



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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE
POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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Volume I

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NOVEMBER 1910 TO AUGUST 1911

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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

b.

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NOTE

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IT is a common complaint, both in Great Britain and in the Dominions, that it is well-nigh impossible to understand how things are going with the British Empire. People feel that they belong to an organism which is greater than the particular portion of the King's dominions where they happen to reside, which is one of the greatest of human fabrics, but which has no government, no Parliament, no press even, to explain to them where its interests lie, or what its policy should be.

Of speeches and writings about the Empire there is no end. But who has time to select what is worth reading from the multitude of newspapers and reviews? Most people have no access to the best among them, and such as have are haunted by the fear that what they read is coloured by some local party issue in which they have no concern. No one can travel through the Empire without being profoundly impressed by the ignorance which prevails in every part, not only about the affairs of the other parts, but about the fortunes of the whole. This ignorance naturally leads to misgivings, and people are frequently involved in disputes and controversies about the Empire which in most cases would immediately be solved if the facts were known. The truth, of course, is that all who have grown up under the Union Jack are in their hearts devoted to it, for it stands to them for a great tradition in the past, a great inspiration in the present—as the writer in India shows—and a still greater promise in the future. There is no British subject who has not subscribed in some way to the cost of keeping it flying in the heavens, and who does not cherish the memory of some friend or some hero of his own who has died for it. But many associate imperialism with the project of jingoes and capitalists, and object to it, just because they admire the ideals of liberty, and justice, and personal responsibility upon which the Empire rests, and which such projects would destroy. Nothing is further

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from their minds than that the Empire itself should be allowed gently to dissolve so long as it is true to its traditions. For not they alone, but the world, would be poorer from its decay.

In order to dispel the ignorance on which misgivings rest, we need information of two kinds. On the one hand we ought to know the truth of what is going on in the several portions of the Empire. On the other hand we ought to be able to find out how the Empire is faring as a whole. But how is the truth to be found? No one who has other business on hand can follow affairs on the Indian frontier, the reciprocity negotiations between Canada and America, the proposals whereby the British Constitution is to be mended or destroyed in a federal reconstruction, the Asiatic menace in Australia, the complications which might follow in Africa from a revolution in Portugal, and steer his way to a clear judgement about each separately, or of the upshot of them all. That would be a task to be entrusted to a council of the wisest men to be found. But we are practical people who dislike creating governments to rule over us unless we are quite certain that we shall be the better for them, and we have got on very well hitherto with an arrangement by which the Imperial Government has no authority over the larger part of the Empire which it may be called upon to defend.

Failing, therefore, a body which can speak for every part, we must contrive a makeshift, and the makeshift is THE ROUND TABLE. The aim of THE ROUND TABLE is to present a regular account of what is going on throughout the King's dominions, written with first-hand knowledge and entirely free from the bias of local political issues, and to provide a means by which the common problems which confront the Empire as a whole, can be discussed also with knowledge and without bias. For that, in the opinion of the promoters, who reside in all parts of the Empire, is what is most needed at the present day.

In order that THE ROUND TABLE may achieve its first aim

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and may truly represent the opinion of all parts it has been arranged that each part of the Empire should provide its own correspondent, whose business it will be to present the views of that part frankly, with local knowledge, and local ignorance perhaps, about its own concerns and the interests which it shares with the rest. The greater part of the Review will thus consist of articles actually written in the different Dominions and Dependencies. There will be no censorship of opinion. But it is an essential condition laid upon every writer that he should neither misrepresent facts nor persons nor subserve the interest of any party in the locality where he resides. Personal bias cannot be entirely excluded. But the reader will at least know that what he reads is straightforward opinion, and not a careful paraphrase of the facts put forth by a cunning partisan.

If this part of the programme is fulfilled, THE ROUND TABLE will present as true a reflection of the present state of affairs as it is reasonable to expect. It will reveal the wide divergence of opinion on common concerns. It will give readers the structural ideas in current controversies, and explain the broad movement of events. It will help them to understand the meagre cablegrams which flash fitfully across the wires, and to correct the glaring errors in fact and quotation which every citizen abroad notes in the news from his own home.

But this is not enough. The founders of THE ROUND TABLE have an uneasy sense that times are changing, and that the methods of yesterday will not serve in the competition of to-morrow. They feel that if the various communities of the Empire have common interests they are singularly badly equipped to pursue them. If there is a conflict between the political systems of the British Empire and of Germany, as the writer on foreign affairs thinks, and if, as Captain Mahan says, "the balance of forces influences continually and decisively the solutions of diplomacy," it is an anomaly that there should be no means of marshalling the whole strength and resources of the Empire effectively be-

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hind its will, when its mind is made up. If its weight in the counsels of the world depends in the long run on man power and the type of human being that becomes a British subject, it is strange that its people should be left to drift to foreign lands, and that there should be no joint authority to assist the migration of British citizens from one portion of the Empire, where they are superfluous, to another where they are urgently required. If there is a common problem such as Asiatic immigration, there should be some other means than the circulation of formal official despatches, or a meeting of Premiers only once in four years, whereby it can be publicly discussed, and a decision quickly reached.

Special articles, therefore, will be obtained from all parts on such matters and distributed to subscribers, either with the quarterly issue of THE ROUND TABLE or, if the topic is engrossing public attention, at intermediate times. In this case, also, the vital principle will be strictly observed that no article will appear which is written in the interest of any local political conflict.

THE ROUND TABLE will thus be concerned solely with Imperial affairs. Nothing else, indeed, would justify its production, for there is already a plethora of admirable journals which at times discuss the problems of the Empire. But these journals have a common quality, which diminishes their value for our purpose. They are all written for a particular public and from the point of view of a particular locality. As is but natural the Editors have to consider the wishes of their readers, who are more anxious to learn about budgets which lighten their breakfast tables, or land laws which reach into their purses, than to follow misty proceedings at a distance, which may affect their careers not to-day or to-morrow, but in the far future. The ordinary journal, therefore, cannot help representing local prepossessions and being influenced by the local atmosphere, and if it is to sell at all it must concern itself with much besides the Empire.

It is a main object of THE ROUND TABLE to escape this

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quality, for its value would disappear if it could be accused of local bias. It will do so, it is true, at the expense of being, perhaps, somewhat unsaleable. But this prospect does not dismay the promoters, who do not seek a large circulation or publicity but hope to create a review which will be of interest to all parts and will gradually accumulate the material on which a sound judgement of the Imperial problem can be based.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to bring the whole scheme of THE ROUND TABLE into operation at once. This first number contains no articles from Australia and New Zealand or Egypt, and in other ways is incomplete. It may take some time before it is in full working order, and, indeed, that can only be when the discussion provoked by views expressed in THE ROUND TABLE has begun to appear in its columns. But, by making a start at once, some useful information may be distributed to those interested in Imperial affairs, and suggestions elicited as to how the scope of the Review could be enlarged or its methods improved.

THE ROUND TABLE will appear about the middle of each quarter—that is, in November, February, May and August—and supplements may be circulated at intervals. It will not contain many articles, for no man ever reads the whole of a magazine of 200 pages. It will be obtainable in all parts of the Empire, as may be seen from the note after the Table of Contents. But no effort will be made to obtain a circulation by the ordinary methods of advertisement or exhibition on the shelves of booksellers' shops, for it will be of little interest to any but such as think seriously upon Imperial problems, and they will bring it to the notice of their friends.

Much that relates to the several portions of the Empire may appear obvious and commonplace to dwellers in these parts. But they should remember that such articles are produced not for those who know the facts, but for people at a distance who are ignorant of them. THE ROUND TABLE does

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not aim at propounding new theories or giving voice to ingenious speculations. It will serve its purpose if it contributes to the better understanding of the problems of the Empire and to their solution, and if no one ever raises the charge against it that it has distorted the truth for its own ends.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY

I

THE central fact in the international situation to-day is the antagonism between England and Germany. It is the universal element which every foreign minister has to take into account in appraising his country's fortunes, and it is the topic which dominates all others in the columns of the world's press which are devoted to the discussion of foreign affairs. Much that is absurd, it is true, has been said in England about Germany's reputed plan, prepared in every detail, for a sudden and unprovoked attack on the heart of the Empire, on a date which is almost due. There is, too, ground for suspecting that minor candidates in the heat of an election conflict have employed this tale for party advantage. Even wilder stories have been circulated in Germany about England's supposed design of destroying Germany's fleet before it is full grown and then marching an army on Berlin! That tale, also, has been exploited for party purpose in the Fatherland. But underlying these exaggerations there is a solid substratum of truth. It is an old and a true saying that there is no smoke without fire. Anglo-German rivalry does not exist solely in the minds of panic-mongers and Chauvinists, nor can it be dispelled by the amicable disclaimers of pacifists and "cordiality leagues." It is an all-pervading reality.

If this be so, the solution of this rivalry between the great military power of Europe, and the great sea-power of the world is the most difficult problem which the Empire has to face. Let us, therefore, discover where the truth lies, and whether there is any real basis for the antagonism which thus overshadows the world.

Foreign policy is seldom the creation of the foreign minister of the day. A minister may manœuvre freely within certain limits. At times of crisis he may force or evade a war,

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but in the long run foreign policy derives its force and character from the individuality of a people. King Edward VII commanded the universal confidence of the Empire because his attitude towards foreign powers reflected precisely the temper and ideals of the people over whom he reigned. The Emperor William, despite his indiscretions, is the idol of Germany, because he represents exactly the genius and beliefs of the great mass of the German people. To grasp the foreign situation, therefore, it is more important to understand the forces which have moulded the nations than to unravel even the most intricate of the diplomatic intrigues of the day.

Modern civilization is a compound of ideas contributed by a number of peoples. To the Jews it owes the idealism of its religious beliefs, to the Greeks the conception of liberty, to the Romans the sanctity of law, to the Teutonic peoples its respect for personal rights.

It is within the British Empire that the spirit of individualism has grown to its full maturity. For of all the Teutonic peoples the Anglo-Saxons alone have been free from the cramping necessity of subordinating their development to the exigencies of war. Scarcely ever have they heard the drums of war in their homes, for nature has provided in the Channel a better defence than walls of steel.

The unconscious working of this intense spirit of individualism runs through the whole history of the Empire. It is the keynote of the long struggle of the people first with the feudal barons and later with the crown, and when, after two revolutions, the victory was won, the constitution which enshrined the liberties of the British people was transplanted to America, Africa and Australia. Once an attempt was made to force some reluctant colonists in America to contribute to the common defence, and the issue has moved England to protect her dominions ever since at her own expense. Moreover, in conceding self-government to the young communities overseas, she handed over to them the vast wealth of the lands they dwelt in without reservation,

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and without even attaching to them the burden of debt she had incurred in acquiring them. To this day the tradition has run on, for, to the wonderment of the world, she gave self-government to the Transvaal four short years after the termination of a long and costly war, again without casting upon it any share of the cost or making conditions about its contributing to the common defence. Under no political system but the imperial system could the French Canadian or the Boer retain his language, his customs and his racial individuality. Even in America, where personal freedom has been carried to the point of weakening the rule of law, the new-comer has to submit to a far straiter discipline than the immigrant to any of the British domains. With the backward races it is the same. For the first time in history conquered peoples, incapable of maintaining order among themselves, were governed not mainly in the victors' interests, but in their own. Slavery, though the tradition of all the ages, was obviously inconsistent with personal freedom, and was abolished throughout the Empire a century ago.

Let us look at the other side of the picture. The peoples of the continent were not so fortunate as the Anglo-Saxons. Nature afforded them no better protection from foreign attack than a narrow stream or a mountain pass. Europe has been torn by the ambitions of kings and the brutal savageries of war. The struggle for personal rights has been impeded by the constant necessity of submitting to a rigid and uniform discipline. Personal freedom has had to be sacrificed to national liberty. The continental spirit, therefore, is very different from the British spirit. It is the spirit which accepts authority readily, and subordinates the individual to the will of the community. It is a spirit which produces an intense corporate life and a splendid eagerness in the individual to sacrifice his personal desires for his country. But it is also the spirit which is prone to follow the allurements of ambition, and to exalt the claims of a nation above the rights of mankind.

The continental spirit finds its most characteristic em-

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bodiment in modern Germany. The Germans give free play to individualism in many respects. They are not false to the dominant characteristic of the Teutonic peoples. But their history has taught them the bitter lesson that the citizen can only be free when the state to which he belongs is strong enough to guarantee his freedom. Individualism, paramount in other matters, stops at the entry to the political field. They have never known the political liberty of the British subject or the American citizen. To their minds it conflicts with national interests. Just in so far as the interests of the individual are allowed to prevail the effective power of the state is diminished. The political organization of the British Empire is designed to promote the development of the individual, the political organization of Germany to promote the efficiency of the state. It is only by realizing that to the German the interests of the Fatherland far transcend all other claims that one can understand the German character, and so the German policy.

This central idea of national efficiency—the parallel in Germany of the idea of personal liberty in the British Empire—is the key to their internal policy. It explains how an intelligent and advanced people can tolerate the inquisitorial tyranny of the police, the unmeasured powers of the bureaucracy, the sacrifice involved in a conscriptive system which all the nations of Europe would abandon if Germany would give the sign. It explains, too, the contrast between the British treatment of the French Canadian and the German systematic persecution of the unfortunate Pole. It explains the contrast between the harsh German policy in south-west Africa and the British assumption of the trusteeship for subject peoples. It is not the lust for cruelty. It is simply an overwhelming sense that the welfare of the state must at all costs be made to prevail over the welfare of the individual. Perhaps nowhere has the central idea of modern Germany been better expressed than in the speech of the German Emperor delivered at Königsberg but a few days ago (August 27, 1910).

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“They (German women) must impress upon their children’s children that to-day the principal thing is not to live one’s life at the expense of others, not to attain one’s end at the cost of the Fatherland, but *solely and alone to keep the Fatherland before one’s eyes, solely and alone to stake all the powers of mind and body upon the good of the Fatherland.*”

There is no idea of the rights of man, or of the claims of humanity in these lines, nor of the horrors and wickedness of war in the counsel he gave to German men. “We men,” he said, “must cultivate all the military virtues.”

How different is the point of view of Germany from that of the British Empire! Could any leading statesman make such a speech to any audience under the Union Jack and evoke tremendous applause? Did King Edward VII, the trusted idol of the Empire, ever give expression to such ideas? He was the peace-maker. The Kaiser is the war-lord. Both represent the essential temper of their peoples.

It is not the purpose of this paper to estimate the relative value of these two systems. Each has its part to play in the world. But it is clear that there is an antagonism between them. To the German there is something soft and unvirile in the British system. To the Anglo-Saxon there is something reactionary and illiberal in the German system. The point is not which is right, for probably there is truth on both sides, but that each is convinced that his own system is the best. It is just as useless to suggest to the German that he should abandon his centralized system of state efficiency as it would be to suggest to the British subject that he should forego his liberties and adopt the inquisitorial and bureaucratic methods of the continent. Time may insensibly assimilate the two. But it is unreasonable to suppose that argument and explanation are going rapidly to change the character of either people.

This analysis of the political philosophy of the British and the German empires has been required because, as already explained, the foreign policy of a people reflects its national

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temperament. Let us see if the foreign policy of the two peoples bears out what has been said about the conflict between their political ideals.

Just as the governing idea of the British people has been to conduct their own internal government so as to admit of the maximum of freedom to the individual consistent with the national welfare, so the governing idea of British foreign policy has been to protect at all costs this unique political system from destruction from without. Shallow observers abroad have frequently described British foreign policy as one of calculated aggression. Nothing could be further from the truth. They are led astray by the size of the British Empire. But, as the briefest study of history will show, the greatest empire in the world has, by the irony of fate, been built up almost in the teeth of its government. It has been acquired in two ways: partly in the desperate wars against the dominance of Spain and later of France under Louis XIV and Napoleon, and partly as the outcome of establishing law and order in uncivilized countries where enterprising British citizens had established themselves as traders or missionaries, and were in danger of losing life and property if anarchy were not immediately and permanently repressed.

An aggressive and expansive policy is contrary to the whole spirit of England. We have seen how within the boundaries of the Empire she gives a liberty to racial characteristics, which is incomprehensible to continental peoples, so in foreign affairs she jealously respects the rights and privileges even of the weakest powers. Throughout the whole nineteenth century her unchallengeable navy, far from being used to browbeat weaker nations and force them to England's will, has patrolled the seas, destroying piracy and the slave trade and guarding the commerce of all the world.

Many a time has the policy of aggrandizement been pressed on England. But she has always refused—not so much, perhaps, because she disliked to use her power to the

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advantage of her people, but because she believed that they would prosper better from their own activities than from state diplomacy and war. It is absurd, of course, to claim that British policy has been wonderfully altruistic or high-minded. It is, and always has been, based on an enlightened self-interest. The inhabitant of the British Empire sincerely believes that a system which accords the greatest liberty to the individual is the best for him and the best for everybody else. In freeing slaves, in protecting the subject peoples, in removing restrictions on trade so that the foreigner has the same trading privileges as himself, above all in seeking for peaceful relations with his neighbour, he is merely giving effect to this profound conviction. So it is that the jingoes of all times have lamented that the face of the British Government has been set against the expansion of its domains. Peace has always been the chiefest interest of the Empire, because it is in peace alone that its citizens can pursue their lives undisturbed.

The foreign policy of Germany is better described as the foreign policy of Prussia. Before the Franco-Prussian war Germany was little more than a geographical expression, signifying a number of Teutonic peoples united by a bond even more slender than that which links the British Empire to-day. It was Bismarck—the incarnation of the Prussian spirit, the successor of Frederick the Great—who created the German Empire, and, as we shall see, it is Bismarck's policy which is still the foreign policy of Germany.

The central idea in Bismarck's policy was derived from Napoleon. Napoleon's theory was that weak powers always tend to gravitate towards, and finally to coalesce with, a strong power. He believed that if he could only create a sufficiently dynamic nucleus, the weaker nationalities, unable to withstand its influence, would ultimately become absorbed, until finally all Europe would be united under the hegemony of France. He recognized, however, that real strength consists not only in latent force but in the will to use it. He knew that weaker powers would continue to

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resist him until they saw that if they did not give way he would deliver an attack which they would be powerless to repel. His earlier campaigns therefore were entered upon largely with the idea of convincing the world that he had power and would hurl it mercilessly at anyone who was bold enough to stand across his path. Afterwards, as he foresaw, he was able to gain his way by the mere threat of war.

Napoleon failed for two reasons. In the first place he was in too great a hurry. Napoleonic France absorbed all Europe to the Russian border, and before it had settled down to the new situation, he began to strain its loyalty by drawing upon it for men and money for his wars with England and Russia. Rather than see its vitality drained for Napoleon's sake Central Europe seized the first opportunity that promised success to rise and destroy the nucleus on which his strength was based. In the second place Napoleon could not apply his theory to England, because he never had a fleet which could defeat the British Navy. Europe acquiesced in his rule because it knew that Napoleon could enforce his will with the matchless armies of France. England was able to fight war after war by sea and land because so long as she kept command of the sea he was powerless to inflict upon her the penalty of resisting her will. Napoleon understood the position clearly. "Let us," he said, "be masters of the Channel six hours, and we are masters of the world." Fortunately for the world England understood it too.

Bismarck saw the possibilities of the Napoleonic idea and deliberately revived it for the benefit of modern Germany. Like all true Germans, like the German Emperor to-day, Bismarck was ambitious "solely and alone" for the good of the Fatherland. Beyond the orbit of national existence Bismarck recognized neither right nor justice. International law was a figment invented by weaker nations to protect themselves, and was to be respected or ignored as expediency required. As he himself expressed it—the destinies of Germany were to be worked out not by speeches or resolutions, but by blood and iron.

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Bismarck's interpretation of the Napoleonic idea was wonderfully successful. With the aid of Moltke he welded Prussia into a nucleus of such military strength that it had little to fear from an armed contest with its neighbours. Immediately the magnetic attraction came into play and the weaker among them began to drift towards Prussia. But the process was too slow. Bismarck had to prove that Prussia had the strength to will war, as well as to wage it if attacked. So in 1864 he attacked Denmark and annexed Schleswig-Holstein, with its port of Kiel. In 1866 he attacked and defeated Austria, and added Hanover, Hesse and Nassau to the Prussian Empire. In 1870 he precipitated war with France by altering the famous Ems telegram, defeated the French and annexed Alsace and Lorraine. Then he had to consolidate his new acquisitions. The overwhelming magnetism of the Prussian nucleus did its work, and the German Empire was born under the hegemony of Prussia.

Bismarck was wiser than Napoleon or had learnt the lesson of Napoleon's defeat. He did not strain the new creation. He gave the patriotism evoked by a war against a non-Teutonic people time to permeate the mass and fuse it into a national whole. Originally a number of petty states frankly hostile to Prussia and to one another, Germany has now become a solid and united people. She has the largest and most powerful army in the world. She is always ready for war. Her people are schooled to so strict a discipline and so intense a national patriotism that the favourite method of overcoming internal dissensions is to raise the cry, "The Fatherland in peril!" Bismarck's work is complete. The German Empire is in a position to play in Europe and the world to-day the part that Prussia played in Germany forty years ago. The present German foreign policy is the policy of Bismarck brought up to date. It is less ruthless, perhaps, less arrogantly selfish, but at bottom it is still the same.

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II

WE have now examined the national characteristics of the inhabitants of the British and the German Empires and the underlying principles of the foreign policy which is the outward expression of those characteristics. Let us now test the correctness of this analysis by discovering whether it can explain recent changes in the international situation. It will be convenient to follow German policy first of all in Europe and then in the outer world—the field of “*Weltpolitik*.”

Once establish the reputation that you are willing and able to fight, and the threat of war is as good as war itself. The foreign policy of Germany, based on this theory—known to diplomats as “rattling the sabre,” or, “the pressure of the iron hand within the velvet glove”—has met with considerable success.

In 1905 the foreign policy of France under M. Delcassé began to interfere with Germany's plans. Germany demanded as a proof that the policy would change that M. Delcassé should be dismissed from office. She made it clear that if France would not comply she would find an opportunity for achieving her will by force. France was not ready for war, and M. Delcassé resigned. A year later Germany attempted the same policy at the conference over the Moroccan difficulty. But this time England and Russia supported France, and after some bluster about war Germany, unwilling to face the combination, withdrew her demands. In 1908, when Russia, the protector of the Slavs, objected to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, and was inclined to support Serbia in her demands for compensation, Germany, to quote the Kaiser once more, took her “stand in shining armour at a grave moment, by the side of your (the Austrians') most gracious sovereign.” In plain language, she threatened Russia with war unless she gave way. Russia, like France in 1905, was not prepared to fight—Germany was: so Russia gave way. As Bismarck realized, diplomacy is never a match for the sword.

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This policy, profitable as it is, is also very dangerous, for it may lead at any time to war. Unless Germany is strong enough to make resistance hopeless when she presents her demands, she will gain her way only at the price of war. She realizes this well enough, as her prodigious strength and efficiency shows. As the Kaiser has said, "on our armaments alone does our peace rest." If it were not for them her rivals would fight rather than submit to her demands.

The natural result of this masterful policy, so clearly foreseen by Bismarck and Napoleon, is already in evidence. Weak powers, rather than incur the enmity of so ruthless a neighbour, hasten to make friends, and the sphere within which the will of Germany is supreme is steadily widening. Originally Austria and Germany were bitter foes. Now they are inseparable allies. It is hopeless for Austria to attempt to resist Germany. It is, therefore, better to be friends. Besides, there are many advantages to be gained from an intimate, if dependent, relation. If Austria will stand behind the German Weltpolitik, Germany will support her in extending her dominion (and with it the magnetism of the Teutonic nucleus) in the near east, which Russia might otherwise obstruct. With a friendly Germany, too, Austria can adopt a firmer policy with the Slav elements in her population. In 1870 Germany was the nucleus of force on which the Bismarckian policy rested. In 1910 Austro-Germany is rapidly becoming the nucleus. In the language used during the recent interchange of royal courtesies at Vienna, "Our alliance has, to the weal of the world, passed into, and like an imponderable element, pervaded the convictions and life of both peoples." There are many mutterings of discontent in Austria among Hungarian and Slav, but what are they to do? How can they face the German sword?

So with Italy. She hates Austria, her hereditary foe, with a deadly hatred. Perhaps if she saw a good chance of success she would desert the Triple Alliance, which ties her hand and foot, and join an anti-Austrian combination. But what is the chance of success? It is better to be friendly and to

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reap the benefits of alliance with the powers which dominate central Europe. So Italy's weight is thrown into the balance on the German side, and she will continue to add weight to the diplomacy of Germany, as Europe stood behind Napoleon, until it is clear that she has more to gain by deserting her. Not for nothing did the Austrian emperor, after conferences between the Italian, the Austrian and German ministers, declare in the speech from the throne on October 13 of this year, that "our alliances with the German Empire and with the kingdom of Italy have become, if that be possible, still firmer and more intimate."

The ultimate aim of the more advanced of Bismarck's disciples is to add to the circle of powers dependent on Germany, Denmark, the control of which will enable her finally to prevent Russia gaining access to the North Sea; and so exclude her from western European politics; Belgium and Holland, because they are the natural outlets for the immense traffic of the industrial valley of the Rhine, and, in the words of Napoleon, are a pistol pointed at the heart of England; Switzerland, because it is a wedge driven in between Italy, her unwilling partner, and France, her bitterest foe. The gradual suction of these states within the orbit of her paramount influence would go far to make Germany the dictator of Europe. Russia would be cut off from the west. Italy would be even more straitly bound to her chariot. The natural protection which England enjoys from the sea would be greatly lessened, while Germany's naval and strategic position would be immensely improved. The grouping of the powers at the last Hague Peace Conference suggested strongly that the pressure of Germany in some of these quarters is beginning to tell.

But the magnetic attraction of the tremendous power in central Europe is beginning to extend even further afield. During the past few days the world has been watching Turkey drifting into the circle of the Triple Alliance. The young Turks after the revolution were frankly hostile to Germany, which had been a pillar of the autocratic Hami-

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dian regime. It was not very long before they were plunged in difficulties, both internal and external. Alone they were powerless to withstand outside pressure. So they began to look around for allies. Germany was willing to support the young Turks, provided they accommodated their foreign policy to German ideas. The other powers of Europe were also ready to give their support on similar terms. But Germany was ready to act. The other Powers would only pull the strings of diplomacy. The "attraction" to lean on the strongest power was too great, and Turkey, hostile two years ago, is fast identifying itself with the circle of powers which range themselves under the hegemony of Germany, and, in return for her benevolent countenance to their own minor ambitions, lend their weight to that which Germany can marshal behind her iron diplomacy. It is obvious that the small states in the Balkans—Servia, Rumania, Montenegro, Bulgaria—cannot by themselves withstand the combined pressure of Turkey and Germany. Unless they can lean on some other combination, they, too, must ultimately be attracted to the great magnet of Germany. Germany is absolutely supreme in central Europe, because no great power will risk war to thwart her will.

We may turn now to Germany's attitude in world politics. Bismarck, the student of the past, had limited his ideas to the Continent of Europe, and his policy had been based upon the use of an army of irresistible power. He had steadfastly rejected every scheme for colonial expansion, for such projects would have weakened the striking power of Germany in Europe at a time when she had to nurse her strength. But when Bismarck's successors were ready to resume his policy once more, they found that they could not confine themselves to Europe. During the thirty years which followed the Franco-Prussian war the world had strangely shrunk. Railway, steamship and telegraph now encircled the globe. Transport and communication were safe and rapid everywhere. The merchant and manufacturer, who in 1870 had thought only of German trade, now talked glibly

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of his transactions in the markets of the world. The whole earth was more accessible to Kaiser Wilhelm than was all Europe to Napoleon.

Germany first learnt that the centre of international gravity was shifting beyond her reach, when, from the partition of Africa and the tropical east, she gained but two small and useless colonies. But it was her impotence to seize the opportunity for national expansion afforded by the entanglement of England in the Boer war which impressed upon her the final lesson of Napoleon's career, that without sea-power her influence could not extend beyond the narrow confines of Europe. The Kaiser, with characteristic flair, expressed his countrymen's instant resolve: "Our future," he said, "lies upon the waters." There was no delay. In 1900 the Reichstag passed a navy bill which declared bluntly in its preamble that Germany needed a navy of "such strength that a war, even against the mightiest naval power, would involve risks threatening the supremacy of that power." This was a big step for a purely European power. But in 1906 the programme was enlarged, and in 1908 a yet further increase was authorized, so that to-day the navy act provides for the creation of a fleet of thirty-eight Dreadnought battleships and twenty Dreadnought cruisers, to say nothing about thirty-eight other cruisers, 144 destroyers and a number of submarines and other minor vessels. This projected fleet, in the words of Sir Edward Grey, is "greater than any now in existence." Within a few years Germany, possessed of an irresistible army and this prodigiously powerful navy, will be in a position to practise the same policy in the world that she has already practised with such success in Europe. Is there any example in history of a national resolve to remedy a past omission more rapidly formed and more steadfastly pursued?

The time for applying Bismarck's maxims to an active world policy is not yet come. Germany's full fleet of Dreadnoughts will not be ready till 1918. But the other powers of the world, reading the lessons of the past, are little inclined

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to believe that Germany is building this immense navy, with the tremendous financial sacrifice involved, without a very definite intention to use it for her own advancement. It is an old adage that coming events cast their shadows before. Let us see now how the manifestation of Germany's naval ambitions has affected the grouping of the powers.

In 1901 England, save for the Japanese understanding,* entered into practically with sole reference to her special difficulties with subject peoples in India and the Far East, was isolated in the world. She had not concerned herself much about the earlier proceedings of Germany. Her foreign policy was aimed at protecting the Empire in the enjoyment of its free system of government, and, so long as it was not endangered, at avoiding entanglements which might lead to war. But the German Navy Bills awoke her rudely to the revival, a century later, of the Napoleonic peril. England's answer to Napoleon's theory of the hegemony of one central power had been the balance of power—the creation of another nucleus the equal in strength to the Napoleonic nucleus, on which oppressed nations could rally. She saw that if Napoleon became the absolute master of Europe, he would command such resources that in the end he must beat down her resistance. The liberties of Britain were bound up with the liberties of Europe.

The same cause has produced the same effect a century later. In 1900 France still nursed her traditional hatred of England, Russia still cherished the ambition of wresting India from the British, the United States still harboured the unfriendly sentiments of 1775 and 1812. To-day all is changed. The Russo-Japanese war strengthened the position of Germany immensely. It disclosed the weakness of Russia and the impotence of the Franco-Russian alliance to withstand German attack, as the dismissal of Delcassé actually proved. It showed that unless the balance was restored Germany was bound to become the dictator of Europe as Napoleon once had been. In a surprisingly short time the Anglo-French hostility had vanished, the peren-

* The Alliance was signed in 1902.

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nial rivalry between England and Russia was removed by an Anglo-Russian agreement about the Indian frontier and Persia, so that three powers yesterday bitterly hostile are to-day linked in the Triple Entente—a balance to the Triple Alliance. England has also been busily settling her long-outstanding quarrels with America, and there is now a growing cordiality between the two peoples, as is witnessed by the mutual congratulations which followed the settlement by arbitration, a few weeks ago, of the century-old Newfoundland fisheries dispute. Another recent international event of first-class importance, the agreement of July last between Russia and Japan to forget their quarrels and to co-operate in the development of Manchuria, though not caused by the rise of Germany, has been greatly facilitated by the anxiety of Russia to have a free hand in protecting her European interests.

III

SO much for the international situation as it stands to-day. We will turn to the future. Is there any real reason to fear that England or the Empire would suffer from the triumph of Germany in Europe? Why not allow Germany to pursue her ambitions undisturbed, resisting only when attacked? Is not the whole story the terror of a dream? We can determine this point only by finding the answers to two questions. What are Germany's real ambitions and interests? What would be the position of the Empire if Germany were to become relatively much stronger than she is to-day?

Fifty years ago British liberal ideas were the model held up before every German. The wonderful success of British political institutions captivated the German mind, and a generation arose which advocated their adoption in the Fatherland. But Bismarck saw that the English theory of personal liberty was utterly subversive of his own political ideas, and even dangerous to the independence of a European nation. He set to work, therefore, deliberately

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to root it out. As he frequently said, the English system was contemptible and abhorrent to him. He put before his people in its place the Napoleonic theory of the creative force of nationality inspiring a vigorous foreign policy. Though British ideas had only just struck their roots, it took Bismarck three wars and much labour to achieve his end, but as a recent writer has expressed it, "from the moment of the breach with free trade in 1879 . . . the alienation of the German mind from all English sympathies was complete." There is now a "violent psychological antagonism between Prussian and insular ideals." We have seen how the Bismarckian ideal has dominated the foreign policy of Germany as conducted by the bureaucracy he created. It has also permeated the whole nation, so that today it is the unalterable conviction, deep in the hearts of the people, that it is their destiny to become the first power of the world. As one of their own writers, Colonel von Bernhardi, has expressed it,

"We must understand that the historic mission of Prussia has not yet closed, inasmuch as that mission involves the formation of a nucleus round which all the scattered elements of the German race may group themselves, the extension of its sphere of influence so as to coincide with its political boundaries, and the getting and securing for Germanism of the place to which it is entitled in the world."

There is scarcely an issue of any German political newspaper which does not refer to the high hopes and destinies which lie before Germany, if she is true to herself and to the traditions of her past. The youthful belief in their national future is only paralleled by the confidence of the young communities of western America and Canada in their own material development.

This burning faith in themselves and the ideals of Germanism explains the aggressive foreign policy of Germany, and the anxiety with which she views the growth of other nations. It explains, too, why their triumph in Europe

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cannot satisfy them, and why they believe in a policy involving world dominion to be essential to their future.

Germany to-day has a population of nearly 70 millions. It is increasing at the rate of almost a million a year. There is no emigration to speak of. In fact, on balance, Germany gains more from immigration in the east than she loses from emigration to the west. Yet her territory is small as land empires go, and there is no unoccupied soil she can add to her domain in Europe. Thirty years ago she was losing population at the rate of 200,000 a year. She is in terror lest these days should return, which, indeed, is sooner or later inevitable. And when they do, Germany has no colonies to speak of to which she can direct the flow of her surplus population. Practically all the empty spaces of the earth which are still available for white habitation are in the hands of a civilized power. Is she to lose the vital human material on which her strength is based to some rival nation? The thought is galling to an ambitious people. For the moment Germany is content, for she can absorb her surplus. But when emigration begins once more the old cry for colonies is certain to revive. In the words of a well-informed writer in *The Quarterly Review* a year or so ago,

“They must have colonies, as they believe, or sink in the end to the second rank among nations. Of accepting the latter alternative, they do not think for a moment. They believe that territories must belong to those who can fill them.”

How would this last doctrine square with the quixotic behaviour of England in handing over to a few thousands of colonists vast territories which had cost her many lives and much gold to win, without even the condition that they should allow free entry to her own surplus population?

So we see that the aims and interests of Germany alike point to a policy of expansion. Time is on the side of her rivals, Russia, America and the British Empire, who are rich in vacant land, and unless she can grow in wealth and popula-

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tion as they grow, she is bound in the long run to fall back in the race for world supremacy which it is her fixed determination to win. Of all things she fears the effective union of the British Empire for defence. In the long run it is mathematically just as certain that she will defeat England alone in a contest of wealth and numbers, as it is that she will be beaten by the combined peoples of the Empire. That is why she thus feverishly augments her armaments, and plans to master Europe, for it is only by making herself invulnerable at home that she can hope to use her strength effectively on expansion abroad. The motive is clear enough. In the words of General von der Goltz,

“The national energy of Germany has need of space, and the soil of our country has become insufficient. The dream of a Greater Germany has become law for the present generation under the iron hand of necessity.”

This interpretation of her growing armaments seems so simple and reasonable that one is inclined to wonder why the panicmongers have gone to the trouble of making out that the sole object of Germany's immense preparations is the destruction of England and that the cherished longing of every German is to set his foot upon England's neck. But the panicmongers, while they have gone astray about motives, are not far wrong in their estimate of the practical meaning of Germany's policy. Nobody has ever described the inevitable result of the policy to which Germany has committed herself better than the great Treitscke, the national historian of Germany.

“If,” he said, “our empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests and those of England is unavoidable. It was natural and logical that the new great power of central Europe had to settle affairs with all great powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with France, with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult.”

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Unfortunately, Treitscke's doctrine is the belief of the mass of the German people. The essential fact is that an overwhelming majority of Germans regard war with England as inevitable. Germanism, they say, must and will prevail, for it is the most vital and the most self-sacrificing of the forces of the day. England, the colossus with the feet of clay, the plutocrat who can neither fill nor effectively defend the vast lands she owns, lies across her path. The prospect of gaining a new colonial dominion, or of winning the first place in the world, may be remote, but it is hopeless so long as the British bar the way. Once that obstacle is torn away, at least there is a chance, and the blind instinct of expansion makes every German resolve that he will not abandon the struggle till the question of British supremacy has at least been put to the test. They do England the credit of believing that she will not surrender without a struggle, and therefore they believe that war, with all its horrors and suffering to themselves and the world, must come. There is a common toast in military and naval circles in Germany; it is to "the day," the day when the myth of England's greatness will be finally shattered by German arms.

There is something heroic about this. It is not jealous envy or national antipathy to the British which animates the German; it is the resolute faith in the virtue of their own cause, a faith like that which has sent thousands to death on the battlefield, on the scaffold, and on the slaughter-ground of science.

What is England to do? She has no desire to thwart German ambitions so long as they do not involve injury to her own citizens or destruction to the free institutions of the Empire. The idea that she is jealous of German progress is absurd. During the years of her supremacy has she lifted a finger against the United States, which have now a population twice her own and resources immeasurably greater? No, for the ideals of the United States, like her own, are essentially unaggressive and threaten their neighbours no harm. But Germanism, in its want of liberalism, its pride,

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its aggressive nationalism, is dangerous, and she feels instinctively that if it is allowed to become all powerful it will destroy her freedom, and with it the foundation of liberty on which the Empire rests.

In these circumstances there is only one policy for England. She cannot take the risk of trusting to the benevolence of Germany. She must maintain such a counterpoise to the Germanic powers, as will make it impossible for Germany to achieve her ambitions by force. As long as Germany continues to add to the gigantic armaments she can bring to bear in the pursuit of her external ambitions, so long must powers which wish to keep their independence maintain, if necessary in combination, sufficient force to make it fruitless for Germany to think of attacking them. Otherwise their independence will go. They can be certain of their safety only by being certain that they can withstand attack. And in an ample margin of strength lies not only the protection of their liberty but their peace. For it is a cardinal axiom of the Bismarckian policy never to attack unless you are pretty certain of victory.

That is why England is concerned about the balance of power even in Europe. For, as Napoleon said of France, if once Germany becomes the dictator of Europe it will not be long before she will be the dictator of the world. With the inexhaustible resources of all central Europe behind her, cowing continental opposition by the matchless force of the Germanic armies, absolutely unassailable by land, and with a vast sea-power, it would be extraordinarily difficult for the Empire to resist her pressure.

Directly the British Empire is doubtful of its supremacy by sea its full liberty will disappear, even if there has been no war. Germany might use her influence directly. At some opportunity she could demand a new partition of Africa, on the ground that undeveloped "territories must belong to those who can fill them," and that the dog-in-the-manger policy of England and South Africa in throttling her development by keeping locked up lands they could not

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people themselves was in itself a hostile act. Or, at a time when England was occupied in India, she might support Turkey in demands relating to Egypt or the Suez Canal, or shatter one of the powers which sustained the coalition against her.

Or her influence might be indirect. The kaleidoscopic changes in the international situation of the last ten years prove that it is not impossible that Japan—the dynamic power of the east—should come to an understanding with Germany—the dynamic power of the west. Each is possessed by an intense national ambition. Nowhere do their interests conflict. The grave bearing of such an arrangement on America and the British Empire it is impossible to ignore. Perhaps the most insoluble of all problems arising before the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line. Canada, America, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have all refused to permit Asiatic immigration. That is not a situation which a militant people like the Japanese tolerate easily, and it was with difficulty that at the first crisis their national pride could be appeased. Even to-day Canada has found it politic not to prohibit Japanese immigration, and British Columbia is saved from an inrush of Asiatics only because the Japanese Government has voluntarily agreed to prevent its citizens sailing for Canada? Who can say how long the forbearing attitude of Japan may last? At present she is unwilling to act. She has not the strength to enforce her claims. But if Germany chose to support her in the not unreasonable demand that the citizens of a civilized power should no longer be treated as unclean beings, it might be difficult to refuse. And the alternatives would be the free ingress of an unassimilable element into a white society, or war with one of the great military powers of the world befriended by the other, or with both. England has entered into an alliance with Japan involving the obligation of war: why should not Germany? The plain fact is that when Russia recovers her strength it will probably be to the interest of Germany and Japan to

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ally, on the basis that each will guarantee the other a free hand in its own sphere of influence.

Pitt, with his penetrating vision, saw long before his fellows the full meaning for England of Napoleon's ambitions, and had the fibre to insist on the sacrifices by which alone they could be withstood. We are faced by the same situation to-day. Fortunately for the Empire, British statesmen realize the position. Great Britain, far from exhibiting a supine neglect of the vital interests of the Empire, has steadily been making, year by year, heavier sacrifices to protect the system she has built up. The following table shows the growth of expenditure on the Navy during the past thirty years:

		<i>Per head of Population.</i>
1880-1	£10,500,000	5s. 11d.
1885-6	13,000,000	7s. 1d.
1890-1	14,500,000	7s. 7d.
1895-6	19,500,000	9s. 10d.
*1900-1	29,998,529	14s. 5½d.
1905-6	33,200,000	15s. 4d.
1906-7	31,500,000	14s. 3½d.
1907-8	31,250,000	14s. 0d.
1908-9	32,200,000	14s. 4d.
1909-10	35,150,000	15s. 6d.
1910-11	40,600,000	17s. 10d.

* War year.

There is another lesson to be learned from this table. After the present Government came into office, it made advances to Germany and, as the figures for 1906-9 show, gave most convincing proof of its willingness to suspend the insane competition of armaments. But Germany, so far from welcoming the idea, passed the Navy Bill of 1908 adding to the effective strength of her navy. Any proposal for the restriction of armaments must be based on the maintenance of the *status quo*, and that is precisely what Germany is determined to upset. There was only one answer, the

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answer of the tremendous budgets of 1909-10 and 1910-11. Even Mr Lloyd George, once the foremost advocate of disarmament, has abandoned hope and become a stalwart supporter of the Navy.

“ We cannot disarm in the midst of an armed camp,” he said. “ Any remedy must be international, and we are not merely willing but eagerly anxious for an international arrangement by which we could arrest the headlong race to destruction. But when we have piped to other nations they would not dance to our music, . . . and until such an arrangement is arrived at we have no option but to go on sadly, but with unflinching resolution to maintain the comparative preponderance of naval strength which for a hundred years has been recognized by friends and foes alike as the irreducible minimum of our national security. . . . Our naval supremacy . . . is a matter of life and death. We do not argue about it. We maintain it, and must go on maintaining it, against all challengers, even if it comes to the spending of our last penny.”

But even this gigantic expenditure by a country struggling with its social problems is not enough to keep the balance. The disproportion between the British and German navies is steadily diminishing. Despite a £40,000,000 naval budget, the two-power standard, for long the gospel of every patriot, can scarcely be said to be still maintained. As we have seen, England has been forced to abandon her traditional attitude of isolation and join the Triple Entente as a guarantee that by the sudden use of overwhelming military force Germany will not become the master of Europe. Yet the Triple Entente is a poor makeshift to set up against the solid front of Germany. What guarantee is there that France and Russia will come to the defence of England, or that England will instantly go to war on the Continent of Europe, before the joint might of Germany and Austria has overwhelmed the resistance of France?

Even the Dominions, situated far from the seat of danger, have begun to feel the strain. Their expenditure on naval

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defence during the years previous to 1910 had been as follows:

	CANADA		AUSTRALIA		SOUTH AFRICA	
	Amount	Per head	Amount	Per head	Amount	Per head
1906-7	Nil	—	£250,200*	1/2½	£85,000	1/6
1907-8	Nil	—	254,069*	1/2½	85,000	1/6
1908-9	Nil	—	259,250*	1/2½	85,000	1/6
1909-10	Nil	—	328,553*†	1/6	85,000	1/6

	NEW ZEALAND		NEWFOUNDLAND	
	Amount	Per head	Amount	Per head
1906-7	£41,540	11d.	£3,000	3d.
1907-8	42,579	11d.	3,000	3d.
1908-9	47,300	11½d.	3,000	3d.
1909-10	110,000	2/2½	3,000	3d.

But in 1909 they came to a conference, held in London, to discuss the problem of common defence. As a result, with the exception of South Africa (which could take no step until a Union Government was in power), all the Dominions undertook a greatly increased burden for naval defence, and introduced uniformity in their military arrangements.

Canada accepted a scheme involving an expenditure of

*NOTE.—In addition there are certain amounts for new works not defined in the estimates. †Including £60,000 on fleet unit.

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£400,000 a year on a Canadian fleet, and a navy bill, passed by the Canadian parliament in March, 1910, provided for the construction of five cruisers and six destroyers at a capital cost of £3,117,333. Pending the completion of the new cruisers Canada has purchased from the Imperial Government two cruisers, one of which has already been delivered in Canadian waters.

Australia undertook a capital expenditure estimated at £3,695,000 on a squadron of which she was to retain control, but which was to form part of the eastern fleet of the Empire. Her annual expenditure is put at £500,000, namely, £750,000, the estimated annual cost of the squadron, less a contribution by the Imperial Government of £250,000 until such time as the Commonwealth can bear the whole cost by itself.

New Zealand presented a Dreadnought cruiser to the British navy and agreed to pay in addition a subsidy of £100,000 per annum.

The following tables show the total expenditure on defence—both naval and military—of the various portions of the Empire for the last six years, and of the great powers of the world for 1909-10.

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE DOMINIONS
THE COST OF DEFENCE

Years	U. Kingdom	Per head	Canada	Per head	Australia	Per head
1905-06	£ 61,630,704	£1 8 3	(1905) £530,000	1/10½	£970,345	4/9½
1906-07	59,973,508	1 7 2	(1906) 880,000	3/0½	1,035,795	5/0½
1907-08	58,392,798	1 6 3	(1907) 680,000 (9 months)	2/3	1,084,744	6/4½
1908-09	59,048,608	1 6 3	(1908) 1,000,000	3/2¾	1,050,590	4/10½
1909-10	63,266,800	1 8 0	(1909) 1,050,000	3/1½	1,575,109	7/0
Estimates 1910-11	68,363,700	1 10 0	2,250,000	6/0	2,834,000	12/8½

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Years	New Zealand	Per head	South Africa	Per head
1905-06	£236,328	5/4½	—	—
1906-07	209,358	4/7½	—	—
1907-08	240,997	5/2½	—	—
1908-09	242,982	5/0¾	A £400,000	6/8
1909-10	300,343	6/2	(B)	—
Estimates 1910-11	477,095	9/6	(B)	—

(A) Approximate expenditure in Cape Colony, Transvaal and Natal on volunteers, militia and naval contributions.

(B) The Union Parliament has not yet met to consider question of defence.

EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE, 1909-10

United Kingdom	£63,266,800	per head	£1 8 0
France	45,353,800	„	1 2 11
Germany	60,379,000	„	19 2
United States	63,000,000	„	14 10
Russia	58,868,000	„	7 7

Whether the arrangement whereby each Dominion is to retain separate control of its own fleet is likely to be successful in withstanding a possible attack on the Imperial system, or is the method of attaining the maximum of defensive efficiency from the expenditure involved, we need not inquire. The proceedings of the defence conference of 1909 are significant enough of the effect on the Empire of German "Weltpolitik." They prove that the Dominions have begun to realize that they can no longer shelter behind a navy paid for only by the British people, and that their interests are indissolubly bound up with those of England, because if the sea power of England is destroyed they will begin to feel the forceful diplomacy of Napoleon and Bismarck and lose the ample liberties they now enjoy. They

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therefore have also begun to make sacrifices for the sake of the political ideals they cherish. For it is the pride of a free people to bear their responsibilities readily. Citizenship does not confer privileges only, but demands the surrender of wealth and even of life in defence of the freedom and ideals of the community, as some Uitlanders found to their cost who had lightly become Transvaal burghers in the days of the Boer Republic. In the words of Mr Roosevelt:

“Free peoples can escape being mastered by others only by being able to master themselves. . . . In the last analysis the all-important factor in national greatness is national character.”

IV

THIS is no cheering prospect which lies before the citizens of the Empire. Is there no chance of escaping the prodigious sacrifices which seem inevitable if they are to resist the onward march of Germanism? Two alternatives have been put forward. Some people think that the movement towards universal peace, which has made a welcome stride to the front of late, may achieve its end, and disarmament ensue. Others believe that the aggressive policy of Germany, which no one denies, is the policy of the bureaucracy and the military castes only, and that the German people, growing restive under their tyranny, will shortly refuse to be a party to the extravagant policy of aggrandizement, and will insist on a reduction of the expenditure on armaments.

Let us examine these possibilities. If they fail we must, with quiet resolution, make our preparations to resist, whatever they may cost us, as all the great peoples of history have done.

The far-sighted enthusiasts who believe the millennium of peace to be at hand are apt to forget that the chief obstacle is in the German spirit itself. The concert of the nations, like any other community, needs a policeman to enforce the peace when its members begin to quarrel among

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themselves. British and American pacifists are inclined to forget the policeman, and to suggest that charity will do for nations what it has failed to do for individuals. They forget the possibility of such quarrels as that which rent in two America, the least warlike of all nations, but half a century ago, and which no international agreement could have stopped. They forget that there are certain matters about which men will fight rather than submit—Asiatic immigration, with its effect on the composition of society, might be one. Their plea is in essence that nations should abandon ideals of national aggrandizement not surrender their cherished principles, and that is precisely why it falls on deaf ears in Germany.

The thoughtful German will tell you that there is only one road to universal peace so far as he is concerned. He is not vehemently anxious for it, for he respects the martial qualities which the soft atmosphere of peace might undermine. But if it is to come, it must not interfere with his country's destiny. If the world wants peace, it can have it by making Germany the policeman. If others agree she will willingly play the role. She will do exactly what the executive of the ultimate federation of the world will have to do, declare the creation of armaments above a certain scale, an offence against the peace of the world, and destroy by overwhelming force an infant navy before it is strong enough to fight. Germany would accept such a solution, for it is the logical outcome of her ambitions and would mean that Germanism had prevailed. It is just because such a system would involve a diminution of their freedom that the proposal falls on deaf ears in the Empire. The British peoples will no more surrender their liberties than Germany will surrender the future of Germanism.

We begin to realize now the full bearing of the antagonism between the ideals of individualism and the ideals of national strength.

What of the other possibility, that Germany is beginning to revolt against the political ideals of Bismarck's policy of

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blood and iron. There are better prospects here. The chief hope for the peace of the future is the growth of true democracy in Germany. There is no doubt that there is much discontent at the iron tyranny of the bureaucracy in internal affairs. But nothing could be more dangerous than to believe that the forces of discontent can exercise much restraining influence to-day, or that the German people are opposed to the foreign policy to which Germany is committed. The Germans are proud of their past, and they will hesitate for long before they upset a system which has raised their country to its present position in the world. There is no charge of inefficiency against the official classes, and if to our ideas they trample on the people's liberties, the people, as we have seen, are disposed to accept authority in political affairs. Moreover, the Government is in a strong position. It conducts a press bureau through which its own view of every situation is disseminated throughout the Empire. The professors of the great Prussian universities are appointed and paid for by the Prussian Government, and by imbuing the ablest of the rising generation with a belief in the policy of the Imperial Government and the bureaucracy, wield an immense influence over public opinion in Germany. The whole mass of the people, too, are drilled in the conscriptive system. There is, in truth, not much hope that there will be any immediate reversal of the traditional policy.

Moreover the people of Germany clearly support the Government in its policy of naval expansion. The one power they have over the executive is the power of the purse. The votes of the Reichstag for new naval construction alone in the past ten years are the best proof of what it thinks.

GERMAN NEW CONSTRUCTION

1901-2	£4,500,000
1902-3	4,500,000
1903-4	4,500,000

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1904-5	£4,500,000
1905-6	4,500,000
1906-7	5,000,000
1907-8	6,000,000
1908-9	7,500,000
1909-10	10,000,000
1910-11	11,392,000

It is easy, too, to over-estimate the influence of Socialism in Germany. At the recent International Congress of Socialists, on September 3, the British and French members brought forward the usual motion in favour of disarmament, passed unanimously at every Socialist meeting in the British Isles. The German Socialists rejected it. Socialism, they said, might be international. But it was not anti-national, for it was the duty of every citizen to bear arms to defend his country. "Each nation was entitled to preserve its own liberty of action." The German Socialist leaders cannot press the reduction of armaments because they know that it would forfeit them popular support. The German Navy League has a million members. The British Navy League less than 100,000. There is little doubt that the German people are far from reversing the national policy of their Government.

We see now what was meant by the opening sentence of this article. The central fact in the international situation to-day, is the antagonism between England and Germany. Germany is the storm centre whose armaments and ambition threaten to engulf the world in war. England is the power whose paramount interest it is to keep the peace. For Germany has little to lose and much to gain, England nothing to gain and the Empire and her full freedom to lose, from a disturbance of the *status quo*. Peace and her safety, England sees clearly enough, depend upon her maintaining armaments of such strength that it is hopeless for Germany to put her future to the arbitrament of war. The freedom of the Empire can in no other way be guaranteed.

There is an eternal conflict here. It is no mere contest of

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rivals over which should be cock of the walk. It is a conflict between the political ideals of the liberty-loving citizens of the British Empire, and of the enthusiasts for the national greatness of Germany. Whatever the casuists may say, every citizen of the Empire feels this instinctively to be true. He frankly dislikes what is called Germanism—its national selfishness, its arrogance, and its pride. If the spirit of Germany were the spirit of the British Empire, the rise of Germany would matter no more than the rise of America, for it would threaten no one. But it is not so, and so almost unconsciously the instinct for self-preservation has begun to assert itself in the Empire.

And there is good reason, for so long as the Germans are determined and self-sacrificing as they are to-day, the power of Germany will inevitably increase. It is almost a law of nature. It will grow not from naval and military expenditure alone, though that is rising year by year, but from the multiplication of small successes won from unwarlike peoples by Bismarckian diplomacy, and the steady attraction of weak states to a strong one. There has been quite recent proof how Italy, Turkey, Rumania and the other lesser nations of Europe are powerless to resist her magnetic force. Austria, as the price of German support in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has undertaken a programme of Dreadnoughts which would be simply unnecessary were it not to uphold Germanic prestige in the Mediterranean and the Near East. Germany herself has neglected no preparation which might improve her prospects of success. Though she has planned no deliberate attack on England or France, there is not the slightest doubt that she has worked out every detail of the campaign she would conduct if war broke out, even to the local rendezvous for her citizens resident in either country. She cannot tell when the wheel of fortune may force on the struggle, and the future of Germany must not be left to chance.

What is the issue to be? We can only look at the spirit of either side. The British peoples we know. They have

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never failed to respond to the call in the past, and there is little evidence that they will fail in the future. They have the men and the resources with which to maintain the Empire. They will not allow it to crumble or to be destroyed for want of resolution, for they value too highly the ideals which it upholds. Whether the present diplomatic method of maintaining the balance of power against Germany is the best, is a question on which opinions may differ, and on which the Dominions might give valuable counsel. But that the nations of the Empire will ever, through want of courage or self-sacrifice, sink into that dependence on another power which is inevitable if they cannot resist its will, is not to be believed.

But their resolution is matched in Germany. As the writer previously quoted says :

“ They believe that the twentieth century will belong to the Germans. Serious scientists and brilliant impressionists write volumes and pamphlets to prove that their race is the parent of the great northern breeds; that it is the foremost in natural capacity, and the highest product of human evolution; that its geographical position in the heart of Europe is the most advantageous imaginable, commanding as it does the valley of the Rhine and Danube; and that by numbers and efficiency it is destined to prevail.”

The Germans will never surrender Germanism, for they are determined to stand beside the Greeks and the Romans, and perhaps the Anglo-Saxons in their palmy days, as one of the peoples who have wrought their mark on the history of all time.

Where two such peoples are set up over against one another, none can tell what the outcome will be. Let us hope that it will never be put to the crude test of war. But in considering our measures for the defence of the Empire it is well to remember what the Germans think. If ever it comes to a struggle between them and us, they are confident of victory. They believe that they embody the vital

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civilization of the day. Their philosophy, as they say, is less material than the Anglo-Saxon, more robust than the French. Their worship of art—especially music—their relentless pursuit of knowledge, their readiness to sacrifice themselves for the good of the state, are all marks of a dominant people. The Anglo-Saxon world, they point out, is full of the talk of disarmament, of peace as the supreme necessity of the time, of material well-being as the central aim of collective activity. Such a creed, they say, is bound to go down before the idealism of Germany. For it is a conflict between people who value their ideals above their lives, and a multitude which rates its life above all else. They believe that the Anglo-Saxons are not capable of that self-mastery which will give them the unity and strength to resist assault, and that the selfish individualism of the nations of the Empire is as powerless to resist their worthier system as was the nerveless civilization of Egypt to withstand the onward march of Rome.

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FOR the apathy of the home-staying Englishman towards India, Matthew Arnold ought to take his share of blame. If people are for ever plunging in thought again, however much you shock them, it seems so much simpler to let them be. But the mental attitude is far older than the poet. Always proud of her immense dependency, England never cared to learn too much about it. She had an honest idea that all was well with India, because from very early days she endeavoured to send out good men, and they told her so; but eastern ways never were as western, and it was troublesome to understand the difference.

From the very first there has been a note of sobriety and sincerity in the utterances of English public men about India, for whose origin we must look to the great revival of morals which the Wesleys set on foot in the eighteenth century, and which inspired the reforms of Clive, Hastings, and Cornwallis, and found its full fruit in the abolition of slavery and the other social and political reforms of the earlier nineteenth century. There was plenty of conviction that England had a great work to do in India; plenty of resolve that she should do it well. Soldiers, administrators, missionaries were freely sent; money was never stinted. But with all her high purpose and magnanimity, England asked only that she should not hear too much of India. When Warren Hastings' trial crowded Westminster hall, it was not because people cared how a great proconsul had discharged his task, but because they were anxious to see how their own gladiators would acquit themselves. India's fortunes were a pawn in the political game of the honest. The mutiny, indeed, woke England to brief and terrible consciousness of her responsibilities, but the very horrors and excesses of that bad time were a reason why every effort was made to forget them quickly, as one tries to be rid of an evil dream. Later Indian history, too, has not lacked

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its dramatic moments, but the mother country has generally preserved her pose of great aloofness. Perhaps she cared more than she showed, and was afraid of assuming too visibly the pride of Empire. But in so far as she realized her ignorance and indifference, she gave it the name of virtue and talked of trusting the man on the spot. And so until quite recent times India filled the imagination of England (all but that portion which sends its sons abroad), chiefly as convenient material for ceremonial, a place from which on set occasions martial figures in vivid uniform, with curly beards and curly sabres, might be drawn to kindle the grey streets of London with romance.

The change which the last ten years have wrought is very striking. This period has seen a viceroy who took care that his achievements filled the public eye; and with the accounts of his doings and their dramatic curtailment come also whispers of a certain reaction from them. The present king made a journey in state through what was, ere many years, to be his Indian empire. An election put into parliament a number of ex-Indian officials, some of whom had fallen short of the highest in India, and were going, if they could, to make up for it at home. Labour members visited India and acquired lightning knowledge from the sources which they found most open to them: clever novels appeared, dealing with the wrongs of Europeanized princelings and the back-paths of Calcutta intrigue. Slowly at first, then rapidly, England awoke to the perception that all sorts of movements were simmering in her great dependency. Vague talk of unrest, of changes in native opinion, of loss of authority and diminished prestige, was followed by positive news of conspiracies and assassinations, and the disclosure of active propaganda aiming at the subversion of the raj. Then, much more deliberately, were announced certain repressive measures in the form of a seditious meeting act, and a press act, and simultaneously large changes, labelled "reforms," were proclaimed in the legislative councils, and for the first time natives of India were appointed to seats in

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the highest councils of the Government. For the first time in their lives hundreds of the Englishmen who think at all have given thought to India. Perhaps few of them have penetrated deeply into the intricacies of the right and wrongs of the partition of Bengal, or of the representation of the Mohammedan community; but many have conscientiously addressed themselves to many other questions propounded in their ears, which bear a fallacious appearance of comparative simplicity.

Is it any longer true, they have asked, that the educated and highly intelligent Indian, who beats our senior wranglers and makes such admirable speeches, is unfitted to govern his own people? Is this talk, which we hear from our administrators, of divorce between words and substance, between education and morals, between apparent solidity and inward hollowness, to be trusted any longer? Have our men been as faithful to their trust as we believed them? May not uncontrolled authority have spoiled them and we by our ignorance have contributed to the spoiling? How can this manifest incredulity in the face of what seems serious and noble effort escape the suspicion of self-interest?

For the first time in 150 years India has indeed no reason to complain that England has shown no concern for her. Perhaps those who see her interests best think privately that there has been undue concern. A great revolution has been brought about unseen, through the conjunction of a strong secretary of state and a not-strong viceroy; and for the past five years India has been governed directly from Whitehall, and not ill-governed either. To-morrow a change at either end might terminate the present relations, nor is it possible to see how they could long endure without most embarrassing results. The increasing tendency to refer matters to England will be so improved by adroit critics of the administration as gradually to paralyse the energies of the government in India. If officials are always looking upward for approval, they cannot see the stumbling-blocks about their feet. Precisely to the extent to which there issue

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from Charles Street, Westminster, precepts about the use of canes for whippings, or the distribution of quinine, or lantern slides for schools, will India be the worse punished, physicked and educated than she might otherwise have been; or rather in a compound ratio, seeing that the effect of leading strings on the responsible officials in India must be remembered.

The Indian services, it may be said, have almost as great reason to pray for deliverance from their friends as from their enemies. They have come in for violent criticism, and the criticism has been met with a volume of well-meant but most ill-judged laudation. It is disagreeable to be suspected of still shaking the pagoda-tree, but it is nearly as bad to hear oneself perpetually described as a latter-day saint. It is certain, as it is natural, that the process of keeping up the administration to concert pitch, to which suddenly succeeded a violent revulsion, has rather worn the nerves and tempers of the services in India. Year by year they were required at all costs to be efficient, and they did their best to comply: their burdens increased enormously, but not their staff or pay. One day there came a change; they found themselves vehemently criticized for being unsympathetic, and the efficiency which had been counted unto them for righteousness their chiefest fault. Is it surprising that there have come home to England stories of drift and indecision, of hesitation to act promptly, of want of backing in difficulty, of over-control in trifles, of paper-made government, and of ever-increasing work and worry and expenses? The glory has departed; the Englishman has no authority left; he is to look on helpless while babus make speeches; India is no place for men who looked to Lawrences as their model: the beginning of the end has come. Dismal talk indeed; but not for the first time heard.

It should be of some importance to us to know not merely what Englishmen think in England and in India, but in our other nations as well. But only the unsatisfactory answer can be given that over-seas they simply do not care. South

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Africa and British Columbia have indeed made it plain how they regard the presence of certain Indians in their midst; and it may be that from the heat which their action has aroused will be derived some of the energy which one day will be applied to pull the Empire into shape. But as yet none of the Dominions takes much concern in the great dependency, which, if they only knew, is the heritage of them all. They have no trade with India, they send no successive generations to her service, their prestige is but little enhanced by India's being English. South Africa has a dim sense of historical association with India; Australia knows vaguely that it is well for her that no other power should be in a position to flood her with Asiatic immigrants. Canada frankly knows nothing and cares less. If you get an opinion out of them at all, it is tinged with scepticism. They associate the English rule in India too much with the period of their own military governors; such ways were well enough in the days of cocked hats and gold uniforms, but they do not suit well with the manners of free commercial communities. They have never governed subject races themselves, and do not greatly believe that the thing can be done disinterestedly. A candidate for the presidency of the United States ingenuously asked how *can* the contract between two parties be possibly fair, if either one of them settles its terms?—a reasonable enough question if the standards of commerce happen to apply, but betraying a certain ignorance in its assumption that these are all-per-vading. It is true that Mr Roosevelt has uttered tremendous panegyrics of the government of India, and declared that its methods have for all time set the standard which other civilized nations must apply in dealing with their subject races. But none of the Dominions yet has had actually such a problem in its hands, and only one of them—South Africa—is likely to have one in the near future.

What is the upshot of this survey? Englishmen are interested, but not a little uneasy, and unwisely are letting their uneasiness appear. The Dominions, whose voice in

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imperial affairs must be heard at some day which is rapidly approaching, are candidly indifferent or surreptitiously critical. India does not know much of England, and knows nothing of the colonies: England's mercies may be peculiar, but the colonies are probably populated by demons like the Rakshas whom Rama smote. On such a text many treatises might be written. Not the least useful would be a simple work for Indian schools setting out the truth of the struggle for free institutions in our own land, and the character of the Englands oversea. The purpose of this paper is neither to do this nor yet to analyse the causes and significance of present changes in India; it is only to remind ourselves, in a season of some heart-searchings and disquietude, that India means much to England and England infinitely more to India; that both, but India the more, benefit by the association, and that to the Dominions, if they only knew it, India ought to stand for much.

Those who set out to argue that our possession of India is an encumbrance and a weakness can make their point, for what it is worth, easily enough. Without India we should not be a continental power, and should have no need to keep 80,000 British soldiers locked up in an unhealthy climate, waiting for an attack which may never come. Without India we should be rid of possible embroglios with Russia, Persia, Afghanistan and China. *A fortiori*, we should be quit of Egypt also: the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal would be no longer a supreme concern to us. The problem of naval defence would be enormously simplified. True, there would remain Australia and New Zealand, but the same arguments lead to our throwing the burden of their defence upon themselves. We are no more bound in honour to defend them from Germany or Japan than we are bound in honour to hold the Indian frontier wall against the grey coats from the North. If we did retain the Dominions, at least we should be rid, with India, of a most difficult and vexatious question between themselves and us.

What, then, does India mean to England? First and fore-

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most, it means Empire. Because we hold India and govern three hundred millions of another race, we are without a near rival among the nations of the world. Take India from us, and we sink to the level of a trade competitor with Germany and the United States. But so long as the consciousness of civilized man recognizes government as the noblest task of the race, so long by administering India is our pride of place unquestioned. No nation in modern times has done the like or can aspire to do it. To hold India, with its hundreds of races and religions and languages, and castes and customs, to be possessed of such a heritage of history, learning and romance, is an achievement for which the world's records show but one parallel. Thothmés and Sennacherib, Alexander and Napoleon never did the like. Only Rome in her greatest days did what England has been doing, as a matter of course, for one hundred years. We honour Rome, after two thousand years, for her genius for law and order and administration; we kindle to her poet's boast,

“ *Hœc est in gremium captos quæ sola recepit,*”

and yet with how much greater right can we make it ours? We, we in India, have found out and taught a modern world how to govern a continent incapable of the task itself; and when the future annals of a steadily shrinking world are written the achievement will rank higher than the broadest minded decrees of the Senate or the most generous edicts of the Cæsars.

But, inasmuch as we are a practical people and our brothers across the Atlantic think themselves more practical than we, let us bethink us also what India means in the language of the market-place. Indian trade is not so romantic as it was when she sent Europe apes and ivory, spices and diamonds. Now she sends useful, unsensational things like tea and cotton and rice and wheat and jute and oil-seeds, and takes in exchange chiefly cotton goods and yarn, metals and machinery. She is a poor country and industrially undeveloped, and her income per head of population is small

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indeed compared with countries of our status, but she is big and populous. Losing India, we lose an import trade as big as that with Germany and an export trade bigger than that with any single country, even with the United States; one-thirtieth of our imports, and nearly one-twentieth of our exports, are wiped out. In these days when the permanence of our industries, and their sufficiency to support the increasing population of our islands, begin to be in question, these are assets we cannot lightly let go. But why should we assume that because we leave India our actual advantages of trade will be insufficient to save for us some substantial portion of this enormous traffic? The answer is that now and for long to come we cannot conceive of an India that can defend as well as govern herself. Leaving India, we leave her first to a period of internal struggle and bloodshed, at no distant date to the armed occupation of a foreign power. But all the powers, save ourselves alone, look upon trade as a potent instrument to be deliberately used in the strengthening of a nation in the international struggle; and neither Russia, nor Germany, nor Japan, having conquered India, is going to imitate us in holding their ports open to the ships of all the seas. In those days poor India will get a higher tariff than that which Lancashire has denied her. But the proceeds will not build mills in Cawnpore and Delhi, but will pour into imperial war-chests in Petersburg or Tokio.

But India is not merely a market for our goods and a source of our own supplies. She offers a wide and improving field for the employment of surplus British capital, under a government which not merely keeps faith and order, but which can do much to help or hinder enterprise. With a stable currency, a government seeking to stimulate industry, and a people whose standard of living is slowly rising, there is no good reason why money should not be forthcoming. Perhaps it is in the sphere of industry that the best hope lies of that co-operation between English and Indian which is so greatly to be desired.

There are, too, other obvious services which India

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render us. I will not dwell on them at length, because, important as they are, nobody supposes that they are the most important. She recruits for us an army of 240,000 fighting men, some of whom might in certain extreme contingencies be employed elsewhere, and she finds honourable employment for a few thousand Englishmen of the middle class in her public services. The Indian army, however, is there for Indian defence; and the emoluments and prospects of the little regiment of Englishmen employed in India have never yet been, and never ought to be, regarded as a material point in issue. If India pays their wage, they do her work; and if need be, the world is big enough to give them work elsewhere.

In none of these matters consists the true value of the possession of India; not in prestige, nor trade, nor investments, nor armies, nor employment. But herein it lies—that in an age when national energies are being bent from actual to industrial warfare, when all round the world are growing up new peoples who, never having known in themselves the supreme tests of citizenship, are sedulously and dangerously absorbed in the search after material good, when the promise of physical comforts is being proclaimed as the supreme gospel of the new century by newspapers and preachers and teachers who agree in nothing else—at such a time England nevertheless holds and governs India, not for her own advantage, not to be richer or more comfortable or free from worry herself, but as a duty thrust upon her which she is bent on discharging faithfully; this, with its direct consequences in Egypt, East Africa, the South African Protectorates, Cuba and the Philippines, is the one achievement which discriminates the Anglo-Saxon destiny from all others in the world, and abundantly redeems it from the charge of seeking its own good alone. If these claims can be made good, England has reason enough to be grateful for India; nor should the Dominions be slow in coming to claim their share also of what ought to be the common privilege of the race.

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It is even more certain that the Englishman means much to India. National congresses, all-Moslem leagues, educational conferences, fill large spaces on paper. "Self-government on the Colonial system" is a blessed phrase on the lips of many who have never seen a colony, or understood how the foundations of their parliaments were laid far back in the centuries. These names and shibboleths fill the eye of newspaper readers and the ears of polite audiences in England; and they seem to leave small room indeed in India for the harmless necessary Englishman. But in an Indian district they count for little. They are things to be watched, studied, reported upon, sympathized with, just as are the philanthropic efforts of the people who build wells or hospitals or start new schools. The well must be pucca, the hospital must be of approved design, the school will eventually want "recognition," and so must think seriously about its equipment and staff. And even so, however imposing the manifestations of self-effort, in so far as they deliberately forsake the ideals and principles which the English have set for a century and a half, they are sound and fury, signifying nothing. Let us take a favourable instance. I have in mind the case of a great indigenous educational institution, started by a clear-sighted reformer and leader of his people. Its watchwords are "loyalty to our religion, consistently with recognition of western science; training of character after European methods; and loyalty to the existing rule." Holding tightly to these for twenty years, it has thriven exceedingly, and its record is worth all admiration. With the progress of the new ideas, lately there has come upon it a tendency to self-complacency and assertion that will throw a strain upon fidelity to the last ideal. But what will bind the college fast, now and for a long time to come, to the support of our administration is the knowledge that, whether they like it or not, it is only the sympathy and assistance of the Englishman that can give them what they want: neither in themselves nor in any of the other rival communities of India can they find the inspiration to inform and the force

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to sustain their endeavours, and eventually place them in the position to which they aspire.

But if English ideas are so necessary even to leaders who are earnestly and soberly bent upon the advancement of their people, what shall we say of the untold multitudes who have no thought beyond eating or drinking and marrying their daughters, and the smaller but increasing classes of townspeople and smaller land-holders, who die happy when their sons have passed the entrance examination, and seem fairly launched on the glorious road to a deputy collectorship? And these are four-fifths of the population of India. How necessary he is to them every European official knows: and his knowledge of it is to most men the great balm for the worries of Indian service, and the great corrective of the faults which authority may easily breed. Give a foolish or ill-considered order, and it generally recoils upon you in a tempest of appeals and petitions; insist on too much elaboration in one matter, and you speedily see all sorts of more important duties going neglected elsewhere. It is difficult enough to hit the golden mean, but the one abiding encouragement that each overworked official has is surely the feeling that there are problems to be solved and that many eyes are looking to him to solve them. And they look with confidence. What district officer in Northern India does not know the daily cry of the petitioner, "Huzur khud tahqiqat karen"—"Let your honour personally inquire into the matter!" not through lieutenants, not through deputy-collectors, tahsildars or police officers, because the chances are that they pass it on and on down the chain, till eventually there arrives in the village some underling who can be bought or bullied by the stronger side. It is a question of encroachment on a village road, or a field boundary dispute, or a quarrel over cutting a branch by which thieves may climb over a mud wall (which, tree or no tree, would never keep them out)? Still, let the collector, or the joint magistrate if there is one, come and see with his own eyes, and do justice on the spot. Let him wash his hands of reports and

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correspondence and regular litigation and come and sit on a charpoy, and listen in the old way under the village tree. He possibly may not be made to understand all the details of a complicated case so readily or fully as an Indian official; but so far as he does comprehend, he will do right without fear or favour, and his award will stand unquestioned for three generations.

Unhappily it is no more possible for the district officer to answer all these appeals in person than it is for him to comply scrupulously with all the requirements which codes and regulations lay upon him. If a collector personally verified all the minutiae of routine for which Departments, by means of choicely worded admonitions printed just above the place of his signature, proclaim that they have every intention of holding him personally responsible, he would be poring all day and every day over flimsy yellow papers covered with undecipherable spider-writing; if he personally attended to every appeal to him from every one of his 1800 villages, horseflesh and motor cars could hardly serve his need. But, having neither the eyes of Argus nor the wings of Graham-White, he just does what he can. When he is in office he routs out some point of detail here and there as a test case; and when he is in camp he takes every opportunity that offers of being in the villages and dealing with questions at first hand. And all the time he knows that his doings are being watched by many eyes and discussed by many tongues, and not unkindly.

It is a mistake and a folly to proclaim the want of sympathy between the English official and the native. The relations at their worst are probably to be seen in the case of a litigious-minded district in Lower Bengal, which has had its peculiar agrarian grievances and has been carefully played upon by persons from Calcutta, whose purpose it is to make the muddy waters muddier for their own fishing. In such a district the tradition of personal government is relatively weak; the people lack the openmindedness

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and self-respect of northern races; some of the older legislation binds the activities of the reforming official in chains, and over the whole length of the country lies the shadow of the appeal court of Calcutta. The climate is trying, the solitude great, the amenities few. Likely enough, in such conditions one man here and there may be goaded by a policy of studied annoyances and irritations into some petulant and ill-judged action, which is forthwith brayed abroad throughout the land by an ill-wishing press, and made the text for many homilies upon the pride and insolence of expensive alien bureaucracies "and the lack of sympathy" which is to lose us India.

But let us see things in their true perspective. These things happen, and sober-minded English and Indians alike are sorry. The very fact that agitators are at work, and that an extensive Press is ready and keen to exaggerate the errors of the best friends of India, is bad enough, serious enough to demand the full inquiry and study of such phenomena, which is being given to them, and upon which this is no place to enter. But when the worst has been said, when the long list of inflammatory writings, conspiracies, murders and attempts at murder has been set forth in extenso, and the question is asked, Is this what we have created for ourselves in India, and, if so, to what does it all tend? still the answer may be given in all confidence, No, this is not yet typical of India; any more than the Mackarness pamphlet is a true picture of police methods, or the photographs of living skeletons carefully collected in a mission poorhouse is a faithful presentment of the average condition of the population of a district in famine times. In their place, and in just proportion, these things are all true. There *is* bitter feeling against the Englishman among limited classes and in limited areas: precisely as every now and then some obdurate offender *is* beaten in a police station. But the important thing is not that one offender is beaten, but that all are not. One of our most upright inspectors expressed sincere regret the other day that a peculiarly

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abominable murder case must go all wrong, because, though they had got the right men, no confession was forthcoming, and without it the evidence must fail. "What a pity that the days of beating these persons have gone by!" He spoke out not his own thoughts only but those of most decent law-abiding people. Such an utterance is not only the answer to home critics, but throws some light on the way our work is regarded. They still stand "astounded at our moderation." Why take such pains to reason and consult and explain when obviously the simple order is the more effective plan? This is still, and for immeasurable time will be, what most of the people of India think of our methods.

Nor is it true, even nowadays, when a bad habit has grown up of rapid changes in personnel, that there is growing estrangement between the Englishman and the native. Put an average Englishman in any place of responsibility for a long enough time for him to feel the claims of the position twining themselves about him, and the mere earnestness and insistency of the appeals to him to do his best to redress wrongs and to clear out corruption—whether it takes physical shape in the drainings of a slaughter-house, or thrives invisible among some underlings in a revenue or municipal office—will impel him inevitably in the direction of closer intercourse with the people, and more intimate understanding of their ways and thoughts and wishes. Probably most Englishmen feel that the time is all too short. The pressure of the moment is so great that there is small leisure for the study of castes and customs, religions and social usage. But most men pick up some knowledge of these things, and few would not be willing to have more. At bottom everything depends on the men. India has so far been fortunate in getting men who were anxious to give her of their best; and so long as that tradition continues there is small reason to peer ahead for the beginning of the end of the raj. Nor is the native in the least slow to respond. The bigger men have a pride in their district and hope that its officers will so run it as to increase its glory and, incidentally, their own. But all

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through the bazaar the English officer is discussed, he and his habits, his tastes, his horses, his servants and so forth. There is expectation as to what he will or will not do. If he takes extra trouble over some struggling school, or the local fair, and a dispute between co-sharers in a big estate, comments are made, and stray echoes come back to his amused ears. In all this there is no suggestion of hostility. The criticism is friendly. The new man has ample allowance made for him. He does not understand the language well; but he may learn. He did not attend to something personally; but it was hot, and sahibs feel the heat. He was mistaken in such a decision; well, these things happen, better luck next time, and anyhow you did not have to buy him. And the District Officer who is at any pains to go a little beyond the beaten track, and to show his interest in local enterprises, or festivals or meetings and the like, will usually find his extra labours rewarded by very generous acknowledgements. The simple truth is that throughout the greater part of India the people have learned to expect the best of the Englishman, or, at all events, something better than anyone else can give them, and, in spite of all the agitators and editors, they are slow to unlearn the lesson. The conservatism of India which delayed the consolidation of the raj will prove its strong foundation. It is hard work to sink caissons in the solid rock, but the bridge stands. What we have chiefly to see is that the contractors do not supply cheap steel in future.

There is small fear, then, that the days of the Englishman are past in India. No one can calculate on the effect of new and unforeseen forces. If there arises in India some new active principle, akin to that of radium in the physical world, which dispenses undiminished energies, it may work unimagined wonders. It may reconcile the breach between religion and ethics which sterilizes Hinduism as a progressive force; it may shatter the walls of caste, and awake a belief that the humbler people are not necessarily beyond redemption; it may set free Mohammedanism from the cast-iron fetters of its traditions; it may breed habits of commer-

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cial confidence, and break down the disdain of practical enterprise, which has left India with few industries and little commerce; and it may stiffen the moral fibre of both great peoples, until they become capable of dealing justly with their weaker brethren, and of such mutual trust and respect and community of opinion and desires as underlies government as we know it in the free nations. In those days there may be small room for the Englishman. But then he will have done his work and may depart in peace, not without honour.

As yet, however, all these changes are as visions afar off. The new movement brings small promise of them. Nevertheless we are perhaps too ready to find in the mere existence of unrest, in the plain beginnings of a disposition in certain quarters to assume a larger share of affairs, a verdict of condemnation of our work. Surely the truth is exactly the opposite. If the labours of 100 years had left India exactly as we found it, we were indeed to blame. But if we have genuinely lifted India an inch or two towards our own political level, then let us congratulate ourselves on the result. It is not the fact of unrest, but the methods of its manifestation that are disagreeable and unsatisfying, methods adopted by a few, who are credited with thinking chiefly of their own class interests, and who, hitherto, have never played such a part either in administration, or industry, or commerce, or learning, as to justify their boast that they speak for the people of India. Moreover, in its more active forms the movement is discreditably associated with the darker aspects of a savage cult, and with appeals to caste and race prejudices that can only impede the steps of progress. Beholding these things we are justified in doubting. The real leadership of the real new India is not coming from Bengal or Madras, perhaps not even from the Maharashtra country. It is coming in the long run from the slower, simpler, stabler races of the North, on whom British rule has wrought less visible results, but with whom the results are more abiding. Only the foundations are still being laid

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in the colleges and technical schools and factories of Upper India; and there is work for Englishmen to do for many years yet in training the new generations of Government servants, doctors, engineers, chemists, agriculturists and others, on whose unaided shoulders the fabric of a future administration may one day be laid.

New developments are nascent under our eyes; and no vision can see exactly where they are tending. But we ought to rejoice in the evidence of life, and not fear that we shall be able to nurture it to a sound maturity. The questions of the future may be more difficult than any of the past. But we approach them with the great advantages of a sincere purpose, an unrivalled training in the arts of administration, and the unquestioning confidence of the great mass of the people.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

THE outstanding event in the domestic history of the past few months has been the conference between the Liberal and the Unionist leaders over the constitutional crisis. This arose directly out of the controversy which has raged around the House of Lords for many years, but which came to a head in the general election of 1910 after the Lords had rejected the Budget in 1909.

As usual in the case of controversy, there is much to be said on both sides. The Peers are certainly not a body of grasping landlords or ogreish plutocrats, bent on protecting their privileges and their possessions, at the expense if need be of the public welfare. They are probably as public-spirited a number of men as are to be found in any country, and foreign observers habitually declare them, in experience, judgement, and ability, superior to any assembly in the world. But their qualities are impaired by two defects. They are representative practically of only one class, and they are overwhelmingly of one party colour. It is, no doubt, a great advantage that England should be able to enlist for the study of national problems the services of the administrators of her great dependencies, of the men who have built up the financial and industrial prosperity of the country, of the great territorial magnates, of men eminent in the sphere of literature, art and learning. Other peoples envy us the system which places such talent at the disposal of the country. No other country has managed so well. But, however admirable the Peers may be as individual legislators, the House itself undoubtedly represents too exclusively what are variously described as the upper classes, or the governing classes, or the aristocracy.

The case against them on the ground of party colour is even stronger. Nobody pretends to deny that four-fifths of them are thick and thin supporters of the Conservative party. There is apparently no chance of this Conservative

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preponderance disappearing in the future, for the propertied classes, from which its members are chiefly drawn, are in all countries suspicious of change. A state of affairs in which one party in the state, however decisively rejected at the polls, remains in permanent control of the upper chamber of the legislature clearly cannot last. It is subversive of the root principles of democratic government. The case of the Liberals against the House of Lords that it invariably rejects the most contentious of Liberal bills, while it ceases to act as a chamber of revision at all when the Unionists are in power, is unanswerable.

These defects are mainly due to the operation of the hereditary principle. The hereditary principle in itself is the least of the charges against the House of Lords. In theory quite indefensible, and open to telling platform attack in election time, it does not work badly in actual practice. It is simply an application of the Platonic idea that the business of government requires trained experts as much as any other business. The hereditary peers are born to positions of responsibility, are specially trained from boyhood to sustain these responsibilities, and in practice discharge their duties well. There is the usual proportion of failures, but they mostly stay away from the House, and any system of electing members from among the Peers themselves would eliminate them altogether. The real charges against the House of Lords are not that it is incompetent or corrupt, but that it represents one class and one party. And inasmuch as the hereditary principle is the root cause of these two defects, it seems certain to be mutilated if not to disappear.

There can be no question that in the election of 1910 the country accepted the view of the Liberal party that the present system could not continue. But it had formed no opinion as to the changes which should be made. Broadly speaking, there were two courses open. Either the composition of the House of Lords could be altered so that it should cease to represent only one class, and one party, and should

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play its part as an impartial chamber of revision; or it could be abolished entirely or have its powers so restricted that the Lower House could overcome its resistance whenever it chose.

Unfortunately, perhaps, for the Liberal party, they found themselves committed to the second course. As long ago as 1906, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman had officially declared that the only solution acceptable to his party would be an arrangement whereby the will of the people as expressed by their elected representatives in the House of Commons should prevail within the lifetime of a single parliament. That consummation could clearly only be attained by limiting the powers of the House of Lords. When the controversy became acute after the election of 1910, a large element in the Liberal party would have preferred the expedient of reform, but the earlier declarations of their leader, the vehement objections of the more extreme wing, and the fact that they depended on the Irish members, who would accept nothing less than the abolition of the veto power of the Lords as the price of their support, made it impossible.

The Parliament bill, therefore, which embodied the proposals of the Government provided only for the restriction of the powers of the House of Lords. The preamble to the bill, at the instance of the moderate wing of the party, foreshadowed a future alteration in the constitution of the House of Lords, but actually left its composition unchanged. The restrictions proposed were twofold. In the first place, that finance should be removed altogether from the purview of the Lords. In the second place, that bills passed by the House of Commons in three successive sessions should become law despite the refusal of the House of Lords to consent to them, provided at least two years had passed between the first and third passage of each bill through the House of Commons. In addition, the duration of Parliament was to be reduced from seven to five years.

These proposals clearly involved a vital alteration in the

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British constitution. The Liberals justified the measure on the ground that the first and most urgent necessity was the removal of the absolute barrier to progressive legislation presented by the House of Lords. The Unionists opposed it vigorously, partly on the ground that it was tantamount to the establishment of single chamber government, inasmuch as the Lords would only have the power of delaying the passage of a bill for two years, partly on the ground that the scheme itself was unworkable. After some delay they proposed, as an alternative to the Government policy, that the composition of the House of Lords should be reformed, but that its powers should remain unchanged.

Thus, early in the session, the two parties were ranged up for a desperate struggle over the House of Lords. It seemed fairly obvious that after a preliminary period of educative argumentation on both sides, the country would be called upon to decide at another general election between the Liberal policy of abolishing the veto power of the Lords, and the Unionist policy of reforming its composition.

At this moment the King's death occurred. The effect was electric. It became clear that a renewal of the bitter controversy of the preceding weeks was entirely foreign to the temper of the people. The death of a wise and trusted monarch was too great a constitutional loss for them to welcome a battle about an even graver constitutional change. Someone suggested that in the circumstances compromise was better than conflict and that a Conference of the leaders of the two parties should attempt to devise a solution to which all could agree. The idea grew rapidly in favour until eventually public opinion was overwhelmingly behind it. The party leaders were not averse to a truce, and the Conference was arranged.

The significance of the constitutional Conference is greater even than appears at first sight. It is more than a striking testimony to the respect and affection in which the late King was held. It is more even than a welcome device for settling an acute and barren controversy. It may be the

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herald of a new and vital piece of machinery in the British Constitution. Clumsy as it may appear, the party system is the best method of bringing about ordinary reforms in the body politic that has yet been devised, for it is the only system of popular government which permits of a principle or policy being carried out in its entirety. On all other plans concessions have to be made to this body or that, to a crank here, or a pighead there, before its upholders can collect the requisite majority, and so what began as a great and comprehensive measure of reform is usually whittled away until it is practically non-contentious, if not actually useless, before it is passed into law. But the dragooning process, while an admirable expedient for preventing the emasculation of licensing bills or land bills, is dangerous when applied to the fundamental institutions of a country. People will sit still under the tyranny of a majority which imposes an extra 2d. in the £ on the income tax for a purpose of which they disapprove, but they will think of revolt when they witness the forcible enactment of a measure which they believe is fraught with grave danger to the country's safety. National institutions like the national safety are not to be lightly handled by temporary majorities embittered and blinded by the excesses of a party conflict.

Almost all countries safeguard themselves against this danger by providing that the Constitution can be altered only by resort to some special machinery. In some places a referendum is required, in others a two-thirds majority of both houses, in yet others agreement between federal and local authorities. The British Constitution, however, can be torn up by the mere vote of a temporary majority in the two houses of Parliament. This arrangement, while it makes for flexibility, may be a source of grave danger in the hands of an unscrupulous majority. The significance of the Conference lies in the precedent it creates for the alteration of the national constitution by the expedient of conference and compromise, instead of by the steam rolling of a party machine. The British Empire has afforded many prece-

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dents for such a course. The Federations of Canada and Australia were achieved by this means, and the wonderful success of the recent South African Convention, not only in uniting four colonies, but in overcoming the violent prejudices of two races recently at war, is fresh in every one's mind.

There is little question that the great bulk of the nation would welcome a settlement of the constitutional difficulty by the Conference. The extremists on both sides, and it is chiefly their cries which are heard across the seas, may howl for a renewal of the fight, but the sober sense of the country is opposed to such a course.

It is, of course, impossible to forecast what the Conference will do. But it is not too much to say that its decision is fraught with most momentous consequences, not only to Britain, but to the Empire. It may find the ties of party too strong, and throw the country back into the throes of a sterile and apparently endless wrangle over the second chamber, which will block progress for years to come. It may rise to the height of its opportunity, and propound a solution which will make it impossible that the fundamental institutions on whose smooth working the safety of the Empire depends, should ever be prostituted to the exigencies of a party conflict.

II. THE REVIVAL OF HOME RULE

DURING the past few weeks political activity, which has been dormant since the meeting of the constitutional Conference, has suddenly revived. A persistent rumour went the round that the Conference had extended its deliberations to cover the relations between Ireland and Great Britain as well as the relations between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. It was said that the Conference was able to find a solution of the House of Lords question, but only if the century-old problem of Home Rule were settled at the same time. Whether the rumour originated

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with the members of the Conference or not is immaterial. The facts upon which it is based are clear. The settlement of the constitutional controversy between Liberal and Unionist was bound to lead straight to a new Home Rule Bill, for it would leave the Liberal Government dependent on the votes of the Irish, who have repeatedly declared that they will withdraw their support from the Government unless it introduces a new Home Rule Bill into Parliament directly the obstacle of the House of Lords veto is removed. Neither Liberal nor Unionist welcomed this prospect. The Liberals were not particularly anxious to be left at the mercy of the Irish. The Unionists, who became a party in the struggle against the last proposal for Home Rule, were reluctant to agree to any constitutional settlement which would destroy the certainty that the Lords would reject any Home Rule Bill of which they disapproved. Both parties, therefore, came to realize that Home Rule and the constitutional crisis were closely connected, and that the chance of a successful issue to the Conference probably depended on the treatment of both questions together.

Curiously enough, in June and July last the idea had been put forward in a number of different quarters that it was time to settle the Irish difficulty on lines to which both Liberal and Unionist could agree. It was pointed out that the prosperity of Ireland had immensely increased, and the acerbity of its religious, political and agrarian feuds immensely diminished, since the outrages and riots of the days of Parnell and the Land League, and that the aspirations of the Irish party could be satisfied by a federal arrangement which would preserve the national unity of the British Isles and the sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament, while giving to Ireland (and also to other portions of the United Kingdom) the control of purely local affairs. This proposal had nothing to do with the constitutional Conference. It probably originated in the general feeling produced by the King's death that ancient quarrels should be settled by agreement and not by conflict. Before Parliament broke up

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Mr Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, gave his blessing to the idea in a public speech (which proves that the Conference itself had not then discussed it), and certain Liberal members for Scotland issued a manifesto declaring their belief that in the interests of administrative efficiency some measure of Home Rule should be given to Scotland as well as to Ireland.

As soon as people realized that the Irish problem and the constitutional problem were intimately connected, they at once began to discuss whether the federal scheme might not prove the way out of the first difficulty, if the Conference had found the solution of the second.

The idea which holds the field at the time of writing is that the Conference should recommend that a larger Convention, representing all parties, should be summoned after the New Year to discuss the revision of the Constitution of the United Kingdom as a whole. It is, of course, impossible to say whether the Conference will adopt this suggestion or not. It may solve the question of the House of Lords without reference to Home Rule; it may declare itself totally unable to reach an agreement on any point; it may report that a solution is possible, but only as the outcome of a larger constitutional change which they do not feel themselves in a position to discuss without the authority of Parliament. But whatever the actual outcome of the Conference, it is quite clear that the federal idea has come to stay. If events are propitious, it may become a practical question almost at once. If they are unpropitious, it may not come to a head for some years. But sooner or later the people of this country will have to make up their minds whether they are to adopt it or not.

There is some disagreement as to what federalism precisely entails. But, broadly speaking, it would mean that beneath the present British Parliament there should be provincial assemblies entrusted with the purely local concerns of the areas they represent. There might be two such bodies, for Great Britain on the one hand and Ireland on the other; or four, one for each of the ancient kingdoms of England,

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Scotland, Ireland and Wales. The British Parliament would continue to control Imperial affairs, and such matters as the customs and shipping, which were common to the United Kingdom.

The case of the federalists rests on two main foundations. In the first place, it aims at settling the perennial Irish question. There is much misapprehension about the nature of the Irish case. The Irish, of course, have a larger representation in the Parliament which controls the affairs of the United Kingdom than their numbers entitle them to. But they cherish national aspirations which prevent them from sinking their political identity in the larger identity of the United Kingdom, and which impel them to demand a separate Irish Parliament for purely Irish affairs. Gladstone, who was chiefly anxious to put an end to the obstruction which was destroying the traditions and efficiency of Parliament, proposed to meet the Irish demand in two different ways. In the first Home Rule bill (1886) he granted Ireland a national legislature, but withheld from the Irish representation in the Parliament at Westminster which controlled not only foreign and imperial affairs and certain matters such as currency, naturalization and volunteers, common to the whole kingdom, but taxed the Irish through the customs for purposes like military and naval defence. The 1886 bill thus violated one of the most sacred principles of the Constitution that there should be no taxation without representation. It was much the same as if the inhabitants of Quebec, Natal, or New South Wales were left their own state or provincial legislatures, but were refused representation in the Parliament of their respective Dominions. Such a bill was almost certain either to fail in working or to lead to the break-up of the Union, and was accordingly rejected. Gladstone's second bill in 1893 created an Irish legislature for local affairs, and kept the Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament, which controlled the customs and excise, militia and various other matters as well as foreign policy and defence. This bill, however, only removed the

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earlier difficulty by creating another. For while the Irish were represented in both assemblies which voted taxes, they were able to interfere in the purely local affairs of England, Scotland and Wales, though their own local affairs were beyond the purview of the common Parliament. This was tantamount to allowing the inhabitants of Quebec, Natal and New South Wales to keep their own state or provincial assemblies as hitherto, while the other states and provinces of the three Dominions were deprived of their legislatures and governed in all matters by the Dominion Parliament. This bill also failed.

The obvious way out was to carry the principle of the 1893 bill to its logical conclusion, and create another assembly to control the local affairs of England, Scotland and Wales, or three assemblies, one for each, with the same powers as the Irish assembly. This measure, for which opinion was not ripe in 1893, is precisely what the Federalists propose to-day. They do not contemplate breaking up the national unity of the United Kingdom. They wish to satisfy the aspirations of the Irish, and remove obstruction from Parliament, by conceding Home Rule all round in local matters like education, land and local government, while retaining the present Parliament, representative of the population of the British Isles for matters like defence, foreign policy and customs, which are the common concern of the whole nation.

Anxiety to satisfy the Irish demand might not be sufficient in itself to carry through so momentous a change in the British Constitution. The advocates for federalism, however, support their case on another ground. They declare that the present machinery of Parliament is breaking down. This assembly is expected to perform an incredible amount of difficult and responsible work. Parliament has to administer the domestic affairs of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales, and this at a time when scientific discovery is making the business of Government daily more complex and exacting; it has to frame laws on every conceivable subject, sometimes for

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these four kingdoms separately, sometimes for the United Kingdom as a whole; it is responsible for the government of India, Egypt and a host of minor dependencies; it controls the foreign policy upon which the peace, not of the British Isles alone, but of the great Dominions depends, and the military and naval services which back that policy and which defend the Empire, if it is unable to stave off war. People are beginning to recognize that it is impossible for one body of men to discharge all these functions without neglecting some, overrating others, and losing sight of the problem as a whole. In the words of a recent writer in the *Quarterly Review*:

“To Englishmen who have lived in one of the great dominions it seems astonishing that the people of Great Britain and Ireland should attempt to govern not only themselves, but a vast Empire, by one Parliament. Canada has ten Parliaments to govern some seven million people; Australia six Parliaments to govern some four and a half million people; South Africa five Parliaments to govern one million white people and five million Kaffirs. The single British Parliament governs forty-five million people and the whole Empire. Subjected as it is to so great a strain, the Parliamentary machine at times seems likely to come to a full stop.”

The position of the Cabinet is even worse. The same writer says:

“The responsibilities cast on the British Cabinet are greater than any that have been ever undertaken by a single body of men. The relations of Great Britain to the great powers of the world, her relations with the Dominions, the government of India, the government of Egypt and the administration of countless Crown Colonies, great and small, the problems of the defence of the Empire, the vast work of administration in Great Britain and Ireland, the preparation of all important legislation, constant attendance in Parliament, constant speechmaking in the country, and many social engage-

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ments—these are duties too multifarious and too burdensome to be performed, as they ought to be performed, by even the ablest Cabinet. How much time is it likely that the Cabinet, as a whole, can give to the consideration of its great measures? Are we to think that Sir Edward Grey gave much thought to the Budget or Lord Morley to the Licensing Bill? There can be little cohesion or unity left in a modern Cabinet. A Minister who is overwhelmed with the work of his department and who devotes what spare moments he has to Parliament and the platform, can have no time to keep an eye on his colleagues.”

The federalists have thus made out a strong case on both grounds. They have, too, advanced their arguments with great sincerity and moderation, and have clearly made an impression on public opinion. Public discussion of the idea, too, has been astonishingly free from party bias. The majority of writers in the Press seem to favour serious consideration of the scheme, and unite in agreeing that if it is ever to be carried it must be by consent of all parties. There is a general feeling that it would be a grave mistake to allow it to become the punch ball of a party conflict. What will happen the next few weeks will decide.

There is a tendency, however, in some quarters to confuse federation for the United Kingdom with the old idea of the federation of the Empire. The federal idea, as it is outlined in this article, has nothing to do with an Imperial constitution. It is concerned only with the domestic problems of the United Kingdom. If ever a real Imperial Union is to come about, it will be the outcome of a demand from the Dominions, not of a domestic complication in the United Kingdom. An Imperial authority, however it is constituted, will handle no business which is not the common concern of all parts of the Empire. It will be concerned with foreign affairs, the dependencies, defence, and will leave the domestic affairs, both of the British Isles and the overseas Dominions, severely alone. No stable Union could be built on the surrender to a common body of any such powers as

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are in dispute in the present controversy. It is well that this should be clearly understood from the outset or misunderstandings and suspicions may arise. The Home Rule which Gladstone proposed, and which Parnell accepted, gave Ireland powers similar to those enjoyed by the province of Quebec within the Dominion of Canada. The federalists of to-day—if their public utterances are a guide—propose no more than that not Ireland alone, but England, Scotland and Wales as well, should acquire the status of Quebec, under the sovereignty of a British Legislature. This, clearly enough, has little to do with Imperial Union.

AFFAIRS IN CANADA

I. SIR WILFRID LAURIER AND TARIFF REVISION

AT various points in the West deputations of farmers have met Sir Wilfrid Laurier in order to urge public ownership of terminal grain elevators, the construction and operation of the Hudson Bay railway by the government, and reduction of customs duties. The grain-growers are a powerful organization, tinctured with the radicalism for which western communities are distinguished. The social and political temper of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia is very like that of New Zealand and the Australian States. The three prairie provinces have established State telephone systems, and Manitoba is now organizing a system of grain elevators under control of an independent commission. There is much feeling also for State ownership and operation of railways, and generally a suspicious attitude towards corporations.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, however, is an individualist. He frankly confesses his distrust of state operation of railways. He opposed and overcame the movement for nationalization of the telegraph and telephone systems. It is settled that the Hudson Bay railway will be constructed and operated by a private company with assistance from the federal treasury. It is not clear that he will sanction public purchase of terminal elevators. In short, he believes in public regulation rather than in public ownership and in the greater efficiency of private management of services and enterprises which are not necessarily embraced in the functions of government.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier professes an academic devotion to free trade. At the beginning of his public career he was a protectionist. He has made protectionist speeches in the Quebec legislature and in the House of Commons. His contention was that protection was necessary to establish an industrial fabric in a new country and was part of the legitimate cost of national development. Long ago, however, his mind turned towards free trade, if, indeed, he ever gave

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favourable consideration to protection as a permanent national policy. During the year that he became leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons his party committed itself to free trade with the United States. This policy was modified by the National Liberal convention of 1893 into a declaration for freer trade relations with both Great Britain and the United States, with the gradual elimination of the principle of protection from the tariff. On his taking office in 1896 the tariff was revised downwards and the British preference established. During the last fourteen years there has been no material modification of duties, while the preference has been maintained as the corner-stone of Liberal fiscal policy.

During all these years, however, there has been an incipient agitation for tariff reduction. In Ontario the movement has been led by the Farmers' organization, of which *The Weekly Sun*, under Goldwin Smith's control, was the organ. In the West there is a strong feeling for low tariff, which has its articulate expression in the grain-growers' association. Down to 1896 the organized manufacturers had a practical alliance with the Conservative party. This was natural and inevitable so long as the Liberal party stood for low tariff. But, upon the whole, the tariff revision of 1897 was satisfactory to the protected manufacturers, and the result has been the gradual disappearance of the tariff as an issue between parties. With the division in the ranks of the manufacturers the Conservative leaders slackened in their zeal for protection. In the West Conservative candidates began to suggest reduction of customs imposts. In the east there was nothing to gain, in the west there was something to lose by the advocacy of higher duties. Hence the tariff has remained stationary, political controversy has turned upon other questions, and neither in the press nor from the platform has there been any general presentation of protectionist arguments.

Now, however, the fiscal controversy has been revived by the action of the western grain-growers. If they do not go

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the length of free trade, they demand substantially lower duties and better fiscal relations with the United States. They particularly desire free harvesters and the freer admission of all classes of farm machinery. The Payne tariff, in the original draft, provided for the free interchange of farm implements under reciprocal legislation by the Canadian Parliament. Canadian implements, however, are practically unknown in the United States, while much American farm machinery is sold in the western provinces of Canada. The disposition of American settlers is to purchase the machines and tools to which they were accustomed before they crossed the border. Moreover, there has always been a market for American manufactures in the Canadian west. It is contended, and no doubt correctly, that, owing to the limited population of Canada and the long haul from east to west, freight rates are against the Canadian manufacturer. Hence, it is argued that Canadian makers of farm implements could not secure a foothold in the United States, and that under free trade American manufacturers could drive Canadian machines out of the western markets. On the other hand, one of the great American implement companies has established extensive branch works in Ontario in order to escape the Canadian duties, while Canadian machines are sold freely in Australia and other remote markets.

These are the facts and statements which Sir Wilfrid Laurier has had to meet in the west, and perhaps he has not always found it easy to satisfy the low tariff deputations. He has pointed out that, although America suggests reciprocity in agricultural implements, duties running as high as forty-five per cent. are laid on material entering into their construction. He insists, therefore, that there must be an equal balance of duties on such material before the American offer can be reciprocated. He tells the deputations that the manufacturing supremacy of Great Britain was attained under protection; that the advance towards free trade must be gradual as in England, where two or three generations

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laboured for its accomplishment; that while reciprocity with the United States is a goal that may be attained, vested interests in Canada must be considered; that customs duties have been reduced under his administration, and that a tariff commission will be appointed to investigate industrial conditions and determine if further reductions can be made. As it would be easy to misinterpret these statements, probably it is better to leave the determination of their significance to events. What is certain is that Canadian industries will be subjected to a general investigation, with the chances in favour of an appeal to the country before the tariff is revised. It is also fairly certain that the Conservative politicians, notwithstanding that protection in Canada is the child of Conservatism, will endeavour to exploit the low-tariff sentiment of the west to the disadvantage of the Government.

NOTE.—Since our correspondent wrote, President Taft has made renewed advances to the Canadian Government. It has been arranged that at an early date—probably before the end of this year—a meeting shall take place between representatives of the American and Canadian Governments to discuss reciprocal reductions in their respective tariffs. Opinion in Canada seems to be hardening against reciprocity. Its opponents contend that as the American tariff against Canadian goods is nearly twice as high as the Canadian tariff against American goods, no negotiation should take place except upon the basis that the general level of duties in each country against the other should be the same. They also point to the movement in favour of lower duties in the United States, and declare that for internal reasons America is bound to reduce her duties shortly, without Canada having to make any concessions in return. Public opinion appears to concur with these views, and to be opposed to any all-round reduction which might enable American producers to overwhelm Canadian industries. It seems chiefly interested in the question whether the

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present Canadian duties are not higher than is required either for revenue or protective purposes, and therefore an important cause of the increased cost of living. It seems evident that there is little real feeling for free trade as a national policy. The people have no objection to tariffs as such, but are seriously considering whether the time has not arrived for a change in the scale of duty. The conference between Ottawa and Washington, therefore, seems more likely to confine itself to bargaining reductions which each desire for internal reasons, against one another, than to enter upon a serious discussion of the possible advantages of a general treaty of reciprocity, as was at one time thought probable.

II. IMPERIAL CO-OPERATION

MANY influences are operating towards the political unification of the Empire. Amongst these are the Pacific cable, steamship subsidies, the preferential treatment of British imports and the investment of British capital in Colonial enterprises. London is peculiarly the banker of the over-sea Dominions. During the last five years, according to *The Monetary Times* of Toronto, Great Britain has loaned Canada \$605,453,852. This sum includes an outlay of \$1,125,000 in the purchase of Canadian bank shares, investments of \$5,719,774 with loan and mortgage companies and of \$9,731,742 by British insurance companies. There were private purchases of municipal bonds to the amount of \$10,000,000. There were industrial investments of \$22,500,000, land and timber investments of \$19,000,000, and mining investments of \$56,315,500. There were Canadian public flotations in London of \$481,061,836. For the first six months of this year Canada obtained in Great Britain nearly \$120,000,000 for industrial, mining, financial and municipal purposes, for railway, land, and lumber companies and on Government account. During the last ten years over a million and a half of immigrants have entered

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the Dominion, and of these nearly 600,000 came from Great Britain. It is true that the Dominion has had a period of expansion perhaps unequalled even on this continent, but such an extraordinary movement of capital and population is not wholly explained by the natural wealth of the country or the cold and deliberate commercial calculations of British investors.

The Imperial sentiment behind these investments and this great volume of immigration is also expressed in the determination of Canada to assist in the naval defence of the Empire and in the movement to organize the Canadian land forces on the model of the British army. In the Imperial Defence Committee we have a common organ of Empire. The whole disposition of the militia department of Canada is to co-operate with the Imperial authorities in the movement to standardize the organization, establishments, training, arms and equipment of the forces of the Empire. We have assumed the cost and responsibility of maintaining the garrisons at Halifax and Esquimalt. In ten years the militia appropriations have increased from less than two millions to six and a half millions of dollars. A few weeks ago Sir John French came out, on the invitation of the Government, in order to investigate and report upon the organization and efficiency of the Canadian forces. It is understood that he was favourably impressed by the military college at Kingston and by the materiel of the artillery and infantry, both in older Canada and in the western provinces. There is, however, an expectation that he will report adversely upon the training and qualifications of officers and declare the inefficiency of the Canadian system of organization for actual warfare. There is much speculation as to the actual character of the report, and perhaps some disposition to resent unfavourable criticism. But Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia, has declared that the report contains nothing to which the Government objects, and it is certain that in his relations with troops and officers and in his consultations with ministers Sir John French was sympathetic

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and conciliatory. But he was here to discharge a high duty both to the Dominion and to the Empire. It is not to be expected that he will be feeble, apologetic or evasive. If he finds it necessary to mark inefficiency, to counsel resistance to local influences, and to denounce the mischievous intrusion of political patronage, Canadians will be robust enough to esteem the service he does to the country and ready to support the Government in such measures as may be necessary to give effect to judicious recommendations. In any event, the result of Sir John French's visit must be to increase the fighting efficiency of the Canadian forces, and so to strengthen the defensive power of the Empire.

By co-operation between the Imperial and Canadian Governments postal charges on books, magazines and newspapers have been materially reduced. The result is an enormous increase in the distribution of British publications in Canada. At the last session of the federal Parliament an act was adopted to bring cable companies under the jurisdiction of the Canadian railway commission. It is suggested that under this legislation the rate per word for urgent cablegrams should be 1s., for commercial messages 6d., and for press despatches 3d. It is provided, however, that the act shall take effect only upon concurrent action by the Imperial Government, and it is understood that the authorities at Washington will be asked to join with Great Britain and Canada in establishing public control over cable charges. The Canadian Postmaster General believes that lower cable rates will lead to a material increase of trade between Canada and the mother country. He is now in England and will endeavour to persuade the Imperial Government to take the step necessary to give effect to the Canadian legislation. In any event, whether by compulsion or by voluntary action, there is ground to believe that some reduction of cable tolls will come in the near future.

An even more important question, and one which should engage the attention of the next Imperial Conference, is the regulation of ocean freight rates. It is admitted that the

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North Atlantic west-bound freight conference has greatly increased ocean charges. This is accomplished by an arbitrary agreement between the shipping companies and by a deferred rebate of ten per cent, which is returned to shippers who refuse to employ vessels outside the Conference. The combination covers ships using British, European and United States ports as well as those in the North Atlantic west-bound freight association. By the new tariff, which took effect at the first of the year, the rates on dry goods were increased by twenty per cent. On many classes of hardware there have been recent increases of 10s. per ton and in seven years on some classes of goods there have been advances from 7s. 6d. to 22s. 6d. On the other hand, there have been decreases on grain and cattle and on various cheap commodities. The decreases, however, are few and inconsiderable in comparison with the increases, and it is manifest that the action of the shipping companies deprives British exporters of the advantages of the Canadian tariff preference.

It is necessary, therefore, that some form of public control over ocean rates shall be established. In Great Britain, as in Canada and elsewhere, where the railways are operated by private companies, there is machinery for the regulation of freight charges. In Canada this power is vested in a public commission, which has authority to investigate and adjust grievances and which must sanction new freight schedules before they can go into effect. Negotiations are now proceeding between Canada and the United States with the object of creating an international tribunal, or devising some form of concurrent legislation to regulate freight tolls on traffic passing between the two countries. It is found that rates on traffic originating in Canada for points in the United States or in the United States for points in the Dominion cannot be satisfactorily regulated by the existing machinery. Hence the necessity for co-operation between the Canadian railway board and the American interstate commerce Commission. Similar co-operation is essential be-

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tween Great Britain and Canada in order to control ocean charges. It is found that combination between ocean carriers is as feasible and as destructive to mutual trade interests as combination between land carriers. It will be useless to give a fiscal preference to British manufacturers in Canada if the whole advantage may be seized by the shipping companies. So the advantages of mutual preferences could be destroyed by shipping combinations. It is not a question, however, which has any necessary relation to fiscal policy. It is vital to freedom of trade and equitable treatment of shippers that ocean monopoly should be prevented and adequate public control established. No question of greater importance can claim the attention of Imperial statesmen. There is reason to think that both the Imperial and Canadian Governments have the subject under consideration. It is certain that Canada will heartily cooperate with the British authorities in any well-considered measure to protect traders and manufacturers from undue exactions by the shipping companies.

III. PARTIES AND THE NAVY

THE determination of the Government to organize a navy has had some curious political effects. The movement began a year and a half ago with a resolution by Hon. George E. Foster, Conservative member of the House of Commons for North Toronto, declaring that it was the duty of Canada to assume her proper share of responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coast line and great sea ports. This resolution lay on the order paper for weeks, and it began to be suspected that there was division of opinion in the Conservative caucus. Action was hastened by the discussion of the British naval estimates of 1909. The facts stated in the Imperial Parliament concerning the accelerated naval programme of Germany and the apparent failure of the mother country to maintain the two-power standard roused an Imperial

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feeling such as had not been witnessed since the outbreak of war in South Africa. Under this impulse Mr Foster brought forward his motion, and the House of Commons, under direction of the Prime Minister and the Conservative leader, adopted unanimously a joint resolution declaring that Parliament would cordially approve of any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy, that the House was in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain was essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the Empire and the peace of the world, and that if the need should arise the Canadian people would be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that might be required to give to the Imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and the honour of the Empire.

Thus both parties seemed to be pledged to the organization of a Canadian navy and against direct contributions to the Admiralty. But the apparent unanimity of Parliament failed to secure unanimity in the country. A few influential newspapers in the English provinces urged an immediate contribution of Dreadnoughts. The Conservative and Nationalist press of Quebec opposed both direct contributions and the organization of a Canadian fleet. Representative western Conservatives expressed dissatisfaction with the policy of Parliament. Mr Borden, leader of the Opposition, in various speeches gave a stout support to the platform formulated in the joint resolution. But when Parliament reassembled he faced a caucus divided and disorganized on the issue, and with Mr Monk, the Quebec leader of the party, in open revolt. In short, the Opposition was determined to have an alternative policy to that of the Government, and when the ministerial programme providing for purchase of the *Niobe* and the *Rainbow* and the construction in Canada of four ships of the Bristol type and six destroyers to be divided between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, was

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disclosed, the Opposition offered as an alternative policy the immediate contribution to the Admiralty of two Dreadnoughts or the equivalent in money and the submission of the Government's proposals to a vote of the people. This resolution united the Opposition with the exception of Mr Monk and his French Canadian colleagues. They proved to be irreconcilable, and as a result a remarkable situation has developed in Quebec.

While there has been no actual resignation or formal expulsion, Mr Monk ceases to hold the Conservative leadership for Quebec. There has been a tacit assumption of the office by the Hon. C. J. Doherty, an Irish Roman Catholic of high character and sound political judgement, who sits in the Commons for one of the divisions of Montreal. In a series of meetings held in Ontario and the eastern provinces by the Opposition leader he was accompanied by Mr Doherty. The significance of this proceeding is obvious, and no doubt in the English provinces Mr Doherty is entirely acceptable. But ever since confederation, as in the old Parliament of United Canada, each party has had a French leader. Mr Doherty is not French, and he will find it difficult to establish the ascendancy of leadership in Quebec. It is believed, however, that no French Canadian, in or out of Parliament, aspires to the position from which Mr Monk has removed himself. It is the settled determination of French Conservatives to oppose the naval programme of the Government. On all other questions they are in substantial accord with Mr Borden. But upon this issue they mean to make their appeal to the French constituencies. Naturally, therefore, Mr Monk has effected a coalition with Mr Bourassa, the leader of the French Canadian Nationalists, and manifestly the object is to elect a group to the House of Commons pledged against naval contributions and unfriendly to all Imperial enterprises.

Mr Bourassa was one of the most brilliant of the younger French Canadians who entered Parliament when Sir Wilfrid Laurier succeeded to office fourteen years ago. He was a

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close friend of the Prime Minister, and at any time down to his estrangement from the Liberal leader could have had a seat in the Cabinet. His severance from the Government began with the Boer War, and he steadily drifted from armed neutrality to positive hostility. Eventually he withdrew from the House of Commons and was elected to the Quebec legislature, where he was one of the most vigorous opponents of the provincial Liberal Government. He has, however, never shown any disposition to join the Conservative party, nor had he even shown any sympathy with Mr Monk until the naval issue appeared. He has great personal charm. It was a common opinion that in either French or English he was the most finished speaker in the House of Commons. He is immensely influential with French audiences, and he is heard with respect in Ontario, even when he speaks in the teeth of the dearest convictions and prejudices of its people. A rigid Ultramontane and a fervent French Nationalist, both church and race unite to enhance his power in Quebec. He is, moreover, a man of absolute integrity, intolerant of the baser practices of politics, and equal to sacrifice for his convictions and principles. In cooperation with Mr Monk, who is also an attractive and effective speaker, he is bound to make an impression on Quebec, and it is conceivable, although improbable, that after the next election the Nationalist group may hold the balance of power in the House of Commons.

It is said Sir Wilfrid Laurier has admitted that when he passes from the stage Mr Bourassa will control Quebec. But French Canadians are very proud of the gifts and successes of the Prime Minister, and while he lives no rival is likely to divide or possess the kingdom. It seems probable, however, that in the next election the Conservative party will be unable to create an effective organization in Quebec. In some constituencies there will be candidates in active sympathy with Mr Borden, but there will be also a separate Nationalist organization with candidates owing special allegiance to Mr Monk and Mr Bourassa. In the English

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provinces the Government's naval policy will be denounced as an inadequate discharge of Imperial obligations and as making for the separation of Canada from the Empire, while in Quebec Sir Wilfrid Laurier will be assailed as the agent of a dangerous Imperialism, committed to a costly militarism, and careless of the dignity, authority and autonomy of Canada. Moreover, this remarkable situation is not the result of any deliberate plot to destroy the Prime Minister in his own province or of any unholy compact between Conservatives and Nationalists, but the natural action of forces which could not be controlled by the Conservative leader, and which, if not overcome by Sir Wilfrid Laurier, may give to a separate and independent group in parliament a potent voice in grave issues of national and Imperial concern.

Canada, September 1910.

SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS

TO understand the present political position in South Africa it is necessary to go back a little way. Two years ago what is now the Union was four separate colonies, quite independent of one another except for the fact that they had adopted by agreement a common customs tariff. In three out of the four the government was in the hands of a party constituted on the same lines. This was commonly though not officially styled the Dutch party, and was composed mainly of persons of that descent and language. The use of these racial descriptions in current political controversy is very properly deprecated, because it tends to preserve the memory of a division on racial lines which thinking men on both sides wish to drop. But it need not be misunderstood in a review written mainly for students of politics. No one will deny that from Majuba to the late war South African opinion was in fact divided primarily on racial lines. The division was kept open by the existence of the Republics. Every one looked forward to the union of South Africa; but the question was whether the Colonies should absorb the Republics into a state forming part of the British Empire, or the Republics absorb the Colonies into one which should be independent. The division of parties on such a point was naturally for the most part racial.

That question, however, was settled by the war. The Boer leaders in the late Republics accepted the settlement as an accomplished fact. Having accepted it, they were not long in recognizing that the status of a self-governing dominion is in the present condition of the world much more secure than that of a petty republic. In a short time the bulk of their followers came to take the same view. It is doubtful if to-day more than a very small minority of the Dutch have even a theoretical desire for separation from the Empire, or would take separation if they could have it for the asking. It is certain that none of them would make any substantial sacrifice to obtain it. So far as the desire for it remains at all,

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it does so as a decaying sentiment. For practical purposes the ideal of South African independence is dead—though a dozen years ago it was cherished by half the population of South Africa. And with its disappearance has disappeared the cause which kept racial division between the British and Dutch constantly alive and festering.

But it is only eight years since this ideal received its death-blow at the peace of Vereeniging, and the process of dissolution, rapid as it has been, was not accomplished in a day. Besides, party traditions and connexions can hold individuals together even after the party ideal has been abandoned or modified. Thus we have still in the main a racial division of political parties, though the reason for race feeling has gone, and though all politicians agree to condemn and ignore it except occasionally, when they wish for electioneering purposes either to appeal to it themselves or to accuse their opponents of doing so. The one party is still mainly British and the other mainly Dutch, because both are still composed of people who acted together when the leading question was whether South Africa was to be a British dominion or a Dutch republic.

If there had been other dividing lines crossing the racial one, the break-up of the racial characterization of parties might have been quicker. Unfortunately the most obvious line of division—that between the farming and the town population—coincides very closely with the racial line. Except in the eastern province of the Cape Colony and in Natal—which stands by itself—the great majority of the country population is of Dutch descent and Dutch-speaking. The great majority of the town populations all through South Africa are of British descent and English-speaking. Thus the divergence of views and of interests which in many matters naturally prevails between town and country has helped to perpetuate the racial character of the party divisions. It is of course an accidental coincidence and it is subject to exceptions. Some of these and the anomalies which they create in the parties as now composed will be seen later on.

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After this digression we may return to the situation of two years ago. As stated, the Dutch or country party was in power in three out of the four Colonies. In the Cape Colony and the Transvaal it was reinforced by a British wing, which was represented in the ministry out of proportion to its voting strength in the country. At the Cape this section called itself the South African party, and had an organization distinct from that of the country Dutch party (called the "Bond"). It was composed chiefly of men of British descent, but many—though not all—of its members had for one reason or another acted with the Dutch even during the time of conflict of racial ideals. Its adherents were mostly townsmen, and at the time of the last Cape elections it was probably strengthened by the accession of many voters who had ordinarily gone with the Progressives—as the British party was called—but who had been discontented in one respect or another by the acts of Dr Jameson's preceding administration. Mr Merriman, the Prime Minister, was a member of this wing—so were Mr Currey and Mr Burton.

In the Transvaal, also, there was a British wing to the ministerial party—represented by Mr Solomon and Mr Hull in the Ministry, and by four other "Nationalist" members, as they were called, in the House. Besides them, the British element was represented by three labour members, who generally voted with the Government, and by Mr (now Sir Thomas) Cullinan, who sat as a Het Volk member. This wing was in a rather different position from the South African party at the Cape. None of its members had any long-standing connexion with the Dutch party. On the contrary, those of them who took any active part in politics before the war, such as Mr Solomon, Mr Hull and Mr Wybergh, had been prominently associated with the Uitlander agitation. The immediate reasons for their alliance and that of their supporters with the Dutch party were either personal or were based on anti-capitalist feeling. The Progressives were closely identified in the public mind

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with the leaders of the mining industry, and those who distrusted the political aims of the "mine magnates," or who, perhaps, had quarrelled with them individually, supported the opposite side. A similar feeling no doubt led the three labour members to rank themselves as supporters of the Government. And, apart from these, one-half of the House consisted of a solid regiment of Het Volk members, returned by the country constituencies.

In the Orange River Colony the Unie—corresponding to the Bond in the Cape Colony and to Het Volk in the Transvaal—had an overwhelming majority, for the British population was small. There remains Natal. Here the racial division of parties had never existed, for the reason that there were hardly any Dutch in Natal, except in the two northern districts, which were annexed from the Transvaal after the war. Indeed, there were no regular party lines at all, since the under-representation of the towns did not allow them to constitute a party on the lines of town against country. The Natal Parliament was divided into groups, formed mainly on personal lines, and without much cohesion. The Ministry last in office represented chiefly the farming interest, and was kept in power chiefly on the consideration that it was more likely than any rival group of politicians to maintain friendly relations with the Transvaal Government, and so to obtain trade and railway privileges which were important to various local interests.

As the Dutch or country party was in power in the Transvaal, Cape Colony and Orange River Colony, having in each of the two former its British wing, so the main British, or town party—called the Progressives—was in opposition. In the Transvaal Parliament it had 21 out of 69 members, under the leadership of Sir George Farrar—in the Cape Parliament 37 out of 107 members, under the leadership of Dr Jameson. Its normal strength in the electorate was probably greater than indicated by these figures, for in the country districts the Progressive minority was regularly swamped and counted for nothing. Moreover, the

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ordinary feeling of discontent with an outgoing Government told against this party at the last elections, not only in the Cape Colony, but also in the Transvaal, since some of the Progressive leaders had been closely associated with the Crown Colony administration. In the Orange River Colony the Opposition only numbered five out of a house of 39 members and was led by Sir John Fraser.

The calling of the National Convention and the carrying through of the work of unification put an end for the time being to the ordinary process of party warfare. Both sides co-operated for the common end. At one moment it looked as if new parties might spring up out of the division between those who favoured unification and those who preferred federation. But this line of difference died out as the latter section became converted or waived their ideas, and the Unificationists had it all their own way. Still, though the making of union did not immediately involve the formation of new parties on new lines, it had the effect of bringing it home to both sides that there was no longer any real ground for the old division on racial lines. Dutch and English alike—General Botha and Dr Jameson, Sir Percy Fitzpatrick and President Steyn—found that they had a common ideal as far as the great question of the day was concerned. The convention never fell into the rut of racial division; and for this a tribute must be paid to the statesmanship of its members, that they were able to resist so successfully and completely the influence of habit and tradition.

Possibly they were somewhat surprised by their own magnanimity; and possibly this surprise raised hopes which were destined to remain unfulfilled. At any rate, soon after the draft act of Union was settled, a movement arose for the formation of the first Union government on the lines of what was by some called a coalition, by others a "best-man government." It seems pretty clear that the first formal proposals to this effect came from Dr Jameson; but it seems equally clear that they commended themselves, at least for

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a time, to General Botha. This is not to be wondered at. A strong feeling of personal sympathy and liking had grown up between these two men; and if existing party ties could be disregarded it is probably correct to say that each of them would rather act with the other than with a good many of their actual colleagues. Dr Jameson was able—in the teeth of no slight opposition—to bring his party as a whole to the view that a coalition or “best-man” government would be acceptable. General Botha was less successful. Indeed, his task was the more difficult one. To begin with, the acceptance of this idea by his party would have meant giving up to the other side a substantial share of the spoils of office which otherwise they might reasonably reckon on keeping entirely for themselves. Then he had to deal not only with his own followers in the Transvaal but with the Cape and Free State sections of the party. Now in the Transvaal the majority of the parliamentary leaders on the ministerial side are men whose ideas of government and legislation are more in harmony with those of the town than with those of the country party. That is to say that, putting apart the racial division—which, as stated above, has no longer any effective sanction—General Botha and Mr Smuts would find more support for many aspects of their policy from the members of the Opposition than they will from the bulk of their own followers. A coalition therefore would have distinct attractions and advantages for them in giving them a freer hand to carry out their own ideas.

In the Cape Colony, and still more in the Free State, the case is different. There the leaders of the country party are for the most part thoroughly in sympathy with the conservative views of their followers. For them a coalition would not mean greater freedom to carry out their ideas; it would mean a partial sacrifice of their own views to those of the other party in the coalition. Mr Merriman, the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and Mr Fischer, the Prime Minister of the Free State, both voiced this feeling in speeches against coalition when the subject was mooted.

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And from their own point of view they were perfectly right.

General Botha therefore found the suggestion of a coalition received with hostility by "my people," as he calls them. If he had persisted, he would have had to face the risk of more or less serious secessions. Opinions differ as to the extent to which the secession would have gone. Some hold that Mr Merriman and Mr Fischer would have carried the Bond and the Unie with them en masse, and would have been supported by a large body of malcontents in the Transvaal itself. In that case General Botha would have been left with only his own personal following and perhaps a few recruits from the Cape Colony and still fewer from the Free State. This force, added to that of the Unionists and the Natal members, might have been sufficient to put a coalition Ministry into power. But such a result would have destroyed the solidity of General Botha's own political position, and left him very much in the situation of a commander who has made peace with the enemy without the consent of his army. Others, again, contend that if he had pushed the matter he would have carried with him not only the whole Transvaal contingent but most of the Cape members and a strong party in the Free State, leaving only the extreme reactionaries behind. And between these two limits there are other theories as to what he could or could not have done. But this is an idle speculation, since whatever the risk was he did not choose to take it—whether because he judged it too great or that he was not himself enthusiastic about the merits of the coalition scheme. When it came to the point he preferred to continue to act with the party to which he was traditionally attached rather than to break it up for the sake of acting with Dr Jameson. On the facts as they appear, no other decision was to be expected from a man of his cautious temperament.

Consequently, when he was called on to form a ministry last May, he did so on strictly party lines as far as the three larger Colonies were concerned. He selected two colleagues from the existing Transvaal Ministry, four from that of the

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Cape, and two from that of the Orange River Colony. Two of the Natal ministers were also invited to join the Cabinet, and accepted the invitation.

When the Ministry had been so formed it at once became evident that the first Union elections would be fought on the old party lines. In anticipation of this—for General Botha's decision was practically avowed before the Ministry was actually formed—the Progressive Opposition in the three Colonies drew together and, after a conference at Bloemfontein in May, organized themselves as a single party under the name of Unionists. A little later the *Het Volk* organization in the Transvaal absorbed its British wing, and the joint body took the name of the South African National party. So far, however, no attempt has been made to effect a formal union with the *Unie* in the Free State or with the *Bond* and the South African party in the Cape Colony, which retain their separate styles and organizations. Possibly it was judged better to leave them separate until after the elections. The country constituencies are safe, in any case, and it may have been thought that the existing local party organizations had a better chance of capturing seats in the towns of the Transvaal and the Cape Colony than if they were merged into one body. Meanwhile the Ministry itself serves as an informal head committee, sufficient to preserve a close alliance between the branches.

Natal has remained apart and taken no share in these proceedings. An attempt was made to organize in the province a "Natal" party, bound together by a policy of defending Natalian interests, but it seems to have fallen flat. General Botha has visited Natal and is believed to have recommended candidates in certain constituencies. Dr Jameson and other Unionist leaders have also visited it and expounded their policy in public speeches, but Natal has not been brought into the general Unionist organization. So far as can be judged, most of the Natal candidates will preserve an attitude of independence up to the elections, not pledging themselves to support either the Government or the Oppo-

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sition, though some will be known to have a leaning one way and some the other, while a few may possess a definite intention to act with one or the other side.

In the other three Colonies the position is more simple. The three Governments which existed till last May have united into one and are asking the electors to renew their lease of power. Practically they stand on their records. They have not as a whole put forward any official programme. General Botha brought one forward at the congress of the Transvaal section of the party, but it has not been adopted, nor, as far as the public knows, even considered by the Cape Colony and the Free State sections, while Mr Smuts has stated that it is merely provisional and that a definite programme for the whole party will have to be agreed upon after the elections. In its outlines it is very similar to the programme published by the Unionists, though the latter is more elaborate in details and in some respects goes further. The likeness is not surprising, since it appears that both the Unionist programme and General Botha's are based on the general outline of policy agreed upon between the Prime Minister and Dr Jameson at the time of the negotiations for coalition. In the form in which the Unionists have now adopted it the t's have been crossed and the i's dotted; in General Botha's version there is more vagueness, probably out of regard to the susceptibilities of the "weaker brethren" among his followers. In the Cape Colony and the Free State, where on several points it might have been necessary to be still more vague, the difficulty has been overcome by not adopting it officially at all.

In spite of the similarity of programmes the electoral struggle is proceeding in general on well-defined party lines. In the "backveld" constituencies of the Transvaal, the Free State and the western province of the Cape Colony the result is a foregone conclusion. It is a walk-over for the ministerialists. The electorate in those constituencies is overwhelmingly Dutch and permeated with the traditions of racialism as well as with party spirit. A Unionist candidate

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would stand a little chance in any of them as an English Conservative in the south of Ireland, and the only trouble the Ministerial party will have is a possible revolt in a few constituencies against candidates imposed from headquarters. From this source the Government is sure of a solid body of supporters, who will number nearly half the house. But on the assumption that the Natal members, except possibly one or two from the northern districts, must be reckoned as independents, this will not give them a working majority, especially if a few Dutch malcontents are returned, as seems to be possible, in the Free State, where the very weakness of the Opposition has apparently loosened the bonds of discipline on the other side. The Government must therefore hold or win a certain number of urban or semi-urban seats. They are known to be anxious about this, and it is generally supposed that General Botha's determination to attack Sir Percy Fitzpatrick's constituency in Pretoria instead of retaining his own safe seat at Standerton was inspired by this anxiety. Several such constituencies are represented in the Cape Colony by members of the South African party, and in view of the possible "swing of the pendulum" these are by no means secure. The crucial point, however, lies in the Witwatersrand, which returns seventeen out of the thirty-six Transvaal members in the Union Parliament. If the Unionists can carry all of these, besides a seat at Pretoria, and if matters go badly for the ministerialists in the Cape Colony, the Government will only be able to maintain itself by the grace of the Natal members—a situation which, of course, it desires to avoid.

Besides putting forward candidates of their own in some divisions on the Witwatersrand, the Nationalists are supporting Labour candidates in other divisions. It is denied that there is any formal alliance between the Government and the Labour party, and this may be technically true. But it can hardly be by accident that nowhere on the Witwatersrand are a Labour man and a Nationalist standing concurrently except in the two divisions where the Labour

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candidate is more likely to draw votes from the Unionist than from his ministerial opponent. Elsewhere either the Nationalists are supporting the Labour man or the official Labour party is supporting the Nationalist. In some respects this arrangement—since it must not be called an alliance—is curious. There is no sympathy between the ideas of policy which are common to all Labour parties, and those which inspire the “landed aristocracy” forming the main body of the Nationalists. But presumably the Government regards the Labour men as unlikely to be numerous enough to give serious trouble, and supports them as diminishing the strength of the regular Opposition. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the Dutch population in Johannesburg largely consists of the poorest class—the driftage of “bywoners” from the farms; and that this element, while it still retains in a great measure its political faith in its racial leaders, is by its circumstances brought into sympathy with much of the Labour policy. From this point of view an understanding with the Labour party on the Witwatersrand is convenient for the ministerialists, and not unnatural. But considering not only the conservative instincts but the prejudices of the country party as a whole, it is difficult to believe that such an understanding would survive any sustained attempt on the part of the Labour leaders to carry their political ideals into practice. In the present elections it is doubtful whether the Labour party will not lose more from the suspicion of alliance with the ministerialists than it will gain from any arrangement about candidates. The artisan or the miner is generally aware that a labour policy on Australian lines—which is what he really wants when he is a politician at all—is not in the least in accordance with the ideas of the country population.

It may be said then that the interest of the elections lies in the towns and in the question of the extent to which the Ministry will be able to gain support there—in the Cape Colony through the “South African party,” in the Transvaal through the success of Nationalist and Labour

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candidates on the Witwatersrand. The Unionists have the advantage of criticism. Both in the Cape and in the Transvaal there are parts of the policy and actions of the late Governments which are open to damaging attack, apart from the discontent which always accumulates against any Government; in the Cape in particular there are the concessions made by Mr Merriman's Ministry to the wine-farming interest; in the Transvaal such matters as failure to redress inequalities of taxation, excessive and sometimes misdirected expenditure of revenue in the country districts, the alleged maladministration of the railways, and a certain amount of jobbery and inefficiency in some, though not all, of the government departments. But as an election cry all these have been overshadowed by the question of "Hertzogism." General Hertzog, as Attorney-General of the Orange River Colony, passed an education act which has raised a storm of opposition among the English-speaking population there. It is not necessary here to discuss the merits of the quarrel. It will be enough to say that the charges brought against the act—which compels not only the learning of both Dutch and English in schools, but that all subjects must be taught in both languages concurrently—are, firstly, that it destroys educational efficiency by causing a lesson given in one language to be repeated in the other; secondly, that it has led to the wholesale dismissal of the imported English teachers and their replacement by Afrianders of much lower qualifications. As the people of Bloemfontein have subscribed a considerable amount of money to start separate schools, they presumably feel that their grievance in the matter is a serious one. Education is a matter left to the Provincial Councils by the constitution; and General Botha while condemning the Hertzog act has, on this ground, declared himself unable to do anything. But the inclusion of General Hertzog in the Cabinet—the approval of the Hertzog act which has been avowed by several of his colleagues and by the Dutch press generally—the fear that an attempt may

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be made to extend it to other provinces, and finally sympathy with another English-speaking community—all these combine to make “Hertzogism” a leading topic in the elections elsewhere than in the Free State, and particularly on the Witwatersrand.

The history of this particular incident up to the present certainly gives colour to the view that General Botha and the progressive members of his Cabinet are by no means certain to be able to carry out their own policy against the reactionaries. It therefore reinforces the demand of the Unionists that, since there is not to be a “best-man” Government drawn from both sides, there shall at least be a strong Opposition.

The main cry on the other side on the Witwatersrand is that of “anti-capitalism.” This was very successful at the last Transvaal elections and is being brought into use again. In a community which depends entirely on one industry, the control of which is concentrated in the hands of less than a dozen firms, there is naturally a good deal of anti-capitalist feeling, which gathers strength from several sources. First of all there is the objection—sometimes reasoned, sometimes vague—which a certain number of people feel against the present “capitalist” constitution of society; then the much more general feeling that the great powers placed in the hands of very large employers require to be severely watched and checked; then the hostility raised by individual grievances, which, where the employers are so few and so conspicuous, tends to become more concentrated than in an ordinary industrial centre.

Now, in the minds of most people on the Witwatersrand “capitalism” is identified on its political side with the Unionist party. This is a temporary accident. It is true that the heads or managers of two or three of the principal mining “houses” are leading Unionist politicians; but this, like other things, is a legacy from the days when political opinions were formed essentially on racial lines. As a matter of fact, at the present time one of the great gold-mining

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“houses” strenuously supports the Government; at least three others, including the two “German” firms, have always observed an attitude of friendly neutrality towards it while professedly they take no part in politics, and it is an open secret that the attitude of the “political” firms on the Unionist side is determined mainly by the personal convictions of one or two men, and that if they were to retire their “houses” would join the rank of the neutrals. Moreover, the great diamond mining company of the Transvaal is controlled by ministerialists, and its chairman sat in the last Transvaal Parliament as a Het Volk member. Still, for the time being, the identification spoken of does exist in the public mind, and therefore the orators on the ministerial side find it easy to make frequent appeals to the anti-capitalist sentiment. This, indeed, is their strongest card. Some sort of consciousness that the Government is not and is not likely to be “anti-capitalist” in the ordinary sense of the word perhaps prevents them from pushing the appeals with any great violence. But even in the moderate form which they assume they are worth a good deal on the platform. They are often mingled, and sometimes confused, with appeals to a different sentiment, that prejudice against the stranger who comes to make money which was invoked by the late President Krüger against the whole Uitlander population, magnates and miners alike. Such invectives no doubt represent a real feeling on the part of the country population against the inhabitants of the large towns en masse, but it is strange to find them used by people like Mr Hull, who were themselves the target for them a few years ago. However, they also have their effect, especially when they are joined with exhortations not to be “ruled from Park Lane.” They are part of the stock-in-trade of ministerialist speakers, in the Cape Colony as well as in the Transvaal, and are sometimes addressed to audiences which are quite as liable to the reproach which they convey as any of those against whom they are directed.

Before this article is published it will be known to what

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extent the Ministry has succeeded in strengthening its phalanx of country members with a contingent from the towns. Should the contingent be even moderately large, the position of the Government will be assured and the political interest of the next five years will lie in the conflict between its progressive and reactionary sections, a conflict which will be conducted behind a veil and the progress of which the public will only be able to conjecture from the resulting policy. If, on the other hand, the Unionists sweep the towns—as is possible, though not likely—the situation will be more complicated. Even in the extreme case ministerialists must have a substantial majority over the Unionists if the Natal members are counted as belonging to neither side. The bulk of the latter will probably be returned unpledged, and if the balance of power in the Lower House is found to rest in their hands it is doubtful if General Botha will be able to retain office with his present Cabinet. In that case the negotiations for a “best-man” Ministry may be reopened. Dr Jameson has publicly professed his continued adherence to this policy, whatever the issue of the elections may be. The probability, however, is that the ministerialists will carry enough seats to give them a majority in the Lower House over the Unionists and the Natal independents combined. In the Senate their majority is already assured and will no doubt be strengthened, as the Union Government has still to make eight nominations. The Unionists are weakly represented in that body, not only in numbers, but in debating strength. Assuming, therefore, that the Botha Ministry continues in office, the extent to which its conduct and policy are influenced by the Opposition will depend entirely on the size and discipline of the minority in the assembly.

It will be seen that controversy in the elections has turned upon questions of personnel and upon the merits of particular measures and acts of administration rather than upon admitted differences of policy. The family likeness in outline of the two programmes which have been published leaves

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little room for argument of the latter sort, since both parties profess the same objects in general. It only remains open to either side to dwell on the incompleteness or vagueness of their opponents' declarations—the inconsistency of their present professions with their past policy—the unlikelihood of their doing anything substantial to forward the aims which they avow. In this kind of debate the Unionists have the advantage that they represent a more homogeneous party and one more likely to be agreed internally about many planks of their platform. The urban party—whether at the ports or at the mining centres—can reasonably pretend to a common policy and common ideas about such matters as education, the civil service, immigration and closer settlement and so on. It is more difficult for the ministerialists to reconcile the views which the bulk of their country followers notoriously hold on these subjects with those which must be professed in order to gain a hearing in the towns. To balance this, the ministerialists have the advantage on what may be called the personal side of the election campaign, owing to the anti-capitalist and anti-Uitlander feeling referred to above, which, as far as it is an effective factor, tells against the Unionists.

Besides the questions dealt with in the published programmes—both those mentioned, and others such as Asiatic immigration, on which there is pretty general agreement—there are one or two which are of first-class importance, judged by the amount of public interest which they excite in certain parts of the Union, but which have not been taken up by either party. The first of these is the question of the separation of the eastern from the western province of the Cape Colony. There is a strong feeling for this measure in the eastern province, which has for a long time considered itself neglected in the Cape Parliament and demanded local autonomy. At one time recently the feeling seemed likely to cause a local disruption of the Unionist party. The eastern constituencies clamoured for the separation movement to be officially blessed by the

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party leaders and threatened to put up independent "separatist" candidates if this was refused. To consent would have been to destroy the Unionist chances in the Cape peninsula, which like the rest of the western province is strongly against separation. The ministerialists were in the same difficulty over the question, though to a less extent, because their prospects in the eastern province are poor in any case, and therefore they would not hesitate to denounce separation if it came to an issue. However, Dr Jameson succeeded in convincing the "separatists" that nothing was to be gained by making the question one of confidence, and the danger to the Unionists was averted. For all that the movement remains a strong one, and more will probably be heard of it in the course of the next year or two.

The other important question of this kind is that of the native franchise. Here there is a cross division on both sides. Most of the Cape members are not only pledged to maintain the existing native franchise in that province, but have declared their approval of a native franchise in principle. Both personal convictions and the existence of a native vote able to turn the balance in a number of Cape constituencies forbid either party to recede from this position. The Bond and the South African party are even more deeply committed than the Unionists, and Mr Sauer, who may be called the leader of the Cape Colony wing in the Ministry, is generally looked on as a protagonist of native claims in this matter. On the other hand, public opinion in the northern provinces, both in town and country, is absolutely opposed to any extension of the native franchise beyond the Cape, and would welcome its curtailment there, if it were possible. Thus, on neither side can the leaders afford to see this particular question brought into prominence. The difficulty has been solved by a tacit agreement among them not to make it a party matter. This agreement has so far been honourably observed by the principal men on both sides—though some of the Labour and Nationalist candidates on the Witwatersrand have

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attempted to make capital out of the question by arguing that, since Dr Jameson is a Cape Colony man and General Botha a Transvaaler, the Unionists are more likely than the ministerialists to impose the Cape native franchise on the other provinces. Dr Jameson, however, stated his own personal position in the matter quite clearly in a speech at Johannesburg in August, and repeated it in Natal. It is that he considers himself bound not to press the extension of the native franchise to any province unless that province itself desires it—that is, presumably, unless a majority of the members from the province vote for it. General Botha has, as a rule, avoided the question, but is reported to have said at one meeting that he was against any extension of the native franchise beyond the Cape Colony. There is not much doubt that his own personal view is hostile to the native franchise altogether.

It thus seems probable that this question will be kept out of the party arena altogether as long as parties remain constituted on their present lines; and, indeed, an opinion is rapidly growing up among men on both sides that an endeavour should be made to treat not only this but all aspects of the native problem in the same way as foreign policy is treated in England, that is, as matter which must not be made the subject of purely factious controversy, whether in Parliament or on the platform.

South Africa, September 1, 1910.

NOTE. The result of the South African elections held on September 15 was as follows:

	Nationalists	Labour	Independent	Unionist
Cape Colony	29		1	21
Transvaal	20	4		12
Orange Free State	16			1
Natal	1		11	5
Totals .	66	4	12	39

The Nationalists were successful as a party, but suffered a severe rebuff in the personal defeats of the Prime Minister, the Treasurer, and one other Minister.

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General Botha (Premier) was defeated for Pretoria East by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick by 1231 votes to 1136.

Mr Hull (Treasurer) was defeated for Georgetown by Sir George Farrar by 1109 votes to 515.

Mr Moor (Minister of Commerce) was defeated by Mr Meyler, for Weenen, by 495 votes to 450.

All the other leading men on each side were elected.

After some negotiations for a reconstruction of the Cabinet, General Botha decided to continue in office with the same Cabinet as before. He was returned at a bye-election for Losberg, Mr Hull for Barberton, and Mr Moor was nominated to a seat in the upper house.

The Government will thus meet Parliament at its opening session, on Friday, November 4, with a majority over all parties of eleven. Of the Natal independents four are said to be inclined to the Government, seven to support the Opposition. The Labour members will, probably, usually support the Government. Of the Witwatersrand seats, to which our correspondent alluded, the Unionists won twelve, the Labour party four, and Nationalists one.

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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

THE Anglo-Japanese Alliance can be ended by either party on August 12, 1915, though, if the agreement is not denounced before August 12, 1914, it will continue in force until a year after notice to terminate has been given by either side. The question whether the alliance is to be ended in 1915 or not is already exercising the diplomats of the world, for the destinies of many nations wait upon the result. The diplomats, however, consider chiefly the relations of the great powers, and do not always remember that the Dominions are also deeply concerned. This is not surprising, for the Dominions have played as yet but a small part in the world's affairs, and when the alliance was made exerted no influence over its terms. But these days are passing away, and the Dominions are beginning to look beyond their boundaries, and to take an interest in the settlement of external matters which affect themselves. The Japanese Alliance is one such matter, and it is the object of this article to examine how it is likely to affect the future of the empire, and the parts of which it is composed. For this purpose some preliminary analysis is required of the political structure of the world.

It is usually a little difficult for laymen to understand what is vaguely described as the foreign situation, or to grasp the principles which govern action in the international sphere. The language of diplomacy is so entirely different from what they are accustomed to in their daily lives that it frequently sounds archaic and unreal, and the experts in foreign affairs seem queer, cranky persons who talk as if rapier and bludgeon were still the everyday weapons of princes and men. And, indeed, this impression is true, for, however weak and unwarlike a diplomat may be, he is perilously near an arena where reason and virtue are of small avail.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, let us declare

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bluntly at the outset that where the destinies of nations are concerned the first principles of primitive society, that "might is right," and that the weak must accept the "justice" of the strong, are still in practically unrestricted operation. This may appear a hard saying when applied to peoples who plume themselves on their civilization, but it is true none the less.

As the world is constituted to-day, competition is the universal law of existence. The ceaseless struggle for survival which is a commonplace in nature is a commonplace also of human affairs. We find men engaged in fierce contests for honour, for wealth, for food, for the very right to live. We find them combined in groups and parties fighting for justice or equality, for their rights or for profit, for their opinions or their ideals. We find them, as nations, striving for pre-eminence, for freedom, for the right to grow and expand. Wherever we turn, an unending struggle meets our eyes, and the history of the world centres about our efforts to mitigate its ferocity, and to abate the cruelty and injustice of its fruits.

Civilization may almost be said to consist in the principles and machinery we have devised for resolving this eternal conflict of opposing interests. In quite primitive days most of the disputes between individuals or family groups were adjusted by the use of physical force. By degrees mankind came to realize how absurd and unsatisfactory this method was, and gradually evolved a rough code based on reason and justice, which limited the claims of the individual, defined the rights of society, and laid down the principles on which disputes were to be judged. But people found that unless there was force behind this code, men obeyed it only when it suited them. They therefore gave to kings and nobles the strength with which to compel the strong to obey the laws they framed. After a time the Western peoples found that kings and nobles had become tyrants and obstructed the growth of that great body of law which was gradually simplifying and

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regulating the fierce competition of daily life. During many centuries of effort, therefore, they developed a better system, whereby the function of interpreting and administering the law was entrusted to judges and they reserved to themselves the task of moulding its growth and of controlling the power personated by the police, which enforced the verdicts of the courts.

This system, though far from perfect, is at least better than any that has gone before. It has still many defects, but day by day it is being improved, in order that the weak may be better protected from the cunning and the strong, and justice and reason may prevail over force and fraud. Nor does it apply only among civilized races. Not the least of the achievements of the British race has been that for more than a century it has maintained in India, Egypt and elsewhere a code of civilized law which is an immeasurable advance on the tyrannous system which was all the native peoples had been able to evolve for themselves.

But while we have made great progress within each civilized state, in the international sphere we are still barbarians. Physical force remains the only final method of settling disputes between nations. We may attempt a solution according to the principles of reason and justice, but if one side refuses to abide by the verdict they produce, there is nothing left but war or the submission of the weak to the will of the strong. If Germany were to seize Holland or Belgium and to annex their colonies in Africa and the East, there is no superior authority to whom either Holland or Belgium could appeal for justice or for compensation. If America were to refuse to abide by the terms of the Newfoundland Fisheries arbitration, only a war could compel her to do so. If some of the smaller powers of the world were to commence maltreating the fishermen of any of the British Dominions or to repudiate their obligations to its citizens, the only redress would be the redress that could be won by force. In international affairs the primitive rule,

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that "might is right" still holds good, for either side to a quarrel can insist on a resort to force. In the outer void of world politics there is no reign of law, for there is no law maker; there is no assured justice, for there is no judge; there is no safety for the weak, for there are no police to whom they can appeal.

Why is this? It is because no nation is willing to submit its destinies to a tribunal over which it has no control, or to surrender its armaments to a world authority which will use them to enforce some international code of its own creation. As Sir Frederick Pollock, discussing international arbitration in the last volume of the "Cambridge Modern History," writes "No nation will submit to any tribunal the question whether it shall accede to demands which its rulers consider ruinous or humiliating." Thus, every arbitration treaty specifically excludes matters which affect "the vital interests, the independence or the honour" of the contracting parties. As another writer in the same volume says:

"No arbitration court could have ruled out the natural aspiration of Prussia to take her place as the chief unit in a consolidated German people. No authority could suppress the right of France to regard such a development as a menace to her own security. The rival and fixed desires of these two powers could not be satisfied: the arbitrament of force could alone decide the issue."

And what was true of 1870 is true of 1910. Germany to-day is no more willing to limit her armaments, on which she believes her prospects of national expansion depend, at the bidding of an international council or court than was Prussia in the 'sixties. The Dominions would refuse to submit the question of Asiatic immigration to a body composed partly of Asiatics, or of members of those races which display no aversion to the intermixture of blood. Last August Senator Pearce, the Minister of Defence, used

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in the Australian Parliament the following words to clinch his argument for compulsory military service,

“ There were those who would say that arbitration was the way to settle national strife; but would Australia be prepared to arbitrate with Japan over the immigration question ? ”

Even the projected treaty of unlimited arbitration between the United States and the British Empire is important rather as a declaration by two great peoples in the forefront of civilization, speaking the same language, living under similar laws and institutions, and possessed in great measure of the same ideals, that they are determined to avoid war, than as an effective guarantee that they will never bring their armaments to bear against one another should any serious conflict of national interest spring up between them.

It is quite true that great and beneficial changes have been made in the practice of war in the last century. The public opinion of the civilized world, for instance, has enormously mitigated the ferocity of war between civilized nations by refusing to tolerate torture, the poisoning of wells, or the use of explosive bullets, and by providing for the immunity of non-combatants and neutrals. Still more recently public opinion has reached the point when it is becoming the rule that disputes between the most civilized powers turning on the interpretation of treaties, or the financial compensation of individuals, should be settled by arbitration. But as yet nothing has been done to eliminate the fundamental cause of war the conflict of vital national interests, the clash of “ irreconcilable national impulses.” And so long as the chief nations of the world are determined to remain the masters of their own destinies, force will remain the only final arbiter of quarrels between them.

This does not mean that all international disputes are

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settled by war. Far from it. In most cases the conflict of interest concerns some trifle which civilized nations, at any rate, are willing to settle by arbitration or compromise. But even minor differences can be settled by these means, only where both parties are reasonable. Either side can force the quarrel to the point where the other must fight or yield. For instance, if Russia had persistently refused compensation and redress when her ships fired on the North Sea fishing fleet, Great Britain would have been faced with the choice between war and retreat from her just demands. That is why every international complication is dangerous. One side may be unreasonable, and then the other has to choose between fighting for its rights and abandoning them at the demand of the other. Great Britain is notoriously willing to solve disputes in which it is involved by reasonable means, but if her opponent shows fight she must accept the challenge or—run away.

Even when vital interests are concerned, or when one side to a minor dispute refuses to compromise or arbitrate, war does not always follow. The immense complexity of modern life, and the terrific dislocation and loss caused by war, has made civilized powers very chary of embarking on an actual trial of strength. Many disputes, therefore, which justice and reason cannot resolve, are settled by the test of force, but not by war. The relative military strength which the two parties are in a position to muster on the scene of conflict is estimated by diplomatic means, and the solution is determined accordingly. If either side is obviously stronger the other accepts the fact and gives way. If they are reputed equal they have either to compromise or let war decide where the real strength lies. In 1904 both Japan and Russia—each thinking itself the stronger—refused to come to terms, and war ensued. In 1908, while Austria was ranged against Russia alone, the war clouds hung low. Directly Germany threw her “shining armour” into the scale, they disappeared. The balance was upset, and Russia gave way. As Captain Mahan says,

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“The balance of forces influences continually and decisively the solutions of diplomacy.”

Thus the possession of strength is the condition of success, almost of existence, in the international sphere. It is necessary to peoples who value their liberty, like the nations of the Empire, because without it they must bow to the wills of those stronger than themselves. It is necessary to peoples who aspire to national greatness, like the Germans or the Japanese, for without it they cannot make for themselves a “place in the sun.”

National strength, which is thus essential to liberty and greatness alike, can be obtained only by effort and sacrifice. If a people is very numerous or very rich, or is very fortunately situated, it may develop the force it needs within itself. But if, as is commonly the case, it cannot do so, it must protect itself by buying the assistance of its neighbours. That is why almost the whole world is linked by “ententes” and alliances designed to maintain the balance of power. Foreign politics centre on the constant effort of the aspiring “nationalist” powers to upset that balance in their own interest, and the not less constant struggle of the peace-loving powers to maintain it.

As this paper deals with the Japanese Alliance, it is important to be quite clear what an alliance means. An alliance is nothing more nor less than a business bargain, negotiated on strictly business principles. Each side has something which the other wants—usually protection against third parties—and an exchange of that commodity is effected on terms which are settled by the relative bargaining strength of the two parties. No alliance can be had for nothing. One nation can only induce another to go to war on its behalf if it, too, will agree to fight the battles of the other. Moreover, an alliance need involve no real sympathy or friendship between the parties, no identity in aspiration, no similarity in civilization, no community of interest or policy even, except in the sphere to which the alliance relates and during the period for which it operates.

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
It implies no obligation of honour, save such as is written in the bond. Sentiment may grow up about an alliance as in the case of Germany and Austria, or it may not, as in the case of Italy and Austria, but that does not alter the fundamental principle that alliances are based on nothing but the mutual self interest of the parties concerned.

Alliances are thus the loosest and least permanent of human partnerships. For this reason, and because the strength of nations is constantly changing, the balance of power is proverbially unstable. And as peace and their safety depend on the maintenance of this delicate equipoise of ententes and alliances, it is not surprising that foreign policy seems very important and absorbing to the great nations of the world. It has not hitherto been of much concern to the Dominions, because their interests have scarcely come into conflict with those of foreign powers. But, as we shall see, they are beginning to do so, and when the conflict becomes acute the Dominions will find their future more and more determined by what goes on abroad, and will realize, as they cannot realize to-day, how indispensable is strength, when the fate of nations is at stake.

We understand, now, why the layman feels so unfamiliar in discussing foreign affairs. He is accustomed in his daily life to the peaceful settlement of disputes according to well-recognized principles of reason and justice, and a sphere in which law does not apply and in which decisions are reached by quite different methods is naturally strange to him. He is used to the obligations of friendship and a generous honour, and the harsh and ruthless principles which govern the international sphere seem barbarous and unreal. We understand, too, the paradox that while civilized individuals have finally laid aside pistol and sword, civilized nations are day by day piling higher and higher the burden of their armaments. An individual can trust his freedom and his rights to the care of judge, jury and police, but a nation can rely on naught but its own right arm and that of its friends. Nothing else counts—neither


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the sympathy of foreign nations nor the public opinion of the world, as our Boer fellow countrymen found ten years ago when England was execrated by all the peoples of the earth. In the last resort it is on the effective strength that a nation can bring to bear in guns and ships, and in men possessed of the nerve, courage and skill to fight them, that its national honour, its national ideals and its national future depend.

Few will deny that this is perilously near barbarism. Yet it is the plain fact of the situation to-day, and as such we must base our calculations upon it. Some day events may persuade the nations to abandon their armaments and to forego the right of moulding their own national destinies. Till that time comes—and the spirit of “autonomy” which flourishes even in the peace-loving Dominions, is no omen of its near approach—war and the diplomacy of force will remain the only final solvent of international disputes.

II.

THE astonishing growth of Japan into a first-class world power dates from about 1870, when the fruits of Japan's first contact with civilization began to appear. Before that time Japan lay chained in feudalism of the most rigid type. There was a small and ornamental aristocracy of court families, related to the Royal family. Then came the Samurai—a purely fighting class, pledged to die on the mere command of the great territorial nobles, the Daimio, who were real masters of the country. Below the Samurai were the farmers, artisans and traders, who were practically serfs, compelled to follow their fathers' walk in life, with no voice in the conduct of affairs, with no rights as against the Samurai. In a community such as this there was no real freedom. There was no recognized system of law, no organized courts of justice, and no competent legal officers. Torture was an incident of every trial, and death the penalty for the most trivial offence. There was no

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education and no learning. The profession of Christianity was forbidden under the severest penalties. It was even a capital offence for a Japanese to leave Japan. The system of government was not unlike that which prevailed in England in the days of the later Saxon or the earliest Plantagenet kings, when the real business of government lay with the great feudal barons.

No sooner did the Japanese begin to move out from their own islands into the great world beyond than they discovered that they were regarded as semi-barbarians, and laboured under disabilities not imposed upon civilized peoples. They found that while in civilized countries foreigners were subject to the national laws, in Japan every power insisted on establishing courts of its own, where its national laws were enforced, and in which alone it would permit its citizens to be tried. The Japanese recognized at once that this extra-territorial jurisdiction was the badge of inferiority imposed by the civilized world on communities incapable of maintaining law and order within their territories. They determined to free themselves of the stigma, and to win recognition as one of the great powers of the world. Within twenty-five years they had revolutionized the whole mode of their national life and customs, and had literally swept away the methods which had prevailed for a thousand years. Torture and other barbarous customs disappeared, the privileges of the Samurai were abolished, and the best talent of Europe and America was enlisted to organize the machinery of government, the railways and telegraphs, and the army and navy. The common people were freed from their disabilities and a democratic system of government, based on the German model, was set up. Large provision was made for general education, and as a result a vigorous and independent press sprang into being.

So rapid and complete was the transformation of primitive Japan into a well-governed, orderly, enlightened and tolerant country that in 1894 Great Britain entered into a treaty by which she renounced her extra-territorial

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rights and agreed that her citizens resident in Japan should be subject unreservedly to the jurisdiction of Japan. This was the first time that an oriental state had been accepted as a member of the comity of nations. But so convincingly did Japan prove her fitness that by 1899 all the great Western Powers had followed suit, and Japan took her place in the world as a sovereign civilized state.

No sooner had Japan abandoned her traditional policy of isolation than she found herself necessarily involved in relations with foreign powers. The story of these relations, commercial and political, is a striking example of the principles underlying international politics.

Japan's first dealings were with Korea—that great arm of the Asian mainland, which stretches out to within a hundred miles of Japan. There were continual disputes between them owing to the corruption of the Korean Government and its total inability to maintain order, either among its own subjects or foreign residents. These disputes were important mainly because they eventually involved Japan in a serious controversy with China, which claimed a shadowy suzerainty over Korea and was jealous of the new star in the East. For a time, however, the peace was kept, and in 1884 China and Japan signed a treaty defining the conditions on which armed intervention in Korea should take place, if it eventually became necessary.

At this moment, however, a new power appeared upon the scene. Russia, who had gradually extended her empire across Siberia to the Pacific, found it essential to secure an ice-free port in the East as an outlet for her vast Siberian possessions and as the base for her Pacific fleet. Port Arthur was the obvious place, and Russia made up her mind that to protect her access to it, and to consolidate her position in the East, she must incorporate Manchuria and Korea in her domains.

As soon as the Russian plan was disclosed Japan saw that her whole future was at stake. If Russia were allowed to occupy effectively Manchuria, Korea and Port Arthur, the

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Japanese hopes of becoming a great power and of leaving the impress of their personality on the East were finally doomed. They would be debarred from the mainland and confined to their own narrow lands—a few islands which could never contain population or resources sufficient to enable them to make headway against the gigantic if slow-moving Russian Empire, once it was firmly established across the straits of Korea. If Russia achieved her purpose Japan would exercise no more influence on the politics of the East than do Holland or Belgium on the destinies of Europe.

There was thus a fundamental conflict of national interest. Russia's future in the Far East depended on her annexing an ice-free port and its hinterland. Japan's future depended on her occupying the very territories which were essential to Russia or at least converting them into an allied buffer state. The situation contained all the elements of tragedy. Two powers each driven by the pressure of necessity claimed the right to expand and grow. There was not room for both. Their interests were irreconcilable. Compromise was as impossible between them as it is between two rivals for the hand of a lady. One or other had to prevail, and the drama moved steadily to its appointed end.

Russia early began to take advantage of Korean misgovernment to forward her interests in that country. Japan immediately tried to force on the reform of the Korean government so as to remove the excuse for Russian interference. But in doing so she fell foul of China, and in 1894 war broke out between them. Japan at once gave proof of the vitality of her progress by defeating the Chinese by land and sea with consummate ease. She demanded as the price of peace the cession of Port Arthur and the Liao-tung peninsula on which it stands (which would make her influence paramount in Korea), of Formosa and other islands in the Japan seas, and of trading privileges for Japanese citizens in Chinese ports. China accepted the terms, and the Shimonoseki Treaty was signed in 1895.

But Russia was not willing to see her prospects destroyed

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by a flanking movement on the part of an insignificant oriental state which she thoroughly despised. She instantly set in motion the ruthless machinery of force which governs events in the international sphere. The European powers were then thinking about the partition of the supposedly moribund Chinese Empire. Here was their chance. Let them save China from humiliation and their reward they could fix for themselves. Russia, Germany and France, therefore, rapidly agreed upon a plan of action. Their representatives presented a collective note to Japan in which she was urged to forego the cession of territory on the mainland, on the ground that any foreign power possessing Port Arthur would dominate Peking. Japan was powerless to resist the combination and to insist upon her treaty rights, and agreed to the proposition. Force carried the day. Then the three powers presented their bill to China. Russia took the lion's share. In 1895 China granted her the right of constructing railways through Manchuria, and three years later leased to Russia for ninety-nine years the very territory and port which Japan had been made to surrender on the ground that the foreign power occupying them would be able to exercise undue influence on the Chinese government in Peking. Germany obtained the lease of Kiao-Chao and a hinterland of 200 miles. France gained Kuang-chow-Wan in Southern China, and Great Britain, that she might not lose all prestige in the Far East, secured the lease of Wei-hai-wei, a port on the southern shores of the Gulf of Pechili, for so long as Russia kept Port Arthur.

This was a bitter blow to Japan, and worse was to follow. The Boxer outrages gave Russia an excuse for massing troops in Manchuria, and for pressing on the connexion between the trans-Siberian railway and Port Arthur. Moreover a palace intrigue, in which some Japanese adventurers had been involved, and which had ended in the murder of the Queen of Korea, had destroyed Japanese influence in Korea some years before, and thrown its government into the hands of the Russians. Japan saw that the crisis in her

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national destinies had arrived, and began to prepare to put the issue between herself and Russia to the only final test within her reach—the test of war. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902—of which more anon—ensured that the struggle would be confined to the Far East, and that the European intervention of 1895 would not recur. Various attempts were made to define by agreement the status of Russia and Japan in Korea and Manchuria, but without avail. In 1903 the quarrel took an acute form. Under a Russo-Chinese treaty of 1902 Russia had agreed to respect the integrity of China and to evacuate Manchuria. The evacuation was to take place in three stages on definite dates. Despite emphatic protests from Japan Russia declined to carry out this undertaking except at the price of further concessions. Six months later war broke out, with the result that the Russian forces in the Far East were defeated and driven back into Siberia. The treaty of Portsmouth (August, 1905) practically re-enacted the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 which had been torn up by the greedy intervention of Europe. Manchuria was to be evacuated by both armies, the lease of Port Arthur and the Liao-tung peninsula were ceded to Japan, and Japanese influence in Korea was recognized as paramount. At the same time the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was renewed in a strengthened form for ten years.

The war settled the conflict of interest between Russia and Japan on the time-honoured principle that "might is right." A balance of force was established at a point about the centre of Manchuria. Japan could push Russia no further. Russia could make no headway against Japan. Japan had won everything required by her national future, Russia had to abandon her ambition to become a great Pacific power—at any rate for a time. Nor did Japan delay long in reaping the fruits of victory. Five years after peace was signed Korea was incorporated in the Japanese Empire. Japan has now a territory of 245,000 square miles instead of 160,000 square miles and a population of 62,000,000

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instead of 50,000,000 souls from which to draw men and resources when the next international settlement is made in the Far East.

Why did the United Kingdom enter into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 and renew it in strengthened form in 1905? Let us look at the actual terms of the agreements.*

The earlier alliance was entered into on January 30, 1902, for a period of five years. Its object as set forth in the preamble was to "maintain the *status quo* and general peace" in the "extreme East," to preserve "the independence and territorial integrity" of China and Korea, and to secure "equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations."

Article one declares that while both powers are "entirely uninfluenced by aggressive tendencies" Japan has special interests in Korea, and Great Britain in China, and recognises the right of each to take action to protect its interests if "threatened by the aggressive action" of any other power. Article two provides that if either power becomes involved in war with another power in defence of its respective interests (i.e., in Korea or China) the other will "maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally." According to Article three if either ally is attacked by more than one power in defence of its special interests as aforesaid, the other must come to its assistance and conduct the war and make peace "in common."

The official reasons for the treaty of 1902 are those already quoted from the preamble. But it is not difficult to judge of the underlying motives. It was quite obvious that Japan and Russia were rapidly drifting into war. The chief objects of Great Britain were to prevent that war from growing into a general international armageddon as a result of European intervention, to save China from the dismemberment which would probably follow that intervention, and which would close the "open door" and convert the Far

*The agreements are printed in full at the end of this article.

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East into a great theatre of international friction and quarrel, and to maintain the balance of power in the "extreme East" by guaranteeing Japan from destruction by a coalition as selfish and ephemeral as that of 1895. These objects, in the judgement of the statesmen of the day, could best be achieved by isolating the approaching conflict so that Russia and Japan should settle the issue between them by themselves. Thus Mr. Balfour—then Prime Minister, in explaining the treaty to Parliament in February, 1902, said:

"It is neither good for us that Japan should be crushed, nor that through a coalition of the powers she should be obliged to mould her policy in a direction antagonistic to our interests. . . There can (now) never be two powers ranged against Japan alone any more than that there can be two powers ranged against us alone in the Far East."

As the event proved the treaty of 1902 served its purpose, and Russia and Japan were allowed to fight out their quarrel undisturbed.

As the war drew to a close, and negotiations were in train for the Peace of Portsmouth, the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902 was replaced by a new and stronger treaty dated August 12, 1905. This treaty differs in important respects from its predecessor. The preamble again defines the common objects of the contracting powers as peace, the independence and integrity of China, and the preservation of the "open door" for the commerce of all nations. But instead of being confined to the "extreme East" (China and Korea) it relates to the "region of Eastern Asia and India," and to the "special interests" of the two parties in that region. The treaty then goes on to define these special interests. It acknowledges Japan's "paramount, political, military, and economic interests in Korea," and recognizes her right "to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may think necessary to protect those interests provided the open

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door is maintained there to the commerce of all nations." It declares that Great Britain has "a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier," and recognizes her right "to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions." Finally, the treaty provides that if by reason of "unprovoked attack or aggressive action" on the part of one or more other powers either ally should be involved in war "in defence of its territorial rights or special interests" as already defined, the other will "at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in agreement with it."

Thus, the second treaty which was to last for ten years, and longer if not denounced, compelled either ally to assist the other if even a single foreign power attacked its interests anywhere in the "regions of the Far East and India." It is obviously a much more comprehensive and far reaching instrument than its predecessor.

Why did Great Britain want the treaty? There were two chief reasons. In the first place there was the situation in the Far East. The general interests of Great Britain as before were those already quoted from the preamble. But now that Russia had been defeated only two powers could bring any effective strength to bear in the territorial waters of Eastern and Southern Asia, Great Britain and Japan. If these agreed to assist one another to protect their frontiers, whether in India, or the Far East no other power or combination of powers, could hope to attack them with any prospects of success. So long as the alliance continued, therefore, it guaranteed the greatest interest of the Empire in the Far East, peace and the security of India.

But this in itself was no sufficient motive for entering into so close and binding an alliance with Japan. There was a second and new reason, the growth of the German Navy. By 1905 it had become quite clear that Germany was well on her way to construct a navy more powerful than the whole British Navy of that day, and that her policy was not

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friendly to the British Empire. In foreign affairs Germany's aim, forced on her by the necessities of her situation, was national expansion and the professed and indeed the natural object of her naval policy was to put an end to the world-wide supremacy of the British Navy, and by limiting its effective radius, to increase German influence in the disposition of the world's affairs. In face of the unceasing development of the German Navy, the British Government had no option but to concentrate in the North Sea a force sufficient to ensure the safety of the British Isles. Unless it was to add enormously to the already huge burden of taxation for defence it could only do this by denuding the naval stations which had guaranteed British supremacy elsewhere. How then were the Dominions and the Dependencies to be adequately protected ?

The method England adopted was to convert the Japanese alliance of 1902 into that of 1905. If Japan had been free to pursue a policy hostile to British interests, and still more if she had been free to ally with one of Great Britain's European rivals, the position of British possessions in the Pacific and Indian oceans would have been precarious indeed. But so long as Japan was friendly the Pacific coasts of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, the sea frontiers of India, and the East coast of Africa were safe from attack, for there was no other power which could reach them with modern ships of war. The alliance guaranteed the friendship of Japan for at least ten years. Its importance, therefore, to England has been that it has allowed her to concentrate her resources against the menace of the German fleet, has guaranteed the peace of the Far East, and the safety of the Indian frontiers, and has protected the Empire against the hostility of Japan. Its value to Japan has been not less great. It has enabled her to concentrate on consolidating her position on the mainland of Asia, free from all thought of foreign intervention. It has given her the peace which is vital to swift recovery from the exhaustion of war. And it has kept the only other

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power which could bring effective force to bear in the East, a friendly ally instead of a suspicious rival.

III.

BEFORE we go on to examine the changes which have taken place in the international sphere since the conclusion of the 1905 Alliance with Japan, we must turn aside to trace the history of the problems connected with Asiatic immigration into the great Dominions of the Empire. For though few people have yet realized it, these problems, which have been of small importance in the past, are likely to exercise a profound influence on the foreign policy of the Empire in the future.

For the purposes of this article a very brief history must suffice. If any reader requires further detail he will find the whole subject admirably handled by Mr. Richard Jebb in a paper read before the Royal Society of Arts in April, 1908. The history falls into two periods: from 1855 to the Colonial Conference of 1897, and from that Conference to the present day. The restriction of Asiatic immigration began in Australia as long ago as 1855, when Victoria passed a law which served as the model for all subsequent legislation up to 1897. This law discriminated openly against Asiatics—specifying the Chinese—by limiting the number of Asiatic immigrants in proportion to the tonnage of the ship bringing them, and by imposing on each a landing charge of £10 or more. It was adopted with small variations in subsequent years by all the Australian colonies, by New Zealand, and by Canada. In South Africa the question did not arise, for there was no considerable immigration of free Asiatics, though the Natal government in order to develop its sugar plantations began shortly afterwards to import British Indian labour under indenture.

In 1897, however, Natal found that the colony contained nearly as many Indians as white men, in addition to 1,000,000 natives, and passed the famous "Natal

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Act," intended to restrict the immigration of free Indians not under contract to labour. This Act defined a prohibited immigrant as any person "who when asked to do so by an officer shall fail to himself write out and sign in characters of any language of Europe, an application to the Colonial Secretary in the form set out in the schedule." In the same year the question of Asiatic immigration was fully discussed at the Colonial Conference, and the policy of exclusion was upheld by all the Dominions. But it was generally agreed that discrimination on the ground of race or colour was undesirable as being needlessly offensive to British Indians, and to Asiatic powers. In consequence the "Natal Act" prescribing the writing out "at dictation a passage of fifty words in a European language, directed by the (immigration)officer" has now been adopted by all the Dominions except Canada, which still imposes a head tax of £100 on every Chinese entering the country. The policy of exclusion, thus uniformly adopted in 1897, is still the official policy of the Dominions. Thus, in December last, General Smuts the South African Minister for the Interior announced to Parliament, amid general approval, that the policy of the government was "not to let Asiatics into the Union." The adoption of universal compulsory service in Australia and New Zealand during last year, is a striking testimony to the determination of the Australasian people to preserve their countries for the white races. The British Columbia legislature has for many years been passing acts discriminating against Asiatics, which have not become law only because they have been disallowed by the Dominion Government as being contrary to treaty obligations—as will later be described. It is quite clear that, as Mr. Alfred Lyttelton expressed it two years ago, "the self-governing Colonies are irrevocably determined not to admit the effective competition of Asiatic races within their borders."

So much for the facts. Before going further let us examine the reasons for this policy, and see whether it is likely to

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change in the near future. There is a natural tendency in all new countries—states whose territories are wide and resources great, but whose inhabitants are few, to import or attract from outside the labour with which to develop their native wealth. We find instances throughout the history of Greece and Rome, more recently in the slave traffic for the plantations of the Southern States of America, and in quite modern times in the engagement of contract labour for the South African mines, and the elaborate system now at work for recruiting and transporting the free labourer of Europe to the United States, Canada and Australia.

The young democracies of the British Empire, however, soon discovered that there were grave objections to the introduction of certain classes of labour. They found that uncivilized or semi-civilized coloured labour, while tiding over temporary economic difficulties, brought with it evils infinitely greater. Cheap coloured labourers were ready to accept wages on which no civilized man could subsist, and so by underselling the white man in the labour market brought into being large numbers of those “poor whites” who have been such a problem to America and to South Africa. They sent a great part of their wages out of the country and contributed little to the public revenues. Many of them, too, fell victims to the vices and diseases of civilization, with obviously evil effects on the society which harboured them. Moreover, a constant infiltration from the lowest strata of humanity was found to be quite incompatible with the steady elevation of the material and moral conditions of the community as a whole. At a very early stage, therefore, the Dominions made up their minds to forego the profits which followed the exploitation of their natural resources by cheap coloured labour, rather than burden their countries with the evils of a permanent “colour problem.”

During the last few years, however, the problem has taken a new form. So long as the would-be immigrants were semi-civilized coolies no great difficulty arose over exclusion.

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But what was to happen in the case of educated and civilized people like the Japanese? It is impossible to regard the Japanese as uncivilized, though some of the poorest classes may be more backward than the corresponding classes of Europe. We have recorded their astonishing development during the last 40 years. They have fought and won some of the greatest battles in all history. They have self control, resource, courage and perseverance in the highest degree. They have initiative and energy, and they are law abiding. In medicine, in industry, in trade, they are well abreast of the rest of the world, and their system of government is more efficient, and even more democratic than that of some of the members of the European concert. There is no more striking testimony to their practical efficiency than the relative figures of loss from disease in the Chino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war ten years later:

DEATHS PER 1,000 TROOPS.

Japanese-Chinese War			Japanese-Russian War		
Cases.		Deaths.	Cases.		Deaths.
82.87	Cholera.	50.96	None.	Cholera.	None.
37.14	Typhoid.	10.98	9.26	Typhoid.	5.16
102.58	Malaria.	5.22	1.96	Malaria.	0.07

To quote the statement of the Japanese Surgeon-General: in the Russo-Japanese war

“ We established a record of four deaths from bullets to one from disease. In the Spanish-American War fourteen men died from preventable sickness to one man killed on the field of battle.”

In the South African war nearly two men died of disease for every one killed in battle.

And it is not the Japanese alone who have won the right

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to be treated as respectable civilized folk. There are many individual Chinese and Indians, who are capable of enjoying all the privileges and discharging all the obligations of the citizen of a Western State, who are in fact more truly civilized in the best sense of the word, than immens numbers of people in any white community. It is pure prejudice to blind one's eyes to this fact. How is this new factor to be dealt with? Does the decision of the Dominions to exclude Asiatics relate only to unskilled and semi-civilized Asiatic labour, or does it apply to Asiatics as such?

There is not the slightest doubt that the objection of Anglo-Saxon communities to Asiatic immigration applies to all classes of Asiatics, if they come as permanent residents. The basis of this objection is not shallow prejudice, but a deep-rooted instinct of self-preservation. The white peoples of the Dominions feel that the Chinaman, or the Japanese is essentially different from themselves, that they themselves are not strong enough to assimilate him if he comes in large numbers, and that his presence therefore threatens the very basis of their society. This fundamental belief is expressed in the sentiment common in all the Dominions bordering on the Pacific—that Asiatic immigration is "incompatible with the intention of building up an indigenous democracy of the British type."

We may, perhaps, be allowed to probe a little into the root reasons for this belief. Western civilization is the product of many centuries of struggle and experiment on the part of the ancestors of the white races of to-day, and is essentially a European product. Since the beginning of the Christian era it has been influenced to an astonishingly small degree by the East. Its modern religious ideas, its conception of liberty, its morality, its political machinery and social conventions, the principles of its law, are essentially Western. The elements of this intricate system we imbibe in the first moments of our lives. Its spirit envelops our growing years, no alternative to it is ever set before us, and by the time we reach maturity it has become a part

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of our very nature. We scarcely question its essential truth even if we are alive to its many defects, and are eager for their reform. We certainly are not prepared to see it undermined, or to endanger the prospect of its development for the sake of immediate economic gain, or because the protection of it may make difficulties with our neighbours.

On the other hand, ours is not the only civilization. The East also has a civilization which is far older and which is fundamentally different from that of the West. There are many variations within it, more numerous, perhaps, and more profound, than within our own, and after the sleep of ages it is awakening to absorb some of the externals of our Western system. We need not inquire which is the better, or prophesy that the ideas of the West will prevail over those of the East, or the reverse. Time will determine that, and for the present our ignorance of the East is such that even a true comparison cannot be made. It is enough to recognize that in the root principles affecting conduct and belief they are different. Yet the Oriental, by the time that he comes in contact with Western peoples, is as fixed a product of his civilization as we are of ours. Even the Japanese, who have adopted the material paraphernalia of the West more rapidly and more completely than any Eastern people, are strangely unfamiliar at close quarters. They cherish ideas, especially in the social and moral sphere, which are frequently even repellant to white men. It is hopeless to expect a few short years of intercourse to bridge the gulf. Orientals may learn something about the practical conduct of affairs from us. We may learn something of philosophy from the Chinese, and of the spirit of self-sacrifice from the Japanese. But the Chinese and the Japanese will no more abandon in the near future what they believe to be the best elements in their civilization, than we will abandon the noblest principles of our own.

In this fact lies the essential difficulty about Asiatic immigration. It is not that the Oriental is inferior to the Caucasian, but that he is different. He cannot be assim-

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lated. He cannot be fitted into our political, social or economic structure. He is for ever a foreign element. The difference in appearance, in colour, in language, in ideas, in temperament, in history, in customs, in beliefs, in everything save the most elementary human instincts, is too great to be overcome except by the lapse of ages. Asiatic immigrants into a white community, whether they are educated and skilled or not, remain for generations overseas deposits of Oriental ideas, Oriental traditions and Oriental ambitions.

There is no need to enlarge upon the evils produced by the racial cleavage at the present day. The economic dislocation of white society, and the riots and general weakening in the sense of tolerance and justice it produced among the white communities on the Pacific slope, are still fresh in peoples' minds. Moreover, in times of excitement the Japanese immigrant becomes a source of grave national danger. Unlike the European immigrant, he does not settle down into a loyal citizen of his adopted land. During all his stay he never ceases to be a Japanese patriot. It is an article of religious belief with him that he can never surrender his national obligations, nor cease to be a Japanese. He is never taken off the registers of his native land, he is never freed from the duty of fighting for his country in time of need. Yet, if, owing to race feeling or colour prejudice, he is maltreated, or is placed under legal disabilities, as has been the case frequently hitherto, his only resource is to appeal to the Mikado. We all know what is likely to happen when one government begins to interfere in the domestic concerns of another on the appeal of its distressed citizens—the history of the Uitlander agitation in the Transvaal is an exact case in point.

If we look ahead the prospect is no brighter. When Asiatics have settled down as permanent residents in any considerable numbers, the cleavage, now apparent in the economic and social sphere, will appear in politics, and then it may disrupt the State. For the Asiatic will find himself

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subject to grievances or disabilities which only political action can remedy. He cannot be permanently subjected to political servitude without injustice and without grave danger of revolution. When he gains the vote he is certain to form a separate political group, alien from the mass of the population, foreign in sentiment and aspiration, distinct in manners and customs, inspired by a different code of morality and different ideals. This group, possessing no patriotic instincts towards the country of its choice, will act in its own interests, selling its voting power to the highest bidder, as is the universal experience in democratic countries. We find a political cleavage persisting for generations in the case of racial types as similar as English and Irish, British and Dutch, French Canadian and British Canadian, with grave detriment to the State. Is it not likely to be permanent between Caucasian and Oriental, reinforced as it is by a complete separation in the economic and social spheres, and by colour and appearance? And how is a community to thrive with this canker at its heart? The very word community, indeed, ceases to apply.

Is it to be wondered at that the Dominions are determined to resist at all costs an immigration which brings in its train such problems and such evils as these?

Two quotations in support of what has here been written may usefully be appended. The first is from one of the leading Australian dailies—the *Sydney Morning Herald*—and is taken at random from the issue of August 27 last.

“They (Asiatics) are representative of a civilization older than our own, and the centuries of heredity which this implies have evolved thoughts which are not our thoughts, and ways which are not our ways. And hence we, as being in greater degree than any other Western country under the shadow of Asia, have to choose between exclusion or extinction of our own type of civilization. And in this we have the justification of the white Australia doctrine.”

The other is more striking still. It is taken from the mani-

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festos of the Asiatic Exclusion League of North America—a body with an immense membership, and with branches in British Columbia. It was produced at the time of the anti-Japanese riots a few years ago, and is couched in extravagant and insulting language. None the less, it reflects faithfully the medley of motives, high and low, which go to make up the unalterable resolution of the inhabitants of the Northern Pacific slope to exclude Asiatics from their shores. The manifesto reads, We

“ protest against the continuance of Asiatic immigration upon the exalted grounds of American patriotism for the reasons (1) that they are utterly unfit and incapable of discharging the duties of American citizenship; (2) their introduction into our national life will impair and degrade our cherished institutions; (3) are aliens to our ideas of patriotism, morality, loyalty, and the highest conceptions of Christian civilization; (4) their presence is degrading and contaminating; (5) with their low standard of living, immoral surroundings and cheap labour, they constitute a formidable and fierce competition against our American system and unless prohibited will result in the irreparable deterioration of American labour; (6) the living in our midst of a large body of Asiatics, the greatest number of whom are armed, loyal to their government, entertaining feelings of distrust, if not of hostility to our people without any allegiance to our government or our institutions, not sustaining American life in times of peace, and ever ready to respond to the calls of their own nations in times of war, make these Asiatics an appalling menace to the American Republic.”

IV.

IT seems clear, from the foregoing, that the Dominions are opposed to Asiatic immigration in all its forms. They not only abide by their earlier objection to the entry of Asiatic labourers. They have declared against the incorporation within their society of civilized and educated

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Asiatics. The adoption of this policy, coupled with the rise of Japan, has introduced an entirely new factor into the international situation. Its far-reaching importance can best be judged by tracing the attitude of Japan towards the doctrine of Asiatic exclusion during the past fifteen years.

It will be remembered that in 1894 the British Government recognized the status of Japan as a civilized power, by agreeing to the abolition of its own extra-territorial jurisdiction. At the same time a treaty was signed between the two countries granting certain mutual commercial privileges, guaranteeing the rights and liberties of traders and sailors, and containing a clause giving to the subjects of each power full liberty to enter, travel, or reside "in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other." This clause, in some form or other, is indispensable to all commercial treaties, if there is to be any considerable interchange of trade. The British Government, however, was aware of the anti-Asiatic sentiment of the Dominions and a further clause provided that the treaty should not apply to any of the Dominions or to India except with their consent. Natal and Newfoundland decided to accede in 1895. But the other Dominions declared that they would only become parties to the treaty provided they could retain full right to legislate against the immigration of labourers and artizans. The condition put forward by the Dominions was based on a proviso embodied in a commercial treaty between Japan and the United States (1895), but went beyond it in that it asked for the right to exclude artizans as well as labourers. At first Japan would only agree to the exclusion of labourers. But after protracted negotiations the British Ambassador at Tokio was able to carry his point and to persuade the Japanese Government to allow any of the Dominions to become parties to the 1894 treaty amended by protocol so that it should not affect

"the laws, ordinances, and regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of labourers and artizans, police

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and public security which are in force or which may hereafter be enacted.”

The treaty in this form was terminable by either party subject to a year's notice. By this time, however, anti-Asiatic opinion had further developed, and after a full discussion at the Colonial Conference of 1897 all the Dominions except Queensland (which has since again receded) decided to refuse the treaty even on these terms.

In 1906, owing to the rapid development of trade both in Canada and in the Far East, the Canadian Government found it desirable to place commercial relations between Canada and Japan on a proper footing. To quote Sir Wilfrid Laurier:

“ We passed a commercial treaty because we expect to profit by it. We have a growing trade with Japan. We send flour from Ontario and the West, lumber from British Columbia, cattle from Ontario.”

The Canadian Government, therefore, asked the British Government to arrange that Canada should become a party to the 1894 treaty. Before consulting Japan the Secretary of State inquired whether Canada wished to retain the right to exclude labourers and artisans by a protocol similar to that agreed to by Japan in 1897. The Canadian Government replied officially that it was prepared “ to adhere absolutely and without reserve ” to the treaty as originally drafted. This decision was apparently based on a statement by the Japanese Consul-General at Ottawa, confirmed in other ways, that his Government would refuse to enter into any commercial treaty which involved its admitting Canada's right to differentiate against the entry of Japanese, but that immigration would “ always be restricted voluntarily by Japan.” Accordingly Canada, with the assent of her Parliament, became in 1906 a party to the treaty of 1894, which was, however, to be terminable on six months' notice by either side. Scarcely was the treaty concluded

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when, owing to labour troubles in Hawaii—an American possession—large numbers of Japanese began to enter British Columbia. No less than 10,000 entered in a single year, and a large influx of British Indians and Chinese occurred at the same time. Under the treaty the Canadian Government had no power to exclude the Japanese, and anti-Japanese riots immediately broke out in British Columbia. The Japanese appealed to their Government, the Government protested, and the situation became serious. A Canadian minister was therefore sent to Tokio to negotiate a settlement with the Japanese Government. The result of his negotiations is embodied in the following important letter :

“Tokio, December 23, 1907.

“Monsieur le Ministre,—

“In reply to your note of even date, I have the honour to state that, although the existing treaty between Japan and Canada absolutely guarantees Japanese subjects full liberty to enter, travel, and reside in any part of the Dominion of Canada, yet it is not the intention of the Imperial Government to insist upon the complete enjoyment of the rights and privileges guaranteed by those stipulations when that would involve disregard of special conditions which may prevail in Canada from time to time.

“Acting in this spirit, and having particular regard to circumstances of recent occurrence in British Columbia, the Imperial Government have decided to take efficient means to restrict emigration to Canada. In carrying out this purpose, the Imperial Government, in pursuance of the policy above stated, will give careful consideration to local conditions prevailing in Canada with a view to meeting the desires of the Government of the Dominion as far as is compatible with the spirit of the treaty and the dignity of the State.

“Although, as stated in the note under reply, it was not possible for me to acquiesce in all of the proposals made by you on behalf of the Canadian Govern-

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ment, I trust that you will find in the statement herein made, proof of the earnest desire of the Imperial Government to promote, by every means within their power, the growth and stability of the cordial and mutually beneficial relations which exist between our countries. I venture to believe, also, that this desirable result will be found to have been materially advanced by the full exchange of views which has taken place between us, and it gives me special pleasure to acknowledge the obligation under which I have been placed by your frank and considerate explanations regarding the attitude and wishes of your Government.

“ I avail myself, etc. etc.,

“ (Signed) TADASU HAYASHI.

“ The Honourable Rodolphe Lemieux,

“ Postmaster-General and

“ Minister of Labour for Canada.

“ Tokio.”

It has since been stated at Ottawa that the Japanese Government also agreed to limit the number of immigrants to 400 a year, and not to allow any of them to proceed to Canada except under contracts approved by the Dominion Government.

The importance of this letter is not, as is sometimes urged, that British Columbia is protected only by a declaration that it is not the “ intention ” of the Japanese Government to insist on the “ complete ” enjoyment of the rights and privileges guaranteed to it by the treaty,” for Canada can recover full liberty of action within six months by foregoing its commercial privileges. Its importance consists in the proof it gives of the change in the attitude of Japan. In 1896 Japan was willing to enter into a commercial treaty which would give the Dominions the right to exclude her labourers and artizans. Ten years later she refused even to discuss the idea. The letter is studiously courteous and polite, but it refuses the slightest concession on the main point. It reserves to Japan the most complete liberty of action.

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It is quite clear that Japan is now as jealous about the rights and privileges of her citizens as any European power. She will not tolerate their being treated as if they were undesirables or uncivilized. As Mr Jebb has pointed out, the demand of the Japanese Government to-day is not merely that she should be given the status of a civilized nation, but that her citizens should be treated on exactly the same terms as the members of white communities. Thus Australia, like Canada, has found that her growing trade with the Far East renders commercial treaties desirable, and has endeavoured to negotiate a treaty with Japan. But Japan steadfastly refuses to enter into commercial arrangements so long as Australia claims the right to exclude the Japanese. Further, she protests against the European language test on the ground that it is a stigma on the Japanese language, and Australia has found it expedient to meet her wishes, leaving the selection of the language to the individual officer. Her claims, in fact, if admitted, would nullify all attempts at restriction.

Moreover, the attitude of Japan is not dictated only by considerations of national honour. The right of immigration is of great value to her. Her citizens leave a country where the standard of living is very low, and after accumulating wealth in the white man's land return with it to Japan. Merchants and shipping companies make their profit on the business, and the Government levy their toll on all alike by means of taxation. Further, as we have seen, such Japanese as fail to return do not repudiate their allegiance, and may be a source of immense strength to Japan in the event of war with another power. So great has been the immigration of Japanese into Hawaii—an American possession and the only naval base in the centre of the Pacific—that competent authorities declare that it would become a Japanese possession on the outbreak of war. It is said that the same is rapidly becoming true of the Phillipines. If ever Japan aimed at incorporating part of Australia within her domains, obviously the first step she would take would be to encourage or compel the immigration of her citizens into

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the Northern territories. Once they had occupied the land, the transfer of sovereignty would be comparatively simple.

If it is certain that the Dominions have finally determined to exclude Japanese and all other Asiatics from their territories, it is equally certain that Japan is not going to acquiesce in that decision, without at least a "quid pro quo."

Why has the problem of immigration grown increasingly difficult where the Japanese are concerned, while Canada can go on cheerfully discriminating against the Chinese by imposing an entry fee of £100 upon every one who enters the country? The reason is clear enough. Japan has created for herself a powerful army and navy, and because she has them her friendship is worth having, and her wishes carry weight. In the case of China, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, "There was nobody to protest and we had no hesitation in adopting that policy" (of discrimination). It would be more accurate to say that China can do nothing but protest, whether her citizens are treated unjustly or not. The protests of the Chinese are backed by "speeches and resolutions," the protests of the Japanese by "blood and iron."

The immigration difficulty has never yet become serious in the case of the Dominions, for, owing to the Alliance, Japan has never pressed for the rights of her citizens as she has in the case of America. It has thus been possible so far to keep immigration and commercial relations in a separate compartment, so to speak, from the broader questions of international politics. There is, however, little reason to expect that the present state of affairs will continue indefinitely. On the one hand commerce between Japan and the Dominions is increasing and requires regulation, on the other Japan is becoming more sensitive about the status of her citizens and refuses to enter into commercial treaties except on the basis of equality of treatment. Moreover, anti-Japanese feeling seems to be growing stronger at any rate in Canada. If the immigration difficulty is not solved it is bound to complicate sooner or later the foreign relations of the Empire. And if it does, and if feeling begins to

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run high, the situation is likely to be serious. For disputes over immigration must be classed among matters affecting the "vital interests, independence and honour of nations." Neither side would agree to submit the essential point to arbitration, and therefore in the last resort, if both parties were unreasonable, the quarrel could be settled only by the use or display of force. The dangerous possibilities of the question may be seen from the general conviction in the United States that war with Japan is ultimately inevitable. Let us realize at once that a real quarrel over immigration would make a continuance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance impossible, and might range Japan in definite hostility to the Empire.*

Before discussing how this affects the situation in the Far East, let us see if the immigration difficulty cannot be settled on its merits and put out of the way.

Fortunately, agreement would not seem to be impossible, if both sides are reasonable. At bottom the objection of the Dominions is not to contact with Asiatics—Chinese, Japanese, or Indians, except of the lowest class—but to their becoming permanent residents in their territories. They are not really opposed to the entry of educated Asiatic merchants, travellers or students, provided it is quite certain that they do not acquire domicile, and that they leave the country again after a relatively short time.

On the other hand, the Japanese appear to regard Europeans in much the same way as the Dominions regard Asiatics. They also seem jealous of the purity of their own society, and determined to protect themselves against white competition within their own country. Not only do they entirely exclude Chinese labourers—a provision which would certainly be applied to European labourers, if they attempted to enter Japan in any considerable numbers—but Europeans are not allowed to acquire land—the prelude to domicile—and are subject to many other restrictions of which outsiders have little knowledge. These re-

*See note at end of article about new Japanese Treaty with America.

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strictions, while they hinder the acquisition of domicile, do not prevent the free entry of visitors, for the Japanese realize well enough that the presence of educated strangers, merchants, financiers, and others is not only no menace, but a positive advantage to themselves.

It would seem, therefore, that an agreement could be reached which would settle the immigration difficulty and pave the way to stable commercial relations between the Dominions and Japan, on the following basis. That each race should have the right of excluding altogether labourers and artisans of the other race, but that educated persons, travellers, traders, students and so on, should have free entry, but under such restrictions as would prevent them from becoming permanent residents. There are some practical difficulties in the way, but these are certainly not insurmountable. Such an arrangement could not offend the "honour" or damage the "vital interests" of either party. It would be based upon the recognition of absolute racial equality. It would not raise the question of inferiority one way or the other. It would simply declare that the incorporation of considerable numbers of one race in communities of the other race produced grave evils for both races, and as such was not desired by either party, and would be prevented by common action. It is said that the Japanese have raised objections to a general settlement on these lines, but it has never yet been pressed upon them with the united strength of the whole Empire.

V.

WE have now to draw together the threads of this paper, to examine the changes which have come about recently in the international sphere, and to discover the conclusions to which they point, both as regards the future of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the relations of the Dominions to the government which conducts the foreign policy of the Empire.

The changes in the international situation as it affects the Far East have been neither few nor unimportant. We can,

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however, do no more than allude briefly to the chief among them.

There is the recent Russo-Japanese agreement, scarcely six months old, by which Russia and Japan agree to abstain from "all competition" with one another in the common development of Manchuria, and to co-operate in maintaining the status quo established in that country by the treaty of Portsmouth and other agreements between China, Russia and Japan. This is a great change. In 1905 Russia and Japan were at war. In 1910 their antagonism had become overshadowed by their common interest in Manchuria, as against China to whom it belongs, and those other powers who seek special commercial or financial interests within it.

There is the change in China. The old idea that China was destined to be partitioned among the great European powers has now vanished to the limbo of unfulfilled prophecies. Progress and reform are the watchwords of the day. The army and navy are rapidly becoming efficient under Western guidance. Education is spreading fast. Within a few months China will have established a system of representative government. The anti-opium movement is a striking testimony to the reality of her efforts at self-regeneration. As in Japan, national sentiment is rising. The old negative, anti-foreign prejudice is giving way to a positive sentiment of national ambition. With a population—according to the last census—of over 430,000,000 of the cheapest and most industrious workers in the world, China is bound sooner or later to dominate the East, unless she becomes divided against herself. And this the pressure from the greedy competition of foreign powers seems certain to prevent.

There is the understanding between England and Russia about Persia and Afghanistan, which for the present at any rate removes much of the anxiety about the Indian frontier.

There is the growth of hostility between the United States and Japan, due partly to difficulties connected with Asiatic immigration on the Pacific slope, partly to a supposed conflict of economic interest in the commercial deve-

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lopment of China. The influence of the United States as a Pacific power will be greatly enhanced on the opening of the Panama Canal in 1915.

There is the change caused by the rise of the German navy—foreseen in 1905, and now realized. What the effect of that has been can best be seen by examining the altered disposition of British naval strength. The two following tables set it forth clearly:

BRITISH MEN OF WAR IN EASTERN WATERS

	<i>Armoured Unarmoured</i>		
	<i>Battleships</i>	<i>Cruisers</i>	<i>Cruisers</i>
1901	5	4	29
1902	4	2	26
1903	5	2	25
1904	5	3	24
1905	5*	3	18
1906	—	3	17
1907	—	4	15
1908	—	4	15
1909	—	4	15
1910	—	3	16

This table includes ships on the Pacific, China, Australia and East India stations.

DISPOSITION OF BRITISH BATTLESHIPS

	<i>Far East</i>	<i>Mediterranean</i>	<i>Home Waters</i>
1903	5	14	16
1910	—	6	33

And even these figures do not expose the full measure of the change owing to the immense advance in battleship construction in the last few years. All the Dreadnought battleships and cruisers, each of them far more powerful than ships

* Reduced to nil after signature of Alliance.

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of the older types, are now concentrated within hail of the North Sea. The contraction of the area in which the British navy can claim undisputed command of the sea, indicated by these figures, is entirely due to the rise of Germany as a naval power. It illustrates vividly the essential importance of the possession of force in the international sphere.

Finally, there are the difficulties connected with Asiatic immigration into the Dominions. These introduce an entirely new factor in the relations between Great Britain and Japan. Up to the time of the 1902 Alliance Japan's whole thoughts were concentrated on the approaching war with Russia. When the present alliance was concluded, hostilities were still proceeding. It is only since her victory over Russia, and since she has become the strongest power in the Pacific,* that the rights and status of her citizens abroad have acquired a high and significant importance in her eyes. As we have seen, if both sides are reasonable, there seems no insuperable obstacle to a settlement of the difficulties which now exist. But if no agreement is reached Asiatic immigration is bound to raise issues of the most insoluble kind—for they lead straight to the world problem of the future—the relations between the white and yellow races—a matter which will be finally determined neither in our time, nor in that of our children.

It is thus quite clear that the international situation to-day is quite different from that which produced the alliance in 1905, and that by August, 1914, it will have changed still more. Whether or not at that time the alliance will be denounced by England or by Japan, will depend entirely upon the mutual self interest of the two parties. If it suits both, the alliance will continue. If one finds that it can do better for itself elsewhere the alliance will come to an end. As to which is the more probable recent events give no clear lead.

But one conclusion is evident from the analysis in the

* In 1910 Japan had 13 battleships, and 18 cruisers in commission, and 2 Dreadnoughts on the stocks.

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foregoing pages—that if any proper decision is to be reached we must in the near future greatly change the internal arrangements of the British Empire. Hitherto the keynote of the relations between the Imperial and the Dominion Governments has been local autonomy. Experience has shown that where local interests are involved, it is best to leave local authorities in charge. But the two questions we have been discussing—Asiatic immigration and the future of the Japanese Alliance—are no mere local concerns, for they cannot be handled effectively by any one part of the Empire. No one Dominion is strong enough to uphold the policy of Asiatic exclusion in its own territories in face of the force that could be brought to bear against it. Nor can England settle the future of the Japanese Alliance in the light of her own interests alone, because the Dominions have it within their power to make the continuance of the alliance impossible by going to extremes over Asiatic immigration. In these matters the Empire must arrive at a common policy, or it will disrupt.

It is this fact which invests the forthcoming Imperial Conference with such peculiar importance. For the first time since 1897 the whole question of Asiatic immigration will be thoroughly discussed, and in all probability it will be the last formal gathering of the Prime Ministers of the Empire before the alliance is terminated by one of the parties to it, or is continued by mutual consent. On both these subjects it may arrive at far-reaching conclusions.

As to the difficulties about immigration it is obviously to everybody's interest that these should be settled and put out of the way as soon as possible. It has been a thorny and difficult subject in the past, and may lead to dangerous complications at any moment. We have seen that a basis of settlement can be found which does no violence to the honour or vital interests of either people. But not only is a settlement far more probable if the Empire presses its views on Japan with a single voice, but the Dominions are likely to get better terms. Yet the Empire has still to agree upon a common

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policy. On the one hand, the British Government has had no direct experience of the question, and while it has raised no obstacle in the way of Asiatic exclusion by the Dominions, it has yet to adopt unreservedly their policy as its own. On the other, the Dominions have still to realize that the problem of Asiatic immigration is no longer a purely domestic concern, because it is inextricably bound up with the larger problem of international relations. And if a united policy is needed to facilitate agreement with Japan it is a thousand times more necessary if agreement proves impossible. In the long run the project of a "White Empire" will only be accomplished if the Empire has the strength to resist the terrific expansive pressure of the teeming millions of Asia. And that strength it will be able to exert only if all its parts are absolutely at one on the policy they should pursue.

When it comes to the alliance the Conference will find itself confronted with the problem of how the Empire is to be defended in 1915. For the moment, barring accidents, it is safe enough, since the alliance protects it in the Far East, and anxiety centres chiefly on the restless policy of expansion pursued by the bureaucrats of Germany. If the alliance continues, well and good; no vital change in our present system is required. But if it is denounced—and Japan can denounce it as well as England—it means that Japan must be included among our possible enemies, and our policy of defence calculated accordingly. Japan is not strong enough to dispense with allies. If we do not come to terms with her, to whom will she turn but to our rivals? Compare the position of Italy, who is notoriously friendly to England, yet whose army and navy are pledged to the Triple Alliance.

This then is the crucial point, that after 1915 the Empire may have to face the hostility of Japan in the Far East, as well as the hostility of Germany in the Atlantic and the North Sea. Before going further let us see what this possibility entails.

Since 1905 the rise of the German navy has revolutionized

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the international situation—another proof of the part played by force in the affairs of nations. In a previous article its influence was shown on the European balance of power. We can now see that its effect on the Empire has been no less great. It has seriously diminished the protection which the British navy can give to the Dominions in time of emergency by introducing the factor of delay. Great Britain, of course, admits without reserve her obligation to defend the Dominions with her last penny and her last man. But the whole defensive system of the Empire to-day centres on the British Isles, because its population pays more than nine-tenths of the cost of the navy. If a successful attack were made on England or its trade, the defence of the Empire would instantly collapse. So long as this remains the case, the British fleet cannot leave British waters until the German or any other hostile fleet has been destroyed or its neutrality guaranteed. That is to say, the bulk of the British navy cannot proceed to the defence of the outlying parts of the Empire until the safety of the heart is assured. And even though ultimate victory is in European waters beyond doubt, what may not have happened elsewhere in the meantime? The Dominions have begun to realize how the rise of the German navy affects themselves, despite the protection of the alliance. Australia and New Zealand have each adopted compulsory military service, and two Colonial Dreadnought cruisers, as well as a number of other modern vessels of war will shortly be afloat in the Pacific.

If the rise of Germany has produced this effect already, what will be its effect in 1915, when the German navy will be at least twice as powerful as it is to-day? And what would be the position if Japan were no longer our ally? Armaments are not only used for defence. To “nationalist” powers like Germany, they are an “instrument of policy”—to be cast into the scales which determine the fate of nations, as national interests require. Thus, the *Cologne Gazette*, an accredited organ of the German Foreign Office, declared

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not two months ago that the "secret of diplomatic success is ultimately military power," and that

"success is reaped only by him who has the courage at the decisive moment to stake all the forces at his disposal without reserve."

And the German Chancellor, speaking in the Reichstag on December 10, endorsed this view in the following words:

"to maintain intact the strength and readiness for war of our army, to carry through the construction as provided by law of our navy—these are demands that belong to the programme of all parties which do not on principle base themselves upon the standpoint of negation. These demands are rooted deep in the sentiments of the nation because it is military strength alone which enables Germany to pursue that policy of quiet determination which the practical efficiency of the people has the right to claim."

We cannot misunderstand what these statements mean, nor forget that the policy of Germany is in the hands of a bureaucracy, created by Bismarck, inheriting his tradition, subject to no effective Parliamentary control. So long as the policy of Germany is hostile to the British Empire—as it is to-day—is there any reason to expect that when next it is urgently necessary for the British navy to leave home waters, the price of German neutrality will not be concessions—territorial concessions in Africa, for example, naval bases in the Atlantic or the Pacific, or whatever the "quiet determination" of a forceful diplomacy can extract. And if any one doubts what would happen let him put himself in the position of a German, fired by patriotic zeal, full of faith in the mission of Germanism to the world, possessed by the idea that the British Empire, by lying selfishly across the path, was compromising his country's destiny. Is it likely that he would prevent his Government seizing such an op-

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portunity, even if in sober moments he longed for the days of universal peace? And what if the other great "nationalist" power of the world, Japan, were ranged in hostility in the Pacific? Would not the opportunities of squeezing England, and despoiling the Dominions be multiplied a hundredfold.

This, then, is the possibility which the Conference has to take into account. It is the worst that can befall us, and we are more likely to forestall it if we face it now, than if we blind our eyes to the facts until it is too late to prepare against them. The Conference itself can reach no final conclusion about the alliance. But it can discuss the advantages and disadvantages of continuing the alliance, so far as British interests are concerned, from the point of view of the Empire instead of from that of the British Isles. And it can consider how the gap in the defensive system of the Empire is to be filled should the alliance end and the protection it now affords to India and the Dominions disappear. That gap must obviously be filled, and if we face the necessity in time it should not be difficult to do so. It might be possible to reach an understanding with Germany. We might find an effective basis for co-operation with the United States if the present difficulties with Washington over Far Eastern policy were removed. Or the Dominions might elect to stand on their own feet and do for the Empire in the East what the alliance does to-day. If they were to spend per head even one-half of what is paid by the people of Great Britain for naval defence, the Empire would be absolutely safe from the possibility of successful attack. For, as the Defence Conference of 1909 declared, the assistance of the Dominions is required not in the North Sea, but in the outer oceans of the world.

But whatever the correct course may be, what is essential is that the Dominions and Great Britain should thoroughly understand one another's views, and should agree upon a common policy. And in order that the Empire may continue to pursue a common policy on matters which concern

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the whole, perhaps the most important practical step which the Conference can take will be to devise some method by which the Imperial Government and the Dominion Governments can keep in consultation with one another in the future. At present, the Dominions have no means of finding out about international affairs. They have no ambassadors and no foreign offices, for diplomacy is chiefly concerned with the balance of power, and the Dominions to-day have little or no force to cast into the scale. None the less, as this article shows, they are vitally affected by the foreign policy of England, and before the Conference meets again the alliance which is their bulwark now, will have vanished, or been renewed. Some machinery, therefore, should be contrived whereby they can be effectively and continuously consulted by the Imperial Government.

They are thus difficult problems which lie before the Empire under the two headings, the Japanese alliance and Asiatic immigration. It may be possible to treat them separately. They may become merged in the gravest danger which has yet beset us. Let us again remember that as the world is constituted to-day, the safety of nations, in the last resort, depends upon their strength and not upon the justness of their cause. The Empire cannot survive by sitting still. It cannot survive if its parts pursue their several ways regardless of the rest in matters which concern the whole. In the growing struggle of nations it will survive only if it can agree upon a united policy, and support it with its whole strength. Hitherto England has been able to conduct the policy of the Empire alone. She can do so no longer. It is not merely that she finds it increasingly hard to bear the burden of defence. It is that neither England nor her Dominions are masters of their own policy. England cannot carry on her alliance with Japan if the Dominions are unreasonable in their treatment of the Japanese and the Dominions cannot secure the purity of their white society without the support of the British navy. Even Canada, as a Toronto paper observed the other day,

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must defend British Columbia in conjunction with the rest of the Empire, if she is not to be forced to accept the assistance of the United States, on whatever terms Washington chooses to dictate.

For the first time the Imperial Conference is confronted with the task of framing a common policy for the Empire, and of deciding on the means by which it is to be upheld. A momentous future hangs upon its work, and in deciding what to do, it has not merely to consider how South Africa is to be defended, or how to preserve Australia as a white man's country, or how to sustain the trade or prestige of Britain, great as these countries are. It has to think of the future of the Empire itself, which is a far greater thing. For if the Empire dissolves, there disappears with it law and good government among many hundreds of millions of subject peoples, who are protected from war and oppression by nothing but the British flag. There disappears the national freedom and individual liberty which the self-governing peoples have enjoyed within the Empire. And then there disappears for ever that great fabric which for a century has given peace and justice to one quarter of mankind, and which may yet give them to the world.

The terms of the new commercial treaty between America and Japan, announced while THE ROUND TABLE is passing through the press, are a striking confirmation of what has been written about the attitude of Japan towards the question of immigration. In the 1895 American treaty Japan agreed to allow America to pass any laws it liked excluding Japanese labourers, and as we have seen, she was prepared in 1897 to allow the Dominions to exclude artizans as well. In the new treaty the clause relating to the exclusion of labourers is omitted, and America, like Canada, has to rely on a declaration of Japan's intention not to permit her citizens to sail for America. In consequence the commercial treaty is terminable at six months' notice, an arrangement very inimical to the development of trade. This treaty proves how difficult the question of immigration becomes when it is handled by two people unfriendly to one another. It proves also that both sides anticipate that circumstances may arise at any time which will make it important that they should recover complete liberty of action with the shortest possible delay. It is a proof of the extreme importance of attempting a general settlement of the immigration problem as soon as possible, if the Dominions are not to live under an arrangement affecting the vital

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interests of the Empire which is unstable, temporary, and which is no guarantee against the outbreak of grave trouble at any time.

NOTE ON INDIAN IMMIGRATION TO THE DOMINIONS.

There seems to be no reason why the principles which have been suggested as the basis of settlement for the difficulties connected with Japanese immigration, should not be equally applied in the case of the British Indian. Exactly the same arguments apply. The incorporation of large numbers of Indians in communities predominately European, and *vice versa*, is highly injurious to both peoples; the entry of educated persons is unobjectionable provided they and their families do not become permanent residents. This solution affects the question of the British Government of India, neither one way nor the other. The British rule India partly because their international position compels them to do so, partly because having destroyed the old tyrannous system of Indian government they cannot relinquish the responsibility of governing the country until they have built up an efficient system of native government which can replace them. But they do not become incorporated in the social and economic life of the country. Practically the whole of the white governing military and commercial classes return eventually to the British Isles. Speaking generally, white families never become permanently domiciled, and, therefore, the real evils which follow from the intermixture of races never arise. In fact the Government of India would probably be the first to interfere if any considerable number of white men attempted to settle permanently in India as workmen or agriculturists. A basis for agreement, therefore, already exists, although the practical difficulties in the way of carrying it out are not entirely easy to overcome. None the less, if the Imperial and the Dominion Governments were to declare that in the joint interest of India and the Dominions, it was the policy of the Empire to prevent the permanent settlement of members of the one race in countries mainly peopled by the other race, most of the present difficulties would disappear. The friction with the Dominions would come to an end if they were freed from the spectre of Indian immigration, and the natural indignation of the Indian people would diminish if educated and civilized Indians were allowed temporary entry to the Dominions, and if the exclusion of Indians as settlers was grounded not on a narrow colour prejudice, but on a general policy, applicable to India as well as to the rest of the Empire. Half the trouble to-day is due to the fact that the white population in the Dominions only comes into contact with the lowest classes of Indian labourers, and is, therefore, contemptuous and inconsiderate. An arrangement like that suggested would gradually eliminate this cause for friction, while it would establish as the ground of exclusion not the inferiority of all Indians, but the common interests of Asiatic and Caucasian. It is true that it would finally destroy the fiction that there is absolute equality of opportunity for all British subjects everywhere under the Union Jack. But this is a fiction which has long ceased to exist in practice. The preceding article has proved that the Dominions are determined not to permit the entry of Indian settlers. And it has proved that India can only suffer from the introduction of any large number of permanent settlers of European stock. The policy of exclusion has seemed a hardship and injustice to the Indian peoples only because their lower

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economic standards have led to the question being raised first in their case. In reality, it already also applies in the case of India to the white working classes.

APPENDIX I.

Agreement between Great Britain and Japan, signed at London, January 30, 1902.

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE I.

The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and of Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically, as well as commercially and industrially, in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

ARTICLE II.

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

ARTICLE III.

If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE IV.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

ARTICLE V.

Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

ARTICLE VI.

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it.

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But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement, and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th January, 1902.

(L.S.) (Signed) LANSDOWNE,
His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(L.S.) (Signed) HAYASHI,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

APPENDIX II.

Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan signed at London, August 12, 1905.

PREAMBLE.

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for their object—

(a.) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b.) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c.) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:

ARTICLE I.

It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

ARTICLE II.

If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

ARTICLE III.

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and neces-

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sary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

ARTICLE IV.

Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

ARTICLE V.

The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI.

As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

ARTICLE VII.

The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

ARTICLE VIII.

The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

(L.S.) LANSDOWNE,
His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

(L.S.) TADASU HAYASHI,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

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SINCE the publication of the first number of *THE ROUND TABLE*, there has been much political controversy in the British Isles, but it has been centred almost entirely about a single issue—constitutional reform. In November last the Conference between the Unionist and Liberal leaders, convened to attempt an amicable settlement of the dispute between Lords and Commons, was still in session, and though the delegates had attended some 20 meetings spread over four months, nobody had any certain information as to the probable result. On November 10 Mr. Asquith announced that the Conference had “come to an end without arriving at an agreement,” and that it had decided to make no disclosures as to the course of its deliberations. Therefore, as he said in a subsequent statement, the two parties to the controversy which had stood adjourned from the death of King Edward, forthwith “reverted to a state of war.”

Why did the Conference fail? From statements made at different times by its members, it is pretty clear that it was not on matters of detail that the Conference split. The plain fact was that its members never found common ground. Conferences between parties deeply divided on matters of principle, as distinct from matters of policy or tactics, seldom if ever succeed, unless they meet on the common ground that paramount national interests make agreement imperative. Thus in the case of South Africa it was the absolute necessity of union as the only solvent of the growing racial and inter-colonial quarrels which impelled the opposing parties to meet in the convention, and to abandon time-honoured party and racial traditions, which were found to be incompatible with union. And what was true of the African convention was true also of the assemblies which led to the confederations of Canada, Australia, and America, and of those international conferences which have remade the frontiers of Europe in the knowledge that failure to agree would mean war.

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In the case of the recent constitutional Conference, however, there was no such common ground. Neither side believed that the destinies of the nation were bound up in the success of the Conference. Neither side was willing to sacrifice its principles or its future as a party, for the sake of finding a solution. They went into the Conference because a lamentable accident—the death of King Edward—had forced their hands, not because they were convinced that the national safety would be imperilled by a continuance of the quarrel.

Thus from the start the Conference was doomed to failure. From the attitude of the two parties it is easy to see that only a paramount national crisis could have produced agreement. The Liberals believed that the welfare of the country demanded the rapid passage of a series of far-reaching measures of reform. They saw that the existence of the House of Lords as at present composed was a fatal obstacle to the millenium according to the Liberal gospel. To destroy the Unionist predominance in the Lords would require a measure of reform far more sweeping than they felt themselves competent to undertake. The shortest road to their desires was to deprive the second chamber of its real power, and confine it to the not unimportant function of delaying the passage of bills of which it disapproved, and so giving opportunities for the reconsideration of hasty or hotheaded legislation. This plan, lightly adopted, was based on the assumption that the realization of Liberal ideals was the paramount necessity of the times. If the powers of an ancient institution like the House of Lords or the privileges of its members stood in the way, they must be swept aside. Doubtless there were other and less worthy motives. The veto bill had the advantage that it would “dish” the Tories, who possessed a permanent majority in the upper house. It was “popular.” It struck a shrewd blow at property and privilege, and so on. But the dynamic force behind it was the belief among the great majority of Liberals, that the interests of the country were indissolubly bound up with the immediate removal of the obstacle to the passage of Liberal legislation.

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The Unionists on the other hand, were profoundly convinced of the value of institutions and traditions which are the legacy of the ripe wisdom and bitter experience of earlier ages, and for which Radicals profess little respect; they were sceptical of the beneficial results of most of the legislative proposals of the other side, if they were not actually opposed to them; and they were certain that the evils which would follow the dislocation of the constitution would be incomparably greater than even the most beneficent laws could cure. The opposition of the Unionists, therefore, was based on the assumption that the national safety was bound up with the maintenance of the traditional bicameral system—substantially unchanged. Reform, which they agreed was needed, should take such shape that the safeguards against drastic changes should not be seriously diminished. If the conservation of the constitution meant the indefinite delay of all Liberal hopes and aspirations, that could not be helped. It was much more important that the fabric which had weathered the storms of ages, which seemed bound up with the safety of the State, should be preserved, than that a few measures of social reform of doubtful wisdom should be hurried through a little more rapidly than was possible to-day. In this case also no doubt unworthy motives played their part. The House of Lords was a Tory preserve. It could exercise what was practically a Tory veto. It was the stronghold of property and social standing, and so forth. But where the bulk of the Unionist party were concerned, it was anxiety lest a rash constitutional change should endanger the State, which was the dominating motive of their opposition to the Liberal scheme.

To a non-party man, there seems much reason on both sides. One is forced to sympathize with the Liberals when they declare that owing to the progress of modern science the rapidity of social and economic movement has enormously increased, and that changes in legislation must keep pace with the changes in the condition of the people. One has even more sympathy when they cry out that it is

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scandalous that when they possess the confidence of the country, half their most important measures should be thrown out by a house which is a permanent Tory chamber, and is influenced mainly, if unconsciously, by Tory motives. Few dispassionate men would deny that there is a case for at least such constitutional reform as would substitute for the veto of a party caucus, the review of a strong, responsible and non-party second chamber.

On the other hand one feels also that there is great force in the Unionist view, that reform in the composition of the second chamber should be attempted before its powers are cut down; that only the gravest reasons can warrant an attack on the fundamental institutions of the State; and that the removal of a handicap on the rapid passage of Liberal legislation is not the only or even the most urgent of national interests, and certainly does not justify the destruction of an otherwise valuable part of our well-tried constitutional machinery. The Liberal plan, too, does place too much power in the hands of a temporary majority, and if it is unlikely that any government will gravely abuse its powers, few people who realize the responsibilities and dangers of the Empire are anxious to remove all checks upon its doing so.

Thus to the ordinary man it appeared no impossible task to make such constitutional changes as would remove the Liberal grievance, and yet ensure that stability in the conduct of public affairs, which it is the chief purpose of a second chamber to secure. But with a party man it is otherwise. Once he has adopted a policy, he ceases to inquire into its wisdom. He is for the party programme, the whole programme, and nothing but the programme. Moreover, as Lord Rosebery says, to be a good party man you must not only think your opponents wrong but rogues and knaves to boot. To compromise on a party plank, to trust a party opponent or to refuse a party advantage is to a party man perilously near treason. It is only when some national crisis clearly demands that all should co-operate on some

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national end, that he will agree to suspend the party strife, or have dealings with the foe.

As we have seen, the party men did not believe that there was in 1910 a national crisis of sufficient gravity to warrant their settling the constitutional difficulty by other than the ordinary constitutional means. Neither Unionists nor Liberals were ready to see vital points in their own programme given away for the sake of agreement—the Liberals to perpetuate the obstacle of a second chamber of conservative if not Tory complexion, the Unionists to open a way for revolutionary change or to accept those sweeping changes in the composition of the House of Lords which alone could put an end to their party preponderance within it. The leaders realized that they could not command the assent of their followers to any scheme they could jointly contrive, and that an attempt to coerce them might break up both parties—a calamity which no existing national crisis seemed to warrant. For the party system, defective as it may be, is the best system of popular government which has yet been devised. On the one hand it recruits men of first-rate ability, tried courage, and long experience for the control of the public destinies. On the other, it admits of a government taking action decisively and rapidly so long as it has the country behind it, and of its being turned out of office once it has forfeited public support.

The Conference therefore broke down all along the line. Speaking with the wisdom that comes after the event, the Conference should not have met at all unless the leaders on both sides were convinced that a settlement was absolutely necessary, and that once they had entered the Conference they had somehow or other to agree. The advocates of the Conference, who were very largely animated by the belief that settlement by consent was needed for wider imperial reasons, persuaded the party leaders, unbalanced by the death of the King, to enter the Conference, but they did not convince them that a national crisis existed sufficiently grave to warrant them dealing a serious blow to the party system. This, perhaps, is not entirely surprising. For though, as the

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advocates of the Conference saw the confusion of British party politics with imperial problems is one of the roots of the present constitutional difficulties, the fact that it is so is not yet generally apprehended, and therefore did not influence the leaders at the Conference, or their followers outside it.

The General Election followed immediately. There is little doubt that the Government scored by dissolving Parliament within little more than a fortnight of the failure of the Conference. Though the Unionist leaders in the Conference had had the opportunity of thinking out the position, and acquiesced at first in the immediate dissolution, neither the rank and file of their party nor the mass of the people knew more than that their policy was reform as opposed to the abolition of the veto. In consequence, when the Unionist proposals were produced, they were adopted practically without discussion, under circumstances which created the impression that they were a hastily compiled alternative to the Government plan rather than the deliberate and considered policy of the Unionist party.

Seldom, if ever, has a general election been fought on a more defined issue. Usually the struggle is between two groups of rival claimants for the public confidence, and two programmes, each comprising a large assortment of measures, many of them of first-class importance. On this occasion the veto bill occupied the whole front of the Ministerialist programme, though some play was made with payment of members, invalidity and unemployment insurance, and Home Rule for Ireland. On the Unionist side there was similar concentration. The Lansdowne scheme of reform was put forward as the alternative of the veto bill, and Mr Balfour, by promising to submit the principles of Tariff Reform to a referendum, even if the Unionists were returned to power, practically confined the election to the constitutional struggle. Thus the choice before the country was the Liberals and their veto bill, with Home Rule in the background, or the Unionists and their proposals for reform, with Tariff Reform in the background. The principles of the veto bill were

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short and clear. Finance was to be a matter for the Commons alone. In the case of other legislation, the Lords were only to have a suspensive veto. Any bill passed by the House of Commons, in three successive sessions over a period of not less than two years, was to become law whether the Lords passed it or not. The duration of Parliament was to be reduced from seven to five years.

The Unionist reform proposals were not so clear. The powers of the Lords were to remain unchanged, save that they were to forego their right to amend or reject bills dealing solely with finance. If a dispute arose between the two Houses in other matters extending over two successive sessions, it was to be settled, in the case of ordinary legislation by means of a joint sitting composed of members of the two Houses, in the case of matters of "great gravity" by means of a referendum. The composition of the Lords was to be reformed by reducing their numbers, abolishing the hereditary right to sit in the House, and by constituting the new chamber partly of persons qualified by distinguished public service, partly of persons elected by the hereditary peers, and partly of persons chosen from outside. As the Liberals justly observed, this scheme contained several unknown quantities, and its value as a measure of reform would depend on the manner on which these unknown quantities were defined. The real case of the Unionists was that the veto bill was dangerous and mischievous, and that the proper line of constitutional advance was to reform the House of Lords along lines generally indicated but not precisely defined, and to create adequate machinery for solving deadlocks when the two houses disagreed.

The result of the election was a majority of 126 for the Government and its veto bill. It is proverbially foolish to explain elections, but if people outside the British Isles are to understand the situation to-day, and not to be led away by the melancholy forebodings of partisans or croakers, some attempt at it must be made.

It is necessary to distinguish between the functions of the

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party man and the average elector. The pledged party adherents are those who are interested in political questions, and who, by tradition, by temperament, or by conviction, have become convinced believers in the general principles of one of the great parties in the State. Beyond them is the great mass of electors who have no permanent party leanings, and who vote at each election for the party and programme they think best suited to the country's needs at the time. It is impossible even to suggest the relative numbers of the two groups. Probably the convinced party supporters are not as numerous as the noise and excitement they create would suggest. The functions of the two groups are quite different. The party men in the intervals between elections mould the alternative programmes which are set before the country. The average elector decides at election time which party and which programme is to prevail.

We have already examined the respective attitudes of the two chief parties as manifested by their leaders at the Conference. We have now to analyse the views of the ordinary elector on the choice between veto bill and reform laid before him by the party men. Judged by the outward expression of his opinions, the average British elector is the stupidest political animal the world has ever seen. He takes narrow views, is hide-bound by prejudice, is incapable of grasping a principle, applauds vociferously the most absurd and unreasonable of arguments. But judged by results he is the most successful. He has a strange instinct which makes him vote right. He refuses to follow alluring theories, he is suspicious of panaceas, he distrusts cleverness, sentiment, rhetoric and all the fascinations of the professional politician. He will "roll up" in thousands when some popular exponent of the demagogic arts, like Mr F. E. Smith or Mr Lloyd George appears upon a platform within his reach. He will appear to approve of even the wildest of their utterances. He will go about for days repeating inanely some phrase which has caught his fancy. But none the less he is the despair of the political weather prophet. For when the time comes to vote, he will cast aside all the

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panaceas, the platform phrases, the promises, that he has been listening to with such wrapt attention, he will forget all about his pledges to party canvassers, and he will sit down and make up his mind which, on the whole, is the better side. And in general he will vote rather on men than on the measures they advocate. He recognizes that he does not understand much about legislative or fiscal proposals and he trusts his judgement of the party leaders a long way before he trusts his judgement of their programmes. And the qualities he looks for in his leaders are honesty, conviction, and high purpose. He does not want sparkling ability. He does not want men of his own class or mere mouthpieces of his own particular needs. He wants to put in power the men he trusts to run the country best, men who he is sure are straightforward, sincere, balanced, strong, solicitous not for themselves, or their party, or for fads and nostrums, but for what they think the country's good.

What did the ordinary elector—the man who settled the election—think about the last election? He was first of all thoroughly disappointed at the failure of the Conference. While the struggle between the two Houses of Parliament had greatly heated party men, it had never aroused genuine enthusiasm in the mass of the people. The controversy was too remote from the problems of daily life, and most ordinary men felt that once a conference had been called, it certainly ought to have found a compromise. It was this feeling which accounted for the rounds of applause which invariably greeted platform denunciation of the party system, and for the marked diminution in the poll as compared with the election of a year before. Still the elector had to exercise a choice. What made him vote for the Liberals? In the main two considerations.

To use a phrase common in his own mouth, he wanted to give the House of Lords a knock. He had no strong convictions as to whether restriction of veto or reform was in itself the better road of constitutional advance. But he felt that the Lords had been playing old Harry with the legislation passed by a majority he had put into power and that the time had come to assert his own supremacy. He wanted to put the Lords in their

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place. That he could only do by voting for the Liberals who were for fighting the Lords, and against the Unionists who were backing the Lords' scheme of reform.

The only argument which could have induced the average elector to forego the chance of asserting his supremacy, would have been the fear lest in voting Liberal he would place in office an irresponsible Cabinet of wreckers empowered to remove the chief check on revolutionary change—the veto of the second chamber. But so far from thinking this, his opinions ran the other way. He believed that the Liberal leaders were stronger and abler men than the Unionist leaders. He was convinced of the patriotism, public spirit and sober judgement of men like Mr Asquith, Lord Loreburn, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Morley, Lord Crewe, and Mr Haldane, even if he had doubts about the caution and moderation of Mr Lloyd George and Mr Churchill. So long as these men were in office he was prepared to run the risk of the Government taking advantage of its powers to bring ruin and revolution on the land. On the other hand, he had no great confidence in the Unionists. In talent and strength their front bench was manifestly weaker than that of their opponents. Rightly or wrongly he believed the party to be less sincere and less broad-minded than the Liberals, and to be more concerned with the protection of property and privilege than with the general amelioration of social conditions. Their policy of reform, too, perhaps owing to the hasty dissolution, seemed to have been adopted as an electoral measure rather than because of any earnest belief in its wisdom. Moreover, the Unionist denunciation of the Government as wreckers did not carry conviction, when in order to concentrate the issue on the veto bill, Tariff Reform was set aside by an eleventh hour pledge to introduce the referendum—a constitutional change, which, however sound in itself, was infinitely more revolutionary and far-reaching than anything that the Government proposed.

On the ground, therefore, both of measures and men, the average elector voted for the Government and its plan. Many individual voters, of course, were influenced by selfish

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and shortsighted motives, and the Irish Nationalists as usual thought of nothing but Home Rule. But the great mass of the floating electorate—who despite all the accusations of the disappointed side, usually vote from public-spirited and not selfish motives, decided that something drastic ought to be done to the Lords, and that the Liberals were the people to do it. They did not look much further. They were willing to trust the Government with the somewhat unmeasured powers conferred by the veto bill, and they were therefore willing to trust it also not to abuse their confidence when it came to deal with Home Rule.

In the light of Mr. Asquith's declaration of April 14, 1910, that the Government would only dissolve if it was certain that a verdict in their favour could be carried into effect, there is little reason to doubt that the veto bill, substantially in its present form, will become law. In the opinion of the writer the policy of the veto bill has been a mistake from start to finish. It is dangerous and shortsighted, and the grievance it is designed to remove could have been remedied in other and more constitutional ways. But the responsibility for it really lies less with the Liberals than with their opponents. If the Liberals lightly committed themselves to a line of advance from which they cannot now retreat, it was because the Peers had allowed themselves to become a Unionist caucus out of touch and out of sympathy with the life of the nation. And if the veto bill becomes law it will be because the Unionists, disorganized and without any clear grasp of principle, have failed to convince the country that reform is the real alternative to the veto bill as a cure for the evils which exist, or that if returned to power they would thoroughly purge the House of Lords of its party bias.

What will happen after the veto bill has become law it is impossible to say. But it is well for those who fear and dislike it to remember that it will not be a final settlement. The Government as well as the Opposition is pledged to reform the House of Lords, and there is every indication that this

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will be undertaken, not by means of a party majority, but in friendly co-operation both with the Lords and the Unionists. No constitutional reform can be stable which does not command at least the acquiescence of all parties, and it is quite clear that the Unionists, if ever they have the power, will not leave the veto bill as it stands. Therefore, before finality can be reached some further change, certainly in the composition of the upper house, probably in its powers, must be made, and that change must meet with the assent of both parties. The Government have won their point, the present Tory veto on Liberal legislation is to disappear for ever, and if some thoroughly impartial and non-party chamber, acceptable to both sides, can be constructed, there is no reason why some at any rate of the powers taken away from it by the veto bill should not be restored.

There is one aspect of the present discontents which calls for graver consideration than it has yet received. In reality most of the evils which have produced the veto bill, the scheme for the reform of the Second Chamber, the revival of Home Rule, and the outcry against the party system—are symptoms of a profounder disease, the growing congestion and incapacity of the Imperial Parliament, which none of these proposals will cure.

The congestion of business in Parliament is a commonplace of everyday politics. All government departments have pigeonholes filled with draft bills of great practical importance which have been set aside from year to year to make room for the great party measures. No private member now has a chance of placing any important act on the Statute-book, unless he can persuade the Government to take over the bill. Home Rule is advocated as much because it will relieve Parliament, as because it is a proper concession to the national sentiments of the Irish people. The Federalists go so far as to say that only by a wholesale measure of devolution affecting England, Scotland and Wales as well as Ireland, can the efficiency of the national Parliament be restored. If the purely domestic interests of the United Kingdom have

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already suffered to this extent from the inability of Cabinet and Parliament to attend to them, what must not be the case with the Empire, to whose world-wide problems—including foreign policy and defence—the Imperial Parliament now devotes less than one-tenth of its time?

Yet even if Parliament were relieved by some sweeping scheme of devolution of all its minor duties its real incapacity as an Imperial Parliament would still remain, for it would still be elected by the people of the British Isles voting on party issues which have little or no relation to imperial affairs. So far as the elections are concerned, it is a matter of chance whether a cabinet contains men of sufficient knowledge and ability to manage the imperial side of the national business. For instance, if as a result of a series of social and labour troubles a government came into power, composed of the leading labour men—a contingency which from the point of view of the British Isles alone might not be at all dangerous—it would contain no member the least qualified to look after the foreign affairs and defence of the Empire, or the government of India and the dependencies. It is the possible effect on the Empire of the present constitutional changes, frankly designed to meet local needs, which is making thoughtful people uneasy. So far as the purely internal affairs of the British Isles are concerned, no very fearful results are likely to follow the veto bill. But there is no guarantee that British party politics will always produce a government which can take a statesmanlike and farsighted view of imperial affairs, and if an “advanced” and reckless government were returned after the constitutional safeguards on its action had been removed, things might look black.

This uneasiness has begun to manifest itself in the Dominions. A South African paper, writing of the constitutional controversy, said:

“It is quite evident that the overseas Dominions are now of such importance that no drastic change in the supreme government of the Empire by the Imperial Parliament can now take place without their being consulted and their interests studied.”

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Yet that is precisely what is happening—a fact which a New Zealand paper said “is loaded with tremendous possibilities for ourselves and all the households of the Imperial Clan.” Similar sentiments have appeared recently in most of the papers in all the Dominions, and indeed are the obvious reflections on current events. The plain truth, as *The Nation*—the leading British Liberal weekly, says—is that “the central authority has broken down.” There is no Imperial Government. There is only an insular government elected on the party issues of the British Isles, which is charged as well with the duty of managing an Empire which comprises one quarter of the human race and one fifth of the globe.

People are coming more and more to see that this confusion of imperial and domestic affairs is the root problem of which the most of these local disturbances are the symptoms. The evils it produces are not confined to the congestion of business, or to disregard or ignorance of imperial interests. It tends to embitter political life. One man approves of a bill on imperial grounds, another votes against it for local reasons. The one is thereupon dubbed a jingo, the other a traitor. The Unionists would not be so bitter against the veto bill if they did not think its results might imperil the Empire. There would not be the violence about Tariff Reform if it were not that its imperial and domestic aspects are at present inextricably confused.

Our difficulties will not have disappeared when the dispute between Lords and Commons is over. The veto bill does not touch the fringe of the real question, which is the readjustment of the machinery by which the Empire is governed. The problem is one which will not be solved to-day or to-morrow. It will probably not even be discussed by the Imperial Conference, for its issues are not ripe for decision. Yet it is the great question which is looming up for settlement in the future. One thing alone is clear. If the Empire is to survive, its interests cannot figure much longer as counters in the party prize fight of the British Isles.

CANADIAN AFFAIRS

I. A STORY OF EXPANSION

CANADA has had a year of remarkable prosperity. The total foreign trade for 1909-10 was \$693,161,000. This is more than three times the volume of twenty years ago. The total value of field crops for the year is estimated at \$507,185,000 as compared with \$539,992,000 for 1909. There was a partial failure of the Western crop in Southern Manitoba, Southern Alberta and South-western Saskatchewan, and Sir Edmund Walker, a high authority, estimates the total value of field crops in the Prairie provinces at \$155,926,000 as against \$192,839,000 for 1909. This is a decrease of \$37,000,000 due chiefly to lower prices. The clearing house returns totalled \$6,154,000,000 as compared with \$5,204,000,000 in the previous year, or an increase of 18 per cent. There was great industrial activity in the older provinces, and a marked increase of building operations in many towns and cities. For example, the building permits in Montreal show an increase from \$10,713,000 in 1909 to \$15,815,000 in 1910; in Toronto from \$18,139,000 to \$21,127,000; in Winnipeg from \$9,226,000 to \$15,106,000 and in Vancouver from \$7,203,000 to \$13,150,000.

The output of silver at Cobalt is estimated at \$14,500,000 as compared with \$12,461,000 for 1909, and altogether the camp has yielded a total product of \$48,000,000, of which \$24,500,000 have been paid in dividends. The gold yield of the Yukon, where strong mining companies with advanced machinery have replaced the small operators with inadequate appliances, was between \$4,000,000 and \$4,500,000. During the year the Canadian Northern Railway Company laid 454 miles of track in the Prairie provinces and 73 in Ontario, and inaugurated a fleet of steamships on the Atlantic. Its total expenditure for the year ran to \$17,000,000. The Canadian Pacific Company laid 326 miles of single track and 57 miles of double track, and at the end of the year 323 miles of single track and 77 miles of double

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track were under construction. It is also announced that during 1911 the road will spend \$7,000,000 in rolling stock and equipment and appropriate \$8,000,000 to extend its irrigation system in Alberta. On the National Transcontinental Railway between Moncton and Winnipeg 995 miles of track and 187 miles of sidings have been laid at a total cost of \$85,997,193. The estimate for 1911 is \$27,000,000. On the Grand Trunk Pacific road in British Columbia and the Prairie provinces 288 miles of track were laid or graded during 1910, and already a thousand miles of this road are in actual operation.

During the first six months of the fiscal year 204,365 immigrants entered the Dominion as compared with 120,912 for the same period of 1909-10. Of these 75,445 came from the United States as against 56,465, an increase of 34 per cent, while 128,919 as against 64,447 entered by ocean ports, an increase of 100 per cent. For the year the authorities estimate that the immigration will reach 400,000. For the nine months of the fiscal year ending with December 31, the Federal revenue was \$85,665,833, as against \$73,390,080 for the corresponding period of 1909-10, an increase of \$12,275,753. For federal, provincial, municipal and other purposes Canada is borrowing at the rate of \$200,000,000 per annum. It is estimated that the Dominion has absorbed \$1,000,000,000 of British capital. During a decade outside investments in Canada have totalled \$962,000,000, of which Great Britain has contributed \$605,000,000. In five years we have borrowed \$250,000,000 for railway construction alone. During the last ten years we have received 1,500,000 immigrants and these have brought money and settlers' effects probably to the value of \$500,000,000. A calculation by *The Toronto Globe* places the government, corporation and municipal borrowings for 1910 at \$215,338,500 as compared with \$240,000,000 for the previous year. In the distribution of bonds the United States took 1½ per cent, Canada 17½ per cent, and Great Britain 81 per cent. No doubt we are borrowing heavily, but it is just as true that

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the country is enjoying a season of astonishing expansion, and that there is abounding vigour and energy behind all its activities. The outstanding fact in the story, however, is the extent to which we depend upon the constant inflow of British capital.

II. WESTERN FARMERS AND THE TARIFF

IN December the farmers' deputation which had been in process of organization for some months waited upon the Government at Ottawa. There were between four and five hundred delegates from the west, and these were joined by two hundred delegates from the farmers' organizations of Ontario and the eastern provinces. Substantially, however, the deputation represented Ontario and the west. There were only a few delegates from the eastern provinces, while the organization does not seem to have secured any considerable foothold in Quebec. In the main the leaders of the movement in the west are men of substance and of influence in their own communities. Amongst the western delegates were to be found English and Scottish free traders with the old economic faith unaffected by new surroundings, and a few from the American west who were leaders amongst the Populists a quarter of a century ago and find in the new provinces of Canada a soil not less congenial to the propagation of their opinions. Behind the movement in Ontario are men of signal influence amongst the farmers, less radical, perhaps, than some of their western colleagues, but resolute advocates of low tariff and reciprocal trade relations with the United States. No more influential deputation has ever waited upon the Federal Government nor any representing a higher average of Canadian citizenship. It is said that the Western Grain Growers' Association has 28,000 members and probably three or four thousand farmers belong to the granges and other farmers' associations in the older provinces. It is by no means certain that all these have an equal zeal for low tariff and continental reciprocity, but undoubtedly the

WESTERN FARMERS & THE TARIFF

movement commands the sympathy of thousands of farmers who have no actual identification with the Western Grain Growers' Association or the farmers' organizations of the east.

The spokesmen for the deputation asked for reciprocity with the United States in horticultural, agricultural and animal products, spraying materials, fertilizers, fuel, illuminating and lubricating oils, fish, lumber, agricultural implements, farm machinery and vehicles, for an immediate reduction of the duties on British goods to one half the rates imposed on foreign products and manufactures, and for such a further gradual reduction of duties on British goods as within ten years would give complete free trade between Canada and Great Britain. It was also suggested that all reductions of taxes on imports from the United States should be extended to imports from Great Britain and that as free trade between the Dominion and the mother country would best contribute to the development of Canada no preference for Canadian products in British markets was desired. Fairly examined this will be found to be a logical policy with free trade as its ultimate object. Two elements chiefly constituted the farmers' deputation. One sets the higher value upon better trade relations with the United States. The other aims at a steady reduction of duties and ultimate free trade within the Empire. The one element suspects the policy of reciprocal preferences as inimical to continental reciprocity; the other as savouring of protectionism, as operating against immediate reduction of duties, and as giving aid and comfort to the fiscal reform movement in Great Britain. In short, the whole attitude of the deputation becomes clear if it is remembered that they are free traders, that as such they can have no sympathy with any proposal that has a protectionist character and must regard a high tariff between Canada and foreign countries as only less objectionable than a high tariff between Canada and Great Britain. But recognizing the strength of British sentiment in the Dominion, and sharing in the feeling, they aim at a free trade Empire and simultaneously at better fiscal

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relations with other countries by a series of reciprocity treaties. Incidentally they probably also have in mind the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, which, notwithstanding its advocacy of protection for Canada, has always shown active sympathy with British fiscal reformers and has given a firm and consistent support to the policy of inter-Imperial preferences.

The reply of Sir Wilfrid Laurier to the deputation was substantially a repetition of what he said to the grain growers during his tour of the western provinces. He frankly recognized the more radical temper of the west, and its increasing influence in the government of the country. He avoided reference to the proposal to increase the British preference as also that to advance towards free trade within the Empire. He pointed out that the industrial interests of the east had to be considered, and that there must be accommodation and compromise. He agreed that a free interchange of natural products between Canada and the United States would be of vast benefit to both countries, but he gave no hint of any intention to reduce duties on American manufactures. Finally he reminded the deputation that negotiations are now proceeding with Washington with the object of improving trade relations and insisted that it would be unwise to make tariff changes until the negotiations were concluded. "Whatever may be the outcome of the negotiations with our neighbours," he said, "I can assure you that it in no way will impair the British preference."

The western farmers also demand that the Hudson Bay railway shall be constructed and operated by the Government, and that it shall purchase and operate the terminal grain elevators at Port Arthur and Fort William. They argue that any private company controlling the outlet to Hudson Bay would have the other roads at its mercy, and that, therefore, the Government should be the common carrier for the three great transcontinental systems. They argue again that with the terminal elevators in private hands it is impossible to secure honest grading of grain, and that

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by judicious mixing, by fattening grades and by other processes the farmer is deprived of some portion of his legitimate profit. It is clear, however, that the Government will not go the full length of these demands. It will construct the Hudson Bay road and devise some method of private operation. It will not buy out the terminal elevators, but will place both these and the receiving elevators under an independent public commission, and take power to purchase if the system of regulation should prove unsatisfactory. It is further understood that the Government, probably by co-operation with private capitalists, will establish elevators at Hudson Bay and at Liverpool, and thus exercise control from the point of shipment to the ultimate market. It also seems clear from recent statements by the Prime Minister that the Government will deepen the Welland Canal, construct the Georgian Bay water route and improve the St. Lawrence channel, and thus reduce transportation charges to the prairie settlers. This is an ambitious programme, involving, perhaps, the expenditure of one or two hundred millions of dollars, but likely to strike the popular imagination and to bury minor grievances in the great onrush of national development.

III. THE NAVY IN POLITICS

THE naval policy of the Laurier Administration has wrought much confusion in Canadian politics. Opposition far stronger than anyone foresaw has developed. This is confined chiefly to Quebec, where the Government has sustained a sensational defeat in a bye-election. A contest became necessary in Drummond and Arthabaska through the appointment of the sitting member to a seat in the Senate. This is one of the most populous and intelligent rural constituencies in the French province. Inhabited mainly by prosperous farmers, it has been regarded for many years as a Liberal stronghold. This constituency gave Sir Wilfrid Laurier his seat in the Legislature nearly forty years ago, and a few years later his first seat in the House of Commons. Here he sustained the only

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personal defeat that he has ever experienced. Appointed to a seat in the Mackenzie Cabinet in 1877, and obliged to go back to the constituency for re-election, he failed by 29 votes to secure his return. Sir John Macdonald had just committed the Conservative party to protection, the country was in the depths of commercial depression, and constituency after constituency under the influence of the new propaganda fell away from the dying Government to which the young minister had joined his fortunes. At Arthabaskaville, the centre of the judicial district, Sir Wilfrid Laurier practised his profession from 1866 until he was called by Lord Aberdeen to form the administration which still controls the destinies of the country. Here he still has his summer home, and here by French and English alike he is regarded with affection and respect. The constituency has a population of 44,484, of whom 41,045 are French and 42,062 Roman Catholics.

In this constituency, however, which in 1896 gave a Liberal majority of 1,206, in 1897, in a bye-election, of 1,648, and in 1904, in the general election, of 2,476, with the naval policy as the chief issue the Liberal candidate was beaten by a majority of 207. The opposing candidate was a Nationalist, and the campaign against the Government was conducted chiefly by Mr Bourassa, Mr Monk and Mr Armand Lavergne, the three most conspicuous figures in the Nationalist movement. It is difficult to give sober consideration to the arguments that were employed to excite and inflame the population. It was represented that the younger French Canadians of the community would be drafted to serve on British ships in remote seas, that the Canadian navy would be under the absolute control of the British authorities, that taxes would be laid upon the people of Quebec for the wars of the Empire abroad, that the naval programme involved the sacrifice of Canadian autonomy on the altar of British Imperialism, and finally and chiefly that there must be delay until the whole project could be submitted to a plebiscite. The position of the Government was stoutly defended, particularly by Mr Brodeur, and until the result was declared neither Liberals nor Nationalists

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believed that the Government candidate could be defeated. The actual defeat was a shock to the Government and to the country. For the moment there was immense elation amongst Nationalists, and the victory was celebrated by a great demonstration at Montreal, at which Mr Bourassa was the central figure, and which was characterized by such enthusiasm as has been rarely witnessed even in a tumultuous assemblage of French Canadians.

But there has been a sequel to Drummond and Arthabaska. A month later a bye-election became necessary in order to fill the seat for St John's in the Quebec Legislature. A Conservative-Nationalist was nominated to oppose the Government candidate and again it was attempted to make the naval policy the sole issue between the parties. The result, however, was to increase the Liberal majority from 300 to 600 and unlike Drummond and Arthabaska the English Conservative vote was cast almost solidly for the Liberal candidate. It has to be remembered, however, that the Provincial Government has no responsibility for the naval programme. Moreover, Mr Bourassa was in Europe during this contest and his leadership is the great asset of the Nationalist movement. It is also alleged that a powerful section of the Roman Catholic Church, for causes which have not been disclosed, has entered into an alliance with the Nationalists against Sir Wilfrid Laurier. But it is not certain that this hostility is directed with equal energy against the Provincial Liberal Administration. For that matter, any statement touching the attitude of the Roman Catholic clergy must be made with reserve. It is established, however, that Archbishop Langevin of Manitoba is using his influence to promote the circulation of the Nationalist organs and that French Liberal newspapers of Montreal complain that certain priests have advised their flocks not to read the Liberal publications. It is assumed that the quarrel with the Prime Minister has its roots in the old controversy over the status of Catholic schools in Manitoba and the failure of the Federal Government to introduce remedial legislation in behalf of the Catholics of Winnipeg, who have

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not accepted the compromise of 1896 and are thus obliged to support the provincial educational system while maintaining parochial schools for the education of their children. In all this there is something of speculation, and if the explanation seems to be inadequate, all that can be said is that no other is available. It can hardly be doubted that there is a renewal of clerical hostility to the Prime Minister and that this was more apparent in Drummond and Arthabaska than in St John's. The significant fact in the provincial contest, however, is that the English-speaking Conservatives of the division seem to have polled almost solidly for the Liberal candidate, and this can be explained only by hostility to the Nationalist movement.

The debate on the Address at the opening of Parliament was marked by much temper and much mutual recrimination. There was a determined attempt to show that the Nationalist speakers in Drummond and Arthabaska strove to excite feeling against Great Britain, and that there was a practical alliance between the Nationalist and the Conservative party. The Conservatives repudiated the alliance; the Nationalists professed all proper devotion to the mother country. Furthermore, the Nationalists contended that they were faithful to the historical teaching of the Liberal party, and much ancient campaign rubbish was rescued from the dust heap to confuse one side or the other. The Conservatives were placed in a difficult position by an amendment to the Address which Mr Monk introduced in favour of a national plebiscite on the naval programme. A year ago the Opposition, as an alternative policy to that of the Government, had declared for the immediate contribution to the Admiralty of two Dreadnoughts or the equivalent in money, and the submission of the Government's proposals to a vote of the people. It was, therefore, difficult for the Opposition to vote against the Monk amendment while there was the clear risk of misunderstanding if they gave the resolution their support. The best that could be done was to submit an amendment reaffirming the policy laid down last session,

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and, when this was defeated, to support Mr Monk's resolution. Naturally, the fact that Conservatives and Nationalists voted together is made a ground of attack upon the Opposition by the Liberal press and from Liberal platforms throughout the English provinces.

In the course of the debate, however, Mr Borden, the Conservative leader, in a speech of unusual power and vigour, outlined the general policy of the Opposition. He argued that the Government's policy did not provide for certain unity of organization and action with the Imperial fleets, and that without this the whole project and the heavy expenditure involved would be comparatively useless. If the Conservative party came into power they would at once open negotiations with the Imperial Government in order to ascertain if the Empire faced any grave danger from foreign nations. If it was determined that action was necessary to meet an emergency they would call upon Parliament for a contribution direct to the Admiralty, and if this was refused they would appeal from Parliament to the constituencies. Having provided for the emergency they would approach the Imperial authorities in order to arrange a permanent basis of naval co-operation between the Dominion and the mother country. As the Dominions were at last to join Great Britain in defence of the Empire they should have a voice in determining Imperial policy. They would, therefore, go to an Imperial Conference and endeavour to develop a system under which participation in the wars of the Empire would give the Dominions a voice in deciding whether or not hostilities should begin. Having secured this extension of Canadian autonomy they would be ready to develop a Canadian navy in real co-operation with the Imperial navy, and would go to the country for popular approval of the whole project. Against this is the policy of the Government, which recognizes equally the duty of Canada to provide for sea defence, but which refuses any direct contribution, and under which the Canadian Parliament will decide in what wars the country will engage.

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Probably in the natural evolution of the Imperial relation, whether by actual agreement or otherwise, the Canadian navy will be at the command of the Admiralty in any and every conflict and inevitably, as in the organization of the land forces of the Empire, there will be ultimately common action as well as a common understanding. Either that or there will be a drift in the Dominions towards independence and separation. It is not the purpose, however, to pass judgement between the two parties, to commend or to criticize either set of proposals, to discover differences in spirit or motive. Enough to say that the attitude of neither party need give rise to doubt or uneasiness throughout the rest of the Empire. Canada is committed to co-operation in sea defence and will not turn backward. There is more behind the Nationalist movement than opposition to the naval programme. There are the ambitions of Mr Bourassa and Mr Monk, apparently a clerical movement against the Prime Minister, and the soreness of Quebec Conservatives over many defeats. In the judgement of many politicians the naval policy is also distasteful to the farmers of the English provinces, and in confirmation of this view a condemnatory resolution was adopted at a farmers' convention in Toronto. But when the argument for the navy is fully presented, and in face of the Nationalist movement vigorous defence of the policy becomes necessary, there probably will be a decisive response at least from all the English speaking communities. It is a mistake to think that the Imperial feeling of Canada is confined to Toronto and Halifax and St. John and Winnipeg and Vancouver and Victoria. There is a dumb loyalty in the villages, on the farms, in the back settlements, which has found its voice in the crises of our history and will speak again if the demand for speech or action becomes imperative.

THE TRADE AGREEMENT

MR Fielding has just announced the terms of the trade agreement with the United States. The arrangement is far more revolutionary than was generally expected. It is mani-

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fest that owing to the exigencies of American politics, and the formidable agitation against the high cost of living the Republican administration was determined to effect a reciprocal treaty with Canada. Hence terms were offered which the Canadian Government could hardly afford to reject. While the duties on manufactures are not seriously disturbed the agreement goes far towards free trade in natural products. The free list covers wheat, oats, rye, barley, eggs, live stock, poultry, dairy products, hay, vegetables, fresh fruits, fish, and lumber. There is also a provision for removal of the American duties on manufactured paper when the restrictions and prohibitions laid by the Canadian provinces on the export of pulp wood to the United States are abolished. This clause of the agreement is not likely to become effective, as the provinces are determined to conserve their natural resources, and to compel manufacture in Canada. It is provided that the agreement must be accepted both by Congress and the Canadian parliament as a whole, but in so far as pulp wood is concerned probably it will be recognized that the Federal ministers have no power to reverse the policy of the provinces.

Whatever may be its fate in Congress there is hardly any doubt that the agreement will be accepted in its entirety by the Canadian parliament. Canadian farmers desire a free American market for many of their products, and the agreement as drafted makes a powerful appeal to the agricultural classes in every section of the country. The west desires to send wheat, rye, and oats across the border. The farmers of Ontario are deeply interested in a free American market for live stock, dairy products and vegetables. The products of Quebec are very similar to those of Ontario, while free fish would be a boon to the Maritime provinces. Thus, as the home market is not to be impaired by lower duties on manufactures, the whole strength of the agricultural interest will probably be behind the agreement. Practically, henceforth, the American market will deter-

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mine the level of prices for many natural products in Canada and the general expectation is that this will ensure somewhat better returns for Canadian²⁷ producers. Naturally this would mean higher cost of living in the Canadian industrial centres, but with that the farmers are not concerned.

It is believed the flour milling industry will be adversely affected by the agreement, while there is fear that free trade in lumber will tend to the rapid depletion of Canadian forests. No doubt there will also be a diversion of trade to the south which must affect in some degree the earnings of Canadian railways. There is a slight reduction in the coal duty, and also in the duties on farm machinery, but the reduction on coal does not go far enough to affect the Nova Scotia coal producers, nor will the manufacturers of agricultural implements be seriously prejudiced by the agreement. It is provided that the arrangement shall not go into effect in Canada until it is adopted by Congress, and that the understanding shall not take the form of a treaty, but be adopted and maintained by concurrent legislation.

The agreement ignores one objection which has been urged with force and persistence in Canada. It has been contended, whether soundly or not, that with free trade in natural products between Canada and the United States, reciprocal treatment of Canadian products in British markets would become impossible, inasmuch as American products would seek an outlet at Canadian ports in order to secure the benefit of British preferential duties. Certainly Canada has faced no such radical change in fiscal policy since the system of protection was established over thirty years ago, and clearly it is impossible to foresee the ultimate results of a free American market for Canadian producers. At this time of writing the Opposition in Parliament has not declared its attitude towards the agreement, nor has public opinion in the country had opportunity to express itself.

Canada, January 30, 1911.

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NOTE. Since our Canadian correspondent wrote, the agreement has been passed by the House of Representatives at Washington by a majority of 221 to 92. It has still to be considered by the Senate, but it is uncertain whether it will be passed before the end of the Session—March 4. If not, President Taft will probably summon a special session for the purpose of dealing with the agreement. As the Senate, in accordance with the recent elections, will then contain a larger number of Democrats who have declared for the agreement, it will probably pass without difficulty. In Canada the agreement has met with far greater hostility than was expected. This hostility is directed not against the alterations in the tariff, but against the general policy of the agreement. For it is now seen that the agreement is an abrupt change from the "national" policy, steadfastly pursued by Canada for more than 30 years. Public opinion has been for so long determined on the East and West policy, and on building up a strong national individuality in Canada, that a proposal for encouraging the movement of trade North and South, and closer commercial relations with their immense and magnetic neighbour has come as a severe shock. The agreement, in fact, has become a national rather than a trade issue. The opposition are now united against it, and it is reported that many prominent Liberals are strongly opposed to it. None the less the general opinion is that party discipline will enable the Government to carry the bill through Parliament, though a general election may follow.

THE AUSTRALIAN SITUATION

TO understand the present situation in Australia, one must delve somewhat into the genesis of things. Communities, like individuals, are influenced by their environment, and before Australian ideals can be fully appreciated it is essential that other British communities should understand something of local conditions.

With a total area approximating 3,000,000 square miles, Australia presents every variety of physical condition. Though the greater part of its area is within the warmer zones, the climate everywhere is healthy; but the rainfall, upon which successful settlement depends, diminishes generally with the distance from the sea. The centre of the continent is held to be of little value, but the fertile region extends so far back from the coast that it aggregates an enormous area. For hundreds of miles inland, particularly upon the eastern littoral, immense tracts are being brought under the plough, and with the development of agricultural science "no man's land" is being pushed steadily further back. Lands at one time thought fit only for carrying sheep are now yielding splendid crops of wheat, and so successful has farming become in comparatively dry areas that it is hard indeed to forecast accurately where the limit will be found. In addition to the development known as "dry farming," immense irrigation works are being constructed and others are contemplated, so that altogether there is plenty of room for the augmentation of our present population of 4,500,000.

The first British settlers—convicts and their guards—found on their arrival in 1788 an island continent, sparsely populated by a race ignorant of even the crudest form of agriculture. For years the tiny colony had a hard struggle to maintain itself on the comparatively poor lands around Sydney; but, as exploration disclosed the fertile plains beyond the coastal range and the rich flats of the rivers north and south of the first settlement, a new era was begun. It was

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soon found that almost "illimitable areas were suited for stock-raising, with an infinitesimal preliminary expenditure. In the "days when the world was wide," these lands were taken possession of by "squatters"—men who took their flocks far afield without waiting for either fence or land titles. Later, the Government gave these pioneers formal possession as leaseholders under the Crown, but the term "squatter" still clung to them, and even to-day is used to denote the pastoralist in a large way. Stock-raising proved so profitable that within a comparatively short time, in each of the colonies successively founded, the whole of the suitable lands were occupied for pastoral purposes, mostly under leasehold tenure. It must be understood that the Australian climate is so genial that stock thrive all through the year right round the continent, and thus the pastoralist was encouraged to occupy all land except the heavily timbered areas on the coast.

For many years the unoccupied land was sufficiently plentiful to afford scope for all who desired to share in the harvest of the "golden fleece," but gradually, as the population grew, would-be settlers had to go further and further towards the parched interior until the rainfall limit was reached. Just when further expansion on the old lines appeared impossible, at any rate in the older colonies, a diversion occurred through the discovery of alluvial gold, which attracted an immense number of enterprising immigrants from all over the world—men fitted to leave their impress on the history of any country. For some time the "gold fever" was in the blood of all, but as the richer alluvial fields were worked out the "diggers" helped to swell the ranks of those who were vainly looking for land. A demand for "closer settlement" was raised, and a fierce political struggle ensued over the question of whether the vast pastoral areas under leasehold should be made available to the "small men." In such a contest it was inevitable that the landless majority should win, but in every colony a keen fight took place between "selector" and "squatter"

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ter" before the latter was routed. The refusal of the squatters' representatives to allow any land at all to be made available naturally led to a correspondingly extravagant demand by the other side, and thus, when victory at last rested with the selectors, their representatives threw open all leasehold land for settlement, on the principle of "free selection before survey." As a result, there sprang into existence, alongside the bona fide settler, a class of speculative selectors, whose idea was to pick the eyes out of a pastoral property (a procedure known as "peacocking") with the object of blackmailing the leaseholder into buying the area back. Assailed on all sides, and denied the right of ordinary purchase, the squatters retaliated by themselves taking up selections in wholesale fashion through "dummies," and thus secured large areas on a freehold basis. In other cases selectors were bought out, and to-day we find in New South Wales that, although some 351,000 selections have been taken up since 1861, yet only 42,000 are still held by small settlers. The balance has by one means or another again been absorbed into the large holdings. This brief outline of the history of attempts at land settlement more particularly refers to New South Wales, but the same general principles are common to all the older colonies. It is necessary to give an idea of these facts, as they had an immense influence upon the political and social development of Australia. The war of squatter against selector embittered not only those directly concerned, but also coloured the outlook of the community generally. For many years practically everybody took sides, and a class feeling was evolved which, supplemented by that developed in urban centres, has continued right down to the present time. Looking back one cannot help thinking that the trouble could have been avoided by throwing open suitable lands as required by bona fide settlers, but no doubt those responsible did what appeared to be the right thing at the time. In any case, the fight for land is largely responsible for the fact that in Australia to-day class feeling is developed beyond any hope of early eradication.

THE AUSTRALIAN SITUATION

During these years of agrarian dispute, the population generally had been increasing, and manufactures had gradually raised their heads. Coincidentally had grown the trades union movement, and as long as fifty years ago the eight hours system was successfully inaugurated. Year by year the unions waxed stronger, until in 1890 was precipitated an epoch-making event in the shape of the great maritime strike. Originating with the maritime unions, it gradually spread around the coast of Australia until many thousands of men in different occupations were sympathetically involved. The strike gained its importance, not so much because of the numbers affected and the fact that the men were defeated, but because it turned the minds of thinking unionists towards politics, and was thus responsible for the political birth of the Labour Party. All through Australia the cry was raised that the workers should aim at direct representation in Parliament, and at the next elections in the eastern colonies platforms were formulated and candidates put forward. Apart from its purely labour proposals, the Labour Party at once associated itself with the demand for cheap land, and thus secured a considerable support from the farming classes in the country districts. Indeed, one of the strongest unions, that of the wool-shearers, was largely composed of small farmers (or "selectors"), and therefore brought backing to the movement in districts where otherwise it would have been naturally weak. So at its inception the Labour Party met with a fair measure of success, and since then, after allowing for defections and internal dissensions, one may say that it has grown with each succeeding election until to-day it commands a majority in the Federal Parliament and in two of the states, while in the remaining four it is the direct opposition.

As the Labour Party is to-day the dominant force in Australian politics, and even where not in power has helped to colour the proposals of its opponents, it may not be amiss to attempt some analysis of its ideals and methods. Starting essentially as a class party, it has gradually gained a broader

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outlook until it now includes representatives of all classes of brain workers as well as manual labourers, and therefore attracts a much wider support than its name might imply. Many of the smaller employers are members of the party, but the vitality and strength of the movement undoubtedly depends upon trades unionism. With the adoption of compulsory arbitration, or cognate methods of settling industrial disputes, new unions have been everywhere established, mainly with a view to securing better conditions through the law. Through the operation of these laws, the conditions of the workers generally have been vastly improved, though in the opinion of many much remains to be done. Once associated for industrial purposes, it is found that working men exhibit a much livelier political interest, and therefore the formal organization of Labour in politics relies extensively upon trades unions. At the same time there is quite a large proportion of working men opposed to the Labour Party, a fact probably due in the main to the strong socialistic leaning of the party. Its declaration in favour of socialistic ideals dates from its formation, but in that respect it is far from satisfying the aspirations of the direct Socialists. These latter desire immediate and revolutionary socialism; the Labour Party declares for evolutionary socialism. Its objective as formally adopted runs:

1. The cultivation of an Australian sentiment based upon the maintenance of racial purity, and the development in Australia of an enlightened and self-reliant community.
2. The securing of the full results of their industry to all producers by the collective ownership of monopolies and the extension of the industrial and economic functions of the state and municipality.

It will be seen that while socialism is not specifically mentioned, the objective clearly aims at a substantial step in that direction, and in this respect the party is representative

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of the general trend of Australian political thought. Even the opponents of the Labour Party, classing themselves as Liberals, include few who are individualists of the old school. Practically all parties are socialistic, in the sense that each is prepared to utilize collective effort as against reliance upon the individual, though differing radically as to degree. Probably the early adoption by Australia of the principle of state-owned railways (first forced upon local politicians by the unwillingness of private enterprise to meet public requirements and later continued as intrinsically desirable) has had a great influence in reconciling the people to further extensions of collective ownership. The tendency towards socialism, or socialistic restrictions upon the individual, has, however, been partly due here as elsewhere to the steady development of business combinations, formed in many cases for quite justifiable objects, but in others used for the purpose of imposing undue exactions upon the public. In Australia these injurious combines have not reached proportions similar to those obtaining in some other countries; but locally they have at least made their presence felt and aroused popular antagonism. The state-owned railways have in some measure secured the people against exploitation, and therefore many are encouraged by their success to seek an extension of the principle of collective ownership. In any case, the position to-day is that politicians of all parties are prepared to use collective agencies to protect the public from private extortion. In its concrete proposals, however, the Labour Party goes considerably further than the older parties. As against the endeavour of the Liberals to regulate monopolies into good behaviour, following generally the lines of the Sherman law of the United States, the Labour Party urges that monopolies should be nationalized, on the ground that only the owners can successfully regulate a business. An amendment of the Federal Constitution to allow the Federal Parliament to nationalize monopolies is to be voted upon by referendum in April next.

To those unacquainted with local conditions the cry

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for a "White Australia" may seem somewhat hysterical, but there is no question upon which the people are more united and determined. The objection to coloured immigration originally arose through the influx of Chinese in the gold-digging days. After the first "rush" of adventurers (in the best sense) had demonstrated the richness of the fields, thousands of Chinese were attracted by the same golden magnet, and in many places secured rich areas claimed by the whites as theirs by right of discovery. Much rancour was engendered, and in some places riots occurred sufficiently serious to call for military intervention. The antagonism was for a time confined to the gold-seekers, but as the Chinese increased in numbers and extended their activities to trading and other occupations the classes affected added their voices to the general complaint. Then proposals were made to exclude Chinese immigrants, and after considerable negotiation with the Imperial Government, became law, though not until the Chinese numbered many thousands. It will be seen that the original objection to coloured immigrants was a purely economic one, but as experience was gained of their habits and standard of living, it was realized that they could not be absorbed into the community without its serious deterioration. The abhorrence of racial admixture added force to the original objection, and to-day we find practically a unanimous demand for a "White Australia." It may appear somewhat selfish for a mere handful of people, who cannot themselves develop the immense resources of the continent, to object to the immigration of anyone desirous of exploiting the unused areas; but when outsiders appreciate the menace involved in the proximity to our empty north of hundreds of millions of land-hungry Asiatics, they will perhaps sympathize with the view held in common by all parties in Australia. Asiatic settlement in the Northern Territory, would, as no "Dixie's Land" could be maintained, soon involve a steady drift to the south, and with free ingress the preliminary trickle would soon become a resistless tide. The people are determined, to the utmost

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of their resources, to preserve Australia as a heritage for the white races. The aboriginal natives are numerically a negligible quantity, so there is every opportunity for the building up of a great white democracy if the community can maintain possession against the natural desire of the brown and yellow races to participate in the good things to be found in the Commonwealth. That the Asiatics will for ever tamely submit to be excluded from a country which, while presenting golden opportunities, is yet comparatively unpeopled, can hardly be expected. Therefore Australians are realizing that to maintain their ideals they must fill their waste spaces and prepare for effective defence. To both points we have lately been devoting considerable attention.

Taking defence first, the Federal Parliament has recently passed laws providing for compulsory military training. Every youth who is physically fit will, from 1911, be compelled to prepare himself for taking part in defence. This is being done on a modification of the Swiss system, so that young men are not totally withdrawn from civil occupations. Youths between fourteen and eighteen years of age will be trained as senior cadets, and must attend a minimum number of drills annually. From the eighteenth until the twenty-sixth year, young men must undergo sixteen days' continuous training annually, in addition to attending drills at their home centres during the remainder of the year. It is expected that the habits of discipline acquired will have a beneficial civic influence on the young men of the community, while from a military standpoint it will allow Australia to make the most of the material at her command. Naval defence is also receiving attention, an Australian naval unit having been decided upon. Though both political parties are now agreed as to the desirability of these defence provisions, it is worth noting that they originally emanated from the Labour Party. This simple fact indicates the wide divergence between the views of the Labour Party of the Commonwealth and those in some other parts of the world. It is not that the local Labour supporters favour

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militarism, but rather that they believe that only through an effective citizen army can they save the country from having militarism imposed upon it by a foreign power.

On the matter of white immigration, while no one denies its urgency, there is some difference of opinion as to the steps which should be taken to afford encouragement. The Liberal Party has advocated immigration for years, but the results of its efforts have been comparatively meagre. Some thousands have been attracted annually from overseas, but as compared with our necessities they are but as a drop in a bucket. The Labour Party has steadily advanced the view that before entering upon any large scheme of immigration it is necessary to ensure that land should be readily available. The position is that, in the states where conditions most nearly approximate to those of Great Britain, much land suitable for close settlement is held by large pastoralists, who make a safe and profitable return by stock-raising. These people have rendered good service to Australia in the past, but altered circumstances now demand that room must be found for the farmer. The Labour Party's proposal to make the land more readily available by imposing penalizing taxation upon the large estates was approved by a large majority of the voters, and the tax has lately become law. Whether it will be held constitutional, or achieve the object aimed at, are questions of course open to doubt; but the fact that it was endorsed at the recent elections may at least be accepted as evidence that the people are in earnest as to the need for more population. It is not contended by the Labour Party that immigration should be confined to farmers—as a matter of fact, even under present conditions, employment can be found for thousands of additional artisans in Australia—but it is argued that land occupation should form the basis of any comprehensive attempt to attract additional population. In West Australia and Queensland large areas of good land still remain in the hands of the Crown, and are rapidly being made available to settlers. The Northern Territory, an immense area with a fair proportion of good land, has

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recently been taken over from South Australia by the Federal Government, and will probably be opened up shortly. In the writer's opinion, however, it would be unwise to dump any large number of immigrants in the territory before it has been thoroughly tested by those accustomed to Australian conditions. That white settlement will be successful there seems reasonably certain, but the pioneering should be done by those who have been trained in the adjacent states. The same caution should be exercised in the northern portions of Queensland and West Australia, though perhaps not necessary in the same degree. Although these areas are within the tropics, it does not seem that the climate will prove any serious handicap, as, on the whole, it has so far appeared to be healthy for whites. The real point to be determined is whether Northern Australia is suitable for close settlement. That it can raise fine horses and cattle is already amply demonstrated, but extended experiment work is necessary before anyone can honestly say that old-country people would be justified in attempting small settlements in the far north. In any case, there is room enough and to spare for many additional millions in districts already proved as ensuring a handsome reward to the industrious. Generally, it may be said that the Australian people and their Parliaments are recognizing the urgent need for augmenting the population, and are prepared to assist and encourage the immigration of those likely to help in building up a homogeneous community.

The present feeling in Australia towards imperial unity, though still somewhat vague, is distinctly encouraging. In the earlier years of responsible government in these colonies considerable resentment was aroused by the ill-considered attempts made to control Australian affairs from "Downing Street," but with the advent to the Colonial Office of statesmen with a broader conception of the meaning of colonial self-government a decided change has occurred in Australian feeling. The rise of Japan and the awakening of China are peculiarly significant from the Australian stand-

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point, while the naval activity of continental powers indicates that the Empire may at any time be forced into a life and death struggle, in which our interest would be vital. Therefore to-day all parties are anxious for empire preservation, and some indication of the spirit now prevailing is afforded by the tariff preference voluntarily extended towards British products at the last revision. Recent action in connexion with naval defence, in deciding upon the creation of the local unit, while it may be looked upon by some as separatist in tendency, will be found on closer scrutiny to be really more likely to advance imperial union than the method it superseded. The plan adopted in 1887, when the Australian auxiliary squadron was agreed upon, was for the Admiralty to equip and maintain a small number of vessels on the local station in consideration of an annual subsidy paid jointly by the Australian colonies. The same principle was followed in the agreement made by the Federal Government in 1902, the sum contributed under the agreement being £200,000 per annum. Though from an imperial standpoint this sum was ridiculously small, as years passed by it becomes increasingly apparent that, however desirable a larger contribution might be, there was little probability of securing by way of subsidy from the Australian people anything really substantial. No local enthusiasm could ever be expected in favour of a payment that looked suspiciously like tribute. On the other hand, local patriotism is aroused by the suggestion that we should directly bear our share in empire defence by providing a unit ourselves. At the time of writing, the first vessels of the locally-owned unit have just arrived, and their reception at every port along the coast bears testimony to the degree to which local sentiment has been stirred. A Parliament which haggled over a yearly subsidy of £200,000 has already for something Australian cheerfully committed itself to a capital expenditure of nearly four millions, in addition to over £500,000 annually for upkeep. Further, it is clear that on all sides this is looked upon only as a beginning. If

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it were proposed that an Australian unit should operate only in local waters, some doubt might reasonably exist as to its imperial value, but the public declarations of the Labour Government make it clear that it is to be utilized in war as part of the British navy. The Australian Squadron may therefore be looked upon as an earnest attempt to solve the problem of empire defence.

On the whole, then, an excellent tone exists in the Commonwealth with respect to imperial affairs, but there is no concrete public opinion as to any form of imperial federation. Australians are proud of the Empire and its traditions, and appreciate the freedom they have enjoyed under the protection of the British flag. No doubt they would prefer to be allowed in future as in the past to manage their own affairs in their own fashion, but some of them at least are beginning to inquire whether the present basis is one that can last. Australia may at any time be involved in serious trouble with the Asiatic peoples over the question of exclusion, yet the policy is one upon which the whole community is firmly resolved. Is it to be expected that Great Britain can for all time bear alone the burden of defending the Empire's interests. It seems too much to expect or to ask. Yet it is difficult to formulate a scheme which will ensure joint contributions (either in ships or money) and joint control without risking too greatly the legislative independence which the Dominions value so highly. The problem is urgent, and its solution will undoubtedly be welcomed by the great majority of Australians.

Australia, December, 1910.

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THE ROUND TABLE of last quarter left the political situation in South Africa at the conclusion of the first general election for the Union Parliament. General Botha's party, composed of the three provincial parties which had joined in accepting him as Prime Minister, had found themselves with a substantial working majority. On the other hand they were faced by an Opposition which had won considerable prestige in the elections by defeating three members of the Ministry, and which was far stronger in Parliament than the numbers suggest, because it was admittedly a more coherent body than its opponents, and included a larger proportion of effective debaters.

All things considered it must be regarded as fortunate for the country that the new chapter in South African history should open with a legislature in which no party was strong enough to disregard the views of any considerable section of the people, and the history of the first session has on the whole been one of steady recovery from the narrowness and bitterness of the election campaign.

A great impetus was given to this process from the beginning by the splendidly successful mission of the Duke of Connaught, who arrived in Capetown on the last day of October to open the Union Parliament, on behalf of His Majesty the King. South Africans of every race and class threw themselves with enthusiasm into the festivities of the Royal visit, which included most of the principal towns in the Union and Rhodesia. They were genuinely inspired by the stately ceremony of November 4, with all its reminiscences of similar ceremonies in England, and the other Dominions, all of which were represented in Capetown by distinguished delegates. Long before the Duke of Connaught left South Africa there were signs, which could hardly have been foreseen, that the new House was making a determined effort to maintain the best traditions of British Parliaments and the immense powers vested in it by the Act of Union.

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On December 20 Parliament was adjourned till February 1 when it will reassemble and sit continuously for the remainder of the session.

I. FINANCE AND THE BUDGET

THE first part of the session was mainly occupied with discussion on the financial position as disclosed by the estimates of revenue and expenditure for the period from May 31, 1910, when the Union came into being, to March 31, 1911—the end of the financial year. The South Africa Act provided that from the date of the establishment of Union till the expiration of two months after the first meeting of Parliament the new Government could draw from the Exchequer the money necessary for carrying on the administration of the country without parliamentary authority. The first Budget, therefore, presented to Parliament dealt with the revenue and expenditure of a period more than half of which had already elapsed.

In two other respects also the budget was abnormal. In the first place it does not reflect the expenditure of the Union administration as it will be organized under the new order of things. When Union was established the administrative work of the four colonies had to be taken over, so to speak, as a going concern. The main lines of reorganization have been laid down, but the working out of details will be a long process, and, though the first budget indicates to a certain extent the lines on which the Union Administration will be built up, it would be misleading to regard it as much more than a record of expenditure for which the Union Ministry found itself responsible on taking over the Government of the country from the four pre-Union colonies. Not only has the necessary reorganization of departments and services not yet been carried out, but the Commission provided for in the Act of Union to lay down the financial relations between the central and the provincial governments has not yet been appointed, and, until that

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question has been settled, the whole expenditure of the provincial councils has to be met by grants from the Union Treasury. In the second place the expenditure provided for in the budget is for a period of ten months only, and this makes it almost impossible to set up any useful comparison between the expenditure provided for in it and that of the four governments which have been replaced by the Union. In both these respects, therefore, the budget was an abnormal one, which it was difficult to criticize either by reference to the future financial policy of the Union, or by comparison with the actual expenditure of the superseded colonial governments.

For these reasons detailed criticism of the budget is of little value. The main features from a financial point of view are (1) that revenue balances taken over by the Union Government at its establishment amounting to over £2,000,000 are to be used for paying off Treasury Bills, mostly issued by the Cape Colony to meet the recurring deficits of the years prior to the present financial year; (2) that new taxation is imposed on the profits of mining throughout the Union where such taxation does not already exist, or where the State does not by existing legislation (as in the case of the diamond mines in the Transvaal and Orange Free State) take a larger share of the profits than is intended to be taken by the tax; and (3) that to meet the balance of the expenditure a sum of £1,200,000 is taken from the profits of the railways for the period covered by the budget.

Now the South Africa Act provides that after four years from the establishment of Union the railways system is to be administered so as to earn only sufficient to meet working expenses, with the necessary provision for depreciation and betterment of the system. From that date, therefore, it will no longer be possible for the Finance Minister to save himself from a deficit by making a call on railway profits. The budget, therefore on its revenue side, indicates that in future years other means will have to be found for

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obtaining the necessary balance between revenue and expenditure. On the expenditure side it will, no doubt, be possible to effect large reductions, but, on the other hand, the present budget shows no provision for a comprehensive system of internal defence, which the Government have promised, and the contribution to the Imperial Navy is limited to the amount formerly paid by the Cape Colony and Natal (£85,000), which is generally admitted to be altogether inadequate as a contribution from the Union. The present budget, therefore, shows a decided want of equilibrium between revenue and expenditure, but, for the reasons given above, it will be easier to form a fair judgement on that question when the budget for the ensuing year is presented after the recess.

II. LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION.

THE legislative programme promised so far is not formidable, consisting chiefly of measures for consolidating the different laws existing in the colonies relating to matters in which uniformity is necessary. It is natural to expect that the main work of the new Parliament, at any rate for the first session, and probably for some time to come, will be of this character. Only matters of immediate urgency are likely to receive the attention of the Government and legislature until some substantial progress has been made with the work of organization, both administrative and legislative, which necessarily follows on a constitutional change so fundamental as that instituted by the South African Union. A good deal of parliamentary time is also likely to be occupied during the first session in debates on motions of a more or less abstract character, reflecting the discussions which took place throughout the country during and before the election campaign, and which naturally come to a head and are ventilated in Parliament.

Some of these already dealt with have been of more than temporary interest, as, for example, the debate on the

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troubles which have arisen in the Orange Free State province in connexion with the Education Acts of the late Free State Parliament, which are associated with the name of General Hertzog. These acts, since they came into operation, have caused loud and widespread protests from the English speaking minority of the province, who, failing to get any acceptable measure of redress from the Government, finally took the extreme step of starting private schools, for the support of which they appealed to sympathizers throughout South Africa. The controversy caused much racial bitterness, both in the Free State and in the other provinces, and during the election campaign formed one of the main themes of the Unionist candidates. The Nationalist party on the other hand sought to show that the whole agitation was insincere and promoted for party purposes by their opponents.

The provisions of the Free State Acts in regard to the medium of instruction are briefly as follows: Except in the teaching of a foreign language English and Dutch are declared to be the sole and equal media of instruction. Up to and including standard 4 every child is to be instructed through the language best spoken and understood by it as the principal medium, and the other language is to be introduced as a subsidiary medium by gradually increasing use as is consistent with the age and intelligence of the child. After standard 4 three "principal subjects" at least must be taught through the English medium, and three through the Dutch medium. Teachers in the service at the passing of the Act are to be graded according to the value of their certificates, whether they were competent to teach through the medium of both languages or not, but if they were not so competent an endorsement was to be made on their certificates. For the future, however, certificates are only to be given after an examination which has to be answered half in English and half in Dutch, or alternatively, if a candidate chooses to answer the papers in one language only he must satisfy the examiners that he

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is competent to give instruction through the medium of the other. The salaries of the teachers are regulated according to the grade of certificates held by them. The practical effect of these provisions is that ability to teach through the medium of both languages is made a necessary condition for entrance into and promotion in the service.

The complaints which have been made against these acts are (1) that it is impossible to educate children efficiently through the medium of the two languages simultaneously without serious waste of time, and that an attempt to do so means that the rest of the child's education is sacrificed to a knowledge of both languages; (2) that it is contrary to the Act of Union that parents should be compelled either to have their children taught through the medium of the two languages, or to lose the time during which instruction is being given through one or other of the two; (3) that it is unfair to teachers now in the service that they should be compelled to qualify themselves to give instruction through both languages, and that as South Africa is not yet supplied with sufficient bilingual teachers who are otherwise qualified to teach, the Free State Acts are bound to lead to the appointment of incompetent teachers, with obvious results on the education of the rising generation.

The advocates of the system reply (1) that it can be carried out without any loss of time or efficiency by teachers who are desirous of making it a success and that it is the only system under which full effect is given to the principle of equality between the two languages laid down by the Act of Union; (2) that the State compels the parent to send his child to school and prescribes what he shall be taught, and, therefore, there is no special or unconstitutional compulsion about its prescribing also in what language he shall be taught; (3) that South Africa is a bilingual country, and, therefore, if teachers are to be really efficient they must as soon as possible qualify themselves to teach through the medium of both languages.

The debate in Parliament on a motion introduced by

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the Opposition condemning the Free State system, was remarkable for the frank, and on the whole, temperate manner in which the opposing points of view were stated. It was equally remarkable for the recognition on both sides that the Union Parliament is the proper forum to which racial differences should be brought for free discussion, and that the Union constitution is the charter to which we must look for their solution. The debate, apart from some bitter reminiscences of the pre-Union racial grievances, turned mainly on the question of whether these laws of the Free State were or were not in harmony with the principles laid down in the Act of Union as to the relations of the two languages, and it ended somewhat abruptly by a proposal from General Botha that a select committee should be appointed

“with a view to ensuring in regard to the system of Public education throughout the Union, the due application of the principles of freedom and equality laid down in Article 137 of the South Africa Act, to examine the educational systems of the four provinces with a view to ascertaining,

(i) whether they are in harmony with Article 137 of the South Africa Act;

(ii) whether they involve any compulsion in respect of the teaching or use as a medium of either the English or the Dutch languages;

and in case in any particular they are not in harmony with Article 137 of the said Act, or do involve compulsion in regard to language to make recommendations as to the best means of bringing them into harmony with the principles enunciated in Article 137 of the said Act; due regard being had to the rights assigned to the provincial authorities under the South Africa Act.”

This proposal was at once accepted by the leader of the Opposition, and was adopted by the House without further debate, and a select committee was accordingly

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nominated (and is now sitting) composed of four members of the Nationalist party and four from the Unionist party

The discussion and its result are of hopeful augury for the achievement of a lasting basis of good understanding in questions of race and language throughout the Union. No doubt there will be from time to time a recurrence of friction and difficulty in particular cases, however successful the select committee may be in devising a concordat. But the Union Parliament is now recognized as a court carrying supreme authority throughout South Africa, to which grievances can be brought and where, unless this precedent is departed from, they can be fully and frankly threshed out with a view to finding an acceptable settlement, and so long as this is so the Union will have provided the only possible solvent for the racial difficulties of the country.

III. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

APRECEDENT of far reaching importance has also been laid down in regard to the relations of the Union Parliament to the provinces in matters assigned to the provincial councils under section 85 of the South Africa Act. That Act, it is true, confers no exclusive jurisdiction on the provincial councils in any of the matters entrusted to them. An opinion has, however, undoubtedly prevailed widely since the establishment of Union that in regard to primary education (which is entrusted to the provinces for a period of five years and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides) the provinces had in some way a special reservation of their rights as against the Union Parliament. During the election campaign this was freely used by the Nationalist party as an argument against Unionist attacks on the Free State Acts. It was urged that these attacks were in effect an attempt to invade the rights given to the provinces in the Constitution by inviting the interference of the Union Parliament in matters of primary education. The proposal

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of the Government, however, to appoint a select committee of the Union House of Assembly to deal with the question of language in primary schools is a clear acknowledgement of the right, and even the duty, of the Union Parliament to intervene in questions which, though arising out of matters of provincial administration, have raised issues of national importance.

Another question affecting the relations of the Provinces to the Union Parliament was raised in a motion proposed by the Opposition that the commission provided for in section 118 of the South Africa Act, to enquire into the financial relations of the Union Government to the provinces, should be appointed at once. The Government, while admitting that they had had it under consideration, refused to accept the motion on the ground that the division of functions as between the central and provincial governments had first to be definitely settled. The result of this policy, if carried out, would be that for some considerable time to come the provincial administrations would continue to live on grants from the central Treasury. All experience shows that, where local administrative bodies are financed from the National Treasury, with no responsibility for raising the revenues which they spend, the result is wasteful expenditure and constant pressure on the central government for increased grants, and there is no doubt that the Provincial Council would be no exception to this rule. In the end the Government promised to appoint the Commission without delay and the motion was withdrawn.

It is clear that the working of the Provincial Councils will be the point of greatest difficulty in the new constitution. Their functions are those of local authorities. Their size, dignity and machinery are more appropriate to national legislative bodies. It remains to be seen whether the unitary spirit of the constitution will prevail to the extent of sub-dividing the present provincial areas and constituting councils more suitable for the functions entrusted to them, or whether the functions of the councils will gradually be

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enlarged so as to be more in keeping with their external equipment. Much will depend on the financial policy which is adopted towards them. If the sound principle is laid down that they must themselves raise a substantial part of the revenues required for their administration it is unlikely that they will long continue in their present form, as it will be difficult for them to raise any large revenues except by taxes on land and other immovable property. Taxation of this character is not popular in South Africa, and will probably not be imposed except either by local authorities, such as divisional councils to meet purely local needs, or by a central government strong enough to overcome the traditional opposition of the country people.

IV. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

THE revolution in Portugal has served to remind the people of South Africa how closely their interests are bound up with the foreign relations of the Empire. A glance at the map will make this clearer than any verbal argument. The Dutch (who succeeded the Portuguese in the European conquest of South Africa), and after them the British, have pushed their influence and dominion northwards from the southern ports, but both on the east and west the Portuguese have remained in possession of large stretches of the coast with harbours which have now become or are becoming the gateways through which the British territories inland find their easiest and most natural access to the sea.

Delagoa Bay on the east is a hundred miles nearer the gold fields of the Witwatersrand than the nearest British port, and is or could be connected with them by an easier line of railway. By a treaty made in 1909 regulating the relations between the Transvaal and the Portuguese province of Mozambique, in regard to through traffic and the recruiting, in Portuguese territory, of native labour for the Transvaal gold mines, it was agreed that the through railway rates from the various ports to the Transvaal should

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be fixed so as to limit the traffic coming through Delagoa Bay to not more than 55 per cent of the whole. Before this the Portuguese share was well over 60 per cent. If the railways, instead of being owned by the State were worked by competing companies, and the natural advantages of the Portuguese port were used to their fullest extent, in competition with the British ports, there can be little doubt that a much larger share of the Transvaal traffic would find its most economical entry through Delagoa Bay. It is also the natural outlet for the coal and iron fields of the Transvaal, and such export traffic as now exists in Transvaal coal goes out that way.

Further north in Beira the Portuguese have a port whose natural and economic advantages over the British ports on the southern coasts should give it an even stronger position in competing for the oversea trade of the vast and rapidly developing territories of Rhodesia. On the west a line is being built inland from Lobito Bay, in the Portuguese colony of Angola, to the copper fields of the Congo State and Northern Rhodesia, which may in time be used to give to Rhodesia and also to the Witwatersrand, and a portion of the northern Transvaal, a nearer route to Europe than the existing route via Cape Town.

Portugal, in fact, while she has left to her later coming rivals the occupation of the interior, has clung to the coasts through which the inland power, as it extends its dominion northwards, must find its most natural access to the sea. The traditional foreign policy of Portugal, however, has been one of friendly co-operation with the British Empire and the relations between the British and Portuguese colonies here have always been specially close and friendly. Happily the revolution has passed over Portugal so quietly as to leave these traditions and relations undisturbed. If, as the new Government in Lisbon has announced, one of the first effects of the change is to be a quickened interest in colonial affairs, and a policy of vigorous and effective development, the new Republic will find much

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sympathy and encouragement from the British South African household of which she is so near and important a neighbour.

If, however, things had gone differently, as they easily might, and Portugal had either lost the sympathy of her South African colonies in the recent revolution, or deliberately withdrawn from the burden of oversea dominions, we in South Africa would have found ourselves near the centre of a difficult and delicate crisis in the foreign affairs of Europe. We are coming to realize that the old idea that the first principle of inter-imperial relations should be the non-interference of Downing Street in colonial affairs is not the whole truth. For our own growth and the increase in the power and activity of foreign powers, make it more and more probable that occasions will arise—international complications about Delagoa Bay, the natural port of the Transvaal, would be a case in point—when we should be quite powerless to deal with a matter of immense local concern, unless we had the strength of the Empire behind us. How our views are to be reconciled with those of the Imperial Government and the other Dominions, and the resources and strength of the Empire wheeled into line in support of a common policy, is the great question of the future. But it is well that events like those in Portugal recently should remind us of the possibilities and the problems which lie before us.

NOTE. The financial commission alluded to by our South African correspondent has since been appointed. The chairman is Sir George Murray of the British Treasury, nominated by the Imperial Government. The other members are Sir Perceval Laurence, representing the Cape Province, Sir Thomas Hyslop, representing Natal, Mr C. H. Wessels, representing the Orange Free State, and Mr Patrick Duncan, representing the Transvaal.

NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS

I. INTRODUCTORY

AS this is the first of a series of letters designed to give those residing outside New Zealand a clear view of the facts of the politics of the Dominion, in so far as they bear, directly or indirectly, on the problem of the future relations of the different parts of the British Empire, we must endeavour to present in this preliminary sketch an historical outline, so that readers of these letters, in considering possible modifications in the political structure, shall be chary of judging hastily and supporting plans for uprooting those parts which circumstances have grounded firmly in the national life and which the experience of the past has shown to be peculiarly suitable to the general environment of the people. All that we can attempt, however, in this first communication, especially as the approaching Imperial Conference calls for notice, is merely to outline some of the more important features of our life that will inevitably influence the judgment of New Zealanders upon any plan of closer union with the other parts of the Empire, leaving to subsequent letters the filling in of minor details.

II. DISCOVERY AND COLONIZATION

TASMAN, a duly accredited agent of the Netherlands Government, discovered New Zealand in December, 1642, but he did not land, and the bare fact of discovery was, even at that time, not recognized as an adequate basis to support a claim of proprietary right over the territory discovered. Tasman's new found land was neither utilized by the Dutch nor explored by other nations; but it is an interesting indication of the reluctance of English statesmen of the early nineteenth century to found colonies that the obsolete and weak Dutch claim was momentarily revived by them about 1825 as a convenient excuse for refusing official recognition to the company which was then pro-

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posing to colonize a part of New Zealand. During Cook's six months' stay—October to April, 1769-70—he surveyed the islands, formally took possession of them for the British Crown, and reported upon the best place for establishing a colony. But the inchoate title thus established was not developed. From 1814 onwards many British subjects—some drawn hither by love of adventure and the prospective delights of an idyllic life among the Maoris, some by the desire for commercial gain, some by the hope of propagating the Christian faith—fixed their residence here, cultivated the soil, and began to export the natural products—seal-skins, whalebone and oil, flax, and timber—and had grown by 1840 to the number of 2,000, claiming to have bought four-fifths of the whole area, or nearly 45 million acres. But the British Government on several occasions* disavowed sovereignty over New Zealand, chiefly for reasons that influence the current colonial policy.

But two forces were already operating to compel British annexation: the French were displaying great activity in the Pacific in the thirties and in 1839 had planned a colony in New Zealand, and the indefatigable Edward Gibbon Wakefield had banded enthusiastic supporters of his systematic colonization scheme into the New Zealand Association of 1837, merged in 1839 into the New Zealand Land Company, which announced its intention of colonizing the country. Hence the letters patent of June, the hurried despatch of Captain Hobson to New Zealand, the cession of sovereignty over the islands in the Treaty of Waitangi by the Maoris in February, 1840, and the formal proclamations of sovereignty in the following May and June

III. POLITICAL PROGRESS

TILL May 3, 1841, New Zealand was a dependency of New South Wales, her affairs being administered by Lieutenant-Governor Hobson. In 1841 it was erected

**E.g.* in 1817, 1823, 1825, 1828, 1832, 1835, 1836.

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into a separate Crown Colony with a Governor and nominated Legislative Council. On August 28, 1846, a British Act was passed under which a charter was issued dividing the colony into two provinces and granting it representative institutions. Governor Grey, however, took the extreme step of refusing to carry out part of the instructions under the Act, and on his advice a statute of 1848 suspended for five years that part of the Act which had conferred representative institutions on the colony. From January, 1848, to March, 1853, there was a Lieutenant-Governor in each of the Provinces, under the Governor-in-chief of the colony of New Zealand. In January, 1853, the form of government granted by the Constitution Act of June, 1852, was proclaimed in the colony. This Act established representative institutions and constituted the colony a kind of federation. Its general affairs were to be directed by the Governor and a General Assembly of two houses, one nominated by the Governor in Council and the other elected by the colonists, while for purposes of local government it was divided into six provinces, each with a representative assembly of one house and an elected superintendent. Responsible government was not established firmly till 1856. Native affairs were reserved for the direct control of the British Government till 1863, when the responsibility for them was entrusted to, and accepted by, the New Zealand Legislature. This federal form of government lasted till November 1, 1876. From that time the government of the colony has been in the hands of a Governor and General Assembly, which has assumed some of the functions of the Provincial Councils and divided the remainder among county, city, borough and town councils, and road, drainage, and education boards, etc. Since 1879 the duration of Parliament has been regulated by the Triennial Act. Changes in the Parliamentary franchise shew the rapidly advancing democratic sentiment; in 1879 every resident male of twenty-one years of age and over was admitted to the vote; ten years later the principle of "one man, one vote" was recognized by the

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view that a voter should vote only in one electorate; in 1893 the franchise was extended to women on the same terms as the men hold it; and in 1896 the non-residential or property qualification to vote was abolished.

Once under the ægis of the British navy, the colony was free from apprehension of any attempt at seizure by foreign states and able to devote all its energies to internal economic and political development; but the growth of rapid means of communication and the establishment of foreign colonies in neighbouring islands raised external problems, and, in particular, made the more thinking portion of our people speculate as to the future relations of the colony with the Pacific Islands and with Australia.

During his first governorship, 1845-53, Sir George Grey took active steps to institute a federation of the islands of the South Pacific, with New Zealand as the dominant state, and though he was supported by Bishop Selwyn, the British Government remained uninterested and allowed some of the best of the groups to be annexed by France and Germany and to become a source of irritation to the free British communities. The exigencies of Pacific politics had, on more than one occasion, forced the Eastern Australian colonies and New Zealand to offer common advice or to take common action; but public opinion in New Zealand was not prepared to merge the colony in the Commonwealth of Australia. Not only did it recognize the difficulties springing from distance and comparative isolation and from our different geographical environment, but it also clung tenaciously to the idea of independence and prided itself on the past history of the colony which, distinct from that of Australia, seemed to mark our land out for separate development in the future. Already many in New Zealand were hoping she would become a sister state to Australia in a far wider reaching federation, and they were not prepared to sacrifice this expectation for the small advantage offered by immediate incorporation in the huge continental state.

This feeling of growing nationality partly explains the

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extension of the colony's boundaries to include the Kermadecs in 1887, and the Cook and "other islands" in 1901; the promotion of the Agent-General's office to that of High Commissioner in 1905; and the proclamation of the colony as a Dominion from September 26, 1907. The only concrete changes involved in the latter were those of nomenclature, such as the substitution of "Minister of Finance" for "Colonial Treasurer," and so forth; but, as Lord Islington said, in a recent speech, the promotion of New Zealand to a Dominion may be regarded as the local and titular complement to that organic movement which has been in progress in other parts of the Empire, and it insensibly but materially brings the status of New Zealand into closer relations with that of the other self-governing dominions. Thus viewed, it is a necessary step in the movement towards any form of organic union of the Empire for dealing with matters of common interest.

IV. POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT

THREE facts greatly influenced subsequent history: the systematic colonization of much of the country on Wakefield's plan; the planting of several settlements in districts separated from one another, some of them without many common interests; and the colonists' ignorance or disregard of native land law and custom. The first ensured a supply of colonists of high ideals, unbounded energy, and firm determination to establish a new and better Britain in the south; the second, while promoting a healthy rivalry of parts, explains the keen provincial jealousies, some of which persist to the present day; the third, by embittering the relations of the colonists with the local government, which was bound to respect the rights of the natives as acknowledged in the Treaty of Waitangi, and, secondly, with the Maoris, seriously retarded the progress of settlement and involved the colony in a long series of harassing wars (1844-73).

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The seat of government was fixed in 1840 by Hobson at Auckland (it was transferred to Wellington 1864-5) in the north, in which region the majority of the earliest settlers had established themselves. The New Zealand Company, directly or indirectly, founded colonies on Wakefield's plan at Wellington and Wanganui, 1840; Taranaki, 1841; Nelson, 1842; Otago, 1848; and Canterbury, 1850.

The chief factors governing the growth of population after the establishment of these colonies were the gold discoveries, the public works and immigration policy of the 'seventies, and the later pastoral and agricultural expansion. Population has increased continuously, in spite of the Maori wars, the great distance from Europe, and severe commercial depressions. Between 1871 and 1881, the period during which Vogel's public works and immigration policy was in full operation, population doubled, being in the latter year about half a million, or half of the present population. Immigrants were attracted by assisted passages and by grants of land. State-assisted immigration was discontinued in 1890; but it was revived in 1906, and for the year ending March 31, 1909, nearly 5,000 people were assisted from England by the State, bringing a capital of £96,000 at a cost of £17,000 to the Dominion. Gold was first discovered at Coromandel in 1852, but the Coromandel goldfield was not opened till ten years later; the first payable gold was found at Collingwood, Nelson, in 1857; in 1861 a rich field in Otago was discovered; in 1864 there were discoveries on the West coast of the south island; and in 1867 the Thames goldfield was opened up. The effect on the population is shown by the increase in the year 1862-3, which amounted to nearly 40,000. One of the results of the gold discoveries was increased immigration of Chinese; by 1881 the Chinese population was 5,000, and from that year to 1896 an immigration poll tax of £10 a head was imposed on the Chinese; from 1896 this tax has been £100, and the immigration of Chinese has been restricted in other ways, an Act of 1907, for example, pro-

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hibiting the landing of any Chinese who cannot read a printed passage of not less than 100 words of English. The census of 1906 enumerated 2,570 Chinese, the majority of whom are gold miners, market gardeners, fruiterers or greengrocers, laundrymen and storekeepers. It is the opinion of many in the Dominion that a more vigorous immigration policy should be pursued by the Government. It is recognized that the natural increase of population, the excess of births over deaths, is unusually high owing to the character of the death rate, which is the lowest in the world; but it is held that an increase in the total population of the country would be accompanied by a more than proportionate increase in national productive efficiency.

Our people are almost wholly British or of British descent; in 1906 the birthplaces of the people were shown to be as follow: New Zealand, 68·26 per cent of the total population; United Kingdom, 23·53 (England and Wales, 13·37; Scotland, 5·38; Ireland, 4·78); Australia, 5·35; foreign parts, 2·24.

The immigration of aliens generally has been regarded with disfavour, and this policy has found expression in the law prohibiting the landing of any alien who fails to write out and sign a prescribed form of application in any European language (1908).

There is no doubt that there exists in New Zealand a strong antipathy to the yellow races of the East. The cause is partly a natural race prejudice, partly economic, for the New Zealand worker objects to the cheap labour of the Asiatic, and partly the result of the strong anti-Asiatic agitation in the neighbouring Commonwealth, which, unlike New Zealand, has territory bordering Asiatic seas and not easily exploited by white labour, and which has already experienced to some degree the horrors of a mixed white and yellow population. This feeling, unreasonable though it may appear to the people of the old country, is real, and has influenced the way in which the British-Japanese agreements of 1902 and 1905 are regarded here. We specu-

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late as to the position under the present agreement expiring in 1915, of British countries like Canada, Australia, and our own, bent strongly towards the prohibition of anything approaching a regular yellow immigration, were Japan to become involved in a war with the United States on the question of immigration or the treatment of the yellow people on her Pacific coastal lands. It may have been a contingency such as this which a Canadian statesman had in his mind when he hinted recently that England at war would not necessarily mean Canada at war. Certainly an alliance with the United States would now be much more popular with us than the Oriental agreement. And one of the factors turning our thoughts towards closer union with England is the feeling that some time effective protection will be required against the Oriental powers. The antipathy may seem founded on no more solid basis than impalpable sentiment; but such a sentiment is as natural as that pride of race and of social traditions which binds us so strongly to the home country; and in politics the feelings, even more than the intellect, determine the main issues.

The land available for settlement is estimated at 27½ million acres in the North Island (13 agricultural, 14½ pastoral) and 28 in the South Island (15 agricultural, 13 pastoral). Of the total, 55½ millions, 38 millions are occupied, there being over 75,000 holdings, only 21 per cent of which are over 320 acres in area. Nearly 17 millions are freehold, 3½ millions are leased from individuals or local authorities, nearly 2 millions are leased from Maori owners, and 16 millions are held from the Crown on different tenures. The capital value of the holdings is £96,000,000; the unimproved value £67,000,000. The lands at present owned by Maoris amount to about 7½ million acres, valued at £12,000,000; and the Crown has the right of purchase over such lands in certain districts at a price not less than the official valuation.

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V. THE NATIVE QUESTION

ALMOST from the very beginning of colonization the white settlers came into conflict with the Maoris. This was the inevitable consequence of the prospective colonist's desire to acquire land, together with his complete ignorance of an extremely complicated native land law, an ignorance of which the highly intelligent Maoris were quick to take advantage. In the Treaty of Waitangi the Maoris ceded to the British Crown all their rights and powers of sovereignty. On the other hand, Her Majesty guaranteed to the chiefs and their tribes full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands, forests, fisheries, and other properties; the Crown was to have pre-emptive rights over the native lands; and the natives were to be accorded all the rights and privileges of British subjects. This treaty, however, was a source of bitter contention for many years between not only the home and local governments, but also the colonists and both governments. Disputes over land titles originated in several ways and developed into fierce wars, in which colonial and imperial troops fought side by side. By 1870, however, the worst had passed, and the imperial troops had left New Zealand. Since 1873 the country has been at peace, though there have been many minor disputes over the ownership of land.

Unfortunately, peace has not brought to the Maoris blessings equal to those it brought to the pakeha (white man). Sale and lease of his lands to the white race have often brought him luxury without toil. Disease and depopulation have followed, and a race which in 1800 numbered over 100,000 has now shrunk to fewer than half that number. The decline, however, has now ceased; the following table shows the movement in numbers for the past twenty years, but it is possible that the increase shown by the two last censuses is due to more effective methods of enumeration.

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Population.</i>	<i>Year.</i>	<i>Population.</i>
1886	42,000	1901	43,000
1891	42,000	1906	48,000
1896	40,000		

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Contrasting strongly with the antipathy against the Chinese is the friendly spirit shown towards the Maoris, partly because we appreciate their innate nobility, and partly because they do not increase materially in numbers and are not competitors, like the Chinese, in the labour market.

The Maori, for his part, is on excellent terms with the white; mixed marriages occur in all grades of society; stringent laws control the sale of alcoholic liquor to the native race; while education, along academic, technical, agricultural, and domestic lines, is at last slowly fitting them to take a place in the elaborate scheme of European civilization. They were admitted to the parliamentary franchise in 1867; but so far they vote for members to represent their race only, the Dominion being divided into four electoral districts for that purpose. Two members of the present Cabinet are of Maori blood, one of them a barrister and honours graduate of the University.

VI. COMMUNICATIONS

NEW ZEALAND'S geographical position renders the question of cheap, rapid, and regular communication a matter of the utmost importance in a world where the element of time is a factor of ever increasing importance. Regular lines of passenger and cargo vessels have connected New Zealand with England, via Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope for nearly half a century; no inconsiderable progress has been made in this respect during the last few years, and still more important developments are probable in the near future. Mails are despatched by all these routes, the time occupied being approximately six weeks. We have also had a subsidized mail, cargo and passenger service via North America since 1870; the time occupied has been five weeks; sometimes it has been via Vancouver, sometimes via San Francisco. At present it is largely a question of whatever suits Australia; but the increase of New Zealand's

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wealth and trade points to a time not remote when New Zealand will subsidize direct liners between the Dominion and America.

In 1876 cable communication with England was completed via Australia. In 1902 the Pacific (all red) cable gave the Dominion communication with the homeland via Canada. In 1901 New Zealand established "universal" penny postage, i.e., a penny service to the United Kingdom and most of the British possessions, and recently the New Zealand parliament sanctioned a scheme for the establishment of a system of wireless telegraphy which will bring New Zealand into touch with Australia, Fiji, and other Pacific Islands. It will thus form one, and perhaps the first, great link in that chain of stations which will bind in invisible and inseverable bonds our world-encircling empire.

VII. TRADE AND FINANCE

NEW ZEALAND is situated close to the centre of the water hemisphere. Her nearest commercial neighbour, Australia, is 1,200 miles distant; while her best customer, the United Kingdom, is no less than 11,000 miles away. New Zealand is approximately 6,000 miles from South Africa and the United States of America, and 6,300 miles from Canada. Her population is a million; she has no city of more than 100,000 inhabitants; and the aggregate population of the four largest cities does not exceed 300,000. These facts, and other disadvantages incidental to her youth, have proved hindrances to rapid progress in the manufacture of goods of a secondary order. Yet commerce flourishes, and the ratio of her urban to her total population is, in the opinion of many, already so high as to diminish her chances of healthy national development.

The basis of her wealth is her soil and climate. Leaving out of consideration coal and gold (the production of the latter does not increase), New Zealand's mineral resources,

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however potentially great, are so far practically undeveloped. But the products of the fertile soil and genial climate are rapidly increasing in quantity and value. The following table shows the growth of the value of our export trade:

	£
1860	549,000
1870	4,545,000
1880	6,102,000
1890	9,429,000
1900	13,055,000
1909	19,662,000

It should be remembered, in reading this table, that the general level of prices rose between 1860 and 1874, fell thence to 1895, and rose again till 1907, from which date there has been a fall.

Of the total export trade of 1909, wool accounted for £6,306,000; frozen and preserved meats for £3,600,000; butter and cheese for £2,745,000; and agricultural produce for £976,000. The products of the soil and pastures alone accounted for £15,608,000, or 79 per cent of the total export trade. Our exports were distributed as follows: To the United Kingdom, 82 per cent; to other British possessions, 12·5 per cent; and to foreign countries, 5·5 per cent. An import trade of £15,675,000 in 1909 was principally in textiles, hardware, sugar, tea, spirits, and paper. 59 per cent of the imports came from the United Kingdom, 27 per cent from the British possessions, and 14 per cent from foreign countries. All these statistics referring to 1909 are representative of the general position of our trade.

Since 1888 the policy of the New Zealand tariff has been avowedly protective. In 1895, however, reciprocal trade arrangements were entered into with South Australia and Canada. By the first treaty New Zealand consented to admit South Australian wine, olive oil, fruit, and salt duty free, while South Australia accorded the same treatment to New

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Zealand barley, hops, oats, and horses. The agreement was for seven years, but it was terminated in 1901 by the formation of the Australian Commonwealth, with which no reciprocal agreement has yet been made. The effects of such a treaty are difficult to estimate, as it is almost impossible to isolate them from the trade variations due to general commercial conditions. It should be stated, however, that, while our imports from South Australia remained almost stationary, our exports thereto more than doubled. The treaty of reciprocity with Canada provided for the admission of some twenty articles duty free, and for the preferential treatment of a number of others. This treaty was in existence for a very brief period, and any tendency which it might have had to promote reciprocal trade was no doubt nullified, to a great extent, by the lack of quick, regular, and direct steam communication. Although Canada has no longer a reciprocal treaty with New Zealand, she enjoys whatever benefit flows from the New Zealand preferential legislation of 1903 and 1907. By these laws certain articles of British manufacture are admitted into New Zealand at a lower rate than the same articles from foreign countries. As these articles are not such as can be profitably produced in New Zealand and as the preference takes the form of increasing the duties on foreign goods and not reducing them on British goods, the measure does not involve any conscious sacrifice on the part of New Zealand. Out of 486 main items on the tariff, no fewer than 193 are now subject to the preferential surtax. New Zealand, of course, shares in the preference accorded to British imports by Canada's 1907 tariff. The value of the preference given to British goods in 1909 in New Zealand is estimated at 12½ per cent. The customs revenue from foreign goods subject to the surtax increased last year by £85,000 in consequence of the surtax. The following table shows the value of our import trade from the United Kingdom and foreign countries (not including British possessions) as percentages of our total imports:

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	<i>United Kingdom.</i>	<i>Foreign Countries</i>
1901	59	17
1902	61	17
1903	60	16
1904	60	17
1905	61	17
1906	59	15
1907	59	14
1908	60	15
1909	59	14

It is to be noted that in some of our trade with foreign countries, the United Kingdom cannot hope to share; for example, we draw the whole of our kerosene and petroleum from the United States.

The excess of exports which marks the normal state of our trade is, of course, the result chiefly of interest payments on British loans and freight charges paid to British shipowners. By the Customs Duties Act of 1908 the Government of New Zealand is empowered to establish reciprocal trade relations with other states. In the preceding year New Zealand had entered into such relations with the South African colonies, whereby certain articles were admitted by each country at special rates, and all others at 3 per cent less than the duty payable under the general tariff. Since 1907 the percentage of our South African trade of our total trade has been:

	<i>Imports.</i>	<i>Exports.</i>
1907	·01	·32
1908	·03	·53
1909	·04	·62

The outstanding feature of the public finance of New Zealand from the imperial point of view is the large public debt, which is held chiefly in England. The amount of the debt of the central government at March 31, 1910, was £74,000,000, or about £75 per head of the white popula-

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tion, against which a sinking fund of over £3,000,000 had accrued. During the present session of Parliament an Act has been passed by which the Minister of Finance hopes to repay the whole of the present debt in 75 years. The bulk of the loan moneys have been employed on work that is directly or indirectly reproductive. According to the last Budget, if we deduct the amounts represented by assets such as railways, native lands bought with loan money, and money advanced to local bodies secured on rates, the total amount of the debt will not be more than £25,000,000. The percentage of the total debt spent on services is about 65 (railways, 33; roads and bridges, 9; public works and buildings, 7; immigration, 3·5; Maori wars, 3·3; land purchase, 3; defence, 2·8; telegraphs, 1·9); on investments by way of purchase of lands for settlement, advances to settlers and loans to local bodies, 23·25; whilst 11 per cent has gone to meet deficiencies in revenue, charges in raising loans, and miscellaneous expenses. The total interest charges are over 2¼ millions a year, or about 25 per cent of the revenue of the state; this percentage has been continually falling despite the rapid increase in the debt, and the Minister of Finance holds that for every million increase of our debt our assets have increased by three millions. The debt of the local bodies was on March 31, 1908, 12½ millions, 7¼ having been raised in the Dominion and 5¼ abroad, involving an annual charge of £658,000. This does not include money borrowed from the central government. General taxation takes the form of customs and excise, returning about two-thirds of the tax revenue; land tax, returning 14 per cent; income tax, 7 per cent; death duties, 6 per cent; and other direct taxes, 6 per cent. The tax system is in part designed for other than financial purposes, e.g., there is a heavy graduated land tax imposed to "burst up" large holdings of land. The total revenue of the central government is about 9 millions a year, derived nearly equally from taxation and other sources; the total expenditure is usually less than the revenue.

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VIII. DEFENCE

TILL recently the question of defence has not been regarded as a serious problem by New Zealand. Her geographical position and the overwhelming strength of the British navy allowed her to grow up almost without a thought of interference from foreign powers. All her resources were free to be devoted to internal development. The Maori wars necessitated the employment of British troops; but in 1870 the last of these left New Zealand, and colonial troops successfully terminated the struggle a few years later. Till 1887 the British Government maintained a small fleet in Australian waters; but the increasing strength of foreign powers in the Pacific, and the awakening of the Australasian colonies to the dangers which stalked at their door, made some new arrangement imperative. New Zealand was represented at the 1887 Colonial Conference, the main object of which was the organization of the military defence of the empire. As a result of this Conference, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Australasian Naval and Defence Act, by which New Zealand agreed to contribute towards the cost and maintenance of a British-Australasian Squadron. This squadron was to form one undivided whole; but, owing to New Zealand's exceptional geographical position, it was agreed that two vessels should be permanently stationed in New Zealand waters. New Zealand's contribution, apportioned on a population basis, amounted to £21,452 per year.

Opinion in the New Zealand Parliament was practically unanimous on the measure. The Premier, Major Atkinson, viewed it as a step towards ultimate federation. He condemned the idea of a local navy and also sought to commend the Conference scheme by declaring that a large part of the subsidy would necessarily be expended in New Zealand. The leader of the Opposition, Sir Julius Vogel, an ardent Federalist, gave the Bill loyal support, but thought the tendency of such measures to be anti-federal. He deprecated the idea of making separate portions of the Empire

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responsible for local defence. The Empire should be regarded as one undivided whole, and all parts should contribute to a common defence fund. In the mind of the Premier the chief obstacle to federation lay in the indifference of the people of the United Kingdom towards the colonies. The leader of the Opposition, however, saw the chief obstacle in the growing wealth and independence of the colonies—a difficulty destined to increase with the years. Criticism of another kind came from a small party, which declared that the colonies should not be dragged into European disputes, and that the Great Powers should each adopt a colonial flag, whose neutrality should be respected during wars which might, from a certain viewpoint, be deemed to concern Europe only.

This agreement remained in force till 1903, when, as the result of a motion proposed by New Zealand at the Imperial Conference of 1902, New Zealand and Australia increased their naval subsidies, New Zealand henceforth paying £40,000 per year, or one-thirteenth of the cost of maintenance of the squadron, as against five-thirteenths paid by Australia, and seven-thirteenths by the United Kingdom. This raised New Zealand's naval contribution from 6½d. to 1s. per head, and brought her total naval and military expenditure up to 3s. 4d. per head. At the same time the United Kingdom was expending £1 9s. 3d., New South Wales 3s. 5d., Victoria 3s. 3d., and Canada and Cape Colony each 2s. per head. The Bill giving effect to the new arrangement was passed almost without debate. The opinion was unanimous that New Zealand was not paying an adequate sum for the protection afforded. In 1908 the subsidy was further increased to £100,000 per year, again without opposition. This raised New Zealand's naval contribution to 2s. 2d. per head.

During the South African war New Zealand raised and equipped about 7,000 men at a cost of £250,000. This policy met with almost unanimous approval, though keen criticism of the causes of the war was expressed in a few quarters.

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In 1909 the New Zealand Government offered a Dreadnought, or two if necessary, to the British navy. The offer was subsequently unanimously approved by Parliament, though the Government was subjected to severe criticism for having made the offer without consulting the Legislature. In support of his action, the Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, said that the administration knew of one matter that they regarded as of the most dangerous significance, and they considered that the moral effect of any offer they could make would be the greater the more promptly such offer was made. Other members, however, doubted whether, in presenting a Dreadnought, we were expending money to the best advantage. Might not the ship, it was asked, be laid up with a skeleton crew by some "Little England" Government? Some advocated the formation of an Australasian navy which should police the Southern seas from Cape Horn on the east to Cape Town on the west, and which, in the event of war, would be strong enough to capture and hold the possessions of any hostile power in the South Pacific. Above all, the point was raised that, since our contribution to the British navy has increased and is likely to increase much more, it is imperative that we have some voice in deciding the foreign policy of the Empire. Some means should be devised to ensure that, in case of disaster to England, peace should not be purchased at the price of the transfer of such places as New Zealand to foreign powers. On the whole, the debate revealed that all were actuated by the keenest sense of New Zealand's liability to attack and of the necessity of her assuming a fair share of responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the empire.

The New Zealand Defence Act of 1909 marks what is probably the most important step New Zealand has yet taken in defence. This Act and the amending Act of 1910 made necessary by Lord Kitchener's recommendations render every New Zealander, with certain exceptions, between the age of 18 and 25, liable to be called upon to undergo military training. The principal features of the

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scheme are the formation of a Territorial force of 20,000 men, recruited voluntarily if possible, and the institution of a general training section. At the recruit stage—between 18 and 19—the recruit must undergo a fortnight's training in camp in addition to the ordinary home training. From 19 to 25 the period of training in camp is reduced to six days per year.

As military drill and the "cadet system" are now compulsory in all primary and secondary schools, the youth of the Dominion will undergo a continuous course of training till the age of 25. Public opinion is almost unanimous in its approval of some such scheme; but the financial, industrial, and social difficulties involved, make it necessary to restrict considerably the number that may be called up. At any rate the Bill establishes a principle whose operation may be extended as circumstances permit.

In 1910 New Zealand will expend on military defence £350,000, which, with the naval subsidy, makes a total expenditure of £450,000 on defence, or approximately 9s. per head. It is probable that the operation of the new Defence Act will cause a considerable increase in this amount.

IX. THE CONFERENCES

THE principal object of the 1887 Conference was the discussion of the best means of securing the military defence of the Empire. So far as New Zealand was affected thereby the principal result was the contribution of the annual sum of £21,452, towards the maintenance of the squadron in Australasian waters. Though the subject of Imperial Federation was expressly barred at the conference, on the ground that the colonies had made no pronouncement on the matter, the subsequent debates in the New Zealand Parliament on the naval subsidy revealed the idea already stirring in the minds of many New Zealanders. New Zealand was growing in population and trade, and

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was becoming more and more capable of sharing the burdens of common nationality; but what influenced the minds of our public men most was the steady growth of the foreign possessions of Germany and France among the islands of the South Pacific. At this time New Zealand vainly endeavoured to impress upon the British Government the necessity for making the Governor of New Zealand the High Commissioner of the Pacific. In 1897 the Colonial Premiers again met in conference; but it was clear that the time was not yet ripe for the formulation of any definite scheme of Imperial Government, in which all the colonies could share. In fact the Premiers of New Zealand and Tasmania were the only members that raised dissentient voices from a motion affirming that the existing political arrangements of the empire were satisfactory.

When the Imperial Conference next met in 1902, public opinion had moved far and fast. The empire had passed through a great crisis; the colonies had all tasted a little of the realities of war. Strong though indefinite feelings had been aroused that the empire should stand as one undivided whole, and not as an aggregation of separate states bound by a common sympathy yet free to pursue divergent ways at critical times. At this conference New Zealand, through its representative, Mr Seddon, played a prominent part. Among the suggestions he made were the strengthening of the Australasian Squadron, and the formation in each colony of an Imperial Reserve, which might be despatched for service to any part of the empire. Colonists also, he urged, should be given opportunities for obtaining commissions in the Imperial army and navy. He proposed that the colonies should accord preferential treatment to British goods carried in British ships, and that the British Government should reciprocate by reducing the duties on taxable products from the colonies. New Zealand had suffered through the operation of the American coastal shipping laws, and Mr Seddon suggested that the British Government should use its efforts to obtain the mitigation of those

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laws, or, failing in that, devise some means of applying similar laws to the British colonies.

He advocated the establishment of a subsidized line of fast merchantmen between the United Kingdom and the Australasian colonies, such ships to be capable of conversion into cruisers, and he insisted that the time had come for regular conferences, mentioning three years as a suitable interval between the meetings.

The universal interest in imperial affairs this conference aroused in New Zealand expressed itself in two pieces of practical legislation—the increase of the naval subsidy to £40,000 and the adoption of a preferential tariff on certain goods from the British Dominions.

When in 1907 the Premiers were again called to conference the idea of imperial co-operation had taken firmer root. The New Zealand representative, Sir Joseph Ward, suggested that these consultations should no longer be called Imperial Conferences, but Imperial Councils, as the latter term implied permanence of organization and continuity of purpose. This council, to consist of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Prime Ministers of the Colonies and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, should have only consultative and advisory functions on all imperial subjects, i.e. subjects affecting directly the interests of the colonies as well as those of the United Kingdom. The members of this council should correspond with each other during the recess. He strongly urged that the self-governing colonies should be represented by a separate minister in the British Cabinet. He advocated the preferential treatment of British goods and the appointment of trade consuls throughout the empire, and urged upon the conference the necessity of establishing rapid steam communication between the United Kingdom and the colonies. He entered a most forcible protest against the exorbitant dues of the Suez Canal. He pointed out how the strain of providing for the internal development of so young a country as New Zealand made the maintenance of a local navy impossible,

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though next year New Zealand in part admitted her responsibility by increasing her naval subsidy to £100,000, i.e. by 250 per cent.

At the Defence Conference in 1909 New Zealand preferred to adhere to her present policy of contribution. It was decided to apply her subsidy towards the maintenance of the China unit, of which some of the smaller vessels would have New Zealand waters as their headquarters.

It will be easily seen from our rapid sketch that New Zealand has had a full share of the favours granted by the mother country during the last sixty years in the shape of political freedom, commercial autonomy and protection from aggression, and that she has now begun to feel the impulse to shoulder some of the responsibilities every people must bear on its way to develop nationality, and this impulse, we believe with Lord Milner, is even stronger in the people than in the politicians. The rapid growth of our external trade, whose annual value is now nearly 40 millions, the increasing national wealth—it is now roughly estimated at 700 millions—and the appearance of strong foreign powers on the Pacific, are arousing in our people a keen sense of our dependence on British naval supremacy and of our obligation to assist in maintaining this essential condition of our wealth and liberties. This feeling may carry us far along the way to closer union with the whole empire, but one necessary condition precedent to organic union is a more intimate knowledge of each state in the minds of the others. Unfortunately, despite the great modern improvements in the means of communicating ideas, there is growing up in these over-sea states a race that knows England and one another only from books often written on insufficient and ill-digested data, or, worse still, from meagre and intermittent cable “news.” The blame must be shared by several factors, not the least culpable being, in this state, a system of education that discourages any general intimate knowledge of the history of the British race and institutions, and fosters unduly the spirit of insularity which is

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already stimulated too highly by our geographical environment.

Still, many of us look with hope to the indications of an awakening civic conscience hinted at in these pages and to the probability of increased cheap facilities for travel in the near future, the interchange of teachers and students, increased facilities for colonials to enter the army and navy, a system of travelling scholarships, and similar means of promoting mutual knowledge. The latter may rob us of some of our best talent, for New Zealand is essentially a country of low salaries and high cost of living, but this deprivation would be cheerfully borne as part of the necessary price of more intimate relations. Union cannot come where mutual ignorance exists. We look forward therefore, and not remotely, to free interchange of persons and ideas among the different states. To this end the laws of naturalization and of marriage, and the requirements demanded for the practice of professions should be brought into harmony, more especially should mere traditional restrictions be removed.

And finally we feel sure the country would have been better pleased if our Parliament, which has been sitting continuously up to date for over three months, had devoted some time to the consideration of the forthcoming Imperial Conference; but, although there will be no other session before our representatives leave for the conference, it has been deemed worthy of mention neither in the Governor's speech nor in the debates on the Address-in-Reply, and if it is discussed at all it will be in the latter part of the session, when business is always rushed. To mention only a few points, the opinion of our politicians would have been particularly valuable on the question of two-yearly conferences, the establishment of a separate Department of the Home Government for Dominion affairs, and the desirability of initiating our conference representatives into some of the intricacies of foreign policy, of which at present they are largely in careless ignorance.

New Zealand, October 10, 1910.

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APPENDIX

Table I shows the approximate total defence expenditure of New Zealand, the expenditure per head, and the percentage which the defence expenditure is of the total general expenditure of the Dominion.

Table II shows the defence expenditure per head and the percentage which that expenditure is of the total Dominion expenditure averaged over quinquennial periods.

TABLE I

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Defence Exp.</i>	<i>Population.</i>	<i>Per Head.</i>	<i>Percentage of total expenditure.</i>
	£			
1898	146,000	743,000	3s. 11d.	2.3
1899	211,000	757,000	5s. 7d.	3.0
1900	181,000	768,000	4s. 9d.	2.5
1901	278,000	788,000	7s. 1d.	3.2
1902	319,000	808,000	7s. 11d.	3.8
1903	265,000	833,000	6s. 4d.	2.9
1904	282,000	858,000	6s. 7d.	3.2
1905	236,000	882,000	5s. 4d.	2.3
1906	209,000	909,000	4s. 7d.	1.7
1907	241,000	930,000	5s. 2d.	2.1
1908	234,000	961,000	4s. 10d.	1.8
1909	294,000	983,000	6s. 0d.	2.7
1910	450,000	1,000,000	9s. 0d.	4.8

TABLE II

<i>Quinquennial Period.</i>	<i>Expenditure per Head.</i>	<i>Percentage of Total expenditure</i>
1898-1902	5s. 10d.	3.0
1899-1903	6s. 4d.	3.1
1900-1904	6s. 6d.	3.1
1901-1905	6s. 8d.	3.1
1902-1906	6s. 2d.	2.8
1903-1907	5s. 7d.	2.4
1904-1908	5s. 4d.	2.2
1905-1909	5s. 2d.	2.1
1906-1910	5s. 11d.	3.4



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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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NOTE

THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in all parts of the British Empire, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of Imperial politics, entirely free from the bias of local party issues. The affairs of THE ROUND TABLE in each portion of the Empire are in the sole charge of local residents, who are also responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way THE ROUND TABLE will reflect the current opinions of all parts about Imperial problems, and at the same time present a survey of them as a whole. Opinions and articles of a party character will be rigidly excluded.

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THE NEW PROBLEM OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

I

THERE is at the present time a widespread feeling that the British Empire is approaching a crisis in its history. There has been no official or authoritative exposition of this belief, and the politicians as usual conspire to murmur that all is well so long as they are left alone. But the popular instinct, so unerring in its broad judgements, is clear. Times, it says, have changed, and the principles and methods which have served the Empire in the past are failing to meet the new needs of the twentieth century.

During the last fifty years the Empire has faced and solved the problem of its own internal government. The principle of complete autonomy in local affairs has now been established as the basis of the internal government of the Empire—a solution which no one is ever likely to question again. But scarcely has the old problem disappeared than a new problem has begun to arise in its place. Hitherto the external relations of the Empire have been regarded, by the Dominions as well as by Great Britain, as the proper concern of the British Government. During the last few years, however, the Dominions have realized that they can no longer ignore foreign affairs. In numberless ways they are finding themselves affected by what goes on beyond their borders. And as they are affected they are considering by what means they are to safeguard their national interests. How are they to do so without obtaining a real influence over the Foreign Policy and the defensive arrangements of the Imperial Government? It is obvious that foreign policy and defence cannot continue to be the sole and exclusive concern of the United Kingdom. Indeed, they have already ceased to be so, and it is the instinctive apprehension of this fact and of its far-reaching consequences which is the cause of the present general feeling of unrest about the future of the Empire.

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Before going on to examine the new situation we must first have some understanding of what the Empire really is. The British Empire is not an Empire in the ordinary meaning of the word. It is a system of government. And it is a system which is the direct outcome of the political philosophy of the British race. More perhaps than any other people the inhabitants of the British Isles, and their descendants in other parts of the world, have clung to a belief in personal liberty. They have shown it in their long struggles against the tyranny of king and baron, against religious intolerance, against privilege of all kinds. They have shown it by their long adherence to the idea that the community prospers better from the enterprise of the citizen than from the action of the government. They have shown it in their belief that it is the function of government to afford to the citizen the opportunity of self-development, rather than to enlarge or glorify the state. But experience taught them that liberty carried with it heavy responsibilities. They early learnt that individual freedom was possible only if the members of the community were willing to respect one another's rights as defined by law, and to shoulder of their own accord the burdens which the preservation of the State entailed. The practical success of British political institutions, therefore, has rested on the readiness of the people to make the preparations necessary to repel attacks from outside, and to uphold resolutely throughout their territories those conditions of peace, law and order which they believed to be essential to the enjoyment of true liberty.

If its history be narrowly examined, the Empire will be found to be the product not of a policy of expansion, but of the determined attachment of the British peoples to these ideas. The inhabitants of the British Isles were able to develop their own free system of government because the Channel protected them from constant foreign attack and enabled them to concentrate their attention continuously on the problem of government. The people of

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Europe, however, were not so fortunate. For centuries the essential condition of safety in Europe was armed strength, and the energies which they might otherwise have devoted to internal reform were expended on preparations for defence. It was natural, therefore, that continental peoples, finding strength the first necessity of existence, should have come to regard the aggrandizement of the state as the primary object of national activity. Dominion, not the well-being of their citizens, has been the key to the policy of the leading continental powers. Such a policy clearly threatened other nations, and England found that she could keep her freedom only by a long series of desperate struggles against the threatening might, first of Spain, and later of France under Louis XIV and Napoleon. It was during these struggles that the foundations of the Empire were laid. To protect herself from subjection to the great continental powers England had to keep command of the sea, and it was her sea power which, by enabling her citizens to conduct their enterprises safely all over the world, led to the acquisition of territory in Canada, Australia, South Africa and India.

Once established in these parts the Empire expanded almost of its own accord. Where settlements had been made in unoccupied lands private citizens kept pushing forward as settlers and pioneers, only to invite the British Government to step in as policeman, judge and law-maker to the territory they had occupied. Where settlements had been made in peopled lands missionaries and traders almost always found themselves engulfed by the anarchy or tyranny of native states and appealed to the might of England to protect them from injustice and oppression. In both cases the British Government found that if law and order were to be established it had no option but to step in. And it invariably found that it could prevent the recurrence of anarchy only by annexation. Every advance was a prelude to a further extension of the British domain. For savage tribes would sooner or later attack the prosperous territory under

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British rule, or riot and disorder would break out beyond the frontier and threaten to spread to British territory. From the beginning the British Government has endeavoured to avoid increasing the burden of its responsibilities, but invariably has the necessity of protecting its citizens and maintaining order driven it forward. The whole history of South Africa from the days of Lord Glenelg to those of Cecil Rhodes centres on the reluctance of the British Government to extend the Empire it had to govern and defend. Because of its reluctance two sovereignties were allowed to grow up in an area meant for one—a calamity which made the country a cockpit of war and intrigue for a hundred years. So the process of extension has gone on, across Canada, in Australasia, in the Sudan, in India, everywhere, until the Empire has reached some natural frontier like the Himalayas, or has come to abut upon the territory of some civilized people.

But once having built up the Empire, the logic of their philosophy impelled the British to apply to it their own political ideas. Averse to oppression and all unnecessary interference with the liberty of the subject, they have everywhere carried with them the freest system of government which has yet been seen. Slavery was abolished a century ago. The rights of minorities in language and religion were everywhere safeguarded by constitutional enactment. Such of the young communities oversea as were capable of supporting a civilized administration were given the fullest measure of self-government, and complete control over lands which it had cost England much treasure and many lives to win. And where backward peoples were not capable of governing themselves, the British Government itself undertook the duty of maintaining peace, justice, freedom and good government among them. Nor was the Empire even treated as the special preserve of the peoples which inhabit it. For the first time foreigners enjoyed exactly the same rights and privileges as the native born, save in the political sphere. They were given the same rights to trade, to invest capital,

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to enlist the assistance of the government or the machinery of the law.

Thus the Empire, both in its growth and in its organization, is the product of the individualist principles of the British race. The inhabitants of the British Isles do not maintain the Empire because they derive a profit from it, or glory in keeping other peoples beneath their rule. From the purely material point of view the Empire is a burden rather than a source of gain. England draws no revenues from her colonies to lighten the weight of her own taxation. She erects no tariff fence in her dependencies to give a preference to her own traders over those of foreign countries. She makes no charge to any part of the Empire for the service she renders in protecting it from external attack. The few civil service posts, reserved for men who are willing to pass their lives as underpaid exiles in savage and unhealthy parts, are no compensation for the enormous financial strain and the constant risk of war which the duty of preserving a world Empire entails. Her people gain many indirect advantages from trading with territories under British rule, but if we take into account the cost of acquiring the Empire we can still say with Disraeli, "It has been proved to us that we have lost money through our colonies."

The British people preserve their Empire because they must; because they would suffer if it fell into the hands of others; because having done almost unknowingly a great work for civilization they cannot betray the tradition of their ancestors; because the Empire is the product of their own theory of government and their full liberty would almost certainly be curtailed if it disappeared. One has only to look at the condition of other peoples, at the weakness and misgovernment of the minor states of the world, at the subservience of the judiciary in Mexico, for instance, at the corruption of some of the South American republics, at the oppression of the Russian autocracy, even at the militarism of Germany, to see the real mean-

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ing of the imperial system, not to the Empire alone but to the world. If it were to collapse it would infallibly be replaced by something worse. It would be worse for India that it should be governed by Russia or some local tyrant, for the African colonies that they should relapse into the barbarism which is the only alternative to European control, for Great Britain and the Dominions that they should become so many petty peoples, each forced to arm to the teeth to preserve their independence in a world of warring nations.

It is only by bearing in mind what the Empire really is, by remembering that it is not an imperium but a system of government which gives peace to one quarter of mankind and better government to hundreds of millions of backward people than they could get in any other way, that it is possible to understand the real nature of the problem of imperial defence.

II.

JUST as in the early days the inhabitants of the British Isles were able to develop their own free system of government because they were preserved from the necessity of devoting all their energies to defence, so the inhabitants of the Empire have been able to devise a method of imperial government to suit their own ideas because they have been free for a century from any serious external pressure. Since Napoleon no foreign nation has attempted to interfere with the Empire. There have been local dangers and outbreaks, but since 1815 no power has attempted to set up a world system on lines which were inimical to the free system of the Empire. Left to itself the Empire has been able to establish a really effective and civilized government in the dependencies, and has found, in the principle of complete autonomy in local affairs, the true basis for the relations between the white self-governing communities within it. If we had reached the era of universal peace this would probably serve as the final form of Imperial organization, at any rate until the Dependencies were ready for self-government. But with the twentieth century the external danger

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has suddenly revived, and with it problems with which the existing organization of the Empire was not framed to deal.

The external danger has arisen in two forms. In the first place, in modern Germany the Napoleonic idea of a world Empire based on physical force has been revived. Once more a vast organism is being built up on the continent of Europe whose object is the expansion of the state. Once more it is coming into conflict with the system based on the freedom of the individual represented in the British Empire. For the German conception of the state, inherited from Bismarck and Napoleon, is essentially aggressive. To the ruling classes in Germany the object of national activity is the greatness and power of the Fatherland, and success in attaining this object necessarily involves the destruction of rival nations which stand in the way. No principle based on reason or justice has yet been discovered by which a nation can establish its superiority to other nations. It is only by the use or display of force, in diplomacy or war, that a nation can expand and win its way to the dominion of the world.

The essential antagonism between the German national policy based on physical force and the political system of the British Empire was fully explained in the first issue of this review and need not be repeated here. It has, however, received a striking confirmation in the history of the arbitration movement during the past few weeks. America has inherited the traditions and political ideas which are now embodied in the imperial system. To America, as to England, armaments are a defensive, not an offensive, weapon. For many years, therefore, it has been the object of her statesmen to encourage the settlement of international disputes according to the principles of reason and justice rather than by the arbitrament of the sword. Recently she issued an invitation to the other nations of the world to enter into a treaty of unlimited arbitration by which the parties were to bind themselves to submit every dispute which might arise between them to the settlement of an arbitral court.

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Such an arrangement would not absolutely prevent two peoples from going to war with one another. But it would be invaluable as registering in the most solemn manner their resolve not to encroach upon the interests and possessions of one another, and to settle their disputes by peaceful means.

What was the outcome of this remarkable offer? On March 13 the British Government, through Sir Edward Grey, gave it a cordial welcome, and negotiations for the completion of the treaty are in train. On March 30 the German Chancellor responded with a blunt negative. His reasons are contained in his references to proposals for disarmament.

“If” (he said) “the great Powers desired to make an agreement about general international disarmament they would first have to agree among themselves about the position which the several nations were to have in relation to one another.”

Germany, he said (according to the *Times*' summary of his speech), like every other nation, would claim the place in the world which corresponded to the sum total of its national capabilities, and its fighting strength must be measured by that scale. Arbitration treaties simply recognized and confirmed

“a state of things already existing *de facto*. Let this state of affairs change, let there arise between the two nations antagonisms which touch their vital interests, antagonisms which, in the language of ordinary life, cut to the quick, then I should like to see the arbitration treaty that does not burn like tinder.”

The Chancellor's case is unanswerable—if you have national expansion in view. Every arbitration treaty implies the maintenance of the *status quo*, and the maintenance of the *status quo* is obviously inconsistent with the expansion of Germany. Some means must be found for enabling Ger-

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many to reach the position in the world to which she believes her resolution and self-sacrifice entitle her. It is her destiny to become the great power of the twentieth century. Arbitration will not give her that position. Her "fighting strength" may. Accordingly, in loyalty to her own ideals, she has no alternative but to reject arbitration, and to trust to her armaments instead. The German people are no supine loiterers on the road to fame. They are not prepared to forego their national destiny for the sake of the sweets of peace.

Unfortunately the policy of Germany cannot fail to be dangerous to the British Empire. No people can escape the compulsion of the ideals they hold. The Romans were forced to build up their Empire to maintain the rule of law which was the only condition on which Roman civilization could subsist. The British were forced to build up their Empire because the maintenance of their national freedom and the existence of law and order wherever they wished to live and trade, was essential to a civilized life according to their ideas. So with the Germans, they are compelled to go on building up the strength by which they expect to win the first place in the world, and to seize every opportunity of advancing the cause of Germanism that comes their way, so long as they hold by their present policy of expansion. Without steady national expansion—now fast, now slow, but never interrupted—the mission of Germanism will fail, and the Napoleonic ideal, which they unconsciously inherit, of federating the world round a single mighty nucleus of power will have vanished once more. It is not a selfish greed which impels the German foreign office to appear in "shining armour" beside Austria, to intervene in Turkish politics, to bring Europe to the verge of war in Morocco, to demand the dismissal of the foreign minister of France, to look with suspicion on the British Empire, to pile up the greatest combination of naval and military strength that the world has seen. It is the inevitable driving force of a national policy. So long as she holds by that

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policy, it is just as impossible for Germany to forego an opportunity of expansion as it would be for England to stand by while tyranny or slavery was being established in British territory. What she may be driven to in order to bring it to fruition she does not know, any more than England knew that in resolving to fight Napoleon for her freedom with her last penny and her last man she was committing herself to the creation of an enormous Empire. But, somehow or other, her power in the world must grow, and she believes that it is by the use or display of her armaments alone that it will do so. This belief was stated officially by the Chancellor, six weeks ago.

“When a people will not or cannot continue to spend enough on its armaments *to be able to make its way in the world*, then it falls back into the second rank and sinks down to the rôle of a ‘super’ on the world’s stage.”

If anybody questions the view that modern German policy is a policy of expansion, let him weigh carefully the quotations from the German Chancellor’s official statements, from the German Emperor’s speeches, and from other sources which have been made in this Review. Let him look at the history of German policy since Bismarck took the helm. Let him consider where the origin of the present mad race for armaments really lies. There is not the slightest room for doubt that Germany is pursuing a policy of expansion to-day. We say this in no animosity against the Germans. They must judge of their own interests. We simply state it as a fact. And it is a fact of the first importance to ourselves. For in her search for an outlet Germany has already come to regard England as the enemy. Some day she may find that the existence of the Empire is inconsistent with the realization of her aspirations. She does not want deliberately to attack the Empire any more than Great Britain was anxious to make war upon the Transvaal or the United States wishes to invade Mexico. But the logic of

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her policy may drive her to it. Modern wars are caused more often by a conflict of principle than by hatred or jealousy. The Americans of the North and of the South were very good friends, yet between them they lost a million lives for the sake of principles they revered. The British and the Boers had little personal enmity for one another, but each cherished political aspirations which were incompatible with one another, and it required the sword to decide between them. Russia and Japan went to war not because they hated one another but because they cherished expansionist dreams which were irreconcilable. And so long as Germany nurses her dreams of expansion the danger that her armaments may be hurled upon the Empire will not disappear. That is why the unprecedented growth of German arms has revived the external menace to the safety of the Empire.

It is sometimes said that the danger of a rupture between England and Germany is increased by talk about the possibility of war. So it is if people talk in an aggressive, abusive or unthinking way. But all history proves that there is no more disastrous fallacy than the belief that a refusal to estimate the risks of war will serve the cause of peace. Pitt would not have saved the liberty of his country by refusing to admit that the rise of Napoleon was a danger to England. There would probably have been no war in 1870 if France had realized the danger which threatened from across the Rhine and had been prepared to meet it. We are no more likely to remove the antagonism which unquestionably exists between England and Germany at the present day by pretending it does not exist than we are to promote the cause of social reform by refusing to admit the existence of slums or the conflict of interest between capital and labour. No great cause has prospered by a suppression of the truth, and the cause of peace will be far better served by admitting that there is a real antagonism between Germany and the Empire to-day, by exposing where the root of it lies, and by making both peoples realize how near they are to war than by hiding the facts away.

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And when we face the facts the exact measure of danger to the Empire is clear. The danger will continue as long as the national ideals of the German and the British people remain as different as they are to-day. It will last as long as the motive for German armaments is the desire for national expansion, and the motive for British armaments is the determination to preserve intact the free system of the Empire. What chance there is of reconciling the political aspirations of Germany and the Empire it is not easy to say. The task does not seem impossible. The Empire, it is true, is never likely to adopt the German view, because it believes it to be reactionary, and because all history teaches that peoples who have pursued the allurements of ambition have in the long run destroyed themselves. But the Germans had actually begun to be infected with the spirit of political freedom when they were turned aside by Bismarck and his Prussian friends. They may still be persuaded to return to the path of progress, especially as it is at least open to question whether her national policy is not imposed upon Germany by the official and military classes rather than by the sentiments of the people. Fortunately there will be indisputable proof of the change in German opinion. For Germany will then be willing to negotiate for the abandonment of conscription in Europe and to refer her disputes with civilized peoples to the consideration of an arbitral court. When that day comes the relations between the two countries will become as friendly as those between America and the British Empire.

Pending the reconciliation of the political ideals of Germany and the British Empire there is only one way to serve the cause of peace—the Empire must maintain such defensive strength that it is hopeless for the apostles of Germanic expansion to think of attacking it. There is not the slightest danger of the British army and navy being used for offensive purposes. Such a course would be contrary to the whole spirit of British policy, and to the tradition which

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has governed the use of the paramount navy of the world for a hundred years. The existence, therefore, of a supreme British navy is the only true safeguard against war, while the German policy remains as it is. The course of real danger, the course really likely to lead to war, would be to allow the defensive strength of the Empire to fall below what Germany can mass against it. For that would be to lay a people, committed to a policy of expansion, under the temptation to destroy what they regard as their chief rival for the hegemony of the world at a single blow.

But the rise of a great nationalistic power in modern Germany is not the only change in the external situation of the Empire in the last few years. Till comparatively recently the whole naval and military strength of the world centred in Europe. Except for the United States, whose policy has always been essentially peaceful, there was no fleet but the British squadrons outside European waters. And force was then concentrated in the hands of a few great powers—France, Russia and Germany. Of late, however, other peoples have entered upon the competition of armaments. First of all there was Japan. The effect of her appearance was electric. It abruptly terminated Russia's dream of expansion to the East and it revolutionized the whole defensive system of the Empire. Now other nations are beginning to copy the example. Italy and Austria are busily building fleets of Dreadnoughts. Turkey and Spain, not to be left powerless in the Mediterranean, are following suit. South America will soon rival Europe in its martial preparations. Chili, the Argentine and Brazil are each building Dreadnoughts of the largest and most powerful type.

These are very ominous facts. What policy are the nations which control these vast engines of war going to pursue? Will they follow the example of Germany and look upon their warships as so many instruments for furthering their national ambitions? Or will they follow the example of England and America, and use them solely for defence and in the interests of peace? Looking to their history and to

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the composition of their populations, which is the more probable? And if they adopt the gospel of force and come to believe that their national destinies depend upon using their "fighting strength," will their appearance cause results any less dramatic than did that of Japan? What will be their effect on that delicate scale which preserves the international balance of power? Moreover, most of the younger powers, notably those of South America, have immense resources and rapidly growing populations. As they grow richer and more populous, will not the number of Dreadnoughts afloat in the distant oceans of the world steadily increase?

This growth of navies of the modern type, each designed to further or protect the interests of a different nation, is the most sinister feature in recent international history. What it may lead to none can say. Young peoples with no traditions, with no responsibility, with no defined ideals, are taking into their hands the most terrific engines of destruction the world has seen. Who knows what they will do with them? There is no world government to command them, and no court to arbitrate on the justice of their cause. High principle or fear of the consequences are the only motives which can control them.

Many of us have believed that we were near to the millennium of peace. But may it not rather be that we are on the verge of a new era of international stress and strain?

III

IT is quite clear that external pressure is already more severe than it has been for nearly a hundred years, and that it will probably become even greater in the future. Before considering how the new dangers are to be withstood let us examine the methods which have served to protect the Empire from external attack in the past, and how far they are likely to meet the present difficulties.

The British Government, in considering how best to provide for the defence of the Empire, has found its policy governed by three facts. In the first place, the Empire is

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distributed over the four quarters of the globe. Its foreign policy, therefore, has had to be a world policy. There is practically no part of the earth where events may not affect its safety in some way or other. The subtle politics of Europe concern it, because they centre on that balance of power which protects the Empire from aggression in the North Sea on the one side, and on the frontiers of India on the other. So do the obscure intrigues of the Balkan states, for in them may be involved two great imperial interests: the safety of the Mediterranean route to Egypt, India and Australasia, and the friendliness or otherwise of the Sultan—the religious head of many millions of Mohammedan subjects of the British crown. So, again, do the politics of Persia, or the negotiations about the Bagdad railway, for the presence of a foreign navy in the Persian Gulf would make the defence of India many times as difficult and as expensive as it is today. So, too, do the proceedings of foreign powers in Africa or projects for the establishment of foreign naval bases in the Pacific, because either might impose upon it an increased burden for naval and military defence. The foreign policy of the Empire has to comprise within its survey the politics of the whole world, because every change in the international situation may affect in some way or other the peace of the Empire, the security of its trade, or the balance of power which may be arrayed against it.

The British Government, however, has also been faced by the fact that the chief portions of the Empire are separated from one another by many thousands of miles of ocean, and that the ocean is the highway not only of the commerce but the navies of all the powers of the world. Unlike most great powers, it has no assured communication with the greater part of the territories it is called upon to defend. The possession of a navy, therefore, strong enough to keep open the sea-roads between the different parts of the Empire has necessarily been a cardinal feature for British policy, for without it the Empire would have been liable to attack and dismemberment piece by piece.

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But there has been a third fact to compensate for the separation of the parts of which the Empire is composed. None of them is faced across a land frontier by a first-class military power. Nowhere within the Empire, therefore, has it been necessary to make preparations for military defence on a continental scale. So long as the navy has been able to prevent the landing of hostile armies from across the sea, a relatively small but mobile expeditionary army has been sufficient, in combination with local militias and native levies, to cope with internal revolt or frontier attack.

The Empire, therefore, has always been defended as a single organic whole. For, to quote Lord Kitchener,

“as long as British superiority at sea is assured, then it is an accepted principle that no British Dominion can be successfully and permanently conquered by an organized invasion from oversea.”

The navy has been the first line of defence, for so long as it has held command of the sea the Empire has been safe, no matter from what part of the world danger might spring. The army has been the second line—an indispensable complement to the first—partly to cope with internal rebellion or frontier trouble beyond the reach of ships, and partly to bring to a decisive end wars which could not be terminated by sea victory alone. This organic system, as Lord Tweedmouth claimed at the Conference of 1907, has, if judged by its results, been a success.

Unfortunately the arrangements which have served the Empire well for a hundred years are breaking down. In the first place, the British navy can no longer defend the Empire as effectively as it did in the past. Command of the sea, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge says, means the control

“of the ocean paths which connect one part of an extensive Empire with another, which sea-borne commerce must traverse, and along which belligerent expeditions must proceed.”

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Not many years ago the British Government might almost have claimed to possess the command of all the oceans of the world in this sense. It had the most powerful fleets in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean and in the Far East, and each of these was in a position to reinforce the others in case of need. But it can claim this supremacy no longer. The rise of the German Navy has compelled the British Government not only to increase enormously its naval estimates but to concentrate almost its whole forces in home waters. The first stage occurred in 1905, when after the alliance with Japan all the British battleships were transferred from the Far East to Home waters. The second stage followed soon afterwards, when the Mediterranean, like the Far East, was depleted of its naval strength. Whereas eight years ago there were five battleships in the Far East, fourteen in the Mediterranean, and sixteen in Home waters, there are to-day none in the Far East, six in the Mediterranean, and thirty-three in Home waters. And these thirty-three include all the Dreadnoughts in commission.

Obviously, the British Navy holds command of the sea to-day in a far more restricted sense than it did ten years ago. Its concentration unquestionably diminishes the protection it is able to afford to the outlying portions of the Empire by introducing the element of delay. It is still certainly strong enough to establish its superiority over any probable enemy or combination of enemies. It is probably stronger and more efficient than it has ever been before. But while ultimate success is the primary and only vital consideration, delay in sweeping an enemy off the remoter oceans of the globe may result in much damage to life and property. Great Britain, indeed, has already recognized the change in her position, for the safety of India and Australasia is no longer directly secured by a British fleet, but by an alliance which guarantees the goodwill of the strongest power in the Pacific.

And what will be the position when the navies of the younger powers, now building, are afloat? As Captain

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Mahan has pointed out, the effect of the increase of the German Navy has been to increase the relative power of all other navies, because it has diminished the mobility of the British fleet, and limited the number of ships which can leave Home waters while the German Navy is hostile and afloat. What will happen when the Mediterranean is alive with French, Italian, Austrian, Turkish and Spanish Dreadnoughts? Eight are already under construction. Who will then control the shortest route to India and Australia? And what will be the effect of the Brazilian and Argentine Dreadnoughts in the South Atlantic? It is at least possible that if the Suez route is closed they might hold up the route round the Cape to the commerce or warships of any powers unfriendly to themselves. The following table shows the number of Dreadnoughts built, building and projected for the various powers:

	DREADNOUGHTS.			<i>Total.</i>
	<i>Complete.</i>	<i>Launched.</i>	<i>Laid down or projected.</i>	
British Empire . . .	12	9	11	32
Germany	5	6	10	21
U.S. America	4	4	4	12
France	0	6	4	10
Japan	2	2	3	7
Russia	0	0	4	4
Austria	0	0	4	4
Italy	0	1	3	4
Brazil	2	1	0	3
Spain	0	0	3	3
Argentine	0	0	2	2
Chili	0	0	2	2
Turkey	0	0	2	2
Total of projected and complete Dreadnoughts .				106

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It is quite clear that while the British Navy may remain much the greatest naval force afloat it is very unlikely ever to regain the position of world supremacy it formerly held. Its capacity to protect all parts of the Empire from raids, to guard the trade routes, and to reinforce local defence forces in time of need, has diminished and in all probability will continue to diminish. Left to provide for the safety of the Empire by itself the British Government will have no option but to depend less upon its navy and more upon international agreements and understandings—like the alliance with Japan and the *ententes* with France and Russia. This is a very serious change in the system of Imperial defence which has obtained for a hundred years.

The old system of defence, however, is breaking down for a second reason. Up to a couple of years ago it had been a universally accepted maxim that the foreign policy and the defence of the Empire should be treated as a single organic whole. It was recognized that sooner or later the Dominions would wish to share in the control of the policy and to pay some portion of the cost of defence. But according to the prevailing view the assistance of the Dominions would take the form of gradually increasing contributions towards a single Imperial Navy, in return for which they would acquire a growing influence over Imperial policy, until finally both would be proportionate to their wealth and population. This view runs through all the discussions of the Imperial Conferences of 1897 and 1902. Even as late as the Conference of 1907 Lord Tweedmouth, in inviting the Dominions to assist in defending the Empire, laid stress upon the paramount importance of "unity of command and direction of the fleet." And though some references were made to the possibility of starting "some naval service" of a local kind, the Dominion contributions to the navy were continued.

But since 1907 there has been a complete change of view. In 1909 the scare about the secret acceleration of the Ger-

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man Navy occurred. The Dominions hastened to promise whatever assistance was required to maintain the supremacy of the British fleet, and a subsidiary conference was summoned to discuss the situation. This conference made a far-reaching change in the defensive system of the Empire. It was decided that instead of contributing to a single navy under Imperial control, Australia and Canada should each establish a navy of its own. These navies were to be no mere coast defence squadrons. They were to contain first-class modern cruisers, and were intended to fight upon the high seas. The Australian squadron was to include a Dreadnought, and if Admiral Henderson's plans are approved it will eventually comprise eight. The change was even greater than the Admiralty realized. For at the Conference it had assumed that in time of war these navies would be placed under its control, in order that the defence of the Empire might still be conducted as an organic whole. Thus, in his preliminary memorandum, Mr McKenna said,

“ It has been recognized by the Colonial Governments that in time of war the local naval forces should come under the general directions of the Admiralty.”

But this expectation has not been realized. The Australian Act constituting the Australian Navy only provides that the government “ may ” place the Australian ships under the control of the Admiralty, though the public declarations of the present Ministry prove that it intends to do so on the outbreak of war. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, however, has gone further, and has announced that Canada will only take part in imperial wars of which she approves. Thus, in November, 1910, he said to the Canadian House of Commons that

“ under present circumstances it is not advisable for Canada to mix in the armaments of the Empire. But we should stand on our own policy of being masters in our own house, of having a policy for our own purpose, and leaving to the Canadian Parliament, to the Canadian

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Government, and to the Canadian people to take part in these wars, in which to-day they have no voice, only if they think fit to do so."

The old principle of unity has clearly disappeared from the system of defence. As was inevitable, it is disappearing also in foreign policy. Canada negotiated her arrangement with Japan about Japanese immigration into British Columbia through a special representative of her own at Tokio, assisted by the British Ambassador. She has also concluded direct commercial treaties with the United States, France and other powers. South Africa also has entered into a treaty with Portugal, to which the British Government was an assenting, but not a principal, party.

IV

THERE can be no doubt that the Empire is gradually approaching a crisis in its history. After a century of quiet the external danger has revived in an acute form. Germany is piling up armaments in support of her policy of expansion. And all the other nations of the earth are following suit. This terrific growth of armaments controlled by peoples, some of whom look to the use of force as the instrument of their national progress, some of whom have but recently joined the number of civilized nations and whose policy none can foretell, is a grave menace to the safety of the Empire. And while the external dangers of the Empire are thus steadily increasing the system of defence by which its integrity has been preserved is breaking down. Great Britain is no longer able to maintain a preponderant navy on all the chief oceans of the globe, and unity in foreign policy and defence, which has been the fundamental basis of the external policy of the Empire hitherto, is gradually being impaired.

The truth is that the safety of the Imperial system cannot be maintained much longer by the arrangements which exist at present. No one, in face of the facts brought

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forward in this article, can believe that the need for national strength is disappearing. The British naval budget and the creation of the Dominion navies alone disprove it. Yet it is quite clear that Great Britain alone cannot indefinitely guarantee the Empire from disruption by external attack. The further one looks ahead the more obvious does this become. A nation of 45,000,000 souls, occupying a small territory and losing much of the natural increase in its population by emigration, cannot hope to compete in the long run even against single powers of the first magnitude—with Russia for instance with its 150,000,000 inhabitants, with America with its 90,000,000, with Germany with its 65,000,000, increasing by nearly a million a year, to say nothing of China with its 430,000,000 souls. Far less can it hope to maintain the dominant position it has hitherto occupied in the world, with a dozen new powers entering upon the scene. Each of these powers, of small account by itself, is already an important factor in the scale which measures the balance of power. And as they are steadily increasing in wealth and population, it is only a question of time before some of them will become first-class powers in their turn. What will be the position of the Empire then, if it has to depend upon the navy of England alone? Obviously the day must come when, if the Empire is to continue, it must be defended by the joint efforts of all its self-governing peoples.

It is not, however, on this ground that a reconsideration of the relations between Great Britain and the Dominions about foreign affairs and defence is becoming urgent. Great Britain can probably defend the Empire, at any rate if the international situation is favourable, for some, perhaps for many, years to come. The other half of the difficulty is far more pressing and far more dangerous. It is simply impossible for the Dominions to set up independent foreign policies and independent defensive systems of their own without destroying the Empire, even if foreign powers refrain from attack. Suppose the present tendency

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carried to its logical conclusion. Instead of there being one government responsible for the safety of the Empire there will be five. Each of these governments will be free to pursue any policy it likes and each will have military or naval strength with which to back its policy. Each of them, therefore, may involve itself in war. And if the policy of one government, or the use it makes of its navy, does lead to war, what is to be the position? Are the other governments to be involved? The Dominions, not unreasonably, do not admit their responsibility for the policy of Great Britain, because they have no share in framing it. Is Great Britain to be responsible for the policy of the Dominions? Australia, for instance, is committed to the policy of Asiatic exclusion—a policy which may lead to international complications of the gravest kind. Are Great Britain and the other Dominions committed to support this policy and are they responsible for making the naval and military preparations necessary to guarantee its being carried into effect? On the other hand Great Britain is responsible for maintaining intact the Imperial system as a whole. Is her government not to know what resources in men, ships and money can be depended upon, in making her dispositions for defence? And are the Dominions to be left to frame policies which may render it impossible for England to make the international agreements by which alone the safety of the Empire can be maintained? Or to take another case, if a situation arises like that recently at Lourenco Marques, and a gunboat or an armed force under the instruction of a government which has no knowledge of the international situation, and no responsibility for the Empire, is sent to keep order, who is to be responsible for dealing with the diplomatic complications which may ensue? Is a foreign power to be left to deal with the Dominion government alone? Is South Africa, for instance, to be at war with her neighbours, Portugal or Germany, without the British navy being also involved?

Obviously, the principle of complete local autonomy, admirably as it works for the internal politics of the Empire,

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cannot be applied to foreign affairs. The Empire will infallibly disappear if any one of five governments can involve it in war. Even if in its weakness and confusion it is spared by foreign powers, it will break up of its own accord, for every one of the five nations of which it is composed will declare its independence, rather than remain a part of a system in which it may find itself at war by the deliberate policy or imprudent folly of any one of four other governments, over none of which it has any sort of control. The conclusion is inexorable. Either the nations of the Empire must agree to co-operate for foreign policy and defence, or they must agree to dissolve the Empire and each assume the responsibility for its own policy and its own defence. There is no halfway house between the two positions. There is no third alternative. The present system cannot continue. It neither provides for the safety of the Imperial system as a whole nor for the safety of the Dominions within it. Somehow or other the nations of the Empire must agree upon the interests they are to defend in common and frame a policy towards foreign powers and a system of defence which they are all committed to support, or they will be faced with the necessity of providing by themselves for their own defence.

Yet it will not be easy to find a satisfactory method of Imperial co-operation for foreign policy and defence. There are many difficulties in the way, and many prejudices and traditions to overcome. There are difficulties, too, both on the side of Great Britain and on the side of the Dominions.

In the case of Great Britain the difficulty will come over the control of policy. She has conducted the foreign policy of the Empire from the beginning. She has conducted it with success. She has great and noble traditions in the diplomatic history of the world. She is still willing to spend her last penny and to lose her last man in defending any part of the Empire. She will, naturally, be reluctant to part with any share of the control, especially to young nations inexperienced in international affairs. But she must recognize that the old system cannot continue. The Dominions are no

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longer colonies. They are nations. Even if they were anxious to remain hermit states they could not do so. In the modern world, with its rapid system of intercommunication and the delicate equipoise of international credit, they are bound to be vitally affected by what goes on beyond their borders. Any war between first-class powers must ruin many thousands of people in each of the Dominions. Markets where they have been accustomed to sell their goods will be closed. Shareholders will lose their dividends and perhaps their capital. Labour will find no employment. The price of money will rise. Business will stagnate, enterprise will be checked, and the whole process of their national life will be unhinged. And if England is involved the position will be still worse. In 1909 the total trade of the British Empire was worth £1,400,000,000. Nearly £600,000,000 of this trade entered or left ports within the Empire other than those of the United Kingdom, of which more than half was carried by British vessels. What would be the effect on the Dominions of a war between England and a first-class modern power, even if they tried to avoid being involved? Dominion merchandize, worth hundreds of millions of pounds, and on whose safe delivery the living of their populations depended, would be liable to instant capture at sea.

Moreover, Great Britain must realize that the Dominions have vital interests of their own entirely distinct from hers, and of which she has little understanding. They are committed to policies—such as Asiatic exclusion—which vitally affect foreign powers. They cannot allow their foreign policy to be decided for them by a government which does not represent them. Nor will their growing self-respect permit them to shelter behind a navy which will retain command of the sea only if Great Britain diverts to a barren expenditure on armaments revenues which are urgently needed for social reform. It is obvious that if Great Britain were ten times as rich and populous as she is and could guarantee indefinitely the safety of the Empire from foreign attack, the day has gone by when she can control the foreign relations of the Domi-

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nions, or act in her own discretion on their behalf. Unless the Dominions have a real share in the control of the Imperial policy they will be driven to adopt policies of their own—policies which must be framed in the light of purely local interests and which may therefore conflict with it. Great Britain must recognize also that co-operation in foreign affairs and defence does not mean that her government will listen to the views of the Dominions and then, on the ground that her population is three times as large as that of the Dominions combined, declare that she must be left to decide knotty problems as she thinks fit. If co-operation is to succeed at all the Dominions must have an effective voice in Imperial policy, and their national interests, such, for instance, as the preservation of their territories as white men's land, must rank in importance with the most vital interests of the British Isles. If the Dominions and Great Britain are to co-operate over foreign policy, the policy must be a true Imperial policy based on the needs of every part.

In the case of the Dominions the difficulty will arise over the responsibility for the defence of the Empire beyond their own territory. The Dominions admit their responsibility for defending themselves. But they do not admit that they have any obligation to keep peace and order in India, to protect Egypt or the African dependencies from external invasion, or even to support Great Britain if she were involved in a European war, though there is little doubt that in practice they would come to her assistance as best they could. But this state of affairs, which exists because they have never yet had to provide entirely even for their own defence, cannot continue. Directly the situation is examined it is obvious that if the Dominions and Great Britain are to co-operate for the defence of the Empire, all must be equally responsible for its safety. It is an axiom of strategy that the Empire cannot be defended by each part defending itself. For no part, save England, is by itself strong enough or rich enough to maintain forces greater than those which can be brought to bear against it. Neither the Austra-

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lian nor the Canadian Navy would be the least use in defending their countries from serious attack, except in combination with the British Navy. Even a third-rate power like the Argentine or Brazil, if it were to pick a quarrel with either Dominion, could destroy its ships or force them to retreat into harbour, and then prey upon its commerce as it pleased. The safety of the Empire can only be secured by ensuring that the navy of the Empire is sufficient to take the offensive and destroy the enemy's fleets before they can attack or land armies on British territory. To use the words of Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord:

“The main object of our fleet, whether for the defence of commerce or for any other purpose is to prevent any ship of the enemy from getting to sea far enough to do mischief before she is brought to action.”

If that is done the Empire as a whole is safe, and no portion of it really requires more local defence than a few cruisers to intercept such of the enemy's commerce-destroyers as may have eluded the main fleet of the Empire. Even if the Empire has more than one enemy to fear, whose fleets are stationed in different parts of the world, the correct strategical course is to concentrate one fleet more powerful than either of the enemy's. For if it can prevent a junction it can destroy first the one and then the other, while if it divides its forces it is simply inviting the enemy to defeat them in detail. The existence of a supreme Imperial fleet is the *sine qua non* of the safety of the Empire and the Dominions alike.

The maintenance of a supreme Imperial fleet by the joint efforts of the five nations of the Empire does not mean that the policy of constructing Dominion navies must be abandoned. Far from it. It means, however, that the Dominion fleets must be stationed wherever they will give the maximum security against the dangers which threaten the Empire from time to time. There is no reason why they should not remain the property of the Dominions provided

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the various governments which own them can agree upon there being unity of control, and upon a strategical disposition of their combined forces which will give the maximum of defence to the Empire. But if the Dominions insist on retaining their own navies off their own coasts at the price of reducing the main fleet below the strength of the probable enemy, they will simply open the Empire and their own territories to a successful attack, which in combination they could have resisted without spending another penny or enlisting another man. As Admiral Henderson said in his recent report to the Australian Government,

“Once the command of the sea is lost by the Empire no local system of defence, naval or military, could secure Australia’s autonomy, and she would become the prey of the strongest maritime power.”

The broad conclusion is not open to question. The peoples which compose the Empire must agree upon a common Imperial policy, and a common system of defence, or they will find it necessary to separate and provide for their own defence, with all the results it entails. It will not be easy to find a method by which Great Britain is to share with the Dominions the control of the foreign policy of the Empire or of the disposition of its armaments, or the principle upon which the contribution of the various parts in ships and men towards the central defence force is to be determined. But if the Empire is to survive it must be done. Fortunately there is no need to hurry a final decision. The problem is being forced upon our attention, not so much by the growing inadequacy of present defensive arrangements, as by the difficulties which spring from the creation of the Dominion navies. But a settlement must be made before long—it cannot be shirked, and it is therefore important that the subject should receive the most earnest attention at once. Moreover, there are items on the agenda paper of the

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Imperial Conference which will raise the issue in its most naked form. Australia, for instance, has put down the question of the status of the Dominion navies. This will not be easy to solve.

If the Canadian theory of the status of its navy is to be upheld, clearly foreign nations must be notified at once. Once war breaks out a foreign power is entitled to treat vessels flying a colonial flag as enemies, whether they are war vessels or merchantmen, and unless they are formally notified of their status beforehand the neutrality of the Dominion navies will depend upon them and not upon the decision of the governments which own them.

It is not only in war time, however, that difficulties may result from the ambiguous status of the Dominion navies. Fleets remain in being and perform most important functions in time of peace. They are among the most important instruments even of peaceful diplomacy, and their movements and actions are often arranged with the most careful design and watched with the most jealous suspicion. The visits of British warships to foreign waters are announced with the most formal precision, and every precaution is taken to avoid the semblance of offence. The action of a naval officer in a distant part of the globe may at any moment produce serious complications, even in time of the profoundest peace, and if he is not under the orders of an authority which is in close touch with the directors of the foreign policy of the Empire, the danger will be vastly increased. This control and co-ordination, however, is impossible under the present arrangement, and if the Dominion navies are to cruise at large at the orders only of the Dominion Minister for Defence, a new and disturbing factor will be introduced into the delicate machinery of diplomatic relations.

There is another difficulty in complete naval autonomy. As is well known, the legislative powers of a Dominion legislature are limited to its territorial waters. Within those

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limits no doubt provision can be made for the discipline of the local navy by a local act. But outside those limits what is the position? *Ex hypothesi* the ships and their crews do not come under the Navy Discipline Act or the King's Regulations. Either those laws and regulations must be made to apply or special legislation must be passed by the Imperial Parliament to provide for their control. In the latter case, the difficulties of united action between the Imperial and Dominion units will be emphasized.

Moreover, before the Conference meets again events of the greatest importance, affecting the whole future of the Empire, will have occurred. The Japanese alliance will have been ended or renewed. The opening of the Panama canal will have profoundly altered the strategic position in the Pacific. Half the commercial treaties of the world will have come to an end. The Conference cannot fail to discuss these matters, and if it discusses them it will find itself faced with the problem of the future relations between the parts of which the Empire is composed. We cannot expect the Conference to answer outright how the system of imperial co-operation in foreign policy and defence is to work. But it is its clear duty to expose the difficulties involved for the consideration of the people of the Empire, and to devise some machinery whereby the various governments can keep in closer and more constant consultation than has been possible in the past. Four-yearly Conferences, even supplemented by correspondence and cablegrams, cannot suffice to co-ordinate the foreign policy and the preparations for defence of five governments.

It may be said that the forthcoming treaty of arbitration with America will remove the external pressure on the Empire which has thus revived so suddenly during the last few years. Apart, however, from the question whether it will be possible to conclude a satisfactory treaty at all, it must be borne in mind that an Anglo-American treaty of arbitration, great advance as it is, makes no change in the external

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situation of the Empire. As the German Chancellor said, it merely registers formally a state of affairs which already exists *de facto*. The treaty, as both President Taft and Sir Edward Grey have been at pains to point out, will involve no sort of alliance. Whatever it may lead to in the future, for the present it leaves the international situation just where it was.

The plain fact is that we are faced with the question of the whole future of the Empire and of the English-speaking races within it. In the long run the existence of the Empire will depend upon the capacity of the peoples which compose it to maintain in combination defensive strength superior to the offensive force which other peoples can bring against it. In no other way can the freedom of the Empire or its parts be preserved. Neither England nor South Africa will be truly free if Germany can dictate the partition of Africa, nor Canada or Australia if they once become conscious that they can no longer guarantee the exclusion of Asiatic peoples. We have, therefore, to decide how effective co-operation between them is to be brought about. And in coming to a decision we must bear two things in mind. We must remember that the Imperial system is probably the cheapest and most efficient system by which the five nations of the Empire can defend themselves. If it were to disappear, they would for the first time be exposed to the full rigours of international storms, and would probably have to spend far greater sums on armaments than they do at present, and to ally themselves with foreign powers on terms infinitely more onerous than they can obtain in combination within the Empire. For the basis of every alliance is the obligation on the parties to go to war in defence of each other's rights. It would unquestionably be worse for every part of the Empire that it should be dissolved. And we must remember also that responsibility for the Imperial system does not rest upon any one part of the Empire. It rests equally on all who

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enjoy self-government within it. True liberty is possible only where it is coupled with a profound sense of the obligations it carries with it. In undertaking the management of their own affairs the Dominions have *ipso facto* made themselves responsible for the safety of the Empire of which they are part. They cannot escape their responsibility for the Imperial system any more than Great Britain can escape her responsibility for protecting from tyranny and oppression the hundreds of millions of human beings she has taken under her charge.

THE EMIGRATION QUESTION IN JAPAN

IN view of the growing importance of the problem of Asiatic immigration to the Dominions, and of the probable discussions on the subject at the Imperial Conference, an analysis of the prospects of the successful colonization of Manchuria and Korea by the Japanese, by a recent traveller in those parts may be of more than passing interest.

When Russia obtained in 1858 a footing in the valley of the Amur the energetic propagandist of Russian enterprise in that region, Count Muravieff, endeavoured to establish agricultural colonies, partly by compulsion and partly by offering inducements to Russian colonists. Both expedients failed, and up till the present moment Russian colonization, even of the region on the north bank of the Amur, which has been in the hands of Russia for more than fifty years, has not been considerable. On the other hand, Chinese colonists have settled in Russian Manchuria in large numbers. The reasons for the non-success of the Russians and for the success of the Chinese lie principally in the following facts: that the Chinese are better farmers, keener traders, cheaper labourers and more frugal consumers than the Russian colonists, and that they seem to withstand the rigorous climate at least as successfully as the Russians, many of whom come from the comparatively temperate plains of Central and Southern European Russia.

When the Japanese undertook to check the southward advance of Russia in Manchuria they did so primarily, no doubt, in order to prevent Russia from establishing herself in so secure a strategical position that she might dictate to China and to Japan alike. China had not the means of effective resistance, and thus the task of checking the great northern power fell to Japan. Japan was fully aware that there were in the Court party in Russia some who even looked forward to the moment when Japan might become

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a Russian province. In entering upon the war with Russia the Japanese thus felt they were fighting for national existence. Together with this feeling, however, which was at once the cause of the war, and the cause of the extraordinary enthusiasm of the people while it lasted, there was the conviction in the minds of Japanese statesmen that the rapid growth of the Japanese population must result either in the extension of the boundaries of Japan or in the flight of the Japanese to other countries. Korea was not overcrowded. Not only, therefore, did it occupy the position of a buffer state which must be controlled as a matter of political necessity, but it also offered a field for colonization. So also Manchuria offered similar prospects. Formosa had been acquired by Japan after the Chino-Japanese war in 1895, partly to prevent that island from falling into the hands of a European power, but also because it offered a field for colonization.

For the problem of overcrowding in Japan is becoming acute. Relieved as she has been for more than forty years of losses from the interior conflicts which had rendered Japanese life picturesque and interesting but very insecure, the growth of population has been proportionately as great as that of Russia and even as that of the United States, immigration notwithstanding. The mean annual rate of increase is such that if this rate is maintained, and if emigration is no greater than it has been, the population of Japan in forty years from now will be nearly ninety millions.

The Japanese are excellent farmers and their frugality is beyond question, but the area of cultivable land in Japan is not great enough to support so numerous a population. Japan has now available for colonization Korea, the Liaotung peninsula, and one half of the Island of Sakhalien, together with such portions of Manchuria, in the vicinity of the South Manchurian Railway, as she may be able to colonize without actually possessing. Moreover, unless she is able to colonize these regions with a labouring population, she will be unable, under the circumstances of these regions,

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to retain her political authority over them. The problem, therefore, is: can Japan hope to be more successful in the colonization of these territories than Russia has been of the northern portion of them, and can she hope to colonize Formosa? The plain fact is that up till the present time Japan has been unable to induce any considerable number of her people to settle in the Liao-tung peninsula or elsewhere in Manchuria or in Sakhalien. There are Japanese in these regions, but they belong to a few classes: soldiers, public officials, engineers, contractors, teachers, railway officials, clerks, traders, innkeepers, shopkeepers and mechanics. There are no farmers or labourers. What is true of the Liao-tung peninsula is also true of Korea, although it must be remembered that the latter country was only affected by the war to a minor extent and then only in the north. Society was not so disintegrated as it was in Port Arthur and Dalny, for example. Only a few months have elapsed, moreover, since Korea was definitely annexed by Japan. It should also be realized that the Liaotung peninsula in its southern portion is a hilly region, much of which is quite unsuitable for farming, and that the principal regions where the settlement of Japanese farmers might be expected to take place are the region immediately north of the peninsula and that lying between Mukden and the Yalu River. Although the latter region, is mountainous, there are in it fine valleys which are not unsuitable for agriculture. The new line of the South Manchurian Railway is being constructed through this region. It will probably be opened for traffic in the summer of 1911, replacing the Decauville line built by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese war. In the construction gangs on the line of this railway there are to be found exclusively Chinese labourers in the northern section, and exclusively Korean labourers in the southern; there are no Japanese labourers. The only Japanese in the camps and in the new railway towns that spring up along the line belong to the classes above mentioned.

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What are the reasons for this? The chief reasons may be set out as follows: In the first place, the level of comfort to which the Japanese labourer is accustomed in Japan is distinctly higher than that of Korean and much higher than that of Chinese comfort among the labouring class. Japanese food consists of materials which are relatively cheap in Japan (fish, e.g.) and relatively costly in Manchuria. The Chinese and the Koreans suffer from no such disability. They will therefore work and thrive on wages which the Japanese cannot accept without lowering, or at least altering, their mode of life.

In the second place, the usual result of the increase in interior expenditure consequent upon a great war has been experienced in Japan. The standard of comfort of all classes has been raised, and the increased demand has caused an advance in prices. The increased standard of living is probably more manifest in the mercantile than in the working class, but it has taken place wherever the influence of the economic reactions of the war has been felt. Among these reactions the advance of wages has been conspicuous, and thus the scale of wages in Japan is considerably higher than in Manchuria. Why, therefore, should a Japanese labourer go to Manchuria to work for wages lower than he can obtain at home?

In the third place, the Japanese farmer who cultivates his own land might not be averse from selling it at the present relatively high level of prices and of emigrating to a new country if he could find any advantage in it; but what does he find when he goes to Manchuria? He finds conditions very different from those to which he is accustomed. His paddy fields in Japan are the scene of toilsome labours, no doubt, but they are near a village or town, where he can enjoy his simple pleasures, where life is organized, and where its difficulties are ameliorated by the results of centuries of development. In Manchuria the distances are not so short as in Japan, they are immense; and those regions where settlement of Japanese is obviously possible are undeveloped,

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and the settler must look forward to a long period of arduous pioneering. Moreover, the Japanese farmer, even from the north of Japan, would find himself under the necessity of engaging in kinds of cultivation with which he was previously unacquainted, for instance, in the cultivation of millet, or beans, or in the collection of wild silk cocoons, which is an occupation extensively conducted in Manchuria. In all these activities, the northern Japanese farmer would find the Chinese farmer a formidable competitor. The Chinese farmer would accept lower prices for his produce than the Japanese, and would make more profit by bargaining more keenly when he had opportunity. To the Japanese farmer from the south of Japan rice and tea are customary crops, and to his mind are likely to be more profitable than any he could raise in Manchuria. Moreover, the question of land occupation and land ownership is a serious one. Japan does not own a square foot of territory in Manchuria, and therefore has none to give away. The acquisition of land by Japanese would in some regions be a costly and difficult affair. The climate, too, in Manchuria is much colder in winter than that of Japan, and in summer insect life is more active and troublesome. Moreover, Manchuria has for fifteen years been the battleground of three great empires which meet there, and it may ere long be again the scene of a campaign. Governments may gain by fishing in troubled waters, and so may camp followers; but the farmer whose fields are ploughed by shells must suffer.

In short, for the Japanese farmer, as for the Japanese labourer, there is nothing to induce him to go to Manchuria.

As to Korea the case is very similar, excepting that save in the north of that country there is no question of pioneering. The Japanese settler in Korea would, however, have to encounter the competition of the Koreans, not overcrowding but still fairly fully occupying their country. The Korean level of comfort is lower than that of Japan. The Korean labourer will work for lower wages and the Korean farmer will sell his produce for less than the Japanese is inclined to do.

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Agriculture in Korea is not a very profitable occupation, the population of the towns is poor and their consumption therefore not great, while the scale of prices is low. Even the Japanese trader has hardly established himself in Korea. There are a few firms, but the Koreans, though inept and feeble traders, nevertheless transact their business on the basis of small profits when needs must and large profits when they can, and the Japanese finds it difficult to adapt himself to their peculiarities.

Thus, notwithstanding the fabled riches in minerals and in fertile soils of the valleys of the Amur, the Sungari and the Usuri, there is nothing to attract the Japanese labourer or the Japanese farmer. For the rich lumberman who is prepared to exploit the forests of the Yalu, for the railway contractor who can exploit the cheap labour of the Chinese and the Korean, Manchuria is a land of promise, but to the Japanese farmer and labourer it offers no inducements.

The Japanese government has been making gallant efforts to meet the situation to which these conditions have given rise by establishing technical colleges and schools in Manchuria and in Korea, and by encouraging the foundation of industries in both regions. If these efforts are successful there may be openings for Japanese artizans, especially in Darien (formerly Dalny), in Seoul, and, perhaps, in some of the small Korean towns. The migration of the labourer and the farmer to these regions cannot, however, be expected unless the scales of wages and prices rise in the countries in question or fall in Japan—a contingency which, of course, must not be left out of account. The climatic and some of the other difficulties would still remain, to be neutralized only by the advance of wages above the Japanese scale.

All the above considerations apply *a fortiori* to the southern half of the island of Sakhalien. And if Manchuria and Sakhalien are too cold for the Japanese, and too undeveloped for the Japanese temperament, the island of Formosa is too hot and not more developed. Apart from the difficulties which arise from the fact that the wild

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Formosan tribes are still untamed, the experience of the Japanese in colonizing Formosa has not been favourable. Japan is not a tropical country any more than it is an arctic one. Its people live in and prefer a temperate climate, and therefore, save under strong pecuniary inducement, they will not go to Formosa. Up till now pecuniary inducement has been lacking. There Chinese and Malays, who are accustomed to labour under a tropical sun, will thrive on lower wages and will do more work than a Japanese labourer or farmer. There, again, nature and human competition combine to block the way of the Japanese.

These considerations are so patent to any intelligent observer that it would be idle to suppose that the Japanese government and its expert advisers have been blind to them. Taken in connexion with the rapid increase of population in Japan they constitute the current problem of that country. Japan must restrict its rate of increase, must find an outlet, must greatly develop its manufacturing industry, or must permit its population to sink, through increasing subdivision of the cultivable land, into the hopeless poverty of the Chinese. If they migrate where are the Japanese to go? Not northwards, for we have seen the obstacles which lie in the way; not into the tropics; not westwards, for China is already full to overflowing; must they not migrate across the oceans of the world, eastwards on their own latitude or southwards beyond the equator to the south temperate zone. At present the problem is not acute, for Japan wants soldiers, and taxpayers to pay them, in order that she may maintain her military position and her national independence, which would be challenged at once either by Russia or China, or by both, if occasion arose. The Government of Japan has therefore shown itself to be quite disposed at present to limit emigration to regions other than those selected upon grounds of policy. But, sooner or later, in the absence of a sufficient gradual stream of emigration, the mere growth of numbers is bound to bring the problem to an acute stage.

1887 AND 1897

WITHIN the ensuing month London is once more to be the scene of a celebration in which all the states and dependencies of the Empire will bear their parts. The earliest of these imperial ceremonies took place less than a quarter of a century ago. The first jubilee was an occasion of great rejoicing. Since that time there have been four pageants which possessed an imperial character, and in these grief and gladness have shared equally. For the funeral of Queen Victoria followed within five years after her second jubilee, and the funeral of King Edward within eight years after his coronation.

A great pageant has much in common with a great poem. In each the direct appeal is to the senses. The aim of each is to overawe, to startle, and to delight by a surprise of beauty and magnificence. But in each there is also an *indirect* appeal, and without it succeed there is no greatness either in the one thing or the other. The purpose alike of the pageant and the poem is to express a thought which lies already in the minds of men, to carry the message of a common joy, or thankfulness, or sorrow from one full heart to another. Lacking this virtue the magic of rhythm and metre and melodious words hardly outlasts its own echo; the procession and pomp of royalty, the military parade, the trumpets and the shouting, are but so many sights and sounds in the streets of the city to make the passers-by stop and stare; they are less moving than a gorgeous sunset, and even in memory scarcely of more account, were it not for their greater rarity.

Upon a cloudless day of midsummer, 1887, a procession of sovereigns and princes wound its way slowly from the Palace up the hill of Green Park, along Piccadilly, across Trafalgar Square and by the river to the Abbey of Westminster. After thanksgiving it returned whence it came through the archway of Whitehall and under the trees of St James's. But this stately progress to and from the Abbey, the cheering and the welcome of the crowds were subordinate

things. The main matter was the service of thanksgiving within the Abbey walls. It was a scene of strange and splendid contrasts—beauty, colour, the flash of jewels; an intense and eager life which held its breath and spoke in whispers; and behind all this brave show, and arched high overhead, the unnoticing and immemorial stone. The morning sun glowed through the stained windows upon the nave and the royal dais carpeted in crimson of the order of the Bath, upon the snowy surplices of the choir, upon the vivid blue of the stalls and benches of canons and prebendaries, upon the judges in their robes of red and ermine, upon the light dresses of women, and the scarlet and gold of countless uniforms. And the beams fell also in pools of prismatic light, upon the gray walls and the faded standards which hung motionless against them. On the right of the dais sat the Peers and on the left the Commons. The Beef-eaters kept the line of the aisle.

By ten o'clock the Abbey was full, save for those who were to take part in the processions. Shortly after this hour came the royal children; towards eleven the Indian princes. They moved to their appointed seats as men used to great ceremonials, with a stately and solemn gait; on their dusky faces an impenetrable dignity and pride. The organ played the March from *Lohengrin* as they passed along—the Princes of Gomdal, of Limri, of Morvi, and of Kuch Behar blazing with jewels; the majestic Holkar of Indore, and the Rao of Kutch whose turban, when the sun touched it, startled the beholders, for it seemed actually to be on fire, so many and so pure were the diamonds which flashed in its folds. At noon the organ played once more as the procession of the Kings and Princes of Europe moved up the aisle.

Half an hour more of waiting, then Garter appears. A fanfare sounds from the trumpeters stationed on the Rood Screen. Then the Queen.

The National Anthem is played, and the great congregation rises to its feet.

Preceded by the clergy of the Abbey, by the Bishop of

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London, and the Archbishops of York and Canterbury, and by the Princes and Princesses of her House, the Queen passed up the aisle and took her seat upon the Chair of Scone, surrounded upon the dais by her children and her children's children. Rising from her seat she bowed low to the altar, and then the robes of State were placed upon her shoulders.

When the solemn service was ended the Princes approached. To each of them, as to a son, the Queen offered her cheek to be kissed, but each of them, following the old custom and putting aside his kinship, bowed low as a subject and reverently kissed her hand. The Queen then kissed the Princesses of her House—three times repeated in the case of the Crown Princess of Prussia. So ended one of the most notable thanksgivings in our history.*

The jubilee of 1887 was a great pageant, but it was beyond everything a thanksgiving. It was most fit that Westminster Abbey, which stirs more and dearer memories among all men of the English race than any building upon earth, should have been the centre of rings which spread to the furthest colony of the Empire. But for what were the thanks given? Even at this distance of time it is not easy to be quite clear upon this point. It was a thanksgiving for so many different things—for things personal to the Sovereign, things national and imperial, things spiritual and temporal. During the past fifty years there had been not only a miraculous growth of prosperity, but also a marked improvement in the conditions of labour—among skilled workers, at any rate, a rise in wages measured in money and a much greater rise measured in what money would buy. There was still much suffering, but rateably to the population it had diminished. Except in Ireland the bitterness of those popular discontents, which blazed so fiercely in the 'twenties, 'thirties, and 'forties, seemed to have burned themselves out; the causes to a great extent had been removed.

* For an account of this ceremony, see the reports in *The Times* and *The Guardian*.

Though Arts and Letters seemed to be in a decline, the education of the people had moved forward with considerable strides. Science had made great discoveries, and the gleaners who follow upon the heels of science had made many inventions. Having weathered the storm, which raged with rare intermissions from 1792 to 1815, we had also come safely and without shipwreck through the breakers of 1848 and through the Mutiny which threatened the loss of our Indian Empire.

There had also been a great growth in population (except, again, in Ireland, where it had lamentably diminished) and also in territory. The delegates from the Colonies who came to England to take part in the Jubilee celebrations, and to confer with the Government of the day upon affairs of common interest, were received at Windsor early in May and presented an address. "Your Majesty," they said, "has witnessed the number of your colonial subjects of European descent increase from under two millions to nine millions, and of Asiatic race in your Indian Empire from ninety-six millions to two hundred and fifty-four millions, and of other peoples in your colonies and dependencies from two millions to seven millions." With all this had come a great increase of imperial responsibility, and for responsibility no less than for other possessions thanks are due.

For all these, and for many others as well, thanks were due. But in a recital by some State Chronicler, while these things would assuredly have figured, one of the main things might easily have been overlooked. The reign of Queen Victoria is closely identified with the movement towards a closer union of the Empire. For the ultimate success of this movement it was desirable, and possibly necessary, that the institution of monarchy should be restored in credit. The character of George IV had done much to diminish the popularity of the crown, while that of William IV had done but little to restore it. In spite of the outburst of chivalrous loyalty which greeted the accession of a girl of eighteen, the

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institution was under a cloud, and many years passed away before that cloud was finally removed. In the end the Queen and her counsellors succeeded in restoring monarchy to much more than its former credit. In a sense monarchy was born again somewhere between the years 1837 and 1887 (no man knew precisely when)—a different monarchy from that of the Tudors and Plantagenets, with an entirely different hold upon its subjects—a democratic monarchy, if such a term may be allowed to pass, founded in sympathy with the aspirations of the people and in an even-handed justice as between political parties which caused men to look up to the Queen as something superior to her ministers, not merely by virtue of her rank, but by a certain permanency, and detachment, and disinterestedness which distinguished her from the great statesmen who served her. Mr Gladstone, like every good politician, kept always nearest his heart the interests of the Liberal party, and naturally enough and with perfect honesty he identified them with those of the people of the United Kingdom. And Lord Salisbury had at heart the interests of the Conservative party, and in like manner identified them with those of the people. But the Queen was concerned first and foremost with the interests of the people. She looked at the main problems, so to speak, over the heads of both parties, and when, as occasionally happened, she judged it to be essential for the interests of the realm that the two antagonists should come to an agreement she insisted upon their finding a way to it. Also, and this is important, the new nations which had been growing up overseas had come to regard her as *their* Queen in a sense in which they could not regard the Imperial Parliament as *their* Parliament.

The greatest reason of all for thanksgiving was simply this—a discovery by the people that their Sovereign understood them, and had given her life to their service; by the Queen that her people realized her devotion. It was the festival of the restoration of the monarchy; such a restoration as had not been before. It had come about by no bold and sudden

stroke, by no swift turn of the wheel of fortune, but slowly, fully and firmly during fifty years of trial. A woman of a singular courage and simplicity of purpose had succeeded where all the Stewarts had failed, where all the men of the House of Hanover had likewise failed. And for more than half the term of her reign Queen Victoria had borne the burden alone.

The historian of the future may conceivably treat this jubilee of 1887 as a boundary post marking the end of an epoch. In so far as the occasion was something different from a thanksgiving, in so far as it was used for what may be called a celebration, it was used for celebrating the position which the United Kingdom—the head of the British Empire—held among the States of Europe. The jubilee of 1887 marked the fact that among European States the United Kingdom stood higher in prestige, in civilization, in security, in wealth, in responsibility, in possessions over-the-seas, in population and in naval power, than at any previous period in our long history. The feudatory Princes of India, some of them tracing their descent as far back as the Queen herself, and also the Colonial Statesmen who figured in it, were evidences brought forward to convince our European rivals of this fact just as much as the Naval Review at Spithead was held to convince them of our strength at sea.

The whole world, we firmly believed, was much impressed, and it is not unlikely that our belief was well founded. We were much impressed ourselves, which was an even more important matter; and to some extent, though not by any means to the same extent, our fellow subjects overseas were impressed. Certainly it was not one of our main thoughts or objects to impress them. We used them to impress others. They were our very good brothers who had done well for themselves and brought credit to the family. At this great celebration we showed them off to our neighbours with affection and also with a pardonable pride, though not without misgivings that at some remote time, or some time

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possibly not so very remote, they might go their own way, in friendliness of course, to complete independence.

But nevertheless there was a certain stirring of the waters, remarkable even at the time, and more remarkable as we look back upon it from this distance. A new spirit, a new idea, was abroad. Some years earlier young Sir Charles Dilke had travelled and had written a book about Greater Britain in which he drew various conclusions favourable to the Radicalism which was his political creed. But incidentally he had called the attention of people in the United Kingdom to a fact which many of them, if not most, had been in the habit of overlooking—that a considerable number of new Britains were quietly growing up beyond the seas. Froude also had written books, stirring men's minds by his vigorous and picturesque style, to a recognition of the same set of facts. And he had attached the present firmly to the past. He had showed how the acquisition of the Empire had been a great achievement. Great courage, great patience had been bestowed upon it. In the process there had even been something at times approaching to foresight and to a settled scheme. It had been the custom to overlook these considerations altogether during that burst of commercial prosperity which followed upon the end of the Napoleonic wars, which had been accelerated by the free trade policy, and which had marvellously increased in momentum down to the surrender of Sedan and the fall of Paris in 1871. The Manchester School had proved without difficulty to men whose thoughts were fixed on other more engrossing matters, that the Colonies in due time would go their own way when the time and the fruit were ripe, and that this severance, instead of being a subject for lamentation, would in reality be a blessing to all concerned and to the world at large as well. But men now began to regard this view with some incredulity, and even when they were credulous their belief was tinged with regret that a union, loose as it was, which it had taken such pains to create should be allowed to drop in pieces. This new view was no new view to the older school of

statesmen, whose experience or traditions dated back to the period before 1847, but these were a sparse band and had grown discouraged by much crying in the wilderness. But it was a new view to the younger generation and was consequently received with wonder and interest, and also with derision and abuse. Accordingly, it followed the usual course of new ideas, attracting only a few, and incurring the contempt of the great majority. It had its eccentrics, like Sir George Grey; its martyrs, like Sir Bartle Frere.

Those of us who were at Cambridge in the early 'eighties will ever remember an odd-looking figure, which seemed to live in cap and gown—a figure with very short legs, a round body and a big head. We can see him now climbing ungainly into the rostrum of the Divinity Schools, leaning over to address the crowded audience—his large face, with folds in it, apparently as detached from human affairs, as impassive and unemotional as one of the gargoyles in Trinity Street. Nor did the voice or the delivery produce a more romantic impression, but only the matter of what he said. Men of letters, men of patient thought, of constancy and of honesty, who deliver lectures and publish them afterwards in books, still influence the action and find the ideas of the democracy much more often than the politicians are willing to allow. And indirectly, if not directly, they even influence the planetary courses of the politicians themselves a great deal more than those gentlemen are aware of. John Seeley, Regius Professor of History in the University of Cambridge, was one of those fortunate prophets who have achieved honour even in their own country. His work owed nothing to any personal charm or tricks of eloquence; but he saw a vision, and believed that it could be brought to pass. Such men have a gift of fertility which more accommodating orators usually lack.

Closer union was not in those days a political question. It was a thing outside politics altogether, which partizans were unwilling to champion, though not backward to deride. Now and then it touched the imaginations even

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of statesmen—Lord Rosebery and Mr Forster, among others. Federation societies were founded to put the idea into a practical shape. They failed. Their failure is admitted. The societies failed, but in some odd way the idea itself did not fail. Perhaps the explanation is that, while the idea was surely founded in historic fact, the societies were built up largely upon a basis of ignorance of present conditions. They were lacking in that first-hand knowledge by which alone the means to closer union could have been discovered. They assumed forces which did not exist. They had little acquaintance with colonial circumstances or feeling. They did not understand how so sublime an idea could need years of patient preparation. Being what it was it ought surely to carry everything before it by a *coup de main*. But chiefly they left out of account two things—the first that, until the British Empire overseas should consist, not of a large number of petty provincial states (which, except in the case of Canada, it then did), but of a small group of great Federations, there would continue to be an absence of what lawyers call “the other high contracting party”; the second that, until a positive need for union was proved, which is quite a different matter from the abstract desirability of union, no union could possibly occur.

Looking at the history of other great ideas, this sequence of events was only what might have been expected. Closer union, Imperial Federation, or whatever it may be proper to call it, became to some extent discredited shortly after its birth. But no discredit attaches to those whose action brought about this result. On the contrary, they deserve praise because they were willing to make the attempt. The fact remains, however, that in 1887 the federation idea, from the standpoint of the ordinary citizen, appeared to be chimerical. It was regarded as the unpractical aspiration of professors and amateur politicians.

The essence of the matter was that, as things then stood, the United Kingdom, which paid the piper, did not see why

the Colonies should have any share in calling the tune; while the Colonies, on their part, conceiving themselves to be for all time as safe as the Bank of England, saw no material advantage in co-operation. The federation idea was, therefore, dubbed fanciful upon both sides of the estranging seas. There was a union of hearts, and that was obviously a much better thing than federation, since it required no greater labour or sacrifice than an occasional after-dinner speech. The British fleet, with its slate-coloured hulls and long guns, seemed to the Colonial mind almost as much a survival of medieval things as the Beefeaters of the Tower, only a great deal more expensive and somewhat less picturesque. The future, as it was pictured to their imagination, was unbroken by a suspicion that at any time any nation possessing the power would ever be so wicked as to endeavour to interfere with their development or seize upon the vast claims which they had "pegged out." The world had become civilized except in Europe which was remote, except among the savages of Africa who were harmless, except among Orientals who were effete. The fundamental axiom of civilization being that it confirms all men (providing they are civilized) in what diplomatists call the *status quo*, what need was there for any defensive confederation? Such a step would only lead to the reinstatement of Downing Street in a more formidable shape than ever.

It was not then seen that the pressure of numbers is a thing which makes little account of wisdom and virtue. If you have a neighbour overflowing his boundaries you cannot continue to hold unchallenged a continent capable of supporting two hundred millions merely by sprinkling five millions along the seaboard of it, and trusting to a great god, which you are pleased to call Civilization, to keep the others off. In the past, attack, conquest and subjugation have been made by overflowing hordes who wandered forth in search of room to live. Inferior in civilization, inferior often in the art of war, they have still pressed forward. They have been killed by thousands, but still the un-

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exhausted race has come on over the dead bodies of its fallen comrades. And in the future it is likely to be as in the past. Mankind still breeds—especially such of mankind as are still uncivilized. This fact the colonies at that time had not come to understand. As for such a thing as an Oriental revival, could not one Englishman frighten off a score of his yellow or black fellow creatures, merely by showing them the muzzle of a rifle? as you drive geese off a common by flicking a pocket-handkerchief. To people who remember the times of which we are writing, this will not appear in the light of a caricature. It was the view of the Colonies, but it was also the view of nine men out of every ten in the United Kingdom.

In addressing the Colonial Conference, which held its first meeting early in April, the British Premier had to deal with this attitude of mind. Lord Salisbury was never a great popular figure. He was constitutionally averse from the public expression of those sympathies which need to be uttered in order to affect large masses of men. To some extent also he lacked the quality of prophetic imagination, and that sanguine confidence in the realization of visions which distinguished alike the dreaming historical mind of Lord Beaconsfield and the vigorous practical mind of Mr Chamberlain. But if Lord Salisbury did not aspire to see into the far future, he had probably the clearest and most penetrating view of any statesman of his time into existing conditions. He saw into the heart of every situation and how the forces were arranged there. He went straight to the essentials without any apparent effort or waste of words, with a kind of intellectual brutality which disdained to pay homage to the customary shams and hollow conventions which it passed on the road. He was essentially a Conservative leader—one to hold courageously rather than to build audaciously—and his position is already secure among the great statesmen whom Britain has produced.

His short speech at the Foreign Office upon the occasion referred to is characteristic of his genius. Brief, lucid and

condensed, it does not lend itself easily to abridgement. It is, in itself, a summary. This meeting, says Lord Salisbury, is the beginning of a state of things which is to have great results in the future. It will be the parent of a long progeniture; and distant councils of the Empire may, in some far-off time, look back to this gathering as the root from which all their greatness and all their beneficence sprung. The peculiarity of the British Empire is its want of continuity. It is separated into parts by large stretches of ocean. But, nevertheless, Lord Salisbury firmly deprecates any ambitious schemes of constitution-making. Imperial Federation is a matter for the future rather than the present, and he thinks the Colonial Governments were wise in instructing their representatives not to enter upon a discussion of it. Such schemes are aspirations, and to call them aspirations is not to cast a slur upon them, for aspirations are the material from which, when it has cooled down and condensed, practical resolutions may come to be taken. He goes on to point out that before the German Empire came to its present condition, it had two forms of union, the Zollverein, or customs union, and the Kriegsverein, or union for military purposes. In our own case, owing to the establishment of free trade in the United Kingdom forty years earlier, a customs union is impossible until, on one side or the other, very different notions prevail with regard to fiscal policy. But a union for purposes of mutual defence is a pressing and most important business. The idea that Britain should bear the responsibility for the defence of the whole Empire, because nothing except her own ambitions and interests were likely to produce wars, is no longer consistent with the facts. The settled policy of the Mother Country is peace. War, if it arose, would be more likely to have reference to Colonial interests than to British. Moreover, the desire for foreign and colonial possessions is increasing among the nations of Europe. The naval strength of these nations has already greatly increased. The power of concentrating military and naval force has also increased, under the influence of scientific progress.

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This progress of science has led to an improvement of communications which has brought the Colonies much nearer to Europe, and has thereby rendered them much more open to aggression from Europe than was formerly the case. And these Colonies comprise some of the fairest and most desirable portions of the earth's surface. Concerted measures for the defence of the Empire are therefore no longer a sentimental aspiration, but a matter of practical urgency. It is not the indolence or selfishness of Britain that makes her desire such an arrangement, but only her sense of the need for security. If security is to be attained, Lord Salisbury concludes, the citizens in all parts of the Empire must be prepared to take upon themselves a personal and equal share in its defence.

This first Colonial Conference held various meetings between the beginning of April and the middle of May. Under the sympathetic presidency of the Colonial Secretary, Sir Henry Holland, it discussed many topics with great cordiality, but, as might have been foreseen, without arriving at any very definite or striking conclusions. There was agreement, however, upon one point—that the Conference principle contained the seeds of usefulness and should not be allowed to die. The delegates had at least seen England and known Englishmen. They had realized that much-abused Downing Street had graver difficulties to contend against than they had surmised, and that red tape was not its only principle of action. They had come to understand also that the bond of feeling which united the English race was as strong in the old country as in the new ones, and that the loyalty to the monarch and to the institution of monarchy was a reality. They saw the fleet at Spithead—the double line of great ships and all the smaller craft—and, doubtless, as they went their several ways they pondered more than once the pregnant words with which the Imperial Prime Minister had opened their meeting, but to which no answer had been given in the course of their deliberations.

The jubilee of 1897 was certainly not a less momentous event than its predecessor. In the proofs it offered of the attachment of the people to the person of the Sovereign and to the Crown, it closely resembled the jubilee of 1887. The proofs of this attachment were, if possible, even stronger and more numerous than upon the first occasion. The affection which was shown upon all hands was not less respectful, and, at the same time, it was of a homelier and more intimate character. The demonstrations of popular feeling were marked above all things by a wonderful delicacy, and by a solicitude lest the burden of ceremonials and pageants should lay too heavy a strain upon the aged Queen. And nowhere was this feeling more prevalent than among the humblest and poorest classes of her subjects. When the Queen journeyed from Scotland by night to take part in the celebrations, crowds assembled at many of the wayside stations to see her carriage pass. As the roar of the approaching train grew louder in the north, and the head-lights and the glow of the engine fires showed in the darkness, they uncovered and stood silent. And as the train crashed and thundered past on its southward way they still stood silent. No man cheered lest he should wake the Queen out of her sleep. The welcome which rang out a few days later along six miles of London streets was not a more striking tribute than this dumb vigil.

But apart from this constant factor of loyalty to the Crown there were very marked differences between the two jubilees. The first jubilee had been a high ceremonial function at which the head of the British State received the heads of the other Great States or their Royal representatives. It had been pre-eminently a celebration or a manifestation of England's place among European powers, and it had therefore been fitly distinguished by all the forms of antique splendour which have come down from the Middle Ages. It had been a pageant of robes and orders, of gold and velvet. By comparison the second jubilee was an affair in homespun. The nature of it was that of a family

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gathering. The royalties who attended upon this occasion were close kinsmen, and came in the character of kinsmen and not in that of royalties. The dramatic centre of the festival was not an elaborate and gorgeous service in Westminster Abbey with a congregation of Kings, Princes, ambassadors and nobles, but a simple ceremony in the open air upon the steps of St Paul's Cathedral, when the assembled thousands of spectators joined spontaneously in the service and sang the National Anthem. The procession from the Palace to St Paul's was by way of the Strand and Ludgate Hill. From the Cathedral its course lay past the Mansion House, across London Bridge and back again to Buckingham Palace, through the humble streets upon the south side of the river. There were great crowds and great cheering all the way; decorations on every house, signs of gladness and welcome on every face, a wonderful harmony and order from first to last, so that, in the words of the *Annual Register*, "not a single serious accident marred the rejoicings of the day." It was a remarkable exhibition. But it was no international state function like the former jubilee: it was merely Queen Victoria among her people, publicly joining her thanks with theirs.

And in the procession, as it passed, the eyes of the spectators were fixed upon a novel sight—Lord Roberts commanding detachments of Colonial mounted troops; and behind these various contingents, in open carriages, the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Colonies, which were thus represented. To a populace used to the shining breast-plates of the Life Guards, to the bright uniforms and antique headgear, the impassive demeanour and clockwork precision of the British army, these lithe figures in khaki, with their slouched felt hats, riding erect but easily, and showing frankly their enjoyment in the pageant of which they formed a part, presented a most unwonted spectacle. Behind these came troops from the Crown Colonies, from Ceylon and Trinidad and Cyprus, and coloured regiments in a great variety; then the representatives of the British navy and army—Life

Guards and blue-jackets and artillery; then Sir Partab Singh commanding the Imperial Service troops; the foreign attachés and envoys, the Royal children, the escort of Princes; finally the Indian Bodyguard and the Queen herself, with the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Connaught and the Duke of Cambridge, riding by her carriage.

The character of this ceremony was abundantly clear. It was a British rejoicing. Whatever might have been written down and arranged by Court officials, the chief guests were not, as formerly, foreign potentates, but the prime ministers of the Queen's self-governing dominions overseas. Partly this was the result of a deliberate arrangement, but partly also it was due to a change which had come over the minds of men during the interval of ten years. If the formal bonds of union between Britain and Greater Britain remained still as loose and undefined as before, there had, nevertheless, been a very remarkable growth of mutual knowledge and interest between the old country and her children since the year 1887.

Several things had happened since that date which had affected the imagination and had led to considerable enlightenment. In June, 1894, an intercolonial conference had assembled at Ottawa, at which the representatives of the Australian, New Zealand and South African State governments had taken counsel with the Prime Minister of Canada and members of his cabinet. It was a distinguished gathering, and included many well-known names, among them those of Sir Henry de Villiers and Mr Hofmeyr. "The subject of discussion was reciprocal trade between the colonies. It was resolved to ask that provision should be made by imperial legislation to enable the colonies to enter into agreements of commercial reciprocity, including the power of making differential tariffs with Great Britain and with one another. It was also resolved to ask that existing foreign treaties interfering with commercial reciprocity should be removed, and a customs arrangement was recommended between the Mother

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Country and the Colonies that would place trade within the Empire on a more favourable footing than that on which trade was carried on with foreign countries.”

That this meeting should have been held at all was in itself significant of a new spirit. Its conclusions were still more so. There was no advance certainly towards that imperial federation which Lord Salisbury seven years earlier had deprecated as a premature aspiration; nor was there any proposal tending towards union for purposes of defence which he had then declared to be a matter of paramount urgency. There was, however, a definite and practical decision leading in the direction of a Zollverein or customs union which Lord Salisbury had put aside at the first conference as an entirely futile subject for discussion, having regard to the existing condition of things.

In the following June (1895) another incident occurred which attracted a much greater attention not only at home and in the Colonies, but also among foreign nations. The Liberal government of 1893, never very robust, had been rapidly declining in cohesion and prestige since the retirement of Mr Gladstone in February, 1894. In the summer of the following year it was defeated and resigned. Lord Salisbury accepted office and the chiefs of the Liberal Unionist party became members of his cabinet. Among these Mr Chamberlain, although not the official leader, was the most striking and powerful character. Indeed, next to Mr Gladstone himself, Mr Chamberlain's personality had struck the popular imagination, both in the United Kingdom and in the Colonies, more than that of any other figure in contemporary politics. His official experience had not been great. It was confined to the Board of Trade (not a first-class office) in Mr Gladstone's cabinet from 1880 to 1885. But he had made his mark in other ways. He was the best debater in the House of Commons and the most effective platform speaker in the country. He was an incomparable fighter, and his meaning was always transparently clear. Consequently, it was generally believed, and probably

with truth, that he could have had any office he chose to ask for. He asked for and obtained that of Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Mr Chamberlain had kept his own counsel, and the appointment came as a surprise. People had talked of him for the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, for the Admiralty and for Ireland. They were amazed when he chose a position which had never yet been filled by one of the recognized party leaders. The Colonies were gratified by this striking recognition of their growing importance in the Empire, while people at home were stirred with curiosity. They wondered what it all meant, for Mr Chamberlain was not generally credited with that futile form of modesty which aspires to hide its light under a bushel. His whole career was evidence of a constructive nature, of an instinct "for getting things done."

The country was not left long in doubt. Mr Chamberlain chose the Colonial Office for the best of all reasons—he had a policy, or at any rate an idea, and he was determined upon carrying it out. His energetic spirit soon made itself felt to such a degree that his opponents began to sneer at what they described as his egotism. "He actually believes that he has discovered the Colonies as Columbus discovered the new world!" But though there was little enough justification for the sneer there was more than a grain of truth in the alleged discovery. Mr Chamberlain had at least discovered the enormous present importance of the Colonies in the Imperial Family, and this was a fact which ambitious statesmen had hitherto overlooked. Or, if they had not overlooked it, at any rate none of them had yet been found ready to risk his reputation in such an uncharted ocean.

It was undoubtedly a deliberate act of policy which gave so great a prominence to the Colonial prime ministers and troops in the pageant of the second jubilee, and the effort was crowned with a complete success. Colonial feeling responded heartily; but it was in England, where the lesson

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was most needed, that the enthusiasm was greatest and the results most notably successful. The beginning and end of the problem of closer union is to make men understand, and the ordinary Englishman certainly understood considerably more about the self-governing colonies after midsummer, 1897, than he had ever done before.

The Colonial Conference met under the presidency of Mr Chamberlain as soon as the jubilee celebrations had ended. Its proceedings have never been published, although a verbatim report exists in Downing Street which may prove of value to future historians. The only portions which have been disclosed are Mr Chamberlain's opening address to the delegates, a speech by Lord Goschen upon naval defence, and a summary of the conclusions at which the conference arrived.

Mr Chamberlain did not think it necessary to argue at all upon the advantages of a closer union between the self-governing colonies and the United Kingdom: "Strong as is the bond of sentiment, and impossible as it would be to establish any kind of relations unless that bond of sentiment existed, I believe we all feel that it would be desirable to take advantage of it, and to still further tighten the ties which bind us together. In this country, at all events, the idea of federation is in the air. Whether with you it has gone as far it is for you to say, and it is also for you to consider whether we can give any practical application to the principle. It may well be that the time is hardly ripe for anything definite in this regard. It is quite true that our own constitution and your constitutions have all been the subject of very slow growth, and that they are all the stronger because they have been gradually consolidated, and so, perhaps, with Imperial Federation. If it is ever to be accomplished it will be only after the lapse of a considerable time, and only by gradual steps."

One of these steps, in Mr Chamberlain's opinion, was the grouping of the colonies in federal unions. In this process Canada had shown the way, and it had added greatly to her

strength and prosperity. Australia at that very time was engaged in a similar endeavour. In South Africa the same idea had bulked very largely in the past and was likely to come to the front again. In regard to these matters, however, it was not for the old country to offer advice or press its interference. If it was possible to help in any way we should gladly do so, for we heartily wished success to such efforts. "But as regards the larger question, and anything in the nature of a federation of the Empire, the subject seems to me to depend entirely upon the feeling which exists in the colonies themselves. Here you will be met half way. The question is whether up to the present time there is such a genuine demand for closer union as would justify us in considering practical proposals to give it shape."

Mr Chamberlain feels that there is at any rate a real necessity for some better machinery of consultation between the self-governing colonies and the mother country. He expresses, "as a personal suggestion," a view that it might be feasible to create a council of the Empire to which the colonies would send representatives who, from their position, character, and close touch with colonial feeling, would be able to give effective and valuable advice. Such a council from its very beginning would possess an immense importance and might naturally develop into something still greater—even into a Federal Council. "There is only one point in reference to this which it is absolutely necessary that we all should bear in mind. *It may be that the time has come, and if not I believe it will come, when the Colonies will desire to substitute for the slight relationship which at present exists a true partnership, and in that case they will want their share in the management of the Empire which we like to think is as much theirs as it is ours.* But of course, with the privilege of management and of control will also come the obligation and the responsibility. There will come some form of contribution towards the expense for objects which we shall have in common."

Mr Chamberlain then went on to consider the problem of

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defence. The navy and the army cost at that time something like 35 millions sterling—more than one third of the total income of the country. “Now these fleets, and this military armament, are not maintained exclusively, or even mainly, for the benefit of the United Kingdom, or for the defence of home interests. They are still more maintained as a necessity of empire, for the maintenance and protection of Imperial trade and of Imperial interests all over the world, and if you will for a moment consider the history of this country during, say, the present century, or, I would say, during the present reign, you will find that every war, great or small, in which we have been engaged has had at the bottom a colonial interest, the interest, that is to say, either of a colony, or of a great dependency like India. That is absolutely true, and is likely to be true to the end of the chapter. If we had no empire, there is no doubt whatever that our military and our naval resources would not require to be maintained at anything like their present level.”

Mr Chamberlain thinks that this must necessarily continue to be the case in the future. Suppose that the colonies were separated from the mother country—suppose that Canada were so separated—“the Dominion of Canada is bordered for 3,000 miles by a most powerful neighbour, whose potentialities are infinitely greater than her actual resources. She comes into conflict in regard to the most important interests with the rising power of Japan, and even in regard to some of her interests, with the great empire of Russia. Now, let it not be supposed for a moment that I suggest as probable—I hardly like to think that it is even possible—that there should be a war between Canada, or on behalf of Canada, either with the United States of America, or with any of the other Powers with which she may come into contact, but what I do say is this, that if Canada had not behind her to-day, and does not continue to have behind her, this great military and naval power of Great Britain, she would have to make

concessions to her neighbours, and to accept views which might be extremely distasteful to her in order to remain permanently on good terms with them. She would not be able to, it would be impossible that she should, herself control all the details of her own destiny; she would be, to a greater or less extent, in spite of the bravery of her population and the patriotism of her people, she would still be, to a great extent, a dependent country. Look at Australia again. I need not dwell on the point at any length, but we find the same thing. The interests of Australia have already, on more than one occasion, threatened to come into conflict with those of two of the greatest military nations of the Continent, and military nations, let me add, who also possess each of them a very large, one of them an enormous, fleet. There may be also questions of difficulty arising with Eastern nations, with Japan or even with China, and under those circumstances the Australasian Colonies are in precisely the same position as the Dominion of Canada."

Mr Chamberlain then passed on to another question—the future commercial relations between the United Kingdom and the Colonies. How far is it possible to make these relations closer and more intimate? He would "like to bring to the reinforcement of sentiment the motives which are derived from material and personal interest." Owing, however, to the differences which exist between the fiscal systems of the various colonies and the mother country it would be a matter of the greatest difficulty and complication to devise anything in the nature of a Zollverein or customs union. "It may be borne in mind that the history of that Zollverein is most interesting and most instructive. It commenced entirely as a commercial convention, dealing in the first instance only partially with the trade of the empire. It was rapidly extended to include the whole trade of the empire, and it finally made possible and encouraged the ultimate union of the empire. But this is a matter upon which at the present time, rather than suggest any proposals of my own, I desire to hear the views of the gentlemen present."

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It will be noted that this speech of Mr Chamberlain's puts in a somewhat different form the same three questions which were raised in Lord Salisbury's speech of ten years before. Upon the constitutional question which Lord Salisbury excluded from practical discussion as an "aspiration" Mr Chamberlain has moved a step forward. He would welcome discussion, not merely upon the principle of the thing, but on the machinery necessary for making it effective. Upon the question of defence he speaks as gravely and in the same sense as Lord Salisbury. Evidently, in the opinion of the British Government, the urgency of this matter has not diminished or receded in the interval. Upon the question of the Zollverein, or something in the nature of an approach to a customs union, Mr Chamberlain sees difficulties, but he retains an open mind. He evidently does not consider it a purely barren task to enter upon a discussion of the ideas which had found formal expression already at the Conference of Ottawa two years before.

So the conference proceeded to its work. What was said we do not know, but its final conclusions have been recorded. As to the commercial relations of the Empire the conference was in favour, as at Ottawa, of the denunciation of any treaties with foreign powers which hampered the relations of Great Britain and her Colonies, and this the British Government forthwith agreed to. The colonial prime ministers also undertook upon their return home to confer with their colleagues with a view to seeing if these trade relations could not be improved by giving a preference in the Colonies to the products of the United Kingdom. With regard to the general political relations it was unanimously agreed—first, that, wherever practicable, it is desirable to group together under a federal union those colonies which are geographically united, and, secondly, that it is also desirable to hold periodical conferences of representatives of the Colonies and Great Britain for the discussion of matters of common

interest. But upon the crucial question, whether or not the political relations between the United Kingdom and the self-governing Colonies were satisfactory under the existing condition of things, there was a divergence of view. The majority were apparently satisfied, or at any rate saw no way of improving matters. But Mr Seddon and Sir Edward Braddon—the prime ministers respectively of New Zealand and Tasmania—dissented. They were of opinion that the time had already come when an effort should be made to render more formal the political ties between the United Kingdom and the Colonies.

As to defence, the existing contributions made by the Colonies to the navy were renewed and the prime minister of Cape Colony further offered unconditionally the cost of a first-class battleship. Various minor points were discussed—the interchange of military units, the advantages of uniformity in arms and ammunition—but although there was apparently nothing in the nature of disagreement, it is also quite clear that only the fringe had been discussed and that there had been a refusal, or at any rate an omission, to face the heart of this matter. The absence of security and the need for security were probably fully recognized. But it is one thing to see the logic of an argument and another altogether to act upon it. With communities, even more than with individual men, it is not enough that danger is foreseen; it must also be *felt* before nations—even the youngest nations—can be spurred to take a new departure.

It is outside the purpose of this article to follow the movement of ideas with regard to closer union beyond the early stages, or to attempt to settle the disputes which at present occupy men's minds as to the true solution of this problem. Disruption may, after all, be the wisest course: a friendly severance with goodwill on all sides: such a falling of ripe fruit from the boughs as the old Radical party

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was prepared to welcome. Or something in the nature of an alliance may prove to be the best plan—an alliance of so intimate and permanent a character that we shall not be merely mocking ourselves with words if we describe it, in the words of Mr Rhodes and Mr Chamberlain, as “a partnership.” Or, again, it may now be feasible, and if feasible it would surely be right, to venture upon an organic union for those few but exceedingly grave matters which concern the common interests of all the states of the Empire. Upon these much-vexed questions we do not propose to enter here.

But at any rate it is clear that there has been a considerable movement of ideas in recent times. We are conscious that in 1887 things were in some ways very different from what they were (say) in the early 'seventies, when, in spite of three great wars within a decade, wars which had changed the boundaries and shifted the balance of power in Western Europe, public opinion in Britain still clung tenaciously to the idea that war was an anachronism, and that the reign of peace was close at hand. There had not been, perhaps, by that time any loss of confidence in the greater part of the principles which were held by Mr Cobden and his friends, but at least there was no longer a complete absorption in them to the exclusion of all other political ideas. The inevitability of the disintegration of the Empire was no longer accepted in 1887 calmly and complacently as being in the preordained order of beneficent events.

And again between 1887 and 1897 it is clear that something had happened which had changed the atmosphere, or the point of view, or whatever it may more fitly be called. For one thing a Man had appeared, which is something. But it was more than that. Many minds had been working earnestly upon the same set of problems; sometimes in agreement when they believed themselves to be opposed; sometimes profoundly in disagreement when they were most confident they were at one. But at least this will be admitted by every one—that the relations of the United

Kingdom and her Colonies had entered into the circle of practical politics. The matter was no longer a remote and academic issue with which statesmen had no need to concern themselves.

Henceforth the political relations between the States of the Empire are considered and discussed in reference to nearly every important event. Everything that happens is now regarded to some extent as affecting this problem. The South African War, the death of Queen Victoria, the Coronation of King Edward, all affect it and are felt to affect it. The riddle though still unsolved is insistent. Nothing will put it out of men's minds. The Conference of 1902 goes over the old ground once more, and discusses the same three issues—closer union, defence and a customs union—because it cannot do otherwise. It discusses them with no flagging interest, nor with lassitude, but with a very painful and puzzled earnestness. The thing has got to be settled somehow or another, and within a measurable space of time.

Various things happen within the Empire and outside the Empire which for the moment appear to change the issue; but in the end they are found always to have left it where it was before, face to face with the same three essentials. Australia becomes a federated commonwealth. Mr Chamberlain, in the autumn of 1903, leaves the Government in order to start a campaign for preference and incidentally for protection. There is a great war in the East, and Japan, one of the "effete" Oriental Powers, drives back the gray-coated squadrons of Russia and destroys her armada. At the beginning of 1906 the Liberal party wins an overwhelming victory over its political opponents. The new Government thereupon grants self-government to the conquered South African States and cuts down the programme of naval defence. Out of the first comes the Union of South Africa, out of the second follows the increase of the German fleet. A Colonial Conference is held in 1907, at which doors are "banged, barred and bolted" against preferential trading within the Empire. In 1909 another colonial conference is

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summoned in hot haste to concert measures for the defence of the Empire in the face of German preparations. England has been to some extent overtaken in the race and is now clearly much less powerful at sea, in comparison with the rest of the civilized world, than she was in 1887 and 1897. The colonial states have meanwhile grouped themselves in federations and have become five *Dominions* over-seas. This reduction in numbers obviously renders it a much easier matter to confer and if necessary to contract with them. They are not any longer backward in considering the question of imperial defence. The problem of national service is faced in several quarters, and plans are worked out in others for the building of independent or semi-independent fleets. Then in the present year we have the reciprocity negotiations between Canada and the United States, and out of the din of this discussion—from the farmers of the West and even from Sir Wilfrid Laurier himself—we hear some talk which surprises us about the possibility after all of free trade within the Empire. Finally there is a vague, but obviously a sincere proposal for a permanent and wide-reaching arbitration treaty between the British Empire and the United States of America. The President holds out a hand, and Sir Edward Grey grasps it. Churches of all denominations upon both sides of the Atlantic overflow with benedictions; but the German Chancellor says very bluntly that “might is right,” and so far as he can see this simple rule is likely to hold good for ever.

Every one of these events has a bearing upon the general problem of the organization of the British Empire. What is more, public opinion both at home and in the dominions, is fully alive to this fact. That in itself is an enormous change amounting indeed to a complete revolution in ideas, when we think of what was the attitude of our politicians and the press less than a generation back. There is, nevertheless, impatience in many quarters, and it must be added

there is confusion in all. There is no clear solution in sight. We are still in the wood and may have been wandering round all this long time in a circle. Or, as is more probable, and also more hopeful, we may have been getting forward and through towards the other side by a kind of zig-zag. We may possibly be no nearer anything in the nature of a customs union, no nearer any scheme of imperial defence than we were in 1887; but is it certain that we are no nearer a political union, whether it be an alliance or a partnership, or something more organic than either? We have, at all events, acquired the habit of conferring together, and that in itself is surely a somewhat remarkable phenomenon. There was a conference in 1887, another after an interval of ten years in 1897. Then it was agreed that conferences should meet regularly every five years. Then the period was reduced to four years. Finally a crisis arose and a special conference was summoned to deal with a special difficulty which profoundly affected the common interests of all. Echoes of the principle of conference are heard in various directions—a Press conference in 1909, an Education conference at the present time. Supposing that all this eagerness to take counsel together is nothing more than the expression of a need it is still a great deal. If the need is now fully realized there is at least a hope, perhaps there is even a presumption, that in due course institutions will be evolved capable of dealing with the situation in which we find ourselves. We are now about to engage in another great imperial ceremony. And before the King's coronation yet another Imperial Conference is to be held. We are grown more patient and perhaps wiser. No man is so sanguine to-day that he looks forward to an immediate and complete solution of any of the three riddles which have been propounded, and again and again propounded. But, on the other hand, there are few who do not believe that when the conference ends its deliberations, and before King George is crowned in Westminster Abbey, there will have been some change

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for the better, some movement forward, bringing us a stage nearer to that closer union, which, in one form or another, is desired, no longer only by a small minority of political students, but by the great mass of the people throughout the whole of the British Empire.

HINDUS AND MUHAMMADANS

THE last few months have seen a striking effort on the part of the leaders of one of the two great races of India to approach those of the other with a view to something resembling an *entente*. They have seen also the failure of the attempt, and a temporary recrudescence of ill feelings. The moment is appropriate for describing the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans, and for endeavouring to forecast the tendencies of either people, and the manner in which they will re-act on the political future.

India is so big that one is almost expected to deal with it by a few mouth-filling statistics, misleading unless qualified, yet difficult to qualify concisely. The Hindus are returned as 220 millions, or three-fourths of the entire population. They predominate in every province except in the Punjab and Eastern Bengal. But when we ask what makes a man a Hindu, the answer cannot be given in a word. For statistical purposes Hindus are all those returning themselves as professing the Hindu religion. And this is all that they have in common. No one ever seriously contended that the Hindus were one by race. It is true that the Hindu revival of the last few years draws its ideals partly from the legend of Aryan ancestors, fair-skinned nomad people, who entered Hindustan as conquerors from the north, worshippers of the Divine power in Nature, and invoking it in Vedic hymns and prayers. To this day deities and heroes are ordinarily depicted fair of skin; unless convention, the outcome of concession to some indigenous cult, requires that they be blue or black. With this vision of an inroad into India of a stately, simple, superior white race, the writings of the early philologists have made us familiar. But in actual fact the Aryas of philology or of the Vedas are nowhere found surviving in unsullied purity; and it is only over Kashmir and the Punjab and Rajputana that they have stamped their impression dominantly upon a mixed population. Numeri-

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cally and actually the stronger element in the Hindu population of to-day is the Dravidian stock: once the aboriginal dwellers in the country, distinguished from their invaders by darker colour, lower physique and baser customs, and animists or fetish-worshippers by religion. The long history of the warfare and the mixture of the two types will never be written. But the result has been for the Dravidian type to survive pre-eminent in Southern and Central India, and for the territories on the north, east and west of its peculiar domain, to be peopled with races half Dravidian in stock. In the people of the United Provinces Aryan and Dravidian stocks are mixed: in Lower Bengal Dravidians are blended with Mongolian invaders. In Bombay, the home of the Mahratta Brahman, the dominant type is a mixture of the Dravidian and some little-known type from Central Asia which it is the fashion to label Scyth. In all these territories the numerical majority of the people are Hindus; but clearly the common quality has nothing to do with race.

Still less is there a common Hindu language. In India diversity of tongues is greater even than diversity of race or creed. Speech follows race, and disregards religion. The Brahman priests carried their domain much farther south than the Aryan invaders, but they left no mark upon the language. Millions of Hindus in Madras and Bombay speak language of Dravidian origin as strange to their co-religionists in the north as that of the Coptic to the Congregationalist Christian.

The United States are an example of a nation without community of race; Switzerland of a nation without community of race or speech. But the Hindus have never achieved political unity for themselves, or had it forced upon them by external pressure. Hindu states have risen and fallen, but there has never been a Hindu empire coextensive with the Hindu name. They lack the consciousness of a national past, and remain a vast diffuse congeries of peoples and tongues, associated rather than united by their profession of a common religion.

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In estimating the strength of the religious bond we are confronted with a difficulty. Historically, modern Hinduism may be described as a blend of the ritualistic Brahmanism that succeeded the Vedic period with a strong element of popular legend and local hero worship. In the first centuries of our era it attained its purpose of driving out Buddhism from popular estimation. It set up and developed the caste system, which has endured with a rigidity unknown elsewhere in the world. But in its complexity and its capacity for tolerating apparently incompatible ideas Hinduism eludes any satisfactory and concise definition. It varies from the strictest sects of Benares to the worship of ghosts and demons in the Central India jungles. If it has any uniform features, these are reverence for the Brahman and for the cow. As Mr Chirol points out, the endeavour to enlist the natural leadership of Brahmans is common to the promoters of agitation wherever situated. But there are sects which hardly admit the Brahman's pride of place, just as there are castes still called Hindu which will eat beef. Moreover, though the individual Brahman finds honour always in his own country, the Brahmans are not an organized community throughout India. Their honour and authority are local. There is nothing like a universal hierarchy, any more than there is a universal creed or cult. Most Hindus of the middle class probably believe in one supreme God, by whatsoever name they know him. But acceptance of one supreme Deity by no means excludes devotion to a multitude of little gods, of nature, or the locality, or disease, and death. These *devatas* are popularly said to be thirty-three crores in number. A census superintendent writes that his orderly once described the relations between the deity and the *devatas* as analagous to those between an officer and his orderlies: but a better simile which has also been quoted is that of Government and its district officers. The godlings attend to the small concerns of everyday life with which Parmeshwar cannot be troubled, and since the villager's life

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is made up of small concerns it is the local or expert deity to whom he turns most often.

Caste is the one stable and permanent creation of Hinduism, but caste itself, by the very rigidity of its partition-walls, takes much of the power from Hinduism as a national force. All castes within the pale do reverence to the Hindu religion in some form or other, but each is a self-contained, self-organized society, and there is no general authority to command the allegiance of them all. And beyond the wall of caste are the millions known euphemistically as the "depressed community," of whom it is debateable whether they are to be reckoned as Hindus at all. The regular Hindus claim them eagerly as adherents when it is a question of counting heads for political purposes; at all other times they ignore them ruthlessly, and the very religion within whose organization the pariahs would wistfully find shelter is pitiless in proclaiming their exclusion. For all practical purposes Hinduism cannot claim the outcasts.

The dissolution of definite beliefs and the discrimination of the worshippers into castes have had the further consequence that Hinduism as a religion has little to do with morality. Most ordinary Hindus observe the code of civilized peoples. They hold it wrong to murder or commit adultery, or to forge or steal; they are reverent to their parents and devoted to their children. But in all these matters the sanction which attends their action is the caste penalty rather than the divine displeasure. In the background there may be a further sanction, but it is doubtful if it appeals with any force to any but the most enlightened. For the most part religion is a matter of prayer and offering, but not an attempt to apprehend and to conform to a Divine command in all affairs of life.

We may sum up this survey by saying that two-thirds of the population of India, diverse in origin and speech, are yet united by professing what they all regard, in spite of its extraordinary variations, as a common creed. But Hinduism,

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being a disintegrated religion, has survived by a process of perpetual adaptation, and in the process has long since lost any real unity of beliefs or observances or constitution. It recognizes a class of natural leaders, but they are diffused and unorganized: it shuts out in effect millions whom it professes to reckon as its own; and though it ceaselessly associates mundane with spiritual things by attaching ceremonial to the smallest affairs of life, it lacks the coercive power upon the wills of men which an ethical religion, preaching right conduct as the will of God, effectively exerts.

Any attempt of this kind to estimate the power and character of the cohesive forces acting upon the millions whom the Hindu political leaders claim, and aspire to present as a united race, can only be made in the widest and most general terms, applicable to the many and unconcerned with the few. But it would be conspicuously incomplete if it made no mention of recent reforming movements. Pre-eminent among these is the Arya Samaj, founded by Swami Dayanand in the 'sixties and now numbering lakhs of adherents, which, in spite of its marked animosity to other religions, and the concern of some of its adherents in illegal forms of agitation, is at least to be welcomed as evidence of life at a time when the parent religion certainly seemed dying. It is easy to refute its pseudo-historical treatment of the Vedas, or to condemn it for temporizing with orthodoxy in the matter of cow-killing. In its preaching of a definite creed and a definite morality, in its intense proselytising and organizing activities, and its advocacy of that social reform which is the greatest need of India, the Arya Samaj compels respect. Politically its position is peculiar. Its followers call themselves Aryas and not Hindus; but the Hindus claim them, and with reason, inasmuch as the reforming activity of the Samaj in religious matters naturally throws its sympathy in politics on the side of the nationalists.

To this extent we have been compelled to explore Hin-

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duism in order to define Hindu. But when it comes to politics it must be confessed that religion does not directly enter into the question much. Mr Chirol has made the most of the appeals to Kali in the Kalighat temple, and the attempt to revive the cult of Shivaji as a national hero. These have served their purpose effectively in debauching Bengali and Mahrattas schoolboys to political murder. But they represent the calculated expedients of the agitator, and not the spontaneous spirit of the movement. The truth is that the Hindu leaders and the educated classes who concern themselves with politics are not under the sway of a Brahman revival in the least, and have probably discarded for philosophic latitudinarianism whatever religious tenets they once learned. We have to distinguish sharply facts from names. In theory the Hindus of India are a nation of 220 millions united by religious worship and ready to rise in the name of religion at the call of Brahman leaders invoking the names of ancient gods. In fact the great mass of Hindus hear and care nothing for politics, and those who do are some hundreds of thousands of the educated and semi-educated classes who in proportion to their education have lost their old beliefs. The stir in India proceeds from social and economic and political causes, and religious prejudices have been turned on as from a bellows to quicken the flame. They are not a hurricane driving fire through a forest.

With the Muhammadans the position is very different. Varying as they do nearly as much as the Hindus in respect of race and language, they are more united by religion, history and purpose. Islam has not compromised with the indigenous faiths of the country as Hinduism has done. Such traces of Hindu religious practice as are found among Indian Moslems are generally confined to converts from Hinduism. In all essentials the Islam of India is the faith carried forth from Ardsia, centreing in and conserved by the written word of the Qoran, as the ultimate source of all inspired knowledge. This produces a uniformity in all essential beliefs that is lacking to Hinduism, and means also

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that the religious text exercises a far more direct control upon practical action. The Arya Samaj attempts to extract a vague moral code from the Vedas. Learned Hindus may occasionally quote the Shastras as enjoining or prohibiting some act. But the Qoran's claim to control each detail of everyday behaviour is commonly admitted by all Muhammadans. From it the maulavis derive *fatwas* regulating the evacuation of houses or inoculation with serum in a plague epidemic; and I have seen a thrill run through a congregation when the preacher quoted, "And there shall be made known to you a new form of carriage which no one has seen as yet," and added the convincing comment, "And behold, the train has come, the motor-car has come, and now the airships have begun to fly!" His hearers felt the proof positive of the Divine utterance.

Nor has the Muhammadan revival, presently to be described, apparently done anything to weaken the compelling force of religion. The founders of the Aligarh College have succeeded to all appearance in combining the pursuit of western science and philosophy with fidelity to the established creed. When religious teaching in its highest phases tends to metaphysical speculation, contact with western philosophy must help to destroy the dogmas that support the fabric. But even with the educated Muhammadan philosophic doubt is only carnal wisdom that expends itself in futile assaults on the eternal structure of the Divine lore.

The Muhammadans are scattered widely over India and predominate only in the Punjab and in Eastern Bengal. In the latter province they are by race indistinguishable from the Hindus, but were forcibly converted during the Mogul suzerainty. But diffused and different as they are, they all have the consciousness of unity. The Musulman who is descended from a conquering tribe remembers how the Moguls ruled nearly all India. The Musulman who was converted three hundred years ago still retains the convert's extraordinary zeal and pride for his new religion. And Islam has always been and still to some extent remains a

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proselytising religion, and this fact lays a common responsibility on all who profess it.

Finally the Muhammadans of India are actuated by a definite purpose, the consciousness of which extends further down into the social strata than might be supposed. They have seen themselves steadily ousted from their pride of place by the people they conquered, and they have seen the process accelerated under the Pax Britannica. The big estates have gone under through extravagance and litigation and have passed into thriftier Hindu hands. From the outset of British rule, the Hindus have surpassed them in aptitude for western education which was the chief passport to Government service. So long as it was only a question of clerical service, this did not so much matter; but when clerks were promoted to subordinate and then to responsible executive office, and when posts such as the police, originally reserved for the classes in whom capacity for executive command was recognized, came to be thrown open more and more to education, the Muhammadan saw the ascendancy of the Hindu being alarmingly extended. They are therefore deliberately bent on a consolidation and conservation of their forces which shall enable them to resist the apprehended deluge of Hindu predominance.

It is only of recent years, however, that Hindu and Muhammadan communities have come to realize their corporate existence. For generations they have lived side by side in the country, divided certainly by religious practices which often led to occasional and local acts of violence, but on the whole peaceably and without racial emulation. The spread of English education among the Hindus was the first thing to arouse Muhammadan alarm. Sir Saiyid Ahmad, a man whose name is less well known than it deserves to be, set himself to preach to his co-religionists the need of modern education and to supply the means of providing it. The college which he had founded at Aligarh has flourished exceedingly, and become the focus of Muhammadan hopes and enterprise in India. Its old boys have become mis-

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sionaries of education and there is no part of India from which the college does not draw students and with which it does not maintain relations. It claims with good reason to be an imperial enterprise, and enthusiastic deputations headed by the leading Moslems in India are now touring the entire country and collecting a large fund with the object of converting it into a Muhammadan university. Nothing has contributed so much to consolidate Muhammadan feeling throughout India as the Aligarh movement.

In the early days when the Indian National Congress was the only embodiment of the demand for constitutional change, a few Muhammadans joined it and helped, as Mr Chirol says, "to justify its claim to be called national, in so far as that term connoted the representation of the different creeds and races of India." But gradually, as the Muhammadans saw reason to fear that the demand for larger powers of self-government meant Hindu aggrandisement, they have ceased to be associated with the Congress, and have concentrated more upon their own lines. And in proportion as moderate methods of representation gave way to violent ones the Muhammadans held themselves more and more aloof. In the ranks of the openly disaffected there are very few Muhammadans, and absolutely none of note. The Muhammadan attitude has been, not indeed to refrain entirely from criticism of Government, but to assert their loyalty to British rule and their strict adherence to constitutional methods of reform.

It is probable that Lord Morley's enlargement of the legislative councils has robbed the congress of whatever political importance it may have once possessed; and it was over the question of representation for the enlarged councils that the cleavage between the races took sharper form. The Hindus asked to be represented on an arithmetical basis, including the depressed castes in their number, in territorial electorates. The Muhammadans said that the depressed community were not Hindus, and that local constituencies would result in the Muhammadans not getting their fair

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share of seats. They pressed for separate electorates. In the end Lord Morley made good the assurances that Lord Minto had given some years before, and the Muhammadans secured their separate representation. The principle is capable of abuse, and there is a tendency for the Muhammadans to abuse it by seeking to secure separate electorates for local boards and committees where they are not really needed and only create unnecessary division. But in the case of the councils they cannot be blamed for insisting on a point that they believed vital to their political future. The adverse comments of the Hindu Press upon the Secretary of State's decision showed that the other party also were fully alive to its significance.

Every man, they say, is a Platonist or an Aristotelian. Most Englishmen in India have probably a private predilection either for Hindu or for Muhammadan. Nor is the preference likely to be a reasoned one. The virtues and the vices are not unevenly balanced. The meanest chicaneries of the Kayasth village accountant are no worse than the sordid cunning of a small Bisati pedlar. The courtesy and fine-feeling of a Muhammadan country gentleman are matched by the simple manliness of an old Sikh resaldar. In both races one can admire men of sincerity and self-abnegation. If the Muhammadan excels in capacity for command, against this may be set the humbler virtues, especially the patience in adversity, of the Hindu ryot. The only positive reason to be given one way or the other is that the Muhammadan is nearer to us than the Hindu in history, religious and social usage. They came into India foreigners as we did; we like they are "people of a book"; and they, like we, think it no evil to eat beef. These points in common, perhaps, appeal to more Englishmen than any ethnological connexion with the Aryans, or any remote community of language, though, owing to the relatively backward and depressed condition of the Muhammadans, the actual cases in which they afford a ground for either social or intellectual intercourse are few. If the Englishman leans uncon-

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sciously one way or the other it is probably mainly a matter of circumstances and temperament.

But in the present political trial of strength it is difficult for most onlookers not to feel sympathy with the Muhammadan; he is in a minority and well he knows it. His only chance is to play the game of the minority, concentrating his forces, rigorously refusing to be drawn into the position of dependence on the larger party, and maintaining perfectly correct relations with the arbiter in the hope of thereby strengthening his cause. And this is what he is doing. After the settlement of the council question, the races were politically as far apart as they have ever been. Then came the last National Congress at Allahabad. The Hindu leaders made speeches deploring the disunion of peoples, and possibly in imitation of recent developments in England, a resolution was passed inviting the Muhammadans to attend a joint conference and discover means of swearing eternal friendship. These overtures caused the Muhammadans an anxious moment. They had seen the net spread before. They did not believe that there was any room for compromise upon the questions in issue. But they were apparently persuaded that policy required compliance. They were advised that it would not look well in England if the Moslems were always a recalcitrant minority, rejecting the olive branches held out to them. So with misgivings their leaders attended the joint conference, which duly resulted in the establishment of a standing conciliation committee for the purpose of adjusting differences. It is not known that the committee has met; it is not unlikely that it never will. There is no human prospect of a committee seated round a table finding any solution of the vital questions which divide the races—such as the non-slaughter of cows by Muhammadans for food and sacrifice, the institution of simultaneous examinations in England and India for the Civil Service, the bestowal of appointments in proportion to numerical strength, and common electorates for local self-government purposes. The first question wakes at once

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all the forces of religious passion on both sides, and bigotry never compromises. The other three, closely connected with each other, epitomise the conflict of political interests. There is no offer of compromise from the majority, and the minority would not dare to compromise.

How superficial were the overtures for amity subsequent incidents have shown. Hardly was the conference over when a prominent Hindu member of it moved a resolution in the Viceroy's Council that gave bitter offence to the Muhammadans as breathing the very spirit which had just been disowned. And all throughout India during the period of preparation for the census, both parties have been sedulously at work to inflate the returns telling in their respective favour. No one can define with great precision the difference between Urdu and Hindi as spoken tongues. The former designates the language evolved in the armies of the Muhammadan conquerors; it is still the official language of most of northern India, and in some vague way it still connotes the importance of the Muhammadan. But in syntax and idiom Hindi and Urdu are one, and when spoken they are distinguishable only by the higher proportion of Persian and Arabic words which Urdu employs. The population of India is too illiterate to fill up its own census papers. Consequently here was a splendid opportunity for the militant agencies of either side to issue private instructions to the enumerators. And from thousands of places complaints went up that the record was being deliberately distorted. Cynics went so far as to assert that the census of Hindi and Urdu-speaking peoples would prove to be in nice proportion to the number of Hindu and Moslem enumerators; but this forecast was unduly unflattering not merely to the supervising staff but to the robustness of the individuals catechized. Probably more Hindus admitted speaking Urdu than Muhammadans confessed to Hindi, since Urdu enjoys the prestige of official countenance and is regarded generally as the more elegant language. At the moment of writing the results are not available. If either

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language shows a decided gain at the expense of the other it is certain that recriminations will be renewed.

It will be unfortunate if the drift of events renders the two great parties incapable of joint action for their common good; worse if one of them comes to be permanently identified with the critics of the Government and the other with its dependents; and worst of all perhaps if Government lays itself under any suspicion of pursuing the policy "divide et impera." The crying needs of India, as has again and again been said, are social and economic. These are the fields in which Government has hitherto done least, partly because of more immediate burdens, partly from a desire to let people help themselves. Now religion enters far into everyday life in India, and there is a small hope of joint action for the purposes of social reform. In education, for the moment, the tide is setting strongly towards sectarianism, but it is yet conceivable that co-operation between the races might result in the great free universal state system dreamed of by Mr Gokhele, with religious instruction by denominational teachers within set hours. There are fields of industry again, which might be developed as genuine *swadeshi*, without any of the quasi-religious intolerance of those whose cry it is. On such a question as that of the excise duties, there is room for joint effort. Above all enlightened co-operation might do far more to improve agriculture, to help an indebted peasantry, and to educate opinion up to measures of precaution that would save India her heavy annual death roll from plague and fever.

Muhammadan effort is too sincere and forceful, and there is too virile a temper behind it for many of them to adopt the rôle of servile friends of Government. If self-interest enters into their loyalty, yet it is mainly a matter of sentiment and tradition. The fact that Islam is a world influence and that they have kinship with millions of the same faith in the Near East will save them from any enervating subservience to the government established in India. Indeed the difficulties to be encountered with the Moslems arise

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chiefly from the pan-Islamic sentiment and their inclination to invest questions of detail with the dignity of international complications. The candid friend must allow that the "vast depressed Muhammadan community" is a phrase that is somewhat lightly and sometimes unreasonably invoked for petty ends.

Nor is it in the least likely that in spite of the human inclination to deal friendly with those who speak (relatively) well of you, the Government will leave itself open to any charge of favoritism. The tradition of impartiality is too well established to be easily overthrown. It is a matter of more serious doubt whether we have not unwittingly entered on a policy of separation which may have far-reaching consequences. It seemed well-nigh impossible to deny the Muhammadan claim of separate electorates to councils. But the Muhammadans have caught at the concession as if it were the administration of a universal principle, and it would be an error of the gravest to admit their claim, and to put Hindus and Moslems into watertight compartments for every trifling purpose of administration. It appears as if the Government were likely to be carried further and to concede a charter for a Muhammadan University. So far official silence has been kept upon this subject, and it is premature to anticipate a momentous decision. But the onlooker cannot but reflect that one Muhammadan University will be the natural precursor of half a dozen Hindu ones, and wonder what the effect will be upon the tensions between the races, as well as upon the system of higher education in India. Neither is so bad but that they might be worse.

CANADIAN AFFAIRS

I. THE DOMINION BUDGET

THE budget speech of Hon. W. S. Fielding, Minister of Finance, occupied only forty-five minutes in delivery. It has been his custom to enter into an exhaustive consideration of the financial condition of the country, and there was, therefore, some surprise that he contented himself with such a summary statement of the results of the year's business. He had, however, no tariff changes to announce nor any new measures of policy to disclose.

The figures for the year reveal an overflowing treasury and surpluses without precedent in the history of confederation. For 1909-10 Mr Fielding had estimated the revenue at \$97,500,000, with a possibility that the total would reach \$100,000,000. The actual revenue was just over \$101,500,000. The current expenditure was estimated at \$81,000,000. The actual outlay was \$79,400,000. The surplus was, therefore, \$22,000,000. The capital and special charges totalled \$35,900,000, but with sinking fund payments the net debt increase was only \$12,300,000. The Transcontinental Railway absorbed \$20,000,000, more than seven and a half millions of which amount was covered by current expenditure.

The incomplete figures for 1910-11 suggest an actual revenue of \$117,500,000, with a probable current expenditure of \$87,000,000 and a surplus of \$30,500,000. The expenditure on capital and special accounts was \$30,500,000, of which \$24,000,000 was devoted to the Transcontinental Railway and \$11,500,000 to public works, railways, canals, subsidies and bounties. The addition to the debt for 1910-11 will be \$3,900,000, which will bring the net debt of the country to \$340,168,000. Estimating the population at 7,785,000, Mr Fielding puts the debt per head at \$43·69, as against \$39·61 in 1907, \$49·88 in 1900 and \$50·82 in 1896.

Mr Fielding intimated that the iron and steel bounties

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would not be renewed and produced a statement to show that since 1884 the country had paid in bounties on iron, steel, lead, manilla fibre, crude petroleum and beet-root sugar \$21,031,700. The outlay for bounties in 1910 was \$2,414,000, while the estimate for 1911 runs over \$1,500,000. A determined effort is now being made to secure a short extension of the steel bounties, and, despite Mr Fielding's assurance to the contrary, some additional assistance may be extended to the great steel plant at Sydney. There is reason to think that the bulk of the Government's supporters in Parliament would not resist a continuation of the bounties or a modification of the tariff in behalf of the steel companies, if the period of aid were strictly limited and it could be shown clearly that such action would not conflict with the Reciprocity Agreement with Washington.

It may be worth while to go beyond Mr Fielding's budget statement in order to show the amazing expansion of Canada. In 1878 the exports totalled \$79,323,667. In 1910 they were \$309,682,431. During that period the imports have increased from \$93,081,787 to \$418,730,764. The total foreign trade for 1910 was \$728,413,195. That for 1911 is estimated at \$800,000,000. For 1878 the aggregate revenue was \$22,406,257, for 1910-11 it is estimated at \$117,500,000. For 1878 the total expenditure was \$30,545,771, for 1910-11 it is estimated at \$122,500,000. A bank-note circulation of \$21,000,000 in 1878 has grown to nearly \$80,000,000. Deposits of less than \$72,000,000 have increased to \$900,000,000, and bank loans of \$129,000,000 have grown to \$900,000,000. In 1878 we had 6,143 miles of railway in operation, and we have now a railway mileage of 24,731. The freight tonnage has increased from 7,883,472 to 74,482,866. We now have 4,500 miles of railway under construction, and during this year, according to the estimate of the Department of the Interior, 450,000 immigrants will enter the country. In face of such facts only a sober-minded and clear-headed people can hope to distinguish between optimism and arrogance.

LORD GREY IN CANADA

II. LORD GREY IN CANADA

A FEW months hence Earl Grey will end his term as Governor-General of Canada. No domestic political crisis has occurred during his term of office nor has any irritation developed between the Dominion and the Mother Country. But while his regime has been unsensational there have been sober forces in action and a steady process of enlarging independence within the Empire. Through his energy, enthusiasm, and determination and the far reach of his imagination we had the great national and Imperial festival on the Plains of Abraham and the final dedication of that hallowed ground to public uses. By long summer journeys and laborious personal investigation he has acquired a knowledge of all the provinces and the far outposts of Canada such as few Canadians possess. He has been active in support of moral, social and philanthropic movements. He has stimulated the patriotism of Canadians. He has nourished and strengthened Imperial feeling. But while speaking freely on occasion he has respected the limitations of his office and has enjoyed the absolute confidence of his advisers. Between himself and Sir Wilfrid Laurier there never has been a moment of friction. With the leaders of the Conservative party he has had only cordial personal relations. It is true that he has been denounced by spokesmen for the Nationalist group of Quebec as an intriguing emissary of Empire and that he has come under the lash of a few British Canadian writers. There is, however, a flavour of high sport in baiting a Governor-General, and probably there always will be colonial patriots with a keen scent for Imperial meddling.

Earl Grey, however, enjoys an undiminished popularity. He has been the more influential because he has manifested an ardent sympathy with the national temper of Canadians and has recognized that a keen native patriotism is not incompatible with a robust Imperial citizenship. The significant fact in the evolution of Canada during his regime

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has been the organization of a Canadian navy, and the deliberate, calculated assumption of larger powers in dealings with foreign nations. We have dealt directly at least so far as the machinery of negotiation has been exposed with Japan, with France and with the United States. We have chosen to retain supreme control of the navy and to determine as the emergency arises what shall be the measure of our co-operation with the Admiralty. In all this there has been no conflict with the Imperial authorities nor any conscious assertion of divided interests between Canada and the Mother Country. But it must appear to practical minds that the Empire develops a dangerously loose organization and that the time approaches for a profound examination of the tendencies both of Colonial and of Imperial policy. Must we forge stronger bonds of union or drift apart? Will the ultimate result of Colonial autonomy be separation or consolidation? In any event there can be no repression of national sentiment in the over-sea dominions nor is there any power of compulsion available to secure the bases of the Imperial structure. What is to be assumed is that the recognition of changing relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country will turn the minds of Imperial statesmen at home and abroad to the necessity of a more practical and more responsible partnership, and that out of the fullness of a developing Imperial patriotism will come the guarantees of security and the realities of Empire.

With the assumption of greater national sovereignty by the Dominions the office of Governor-General will become more rather than less important. Here Canada has had no ground of grievance, and it is frankly recognized that the appointment of the Duke of Connaught expresses a deep and delicate regard for the Dominion. There is amongst the mass of Canadians no great reverence for hereditary distinction save as it represents worth and service. We demand simplicity even in ceremonial functions. We like to express ourselves in the language and the demeanour of a wholesome democracy. For the throne we

WAR VESSELS ON THE LAKES

have reverence and devotion. It is important, therefore, that in the selection of Governors-General and in the distribution of Imperial titles there should be a wise discrimination and an abiding sense of the dignity of the source from which these proceed. Nothing could be more unwise than to treat appointments to the Governor-Generalship or the bestowal of honours as the ordinary distribution of party patronage. Fortunately the appointment of the Duke of Connaught gives dignity to the Governor-Generalship of Canada and an assurance that in the future as in the past the office will be filled by men of personal distinction and adequate fitness for Imperial responsibilities.

III. WAR VESSELS ON THE LAKES

THE question of war vessels on the Great Lakes has been revived by a request from Washington to permit the *Dubuque*, a vessel with six four-inch guns to pass through the Canadian canals as a substitute for the *Nashville*, a larger but less modern vessel, which has been stationed on Lake Michigan since 1907. By the Rush-Bagot convention, entered into by Great Britain and the United States ninety-four years ago, it was provided that neither country should have more than one vessel on Lake Ontario, two on the Upper Lakes and one on Lake Champlain, that no ship should exceed one hundred tons burden and that its armament should not exceed one 18-pounder cannon. Canada, in faithful observance of the treaty, has only one vessel on the Upper Lakes, 170 feet long, with a speed of 16 or 17 knots and unarmed. The United States, however, has ten vessels on the lakes with 50 guns and 2,000 naval militia.

The convention is terminable on six months' notice by either country, and Canada therefore has to accommodate Washington or risk abrogation of the agreement. Before the Joint High Commission of 1890 the United States Commissioners represented that in case of war one hundred

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vessels of the British navy were of sufficiently light draught to pass through the Canadian canals, and that as these vessels could not be opposed by American war vessels they would completely dominate the lakes. It was suggested, therefore, that in this situation it might become necessary for the United States to construct and maintain a fleet of war vessels on the lakes in order to ensure the adequate protection of American interests. It is understood that Lord Herschell was convinced the American demand could not be resisted and that in order to save the Convention of 1817 the British Commissioners, if a treaty had been concluded, would have agreed to allow passage through the canals of war vessels partly constructed on the Upper Lakes but unarmoured and unequipped.

It is manifest that the United States is actuated only by domestic considerations, but none the less there is direct violation of the ancient convention by one party to the contract. In an address delivered at Washington some months ago by Mr Justice Riddell of Canada, it was suggested that in celebration of the hundred years of peace between this country and the United States the convention should be converted into a permanent treaty. This proposal has had the general support of the Press of Canada, and undoubtedly would be acceptable to the Canadian Government. No response has come from Washington, however, and it is unlikely notwithstanding the prevailing good relations between the two countries that it will be favourably considered by the American authorities. The situation is thoroughly unsatisfactory, but apparently the Canadian Government feels that it is better to tolerate such evasion by consent as has been practised than to force Washington to respect or terminate the convention. Throughout the Canadian Government has acted within its own independent judgement and without the suggestion of compulsion from the Imperial authorities. Eventually, notwithstanding the attitude of Canada, the convention seems certain to be terminated or so radically

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revised to meet conditions in the United States that the revision will be tantamount to abrogation.

IV. THE TRADE AGREEMENT

MORE than three months have elapsed since Mr Fielding stated the details of the trade agreement between Canada and the United States to the House of Commons, and still the ratification of Parliament is withheld. There is no doubt that when the final vote is reached the compact will be accepted, but not with such unanimity and confidence as the Government counted upon when its terms were first disclosed. It was assumed that the agreement would receive the united support of the Ministerialists and create a division in the Conservative party. It has divided the Ministerialists, and there is a certain expectation that the Opposition will vote solidly against ratification. For three months no other question has seriously engaged the attention of the country. A few days of anxious doubt and questioning succeeded Mr Fielding's statement. During these days the Liberal Press was jubilant and confident, the Conservative Press guarded and reticent. It was remembered that for nearly half a century Canadian statesmen had sought fiscal concessions at Washington. Galt and Brown and Dorion and Mackenzie had advocated continental free trade in natural products. Even in the birth throes of protection Sir John Macdonald had demanded reciprocity in trade or reciprocity in tariffs. The Liberal party under Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Sir Richard Cartwright had presented free trade with the United States as the chief feature of party policy. It was always believed that Sir Charles Tupper was favourable at least to a limited trade arrangement with Washington. Incorporated in the protectionist tariff of 1879 was a statutory offer of free trade with the adjoining country in natural products. Now that this long object of Canadian policy was achieved and that without serious disturbance of the duties

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on manufactures it was natural to think that the whole country would rejoice. Instead a clamour of hostile criticism soon arose, and as yet its volume and vigour have hardly abated.

It is worth while, without attempting to force a favourable or an unfavourable judgement upon the agreement to state the arguments advanced against ratification and the sources from which these proceed. The first condemnatory resolution came from the Board of Trade of Montreal, but the adverse vote was only slightly stronger than that in favour of the compact. The Board of Trade of Toronto declared against the agreement by 289 to 13. The Associated Boards of Trade of Ontario condemned by 97 to 18, and the Winnipeg Board of Trade and the Winnipeg Grain Exchange by decisive majorities. Condemnatory resolutions were passed by the Executive Committee of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association and by various patriotic organizations. The Legislatures of British Columbia, of Manitoba, of New Brunswick and of Ontario condemned the agreement by the full strength of the Conservative majorities. In the Legislature of British Columbia there was only one vote for the agreement and in that of Ontario the vote was 75 to 17.

In Toronto a hostile manifesto was issued by eighteen influential Liberals, amongst whom were Sir Edmund Walker, President of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, Sir Mortimer Clark, a former Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario, Mr Z. A. Lash, K.C., one of the leaders of the Canadian Bar, Mr John C. Eaton, head of the greatest retail business in Canada, Mr E. R. Wood, a conspicuous figure in Canadian finance, and Mr W. K. George, then President of the Toronto Liberal Association and a former President of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. In the House of Commons Hon. Clifford Sifton, Minister of the Interior from 1896 to 1905 and now Chairman of the National Commission on Conservation of Natural Resources, Mr Lloyd Harris, member for the industrial

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constituency of Brantford, and Mr W. M. German, member for the border county of Welland, in Ontario, although hitherto staunch supporters of the Government, have spoken and will vote against the agreement. A new political organization has been formed at Toronto under the name of the Canadian National League with Mr Lash as President, and which, in affiliation with similar organizations at Montreal and Winnipeg, will issue literature, maintain a staff of speakers, and co-operate generally with the Conservative party to prevent ratification of the agreement, and should it be adopted to accomplish the defeat of the Government and install an Administration at Ottawa pledged to cancellation.

On the other hand, the Government has the energetic support of the Grain Growers' Association of the West and the farmers' organization of Ontario. A multitude of petitions have come to Parliament from the western grain growers in favour of the agreement. The Legislature of Nova Scotia on a strict party division has endorsed it. The Legislature of Saskatchewan, in which there are a dozen Conservative members, declared unanimously for the agreement, for a further preference of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent in favour of British manufactures and for ultimate free trade with Great Britain. Only the Legislatures of Alberta, Prince Edward Island and Quebec have failed to consider the compact, and the assumption is that all three would support the action of the Federal Government. In the meantime the debate drags on in the House of Commons. As yet it has been impossible to convict the Opposition of deliberate obstruction. As many speeches have been made by Ministerialists as by Oppositionists. There was delay in order to vote supplies, delay over the Budget and the Estimates, delay over the Easter recess. There was satisfaction amongst Oppositionists when Congress adjourned without ratifying the agreement. There is a hope, but hardly an expectation, that it may be finally rejected by the United States Senate. It is the settled belief of the

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Opposition that the more clearly the people can be made to understand its details, its general tendencies and its broad effects, the heavier will be public disapproval. The Government holds apparently with equal strength of conviction that once the agreement goes into effect its advantages will be so great and so general that effective opposition will become impossible. Both parties have held numerous meetings in the constituencies and both profess to be encouraged by the results. What is certain is that there has been a serious disturbance of party relationships and that, as from 1876 to 1896, all other questions are subordinated to the trade issue.

It cannot be doubted that the mass of manufacturers regard the contract into which the Government has entered with grave apprehension. Mr Taft admits that the representatives of the United States were instructed to go the length of absolute free trade between the two countries. Canadian manufacturers are convinced that they cannot compete successfully with the great trusts and heavily capitalized industries of the neighbouring country. They feel that if the farmers are deprived of such protection as they now enjoy against the importation of American products there will be an irresistible movement against the duties in favour of manufactures. It is argued that free wheat will transfer the milling industry to St Paul and Minneapolis, particularly as the agreement does not provide for abolition of the duties on flour and by-products. The packing houses fear loss of the western market, keen competition in their own field for hogs, and a trust control of the market across the border against which they cannot hope to make headway. The fruit growers of British Columbia will lose their advantage in the prairie provinces and those of Ontario face the loss of the western trade, heavy imports of American fruits before their own fields ripen, and subsequently a lessened demand in a jaded market. It is held that the salt industry will be prejudiced and that manufacturers of the finer grades of paper will be subjected to severe compe-

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tion under unequal conditions. But beyond the effects upon individual industries national and Imperial considerations enter into the problem, and these chiefly inspire the agitation against ratification of the compact.

It must be remembered that during the old Reciprocity Treaty, running from 1854 to 1866, there was no confederated Dominion, there was no considerable exchange of trade between the two Canadas and the British maritime provinces, the west lay in primeval solitude under the jealous sovereignty of the Hudson's Bay Company. In the meantime we have made connection with the east by the Intercolonial Railway and with the west by the Canadian Pacific Railway and have assumed heavy obligations of cash and credit for two additional transcontinental railway enterprises. It is estimated that eighty per cent of the trade of Canada is done within the national boundaries. The policy of driving trade from east to west was imposed upon us by the exclusive tariffs of the United States. Again and again we made pilgrimages to Washington, only to return discouraged and empty-handed. In order, therefore, to maintain our existence as a nation we were forced to create ports, to deepen canals, to build railways, and to provide at enormous cost all the necessary facilities for interchange of trade between seven or eight millions of people stretched across a continent. Opponents of the Reciprocity agreement naturally dwell upon these facts and insist that free trade in natural products will mean an immense diversion of traffic to north and south courses and thus affect great transportation enterprises in which hundreds of millions of British capital have been invested, check the growth of Canadian industrial centres, and tend to separate both the east and the west from older Canada.

It is argued, moreover, that seventy per cent of the western population has been born on the plains, or has come from over the sea or from the United States, and thus has no knowledge of older Canada, and naturally an imperfect sympathy with eastern interests and eastern con-

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ditions. Besides a great physical gap divides the east from the west and makes the problem of Canadian nationality immensely onerous and difficult. Opponents of the agreement also contend that both the independence of Canada and the connexion with Great Britain are threatened by a policy which establishes close commercial relations between the Dominion and the United States, which encourages an unequal partnership between eight millions and ninety millions of people, which must reduce imports from the Mother Country, and which must practically exclude us from any future fiscal union of the British dominions. It is insisted also that the agreement, terminable as it is at the caprice of either country, lacks the essential element of permanence, and leaves it within the power of the United States when new trading conditions have been established to reduce the whole commerce of the Dominion to confusion, and thus to exercise a mighty leverage for political union.

To all this is added an accumulating mass of statistics to prove that the average prices of farm products range as high in Canada as in the United States, and that the interests of farmers cannot be advanced by the unobstructed competition of products from the United States, from Argentina, from Australia, from New Zealand and from nine or ten other countries entitled to the benefits of the agreement under favoured nation treaties. One result has been to destroy, or at least to impair, the contention that the United States must soon cease to be a grain-exporting country. As was to be expected from more scientific methods of farming the actual yield of wheat in the United States is increasing steadily, the production per head of population is increasing, the acreage devoted to wheat is increasing and the yield per acre is increasing. For example, between 1890 and 1909 the production increased from 2,383,000,000 bushels to 3,464,000,000 bushels, the production per head from 7.33 bushels to 8.07 bushels, the area of production from 36,814,000 acres to 49,930,000 acres and the yield per acre

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from 12·88 bushels to 14·76 bushels. In short, the Conservative party is squarely recommitting itself to the old Macdonald policy of all-round protection, and whatever loss of strength may be sustained in the rural constituencies, there is reason to think that gains will be made in the industrial communities.

Although, as has been said, manufacturers are not affected directly by the Reciprocity agreement, they seem to be persuaded that if the bulk of Western products go southward there must be some proportionate return trade in American manufactures and they well understand that the growth of the west explains the industrial revival in older Canada. It is manifest, however, that the Government contemplates no attack upon manufacturers. This assurance has come both from Sir Wilfrid Laurier and from Mr Fielding, with the additional announcement that it is not now intended to increase the British preference. But in the west both the Government and the Opposition face a formidable free trade sentiment. There is a feeling very like that in the south with which American statesmen had to deal in the 'thirties, and through which free trade was made a principle of the Confederacy. The unanimous resolution of the Saskatchewan Legislature shows the depth of this feeling, and it is inflamed by the considerable element of British free traders in the Prairie Provinces, who cannot have any exact knowledge of conditions in older Canada, but who see here as in England an eternal law in an economic creed. As these can have no alliance with Conservatives, they may become increasingly influential in the Liberal party. It is true the western grain growers have not secured any appreciable reduction in the duties on farm machinery and that the Reciprocity agreement has not taken the exact form of their demands, but while pressing still for lower duties they will not reject what the agreement with Washington offers. There is manifest exasperation amongst supporters of the Government over the attitude of many manufacturers and in the

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west vigorous denunciation of "the eastern interests." It would be idle to deny that the whole controversy is infinitely disturbing and that we approach a dangerous tension between the newer and the older provinces. So long as the agitation for lower duties was directed only towards the Laurier administration Western Conservatives tolerated if they did not even incite the movement. Thus they gave strength to the forces which they must now resist. It is noteworthy that, notwithstanding the action of the Conservatives in the Saskatchewan Legislature every Conservative newspaper in the province opposes reciprocity, and this is true of the whole press of the party from the lakes to the Pacific. It is certain, however, that the Conservative party has a hard battle to fight in the western country or at least in the three grain-growing provinces. There is some expectation that Mr McBride, the Premier of British Columbia, will join Mr Borden, and become virtually the western leader of the party. This undoubtedly would strengthen the Opposition, and, more important, from the commanding position which he would take in national affairs he could perhaps do something to modify western feeling and inspire national consciousness in the new population. It is expected that the first test of public feeling over the trade agreement will be made in Nova Scotia, where a provincial general election is impending. The Liberal Government of the province will seek to have the contest turn on the trade issue. It is contended that the fishermen are strongly favourable to Reciprocity, and this vote is decisive in many constituencies. A provincial contest, however, never is a true test of feeling on a Federal issue, although no doubt a favourable verdict would hearten the Federal Administration. This is not to suggest that the Government at Ottawa fears the judgement of the country. It is showing great activity in the constituencies and a strong confidence in the farming communities. Significant is the fact that even in Quebec discussion of the naval programme has been substantially abandoned, and that Mr Bourassa, with

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various doubts and qualifications, commends the trade agreement, or at least rejects the arguments by which it is chiefly opposed.

The general argument of the Ministerialists is that the Government, faithful to the historical teaching of Canadian statesmen of all parties, has at last secured a generous trade arrangement with the United States, that this opens to farmers their natural and most profitable market, that better prices for farm products will increase land values and the revenues of the farming population, that prosperous farmers assure prosperous towns and cities, that immigration from the United States and elsewhere into the western provinces will be accelerated, that increased field production will mean increased traffic for railways and a greater demand for manufactures, that growth of population will attract new industries to Canada, that with our greater store of raw material manufacturers will come to the sources of supply, that Canada is not less free to enter into a preferential trading relation with Great Britain, and that to suggest that an agreement for freer trade with the United States endangers Canadian nationality or the Imperial connexion is to insult the people and to reduce the profession of loyalty to a base political artifice. Thus stands the great controversy which at least has restored vitality to Canadian politics, and, whatever the immediate issue, must have far-reaching consequences for Canada and for the Empire. Twenty years ago, under the leadership of Cleveland and Laurier there was a formidable demand for low tariff all over the continent. There were no substantial or permanent results. Again under Taft and Laurier the two countries approach a commercial alliance. Generally the Liberal party of Canada inclines towards freedom of trade and welcomes the advances of Washington. The Conservative party, far more definitely than twenty years ago, resists American advances and would continue moderate protection of home industries and of the products of field, sea, mine and forest. Both parties profess to desire a pre-

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ference for Canadian products in British markets, but neither feels that it would be prudent or advantageous to interfere in the domestic politics of Great Britain. Once we have an actual application of free trade in natural products there will follow either a reincarnation of protectionism or a great concentration of influences towards the commercial unification of the continent. Can we, or should we, resist the advances of the United States since we enjoy only equal privileges with foreign nations in British markets? Unarmed fiscally Great Britain is powerless to affect the course of the Dominions over the sea. But we mistake if we think that we can trust to the gods alone to blaze our path and to secure our future.

AUSTRALIAN POLITICS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE—TWO VIEWS

I.

IN the month of April the Commonwealth was in the throes of a struggle for the extension of federal powers and functions. The matters at issue were, in the nature of things, fought for and resisted chiefly on lines of party cleavage, and, as is usual in such cases, certain vital principles and tendencies were obscured or neglected in the clash and clang of conflict. But, while the fight between the Labour Government and its combination of opponents may have been of little more than domestic and temporary concern, and while too the questions decided at the Referendum were complicated by tactical manœuvring, nevertheless the student of imperial politics in its larger relations will perceive in recent occurrences a movement, a shaping of forces, of far-reaching importance. To the eye that looks beyond the present, to the intelligence seized of the value of principles, the thing that signified was not the victory or defeat of the Labour Government's policy but the strengthening and extension of the federal idea, the more complete equipment of the central government with powers, the perfecting of the mechanism of national authority. That is the point of view from which it is proposed to regard the happenings of April.

Five proposed constitutional amendments were submitted for the arbitrament of the electors of Australia. The constitution requires that any amendment shall be approved by a majority of the whole people voting and by a majority of the states. Two bills embodying the proposed amendments were passed by Parliament in its last session; one embodying four amendments, and the second containing the fifth. This is a procedure that occasioned a confusion of the issue, and alienated a mass of thoughtful opinion, threatening defeat for the whole policy.

The four proposed amendments contained in one bill

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were not closely related. As will be seen from the nature of the questions, it should have been quite possible for an elector to discriminate between them, to approve of one or more and to reject the remainder. But the Government wished to secure the whole block of its proposed amendments at one coup, and it therefore fastened together the four by which it was desired to extend the power of the Commonwealth Parliament, making them the subject of one referendum question, which had to be answered "Yes" or "No." It was clever, if not cunning politics, and as the constitution permitted it to be done the Government (on the Machiavellian conception of political ethics) could hardly be blamed for adopting the course that seemed likely to conduce to victory. But it aroused antagonisms and suspicions in quarters where there was an inclination to be friendly; and during the campaign these distrusts were deepened and extended by the intolerance of a section of the Labour party's wirepullers in conference. The Protectionists in Victoria were also alienated. These currents of opinion, however, do not, after all, touch essentials. They are of evanescent interest. What matters, from the broader outlook, is the underlying question of the scope of federal power, and the salutary exercise of it.

The first proposed amendment affected the trade and commerce clauses of the constitution. As it stood, this provision gave the federal Parliament power to make laws with respect to "Trade and commerce with other countries and among the states."

The words, "with other countries and among the states," are a limitation upon the federal jurisdiction. As Professor Harrison Moore writes in his work on *The Commonwealth of Australia*, "Commerce," as the word is here employed, denotes that which "concerns more states than one," as distinguished from the purely internal or domestic commerce of a single state. In fact the provision is the weakest endowment of commerce power enjoyed by any of the federated dominions.

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It does not appear, from the debates of the Convention which framed the Commonwealth constitution, that any consideration was given to the adequacy of the form of words chosen. Indeed, they were hardly chosen at all, in the sense of weighing their import. They were substantially copied from the constitution of the United States, which endows Congress with power: "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."

The result is that a purely artificial line is drawn between the commerce subject to federal law, and that which is under state jurisdiction. A ton of goods passing between Wodonga and Albury, situated in two states, though only three miles apart, is subject to Commonwealth law; but a ton of goods passing between Albury and Sydney, lying 350 miles apart, though in the same state, is not. It is not good government, it is not good sense, to enforce a legal distinction where there is no difference in the fact; and a bifurcated commerce law—nay, worse, a commerce law varying in each state—creates complications and makes mock at the very idea of federation.

The strength of the case for this proposed amendment is impressed upon the mind of any one who reads the expository speech of the federal Attorney-General, Mr Hughes, and the reply to it by Mr Deakin (*Federal Parliamentary Debates*, 1910, pp. 4696-4715, and 4801-4828). Mr. Deakin on this occasion was so far below form as to remind one of Juvenal's Crispus:

" Cuius erant mores, qualis facundia, mite
Ingenium ";

and though, when his cause and his convictions are alike strong, it could never be said of him that *nunquam direxit brachia contra torrentem*, he did now seem to be not swimming against the torrent but blocking it back with a sieve. The main argument rushed through and swirled round, but was not fairly met.

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The pinch of the problem is, as was said by Mr. W. H. Irvine in the same debate, that

“ Commerce is really an organic whole, and an organic whole of continually increasing complexity. . . . When we have in a constitution legislative powers divided by an artificial line we impose on the court the necessity of drawing some distinction, and of resorting sometimes to the most extraordinary expedients in order to do so.”

Three other proposed amendments of the constitution submitted to the electorate in conjunction with the commerce provision, were designed to give the Federal Parliament complete power to legislate with regard to all corporations operating within the Commonwealth; on industries, including wages, employment, and industrial disputes; and regarding combinations and monopolies. They were extensions of the Commonwealth legislative domain that might fairly be subjects of differing degrees of popular favour. The arguments in support of a simple and direct exercise of authority over trade and commerce did not necessarily apply to the grant of a sweeping power over all industries and all corporations. But the Labour Government, being intensely anxious to secure extended scope regarding industrial legislation and the control of monopolies, bracketed these with the two other proposed amendments, so that by a pooling of votes they might achieve their full purpose at one stroke.

The fifth proposed amendment, contained in a separate bill, and the subject of a separate referendum question, contemplated an audacious and drastic augmentation of federal authority. It was designed to hold a loaded rifle at the head of trusts and combines in the shape of a power to issue a peremptory mandate of nationalization. The new section proposed to be inserted in the constitution provided:

“ When each House of the Parliament, in the same session, has by resolution declared that the industry or

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business of producing, manufacturing or supplying any specified goods, or of supplying any specified services, is the subject of a monopoly, the Parliament shall have power to make laws for carrying on the industry or business by or under the control of the Commonwealth, and acquiring for that purpose on just terms any property used in connexion with the industry or business."

This was fully in accordance with the declared policy of the Labour party, and was their first plain order of "quick march" towards socialism. But the submission of it at the same referendum as dealt with the trade and commerce power and the provisions affecting corporations and industrial conditions cut clean across the issue of solidified central power *versus* commercial confusion and parochial prerogative. It ran up the red flag above the federal colours, and complicated a serious national policy with what to many appeared to be a mere wild-cat project.

The strategy of the Labour Government was devised not without electioneering sagacity, and at the time of writing it is impossible to foretell that it will not succeed. But the combinations of opinion against it are formidable and increasing, and the prospects appear to be shaping for a defeat of the proposed amendments at the referendum. An analysis of the forces contending on either side shows the following factors.

On the affirmative side there is, to begin with, the phalanx of the Labour party's organization, disciplined, regimented, ready, coherent. Mr Fisher is at the head of an electoral army, with a striking power unmatched by any other school of thought in Australian politics. When a plan of campaign is considered and determined, the battalions move forward to the ballot box and have no use for laggards or dissidents. The caucus system offers little encouragement to the independent thinker. A party, it has been said, is like a sausage machine, mashing all heads into one pulp. The more effective the party as a concentrated force, the less room there is for the individual who wants to take a road

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of his own. Hence, no doubt, the tone of intolerance that characterized the deliberations of the Labour Conference held in Sydney in February. A by no means negligible element in the Labour party is suspicious of the extension of federal power and jealous for the maintenance of state authority. Mr Holman, the Attorney-General in the New South Wales Labour Ministry, did his best to voice this point of view at the Conference. His experience was unhappy. He was trounced as a traitor, his expulsion was demanded, a formal resolution was passed censuring him in scathing terms, and one delegate suggested that he ought to be hanged. Mr Holman was rapidly reduced to the plight of Omar's pot:

“And with his half-obliterated tongue
He murmured, ‘Gently, brother, gently, pray.’”

Nevertheless, Mr Holman's punishment did not entirely silence the advocates of state rights within the Labour party, for a few weeks later Mr McGowen, the Labour Premier of New South Wales, mustered courage to say that

“to confer on the Federal Parliament powers to deal with such matters as domestic commerce, industrial legislation and the control of the railway system would be fraught with grave possibilities.”

Mr Holman himself, for some time after the ordeal, had not breath enough in his body to utter even a portentous platitude. He had been thoroughly subjugated by his party in caucus, who had handled him in the spirit of the Scotch parson praying for Louis XIV—“O Lord, shake him over the mouth of hell, but don't let him drop”! All that he could do, after ten days' interval for recovery, was to explain publicly that he would “abandon active hostility to the proposals, although his previously expressed opinions were unchanged.”

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The main force, then, in favour of the projected extension of power is the Labour party's solid front, whipped into line by the discipline of the caucus. It is aided by a considerable element of advanced opinion, corresponding to Radical thought in England, which votes "Labour" because Mr Fisher's party in Parliament stands for a forward policy. The legislative and administrative record of the Government has certainly not weakened its hold upon this section. Thirdly, the affirmative host is supported by many of those who wish to see the ambit of federal power widened, and who believe that at present the constitution is too restrictive, although, as already indicated, this accession of strength is not likely to be so frankly conceded as was the case at the general election of 1910, in consequence of the confusion of purely federal with other issues.

A sinister feature of the situation has to be counted as a factor favourable to success. The Government, while the Legislative Powers Bill was in committee, submitted an amendment defining the terms "labour and employment" and making the Commonwealth control over industrial legislation extend to "disputes in relation to employment on or about railways the property of any state." This was a wider extension than was originally proposed even by the Government. It contemplated an invasion of the sphere of the states that if exercised to the full would put them under the thumb of the Commonwealth. The salaries and wages of the railway servants are provided for by the state Parliaments. Any who are discontented are able to make their appeal, through friendly members, to their own Parliament. They have always exercised their power in this respect, often vociferously; but now it was proposed to give them the further right, if dissatisfied with the provision made for them, to appeal to the federal authority over the head of their state paymasters. Such a wholesale subjugation of state sovereignty was certainly never deemed possible when the Commonwealth was established, and is a far different thing from the healthy development of power desired

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by the great body of thoughtful federalists. The manner of making the demand, too, justifies the use of the word "sinister." By this amendment the Government made a bid for the vote of the 150,000 railway servants, their wives, and their dependents, within the Commonwealth. The Attorney-General, as Mr Deakin put it,

"held out a specific inducement to every railway servant in this country to vote for altering the federal constitution, with a view of securing the anticipated benefits that he may think likely to arise hereafter from the operation of Commonwealth legislation."

If it was not buying the railway vote, it looked suspiciously like doing so. Consequently, though this factor has to be counted in favour of the success of the Government policy, it is a most displeasing one to contemplate. There is a smack of market overt about it.

The forces on the other side have no real organization to put into the field in opposition to the caucus-screwed solidity of the Labour party. It is only by noting a gathering of dissociated elements that one can foresee a possibility of defeat for the Government's referendum proposals. It cannot even be said that there is a constitutional party in Australia—a party, that is, devoted to the maintenance of the constitution on its broad federal principles, and to the development of them along the lines of the instrument itself, in accordance with the growing needs of the Commonwealth. But there is still a large body of well-informed opinion opposed to any violent wrenching of the constitutional compact. The wonder is that an attempt has not been made to focus this feeling, to make it articulate and effective by means of organization. It is probably stronger than the politicians believe. It was the real depth of federal feeling as much as the machinery of the Labour party that defeated the Deakin Government's financial policy in 1910. If this great body of opinion were to swing to the other side at the referendum, the strength of it would probably be surprising.

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Another negative element was disclosed by the pronounced attitude of the Victorian protectionists. These politicians, represented by the Melbourne *Age*, desire another increase of the tariff. Indeed, they are never quite happy unless the tariff is being screwed up, and each successive amendment is declared by them to be satisfactory only as a resting-place till times are ripe for giving the wrack-lever another turn. But the leaders of the Labour party have proclaimed that they will have nothing to do with increased protection unless the referendum gives power to the Federal Parliament to pass more extensive industrial legislation. They want, they say, to apply the principles of protection to the workman. This conditional attitude did not satisfy the Victorian protectionists. They want higher customs duties in any case. Consequently the *Age* declared against the whole of the questions submitted at the referendum. This diversion of strength is undoubtedly formidable, as proved by previous experience, and is quite likely to turn the scale in the second state of the Commonwealth in point of population.

Of course, the dead-weight of what may be called conservative opinion is bound to be cast in the negative scale at the referendum. There is a very large class that has a fearsome horror of the Labour party, and calls its leaders "those people." They are not capable of the sacrifice and organized consistency of their political enemies, but they count as a rubble mass at the polls. They have a word, just now, which expresses their haunting dread of vaguely apprehended abhorrences. It is "unification." There is no doubt that the proposed amendment affecting railway servants does undermine the federal idea, but as used by the large class of comfortable persons who roll out the five syllables of "unification" so impressively the word seems rather to be used as an Abracadabra to exorcise the spirit of federalism. A proposal to free the Commonwealth from financial leg-ropes was "unification." An amendment of the trade and commerce power to make the Commonwealth as

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unhampered as is the Dominion Government in Canada is "unification." Avaunt, unification. Dominie Sampson, confronted by Meg Merrilies at the Kaim of Derncleugh, was not more alarmed. "*Conjuro te, sclerestissima nequissima, spurcissima, iniquissima, atque misserima conjuro te—Unification!*" They might as well adopt the whole cabalistic formula. Disraeli said that "England is governed by phrases." But a phrase does at least require constructing. It calls for a touch of wit. To be swayed by a mere word, even one of five syllables, is ignominious. Mr Hughes, in submitting the new policy to Parliament, declared that there was not a shadow of justification "for the assertion that the proposals made for unification." Mr W. H. Irvine, who spoke with an independence entitling him to be heard with special respect, having in view his eminence as a constitutional lawyer and his general antagonism to the Labour party, said:

"The argument that the bill has a tendency towards unification I utterly fail to grasp; I cannot see the meaning of it. Unless the position be taken that any increase at all, or any important increase, in the subjects over which this Parliament is given constitutional power by Section 51, amounts to a step towards unification, that argument cannot apply to this case."

Nevertheless throughout the referendum contest the blessed word has been used as a five-pronged fork to push back the federal wave, and will doubtless be used again whenever the cause of national strength is opposed to that of provincial ineptitude.

The pity of it was that the confusing of issues and the introduction of sinister propositions makes it almost impossible for the distinction between true federalism and false to be plainly drawn. The method of referendum may be a very good means of ascertaining the verdict of the people if a simple, clear, brief, straightforward question be put. But the very object of the referendum is subverted by a tacking of questions; and in face of such a complicated situation

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many ardent federalists had to consider whether they ought not to vote "No" on both bills and advise others to do the same.

The referendum is being held under peculiar circumstances. It is wholly apart from any other issue. It is not held in conjunction with a general election, as previous exercise of the referendum have been. There is lacking, therefore, the strenuousness of contest incidental to personal struggles for election. The probabilities point to a small poll. On the whole the Government is likely to be advantaged by these circumstances, for in the absence of the incitement of personality, organization is likely to tell. Many leaders, too, have left Australia for England. Sir John Forrest, after giving directions to the electors of his state, Western Australia, as to how he wished them to vote, sailed away to confer *eclat* upon the Coronation proceedings; and Mr Fisher, in company with his able Minister of Defence, Senator Pearce, departed shortly after the serious campaign opened. Faced by a situation full of confusion, perplexity and misgiving, the Commonwealth does not approach the referendum in a state of mind which the most confident of political prophets can profess to read with ease.

II.

AS pointed out in the article, the referendums have to be regarded from two points of view—their relation to the present political situation in Australia and their place in the future development of Australian institutions.

As to the first, to many it did not seem possible to accept the invitation to dissociate the question of the proposed extension of Commonwealth powers from the circumstances of time and persons when and by whom it was sought. The government of the country during the next two years is in the hands neither of the Cabinet nor of the Commonwealth Parliament, but of the caucus of the Labour party, and any powers which nominally belong to the Commonwealth are actually exercised by the caucus.

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How completely the functions of Parliament are in abeyance has been demonstrated more than once during the late session when, during debate in the House on important measures, the ministerial party has withdrawn from the chamber into caucus, providing merely for the continuance of debate in the House by "stone-walling" until such time as the caucus has determined how the vote of the party should be cast. It is to such a novel system of government that people accustomed to parliamentary institutions were asked to hand over vast and indefinite powers.

So much for method. Then, as to the actual use that was to be made of these powers, for two years—a not inconsiderable period in the rapidly changing affairs of a young country—the country was asked to give *carte blanche* to the caucus (to the extent of the new powers) to enter upon novel experiments containing it knew not what possibility of danger or disaster or oppression. To take a particular instance. One of the first proposals of the Labour Government on the assumption of office was to amend the Arbitration Act in respect to preference to unionists in two particulars: by making it compulsory in all cases brought before the Court instead of being merely a power which the Court might exercise or not, and by removing the restriction which forbade preference to trades unions formed for political purposes. The second amendment was carried and is now part of the law; the first was abandoned because it was almost certainly *ultra vires* under the constitution. But the constitutional objections which were good in 1910 would have no place under the amended constitution of 1911, while the Commonwealth power would become co-extensive with industrial activity in every part of the Commonwealth. There can be little doubt that the proposal abandoned in 1910 would not wait long for enactment after the new powers had been obtained. Having regard to the identification of modern trades unionism with political organization, the result would be that to work at his trade a man must not merely

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join a trade union, but must hand over to the organization of that union his whole freedom of political action—subscribe to its political funds, subscribe to a party newspaper, cease to belong to any other political organization, and abstain from all political action hostile to the party. In this way, the organization of the Labour party would be extended and its machinery strengthened by the most formidable sanction. A grosser perversion of the institutions of a free country can hardly be imagined. It indicates how completely the Labour party has broken away from the traditions of liberalism and serves to explain how it repels those to whom the name of liberal is something more than a political label.

Turning now to the bearing of the referendums upon the prospective development of Australian institutions and of Australian nationhood, we find that the proposed powers are so extensive in their character that it is not easy to point to any very considerable head of power which is left in the exclusive authority of the states. Yet it is inconceivable that everything which belongs to the vague description of trade and commerce should be the subject of uniform legislation; indeed it is clearly contemplated that the federal industrial power shall be exercised in accordance with the varying needs and conditions of different parts of Australia. This involves a substantial departure from the fundamental principles of 1900—the principles which the authors of that constitution would have described as imparting to the constitution its federal character, viz., that, save in such matters as were within the exclusive power of the Commonwealth, the diversity of local conditions should be provided for by the states and not by the Commonwealth, and that in their vast sphere of internal government the states should be independent of the Commonwealth. Under the proposed amendments, the states and their authorities are in all the more important matters of government substantially responsible to the Commonwealth. If it approves of their acts, it will permit them to operate; if it does not, it will

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supersede their laws and their authorities by its own, just as any central government anywhere controls its local agencies. In addition to the control which it can exercise over the states and their institutions, the Commonwealth can, of course, set up its own local institutions for carrying out its administration. Now, all this may be a good thing, but this general subordination of the state action to Commonwealth action may be not inappropriately described as the substitution of an unified system of government for a federal system. Agreeing that the wail of "unification" deserves much of the sarcasm of the previous article, I do not know that it differs in that particular from political cries in general.

If in their immediate effect the amendments may not unjustly be described as unitary, their tendency is indubitably in that direction. The remaining limitations on the powers of the Commonwealth Parliament will have become meaningless and will serve simply to complicate and embarrass the functions of government. The present organization of the states, derived from their day of plenary power, will have little meaning when their powers are exercised by sufferance of the Commonwealth. The preservation of the forms of the present constitution with the alteration of the substance will commend itself to very few, and even the British toleration of political anomalies will be very severely strained. Already the constitution of South Africa has many admirers in Australia, and the movement for formal unification will receive an impulse from those who desire a reform of the Senate in the direction of getting rid of state equality there. The adoption of the amendments then would appear likely to plunge us in disputes over further alteration of the constitution.

The last phase of the matter, perhaps the least noticed, may be the most important. There is in Australia a large body of opinion, especially among active and intelligent young men, which is ambitious and impatient for Australia to assume her place and her responsibilities among the

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nations of the empire. Recoiling from a mere Victorian or South Australian allegiance, they are in the inevitable conflicts between the federal and state governments, "for the Commonwealth every time," and they identify the augmentation of the powers of the Commonwealth government with the advance of Australian nationhood. It seems that here there is a very dangerous misconception. The framers of the constitution of 1900 were very experienced politicians, and they knew that a parliament to which was committed the great social and industrial problems of modern life would have little thought for anything else; the pressure of interests upon it would be constant, and where the interest is the vote is also. In other words the Australian Parliament would be a replica of the colonial parliaments, with their limitations, their narrow outlook, and their characteristic views of the relative importance of the matters committed to them. It is not to such a parliament overloaded with internal affairs that we are to look for the study of the delicate problems of external relations which Australia has to face in the near future and her appreciation of which will constitute her best title to nationhood. The nationalism of a legislature trained habitually to look inwards is only too likely to be provincialism writ large.

NOTE.—The proposals of the Government were defeated by a large majority at the referendum held on April 26. The figures were as follows: On the proposal to give the Federal Parliament powers over all matters of trade, commerce and industry within the Commonwealth—for 443,000, against 687,000. On the proposal to give the Federal Government power to acquire and naturalise monopolies—for 446,000, against 682,000. These figures are approximate.

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THERE have been no surprises in the latter half of the Parliamentary session. The Ministry has had some trouble with its back benches over points of detail, but that was always expected. On the other hand the Opposition has not shown itself particularly active in hostility. There is an obvious tendency for it to fall into the same attitude as was taken by the Opposition in the last Transvaal Parliament, namely, one of friendly criticism rather than of constant attack. There are exceptions, of course; for the Opposition is no more homogeneous than the Ministerialists, and the marked differences of temperament, antecedents and outlook between the leading men are reflected sometimes in a difference of tactics. But, taken broadly, it is true to say that Doctor Jameson's avowed policy of "helping General Botha" has been followed out. Towards the end of the session the Unionists were deprived temporarily of their leader by illness, and his absence was deplored on both sides alike. There is no individual in South Africa who commands greater general respect at the present time than Doctor Jameson, and none whose loss from politics would be more serious from the national point of view. It is to be hoped that there is no risk of it.

The crop of legislation seems likely to be small. At the time of writing the session is within a fortnight of its finish, and out of the measures of importance that have been introduced it is doubtful whether more than one or two will reach a third reading, since all the time that is left will be needed for the Budget. This position has its compensations. None of the bills introduced were models of draughtsmanship, or showed much evidence of thought. In fact, as a member remarked in the House of Assembly, three hours seemed to have been given to drafts that should have taken three weeks. It is useless to expect any House of Assembly—much less an Assembly so inexperienced as ours—to make a good job of legislation thrown at its head in this sort of form. Most of

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the bills brought forward, if they are passed, will have to be repealed or extensively remodelled within a very short time. A year's delay may give the Government time to appreciate the situation and to provide some machinery more adequate than exists at present for drafting Acts of Parliament. Considering the amount of consolidation that has to be done—that is, of the laws of the different provinces into Union laws—they would certainly be justified in appointing a special commission of such legal talent as they can command to sit continuously for the next two years and turn out drafts.

The situation as it exists between the Government and the Opposition and their respective sections is illustrated by three questions which arose during the session—education, the Budget, and Sunday milling on the gold mines. It was mentioned in the last number of *THE ROUND TABLE* that the question of the language or languages to be used as the medium of education had been referred to a Select Committee of the House of Assembly. At the time of writing these notes the committee has not reported; but it is commonly believed that a settlement has been come to on the only satisfactory lines, viz. that the parents shall have a free choice which medium is used. But it is no secret that up to the last moment a settlement was despaired of owing to the absolute insistence of General Hertzog on his unworkable scheme of using two media side by side, and that only great pressure from the “advanced” section of the Ministry induced him to give way. General Hertzog is hardly accessible to argument on this particular question, but his colleagues naturally did not want a fight which would have revealed divisions in their own ranks, which would have committed them to a system which some of them at any rate are not enthusiastic about, and which would have given the Opposition a standing grievance. There was no public discussion; the matter was settled privately. This may be taken as an instance of the way in which even serious differences of opinion among the Ministerialists can be composed in the party caucus.

The Sunday milling question was the occasion for a revolt

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of the back benches on both sides. In South Africa most Sunday work and trading is prohibited. There are the usual exceptions, and in addition the crushing machinery of the Witwatersrand gold mines is kept running, though mining itself, i.e. the extraction of the rock, is stopped. There are various reasons of convenience given for this, but the merits of the matter need not be discussed here. The main point is that it has always been the custom and was allowed under the laws of the late Transvaal Republic. This session a bill consolidating the regulations dealing with mines and machinery was brought forward, and in the first draft Sunday milling was allowed, according to the existing custom, though other kinds of work were prohibited. Unofficial amendments were moved from both sides of the House. The "backvelders," led by General Beyers, took the ground that all Sunday labour was sinful and that all machinery must be stopped completely on that day. What may be called the commercial-religious element on the Unionist side took the same line but not quite so rigidly, since they did not want the law applied to machinery universally, but only or mainly to that of the mines. On the other hand the Government contended that interference with the established practice would involve loss to the mines, and indirectly to the revenue, which the result attained would not justify, since few men were employed on the mills and these could be given holidays at other times. There was an acrimonious debate, in which the Government, supported by the leaders of the Opposition, found itself attacked by the rank and file on both sides. Finally the question was shelved by consent, the Ministry undertaking to refer it to a commission of inquiry. The incident goes to show that party discipline is lax in the House and the influence of the Ministry not beyond dispute with their own followers when the question at issue cannot be treated as one of confidence.

In the Budget debates the most remarkable feature has been the revolt of Mr Merriman. The only severe criticisms of the Government's financial measures and policy have come

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from him. The official Opposition have criticized, it is true, but half-heartedly. There is no half-heartedness about Mr Merriman. He has denounced the Ministry root and branch, with so much point and effect that General Botha, who loses his temper without difficulty, asked him why he did not sit among the Opposition instead of among the nominal supporters of the Government. His general line has been to accuse the Ministry of extravagance in the present, and senseless optimism about the future; in fact, of a spendthrift policy. He has received some support, not only from his own tiny personal following, but from the Cape Unionists, for the finance of the Union Government is regarded as carrying on the Transvaal tradition, and is therefore looked on suspiciously in the southern province. On the other hand, the Transvaal Unionists, if they have not supported, have at any rate refrained from attacking the Government actively in respect of its financial policy. Possibly Mr Merriman's view is a little exaggerated in gloom, but outsiders are inclined to think that he has made out part of his case. Still, his eloquent invectives have turned no votes, though they may have discredited the Ministry to some extent. If only half his forebodings come true it will seriously damage the position of the Transvaal wing in the Government.

Two matters with an inter-Dominion interest have come up in Parliament during the session—the question of the shipping service and the question of preference. The first has been debated at length, as the Ministry brought in a bill giving themselves very wide powers to favour or penalize shipping companies. The avowed object was to enable them to strike at the Union Castle Company, which holds the mail contract now expiring and which manages the ring that controls South African freight rates. Ministers allege that the company is unreasonable and that they must have penalizing powers to bring it to terms. The company of course denies that it can concede an inch more and live. As no British shipping company is likely to be able to take a mail contract for South Africa on terms refused by the Union Castle Com-

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pany, the probable result of the present situation would appear to be either the establishment of a state-owned line of steamers or the transference of the mail contract to the subsidized German line. Neither of these results would be popular. But in spite of the high words that have passed it would be perhaps a mistake to suppose that the breach between the Government and the company is past repair. The language held by General Botha on one occasion certainly gave some support to the theory that both sides are bluffing and that matters will not be pushed to an extreme. The two points of complaint put forward in public by the Government do not touch the mail contract, but the conduct of the shipping ring; they are the system of rebates by which the ring ties its customers to use no competing line, and the rate of freight on mealies. Both these matters should admit of compromise.

The other question—that of preference—is more important, but has been less in the foreground. There was a mysterious announcement in the newspapers that the South African Government would propose at the forthcoming Imperial Conference that the preference which is at present given to British imports into South Africa should be abolished, and that a sum equivalent to the extra taxation thus raised should be allotted by South Africa as its annual contribution to the British navy. Immediately after this announcement appeared it was contradicted and it was officially stated that the South African Government did not propose to raise the question of preference at the conference. Later on it appeared that the proposal referred to was actually put forward but withdrawn a fortnight later. It seems difficult at first to account for this attitude on the part of the Union Government. South Africa has such plain and immediate advantages to gain by any acceptance of the policy of preference in the United Kingdom that one would think her representatives the last people likely to start an attack on it. Moreover, General Botha has always been supposed to be a strong advocate of preference. The solution

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of the mystery can only be guessed at: the most likely guess is that the move was mostly due to Mr Merriman, who, among his other old-fashioned Radical doctrines, holds an unreasoning horror of preference. The Government, before the Budget debates came on, was anxious to conciliate him, and this suggestion gave them the means of doing so. Besides it had the attraction of promising to provide additional revenue, for the effect would be to raise the tariff by twenty-five per cent on British imports into South Africa. This should bring in a fair sum of money, and even if it were ear-marked for naval defence, the Treasury would be relieved from further demands under that head and would save its present contribution. Another point is that such a proposal coming from one of the Dominions would undoubtedly be useful to the Liberal Government in England for purposes of party controversy. However, the suggestion was not persevered in: possibly General Botha put his foot down when he came to understand the situation. The main importance of the incident is that it shows how many different cross-currents are working on the course of inter-Dominion problems at present. As regards preference itself, some of those who advocate it in the Dominions are beginning to think that Great Britain will have to lose her Colonial as she is losing her European markets before her eyes are opened.

Immigration—another inter-Dominion subject—has been dealt with in a draft bill which is not likely to pass this session, though it cannot be called controversial. It takes the same line as Acts which have already been approved elsewhere, i.e. it imposes on immigrants an educational test, the stringency of which may be varied widely at the discretion of the immigration officer, and which is sufficient, if applied strictly, to keep out immigrants whom the Administration may wish to exclude. Practically, no doubt, the Act will be applied so as to exclude Asiatics, i.e. Indians. It might possibly be used to repress an influx of immigration from Europe, but no such influx is likely. The only immigration

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question which we have in South Africa at present is that of the Indians. That has been sufficiently troublesome in the past, and it is doubtful if the new Act will remove all the difficulties.

In connexion with this subject of immigration, I may refer to the article on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which appeared in the last number of THE ROUND TABLE and which has received a good deal of attention in political circles here. I should say that the general feeling among responsible people is that as far as South Africa is concerned there is no objection to the renewal of the alliance if it seems to be in the interests of the empire, which at present it certainly does. We have never attracted Japanese immigration in large numbers and are not likely to. In our case, therefore, the problem is narrowed down to that of casual visitors, and here no trouble is likely to arise. At most a strict passport system might be asked for, such as has been applied in several European countries to Europeans in quite recent times. Presumably the Japanese Government would raise no objection to this; or at most would require that a similar system should apply to South Africans in Japan, against which no complaint could be made.

Of course, if Japanese immigration should ever be directed towards South Africa more serious difficulties might arise, though even then the problem would perhaps be more capable of compromise than in Canada or Australia. But the suggestion of reciprocity, made in your article, would appear to meet the case as far as all the Dominions are concerned. Japan can hardly make it a grievance if we offer to agree to a common immigration law which shall apply, say, in Australia or South Africa to Japanese, and in Japan to Australians and South Africans. This may result in certain cases of inconvenience or even hardship to individuals which do not occur under the present position; but nothing for which to upset the friendly relations of the two empires, the preservation of which is equally in the interest of both.

As regards the further suggestion made in your article to

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apply the same principle to Indian immigration, this is a point where South Africa is more directly concerned. If the Indian Government decided to impose the same restrictions upon South Africans wishing to settle or to travel in India, as might be imposed on Indians in South Africa, it would not perhaps make very much practical difference to anyone. As regards future immigration a solution on these lines would probably be accepted by South Africa, if it had the effect of barring out any further influx. If it satisfied Indian opinion, so much the better. The real trouble with us, however, is the hundred thousand odd Indians who are already domiciled in the country, chiefly in Natal, but some thousands also in the Transvaal. As so many of these belong to the class which will compete with the white man, not with the native, being traders not manual labourers, their presence will be a constant source of friction on account of the restrictions which will certainly be demanded against their overflowing into other provinces of the Union from that where they are domiciled at present. South African statesmen have, if they can, to devise a plan which will meet the demands of their constituents to be safeguarded against cheap Indian competition, and will at the same time avoid injustice to individuals or unnecessary hurt to the feelings of India.

NOTE.—The report of the Select Committee of the House of Assembly on the question of the language or languages to be used as the medium of education has been issued since our correspondent wrote. The majority report recommends that the "home language" of the child be used as the medium up to Standard IV, and that after that the parents may choose the medium.

NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS

I. THE MOVEMENT FOR COMPULSORY TRAINING

THE session of the New Zealand Parliament, which opened on June 28 last and concluded on December 3, was the longest it ever held. A little more than four months usually suffices to wind up even the most arduous session, but in the present case even five months did not prove to be quite long enough. Whatever may be said as to the methods, the legislative output of the present session has been enormous. No less than 117 Acts have been passed, and this is of itself no inconsiderable merit in a country which is rather inclined to measure the merits of its parliaments by the size of their Statute-books. But not a few of these Acts are of genuine importance. The land question, which during recent years has perhaps presented greater difficulties than any other, has indeed been successfully evaded, and the half-dozen labour measures do not, with the exception to be presently noted, contain any very striking changes. But licensing, gambling, electoral reform, and commercial trusts, have been dealt with in a way to make the session memorable, and the list could be easily enlarged. From the Imperial standpoint the measure which eclipses all the rest and redeems a session otherwise disappointing in its contributions to the Imperial problem is the Defence Amendment Act.

The adoption of the principle of compulsory military training which was effected by the Defence Act of 1909 put the crown on one of the most successful pieces of agitation which even this plastic country has witnessed. The public mind had been prepared by the work of the National Defence League—an organization modelled on the lines of the National Service League of Great Britain. This league had its headquarters in the city of Auckland, and had conducted an active propaganda in that city and the adjoining district. Not compulsory service but compulsory training

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was the object of the league, and the liability was to attach to all able-bodied males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one years. Questions along these lines were submitted to most candidates at the general election held in November, 1908, but in a majority of the electorates the league had no organization and the answers showed that a great educational work had still to be accomplished.

Shortly before the elections Sir Joseph Ward, the Premier, informed a deputation that there was "a tremendous under-current of feeling" against the proposal, and that the country would never stand "conscription." After the elections he made it quite clear that he realized the distinction between compulsory training and compulsory service, but he declared that the Government would propound a scheme of training which would be practically universal without introducing the element of compulsion. And there the matter was left when he took his departure in June, 1909, to attend the Defence Conference in London.

But under the influence of the scare about Germany's naval competition which had prompted the Government's offer of a Dreadnought in March and the warm approval of the proposal by the country, public opinion ripened rapidly in favour of the programme of the National Defence League. It was strongly urged that merely to pay the capital cost of a warship which others were to maintain and to man was but a vicarious kind of patriotism which must at the least be supplemented by a genuine attempt to put our own local defences in order. Fortified by this feeling the National Defence League held a remarkably successful series of meetings throughout the country. Mr R. McNab, who had been Sir Joseph Ward's Minister of Defence until he lost his seat at the General Election of 1908, was the principal speaker at these meetings and made a deep impression. Great enthusiasm was displayed, and there was no considerable reaction. The chief opposition threatened was by the Labour party, but this party, though unable to rise to the height of the national argument like the Labour

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party of Australia, was by no means solid against the proposal. In Auckland the attitude of the trade unions was not unworthy of the lead given in Australia. In Wellington, on the other hand, the majority of the members were hostile, but both there and in other places there was a sufficiently solid minority to hold in check the excesses of the denouncers of "militarism."

The most interesting thing about this brief counter-agitation was the enthusiasm which it evoked on behalf of volunteering in men who had never tried it or studied it and who had no intention of doing either. But extemporized enthusiasm of the kind was quite insufficient to save the volunteer system from the judgment of those who had vainly devoted laborious days and nights to the attempt to make it a success. With hardly a dissentient voice their verdict was that volunteering could never give us an efficient defence force, and the public accepted it. The Government bowed to the inevitable. The premier returned from the Defence Conference on September 30, 1909. Parliament opened on October 7. On November 10, in the most matter-of-fact way possible, and without any beating about the bush, Sir Joseph Ward announced in his budget speech that the Government had decided on a complete reorganization of the defence forces, based on the compulsory principle. It would have been interesting to know how far the conversion of the Government was hastened by what the premier had learned at the Defence Conference. But his reticence threw no light upon the point, and the public was too pleased with the result to waste much curiosity upon the process. The Defence Bill followed close upon the heels of the budget, and contained provision for the compulsory military training of all able-bodied males:—

- (a) From 12 to 14 years of age in the junior cadets.
- (b) From 14 to 18 years in the senior cadets.
- (c) From 18 to 21 years in the general training section.

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The House of Representatives faithfully reflected the opinion of the country by passing the compulsory clauses by 65 to 3, and the bill became law.

But though the Defence Act of 1909 came nominally into force on December 24 of that year the characteristic part of it is not yet in operation. Lord Kitchener, who had been asked to advise upon the defence systems both of Australia and of New Zealand, was due to arrive in Wellington on February 24, and it would have been undesirable, even if it had been possible, to anticipate his advice by any decisive action under the new system. As it turned out, Lord Kitchener's recommendations have necessitated a radical alteration of the system, involving an extension of the age-limit for the application of the compulsory principle from 21 to 25 years. To give effect to these recommendations, or, rather, to enable the Government to give effect to them, has been the principal object of the Defence Bill of the session which concluded last month. A striking illustration of the practical identity of New Zealand's conditions in the matter of defence with those of the Commonwealth is afforded by the fact that Lord Kitchener did not consider it necessary to prepare a special report for New Zealand. His New Zealand report, except as to harbour defences and other confidential matters which have not been made public, merely consists of a short letter to Sir Joseph Ward covering his Australian report and incorporating it by reference as applicable *mutatis mutandis* to New Zealand. One of the paragraphs of the Australian Report which apply without any modification, except the necessary change of name, to our own case is that which declares that:

“The conclusion I have come to is, shortly, that the present forces are inadequate in numbers, training, organization and munitions of war to defend Australia from the dangers that are due to the present conditions that prevail in the country, as well as to its isolated position.”

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We have been devoting about £200,000 a year and an immense amount of individual enthusiasm and self-sacrifice to the building up of a defence force on voluntary lines, and Lord Kitchener merely tells us of the failure which everybody knew before.

The Defence Bill of 1910 proved a much harder task for the Government than its predecessor. Though the first recognition of a new and drastic principle is usually a far more difficult matter to secure than its subsequent extension, there is all the difference in the world for a democratic legislature between a demand which springs from the people and is pressed with enthusiasm and the recommendations of an expert. Popular enthusiasm seemed to have shot its bolt with the passing of the Defence Act of 1909. The National Defence League, which had limited its demand to the age-limit fixed by the Act, was practically in liquidation. Nor were those who had formed and guided the organization willing to revive it for the sake of pushing Lord Kitchener's scheme. When the scheme was first published, it was commonly assumed to imply universal training till the age of twenty-five. In this form the proposal would have aroused a keen opposition, but it could also have relied upon enthusiastic support. It was, however, subsequently discovered that Lord Kitchener only required about one-third of the young men available to be trained, and that the Government proposed not merely to limit the training between the ages twenty-one and twenty-five in this way, but to cut down the universality of the training already established between eighteen and twenty-one to the same proportion. The effect of this discovery was to abate the intensity of opposition and of support alike.

The view taken at the headquarters of the Defence League in Auckland was that any partial scheme would be a violation of the fundamental principle on which the whole movement was based, viz. that is the duty of every man not physically incapacitated to qualify for the defence of his country, and that this duty cannot be evaded or dele-

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gated. These whole-hearted enthusiasts, therefore, declined to support a proposal which violated their ideal of a citizen army and deprived more than half of the male population of the benefits, no less than of the burdens, of a military training. Thus, while the scheme had no violent head-winds to encounter, it seemed at one time likely to lack sufficient motive power to give it steerage way. For more than two months after its introduction the bill was not proceeded with, and when a start was made its progress was of a baffling character. On the second reading a majority of the speakers were in favour of giving the twenty-one years' limit "a fair trial," which meant they were prepared to knock the bottom out of Lord Kitchener's scheme. But the Government, which was understood at first to have itself experienced serious searchings of heart in the matter, stuck to its point. The Opposition did not attempt to make party capital out of the question, and though the leader of the party, Mr W. F. Massey, declared for the twenty-one years' limit, his first lieutenant, Mr James Allen, battled hard for the bill, and must share with Sir Joseph Ward the credit of its passage.

The chief difficulty on both sides of the House was the fear, especially among the members representing dairying districts, that the interference with industry which the bill involved might be strongly resented by constituents who had never had the issue submitted to them. Very few persons outside the House are aware how near this fear came to wrecking a bill against which there had been no public outcry. The position was saved by a compromise which allowed the clause extending the age limit for the general training section from twenty-one years to twenty-five years to stand, but with the proviso that the clause should not apply to any person over twenty-one years of age at the time of the Act's coming into operation. This amendment left members open to the taunt that they were only prepared to legislate for those who had not got votes. But the sacrifice was very sound tactics on the part of the Government, as it saved

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the bill without any fatal injury to its efficacy. It is true that the proviso exempts more than half of those whom the clause should have made liable; but as it will probably take at least a year to bring the scheme into full operation, men now in their twenty-fifth year must have secured a practical exemption in any event. The exemption will, therefore, actually apply to rather less than half of the men within the prescribed limits; and after the scheme has been in operation three years, the general training section will have attained its full strength.

Under last year's Act the territorial force which it substituted for the volunteers was to consist of 20,000 men of all ranks, and if a sufficient number did not offer themselves voluntarily power was given to the Government to transfer enough men from the general training section to make good the deficiency. Lord Kitchener proposed that Australia should provide herself with a citizen force of 80,000, which on a population basis would work out at about 20,000 for New Zealand, just the number fixed by the Act of 1909. By the enrolment of a yearly quota ranging from 3,525 in the case of the 19-20 year men to 2,755 in the case of the 24-25 year men (these figures are reduced on a something less than a 25 per cent basis from those of Lord Kitchener's Australian memorandum), the Government propose to give us a territorial force of trained men numbering 18,800. The officers (1,087) and officers' training corps at the universities (486) will bring the total up to 20,373. To this the number of the permanent forces (459) has to be added, and by also adding the 3,690 recruits, i.e. 18-19 year men and the 2,610 men between 25 and 26 years who will be serving their first year on the reserve, and assembled for a muster parade only, the Premier claims that the actual number of the men in training and available to take the field will be 27,132, as against the 20,000 proposed by the Act of last year. But in any comparison with the Commonwealth the still smaller number of 18,800 is the one to be cited, since Lord Kitchener's estimate of 80,000 for Aus-

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tralia's citizen army includes none of the items by which Sir Joseph Ward has been able to swell the New Zealand total by fifty per cent.

Immense difficulties have still to be overcome before the scheme is a working success. The Legislature has affirmed the principle and provided the power; but everything turns upon the administration. The most important task and the most invidious is that of selecting the men to be trained. It is eminently characteristic of an infirmity of latter-day democracy, of which New Zealand has a full share, that even the principles and grounds of exemption are left to the absolute discretion of the Government. In the Commonwealth Defence Act these matters are directly provided for, and our Premier read these provisions to the House, but without specifying the source. It was not, however, for incorporation in the bill that he read them, but only in order to show how the Government proposed to exercise the power which it claimed by the bill to do all these things by regulation. Even the physically unfit will be dependent upon the will of the Government for their exemption. The Premier informed the House that whereas under the 1909 Act the number of men liable for training was 30,600, the extension of the age-limit to twenty-five years would increase the number to 75,096. In those European countries where conscription prevails 40 per cent is, he said, the usual margin allowed for exemptions, and he estimated that $33\frac{1}{2}$ per cent would suffice in New Zealand. This would reduce the number for training to 50,000, which would still be considerably in excess of requirements. The task of selection will abound in difficulty and odium, even after Mr James Allen's proposal to exempt classes rather than individuals, and in particular to exempt everybody engaged in certain occupations which will be as much needed in war as in peace, is carried out.

Mr Allen urged that selection involves to some extent conscription, but his idea that the difficulty will be overcome if different men from the same factory or the same

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bench are not differently treated is surely incorrect. Differentiation within the same class of workers would be the more glaringly invidious, but as all the men are members of the same community differentiation by classes is still conscription within Mr Allen's definition. The opportunities for favouritism and heart-burnings which any method of selection offers might easily be developed by bad administration into a worse evil than the cost and inconvenience of a universal system. In his reply on the third reading of the bill the Premier claimed that in everything but the scale of pay for the higher officers, "there is not a proposal in the measure that Lord Kitchener has not recommended." As previously indicated, the measure is little more than an outline which it is for the Government to fill in. Everything will turn upon the spirit of the administration. Hitherto New Zealand has shown herself a true "chip of the old block" by allowing political interference to run riot through her War Office. Nothing, therefore, could have been more appropriate to our case than the warnings against influences of the kind which, with an emphasis and an iteration remarkable in so laconic a man, Lord Kitchener has put into his report. If Sir Joseph Ward can guarantee that this part of the Field Marshal's recommendations will be faithfully carried out the success of the scheme is assured. But neither Lord Kitchener nor General Godley, our new commandant, can save us if their efforts are to be thwarted by the same political influences which have reduced to impotence every other military expert whose counsel we have sought.

II. COLOURED SEAMEN AND WHITE NEW ZEALAND

A QUESTION of Imperial concern is raised by the Shipping and Seamen's Amendment Act, which passed both Houses without a dissentient vote, but has had to be reserved for the Royal Assent. The shipowners of New Zealand are, of course, bound by the awards of our Arbitration Court in regard to the wages and conditions of labour, and in order

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to protect them from unfair competition in the coastal trade, ships owned out of New Zealand are bound by the Shipping and Seamen Act of 1908 to pay the same wages and observe the same conditions while plying on our coasts. But the trade between New Zealand and Australia, of which the Union Steam Ship Company of New Zealand enjoys the lion's share, is not so protected. The matter has been agitated from time to time, but has at last been brought to a head by the decision of the P. and O. Company to extend the voyages of some of its steamers from Sydney to Auckland during the summer months. As these vessels are largely manned by Lascars, the question has now assumed an acute form. The Union Steam Ship Company and the Labour Union have been at one in demanding protection against this competition, and the subject is therefore an easy one for a New Zealand Parliament within the limits of its competence to tackle. A labour bill which capital and labour are agreed to support is a rare luxury for the politicians.

The methods proposed by the Government in the bill which Parliament has adopted are two. In the first place the bill declares that .

“ Seamen employed on ships plying or trading from New Zealand to any port within the Commonwealth of Australia, or from New Zealand to the Cook Islands, shall be paid and may recover the current rate of wages for the time being ruling in New Zealand.”

This clause follows very closely that of the Navigation Bill, recently passed by the Commonwealth Parliament, which seeks to curb the far greater mischief of the competition of coloured with white labour in Australian waters. The other clause provides that in the case of ships plying between the countries above named and manned wholly or in part by Asiatics,

“ Passenger tickets issued for passages from New Zealand and bills of lading for cargo shipped in New Zea-

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land shall be liable to a stamp duty equal to 25 per centum of the amount of the passage-money or the amount charged for freight."

A proviso is added which exempts from compliance with this clause any vessel which has complied with the previous one. It looks as though the second of the two clauses would be both effective and *intra vires*, but that the first would be neither the one nor the other. The important question of the right to legislate beyond the three-mile limit is, however, raised by both the Commonwealth and the New Zealand bills, and is likely to cause the Imperial Government some embarrassment. The gravity of the effect upon India of the Colonial discriminations against Asiatics was urged by the special correspondent of the *Times*, who recently dealt with the subject of Indian unrest; and he suggested that the whole question should be considered at the Imperial Conference. With this sensible suggestion our Premier concurs, and though the subject does not figure in the published list of New Zealand's recommendations to the Conference, he evidently intends to bring it up.

III. NEW ZEALAND AND THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE.

TO describe the public opinion of New Zealand regarding the most important of the resolutions to be submitted on its behalf to the Imperial Conference, would be almost as easy as the eighteenth century philosopher found it to describe the snakes of Iceland—"There are no snakes in Iceland" he wrote. In the same way we may say that there is no public opinion in New Zealand regarding the work of the Imperial Conference. Hardly anybody has given the matter a serious thought since the Conference of 1907, and, with a single exception to be presently noted, no public man appears to have given it any close and consecutive thought. Parliament could not even spare five minutes for the discussion of the resolutions which the Premier, Sir Joseph Ward, proposes to sub-

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mit to the Conference. It heard them read, and then proceeded to the next business. The conspiracy of silence has extended to the platform. The Premier has refrained from discussing the agenda of the Conference for the remarkable reason that to discuss them would be "unfair to the other members of the Conference." The Leader of the Opposition has followed the Premier's example but without giving reasons. Apart from some excellent generalities from the Premier on the subject of defence, the only public man who has contributed anything to the Imperial education of the people is Mr. A. S. Malcolm, an Opposition M.P. But he has done so by arguing boldly for Imperial Federation, while frankly disparaging Imperial Secretariats and Advisory Councils—in other words, the whole machinery of the Conference as "make-believes" which are out of the true line of British political evolution.

Thus it is that the work of the Imperial Conference itself has had no exponents, and neither the people nor Parliament nor even, it is feared, the Government itself, has any clear or strong idea about the business of the Conference or the future of the Empire. The two principal resolutions naturally gave an opposite impression when they were cabled round the Empire as the views of New Zealand. But their representative character is entirely destroyed when it is known that neither people nor Parliament has given them any consideration. The *Manchester Guardian*, as the cable informs us, says that "New Zealand's proposals, especially concerning an Imperial Council and the High Commissioner's status, show a conscious pride in nationhood." Whatever view he might take of the stage at which the evolution of New Zealand's national sentiment has arrived, no responsible critic on the spot would dream of suggesting that there is any connexion whatever between the growth of that sentiment and the resolutions submitted on behalf of New Zealand for the consideration of the Imperial Conference. They are as remote from the "business and bosoms" of the people as the agenda of a debating society, and they do not touch reality as closely as

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the proceedings of such a society often do for its own small circle. Except whilst it has been actually sitting, the Imperial Conference has attracted but little attention here. The burking of the subject by Parliament last session destroyed whatever chance there was of stimulating in advance a public interest in the work of the Conference of 1911.

The resolution which savours most strongly of the "conscious pride in nationhood" is that which bears the heading "Imperial representation of Oversea Dominions with a view to furthering Imperial Sentiment, Solidarity and Interest." The text of this resolution is as follows:

"That the Empire has now reached a stage of Imperial development which renders it expedient that there should be an Imperial Council of State, with representatives from all the constituent parts of the Empire, whether self-governing or not, in theory and in fact advisory to the Imperial Government on all questions affecting the interests of His Majesty's Dominions oversea."

If this resolution really represented the opinion of the people of New Zealand, it would of course be a fact of some importance and significance. The aim of the Imperial Conference is to focus and formulate the public opinions of the various self-governing States of the Empire with a view to promoting a better understanding and a closer co-operation in all matters of common concern. But when a proposal of a far-reaching character is put forward on behalf of one of the States which is not backed or understood by the people of that State, it clearly serves the purpose not of mutual enlightenment but of aggravating the mutual ignorance. In England the resolution bespeaks the growth of a national pride in her remotest colony; but here the indifference with which the whole matter has been treated gives this interpretation quite an ironical sound.

The terms of the resolution relating to an Imperial Conference are, indeed, enough to show that even the Govern-

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ment has not devoted any close study to the question of Imperial organization. Previously to the meeting of the Conference of 1907 the subject had been a good deal discussed in England, and the fears of Canada had been aroused by a proposal to establish an Imperial Council which was to be in permanent session in London. As this would have involved the total exclusion of Colonial Ministers from the Council, these fears were justified, but the colonies owe it to Mr Richard Jebb that the proposal was practically dead before their representatives assembled at the Conference. When the subject was introduced at the Conference, Sir Wilfrid Laurier at once said that in Canada the proposal for an Imperial Council did not meet with much favour. The name of "Imperial Council" had obviously been damned in Canada by its association with the proposal attacked by Mr Jebb. The resolution submitted by New Zealand was of a kind to excite the apprehensions of the Canadian representative, for it ran: "That it would be to the advantage of the Empire and facilitate the dealing with questions that affect the Oversea Dominions if an Imperial Council were established to which each of the self-governing Colonies could send a representative." The ambiguity of this proposal would have covered either the Ministerial or the non-Ministerial form of Imperial Council; but Mr Deakin, who opened the discussion, made it quite clear that the Commonwealth Government's idea of an Imperial Council was that it should consist of "representatives of Great Britain and the self-governing Colonies chosen *ex officio* from their existing administrations." The result was that the Commonwealth resolution was modified by the omission of any reference to an Imperial Council, and as ultimately adopted it merely provided an improved name and a permanent constitution for the conference of Prime Ministers which had met at irregular intervals under the name of the Colonial Conference. With the addition of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom as *ex officio* chairman, the body became a truly Imperial Conference and was so named.

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What further change does the New Zealand Government's advocacy of an "Imperial Council of State" contemplate? The proposal is trebly unfortunate—first, because it revives a term which has unpleasant associations, excites strong prejudices in some parts of the Empire without any countervailing advantages, and by common consent was abandoned at the last Imperial Conference; secondly, because although the resolution is ambiguous, the use of the term has been commonly accepted as intending a reversion to the independent non-ministerial type of council sitting permanently in London; thirdly, because, whatever interpretation be put upon the term, it suggests ideas and aspirations on the part of the Government and people of New Zealand for which there is not the slightest foundation in fact. New Zealand has no theory at all regarding an Imperial Council, and is quite in the dark as to what is in the mind of its Government. It certainly looks as though the Government were repeating its own ambiguous proposal of four years ago without having evolved any clearer idea on the subject, and without appreciating the objections raised and approved without dissent at the last Imperial Conference.

Public opinion is equally ill-informed as to the resolution dealing with the reconstitution of the Colonial Office and the higher status claimed for the High Commissioners. In asking for the separation of the Dominions Department of the Colonial Office from that of the Crown Colonies, this resolution merely repeats the request of the last Imperial Conference. Pursuant to that request Lord Elgin was understood to have divided the office into a Dominions Division, a Crown Colonies Division and a General Department. But Lord Crewe's promise early last year to carry out a similar scheme suggested that the work of reorganization had not been carried far. The idea seems a perfectly reasonable one, though its effect cannot be very great. The resolution also asks:

"(5) That High Commissioners be invited to consult with the foreign ministers on matters of foreign, in-

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dustrial, commercial and social affairs in which the oversea Dominions are interested, and inform their respective Governments."

"(6) That High Commissioners should become the sole channel of communication between Imperial and Dominion Governments, governors-general and governors, on all occasions being given identical and simultaneous information."

Why "foreign ministers" should be in the plural is a puzzle which in the absence of any explanation from the Government has not been solved. So far as informal consultation goes, our late High Commissioner, Mr W. P. Reeves, is said on good authority to have been treated with the utmost confidence and courtesy by the Imperial authorities whenever he desired information; and the public is not aware that his successor has had any occasion for complaint. But to generalize the practice and to make it obligatory might sometimes have obvious disadvantages.

The proposal which follows has probably been even more hastily run off, for it is not only cumbrous and unreasonable, but self-contradictory. The High Commissioner is to be "the sole channel of communication" between the Imperial Government and his own, but he is also to be given "identical and simultaneous information," i.e. with what is supplied to his Government by some other channel. He is to be the sole channel of communication, but the normal channel is also to be kept open at the same time. What else can the proposal mean? The present practice which leaves the extent of the High Commissioner's knowledge entirely to the discretion of the Government which appoints him is surely preferable to making him *ex officio* the sole or a duplicate channel of communication. The best practical suggestion, if not the only suggestion, which has been made on the subject is that which Mr James Allen, a leading member of the Opposition, has borrowed from General Botha, viz.,

"That the High Commissioners should *ex officio* compose the Imperial Council. This would combine the

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principal objects of both resolutions, and would provide an Advisory Council which could meet regularly and yet would not be irresponsible."

When we leave the region of the higher state-craft and come to the business and commercial side of Imperial relations, we find the New Zealand resolutions decidedly more satisfactory. In all that relates to commerce, mails and cables, Sir Joseph Ward moves with ease and confidence, the chief fault that the critics find being only that the confidence is sometimes excessive. When he committed New Zealand ten years ago to Universal Penny Postage, the weight of competent independent opinion appeared to be that the experiment was premature and extravagant. But the success of the experiment speedily justified his boldness and silenced his critics. On the other hand, he certainly overshot the mark at the last Imperial Conference when he urged the establishment of an "All-red" mail service between New Zealand and Great Britain via Canada, which would have involved the employment of 20-knot steamers on the Pacific and an annual contribution from New Zealand of £100,000. This was decidedly in excess of what public opinion regarded here as reasonable, and it is significant that we heard more about it from Sir Joseph Ward through his speeches at the Imperial Conference of 1907 than we have at any time since. He then spoke contemptuously of a 15-knot service, but in January last he arranged an Auckland-Vancouver service at this very rate and at an annual cost of £20,000. This arrangement gives general satisfaction, since it will not only land our mails in London in twenty-eight days—eight or nine days quicker than the route via Sydney and Suez upon which we have recently been placing our chief reliance—but also opens up the prospect of a lucrative trade with Western Canada. That Australia has declined to join is generally regretted, but the fact that she lacks the advantage of fiscal reciprocity with Canada which New Zealand enjoys makes it only natural that Australia should not desire to

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participate in a contract which would under present conditions give a dangerous rival the benefit of so considerable a handicap. What the New Zealand Government asks the Imperial Conference to approve is a 16-knot service across the Pacific to Vancouver, a fast service between Canada and Great Britain, and the financing of both services by Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in equitable proportions. Under existing fiscal conditions the Commonwealth can no more accept this proposal than the other, but the objection will disappear if when they meet at the Conference Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Mr Fisher are able to arrange for tariff reciprocity between their respective countries.

On the subject of "All-red" cable communication the resolutions submitted by the New Zealand Government have public opinion behind them. These resolutions ask that there should be a State-owned cable between England and Canada, and that there should be a telegraph line across Canada under public control. The public ownership of such services as railways, tramways, cables and telegraphs, is a principle which has long been credited with axiomatic force in this country, and the Empire is clearly entitled to the benefit of it as much as the State.

On the subject of wireless telegraphy our Government's qualification to press the matter before the Conference is considered by some keen Imperialists as seriously discounted by its acceptance of the Telefunken system for its own wireless installation. It is clearly a delicate matter in which to be under obligations to Germany. The Premier's reply to his critics is that all the other inventions in the competition were of foreign origin, and that to have accepted the next tender would have cost us £30,000, or 110 per cent more to instal as well as a considerable increase in working expenses. As the Marconi Company, which was one of the unsuccessful tenderers, is in English hands, the first of these grounds does not count for much; but the difference in cost was certainly a serious matter.

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As the absence of fiscal preference from the New Zealand resolutions has excited a good deal of comment in Great Britain, it may be as well to say that the omission implies no change in New Zealand's settled attitude to the question. New Zealand stands exactly where she did with regard to this matter, though she never stood where she has often been supposed to stand. We should naturally be glad to get preference for our produce in the London market, but though the late Mr Seddon sometimes spoke in his masterful way about it, we make no demand and assert no right. To say that New Zealand has felt the verdict of the British electors at three consecutive General Elections in favour of Free Trade as a serious disappointment would be quite incorrect, and to say that she felt it as a rebuff would be absurd. We should be glad of a preference for our mutton and our butter, but we realize that it can only come in as an incident in a British scheme of Protection. We therefore do not urge it as a ground for prejudicing the determination by the British electors of what is primarily a domestic question to be decided by them upon their estimate of its relation to their own interests. We have declared for Protection as best suited for our own circumstances, and have no disposition to regard the present determination in favour of Free Trade, at which the people of the United Kingdom have arrived on similar grounds, as a rebuff, an injustice, or even a hardship. The moderation of our Premier's tone upon the subject at the last Imperial Conference was thus in close accord with New Zealand sentiment. We were again all with him when he repudiated Mr Balfour's use of our Dreadnought offer as an argument for preference. The further the defence question can be kept from the fiscal controversy, the better, nor has New Zealand any disposition to regard the mutual adjustment of tariffs as a *sine qua non* of closer Imperial Union.

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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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NOTE

THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in all parts of the British Empire whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of Imperial politics, entirely free from the bias of local party issues. The affairs of **THE ROUND TABLE** in each portion of the Empire are in the sole charge of local residents, who are also responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way **THE ROUND TABLE** will reflect the current opinions of all parts about Imperial problems, and at the same time present a survey of them as a whole. Opinions and articles of a party character will be rigidly excluded.

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THE CONFERENCE AND THE EMPIRE

I. 1887-1902.

FORTY years ago the British Empire was regarded as a failure. Contemporary judgement, conscious of the difficulties and burdens of the day and of the doleful lessons of the past could see no future before it. Men pointed to the white settlements in Canada, Australia and South Africa, and recalled the fate of the earlier American colonies, and the story of the Greek colonies in the Mediterranean. As Seeley said. 'We had not learnt from experience wisdom, but only despair.' History, indeed, seemed to prove that human beings failed of the capacity to rise above a certain territorial nationalism. In Turgot's phrase, colonies had always been 'like ripe fruits which cling till they ripen.' Was it not the manifest destiny of the British colonies also to declare their independence so soon as they could stand alone? Gladstone, indeed, went so far as to suggest that we should anticipate the inevitable end and settle the difficulties between England and America over the Civil War by an immediate transfer to America of British territory in Canada.

There was much the same feeling about the dependencies. India and the West Indies were England's chief possessions—an empire she had gained by no deliberate policy, but which had been forced upon her in her struggles with France and Spain, and by the restless enterprise of traders and adventurers. Her own political traditions—especially as embodied in the phrase 'no taxation without representation'—compelled her to abandon the methods of earlier empires and refrain from levying tribute from subject peoples. There was, therefore, no great enthusiasm for the dependencies. The trade with them was considerable, but it affected only a small portion of the British population, while the burdens for their defence all had to bear. The Indian mutiny in 1857, the Jamaica rebellion of 1865, the endless

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intervention in European politics in order to keep open the route to the East through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, and the consequent expenditure on naval and military armaments, all combined to make people question the value of the dependent Empire, and to wonder whether the future they anticipated for the white colonies should be meted out also to the dependencies. In fact, to use a phrase of Mr Asquith's, the Empire was 'regarded as a regrettable necessity, to be apologised for as half blunder, half crime'

In the Colonies themselves there was complete indifference to the subject. People were absorbed in the task of settling and developing a virgin country, and in casting off the thralldom of a somewhat ignorant, narrow, and unsympathetic office in Downing Street, Whitehall. They had little knowledge of world problems beyond their borders, they had but little national consciousness of their own, and were content to let events shape their destiny. There was much cherishing of the traditions of the motherland, but beyond an indignant repudiation of disloyalty, colonials of that day had few ideas as to what their future relations to the Empire were to be.

The events of the past three months, notably the Coronation and the Imperial Conference, show how fundamentally opinion about the British Empire has changed. The change of course has been gradual, and in order to appreciate the real meaning of the Conference which has just closed, it is necessary to trace as briefly as possible the work of its predecessors.

The first Colonial Conference, held in 1887, marks the first stage in the development of a conception of the Empire totally different from the pessimism of the mid-Victorian days. This growth was caused mainly by the profound change which came over the international situation. From the close of the Napoleonic wars to the early 'seventies, there had been an almost complete lull in international politics beyond the confines of Europe, a lull which was in striking contrast to the world-wide struggles for colonial

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empire of the preceding two centuries. Europe had been absorbed in adjusting its ideas and its frontiers to the doctrines of the French revolution and the upheaval of the Napoleonic wars, and England almost alone of the great powers had showed its flag in the outer oceans of the globe. The era of European expansion seemed to have definitely passed away.

But with the entry of the last quarter of the century the expansion of Europe recommenced once more. Russia began her steady advance towards Afghanistan and the Far East. At the same time she did not relax her efforts to make herself a Mediterranean power by occupying Constantinople. These movements had caused anxiety for some time past to those who were responsible for the safety of India and the approaches thereto. But the Afghan wars, the dramatic despatch of a British squadron to the Dardanelles to warn Russia off Constantinople after her defeat of Turkey, and Disraeli's success at the 'peace with honour' conference which followed at Berlin in 1876, awoke the mass of the people abruptly to the change in the situation. Then the other powers followed the lead of Russia, and the scramble for Africa and the East began. Germany appropriated South-West Africa in 1884, and part of New Guinea a few months later. France began to extend her influence in the North of Africa. Russia, as the outcome of the Pendjeh incident, began a fresh move on Afghanistan. A conference in Berlin in 1885 agreed upon the first partition of African territory.

England to protect her existing possessions found herself forced to take part in the race. To begin with she showed some reluctance. And after the occupation of Egypt in 1882 an attempt was made to limit the increase of Imperial responsibilities. But the issue of the Gladstonian policy in South and North Africa—Majuba and the death of Gordon at Khartoum—brought the 'little England' policy into disfavour, and the size of the Empire was largely increased during this time.

Speakers and writers had not failed to bring home to

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people, both in the United Kingdom and the Dominions, the significance of these events. Disraeli—the first of the Victorian statesmen to see into the future—pictured vividly to his countrymen the great part they might play in moulding the destinies of the world. Gladstone by his rhetoric about the Armenian atrocities and the ‘unspeakable’ Turk taught them what British rule meant for the teeming millions of India. Seeley, in his *Expansion of England*, published in 1883, two years after Majuba, emphasized once more the immense responsibilities of England in India, and pointed out how the development of the system of colonial self government afforded a code of relations between a mother country and her daughter states which would obviate both the evils of secession and the perils of central control. The new enthusiasm was crystallized in the sweeping and ill-considered proposals of the Imperial Federation League.

It was in these circumstances that the 1887* Colonial Conference met. The occasion was the thanksgiving gathering for the Jubilee of Queen Victoria. The British Government in the Queen’s speech at the prorogation of Parliament had expressed ‘the conviction that there is on all sides a growing desire to draw closer in every practicable way the bonds which unite the various portions of the Empire,’ and they accordingly suggested an informal conference at which they might meet colonial representatives, official and otherwise, ‘in joint deliberation’ to consider ‘matters of common interest.’ In their invitation to the Colonial governments the British Government expressly deprecated the discussion of ‘what is known as Political Federation’ and, as was natural in view of recent international events, considered that ‘the question which is at

* NOTE.—Mr Richard Jebb’s recent book, *The Imperial Conference* (Longmans and Co. 25s.), a sequel in many ways to his *Colonial Nationalism*, contains a very full and painstaking account of the history of the Conference up to 1907. The book is avowedly written from a “Tariff Reform” standpoint and its value as an impartial history is impaired by the strongly partisan views of the author.

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once urgent and capable of useful consideration is that of organization for military defence.'

The invitation was everywhere accepted. Recent events had awakened opinion in the Colonies as in England to the fact that the old days when they could live in glorious isolation, oblivious of external affairs, were passing away. Canada had federated in 1867, largely through fear of American hostility; and Riel's rebellion, the immense unoccupied gap between its Eastern and Western settlements and the aggressive attitude of the United States made her much more apprehensive of external danger than she is to-day. Australia still consisted of five separate colonies, but had been so greatly alarmed by the annexation of certain Pacific Islands by France and Germany that she had created in 1883 the so-called federal council of Australasia, charged with the duty of advising the several governments on the external affairs common to all. The annexation of South-West Africa by Germany, and Rhodes's steady preaching of the necessity of incorporating the Northern territories before they were seized by other powers, had rendered the South African representatives fully alive to the importance of external affairs.

The importance of the first Conference lies rather in the definition it gives of the prevailing ideas about the relations which should subsist between the mother country and the colonies, than in its practical achievements. On all sides there was a general wish to promote the 'unity' or 'solidarity,' or 'strength' of the Empire. But there was no general belief that the existing views about the organization of the Empire required alteration. These views were quite clear. It was England's business to run the Empire as a whole, to conduct its foreign relations, to defend it from attack, to govern the dependencies. Colonial legislatures were responsible for the government of their own territories, but had no responsibility for defending them from invasion from across the seas, or for assisting in the defence of the Empire as a whole. Accordingly, at the Conference there was no discussion of foreign policy.

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India was neither represented nor mentioned. Even the debates on defence took no account of the disposition of the main British army and navy.

As suggested in the invitation, projects of federation were ruled out by universal consent. For, as Lord Salisbury explained in his opening address, 'we must reconcile ourselves to conducting our own affairs, so far as domestic matters go, each in his own locality.' He went on, therefore, to refer to what the British Government regarded as the most important matter before the Conference—Imperial defence. 'Our interests,' he said, 'are common,' and the efforts which defence requires should be co-ordinated so as to produce the maximum effect. He pointed out that the colonies were in danger not because of a foolish or aggressive Imperial policy, for the policy of the United Kingdom had long been and still was 'essentially pacific,' but because there had recently been a great growth in naval power in European countries; and though these countries might not be contemplating aggression, it was impossible to ignore the greatly increased 'facilities' for such action afforded by the development of steam and electric communication. He added that the British proposals for Imperial defence were no

'mere contrivance on our part to lighten our burden What we desire is that all parts of the Empire should be equally safe, equally prosperous, equally glorious; and for that end we desire that all should take their fair and legitimate part in a task of which all ought to be proud.'

The practical proposals of the British Government, however, were not so formidable as this address might suggest. The cost of the British navy was still to be entirely defrayed by the British taxpayer, who was also to pay for the defence of naval bases and coaling stations, except when such stations were 'an insurance of colonial property.' It was suggested that in such cases the self-governing colonies, like the

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Crown colonies, should make some contribution towards the cost.

The discussion pointed unmistakably to the prevalence of the 'colonial idea.' The general principle that Great Britain should bear the whole cost of the navy was never questioned, and the discussion turned on what contribution, if any, the colonies should make towards the cost to the British taxpayer of defending their own territories. The Australian colonies wished for a larger squadron and more extensive harbour works in their own waters than the British Admiralty considered it could afford. Accordingly it was arranged that an auxiliary squadron should be stationed in Australian waters under Admiralty control, but not free to move out of territorial waters except with the consent of the colonial governments. To this squadron the Australian colonies agreed to contribute £126,000 a year—apparently about half its cost. It was in no sense a local navy. It was built, manned, and controlled by the Admiralty but, in return for the subsidy, the radius of its operations was confined to Australian waters.

Canada was unable to make any contribution. She quoted the promise of the British Government, made during the negotiations preceding confederation in 1867, to undertake the naval defence of the proposed Dominion provided Canada spent not less than £200,000 a year on her own land defence, and considered her obligations to the Empire discharged by the expenditure of this sum. Cape Colony pleaded the heavy cost of recent native wars, and explained that her financial condition precluded her from assuming any burden for naval defence at that time.

But the subject did not entirely end there. The Dominion representatives were anxious to do something to promote the 'strength' and 'unity' of the Empire. Sir Samuel Griffith of Australia advocated a commercial bond. He urged 'the recognition of the principle that his Majesty's subjects as such have a community of material interest as distinguished from the rest of the world,' and suggested that inter-

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Imperial trade should be fostered by the imposition of differential duties in favour of Imperial products. Mr Hofmeyr, from South Africa, made a more far-reaching proposal. He endorsed what Sir Samuel Griffith had said about the importance of commercial preference as a corrective of the 'disintegrating tendencies' of local territorial interests. But he could not consider the conclusions already reached about defence as 'satisfactory.' Except for the small Australian contribution to an auxiliary fleet the rest of the colonial Empire had done 'nothing at all' towards the maintenance of the Imperial navy. Yet colonial assistance to the British navy might be very necessary 'by and by' in view of the tremendous interests it had to protect, when compared with the French and German fleets, 'and having regard to the limited interests they had to protect.' He therefore suggested that the request of the Imperial Government for assistance in defence and the colonial suggestions for improving Imperial trade might be combined in a single scheme. He advocated 'promoting a closer union between the various parts of the British Empire by means of an Imperial Tariff of customs (two per cent) to be levied, independently of the duties payable under existing tariffs, on goods entering the Empire from abroad, the revenue derived from such tariff to be devoted to the general defence of the Empire.'

These proposals met with a very cordial reception from the colonial delegates. But the Conference was simply an informal gathering; it had no authority to bind any of the governments, no resolutions were passed, and the colonial view on Imperial relations was never precisely defined.

A second Conference, however, held in Ottawa in 1894, set down more definitely the colonial attitude towards the Imperial question. This Conference arose out of certain fruitless negotiations between Canada and the Australian colonies for reciprocity, and out of a resolution passed by the 1887 Conference in favour of a British cable across the Pacific. It was strictly a Colonial Conference, for it was summoned by the

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Canadian Government, whose Minister for Trade and Commerce presided; its business was confined to the discussion of commercial relations and intercommunications, the wider Imperial problems, such as defence and foreign affairs, not being raised at all; and Lord Jersey, the representative of the British Government, only held a watching brief. At the Conference there was general expression of a desire to promote the 'general consolidation' of the Empire, and the natural tendency of the colonies to favour the method of commercial consolidation gained more explicit expression. The general object of the Conference was defined by the Canadian minister at the outset as the diversion into British channels 'by a judicious adjustment of tariffs' of a large portion of the trade with foreign powers. With this purpose in view the Conference passed two sets of resolutions. The first recommended that the British Government, by legislation affecting the colonies and by denouncing the commercial treaties with Germany and Belgium, should enable the self-governing colonies to enter 'into agreements of commercial reciprocity with each other or with Great Britain.' The second stated that

'whereas the stability and progress of the British Empire can be best assured by drawing continually closer the bonds which unite the colonies and the mother country, . . . and whereas this co-operation and unity can in no way be more effectively promoted than by the cultivation and extension of the mutual and profitable interchange of their products, this Conference records its belief in the advisability of a customs arrangement between Great Britain and her colonies by which trade within the Empire may be placed on a more favourable footing than that which is carried on with foreign countries.'

The Conference also approved of inter-colonial preferences pending the realization of the complete scheme of Imperial reciprocity, of the project for the laying of a Pacific cable,

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and of the inauguration of a 'regular monthly steamship service between Vancouver and Sydney.'

Thus from the earliest days the relative attitudes of the mother country and the colonies in approaching the discussion of Imperial affairs, became defined. The Imperial Government, conscious of its immense responsibilities, regarded provision for defence as the most important 'common interest' of the self-governing Empire. The colonial governments, necessarily ignorant of international questions, and of the problems of the dependent Empire, and absorbed in the development of their own lands, thought that commercial reciprocity was the safest and the best method of strengthening and uniting the Empire. The reason for this difference in view is obvious. Combination for defence, as proposed in those days, involved the settlement of a basis of contribution for the different states, and the acceptance by the colonies of the policy of the mother country, both as regards foreign affairs and the expenditure of the common funds. Their representatives in London might have influenced, but they could not have controlled the action of what would have been at once the British and the Imperial Government. It was not surprising therefore, that, in the interests both of their pockets and their autonomy, the colonial representatives should have preferred measures, such as Preference, which were designed to strengthen the Empire, but which left the autonomy of the colonies unimpaired.

Before the next Conference took place—in 1897—events had given still further proof that the expansion of Europe, once recommenced, was going to lead to the partition of the world between the civilized powers. During the early 'nineties the process of dividing up Africa between the Great Powers was steadily pursued, and was productive of much friction, especially between England and France. It was the days of the great chartered companies which acquired Rhodesia, East Africa, and Nigeria, of the preparations for the re-conquest of the Sudan, of the expansion of

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France over North Africa, and of the consolidation of German power in South-West and in East Africa. In this period the scramble for Asia also began, Russia was steadily pushing her Empire towards Manchuria and the China seas, and there was friction between England and France in the Malay Peninsula. The defeat of China by Japan awakened the world to the rise of a new power, while the joint veto by Russia, Germany and France on the lease of Port Arthur to Japan, was the prelude to the first attempt at the spoliation of China by the same powers in 1898. Then came the Jameson raid and the dramatic intervention of the Kaiser in South African affairs with the telegram to President Kruger. These events produced a great change in the British attitude towards colonial affairs, which was strikingly manifested by Mr Chamberlain's choice in 1895 of what had hitherto been regarded as a subordinate office—that of Secretary of State for the Colonies.

The Diamond Jubilee afforded an opportunity of a further consultation between the British and the Colonial Governments on matters of common concern. Though, as Mr Chamberlain explained, the 1897 gathering was in no sense a 'formal conference,' and though it passed few resolutions of importance, it was the first conference which deserves the name of an Imperial Conference. For, though not officially so described, it was in fact the first conference between the governments of the Empire. Unofficial representatives were excluded and the membership was restricted to Prime Ministers who, by virtue of the command of a Parliamentary majority, were in a position to commit their countries to action of which they approved. It was, therefore, an infinitely more responsible gathering than any which had preceded it, because by reaching unanimity it could commit the Empire to any policy it endorsed. As was natural in these circumstances, its resolutions were characterized by far more caution than those of its less responsible predecessors.

Despite intervening events, the attitudes of the British

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and the Colonial Governments were much the same as they had been in 1887. The views of the British Government, as represented by Mr Chamberlain, were determined by the responsibility which lay upon it of governing the vast and still rapidly increasing number of subject peoples in the Empire, and of protecting, by its foreign policy and its preparations for defence, the Empire as a whole. Mr Chamberlain believed that there was a widespread desire in the colonies to 'share in the management of the Empire,' and 'to substitute for the slight relationship which at present exists a true partnership.' He also felt that there was a 'real necessity for some better means of consultation between the self-governing colonies and the mother country,' and he put forward as a 'personal suggestion' the creation of 'a great council of the Empire to which the colonies should send representative plenipotentiaries, not mere delegates,' who would be able 'to give really effective and valuable advice.' He recognized, however, that with the 'privilege of management and of control will also come the obligation and the responsibility,' and that 'federation' would be accomplished 'only after the lapse of a considerable time and only by gradual steps.'

Pending the creation of some 'great council' of the Empire, Mr Chamberlain regarded defence as the most important 'common interest' of the mother country and the colonies. The gigantic British fleet was maintained 'as a necessity of Empire,' for without the Empire 'our military and our naval resources would not require to be maintained at anything like their present level.' It was as essential to the safety of the colonies as of the United Kingdom, and 'nothing could be more suicidal or more fatal' than for any of them to 'separate themselves in the present stage from the protecting forces of the mother country.' He was anxious, therefore, to hear the views of the Premiers as to the 'contribution which they think the colonies would be willing to make in order to establish this principle' of 'mutual support.'

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But the Colonial Premiers differed very widely from the Colonial Secretary. They saw no need for any Imperial council. They considered the 'present political relations' as 'generally satisfactory under the existing condition of things.' They stated explicitly that they were not anxious to share in the control or the burdens of the Empire, though they recognized that before very long a means would have to be devised for giving them 'a voice in the control and direction of those questions of Imperial interest in which they are concerned equally with the mother country.' They were, in fact, not prepared to accept 'a share in the direction of Imperial policy which would involve a proportionate contribution in aid of Imperial expenditure.' In these circumstances there was nothing to be done but to leave the existing arrangements for defence as they were. It was agreed that the United Kingdom should continue to bear the whole responsibility for the naval defence of the Empire, while the colonies were left to make provision for their own land defence. The duration of the agreement for the auxiliary Australian squadron was extended for a further term of years.

At the same time the colonial premiers recognized the great advantages of a mutual exchange of ideas, and recommended the holding of 'periodical conferences' for the discussion of matters of 'common interest.' They also again expressed their belief in commercial reciprocity as the best method of promoting the union of the Empire. ✓
Accordingly they passed a resolution asking the British ✓
Government to denounce the treaties with Belgium and Germany which impeded the grant of preference by the colonies to the United Kingdom, and undertook 'to confer with their colleagues' with a view to increasing the trade between the mother country and the colonies by means of 'a preference given by the colonies to the products of the United Kingdom.'*

*NOTE.—A few months earlier Canada had granted a preference from 12½ per cent to 25 per cent on British goods.

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During the ensuing years the Empire was absorbed first in the successful campaign which led to the re-conquest of the Sudan, and in the three years' struggle in South Africa. The despatch of the colonial contingents to a war in which the whole Empire was involved and their success in action produced a very marked change in public opinion. In the United Kingdom it strengthened the belief that the colonies were willing and anxious to share in the responsibilities and burdens of Empire, if only some means could be found of keeping the Imperial Government in London in touch with their views. In the colonies, on the other hand, it had produced a sense of national individuality which was not fully recognized in the United Kingdom till considerably later. The prevalent belief that untrained colonial troops had proved themselves incomparably superior in the field to the far-famed and highly trained British regular, evoked a conscious nationalism which repudiated indignantly the idea of 'tribute' in men or money to the Admiralty and War Office, and scoffed at the projects of the older Imperial Federation Leagues. But colonial nationalism had not reached its full development by the middle of 1902, when the coronation of King Edward afforded a new opportunity for consultation between the British Government and the colonial prime ministers. We find, therefore, at the Conference itself an attitude of mind which, in the case of the British Government, was practically the same as in 1897 and 1887, and in the case of the colonies, was midway between the 'colonialism' of 1887 and 1897 and the nationalism of 1907 and 1911.

Mr. Chamberlain opened the Conference by expressing the belief that 'the political federation of the Empire is within the limits of possibility,' and asking whether it was possible to 'make any advance' on the resolution of 1897, which declared existing political arrangements to be satisfactory. Commenting on a recent speech of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's, he said that if the colonies were willing to bear their share in the burdens of the Empire, the British

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Government were willing to 'make a proposal for giving a corresponding voice in the policy of the Empire.' 'We think,' he said, 'it is time that our children should assist us to support it (the burden of Empire), and whenever you make the request to us we will hasten gladly to call you to our councils.' Representation, he thought, might be given to the colonies 'in either or in both Houses of Parliament,' though he preferred the creation of a 'real council of the Empire to which all questions of Imperial interest might be referred.' He declared, however, that the British Government, while it would welcome any approach to a 'more definite and closer union,' felt that the demand, 'if it comes and when it comes, must come from the colonies.'

Mr Chamberlain, however, hoped that, whatever might be decided about the political organization of the Empire, 'something would be done to recognize more effectually than had hitherto been done the obligation of all to contribute to the common weal' in the matter of defence. He quoted the amount spent per head by the various peoples of the Empire on defence, and declared that no one could pretend that it was 'a fair distribution of the burdens of the Empire.' He thought it was inconsistent with the position of the colonies—'inconsistent with their dignity as nations—that they should leave the mother country to bear the whole, or almost the whole, of the expense.' Great Britain could not continue to bear the burden indefinitely, and he therefore considered it not unreasonable to call their 'serious attention to a state of affairs which cannot be permanent.' This attitude of mind was still further emphasized by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War. A memorandum from the Admiralty pointed out that the word defence was a misnomer in connexion with naval affairs, 'because the primary object of the British navy is not to defend anything, but to attack the fleets of the enemy, and by defeating them to afford protection to British Dominions, shipping and commerce.' Lord Selborne added that though the British taxpayer bore

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practically the whole burden of naval defence, 'not less than one-fourth' of the eleven or twelve millions of Empire trade was trade in which he 'had no interest either as buyer or seller. . . . It was either intercolonial trade, or trade between the British Dominions beyond the seas and foreign countries.' He also quoted the large expenditure on defence made by such countries as Holland, Japan and the Argentine as proving the immense gain which the colonies derived from being part of the Empire instead of separate nations. He concluded,

'I want to see from all parts of the Empire a personal contribution to the navy, so that there may not only be an abstract Admiralty to govern the navy, but an Admiralty that has won the confidence of the colonies, because the colonies understand its policy, and because in each colony there are officers and men belonging to the navy.'

Mr Brodrick, following up a suggestion from New Zealand, proposed the creation of a special body of troops in each of the colonies to be 'ear-marked for Imperial service.'

The reception accorded to these proposals by the Premiers varied. The idea of federation or of the creation of an Imperial council was unanimously rejected. But it was also unanimously agreed that 'it would be to the advantage of the Empire if Conferences were held as far as practicable at intervals not exceeding four years, at which questions of common interest affecting the relations of the mother country and His Majesty's Dominions across the seas could be discussed and considered as between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing colonies.' It was also resolved that the views of 'colonies affected' should be obtained during the negotiation of foreign treaties 'in order that they may be in a better position to give adhesion to such treaties.' As regards defence there was a divergence of opinion. Australia agreed to pay £200,000 and New Zealand £40,000

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a year to an improved Australasian squadron. Cape Colony and Natal contributed £50,000 and £35,000 a year towards the general maintenance of the navy. Canada, on the other hand was 'contemplating the establishment of a local naval force in the waters of Canada,' and was unable to make any offer 'analogous' to the rest. In the case of the Imperial Army Reserve, Cape Colony, Natal and New Zealand 'were disposed to fall in' with Mr Brodrick's proposals, but Canada and Australia thought it best to raise the standards of the general body of their own forces. Apparently however, all the premiers agreed that

'to establish a special force, set apart for general Imperial service and practically under the absolute control of the Imperial Government, was objectionable in principle, as derogating from the powers of self-government enjoyed by them, and would be calculated to impede the general improvement in the training and organization of their defensive forces and, consequently, their ability to render effective help, if it should be required.'

Once again it was the colonial representatives who took the lead in promoting closer commercial relations. Mr Chamberlain devoted a considerable part of his opening address to this subject. He pointed out that the Empire might be self-sustaining, but that in point of fact the United Kingdom derived the greater part of its necessaries from foreign countries, while the bulk of its exports were also to foreign countries. 'Our first object then . . . is free trade within the Empire' which would 'enormously increase our inter-imperial trade; would hasten the development of our colonies; would fill up the spare places in your land with an active, intelligent, and above all, British population; would make the mother country entirely independent of foreign food and raw material.' Mr Chamberlain, however, recognized that no so 'far-reaching' a proposal had yet been made by any of the colonies, though Canada had

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granted a $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent reduction of duties on British imports, and New Zealand advocated the general adoption of the principle of preference. He then proceeded to examine the effect of the 1897 Canadian preference. He thought the results had been 'altogether disappointing,' a result which he attributed to the fact that even the reduced duties were prohibitive. 'So long as a preferential tariff, even a munificent preference, is still sufficiently protective to exclude us altogether, or nearly so, from your markets, it is no satisfaction to us that you have imposed even greater disability upon the same goods if they come from foreign markets.'

The Prime Ministers, however, dissented from Mr Chamberlain's views. After considerable discussion they passed a resolution declaring that 'in the present circumstances of the colonies, it is not practicable to adopt a general system of Free Trade within the Empire, and that the principle of preferential trade . . . would stimulate and facilitate mutual commercial intercourse and would by promoting the development of the resources and industries of the several parts, strengthen the Empire.' Accordingly the Prime Ministers undertook to do their best to 'give substantial preferential treatment to the products and manufactures of the United Kingdom' and respectfully urged upon 'His Majesty's Government the expediency of granting in the United Kingdom preferential treatment to the products and manufactures of the colonies.'

II. 1902-1911.

THE 1902 Conference marked the close of the second stage in the growth of opinion about the character and organization of the Empire. Succeeding the era when 'disintegration' was regarded as the inevitable future, came the period when the policy of centralizing the defensive resources of the whole Empire in the hands of Great Britain, held the field. As we have seen, this policy,

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which was steadily advocated by the British Government, never gained more than a grudging assent from the colonies. They contributed reluctantly to Imperial services and advocated commercial reciprocity as a preferable method of strengthening the Empire.

The Conference of 1902 also marked the opening of the third period, when both the Imperial and the Colonial Governments pursued, in Mr Harcourt's words 'the path not of Imperial concentration but of Imperial co-operation.' Its history is curious. To begin with, there was a sudden abandonment of the policy of 'concentration' by those who had been its foremost advocates. The experience of the 1902 Conference and a visit to South Africa seem to have convinced Mr Chamberlain that rapid progress towards Imperial unity along the lines hitherto advocated by the British Government was out of the question, and that the most fruitful course was to follow the lead of the Colonial Prime Ministers, and begin by establishing a complete system of Imperial reciprocity. This, as Lord Salisbury had said in 1882, was not possible 'until on one side or the other very different notions with regard to fiscal policy prevail from those which prevail at the present moment.' So convinced, however, was Mr Chamberlain of the urgent necessity of consolidating the Empire by commercial means, that in 1903 he resigned his position in the Government in order the better to preach the new gospel of Tariff Reform. In the event he converted to his view the great majority of his own party and of those who were specially interested in Imperial affairs. In the Dominions, as the self-governing colonies now began to be named, the belief in commercial reciprocity as the best method of cementing the Empire, and as the only policy consistent with their own existence as free nations, was greatly strengthened by Mr Chamberlain's campaign.

Thus, by the time that the 1907 Conference assembled, the older advocates of Imperial Union for defence and

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foreign policy had become converts to the colonial idea of Imperial consolidation by commercial means. By an even more curious chapter of events, the Imperial Government, which might naturally have been expected to call the attention of the Conference to the problems of defence and foreign affairs, found themselves debarred from doing so. This was the more remarkable because the external situation had absorbed a great deal of attention during the intervening years, both in England and elsewhere. In 1902 the German Navy Bill and the popular agitation with which it was accompanied, had finally aroused the people of the United Kingdom to the new danger which was arising across the North Sea. In 1905 the complete defeat of Russia by Japan revolutionized the diplomatic arrangements of the world. It led to the new Anglo-Japanese alliance and to the removal of all British battle-ships from far Eastern waters. It awakened the Australasian people to a sudden comprehension of the Asiatic menace. It removed so completely the earlier dangers to India and to British communications with Australasia and the Far East, that within two years the old enmity between Russia and England had given way to an understanding which settled, at any rate for a time, the vexed and dangerous problems in Thibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. On the other hand, it left Germany unquestionably the first military power in Europe. The disappearance of any serious danger in the rear enabled Germany to put pressure on other European powers with practical impunity, and it was not long before her government tried to take advantage of this strong position. In 1904 an agreement was signed between France and England for the settlement of their long standing North African quarrel, on the basis that France was to recognize the prior rights of England in Egypt, and England the prior claims of France in Morocco. The German Government professed to regard this as a direct blow to her national prestige. It put forward the claim that as a first-class power, Germany had a right to be

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consulted about every international arrangement, and demanded under threat of war, the resignation of M. Delcassé and Lord Lansdowne, as a public proof that her rights were recognized. France felt powerless to avoid defeat, and M. Delcassé resigned. The British Government was strong enough to resist the German threats, and Lord Lansdowne ignored the German demand. For days Europe hovered on the brink of war, but finally Germany decided that the game was not worth the candle, and accepted a conference as a method of settling the questions involved without loss of prestige. After protracted sittings the Algeciras Conference made the settlement of Moroccan affairs, which has been so rudely disturbed of late by the French expedition to Fez, the Spanish occupation of Alcazar, and the dispatch of a German gunboat to Agadir.

In 1906, however, a new Government had come into power in England. The members of this Government had had little experience of office and had little knowledge of Imperial and foreign affairs. Accordingly they began conducting an experiment in foreign affairs which they believed would relieve the growing tension in international politics, and especially in the relations between England and Germany. They hoped that at the second Hague Conference, due in 1907, some practical steps might be taken in the direction of disarmament, and in order to give proof of the sincerity of their intentions, they greatly reduced the building programme and the expenditure of the British Navy in their first two years of office. Thus, on March 2, 1907, on the eve of both of the Imperial and the Hague Conferences, the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, published an article in the *Nation* in which he said, 'We have already given earnest proof of our sincerity by the considerable reductions that have been effected in our naval and military expenditure, as well as by the undertaking that we are prepared to go further if we find a similar disposition in other quarters.'

When, therefore, the British Cabinet met the representa-

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tives of the Dominions at the 1907 Conference, so far from wanting to press for an increase in the preparation for defence they were anxious to do nothing to impair their public declarations in favour of largely diminishing expenditure on armaments.

This practically eliminated all possibility of a discussion of the general problem of defence. It naturally also eliminated the earlier projects for Imperial federation, or the creation of a 'great Imperial council.' For assuming the success of the government's efforts for disarmament there would be nothing for a permanent Imperial body to do. On the other hand there was no great prospect of any important advance towards Imperial reciprocity in trade, for the British Ministry was absolutely committed to Free Trade, and was resolutely opposed to the Dominion policy of Imperial preference. It was evident that the Conference was unlikely to produce any striking results.

The Conference fulfilled these expectations. It was opened by an address from the Prime Minister. Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman struck the new note from the outset. 'I think,' he said, 'that the views sometimes taken of the proper relations of the colonies to the mother country, with respect to expenditure on armaments have been, of late, somewhat modified. We do not meet to-day you as claimants for money, although we cordially recognize the spirit in which contributions have been made in the past, and will, no doubt, be made in the future.' He declared that 'the essence of the British Imperial connexion' was 'freedom and independence'—'Freedom of action on the part of the individual State, freedom in their relations with each other and with the mother country.' But, he added, 'Freedom does not necessarily mean letting things drift,' and he suggested that 'provision should be made for maintaining the impetus' given by the Conference to the consideration and settlement of Imperial problems by arranging for the meeting of subsidiary conferences on matters 'which require more time and treatment in greater

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detail than is possible in the Colonial Conference itself.'

The most important discussion centred on the constitution of the Conference itself. The abandonment of the earlier idea of centralization had produced a practical harmony between the views of the Imperial Government and the national aspirations of the Dominions. Mr Lyttelton, the Colonial Secretary in the preceding Government, had proposed in 1905 that the Conference should be constituted as a permanent institution under the title of the 'Imperial Council,' and that its efficiency should be enhanced by the appointment of a 'permanent commission' of a 'purely consultative and advisory character' to prepare the agenda for the Conferences, and after careful preliminary examination, to present subjects for discussion 'in as concise and clear a form, and with as much material for forming a judgement as possible.' These proposals, though they were not again put forward by Lord Elgin, prepared the way for the extremely important resolution which, after long discussion, was finally passed. This resolution defined with great precision the organization and functions of the body which in future was to be the highest deliberative assembly within the Empire. The Conference itself was to be known as the Imperial as opposed to the Colonial Conference. It was to meet once in four years. Instead of its being a gathering at which matters were to be discussed between the Colonial Secretary and the Colonial Premiers, it was to be a Conference at which 'questions of common interest' were to be considered 'as between His Majesty's Government and His Governments of the self-governing Dominions beyond the seas.' The Secretary of State for the Colonies was to be entrusted with the work of making the arrangements for the Conference, and of controlling a Secretariat whose duty it would be to obtain information for the use of the Conference, attend to its resolutions, and conduct correspondence relating to its affairs. Where matters of impor-

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tance or requiring detailed examination arose for discussion in the intervals between the meetings of the Conferences, subsidiary conferences were to be specially appointed to deal with them.

This resolution established the status of the Dominions as national entities entirely distinct from that which inhabited the British Isles. It recognized that the basis of Imperial organization was the co-operation of five nations, not the centralization of power in the hands of the British, acting as the Imperial Government. It finally destroyed the older conception of imperial development as a gradual reunion of the colonies with the mother country through representation in either of the British Houses of Parliament.

When the Conference came to defence there was considerable confusion of thought. The efforts which were being made by the Imperial Government in favour of disarmament prevented the Dominions from entering upon a serious discussion of how the new principle of co-operation was to be applied to defence and foreign policy. The Admiralty on the other hand made little attempt to apply this principle to naval defence. Lord Tweedmouth, as its representative, stated that if, as he understood was the case, some of the Dominions wanted to start 'some naval service' of their own, the Admiralty was prepared to consider a modification of the existing arrangements to meet the views of the colonies, provided 'unity of command and direction of the fleet' was maintained. He declared that though the British Government did not come to the Dominions 'as beggars,' he was glad that the Dominions should take 'some leading part' in the naval defence of the Empire, 'the only reservation the Admiralty desire to make is that they claim to have the charge of the strategical questions which are necessarily involved in naval defence, to hold command of the naval forces of the country, to arrange the distribution of ships in the best possible manner, to resist attacks, and to

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defend the Empire at large, whether it be our own islands or the dominions beyond the seas.'

It was not unnatural that in such circumstances the Conference came to no decisions at all about naval defence, Mr Deakin declared that the Commonwealth disliked the existing system of paying part of the cost of a squadron which the Admiralty controlled, and would prefer 'to devote our funds to the provision of a local force' which should be 'associated in the closest possible manner with the Navy.' Mr Brodeur said that in Canada there was 'only one mind' on the question, and that was against subsidies. New Zealand was prepared to trust the Admiralty and continue its contribution. The South African colonies were divided, and were clearly not in a position to do anything effective pending Union. In the end the existing arrangements were left entirely unaltered.

When the question of military defence came up greater progress was made, for the War Office accepted the principle of co-operation from the outset. Mr Haldane explained that the system of defence for the Empire comprised three lines. In the first place, there was a fleet 'stronger than the fleet of any other power, or for that matter of any other two powers.' Such a fleet was necessary 'if the Empire is to hold together at all.' In the second place there was an expeditionary force 'which exists not for local defence, but for the service of the Empire as a whole,' and which was available to proceed to defend the frontiers of any portion of the Empire at a moment's notice. In the third place, there were the 'home defence troops' enrolled only for service at home. His main purpose in attending the Conference was to 'emphasize the desirability' of organizing this third line of home defence forces throughout the Empire on common lines, in order that they might be in a better position to render 'mutual assistance' in time of war. And in order to achieve this end, he recommended a scheme for the creation of an Imperial General Staff. Such a staff, while purely advisory and

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having no control over the troops either of the United Kingdom or of any of the Dominions, would produce uniformity in the organization and equipment of the military forces throughout the Empire, and would be able to furnish to the local governments or local commander-in-chief 'whether he were Canadian, British or Australian, or New Zealander or South African,' advice and information 'based upon the highest military study of the time.'

This proposal was a very different one from Mr Brodric's request for the 'earmarking' of colonial troops for the expeditionary army, and was favourably received. The Conference passed a resolution to the effect that it 'welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War and without wishing to commit any of the governments represented, recognizes and affirms the need of developing for the service of the Empire a general staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole.' There was also some discussion as to whether the Dominions should undertake to send contingents to the expeditionary army for service outside their own territories in time of war, but the consensus of opinion was strongly against the idea.

As the natural outcome of the wish of the larger Dominions to control their own arrangements both for naval and military defence, a resolution was also passed authorizing them to refer to the Committee of Imperial Defence 'for advice on any local questions in regard to which expert advice is deemed desirable' and declaring that 'whenever so desired a representative of the colony which may wish for advice should be summoned to attend, as a member of the Committee during the discussion of the question raised.'

When the Conference came to discuss commercial relations a serious cleavage of opinion showed itself. Mr Deakin defined the position of the majority of the Dominions at the outset by moving a resolution stating that it was 'desirable that the United Kingdom grant preferential treatment to the products and manufactures of the colonies.' Preference, he said,

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involved no surrender of autonomy. It left each self-governing portion of the Empire entirely free to arrange its own tariff, provided that it encouraged production and employment within the Empire, by imposing a lower scale of duties on British than foreign products. But during the discussion it became evident that in the eyes of the Dominion representatives any effective system of inter-imperial reciprocity involved the imposition of duties against foreign foodstuffs imported into the United Kingdom. The British Ministers pointed out that this involved a complete reversal of British fiscal policy, that by the very canon of local autonomy they must be the judges of the fiscal policy which suited their own country, and that in fact it was quite impossible for them to abandon Free Trade. They made it also clear, however, that they could not accept the principle of preference even so far as to apply it to the duties already in force under the existing revenue tariff.

In the end the resolution of 1902, declaring free trade within the Empire impracticable, but recommending the adoption of preferential duties throughout the Empire, was reaffirmed, the British Government dissenting in so far as the resolution implied 'that it was necessary or expedient to alter the fiscal system of the United Kingdom.' After doing a considerable amount of practical work designed to improve cable, mail and steamship communications, to remove minor obstacles to trade, and to produce uniformity in certain legal matters throughout the Empire, the Conference adjourned.

The next few years brought about a surprising change—little suspected in 1907. The hopes of the government about the reduction of armaments were rudely upset. The Hague Conference while doing much to regulate war, and diminish its ferocity, left the question of disarmament severely alone. In 1908 Austria, assured of the support of Germany, abruptly tore up the Treaty of Berlin, without consulting any of the original parties to it, and brought Europe to the verge of war by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the same year the prospects of economy in the national expenditure on armaments were finally shattered by the

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passage of a third bill for the increase of the German Navy. In March of the following year the scare occurred about the secret acceleration of the German shipbuilding programme. Mr McKenna startled the world by showing the immense development in German shipbuilding and gun and armour-plate making resources. Sir Edward Grey in a weighty statement in the House of Commons said 'The House and the country are perfectly right in the view that the situation is grave. A new situation in this country is created by the German programme. . . . This new (German) fleet will be the most powerful which the world has yet seen . . . There is no dispute . . . that in order to meet the German fleet when it is completed we shall have to build a new fleet of our own, more powerful than any we have yet got.' As a result the Government, which during the two preceding years of office had built but five Dreadnoughts, found it necessary to accept a programme of no less than eight for the single year 1909.

These events produced a profound effect in other parts of the Empire. The anxiety which had arisen in Australia and New Zealand after the Russo-Japanese war had steadily increased, as public opinion began to realize the facts of the situation. The fixed determination to prevent the immigration of Asiatics had gradually ripened into a conviction that if they were to be sure of carrying out their policy, they must themselves be prepared to resist Asiatic immigration if need be by force. The 'German scare' and the reports of the weakness of the British Navy, following on the removal of all effective battleships from the Far East after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1905, roused the Australasian people to the need of prompt action. The immediate result was a spontaneous offer of two Dreadnoughts to the British Navy, one (two if necessary) from New Zealand, and one from Australia. The later results were even greater. Australia adopted a far-reaching scheme for a local Navy, and within two years a system of universal military service was inaugurated in both Australia and New Zealand, without the slightest pressure from the British Government. Canada,

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though not in danger of invasion, also gave clear evidence of her readiness to play her part if the Empire was in serious danger. Her Parliament passed a resolution declaring that it fully 'recognizes the duty of the people of Canada as they increase in numbers and wealth to assume in larger measure the responsibilities of defence.' The resolution went on to say that the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the Imperial Treasury would not be 'the most satisfactory solution of the question of defence' but that 'any necessary expenditure designed to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian Naval service, in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial Navy' would be 'cordially approved.'

The South African Union constitution had not yet been finally passed, and the South African Premiers could do no more than accept an invitation to a subsidiary conference, issued by the British Government under the resolution of the Conference of 1907, 'to discuss the general question of naval and military defence of the Empire, with special reference to the Canadian resolution, and to the proposals from New Zealand and Australia.'

Thus within two years a special conference had to be summoned to discuss that very problem which the British Government had always put forward as the most important and most urgent of the 'common interests' of the Empire at earlier conferences, but which as already explained, it did not raise at the 1907 Conference as a 'general question' at all.

Though the full effect was not realized at the time the Defence Conference of 1909 applied to the sphere of Naval defence the principles of Imperial co-operation which had been laid down in 1907 on the basis of the organization of the Empire. The Admiralty in a preliminary memorandum discussed the various methods in which the Dominions could 'participate in the burthen of Imperial Defence. It pointed out that the method which would give the 'maximum of power' for a given expenditure would be for 'all parts of the Empire to contribute according to their needs and resources,

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to the maintenance of the British Navy.' But it recognized that the 'individual national sentiment' of the larger and richer Dominions required the creation of local naval forces which would serve as the foundations of 'future Dominion navies' as well as contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of Imperial defence. Accordingly the Admiralty proceeded to 'formulate the broad principles upon which the growth of colonial naval forces should be fostered.' It considered that 'a dominion government desirous of creating a navy should aim at forming a distinct fleet unit' and recommended that it should consist of 'at least' one Dreadnought cruiser, three armoured cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines. It further pointed out that as it was a '*sine qua non*, that successful action in time of war depends upon unity of command and direction' there should be 'one common standard' for the Royal and the Dominion fleets as regards 'shipbuilding, armament and warlike stores . . . training, and discipline.'

Canada accepted the proposals of the Admiralty with certain modifications. 'While, on naval strategical considerations it was thought that a fleet unit on the Pacific . . . might in the future form an acceptable system of naval defence, it was recognized that Canada's double sea board rendered the provision of such a fleet unit unsuitable for the present.' Accordingly it was finally agreed that Canada should acquire four 'Bristol' cruisers, one 'Boadicea' cruiser, and six destroyers. Of these, two 'Bristols' were to be stationed on the Pacific, the rest on the Atlantic coast. Nothing was said about the control of these vessels in time of war.

Australia accepted the fleet unit scheme as a whole, subject to certain temporary financial adjustments. 'In peace time and while on the Australian station, this fleet unit would be under the exclusive control of the Commonwealth Government,' though the King's regulations in regard to naval discipline were to apply. 'When placed by the Commonwealth Government at the disposal of the Admiralty in war

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time,' their vessels were to be under the control of the Naval Commander-in-Chief.

New Zealand did not feel itself in a position to embark upon the construction and maintenance of a fleet unit by herself, and it was therefore agreed that the New Zealand Dreadnought should be the flag ship of a China-New Zealand fleet unit of the British Navy, and that New Zealand should, in addition to paying for the Dreadnought, contribute £100,000 per annum towards the cost of the Squadron's upkeep. The South African Union had not yet come into being, and its representatives were therefore unable to take action.

Under the head of Military Defence, Mr Haldane asked the Conference to consider proposals for 'so organizing the military forces of the Empire as to ensure their effective co-operation in the event of war.' He recognized that the 'representatives of the Oversea Dominions cannot at the Conference pledge their Governments, or undertake in any way to bind the officers and men composing Oversea Dominion forces to engagements beyond the shores and boundaries of their own countries.' But he went on to point out, 'to organize local forces, so that in a time of supreme emergency they may concentrate and act together as one army in any part of the Empire does not lessen, but actually tends to increase the efficiency of these forces for the local defence of their homes.' After discussion, the Conference declared that 'each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire,' and subsequently endorsed a report by a sub-committee which recommended the assimilation of forces, weapons, and the arrangements for transport, to British standards. 'The result,' as the Prime Minister announced to Parliament, 'is a plan for so organizing the forces of the Crown wherever they are, that while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real

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emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous Imperial Army.'

Thus, at this Conference for the first time defence was recognized as the most vital of the 'common interests' of the Empire. The Dominions had come to realize how vitally the preparations for Imperial Defence affected themselves, and the British Government had learnt that even in this vital matter it was impossible to concentrate the defensive resources of five nations in their own hands. Even at this date, however, the Admiralty had not apprehended the full meaning of Imperial co-operation as applied to naval defence. In the memorandum already referred to, it had stated that 'it had been recognized by the colonial governments, that in time of war the local naval forces should come under the general direction of the Admiralty.' What the authority was for this statement is unknown. But at all events, the Admiralty's hopes were disappointed. It could get no guarantee of 'unity of command' either in peace or war from Canada or Australia. The Dominion Act authorizing the constitution of a local naval force in both cases declared that the Dominion Government 'may' place the vessels at the disposal of the Admiralty. The Australian Ministers declared their intention of always doing so in time of war. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, on the other hand, said that under present circumstances it was not advisable for Canada 'to mix in the armaments of the Empire,' and that Canada would 'take part in these (imperial) wars, in which to-day they have no voice, only if they think fit to do so.' Thus, the ultimate outcome of the Conference of 1909 was to apply the method of Imperial co-operation as fully to naval defence as it had already been applied to military defence.

But the 1909 Conference was a subsidiary conference, called to discuss 'the general question of naval and military defence.' It did not discuss foreign policy at all. Yet, as Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman had said to the 1907 Conference, 'the cost of naval defence and the

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responsibility for foreign affairs hang together. This fact was not slow in making itself felt. On the one hand the Dominions had long asserted their claim to negotiate commercial treaties with foreign powers. It was pretty evident that before very long the vigorous and growing nationalism of the Dominions would force the Dominion Governments to intervene in other departments of foreign affairs. So the event proved. The Japanese Alliance was due to expire or be renewed in 1915, and there was considerable anxiety throughout the Dominions, and especially in Australasia as to what was to happen. The Declaration of London obviously affected the trade of the Dominions, and some resentment was expressed in Australia and South Africa that the Dominions had not been consulted during the negotiations. On the other hand there were obvious difficulties* which were certain to arise in the sphere of foreign affairs, as soon as the Dominion navies were afloat. These navies were not to be under Admiralty control. Were they to be in a position to upset the policy of the British Foreign Office, or to embroil the Empire in war without the consent of the Imperial Government? If not, how were their movements to be controlled?

It was generally recognized therefore,† that the most important work which lay before the Conference of 1911 lay in the sphere of defence and foreign affairs.

The Conference itself which assembled on May 23 last was the first to meet under the famous resolution of 1907, and was conducted in the spirit as well as the letter of that resolution. It was essentially a conference 'between governments.' The Prime Minister presided at all the more important meetings, and in his opening address emphasized the new character of the gathering. He expressed no opinion in favour of the creation of any kind of Imperial Council. 'Each of us intend to remain masters in our own house-

* See R.T. for May, p. 253.

† See Debates, House of Commons, April 19, 1911. *Times*, April 18, 19, May 23, 1911.

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hold.' Autonomy, he said, 'was the lifeblood of our polity.' But it was 'none the less true' that the self-governing communities in the Empire while units, were 'units in a greater unity. And it is the primary object and governing purpose of these periodical conferences that we may take free counsel together in matters which concern us all.' He referred to Imperial defence as the most important of common interests, and thought it desirable to 'take stock together of the possible risks and dangers to which we are or may be exposed, and to weigh carefully the adequacy and the reciprocal adaptiveness of the contributions we are respectively making to provide against them.' He also announced that for the first time the Foreign Secretary would attend the Conference and discuss 'the international situation, so far as it affects the Empire as a whole.' No mention was made by Mr Asquith of commercial relations.

As was expected, the most important discussions hinged on foreign affairs, and the problem of how the British and the Dominion Governments were to keep in consultation with one another over foreign policy. Part of these discussions, being confidential, have not been published, but the reports of the remainder and the results of the Conference indicate clearly what happened. The representatives of Australia, South Africa, and Newfoundland were extremely anxious that the British Government should undertake to consult them in all matters of foreign policy which affected themselves, before action was taken. Mr Fisher considered that the time 'has arrived for the Oversea Dominions to be informed, and whenever possible consulted, as to the best means of promoting the interests of all concerned, when the mother country has decided to open negotiations with foreign powers in regard to matters which involve the interests of the Dominions.' Sir Joseph Ward declared that 'no partnership deserves the name which does not give to the partners at least some voice in the most vital of the partnership concerns.' General Botha said it

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was his 'profound conviction that it is in the highest interest of the Empire that the Imperial Government should not definitely bind itself by any promise or agreement with a foreign country, which may affect a particular Dominion without consulting the Dominion concerned.' Sir Wilfrid Laurier took a somewhat different view. He distinguished between commercial and other engagements with foreign powers. He claimed for Canada the liberty of negotiating her own treaties of commerce, while he preferred to leave the negotiation of all other treaties to the British Government, reserving to Canada, the right to decide for herself whether she would abide by them or partake in any war to which they might lead. 'If,' he said, 'you undertake to be consulted and to lay down a wish that your advice should be pursued as to the manner in which the war is to be carried on, it implies, of necessity, that you should take part in that war.'

The British Government undertook to meet the views of the majority in the fullest degree. Sir Edward Grey reviewed comprehensively before the Conference the international situation, and as Mr Fisher expressed it, took the Dominion Premiers into the 'innermost counsels' of the Imperial Government. He accepted, without any reserve, a very important resolution moved by Australia and passed unanimously:

(a) 'that the Dominions shall be afforded an opportunity of consultation when framing the instructions to be given to British delegates at future meetings of the Hague Conference, and that conventions affecting the Dominions provisionally assented to at that Conference shall be circulated among the Dominion Governments for their consideration before any such convention is signed: (b) that a similar procedure where time and opportunity and the subject matter permit, shall, as far as possible, be used when preparing instructions for the negotiations of other international agreements affecting the Dominions.'

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Sir Edward Grey also undertook to open negotiations with foreign governments, with the object of securing liberty for any Dominion to make their own commercial treaties with all foreign powers.

Thus, the most important work of the 1911 Conference was to establish between the five responsible governments of the Empire complete agreement about the general lines of foreign policy. It seems to have been generally recognized that it was impossible to apply the principle of co-operation to foreign policy, and that, as the Australian Minister for External Affairs said, there must be 'only one' foreign policy for the Empire. And the result of the discussion was to formulate such a policy. Two international agreements of far reaching importance were actually approved by the representatives of the whole Empire—the revised treaty of alliance with Japan, and the Declaration of London.* And cordial approval was expressed of the proposed arbitration treaty with America. This was a very remarkable manifestation of Imperial unity.

But even at the Conference it seems to have been generally felt that if there was to be only one foreign policy, there was need for some machinery by which the Imperial Government and the Dominion Governments should keep in close consultation about foreign affairs and other matters between the Conferences. As Mr Fisher said, the Imperial Conference itself would have to meet at 'shorter periods' than four years unless some 'person or body' were constituted to serve as a link between the governments in the intervals. Sir Joseph Ward proposed the creation of an 'Imperial Council of State advisory to the Imperial Government on all questions affecting the interests of His Majesty's Dominions oversea.' But the suggestion was rejected by the Conference, because as Mr Asquith said, if the council was to be really effective 'it would impair, if not altogether destroy, the authority

* Australia abstained from voting for a resolution approving of the ratification of the Declaration, but expressed approval of the measure.

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of the Government of the United Kingdom in such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration and maintenance of peace, or the declaration of war . . . and could impose upon the Dominions by the voice of a body in which they would be in a standing minority . . . a policy of which they might all disapprove, a policy which would, in most cases, involve expenditure, which would have to be met by the imposition on a dissentient community of taxation by its own government.' Other methods were then discussed in connexion with proposals for improving the Secretariat to the Conference itself. The British Government in order to meet the 'general desire' in the Dominions for 'closer touch' with the Home Government, proposed to create a standing Committee of the Conference to carry on the Conference work in the intervals between the sessions. It suggested that the High Commissioners or some other nominee should represent the Dominions. Mr Fisher thought that such a body would be useful if it could discuss informally imperial and foreign problems, in order that the Imperial and the Dominion Governments might both communicate their own and learn each other's views, through their respective representatives. Sir Wilfrid Laurier was afraid that such a body, having no real responsibility might interfere with the smooth working of responsible government. General Botha thought that subsidiary *ad hoc* conferences, or the despatch of Cabinet Ministers to London, was a preferable method of consultation when important matters arose, and that in ordinary cases it would be enough if the Secretary of State called in the High Commissioners for an informal discussion which could then be reported to their respective governments. In the end, no resolution was passed. It is evident that some better machinery of consultation is required than exists at present, but the Conference was unable on this occasion to devise a satisfactory scheme. It seems probable that the pressure of the facts will force a development along the

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lines suggested by General Botha, and that a system of this kind will have to be regularly organized at the next Conference.

As the natural corollary to the understanding that the Imperial Government would in future frame its policy in consultation with the Dominions, it was agreed that the Dominions should not use their navies to defeat the policy of the Foreign Office. It was accordingly arranged that while the Dominions were to retain absolute control over their navies, which were to have naval stations of their own, Dominion vessels were to be governed by Foreign Office instructions whenever they entered foreign ports. It was also agreed that 'the training and discipline' of the British and Dominion navies were to be 'generally uniform,' and that officers and men should be 'interchangeable.' Finally, in time of war, when a Dominion placed its vessels at the disposal of the Admiralty, they were to 'form an integral part of the British fleet, and remain under the control of the British Admiralty during the continuance of the war.'

A committee of the Conference also discussed and approved the arrangements which had been worked out during the preceding two years by the Imperial General Staff for facilitating the voluntary co-operation of the military forces of the Empire.

For the first time Preference did not occupy an important place in the discussions of the Conference. The reason does not appear from the debates. But it is probable that the attention of the Dominion representatives was chiefly engrossed by the problem of defence and foreign affairs, while their strong insistence on the doctrine of local autonomy made it difficult for them to urge any policy such as that of Mr Deakin in 1909, which involved a complete change in the fiscal policy of the United Kingdom, on a Government which was specifically committed to Free Trade. But the Dominion Premiers did not abandon their view that immediate steps should be taken to strengthen and

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consolidate the Empire by the development of its material resources, and the promotion of inter-imperial trade. They brought forward therefore a proposal for the appointment of a Royal Commission, 'representative of the whole self-governing Empire,' which should report on the resources of the Empire, and recommend by what 'methods, consistent with the existing fiscal policy of each part, the trade of each part with the others may be improved and extended.' They also devoted much time to the consideration of other methods of improving the means of communication between the various parts of the Empire by legislation affecting shipping, and by reductions in mail, cable, and steamship rates. The Conference also passed two important resolutions, one designed to effect uniformity in Imperial naturalization, the other to bring about an improved Imperial Court of Appeal.

III. 1911 AND AFTER

THERE has thus been an immense change during the last forty years in the general view of the character and future of the Empire. After an era of despair, coinciding with an almost complete lull in world politics, the self-governing communities of the Empire suddenly awoke to find that they had common interests which they could protect only by common action. For a time there was a divergence of view between the Dominions and Great Britain as to how they should co-operate to defend these common interests. To begin with, the people of Great Britain believed that the correct course was to concentrate in the hands of the British Government, acting as the Imperial Government, whatever defensive resources in men, ships and money the Empire would provide. The Dominions, on the other hand, reluctant to surrender any portion of their autonomy, and necessarily ignorant of foreign and Imperial problems, thought it would be sufficient to strengthen the countries of which the Empire was composed, by measures design-

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ed to increase their population and economic resources, and that there was no serious need for active co-operation for defence. But later years saw a change. The problem of defence came to be recognized as the most urgent common concern. This led to a reconciliation between the views of the Dominions and Great Britain. The indifference of the Dominions disappeared and active steps were everywhere taken to increase the preparations for defence. At the same time the older idea that the control of the system of defence should be concentrated in the hands of the British Government gave way to the newer conception of the free co-operation of five national governments. As was perhaps inevitable during this later time proposals for developing the material wealth which is the foundation of Imperial strength, while not lost sight of, were somewhat thrust into the background.

This great change in opinion has been due to two broad causes. The first cause has been the increase of external pressure. Few people realize how completely the international position of the Empire has changed in the last forty years. At the beginning of the period it was the only world Empire. Outside Europe no power disputed its predominance, except on the American Continent, where the Monroe doctrine of another Anglo-Saxon people rescued a continent from the interference of European powers. To-day the British is only one among many Empires. Except upon the sea it is not noticeably stronger than its neighbours, and even there the radius of its naval supremacy has been greatly decreased.

But the rise of foreign powers has not only destroyed the old isolation of the Empire, it has had a very great effect upon its size and character. In previous issues of the ROUND TABLE we have seen how the competition of France and Spain forced upon England the acquisition of her earliest oversea domains. The same causes produced precisely the same effects when they have re-appeared in the later years of the nineteenth century. 'All war,' said Napoleon, 'is a

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struggle for position.' Directly foreign powers began to seize upon the uncivilized world, England had to follow suit. She could not afford to see India threatened by the presence of Russia controlling the entry to India from Afghanistan. She would not allow some other power to bestride her route to Australia and the East through Egypt, nor witness the building up of a vast and hostile empire overshadowing her possessions in Africa. If she was to be the mistress of her own destiny she could not permit other and possibly hostile powers to occupy the heights which commanded her citadels, or the roads which linked her Empire. It was this inexorable law of self-defence which led to the acquisition during the later part of the nineteenth century of Egypt, Wei-hai-Wei, Rhodesia and other parts of Africa. It is the same necessity which forbids us to acquiesce in the creation of a German naval base at Agadir, and which impels Canadians to object to the extension of American territory in Alaska, Australasians to protest against the transfer of French Islands in the Pacific to Germany, and South Africans to watch with jealous eyes the proposed exchange of territory in Central Africa.

This enforced expansion has meant a vast increase in the burden of Empire. Since 1871, its area has increased by 2,500,000 square miles, containing 150,000,000 people and situated in every portion of the globe. The Empire is now nearly eleven and a half million square miles in extent and has a population of nearly four hundred and twenty million souls. The burden of maintaining a civilized government throughout this vast area is tremendous enough. It has been multiplied a hundred fold by the renewed expansion of Europe, which has imposed upon us the additional duty of defending endless frontiers all over the earth.

The effect on the Empire, therefore, of the rise of foreign powers has been very marked in the past and is not likely to be less important in the future. It is not surprising that external affairs and co-operation for defence should now have obtained recognition as the most impor-

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tant common interest which the Imperial Conference has to discuss.

The second broad cause of the recent development in the organization of the Empire is the change in the Dominions themselves. Not only has their population much more than doubled since 1871, but a national spirit has arisen which was entirely unexpected forty years ago. It is this 'colonial nationalism' which has rejected the idea of concentrating the power of the Empire in the hands of the British Government, and which has led to the creation of 'local' navies and to the acceptance of co-operation as the basis of Imperial organization. Colonial nationalism is a new and immensely important force. Its vigour, self confidence, even its somewhat aggressive independence, is immeasurably more valuable to the Empire than the apathetic irresponsibility of the 'colonial days.' But it has introduced a new factor into the Imperial problem, the full effects of which cannot yet be seen. Its claims have yet to be reconciled with the claims of the Empire. The Dominions explicitly recognize the duty of defending themselves. Further, they declare and have manifested in practice, their willingness to assist in the defence of the Empire, but they reserve to themselves as free nations the right of deciding when and how their help should be given. It is not yet clear how a system of co-operation is to be made to work in which the parties are not definitely pledged and committed to co-operate even for the common defence.

External pressure and the rise of colonial nationalism, therefore, have been the chief forces in moulding the present organization of the Empire. Let us see exactly what this organization is. The Empire to-day is a partnership in which the full responsibility rests upon one partner and a limited responsibility rests upon the rest. Expressed in greater detail the system is as follows. On the shoulders of Great Britain rests a threefold responsibility. In the first place she is responsible for the foreign policy of the Empire.

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She has undertaken to consult with the Dominions on the subject, but she is in no way bound to follow their advice. On the other hand, the Dominions, while not bound by the policy of Great Britain, are not free to conduct a foreign policy of their own, save in commercial matters. In the second place, Great Britain is responsible for the defence of the Empire. The Dominions have raised considerable land forces, and Canada and Australia are now building local navies, but these forces are available for Imperial defence only if the Dominion Governments decide to use them for this purpose. Great Britain is committed to defend the Dominions as well as the dependencies. The Dominions are not committed to defend anybody but themselves. In the third place, Great Britain is responsible for the government of the dependencies. In this the Dominions take no part, save in so far as their naval and military forces may, if they so decide, assist in the defence of the dependencies.

Now this system is evidently anomalous, but it works well enough to-day, and nobody, either in Great Britain or the Dominions, seriously objects to it. Can it last? That is at least an open question. At any rate, there are two very good reasons for believing that it cannot continue indefinitely.

The first concerns Imperial policy. Already we see a difficulty looming up. At present, foreign policy and the general arrangement of Imperial defence is left to the British ministry. Under existing conditions nothing else is possible. The Minister for external affairs for Australia said at the recent Conference: 'Of course there must be . . . only one foreign policy in the Empire, and there must be one final authority,' and the British Government was accepted as that authority. Sir Wilfrid Laurier said: 'The diplomatic part of the government of the Empire has of necessity to be carried on by the Government of the United Kingdom,' and General Botha added that he wanted the British Government to take the 'full responsibility.' But the Australian Prime Minister pointed out that the 'nations (the Dominions

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ions) undoubtedly will feel themselves as time passes, desirous of entering into the spirit of the policy that governs the Empire,' and suggested that they might some day wish to conduct a foreign policy of their own. That, indeed, is inevitable. The Dominions cannot help being vitally affected by Imperial policy. They may only desire to be consulted about such matters as affect themselves, but that means being consulted about every cardinal feature of British policy. The Dominions, for instance, are just as vitally concerned by diplomatic combinations in Europe which affect the relative strength of England on the sea, as are the British people, because the safety of the Dominions depends not upon their own preparations only, but mainly upon the supremacy of the British fleet. If it disappeared they would be faced with the choice of depending upon themselves alone or of protecting their interests by alliances with foreign powers.

How long is it likely that the Dominions will agree to the control of Imperial policy, which may thus at any moment plunge them into war, or the only alternative, a declaration of independence,* remaining in the sole hands of the British Government. It is probable that they would acquiesce for many years to come if it were possible to ensure that the Imperial offices were held by men of the calibre of the late Lord Salisbury, Lord Lansdowne, and Sir Edward Grey, especially if an effective method of continuous consultation between the Imperial and Dominion Governments could also be contrived. But, unfortunately, no such guarantee is possible. Under the existing Imperial system the appointment of the ministers who control the policy and defence of the Empire, and the government of the dependencies is not decided on Imperial grounds. It is a by-product of a domestic party struggle in the British Isles. And general elections in the United Kingdom, as in the Dominions, are fought not on foreign and Imperial politics, but chiefly on issues like education, or social reform, or taxation. At any moment,

* See the article on the fallacy of Colonial Neutrality in the current issue.

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therefore, a purely local crisis may bring into power a party which might pursue a policy of dangerous foreign aggression or reckless disarmament. At any moment a party numbering among its members all the people best qualified to manage foreign affairs may be cast from office, for reasons which have nothing to do with their conduct of these matters, and a ministry installed which has neither interest nor knowledge of external problems, and which contains nobody really competent to handle them. What would then be the attitude of the Dominions?

It is true that we have managed to exist under this system hitherto, but what are the probabilities of its succeeding in the future. There has been an immense increase of recent years in the complexity of domestic and foreign problems. Is it likely that a single Parliament will continue to produce two alternative sets of men competent to deal with both domestic and foreign and Imperial affairs? The British public, which is responsible for returning by its votes one or other party to power, may acquiesce in the conduct of external relations by its chosen nominees. But what likelihood is there of the democracies across the seas, who have no part or lot in the elections, being content to see a minister whose personality and policy they trust and respect, being replaced by some unknown and possibly mistrusted man, simply to suit the exigencies of a domestic crisis in the United Kingdom. The confusion of the interests of the Empire with the purely local politics of the British Isles is almost certain to destroy the present system before very long. If there is to be one foreign policy for the Empire on fundamental matters (and anything else means the break up of the Empire), the ministers in charge of Imperial and foreign affairs must be men chosen for their knowledge and policy, must be trusted by the whole self-governing Empire, and must not be liable to be displaced by the party caprices of a single part of it.

The present system is likely to break down for a second

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reason. It will not work when Great Britain ceases to be strong enough to maintain a paramount navy and an expeditionary army sufficient to defend the whole Empire. To-day the preparations of the Dominions, naval and military, are so to speak only of hypothetical value. They are available for Imperial defence only in certain unknown and unknowable contingencies, and Great Britain has therefore to provide for the defence of the whole Empire out of her own resources. In no other way can it be defended. For the Empire is a sea-empire, and the root principle upon which its defence has rested from the earliest times has been the concentration somewhere or other of a fleet larger than any which an enemy or any probable combination of enemies can bring against it. This assured, ultimate victory is, barring accident, also assured. It may take some time for a superior fleet to clear the seas of hostile cruisers and privateers, and some damage may be done to ports and shipping in the meantime. But if the main fleet is stronger than that of the enemy its ultimate success is certain. Therefore, so long as the Dominions retain the right of withholding their forces when the Empire is at war, the duty of concentrating somewhere a paramount fleet, and of maintaining an expeditionary army to support it, must rest on the shoulders of Great Britain alone.

Now this system works well enough to-day because Great Britain is still able and willing to spend £75,000,000 per annum on maintaining the Army and Navy required to make the Empire secure. But what of the future? In the last issue of the ROUND TABLE we showed how the relative strength of Great Britain had declined. There are now only thirty-two British Dreadnoughts built or building as against seventy-four for other powers. The wealth, and certainly the population of Germany, America, Russia, and some of the South American states is increasing, in some cases absolutely, in others relatively, faster than that of the

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United Kingdom. It is a mathematical certainty that the day will come when the United Kingdom alone will be able to maintain neither fleet nor army sufficient to protect the whole of the British possessions. When that day comes the present arrangements, if they have not already broken down, will disappear. When Great Britain alone is unable or unwilling to maintain a two-power standard against a single rival, or a recognized hostile alliance, either the Dominions must combine their naval forces with those of the mother country, and concentrate wherever danger threatens, a single Empire fleet greater than any that can be brought against it, or both England and the Dominions must make for themselves such alliances with foreign powers as will best protect their territory and possessions. The one course means the real union of the Empire for foreign policy and defence—the equal participation by all the self-governing states in its risks and burdens as well as its privileges and advantages. The other course means the disappearance of the British Empire from the world, and the regrouping of its parts in dependence on other stronger powers. There is no third alternative. To attempt to defend the Empire or its parts by a number of separate fleets, which may or may not be combined after war has broken out, is to invite a weaker enemy to break up the Empire by making war on the different parts and destroying their fleets one by one.

Two broad causes, therefore, make it very improbable that the present organization of the Empire can last for any considerable time. Over one of these causes we have control. If the people of Great Britain manage to keep at the head of the great Imperial offices of the State, men who will command the confidence of the Dominions, and who pursue steadfastly a straightforward, intelligible, and successful policy, and if the people of the Dominions are tolerant and far-sighted enough to accept such a policy as their own, the present arrangement may last. Does

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history give us any reason for expecting that the domestic party system will produce so great a combination of good fortune and good management?

But over the other cause we have no control. We have failed to regulate the growth of our own population and wealth, far less can we hope to regulate the growth of others. Nor by the happiest diplomacy in the world can we prevent the creation of foreign fleets or hostile combinations greater than any that England can fashion in reply. In this respect we are dependent upon the march of events—events which point every year more clearly to the steady decline in the strength of Great Britain as compared with that of foreign powers.

While, therefore, we may regard existing arrangements as adequate, and may congratulate ourselves on the temporary solution of the difficulties* connected with foreign policy and the use of the Dominion navies, which was devised by the 1911 Conference, it would be folly to persuade ourselves that they can be permanent. Sooner or later, if the Empire is to continue, two changes will be necessary. The control of Imperial and foreign affairs will have to be divorced from the domestic party politics of the British Isles. And the Dominions, while gaining a real share in the control of Imperial and foreign policy, will have to throw in their lot unreservedly with the United Kingdom and with one another in defending and promoting those 'common interests' which the Empire exists to serve. When and how these changes will come about we do not feel disposed to prophecy. They will not be simple to devise or easy to compass. But it may not be out of place to examine whether there is any common purpose in the Empire which is likely to justify or carry through so great a revolution in our existing arrangements.

There can be no doubt that Imperialism in its latest form corresponds to a dominant and it would seem growing instinct in the self-governing peoples of the British Empire.

* See ROUND TABLE No. 3, May, 1911, p. 252.

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There are great differences of opinion as to the machinery by which it should express itself and the objects it should hold in view. But there is little cavilling at the existence of the Empire itself. On what real foundation does the almost universal sentiment in favour of Imperial Union, of 'strengthening' or 'consolidating' the Empire, finally rest? From what basis do all propositions for reciprocity in trade, union for defence, and so forth, ultimately spring? Why should Great Britain wish to preserve an Empire which gives her little material profit in return for the immense burden of armaments and responsibility it entails? Why should the Dominions want to remain a part of it, instead of setting up on their own as independent nations? Why should Canadians, for instance, indignantly repudiate the notion that they wish to cast in their lot with the great pacific Anglo-Saxon power along their southern frontiers, instead of with the scattered British communities across many thousand miles of sea?

According to the older text books all States depend for their cohesion upon force, upon a common ancestry, common traditions, a common language, or a common religion. A more recent view is that the basis of nationalism is a consciousness of a common economic existence. But none of these bonds serve to explain the unity of the Empire. No force could compel the self-governing Dominions to remain within the Empire contrary to their will. There is no common ancestry and no common race for an Empire which is composed of Anglo-Saxons, French and Dutch, not to mention many other minor racial elements. The warring of the Christian sects is tenfold more evident than the unity of the Christian creed. Even common traditions can hardly explain the real loyalty to the idea of the Empire of many thousands of immigrants or of the inhabitants of the late republics in South Africa. Nor can we believe that in these days, notable for the phenomenal growth of international trade, and the appearance of a cosmopolitan system of finance, the still rising sentiment of

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nationalism finds its sole root in tariffs or other economic laws. Though each of these forces may contribute to the sentiment of Imperial unity they are not sufficient, singly or together, to explain it.

There is another and more positive basis. The chief reason for the sentiment for Imperial unity is the conscious or unconscious belief of the people of the Empire in their own political system. This belief is based on no mere indiscriminating pride. The inhabitant of the British Empire is ready enough to concede that in the realm of reason and the fine arts, the French are far ahead of his own compatriots; that the Germans have a sense of national discipline and a power of organization which he cannot emulate; that the Chinese have a gift of philosophy compared to which his own is but a rule of thumb. But he believes that in the political sphere he leads the world. Just as he has evolved a social code by which personal honour can be sustained without resort to the absurdity of the duel, so he has devised a political and constitutional code, which combines in a pre-eminent degree the liberty of the individual with the strength and security of the State. The British system, he believes, gives effect as no other system has done to that first principle of political action, that the purpose of the State is not to glorify itself, but to promote the highest good of its citizens.

It is difficult to realise how strong is the grip of these common political ideas. Perhaps the most remarkable proof lies in the absolute acceptance of the British Imperial system by the inhabitants of the two Boer republics within eight years of the termination of a terrible three years' war. To those who know, the passage of the Act of Union was the final and voluntary acceptance by the Boer peoples of the fundamental ideals on which the British Empire rests. And if these are strong enough to convert Republicans into Imperialists, must they not be an infinitely stronger bond between those who, whatever their descent, have been born and bred under the Union Jack?

But the sympathy which springs from identity in

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institutions and political methods was not sufficient to produce any sentiment for Imperial unity until the Empire was threatened with attack from outside. We have seen how strikingly the consciousness of a common purpose has increased within the Empire under the continual pressure of the last forty years, despite the rise of a positively disintegrating force in the new nationalism of the Dominions. Up to the present it has chiefly taken the form of a recognition of the need for co-operation in preparing against attack. It is now taking a new character. The conviction is growing up that the peoples of the Empire have a common interest in upholding their political principles, in international as well as in domestic affairs. For not only does the British Empire differ from the European Empires in its system of government, it differs from them even more in its view of international relations.

With the peoples of the Empire a declaration of war for the promotion of selfish national ends has come to be generally regarded as immoral. Any government which pursued a policy of aggrandisement leading to war would instantly fall from power. It is not merely that the British people are 'satiated' with their possessions, it is that, possibly for that very reason, they have reached a stage of development when they regard national aggrandisement by violence as on a par with personal aggrandisement by violence.

Now this is a point of view which is shared by only two other peoples in the world, the American and the Chinese. To the German bureaucrat, as to the Russian and the Japanese, war is simply an instrument of policy—to be used or not solely according to the balance of national advantage. The traditional policy inaugurated by Bismarck is to regard the national good as transcending all other claims. As the German Emperor said, 'the principal thing is not to live one's life at the expense of others, not to attain one's end at the cost of the Fatherland, but solely and alone to keep the Fatherland before one's eyes, solely and alone to stake

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all the powers of mind and body upon the good of the Fatherland.'

We have during the past few days a perfect example of the difference between the British and the continental view. The Agadir incident was, as an American paper termed it, simply an 'international hold up.' The German foreign office saw an opportunity of furthering the interests of Germany by the display and possibly by the use of force. It cared not at all that in the process it would have to tear up an international treaty, on whose sacredness it had been insisting for the preceding three years, and would inevitably bring the world to the verge of war. The 'coup' was directed to the advantage of the Fatherland and that was enough. Nothing could demonstrate more completely the essential difference between the British and the continental point of view, than the total failure of the German bureaucrat to realize that the violent method of action he adopted was that most calculated to array England against him. British interference was caused, not by any belief in the superior merits of the French case, for there is little doubt that Germany has good grounds for complaint against France. It was not caused only by a desire to protect British interests. At bottom it was caused by the necessity of defending British standards of international morality. The British Government had to interfere partly under her engagements with France, partly in her own interests, but mainly in order to vindicate to the world her belief that international blackmail based on a selfish and reckless use of force is barbarous and uncivilized.

The real lesson of the Agadir incident, is the proof it gives of the part that the people of the British Empire have perforce to play in the world. There are at present two codes of international morality—the British or Anglo-Saxon, and the continental or German. Both cannot prevail. If the British Empire is not strong enough to be a real influence for 'fair dealing' between nations, the reactionary standards of the German bureaucracy will triumph, and it will then

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only be a question of time before the British Empire itself is victimized by an international 'hold up' on the lines of the Agadir incident. Unless the British peoples are strong enough to make it impossible for backward rivals to attack them with any prospect of success, they will have to accept the political standards of the aggressive military powers, just as France has already had to accept those of Germany.

That is one common purpose of the Empire—a purpose based not merely on a belief in our own ideas, but on a shrewd calculation of self-interest. But there is another aspect of the case. Their conception of liberty and government has led the British to assume immense responsibilities for the government of subject peoples. Having interfered, originally perhaps for the sake of trade or to forestall some rival in the possession of strategic points essential to their own safety, they felt compelled to do something to improve the lot of the people they controlled. They did not impose upon them their own ideas of religion, or education, or learning. They did not interfere with local custom and practice, so far as it was consistent with ordinary civilized standards. But they uprooted the older system of government which was founded on tyranny, violence, and frequent injustice, and replaced it by a system which gave the individual peace and good order, the protection of an impartial justice, and economic improvements designed to diminish the ravages of famine and pestilence. This was not all done as we have seen for purely unselfish motives. But whether British action was justified or not, the facts remain. The British have upset in India, Egypt, and elsewhere the earlier system of government, and replaced it by something which is unquestionably better, but which for the present and for many years to come, they, and they alone, will be able to sustain.

Now it is impossible for the British to abandon their responsibility for the good government of the dependencies. They can no more do so and preserve their self-respect than can a father abandon his children before they are able

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to fend for themselves. Yet the immense increase in the responsibilities of the dependent Empire during the last forty years has already been noted in this article. Is it too much to say that just as Great Britain has already become less able to defend the Empire against foreign attack, so she may gradually in the future become unable to discharge, by herself, her duty to the subject peoples? And if so, what will the attitude of the Dominions be? Will they let the British Empire in the dependencies crumble into anarchy and ruin? It is not a little significant that for the first time in the history of the Conference, Mr Asquith, in his opening address this year, spoke to his colleagues of their 'common trusteeship . . . of the interests and fortunes of fellow subjects who have not yet attained, or perhaps in some cases may never attain, to the full stature of self-government.' This may seem but little of a 'common interest' to-day. But is it not becoming a common responsibility? And if so, is it to be a bond of union or a cause of disruption? The Dominions to-day, like America in times gone by, are inclined to pursue a policy of isolation, to shut themselves off from the backward world outside under a colonial Monroe doctrine—the doctrine of non-commitment to the responsibilities of the Empire. But may not necessity and their own convictions drive them from it as they have driven America. May they not come to see that their title to fame in history will rest not upon their success in clinging to the privileges, and repudiating the obligations, of Empire, not upon their success in throwing aside the only opportunity of moulding the world's history which is open to them, not upon their success in becoming a number of impotent weakling states like Belgium or Switzerland, but upon the courage and spirit with which they carry on the high civilizing work which their ancestors began. And if the Dominions rise to this view, may not the people of Great Britain come to realize that they can no longer control, as their own private concern, the Empire they have inherited, but that they must share the conduct

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of its affairs on equal terms with the younger nations across the seas?

There is, therefore, in the British Empire a unity which it is often difficult to discern amid the conflict of rival nationalities, provincial politics, and geographical differences. It is a unity which is based upon the conviction among the British self-governing communities that the political system of the Empire is indispensable to their own progress, and that to allow it to collapse would be fatal alike to their happiness and their self-respect. It is a unity which may come to be based upon the recognition of a common responsibility for a great civilizing power. It is a unity which, symbolized in the monarchy, has already begun to develop a rudimentary institution of self expression. It is no little thing that in less than fifteen years a casual conference of delegates should have grown almost imperceptibly into a plenary council in which the representatives of the dominant peoples take counsel how they shall protect and develop the Imperial system to which they all belong. Imperialism has long suffered from the odious meanings which attach to the word. It has been said to stand for the ambition of world dominion, for the coercion of the colonies, for the creation of lofty but superfluous institutions. Modern Imperialism asks for none of these things. It stands rather for a deep-rooted confidence in the soundness of our political institutions, and for a resolute determination to uphold our principles before the world. And if this be so, is there not reason to hope that this spirit, which has made the Empire what it is, will find the way to overcome the difficulties which still confront it?

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NATIONS carry within their consciousness premonitions of their destiny. That ancient phrase, "the imperial crown of England," was used, no doubt, in the first instance, to denote the assertion of our kings that they were no vassals of the Holy Roman Empire, but not till centuries later did the word receive its full content, and acquire a reality corresponding to its true significance. When England broke with the imperial Church of Rome, whose suzerainty had for centuries been admitted, this claim was reasserted, as though after a passing lapse, and it received new meanings in the spiritual sphere. Our poets also had their premonitions. When Shakespeare makes old Lancaster speak of "this sceptred isle" he invented a phrase which now can be used in a sense infinitely higher and wider than any which it could have had either when Lancaster lived, or when Shakespeare wrote. The loyal, simple-minded Cavaliers, who followed and died for Charles I, really fought in a cause far greater than they knew, for the full importance of an hereditary monarchy had not yet been revealed. As Pascal says, the simple-minded form true opinions for (sometimes) wrong reasons. Indeed, in that contest both parties, as usually happens, were maintaining one side of a complete truth, and the nation was blundering along its way towards a Constitution which should secure freedom without destroying unity and strength. This problem, then almost confined to these islands, is now that which is being worked out by the States of the Empire. An unsuccessful attempt to deal with it cost us the schism of the United States of America, and that lesson also was learnt.

We were so full-fed last June by detailed and over-picturesque descriptions of the ceremonial events in London that there was some danger lest men might fail to see the wood by reason of the trees, and lest the thing signified might be for-

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gotten in the admiration for the things signifying. What is a pageant? It has been the fashion of late years to present historical pageants in our ancient cities, and the example has been followed in Canada and South Africa. These are but representations of representations. There have been representations of such events as the battle of Naseby. But the battle itself, with all its slaying and shouting, was but the outward visible form of an inward visible battle, that of contending ideas and wills. So the recent processions and rites in London were the outward visible form of an inward and spiritual fact, the unseen unity of wills. Thus the whole thing was of the nature of a sacrament, or embodiment of the unseen in the seen. The ecclesiastical, the military, the naval, and the popular, manifestations set forth various sides of this great underlying "thing in itself." The Coronation had all the character of a religious symbol. The pristine meaning of the Latin word religion lay in the idea of "binding," in various senses. There is the binding of man with the divine, the subject of metaphysical theology; the binding back, or restraining, which is at the bottom of that morality through which alone nations live, and the binding together of man with man, which is the foundation of unity in Church and State. This last "binding" imports and involves something hierarchical, the relation of chief to follower, as well as that of comrade to comrade, for, as Shakespeare says,

"Take but degree away, untune that string
And mark what discord follows."

All these aspects of religion are summed up in the sublime words and the symbolic rites of the ancient English Coronation service. We recognize therein that power descends from the supreme source of all power, that centre which we name God; we recognize that the end and aim of government is the loftiest morality; we consecrate our relation to each other in, and through, our relation to our earthly chief and centre of unity.

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All this was absolutely true in those early ages when the Coronation service was first composed, but it is true now in a wider sense. *Then* the words and rites had direct relation only to a kingdom bounded by these seas, and not even including the fair realm of Scotland; *now* they relate to an empire extending to many lands and many races. Our great sacrament of unity has assumed a significance as vast as anything well can have on this planet. The Crown is not only the symbol, but the chief cause, of unity; it is a binding force in the British Empire. Remove this centre of attraction and the empire would dissolve.

“ There must be [said a writer ten years ago], indeed there visibly is a rise in the importance of the Throne. In the nineteenth century the actual power of the Crown in connexion with the internal affairs of the United Kingdom almost vanished, but during the same century the significance and influence of the Monarchy—its spiritual sovereignty, so to speak—has expanded in a vastly wider sphere. What it has lost in respect of domestic it has gained, and far more also, in respect of imperial affairs. At present the direct relations of India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Africa and the rest, are with the Crown. It is not merely the symbol, but the real bond of unity. As without the relation of each of its provinces to the Supreme Pontiff the cosmopolitan and many-nationed Church which centres at Rome could not hold together, so without the relation of each of its parts to the King the British Empire would fall asunder and be dispersed. What, indeed, are English Cabinet Ministers to the princes of India? Not even names. How many among the Indian millions, or those other darker and barbarous millions who live behind the African coast, have so much as heard of the existence of the British Parliament? Even Canadians and Australians are but faintly interested in the struggles and questions of political parties here in England; they have their own affairs. But in all these lands east and west the occupant of the Throne is to every man his own sovereign. A Real Presence, if one may so speak,

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makes itself felt throughout the world. An ordinary English nobleman goes out to India, or to Canada, or to Australia, and carries with him, such is the magic of imagination, the atmosphere of imperial majesty. It is not race, nor law, nor common language, nor similar institutions, nor religion, nor military force that holds together this strange aggregation of many races, many laws, many languages, many kinds of government, many religions and strong peoples capable, if they chose, of achieving independence. The bond is not the British Parliament; it is not the British Cabinet; it is the Imperial Crown. To this central point lines converge from all the ends of the earth. Ideas, to rule men through imagination, must be incarnate; and, if they are to rule great masses of men in every degree of civilization and intelligence, must be embodied in a form easily understood by the simplest through the experience of family life. There are not many Miltons in the world whose imaginations can clothe abstractions, and a republic, like some forms of religion, is only suited to a few homogeneous peoples. England or Australia might be a republic, not so the British Empire.”*

The great events of recent years, the Jubilee in 1887 of Queen Victoria of glorious memory, her Jubilee of 1897, the Coronation of Edward VII, the Coronation of George V, have assembled in London for common rites representatives from all parts of the Empire. To those descended from her own stock, who, or whose fathers left her shores for Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa, England might say in the words of Apollo's Oracle to the home-seeking Trojans:

“ Dardanidae duri! quae vos a stirpe parentum
Prima tulit tellus, *eadem* vos ubere laeto
Accipiet reduces; antiquam exquirite matrem!
Hic domus Æneae cunctis dominabitur oris,
Et nati natorum; et qui nascentur ab illis.”†

* From *Imperium et Libertas*, by Bernard Holland, published in 1901.

† Æneid III.

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Strong sons of Troy! the land which bore you first
From our old stock, the same shall joyfully
Receive you now returning; then, seek out
The ancient mother. Here the ancestral House,
Sons of our sons, and those from these to spring,
Shall rule throughout the world.

To that far greater number who have been brought within the bounds of the empire by war and conquest England can justly use those famous lines addressed by the Spaniard Claudian to Rome:

“ Haec est in gremium victos quae sola recepit,
Humanumque genus communi nomine fovet,
Matris, non dominae, ritu; civesque vocavit
Quos domuit, nexuque pio longinqua revinxit.”

She has received the conquered to her breast;
She only, cherishing the human race
In one associate name; not in the mode
Of mistress, but of mother. She alone
Has named those fellow citizens, whom she tamed,
And bound them from afar with ties of love.

It is good for us, here in England, at times inclined to despondency by our burdens, to be brought in touch with the vigorous and sanguine life pulsing in those, more lightly burdened, who visit us upon these high occasions. It is good for them also to be brought into touch with more centrally situated and experienced minds, and to learn to see things in somewhat truer proportions, perhaps, than they can in their own countries. There is that in London which stimulates thought and feeling. St Paul's, with its atmosphere, a centre of world-wide religion; Westminster Hall, with all the associations of ancient state; the “Abbey which makes us one”; the City, that “power house of the line”; the river uniting this immense port with the oceanic world; the wealth, the cloudy magnitude, and the ordered tumult of London, must make those who, for the first time, come

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from smaller centres to visit it, have something of the feeling of Virgil's countryman on returning from a visit to Rome:

“Urbem quam dicunt Romam, Melibae, putavi
Stultus ego huic nostrae similem.”

Mistakenly, I thought the place called Rome
A city like to ours, Oh Melibæus!

One says this in no spirit of vain-glory, but there can be no visible empire without a visible centre, nor for the whole British Empire can there be, in any time worth at present considering, any centre but London.

But the Coronation must be regarded also from a point of view which is, as things now stand, less satisfying. If the hereditary Throne is of such importance, that importance is enhanced, as it ought not to be, by the present absence of other common institutions, which ought to exist. On one side, the Empire is a solid, real and concretely embodied fact. The destinies of over 350,000,000 of people are as much controlled from London, in the last resort, as the empire of Trajan was from Rome. The vicissitudes of English politics, turning mainly upon the provincial questions of these two small islands, supply the King with a succession of Ministers—mostly hitherto belonging, whatever their party, to the same social caste—who have, individually, or collectively as a Cabinet, the final word in all important decisions affecting India, the Crown Colonies and the great African Protectorates. This is real imperial government, and it all centres in a single block of stately buildings in Whitehall. In this government the self-governing Dominions have no direct share. Our relations here with them resemble those which, in the case of foreign States, are transacted diplomatically by the Foreign Office. The Dominions are close allies, but not even bound, according to the latest doctrine expounded by the Canadian Premier, and having, appa-

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rently, some support in South Africa, and even in Australia, to take part, unless they approve, in wars waged in the name of the King. Liability so limited is almost non-existent. The King is, in fact, the head of an empire-controlling nation which is in more or less loose alliance with other States acknowledging his nominal sovereignty. He is somewhat in the position of the King of Prussia in respect to the North German confederation of States before 1871, when the real German Empire was constituted.

The British Empire thus has two aspects. It consists of a real Empire bound up with an alliance of independent commonwealths. The real Empire almost entirely rests upon a wealthy and populous, but small country, which is continually being drained of its most vigorous and enterprising inhabitants who go to swell the strength of the Commonwealths, which at present give little direct assistance towards maintaining the burden of empire.

So far as regards these States and the United Kingdom, the relations of each to the Crown are like those derived from the force of gravitation, which can make hewn stones, placed together in a certain way, form the walls of a kind of edifice. But no building is secure against downfall when storms arise, nor can it serve purposes of security or beauty, unless nature be supplemented by art, and cement be used to bind the stones firmly together. In buildings which we call States or Empires, political institutions, common laws and common councils act as cement. They turn to good use the mere feelings of kinship and loyalty, just as the art of the mason turns to use the forces of gravitation and adhesion. As between the United Kingdom, India, the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, the Empire is a firmly cemented building. As between this unity and the self-governing Dominions, it is a pile of uncemented, or, at best, most thinly cemented, stones.

The succession of Colonial or "Imperial" Conferences are in themselves a good beginning in the process of con-

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verting this primitive structure into a work of political art, but definite proposals for hastening the process have not, so far, come to much result. Are we awaiting the bitter experience of a great storm? Still the Conference itself takes more and more a definite shape; wider subjects are brought within its view; and each time that it meets it wears more clearly the character of an Imperial Council. This year, 1911, the foundations of our foreign policy were submitted to the Conference in order to inform, and to obtain the concurrence of, all the Governments. This was a new and forward step; it had not been taken at any previous Conference; it was received with satisfaction by the representatives of the Dominions; it does credit to the present Government in London; and it is enough, notwithstanding back currents in some directions, to show that the main stream is steadily moving towards the end of true imperial unity. The more one studies history, the less do events seem to be due to the action of individual statesmen in causing or resisting great tendencies. It has, for instance, been because Liberal statesmen here thought it necessary to refuse the road of greater commercial union that they have been obliged to advance the more by other roads, perhaps less broad and easy.

Sooner or later—we may believe—the complete fabric of British Empire will be built. If, which Heaven grant, the next Coronation does not occur for another thirty or forty years, the reality may then be found to correspond more nearly to that ideal of which the Coronation rites are symbols. An empire now, in part, ideal or invisible, may have become wholly real and visible. It is a matter of incarnation of the spirit. At that time, perhaps, the Government of the United Kingdom will deal only with the domestic affairs of that kingdom; while a permanent Imperial Council will advise the King upon all matters of foreign, imperial, and international commercial policy, and on the strength, mode of levying and maintaining, and the disposition of his naval and military forces. Such a Council might

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be in some direct or indirect way chosen by the electorates of ourselves and the Dominions.

But, to achieve a result of this kind, England must sacrifice part of her exclusive control over Asiatic and African territories, while the peoples of the self-governing Dominions must sacrifice some of their absolute independence in matters of external policy and defence, substituting some kind of more formal co-operation. The exchange of sacrifice is not unequal. No real union, whether of individuals in marriage, or of States, is achieved without cost, but without union there is no fruit. The problem lies in achieving the right balance between the freedom of the individual and the strength of the community.

Even if such results should prove to be impracticable, yet we cannot know this until we have done all that in us lies to test the impracticability. But, if they shall be achieved, then the symbol or sacrament of religious unity, so strikingly presented by the rites in Westminster Abbey, will denote the real and visible unity of the whole British Empire. Till then this sacrament in part, only, denotes a reality, and, for the rest, foreshadows things to come, as, according to the old Christian thinkers, events in ancient Jewish history foreshadowed and signified those fulfilled in the New Testament. Faith, says St Paul, is the "substance of things hoped for." Or, as one might say, that which is in future to be made apparent does already exist behind the veil of non-appearance, and moves our minds to action. "By faith Moses forsook Egypt."

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THE DOCTRINE OF COLONIAL NEUTRALITY.

IN the last number of the ROUND TABLE reference was made to the ambiguous international situation which might result, even in peace-time, from the movement of Dominion navies not under the control of the Imperial Admiralty. This difficulty is dealt with in the recent Naval Agreement between the Admiralty and the Governments of Canada and Australia, by assigning certain stations to the local squadrons, and providing that they are not to enter foreign ports, whether within or beyond these stations, without the concurrence of the Imperial Government. As soon as war breaks out, however, the agreement seems to contemplate that the Dominion navies will not form part of the Imperial forces if their respective governments so determine.

The principle underlying this arrangement has been clearly stated on many occasions by Canadian and Australian statesmen—most recently by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in the debate on the Declaration of London in the Imperial Conference, when he said:

“ We have taken the position in Canada that we do not think we are bound to take part in every war, and that our fleet may not be called upon in all cases.”

We are not concerned here with the strategical aspect of the question, though the disadvantages of divided control in time of war are sufficiently obvious. As Lord Selborne said in 1902, “ the sea is all one, and the British Navy therefore must ”—or should—“ be all one.” But the matter goes beyond strategical considerations, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier himself has pointed this out when, in November, 1910, he said to the Canadian House of Commons:

“ We should stand on our own policy of being masters in our own house, of having a policy for our own

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purpose, and leaving to the Canadian Parliament, to the Canadian Government, and to the Canadian people to take part in these wars, in which to-day they have no voice, only if they think fit to do so."

The right, in fact, is claimed for the Dominions to determine, not only what part they will take in future wars, but whether they will take any part at all.

There has been a good deal of discussion of late about the precise meaning of this declaration. It may be opportune, therefore, to examine briefly exactly what it involves, and what is meant by the further doctrine of colonial neutrality to which it has given rise.

The real meaning of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's declaration is not very easy to understand, owing to the loose phraseology of the expression "taking part." There are more ways of taking part in a war than sending ships to join the battle fleet of one or other belligerent. If war broke out to-morrow between the United Kingdom and a first-class naval power, Canada and Australia would have to decide, not merely whether or not she would incorporate her ships in the Imperial Navy, but many other questions of difficulty and danger, if she is to carry out her policy of "not taking part." Would she permit her territory to be used as a base of naval or military operations by the British forces? Would she give unrestricted use of her ports to British men-of-war to take refuge, concentrate, or refit? Could they bring their prizes there, and would she establish prize courts for their condemnation? Would these privileges be granted or refused to the warships of the enemy? What action would she take if the enemy's fleet appeared on the Canadian station? Again, would she continue to trade with other portions of the Empire? Would she admit merchant vessels flying the British flag to the harbours, and would her navy protect them while in her waters? How would she arrange for the protection of her own mercantile marine sailing to other British ports? Would she intern the merchant ships of

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the enemy lying in her harbours at the outbreak of hostilities? Or would she permit the trade with the enemy to continue as if there was no war? Finally, would she expect the British Navy to defend her commerce on the high seas?

Questions of this kind could be multiplied, but on any known theory of international law there can be but one answer. The citizens of the Dominions are subjects of His Britannic Majesty, and their territories are part of his dominions. When he is at war, they are at war. In many of the minor campaigns of the Empire, this status of belligerency is no doubt more technical than real, but in a first-class war, when the deadly struggle sways from side to side of the world-wide arena, every portion of the King's dominions "takes part," in the sense that when one is at war, all are at war.

The fact is that any departure from an attitude of perfect impartiality is "taking part," *pro tanto*, in the war, and any "taking part," however passive, involves the possibility, and indeed probability, of being drawn into more active participation in the struggles and sufferings of an empire which may be fighting for its life. It follows, therefore, that a dominion can only carry out the declared policy of "not taking part" in a war in which it does not wish to be involved by adopting the same attitude of strict neutrality as do foreign nations. For international law recognizes no middle position between whole-hearted belligerency and absolute neutrality.

This dilemma has been recognized, and indeed proclaimed, by a certain school of thought. According to this school, strict neutrality is the proper attitude for the Dominions, and an article in the Pretoria *Volkstem* of July 4, while advocating this attitude on grounds of policy, argues as follows for its legality:

"The South African Constitution of 1909 is in full accord with the theory that neutrality is per-

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missible in the case of a war in which England or any other independent State of the Empire might be involved. . . . It is wholly incorrect to think that in case of England making war all self-governing British States are automatically involved. An express declaration or Act from the different Colonial Governments is essential before any neutrality can be broken."

This doctrine of neutrality seems indeed to be the only logical basis for the policy of not "taking part" in any war, and the only possible way in which a Dominion can refrain from "taking part" in an Imperial war.

Let us consider for a moment what this means. It means that the Dominion may render no assistance or comfort to the Imperial forces. Imperial warships, if allowed to enter the Dominion's harbours at all, must leave at once after taking on board the bare *minimum* of supplies sufficient to carry them to the nearest British port. The vessels of the Dominion navy must remain idle spectators while isolated detachments of the Imperial fleet, or merchant ships belonging to other Dominions and flying the British flag, are captured or sunk under their very guns. Men of the Imperial forces who take refuge in the Dominion's territory must be disarmed and held to parole. In the case of Canada and South Africa Imperial warships must even be denied admission to the fortified stations of Halifax, Esquimalt and Simon's Town, constructed with Imperial money for Imperial purposes, for it is impossible to suppose that South Africa could remain neutral while part of its territory served as a base of operations for one of the belligerents.

The same obligation of neutrality would be imposed on the Dominions' mercantile marine. The greater part of the external trade of all the Dominions consists in supplying foodstuffs and other raw material to the United Kingdom. Much of this, under the Declaration of London, may be declared contraband, and, though the non-contraband trade would in theory, at all events, be free from interruption, vessels carrying contraband would be liable to

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seizure, and, being neutrals, would not be able to invoke the protection of their own ships of war.

Even if any Dominion were found willing to accept the loss and humiliation involved in such a neutrality, what certainty or even probability is there that the enemy would recognize and respect this neutral status? In the eye of international law the British Empire is under one sovereignty, and its citizens possess a single nationality. The Empire is an international unit. It is difficult to see how a foreign power could distinguish a citizen of, say, New Zealand from any other British citizen, respecting the friendly neutrality of the former and treating the latter as an alien enemy: if, on the other hand, the New Zealander, throwing to the winds the cautious correctness of his government, enlisted in the Imperial forces, his position would be both doubtful and dangerous. The same difficulties arise in the case of the mercantile marine. The merchant ships of the Dominion would be precluded from flying the British flag, and undoubtedly some restriction would have to be placed on other British owners who would try to obtain some of the advantages of neutrality by hoisting the Dominion ensign. No doubt the enemy might in some cases willingly recognize an asserted neutrality which secured him from attack in one quarter at least, but he would not be bound so to recognize it, and his recognition would obviously depend on his estimate of the relative advantages and disadvantages of doing so. This is the fundamental fallacy of the theory of colonial neutrality, for, as General Botha said in an interview with Reuter's Agency:

“If it is to the advantage of the Empire to have a number of its Colonies neutral, obviously it is to the disadvantage of the enemy. The enemy decides whether any part of the Empire is to be left alone.”

In fact, as General Botha said later, “for South Africa or for any other Dominion to be neutral while the Mother

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Country is at war is an impossibility"—an impossibility, that is to say, so long as the Dominion concerned remains part and parcel of the British Empire. The only manner in which any portion of the Empire can secure the rights of a neutral in time of war is by a formal separation as a nation from the remaining dominions of the Crown. Here, again, there is no middle course between absolute solidarity in the international sphere and complete independence. "Colonial neutrality" when the Empire is at war with a first-class power, is simply another word for "declaration of independence."

Even assuming, however, that an attitude of optional neutrality is possible, either by complete separation or by the doctrine of not taking part in Imperial wars, it remains to consider whether it would achieve its object of enabling the Dominion concerned "to have a policy for its own purpose," as Sir Wilfrid Laurier claimed. The rights of neutrals rest on what the law-books call "an international sanction." But in international affairs, more than anywhere else, might is right. We have seen a recent flagrant instance of the value of neutrality to a country which takes no other steps to protect itself, in the case of China, whose neutral territory was made practically the sole theatre of the prolonged and devastating war between Russia and Japan. That is likely to be the fate for some time to come of neutrals who cannot find some means of compelling belligerents to respect their rights.

There are three ways only in which this can be done. The first is by making such preparations for defence that, if its neutrality is violated by one combatant, the neutral can repel force by force, and intervene with decisive effect on the other side. As far as can be foreseen, no self-governing British colony will be in this position for many years to come. The next way is, if a neutral is not strong enough to protect itself, to have its neutrality guaranteed by some more powerful country. A neutral dominion has *ex hypothesi* refused the protection of its own Imperial navy,

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for it cannot be expected that the Empire will assume responsibility for a portion which repudiates all obligations in return. The guarantee must therefore be sought in the alliance of some foreign power, for which a price must be paid. If that price cannot be paid by assistance with men and ships in time of war, it must be satisfied in some other way. In either case, the neutral Dominion does not stand much chance of "a policy for its own purpose."

There is a third way of securing the neutrality of a country which is not strong enough to protect itself, and that is by placing it under the protection of some powerful neighbour. In Hall's *International Law* a protected state is defined as

"one which, in consequence of its weakness, has placed itself under the protection of another power on defined conditions, or has been so placed under an arrangement between powers the interests of which are involved in the disposition of its territory."

The only civilized protected States at the present time are the republics of Andorra and San Marino. At the time of the Crimean War, the now extinct Republic of the Ionian Isles was a State protected by Great Britain, and as such was allowed to claim the rights of a neutral in the British courts. It remains to be seen whether any British Dominion is prepared to accept such a status as a condition of effective neutrality.

The plain fact of the matter is that the advocates of colonial neutrality are attempting the impossible. They are hoping to be able to combine the advantages of membership of the British Empire, with avoidance of its risks and obligations. That has never been possible. It was not possible in the old Colonial days when the British fleet was the only fleet, for if it had ever been defeated, the victor would have been able to deal with the Colonies as he pleased. It is not possible now, for unless the British fleet, in conjunction, if need be, with the Dominion navies,

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is able to overcome the enemy's, the Dominions, in the eyes of the international jurist and of foreign powers, will still be liable to be despoiled by the victor. The safety of the Dominions can be assured in only one of two ways. Either an Imperial Navy, however constituted, must be strong enough to protect them from any probable foe, or if the Empire is not powerful or united enough to provide for its own defence, it must be dissolved and the Dominions must ally themselves, on the cheapest terms they can, with a stronger foreign power. Declarations of neutrality will save neither their honour nor their territories. If they would, every power in the world would be a "neutral" power.

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SOON after Lord Cromer was succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst as H.B.M.'s Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, the idea became prevalent that the natives of Egypt were to be given a much larger share in the responsibilities of government. The Nationalist party, at that time ably led by Mustapha Kamel, was active and vehement; whether solid or not, it filled the earth with its clamour. Analogies from South Africa, India and Japan were floating in the air. In England the Liberals, containing in their ranks men who had distinguished themselves by their support of the most ultra-Nationalist ideas, were in power. The official view of our position in Egypt had long been that we were educating the Egyptians to govern themselves; surely twenty-five years' training must have produced an effect. Let us, said the authorities, govern more according to Egyptian ideas; that will not undermine our position in Egypt; on the contrary it will strengthen it: in the long run you cannot govern a people against their own wishes. Perhaps the suggestion came from home, perhaps the men on the spot thought the experiment would be acceptable at home. Anyhow so it was done, and the experiment began to be tried.

No country occupies a stranger position in international politics than Egypt. Its present system of government is the result of a long and complicated history. There is hardly one of its most familiar features which can be understood without some knowledge of the past. The Egyptian army, for example, is drilled by British officers in the Turkish language, a tongue spoken neither by officers nor men. The official language of the departments of government is French. Its native ruler bears a title, that of Khedive, unknown elsewhere, and so on through a hundred details. The history of modern Egypt begins with its conquest by Napoleon. He first, with his unrivalled eye for large strategic possibilities, recognized the importance of its geographical

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position, and made it the basis of his grandiose plan for taking Europe in flank by the conquest of Asia. When British arms had expelled the French, Egypt reverted to its position as a province of the Turkish Empire. But the man who succeeded in establishing himself as the Viceroy of the province was no ordinary Turkish official. Mehemet Ali, once a tobacco-seller in Albania, was determined to make himself a second Napoleon. It was his army that held Greece for Turkey, till his fleet was shattered at Navarino. Then he turned his attention to the establishment of an African Empire by the conquest of the Sudan. Next he wrested Syria from his over-lord, and, but for British interference, would have made himself master of Constantinople and the whole Turkish Empire. He established his dynasty in Egypt and changed the whole character of the country by introducing the new system of irrigation, and making possible the cultivation of sugar and cotton.

Twenty years after Mehemet Ali's death, his descendant and successor Ismail, who inherited his far-reaching imagination without his executive capacity, took up his schemes. In every direction he launched out into reckless extravagance. By heavy bribes he obtained firmans from the Sultan conferring on him the title of Khedive, and making it hereditary according to the rule of primogeniture, a custom nearly unknown in the East. Province after province was added to the Egyptian possessions in the Sudan. The consequences of his recklessness and maladministration are well known. They led to Mahdism in the Sudan, to bankruptcy and the revolt of Arabi in Egypt. Scarcely ever had the Egyptian peasant in all his thousands of years of slavery reached such a pitch of oppression as he endured during the reign of Ismail. To him, whatever may have been the feelings of the governing classes, the British occupation which followed the defeat of Arabi was the dawn of unhopd for happiness and prosperity. The British occupation of Egypt appears to the student of history an inevitable development. We had found it necessary to expel Napoleon

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at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the thirties Kinglake had written that "the Englishman, reaching far over to his loved India, will sit in the seats of the faithful," and many travellers and writers had confidently foretold it. Yet when it came, it was, as it were, forced upon us, and it was only after the greatest possible efforts to avoid it that our government finally took up the task.

Thus Egypt, whilst occupied and administered by Great Britain, remains nominally a province of Turkey. And this is not merely a theatrical distinction, as it might be, for instance in the case of Manchuria. In the Turkish Empire the high and mighty Mohammedans had thought it beneath their dignity to trouble about the Christian strangers within their gates and their paltry affairs, and had granted to the different European nations the right of managing their own affairs in questions of law and justice. The treaties by which these privileges were granted, known as the Capitulations, remain in force in all parts of Turkey, and, what was once little but the expression of contemptuous indifference for dogs foredoomed to destruction, has grown into the much prized privilege of exemption from the laws of the land. In Egypt the establishment of the mixed (or international) tribunals has solved to some extent the difficulties of the legal relations between subjects and non-subjects of Turkey so far as civil questions are concerned. But the code is, of course, somewhat antiquated now, and no alteration can be made without the consent of all the sixteen Powers who contributed to set it up. While all foreigners accused of any criminal offence are tried by their own consular courts, it follows that no offence against the laws of Egypt is an offence when committed by a foreigner, unless it is recognized as such by the consular court of the country to which he belongs. As foreigners form, not the most numerous, but far the most active and enterprising portion of the Egyptian community, the obstacles thus created in the way of administration may be imagined.

In theory the government of Egypt is in the hands of the

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Khedive, who is a limited despot. He chooses his ministers, and legislates by means of decree. Certain functions of government are performed by International Boards, e.g., the Caisse de la Dette Publique, and new direct taxation has to be agreed to by the General Assembly. Lastly, the sovereign power of the Khedive is limited externally by the suzerainty of Turkey. In practice, however, the Khedive's authority belongs to the British Agent. He exercises his authority directly by what is diplomatically called advice given to the Khedive, and also by his active interference in the details of administration. Each of the principal departments of state Finance, Public Works, Interior, Justice and Education has attached to it an Adviser. These five are the fingers of the hand which the British Agent lays upon the Administration of Egypt. There is no Adviser in the War Office, but the Commander-in-Chief is, of course, an Englishman.

Just as in the Army the majority of the principal officers are Englishmen, so in the Civil Service, many, but not all, of the pivot-posts are held by Englishmen, and among the more subordinate officials there is also a sprinkling of Englishmen training on for more responsible positions. Thus the whole fabric of administration is stiffened, but in many varying degrees in different departments, by the British element. But except in the case of the Advisers, no rule is laid down, in practice or theory, as to what the amount of stiffening shall be, or what particular posts shall be held by Englishmen. Under Lord Cromer a capable native had always the chance of rising high, and could calculate on reaching any position that he was fit for. But capable natives suitable for high and responsible positions were hard to find, and most of the higher positions were filled by Englishmen, especially in the technical departments. In the Interior, however, native administrators have been the rule; there never have been any but native mudirs or governors of provinces: and the Interior has always been, by what is hardly a coincidence, the least

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efficient department. The small body of British officials, at the same time that they are regular servants of the Khedive, forms the special instrument by which H.B.M.'s Consul-General governs. In the background, but vastly important as the source and sanction of his power, is the Army of Occupation.

If Egypt were simply a province in the middle of India, or definitely a part of the Empire, its administration, though not without its own difficulties, would be comparatively a very simple task. But, when many ordinary matters of routine, or what would be so in other countries, become matters of negotiation with the Powers, the case is altered. The Consul-General may always find himself in an international complication over something which could be settled off-hand elsewhere. Worst of all the uncertainty that surrounds our position in the country is apt to produce variations in policy, and breeds difficulties all round. No man is more apt than the Egyptian to ask "Who will be my master"? and trim his sails accordingly; once he knows, he will obey with the ease that arises from millenniums of docility.

The first stage in the experiment was the appointment of a new ministry under Boutros Pasha. Many of the new ministers were decidedly nationalist in politics. It was intimated that these ministers were really going to be responsible heads of departments instead of mere salary-drawing dummies. The Advisers were told that they must treat the opinions of their ministers with more respect, and not merely give them orders in the form of advice. A new Adviser to the Interior was appointed who had the reputation of being more Egyptian than the Egyptians. Some excellent schemes for the formation of municipalities, and provincial councils with some limited but direct powers of administration, which had been long in contemplation were pushed on. High posts in the Civil Service began to be given to natives in succession to Englishmen.

That the experiment was tried in no half-hearted

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fashion is proved by two very salient examples. These examples occurred in very different spheres, but the results were similar, and both are well worth observation by the student of Egyptian politics. They are the affair of the Suez Canal Convention, and the affair of the Cotton worm.

The story of the Suez Canal Convention is not quite fully known in some of its details, but its outlines are sufficiently diverting, and no real harm has been done to any one. Some three years ago, Mr Harvey, the Financial Adviser, casting about for money, had his attention directed to the Suez Canal Company, whose concession comes to an end in about 1968. The year 1908 would seem to be full early to negotiate the renewal of a concession which had still so long to run, but, if the Canal Company were willing to concede terms favourable to Egypt, there was no reason from an Egyptian point of view why the attempt should not be made. It was made, and after two years of laborious and intricate negotiations, Mr Harvey was fortunate enough to arrive at a settlement. In return for an extension of its privileges for another forty years beyond 1968, the Company was to pay over to Egypt a sum of £4,000,000 during the next few years, and concede a certain share in the profits. The terms were certainly fully as favourable as Egypt could have expected to obtain. It is not easy to reckon the value of the Canal sixty years hence, but to pay four millions down (which even at 5 per cent interest is equal to thirty-two millions fifty-six years hence) for a problematical future must be a speculative venture. Even if the conditions of transportation remain the same, Egypt might not be in a position at that date to fulfil its pledges. But such considerations had no weight with the leaders of Nationalist opinion. As soon as the fact of the Convention began to be known a terrific clamour arose in the Nationalist press; the English were selling the future of Egypt to their own profit; the destinies of the country were being mortgaged by the alien oppressor, and the Suez Canal Convention

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became a sort of Shibboleth about which argument was impossible. Meantime, in furtherance of the greater education of Egyptians in self-government, it had been announced that the convention would be submitted to the General Assembly; and that the government would be prepared to abide by its decision.

Who first suggested this unexpected application of the policy of Egypt for the Egyptians must be left to conjecture. Those who are inclined to theorize about the mainsprings of our foreign policy may be divided roughly into three classes, and each class can reasonably read the incident in the light of their favourite view. There is first the joke theory—and surely to those who know their Egypt there never was a more subtly delicious stroke of humour than the reference of this complicated convention to such a body as the General Assembly. Never was a body more ludicrously unfitted to the task thus thrust upon it. The majority of its members are chosen by electoral colleges selected in their turn by so-called universal suffrage. In times of great political excitement and high expenditure as many as 5 per cent of the electors have been known to record their votes. It is in no sense representative of the true feelings of the Egyptian people. Neither by its composition nor its training is it adapted for the comprehension of any but the simplest of issues. Under the Organic Law its only function is to consent to or refuse new direct taxation, and as, since the occupation began, instances of new direct taxation have been rare in the extreme, its opportunities for the development of political wisdom have been few. It would have been just as reasonable to send in these worthy but unlettered rustics for the Cambridge Mathematical tripos, as to expect them to master the details of the convention. When the debate came on, the natural result followed. The arguments of those who opposed were ludicrous in the extreme, but they carried the day, and the convention was rejected with practical unanimity. All Egypt, with the exception, perhaps, of the Financial Adviser, laughed merrily. The Foreign Office

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joke, if joke it was intended to be, was played before an appreciative audience. There is great plausibility about the joke theory, but the Foreign Office must be acquitted. Because the results of its action were humorous, it does not follow that any conscious humour was intended.

The second theory is the Machiavellian theory, and this is held almost exclusively by foreigners. In their view the policy of our Foreign Office is dictated by deep-laid plans of the most crafty and far-reaching sagacity. They observe that, over and over again, actions, which appear at the time foolish and inconsequent, turn out in the end to be links in a chain leading to the most profitable and successful results. They argue that there is no better example than the history of this convention. To please the French it was necessary for the British Government to consent to the convention, and this they did through their representatives on the Board of the Canal Company. But it soon became clear that the terms agreed to were very obnoxious to British shippers. The millions to be paid to Egypt would have to be found by somebody, and there was little doubt that the somebody would be the users of the Canal and not the Shareholders. As more than three-fourths of the trade passing through the Canal is British, it was obvious that British trade would be seriously penalized. The happy device of submitting the convention to the General Assembly was an adroit stroke of policy. It was a handsome concession to the principles of Liberalism, as understood by many of the British Government's supporters. It would avert the danger threatening British trade interests, it would further show up in a strong light the perfect incapacity of the Egyptian representatives, and thereby strengthen our position in Egypt. Finally all appearance of bad faith towards the French would be avoided.

The holders of the Machiavellian theory, like those of the joke theory, commit the fallacy of arguing from results to intentions. We must turn to the third or Providential theory for a more correct view of the situation. This is held

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by those who know best our system of government, and the character of those who carry it on at headquarters. They know that far-reaching craft and tenacity of purpose are not characteristic of our rulers, but that they act in the most perfect good-faith, generally innocent of any scheme, good or bad, and often in the most complete ignorance of the situation. They attribute our success in the past to the peculiar care exercised by Providence over the destinies of the British Empire, which directs that one mistake shall be nullified by another, and enables the energy and devotion of our rank and file to counteract the misguided efforts of those in high places. It is wrong to assume as is done by the Machiavellians that, because nearly every man, woman and child in Egypt knew that the Convention would be ignominiously rejected by the General Assembly the heads of the Egyptian Government knew it too. On the contrary it is certain that they believed it would be passed, and so naturally the Foreign Office at home believed. The experiment was tried in good faith by men who believed in the Convention they had made. They did not conceive in the possibility of its rejection. No harm has been done; the Financial Adviser need not even grieve over the loss of the few millions. Last year Egypt had a realized surplus of about £1,500,000 and she can never have any real difficulty in finding money for useful and remunerative public works. Meantime the authorities have been taught a lesson as to the character of the Egyptian and his capacity for intelligent self-government, which will stand them in good stead in the future.

The second notable experiment was the Affair of the Cotton worm. It was carried out on a humbler stage. On the high grounds of diplomacy and international policy the educated or uneducated Egyptian might reasonably be expected to lose his way without being convicted of fundamental incapacity. But this was no matter of the higher mathematics for men who could only count up to ten, but a plain straightforward test relating to the A.B.C. of farming. The cotton worm is the caterpillar of a moth which at

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certain times in the summer lays its eggs in great numbers on the leaves of the young cotton plant. If these eggs are allowed to hatch the worms do the greatest possible damage to the plant. Experience has shown that the best way to combat the pest is to pick off the leaves on which the eggs have been laid and destroy them. This picking is done by children, and it had been usual for the business to be organized in the provinces by British Inspectors under the Ministry of the Interior. Under the new regime it seems to have been thought that the campaign against the worm might properly be left in Egyptian hands. It was argued that surely in a matter so nearly touching their own pockets the natives could be trusted to repeat a lesson already rehearsed. So the English Inspectors were withdrawn, but the Egyptians left to themselves failed to cope with this simple problem of organization. The cotton worm flourished and multiplied exceedingly. Great was the damage, and loud was the outcry of the afflicted land owner. Politics were all very well in their place, but that the sacred cotton crop should be sacrificed to political ideals was really too bad, and quite outside the calculations of the intelligent patriot.

It was of course expected (and indeed openly acknowledged) that the new policy, of which the two experiments mentioned were not isolated instances, would lead to some sacrifice of efficiency. It is exceedingly difficult in Egypt to lay hands on efficient native administrators; if you run through the names of efficient ministers in the past, they are practically certain to be of Turkish, Syrian or Armenian origin. It is one thing to educate the Egyptian, it is another to endow him with the character demanded of the successful administrator. Still a temporary loss of efficiency would have been a small price to pay for the discovery of even a dawning capacity for self-government. The existence of the Nationalist party, so far as it was genuine, was in itself a sign of progress. No foreign power can permanently and successfully administer a people's affairs, if that people are not only willing but also able to do so themselves. This has always

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been the official view, and the new policy differed from the old not so much in direction as in violence of movement. But there was a worse result of the new experiment than mere administrative or legislative incapacity. Unfortunately, instead of being grateful for the concessions made, the average Egyptian chose to interpret them as signs that the British Protectorate was to be withdrawn. Many a careful man thought it only prudent to display sympathy with what seemed likely to be the winning side. In the towns nationalist demonstrations increased in size and violence. Students in the Government schools became seriously affected with indiscipline. In the country districts crimes and outrages increased; brigands began to reappear. Finally these disorders culminated in the assassination of Boutros, the Coptic Prime Minister, by a fanatical Nationalist.

Even before the assassination of Boutros it had become perfectly clear that the new policy was a failure. The signs of the weather began to point to a veering of the political wind, and the Egyptian, always eager to be on the winning side, was quick to shape his conduct accordingly. The words of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons to the effect that something would have to be done were vague but not on that account the less distressing and harassing to the anxious trimmers. The final execution of the assassin Wardani, and the prosecution of the new Nationalist leader Ferid for a seditious publication, followed by his conviction and sentence to a term of imprisonment (confirmed on appeal), have further cooled the blood of the more ardent. In the election at Zagazig, Abaza Pasha, the leader of the opposition to the Suez Canal Convention, suffered defeat. Above all, in 1910-11 Egypt had a bumper cotton crop. The two previous crops had been comparatively failures, but this last was well over 7,000,000 cantars (1 cantar = about 100 lbs), and with prices averaging over £4 per cantar this means a great accession of wealth to the country. It would not be strange, even if the Egyptian were disposed to be anything of an idealist, which he is not in any degree, that this stream

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of golden sovereigns, for in Egypt it literally is a stream of golden sovereigns, should mitigate the violence of his affection for politics. Not least among the soothing influences has been the strong hand of Mr Graham, lately appointed Adviser to the Interior. At the present moment the nationalist movement seems to have collapsed. It had no real popular backing. No new leader has arisen equal in ability to the late Mustapha Kamel. So once more politics have been relegated to the background, which they always ought to occupy in Egypt. Once in the foreground they do nothing but distract the attention of the Government from the more important work of administration, which perhaps has had a tendency to be neglected during the late season of turmoil.

Beyond a doubt these years have been a severe test of quality for the British officials in Egypt. Perhaps it was necessary for the experiment to be tried in the form it was, but inevitably it caused some feeling of disappointment and disenchantment. Under the new conditions it was impossible that the administrative machine should run as efficiently as before. Men, who saw positions, which had long been the objects of their honourable ambition, given to natives who could not fill them half so well, when they saw themselves and their work misrepresented and vilified in every native print, when among the meanest of time-servers none seemed so mean as not to be able to throw a stone at the Englishman, knowing full well that the brunt of the failure which they could not help would fall upon themselves and their reputation, could hardly be blamed if they were tempted to ask themselves whether, after all, their work was as important as they thought, whether it was really worth while to labour so hard and so conscientiously at the thankless task of making bricks without straw, whether it would not be better simply to let things drift along native-fashion till such time as a pension had been earned, or some other job could be found elsewhere. The real danger was not the actual loss of efficiency itself, though that was hard enough to bear for men trained in the traditions of the 'eighties and

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'nineties, but the loss of enthusiasm in their work by the slender corps of British workers.

It must not be forgotten that for half the year Egypt is a tropical country. The fierce continual sunshine saps the nerve and the energy even of the native born. Without the strong stimulus of pride and joy in their work it is hard for even the best and hardest of workers to continue at pressure during the cruel summer months. But the necessities of government take no heed of climate. The mill must grind continuously, or there will be waste of power. If the European driving-wheels lose their energy, the whole country will suffer. There is no other source of strength. The Egyptian native has a talent for business-like procrastination founded on the most reasonable arguments, and a genius for the avoidance of any decisive action and responsibility. With such influences at work it is easy to subside into a specious *far niente*. Further, the administration of Egypt is no longer in the pioneer stage. Nearly thirty years of progress and increasing prosperity and civilization inevitably tend to blunt the fine spirit of adventure which actuated the men of the early occupation, and which is still to be found in full and vigorous bloom in the Sudan. The growing complication of affairs brings with it routine, and many apparently humdrum matters of detail. It was the glory of the pioneers that they successfully attempted the impossible on a great scale. To-day the glory is less, but the difficulties are the same in principle, if less romantic in appearance. Now, as ever, the task of raising a sound building with bad material and worse tools demands a full measure of ability and patriotism.

It needs more than a casual knowledge of Egypt to realize how creditably the fibre of our fellow-countrymen has stood the strain. Some disappointed grumbling there may be, and anyone unacquainted with the record of work done may be deceived by it. The average Englishman is a man of grim and melancholy humour in the ordinary talk of his leisure hours. He does not change his habit when he

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enters the service of the Khedive. But so far his grumbles, and they are not very serious after all, have made no difference to his work. In action, whether in the office or the field, he is the same cheerful and unwearying enthusiast as ever, however unwilling to admit it. So the crisis has been tided over, and once more the man on the spot has given the authorities the chance to retrieve their mistakes: once more he has taken on his own shoulders the burden and the loss.

Can he not, in the true interests of the Egyptian people, be spared the extra anxieties that come from these fluctuations of high policy? Things may go right for a time, but, it is absolutely certain that the uncertainty of our position in Egypt adds immensely to the difficulties of administration. Certainty of occupation even for twenty-five or thirty years will enormously simplify our task. A glance at the alternatives will prove that nothing else is possible unless we are beaten in a great war.

First, Egypt cannot be independent. Leaving out every other consideration, Egypt depends upon the Nile literally for her very existence; she must, therefore, hold the Sudan securely. Whoever holds the Sudan holds Egypt, for the simple reason that a single dam thrown across the Nile at the right time and in the right place would be the ruin of all the country north of Assouan. But not even the greatest enthusiast for Egypt can maintain for a moment that she is able by herself to hold the Sudan. The attempt would mean relapse to barbarism in the one country and ruin for the other. Therefore Egypt for the Egyptians is impossible. Either we continue to hold the Sudan ourselves and therefore Egypt too, or else some other great power must do so, which we could not permit.

Secondly, no other great Power can be permitted to hold Egypt as long as we are to have any position in the Mediterranean at all. We cannot allow any possible enemy to seat themselves astride of our communications to the East and Australia.

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The third and only other possible solution is that Egypt should revert to her position as a province of Turkey, and no doubt to many Turks this would seem a very natural and desirable development; the possession of this rich and docile province might well appear an agreeable contrast to the constant effort to control the hardy mountaineers of Albania, or the undisciplined Arabs of the Yemen, who even when subdued can bring no profit to the victor. But, whatever may be the future developments of Turkey as a civilized power and however great the rate of her progress, she has too many problems on her hands to make it possible for her to contemplate the administration of a vast African empire within twenty, thirty, or even forty years.

The simple truth is that now, as ever, the river Nile is the central fact in Egypt, on which everything else must turn. Whoever holds the Upper Nile has Egypt in the hollow of his hand. When the British flag was hoisted in the Sudan we not only secured our position in Egypt but we also undertook responsibilities for the civilization and good government of those vast regions on which we cannot turn our backs. While we hold the Sudan, and we must hold it, we cannot get out of Egypt, even if Egypt ceased to be the stepping-stone to India.

Once we were secure from alarms of evacuation for at least a term of years, it would be possible to pursue a continuous policy, the Egyptians would settle down content to be relieved from the difficulty of discerning who their master was to be, and possibly even the foreigner in the land might cling less closely to his privileges under the Capitulations, which now present so formidable an obstacle in the way of many simple and necessary reforms.

Experience has shown that for the present at least it is hopeless for the Egyptian to try and stand alone. In any case the plant of self-government is a slow-growing tree. No greater cruelty could be inflicted upon the mass of the people, and no greater blow to their interests, than the withdrawal of the strong guiding hand.

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Perhaps it is too much to ask the politician to recognize the logic of these facts, but all the same that logic will doubtless prevail. With the facts on his side, the British official, both in Egypt and the Sudan, may go steadily forward, unaffected by changes of policy, real or rumoured. Let him build his dams and his railways, dig his canals, administer justice, and set his face steadily towards bettering the lot of the toiling millions in his charge. His reward will be that in serving the country of his adoption he is serving his own no less.

PS.—I finished my article, and went out into my garden in Gezireh. As I sat in the warm scented air of the spring night, trying to forecast in what pattern our democracy at home would mould its foreign policy in years to come, the sound of the pipers of the Scots Guards at Kasr-el-Nil floated across the river to my ears. I thought there was much solid comfort and good omen in the sound.

NOTE.—Since the above was written, the death has occurred of Sir Eldon Gorst. He had spent most of his working life in Egypt, and indeed there is little doubt that he owed his breakdown in health to the long years he had passed in the country. This is not the place to discuss his services; it was his tragic fate to be cut off by death just at the moment when he appeared to have passed through the difficulties that must always beset a man who follows a great predecessor in a difficult post.

The news of Lord Kitchener's appointment as his successor has been received with intense satisfaction by all the friends of England in Egypt, as well as the Egyptians themselves.

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS.

I. TWO PRINCIPLES AND A SANCTION.

THREE generations at least of Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Irishmen have grown up in the belief that the House of Lords has no power to interfere in matters of taxation, and that it has no power to withstand any measure, no matter how profoundly such a measure may affect our existing laws and customs, if the will of the people has been clearly expressed in its favour. The second of these principles does not discriminate. In its view, constitutional change is on the same footing as a land bill or the reform of the poor laws. A general election is the means by which the will of the people is ascertained. It may be a rough and ready test of public feeling; but it is the only one we have ever used, and until little more than a year ago it was held to be sufficient. No other had ever been suggested.

The belief in these two principles has remained undisturbed ever since our grandsires were birched at school. Individuals may have questioned their wisdom or their legality, but all political parties have agreed openly or tacitly to accept them. No party leader has ever thought of disputing their existence any more than a pilot thinks of disputing the existence of the sandbanks of the Solent, or of the rocks which are charted off Belle Isle. There is hardly a statesman whose name is famous in the political history of the last century who has not at one time or another publicly proclaimed, gladly or sorrowfully, his adherence to these principles as part of that marvellous unwritten constitution which it used to be the fashion to describe as the envy and the despair of the civilized world.

Our Constitution has received much praise on the ground that it is to a large extent unwritten. Its want of definiteness has been held to be one of its greatest virtues. Its elasticity has been lauded to the skies as our best protection on

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the one hand against obstinate *laissez faire* and on the other against violent revolution. But an unwritten, indefinite and elastic constitution possesses the defects of its qualities. No one knows who makes it. No one sees when it changes. It grows, but so slowly that no one can mark its growth any more than if it were an oak-tree, which in fact it much resembles. Parliamentary discussions and contests, popular agitations and violence, the inertia and the vigour of Kings, the predominance of this statesman or of that, all have had their shares in its construction. A dramatic event, a purple passage from a speech of one of our great orators, a backstairs' intrigue unsuspected at the time, even a thing so trivial as a phrase which happens to fit some particular occasion and thereby passes current for a generation, may add to, or destroy, or change some important part of our Constitution for good or ill. The learned writers upon constitutional law, although they are read only by serious students, have a power of moulding the tradition co-ordinate with that of the parliamentarians. If not directly, at any rate through their disciples, their conclusions filter down to common men who are ever ready enough to believe what they are told, providing they are not asked to listen to too many reasons in support of the doctrine. Writers who are not particularly learned, but who are brilliant and persuasive, have a great share also in the business. They interpret the popular mood, the aspirations of the particular epoch, and with a touch here and there bring the constitutional picture into sympathy with current notions. Thereafter this picture is stamped firmly on the minds of men. What right or authority it may be asked had Walter Bagehot to make or mend our Constitution? But by one means or another, under the pretext of explaining what it was, he left it in some way different from the thing he found it. Being a man of genius and force of character, his influence made itself felt just as much as if he had been Prime Minister.

And so ideas fraught with the power to transmute pass

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from the study to the schools, the platform, and the press. The principles to which we have alluded have been expounded for years past in the college lecture-room and in the board school alike. The child's history book of England states them dogmatically and without qualification. Bad history perhaps and worse law, but there they are—firmly fixed in the belief of the people! And that surely is the very essence of your unwritten, indefinite, elastic Constitution: it is what the people believe it to be and nothing else. It is just this belief of the people in a loose set of rules, their loyalty to them, their pride in them, that makes our Constitution what it is. And while the Radical may justly admire a dispensation which accords with his generous trust in the popular theory of the State, the Tory must support it with no less fidelity. For the belief of the people in the sanctity of their institutions is the very foundation-stone of Toryism. If you shake that belief there is anarchy—anarchy and at a short interval despotism. Opportunism, levity and passion are always urging us to run the risk of tampering with popular beliefs for the sake of some immediate party advantage, or triumph or revenge. It has been a frequent and deserved reproach against a section of the Radical party in the past, but it must be frankly confessed that in recent times the Tory is open to the same grave charge, and with less excuse, for he has sinned against the light.

There is a third thing which we were also taught at school, but which stands on a somewhat different footing. It is not a principle of the Constitution, but what philosophers call a "sanction," meaning thereby a penalty or form of coercion following upon a serious breach of the rules. The King can create peers, and if the House of Lords refuses to bow to the expressed will of the people, the Government of the day may advise the King to create a sufficient number of peers to carry the measure. The King must do what his Ministers advise, unless he can find other Ministers able to carry on the affairs of the country

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without forcing him to this odious exercise of his powers. The creation of peers is not a part of the Constitutional machinery. It has only once been resorted to 200 years ago and only once threatened since. It is a desperate resource, and any government which forced, or even threatened, it without the most overwhelming necessity would be certain of universal execration, so soon as the immediate shouts of its adherents had died away. It cannot by any straining of words be called a constitutional act, because it temporarily destroys the Constitution by tampering with the independence of one of the Houses of Parliament. It is just as much an act of violence as if the Guards were turned out to expel all peers opposed to the Government. It is an act of violence which falls short of civil war only by a few inches, and which if unjustly used might easily provoke civil war.

For the understanding of the present situation these two principles and this sanction should be clearly kept in mind. The rejection of the Budget in the autumn of 1909, the right of the House of Lords to insist upon amending the Parliament Bill, the threat of Mr Asquith to force the King to create Peers, in order to pass the bill without amendment, must be judged by this light. Amid the cross-fire of arguments of varying degrees of plausibility, only those are really pertinent to the discussion which have reference to these main issues. Did the people approve the Parliament Bill at the election last December? Was Mr Asquith's threat an act of unconstitutional violence or was it justified by a grave necessity?

II. THE FIRST STAGE—CHRISTMAS TO MID-SUMMER.

IN the February number of the ROUND TABLE the constitutional controversy was discussed at some length. There was no further discussion of the subject in the May number for two reasons, the first, that but little change had come

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over the scene during the interval of three months, the second, that popular interest in the matter had ceased to be acute. The debates which took place in both Houses of Parliament upon various dates in February, April, and May, failed to excite out-of-doors even that very moderate degree of attention which, in recent years, it has been customary to bestow upon what are termed "first-class" measures. In the Commons, the discussions were tedious and unreal. The indignation on the one side and the enthusiasm on the other produced the effect of make-believe; and although the language used was occasionally strong, the spirit of the debates for the most part was singularly weak. No speech was made which is likely to be remembered in our political annals, nor even a phrase which has any prospect of immortality. Of action, which is more important than speech, there was none. No flash of genius or fortunate inspiration came from any quarter to change the situation. The sole movement was a monotonous goose-step of stale arguments and still staler invective.

For this sterility within Parliament and indifference out of doors the Coronation is commonly held to have been accountable. But it is difficult to believe that the proposal to make so profound a change in our Constitution—a change, or revolution, which is more fitly to be compared with the events of 1688 than with those of 1832—would have been eclipsed by any other form of interest had it been fully understood. That it was not, and is not yet, fully understood must be laid at the doors of the Unionist Party, who, by their tactics, helped to obscure it, and in their speeches failed always to capture the attention of the country.

It is obvious enough that the leading members of Government and Opposition had determined that matters should not be brought to a head until after the Coronation. But this undertaking, if it amounted to an undertaking, laid no duty upon either side to abstain from action in the meanwhile. If the Unionists, who were the defending

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party, had felt themselves able to produce an impression upon public opinion either by a new presentment of the danger of Single Chamber Government, or by the advocacy of the Referendum, or in any other way, we may be certain that the attempt would have been made. It was not made; and we cannot resist the conclusion that the reason of this remarkable omission is to be found in the lack of earnestness and conviction which has been the characteristic of Unionist leadership for some years past. Nor did the Liberals in the least strengthen their position. Weariness of abstractions which did not touch any immediate interest of the electors, weariness of politicians who for two years had been crying "wolf," and of other politicians who for a similar period, or longer, had been crying "Millennium," kept the balance even. When nobody is in a mood to listen it is hard to make converts.

The Coronation may certainly be allowed its share in producing this apathy and indifference. The preparations long beforehand, the comings and goings of distinguished guests, the series of impressive ceremonies made demands not merely upon the popular curiosity, but also upon the popular imagination. The prolonged nature of the struggle may also be to some extent accountable. A general election once in a way is a more or less pleasant excitement. Two general elections in a twelvemonth are a tedious superfluity. The worst of a crisis which lasts for two years is that while the danger may be increasing all the time the attention it commands is all the time dying away. But it must be admitted that neither of these reasons fully covers the present case. The main reason is probably to be found in the marked diminution in the interest with which politicians of all parties have come to be regarded since the election of 1906. In many countries—especially in new countries—this phenomenon is not so rare an occurrence as to excite any wonder. But in British politics it has been remarkably rare. From the days of the Reform agitation great abilities, great characters and great causes have always kept firm hold of the popular interest.

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The same may be true of next year or next month, but it has not been true of the past five years. There are always great causes. No cause can be greater than a fundamental change in the Constitution. But the cause is no good without the man. In studies and academies there have always been idealists who sneered impartially at the politicians of both parties; but until recently this has not been the general attitude of the public. To-day there are signs of it on all hands. The papers have discovered that other news is more palatable to their readers. Prominent politicians speak with an ever increasing vigour and emphasis only to find themselves condensed into half a column of small type and consigned ingloriously to a back page. The decadence of parliamentary institutions has become a popular theme; but the institutions are probably much less to blame than what Bacon called "the breed of men."

The events of the Session up to the Coronation may be briefly summarized. Mr Asquith introduced his Parliament Bill into the House of Commons in the third week of February, and the second reading was passed by the end of that month. At the beginning of April (for it was found necessary to devote March to other business of an urgent character) the Bill went into committee, and after debates which took place at intervals up to the end of the month, and which cannot be said to have been unfairly curtailed, the measure was finally reported and sent up to the Lords in the second week of May.

Meanwhile, owing to a series of accidents, fortunate or otherwise, the Lords had not put forward their scheme of reform which it was understood the Unionist leaders had determined to submit as an alternative to the merely destructive proposals of the Government. Ever since Christmas a committee had been actively engaged in preparing a measure of this nature, and on February 23 it was announced that Lord Lansdowne would shortly introduce a Bill in which the policy of the united Unionist party would be set forth. But a very few days later it became obvious

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that reform of the House of Lords was not a matter which the rank and file of the party were prepared to leave in the hands of any secret committee of official mandarins. A very large number of the private members had, in fact, conceived plans of their own to which they were attached with a more than maternal affection. The newest recruits, the most youthful members of the party, were even more fertile and more confident than their elders. It was clear from the omens that if Lord Lansdowne had proceeded to introduce his scheme of reform at the date originally proposed a very unseemly exhibition of independence would have ensued among the rank and file both in the Lords and in the Commons.

The first delay was due to this cause. Subsequently, however, when the internal disagreements were more or less satisfactorily composed, Lord Lansdowne was taken ill, and it was not until the second week in May that he was far enough recovered to bring forward his Bill. It was in the same week that the Parliament Bill was sent up from the Commons.

Lord Lansdowne's Reform Bill was debated in the House of Lords at unusual length and was read a second time towards the end of May. It was decided, however, that under the existing conditions, and in view of the hostile attitude of the Government, it would be fruitless waste of time to proceed further with the measure. Possibly it was also felt that to engage in those discussions on matters of detail which the Committee stage invites, might give rise to dissensions which in face of the common enemy it would be wise, if possible, to avoid.

The Parliament Bill of the Government was next considered by their Lordships. It was debated at length on the first and second readings, both of which ordeals it survived safely, though dislike and distrust of its provisions were freely expressed. It was now the end of May. The Coronation was only three weeks ahead and the general atmosphere was quite unfit for serious political discussions. Conse-

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quently no fair objection could be taken, or was taken in any responsible quarter, to the decision of the Lords to postpone the Committee Stage until after the Coronation festivities.

The debates in the House of Lords, both upon their own Reform Bill and upon the Parliament Bill, were dignified and courteous—so much might have been expected. They were conducted on a high level, and marked on both sides by serious thought, ability and eloquence. Compared with the debates in the Commons upon the Parliament Bill, the Lords' discussions were creditably distinguished, not merely by good manners, but by an absence of exaggeration. It is claimed for the House of Lords, and claimed truly, that the worst way to secure its attention is to overstate the case. There was little in the nature of overstatement upon this occasion. Moreover, there was a freshness, originality and independence about the speeches of the Peers which were in strong contrast to the stale and jaded debates, following the strictest partisan lines, which had taken place in the lower House a few weeks earlier. It must be remembered, however, in fairness, when we draw this comparison, that every member of the House of Commons had long ago become weary of the subject; for months they had been talking about little else. We must also remember that in the House of Lords independence of view is less to be wondered at, seeing that few Peers are much in awe of the party machine. But, despite the high quality of the debates in the Upper House upon both of these important measures, public opinion in the country, so far as it could be gauged, remained entirely unmoved. The country was not angry; it was not pleased; it was not impressed; it was not even bored, for the very good reason that it never listened. There has never been a more striking instance of the law that causes do not win by themselves; that argument, and reason and virtue pass unheeded if they are not attached and knit up to some striking human character. This need is not a special weakness of the democracy but the common heritage of all

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mankind. An aristocracy is in the same boat in this respect with the mob. "But," it may be answered, "the Lords and the leaders of the Unionist party are men of the highest character." It is not high character that is required, nor yet altogether strong character; far less has it anything to do with the intellect. It is some peculiarity about a man which induces people to see him in the round and not in the flat; a being, possibly very imperfect, but for all that a thing in three dimensions and not merely in two. A few public men have possessed this quality, but the great multitude have lacked it. The why and wherefore we are wholly unable to explain. Gladstone had it, and Disraeli, and Parnell, in a very high degree. And men so extraordinarily different as Bright and Cecil Rhodes and the late Lord Salisbury also had it. Mr Chamberlain had it and has it still; for it is a quality of which the owner, even in silence and sickness, cannot divest himself. But among those who now figure on the stage we can only be certain of one man who as yet has shown that he has it. Mr Lloyd George alone possesses those strange polar qualities of repulsion and attraction which mark out the man to whom people will listen at all times, and whom many people will follow, for no reason which they can give, except simply that they must.

Lord Lansdowne's scheme for the reconstruction of the House of Lords proposed to reduce the existing membership by about one half. It was to consist of 350 Lords of Parliament, of whom 100 were to be elected by the whole body of the Hereditary Peers upon some system of proportional representation, the choice being restricted to such of the number as had served their country, and gained experience of public affairs in one or other of a wide variety of responsible offices. Further, 120 were to be chosen by different districts or divisions of the United Kingdom by means of electoral colleges "composed of the members of the House of Commons for constituencies within each electoral district"; and 100 were to be nominated by the Crown on the advice of the Ministry of the

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day. In addition there were to be seven bishops and sixteen judges. Except in the cases of the bishops and the judges the Lords of Parliament were to be elected for a term of twelve years, one fourth of them retiring every third year. The creation of hereditary Peers was to be limited to five per annum, and hereditary Peers who were not chosen to serve in the Upper House were to be eligible for election to the House of Commons.

It was not a very complicated scheme; but when the country is uninterested any scheme appears to be complicated. The country was in no mood to trouble its head about the matter, and no voice which was raised in advocacy of this proposal succeeded in arresting the general attention. The plain man was inclined to say that he could understand a hereditary, or an elected, or a nominated Second Chamber, but that the combination of all three was too much for him. Yet, had the political atmosphere been different, had these proposals been put forward when the Unionists were in power, they would in all probability have appealed very strongly to the common-sense of the nation. For they were reasonable, and in accordance with tradition, and by a few adjustments here and there were capable of being made to give fair play to both political parties. But things being as they were, no enthusiasm was evoked, and it is not too much to say that on the Unionist side as well as on the Radical side they are already well nigh forgotten.

The most remarkable feature, however, of all this period is the obscurity of the Unionist policy in regard to the Parliament Bill. No one knew what the leaders had decided, and the reason of this has recently been made plain—the leaders had not in fact decided anything. From what has happened since it would appear that they held very different views as to the course which ought to be followed in the last resort. The fact that they failed to thresh this difference out and to come to an agreement among themselves before the meeting of Parliament in February last,

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has hampered the action of the party all the way through.

There were two alternatives: the first to accept the result of the election as a verdict by the people in favour of the Parliament Bill; the second to dispute the validity of this election in view of the unprecedented and, it might well have been said, the unconstitutional manner in which this election had been brought about. But neither course was adopted. Everything was left in doubt. No member of the rank and file knew whether in the end the Parliament Bill would be allowed to pass, under protest, in its original form, or whether, after having been amended in accordance with the views of the Unionist party, these amendments would be insisted on. If the election was to be accepted as a clear popular verdict, the right course would have been to say so frankly at the beginning, but at the same time to put forward the alternative policy and to endeavour to persuade the Government to accept as much of it as possible. And had this alternative policy in the meanwhile elicited any support in the country, it is probable that the Government would have been amenable. But if the election had been brought about by trickery and fraud, by the "entrapping" of the King, as has been alleged lately, the right, though violent, course would have been to go on saying so, day in day out. For only on such grounds was it possible to maintain the right of the Peers to set aside the popular verdict. Perhaps the greatest fault of Mr Balfour, as well as a party leader, and as a leader of men, is his passion for that form of circus dexterity which consists in riding upon two horses at the same time. He does it very well indeed, but he never arrives anywhere. The performance indeed is only suited to the ring, where there is soft falling in case of accidents upon the sawdust and tan-bark, and where the end and object in view is merely to go round and round in a circle. It is not practicable for the more serious purposes of war or the chase.

In our own view, howsoever illicit were the means em-

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ployed to procure an election, an election, like the certificate of the Court of Bankruptcy, wipes the slate clean. An election is the constitutional means for ascertaining the will of the people with regard to any legislative change, and when this will has been duly ascertained the constitutional practice is to allow the measure which has been so "willed" to pass into law. The only exception would be if it were quite clear that the popular judgement had been changed by the debates which had taken place in the two Houses of Parliament subsequent to the election. And certainly no such change can be said to have occurred in the present instance. We may be wrong in this view; but whether we be wrong or right it is as clear as noonday that the duty and the interest of the Unionist party was to make up its mind which leg it was going to stand upon, and to act accordingly. The failure to do this is one of the chief reasons why the Unionist defence proved so ineffectual. The confusion of opinion among the leaders percolated down to their followers, and the result, as might have been expected, was confusion, not unmingled with irritation, in the country.

III. THE SECOND STAGE—JULY

PUBLIC indifference to the constitutional crisis continued up to the Coronation and somewhat beyond it. The Committee stage of the Parliament Bill in the House of Lords began in the last days of June and the measure was finally "reported" just before the middle of July. It cannot be said that up to this date any interest commensurate to the importance of the proceedings had been shown either among the members of the lower House, or in the Press, or in the country.

The issue between the Government and their opponents may be put into a very few words.

The Parliament Bill laid it down categorically that in future the Lords should not be allowed to touch any Money Bill. Such measures when passed by the Com-

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mons were to become law whether the Lords thought fit to consent or to withhold their consent. This put beyond doubt what most people, prior to 1909, had understood to be the rule of the Constitution. The Lords, upon the advice of Lord Lansdowne, agreed to accept this restraint upon their strict legal rights.

What was or was not a Money Bill, and whether or not any measure purporting to be a Money Bill contained clauses which constituted "tacking," was to be left to the sole decision of the Speaker of the House of Commons. The Lords inserted an amendment to this proposal substituting for the Speaker, as the sole authority, a joint committee representing both Houses and consisting of the Lord Chancellor, the Speaker, the Chairman of Committees in the Lords, the Chairman of Ways and Means in the Commons, a Lord of Appeal, and a member of the House of Commons to be appointed by the Speaker. The Speaker was to be the Chairman of the Joint Committee and was to have a casting vote.

Any public bill other than a Money Bill which had passed the House of Commons in three successive sessions whether of the same Parliament or in different Parliaments (providing, however, that two years had elapsed since its first introduction) was to become law whether the House of Lords passed it or rejected it. To this Lord Lansdowne proposed and carried an important amendment, which is the crux of the present dispute. Indeed, it is the only point of difference between the two parties which presented any serious difficulties.

Lord Lansdowne proposed that the Government's plan of dealing with public bills (other than Money Bills) should be modified, and that measures coming under *three* categories should not be capable of being passed over the heads of the Second Chamber in this rough-shod manner, but in case of difference between the two Houses, should be submitted for decision to the people by means of the Referendum. These three categories are (1) bills affecting the existence of the

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Crown or the Protestant Succession; (2) bills establishing national parliaments in any parts of the United Kingdom; (3) bills which in the opinion of the joint committee aforesaid raised issues of great gravity upon which the mind of the country had not been sufficiently ascertained.

The Parliament Bill also proposed that the maximum duration of Parliaments should be reduced from seven to five years. To this the House of Lords assented.

Mr. Asquith refused to accept any of the Lords' amendments, and this in spite of the fact that in none of the divisions which took place during the passage of the Bill through Committee was the Government ever supported by much more than half of their normal following in the House of Lords. It is not our purpose to discuss the merits or demerits of Lord Lansdowne's proposals. It is important, however, to point out that at no single point were they open to the charge that they were anti-democratic, either in intention or in effect. The appeal to the people by way of the Referendum may be a good thing or a bad thing; but if it is to be our guiding constitutional principle that the will of the people is to prevail, the Referendum is certainly a swifter, and a more accurate and conclusive way of ascertaining what this "will" is with regard to any particular measure than our present system of a general election, with its confusion of issues and cross-currents of personal considerations. It has been generally assumed that the main, if not the only reason which induced the Government to put aside all attempts at compromise upon the basis of Lord Lansdowne's amendment was Mr Redmond's determination to have Home Rule, and his fear that no Home Rule bill such as he could approve would ever be accepted by the majority of the voters in the United Kingdom! If so, the issue, when we come down to the bedrock of it, was concerned with principles only to a very small extent. It was almost entirely a matter of tactics. Mr Redmond's fear of the result of a Referendum on Home Rule, which may or may not be well grounded, and his

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power to turn the Government out at any moment if they agreed to a referendum, constitute the chief explanation of the present remarkable situation. There seems no other valid reason which could have prevented the Government from coming to an agreement with the Opposition, or which could have led Mr Asquith into forcing the King to threaten the most violent exercise of the royal prerogative which has occurred since the days of the Stewarts.*

Be opinions what they may be as to motives and influences, the gist of the dispute as it has been stated here, will probably be accepted by both parties. Lord Lansdowne's amendments will not strike politicians of any school of thought, who are unconcerned as actors in this particular struggle, as being either anti-democratic or unreasonable. In their nature there is nothing provocative, and there is no taint whatsoever of that stern and unbending Toryism which is alleged against them so freely in our Radical Press. But in spite of their virtues, it must be frankly confessed that they did not evoke any enthusiasm or support, or even much attention, in the country. Whether this was due to the apathy which had been induced by the Coronation, or to the prejudice against the House of Lords which had crystallized at the two recent elections, it is difficult to be certain. Probably one factor which has already been alluded to more than once—the want in the Unionist party of any commanding voice to which the country was willing to listen—had more to do with it than anything else. Many good speeches were made in the House of Lords, but none which had the quality required to make men listen. And it must be added that the method adopted was not wisely chosen with the view to placing the issues clearly before careless or reluctant listeners.

* It should be added that the Government has throughout expressed their strongest objections, on constitutional grounds, to the root principle of the Lansdowne amendments. In their opinion the referendum would undermine the system of representative government.—ED.

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The speeches were for the most part good, but the issues (in their actual nature simple enough for anyone to comprehend) were lamentably confused during the course of the debates. Lord Lansdowne's were not the only amendments brought forward and discussed, and some of the unofficial proposals were neither very wisely chosen nor very carefully considered. Consequently, the small store of public interest available was not husbanded and made the most of, but was wastefully dissipated on proposals which were entirely inconsistent with the principle of the Bill, which, according to the Radical view, had been accepted when the second reading was agreed to. The suggestions put forward by most distinguished peers were not invariably free from ambiguity. Some were advanced with hesitation, a few broke down under criticism. The public, already weary of the subject, became irritated as well.

The official amendments were, to a very considerable extent, prejudiced and deprived of their natural force by this lackadaisical procedure. But the Peers are independent Britons like the rest of us, and especially upon such an occasion as this, when their immemorial powers were threatened, they could not be prevented from having their say. No considerations of method, nor the obvious advantage of a severe concentration would appear to have had much weight with them. Nor were the official amendments themselves as simple and as free from ambiguity as could have been desired. Every one understood what was meant by a bill which affected the Crown or the Protestant Succession, or which proposed to set up a national parliament in any part of the United Kingdom; but this clear understanding was somewhat clouded by the third category of exceptions—those “issues of great gravity upon which the judgement of the country had not been sufficiently ascertained.” Many people did not understand this provision at all. Many took it to mean much more than it did, and saw in it a sinister design by which the Lords were seeking to gain even more than they gave up, and to retain their right to

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pitch Radical measures out-of-window—the fundamental grievance which it had been the special object of the Parliament Bill to remedy. Among many people, not only upon the Ministerial side, who understood quite clearly what was meant, there was considerable distrust of this proposal to set up a Committee consisting of half-a-dozen honest gentlemen with powers to decide over the heads of both Houses, in the first place whether or not any given measure raised an “issue of great gravity,” and in the second place whether or not “the judgement of the country” had already been pronounced upon it. The creation of a committee with such extraordinary powers, would have been quite as much an innovation and quite as startling an innovation as the Referendum itself. As far as the country was concerned the Lords would have had a much better chance of getting their amendments considered and approved had they omitted this vague and dubious proposal, and confined their exceptions to such classes of measures as could be definitely earmarked in advance beyond any chance of dispute.

For all these reasons the Lords' discussions upon their amendments to the Parliament Bill, which took place at the end of June and during the first half of July, did not produce such an awakening of popular interest as had been confidently expected. Far less did they have the effect of stimulating any movement in the country adverse to the Government. Such bye elections as have taken place recently have marked no serious turnover of votes.

The first thing which can be said to have disturbed the general indifference was, when it became clear that there was a sharp division in the Unionist party to as whether the Lords should stand by their amendments if the Commons rejected them (as the Commons clearly intended to do), or whether it was the constitutional duty of the Lords to acquiesce, under a formal protest, in the will of the people as expressed through their representatives. As soon as it appeared—somewhere in the first week of July—

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that there was to be civil war among the Unionists over this subject, the country began to take a mild and somewhat amused interest.

A few days later the man in the street became even more amused and much more interested over the project of a wholesale creation of Peers to carry the Parliament Bill if the House of Lords should refuse to give way. Some newspapers put the creation at fifty, others at five hundred. Had the King consented to this wholesale creation? Would these new noblemen be generally regarded with hatred, derision and contempt, or would they immediately earn the gratitude of all true patriots and the reverence of all true snobs? Would they pay for their titles at the usual rate, or at a reduction in view of the peculiar circumstances? In the former case it was computed by statisticians that the creation of five hundred peers would endow the Radical party fund with twenty-five million sterling, the mere interest of which at five per cent would provide a revenue of £1,250,000 per annum! But above all there was the highly interesting personal question as to who these peers were to be.

This was the beginning of the long-looked-for revival of public interest in the greatest Constitutional change since the reign of King James II. The type of the newspaper headlines now became much bigger. The column of quicksilver could actually be seen climbing the stem of the popular thermometer. When Mr Asquith's letter to Mr Balfour appeared on July 22, and when the public learned therefrom that the King had really consented to make any number of Peers which might be required to overawe the resistance of the House of Lords, the attention at least, if not the moral fervour, of the nation was thoroughly aroused. The transition from wakefulness to excitement and the taking of sides was rapid; so that on Tuesday, July 25, after the noisy and disorderly demonstration by a heroic band of Unionists in the House of Commons, many of our newspapers considered it worth their while to give the "Constitutional Crisis" type almost as large as they were giving to the

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airmen's race round England for the *Daily Mail* prize of £10,000. Some of them even went so far as to put the matter on their bills. Thanks largely to the efforts of the heroic band aforesaid, we have now reached a point when, although the true nature of the Constitutional change which is proposed may be no more clearly understood than it was before, at any rate, owing to the means threatened by the one side to force it through, and those adopted on the other side to withstand it, the Radicals and the Unionists have succeeded between them in collecting a crowd of very respectable dimensions to cheer and jeer.

POSTSCRIPT. AUGUST 4.

AT the time of writing (August 4) we are confronted with a situation which certainly was not foreseen even a few days ago. The Government is at present unaware whether or not the threatened resistance of the House of Lords is substantial enough to justify the creation of peers for the purpose of securing the passage of the Parliament Bill. It may be that no new Peers will be required: it may be that only a few, or it may be that a considerable number will be necessary. Meanwhile there is delay—the motion for disagreeing with the Lords' Amendments was to have been moved last Monday by Mr Asquith in the Commons. Then we heard it was postponed till Wednesday. Now it is put off again until Tuesday of next week.

This development has been caused by a split in the Unionist party—a split which is not due to any disagreement as to the character of the Parliament Bill, but solely to an honest difference of opinion as to the duty of the Unionist party in the peculiar circumstances which have arisen. The great bulk of the Unionists, both in the Lords and in the Commons, hold with Mr Balfour and Lord Lansdowne that, as a consequence of the last general election, it is the duty of the Unionist Peers to bow to the expressed will of the people, and to abstain from insisting

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further upon their amendments, seeing that the Government have definitely refused to accept them.

An uncertain number of the Unionist Peers, however, encouraged by a considerable section of the party in the House of Commons, have let it be known that opposition will be offered to the passage of the Bill. The ground taken is that the last election was snatched unfairly and in such a way as to prejudice the issue: that the King was "entrapped" into granting this election (which in the circumstances was entirely without any constitutional precedent) and into giving a promise to create Peers, owing either to the misrepresentations of the Prime Minister or to the suppression and concealment by him of the alternative courses which it was open to the King to follow. As there was trickery, according to the views of this section of the party, the election is not to count. It is not to be taken as the true verdict of the people. The numbers of this section are variously estimated at from fifty to seventy.

Finally, there is a small band of Unionist Peers who feel so strongly that tradition makes it the duty of the House of Lords not to defeat the verdict of the people (no matter how dishonestly or unconstitutionally such a verdict may have been obtained) that they are actually prepared to vote for the Parliament Bill, which they detest, in order that the Constitution may be upheld. The number of these Peers is likewise uncertain, but not more than about half a dozen of them have as yet openly announced their intention of taking this heroic course.

The group which is determined to wage war to the end, and to "die in the last ditch" has been popularly named *the Ditchers*, and the main body which follows Mr Balfour and Lord Lansdowne are known for distinction as *the Hedgers*; while those noble spirits who are prepared to suffer for the faults of others have been called the *Whipping Boys*.

Now it is perfectly obvious to every one but an excited journalist, that each of these three views of the situation is

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honestly and disinterestedly held by the great bulk of its supporters, and consequently that none of their opinions is in any way discreditable to the moral characters of the persons who profess it. Nor can it be said with truth that any one of them is on the face of it absurd or contrary to reason. Of course, in all political disturbances, the elements of temper and personal intrigue cannot be entirely excluded, and the present case is no exception to this universal rule. Fundamentally, however, there is no cleavage in the Unionist party upon general principles, but merely upon the particular duty of the moment. The matter is one of patriotism much more than of party. It is desirable that this should be understood, especially overseas, whither the sensational gibe is pretty certain to be cabled, while the commonplace explanation is apt to be omitted. For during the past fortnight or so we have been enduring a storm of gibes and gibberish. What has taken place may perhaps be most aptly compared to a ballet, in which the buffoons of the Unionist press and a small number of distracted politicians have divided themselves into two main bands of coryphées (*Hedgers* and *Ditchers*), who advance upon one another and retire to the strains of martial music, all the time brandishing their arms over their heads, shaking their fists, and shouting in shrill and angry tones "treachery" and such like words from the one side of the stage, and "cowardice" and epithets of a similar nature from the other. In the intervals of this stately performance, both chorus and anti-chorus turn from time to time upon the small huddled bevy of *Whipping Boys* and apply to them all the scurrilous epithets which each has endured from the other. It means very little of course, and has effected very little, except a certain loss of temper, which in England is inevitable, quite apart from political crises, when the thermometer goes above 80. With the thermometer rising upon occasions above 90 we may perhaps congratulate ourselves that nothing more regrettable has happened.

To add to the burlesque of the situation, it is now

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suspected that something like a third of the Liberal Peers are disaffected to the Bill, that they have conscientious scruples, and will not bind themselves to vote for it. Arithmeticians are therefore busily engaged on every newspaper in the United Kingdom working out sums to prove how many new peers will be needed, making due allowance for those who are sick, or abroad, or who have not taken the oath, or are minors, or who, for any other reason, cannot be counted on in the division lobby.

Meanwhile, Mr. Balfour has given notice of a vote of censure on the Government which he will move next Monday. His object apparently is to dispel the cloud of obscurity which surrounds the means employed with the King when he agreed, in November last, contrary, as it is believed, to all precedents, to grant a General Election; also to ascertain when, and upon what conditions, and under what circumstances, and by what representations, or misrepresentations, "the guarantees" to create Peers were obtained from the King. The result of this enquiry, if it proves successful, should be valuable material for the future historian.

NOTE.—On August 10 the Parliament Bill was passed by the House of Lords by 131 votes to 114—a majority of 17.

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I. CORONATION AND CONFERENCE

DURING recent weeks interest in Canada has been divided between the Coronation and the Imperial Conference. As was inevitable, the Coronation developed a significant demonstration of loyalty to the Throne and the Empire. While Canadians divide on political issues in Great Britain very much as the British people themselves divide, they unite in a common devotion to the Monarchy and the Sovereign. Possibly in Canada there is no general intellectual acceptance of the hereditary principle. Canadian Liberals are as belligerent as British Radicals in their attitude towards the House of Lords. It is by no means certain that a very different sentiment prevails amongst the mass of Canadian Conservatives. It is gravely doubtful if we should continue the institution of Monarchy if Canada were ever to separate from the mother country. It is just as doubtful if Canada could be held within the Empire if the Monarchy should ever be extinguished.

The Sovereign is the bond of Empire, the object towards which our devotion flows, the seat and centre of a common tradition and a common patriotism. With the Throne abolished and a party chief as President of a British Republic the party cleavage would run throughout the whole Empire and the Dominions become subject to the leader of a political majority in the British islands. Possibly some other system of selection could be devised and some method of consulting the colonies elaborated, but upon the central figure the benediction of the ages would not descend, while the unifying attachment to a traditional and personal head of the race, which acts with mighty power in all the wide dominions of the King, would lose much of its force and significance.

During more than half a century devotion to the Monarchy has deepened in Canada. There are men and women still living to whom the visit of King Edward to Canada sixty years ago is a cherished memory. A youth of infinite

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charm and intimate friendliness, he made an impression that never has been effaced. He enjoyed the peculiar regard of Canadians throughout all his years of service as Prince of Wales, and as King there was something singularly free and buoyant in our attachment. For Queen Victoria we had a regard which verged upon reverence, and almost spontaneously there has developed the same sober quality and firm esteem in our attitude towards King George and Queen Mary. If the feeling is less intimate than that which we entertained for King Edward it is as sincere and it will be as lasting since it is infallibly rooted in respect and confidence. Almost instinctively a natural loyalty to the Throne has strengthened into an aggressive personal fealty to the Sovereign. Of the fact, by whatever processes it has been established, there was abundant evidence during the Coronation celebrations throughout the Dominion; and whatever problems may face the Empire there is an immense reserve of strength in the firm and stable loyalty of the King's Canadian subjects.

When one comes to consider the deliberations and conclusions of the Imperial Conference it is necessary to speak with a certain reserve. Imperial questions tend to become party questions in Canada. There is a school of Canadian Imperialists who distrust the extreme teachings of Colonial autonomists. They doubt whether absolute self government for the Dominions leads towards separation or consolidation. They believe with Mr Chamberlain that greater unity of the Empire can best be secured by a system of trade preferences. They believe that commercial co-operation is of the essence of modern nationalism and that a preference for colonial products in British markets would stimulate Imperial patriotism. They feel that assimilation of the huge mass of foreign and American immigrants who are coming into the Dominion is a task of enormous magnitude and that a preferential trading relation with the mother country would create a predisposition towards an active political allegiance. They doubt both the efficiency

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and the Imperial value of an independent Canadian navy. They would have frank and open co-operation with the Admiralty and a common fleet under a common command. They believe, in short, both in a commercial union and a political freedom of the Empire, and that the silent unorganized forces which move without conscious purpose towards separation must be resisted by active and aggressive advocacy of an organic union of the Empire.

To all these the Imperial Conference was disappointing. With many of these Sir Wilfrid Laurier is under suspicion. It is true, however, as the Canadian Prime Minister contends, that the Dominion has no grievances within the Empire, that there is no movement for separation, that the deliberate and aggressive assertion of Canadian autonomy involves no positive disloyalty to the Imperial connexion. It must be remembered also that Sir Wilfrid Laurier was in a delicate and difficult position. His Government derives its chief support from the province of Quebec. It is by no means without strength in the other provinces, but with Quebec hostile it could hardly survive. There the Prime Minister is attacked by the French Nationalists as the servile agent of British Imperialists and as the author of a naval policy which sacrifices the autonomy of Canada and commits the Dominion to inevitable participation in all the wars of the Empire. Inspired by something like personal hatred of the leader of the Government, they have grossly misrepresented his naval programme and sought to destroy his ascendancy in Quebec by inflammatory appeals to the passions and prejudices of his compatriots. Only a few months ago they defeated his candidate in a Liberal stronghold and naturally they were hopeful that his course at the Imperial conference would furnish fresh grounds of attack. Assailed on the one hand by the French Nationalists and on the other by the extreme Imperialists, it was certain that Sir Wilfrid Laurier would exercise great caution at the Conference. If he has not satisfied the more active Imperialists, he has disappointed the Nationalists by his unflinching assertion of

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Canadian sovereignty in trade and defence. Nor is there reason to think that he has not expressed the sentiment of the Liberal party of Canada. For a generation colonial self-government has been exalted by Canadian statesmen of all parties and as yet there is a general conviction that in this way lies the unity and security of the Empire. Moreover, as between Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Quebec Nationalists every sincere Canadian Imperialist gives his hand to the Prime Minister.

II. MR BORDEN IN THE WEST

IN July Mr Borden, leader of the Conservative party, addressed a series of meetings in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Some of his most trusted advisers gravely doubted if the visit to the west could result in advantage to the party. It was believed that the western grain growers were generally and strongly favourable to the Trade Agreement with Washington, and it was understood that they would take advantage of every opportunity to urge their demands upon the Conservative leader. During the winter the leaders of the grain growers movement had established a lobby at Ottawa in support of reciprocity, and had prevailed upon many of the branch associations in the three western provinces to petition for parliamentary ratification of the agreement. They were, therefore, as firmly committed to reciprocity as the Government itself. The united farmers of Alberta have 303 branches and between 10,000 and 11,000 members. The grain growers association of Saskatchewan has 15,000 members and that of Manitoba 12,000 members. The two organizations embrace at least one-fourth of the agriculturists of Western Canada. Their leaders have a genius both for organization and for agitation. Free traders and collectivists they denounce protection as a system of privilege and plunder and assail "the Eastern interests" with picturesque ferocity. In no invidious sense they recall James Whitcomb Riley's favourite orator:

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“ Jap Miller down at Martinville’s the blamedest feller yit.

When he starts in a-talkin’ other folks is apt to quit:
’Pears like that mouth o’ his’n wuzn’t made fer nuthin’ else

But jes’ to argify ’em down and gather in their pelts:
He’ll talk you down on tariff; er he’ll talk you down on tax,

And prove the poor man pays ’em all—and them’s about the fac’s.”

Mr Borden first encountered the grain growers at Brandon. As at Ottawa seven or eight months ago they read lengthy and vigorous memorials in support of their various demands. These covered State construction and operation of the Hudson Bay railway, public purchase of the terminal grain elevators, government assistance for the chilled meat industry, a redistribution of constituencies in advance of a general election, ratification of the reciprocity agreement, and free trade with the United States in manufactures not largely exported by Great Britain, an immediate increase of the British preference to 50 per cent, and absolute free trade with Great Britain within a decade. The spokesmen for the grain growers declared that they were willing to be taxed directly to meet public expenditures, but that they objected to taxation for the benefit of private interests. The tariff was not only unjust and oppressive in its operations, but dangerous and insidious in its tendency to corrupt public life and to produce legislation in the interests of privilege as against the interests of the people. It had become a breeding ground for mergers, trusts, and combinations organized to destroy competition, and to fix the prices of protected commodities. Opposed to protection, they sought no preferential treatment of Canadian products in British markets. Favourable to reciprocity they condemned the course of Mr Borden and his associates in resisting ratification of the agreement with Washington.

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In the Conservative leader's answer to these demands there was nothing of evasion or equivocation. Outside of reciprocity he pledged his support to the whole platform of the grain growers. As firmly he opposed the fiscal agreement with the United States, and declared his uncompromising adhesion to a policy of moderate protection for Canada. He argued that moderate duties were necessary to ensure the safety and prosperity of Canadian industries, and to prevent the flight of Canadian workmen to American industrial centres. He would have Canadian raw material manufactured in Canadian factories, and would restrict its export to foreign countries. Only thus should we create a balanced and harmonious civilization with diversified and interlacing interests. He did not believe that we could escape the domination of trusts and mergers by interlocking the Canadian fiscal system with that of the United States. Under reciprocity the milling industry would be transferred to the neighbouring country, and Canadian grain would lose its individuality in the world's markets. Indeed, in the whole range of field production there would cease to be strictly Canadian brands and strictly Canadian products for export. He would maintain the British preference and give additional advantages to British manufactures in Canada, but as an industry in the Dominion was as valuable to the Empire as one in the mother country, he would not deliberately legislate to prejudice the position of Canadian factories. Reciprocal trade preference within the Empire would give us the advantage of trade with countries which require our products and which can offer us commodities that we do not produce, while the proposals of the Government were for reciprocal trade with a country which produces a surplus of nearly every commodity that we produce. He opposed the agreement therefore, because it would destroy the hope of reciprocal trade preferences within the Empire, because its tendency would be to disintegrate the Dominion, to separate the provinces, to check intercourse and commerce between the provinces, and between the

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east and the west, and because if carried to its logical conclusion it would lead to commercial union with the United States, and commercial union would inevitably end in political absorption.

It is admitted that Mr Borden's candour and courage impressed the deputation. But there was nothing else to be said. The Conservative party in Parliament had resolved to oppose reciprocity, and even the best strategy was a bold defence of its attitude. The grain growers would not have been deceived by trimming and vacillation. The industrial communities of the older provinces would have been alienated by an attempt to conciliate western free traders. Mr Borden deliberately made his choice between free traders and protectionists. The tradition of his party is protectionist. Freer trade is the fiscal creed of Canadian Liberalism. Since 1896, however, the Laurier Administration has had the confidence of a great body of protectionists while retaining the support of the free trade element. If reciprocity has done nothing else, it has restored the historical division between the parties and probably the very zeal of the western grain growers in support of the Government will drive many protectionists back into the Conservative party. It is true that the agreement with Washington does not materially affect duties on manufactures, but the industrial interests do not forget that the American negotiators were instructed to go the length of absolute free trade with Canada, nor do they ignore the significance of the alliance between western free traders and the Government.

At very many of Mr Borden's meetings the grain growers reiterated their demands, and towards the close of the tour there was a touch of impatience and anger in their representations. Those features of their platform to which the Conservative leader gave assent were substantially ignored. They made reciprocity the supreme consideration, and if their spokesmen express the general sentiment of the grain growers, this formidable element of the western

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population will vote as a body against the candidates of the Conservative party. How far they represent the farmers outside the organizations and to what extent party feeling will operate to the advantage of the Opposition only the actual test of an election can determine. It must be remembered, however, that a considerable percentage of the western people have no settled political affiliations in Canada, that they have no traditional or inherited loyalty to any Canadian party, that they have no clear conception of eastern conditions, and that the grain growers appeal peculiarly and powerfully to all the sectional prejudices and immediate interests of a radical, buoyant, and aggressive agrarian population. There is no evidence that the leaders of the grain growers movement have been affected by Mr Borden's arguments; there is abundant evidence that he has stimulated the spirit of western Conservatives and greatly strengthened the determination of his party to force an appeal to the country on the Trade Agreement.

Saskatchewan already has furnished evidence of the effect of Mr Borden's western meetings. In the Provincial Legislature the Conservative Opposition, under the leadership of Mr F. W. G. Haultain, gave its support to a resolution in favour of reciprocity. For years Mr Haultain was Premier of the Territories. He, more than any other man, laid the foundations and fashioned the structure of its political institutions. He has great strength and popularity throughout the province. Notwithstanding these facts, however, a Provincial Conservative Convention at Moose Jaw, attended by 200 delegates, despite his leadership and authority, has just declared unanimously against reciprocity. Substantially this is a repudiation of Mr Haultain and an endorsement of Mr Borden. It is, moreover, a challenge to the grain growers and a subordination of provincial to national considerations. There may be room for speculation as to how far strictly party influences are responsible for the action of the convention, but at

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least the fact suggests the unity and cohesion of the Conservative party throughout the whole country. It is also beyond question that Mr Borden has enormously improved his personal position. He had never before spoken with so much spirit and power, nor shown such skill, patience, and resource in handling public meetings. No sign of revolt against his leadership remains. He is as heartily accepted by Liberal opponents of reciprocity as by the masses of his own party. This, in itself materially strengthens the campaign against the trade agreement, as it enhances Mr Borden's personal power and prestige. At such centres as Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary, and Edmonton, the Conservative meetings were thoroughly successful and generally in the rural communities there was manifested an eager interest in the arguments advanced against the compact with Washington. Invariably there was a satisfactory response to any appeal to national and imperial sentiment, and to every argument for full and energetic co-operation with the mother country in trade and defence. Whatever, therefore, may be the fortune of Conservative candidates in the Western Constituencies, at least the Conservative leader has done something to unify and energize his party and has given a common language and a common platform to Conservatives in all the provinces.

III. REDISTRIBUTION AND ELECTION.

IT is understood that if the Opposition continues to resist ratification of the Reciprocity agreement the Government will appeal to the country in September or October. At the outset the Opposition may not clearly have designed to force a general election. There was some expectation that the American Senate would reject or amend the agreement, and it was resolved to prevent final action at Ottawa until there was definite acceptance or rejection at Washington. But as the argument proceeded in the press and in the constituencies, the Conservative

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politicians convinced themselves that the sound policy in the party interest was to force a general election, and it is certain that they will exhaust every means of parliamentary obstruction in order to effect their purpose. As there is no machinery of closure in Canada, the Government recognizes that it cannot command the situation and, measurably confident that the country will support the agreement, has determined upon dissolution.

It is not even certain that there will be a redistribution of constituencies before the election. Some weeks must yet elapse before the census can be completed, while after the figures are to hand a Bill must be prepared and put through its various stages. Only a Bill entirely acceptable to the Opposition could make rapid progress. Any measure of the nature of a jerrymander would simply give the Opposition an additional ground of obstruction. If, therefore, redistribution is to be accomplished, the Opposition must be consulted on every detail of the measure, and it must be of such a character as to command practically the unanimous support of Parliament. There is reason to think the Government is doubtful if such a Bill can be produced, and will lay upon the Opposition the onus of blocking any readjustment of the representation.

It is significant that ministerial candidates have been nominated in various divisions that are likely to be abolished, and that the preparations of both parties for the contest rest upon the existing electoral adjustment. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Opposition would lose heavily or the Government gain materially by redistribution. Undoubtedly the West is entitled to greater representation. Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and the Yukon now have thirty-five members in the House of Commons, eighteen of whom are ministerialists and seventeen Conservatives. It is estimated that an equitable readjustment would give the west fifty-five or sixty members, and no doubt a substantial majority of the new member would be assigned to Saskatchewan and Alberta. On the

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other hand, Winnipeg with 200,000 population and only one representative could fairly claim two or three members, the representation of Vancouver would require to be doubled, and Calgary and Edmonton even if joined to rural municipalities, would have the mass of the voters in their respective divisions. Thus, even in the west the whole advantage would not go to the rural population, while in the east, Montreal and Toronto could not be denied additional representatives, Port Arthur and Port William would control a northern division, and the growth of settlement in the mining country would have to be considered. It is also certain that the operation of the Quebec unit will affect the rural representation of Ontario and the Atlantic provinces, and therefore assuming that the rural communities are favourable to reciprocity and the towns and cities less favourable, any fair redistribution will not materially affect the relative strength of the parties. Possibly the balance of advantage would lie with the Government, but by no means so decisively as has been contended.

Ten years ago the census gave a total population of 5,371,315. It is assumed that the population is now between 7,500,000 and 8,000,000. Apart from the natural increase we have received nearly 2,000,000 immigrants during the ten year period. In Quebec there is both a higher birth rate and a more stay-at-home population. From the French province there has been an inconsiderable migration, while the older counties of Ontario and the Atlantic provinces have been drained to fill up the western country. Under the British North America Act Quebec has a stationary representation of sixty-five members in the House of Commons, and the unit for Quebec determines the representation of all the other provinces. Under the census of 1901 the unit for Quebec was 25,000. It is believed that it will now rise to 30,000. Thus the growth of population in Quebec, combined with the growth of cities, means a relative decline in the political strength of the counties in the old provinces and a

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proportionate loss of representation in Parliament. The voting strength of the French population is by no means confined to Quebec. It is estimated that 86 out of the 221 seats in Parliament are practically controlled by the French element. To-day there is a French majority in every county of Quebec. There are 225,000 French Canadians in Ontario, and they are signally influential in fifteen counties. There are 50,000 French in Nova Scotia, 90,000 in New Brunswick, 15,000 in Prince Edward Island and 50,000 in the Western provinces. The old *Rouges* saw "the tomb of the French race and the ruin of Lower Canada" in the terms of Confederation, but more than forty years have brought no serious relative decline of French influence nor any sign of a cohesive English majority.

IV. CANADA AND FOREIGN POLICY

IT is doubtful if Canada has ever had any conscious sense of responsibility for the security of the Empire. Down to Confederation British regiments were stationed in the country. It was only a year or so ago that we assumed the burden of garrisoning Halifax and Esquimalt. Even Sir John Macdonald and Sir Charles Tupper contended that in building railways, making canals and settling the western provinces we discharged our obligation to the mother country. Sir Wilfrid Laurier has been reluctant to create a navy or to contribute towards sea defence, and it was a sudden and resistless movement of popular feeling which forced the Government to send contingents to South Africa. The demand came from the people, and not from the authorities, and probably a Conservative Government would have behaved exactly as the Laurier Administration did under the circumstances. We have gone on the assumption that we have no foreign relations and therefore no direct interest in the foreign policy of the Empire. We have assumed that Canada could be menaced only from Washington, and there has been a common impression that Great Britain would not

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quarrel with the United States on our account. For more than half a century Canadian exports have had a safe pathway across the seas. This security we have ascribed to the beneficence of Providence or to the world's unconcern in the commercial and political relations of the Dominion. To Great Britain we have felt no acute sense of gratitude or obligation, and we have hardly regarded the British navy as the guarantee of our commercial and national safety. Unconsciously, perhaps, we have assumed that we were outside the zone of international conflict and immune from the dangers which threaten other nations.

As yet we see only dimly that we have relations on the Pacific and that the destruction of the Imperial fleet might imperil our existence as a British community or throw us upon the mercy of Washington. In British Columbia alone is there any such sense of isolation as influences South Africa and the Australian Commonwealth. There is no doubt that feeling on the Pacific coast runs strongly against Asiatic immigration. During the last few years hostility to the Japanese has deepened. It now extends far beyond the ranks of organized labour. There are those who fear that British Columbia is destined to become an industrial province of Japan. Feeling against the Chinese has moderated as they become better understood and as the absolute need of an outside supply of domestic servants has been more clearly recognized. The Governments, however, dare not permit the importation of Asiatics for the work of construction on the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, and unquestionably the regulated admission of Japanese under the voluntary agreement with Japan has adversely affected the Laurier Administration in British Columbia. Even with the limited importation now permitted Asiatics are spreading from the coast across the mountains into Alberta. Ten years hence what is now mainly a coast question may become a western question. In proportion as the issue grows in magnitude the Dominion will recognize its responsibilities on the Pacific and its dependence upon the defensive forces of the Empire. Generally

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there is approval of the revised treaty of alliance with Japan. Probably, however, the provision that is most highly regarded is that which anticipates a treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States, and in that event permits the mother country to maintain neutrality in case of war between Japan and the Republic. In some degree the whole movement for arbitration strengthens the indisposition of Canadians to provide for sea defence and confirms the sense of security in which we have rested for two generations.

In the impending electoral contest the naval programme will not be a serious issue outside of Quebec. Even there the question has been less influential since the Trade agreement with Washington was negotiated. In the English provinces there is vigorous assertion of our duty to assist the Empire in any time of crisis. There has been much angry criticism of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's apparent hesitation to agree to intimate consultation with the British Government on details of foreign policy lest the fact should involve us in wars in which we had no immediate interest. But we approach an election, and it is perhaps difficult to distinguish between sober conviction and partisan denunciation. What is certain is that the Canadian people have not yet fully determined their attitude towards Imperial defence nor fully convinced themselves that equal participation in the advantages of the Imperial partnership involves an equal assumption of obligations and responsibilities. Ultimately it will be by shock rather than by argument that the country will realize its true position. To a greater degree than they are willing to admit Canadians depend upon the Monroe doctrine. Is it conceivable that if the doctrine had never been promulgated or if the British navy were not available for our defence that we would trust to the gods to protect our sea-going trade and to maintain our national independence? No one believes that the United States designs to attack Canada, but what is there in the history of the Republic or in that of human institutions to support the

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notion that we can be defended by a foreign power and lose nothing in money, in integrity or in dignity? A nation exists because it has power to exist, but who believes that Canada has such power outside the British Empire? What effective remonstrance could we address to China or Japan? How perilously our trade would go, upon the seas! How feebly we would negotiate with any foreign nation! It is vital that the true situation should be revealed and emphasized, alike in the interests of Canada and of the Empire. Until we understand we shall enter the Imperial councils with less authority than we should command, and the whole movement towards the complete unity and consolidation of the Empire will be impeded, not so much by the deliberate design as by the imperfect comprehension and the prudent detachment of the Canadian people.

Canada, July, 1911

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AUSTRALIA AND THE EMPIRE

THE student alike of Federal and Imperial questions, will find plenty to interest him in the happenings in Australia during the last few months. But in view of the meeting of the Imperial Conference, before reviewing recent events in Australia, it may, perhaps, be of interest briefly to supplement certain remarks made by the writer of the article "The Australian Position" in a recent number of THE ROUND TABLE,* concerning the present general attitude of the Australian people towards Imperial affairs. It must at once be admitted that a great change has come over public opinion during the last few years. There are many people in Queensland, for instance, who have a vivid recollection of the bitter criticism levelled against the then Premier of that State, Sir Samuel Griffith (now Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia), for his share in bringing about, some twenty years ago, what was contemptuously styled the "Naval Tribute"; an arrangement by which the six Australian colonies, as they then were, agreed to pay a total annual subsidy of £126,000 to the Home Government, in return for the maintenance in these waters of an additional special Australian squadron, consisting of five third-class cruisers and two torpedo gun-boats. Queensland's share in this "tribute," on a population basis, was about £12,000. Those were the days when "Imperialist" was synonymous with "Jingo" as a term of reproach, and a writer or speaker could count upon a sympathetic audience when he declared that "Australia was being dragged into European complications to serve England's own greedy and selfish ends"—"European" complications, since the "portent of the East" had hardly yet appeared above the horizon. It was even hinted that the real reason for the presence of the English warships on our coasts was that they

* R.T., Feb., pp. 191-3.

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might overawe the people of Australia, should they show any signs of resenting the mother country's insolent overlordship. But now, England's quarrels, England's interests, are ours also, and Queensland, which once grudged the payment of a few thousands of pounds a year to the British Admiralty for its protection, is proud, in common with all the other States, to form part of a Commonwealth which cheerfully faces an expenditure of millions in order to furnish its quota of a great Imperial fleet, and even considers this as only the first instalment of its task. No doubt the people of Australia look upon their ships as primarily designed to protect their own coasts, but the leaders of all political parties in the Commonwealth have made it clear that in case of need they will be available for the defence of the Empire as a whole, wherever their services may be required.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to give a categorical list of all the reasons for this remarkable change of sentiment. Some perhaps, are apparent enough, others lie below the surface, and are not so easily measured or understood. No doubt the South African War (at the close of last century) exercised a powerful influence in this direction. English regular and Australian volunteer fought side by side against a common enemy, and each bore himself as befitted his country and his race. The effect was increased by the fact that even if the Boers had been victorious they could never have invaded either Great Britain or Australia. The attack ostensibly was upon the colonists of the sub-continent, but in reality upon the prestige of the Empire at large, and it was to uphold this that both British and Australian rallied. Another potent factor may be found in the rapid rise during the last few years, of two military and naval powers, Germany and Japan, the one apparently challenging the mother country's supremacy on the sea, and forcing her to concentrate a large proportion of her defensive strength in her own waters; the other a possible menace to white civilization throughout the whole Eastern world. Australia,

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virtually an outpost, peopled by a mere handful of Europeans, facing the teeming millions of a newly awakened Asia, cannot close her eyes to the grave peril of isolation, and the absolute need of union with her fellow Europeans of her own race, who will aid her to hold her own.

Of less importance, yet by no means without their influence, have been the, perhaps, rather artificial methods which have been largely resorted to of late for the purpose of fostering a spirit of unity and mutual interest between the different parts of the Empire. The various "Imperial" Leagues, the correspondence societies, the regular salute to the Union Jack practised in many schools; the interchange of flags and courtesies between schools in Australia and Great Britain; the circulation of standard English authors among the younger generation of Australians by means of state aided school libraries; the patriotic numbers of the "school papers" issued for Empire Day by the Education Departments of all the states—all these have played their part, if only a small one, in moulding public opinion as it is in Australia to-day.

But even after allowing for all this, it must in honesty be confessed that speaking generally, the average citizen of the Commonwealth troubles himself very little about Imperial affairs at all. Not infrequently, it is true, with a mental attitude, or perhaps merely a trick of speech derived from an older generation, he speaks of England as "Home," although he himself may never have set foot on its shores. But as a rule the mother country is, after all, a far land, even a foreign land, to the majority at least of the native-born, while Australia is the real "Home," where their work and their interests lie. As for the other Dominions, for the most part they attract little attention, and in some instances only as possible rivals for the trade of the United Kingdom or for the emigrants who year by year leave it to seek new homes across the sea. The Empire is there, certainly, and we are proud of it, loyal to it, in a very real if vague fashion. But, except in the time of some stern crisis, or when some great

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world event, such as the death of the late King Edward, catches at the nation's heart-strings, it is too distant, too formless, to excite any very strong enthusiasm in our minds. What we know as "Imperial Federation," the ideal of a concrete political union between the mother country and the scattered Dominions, may occasionally furnish matter for discussion, more or less academic, in the columns of newspapers and magazines; but these excite, as a rule, only a passing interest, and neither reflect nor influence, to any appreciable extent, the general trend of public thought. The question is not considered as within the present range of practical politics. And not only so, but in so far as it is believed to involve the creation of a central Executive, probably located in London, and charged with the control of the general affairs of Homeland and Dominions alike, it is, perhaps, not too much to say that any small amount of opinion that may exist upon the subject is distinctly inimical to the idea. Australians are very strong Home Rulers—that is, so far as Australia is concerned—and they are apt to look with suspicion upon any proposal which may seem to carry with it any curtailment of their power to govern themselves, or any check, however insignificant, upon the free exercise of the legislative or administrative functions of either Commonwealth or States. But this statement must not be mis-understood. It is not meant to assert that there is in this country no regard for the Empire, no Imperialism, in the true sense of the words. Australian loyalty, as already pointed out, if vague and unformed, is yet very real; we are proud of our Empire, and of our citizenship therein; of the glories, the traditions and the memories in which we, in common with all Britons, have our part.

THE REFERENDA

TURNING now to recent events in the Commonwealth, referred to at the beginning of this article, the first to claim attention is the referendum taken on April 26

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last, upon the Government proposal to make certain amendments in the Constitution Act of 1900—the statute which declares and regulates the political relations between the Federal authority and the States. It may be as well to remind the reader that by the provisions of this Act, any desired alteration in the Constitution, after passing both Houses of the Federal Parliament in the usual way, must be submitted to a referendum, the vote of the whole body of the electors, and to become law, must be approved both by a majority of actual voters and in a majority of the six States.

The questions involved on the present occasion have already been dealt with in a previous article; it is, therefore, unnecessary to do more than repeat that the object of the proposed amendments was to confer largely extended powers upon the central (Federal) Administration with regard to matters relating to trade, commerce, industry—especially industrial disputes—corporations, and monopolies. A special provision was inserted to the effect that the power to control industrial matters should extend to the regulation of wages and conditions upon the railways of the different States—a claim which aroused considerable resentment. (It should be noted that nearly all the railways in Australia have been built and are worked by the State Governments; the Commonwealth itself does not at present own a single mile.) The new powers sought were not necessarily to be acquired at the expense of the States; but the effect, in a large number of instances, would have been to set up a dual jurisdiction; and since it has been clearly laid down that should the two jurisdictions chance to clash, that of the Commonwealth must always prevail, it seemed fairly certain that the rights and powers of the State administrations ran a decided risk of finding themselves, before long, very considerably abridged, should the amendments be approved.

At the beginning of the campaign it was declared by leading men on both sides that it was not desired that the contest should be a party one, but that the voting should

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be upon the merits of the proposals themselves, irrespective of any form of political allegiance. As the fight waxed hot, however, this highly desirable state of affairs was found to be impracticable, and before long the Commonwealth found itself divided upon what were virtually the old party lines, Labour on the one side, Liberals on the other.* But a marked exception to this rule was found in the attitude taken up by a large section of Labour supporters in New South Wales, where that party at present holds the reins of state government. It should be understood that the working policy of the Labour party in Australia is formulated, not by the Parliamentary leaders, but by a conference of delegates from the various political organizations, which meets at intervals in one or other of the principal cities of the Commonwealth. This Conference, by a majority vote, lays down a "platform," consisting of a number of legislative propositions, or "planks," to each one of which every member of the party must give his adherence, whether he approve of it or not. His only alternative is to resign his membership. With regard to matters upon which the conference has given no directions, it is generally understood that each member is at liberty to act as he may think fit. A large number of New South Wales Labour men, headed by several state ministers, pointed out that the questions to be decided by the referendum were altogether outside the official party platform, and announced their intention of opposing the Federal Government's proposals. This naturally was a serious blow to the Federal party leaders, who thereupon committed the tactical blunder of attempting to silence the malcontents by peremptory orders and threats of future punishment should they persist

* To avoid misunderstanding, it should be pointed out that the term "Liberal" is frequently used in Australia to denote the whole body of those opposed to the Labour, or Socialist policy; and includes not only persons to whom the name would be given in England, but also many who in that country would be called Conservatives, or even Tories. Compare the names "Republican" and "Democrat," as applied to the great political parties of the United States.

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in their opposition. This action met with very doubtful success; a few of the threatened persons, including Mr Holman, the acting Premier, influenced no doubt by a feeling of loyalty to the party interests as a whole, subsided into a state of quiescence, perhaps more damaging, in the circumstances, than the most voluble activity; others, however, boldly defied the attempted dictation, and continued their part in the campaign. The overwhelming majority—over a hundred thousand, out of a total of between 370,000 and 380,000—recorded in New South Wales against the proposals, would seem to indicate that the adverse feeling aroused in that state by this injudicious action on the part of the Federal Labour leaders far outweighed any possible advantage that might have been gained by the muzzling of a few dangerous critics. A rather unpleasant aftermath of this incident is the announcement, seemingly official, that the labour organizations will shortly consider the advisability of taking steps to punish the recalcitrant members of the party, for voting against the Government. It is to be hoped, when the angry feelings engendered by defeat have in some measure subsided, that wiser and calmer counsels will prevail.

As might have been expected, a great deal of bitterness was imported into the contest, and at times some very exaggerated language was used on both sides. Apart from these defects—inevitable in the circumstances—the campaign was conducted with no small amount of ability, some of the speeches, both for and against the proposals, reaching a distinctly high level. The main argument put forward by Mr Hughes, the Acting Prime Minister of the Commonwealth—upon whose shoulders, in the absence of Mr Fisher, who had left to attend the Coronation ceremonies, fell a large share of the burden of the fight—was that as a result of the interpretation placed by the High Court upon certain clauses of the Constitution, the Federal Parliament found itself unable to enact legislation embodying the distinct will of the people, as expressed at the last general elec-

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tion. It was absolutely necessary, he urged, that these clauses should be amended to allow Parliament to exercise the very powers with which it had been endowed by the Constitution itself. "As a matter of fact," Mr Hughes said in effect, "if the clauses remain as they are, we are practically at an *impasse*. We find it impossible to do the very things which the vote of the people eleven years ago affirmed it to be necessary and right that we should do." On the other hand, Mr Deakin, the Leader of the Opposition, declared that while it was admitted that some changes were required, yet all the powers necessary to enable the Federal Parliament to exercise all its functions to their fullest extent could readily be obtained, without having recourse to the drastic measures proposed by the Administration. He called attention to the fact that during the debate upon the subject in the House of Representatives he had indicated a practical method of dealing with the alleged difficulties, and had offered, on behalf of his party, to co-operate with the Government in passing legislation to that end, but the offer had been refused. Mr Fisher and his friends would have all or nothing. A strong appeal was made by the Government to the growing national spirit in the Commonwealth. "These powers," it was urged—and in many instances, at least, in all sincerity—"are absolutely essential to our stability and progress as a people. Without them, a really united Australia is impossible. Therefore, those who vote against them are mere provincialists, they are not true Federalists, not true Australians." The contrary view—and one which found wide acceptance—was well put by the Leader of the Liberal party in the Senate, in a speech delivered in Brisbane on April 12. "The broad principle," Senator Millen said, "which runs through the whole of the Constitution, a principle which has never been questioned, is the right of each state to manage its own domestic affairs. The Constitution has done more than call into existence a Central National Government—it has reassured to each state its own individuality and rights." And

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it certainly is worthy of grave consideration whether the attempt to place upon the central administration such a multiplicity of duties as would seem to be foreshadowed in the proposals, would not rather tend to weaken the national strength, by disturbing, if not actually overturning, that just balance of powers and rights upon which a true Federation must always depend.

A writer in a recent number of *THE ROUND TABLE* has expended a good deal of ingenuity in an endeavour to cast ridicule upon the use by Liberal speakers and writers of the word "unification." "It is employed," he says, "by a large class of comfortable persons as . . . an abracadabra to exorcise the spirit of Federalism," or—a feat infinitely more astounding than even that of the immortal Mrs. Partington—"as a five-pronged fork to push back the advancing Federal wave." Let it be conceded at once that what he calls the "blessed word" was rather too much in evidence during the campaign. Since it would be difficult to imagine a vigorous political contest without some particular shibboleth being used and re-used *ad nauseum*, the fact ought not to excite very much comment. The Liberals were certainly not alone in the fault, if fault it be. "To be swayed by a word," we are told, "even by one of five syllables, is ignominious." Well, even a word of one syllable can embody a very large idea, and, after all, it should hardly be necessary to point out that it is the idea, and not the mere collocation of letters, which dominates the minds of both speakers and hearers. Two men on opposite sides, Mr Hughes and Mr W. H. Irvine, M.H.R., have both declared that, so far as they are able to judge, the proposed amendments do not make for unification. But, as against this opinion, several of their strongest advocates have openly welcomed them as a decided step in that direction; and others make no secret of their desire to see a single Parliament controlling the whole business of the continent. The absurdity of maintaining, as now, no less than seven distinct legislatures to manage the affairs of less

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than five millions of people is a string that has been pretty constantly harped upon during the last few months. And one stalwart Labour supporter boldly assured the electors of a Western Queensland constituency that if the Referenda proposals were carried, he, as their Federal member, would do for them the work then performed by their state representative. Considering these and similar pronouncements, and reflecting on the general circumstances surrounding the measures themselves and the manner in which they were brought before the country, there should not be much occasion for surprise if, as the event showed, a majority of the electors decided to take no risks in this direction.

It is now an old story that the appeal to the people on April 26 resulted in the overwhelming defeat of the Government proposal in five out of the six states, West Australia alone recording an affirmative vote.* The adverse majority reached a total of a little over a quarter of a million, on a poll of about 1,200,000 electors. Even the most sanguine opponent of the amendments could hardly have anticipated so sweeping a victory. It would be impossible, perhaps, at all events for the present, to arrive at a thoroughly sound comprehension of all the causes underlying this complete and unexpected rout of the Labour forces; still, a few of these may be briefly discussed. Two have been already referred to, the antagonistic feeling aroused by the injudicious attempt to close the mouths of certain dissentient members of the Labour party in New South Wales; and the apprehension that the powers sought by the amendments were merely the first step towards the complete control of all the affairs of the Commonwealth by the central authority alone. A leading King's Counsel, Mr Mitchell, of Victoria, gave it as his opinion, as a constitutional

* The final returns of the voting on the Referenda are as follow:—

(Number of electors on roll, 2,342,380.)

Extended Legislative Powers:	Yes	462,412
	No	714,770
Power to nationalize Monopolies:	Yes	464,763
	No	707,017

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lawyer, that the effect of an affirmative vote would be to confer upon the Federal Administration the right to regulate every detail of every business, large or small, from one end of Australia to the other. The states of Queensland and Victoria, even now, have good reason to remember the disadvantages under which they laboured in the old days before separation from New South Wales, and the hopeless ineptitude of the central government at Sydney in dealing with the more distant territories. A very strong case indeed would require to be made out before the people of those states would consent to risk the possibility of a return to a similar condition of things with regard to their domestic affairs. "Home Rule" was a popular catch-word throughout the campaign.

It must be frankly admitted that there exists, and always has existed, a not inconsiderable section of the community to whom the name "Provincial" may quite fairly be applied; who are so much concerned with their own states that they cannot look outside them, or think in terms of Australia as a whole. There are also many who have always been hostile to the Union, and who look back with regret to the pre-Commonwealth days of independent states. And these have been reinforced by a number of persons who were originally Federalists, but who are now, for one reason or another, dissatisfied with the working of the Constitution to date, and are inclined to believe that the decision of eleven years ago was a mistake. And we must add, too, that large body of citizens which is always opposed to change of any sort. The votes of all these, no doubt, went to swell the total of the "Noes." But perhaps the most potent factor of all in bringing about the defeat of the Government was the widespread feeling that the real questions at issue were not so much political as economic, that the struggle lay, not so much between State rights and Commonwealth rights, as between capital and labour, between employer and employed. Among those who advocated the proposed changes, there were doubtless many in

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whose minds mere party consideration had little or no place, and who were genuinely convinced that the new laws, if carried, would make for a higher ideal of citizenship throughout Australia. But there was also evidence—and evidence derived from the writings and speeches of prominent Labour advocates themselves—which left very little room for doubt that a very strong, if not indeed the principal motive animating the Federal Administration—or rather the Labour party as a whole—was not an aspiration towards a larger and fuller nationhood, but the desire to secure an advantage in the warfare of class against class. New powers were sought, indeed, for the national government, but they were sought because it was hoped that by their means organized Labour would be enabled to strike a staggering blow at those whom its crude economic creed teaches to be its enemies, and to advance a long way on the road towards the Socialistic utopia which is its ultimate goal.

However, be the reasons what they may, the proposals have been defeated, and with a decisiveness which leaves very little doubt as to the opinion of the people of the Commonwealth upon the subject. Mr Hughes, indeed, has intimated—and the intimation has been endorsed by a cable from the Prime Minister, Mr Fisher, who is now in England—that the questions will be submitted to another referendum at the next general election. But much water will flow under the bridges before then, and it is probable that long before the time arrives, Mr Hughes and his friends will have considered the wisdom, or otherwise, of provoking a second battle over the ground upon which they have just experienced so disastrous a defeat.

THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY

REFERENCE has already been made to the arrival in Australia of the two destroyers “Yarra” and “Parramatta”; these vessels are at present engaged in a sort of triumphal progress along the eastern coast, their reception at

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every port leaving little room for doubt as to the temper of the people of Australia towards the question of national and Imperial defence. But a more significant incident in the brief naval history of the Commonwealth is the launch from a Sydney dockyard on April 4 last, of the destroyer "Warrego," the first ship of war ever built in Australia. The occasion was naturally made one of considerable jubilation, as marking a very distinct advance in the national life, and demonstrating to the world that Australia is preparing herself to be able to furnish, within her own borders, not only the men, but the material for her defence, both by land and by sea.

These three ships, as already stated, are the first of the unit which Australia has undertaken to supply towards the creation of a great Imperial fleet. This unit when complete will comprise one armoured cruiser, three protected cruisers, six destroyers, and three submarines, costing in all about £3,500,000. The annual expenditure for their upkeep is set down at £516,000. Under the original agreement, a certain proportion of the yearly cost was to have been borne by the Imperial authorities, but at the express desire of the Commonwealth Government, this provision has been withdrawn, and the whole burden now falls upon Australia alone.

In an earlier part of this article the statement was made that the Australian people consider the provision of the fleet-unit just described as merely a beginning. Much more they think might and should be done towards the sea-defence of this part of the Empire. Accordingly, a distinguished naval authority, Admiral Henderson, was requested by the Federal Government to furnish a report upon the most practicable method of establishing and maintaining, in Australian waters, a small but efficient fleet, capable of guarding our shores against any ordinary force likely to be brought against us; and which, considering our population and circumstances, would bear favourable comparison with those of other countries. Admiral Henderson accepted the

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task, and his report was made available early in March, 1911. It recommends the construction, during the next twenty-two years, of a fleet, including the unit already authorized, of fifty-two vessels; comprizing eight armoured cruisers, ten protected cruisers, eighteen destroyers, twelve submarines, three depot ships, and one fleet repair ship. This force is to be in two divisions, the Eastern and the Western, the former having its base at Sydney, and the latter at Fremantle (W.A.). Sub-bases are to be established at Thursday Island (Q.) and Port Darwin (North Territory). The chief destroyer bases are to be Brisbane (Q.), Western Port (Vic.) and Fremantle, with sub-bases at Townsville (Q.), Thursday Island, Port Darwin, Albany (W.A.) and Cone Bay (W.A.), while extra bases are also provided for the submarines. The cost of the completed fleet, which will have a *personnel* of about 15,000 officers and men, is estimated at £23,290,000, including the replacing of vessels which may have become obsolete during the twenty-two years over which the construction is spread. The annual expenditure, which as already pointed out, stands at about £516,000 for the authorized unit, is expected to increase by about £85,000 each year until in 1933, when all the proposed vessels will be in commission, it will reach a total of £2,225,000. The scheme also provides for the appointment of a competent Naval Board, to advise the Government and to control the general details of the management of the fleet.

There has been no opportunity as yet of placing Admiral Henderson's report before Parliament. On the whole, the recommendations have been favourably received, although the large amounts of money involved will naturally give occasion for some very hard thinking on the part of those on whose shoulders will fall the burden of finding them. The scheme as it stands will probably undergo some modifications, but, taking into account the strong patriotic sentiment that has been aroused by the idea of possessing a fleet that may be called really Australian, and not merely a part of the Imperial navy, together with the existing

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uneasy apprehensions as to the attitude of Japan when the present alliance with Great Britain shall come to an end, it is perhaps fairly safe to predict that it will be adopted in most, if not in all, of its essential features, before many months have passed.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

TURNING now from sea to land defences, we have made what is practically the first attempt within the British dominions, to combine the duty of defence with its privileges of citizenship, by the establishment of a system of compulsory military service. The details of Lord Kitchener's scheme for the effective organizations of the Commonwealth military forces are now well known. To provide for such organization, the Federal Parliament has adopted the principle of the compulsory military training of all boys and men between the ages of twelve and twenty-five years, not physically or mentally incapacitated, who have lived in this country for six months and upwards. In practice, this idea has had to be modified to some extent, since, owing to the great distances between the scattered hamlets and dwellings, it has been found impossible to establish training area over the larger portion of the thinly peopled Western districts, and these must therefore be left out of reckoning, for the present at all events. Taking the scheme in detail, boys between the ages of twelve and fourteen years—junior cadets as they are called—will be engaged in physical culture, drill, gymnastics, walking, running, swimming, and other exercises designed to ensure as far as possible the possession of sound health and vigorous bodies by the time they enter upon their real life as senior cadets. "First aid," and where practicable, miniature rifle shooting will also be taught. The second stage, beginning at fourteen, lasts for four years, during which the cadet is thoroughly drilled in all the first essentials of military duty, so that when he reaches eighteen years of age, it is as no mere raw recruit that he passes into

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the ranks of the citizen forces. He will have been trained, and disciplined, he will know the use of his arms, will be able to march, to shoot, to manœuvre; above all, he will have learnt the meaning of order, obedience, and duty. The real term of service is seven years, making with the junior or preliminary stage, thirteen years of training in all. It should be remembered, however, that at no time during this period will either cadet or soldier necessarily be withdrawn from his ordinary civil avocations. Every one must undergo a certain amount of training, put in so many days under actual military conditions, but for the rest of the time schoolboys will remain at school, workers in the shop, office, factory, or field. The development of the country, the progress of its industries, will go on unchecked, and there will be no danger either of the growth of a military caste, or of the evils which, if report speak true, too often find place in the barrack-life of some of the European armies of to-day.

As yet the arrangements of the Federal military authorities are incomplete, and only one part of the defence scheme, that relating to the senior cadets, has up to the present been put into force. As already stated, something like 150,000 lads, between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, have now been enrolled throughout the states, and it is exceedingly gratifying to learn that only a very small percentage has been found physically or mentally unfit. Indeed, the generally fine physique of the youngsters has evoked most favourable comment from the examining officers. Some little difficulty, naturally, is being experienced in making a start, but the boys will soon settle down to their work. And, altogether apart from actual military considerations, the training upon which they are now entering cannot but be of the highest value from every point of view, to their country no less than to themselves.

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RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT

MENTION has been made of the state railway systems in connexion with matters of defence. Australia now possesses the greatest railway mileage per head in the world, of which at least ninety per cent is under state ownership and control. Unfortunately, each state initiated its own system, in pre-Federation days, entirely with a view to its own needs, and with little or no regard to what was being done in any of the others. The result is that there are now three different gauges in use; for example, a person travelling, say, from Brisbane to Melbourne—about 1,300 miles—will have to change trains on the New South Wales, and again on the Victorian border, instead of being able to run right through. Inconvenient enough for all ordinary occasions, this state of affairs might very well prove positively disastrous in time of war, when everything might hang upon the facilities for the rapid transport of troops and material from one point to another. In view of this disability, at a recent meeting of the state railway managers, or commissioners, as they are officially styled—who, it should be noted, are members of the War Railway Council—it was resolved to recommend that a uniform gauge be adopted as soon as possible, for the lines connecting the four Eastern capitals—a distance, in all, of about 1,800 miles. The gauge preferred is that now in use in New South Wales, namely, 4 feet 8½ inches, the standard of most of the great railways of Europe and America. This gauge has also been decided upon for the new line to be constructed to join West Australia with the Eastern states. The cost of making the necessary alterations is to be divided between the Commonwealth and the states. This proposal, as stated, only relates to a small portion of the existing lines, but once the beginning is made, it is highly probable that the principle will soon be extended to at least all the main trunk routes throughout the continent. Military considerations have had the greatest share in dictating the suggestion, but

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if carried out the change will enormously benefit trade and commerce as well. For which reason, it is not likely to be much longer delayed.

A great scheme of railway extension, involving the expenditure of millions of pounds and the opening up of thousands of square miles of rich pastoral and agricultural country—the greatest, indeed, ever put forward by any Australian government—has recently been sanctioned by the state Parliament of Queensland.

As penny postage only came into force on the first of the present month, nothing can be said as yet as to its probable results. The Post Office authorities anticipate that for the present, at all events, there will be a considerable loss in revenue. How far this will be obviated by increased correspondence remains to be seen. The probable loss, however, will be faced with equanimity, as there is a general feeling that a step has been taken in the right direction.

A new university, too, has just been established at Brisbane, on a basis which bids fair to make it a powerful intellectual and ethical force in the state in the near future.

These, then, are some of the most important events which have engaged the interest of the people of Australia during the last few months. All these things make for progress and for vigorous national life. It only remains to add that the whole continent continues to enjoy a wide-spread prosperity, perhaps unequalled in any part of its previous history. With every prospect of a good season for the coming year, with the tide of immigration now setting strongly towards her shores, with the construction of hundreds of miles of new railways, and the opening up of millions of fertile acres to the settler, with every form of trade and industry rapidly extending on every hand, the outlook for the Commonwealth of Australia in 1911 is indeed bright, and the spirit of hope and confidence which pervades all classes of the community seems likely to be justified to its fullest extent.

Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, May 12, 1911.

SOUTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS

I. THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

IT cannot be said that the public of South Africa has taken more than a languid interest in the proceedings of the Imperial Conference. Their apathy is partly accounted for by the absence of any effective discussion either in Parliament or on the platform of the principal subjects debated at the Conference, and it may perhaps be excused on the ground that they are still preoccupied with the novelty of their own situation, as citizens no longer of four separate colonies but of a single Dominion, and with the domestic problems which this great constitutional change has brought to the front and presented in a new light.

The Conference has, however, received a good deal of attention from the Press, and in some of the English papers there has been a tendency to condemn it as a failure and to pooh-pooh the optimistic view of the results attained which has been expressed by Mr Asquith and the Dominion Prime Ministers. These papers are, perhaps, inclined to exaggerate the disappointment with which the negative decisions of the Conference on some of the larger proposals submitted have been received. Few people in South Africa ever expected, for instance, that this Conference would accept any concrete proposal for constitutional change, such as that put forward by Sir Joseph Ward for the establishment of an Imperial Council as a permanent body. The majority of those who have given any thought to the subject are disposed to admit that a fuller realization on the part of the peoples, both of the United Kingdom and of the Dominions, of the necessity of united action in such matters as defence and foreign policy must precede the creation of new constitutional machinery.

It is generally recognised that on the side of positive results the great achievement of the Conference has been to put the Dominions into a new relation with the mother country in as far as the conduct of foreign affairs is

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concerned. The admission of the Oversea Ministers to the deliberations of the Imperial Defence Committee is the incident which has most impressed the popular imagination. It is probably the one fact in connexion with the Conference which will sink deep into the mind of the man in the street, and the man on the farm. The *Volkstem*, which is the leading Government organ in the Transvaal (written entirely in Dutch and circulating mainly in the country districts) laid great stress on this meeting, and bade its readers look forward to receiving from General Botha on his return an account of how South Africa is affected by the situation as there expounded. General Botha has already told the people of South Africa, through a message given to a Press representative, what is the general impression which the meeting left on his mind. He said just after the first meeting of the Imperial Defence Committee at which he was present:

“ I am profoundly impressed with the confidence shown by the Imperial Government in freely laying before us the problems of foreign policy as they may affect the Dominions. This of itself is a most important step in the growth of Imperial relations and is in reality the beginning of a new era in the history of the Empire. For the first time we now realize in a way we could not before the questions which occupy the attentions of the Home Government, and in what way and to what extent they influence the outlying parts of the Empire.”

The resolution subsequently passed by the Conference, which establishes the principle that the Dominions are in future to be consulted during the preparatory as well as the final stage of negotiations leading to international agreements, confirms the belief that General Botha did not overestimate the importance of the precedent created by the Imperial Government's action in confiding to the Oversea Ministers the problems of the Empire's foreign policy, and that in Mr Fisher's words this action is “ a step which once taken cannot be retraced.” Mr Fisher's further resolution

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affirming the desirability of an exchange of visits between the Ministers of the United Kingdom and of the Dominions suggests a machinery by which the closeness of touch between the different governments on questions affecting the external relations of the Empire may be maintained. We can hardly expect the British Foreign Secretary to visit South Africa for the purpose of explaining the international situation to the Union Cabinet, but there seems no reason why the South African Minister to whom the care of the Union's external affairs is committed should not pay periodical visits to London in order to confer with the Foreign Office.

The fact that the Union Ministry will henceforth be entitled to be consulted throughout the course of international negotiations which may affect South Africa, and will therefore be responsible for formulating the views of South Africa on such negotiations, will make an immense difference to the character of future discussions in Parliament on external affairs and their bearing on the problems of defence. Parliamentary debates on subjects for which the Ministry of the day can disown responsibility, and of which they have no first-hand knowledge, are apt to have an air of unreality and to take no hold on public attention. This was experienced in the Union Parliament during last session, when an attempt was made by the Opposition to raise a debate on the Declaration of London. Mr Smuts, the Minister of Defence, shrugged his shoulders and intimated that the subject was so difficult and obscure, and had been so thoroughly thrashed out in England, that the Union Parliament could not hope to do any good by discussing it. It will be impossible in future for a Minister of Defence to give a like answer when a similar subject is raised. The Union Cabinet will have to formulate a policy on such subjects and to convince Parliament that it is the right policy. Thus the knowledge of these far away matters, on the right conduct of which the safety of South Africa ultimately depends, will filter downwards from the Ministry to Parliament, and from Parliament to the party caucus

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and the electorate. And a process of education will be set on foot which will gradually create in South Africa, what we are far from having to-day, an educated and informed public opinion on the external relations of the Empire as they affect South Africa. The creation of such an opinion is a necessary preliminary to the assumption by South Africa of its proportionate share of the burden of Imperial defence.

II. THE OPTION OF NEUTRALITY IN WAR.

THERE has been abundance of comment in the South African Press on Sir Wilfrid Laurier's contribution to the Conference discussion about consulting the Dominions with regard to international negotiations, and especially on his remark that "If a Dominion insisted on being consulted in regard to matters which might result in war, that would imply the necessity that they should take part in the war." There is, of course, nothing novel in the theory of the Canadian position which is thus implied, namely the theory that Canada has at present a free choice as to whether or not it will consent to be involved in an Imperial war—but this particular remark has been more widely published than Sir Wilfrid Laurier's similar utterances in the Canadian Parliament, and has impressed people here more, just because in this case the theory was made the ground of an objection to the claim put forward by the other Dominions to be consulted as to international negotiations.

There ought not to be much risk of a similar theory finding acceptance in South Africa. The geographical situation of the Union, the possession of frontiers which march with those of two European powers, of ports which are stations of call on the highways of the world's commerce and of a strategic position so coveted as the Cape peninsula, coupled with the obvious fact of the Union's dependence on its oversea trade, ought to convince South Africans that it is impossible for them to stand aside as mere

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spectators from any conflict with a civilized power in which the Empire might become involved. A point of view similar to that of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's finds expression, however, in a leading article on "South Africa's Neutrality" which appeared in a recent issue of the *Volkstem*. The writer discusses the terms of the Union constitution, and comes to the conclusion that, as the Governor General in exercising the control of the Union forces, which is entrusted to him as the King's representative, must be guided by the advice of his ministers, it is quite wrong to suppose that in the event of England making war, the Union, as a self-governing British state, automatically becomes involved in that war. "An express declaration or act of the different Colonial Governments is essential before the neutrality of any of them can be disturbed." After laying down this curious constitutional doctrine, the article proceeds to picture conditions under which a Dominion might best serve not only its own interests, but also those of the Empire by maintaining neutrality in a war in which England was involved. Neutrality would, it is asserted,

"render the Colony immune from the attacks of the enemy, and would remove the necessity for England to protect the Colony with ships or troops."

This assumption having been made, the special conditions of South Africa are discussed as follows:

"South Africa will in the case of a great war occupy a specially important strategic position, because it may be expected that the Suez Canal will be made impassable, and thus the world's traffic will resume its old route via Cape Agulhas. If now England is one of the belligerent powers, and British South Africa is bound to declare itself as England's ally, a considerable portion of the British fleet will have to be concentrated in South African waters for the protection of the sea coast and the defence of the harbours and the communications of South Africa with the outside world. South Africa will

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be constantly exposed to attacks from England's enemies, and if the German Empire is included among those enemies South Africa will have to hold its military forces in readiness for a land war as well as for the defence of its own harbours. Now it is known that England's tactics at sea will be directed to the concentration of its fleet in European waters, and it is by no means a secret that in time of a great war the daughter overseas states of England must not reckon on coast protection by England. Under those circumstances it might be that England, as well as South Africa, would benefit by South Africa's neutrality."

In embarking on these speculations the writer of the article does not seem to have reflected on the probability that Great Britain's enemies might refuse to recognize a neutrality which would certainly be a novelty in international law, and which, on his own showing, would be so greatly to the advantage both of Great Britain and the Empire. But, putting this difficulty on one side, the article suggests a curious picture. Great Britain is, we are to suppose, at war: the Governor-General, on the advice of the Union Ministry of the day, not only abstains from any offer of active assistance, but demands that the Union of South Africa shall be treated as a neutral power; South African ports, including the naval station at Simonstown, become neutral ports: Great Britain is thereby deprived of the use of her naval base in South African waters on which she has expended millions of the British taxpayers' money; she is, however, compensated for this temporary convenience by the fact that her enemies cannot touch that naval base or the stores which it contains, and that South Africa's coasts and shipping are rendered immune from hostile attack. These ingenuous speculations are symptoms of the confusion of thought which at present exists in South Africa as to the responsibilities of the Union as a self-governing state, which is also a portion of the British Empire. Their appearance in such a paper as the *Volkstem* shows the need

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of that process of education to which I referred just now. There are, however, other writers in the South African Press who do not share the delusive dream of the *Volkstem*, and I may, perhaps, be allowed to balance the quotations already given by the following extract from an article in the *Cape Times*, in which Sir Wilfrid Laurier's doctrine of "optional neutrality" was vigorously criticized.

"The doctrine is worth some little examination. From a constitutional point of view it is clearly unsound. It is not the Parliament of Great Britain which makes war. It is the King, as the symbol of the unity of the Empire. And it is to the King that every Prime Minister and every member of Parliament throughout the Dominions swears the oath of allegiance. The present Chief Justice of South Africa has laid down the constitutional principle in the clearest and most emphatic language. Referring to 'the powers and duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war,' he wrote on July 31, 1899: 'They are Ministers of the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible assistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions a responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown.' And if this were not so, the doctrine of optional neutrality would operate disastrously in two directions. The serious danger is not so much that a power at war with England would refuse to recognize the declared neutrality of a British Dominion, as that for political purposes it would snatch at the opportunity of arriving at a prior understanding with a potentially neutral Dominion—an understanding which might or might not be observed at the will of the belligerent power if victorious. The other danger of such a doctrine is based on self interest. Sir Wilfrid Laurier has been one of the most eloquent and powerful supporters of the principle of constitutional equality as between the Mother Country and the Dominion Governments. If that principle be allied with the principle of

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optional neutrality, the Mother Country might equally with the Dominions claim the right of optional neutrality if an affront were offered to one of the Dominions by a foreign power."

III. LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION.

IN the last days of the session the House of Assembly, on the motion of the Government, adopted the majority report of the Select Committee on Education without a division and almost without debate. On behalf of the Government both the Minister of Education and the Prime Minister declared that they adopted the recommendations of the majority report. That does not of itself ensure that these recommendations will be given effect to in the schools of the country, because under the Act of Union, elementary education is committed to the charge of the Provincial Councils for a period of five years, and though constitutionally the provinces have no exclusive jurisdiction, no one was prepared at this stage in the history of the Union to advocate that the Union Parliament should seek to override the powers of the provinces in regard to education of all things. All that could be done therefore by the Union Government was to recommend to the provincial authorities the adoption of the principle of the majority report, and this they undertook to do.

It may be as well to recall here the circumstances which gave rise to the appointment of the Select Committee. The Committee was appointed as the result of a debate in the House on the alleged grievances of the English speaking parents in the Free State against the Education Acts passed by the late Parliament of the province, making compulsory the use of both languages as media of instruction. These Acts were defended by the Government party on the ground that they secured equality as between the two languages in accordance with the terms of the constitution. That they provide for equality of treatment as between the two languages has never been denied. Indeed, he

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Select Committee found that of all the four provinces, the laws of the Free State alone disclosed no inequality as between the two languages in regard to education. The Opposition, however, contended that the equality laid down by the Act of Union was intended to be secured, not by compelling every parent to have his child educated in and through the medium of both languages, but by giving to all parents equal freedom to have their children educated in and through the medium of either or both as they might think fit. Accordingly the Select Committee was appointed (to quote the words of the Order of the House of Assembly)

“with a view to ensuring in regard to the system of public education throughout the Union the due application of the principles of freedom and equality laid down in Article 137 of the South Africa Act.”

The Committee was directed to examine the educational systems of the four provinces with a view to ascertaining whether they were in harmony with Article 137, and whether they involved any compulsion in regard to the teaching or use as medium of instruction of either the English or the Dutch language. It is clear from the reference that mere equality as between the two languages was not regarded as a sufficient fulfilment of Article 137 of the Act of Union, but that compulsion in regard to the use of either language as a subject or as medium of instruction was also to be removed as far as possible in order to bring the various systems into harmony with the Act of Union.

The Committee presented a report adopted by seven of its eight members. A minority report was presented by the eighth member, General Beyers. Mr Fremantle also signed the minority report, but his signature was deleted by order of the Speaker on the ground that having voted for the majority report it was not in order for him afterwards to present a dissenting report. General Hertzog, who also voted for the majority report, put in a reservation at the

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last meeting of the committee, declaring that while adhering to the majority report he would not support it or advocate its adoption except in so far as it was in accordance with the recommendations of the minority report of General Beyers. These facts are important in considering what is the value of the report as a settlement of the controversy over the language question in the schools, and the probability of its being adopted in practice by the various provinces.

Neither of the two reports recommends a system of compulsory bilingual education. The majority report recommends that up to and including Standard IV, the home language of the child should be taught as a subject and used as the medium of instruction, the other language being also taught and used if the parent so desires. After Standard IV either language or both are to be taught as subjects, and used as media of instruction according to the desire of the parents. Teachers are to be free to qualify in either language.

The minority report recommends that the home language of the child should be taught as a subject and used as the medium of instruction throughout its school course, but the other language is also to be taught and used as a medium unless the parent objects. Teachers are to be required to qualify in both languages.

These are the main points of difference between the two reports. The minority report allows no freedom of choice to the parent as regards the home language, but it allows him to object to the other being used either as a subject or a medium of instruction. The majority report while prescribing the use of the home language during the first four standards, leaves the parent free afterwards to choose as between the two. It also enables teachers whose work may be such as to involve the use of one only of the two languages to avoid the labour of qualifying in the other. It remains to consider what has been done or is likely to be done to give practical effect to their recommendations.

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Although the majority report was voted for by seven of the eight members of the Committee, one of them as we have seen desired at the same time to sign the minority report, while another (General Hertzog) by his reservations recorded at the last sitting of the Committee practically withdrew his adhesion to the majority report in so far as it differed from the other. In the House the Government, of which General Hertzog is a member, announced their adoption of the majority report, and this was approved by the House with one dissenting voice and without a division. Of the provincial executives, that of the Transvaal only has decided to give effect to the recommendations of the majority report, and a draft ordinance is to be introduced during the present session of the Provincial Council with that object. In that province, the law governing public education was passed by the late Parliament by agreement between both parties. In practice it has worked without any serious friction, but objections have been raised to it because in certain respects it treats English as the principal language and Dutch as a subsidiary. This it is now proposed to remedy by amending the law in accordance with the majority report of the Select Committee. In the Orange Free State as we have said, the existing education law gave rise to a bitter agitation against the compulsory use of both languages as media of instruction. In that province the executive committee had decided to adopt a policy of "wait and see," i.e., it has decided not to move in the direction of adopting the recommendations of the Select Committee's report till it sees whether they are to be adopted in the other provinces. The Cape and Natal have as yet taken no action.

This question of the use of the two languages in the schools has given rise to a remarkable duality of policy in the Nationalist party, and even within the Government itself. General Botha has taken some credit to himself and his Government for having effected an educational "settlement," and we presume that he means to refer to the

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majority report of the Committee, since both he himself and the Minister of Education stated in the House that the Government adopted the majority report. On the other hand, General Hertzog (also a Minister) openly advocates the minority report, and in this he is supported outside the cabinet by men like ex-President Steyn and General Beyers. The same duality of policy is apparent on the question of immigration. Certain members of the cabinet, such as General Botha and General Smuts say that a well considered policy of encouraging immigration is a crying need for South Africa. On the other hand, General Hertzog declares that it will be the ruin of the country to bring in a population from oversea. General Botha's task hitherto has been to keep together as one, a cabinet whose members appeal to two widely different sections of the people, but it is evident that it is not becoming easier with time.

South Africa, July, 1911.

NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS

THE JAPANESE IN THE PACIFIC.

NOTHING that has happened during the last three months has done more to arouse in New Zealand a sense of their Imperial responsibilities than the activity of the Japanese in various parts of the Pacific. People in England can scarcely realize the attitude of New Zealand and Australia towards the coloured races. England with its dense population has little to fear from Japanese aspirations in the Pacific except loss of trade. But to the New Zealander and the Australian, with the teeming millions of China and Japan at their very doors, the danger is very real. New Zealand with its great and varied resources and its genial climate could maintain 10,000,000 white people in a high state of comfort, yet her population is scarcely more than one million. The question that is beginning to exercise the minds of all thoughtful New Zealanders is whether we are going to be left in peaceful possession of our heritage; whether 5,000,000 Australians are enough to hold a fertile continent of 3,000,000 square miles. The recent activity of the Japanese in Hawaii, on the Pacific coast of North America, and more recently in New Caledonia has brought this question into great prominence. Though no one anticipates any immediate danger, there is a growing feeling that we must realize our responsibilities and contribute our fair share towards the maintenance in the Pacific of a fleet capable of coping successfully with any contingency that may arise.

To understand the nature of the peaceful invasion by which the Japanese are becoming the predominant power in several islands of the Pacific with great strategic possibilities, it would be as well to give a brief review of what has happened in the Hawaii Islands since the annexation of that group by the United States. A reciprocal treaty between the former native government and Washington led to the development of the sugar industry in the Islands.

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The American capitalists who had invested millions in Hawaiian sugar plantations naturally looked about for cheap labour. The native Hawaiians were too lazy, so it became necessary to import labour from abroad. Portuguese, Chinese, Japanese were all tried; but the latter proved in every respect the most satisfactory. Consequently Japanese were poured into the territory in such numbers that they are now the dominant people. A few statistics will make the position clear. According to the census of 1900, out of a population of 154,000 there were 61,115 Japanese, 7,283 Americans, 2,884 British and Germans, 37,635 Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians, 25,762 Chinese, 15,675 Portuguese, and 3,646 other foreigners. It is estimated that the present population is about 240,000 of whom at least one-third are Japanese. The Japanese, too, are the most prolific of the inhabitants: of the 4,593 children born in the year ending June 30, 1909, 2,445 were Japanese. The Japanese born on the islands have all the rights of American citizenship. It is estimated that at the present rate of increase there will be within the next twenty years at least 10,000 Japanese voters on the islands. Thus there is every likelihood of the decadent and fast-disappearing Hawaiians being superseded by this more energetic and virile race from the East. The more immediate danger to America arises from the fact that there are already in the islands twenty to thirty thousand trained Japanese soldiers, who, in the event of an outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, could conquer the territory from within. As Hawaii is only 2,000 miles from California its importance to Japan as a naval base cannot be over-estimated.

The presence of the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands has brought about, too, a social revolution. The Japanese control the retail trade of the islands, and as a natural consequence are beginning to monopolise the wholesale trade also. As they sell cheaper than the Americans and the English, the time is not far distant when the . . . white trader will be driven completely out of business. They have

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their own doctors, their own schools, their own newspapers, their own temples, and their own theatres. White parents are beginning to realize that it would be impossible for their children to enter into competition with the Japanese without sinking to their level of comfort. Hence, in the near future, all the better-class English, Americans, and Germans will have departed, for, as one observant writer has said: "The Japanese are in Hawaii to stay and possess the land, peacefully or otherwise; and not even the millions of dollars that Uncle Sam is spending at Pearl Harbour, near Honolulu, can prevent the complete Japanisation of the paradise of the Pacific."

The success that has attended the Japanese exploitation of Hawaii is likely to be repeated in New Caledonia. This island, which is only 800 miles east of Australia and about 1,000 miles to the north of New Zealand, is from a strategic point of view, even more important to these two countries than are the Hawaii Islands to the United States. The island has been in the possession of France since 1850; but as only those countries with a large birth-rate have any need to think imperially, no effort has been made to people it with good and hardy settlers. For many years it was a convict settlement, and more recently companies have been formed to work its rich and extensive mineral deposits. The most important of these is la Société Nickel. Like the sugar planters in Hawaii this company wants to pay big dividends: hence, it requires cheap labour. Like the planters in Hawaii too it recognises the industrial qualities of the Japanese, and has already imported 2,000 labourers belonging to that race. The announcement of their arrival aroused so much interest in New Zealand that the *New Zealand Herald* sent a special commissioner to New Caledonia. He has travelled all over the island, conversed with all sorts and conditions of people, and has given the results of his observations in five special articles. He found that 2,000 Japanese have already landed in the island, that 2,300 are coming within the next twelve

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months, that the majority are not coolies, but skilled workmen—engineers, bridge-builders, masons, carpenters—and that nearly all fought in the Russo-Japanese war. Even the French Governor admits the presence of Japanese spies. Recently complaints were made that Japanese were trepang-fishing in prohibited waters. Two of their boats were subsequently captured at Noumea, the capital of the island. They were fined £200 each, or in default their boats were to be confiscated. The fines were immediately paid. Subsequent inquiries proved, according to the commissioner, that these ostensible fishermen were in reality Japanese spies who had previously been taking soundings along the Barrier Reef off the coast of Queensland. The Japanese have been showing a similar avidity for useful knowledge in all parts of the island, and have been especially active in exploring a vast coal-field which is situated in the South-west of New Caledonia. The inference drawn, is that information is being collected and forwarded to Tokio for the preparation of charts and ordnance maps of the island. When we remember that the approach to Noumea is unusually difficult to navigate and that the coast of the island is one of the most treacherous in the world, we can realize how valuable such information would be if Japan decided to make Noumea her naval base in the South Pacific.

The writer of the articles referred to, gives a number of reasons for his contention that Japan intends ultimately to overrun New Caledonia just as she has become the virtual mistress of Hawaii. Among them are the following:

(1) She has no good naval base in the Pacific outside her own land.

(2) She has no coaling depot in the Pacific outside her own land.

(3) She has no good victualling base, no dockyard, no arsenal, no resting-place in the Pacific outside her own land.

(4) New Caledonia could give her all these.

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(5) Noumea, the capital, has a splendid harbour that could hold half-a-dozen Japanese fleets with ease.

(6) That harbour is landlocked save for two narrow entrances.

(7) That harbour is hidden on the sea-side by mountainous islands. If a fleet of warships were to lie snuggled up towards the outer mountain wall of Noumea Harbour, it would be impossible to see a mast top from the ocean.

(8) New Caledonia has one of the finest coal-fields in the world.

(9) If Japan gets New Caledonia, she will have all she wants in the way of a coaling station, a naval depot, an arsenal, and all the facilities for building docks.

The obvious deduction is that Noumea in Japanese hands would be a standing menace not only to Australia and New Zealand, but also to British supremacy in the South Pacific. As previously remarked, Britain is too remote to perceive how pressing and real the danger is; but in an Imperial Council or Parliament with representatives from all the self-governing colonies the Australasian point of view would be clearly represented. Doubtless as a result serious negotiations would have been begun with France long ere this for the transference of the island to Great Britain, either by purchase or by exchange of territory. Only a few months ago it was reported that the English and French Foreign Offices had entered into negotiations for the exchange of part of Senegambia in West Africa for the relics of the French Empire in India, and the question of the transfer of New Caledonia was then discussed. Unfortunately, however, as the proposal was made a party question in the French Chamber, the negotiations fell through.

Still, the interest aroused by the nearer approach of the Japanese to our doors may prove a blessing in disguise. The recent naval estimates prove that England intends to maintain a fleet capable of resisting successfully any probable combination of European Powers. New Zealand and Australia have shown of late that they are becoming

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more alive to their national responsibilities; but we shall be failing in our duty to ourselves and to the Empire until we increase our naval subsidy to something approaching the rate—£1 per head—which the Mother Country is at present paying. The recent utterances of the New Zealand Press, and the growing conviction throughout the country that adequate naval defence is essential to our independence, seem to indicate that there would be little opposition to a proposal to make a substantial increase in our naval subsidy.

Sir Joseph Ward, before leaving to attend the Imperial Conference, in reply to a farewell address from the citizens of Dunedin touched upon the Eastern menace, and showed how essential naval defence is to our existence as an independent people. He said that there was an idea that the defence of New Zealand did not affect the working class. He made it clear that no class would be more affected, and asked what the workers would do, if within the next twenty years five or ten millions of people from the Far East were to land on our shores?

NEW ZEALAND DEFENCES.

IN the meantime, the foundations have been laid of the new defence scheme which was described in the last New Zealand letter. A camp of instruction has been held during the last three months at Tauherenikau in the Wellington Province. To this camp were sent all the candidates for staff positions as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the various military districts. At the conclusion of the encampment the most suitable of the candidates were appointed for a period of four years. To judge from the expressions of satisfaction which the selection has evoked, we have every reason for thinking that the appointments have been made on the merits of the candidates, and that they have been free from the pressure of political influence. This is encouraging, and will be an

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incentive to capable young men to qualify for a military career. As the appointments have been made for four years only, the newly-created officers will realize the necessity of making themselves as efficient as possible to qualify for promotion at the end of the term. General Godley, in an interview, said that the camp had been of inestimable value: it had been attended by all the district commanding officers and had secured uniformity in training methods. The first batch of cadets has been selected for training at the Australian Military College. They start immediately upon their course of studies, at the conclusion of which they are under an obligation to serve at least ten years in the New Zealand Military forces. The Government has also accepted a tender for the erection of high-power wireless stations at Doubtless Bay in the North Island, and at the Bluff in the South Island. The completion of this work will give New Zealand wireless communication with Australia, the vessels of the Australian Squadron, and ultimately, it is hoped, with several Pacific Islands. This is another proof of the progressive policy our Government has adopted in military and naval matters.

NEW ZEALAND & THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE.

IN the last New Zealand letter regret was expressed that time was not found to discuss the proposals which the Premier had submitted for the consideration of the Imperial Conference. It was urged that, unless our representatives were given an opportunity to debate matters of great imperial import, little could be done to educate parliament and people with regard to our duties and responsibilities as a unit of the British Empire. However, since the prorogation of Parliament, local politics have receded to the background, and imperial matters have been engaging the chief attention of the public and the press.

The importance which New Zealanders attach to the forthcoming Imperial Conference has been evidenced by

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the enthusiasm which characterised the various official functions held to give the citizens an opportunity of saying farewell to our two delegates, Sir Joseph Ward and the Hon. Dr Findlay. All parties, irrespective of political creed, assembled in the chief towns, from Invercargill to Auckland, to show their sense of the importance of the mission which has been entrusted to these two members of the cabinet. Sir Joseph Ward in his reply to the farewell address from the people of Auckland made it clear that the time for talking platitudes about Imperialism was past, and the time for serious concerted action was come. He believed

“ that the coming Conference would reaffirm, in a very practical way, the practical patriotism they wanted to see infused into portions of the Old Land and into portions of the oversea Dominions.”

He concluded by saying that,

“ It behoved the old Motherland to realize that what was right ten or fifteen years ago to enable the different parts of the Empire to maintain their position against any possible combination of other countries was not all right to-day. It required hearty co-operation of the people throughout the Empire to galvanize us into activity, and to bring about such co-operation and interchange of ideas among the statesmen of the old and the young parts of the nation as would be impossible to put into practice, unless one great aim animated every portion. The good of the Empire must be their watchword, and every Briton must be made to feel himself a brick in the edifice of the nation.”

In reply to the toast of his health at the banquet given in his honour by New Zealanders resident in Sydney, Sir Joseph Ward advocated an organic union between England and her dependencies. He complained that

“ the oversea Dominions have at present no voice— indeed no right to be heard — in connexion with

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foreign policies, vital questions of international law, foreign treaties other than commercial, nor the crowning question of peace and war. In respect of all important matters, the citizens of the oversea Dominions are disfranchised, and no system can be adopted, which while increasing contributions from the oversea Dominions for Empire defence, still refuses these growing young nations a voice in these vital questions. To continue our present undefined policy violates the first principle of our constitutional system—that there should be no taxation without representation.”

He said that under present conditions the foreign and the internal policy of the British Parliament often materially embarrass each other; that the questions upon which active political thought was engaged were preferential trade, Home Rule for Ireland, the veto, licensing questions, the suffragette movement, housing and labour problems; that the most important question of all—the preservation and protection of the great scattered Empire—was either subordinated to others or else became virtually a political shuttlecock, although it was the one topic that should be kept completely removed from party considerations, and that should stand out as the question of paramount importance, being as it was the one question in which all parties in the State were vitally concerned. The remedy he proposed was to grant Home Rule to England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, and transfer the whole business of foreign policy and defence to an Imperial Parliament, consisting of a House of Representatives elected on a population basis, and a Senate in which each unit of the Empire would have the same number of representatives.

MAIL SERVICES.

ONE question which will come before the Imperial Conference and which has been engaging the attention of the public is that of a quicker mail service between New Zealand and England. Since the discontinuance of the mail service

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by Spreckel's boats to San Francisco, our chief business men and our Chambers of Commerce have been systematically working for a more up-to-date postal communication with America and England. A glance at the only available service up to the present shows the great disadvantage under which New Zealand has been labouring. The mail takes via Suez 34 to 36 days, and by connexion with the Australia-Vancouver service at Suva 32 days for outward mails. For inward mails, which are brought to Auckland from Suva via Sydney or Brisbane, the time occupied is 38 to 40 days. Last year the Government entered into a contract with the Union Steam Ship Company for a service between New Zealand and 'Frisco; but as only old and obsolete vessels were available the time taken is 32 to 34 days to 'Frisco: thus, the Dominion would be in no better position as regards mail services. In the interval, however, Sir Joseph Ward has been in communication with the Canadian Government. As a result of his repeated representations it was decided that, when the time came to consider the renewal of the Vancouver contract, efforts should be made to secure a port of call in New Zealand, and when tenders were called by the Government of Canada, returnable on November 1, 1910, it was stipulated that the tenderers should give prices for alternative routes, (a) via Brisbane to Sydney, (b) via Auckland to Sydney, with possible extension to Melbourne. After considering the tenders, the Canadian Government decided to accept that of the Union Steam Ship Company for the service via Auckland to Sydney. The contract was signed for five years, and it was stipulated that the steamers employed should be able to maintain a speed of 15 knots at sea and deliver mails between Auckland and Vancouver within 19 days. This proposal was placed before the Government of the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister, Mr Fisher, however, intimated that, since New Zealand enjoyed more favourable tariff arrangements with Canada, he could not see his way to subsidize a line via Auckland to the exclusion of Bris-

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bane and Melbourne. He also informed Sir James Mills, the Managing Director of the United Steam Ship Company that he intended to discuss the question of a reciprocal tariff between Canada and Australia at the forthcoming Imperial Conference. Even supposing that a satisfactory treaty were arranged, it would have to be ratified by the parliaments of the two countries concerned. This would postpone indefinitely the final settlement of the mail services, and would leave the whole question in a state of great uncertainty. Under these circumstances Canada closed with the offer of the United Steam Ship Company for a four-weekly service between Auckland and Vancouver via Suva and Honolulu, but reserved the right to require the contractor to proceed to Sydney or Melbourne, or to both ports. This reservation still leaves Australia the opportunity of co-operating with New Zealand and Canada to secure the most up-to-date service between these three important units of the Empire. Defeated in the negotiations about the Vancouver service, Mr Fisher was inclined to disparage the prospects of trade with Canada, and hinted that it would be more to Australia's advantage to subsidize a service between Brisbane or Sydney and San Francisco.

From an Imperial standpoint such an attitude is much to be regretted. In the first place, such a service would cost Australia about £100,000, whereas her subsidy to the Vancouver service was £26,000. In the second place co-operation on the part of the three countries would be attended by many advantages. Larger and faster boats would be built for the service. There would probably be an increased tourist traffic between the Dominions, while the quicker postal communication would tend to promote trade and commerce. The new service is practically an all-red route, and with the great prospects which it opens up there is every probability that it will continue to be a great commercial link between Great Britain, Canada, and Australasia. The history of the negotiations also emphasizes the necessity for some Imperial council in which representa-

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tives of the various Dominions might discuss matters of mutual interest. To quote Mr Fisher's words,

“Australia could not agree to the proposal to include Auckland as a port of call because it meant subsidizing another country.”

It is to be hoped that Australia will yet see her way to subsidize the service; but the incident merely serves to show how great is the possibility of friction and misunderstanding, when one Dominion is prepared to sacrifice its own interests and suffer loss rather than join in a scheme which might result in a greater advantage to a sister Dominion, while benefiting the Empire as a whole. The *Auckland Star* reflects the impression which Mr Fisher's attitude has left in the minds of New Zealanders when it says:

“New Zealand may draw from the recent negotiations a moral that we have often pointed before—the necessity for maintaining our political and commercial independence. The risks we would have run by accepting Australia's offer and becoming a member of the Commonwealth have never been better exemplified; and we may well congratulate ourselves that at the most critical moment of our history we decided to stand outside the borders of Federation.”

Whatever little feeling the negotiations about the Vancouver Mail may have left in the minds of New Zealanders and Australians was completely removed by the visit to Sydney of Sir Joseph Ward and the Hon. Dr Findlay on their way to the Imperial Conference. The general tenor of the speeches at the various functions they attended was that New Zealand and Australia should co-operate as far as possible in all matters that are likely to prove to the mutual advantage of the two Dominions. Indeed, the Australian Postmaster-General went so far as to suggest that there should be absolute free-trade between the two

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countries, although when we recollect that during the drought years the Australian farmers strenuously opposed the suggestion that New Zealand produce should be admitted free of duty, we have little reason to expect that the Postmaster-General's idea would find much favour with the people of Australia. The best we can hope for is that some "sensible reciprocal agreement between Australia and New Zealand" as advocated by Sir Joseph Ward, will be seriously considered by the parliaments of both countries. Dr Findlay at the same time dwelt upon the advantages that would result to Australia and New Zealand from the establishment of a two-days' steamship service across the Tasman Sea. Another obstacle to the development of trade between the two countries is the excessive cable rate of fourpence-halfpenny per word. Could the two countries agree to reduce this rate and at the same time establish reciprocity and quicker steamship services, there is little doubt that there would be an unprecedented increase in the commercial and social intercourse between New Zealand and Australia, and that there would be less likelihood of misunderstanding in negotiations on matters of mutual interest.

As the vessels, the "Makura," the "Marama," and the "Zealandia," which will be employed on the Vancouver service are all provided with cool storage, there is every prospect of a large increase in our butter and frozen meat exports to Canada. In 1909 our exports to Canada were worth £180,975, but among these there were only 50 cwt. of butter valued at £257. New Zealand producers are anticipating that under the new arrangements there will be a considerable increase in the export of butter and frozen meat to Canada, and seem to doubt whether the cold storage available on the mail steamers will be sufficient for the demands of the trade. One merchant, who represents a number of Canadian firms in New Zealand, is of opinion that the prospects of trade between the two countries are sufficiently great to justify the inauguration of a regular

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cargo service with cold storage. He maintains that in 1909 Canada's importation of lines in which New Zealand could compete amounted to 9,671,737 dollars, to which amount New Zealand contributed only 313,194 dollars, or about $3\frac{1}{3}$ per cent.

CANADA-UNITED STATES RECIPROCITY.

THE New Zealand press has always taken a great interest in all matters of Imperial concern but our improved commercial relations with Canada may account for the great prominence our daily papers have given to the negotiations for the preferential treaty between the Dominion and the United States of America. While the press ridicules the idea that Canada will be absorbed by the United States of America, and views with regret the suggestion that the new tariff arrangements may weaken the ties with the mother country, it recognizes that Canada is the best judge of what is most likely to advance her own interests. To take a typical comment: the *New Zealand Herald*, which has consistently advocated preferential trade within the Empire, says,

“We shall, of course, deeply deplore the fact, if the reciprocal agreement should weaken the Imperial sentiment in Canada and retard the realization of a pan-Britannic fiscal union. Britain has, however, practically declared that she does not want preferential tariff agreements, but would like more Dreadnoughts. The colossal Dominion, with her vast potentialities, cannot allow her development to be choked because British statesmen are crass and inert. She will do well for herself if she establishes closer, more friendly and more profitable relations with her great neighbour, separated from her by a mere line on the map; and she may be trusted to preserve her separate existence and to pursue her own glorious destiny.”

Another daily paper, the *Auckland Star*, fears that

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“The admission of our American rivals into the Canadian markets on better terms than they now enjoy, will inevitably react against England. But far more important than any temporary loss of trade is the assertion of the principle that the time has come for England’s colonies to consult their own interests by making the best terms they can for themselves in foreign markets. England cannot complain, whatever be the consequences; for, as we have been told so often, the door of England’s markets has been ‘banged, bolted, and barred,’ against the colonial offer of preferential trade. But, believing firmly that the commercial future of England and her Imperial destiny are involved in the acceptance or rejection of the Reciprocity programme, we can only deplore the establishment of a precedent that in our opinion cannot be followed by the colonies without seriously endangering the prosperity and unity of the Empire.”

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON.

ANOTHER topic which has been kept prominently before the public by articles in the press is the Declaration of London. The arguments used have not differed from those put forward at Home; but, though the controversy has been conducted with more vigour in some cases than knowledge, it has served to emphasize the fact that the Dominions are being brought daily into more intimate relation with foreign affairs, and that some provision should be made to ensure that their special interests will be thoroughly considered whenever any important step is being taken. Our interest in the carriage of food supplies, and the question of contraband generally, is a very real one, and with the best intentions in the world those in authority in England might quite conceivably fail to notice how an international arrangement might affect us.

New Zealand, May, 1911.

MEMORANDUM

[Faint, illegible text follows, appearing to be a memorandum or report.]

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

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
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
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