

GENERAL ROGER ENOS

BY

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A LOST CHAPTER OF ARNOLD'S EXPEDITION TO CANADA, 1775

IT is doubtful if any officer of the Revolutionary Army, always excepting Benedict Arnold, has so excited the ire, or called forth the prejudices of historical writers as Roger Enos, Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the rear division of the memorable expedition to Canada under Arnold in 1775. It is a fact, familiar to readers of American history, that Colonel Enos returned from that expedition with his division before the army reached Canada. Judge Henry, in his journal of the march, speaks of that return as a "desertion;" B. J. Lossing, Hon. I. N. Arnold, and others have adopted Henry's word. Bancroft, in his History of the United States, stigmatizes Enos as "a craven." Mr. Mills, in the February Number of the *MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN HISTORY* (1885), refers to his conduct as "cowardice," and thus the charges are repeated by modern writers "ad libitum." So far however, none have accused Enos with being a "traitor." This one more depth remains to which coming writers may consign him.

Correspondence with several authors, who have adopted Henry's language, shows that Colonel Enos' case has received from no one an exhaustive or impartial investigation. If he *was* guilty of cowardice, or desertion, his name should be placed, in the history of his times, just below that of Arnold. If he was *not* guilty of either crime, where should we place the names of those who have so maligned him? It is remarkable how very difficult it is for the present age to view calmly and with an even balance the characters who acted on either side of the struggle during the seven years' war for American Independence. The iconoclasts of the past twenty years have done much to bring about a more judicious examination of that period. Sabine's *Loyalists* was a manifesta-

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tion of fairness that at the time almost "took our breath." Lowell's work on the "Hessians and other German Auxiliaries" has corrected many very one-sided opinions of that unfortunate class of British troops. Parkman's last most charming volume, "Montcalm and Wolfe," has finally toned down materially the glory of martyrdom with which we have always surrounded the sad history of the Acadians. Possibly ere the present century has expired the student of American history, not the mere book-maker, may have reached that large-hearted point of view expressed in the words "audi alteram partem." With this invaluable motto, so very important in judging of events in which we were not factors, it may be worth while to ask

I. Who was Roger Enos?

He was the son of David and Mary (Gillet) Eno or Enos of Simsbury, Connecticut, and great grandson of James Eno, who came from England and settled at Windsor, Conn., 1646. He was born at Simsbury, Conn., 1729, and died, Colchester, Conn., October 6, 1808, æt. 79. He was forty-six years of age when the march to Canada occurred. He entered at an early age into the military service of the Crown during the French War. From 1759 to the close of the war he was actively engaged in the field. Nor was this military service of constraint. His name heads the list of volunteers from his own town—then Windsor—for the Canada Campaign of 1759 and 1760. The Assembly of Connecticut successively promoted him for his services in the field as follows: Ensign of the First Company, Colonel Phineas Lyman's Regiment, March, 1760; Lieutenant of the same company at Montreal, Canada, September, 1760; Adjutant of the Regiment 1761, during which year he also acted as Captain-Lieutenant of the First Company; First Lieutenant and of the same company, 1762; Captain of the Fifth Company, Colonel Israel Putnam's Regiment, 1764, in the expedition sent that year against the Indians. He accompanied his command on the expedition to the West Indies in 1762, which

laid siege to and captured the city of Havanna; an enterprise as successful to the arms of Great Britain as it was disastrous to her army, which was decimated by the climate. In 1773 he was appointed on a commission composed of Colonels Israel Putnam, Rufus Putnam, Phineas Lyman, and Captain Roger Enos, sent to the Mississippi Valley to survey the lands granted by the Crown to the provincial troops engaged in the French War and the Havana Campaign. An unpublished journal of this commission, kept by General Rufus Putnam, is now owned by Marietta College, Ohio. The principal outcome of this commission was the colony settled at Natchez, Mississippi, by Colonel Lyman. In 1775 Enos entered the Continental Army as Lieutenant-Colonel of the 22d Regiment in Arnold's expedition to Canada. He returned from that expedition with his command October 25, 1775, and on December 1, 1775, he was tried by court-martial on the charge of "quitting his commanding officer without leave," and was "*honorably acquitted.*"

He resigned his commission in the army, then Lieutenant-Colonel 16th Connecticut Regiment, January 18, 1776. In May, 1777, he served in a committee of Windsor citizens to secure a bounty of £30 to each man who should enlist in the Continental service. He afterward commanded one of the Connecticut regiments thus raised, and stationed in the southwest corner of the State. Late in 1779 he left the Connecticut service and moved to Vermont, where, with others, he settled the town of Enosburg, March, 1780. In 1781 he was appointed Brigadier-General, and placed in command of all the Vermont troops then in service. In that year he wrote to General Washington announcing his return to active service in the field. In 1787 he was elected Major-General of the 1st Division of the State of Vermont, holding this position until 1791, when he resigned. Thus he was for over thirty years almost continuously in the military service of his country. From 1781 to 1792 he was a member of the Vermont Board of War; of the State Assembly; of the House Committee to settle the New

Hampshire and Vermont controversy, and a Trustee of the University of Vermont, elected by the Assembly. He was also one of the House Committee to consider the Vermont resolutions passed by the Continental Congress. From his entrance into the State in 1779 until 1792, a period of twelve years, he was one of the most prominent actors and most honored figures in the history of Vermont, where none ever doubted his loyalty to the United Colonies, his military capacity, or his moral courage, and where no one at this day believes one word of the charges made against him in regard to the Canada campaign. In 1792, worn out, at the age of 63, with his long and active service, he resigned all his public offices and retired to Connecticut, where with his daughter, Mrs. General Ira Allen, he passed his remaining days. He married, March 10, 1763, Jerusha Hayden, of Windsor, Connecticut, daughter of Daniel and Esther (Mone) Hayden, and had five children, one of whom, Jerusha Hayden Enos, married General Ira Allen of Vermont, and one married Pascal Paoli, who was one of the four proprietors of Springfield, Illinois, 1823, where his descendants still reside. Such an honored record of civil and military services, drawn from the published archives of Connecticut and Vermont, should cause the historian to hesitate before accepting the second-hand statements made against General Enos, or at least prevent a one-sided judgment of his conduct in the expedition of 1775.

II. What are the real facts of Enos' conduct in the Canada expedition?

This important venture for the possession of Canada was planned by Washington, the preparations made with as much secrecy and dispatch as possible, and placed under the command of Benedict Arnold. The little army consisted of 1,080 men in two battalions; Arnold, in his letter of October 13, says 950 men. The first battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Greene; the second by Lieutenant-Colonel Roger Enos. The command was again sub-divided into three divisions, of which the

third, or rear division, was placed in charge of Colonel Enos, and numbered 350 men. The march was begun September 11, 1775. At Fort Western Arnold sent in advance a party of eleven men under Lieutenant Steele, to open the way as far as possible. In this party was Henry, who wrote of Enos only from hearsay. The rest of the army, with Arnold's division in advance, followed as rapidly as the almost insurmountable difficulties of the way would permit, frequently making only two or three miles a day. Each division was supplied with forty-five days' provisions. The various accounts of the hardships of this march seem almost incredible. They are vividly portrayed in the journals of Henry, Thayer, Senter, Melvin, Meigs, Ward, and others, all of whose records are accessible to the student of history. It is doubtful if the terrible sufferings which they have recounted have ever been equaled in the history of military adventures. The army met with heavy rains, swollen streams, and deep morasses in an almost unknown and trackless wilderness. Their boats were dashed to pieces in the torrents, and their provisions lost or spoiled. They dug up roots and ate them, made soup out of moccasins and raw hide, and vainly sought to find nourishment in such a diet; dog meat, including the hide, and "the entrails broiled on the coals, were luxuries, and death by starvation stared them in the face."

Arnold started with his division with forty-five days' provisions. Two-fifths of this was lost by the wrecking of batteaux before October 15. To such terrible straits was this division subsequently reduced that Arnold left it and pushed ahead day and night, to reach the French settlements and send back supplies.

General Dearborn, then a Captain in the first division, says: "My dog was very large and a great favourite. I gave him up to several men of Captain Goodrich's company, who killed him and divided him among those who were suffering most severely with hunger. They ate every part of him, not excepting his entrails; and after finishing their meal, they collected the bones and carried

them to be pounded up and to make broth for another meal. Old moose hide breeches were boiled and then broiled on the coals and eaten. A barber's powder bag made a soup in the course of the last three or four days before we reached the first settlements in Canada. Many died with hunger and fatigue, frequently four or five minutes after making their last effort and sitting down."

Thayer, who was a Captain in the second division, Colonel Greene, says of their sufferings a week after Enos had divided his scanty store with them, reserving only three days' supplies for a march back of 100 miles: "Nov. 1, we observed a sergeant and 10 or 12 men round a fire and saw with astonishment that they were devouring a dog between them, and eating paunch, guts and skin. We pushed on * * * and after marching 2 days and 2 nights without the least nourishment,"—discovered the party sent back by Arnold with a supply of provision, at four o'clock on the evening of November 3. The vicissitudes of the advance party up to October 24, were not unknown to Enos, whom Arnold kept advised by letter and courier until Enos' return. Thus Arnold wrote him from the Third Carrying Place, October 15, "The three first divisions have twenty-five days' provisions, which will carry them to Chaudiere Pond and back, where we shall doubtless have intelligence, and shall be able to proceed or return as shall be thought best." Two days later, October 17, he writes in a different strain from Dead River: "I arrived here last night late and find Col. Greene's division very short of provisions, the whole having only *four* barrels of flour and *ten* barrels of pork." He ordered back Major Bigelow with a lieutenant and thirty-one men out of each company to meet Enos, "and bring up as much as you (Enos) can spare." Thus Greene's division had met with such reverses in the loss of provisions that at that date, October 16, they had less than 800 lbs. of flour and 10 barrels of pork to sustain a body of 350 men for seventeen days, that is from October 16 to November 4, when they met the provisions which Arnold had sent back from the settlements. As to his own division, Arnold wrote Enos,

October 24, that, instead of twenty-five days' provision in hand, his party was reduced to fifteen days' provision when four days' march from Chaudiere, and that a council of war had decided "to send back all sick and feeble with 3 days' provision * * * and that on receipt of this you should proceed with as many of the best men of your division *as you can furnish with 15 days' provisions*, and that the remainder *whether sick or well* should be immediately sent back to the Commissary." To Colonel Farnsworth he wrote the same day, "I find it necessary for the safety of the detachment to send back the sick, and to reduce the detachment so as to have fifteen days' provision for the whole. Those who are sent back you will supply with provisions and send back to Cambridge as soon as possible." This letter he repeated to Colonel Greene the same day. On the 27th he wrote to General Washington that he had left the principal part of the detachment eight leagues below the Great Carrying Place, short of provisions by reason of the loss of many batteaux at the falls and rapid waters; that he had ordered all the sick and feeble to return, "and wrote Colonels Enos and Greene to bring on in their divisions no more men than they could furnish with 15 days' provisions, and send back the remainder to the Commissary." November 8 he repeats this order in his letter to the Commander in Chief: "I had ordered Col. Enos to send back the sick and feeble, *and those of his division who could not be supplied with fifteen days' provisions.*"

Colonel Enos, under date of November 9th, wrote Washington, from "Brunswick, near Kennebunk," thus:

"SIR, I am on my return from Col. Arnold's detachment. I brought up the rear of the whole. Captains McCobb's, Williams' and Scott's companies were assigned to my division. We proceeded as far as 50 miles up the Dead River, & then were obliged to return for want of provisions. When we arrived at the Great Carrying Place, by what I could learn from the division forward that provisions were like to be short, I wrote to Col. Arnold & desired him to take account of the provisions forward. He wrote me that there were 25 days' provisions for all the divisions ahead, but to my surprise before we got over the Great Carrying Place, Major Bigelow with 90 men were sent back from Col. Greene's division to mine for provisions. I let them have all I could spare. I continued my march with all expedition, & when about 50 miles up the Dead River overtook Col. Greene with his division, entirely out of provisions, &

by reason of men being sent back with orders from Col. Arnold for me to furnish them with provisions to carry them to the inhabitants my division was reduced to 4 days' provisions. Col. Arnold was gone ahead; the Chief of the Officers of Col. Greene's division and mine were together when we took the situation of our division into consideration, and upon the whole it was thought best for my whole division to return & furnish those that proceeded with all our provisions except 3 days to bring us back, which I did without loss of time. A more particular account shall be able to give when I return to Cambridge. Shall lose no time if able to ride. I have for many days been unwell. Expect the whole of my division at this place to-morrow, when shall set out on our march to Cambridge.

"I am your most obedient humble servant,

"ROGER ENOS."

From the various journals of this Expedition, it is easy to see the position in which Colonel Enos was placed, and which forced him to the course he pursued. Of the 1,080 men who composed the army, Enos commanded, in his division, and according to Marshall, only one-third, or 350 men. Arnold reached Canada with 550 men. Deducting Enos' 350, leaves nearly 200 unaccounted for, who doubtless returned sick, or fell exhausted and expired by the way. Of Enos' 350, at least 150 were simply "*attached*" to his division, and were not a part of his proper command. Henry speaks without knowledge when he says that "Enos had returned with 500 men and a large stock of provisions." Into this even Mr. Mills falls, and displays a lack of careful examination of the subject. Such an estimate places Arnold's army beyond the number reported by the best authorities. Stone, in his issue of Thayer's Journal," says:

"In the then crude state of military authority, the control held by officers over their men was more the result of personal regard than of deference to position. Every man had an opinion and was free to express it. Among a portion of Arnold's troops the views of officers and men coincided. Disaffection had extended to three companies, and it became advisable to hold a council of war for decisive measures, and this took place October 25, on reaching Dead River." Meigs says in his journal of that date that instead of there then being fifteen days' rations for the command, "the provisions were so reduced that the men were on the allowance

of $\frac{3}{4}$ th pound of pork and $\frac{3}{4}$ th pound of flour per day for each." And a careful examination of the various journals will show that on this day the rations of the entire command, including the two divisions of Greene and Enos, did not exceed four days' supply. On this meager provision the men were to subsist for nine days. Thayer records that during the last forty-eight hours of those nine days, and just before the command met Arnold's provisions, "they were without the least nourishment." The council of war held at Dead River is recorded by three journalists, Meigs, Senter and Thayer. Of these Thayer *alone* was one of the council and present during its session.

Dr. Senter says: "Col. Arnold had left previous orders for Greene & Enos' divisions to come to an *adjustment* of the provisions, send back any who were indisposed either in body or mind and pursue him with the rest." This is not a correct statement and does not agree with Arnold's letters which the two lieutenant-colonels had received. At the council of war eleven officers were present; Colonel Enos presided. Greene, Bigelow, Topham, Thayer, Ward, voted to proceed; Williams, McCobb, Scott, Hide, Peters, voted against proceeding. Colonel Enos cast the deciding vote in favor of proceeding. Senter, who was then a young man of twenty-two years, says: "Col. Enos, though he voted for proceeding, yet had undoubtedly pre-engaged to the contrary, as every action demonstrated." Thayer, a man of thirty-eight years, who had already seen much severe service with Enos in the French war, and had suffered some of its vicissitudes at the surrender of Fort William Henry, who was second to no soldier of the Revolution as to his gallantry and integrity, and who was present in the council of war, says just the reverse about Enos. On the 24th of October, when Arnold supposed the two divisions to be well supplied with fifteen days' rations from Enos' bountiful store, Thayer says of Greene's division: "Had intelligence of its being 25 miles to the Great Carrying Place, where the height of land is, and in the meantime destitute of provisions, for the 2 barrels we brought gave

2 pounds each man, and we had only $\frac{1}{2}$ pint left to deliver out."

"Oct. 25. We staid for Col. Greene to consult about our situation & what to do for provisions. We sent back 48 men & 1 subaltern in 3 batteaux. The men are much disheartened, and eagerly wish to return; however, I am certain if their bellies were full they would be willing enough to proceed."

The Council of War having decided to go forward, he says: "It was resolved that Col. Enos should not return back. His party who were 6 in number, & by one inferior to ours observed with regret that we voted to proceed, on which they held a council of war amongst themselves, of which were the Captains McCobb, Williams & Scott, & unanimously declared that they would return & not rush into such imminent danger. * * * Col. Enos declared to us that he was willing to go & take his boat, in which there was some provision, and share the same fate with us, but was obliged to tarry through the means of his effeminate officers who rather pass their time in tipping than turn it to the profit & advantage of their country who stands in need of their assistance. Capt. Williams stept towards me & wished me success, but told me he never expected to see me or any of us (again), he was so conscious of the imminent danger we were to go through. In the meantime Col. Enos advanced with tears in his eyes, wishing me & mine success, & took as he then supposed & absolutely thought, his last farewell of me, demonstrating to me that it was with the utmost reluctance he remained behind, though being certain he would never survive the attempt."

And so they parted. Greene had near 400 men with three days' provisions to traverse 75 miles through a route that occupied nearly the whole of nine days before a supply of food could be had. On the 28th Thayer says: "We divided our flour equally in 10 companies, the quantity amounting to seven Pints each man for 7 Days." Enos had 350 men and three days' provisions to travel 100 miles to the first settlement. This distance had already oc-

cupied the detachment twenty-two days, from October 2 to October 24, to pass over. As Thayer says: "Oct. 2. * * * at the last inhabitants now, & meet no other until we come to Canada." Enos' command was fifteen days in reaching Brunswick.

To recapitulate: Arnold started on his march September 11th with 1,080 men and forty-five days' provision, his detachment reaching the French settlements November 4th. Within thirty days, October 14th, the first division was reduced to twenty-five days' supplies. Two days later, October 17th, the second, or Greene's division, was reduced to four barrels flour and ten barrels pork for 350 men for seventeen days' march. Ten days later, October 24th, Greene's division having received through Major Bigelow all that Enos could supply, on the 18th had only half a pint of flour left to deliver out to each man: and Arnold's first division was on the allowance of three-quarters of a pound of flour and three-quarters of a pound of pork per day, for each man. Greene and Enos met on the 25th. Enos divided his rations with Greene. They parted, October 26, each with three days' supply. Nine days later, November 3, Arnold's party were eating dog-meat, moccasin soup, broiled hide, etc.; Greene's party had been forty-eight hours without the least food, and Enos' men, on the return march, were saved from similar suffering by having killed a large moose. Enos' position, October 25th, was certainly one of extreme difficulty. He could take no action that would not be, in part, a disobedience of Arnold's orders. He pursued what seemed to him the best course when he voted to proceed. His officers took what really proved to be the best course when they refused to proceed. Arnold's orders were imperative: "Provide Greene's division with supplies, forward all of the best men of his own party that he could furnish with 15 days' rations, & send back the rest, sick or well, immediately." There was no discretionary power left to Enos. On the 18th he supplied Greene's party with all he could spare. On the 25th, when Arnold's orders of the 24th reached him, he divided his provisions with Greene giving him two barrels of flour

and two barrels of pork. On the 26th he began his return march with 300 men and three days' provision. Here was Enos' dilemma (he had 900 rations): 1st. To forward such of his best men as he could furnish with fifteen days' rations would have added thirty men to the advance march, and have left 270 men to tread the way back, one hundred miles, utterly destitute of food. Such a disobedience of orders could not be considered for a moment. 2d. To proceed with his 300 men and three days' rations would have imperilled the whole detachment, and probably, as General Sullivan says, have caused them to perish with hunger. This would have been equally a disobedience of orders.

To return home with all whom he could not furnish with fifteen days' provisions was also a disobedience of orders, as it took away from Arnold this entire division, forwarding none to the assistance of his commanding officer. Each of these lines of action, he could easily see, terminated in court-martial. Without doubt the course Enos did take saved the lives of his own division, if not of the others: preserved the *morale* of his troops, and was declared by the court-martial as necessary and wise.

Of course Enos' return was a surprise to Washington, who was entirely in ignorance of the cause. He placed him immediately under arrest, not because his time of service was nearly expired, for it had only just begun: and ordered a court of inquiry to be held November 29, 1775. This court was composed of Major-General Charles Lee, President; Brigadier-Generals Greene and Heath; Colonels (afterwards Generals) John Stark and John Nixon, and Majors Durkee and Sherburne. Their examination of the charges resulted in the expressed "opinion, that Col. Enos' misconduct, if he has been guilty of misconduct, is not of so heinous a nature as was at first supposed; but it is necessary for the satisfaction of the world, and for his own honour, that a court-martial should be immediately held for his trial."

The court-martial was held December 1, 1775. President Brigadier-General John Sullivan and twelve field officers. "The court being duly sworn," proceeded to try Colonel Enos for "leaving the detachment under Colonel Arnold, and returning home without permission from his commanding officer." To this Enos replied that it was true he did return without permission from his commanding officer, "but the circumstances of the case were such as obliged him so to do." The witnesses for the defense were the officers of Enos' division, Captains Williams, McCobb and Scott, and Lieutenants Hide and Buckmaster. These entirely concurred in their testimony, that to go forward with only three days' supply of food was impossible; that Colonel Enos was for going forward without his division, but that his presence was absolutely so necessary to secure the harmony and safe retreat of the men that they had each protested against his leaving them. The full testimony of these witnesses can be found in Force's "Archives," Vol. III., p. 1709, and Munsell's edition of Henry's "Journal," p. 52, where the result of the trial is recorded as follows:

"The Court being cleared, after mature consideration, are unanimously of opinion that Colonel Enos was under a necessity of returning with the division under his command, and therefore acquit him with honour.

John Sullivan, President. A true copy of the proceedings attest. W. Tudor, Judge Advocate."

The subsequent testimony of General Sullivan is most explicit in confirmation of this decision, and entirely disarms of its force Munsell's intimation that the witnesses in the trial perjured themselves in Enos' defense.

"New-York, April 28, 1776.

"I hereby certify that I was President of a Court-Martial, in Cambridge, when Colonel Enos was tried for leaving Colonel Arnold, with the rear division of the detachment under his command, bound for Quebeck; and, upon the trial, it clearly appeared to me, as well to all the other members of the Court, that Colonel Enos was perfectly justifiable in returning with the division, being clearly proved, by the testimony of witnesses of undoubted veracity (some of whom I have been personally acquainted with for a number of years, and know them to be

persons of truth), that so much provision had been sent forward, to support the other divisions, as left them so small a quantity that their men were almost famished with hunger on their return; and some would undoubtedly have starved, had they not, by accident, come across and killed a large moose. Upon their evidence, there remained no doubt in the mind of myself, or any of the members, that the return of the division was prudent and reasonable; being well convinced that they had not provision sufficient to carry them half way to *Quebeck*, and that their going forward would only have deprived the other division of a part of theirs, which, as the event has since shown, was not enough to keep them all from perishing; we therefore unanimously acquitted Colonel *Enos* with honour.

"I further certify, that by a strict inquiry into the matter since, from persons who were in the divisions that went forward, I am convinced that had Colonel *Enos*, with his division, proceeded, it would have been a means of causing the whole detachment to have perished in the woods, for want of sustenance.

"I further, add that I have been well informed, by persons acquainted with Colonel *Enos*, that he has ever conducted as a good and faithful officer. JOHN SULLIVAN."

The estimation in which *Enos* was held by the officers of the army, and the light in which his course in the present instance was held is seen in this additional testimony.

TO THE IMPARTIAL PUBLICK.

"The case of Lieutenant-Colonel *Enos* having engaged the attention of many officers of the Army, as well as others, and as we are informed he is much censured by many persons, for returning back from the expedition to *Canada*, under the command of Colonel *Arnold*, by which Colonel *Enos's* character greatly suffers, we think it our duty to certify, that some of us, from our own personal knowledge of the military abilities of Colonel *Enos*, and others of us from information, are fully convinced that he is a gentleman fully acquainted with his duty as an officer, a man of fortitude and prudence, and, in our opinion, well calculated to sustain, with honour, any military character; and, from the fullest inquiry, we are satisfied that (whatsoever different representations may be made) in returning to camp, with the division under his command, he is justifiable, and conducted as an understanding, prudent, faithful officer, and deserves applause rather than censure; and we can safely recommend him as a person worthy to be employed in any military department.

WILLIAM HEATH, *Brigadier-General*.

JAMES REED, *Colonel*.

J. BREWER, *Colonel*.

SAMUEL H. PARSONS, *Colonel*.

JOSEPH REED, *Colonel*.

JONATHAN NIXON, *Colonel*.

CHARLES WEBB, *Colonel*.

DANIEL HITCHCOCK, *Colonel*.

JOHN STARK, *Colonel*.

LEVI WELLS, *Major*.

SAMUEL WYLLYS, *Colonel*.

WILLIAM SHEPARD, *Lieutenant-Colonel*.

ANDREW COLBURN, *Major*.

JOEL CLARK, *Lieutenant-Colonel*.

EBENEZER SPROUT, *Major*.

EBENEZER CLAP, *Lieutenant-Colonel*.

SAMUEL PRENTICE, *Major*.

CALVIN SMITH, *Major*.

JOSIAH HAYDEN, *Major*.

JOHN BAILY, *Colonel*.

JOHN TYLER, *Lieutenant-Colonel*.

THOMAS NIXON, *Lieutenant-Colonel*.

LOAMMI BALDWIN, *Colonel*.

JAMES WESSON, *Lieutenant-Colonel*.

ISAAC SHERMAN, *Major*."

Now, supposing Enos to have been guilty of either "desertion" or "cowardice," in his return from the expedition, one of the most remarkable phases of the case is the silence of both Washington and Arnold about his conduct. Neither of these ever applied such terms to his action. The strongest language that Washington used in referring to him was in his letter to Congress, November 19, in which he says, "notwithstanding the great *defection*, I do not despair of Col. Arnold's success." To Arnold he wrote December 5: "You could not be more surprised than I was at Enos' return, with the division under his command. I immediately put him under arrest, etc., etc. He is acquitted on the score of provisions."

Arnold, with his hot blood and impetuosity, so far from "depicting the cowardice and shame of Enos," simply says, in his letter to Washington, November 8, "all are happily arrived, except * * * Colonel Enos's division, who I am surprised to hear are *all gone back*." To General Montgomery he writes same day: "The other part with Col. *Enos returned* from Dead River contrary to my expectation, he having orders to send back only the sick and those who could not be furnished with provisions." Again to General Schuyler he wrote, November 7, "near one-third of the detachment *returned* from the Dead River *short of provisions*." Again, describing his difficulties in reaching Canada, he writes, "short of provisions, part of the detachment *disheartened and gone back*, famine staring us in the face." Beyond this not one word is found in all the writings of either Washington or Arnold that casts the least reflection on Colonel Enos, or on the opinion of the court-martial. There can be but little doubt that had Arnold known one-half the difficulties that awaited him he would never have undertaken the expedition furnished as he was. He wrote Washington, October 27th: "I have been much deceived in every account of our route, which is much longer, and has been attended with a thousand difficulties I never apprehended." He was evidently surprised at the almost insurmountable hindrances he met with; owing to which he fully expected that a part at least of his detachment would

be obliged to return, for want of provisions. Hence his orders of the 24th to Enos, Greene and Farnsworth. But knowing nothing of the destitution in Greene's and Enos' command on that date, he naturally expressed surprise that Enos' command "are *all* gone back." From the marked absence of all complaint or censure, especially after he had become acquainted with the reasons for the return of so many, the conclusion is inevitable that he recognized the necessity for Enos' course, and accepted the opinion of the court-martial as final.

It was so accepted also by the early historians of the Revolutionary war. President William Allen, whose "Account of the Expedition of Arnold" published in the Maine Historical Society Collections, Vol. I., prepared his paper during the life of and in correspondence with General Dearborn, one of the captains immediately under Arnold. He fully accepts the finding of the court as a justification of Enos. So does Marshall in his "Life of Washington," in both the first and last editions. Also Colonel Carrington, U. S. A., in his "Battles of the Revolution"; Drake in his "Biographical Dictionary," and many other impartial writers. The venerable Governor Hiland Hall, one of the historians of Vermont, writes me September, 1879: "I have always believed that Enos' return from Arnold's expedition against Quebec was fully justified by the circumstances in which he was placed, and that the verdict of the court-martial of distinguished officers which investigated his conduct at the time, and which unanimously acquitted him '*with honour,*' ought to be received by posterity as his complete and perfect vindication. Recent examination of original authorities has served to confirm my previous opinion and to make it very clear to me that the censures of modern writers must have been made without sufficient and proper consideration, and that they are entirely unjustifiable."

The letters of Arnold quoted in this paper, with the action of the court-martial and the testimony of the Continental officers,

are all preserved in the State Department at Washington, and are published in Force's "Archives" and the Maine Historical Society Collections. They show most conclusively that the entire charge against Enos was fully adjudicated at the time—adjudicated by his peers; by a court of inquiry of seven officers of high rank; a court-martial of fourteen officers of the Continental line, among them some of the ablest and brightest military men of the Revolution; with all the evidence before them; Enos' own acknowledgment of his return and his reasons therefor; the evidence of five officers of his command testifying on oath, not themselves on trial or to be affected by the issue of the trial; officers known personally to members of the court, and whose veracity is vouched for by the president of the court, and, therefore, cannot be impeached simply to make up a case against Enos. The decision of the court-martial, Washington, who had the power to reject, approved in general orders, intensifying the language of the decision thus: "The court, after mature consideration of the evidence, are unanimously of the opinion that the prisoner was, by *absolute* necessity, obliged to return with his division," etc., etc. The President of the Court, and twenty-five officers of the army, including three of the Court of Inquiry, and Colonel Joseph Reed, the Adjutant-General of the Army, on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, after subsequent and careful inquiry of those who went forward with Greene to join Arnold, in the most positive language reconfirmed the action of the court. Compare those eminent men, sitting in court-martial, "the court being duly sworn," and the five witnesses testifying on oath and the honorable acquittal on oath, with the modern historian sitting in his study, one hundred years after the events of which he writes, repeating old calumnies from second-hand authorities, charging "*desertion*" and "*cowardice*," where he cannot prove either, and say if this last be history? The Honorable Isaac N. Arnold, shortly after publishing his life of Benedict Arnold, addressed to me this letter: "* * * I have not yet found time to give the case of Col. Enos an exhaustive investigation,

but in my late readings & reflections I have not forgotten your suggestions, & I am inclined to think my language in regard to him in my 'Life of Arnold' needs some modification. I do not think Col. Enos meant to '*desert*' the Canada Expedition in the odious sense of that term. I know of no evidence that he acted from '*cowardice*,' and do not think he could be just called '*a craven*.' I shall in my next edition, p. 69, say '*the return of Enos*,' instead of '*the desertion of Enos*.' It was probably an error of judgment; an error which a man like *Morgan* would not have committed, but which a very prudent, cautious man might make without any but good motives."

Against such an estimate of Enos' conduct there is no need to protest, since it accepts the judgment of the court-martial as final, and casting no reflections on either the honor or courage of Enos. The purpose of this paper is simply to show the reading public that Enos was neither a "deserter" nor a "coward," and to enable future writers to accord to him simple justice, no more.

HORACE EDWIN HAYDEN

