alien means of expression and communication—the foreign language press, the Japanese radio broadcasts—were closed down. Seizure and prohibition of short wave radio sets in alien homes cut off contact with Japan. Aliens were forbidden to own cameras, maps showing military installations, any type of firearms or signalling sets. They were prohibited from further business transactions and their funds were frozen in the banks. The three Japanese banks, with eleven million on hand, were closed, though provision was made for personal withdrawals of enough for living expenses. The foreign language schools were closed; most of them were taken over by the Army for the quartering of troops. The Japanese fleet of fishing sampans was tied up for the duration. The Japanese Chamber of Commerce closed its offices.

Most of the Army regulations, particularly those governing the aliens, were cheerfully adhered to by local Japanese. There were some, however, which *Nisei*, eager to

show their loyalty to American ideals, found hard to take. One of these was the disorganization of the Hawaii Territorial Guard. This unit had been called into action on December 7. It was made up of R.O.T.C. graduates and students from the University of Hawaii and the four high schools of Honolulu. Its membership, therefore, was largely Japanese. Nevertheless, they had been given important duties to perform under the regular U. S. Army.

In the weeks after Pearl Harbor there was a great deal of criticism because these sons of enemy aliens were placed as guards over Hawaii's public utilities, communications, and vital waterfront areas. Undoubtedly as a result of this criticism, orders were issued in January, 1942, for Japanese members of the Guard to drop out of service. It was a severe blow to the young men, but they responded in a way that made those who believed in their loyalty tingle with pride.

They addressed a letter to General Emmons, commanding officer of the U. S. Army in Hawaii. It read:

"We joined the Guard voluntarily with the hope that this was one way to serve our country in her time of need. Needless to say we were deeply disappointed when we were told that our services were no longer required. Hawaii is our home—the United States our country. We know but one loyalty and that is to the Stars and Stripes. We wish to do our part as loyal Americans in every way possible, and we hereby offer ourselves for whatever services you may see fit to use us."

General Emmons accepted their offer. With the group of one hundred and fifty Japanese-American students of the University of Hawaii as a nucleus, the Varsity Victory Volunteers were organized. They were assigned as an

auxiliary unit to a regiment of engineers, with a semi-military status. Their jobs were as quarry laborers, as railroad track layers, as carpenters, painters and common laborers. They lived in camps sometimes far inland. Their pay was that of army privates, thirty dollars a month.

General Emmons later declared his appreciation of this group. "The way you boys have acted," he told them, "enables me to say that the VVV is one of my favorite units among the army forces of my Hawaiian command."

Yet there soon occurred another incident which showed the young island Japanese that their loyalty was still on trial. About two thousand *Nisei* were already in the regular army in Hawaii. Most of them had been inducted with other island youths under the Selective Service Act, although some had volunteered. They had been on active duty since December 7 and many had won commendation for their performances during the attack. Officers said they made excellent soldiers.

But in June, 1942, orders came from Washington that all men of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Department were to be detached and sent in a group to a Mainland training camp. It looked like another evidence of suspicion, and morale among the boys and their families at home sank to its lowest ebb.

It was about this time that Japanese who had been active in island political life began to announce their withdrawal from politics. George Eguchi, Honolulu representative in the Territorial Legislature, announced that he was not going to run for re-election. "To save the Territory from embarrassment in the eyes of the nation and for the sake of island Japanese, I am saying goodbye to politics for the duration," he states.

Others followed this example.

On the island of Kauai one candidate representative to the legislature, and three Japanese candidates for the county board of supervisors, withdrew from the campaign. On the island of Hawaii two candidates who were assured of seats on a like board dropped out. One of them, a graduate of Punahou School and married to a white woman, at first insisted he would run because it was his patriotic duty. "I have nothing to do with Japan," he said. "I was born here in the Islands and I belong here. No real American would expect me to resign. It would not be democratic."

When he finally did drop out it was, he said, only as a concession to his friends in the Japanese community.

Last to resign was Sanji Abe, member of the Territorial Senate, who was interned after police discovered a Japanese flag in his home in violation of military orders. Abe's case provoked considerable difference of opinion among islanders on the question of his loyalty. For years Abe had been a ranking officer of the Hawaii county police department and in World War I he had enlisted in the U. S. Army. Yet up to a month before his election to his seat in 1940, he was a dual citizen and did not give up his Japanese citizenship until it appeared as though it might affect his chances of election.

Two other Japanese politicians on the island of Hawaii, one a territorial representative, the other a county supervisor, did not have to go through the formality of resignation. They were picked up on suspicion of subversive activity before the primary political campaign got started. The 1943 Legislature was the first session in many years which had no Japanese sitting in either the Senate or the House of Representatives.

The FBI and the Army and Navy intelligence sections continued to round up other Japanese suspected of subversive activities. In August, 1943, the director of the FBI in Honolulu announced that since December 7, 1941, a total of 1,479 suspects had been taken into custody. Of these 464 were Hawaii-born Japanese and 626 were alien Japanese. Most of the others were Germans.

Meanwhile, a number of other factors within the community were making island Japanese uneasy. As the war progressed and additional thousands of newcomers, service men and defense workers arrived in the Islands, resentment against the local Japanese was often openly expressed.

To fighting men, returning to Hawaii for rest after months at Guadalcanal and Tarawa, the mere sight of Japanese walking in the streets of Honolulu was sometimes enough to start a disturbance. Nearly every restaurant and most of the beer cafes and bars in Honolulu were staffed by Japanese. Soldiers and marines, some of whom had never seen a Japanese until they met the dark-skinned enemy troops in the South Pacific, found it hard to accept Japanese waitresses, bartenders and busboys. It seemed strange to them, something perhaps to be resented, when they stood shoulder to shoulder in elevators, or shared trolley car and bus seats with men so like the enemy they had learned to hate.

Over in the city of Hilo, where the population was largely Japanese and where many U. S. troops were stationed for rest, incidents were frequent. One day three Marines stopped a Japanese driving by in his car. They pulled him out, knocked him down and took the car on a tour of the island. Military authorities found it a vexing problem to restrain their men from such notions.

Still, there were no serious outbreaks of racial disorder as the war went into its third year. Isolated minor incidents were not publicized.

Many things the Hawaiian-Japanese themselves did aggravated the rising feeling. Even *kamaainas* began to be irritated. Their complaint was the wholesale departure of Japanese domestics for more lucrative trades in boomtime Honolulu. Gardeners, maids and chauffeurs were leaving to make some of the big money in restaurants and bar jobs and in non-military construction work.

One thing about the Japanese "situation" which did perturb big business—and they were quick to sound off about "agitators" and "trouble makers from the coast"—was the alacrity with which Japanese workers were joining union movements. This was definitely a threat against the economic status of the future. Now when a labor controversy arose, the racial phases became the first target for criticism. A new cry against "domination by the Japanese" went up.

Occasionally the harshest opponents of island Japanese put their opinions into public print. In 1942, John A. Balch, chairman of the Mutual Telephone Company which operated all island communications, published and distributed through the Islands and on the Mainland a pamphlet which charged that the Japanese were on the way to control the Territory.

"In twenty years," Balch said, "the Japanese will have gained absolute control of the Islands. Only the immediate removal of twenty thousand Japanese families to the Coast, preferably to the Mississippi Valley, can save the situation."

His thesis was that only the older Japanese should be allowed to stay and work on the plantations. He did not

say so, but that aim had been formulated by the early sugar planters. They wanted cheap agricultural labor, but they wanted someone else to be responsible for the social and economic consequences involved.

Because neither the community nor the military paid serious attention to his plan, Mr. Balch brought his pamphlet to Washington in June, 1943. He informed the press there that Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons had "given him the brushoff." When he had lingered for some time in Washington without obtaining encouragement, it began to seem as though other responsible leaders were doing the same thing.

In 1943 Colonel Perry M. Smoot, director of Selective Service in the Territory, publicly scolded the oriental people in the Islands and big business for their attitude towards the war effort. His lengthy statement particularly charged them with "stamping the draft boards for deferments from war service."

"That half the population with an Oriental background is not carrying its share of the burden can be proved by facts and figures," said the Colonel, who had two sons of his own on duty in combat areas.

Inasmuch as the Army was not taking enlistments from men of Japanese ancestry, it seemed as though his charge was leveled largely at the Chinese in the Islands. Indeed, he was pretty specific about this. "The Chinese in China are screaming for American aid," he said, "but Selective Service, plasma bank records and territorial property records show that the people here are not contributing to the war effort, but rather are buying up local real estate and turning a deaf ear to their countrymen."

The Colonel's ire was aroused by the response to the

first new draft he had called in sixteen months. The various draft boards found themselves swamped with requests for deferment of white collar workers, even soda fountain clerks, whose services it was claimed were essential. "Island business firms have had more than a year," he pointed out, "in which to arrange for replacements. Why can't they change from a forty hour to a forty-eight hour week, as government agencies did?"

"Those island interests making the biggest clamor for statehood and equal rights are making the greatest efforts to get deferments for employees and relatives," he charged. "As the record now stands, it leaves a big hole to be plugged in the case for statehood. A large proportion of our people here are ready to take advantage of the privileges of American citizenship but are slow to accept the responsibilities which go with it."

While the Colonel's criticism touched others besides the Japanese, this was not true of a statement by a columnist for the Honolulu *Advertiser* about the same time. The columnist had worked for several years in China and had seen at first hand the tactics of the Japanese Imperial forces. It was an experience which did not instill in him much regard for the Japanese, wherever he might find them.

In a series of articles he hammered bluntly at the Japanese in Hawaii. "They are," he said, "negative Americans. In speech they contribute nothing to the denunciation of the foe. It is time now that our misunderstood 'little brethren' began to understand his 'Big Brother.'"

The *Advertiser* articles were inflammatory enough to arouse protest, including a word from the Army. Subsequently Lorris Thurston, publisher of the paper, wrote a signed statement on the editorial page which virtually re-

pudiated the series. "I personally do not agree with many of the convictions of the writer," he said. "There is another side of the picture which the average person, including the writer, will not readily understand. We must expect to have 'Jap haters' who do not take time to get down to basic facts. Prejudice, not facts, largely guides their statements. Many points which our columnist brought out are based on prejudice."

Many islanders thought that was a bit rough on the columnist; but they agreed, too, that the local Japanese had been kicked while on the ground.

Not long afterwards, however, the young Japanese of Hawaii were able to take some of the positive action the *Advertiser* columnist had demanded. In January, 1943, General Emmons announced that the War Department had authorized him to recruit 1,500 young men from among local Japanese to make up a special combat unit in the U. S. Army. The new unit would not go through the normal training of regular inductees. Recruits would instead go to a Mainland camp for a period of intensive combat training; then they would immediately be shipped overseas into the front lines. It looked like a forthright test of American-Japanese loyalty.

If it was, then a clear cut answer was given. From all the islands, young Japanese flocked to recruiting headquarters. They came from various walks of life, from plantation workers to the most prominent young professional men. Within a month, so many had volunteered that General Emmons announced the War Department had increased the quota to 2,600. By the end of February a total of 9,507 had volunteered.

In March the Army picked out its men. When the job

was done the 2,600 chosen represented the top strata of the Islands' young Japanese. They were mostly lawyers, school teachers, business proprietors and managers, and skilled tradesmen. It was reported that the unit comprised a greater proportion of high school and college graduates than were to be found in any troop unit of similar size in the U. S. Army. One out of every eight was a college man.

Almost as soon as the volunteers could be fitted with uniforms, they were told to make ready for the trip to the Mainland. On March 28, 1943, Hawaii's Japanese community gathered on the grounds of Iolani Palace to bid *aloha* to their sons going off to the front. A crowd of more than twenty thousand, the largest ever to assemble in downtown Honolulu, was there. And after ceremonies attended by the military and civil governors, the mayor of Honolulu and other officials, the Japanese mothers and fathers of these young soldiers—returned to their homes to put up service flags with a star or two for the sons who would soon be fighting as a part of the American Army.

The island troops were next heard from at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and soon after that at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, where they were given an especially intensive course in basic and combat training. At the camps, they trained as officers had seen no other units train. One day as they were starting the last mile of a thirty-mile hike with packs, the officers were amazed to see the Hawaiian *Niseis* break into a trot and run the entire mile back into camp. Throughout their training they had one ever-recurring question: "When do we go overseas?"

By September they were gone. And then reports began to come back from Africa, from Sicily and Italy of this

strange unit which was in the thick of the fighting with the Fifth Army. War correspondents told of how the unit went into action in the mountains above the Gulf of Salerno on September 25, "with smiles on their faces."

An Associated Press correspondent wrote: "Their smiles brought expressions of blank amazement from veterans and officers accustomed to seeing men enter combat with tense, drawn faces."

He quoted the commander of the Japanese-American unit as saying: "They're really anxious to get into action, for it's their chance to prove that they're real Americans. They've got something extra to fight for. Those smiles aren't forced. Those are smiles of satisfaction."

Scores of the Hawaiian troops were killed or wounded. One press dispatch reported a group of them wounded on the Volturno front. They were taken to a field hospital where they underwent an air attack which killed several of the injured.

Another dispatch told of fighting in October along the Benevento front, where the Germans lost heavily. "The Japanese-Americans were under fire for four days," it said. "During the operation Sgt. Yutaka Nezu from Waimanalo, Oahu, led a squad into no man's land to rescue twenty-two American paratroopers who had been cut off behind the German lines for sixteen days. One of the men volunteered to wipe out a German machine gun nest and led the attack. A shell caught him in the head. He remained alive long enough to inform the platoon sergeant of details about the machine gun raid, then dropped dead."

Stories of Hawaii's fighting Japanese during the dreary, bloody battle for lower Italy became legend in the Islands, and all over the world too.

Correspondents dubbed them the "puka puka battalion" after they had forced several breaches in the German lines during twenty-eight successive days of fighting at Cassino. To the battalion each break-through was a "puka," the Hawaiian word for "hole." The "puka puka" boys took San Michele in a night attack. They launched the first infantry attack below the abbey at Cassino. They held the terrible Castle Hill sector against repeated vicious German counter attacks.

A New York *Times* correspondent, with U. S. troops in Italy, told something of the personal crusade the Hawaii boys were waging. He had just seen them come in—muddy, wounded and half-starved after four days and five nights up on the front line. He wrote:

"Latest periodicals reaching the troops quote those who have never heard, shot, or fired at anything bigger than a duck to the effect that all Japanese citizens of the United States should be barred and that 'the only good Jap is a dead one.' This Japanese-American battalion is the best answer to that type of doctrine. These men not only have been fighting with tremendous bravery and bearing all the sufferings and dangers their fellow G.I. soldiers have, but they are serving in a sort of crusade—to make the rest of America understand that they, too, are good and loyal American citizens."

Back in Honolulu, Japanese and white residents alike thrilled to the stories of the heroism of their island troops. A new sense of unity was born as word came home of the deaths of Japanese boys. Even in the tragedy of the parents' bereavement, there seemed to be an effort to show some understanding of Americanism. In the Japanese community, it was customary on the forty-ninth day after death

to distribute tea among friends and relatives in memory of the dead. On November 3, 1943, Joseph and Hiromatsu Takata, plantation workers at Waialua, Oahu, announced they were donating \$400 to the Red Cross, rather than distributing tea, in memory of their son, Sgt. Joseph Takata, killed in action in the North African theater. Similarly, Mr. and Mrs. Kikuzo Tanaka, of Honolulu, gave \$200 to war relief societies, in memory of their son, Private Keichi Tanaka, killed in North Africa. Other Japanese parents of battle dead did the same.

One day in March, 1944, some of the families of the Takatas, the Oyamas, the Kobayashis who had given their lives in battle, gathered in the bare University of Hawaii auditorium. The U. S. Army commander in Hawaii had invited them to come.

An army spokesman—Col. Kendall Fielder, head of Army Intelligence in the Islands—went to the platform to address them. For some minutes he spoke solemnly to the hushed group. Many of these in the audience listened stiffly, unable to understand most of what was said. When the Colonel had finished, Staff Sergeant Howard Hiroki, a Japanese-American veteran of the South Pacific, stepped forward to interpret. As the young, dark-skinned sergeant translated what his superior in command had said, some of his listeners began to sob.

At the conclusion of the address those present in the audience were asked to come forward. They stood in line by the stage—some of them bespectacled, hard-handed workmen, some wrinkled mothers, some young matrons. Colonel Fielder shook each of them by the hand. Then he presented each with a Purple Heart medal, posthumous award for a son or a young husband or sweetheart killed in Italy. Rarely

had this award for the final test of American patriotism been so reverently given.

It might have struck some of the people of Hawaii about this time that the younger Japanese of their islands—struggling to express themselves upon principles of labor on the home front, and giving their lives in battle as the Takatas, Tanakas and other fighting comrades had—were indeed a legitimate breed of new Americans. Perhaps there had been all the time within this tormented, American-born generation a sense of loyalty which had needed neither their cursing nor their coddling.

Yet, more than any other factor of community life, the question of Hawaii's Japanese was brought to the fore, unfavorably for the islands, each time the territory's most insistent political issue came up for consideration. This issue was Statehood—which gives perhaps the best illustration of the artful juggling public opinion in the islands underwent at the hands of the men of the Big Five.

"THE FORTY-NINTH STATE"

"Hawaii is by no means ready to join the sisterhood of states . . . due to the unhealthy state of control of her economic setup, legislature, police and judiciary."

—Henry Rudin, former Recreational Director of Waiialua Plantation.

In May, 1943, American and Japanese troops were battling in the damp, frigid hills of Attu, In the Solomons in the same month American land and sea forces were pushing up through the last Japanese bases in that blood-soaked archipelago. Down in New Guinea General MacArthur's U. S. and Anzac jungle fighters were mopping up the last of Japan's stubborn invaders of that island. All along this great arc sweeping the Pacific from the Aleutians to the continent of Australia, America was battling to drive the Japanese back from the outer tips of the great fan-shaped domain they had overrun since December of 1941.

On the edge of this arc, as the farthest point east that the Imperial forces had ventured, were the Hawaiian Islands—3,600 miles out of Tokyo, 2,200 miles to San Francisco's west. Hawaii was up to its neck in the war in the Pacific. She was the main operating base from which U. S. offensives were launched. Honolulu was a garrison city, her everyday life so guided that it would fit into the military plan. The half million people of Hawaii, living almost

within earshot of the sound of battle, were thinking of little else than the job of getting this war done as soon as possible. Numbered among them were 150,000 resident Japanese, uneasily fulfilling whatever were their tasks in the prosecution of war.

Yet it was in this month, in May of 1943, that the Territory of Hawaii's delegate to Congress rose in the House of Representatives to ask Congress, as it had been asked sixteen times over a period of eighty-nine years before, to admit Hawaii as a full-fledged state in the American union. The Hon. Joseph R. Farrington asked the House to pass an Enabling Act which would permit Hawaii to frame a state constitution whereunder the Territory could take her place as a sister state in the Union.

Freshmen congressmen might have been taken aback by the delegate's temerity in making the application at such a time. But to oldtime members Hawaii's statehood petition was so familiar a feature of each Congressional session, that they would have been more surprised had it not been introduced. They knew, too, that since 1933 Hawaii's statehood drive had become singularly insistent. During the past decade the Territory's statehood campaign had commanded many new strengths and more respectable pressures.

The obvious reason was that in 1933 big business had suddenly gone all out for statehood. Up to that time statehood had been little more than a crusade conducted by island idealists who felt that Hawaii had won the political right to be admitted into the sisterhood of states. Ten years ago, the business interests were too preoccupied with keeping their economic house in order to pay more than casual interest to the crusade. It took two events in 1933 and

1934 to suddenly cause the business interests to throw all their resources into the campaign.

First there was the bill introduced in Congress in the spring of 1933 by Rep. John E. Rankin, Democrat of Mississippi. It was strictly a New Deal measure, framed with the blessing of President Roosevelt. The message he sent to Congress with the measure indicated that he had some doubts about how things were going in the Territory. "It is particularly necessary," the President wrote, "to select for the post of Governor of Hawaii a man of experience and vision who will be regarded by all citizens of the Islands as one who will be absolutely impartial in his decisions."

The Rankin bill was to remove the three-year residence qualification and give the President power to appoint a non-resident as Governor of Hawaii. It was rumored that Mr. Roosevelt had it in mind to appoint Judge Ben Lindsey, the non-conventionalist champion of companionate marriage and juvenile courts. The volcanic Fiorello H. LaGuardia of New York was also mentioned as a possible choice.

The wail of protest that greeted the news in Hawaii echoed out into the Pacific. The Territorial Legislature, the Chamber of Commerce, both political parties, business firms and organizations cabled to Washington to say that the bill was unjust and undemocratic. The morning *Advertiser* was recklessly ironic. "Judge Lindsey is out of the question as a companionate governor of Hawaii," the editor wrote. "Give us Ely Culbertson or Al Jolson, but not Ben Lindsey."

Hawaii's protests aroused some Congressional support and the bill was finally rejected, with the aid of a filibuster in the Senate. But for the first time, big business in the Islands

began to reflect upon the weaknesses of their Territorial status. What if Lindsey, LaGuardia, or *any* reformer, had come to butt into such peculiarly local situations as the relations between island business and labor. This so horrible a prospect might very well be reality during the next session of Congress.

If there were any among the business group who were not impressed by their narrow escape, the incident of 1934 jolted them into a grim enthusiasm for statehood. That year one of the most fearsome of the New Deal's alphabetical agencies, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, turned its hot breath upon Hawaii's prosperous sugar industry. Early in 1934 congressional hearings were being held upon the apportionment of quotas for sugar areas. The HSPA rushed its biggest men to Washington to fight, alongside the Territorial delegate, for Hawaii's share. Similarly representatives of the sugar cane states, Louisiana and Florida, the ten sugar beet states, and Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines laid their cases before the Congressional Committee. Their respective fates were to be determined by the quotas set up by the Jones-Costigan Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

In June, 1934, the quotas were announced. With profound dismay, Hawaii learned that she had been classed with Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico as a "foreign area." All the favors had gone to the Mainland areas, to the sugar-raising states with their all-important votes in Congress. Here, in one lightning stroke, was a revelation of the value of a voice in Congress. On that day a new champion for Hawaii statehood was born. In 1934 Sugar buckled down to the job of making Hawaii the forty-ninth state.

This was exactly sixty years after the first attempt had been made to win statehood for Hawaii. In 1874 King Kamehameha III, prompted by missionaries, had petitioned Washington for Hawaii's admission into the Union. The United States Department of State, in answer, agreed to sign a treaty giving every privilege short of statehood. When the king insisted upon full statehood, the negotiations collapsed.

They were not revived until Congress was debating the political future of Hawaii after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893. The view then was that Hawaii would have plenty of time to prove her worth as a Territory. The movement for statehood received little support. Business leaders were much too busy with their expanding sugar trade.

For two decades afterwards the lone champion of statehood was a native Hawaiian, Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalaniana'ole, who was sent to Washington as delegate of the Territory with an overwhelming vote at each election. Until his death in 1922 this cultured Hawaiian statesman pleaded for statehood as a privilege due his people. Some said he sought this closer bond with the United States because it might serve to break up the tightening grip that he saw was being fastened on the Islands by a restricted group of families.

In 1911, Prince Kalaniana'ole made public his grievance. "While there is great, in fact too much, wealth concentrated in the industrial corporations of Hawaii, and in the hands of a few men who control them, the population at large was never relatively shorter in its supply of independent land and home-owning citizens," he said. "The vital trouble is that the people who control the industrial life of

Hawaii have become so blinded by long-continued prosperity and the habit of controlling everything from their own standpoint that they, themselves, do not realize how deadly that policy is to the ultimate welfare of the Territory."

This attack was hardly likely to win friends for statehood among business men of the Islands. But in 1926 it was revived by the new delegate, Victor S. K. Houston, over the protests of the island sugar interests. Houston, a former naval commander, though island-born, was not long in recognizing the growing political strength of the sugar beet and Mainland cane interests. He wrote back from Washington to say that this strength could be met only with Congressional votes.

Island business was apathetic. An HSPA spokesman even tried to talk him out of his efforts. "Look," he said. "Why don't you just forget about this statehood. You've got to get down to real business."

Through two terms Delegate Houston carried on his lone campaign. For the 1931 session of the Territorial Legislature, he prepared the draft of an Enabling Act, based upon those submitted by other Territories which had achieved statehood. This was duly presented to the Hawaiian Legislature which automatically passed it, without even bothering to fill in the provisions Houston had left blank for their suggestions. In this incomplete form it arrived on the desk of Governor Lawrence M. Judd, known then as an opponent of statehood. He promptly vetoed the bill on the basis of "technical deficiencies."

Interestingly enough, it was the same former Governor Judd who, in the climactic years of sugar's drive for statehood, was hired as the spearhead of the campaign. In 1940

he toured the nation as a lecturer, boosting Hawaii's bid to become the forty-ninth state.

Delegate Houston's attitude toward statehood and his failure to fight the Congressional Filipino Exclusion Bill for island sugar in 1931 spelled the end of his career in Washington. Lincoln L. McCandless, Democratic financier who succeeded him in 1932, would have nothing to do with statehood—not only on account of what might have been sympathy for big business but because of the Massie case, an event so costly to Hawaii's prestige that she was perhaps fortunate in not losing many of her privileges as a Territory.

Many Mainland Americans first became aware of the existence of the Hawaiian Islands when they read in September, 1931, how Thalia Massie, wife of a young Navy lieutenant, was attacked and allegedly raped by a group of young Hawaiians and Japanese on a lonely Honolulu road. The story continued to stay on the nation's front pages when Lieut. Massie and his mother-in-law subsequently kidnapped and killed one of the Hawaiian defendants in the assault. The pair were tried and found guilty of manslaughter, only to be released after one hour in jail.

The case had far-flung consequences. It caused, for the first time, a sharp conflict between island residents and the authorities. The local community saw the assault case as regrettable, but something for which Mrs. Massie might have been partly to blame. On the other hand, they looked upon the slaying of the Hawaiian and the release of his slayers as a definite miscarriage of justice. The Navy, naturally, lined up solidly behind the Massies—but the tension was not lessened when the crew of Massie's ship swept

through a native section of Honolulu during the trials and beat up every non-white they came upon.

The immediate reaction in Washington was a report that a military commission would be placed in charge of the Islands. This rumor was given some credence when the U. S. Attorney-General, at the behest of Congress, dispatched Assistant Attorney-General Seth W. Richardson to Honolulu to investigate local crime and police administration.

Mr. Richardson found that crime was anything but rampant in the area.

"We can report no organized crime in Honolulu," he said. "Nor did we find serious racial prejudices, nor serious deficiencies in the courts. But there is no question as to the weakness of its police system and the general inefficiency of the administration of justice."

What dismayed Hawaii's leaders were the facts which Richardson's investigators dug up as a sort of extracurricular effort during their stay. The hearings uncovered complaints of economic injustices, of landgrabbing, oppression and monopolies. Island industrialists were highly resentful when these findings were included in the final Richardson report, which naturally received wide national circulation. Particularly painful was the criticism of their labor policy of importing foreign workers.

"Island industry pursues a policy of importing an unending stream of common laborers, without working out any real employment program for the purpose of carrying on island industries with island labor," the report pointed out.

Hawaii's chastened leaders hastily offset the immediate threat of a military commission by calling a special session

of the Legislature during which the whole island system of police and prison administration was overhauled. A commission was appointed to govern the politics-ridden police department, a new prison board was named and the office of public prosecutor was established for the first time.

Perhaps this house cleaning helped in the defeat of the hated Rankin bill next year. That New Deal bogey out of the way, there was still the New Deal's alphabetical invaders to contend with. First of these was the AAA.

In July, 1934, a personal representative of Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace arrived in the Islands to see to the administration of AAA provisions in the sugar industry. Strangely, the sugar planters found that behind the AAA plan there lay a great deal of economic horse sense. It was not so unlike their own HSPA, only on a national scale. Hawaii's complaint was that her share in the scheme, compared with inshore areas, was unjustly small.

They even admired the young executive who came to administer the AAA. Aware that his Washington background might be a valuable asset for island interests, their native acquisitiveness was aroused. They made overtures and, after some months, the AAA man joined the HSPA payroll as assistant secretary of the Association. His immediate superior, the executive secretary, came to the HSPA with an even broader background of Washington influence. He had retired as a general in the U. S. Army after serving as commander of the forces in Hawaii. When the editor of Hawaii's independent weekly newspaper read certain inferences into the HSPA appointment, the general brought suit for criminal libel and won a conviction. Mr. Crowley went to jail for three months.

The AAA was followed by the NIRA, Social Security, and other New Deal creations and then the island sugar men added their voices to the nationwide big business denunciations of "that man in the White House." Typical of their attitude was a speech before the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce in 1935 in which William R. Castle, Hawaii's then most distinguished son, branded the NIRA as insidious "government control of business."

Mr. Castle, grandson of the founder of Castle and Cooke, had left Hawaii earlier to enter a career in Washington. He became Assistant Secretary of State under President Hoover. His future, however, developed along unfortunate lines. One of the founders of the America First Committee, he publicly attacked President Roosevelt in 1939 as "a hater of Hitler." During his America First activities he became a close friend of George Sylvester Viereck, an important Nazi agent in America, and contributed articles to the Nazi organ, *Today's Challenge*. The climax of his misadventures came when a featured letter appeared over his name in the Sunday New York *Herald-Tribune*. It bore the title, "*Why Should We Go To War With Japan?*" and it excited reasons why the United States need not fear the intentions of Japan. The date of its publication was December 7, 1941, and at the time of its appearance Mr. Castle's native isle was being rocked by Japanese bombs.

Back in 1934 the whole combination of events—the loss of Island prestige in Washington through the Massie case, the Rankin Bill, the "discriminatory" AAA provisions—had convinced big business in the Territory that statehood was the only solution for Hawaii. That year they put up another

native-born former naval commander as candidate for Delegate. This time, however, they chose one about whose policies there could be no room for doubt. Samuel Wilder King was a forceful, hard-working representative for all the things the Big Five wanted. Chief among these in 1934 was statehood. King swept through the territorial election on a statehood platform and went packing off for Washington with this as his primary goal.

In January, 1935, Mr. King introduced Hawaii's statehood bill in Congress, just as it had been introduced a dozen times before him. But the dynamic energy which he threw into following it up brought some results. The Committee on Territories appointed a sub-committee of six members and sent it off to Hawaii in October to look into the matter at first hand. Though Honolulu greeted them elaborately, it was the feeling among islanders that this was a "joy ride" junket which wouldn't amount to anything. Perhaps they were right. Nothing much further was heard about statehood in that session of Congress. Mr. King, however, went on with his spade work, bringing the matter up before committees and button-holing House and Senate members at every opportunity to tell them why Hawaii should be the forty-ninth state.

Back home, the Territorial Legislature in its 1935 session voted assistance for the statehood drive. The Hawaii Equal Rights Commission was created, with a \$10,000 budget, to spot discriminations against the Territory and to fight for equal treatment. And when voters went to the polls the following year, they, too, were warming up to the statehood campaign and Mr. King was re-elected by a handsome majority.

In June, 1937, the delegate again put his bill before Con-

gress. This time a real tribute was paid to his diligence. The Senate and House joined in appointing a Joint Committee on Hawaii of twenty-four members, empowered to conduct a thorough study of the statehood petition. They, too, would go to Hawaii. In anticipation of their visit the Territorial Legislature had already appropriated \$20,000 for committee expenses in the Islands.

They arrived in October and for eighteen days applied themselves conscientiously to the task of digging out facts on the Territory. As the way had been well prepared locally, their hearings naturally brought out a steady succession of witnesses who were ready with reasons why Hawaii should become a state. But there were a few nonconformers. Some of this unorganized group stated their belief that island industry had agitated the whole campaign for its own selfish, protective purposes. A few brought up the Japanese question. Some claimed that the negative side of statehood was not being presented for fear of reprisals.

One of the few who dared speak out openly against the state of things in Hawaii was the former recreational director of the Waialua sugar plantation, Henry Rudin, who forthrightly opposed the Territory's claim for statehood.

When he testified before the Congressional hearing, Mr. Rudin, a stocky, bald pated man with booming voice, told of his convictions without any preliminaries. He cited three reasons for Hawaii unpreparedness for statehood:

1. The unhealthy control of its economic setup.
2. Oligarchal supervision of the legislature, police and the judiciary.
3. The inability of the public utilities commission to protect the majority of the people.

Later, in a more specific criticism of the political situa-

tion, he testified: "As I see it, Poindexter is not the governor of Hawaii. Frank E. Thompson, the Big Five lawyer, is the real governor."

Whatever the Committee thought of opposing opinions, it was certain that their own report to Congress early in 1938 was no endorsement of Hawaii's petition. In it they dwelt on many facts that were unfavorable to statehood. They pointed out that the number of voters of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii had more than quadrupled in the preceding eight years and that this increase was greater than that of any other racial group. They recalled that there were 178 Japanese language schools in the Islands, with nearly 500 alien teachers in charge.

The final judgment was: "We recommend that the question of statehood for Hawaii be deferred, to be further considered by the Congress on some more appropriate occasion after determination of the sentiment of its people."

Island proponents of statehood refused to accept the decision. They grasped at the straw offered by the words "after determination of the sentiment of its people." Here was virtually a mandate for a territorial plebescite on statehood.

The next session of the Territorial Legislature voted for a territorial plebescite on statehood. The public vote was scheduled as part of the 1940 fall elections.

For Hawaii itself this was to be the showdown. Her own people had to show Congress they were overwhelmingly for statehood if the union of states was even to consider admission. Island interests had little doubt that a great majority had always looked upon statehood as a right Hawaii had earned. Most islanders who watched the scene closely felt that a vote along in the middle nineteen thirties

would have turned out at least a seventy-five percent majority favoring the step. But big business, with consistent thoroughness, wanted a complete vote to be cast in statehood's favor, whatever the cost. A program of education therefore was mapped out.

The job of promotion was turned over to the Big Five's publicity organization, the Pan-Pacific Press, a subsidiary of Bowman, Holst, Macfarlane & Richardson, the advertising firm which handled Matson, HSPA and the bulk of Big Five advertising. The publicity staff accepted the assignment with trepidation. They could not refuse, for this was a job their clients wanted done; but, as publicists, they knew that a showdown of public opinion on a question with so many ramifications was dangerous gambling.

However, they plunged into the task. Lists of speakers were made up. The press and radio stations were called in to do their part. The Hawaii Tourist Bureau and Big Five firms were prevailed upon to pool \$50,000 for the production and exhibition of a colored motion picture film to be titled, *Hawaii: USA*. The scenes were shot by a crew from Hollywood, but the dialogue, a one-hour plug for statehood, was prepared by the Pan-Pacific Press.

As these preparations began to reach a higher and higher pitch, the Honolulu *Advertiser* took time out for a warning. "There will be no organized opposition against education for the plebiscite. No one would care to stick his neck out that far. Consequently the question will be deprived of the advantages of open debate. Let's not make this statehood plebiscite the object of steam roller tactics."

Yet throughout the summer and fall virtually every organized group in the Territory heard a Pan-Pacific Press talk on statehood. The brunt of the speaking load was borne by Dr. Frederick B. Robinson, former president of

the College of the City of New York, who had been added to the Pan-Pacific staff to specialize in addressing island groups. The former educator invariably found an opportunity in his speeches, whether they were on statehood or high school graduation themes, to devote a few warning words to the subjects of Communism and liberal government. During the height of the statehood campaign, he took time out to hail the short-lived Russian-German peace pact as the beginning of a worldwide wave against radicalism and cited the spirit of revolt against labor then evident in California.

If Dr. Robinson was too busy, there were certain business leaders on call for talks. For reference they had a handy booklet, of which thousands of copies were mailed to the Mainland, that gave all the arguments for the Territory's admission as a state: that Hawaii had more population than Vermont, Delaware, Wyoming, and Nevada; that in area she was bigger than Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island; that in 1939 she paid more federal taxes (\$11,893,768) than fourteen of the forty-eight states. The booklet skipped over statistics on the Japanese.

To most islanders this was all an old story. They had been reading it for years in the local press. It rankled now to have to endure speeches on the subject for there undoubtedly was compulsion. When a business management announced a meeting of all personnel to hear a talk on statehood, attendance could hardly be called voluntary—even though most speakers prefaced or concluded their speeches with phrases such as “it is to be understood that this meeting is not intended as an attempt to influence your vote.”

There was bound to be reaction to such pressure. Islanders who had been ready to cast a willing vote for statehood

now began to reconsider. For years they had seen the Big Five apathetic toward, if not in opposition to, the move for statehood. Knowing the Big Five, they knew that this sudden championing of the cause must have had financial ramifications. It was enough to becloud the issue with suspicion. In typical American fashion, they resented being told how to vote. Moreover, with the United States edging closer and closer to the war in Europe, and relations with Japan growing progressively worse, it seemed to many that this was no time to upset the status quo.

If the campaign managers were blind to this reaction within the Islands, they could not have been unaware of the attitude on the Mainland. A public opinion poll in *Fortune* magazine early in 1940 indicated how small a place the Hawaiian Islands occupied in the national mind. Most insulting of all was the fact that *Fortune*, in which Bowman, Holst, Macfarlane & Richardson had invested many thousands of Big Five advertising dollars, listed Hawaii as a foreign country. The poll itself indicated that, by a vote of seventy-four per cent and fifty-five per cent respectively, more Americans favored defending Canada than Hawaii. Worse, the poll indicated that more than twenty-five per cent of American citizens favored the outright abandoning of Hawaii should the Islands be invaded.

One prominent Big Five executive was reported to have muttered bitterly, when he heard of this, "Well, I must say, that's a hell of a way to think about a prospective sister state!"

The showdown came on November 5, 1940, during the general political election. The ballot said simply, "Do You Favor Statehood for Hawaii?" When the votes were

counted, returns showed that the worst fears of the Pan-Pacific Press staff had been realized.

Of the 68,552 who voted on the issue, 46,124 were for statehood, 22,428 against. Significantly, more than twenty per cent of the 84,000 registered voters had cast no ballot at all. If these 15,000 remaining voters were too apathetic about statehood to cast their ballots, it may be fair to assume that they were not supporters of the cause. Certainly, 22,428 outright votes against the measure was a hefty minority.

The prevalent theory at the time was that the bulk of the opponents were Caucasian voters. The big Japanese vote was almost entirely in favor of statehood. Outspoken enemies of the island Japanese said they would vote for it as a solid block, with the hope of one day electing Japanese congressmen, probably a Japanese governor. Friends of the island Japanese calculated that their vote was solidly in favor because they accepted the plebiscite as a chance to express their loyalty.

If island interests were disappointed by the plebiscite showing, they hid their feelings successfully. Ignoring the gloomy side of the vote, the Honolulu *Star-Bulletin* triumphantly hailed the results as a two-to-one victory for statehood. "The righteous cause of statehood has triumphed over the doubts and fears and the undermining and weaseling of its opponents and enemies," the editor exulted.

Developing this theme, business interests saw that the Territorial Legislature voted a sizable appropriation in support of the campaign to revivify the statehood issue in Washington. Additional funds were allotted to The Hawaii Equal Rights Commission and a full time executive secretary was assigned to line up every bit of strength that could be thrown into the campaign.

It was somewhat disquieting to find that Hawaii still had a virulent, outspoken foe in the person of Rep. John E. Rankin of Mississippi, sponsor of the "carpetbagger" bill and member of the 1937 committee which visited the Islands. Even as Delegate King was preparing to bring a statehood bill before Congress, the congressman anticipated it.

"Another statehood bill in this session won't stand a ghost of a chance. Do you think we want two Jap senators from Hawaii?" he sourly demanded.

Nevertheless, on May 28, 1941, Delegate King went up again to Capitol Hill and presented Hawaii's renewed plea for admission as a state. It was perhaps unfortunate that he chose the very same day on which President Roosevelt decided to declare a state of national emergency.

It was the first public admission that war was only a matter of weeks or months away. A new consciousness of the existence of Hawaii was being awakened, but it had little or nothing to do with the statehood movement.

Rather than encouragement, indeed, there came another new and horrible threat against the privileges Hawaii enjoyed as a territory. In November the War Department instigated a bill empowering the President of the United States to invoke martial law in Hawaii and Puerto Rico by so directing military commanders in those theaters. Delegate King leaped into the breach. This definitely was that old threat of military domination. Under the Organic Act, the civil governor of the Territory decided when and if an emergency was serious enough to warrant declaration of martial law. Under the proposed bill, the military could inform the President when and where to act.

Delegate King appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on November 12 to brand the bill as

unnecessary. Home in Hawaii the *Star-Bulletin* protested. "This is another of a series of attempted abrogations of territorial rights."

The bill was still under consideration on December 7. At that time, too, Hawaii's statehood measure was deep among bills upon which the committee on territories had not acted. It was generally conceded that there it would die and Hawaii's efforts toward statehood would be abandoned for the duration.

But such a conclusion reckoned without the tenacity of the Hawaiian "interests." In the spring of 1943 when the Territorial Legislature assembled again, sure enough there was a new bill for statehood to replace the one which Congress had allowed to lapse. On April 27 the legislators, almost by force of long habit, passed a concurrent resolution "memorializing the Congress of the United States to make provision for granting statehood to the Territory of Hawaii." As an amendment there was attached a form of procedure, drawn up by the HSPA Speaker of the House, for attaining the long-desired status.

This time a new figure bore the familiar message to Congress. In 1942 Delegate King, relinquishing his unhappy labors for statehood, went back into the naval service as a commander with the U. S. fleet in the Pacific. Mr. Farrington, publisher of the *Star-Bulletin*, now carried the statehood banner to Washington.

If Delegate Farrington brought with him to the Capitol great hopes for favorable action, he was more optimistic than ninety-nine per cent of islanders. Most of them agreed with a Honolulu *Advertiser* editorial printed at the time: "As for statehood, there is no blinking the fact that Hawaii's chances for that status now are nil. But after the

war we will not be the same old Territory we were before. The days when political showmanship and the name of a candidate's family directed the course of island statecraft are days gone by."

Another prop was pulled from under Farrington's hopes soon after he arrived in Washington. He had been assured before he left Honolulu that a generous appropriation would be given the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission so that they could open an office in Washington to aid him in his fight. A bill subsequently was introduced in the Territorial Legislature, giving the commission \$74,000 to do its work. So confident were Commission members of the measure's passing that they hired a new executive secretary to be stationed in the nation's capital. But while the new secretary was busily arranging for an office, the Appropriation Bill was meeting trouble back in Hawaii. It seemed that members of the legislature had lost some of their enthusiasm for the statehood movement. Furthermore, legislators charged that the Washington secretary was being appointed principally as a publicity agent for Delegate Farrington. All in all, the Equal Rights Commission Bill got snarled up in the committee. When it finally passed, it had been reduced from \$74,000 to \$19,000, hardly enough to keep island activities of the commission functioning.

Thus, with the skies dark all around him, Delegate Farrington appeared before Congress on May 24, 1943, to present for the sixteenth attempt a bill asking that Hawaii be admitted as the forty-ninth state. With barely a comment, it was referred to the House Committee on Territories, where it will undoubtedly remain for the duration—as dormant as the Islands' once bustling tourist trade.

HAWAII TODAY

A good many millions a year now flow into the Territory as a result of the tourist trade. But it takes continued effort to keep the trade up to present levels, still more to increase it."

—Editorial, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 1940.

At intervals of a week or so, in the months following Pearl Harbor, a nondescript fleet of drab-painted ships appeared over the horizon off Oahu and, one after the other, trailed into Honolulu harbor for berthing. Usually most of the convoy would be freighters. Occasionally, though, there would be a former luxury liner among them, masked in dirty gray, and as these ghost ships swung up alongside the docks, hundreds of khaki-clad soldiers could be seen crowding the rails. Despite their numbers, the men were silent as the lines were thrown ashore and the ships tied up. They would peer over the town and toward Oahu's green ranges, without speaking. It was as though the sight and the smell of the land were enough to satiate their senses. Nor was there the customary noise of greeting from the wharves below. Only little power trucks fussed busily about the docks, towing the lines and moving gangplanks into place, while a few officers in tropical khaki waited to check the new arrivals. When the gangways were in place, the men started coming

down, one by one, packs on their backs. The ritual of a troop ship arrival was a sober, military business.

The landing of Hawaii's wartime "tourists" was a strange contrast with the carnival spirit of a pre-war ship arrival. Yet it was the only vestige remaining of what had once been the \$12,000,000 tourist industry, the Territory's former third-ranking trade.

Before Pearl Harbor the strains of "Song of the Islands" would have come blaring from the Royal Hawaiian Band, grouped in their military-cut white uniforms on the upper dock, as the liner inched its way into the wharf. Friendly islanders would have yelled greetings shipward to returning friends.

"Hel, Bill! *Aloha mui loa!*"

"Frank, you're back just in time! A 'first break' surf's running at Waikiki!"

The throngs on the docks, waiting for gangplanks to go down, would have been burdened with fragrant flower leis to drape over the shoulders of the passengers. Then, the arrival or departure of a big Matson luxury liner had been a social event of Honolulu's week. It was an elaborate bit of tradition that helped endear these apparently sentimental Islands to multitudes of vacationing visitors. But now ship movements had become military secrets.

War killed off Hawaii's tourist trade with the suddenness and finality that an out of season frost will destroy whole acres of a farmer's crop. It had been a gay, exhilarating business while it lasted. For all its phony glamour this tourist industry had become a sentimental favorite with many of the hardest realists among island businessmen. It may have been because the trade had breathed a sort of artificial life into the mores inherited from old Hawaii.

It had kept alive many of the native traditions which the sheer momentum of the acquisitive commerce of the last century had nearly killed off. The hula troupes, the *luau*s, and the other fragments of primitive island culture, sponsored as romantic background for the tourist trade, might even have given some of the businessmen a sense of consolation. These might have seemed a proof to them that the cultivation of sugar and pineapples had not been entirely a process of spoliation, that the policy of live and let live was not wholly unknown to them.

But if all this had been a source of any satisfaction, it would have only made more acute the financial loss they suffered with the temporary demise of the tourist industry. Island newspapers could no longer hail the new records of a tourist year. In early 1941 it was the *Star-Bulletin* which reported the glad news, hot from the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, that the 25,328 visitors vacationing in the Islands in 1940 had brought a total of \$12,664,000 in "new money" into the Territory.

An appraisal of the industry showed at a glance where most of the tourist dollars went. It cost the 25,328 tourists something like ten million dollars in fares, to get to the Islands and back. The bulk of this money went to the Matson line. When the visitors arrived in Honolulu, they usually stopped at two hotels, the Royal Hawaiian and the Moana. Both were owned and operated by the Big Five. When they went on side excursions to the other islands, they traveled via the Big Five's Inter-Island Steamship Co. or their Inter-Island Airways. The most popular tourist resort away from Waikiki was the Kona Inn on the island of Hawaii, also a Big Five enterprise. The smaller businesses

profited only in the money that tourists spent on incidental amusements.

Recognition of this fact was bluntly expressed in the 1939 legislature when a block of legislators unsuccessfully sought to chop off the appropriation, biennially made from public funds, to support the Hawaii Tourist Bureau.

"The ship lines and hotels are making all the tourist money," they pointed out. "Let them pay the advertising bills."

The Honolulu *Star-Bulletin*, ready spokesman for anything involving its owners' interests, assailed the legislative attempt. "It's true," an editorial said, "that big business gets first whack at the tourist dollars. But this income later percolates all through the community when it is spent by the shipping firms and hotels on wages, supplies and various services."

The Hawaii Tourist Bureau, one of the oldest organizations of its kind, was proof of the readiness with which island interests realized the profits to be made from the tourist trade. In 1901, the shipping lines and hotels formed the bureau as a community committee to promote travel to Hawaii. The Bureau's job was to see that prospective vacationers on the Mainland, with a yen for travel, were made aware of the charms of Hawaii. This was done conservatively, by supplying travel agencies throughout the world with literature on the Islands, and by quoting attractive hotel and shipping rates. A staff photographer turned out an endless stream of pictures illustrating the Islands' scenic beauties. The Bureau made a definite attempt to keep alive the traditions of native Hawaii, with shots of native huts (the only authentic grass one in the

Islands was the one painstakingly erected by ethnologists at the Bishop Museum in Honolulu) and of men casting fishing nets and pounding *poi* from taro roots. Little effort was made to capitalize on the native girl "angle," and pictures of hula dancers were usually photos of demure, slightly obese Hawaiian maidens in long tresses that fell to their ankles. The Bureau also made it a rule to send a representative, laden with flower *leis*, to meet every ship and to greet prominent passengers aboard.

Thus each year the tourist business grew, and annual reports of the Bureau showed an increase of a thousand or more visitors and a million or more of "income" over each preceding year. By 1927 the progress was enough to encourage the Matson Line to put up their \$2,000,000 Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

But in 1929 Wall Street cracked wide open. Almost immediately the effects were felt in Hawaii. As though a dam had been suddenly thrown up, the stream of extravagant spenders dwindled down to a mere nothing. Through the early thirties the lush new Royal Hawaiian was distressingly bare of guests.

The tourist business began to recover, gradually, in 1933. But still there were hundreds of rooms in the Royal Hawaiian that had never seen a paying guest. Some fresh impetus was needed for this lagging trade.

In 1935, a fast-talking San Francisco advertising man, Sydney S. Bowman, stepped off a ship at Honolulu. He must have looked upon the ripe, lush prospects that lay all about this bountiful territory, with the hot impatience a prospector exudes upon the discovery of gold. The possibilities here were tremendous.

Almost immediately, he had the responsible representatives of the Big Five together. To them he outlined his plan. Why not consolidate all the weak, loose ends of promotion for their various interests into one centralized super agency? Why not put sugar, the tourist business, statehood, and industrial relations into the hands of a public relations expert? Such a man could really sell Hawaii to the Mainland and to the world.

This was the first time the sugar executives had been exposed to such pressure. It was something foreign to their experience. The old Tourist Bureau routine had always seemed adequate to them. As for industrial relations, there was never anything needed beyond the policy of paternalism their own predecessors used. Yet, reflecting upon the waning tourist trade and upon the growing community complaints against monopoly and big business, they reluctantly admitted that a little more emphatic missionary work in these fields could be undertaken.

"All right," they finally told Mr. Bowman. "We'll give it a try. We'll start with the tourist business. You can go ahead."

The dynamic influence of Sydney Bowman soon began to be felt in a dozen different spheres. He moved in immediately on the Hawaii Tourist Bureau affairs. The old organization began to feel itself being propelled ahead by the force of a single personality.

Local newspapers found a new figure in island affairs, who proved to be an undrainable source of news. The Chamber of Commerce, Rotary and other luncheon clubs also felt the impact of Sydney Bowman's power of personal salesmanship. He addressed them on the vistas of new riches that were theirs for the asking.

Mr. Bowman organized a staff of publicity men and photographers into the Pan-Pacific Press Bureau, a Bowman, Holst & Macfarlane subsidiary, to inject new life into the tourist trade. In a short time, newspaper and magazine editors all over the country began to receive publicity releases and pictures from Hawaii. The photos aroused the interest of indolent editors. Unlike the occasional stuff they culled from the Islands before, these showed native girls with the accent on glamour. Some of the pictures were full color prints that found their way on to various magazine covers. The photos the Bowman Company sent them were rarely the less photogenic pure Hawaiian girls. They seemed to specialize in *Hapa-haoles*, half-white mixtures who more closely approximated the Hollywood version of South Sea maidens. Their articles were usually timely features on Hawaii's fight for statehood, or perhaps a colorful story on sugar pioneering. Similarly, the entire theme of the heavily accelerated program of island advertising was the glamour of romantic Hawaii. Full page color ads in national magazines were also used to lure visitors to the Islands.

Prospective visitors, who missed reading about Hawaii began to hear about the mid-Pacific islands, for Bowman and his associates had Hawaii on the air, over nationwide networks. Two noncommercial programs were accepted by the Mutual and National Broadcasting Systems. Both featured Hawaiian music, along with narration about the native folkways of the Islands. The impression gained by Mainland listeners was that the programs were picked up by a wandering radio reporter, who had chanced upon a group of Hawaiians at some native haunt.

In "Hawaii Calls," for example, every effort was made to get away from the impression that this was just another studio production. The program opened and ended with the actual sound of the gentle wash of the waves at Waikiki beach. Television reception of the program would have revealed a band of slightly bored professional Hawaiian musicians playing on the crowded stairway of the Moana Hotel. And for that gentle wave sequence, they would have seen the satorially immaculate young announcer in charge of the program, step gingerly down from the cement breakwater which skirted Waikiki and hold the microphone to the waves lapping on the beach, for a few seconds. "And now, to the gentle music of the waves at Waikiki, we bid Aloha from fair Hawaii, Alo-o-oha." Soft music. Fadeout.

There was no denying that this new accent on Hawaii's charms began to draw fresh streams of tourist business to the Territory. Castle & Cooke were constantly reporting increased passenger traffic on the Matson Line. Activity was in evidence in those long, rich corridors of the Royal Hawaiian, and the old Moana reached sellout peaks during the summer and winter seasons as well.

By 1940, the *Star-Bulletin* felt pleased enough to murmur editorial congratulations. This was just after the year's \$12,664,000 tourist income was announced.

In that year, the Bowman Company injected a new slant into tourist advertising. Most of the world was at war. Hawaii was still at peace—a haven of serenity in a world of havoc. A new advertising slogan was devised—"Hawaii: A World of Happiness in an Ocean of Peace."

By this time Mr. Bowman had begun to feel that every-

thing was well under control. It was something of a shock, therefore, when in August, 1940, one of his publicity plans backfired.

It had been part of his over-all campaign in selling Hawaii to invite magazine writers and editors, sometimes several from one staff, to the Islands, as guests of the Matson Line and the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. In return, they were to tell their millions of readers of the wonders of travel in Hawaii. It was a sound idea, and usually paid off.

In the summer of 1940, however, a group of writers from the magazine *Fortune* arrived in town. They proceeded to gather up the facts on the Territory. What they put together was published in August under the title "*Hawaii: Sugar-Coated Fortress.*" The article was a straight-forward description of the Islands' economic system and an honest appraisal of Hawaii as a part of America's military defenses in the Pacific.

It was entirely unlike any of the rave notices which the previous Bowman-sponsored writers had turned out.

The Bowman Company wanted revenge and they wanted it quickly. At the next meeting of the Tourist Bureau Committee, Mr. Bowman personally put the issue up to members. He moved that every inch of advertising scheduled for this magazine be withdrawn at once.

One member of the committee, independent of the Big Five, opposed him. He even took the occasion to rebuke some of the things Bowman stood for. "*Fortune's* interpretation of situation in Hawaii is shared by many local residents," he said, "and is to some degree based upon the information and impressions furnished by local residents."

Rather than have the matter develop into an issue in

which the whole community might take part, the other members decided that *Fortune* should not be penalized. The advertisements remained intact.

No one apparently believed it necessary to call a halt to this emphasis upon Hawaii as the last place of peace in the world. The "World of Happiness in an Ocean of Peace" campaign was continued through that year and into the next. Even as late as May, 1941, the Honolulu *Star-Bulletin* was printing self-congratulatory pieces on the safety of the Islands as a refuge for travelers of the world. On May 16, an editorial boosting island travel commented as follows: "This week a high officer of the U. S. Army remarked that he knows of no place under the American flag safer than Hawaii—more secure from the onslaught of actual war." Readers, who remembered the editorial, perhaps wondered if that high officer was still in the Islands seven months later.

December 7 witnessed the collapse of the tourist industry. With it went the whole elaborate publicity machinery that Sydney Bowman and his staff had erected; he quietly left the Islands, along with other members of his advertising organization. The sumptuous suite of offices the firm had taken in the Castle & Cooke building fast dwindled down to a single room, a token of the brief cyclonic career of Hawaiian propaganda. Not only did most of the Bowman contracts dissipate with the advent of war, but it was soon reported that the Matson Line had withdrawn its huge account from the San Francisco office of Bowman, Dute & Cummings, Inc.

Not long after Pearl Harbor every vestige of the Hawaii that the Bowman campaign had peddled in magazines

throughout the nation was gone. Honolulu quickly took on its wartime role of a highly geared, fighting fortress.

In the years before the war, the streets of downtown Honolulu had shown colorful evidence of the mixture of Pacific races that made up this island community. Japanese women of the older generation had not hesitated to come into town in native silk kimonos, and go clacking in and out of stores on their wooden *geta*. Occasionally the younger women appeared in the brilliant pink and purple kimono cloths which Japanese custom ordained for the different seasons. Vying with this show of color were the red and blue *holokus* of Hawaiian women, those long sweeping dresses the missionaries had taught the natives to wear. Older Chinese women invariably appeared in the long silk gowns they had worn in Peking and Canton. The men folk, if they were on business downtown, usually wore white linens with glossy feather *leis* in their wide Panama hats. Those on less serious missions appeared in slacks and "aloha" shirts in colors that rivaled both kimonos and *holokus* alike.

December 7 altered the entire complexion of the downtown scene. As if fashion had dictated it, Honolulu women changed to more sober dress. The Japanese quite naturally put their kimonos away and the Hawaiian women their gay *holokus*. It seemed, too, as though women remained away from the downtown districts; however, this may have been due to the great numbers of men in uniform. Streets and shops were now thronged with strolling thousands of soldiers and sailors on leave.

The air of tropic leisure was absent in the town. The lobby of the Young Hotel, long a favorite place to doze comfortably in big easy chairs, became a milling place of

rendezvous. The restaurants—the Merchant's Grill, M's, the Young, Maxim's, all of them down to the greasiest quick lunch cafe—served a never ending stream of customers. There were waiting lines everywhere. It was impossible to get into a movie house from before noon to the blackout closing time, without at least a half-hour wait for seats.

A new honky-tonk atmosphere developed in downtown areas where concessionaires set up pin ball machine galleries, hot dog stands, novelty shops, tattooing parlors, and the like. There sprang up a dozen photo galleries where girls, invariably non-Hawaiian maids in hula skirts, posed with service men for pictures to send home.

Waikiki was transformed along with the rest of the tourist haunts. The U. S. Navy took over the Royal Hawaiian and turned it into a rest resort for officers and men home from long submarine patrols in enemy waters and for airmen up from the South Pacific. In the spacious, palm shrouded grounds where tourists used to stroll, horseshoe games, volleyball courts and punching bag stands were set up. At the staid old Moana, a favorite stopover for visiting school-teachers in the balmy pre-war days, the clientele consisted of young Army and Navy officers on leave. Every evening the halls of this elite hostelry resounded heartily with the noise of wassail and song.

The beach at Waikiki soon lost the little attraction it held within its tight encompassed shore, walled in by hotels, bowling alleys and beach concessions. It was now laced up and down with barbed wire. Cheap amusement places mushroomed along Kalakaua Avenue bordering the much-advertised strip. Opposite the Moana, a miniature golf links defied all traditions of the fad trade by remaining

open and prospering, after a run of a dozen years. A block away were a bowling alley, a skating rink and a bow and arrow shooting gallery, all catering profitably to servicemen. Such were the sights that would have made Sydney Bowman's heart ache.

Another common sight in almost every community of the Territory now was the beer and liquor dispensing joint. In 1943 there were 138 bars in Honolulu proper. The Territorial bureau in charge of liquor control, at that time, was issuing licenses for 15,000 cases of hard liquor and 30,000 cases of beer to quench the community's thirst every week.

Where there was wine, usually there were women. In Honolulu, the women were few. Someone who had a good idea of the rate of influx of service men and defense workers as an addition to the normal population, estimated that the ratio on Oahu was two hundred and seventy men to every woman. This figure did not include the thousands of men out on island military camps and naval stations. Therefore it was not surprising to see officers and enlisted men squiring girls of all races and color about town. It was no rare thing for a young officer to escort a local Japanese, Korean or Chinese girl to one of his ship's officers' club dances, or to find girls of Hawaii's multifarious races present at enlisted men's dance places, such as the Navy's "Breakers" or the Army's "Maluhia" at Waikiki.

Honolulu had always been traditionally broadminded about the commercialization of sex. The personnel of the various service forces found this to be to their advantage. At the turn of the century, the community had made its only all-out crusade to stamp out the evil of prostitution.

At that time there had been a restricted, well-recognized red light area in what was called Iwilei, a waterfront district. A sudden decision to wipe out this vice resulted in the demolition of most of the houses and a clean-up of the entire district.

But if this was expected to put an end to commercial licentiousness, zealous leaders of the crusade soon discovered they were badly mistaken. Headquarters for the trade sprang up in all districts of the city. New quarters were persistently found as soon as officers of the vice squad drove them out of their established places. Gradually the community decided it must accept prostitution as a necessary evil. Establishments were allowed to flourish in the River and Hotel Street area, known as the city's Chinatown. Unofficial regulation of the business was enforced by the police and an inspection routine was devised by island health authorities. Should visiting merchant seamen inquire, any taxicab driver could guide them to the "Senator Hotel," the "Honolulu Rooms," the "Service Hotel," or one of a score of recognized houses.

Some islanders charged that the police commission tolerated the trade because it, too, was part of the Big Five's financial structure. Such a charge, however, would have been difficult to support.

After December 7 this phase of community life passed over to Army control. Military police assumed the task of regulating this organized prostitution. They kept the registry of employees and decided what hours might be observed. Officially, there were nineteen houses in operation. Although they could not be open during evening hours, there was no slackening of trade. Natives of the city

observed that, coincident with the city restaurants and theaters, there seemed to be the inevitable waiting line outside the houses at all times of the day.

Under civilian regulation, prostitutes were required to be in their place of business by ten o'clock at night and remain there. This rule was intended to restrict the trade to approved establishments.

Under martial law the system was reversed. Girls were required to complete their business by nightfall, and could go where they pleased after dark.

To the distress of local residents, this innovation had two undesirable consequences. For one thing, the prospering young ladies of the trade began to buy up some of the swankiest homes in town as private residences. Even worse was the fact that others misused their nightly freedom to cater to favored clients in all parts of the city—a peculiar addition to the various “black markets” that were born as the result of war restrictions.

The service men and defense workers, who declined these island offers in wine and women, found there was little else to do. There was one night club in all Honolulu, grotesquely named “La Hula Rhumba.” Visitors found this place nothing more than a modified Pacific clip joint. Like all other places of amusement, it had to close doors at nine P.M. The ten o'clock curfew was clearly a mortal blow to night life in the Islands.

Radio entertainment seemed to fare best under the military regime. Honolulu's two stations, through the Office of War Information and the Special Services division of the Army, were fed the best that the radio world could possibly offer. Transcriptions of all the topnotch programs were either air-mailed to Honolulu, or beamed directly to

the stations for rebroadcast to service men in the area. The programs came with the commercials deleted. Special ones like "Command Performance" came in for the men overseas. In the island world of radio, "Hawaii Calls" carried on in a somewhat altered form. It was now a "H'lo Ma!" program. Instead of featuring lush narrations about the Islands, the program introduced soldiers and sailors who were allowed to greet folks back in their home towns.

Undoubtedly the biggest attempt to entertain the one hundred thousand defense workers—as well as the mass of Army and Navy visitors, who although varying constantly, might have easily been equal to twice or four times that number—was the program of the United Service Organizations. A USO executive recently reported that approximately three hundred shows a month were presented for service and defense work audiences. In addition, the USO organized "Flying Squadrons." These were groups of willing young Honolulu girls who were transported, almost nightly, to camps throughout the Islands to be partners for enlisted men's dances. It also operated nine clubs on Oahu and offered a variety of services which went to make the stay of the Territory's war guests a brighter one. That, roughly, was the way one USO executive put it.

The largest club operated by USO in Hawaii was the one located in a huge department store, erected in Honolulu only a few months before the war by Japanese interests. It had been the House of Mitsukoshi and was a million dollar modernistic building modeled after Tokyo's famed Mitsukoshi department store. Among other things, it boasted the only escalator in the Territory. Closed after December 7, the five-story structure had been remodeled with \$110,000 provided from federal funds, to serve as a

recreation center for service men. Soda fountains, game rooms, dance floors and reading rooms were built on the floors where kimonos, lacquer ware, silks and Japanese food delicacies had formerly been sold.

The USO program is worth remembering. The experience revealed something that was, perhaps, highly significant to Hawaii and her tourist trade. USO discovered that native entertainment was not what visitors to Hawaii wanted. They readily admitted that newly arrived troops wanted, first of all, to see some Hawaiian hulas, and to hear some native songs. They enjoyed the novelty of these performances, but they were not interested in having them repeated. For a steady fare, they insisted on the tried and true programs of the tap dances, acts of magic, low comedy and swing music. The Hawaiian hula was invariably disappointing because it wasn't the grass-skirted strip tease they expected. The native songs were unintelligible and thoroughly without any swing appeal.

This posed challenging questions for island men in the tourist trade. Had they been wrong in building their entire travel appeal around native customs? Would the visitors who had been saturated with Hawaiian songs and dances feel that they had had enough and perhaps never come back? And meanwhile, if wartime visitors rejected their island entertainment, would it, as a profession, be discarded by the natives before the return of peace? *Great Scott! Was the hula about to die?*

Even if they did not take it quite so much to heart, island businessmen seriously had cause for concern over what might happen to their third-ranking industry after the war. There was no doubt that the war had, at least

temporarily, exterminated the old allure of the Islands. They wondered what was going to happen when it was all over. Would the population thin out? Would all of the troops and the workers return to their own communities? Would Hawaii be able to recapture at least some of its pre-war charm?

They looked at the teeming crowds, at the increasing force of labor, and they wondered.

They should have looked closer into the faces of the people making up those crowds. They might have noted something there. It was the change that war had brought in the temper of island folk. This change should have caused them some feeling of uneasiness. War seemed to have instilled a new sense of group consciousness and unity among the people of the Islands. In Hawaii, the man in the street seemed finally to be coming into his own.

ON THE HOME FRONT

"Rarely have I visited a place where there is so much charity and so little democracy as in Hawaii."

—RAY STANNARD BAKER, *American Magazine*.

Anyone who has taken even a cursory look into the community life of the Territory of Hawaii will readily concede that the native Islander, so far as his own social development was concerned, was an extremely backward creature. The cause of this social vacuum obviously lay in the community's traditional acceptance of paternalism.

Except for the upper strata of society, the people of the Islands had become used to having things done for them. The average man had long ago accepted the fact that the force that turned the wheels of his community life came from somewhere outside his common social group. Whatever these forces were, they always seemed to have taken care of the Territory's commerce, its politics, its education and its charities. For lack of a more specific and convenient identification, the native Islander called this vague force by the catch all title—The Big Five.

Whenever a newcomer won a seat in the Territorial Legislature, there was the invariable comment made. "Him? Oh, the Big Five put him in."

When a new industry, such as candy manufacturing, was

started in the Islands, the natives looked no further for an explanation than to say, "I see where the Big Five's gone into the candy business."

When the goal of Honolulu's annual Community Chest campaign was increased, he knew well how it had come about, "The Big Five's raised the ante again."

Those islanders who recognized this apathy as a kind of community surrender of social initiative deplored it as unhealthy and un-American. To them, it was the spirit of men of other times, of feudalism's peasantry, rather than of a twentieth century American community.

When Ray Stannard Baker, California's famed educator, came to make a social study of the Territory some years ago, he commented upon this addled spirit. "Rarely have I visited a place," he wrote, "where there is so much charity and so little democracy as in Hawaii."

This, then, was pre-Pearl Harbor society in the Hawaiian Islands.

It took a war, coming suddenly and with violent impact on the community, to arouse Hawaii's average man. When the first shock of the December 7 attack had passed, this average man began to see, for the first time, some of the forces that shaped his life as a member of the community. The transfer of sovereignty rights to the military made them evident to him.

There was nothing vague about the community regulations issued by the office of the military governor. They were cleancut. There was no doubt as to their origin nor their effect. When some of the regulations were challenged—particularly when the necessity of martial law was questioned—he recognized this as a clash of forces. When the civilian courts and the military brought the battle of

habeas corpus out into public print the average man was made forcibly aware of what were intended to be his democratic rights.

He began to think in terms of challenges of his own. He joined labor unions and for the first time joined in speaking out to his employer. He now was in a position to analyze some of the forces he had dismissed as Big Five obligations and as something which was beyond his understanding. He was beginning to see that politics, instead of being part of an exterior force, could be made an instrument that he himself could wield.

This feeling spread throughout the community, and with it began the renaissance of the average man in Hawaii. It was something that boded no good for the Big Five.

There were few concrete evidences of this new community spirit. It was something that developed gradually and was present, mainly, in the way ordinary men began to talk. They openly discussed what the war was doing to Hawaii, how they felt about the military and how they saw their personal lives being affected. It was not a thing immediately apparent after the bombs fell on December 7. Honolulu was too shaken a community then. Her citizens were too feverishly busy throwing up defenses against the enemy and counting their dead. They had no time to think of social forces.

Islanders had many sudden duties which had to be done at home. The average man concentrated on blacking out his house. Articles in the daily papers showed him how he could do this most efficiently. With instructions from Army authorities, he dug up his yard to build a bombshelter for himself and family. He made up emergency ration kits

to be easily accessible should an enemy invasion force him to the hills with his family.

These things were not done with the spirit of practice maneuvers. These defenses were grimly prepared, for at the time the enemy seemed dangerously close at hand.

In the community, islanders joined neighborhood units of the Office of Civilian Defense. They attended meetings nightly to learn their duties as wardens, or as first aid workers, or as emergency ambulance drivers. The man of the house joined the Business Men's Training Corps, and went to drills and classes so he could become a more effective member of the community's home front guard. He joined the Police Reserves and worked regular watches almost every night. Every islander took part in at least one of these wartime activities. All of them were new experiences for him in community organization.

Hawaii's average man responded to these calls for war services with little prompting. December 7 had brought the war very close to him. In no other American community had this world conflagration been thrust so realistically into a people's life. It was not surprising then, that he should feel that such things as a donation of blood to the community plasma bank was a personal obligation.

For months before December 7, island folk had begun much of the practical preparation for war. A Major Disaster Council had been organized early in 1941, followed swiftly by a Community Blood Bank. From this latter life-saving source, 1,200 doses of blood plasma were provided to care for December 7 casualties. After the attack, hundreds came to donate blood. By the end of the first year of war, 15,850 donors had given their blood.

Almost immediately after the military took over juris-

diction of the Territory, the average man began to feel its effect in his personal life. Usually it was through the application of some new order from the military governor's office. He discovered first that all his communications had gone under military censorship. The cable that he sent to relatives back on the Mainland—his call by transpacific 'phone—and all mail sent away from the Islands came under the scrutiny of Army censors stationed at the Honolulu postoffice. These censors also watched what the local newspapers printed and what was broadcast over local radio programs.

One of the earliest military orders instructed the islander to go to his neighborhood school where a registration board would give him an official identification number for the duration. Here his private life was investigated, his fingerprints taken and his occupation registered.

Soon after this, he was issued a gas mask that he was required to carry with him at all times. Special masks were issued to his children. These were built-up masks especially designed for faces too small to fit the adult size. In addition, the Chemical Warfare Division of the Army in Hawaii designed a protective device against gas for babies. These were made of a fuzzy material and had large rabbit ears; they were properly called "bunny masks."

At the same time, a Territory-wide program of instruction in the means of protection against poison gases was given by qualified Army personnel. And at thirty-five strategic locations on Oahu, gas decontamination centers were constructed for the treatment of persons affected by poison gas.

They even went so far as to train a special mortuary and burial section group for the identification of casualties. Seven sites were selected as identification centers for

civilian dead in the event of further enemy attacks. A volunteer group of two hundred islanders was recruited for the grisly chore.

The average man in Hawaii was being thoroughly prepared for the worst.

When the registration of all persons in the Territory was completed, residents were told to appear again at their neighborhood centers for inoculation against disease. Public Health and Army doctors inoculated the populace against smallpox and typhoid fever. Usually, they became ill and miserable for a few days following these injections. They found in this common misery something new to talk about. Neighbors who had not spoken to each other for years found a new meeting ground.

It was undoubtedly this small talk that gave rise to the new spirit of neighborliness that seemed to have sprung up since the war started.

The Army later announced that where it was possible, civilian women and children should be voluntarily evacuated from the Islands. Army and Navy families were given no choice in the matter. They were ordered out. Hundreds of civilians followed their example. Men sent their wives and children to live with relatives on the Mainland.

Within a year, the danger of Japanese invasion had abated and many of the evacuees returned to Hawaii. Hundreds of others, however, found they could get no space on ships bound for the Islands. Civilian travel to Hawaii was discontinued indefinitely in 1943. This left nearly two thousand islanders stranded on the West Coast.

In December, 1941, the military authorities ordered the rents and wages of all workers on defense projects frozen. The Army also took over the control of building supplies,

and work on homes that were under construction was halted unless they were more than fifty per cent completed. The building of private establishments was to be outlawed for the duration except in very special circumstances.

There was no doubt that one of the most critical shortages facing the Islands was that of lumber. This prospect moved the Territorial Board of Agriculture and Forestry to unprecedented action. For years the Board had made one of its primary responsibilities the planting of hundreds of thousands of trees in forest reserve lands throughout the Islands. After December 7 they threw this program into reverse. The Board told the U. S. Engineers to take what timber they needed for war materials from the carefully conserved reserves. At the end of the first year of war, Hawaii's meager forests had been stripped of 106,727 cubic feet of small timbers and 627,979 board feet of saw log.

On December 8, the military governor ordered the closing of all schools, theaters, saloons, and places of amusement. On December 24, as something of a Christmas present, theaters and places of amusement were allowed to reopen for daylight hours only. Schools were not reopened for another month.

In February, the sale of liquor and the opening of bars were allowed. On opening day, Honolulu went on the biggest spree in its history. Never had police records listed so many arrests for drunkenness in one day. It seemed as if the whole community had been waiting for this opportunity to release a part of its pent up wartime neuroses.

The military ruled, however, that sports events such as football and basketball must be banned, since it was still considered dangerous for people to assemble in large open

air crowds. The University of Hawaii had, however, already imported a complete football squad from San Jose State College, and another team from the University of Utah was making ready for a trip to the Islands, as guests, for the Pineapple Bowl Game on New Year's Day. Both games were cancelled. Later it was discovered that most of the the San Jose players had joined the Honolulu Police Force.

Hawaii's complete blackout every evening caused the Army to rule that no one, except authorized persons, were to appear on the streets after dark. This, coupled with the banning of virtually every amusement, made everyday life for the average man a pretty grim business. For wartime recreation, he was advised to busy himself with a backyard garden. Very often he joined the Office of Civilian Defense wardens or the Police Reserve in order to get out during the night hours.

He felt the pinch of war more materially when it reached the conveniences he had come to accept as part of his every day life. Two weeks after war broke out, the military announced that Hawaii would be subjected to gasoline rationing. Motorists were to be allowed ten gallons a month. Only those in essential war jobs were to be considered for additional allotments. At the same time, the complete rubber tire supply was taken over by the authorities. New tires, or the recapping of old ones, could be obtained only through application to the military governor's office.

But what was even more important was that the average man found that certain foods were difficult or almost impossible to obtain. Butter, meat, and oranges, chiefly imported, became prized items in those first few months of

1942. Until the Office of Food Control had leveled out the process of importation, any item of food or household goods might suddenly become a rarity due to the delayed arrival of convoys bearing fresh supplies. When small merchants began to take advantage of the situations the military governor set up an Office of Price Control that attempted to check inflationary prices. Later, a branch of the federal Office of Price Administration was established in the Territory.

Island newspapers took advantage of the times by putting out skeleton editions of eight to twelve pages, ascribing this move to lack of newsprint. Nevertheless, there was no reduction in the price of five cents, which was equivalent to that of the leading Mainland dailies. There was no attempt to put a ceiling on circulation either. As a result, sales leaped to fantastic figures. After a year of war, the Honolulu *Star-Bulletin's* circulation doubled, climbing to more than a hundred thousand sales daily, while the *Advertiser* trailed close behind.

The lack of newsprint did not prevent either paper from publishing twenty and thirty page editions when some pretext for special advertising campaigns arose. For example, all special campaigns for the sale of war bonds found the papers swollen with full pages of advertising, culled in the main from liquor and jewelry establishments unloading excess profits and from Japanese merchants who hesitated to turn down advertising based upon a patriotic theme.

The complete stoppage of liquor sales on December 8 created, for the average man in Hawaii, a period that was strongly reminiscent of the flighty days of the Eighteenth Amendment. As there had been no hint of any drastic curtailment of the supply, the average man found himself sud-

denly short of liquor during a time when he probably never needed a drink more desperately.

Reaction to this situation was the same throughout the entire area. The islander went out and got liquor by whatever means possible. If he could not find a friend with a liberal supply in his cellar he found a taxi driver who could sell him a bootleg bottle, priced anywhere from \$10 to \$25. On occasion, even, he devoted his blacked out evenings to experimentation with a home brew. When he learned that the military had thoughtfully taken over the supply of malt, he changed his plans about making beer and stocked up on canned pineapple juice. Fermented "pine" juice became a popular, though not too tasteful home substitute for the drinking man.

After two bone dry months, the military governor announced that bars could be reopened on February 4, and that from this date, all retail liquor would be sold under a program of military control. An Office of Liquor Control was then established. Under it, each citizen was allowed a quart of liquor a week when supplies were available. Individual liquor permits were issued upon presentation of official registration cards at the central office. Bars were now open for business only a few hours daily in order to comply with blackout regulations. The great new thirst the islanders seemed to have developed, threatened to wipe out their limited supplies of spirits all too quickly. Honolulu breweries worked overtime to keep up with the demand, but it was impossible. No sooner was the brew drawn from the vats and bottled, than it was carted off for immediate consumption.

In this wartime situation, island sugar interests found a fresh source of revenue at home. For some years, when

many of the more conservative descendants of the missionary families were controlling island industry, the sugar companies consistently refused the blandishments of U. S. and foreign liquor interests who asked them to turn part of their crops into alcohol for the manufacture of rum. Perhaps the loosening of morals during wartime helped change their minds, or perhaps, with profits cut to a minimum, any source of new revenue invited investigation. At any rate several liquor manufacturing firms, locally financed, were established with alcohol from plantation sugar as their stock in trade. Most of them turned out imitation whiskey that sold very well on the parched local market. The sugar companies were able to net tidy profits from the venture, since the prices of the wartime product were set at the level formerly enjoyed by the more reputable whiskeys from Kentucky and Scotland.

Although food and liquor supplies had become short, the supply of labor in the Islands was even shorter. Honolulu families found it impossible to keep domestic help in their homes. Gardeners, maids, cooks and other household workers were off to the lucrative jobs on defense projects and in local industries. One day, the president of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company found a resignation note on the living room table. It was from a maid who had been with the family for years.

"I'm going to take a new job next week," the note said. "I'm going to work at the pineapple cannery."

Stores and restaurants likewise found it impossible to keep trained workers. Some places of business opened only a few hours a day to avoid being swamped with trade. Where business houses once competed for customers, cus-

tomers now began to vie with each other for business service. It seemed almost miraculous when they did not have to wait in line or when the stores had just what they wanted.

All this was something of a revelation to the average Hawaiian, and contributed strongly to his social awakening. He saw that all the things he had to bear as a result of war and military orders had to be borne, just as well, by the persons he had associated before with the out-of-reach group in the Big Five. They, too, had to be fingerprinted and inoculated. They, too, had to stay in at night in blacked out homes. They, too, carried gas masks and they, too, had to stand in line. There was an equalizing influence about wartime restrictions that tended to give him a new perspective.

Many of the military orders governing the average man in the Islands after December 7 were administered by the Territorial Office of Civilian Defense. This organization was built upon the framework of the pre-war Honolulu Major Defense Council which, soon after the declaration of war, was placed under the direction of military authorities. No program could have asked for more liberal financial support than this one garnered. When organized by the Territory, it was granted \$1,500,000. The U. S. Department of the Interior matched this with a \$2,800,000 grant. Shortly after December 7, the Department of the Interior allotted \$15,000,000 more. Within a year the Territorial office had 1,500 persons in its employ, was additionally staffed with some 30,000 volunteers and was partially financing four island programs besides its own.

In Honolulu, the Office of Civilian Defense financed the services of 200 regular and 250 reserve police officers and

of 323 additional firemen. More than 6,500 volunteer air raid wardens and 1,000 volunteer communications workers were recruited by paid staff members. Another group of staff and volunteer workers provided for the evacuation of 65,000 women and children who had to be removed from the waterfront and military installations of downtown Honolulu. Seventy per cent of these war casualties were induced to find homes with friends and relatives in safer areas. Evacuation camps in the hills were built for the greater majority who could not arrange this. The OCD also leased and equipped hospital facilities and ambulances that stood ready for instant use in case of emergency. Still another emergency measure was the storing of 60,000 cases of canned food and sixty barrels of powdered milk in various parts of Oahu.

During this period the most impressive OCD activity for the average man was the building of public bomb shelters throughout Honolulu and rural Oahu. By the end of the first year of war, a total of 1,250 of these buildings had been constructed, at an average cost of \$600. By 1943, the precincts of the wooden, underground structures had been so often violated by amorous couples and by passersby who looked upon them as convenient substitutes for public comfort stations, that military authorities ordered their entrances boarded up. The bomb shelters were a \$750,000 investment in public safety which had not paid off.

Only once after December 7 did the island community feel the same apprehension which had gripped it during the first few weeks of the war. That was before the Battle of Midway in late May of 1942. After the battle of the Coral Sea a report came through stating that the

United States Pacific fleet had won a smashing victory over the Japanese in the South Pacific.

This report was followed by a cloud of rumor: "The Japs are on their way over again."

People were certain the rumor was true. Hadn't the Army ordered certain sections of Honolulu to stand by for evacuation?

Early the next week workers at Pearl Harbor confirmed the fear that gripped the heart of the islanders. They reported that some of the fleet had come back from the South, fueled and had gone right out again.

Although there had not been a single word of official confirmation, an air of suspense hung heavy over Honolulu. At night OCD wardens voluntarily reported for extra duty. On street corners people passed on to friends the latest rumors, but they did it frankly and in sober voice. There was none of the frenzy that usually goes with run-of-the-mill rumor manufacture.

During those first three days of June news of the Japanese invaders was expected hourly.

The night of June 4 brought Admiral Nimitz' first communique of the war:

"At 6:35 A.M. today the Island of Midway was heavily raided by Japanese carrier-based planes. The carriers were accompanied by battleships, cruisers and destroyers. The attack was repulsed by the local defenders. Our attacks on the enemy are continuing."

For three days details of the great sea and air battle continued to come in. Gradually, as it became evident U. S. forces had smashed the invaders, the tension released. Hawaii . . . along with the rest of the nation . . . breathed easier.

Midway marked a turning point, not only for the war in the Pacific, but for the people on the home front in Hawaii.

After Midway, General Emmons announced that the nightly curfew would be extended until 10 P.M. This did not alter the blackout at sundown ruling, but after so many months of evening confinement the small concession seemed a wholesome grant of freedom. Theaters, restaurants and places of amusement were now allowed to remain open until 9 P.M.

The first night club to blossom since the outbreak of war advertised that there would be evening shows from 7 until 9 P.M. Honolulu began to sing again. The popular ditty of the day was "She's a Knockout in a Blackout," a local composition with a naughty refrain:

"I knew her voice was warm and tender,
"She had skin you love to touch,
"I wonder would her face have mattered
very much?"

By this time, thousands of new defense workers arrived from the Mainland and the average native found that his Honolulu had become, almost overnight, one of the war's busiest boom towns. Wages and prices ran rampant. The newly established OPA staff tried to stem the upward surge of the prices but retail stores were the only ones they were able to limit. Restaurant prices doubled and trebled in some cases. In 1942 and 1943 few could offer steaks on the menu, but when they did, the prices ranged from \$2 to \$3.50, per cut. Fish, once so plentiful in the Islands, disappeared completely from market stalls and restaurant menus. The average Honolu'an found that the free-spend-

ing defense workers made it impossible for him to eat at downtown restaurants. They paid \$1.50 for a meal that had, in pre-war days, cost from thirty-five to fifty cents.

Workers on Hawaii's defense projects were not restricted by the Little Steel Formula that held wage increases on Mainland jobs down to 15 per cent or less. In the Islands, unskilled laborers began at more than \$200 a month and were soon graduated to three or four hundred a month. One day in September, 1943, an advertisement was placed in the Honolulu *Star-Bulletin's* help wanted page by a desperate laundry operator: "Wanted: First class pants presser. Salary, \$500 a month."

One point must be considered, however. A generous portion of this top heavy income went back into the war effort. When the U. S. Treasury Department announced its first quota system of war bonds for states and territories in May, 1942, Hawaii's goal was set at \$992,000. Island workers fell to with a will. Their month's total was \$5,985,000. Hawaii's record of 603 per cent of sales to the quota exceeded by far the record of any other section of the country.

During a special drive to commemorate the Pearl Harbor attack, a goal of \$1,000,000 was fixed for Hawaii's one-day purchase of bonds on December 7, 1942. The "bargain day" lineups crowded the sales booths and forced a two-day extension of the drive. At the end of the three days more than \$5,000,000 in bonds had been sold.

Treasury Department officials had become so accustomed to Hawaii's receptiveness, that when it came time for the Third War Loan Drive in September, 1943, the Territory's quota was pushed up from its original request of \$992,000 made for May, 1942, to \$17,000,000. Islanders responded by subscribing more than \$20,000,000. Hawaii was

pleased to learn that she was the only state or territory in the Union to have exceeded every quota set in the first two years of war.

The war bond record put to shame the Territory's Community Chest drive, held the following month. It had been a matter of pride with the business men of the Big Five, who traditionally led it, that for a quarter of a century the annual Chest campaign had never failed to reach its goal. The Chest, financing a score of island social agencies, had always been, for the average man, a symbol of Hawaii's system of community paternalism. For this 1943 campaign, the Chest consolidated with the United Service Organizations in a drive for \$900,000.

Campaign workers made the usual rounds of business houses and workers' homes. But at week's end returns showed that a hundred thousand dollars was still lacking. The drive was extended another week. Contributions seemed to have run dry, although workers had never been so prosperous, and the campaign closed, failing for the first time in its history to achieve its goal. This fact was interpreted by many as yet another sign of the breach taking place between the people and the paternalistic system.

CHARITY AND DEMOCRACY

"That it is a system is the trouble. If it was merely a temporary combination of evil-minded men their dispersal would be all that would be required, but what has grown up in Hawaii is akin to the development of the slave power in the United States."

—W. A. Kinney, *Petition to U. S. Congress, 1928.*

Once the small group of sugar royalists had firmly established themselves during the nineteenth century, they saw that, as part of their role as guardians of Hawaii's destiny, they must do something about the social welfare of the Islands. It would not do to have their guardianship seem too mercenary or callous a one.

Out of their concern grew Hawaii's peculiar system of paternalism. It was based upon the guiding principle that nothing was to be developed that would upset the status quo of their sugar economy. As sugar went, so went the welfare of the people. This was no empty figure of speech—it was virtually a mathematical truth.

But the advent of Pearl Harbor was something that did upset the sugar economy's status quo. By the time the war was two years old, it became evident that the future of Hawaii, in terms of social well-being at any rate, was one which demanded an outlook considerably broader than

that which had sufficed for the sugar industrialists these many years.

In pre-war days, Hawaii had been an agricultural community with a population of less than 400,000, exclusive of service men. Of the 110,000 employed workers, nearly half were found in agriculture; 35,000 of these worked on the sugar plantations alone. There was no doubt that sugar dominated the economy.

By 1943, Hawaii's working population had more than doubled. Nearly 100,000 men and women were employed on defense projects. The sugar plantations had lost more than 10,000 workers to this more lucrative field. War had transformed the Territory into an industrial community, for the duration at least. Sugar was no longer king.

This was a situation which prompted the more serious-minded islanders to ask themselves what was going to happen after the war and how agriculture, the only possible permanent base for island economy, could absorb these hundred thousand workers when their war jobs were wiped out?

The problem would have some alleviating factors. For one thing, Hawaii, along with the rest of the world, would go through a period of home and industrial reconstruction immediately after the war. This would serve as a "tapering off" period for the armies of workers released from defense jobs. Then, a great many of the defense workers who migrated from the Mainland undoubtedly would return to their homes once the war was over and their island contracts terminated. Also, hundreds of the defense workers were women, who would take up their duties as housewives after the war emergency.

Despite this, however, there still would remain a residue

of thousands seeking new employment when the peace was finally established. There was some possibility, too, of complications being added to the problem.

It had been unofficially reported from Washington, during preliminary discussions on post-war manpower, that certain U. S. areas were suggested as outlets for the emigrant millions from overcrowded Europe. The Territory of Alaska, it was recommended, could absorb a half million or so from the Scandinavian and Northern European areas. The Territory of Hawaii, they said, could take a like number from the Southern European countries. Although the plan was given no official sanction, it did hold a promise of what had to be faced when the world set to the job of righting itself after the upheavals of war.

The Territory certainly could not look to the sugar industry for assimilation of many more workers, local or immigrant. The planters were not preparing to take back the men it had lost to defense projects, as they had rushed through a program of mechanization when faced with the war labor shortage. After two years, the results seemed highly satisfactory. In 1940, with more than 35,000 workers, island plantations had produced 950,000 tons of sugar. In 1943 the same tonnage was produced with little more than 23,000 workers.

It was apparent then, that in order to care for her own, Hawaii's post-war plans would have to include some drastic departures from the community paternalism and agricultural peonage that had so long been a part of the island social planning. A varied list of suggestions drawn up by men who had long deplored the Islands' traditional economic system was available, even at this early date.

As practical as any was the suggestion of Newton Holcomb, director of the Federal Social Security Office in Hawaii, and wartime director of the local War Manpower Commission. He advocated the depopulation of immigrant labor from the sugar and pineapple plantations throughout the area.

He further pointed out that of the 23,324 workers on plantations in 1943, fifty-one per cent were Filipino nationals who could well be used in the rehabilitation of their own land. "Plan, as a start," he advised, "to deport these laborers as soon as the war is over."

There was little hope that the HSPA would willingly accept the proposition. As late as 1941, members of the association were reported planning to bring five thousand more Filipinos in as sugar laborers. It was evident, now, that the sugar industrialists were committed to a policy of cheap foreign labor, as opposed to working some feasible plan of attracting white agricultural workers back into the industry at a higher wage.

More revolutionary than Mr. Holcomb's plan, was the one proposed to Congress as far back as 1928. Its creator, William A. Kinney, a Hawaii-born attorney, was ardently opposed to the HSPA and its system of Asiatic peonage.

As part of his housecleaning, Mr. Kinney also had a specific proposal for breaking up the influence of the Big Five.

"The sugar plantations and their subsidiary corporations," he recommended, "should be preserved as an essential factor in the new departure. They ought to be conducted, however, merely as manufacturing, transportation and selling corporations. They could also be used incidentally to operate as the distributors of water and in other like

lines where wholesale action is necessary. They ought to be confined to a six or eight per cent profit, payable as a preferred dividend, except as to a living return to citizen planters. All profits otherwise ought to go to citizen planters holding in fee, or, on long term leases direct from the government, appropriate small holdings cut out of the present large areas held directly by the plantations."

Mr. Kinney ventured a prophecy of his own as to the results of his plan, if put into operation. He predicted that, deprived of the control of the executive, judicial, and legislative powers of the Territory, and dependent upon the tariff on sugar for most of their profits, with large areas of their lands and much of their water still under the ownership or control of the government, and confronted by new labor conditions where their perennial resort to Asiatic sources would be cut off for good, and proven guilty of the intolerable abuse of local self-government, the sugar interests would compromise as best they could.

The plan was aimed primarily at the breakup of what he termed "the small armies of Asiatics" which made up plantation labor.

Mr. Kinney compared the sugar industry's control of free speech and politics in Hawaii to the influence brought to bear on the U. S. Government by cotton interests before the Civil War. His petition, published as part of a book full of documented charges against Hawaii's missionary element and against the HSPA, fell upon deaf ears in Congress. The press in Hawaii also ignored the book's publication at the time, with the result that no one in the Territory got around to reading Mr. Kinney's very salty revelations of island skullduggery.

However, those who began to think seriously of what

was going to happen after the war were inclined to agree with the contention that island agriculture must, first of all, undergo some sort of an Americanization process. Two things were plainly needed before it could be anything but part of an economic system which was essentially feudal.

First, a more equitable sharing of the returns was necessary. If plantation work was to be accepted by American agricultural workers, they required, more than anything else, that it be lifted above its traditional status of peonage labor.

It was suggested that both these ends might be accomplished by a form of cultivation contract planning, similar to the Russian farm cooperatives, that would give a proportionate reward for personal diligence and initiative. A preliminary step toward this would be, as the Kinney report recommended, the breakup of huge plantations into smaller holdings. This would probably then lead to another reform suggested as a solution of the existing economic problems.

It was essential, practical persons agreed, that post-war Hawaii go in for diversified agriculture. This was urged not merely to make the Islands self-sustaining; it would also serve as part of the democratizing of the Territory. It would provide for the opening up of new enterprises and the opportunity to create channels for new capital.

Back in 1928, it was Mr. Kinney again who offered some ideas on the spreading out of island agriculture. Confine sugar produce to the lowlands, which were best suited for cane, and grow vegetables and fruit, including tropical varieties suited for shipment abroad, in the uplands, he proposed. He suggested, too, that the transportation of this

new produce to the Pacific Coast, particularly to the northern part, and the distribution and sale there, should be controlled by local cooperative societies patterned after those of California.

"Hawaii," his proposal read, "should be to the Pacific slope what Bermuda and the West Indies are to the Atlantic Coast of the United States."

Others warned that the Territory's plans must include provision for new consumer industries. They pointed to Hawaii's nearly complete dependence upon two basic home industries as a tragic weakness of its internal economy.

Each of the plans for post-war readjustment was no more than an offering of social theorists, and island sugar planters did not leap forward to put any of them into execution. Their stock reply was that no amount of small individual enterprise could assure the Territory the income realized by the highly rationalized sugar industry. They did not add, however, any admission of how exclusively it was the privileged few who benefited from such rationalization.

Without question, the foremost of Hawaii's post-war problems was going to be the realigning of its economic machinery. But there were other issues.

As a direct by-product of wartime, Hawaii was faced with the general loosening of morals among the native population. Honolulu, during the war, was too well policed to permit much organized crime. Besides the regular police department, considerably expanded with the aid of OCD funds, there were the military police, shore patrol and the police reserves on constant guard against professional criminals. But these guardians of island peace found it difficult

to cope with the type of infringements of the law that were worrying the social workers of the city.

The scourge of wartime society in the Islands was juvenile delinquency. One day in 1943, Joseph B. Thornton, Territorial Director of the FBI, announced that delinquency among the girls of Honolulu was becoming the community's most serious social problem. He reported that, during 1942, among girls under twenty-one, prostitution increased sixty-four per cent; vagrancy, 124 per cent; disorderly conduct, sixty-nine per cent; and drunkenness, thirty-nine per cent. Arrests of minor girls had increased during the year by fifty-five per cent, and more arrests were made of eighteen-year-olds than of any other age group.

Upon the release of these facts, the FBI man announced that his office was going to make a sweeping investigation of prostitution. He contended that it was being run openly in the city by a ring of ex-convicts.

The news came as no surprise to Honolu'ans. They were only surprised that someone was going to do something about it.

As startling as any admission that the trade was officially winked at, was the fact that registered prostitutes were subject to the payment of a Territorial gross income tax on their earnings. The tax afforded an insight into the financial returns of this bizarre island trade.

In 1941 the madame of a River Street bordello turned in \$2,000 in gross income taxes for 1942 and was reported to have paid a federal income tax of \$40,000 upon the same year's business.

One of the prostitutes in her tax return revealed that in May, 1942, she was subject to taxation for one hundred

and fifty-two transactions conducted in a single day.

Much of this sordid picture was publicly unveiled in September, 1941, when a new member of the Honolulu police commission openly charged his fellow police commissioners with countenancing the white slave traffic, and opened a one man crusade to put a stop to the business. This unorthodox newly appointed commissioner was Victor Houston, former Hawaiian delegate to Congress, who had, years before, exhibited a similar independence toward the wishes of the Big Five.

Commissioner Houston, normally a mild-mannered gentleman, appeared at the September commission meeting with fire in his eye and a revealing report on Honolulu prostitution in his hands. "I am presenting herewith," he informed startled fellow commissioners, "a detailed review of the facts of this illicit trade as I found them. Section 5710 of our Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1935, specifically forbids prostitution. I demand now that steps be taken to wipe it out."

A first glance into the report told the uneasy commissioners many things they already knew. A Honolulu finance and loan concern and its lawyers, Houston reported, served as the financial agents of organized prostitution. Madames of houses paid as much as \$25,000 and \$30,000 for leases which Houston described as nothing more than licenses to operate. Rentals of \$3,000 were charged for buildings whose total value was appraised at little more than \$5,000. One house turned in a gross income return of \$21,000 a month, with girls reporting in excess of \$1,000 each, he charged.

Who, of the local population, was benefiting as financial backers of the trade, which he described as a five million

dollar a year business, Houston did not specify, but he did decry the police department's part in it.

"I note," he said, "that a member of our vice squad has been assigned the task of checking up on prostitutes reported as infected. His job is to see that such women 'get off the floor.'"

Houston noted that a bordello in Wahiawa, near the great army barracks at Schofield, not listed as a regulated place, had been closed up the day before service pay day. He had found that there were two hundred and three "entertainers" currently in the business and that, except for those in three small places on Aala Street which were staffed by island girls, all had been imported from Mainland vice syndicates. He demanded that the whole ugly situation immediately stop.

His fellow commissioners accepted the report, and assured him that it would be studied. That was in September, 1941. December 7 came, and action was still pending. Undoubtedly to the relief of the commission, Mr. Houston was immediately recalled to active duty with the Navy, from which he had been retired years before as a Commander. Before resigning his desk, however, he forwarded his full report on prostitution to the Department of Justice in Washington.

In two years of war nothing was done by the police commission about Honolulu prostitution except to make changes in the regulations to conform with wartime necessities. Business was not allowed during blackout hours. This meant that it had to become a daytime enterprise. For a time, efforts were made to continue confining entertainers to their places of business at night. But here the women rebelled. When police persisted, they countered by staging

a sit-down strike. For two or three days they refused, as a body, to serve their clientele. The police gave in. They were allowed to find places to live about the city. This was permitted with the understanding that their business would be conducted only at recognized downtown hostelries.

The trade thus ran merrily on. With the removal of Commissioner Houston from the scene there was no further agitation against the illicit traffic.

FBI Director Thornton's announcement in October, 1943, that he was "going after" the white slave traffic was the first official action taken. He, however, was limited to enforcement of federal law violation. He could not close up the Honolulu houses of ill fame. In November, nevertheless, he declared that his men had rounded up seven men and thirteen women who, he claimed, made up the white slave syndicate operating between Cleveland and Youngstown, Ohio, and Honolulu. Honolulu ringleaders, he reported, were two ex-convicts, "Sugar" Harrell and "Taxi" Elkovitz, for whom he obtained federal indictments. The thirteen women were sent back to the Mainland.

Later in November, a convoy ship in from the West Coast disembarked a troupe of twenty negro girls. They were reported to be destined for a place that would cater to the negro troops and civilian workers brought to the Islands by the war. Prior to this, Hawaii had no more than a handful of Negroes. By 1943 there were more than a thousand negro civilians working at Pearl Harbor and at other war projects. Honolulu, traditionally race tolerant, made these newcomers welcome and paid little attention as they found homes in the community. A "Little Harlem" neighborhood developed near the theatrical district where restaurants and dance halls catered almost exclusively to Negroes.

Many of the Negroes themselves declared that they had discovered something of a paradise in Hawaii. They learned that, only a few years before, one of the few Negroes in the Islands had been elected to the Territorial Legislature and still commanded a respectably large political following. Many decided that after the war they would make the Islands their home. It looked as though the war had tossed another permanent mixture into the melting pot of the Pacific.

The prospect of a Negro minority was not completely pleasing to the business men of the Islands. They showed some concern when in the summer of 1943 a report was circulated that a Negro was going to be sent from Washington as an official of the Territorial War Manpower Commission. After confirming the report, they joined in an effort to block the appointment. But the appointee was already on his way and he arrived in Honolulu before action could be taken. The attempt was abandoned. Several Honolulu'ans noted the Negro bureaucrat's arrival as an ironic reversal of the carpetbaggers from Washington arriving in the South in post Civil War days.

Another vexing phase of Hawaii's wartime social problems was the matter of island health. Had Hawaii's tourist business still been flourishing in 1942 and 1943, the Territory would have had an embarrassing time justifying its claims that the Islands were the "healthiest spot in the world." Early in 1942, the Territorial Board of Health and the Army had joined in a program of inoculating everyone in the area against smallpox and typhoid fever. Later, as another safeguard against infection, the entire water system of the Islands was regularly chlorinated. Despite

these and other precautions, the two years of war saw a wholesale outbreak of disease in Hawaii.

The most widespread of the wartime diseases was one virtually unheard of in Hawaii until now. It was the tropical disease, dengue fever. Striking in the summer of 1943 with epidemic force, it sent hundreds of civilians and service men to hospitals. Though rarely a fatal illness, it was serious enough to take men from war jobs and posts of duty for several days. Government authorities hastily quarantined districts where the disease first broke out.

Yet cases began to spring up all over the city of Honolulu. The Board of Health instituted a special campaign of education, warning residents that dengue was spread by day mosquitoes and urging the entire community to wage war on the insects.

As the disease continued to run amok, the Army moved thousands of troops away from urban Honolulu out into camps in rural Oahu. By November, more than a thousand cases of dengue had been registered with the Board of Health. The authorities continued their campaign, warning that once the disease got out of control tens of thousands might be stricken. Still hundreds of cases remained unreported.

The first year of war saw a rise, too, in that most dreaded of diseases—bubonic plague. One of the few places in the United States where the disease is endemic, Hawaii felt it had been sitting on dynamite since its first outbreak of plague in 1899. Scores of lives were lost then. In recent years, the disease had been confined largely to the sugar areas on Hawaii and Maui, where bubonic germ-bearing rats lived off the cane. In 1942, a total of 154 cases of bubonic plague among rats were reported on Hawaii,

three times the number a year before. In the first half of 1943 there were five human deaths from the plague. Army authorities shuddered when they thought of the result if the disease were to become epidemic.

Two other major contagions struck in the Islands in the first year of war. One was an epidemic of infantile paralysis that claimed more than one hundred victims, and the other was typhoid, which hit the student body of a Honolulu school. This was controlled after Board of Health detectives spent several frantic days tracking down the source.

As though these visitations were not enough, the Board of Health reported in 1943 that, for the first time in more than a decade, tuberculosis was making gains in the Territory, largely as a result of the war. A thirty per cent increase in active tuberculosis was reported in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943. The increase was credited to wartime conditions of overcrowding, overwork, anxiety and faulty diet.

It would probably be unfair to single out paternalism as the cause of Hawaii's economic maladjustments, its failure to solve such problems as prostitution, and its unfortunate record of wartime disease; but it seemed pretty evident at the time that paternalism was not going to provide the solution of these problems. It was just not big enough. As practised by island industrialists, the policy was one of allotting for community ills only such efforts and goods as were considered expendable surplus. It presumed that sugar and the satellite institutions it supported must first be taken care of. After that, what could be done for the community would be done.

The new Hawaii that was growing up during the war

would undoubtedly call for a broader approach than this to community problems, once the fighting was over. The refreshing breath of democracy that had begun to give new life to island labor, politics, and the people at large, would assuredly aid in developing a more wholesome community life. Of that, you could be sure.

THE LAND OF PROMISE

"Puali ka hau nui i ka hau iki."

*"The common people have won over their rulers,
have come into their own."*

—Old Hawaiian Proverb.

As Hawaii went into her third year of war, many islanders paused to look at what had gone before. They tried to analyze the march of events.

They saw that, in those first two years of war, Hawaii had undergone social and economic changes which, in the course of ordinary events, would have been a generation or two in the making.

These sudden developments were discussed wonderingly. "What we've been through amounts to a revolution!"

Before December 7, 1941, Hawaii had been a tight, little, self-contained sovereignty. What, exactly, had taken place in the two years that followed?

The most decisive event was the supplanting of the missionary-industrialist system of control with military rule. Over night, war had stripped the Big Five of political power.

Socially, a vital development had been the emergence of labor as a new, articulate middle class. Labor's wartime gains were bound to close some of the gap between the lower strata of Hawaii's feudal make-up, and the place

workingmen held in a democratic society. As a group, the workers were becoming better prepared to make intelligent use of their political power. As individuals, they had become better aware of the status of their personal rights.

Then there was the quickened assimilation of the local Japanese into the American community. This was an important part of the Territory's revolution. War had brought the contents of the melting pot of the Pacific to a boil, but the younger Japanese had stood the test well. They too had helped close the gap which lay between the Territory's lower strata and real American citizenship.

Hawaii's revolution hinged principally, then, upon these four developments. They constituted a definite promise that the oligarchy had run its full course in the Hawaiian Islands.

One wartime development stood out sharply as evidence that the democratization of Hawaii's economy had already begun. This was the rise of new leadership in island business. In several key spots, old-line owner-industrialists who had died or retired were succeeded by a new, manager-type of industrialist. The multiple presidencies and directorships which the former had filled were taken over by different managers.

There was some prospect that these new leaders would bring a fresh spirit into island business. They might be willing to meet opposition with a policy of competition, rather than with the old policy of seeking to stifle, to team up with, or to buy out rival enterprises.

Unfortunately, there was already one factor working against this possibility—the rise of the “top sergeants” of island industry, the men who had been imported and

schooled in Big Five tactics. Many of these had already been promoted to places of influence.

But there was another development which promised help in decentralizing the local controls. This was the transfer of more and more stock ownership in Hawaii's business into the hands of trust companies.

Present day heirs to substantial blocks of stock in industry seem more inclined to allow trustees to handle their affairs than to take any great active interest in business operations, as their predecessors would have done. When the former limited group of Big Five leaders sat on the boards of the Hawaiian Trust Company, of the Cooke Trust Company and of the Bishop Trust Company, it had the effect of a tight centralization of control. But the gradual withdrawal of this senior group brought new leadership to the trust companies. Trust executives, men who were trained in investment procedure rather than in industrial operation, succeeded to the vacant places on the trust company boards. This should have had the effect of further dissolving interlocking directorates. Some islanders, however, saw the possibility of quite the opposite result.

"If enough stock ownership is turned over, say, to the Hawaiian Trust Company, which already holds healthy interests in Castle & Cooke, Hawaiian Pine and other big enterprises, you'll have another nice situation. Directors of this one company could just about run all industry from their own board room."

The new leaders who are coming to the front will have to face many problems as they take over the guidance of Hawaii's economic future.

None is going to be more critical than the problem of

the Islands' sugar industry. Before Pearl Harbor, Hawaii had been barely able to hold on to her share of the trade. Island planters quailed when they thought of the free-for-all scramble that was bound to take place in the post-war sugar market.

For one thing, there is the booming Mainland sugar industry, both beet and cane, which would be highly reluctant to surrender the gains made during the war. Then there are the new markets in Latin America—markets which have been encouraged as good neighbor trade. There is the huge Philippines supply which the United States, egged on by Mainland sugar lobbyists, had been ready to cast off. America will be bound, at least morally, to aid the rehabilitation of the Philippines once the war is over. Unless Philippine plantations have converted their sugar crops to cotton, as the Japanese conquerors had begun to force them to do, the most valuable assistance the United States can give, would be the restoration of some of their annual million-ton quota of sugar.

With such existing rivalries, Hawaii may expect to have to fight tooth and nail for her share of post-war trade.

On the home front, too, the HSPA is in for trouble. The complete organization of labor is only a matter of time. Many planters already admitted its presence and the dangerous influence it could wield. Eventually it might force the acceptance of some plan similar to the cultivation contract system. And it might so narrow down returns that plantations would demand reduction of their agencies' burdensome gross profit fee.

Those plantations which had enough stock ownership, independent of the five agencies, perhaps might throw off Big Five control and handle, individually, their own prob-

lems of supplies and labor and marketing. Or independent planters like Charles Rice, who discontinued production on Kauai because of Big Five "milking," might unite and organize their own cooperative agency.

That the Big Five has lost its hold on wartime shipping, goes without question. What Big Five stockholders wonder now is what is going to happen after the war?

They know that the signing of peace terms will throw a greater fleet of American ships into the world commerce than ever before sailed under one flag. American shipping lines will be seeking traffic on every ocean.

The President Line had already wedged itself into the picture when it was offered pineapple cargoes before the war. It would be prepared to cut in deeper when island trade was reopened again. Other lines would be ready to do the same. All other island business, particularly plantations which might see fit to break away from the established agencies, could also turn to shipping lines other than the Matson to carry their produce.

Hawaiian interests, if they were going to play any sizable part in post-war shipping in the Pacific, would have to get in and fight a commercial battle where the gains are based upon an entirely new set of rules.

An obvious factor that was going to affect the future of Hawaii's pineapple trade was the jettisoning of their marketing agreement shortly before the war. The market was so ready to accept all produce that island canneries could turn out, the element of competition had had no chance to enter the picture.

But when the signal was actually given to plunge into competitive trade, Hawaiian Pine would immediately have the upper hand over the other giants of the industry, the

Libby McNeill & Libby Co. and California Packing Corporation. This, because of its tie-in with the Matson interests, a privilege not so fully enjoyed by its rivals. The two Mainland-owned firms, on the other hand, could turn, on their own initiative, to new shipping lines entering the Hawaiian trade and undoubtedly obtain more attractive rates than Matson offered.

Just how vigorously these three firms will explore the latent possibilities depends, perhaps, upon how genuine their motives were in breaking up the marketing agreement.

In speculating upon what the future held for Hawaii's industries, no question is more intriguing than the fate of that early war casualty—the Islands' tourist trade.

When the barbed wire is pulled up from the beaches, and the luxury liners swing into Honolulu harbor once more, will Hawaii's third ranking industry begin to boom again?

It might. But it will be a vastly different business from the giddy enterprise that in pre-war days grossed twelve million dollars a year. It will be a more business-like traffic, not so likely to be lured across the sea by ukelele players, native hulas, or primitive songs.

There is little hope that Waikiki will recapture the precarious hold it once had upon the tourist trade. Civilization had more than caught up with this old worn beach on southern Oahu. Hemmed in by apartment houses, business shops and amusement concessions, Waikiki's one time tropic charm has been overwhelmed by the march of time and of men. Disillusioned servicemen soon had their own name for the former glamorous beach resort. They called it the Coney Island of the Pacific.

The \$2,000,000 Royal Hawaiian Hotel may never again be the mecca for lavish vacationists that it was in pre-war days. It will probably inherit the fate of its nearby predecessor, the old Moana. Once the headquarters for island visitors, this huge, old fashioned hostelry has gradually become a family hotel for hundreds of permanent island residents. Both hotels, incidentally, are Matson owned.

Despite this, Hawaii has every possibility of reclaiming its tourist trade. There is still enough of the matchless climate and true natural charm to attract thousands of visitors annually. They might not come in response to the earlier Polynesian blandishments, but simply because few places in the world can equal the Islands as a resort vacation spot.

Hawaii realizes this and has already looked about prospectively for better locations to center the trade. Some years prior to the war, plans had been made for opening an extensive resort on the windward shore of Oahu, across the mountains from Honolulu and Waikiki. Wartime development of a great naval air base in this area, and the inevitable infiltration of thousands of defense families along with it, considerably altered its possibilities as a resort site.

This might well lead to the exploitation of the virgin beauty of some of the outside islands—Maui and Kauai, in particular. A few minutes from Honolulu by plane, or a few hours by ship, would set the tourist down in tropical scenes that could easily justify the claims of the travel brochures. In such an atmosphere, the tourist trade has its best chance of making a resounding comeback.

A fresh field of post-war activity in the Islands would be the building trade. Perhaps no part of the United States

seems destined to plunge into so great a program of reconstruction as soon as the war ends.

While millions were being poured into the building of military defenses in the Islands during the war, public and private construction plans had to be put aside until after the duration. Public office buildings, schools, business blocks, roads, private dwellings are ready to go into construction the moment peace treaties are signed and materials become available. There is no doubt Hawaii is in for a building boom that may well compare with the war construction period.

Much of the significance of this prospect was the fact that capital from the U. S. Mainland was bound to have a considerable share in the business. Many of the larger construction contracts would be let to Mainland contractors who had great defense projects during the war. Their capital and their labor would be held over to pick up some of this income. Also, they would call for competitive bidding when they were ready to bring in building supplies. Thus they would open up new channels into the Islands for Mainland firms.

Investment of capital in quantity large enough to withstand Big Five pressure had always been an obstacle most small industrialists in the Islands had been unable to overcome. Two of the concerns great enough to override this pressure were Sears-Roebuck and the Kress chain of five and ten cent stores, who, after considerable difficulty, finally became established in the Islands.

However, even such merchandising giants as these came very close to defeat in challenging entrenched island capital. Wartime pressures found both firms running out of

stock. They could not get shipping space nor supplies to keep their shelves filled. Honolulu became rife with rumors.

"Have you heard about Sears? They're going to close . . ."

"Kress, too. The Big Five's fixed it so they can't get any goods. They're getting out for good."

To prove that these reports were somewhat far-fetched, both stores took large advertisements in local newspapers. These advertisements categorically denied that either firm planned to liquidate, or that anyone could force them out, or that they would get out. Both were in the Islands to stay.

Similar changes of attitude took place in other fields of local life. There was for example, the rise of labor. Against the most determined kind of opposition, labor had finally been able to assert its claims for privilege. By the third year of war, the prospect of organizing the bulk of labor, including the plantation workers, seemed fairly definite.

A comparison of statements made by the new leaders of Hawaii's sugar industry with those of their predecessors provides a striking example of this changed attitude.

Philip Spalding, the new president of the leading sugar factor, C. Brewer & Co., expressed his views in a published statement in 1943. Management was more than willing to roll up its sleeves and go to work with labor on problems confronting both.

Another spokesman for the new type of sugar industrialist was J. Scott Pratt, manager of the Kohala plantation on the island of Hawaii. Mr. Pratt believed in collective bargaining and in labor unions. In November, 1943, Mr. Pratt said, "Labor has a perfect right to organize."

All this represented quite an advance since the days when plantation managers believed that a dozen lashes with a black snake would stop all strikes or talks of strikes.

If labor was to take full advantage of its wartime gains, it needed, as much as management did, honest, articulate leadership. Some leaders had already come to the fore in the early struggle for recognition. Pioneering leaders came from the various races, including Hawaiian and Japanese. It could not be said that labor had been taken over by "foreign agitators."

One wholesome aid brought by the war to the cause of labor in the Islands was the immigration of thousands of conservative trade unionists who came to work on defense projects. A sizable portion of this group could be expected to stay over in the Islands after the war and bring new blood and new leadership to the cause.

Labor in Hawaii was sufficiently impressed with its successes by 1943 that many of its leaders seriously planned to put into action a motion previously made to Honolulu's Central Labor Council. It was suggested that the various unions in the Territory form a federation which would be independent of their AFL and CIO parent organizations on the Mainland.

Although all the existing unions were affiliated with one or the other parent group, they gained little from the association and in some respects their policies were quite different. For example, AFL unions in Hawaii had long since recognized that they must accept Japanese workers and never question their memberships. AFL locals on the Mainland barred Orientals from membership.

Island labor leaders began to point out how strong a local federation would be if it kept the thousands of do-

lars which flowed monthly from island locals to national treasuries for its own financing.

Sponsors of the federation also looked upon the acquisition of funds as a prospective means of consolidating labor's voting strength. They envisioned labor-supported legislators refashioning the whole structure of island government, that had so long been the instrument of a limited circle of industrialists.

It was very evident that by the third year of war, labor in Hawaii, so long suppressed, was becoming militant.

There were three other issues which the war had pushed to the surface: They were questions the islanders were asking as avidly in 1944 as they were in the years prior to December 7.

"What are we going to do about the Japanese?"

"Will the military keep its hand permanently in island affairs?"

"When is Hawaii going to become a state?"

The three questions are inextricably related. No one of them could be answered without some effect upon the others.

The question of statehood holds the least doubt. Only the fondest believers in this half-century-old expectation still hold hope for any kind of action on the Territory's bid immediately after the war is over. More realistic natives accept the fact that war has set the statehood movement back a dozen years.

In the years of pre-war campaigning carried on by statehood's proponents, the existence of 159,000 Japanese among Hawaii's population had studiously been glossed over in the hundreds of thousands of pamphlets, newspaper hand-

outs, radio programs, and lectures that pleaded the cause. War dragged the Japanese problem out to the center of the stage. It was soon apparent that no other information coming out of the Hawaiian Islands interested the U. S. readers as much as facts about her Japanese. The Mainland wanted to know all about them—how many there were—whether they had aided in the Pearl Harbor attack—why they were not thrown into concentration camps.

The facts seeped out gradually. Statehood proponents listened apprehensively for reports of their reception. They heard that people all over the United States were at first shocked at the enormity of the problem. Californians were ready to believe that any day Hawaii's Japanese population would arise and seize the Islands in the name of their emperor.

After several months had passed and the Hawaiian Japanese still had not gone in for wholesale betrayal, some of the clamor quieted. Then, as the Japanese began to assert American loyalty by definite acts of patriotism, there were even some acknowledgments as to the sincerity of their citizenship.

To those islanders who had never approved the statehood committee's hush-hush policy with regard to the Japanese, all this came as a source of deep satisfaction. They felt that the enlightenment enforced by the war might even prove the best way to an understanding of the islanders' racial problems and perhaps to the arrival at its solution.

"After the war," they said, "Hawaii will have all her cards on the table. Then we can go out and ask for statehood without feeling we are trying to hide something up our sleeve."

Nevertheless, there was an even more formidable obstacle than the resident Japanese barring the way to statehood. This was the military. Hawaii still had to know the answer to this question before she could begin to think of her role as the forty-ninth state.

"Was the military going to retain its hold over the islands after the war?"

Some islanders doubted that the military would be ready to surrender its influence even after the war. "This place is going to be just as important to America even when the fighting's over," they said. "There isn't much chance of the Services letting go."

This was not said regretfully in every case. Many were quite willing to have military help in adjusting the Islands' post-war affairs. They knew that the Territory, turned to war service as completely as some of America's major industries had been, would have to go through a definite period of post-war reconversion. One suggestion was that a temporary form of commission government be set up to bridge this "tapering off" period.

"Why not have the military and civilian governments join hands for awhile?" they asked. "Let the Army and the Navy appoint three commission members. Let the civilian population appoint three: one representing business, one labor, and one education or the courts. Then have a statesman or jurist from the U. S. Mainland sit as chairman of the commission. The commission could administer government, through existing departments, until Hawaii got her political feet on the ground. The Congress could at any time end this post-war probationary period by declaring itself satisfied that Hawaii was ready for statehood."

To some this seemed a graceful solution. Others dismissed the whole idea as not American, undemocratic and unconstitutional. The military opinion was not for quotation. However, no one doubted that the services, while withholding judgment, were going to have a good deal to say in deciding the political fate of their fortress in the Pacific.

After the situation has been carefully surveyed, Hawaii should have few qualms about her post-war outlook. There is every prospect that it will be, more than for almost any other part of America, a period of reconstruction, of the reshaping of her community life. By then, the revolution should have begun to bear useful fruit. Her people, awakened by the many democratizing influences the war had set in motion, should be more widely represented in island affairs.

By then, labor should have consolidated its gains and have established the working man as an influence in community life. Island Japanese should have found their place in the social scheme. New business leaders should have breathed something of the spirit of competition into all island trade. The whole process of war change should have been a refreshing one and a thorough job of housecleaning which should have rid Hawaii of many unhealthy things.

There seems no question that Hawaii can look to the future and feel that economically she has little to fear. Whether sugar, pineapples, shipping, tourists, or some other industry takes the leadership of island trade after the war, Hawaii's place as the crossroads of the Pacific is sufficient to insure her economic future.

When plans for a new world order are set up after the

war, Hawaii will be a key station in the plan for the Pacific. Whatever the system of world policing set up, Hawaii will take her place as a central garrison of that system in the Pacific. A great military and naval population would be assurance of a lively merchandising trade.

War has thrust Hawaii into a role which she can perhaps never relinquish. Before Pearl Harbor she was an independent, agricultural community preoccupied with her own destiny. The war has reduced her local problems, and the narrow group of men who answered them, into insignificance. Overnight she has become the nation's most vital frontier. Every month of war has added to her stature.

After the war Hawaii will not be allowed to lapse into her independent provincialism again. Her own economy will be made to fit the larger role her country has been assigned. As a link for America with ports in Asia, that role will continue to be an important one in post-war Pacific trade. Her airports will be a part of the vast system of airlines connecting the U. S. Mainland with China, Japan, India, and the Antipodes. Her waterfronts will be ports of call for merchant fleets crisscrossing the globe.

In a prospect like this, the people of the Islands will find the opportunity for making the most of their revolution. Behind them lie a shoddy record of ambition, misunderstanding, and greed. Ahead is a new order, one that promises well for their Hawaii of the future.



*Hawaiian
Islands*

