



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THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE
POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Volume VII

145733

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DECEMBER 1916 TO SEPTEMBER 1917

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THE MAKING OF PEACE

I. THE OVERTHROW OF MILITARISM

THE recent speeches of Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey, following the interview with Mr. Lloyd George, have served a double purpose. They have reaffirmed the determination of the people of the British Empire to go on with the war until the aims with which they entered it are won. And they have made it clear that in the judgment of the responsible Ministers the day when we can consider peace has not yet come, and is not even near. In making these declarations Ministers unquestionably represent the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the self-governing population of the Empire. So far as we can see we are not yet within measurable distance of achieving the purpose for which we entered the war.

That purpose was defined by Mr. Asquith on November 9, 1914, in the following terms :

We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.

To these terms, on February 23, 1916, he added Serbia. And on April 10, 1916, he interpreted the meaning of the last clause. After declaring that "Great Britain, and France also, entered the war not to strangle Germany, not

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to wipe her off the map of Europe, not to destroy or mutilate her national life, certainly not to interfere with (to use the Chancellor's expression) 'the free exercise of her peaceful endeavours,' but "to prevent Germany (which for this purpose means Prussia) from establishing a position of military menace and dominance over her neighbours," he went on to say :

As a result of the war we intend to establish the principle that international problems must be handled by free negotiation on equal terms between free peoples, and that this settlement shall no longer be hampered and swayed by the overmastering dictation of a government controlled by a military caste. That is what I mean by the destruction of the military domination of Prussia : nothing more, but nothing less.

These declarations received endorsement from all quarters. Indeed, if one were to seek for the shortest formula in which to express the feeling of the average citizen about the object for which he is fighting the war, it would probably be found in the words "never again." The ordinary man does not and cannot know much about the intricate high politics of Europe, but he is acutely conscious that there has grown up in Central Europe a body of militarist doctrine which will overthrow morality and civilisation unless it is itself discredited and destroyed. Fundamentally, militarism is the belief in physical force, and not justice, as the final arbiter in human affairs, and it is this belief which has captured the Germanic peoples, which is the root cause of all the trouble. It is incarnate in a constitution which is frankly based upon the theory that the stability of the State depends upon the hereditary ruling classes having absolute and autocratic powers over their subjects. It has resulted in a foreign policy which sees in war or the threat of war the only solution of international problems. And it has led not only to the blind obedience of the German people to their rulers, but to their acquiescence in the perpetration of almost any barbarity which can terrify or coerce other

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nations into surrendering their liberty by complying with the dictation of the Germanic will. So long as this belief survives as the dominant doctrine of any great State, the world can never be safe from war, and can never progress towards international concord and peace. Hence the grim unanimity of all classes to see the war through. For practically everybody recognises that, whatever steps might have been taken before the war to prevent the cataclysm from breaking out, there is only one thing to do now, and that is to defeat at the appalling sacrifice of war the attempt of the German Empire to seize control of the destinies of the people of Europe by the sword.

But if there is unanimity about the necessity for continuing the war, there is no unanimity of opinion as to when it will be won. There is every variety of opinion from the pacifists who believe that Germany is so chastened already that we can afford to consider terms, to the jingoes who declare that there can be no peace until the Hohenzollerns have been dethroned and Germany has been so tied up by political and military and economic bonds that she will perforce be innocuous for evermore. The great mass of people are frankly in doubt. All they are convinced of is that the time for peace-making has not come yet.

This doubt arises largely from the difficulty of distinguishing between the two halves of the problem of peacemaking, the first half that of winning the war by achieving the purpose for which we entered it, and the second half that of providing adequate securities for the settlement, and for peace, after that purpose has been attained. It is, of course, as impossible to foresee the time or the exact conditions of peace as it was to foresee the time or the occasion of the war. But it is not impossible to see the principle which should guide us in peace negotiations. The one thing we must not do is to trust to the calculations of expediency. For expediency, like fear, is the most short-sighted of counsellors. It depends upon the power of human beings to foresee the future—a thing which all history proves that they

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are incapable of doing. If we begin to base our peace terms upon calculations as to the future balance of forces in Europe, or upon this grouping or that, we shall simply be doing what the German Government has always done, and with the same results. We shall fail, and we shall therefore, as they have been, be continually driven back on a new expansion of our own armaments as the only alternative when our carefully contrived combinations break down. It was adherence to principle which took us honourably into the war. It will be adherence to that same principle which will take us honourably and safely out of it again.

It is sometimes said that we entered the war through enlightened self-interest. Such a view will not bear the test of an examination of the facts, save in the sense that it always pays to do right. Because honesty is the best policy, it is absurd to regard every honest man as a calculating schemer. The immediate causes of our entering the war were a tacit obligation to assist France against German aggression, and a legal obligation to defend the neutrality of Belgium. And these obligations were entered into as the best available means of protecting our own security and the liberty of Europe. The treaty of neutralisation of Belgium was the outcome of the system of public law originally drawn up by the Congress of Vienna. How sound a safeguard it was has been proved by subsequent events, for so long as the neutralisation of Belgium was intact it was impossible for France or Germany to dominate the Continent, and when Germany set out to grasp supreme power she found herself driven to violate Belgian neutrality, and so bring the British Empire into the war and lose the moral sympathy of the civilised world. If enough nations had realised the significance of the neutralisation of Belgium and had been sufficiently prepared to vindicate it, the war would never have taken place. Similarly with the obligation to France. The Triple Entente came into being as the outcome of accumulated evidence, also justified by events, that

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Germany intended to overturn the last obstacles to the supremacy of her will in Europe, and for this purpose was determined to crush France finally to the ground, a proceeding which we considered it our duty as well as our interest to prevent.

Thus, when it came to the crisis, we found that we had no option but to enter the war, because in no other way could we fulfil obligations which we had honourably entered into in order to preserve that public right which was the safeguard of liberty, both for Europe and ourselves. We cannot entertain the idea of peace negotiations, except on the basis that public right is to be restored. To consider peace terms on any other condition would be to fail of our fundamental purpose to discredit and overthrow the militarist doctrine.

Mr. Asquith put his finger on the crux of the case when he said at the Guildhall on November 9, 1916, "We are equally pledged to the reconstitution and independence of Serbia, and, so far as I am aware, no German propaganda here has even suggested that the German Government is prepared to concede anything to this demand." The war began over Serbia. And it began over Serbia because the militarist rulers of Germany and Austria-Hungary were resolved that a question which was, and always had been, a European question, inasmuch as it affected the vital interests of many great nations, was to be settled by the sword and as Germany and Austria-Hungary decreed, and without being even discussed in international conference. And further that, if their neighbours would not acquiesce in this fourth attempt to impose a settlement of a European question upon them under threat of war, they were determined to prove to them, in a successful war, that they, the tyrants of Germany and Austria-Hungary, were the tyrants of Europe too. The position is nakedly revealed in these words printed in the official German account of the negotiations which ended in the war. "Faithful to our principle," it reads, "that mediation should not extend to the

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Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relation between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two powers." It was on this issue that the war began. On this issue it will end. For according as Germany succeeds or fails to remodel Europe according to its own will, by force of arms and in defiance of public right, will militarism itself be proved a success or a failure. On this fundamental issue of might versus right, therefore, there can be no compromise. There is room for negotiation and compromise on other points. The war is bound to change the map of the world in many important respects. The hopes of lasting peace are largely bound up with uniting races and nationalities now divided, and in this process there will be much room for give and take. But we shall be false to the principle on which we entered the war, and the cause for which we fight, if we show the slightest willingness even to discuss this new map until the Germans have agreed that the free nations which have been wantonly assailed are to be liberated and indemnified, and that the treaties which Germany set out to overthrow, and which were the guardians of right and liberty in Europe, are to be its guardians still.

But this is only one half of the problem of peace. The other half is to give the settlement stability. If "never again" is to mean anything we must create practical securities against a repetition of this war. Here also principle is the only safe guide. We shall be no less false to it if we attempt to base the stability of the peace on any mutilation or permanent coercion of Germany by political or military or economic means than if we accept a peace which does not vindicate public right. The real security for peace in the world is not force, but justice, though to be effective justice must be backed by the preparedness of a sufficient number of nations to make it useless for the would-be wrongdoer to challenge it. At bottom the

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situation in the international sphere is similar to that within the state. The real security for law and order in a free state is not the policeman, but the inherent justice and liberality of its laws. Parliament does not legislate against criminals. It simply passes laws, defining the rights and duties of citizens, which the great majority willingly obey. But human nature being what it is, the policeman is also necessary in order to deal with the criminal few, who would disobey the law, and who, if the law were not enforced, would rapidly destroy the foundations on which the peace and good order of society, and the freedom of the individual, depend.

It is the same in the international sphere. The permanent safeguard for peace is not measures against particular states thought to be dangerous, but the drawing up and enforcement by all civilised nations of a code of public right defining the rights and duties of nations to one another. Germany, "the great anarchist," was able to attempt to make herself the tyrant of Europe by violence because the rest of the world had made no adequate attempt to draw up such a code, and was apparently neither willing nor prepared to defend such public right as already existed. Fortunately, she was mistaken, but she was mistaken only because the peoples of the British Empire sprang immediately into the breach in a manner which could not have been foreseen, and sent 5,000,000 men to fight for freedom. But having defeated the German purpose in the field, we shall only hinder lasting peace if we attempt to give permanent security to the settlement by attempting to deprive Germany by military means of her full freedom as a member of the comity of nations. That, indeed, would only be to swallow the militarist gospel ourselves. The true course is to depart entirely from the militarist creed by resting the permanence of peace, not on a combination of powers whose main purpose is directed against Germany, but by massing an overwhelming preponderance of force behind a new code

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of public right, which shall embody the essentials of a just peace.

Thus the final overthrow of militarism is a matter not only for the Allies, but for those nations which are now neutral also. The Allies have still their part to complete. They have still to prove to Germany that liberty and justice are stronger than military might. But if militarism is to be for ever overthrown the neutrals will have to abandon the dream of selfish isolation, and undertake their share of the burdens and obligations of creating an effective security behind public right. If the permanence of the settlement is not to be founded on the military preponderance of one group of states in Europe over another, it will only be because all the great civilised powers have undertaken that if any power, however strong, attempts to overthrow the public right of the world without conference and by war or threat of war, they will immediately combine to vindicate public right by every means they can. When once the world, and especially the democratic world, has proved that not only will it not tolerate the overthrow of right by might, but is willing to combine to define, obey and enforce a code of public right, covering the whole earth, militarism will be dead, and the world will be free as it has never been free before.

That is the goal towards which the nations of the Empire are striving with unfaltering steps. It is for other nations to decide whether it is to be immediately attained.

II. THE DOMINIONS AND THE SETTLEMENT

THERE is another side to the question of peace-making of which it is important not to lose sight. The peoples of the Dominions are playing their part in this war, because they approved of the policy of the British government in declaring war. They have placed their armies under the direction of the British government

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because unity of direction is essential to the effective prosecution of the war, and because under the present constitution the British government is also the Imperial government. But at an early stage they gave notice that they expected to be fully consulted when it came to the negotiations of peace.

In doing this they were clearly right. Before the war few people in the United Kingdom and fewer still in the Dominions realised how vitally foreign policy might affect their lives. Hence the self-governing Dominions were content to leave the control of foreign policy in the hands of the British government. Nowadays nobody has a doubt that foreign policy is the most vital of all the aspects of national policy. Hence their concern about the negotiation of peace. For the settlement at the end of the war will not merely redraw the map of Europe, it will govern foreign policy and determine what the obligations and the burden of armaments of the Empire is to be for many years to come. As we have seen, it was a treaty entered into in 1839, and an obligation tacitly assumed in 1904, which finally determined that the British Empire was to enter the war without further delay on August 4, 1914. And on the nature of the settlement it will largely depend whether or not the world sinks back to the extravagant and ultimately disastrous methods of the balance of power, or the more economical and safer methods of concerted enforcement of a new code of public right. The Dominion governments, therefore, who act for the peoples of the Dominions, were clearly wise in asking to be consulted about a settlement which is bound to determine their own national obligations, and to govern their own national policies, for many years to come.

The British government has undertaken that such consultation shall take place. Speaking on April 14, 1915, Mr. Harcourt, then Colonial Secretary, quoted as follows from an official despatch which he had already sent to the Governors-General of all the Dominions :

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Will you at the same time inform your Prime Minister that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to consult him most fully, and, if possible, personally, when the time arrives to discuss possible terms of peace. And he went on: I need hardly add that His Majesty's Government intend to observe the spirit as well as the letter of this declaration, which I believe has given complete satisfaction to the Governments of the Dominions.

There is not the slightest doubt that the Imperial government intend to abide by this declaration. Yet even in making it they found themselves forced to use the words "if possible," not through any reluctance to consult the Dominion governments, but from a consideration of the practical facts of the case. Peace, like the war, when it does come, is likely to come very rapidly. After a long period of rumours and subterranean moves and counter-moves, the basis of agreement will suddenly come in sight, and all the nations will rush to clinch it, so as to put a stop to the endless death and suffering of the battle front. Yet, unless Dominion Ministers happen to be in London any attempt at consultation at the last moment is bound to be nugatory. It is almost certain that there will not be time for the Premiers to arrive from the more distant Dominions, and negotiations cannot be hung up till they arrive. It will be out of the question to explain the whole situation by wire. At a time when proposals and counter-proposals will be flying with the utmost rapidity between all the belligerents, and the situation will be changing from hour to hour, telegraphic communication will be almost useless, for cables will be out of date before replies can be received. Nor is it practical politics that the Prime Ministers, with their heavy responsibilities for their own national affairs, would come and dawdle for months in London in case peace should come. There is manifestly only one way of consulting the Dominions about the terms of peace, and that is to hold an *ad hoc* Imperial Conference before the negotiations begin, at which the Dominion Premiers can make clear their desires on those

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matters of immediate concern to each Dominion, and at which the broad principles to be aimed at in the settlement and in creating securities for its permanence should be discussed and agreed. Once that has been done, the Foreign Secretary will enter upon the negotiations as the representative of the whole Empire. And that is in itself the right plan. During the peace negotiations themselves the Empire must speak with a single voice, and while it is essential that the Imperial plenipotentiaries should know the views of all parts, and if possible should have within reach for purposes of consultation representatives of all parts, it is clearly best that they should be left as free as possible from interference during the negotiations themselves.]

It may be said that the visits which individual Premiers have made to London, followed perhaps by others, will be a sufficient substitute for a conference. That is certainly better than nothing, but it falls far short of a full conference of the responsible parliamentary leaders of the whole Empire, sitting round one table and discussing with the plenipotentiaries who will speak for the Empire in the peace negotiations, as to the principles which should govern their conduct. It is not a mere question of ensuring that the British Foreign Secretary should know any particular objects which this Dominion or that wishes to see embodied in the settlement from its own point of view. That could certainly be done by the personal visit of each Prime Minister. What is really important is that the peoples of the Empire as a whole should have considered how the main objects for which they are spending their blood and treasure should be secured, and that the Foreign Secretary should go into the negotiations knowing that he has them all behind him, and that in entering into obligations for the future he will have their support. And that can only be done if the principles at issue have been threshed out beforehand in a conference of representatives of all the peoples concerned.

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It is not possible to be precise about the time when this conference should be held, for the time will depend upon many factors, not the least of which will be the difficulty of finding a date which suits all the Dominion Premiers. But the essential thing is that it should be held before the negotiations commence, for if it is not, it is likely to be too late for them altogether. And that means that it must be held before the autumn of next year (1917). The chances of peace this winter and spring seem to be so remote as to be negligible. But next autumn, after the results of the spring and summer offensives have become clear, it would seem likely that an attempt will be made to discover if Germany is willing to discuss peace on the allied terms.

It is difficult to overrate the importance of holding this conference from another point of view. Much of the future history of the Empire may depend upon whether the nations of which it is composed go out of the war as unitedly as they entered it and have fought side by side during it. And that unity will depend very much upon whether all the governments concerned act up to the level of their responsibilities. This is primarily a matter for the Imperial government. It has received the unstinted trust and assistance of the peoples overseas during the war. It will not fulfil its duties to those whom it represents unless it leaves nothing undone to ensure that it does really represent them when it comes to making peace. And it will only represent them if it has left no stone unturned to take them into its confidence and discuss with them, fully and collectively, its plans. Yet it is also a matter for the Dominion governments. When the time comes near there will be an inevitable tendency in official circles to postpone or avoid a conference, not because they do not wish for consultation, but because busy men loaded with heavy responsibilities naturally shrink from new burdens and from discussing the ideas upon which they are agreed, with new minds.

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If there is then any hesitation it is for the Dominion governments to insist. For it is precisely that contact with new minds which is so important. Few members of a British government realise how deeply in the groove of the national ideals of the British Isles they are, and how different the problems they handle look when viewed from across the seas. They honestly do their best to consider the welfare of the whole Empire, but they cannot fail to be unduly influenced by the atmosphere of the island in which they have spent their lives. And it is far better that these differences should have been brought out and adjusted in conference beforehand than that they should emerge when it is too late, to embitter and estrange during the difficult period of repatriation and readjustment after the war. The charge which is made against British statesmen is not that they do not take infinite pains to discover the right course to follow, but that having discovered it, they do not realise that the second half of statesmanship is to consult and carry with them those who are affected by their decisions. The charge against Downing Street has seldom for a long time past been that of bad government. It has consistently been that of high-handedness. And the cure for that defect is personal contact in conference. The holding of an Imperial Conference in the first half of 1917 is indeed an elementary act of statesmanship. If the war is to go on into 1918 it will be necessary in order that the Empire may concert its measures for the new year. If peace negotiations are to be attempted it will be essential in order that the Imperial Government may enter upon them fortified by the consciousness that the whole Empire is agreed about the principles which must be made to prevail in the terms of peace.

THE GROWING NECESSITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

IN the last few months the conviction has grown, at any rate in the British Isles, that in many important departments of our national life we cannot go back to the grooves in which we travelled before the war. There is a steadily strengthening realisation that there must be a change in the status and powers and responsibilities of the nations of the Empire, and that there must be a more conscious development of the resources of the Empire for the benefit of all who dwell within it. The purpose of this article is to discuss the relation which exists between these ideas and our present constitution. A constitution creates the political machinery through which a community controls its life. A good constitution will give both stability and flexibility to national life. A bad one may be a continuous cause of unrest and bitterness. In this article reasons will be advanced for thinking that our constitutional machinery has grown so defective that the most important single work which lies before us is its reform; because unless it is reformed it will not only become increasingly difficult to carry on smoothly the work of government and reconstruction, but it may give rise to disputes which will be dangerous to the body politic itself.

I. INTER-IMPERIAL RELATIONS

THE first, and in some ways the most important, defect in our constitutional system is to be found in the imperial sphere. Practically everybody now recognises that the present arrangement whereby the Dominions

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can be put to war without being consulted, and at the discretion of a government elected by and responsible to the people of the British Isles alone, cannot continue. This view has been frequently expressed by leading statesmen both of the Dominions and of the United Kingdom in recent months, and has found an almost universal echo in the popular mind and the public Press. It behoves us therefore to see exactly where the present system has begun to fail.

The present constitution of the Empire is defective in two respects. On the one hand the Empire must have its foreign policy—with the tremendous consequential liabilities of peace and war—determined by one authority. The control of foreign policy, of the issues of peace and war, cannot be divided among a number of different authorities. As the events of the fortnight preceding the war conclusively showed, and as the negotiation of peace will probably equally show, the essence of a sound foreign policy is often prompt action. That authority to-day, however, is the Cabinet and Parliament and people of the United Kingdom. And that means that so long as the British constitution remains as it is to-day, the Dominions, at every crisis, however perfectly they may have been consulted beforehand, will be faced in the final resort with the intolerable alternatives of acting on the instructions of a foreign minister who does not represent them, who is not responsible to them, and who in the nature of things is likely to be ignorant or forgetful of their local conditions, or of seceding from the British Empire, and ceasing to be British citizens.

On the other hand the present arrangement means that the so-called Imperial Government has no real authority over a great part of the Empire for whose safety it is responsible, and also has to depend for the revenues necessary for Imperial defence upon taxes voted by the people of the British Isles alone, supplemented by contributions in money or in kind voted by peoples oversea, whom it does not repre-

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sent and whose Parliaments it never meets. Thus, under existing circumstances, the Imperial Government is not responsible to the people of the Empire, for they cannot change that government when they disapprove of its policy, nor are the people of the Empire responsible to the Imperial authority for obeying the laws or finding the revenues it may consider essential to the well-being of the Empire as a whole.

This system has worked hitherto, because till 1914 it had never been subjected to any serious strain, and because when the crisis did come all parts of the Empire were entirely agreed about the need for entering the war, and equally resolute in prosecuting it with the utmost vigour and determination under the general direction of the British Government. But while it has worked hitherto, and while it was probably the only system which could have worked in the transitional era before the war, it is obvious that it cannot remain unchanged indefinitely after it is over. It is neither consistent with the determination of the Dominion peoples to be fully self-governing, nor with the growing necessity for a representative authority which can handle properly the rapidly multiplying problems of the Empire.

The root of the trouble lies in the fact that the so-called Imperial Parliament is in reality the Parliament of the British Isles, and that what is in essence a national government has to discharge the functions of an Imperial Government as well. So long as this continues it is manifest that the present Imperial authority will not command the full confidence of the oversea peoples, and will not in consequence be able to discharge efficiently its difficult and increasingly important Imperial functions. This state of affairs cannot be remedied by patchwork reform. It clearly requires far-reaching constitutional change. In an article entitled *The Imperial Dilemma*, published in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*, the conclusion was reached that the only cure was the application to the Imperial

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Constitution of the federal principle, that is to say the separation of the bodies which control the domestic affairs of the United Kingdom and the common affairs of the Empire, and making the one responsible to the people of the British Isles and the other responsible to the people of the Empire. In no other way did it seem possible to reconcile national autonomy with an united self-governing Empire. The present co-operative system will work so long as the Dominions are willing to leave the final decision in Imperial and foreign policy to the British Government and to comply with its decisions themselves, and so long as the British people are able and willing to make themselves responsible for the defence of the whole Empire. But directly one of these conditions fails the co-operative system will also fail, and we shall be faced with the immediate necessity for constitutional change of the gravest kind.

Pressure towards constitutional change is also coming from another quarter of the Imperial horizon. India has recently put forward not only the demand for a larger measure of local self-government, but also for some representation in the Imperial councils. That is a demand which no one who realises the services rendered by India in this war and the internal progress in India itself can ignore. It is manifest that some means must be found whereby the views and needs of a country containing 315,000,000 inhabitants can find direct expression when fundamental questions of Imperial policy are under consideration. The way of doing this will not be easy to find, but the fact that the demand has been made, and rightly made, shows that from the point of view of India, as well as of the self-governing Empire, the constitutional system governing inter-Imperial relations "will of necessity," as Mr. Asquith said, be "brought, and brought promptly, under close and connected review," after the war, unless serious misunderstandings and difficulties are to arise.

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II. THE PARLIAMENT ACT

THERE is another important respect in which constitutional change is required. The Parliament Act, whereby the absolute veto of the House of Lords over legislation was taken away, and whereby any act of the House of Commons passed in three consecutive sessions becomes law over the heads of the second chamber, has left the British constitution in a mutilated and a highly dangerous condition. We need not discuss whether or not the House of Lords was wise in forcing a fight on the constitutional issue, or whether or not the majority in the House of Commons was wise in the precise method it adopted to overcome the veto power of the upper House. The only fact with which we are concerned is that, as its authors are the first to admit, the Parliament Act is only a first stage in a process of reform, and that it has left the constitution itself in a state in which it is liable to involve the Empire in grave danger.

The constitution as it exists to-day is dangerous for two reasons. In the first place, it leaves not the British Isles alone but the Empire under the control of a single chamber government, with no other safeguard against revolutionary change by a temporary party majority, except that if its acts are rejected by the House of Lords there will be a delay of between two and three years before they become law. The objection, however, to single chamber government is not only that it is undemocratic because it gives a temporary party majority autocratic powers, it is even more that it acts as a direct incentive to passive resistance or even active rebellion. For where important bills are in question large minorities are tempted to resist the law on the ground that the majority has misused its powers by utilising the machinery of the State to impose upon them a change of which the community does not approve. In the second place, it undermines the independence of the House of

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Commons itself, while making it less, rather than more, responsible to electoral control. This is the result of the provision delaying the final enactment of an act. For during the two and a half years which must elapse before a bill rejected by the House of Lords becomes law the bill overshadows the whole life of Parliament. Though other matters of fundamental importance are before the House, everything is subordinated to getting the main parliamentary plank, not yet law, on the Statute Book. Members are urged and induced to support the Cabinet on many matters on which they might otherwise oppose it in order not to imperil the bill, which means that the power of the party machine over the individual member is largely increased. At the same time general elections are resisted and postponed to the last possible minute, lest the bill be lost. Thus the effect of the Act has been to get rid of the veto of an hereditary and ultra-conservative second chamber, but at the price of creating a single chamber government for the British Isles and for the Empire, of constant encouragement to civil strife, and of diminishing the independence of the members of that chamber and making it even less subject to the control of the electorate than it was before.

These evils were abundantly exemplified in the history of the Home Rule Act. The question of Home Rule was taken up by the Liberal-Nationalist majority with general popular consent. But the bill as introduced aroused the most violent opposition, especially among a quarter of the people of Ireland. Now the Home Rule Bill was manifestly a most far-reaching measure of constitutional change. It proposed to separate the governments of Great Britain and Ireland, to place the Irish Protestant minority under the control of the Catholic majority, and to complicate seriously the working of the Imperial Parliament by enabling Irish members to continue to vote on Great British local affairs after the control of Irish local affairs had been transferred to an Irish Parliament. It was indeed the gravest

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measure of constitutional change since the Union Act of 1800. Under any properly balanced constitution such a constitutional change would either have been subject to rejection by an independent second chamber, which would have compelled the party majority to compromise or lose their bill, or the final decision in regard to the proposals would have been referred in some way or other to the people themselves. In this case the minority, believing the bill to be disastrous, prepared to resist the application of the Act by force directly they saw that the Government intended to pass it into law under the Parliament Act without a reference to the electorate, with the inevitable result that the country drifted towards civil war. We are not concerned here with the rights and wrongs of the conduct of any of the parties whose action produced these results. We are concerned only to point out that this evil was produced not solely by the violence of human passion, but in great measure by the state of the constitution itself, and that, so long as the constitution remains as it is, this danger is certain to arise again whenever some fundamental measure becomes the subject of party warfare.

The principle of reform is not difficult to discern. In a democratic community the ideal constitution provides for great stability in fundamental laws and great facility for change in everyday administration and legislation. In the past the British constitution has possessed these qualities. Sovereign power was concentrated in the hands of Parliament, which could therefore act with great speed and decision when so minded. But security was provided against revolutionary change by an independent second chamber, constituted partly on the hereditary principle and partly by nomination of the government of the day, and unalterably conservative in character. This security has now been destroyed, and it is certain that it will never be restored in its old form. The alternative most usually put forward is the restoration of the veto power to a reformed second chamber. Experience, however, all over the world

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shows that it is extraordinarily difficult to find any method of constituting a satisfactory second chamber with co-ordinate powers to those of the Lower House. The usual methods of doing so are nomination by the government of the day, or some form of popular election, or some combination of the two, but none of these expedients have proved really successful. The second chamber is practically never independent. It either becomes the creature of one party, in which case its decisions are not really independent, or it becomes simply another reflection of the popular will, competing for power with the lower House, but not really representing an independent point of view.

The truth of the matter would seem to be that in a modern democracy it is the electorate itself which must perform the most important duty of the old second chamber, and be alike the security against revolutionary change by temporary party majorities and the authority which must secure the peaceful acceptance by minorities of important measures of constitutional reform. This can be done in one of two ways. The constitution itself can be written down and it can be provided that the law of the constitution can be altered only with the assent of the electorate ascertained by referendum. Or if the constitution is not written it can be provided that where the upper and lower Houses cannot agree the deadlock shall be resolved by a referendum. Referendum, indeed, is the essence of the case in both methods. For, as will be seen more clearly in the next section, a general election is an almost useless method of obtaining a decision.

We need not discuss the merits of these two methods. Both of them restore a proper balance to the constitution. The first probably implies federation, for under no other circumstances is the writing down of the British constitution likely to be undertaken. The second probably implies a reform of the second chamber, but it makes that reform far easier, for the most important responsibility of the second chamber, the absolute veto

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power, will have been transferred to the electorate, and the second chamber itself will take its proper place as an independent chamber of review, and not as a co-ordinate political authority. But whichever system prevails it is clear that if we are to avoid a renewal of the dangers which arose over the Home Rule Act we must at a very early date complete the process of reform begun by the Parliament Act.

III. THE CONGESTION OF PARLIAMENT

THERE is a third reason for constitutional reform, which is perhaps the most urgent of all, and that is the growing congestion of Parliament. This congestion takes two forms. First of all there is the inability of Parliament to deal with the sheer mass of business which comes before it. This subject was exhaustively treated in an article published in *THE ROUND TABLE* in November, 1911, and entitled "The Congestion of Business in the House of Commons." It was there shown that the House of Commons was unable under the present conditions of working to pass the legislation necessary to the good government of the country. Vital subjects urgently requiring attention were shelved for years for want of time in which to consider them. Large numbers of bills of less importance, but none the less essential to the smooth working of government, were lost every year through being squeezed out by the great measures of the session. There was a growing failure to scrutinise public expenditure, millions being voted every year without discussion of any sort or kind. Further, the Government, by requiring almost the whole of the time of Parliament for its own essential business, deprived the private member of his proper opportunities, and reduced him to a mere machine for speaking and voting for his party.

An analysis was also made of the expedients whereby

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the situation might be relieved. It was shown that it was practically impossible to increase the amount of parliamentary time, indeed that it was important rather to diminish it, if Ministers were to attend properly to their departmental duties and to the preparation of legislation. It was also proved that Parliament itself was fully alive to the problem, and had attempted to tackle it by various forms of closure, from the "kangaroo" to the "guillotine." But the conclusion was reached that "it had failed to find any permanent cure. The difficulties have a way of growing faster than the alleviations ; and after ten years of constant changes of procedure, it is impossible to maintain that the legislative horizon is any brighter or any clearer. The congestion is, if anything, more pronounced, and it has become tolerably clear that no mere adjustment of existing machinery can avail to relieve it."

Opinions may differ as to the extent to which party spirit and the methods of parliamentary warfare are responsible for the state of affairs, and to the mitigations of the evil which might be made by a reform of parliamentary procedure. But party spirit and party politics cannot be exorcised altogether. In every country where great reforms are in progress there are bound to be violent divergencies of opinion which will reflect themselves in Parliament. And wherever a parliamentary opposition manifests itself the present evils are bound to reappear. But even under the most favourable conditions it is pretty obvious that there is bound to be congestion of business in the House of Commons. America, with a population of 100 millions, transacts its business through one Congress and 48 State legislatures ; Canada, with a population of between seven and eight millions, through one federal Parliament and nine provincial legislatures ; Australia, with a population of five millions, through a federal Parliament and six State Parliaments ; and Germany, with a population of 66 millions, through an Imperial Government, six State Governments, and a number of lesser author-

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ities. The British Imperial Parliament, on the other hand, not only governs the 45,000,000 people of the British Isles in every detail, but is also responsible for the foreign policy and defence of the whole Empire and for the government of India, Egypt and the Crown Colonies. Yet the scope of governmental activity, both in the national and the Imperial sphere, so far from contracting, is expanding with huge rapidity. It is manifestly impossible that the immense variety of administrative and legislative work involved should be adequately performed by one organ of government alone. It is inevitable that Ministers and members should become more and more overworked, that they should choose those matters for attention which are most forced upon their notice, that in consequence they should neglect or misunderstand those remoter Indian and Dominion interests for which they are responsible but which are not represented in Parliament, that legislation should be hurried, scamped, and above all delayed, that the work of day-to-day administration should suffer, and that the distrust of Parliament and politicians should steadily increase.

But there is another aspect of congestion which is in reality more serious than the congestion of business to be transacted, and that is the paralysis it is causing in parliamentary life, and the hopeless impediment it presents to the control of public policy by the electorate. It first of all impairs the efficiency of the Cabinet. Owing to the immense variety of subjects with which it has to deal, the Cabinet becomes too large in size, while at the same time it becomes practically impossible for the individual Minister to have any real knowledge of the majority of the subjects which come before it. This means that while each Minister finds the work of his department delayed because the Cabinet cannot find time to decide the questions he wishes to put before it, the Cabinet itself, when it does find the necessary time, is over large, and is at the mercy of the specialised knowledge of the Minister. The effect of this has become obvious during the war. But it is no less

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true in peace. It is exactly the same with Parliament. In his ignorance, the individual member of the majority has no option but to comply with the official view. He is subject, indeed, to a quite exceptional degree of discipline. Discipline is to some extent inseparable from any system of government. But it becomes a grave danger where it is carried to the extent which is inevitable under the constitution as it exists at present. A single party majority is responsible for such separate provinces of government as foreign affairs and defence, the government of India and the Crown Colonies, the British constitution, Irish affairs, and the whole gamut of domestic reform. Members of the majority will certainly not agree with the decisions of the Cabinet in all these spheres. They may be vehemently opposed to their policy in one of them. Yet if they show their independence by voting against it they imperil the rest of the reforms for which they have been working for years. The pressure, therefore, on the individual member to come to heel on every occasion lest he should imperil the Government on whom his main hopes depend, and put in the Opposition whose programme he detests, is tremendously strong. The multiplicity of function, therefore, while overloading and overworking the Cabinet, gives it almost autocratic powers over the House of Commons.

In the second place, the over-concentration of functions makes it extremely difficult for the electorate to exercise any effective control over public policy. General elections at present are an almost farcical method of doing so. For at election time the voter is expected to decide by means of a single vote between two sets of candidates for office, representing different points of view, and their programmes on external policy, Imperial policy, constitutional reform, and the infinite complex of social reform. In most cases it is probable that a very large number of voters would wish to vote for one party on one set of issues and for the other on another. For instance, many voters would have voted for

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the Unionist foreign and defence policy and the Liberal home policy before the war. Yet it was impossible for them to do so. They are forced to choose which was the most important set of issues, and let the other slide. The actual choice before the voter, therefore, is little more than which set of party politicians does he wish to give a comparatively free hand to for the next five years.

The congestion of business and the over-concentration of functions in one Parliament, therefore, tends to delays, to inefficiency in government, to the overwork both of ministers and members, to party rigidity, the paralysis of the independence of the individual member, the autocracy of the Cabinet, and the diminution of the effective control by the electorate over public policy. And it causes these evils not in a national legislature but in the parliament which is ultimately responsible for the good government of over 400,000,000 souls and for the peace and safety of the whole Empire.

In this case there is only one cure, and that is the application of the principle of federation—that is to say, the division of the functions of government between different sets of Cabinets and legislatures, which will give to each the time to master and transact the business entrusted to it, and will enable both the member of Parliament and the electorate to vote separately on the various provinces of government. This is the system which has been adopted in America, in Germany, in Canada, and in Australia. It is obviously the system to which we must come in the case of the British Empire. There is indeed no other way in which the problem can be dealt with at all under a democratic system of government.

IV. THE URGENCY OF REFORM

THE preceding sections would seem to prove that the constitution of the Empire is rapidly breaking down, and that the only real cure for its many defects, if the unity

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of the Empire is to be maintained, is the separation of the body which controls Imperial affairs from that which controls United Kingdom affairs, by the application to the Imperial constitution of some form of the federal principle. Some of the defects can be mitigated in other ways, but the federalisation of the institutions of the Empire is the only method by which all the needs of the situation can be fully met. Federation would enable all the self-governing peoples of the Empire to share equally in the responsibility for their foreign policy and would ensure that that foreign policy was subject to the control of the Imperial democracy. It would provide for the situation created by the Parliament Act, for it would involve the definition of the relative spheres of authority of the Imperial and the national legislatures, and the provision of constitutional means whereby alterations to the constitution would have behind them the assent of the electorate before they were put into effect. And it would enormously diminish, if it did not entirely remove, the evils of congestion, for it would double the machinery of government by entrusting the control of Imperial affairs and of the national affairs of the British Isles to separate bodies, and would also enable both members of Parliament and the electorate to decide at separate elections on the broad policy to be followed in each sphere.

It may seem at first sight that so profound a change in our institutions, one for which public opinion in all parts is so little prepared, and which is bound to disturb so many traditions, must necessarily be so far off that there is no need to think seriously about it at present. But the briefest consideration of the situation as it will exist at the end of the war shows that, however far off the final decision may be, the constitutional issue itself is bound to be driven into the forefront of practical politics by the facts of the situation. It may be brought to a head by events in the inter-Imperial sphere. The many questions relating to the control of the foreign policy of the Empire, the liquidation of the war itself, and the distribution of the burden of

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Imperial defence, or of obligations incurred in the peace settlement, will all be made doubly difficult because there is no true Imperial government to deal with them. The so-called Imperial government is really the national government of the British Isles, and as such unrepresentative and over-influenced by the point of view and requirements of the electorate to which it is alone responsible. This state of affairs may well produce difficulties and misunderstandings which will be recognised to be insoluble except by constitutional change. Similarly the Parliament Act may precipitate the necessity for constitutional reform, and as it is the Parliament which is responsible for the security of the Empire and the good government of India, Egypt, and the Crown Colonies, whose independence and efficiency it impairs, reform, when it is undertaken, is bound to be a matter of concern to the Empire as well as to the people of the British Isles.

But it is the situation which will exist within the House of Commons which is most likely to force the issue to the front. If congestion was bad before the war, it is likely to be far worse after it, as is obvious if one considers the list of matters which will demand urgent and continuous attention. In the first place, there will be the international situation. The cease-fire is likely to be sounded on a settlement of boundaries and indemnities and one or two other matters. But there are bound to be many other questions to be settled, as was the case after the Napoleonic wars, questions of great practical importance to the future of the world, and especially that of creating an international system which will give real security for liberty and peace. The settlement of these problems will certainly take years and will require constant attention and prompt decisions if any real measure of success is to be attained. Then there will be the difficult and thorny question of defence. Is the principle of compulsory service to be retained or not? What are the relative burdens to be borne by the different parts of the Empire? Then there is India. India has put forward, as we have seen, the claim both to a further

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advance towards self-government in India itself, and for some system by which India's views and needs can be directly represented in London when Imperial policy is under review. And however opinion may differ as to the form in which they should be conceded, they must be dealt with without delay when the war is over. Then there is the whole group of subjects left over from before the war. The Irish question is the most obvious as it is the most important and the most difficult. In addition, there is the Welsh Church Bill, the Insurance Act, land reform, housing, poor law, and a vast number of lesser matters. Finally, there is the colossal group of problems created by the war itself. There is the demobilisation and repatriation of the armies, their re-absorption into the national life, the restarting of industry and trade on a peace basis, the settlement of pensions, disablement allowances, the fulfilment of the industrial promises about the reintroduction of Trade Union rules, the future of women in industry, protection versus free trade, the relations between capital and labour, the rehabilitation of agriculture as a vital source of food supply, and so on. The list might be indefinitely prolonged.

Every one of these matters will be urgent. Yet every one of them will have to be dealt with by one Cabinet and one Parliament. Is it not inevitable that there will be serious delays, and inefficiency and hurry in the effort to avoid delay? Is it not inevitable that a Cabinet overgrown and overloaded in war will become yet more overgrown and overloaded in peace, and that Parliament and people will be driven more and more to do what the Cabinet decides because to dispute about it would be to intensify confusion and delay? And is it not inevitable that general elections, that corner-stone of democracy, will be almost useless as a means of reaching decisions and getting things done? One has only to consider what a general election would mean when all these issues were presented to the electorate at one moment, to see how futile it is bound to be. And what is likely to be the effect of such a state of affairs? Is it

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possible, for instance, to conceive a more certain way of producing a revolution in India, or a hopeless impasse in Ireland, or general revolutionary industrial unrest, or serious inter-imperial friction, than that the government should keep on making the reply that the consideration of these problems, vital and urgent as they admittedly were, must be postponed until more urgent business is disposed of, and it has time to deal with them. Yet that is the reply which must inevitably be frequently made.

It requires, indeed, no elaboration to show that we may be far nearer a real breakdown in our governmental machinery than anyone supposes. Nor does it require any argument to show that the root cause of the trouble lies in the fact that we are endeavouring to conduct the government of the Empire and the government of the United Kingdom through the same set of men, and that there is no way of getting rid of the trouble so long as Imperial and national functions are concentrated in the same hands.

With that we may leave the problem. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the merits and demerits of particular schemes of reform. Its purpose is to endeavour to show that the question of constitutional reconstruction of the most far-reaching kind is bound to enter the sphere of practical politics directly the war is over, not through the activity of enthusiasts or constitutional reformers, but through the inexorable pressure of necessity. Our present constitution neither enables the people of the British Isles to mould effectively the development of their own society, nor does it enable the people of the Empire to control at all the government and the future of the greater commonwealth of which they are parts. We are members indeed neither of a commonwealth nor an Empire. If the work of reconstruction is to be smoothly and efficiently accomplished, if the Empire is to survive as a unity, and if democracy is to be a reality in any of its parts, it will only be as the result of the remodelling of its institutions on federal lines.

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I. THE HIGHER DIRECTION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

ON the return of peace this country will be faced with the greatest industrial problem in its whole history. Six or seven million men will be discharged from their present occupation either of serving in the Army or Navy or of making munitions. The cost of living will be much higher than before the war ; wages will be higher ; interest on capital will be higher. Since interest and wages can only be paid out of the daily product of industry—there is no other source—neither will wages be maintained nor will capital obtain the return necessary to prevent its being drawn off to other countries, unless the product of our industry is greater than before the war, and unless our trade and commerce are organised to find markets for this increased product

The standard of living among the majority of the industrial classes, as is now generally recognised, imperatively requires not only maintaining, but improving. On that basis only can a better trained and a more vigorous community be built. Yet that better standard can only come out of increased national production. It cannot be created by distributing the accumulated capital resources of the rich as wages, nor by diminishing the return which capital received from industry before the war. That was so low that the greater part of the national savings were attracted by the higher interest offered abroad. From the practical point of view successful reconstruction depends

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upon such increased national production as will permit of paying the market rate of interest on capital and such wages as will improve the standard of living, especially of the poorer classes.

The rapid and efficient production of wealth depends in the main on the following conditions. First and foremost, on harmony between capital and labour. In industry those who work with their heads and those who work with their hands co-operate to produce the things which all of us need. If conflict and disunion take the place of co-operation, wealth-production is hindered, and everything the community requires is rendered less abundant and more costly. To secure this harmony of interest is the master problem of the modern industrial state. This subject is further discussed in another article in this issue, and to it we need not make further reference here.

Secondly, the rapid production of wealth depends on the habits of the rich. If those who have more than they want for the ordinary needs of life squander their surplus on forms of expenditure unproductive and wasteful in themselves, they do a double injury to the nation. They reduce *pro tanto* the wealth available for spending on productive effort, and they demoralise that part of the population whose lives are spent purely in ministering to the useless pleasures of the rich. If a rich man with a million to spend were to spend it on laying out pleasure grounds, on yachting, and so forth, the results to the community would be altogether different from those which would result supposing, for instance, he decided to spend it, say, on a great scheme for electrical power stations in an industrial area, designed not for his own profit but for the public benefit. In both cases he might employ the same amount of labour, but in one case the permanent results to the community would be *nil*; in the other the public would enjoy for ever cheaper and better power facilities, with innumerable effects on prices, travelling facilities, and so on. While our own country stands in need of vast schemes of re-housing,

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improvement of communications, development of electrical power, economical use of our coal supply, reorganisation of agriculture, improvement in education and in every sphere of social life there can be no excuse for the extravagant expenditure of the nation's resources in labour and material in providing superfluities for the rich. To this subject also no further reference will be made in this article.

The third important factor in the production of wealth is what may be termed the higher direction of industry in the broadest sense. Organisation, direction, co-ordination and knowledge are as essential to modern industry as they are to a modern army. The industrial army is always at war with nature. If it is to maintain its place in the van with the industrial armies of other progressive nations, it will depend not only on the natural qualities of its rank and file and on the good feeling between the rank and file and the directing class, but also on its staff work, on its equipment being maintained at the highest possible pitch, on new developments being carried through, new ideas and inventions sought and welcomed, on the collection of detailed and world-wide information on trade and industry, and on the co-ordination of all the directing forces of the nation, political, industrial, scientific and financial, both to secure the utmost internal development, and to conduct the strategic penetration of foreign markets. In a word, it will depend on the brains, adaptability and hard work of those who direct industry. It is this aspect of the problem of increasing the national production with which this article is concerned, and especially with the relation which the provision of adequate financial facilities to industry bears to it.

It is admitted that there are many weak points in our industrial armour. In the first place it is generally agreed that the equipment and plant of our industry is in many respects inferior, and sometimes markedly inferior, to that of America, and probably in a good many cases to that of Germany. We were before the war, and still are, in many

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respects inferior to the United States in the application of machinery and automatic mechanical appliances ; we are greatly behindhand in the use of power, particularly electrical power, by the efficient utilisation of which our industrial life might be largely transformed.

The causes of our mechanical inferiority are various. One is the lack of research, to which reference is made later, and which results in the use of antiquated processes. Another is that we started earlier than our competitors. We built our railways and factories and docks on too small a scale ; our tunnels too narrow, our platforms too small, our terminals too cramped ; our workshops in crowded towns, where there is no room for expansion. Different industries grew up separately—e.g. blast furnaces, and steel works, which to-day should probably in certain cases be combined. Everywhere we are handicapped in the re-equipment and reorganisation of our industry by our having started on a scale too small for to-day, to say nothing of the further handicaps caused by the reluctance of the British workingman to take kindly to new labour-saving devices, and of the British industrialist to accept new ideas.

These difficulties have been increased by the ruinous tendency of most industrial businesses to divide profits up to the hilt, a tendency encouraged by our taxing laws. Reserves for depreciation and betterment are usually inadequate and accordingly large expenditure on re-equipment becomes impossible. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of this matter. There never has been an age when developments in new inventions and processes were more rapid, or when more money was required by all the great industries, if they are to keep abreast of their foreign competitors. Unless they build up their reserves they cannot take advantage of new developments ; their profits are reduced in the face of more up-to-date competition, and they become less and less able to regain their position. Take an electric power company as an example. The coal consumption of a power station

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constructed to-day should for the same output be certainly not more than half that of one built in 1900. If a company which built its power station in 1900 has not been able to put by money wholly to re-equip it, it must either charge its customers much higher rates for power than should be necessary or face such a reduction in profits as may ruin it. A very large proportion of the coal used in the country is still used in plants involving a coal consumption from five to fifteen times greater than the best that can be done to-day. Everyone knows that our railways have been great sinners in the past in not conserving their resources. Does anyone suppose that, if some of our southern lines were in the United States, they would not be reorganised within a year? No doubt there are in this country much greater difficulties owing to the far smaller scope for development. But what is the position? They go on decade after decade crying for thorough reconstruction, starved by the sins of their former directors, and yet incapable of reorganisation owing to the provisions of our laws relating to statutory companies, originally designed though these were to protect the public. If the alternatives facing a railway company or any industrial company are to starve its plant and divide all its profits on the one hand, and reorganisation and a reduction of capital on the other, the interests of the community are decidedly in favour of the latter. The community requires the most efficient transport facilities and production of wealth possible. These can only be obtained by constant renewal of plant, and that is only possible if a producing company is able either to devote its own surplus earnings to the work or to obtain fresh capital. It is in such matters that a sound financial policy is essential to the welfare of industry. If the British investor is to be attracted by the securities of British industrial, railway and public utility companies, then he will have to be assured, and the financial world will have to see to it that a more conservative policy than heretofore is pursued in respect to building up reserves.

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Another defect in our industry is generally thought to be our inferior organisation, both in manufacturing and in selling, and particularly our organisation for competing in foreign markets. Often there are too many small firms making the same thing, with the result that the scale of manufacture is too small, and overhead expenses inordinately large. Then again there is want of co-operation in selling. British industry is organised to meet individual competition, not the organised selling of cartels and great combinations. It is often necessary actually to create the demand, and to compete in fields where we must meet the huge American industries, and the highly organised German competition. Each trade must scientifically investigate foreign markets and lay out its plans in a thorough and far-seeing manner. Whatever we may think of cartels and combinations for home trade, they are undoubtedly necessary for foreign trade, and it is significant that recently the American anti-trust law prohibiting trusts and combinations has been amended so as not to apply to export business. Moreover, a Trade Commission now sits permanently at Washington, the chief activities of which are said to be the organisation of each separate American industry for export trade.

It is in this direction also that industry and finance should go hand in hand. The organised efforts of the German Government and the German banks constantly to assist not only German commerce but German industry abroad are well known. And now great American financial institutions, the National City Bank, the American International Corporation, and the Guaranty Trust are doing the same thing. They are beginning carefully and thoroughly to study foreign markets with a view to developing American industrial exports. The British foreign and colonial banks already do much for British trade abroad. But closer contact between finance and industry is needed. Opportunities in foreign markets often require in these days combined investigation both on the financial and

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industrial side. Whether, for instance, it is a foreign country which wishes to give out a large construction contract, or a British shipbuilding company which wishes to tender to build ships abroad, or whatever may be the proposal, the financial and manufacturing world must go hand in hand. There is too little co-ordinated effort in London in this direction.

A third defect is the lack of co-ordination between industry and research. The work of research, much neglected in this country, can no longer be carried out in a haphazard and unmethodical way. Modern industry is founded on natural science and its application to the material world. There may be a time far distant when we shall have found out all that we can about nature. But to-day that is far away. To-day we are in an age of incessant scientific discovery, and the increased production of wealth and our power of competition depends on the application of all this knowledge, both in small and great things, to industry. Wherever we look, whether it is in the vast development of electricity, not only for the ordinary purposes of lighting and power, but in the refining and production of metals or products such as nitrate from air, or the development of chemistry and its universal application to industry and agriculture, or to the vast economies possible in the proper utilisation of our coal resources, or whether we consider the development of the internal combustion engine, everywhere we see great progress. If we are to live in competition with other nations, we must keep ourselves abreast of them, not only in actual knowledge but in its practical application to industry.

The recent report of the Committee * of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research contains ample evidence both of the lack of research and the need for it. Here again the difficulties are due largely to the

* Report of the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research for the year 1915-16.

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small-scale industry and the lack of co-operation. "Research," says a Committee of the British Engineers' Association, "cannot be fostered in the comparatively small establishments (and smaller research departments) of most British engineering concerns." "We think," says the Privy Council Committee, "that a good deal of the inertia which British manufacturers have shown towards research may have been due to a realisation, partly instinctive, perhaps, that research on the small scale they could afford was at best a doubtful proposition." The Committees further point out that "organisation can only be fought by counter organisation," and that nothing can be done "so long as the Englishman treats his business house as his business castle, adding to its original plan here and there as necessity or inclination directs with his hand against the hand of every other baron in the trade and no personal interest in the foreign politics of his industry as a whole." The Committee add that they are told that it is difficult, owing to the British banking arrangements—

for any but the largest British manufacturing firms to compete successfully for contracts in foreign markets where long credit is often customary. This difficulty led the British Engineers' Association, shortly before the war, to take steps to form an engineers' trust which would be supported by the firms belonging to the Association and furnish the necessary credit. We do not presume to offer any opinion upon this important and difficult question of finance, but we have felt bound to refer to it in support of the view we have already expressed, that the encouragement of research in our industries raises many other related issues which need equal attention, and which, if reconstruction is to be effective, must be brought into a single synthesis.

The difficulty in the way of research appears, therefore, to be partly accounted for by the unorganised state of British industry and the small scale on which most businesses are conducted.

This question of research leads naturally to the allied one of the adaptation to practice of new ideas, new inven-

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tions and new schemes. We are believed to be behindhand, if not in our scientific knowledge, at least in our application of it. Very many inventions are the fruit of English brains, but their development and application are done by others. Scientific progress to-day is not a series of brilliant ideas which can be straightway committed to practice. In general new developments come step by step, and the secrets of Nature yield themselves to us little by little at the cost of infinite toil. And when we have learnt them "there is many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip." There is a long road between a laboratory experiment and its successful and profitable development in industry, as many know to their cost. The most difficult period in the life of a new invention or a new design is that of adaptation to practice, the long period during which it is necessary to spend much money and much labour, often fruitlessly, in seeing whether it can be applied on a commercial scale. It is often a most costly process, but it is an unavoidable one. Yet it is not seldom far beyond the reach of any individual company with limited resources. The risk of failure is too great. If, then, we are to unite natural science with industry in an effective way, industry must be prepared to face much delay and much expense. It must be ready first to encourage and maintain year in and year out the steady work of research and then to spend time and money on the practical development of the results. It is useless to carry on the work of research haphazard or by fits and starts. An industry must be prepared to forgo its reward perhaps for an indefinite period. And by research is not meant simply chemical research. It covers research of every nature, mechanical, electrical, and so forth.

It covers, too, the study from every side, scientific, commercial and financial, of large schemes of development. An address was recently given before the British Association by Mr. Charles Merz on "Electric Power and Distribution," in which he advocated the establishment of a distribution system of national electrical trunk mains and large

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power stations, by the means of which he anticipated it would in many ways be possible to revolutionise our industry, saving in the near future 25,000,000 tons of coal per annum and eventually 50,000,000 to 60,000,000 tons by developing the general use of electrical energy, establishing new industries, using to a far greater extent the by-products of coal, and cheapening motor fuel.

There is no organisation now in the Empire for developing such schemes either at home or abroad, and generally no money available for even investigating their merits. New schemes frequently get into the hands of people who would rather float them or start them without proper investigation than run the risk of losing the money necessary for proper investigation. New schemes, new processes, and new ideas frequently fail, because they get into the hands of unthorough people, who have not sufficient technical advice and assistance properly to develop them.

These weaknesses in British industry—the failure to apply scientific and technical knowledge to manufacturing, the lack of research, the want of co-operation in manufacturing and in selling, the failure to provide for renewals and depreciation—all of which have as one of their effects the keeping down of wages—are overcome to a great extent in America and Germany by large organisations, cartels and trusts. Their monopolistic tendency is objectionable to the English mind, and possibly among other drawbacks may have the effect of deadening individual initiative. It is particularly to be desired that the small man and the man with new ideas and new schemes should be able to obtain adequate financial assistance, and much can be done to effect this by co-operation among the individuals themselves, and intelligent assistance from the banks. Yet even so it can hardly be questioned that, if the most recent methods are to be used and the greatest economy in production and the use of by-products is to be obtained, some of the greatest industries of the country may have to be conducted on a larger scale.

The Higher Direction of British Industry

The characteristic modern industry is the large-scale industry, whether it takes the concentrated form of the American trust or the combinations of smaller businesses more or less closely organised together, for production or selling, like the German cartels or in a lesser degree the British "rings." In the case of the great industries, like the iron and steel industry, or coal mining, or the chemical engineering, electrical and shipbuilding industries, or the textile industry, increased efficiency is to be found more and more in co-operation and combination than in unrestricted individualism and competition—a co-operation which will not only cover the different processes of industry itself from the raw material up to the sale of the final manufactured article, but which will link up together industry, finance, and research. Efficiency will depend largely on the operations of the industry being conducted on a great scale, on its power to spend large sums of money not only in providing against depreciation, but in installing the latest forms of plant and machinery, and also in looking for improved designs and processes and methods of manufacture. A number of small firms opposed by the Steel Corporation, or the Standard Oil Company, or the Allgemeine Electricitäts Gesellschaft, is like an ill-trained levy meeting in the field a highly organised modern army. Co-operation and combination in production are necessary first, because otherwise the scale of manufacture will be too small and the advantages of specialisation will be lost. They are necessary, again, in selling in order to steady prices, to cut down the middleman's expenses, and also in order to carry on a strategical campaign for the penetration of foreign markets, and to obtain that world-wide knowledge of foreign markets necessary to harmonise production with demand and to escape periods of inflation and depreciation. They are equally necessary if a far-sighted plan of investigation and research is to be steadily carried on.

If these criticisms of British industry are justified, then it seems certain that in the near future we shall require

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large sums of money and the close co-operation and advice in the reorganisation, renovations and new developments which will be needed. It follows that the attention of the British investor must be drawn to his own industries in a more systematic and efficient way than hitherto. He must invest at home some of the hundreds of millions he has in recent years invested abroad. British industry will no longer be able to rely, as hitherto, on its own private and local resources, but must seek more largely the reservoirs of the London market. Whether, if this is to be done systematically and adequately to the needs of the situation, our financial machinery will not have to be supplemented is the problem now agitating the financial world. Before discussing it in detail it may be useful to give some consideration to the case of Germany, where, as is well known, the relations between finance and industry are more intimate than anywhere in the world, and where, as a German writer says, "the credit banks are linked with industry in a well-nigh indissoluble union for weal or woe." German methods seldom in their entirety suit the British people. But we can learn something from them. In a report just published by the Board of Agriculture on "The Recent Development of German Agriculture,"* the following conclusions are reached:—

On a farm of 100 acres

(1) The British farmer feeds from 45 to 50 persons, the German farmer feeds from 70 to 75 persons.

(2) The British farmer grows 15 tons of corn, the German farmer grows 33 tons.

(3) The British farmer grows 11 tons of potatoes, the German farmer grows 55 tons.

(4) The British farmer produces 4 tons of meat, the German farmer produces $4\frac{1}{4}$ tons.

(5) The British farmer produces $17\frac{1}{2}$ tons of milk, the German farmer produces 28 tons.

* *The Recent Development of German Agriculture*, by T. H. Middleton, C.B., Cd. 8505. 1916.

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(6) The British farmer produces a negligible quantity of sugar, the German farmer produces $2\frac{3}{4}$ tons.

The author concludes that, while from the actual processes of German husbandry there is relatively little to learn, "from the agricultural policy of Germany we may learn something, and from the admirable machinery—administrative, educational and commercial—set up to lead, teach and finance agriculturists we may learn much."

It is by no means certain if we could measure the output before the war of a 100-man factory in this country in some of our large industries, and compare it with a similar output in Germany, the United States or Canada, the result would be more encouraging. If our output were less it would certainly not be due to any inherent incapacity in our people, but the result of restriction of output on the one hand, and failure in the co-ordination of industry, science, organisation and finance on the other.

II. THE GERMAN BANKING SYSTEM

THE German banking system differs from the English not only because the Germans are different in temperament from the English, and because, as a recent very qualified writer* has said, the German soul has a "thirst for system, wholeness and closely knit organisation," but because the historical environment of its early beginnings was very different.

When German industry began it found the industry of other countries, and particularly British industry, in control of the world. Germany had practically no industry. Her people were very poor, and a developed banking system practically non-existent. The necessity therefore existed for concentrating as much available capital as possible in the newly formed banks and for utilising this capital for the purposes of industry. In order to grow in the face of

* *The German Soul.* Baron Friedrich von Hugel. 1916.

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foreign competition German industry required every possible weapon, whether it were a tariff or Government aid by bounties, or railway export rates, or, lastly, the organised aid of banking. A further consequence was that German banking and industry practically started simultaneously and grew up together organised in close co-operation. German growth therefore resembles in this respect Japanese growth.

If the beginnings of some of the great banks about 1840 and 1850 are examined, it will be found that in every case their objects included the active promotion of industrial enterprises of all kinds, the investment of the banks' funds in them, and the formation, consolidation and combination of joint stock companies. Thus from the commencement the German banks, induced thereto by the economic conditions then existing in Germany, started out on that path of close partnership with industry upon which they have continued ever since. Special banks of deposit, not taking a direct participation in industry, were not possible at this era owing to the scanty means of the population. As industry itself was too poor, the banks were the only reservoirs from which the capital and credit needed could be drawn.

There has accordingly been developed a far closer connection between banking and industry in Germany than in this country, and many functions are performed by German banks which would be considered in this country to be outside the sphere of legitimate banking. These functions include the tasks of acting as close financial advisers and even controllers of many industrial concerns, of carrying through reorganisation and promotions of industrial companies, of issuing industrial securities, of encouraging new ventures and of syndicate business of every description.

The full development of the limited liability company was of later date in Germany than in this country, and the German banker played a leading part in transforming private firms into limited companies and then in financing

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the new concerns and issuing their securities. Through these transactions the banks were led on "to the conquest of entire branches of industrial activity and to close affiliations with commanding concerns, cartels and syndicates." It was natural that, when once a bank had issued the bonds and shares of an industrial company, and made itself responsible to the public for them, it should, if only for the sake of its issuing credit, take a permanent interest in the company. Thus the banks were brought into ever closer relations with industry. So much so that every great German bank has its own representatives on a surprisingly large number of industrial businesses. For example, the Deutsche Bank, it appears, was in 1911 represented directly on the boards of 12 mining, smelting and salt works, 1 stone and earth company, 3 metal-working companies, 23 engineering and machine companies, 1 chemical company, 4 oil and gas companies, 6 textile companies, 1 paper company, 1 rubber company, 2 food-producing companies, 1 waterworks company, 2 building societies, 2 printing and publishing companies, 27 commercial enterprises, mostly banks, 9 insurance companies, and 19 transportation and public utility companies. Many of these are among the biggest undertakings in Germany. A similar list could be compiled for all the other banks. It was natural that, when the banks became so deeply interested in industries, they should have exercised a strong influence towards consolidation and concentration. They have "promoted a great number of fusions, whose object was either to get rid of troublesome competition, to combine successive stages in the process of production, or to diminish the cost of production," particularly in the mining and electrical industry.

"Large scale industry and capitalism bearing to each other the reciprocal relations of cause and effect were thus enabled by the aid of the German banks to unite in an inseparable alliance, which impressed its characteristic stamp on the entire economic development of Germany."

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It is the German banks' practice of undertaking the responsibility for industrial issues—a practice British joint stocks have never lent themselves to—which “is the keystone of the vast structure of the industrial relations between banks and industry.” It is this practice which, as pointed out above, inevitably leads to direct representation of the banks on industrial boards, and furthermore causes the banks of necessity to maintain with the companies in question the influence they have gained by their issues. It is the duty “of the bank, according to the well-established and sound practice of German banking, to retain such permanent control.”

In order to strengthen themselves in the performance of the heavy duties which they undertook, the German banks naturally resorted to concentration of forces of different kinds. These alliances have taken different forms. There is first what may be called the permanent group of banks round each leading bank. The Deutsche Bank group consists, for instance, of about 20 banks with a combined share capital of something like £50,000,000. In the second place, there are throughout German banking permanent combinations formed by certain banks or banking firms for certain operations or classes of operations, and involving a more or less close alliance among individual banks. These definite groups are divided either as regards certain countries or as regards certain industries, and even as regards special concerns. For instance, most of the large banks and private banking houses have combined to form in the case of China the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank, thus assuring united action, “not only with reference to Chinese, but also all Asiatic financial operations, the new powerful syndicate, led by the Disconto-Gesellschaft, undertaking the common planning and managing of loans and advances to the central Governments, provinces and railroad companies in China, Japan and Korea, and the organising of railroad and mining companies in China.”

“A large number of bank groups originated during the

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second period (i.e. after 1870) as a result of the changed relations of the banks to industry. In this field, the formation of groups, while due to designed industrial policy, had become more pronounced and definite since the 'nineties, and in turn caused a more refined differentiation and growing intensification of this policy. The principal cause was, however, the enormous demand for capital by industry in general and the electro-technical industries in particular. Accordingly we find such bank groups closely allied with the so-called 'heavy' industries (mining, iron and steel) as well as with the 'light' industries, especially the electrical industry, breweries, secondary railways, and petroleum enterprises."

The third class of alliances is what are known in Germany as "konsortien," i.e. syndicates formed for the purpose of a particular operation, and generally similar in character to the underwriting syndicates common in London. It may be interesting to note that "in many cases the acceptance of syndicate participations is by no means voluntary. Whenever there are permanent groups (e.g. for Asiatic, Russian, Austro-Hungarian business, or for business in the domain of the electrical industry), any bank belonging to the group is bound to accept its participation quota in the underwriting or issue unless there is a special arrangement—which is rarely the case—whereby it is free to abstain from a particular operation of the group. The obligations remain even when a bank objects to the particular operation as a whole or to any of its features, to the time, or, what is not less important, the price, or to any other terms of the issue."

The influence of the banks naturally differed in different industries. Compare, for instance, the electrical, the chemical and the mining and metallurgical industries. The electrical industry has required for the great developments it has made in Germany very large capital sums, and its growth would have been "simply inconceivable at any stage of its concentration without the aid of the banks."

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This industry went through several severe crises, in which the banks suffered very heavy losses. At the beginning of this century there had been a period of general overproduction and a chaos of financing, resulting in the formation of seven different large groups of electrical enterprises, each backed by its own banking group. But the financial requirements of the industry were again too great for many of the groups, and subsequently, after the companies and the banks supporting them had gone through some very bad experiences, these seven groups themselves coalesced into two main groups, the Allgemeine Electricitäts Gesellschaft and the Siemens-Schuckert Group. These again now work in co-operation and are supported by all the leading banks. They form a combination in the electrical industry vastly more powerful than anything this country can show.

The chemical industry, for which Germany is equally, if not more, famous, has been influenced in the direction of concentration by technical and not financial causes. It never required much financial assistance from the banks, and therefore did not come under their control. Technical influences and the organisation required for the export trade seem to have been the chief reasons for concentration. It may be added that since the war the two great chemical groups have amalgamated into one.

In the mining and metallurgical industries, again, concentration has been due very largely to the existence of cartels, and "banks and concentration banking have exerted a vast influence on industrial concentration."

It is certain, moreover, that the entire German banking world, as may be seen from numerous reports, not only welcomed such important cartels as the Rhenish-Westphalian and Iron Syndicates and the Steel Works Union, but in many cases helped to bring them into existence, as far as it lay in their power, and within limits compatible with their other duties. This they did not only in the interest of the general welfare and of the prosperity of industry in general, but in the last analysis also in the interest of their own business, closely bound up with the growth and prosperity of the industry which was to be fostered by the establishment of cartels.

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The activity of the large banks in the formation of syndicates has, however, as a rule, more important consequences. As we observed, the organisation of large cartels, which in themselves represent a type of concentration, usually involves the erection, equipment, and amalgamation of large "mixed" works (mixed works are those works combining blast furnaces and steel works) devoted to a variety of operations, thus promoting another form of concentration.

These two districts, the Rhenish-Westphalian and the Lorraine-Luxemburg districts, which may be regarded as the capital seats of the mining and iron industries, witness at present the great struggle for industrial supremacy between the leading mining concerns and for financial supremacy between the leading banks. It is highly interesting to watch the turns in this battle, the numerous ups and downs, surprises, and combinations which present themselves in varied and exciting array to the attentive observer as the contending parties manoeuvre and clash in the combat.

Concentration in banking, which itself was greatly influenced by developments in industry, thus in turn helped to bring about concentration in industry.

A regrettable feature of this movement has been the disappearance or absorption of many of the great private banking houses, whose utility was recognised when it was too late.

It is hardly possible, however, to dispute the fact that German industry has derived great benefits from German banking methods. "One difference," says a German bank director in 1908 to the American National Monetary Commission, "between the banks of England and Germany is that in England the primary purpose of the banks seems to be to secure large earnings for their shareholders. In Germany our banks are largely responsible for the development of the Empire, having fostered and built up its industries."

But is there a reverse side to the shield? Industry has benefited. Has banking gained equally? Are the benefits to industry more than outweighed by the dangers which may invade the whole banking structure? Do the conditions of German banking inspire British bankers to follow in their path? Safety and liquidity must be the

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watchword of a deposit bank, such as are all great British banks, and such as the German banks are more and more tending to become. It is significant to note that the more German banks increase their deposits, the more they are forced to pay heed to those principles of distribution of risk and liquidity of resources which characterise British banking.

On the whole (says Dr. Riesser, from whose work on German banking the above quotations have been made) it may be said that :

1. The distribution of dividends by the banks is becoming steadier in proportion as their deposit business develops.

2. The flotation and issue business is relegated to the rear in proportion as the deposit business comes to the front.

In liquidity of resources, indeed, there is no question but that the British system is incontestably superior to the German. Dr. Riesser, who is himself a convinced advocate of German banking, shows that, notwithstanding the flourishing condition of German industry, the proportion of liquid assets to liabilities has been constantly falling, e.g., as calculated by him from 85 per cent. in 1893 to 62 per cent. in 1908, though recently there is said to have been a considerable improvement. This falling-off he traces to the strong concentration movement in banking and industry and to the unexpectedly large demands of industry and the accompanying growth of speculation. It is generally understood that after the financial crisis of 1907-8 the German Government itself officially notified to the great deposit banks that in its opinion they did not offer sufficient guarantees to their depositors and that by some means or other an improvement must be made. Since that date, and notwithstanding all the successes achieved during the last thirty years, there has been much uneasy feeling in Germany about future banking developments. Banking and industrial power has become largely concentrated in a few hands, and it is recognised that much will depend on competent successors being found to the extremely able

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men who have built up the great banks and industries in the last few decades. Some observers go so far as to say that but for the war far-reaching changes in the German banking system would have been inevitable. It is difficult for anyone in this country to form a sound judgment on this question.

The German banks have all of them learned by bitter experience the danger and difficulties of the large deposit bank of industrial financing.

It cannot be doubted (says Dr. Riesser) that the permanent assumption of large risks in enterprises by credit banks is incompatible with fundamental principles of sound banking policy. Transgressions of this rule have almost always brought their own atonement, often of a cruel nature . . . in order to avoid direct participation, have to a large extent resorted to the invention of trust and finance companies for the purpose of exercising their promoting activity, and for the financing of subsidiary banks.

It has undoubtedly frequently happened that, when once the banks had tied themselves up with a particular industry, they were forced, unless they were prepared to lose everything they had put in, to continue and even increase the facilities they were granting, even if such a course were extremely inconvenient, and in the mining, the engineering and the electrical industries the banks have had many sad experiences. Similarly the banks have often had to finance foreign contracts for German industries, in which they were deeply interested, though the profits attached might not have been commensurate with the risks. On the other hand, German industries have, of course, immensely benefited from the assistance so given.

Where an industrial concern has grown very big and has had large requirements for capital, which its banks will not or cannot meet, it has in more than one case been compelled itself to found institutions apparently independent, for the sole purpose of unloading on to them its undigested securities. Brilliant, then, as have been the successes of German banking, they do not afford any ground for

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suggesting that our joint stock banks would do well to follow in their footsteps. The problem before us is to discover whether we can secure the undoubted merits of the German co-ordination of industry and finance without running the risks which inevitably follow the concentration in one class of bank of every banking and financial function.

III. ENGLISH AND GERMAN BANKING COMPARED

NO financial centre in the world approaches London in the wealth and variety of its banking institutions or in the development of a form of deposit banking of an unrivalled strength and elasticity. No other financial centre approaches it in the width of its operations, whether in financing the world's trade by the London bill of exchange or in the freedom and world-wide scope of its Stock Exchange. No other centre has poured through the machinery of its great issuing houses such a copious flow of capital throughout the world. In no other centre can first-class foreign and colonial securities, whether Government or municipal or railway, be so easily placed. No other financial centre offers to its traders and merchants the help of so many banking institutions abroad as are offered to the British merchants and traders by the British colonial and foreign banks. Moreover, the great British joint stock banks, with their hundreds of millions of deposits, a large percentage of which is loaned direct to trade and industry in this country, provide banking facilities which, subject to the conditions imposed by the nature of British deposit banking, are on the whole quite as liberal as those obtainable in any other country. The British banking system, moreover, escapes the dangers which undoubtedly threaten the German. It is safer and more liquid. The differences between them are largely due to the different conditions surrounding the historical development of the two systems. In this country the imperative reasons for co-operation

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between banks and industry never existed, as they did in Germany, and in consequence they have grown up more or less in separate compartments. British industry early grew wealthy and relied largely on its own resources; it was never forced by want of money to accept the control of the financial and banking interests. Moreover, the system of deposit banking characteristic of this country did not lend itself to close co-operation with industry. The interests of depositors and the comparative smallness of the capital employed required that the banks' assets should be kept as far as possible liquid, and it was not supposed, and with good ground, that such safeguards would be sufficient to prevent the solidity of the banking edifice from being endangered if banks of this character took an active part in the conduct of industry.

The British Joint Stock Banks are, indeed, not fitted, from the nature either of their liabilities or their management, to undertake the tasks which the German banks have hitherto shouldered, and it would be paradoxical that at a time when the German banks, as their deposits grow, are more and more tending towards our own methods, our deposit banks should launch out in directions for which they are in no way suited.

Similarly our great private banking houses in almost every case have avoided being drawn into industrial financing. It could not be otherwise in view of the large liabilities they undertake in connection with financing overseas trade by means of acceptances.

Yet, notwithstanding all the merits of our system, the value of which it would be impossible to overestimate, and while the cogent reasons for the policy of the big banks and accepting houses are admitted, a reflective mind is constantly struck by the peculiar lack of contact between the chief financial centre of the world and the industry of its own country. Indeed, London and the British investor who invests through London knows very little of British industries. In this respect there is a great difference

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between Berlin and New York on the one hand and London on the other. American industrial securities occupy a large space in the life of the New York market ; the most prominent banking houses and other financial institutions are concerned in the organisation and reorganisation of the great railway companies and the great industrial combinations. Their securities are constantly brought prominently before the eyes of the American investor—so much so, indeed, that the great difficulty is to get him to invest in anything else. As to Germany, there is clearly nothing in our country approaching the highly developed co-ordination of the German system, nor the intricate interlocking in the management of finance and industry in every sphere. There are no first-class financial institutions in London which act as organisers or reorganisers of companies, or which issue on their own responsibility industrial securities, whether shares or bonds. Speaking broadly, the banks do not accept any responsibility to the public as regards issues of any sort, even when their name may appear on the prospectus. Therefore they are not driven, as the German banks are, to aid in every way possible the companies whose securities they have issued, or to maintain any special representatives as directors of any large industrial concern, nor do they, either singly or grouped according to the German method, in any way identify themselves with any particular industry or concern. Certain trust companies, it is true, act as media in the issue of industrial securities of prosperous and going concerns. But there is no big financial institution which possesses an industrial department, or has an organisation for study or research into new ideas or new inventions, or a technical staff or advisers ; there is no institution whose special business is to examine and nurse new schemes or developments until they are sufficiently proved and ripe for public investment, or which makes it its business to investigate conditions of industry abroad, or to conduct any campaigns in conjunction with British industry and shipping for a strategic development of foreign

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markets. In a word, there are no financial institutions in London whose aim it is, as it is the aim of the German banks, to act as a kind of general staff to industry.

Our system appears to have certain weaknesses in face of the close and organised inter-relation between industry and finance in Germany. Take, for instance, the question of foreign contracts. Suppose a foreign Government or company wish to carry out in their country a scheme of industrial development involving a large financial outlay. There are some reasons why they should prefer Germany to England. In Germany their schemes will be considered at once by an institution which combines the financial power, the means of investigation and research, the issuing capacity and the industrial connections amply sufficient to carry out any contract, however large, if the scheme is approved by it. Suppose it were a scheme for large electrical development. The plans would be worked out in co-operation between, say, the Deutsche Überseeische Bank, the Deutsche Bank, and Messrs. Siemens and Halske, or the Allgemeine Electricitäts Gesellschaft, or both in conjunction. In many cases the German bank would probably be willing to guarantee the manufacturer or contractor since they are so largely interested.

But if the project were brought to England, how would it be handled? If it were a scheme for harbour or railway building it might well be efficiently handled by one of the great British contracting firms. But schemes relating to more technical industries might be more difficult. No joint stock bank would take up such a scheme or make itself responsible for it. It is possible but improbable that a private banking house might. Even if it did, it would have no organisation for investigating it, nor probably any close contact with the industry concerned comparable to that likely to be possessed by the German bank. In all probability the scheme would fall into the hands of a company promoter, who would then try to interest some financial concern or other, and who might

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or might not finally manage to gather together the means of carrying the scheme through. And this defect of our system is of still more importance when it comes, not to the financing of foreign contracts, but to the development of our own country. It seems likely, therefore, that our lack of co-ordination results in a preference in favour of German industry.

Industrial issues, and particularly new schemes, are left too much to the company promoter. They do not bear the *imprimatur* of any institution which would carry weight with the public and would be a guarantee that the business has been thoroughly investigated, and will be looked after when the issue has been made. The company promoter is concerned to make the issue a success, but, when once it is made, his interest in the business often fades. He must therefore look to make as large an immediate profit as possible regardless of the future welfare of the business. He dares not bear the subsequent responsibility that would attach to an issuing bank or private house. It is a natural consequence of this system that expert inquiry into projects, before they are offered to the public, is often of a far more casual nature than would be the case if a really responsible institution was standing behind the issue. It is this habit of superficial inquiry which has led to vast sums being lost by the public, and to the words "company promoter" and "expert" becoming clothed with a sinister significance in their minds.

A detailed investigation of the public issues made in London in 1913 as shown in *The Times* volume of prospectuses gives the following results. The total issues of that year amounted to over £229,000,000. Of that total only about £13,500,000 was for the purpose of British industry and commerce of every description, including in that definition not only shipping, steel power companies and so forth, but picture palaces, sewing machines, etc. Iron and steel companies and armament firms took something

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over £2,000,000; electrical power about £1,250,000; shipping, £3,800,000; engineering, £100,000. Obviously the amount of permanent capital London provided for British industry is small indeed compared to the copious streams which flow to the Dominions and to foreign countries.

In 1900 the issues of industrial shares by the German banks, on the other hand, amounted to nearly £23,000,000; in 1906 to about £32,000,000. One may take about £25,000,000 as an average. Their issues of industrial debentures may be placed at from £5,000,000 to £15,000,000 a year.

Habit plays a large part in the psychology of the investor. The American investor has the habit of investing in nothing foreign; the French investor has a habit of investing in first and second class foreign government securities; the British investor the habit of investing in colonial and foreign securities of all kinds. This latter habit is the result of a good many influences working over many years. The financing of British industry has been largely of a local and private nature, and the north of England has not closely allied itself with London; the great issuing houses in London have often been more closely in touch with foreign countries than with British industries; and of late years the difficulties with labour, the Trade Union habit of restricting output, and the general insecurity produced by what may be called Mr. Lloyd George's pre-war policy have scared the British investor off home industries. The absence of any protection against "dumping" and unfair foreign competition has added to his diffidence. While our huge foreign investments have been of incalculable value to the whole Allied cause in this war, it is undoubtedly a question for debate whether we might not have spent some at any rate of the capital we have poured into foreign countries more profitably to ourselves and to the whole community in the development of our own country. Important for our trade and

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commerce and for our economic and financial life as are our investments overseas, they must not blind us to what is still more important, the adequate development of our own land. Investments overseas bring profit and interest to the British investor who sends his capital abroad; they increase our exports, and therefore give work to labour here; they also give work to the labour and profits to the capitalists of foreign countries. Capital advantageously spent here is doubly profitable. The labour employed is all home labour; the profits all remain here; and the work done adds wholly to the development of the country. When one considers the condition in which a large section of our population live, it is absurd to say that great sums of capital could not be spent here with advantage to the community. Is not Mr. Sidney Webb right in saying that "the economically sound policy for a nation in the long run is to develop within its own borders as many as possible of the industries fundamental to its health and strength"? Is he not right, too, in suggesting that the real key-industries are—

(a) The re-housing of the population; (b) the improvement of our system of communications; (c) the reorganisation of agriculture; (d) the development of the economically all-important "industry" of preserving the health of the community (drainage, water supply, hospitals, medical attendance, school clinics); (e) an increase in the output of our most valuable product—namely, a highly-trained population.

To these we may add the highest development of our industrial plant—*e.g.*, the use of electrical power, the proper development of our fuel resources and the use of labour-saving devices.

The figures of issues above quoted suggest the reflection whether in view of the reduction caused by the war in the amount of available capital, some measures will not be required in peace time to encourage the employment of capital here rather than its export abroad. The first duty of the German banks, urges Dr. Riesser, is "to use

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the available funds of the nation for increasing the national production and purchasing power, and for strengthening the home markets.”

The undertaking of or participation in foreign investments is practicable only when there is a considerable surplus of capital fully met. Even if these conditions exist, such investments are not to be favoured, when in the long run they result in the strengthening of foreign industry and the enhancing of foreign competition against our domestic trade and industry.

International commercial dealing as well as international flotations ought to be but the means of attaining national ends, and must be placed in the service of national labour.

It is a question whether it is not possible to supplement our financial machinery so as to assist in new schemes of development in this country, and to create a closer link between British industry and the British investor.

IV. THE FINANCING OF INDUSTRY AFTER THE WAR

IF the arguments used in the foregoing pages are sound, then it would seem likely that British industry will, or ought to, require in future years the assistance of finance in a large way, first because existing industries will require renovating, and in some cases conducting on a larger and more economical scale ; secondly, because new schemes and new developments at home will require much more encouragement than they have received in the past ; and, lastly, because foreign contracts and foreign industrial and “ public utility ” schemes will require the close co-operation in this country of finance and industry if we are to compete with Germany and America.

If the needed assistance of finance is to be given it must be through the agency of one or more institutions, whose business it will be to co-operate with industry to achieve the above-mentioned objects. An institution of this character should form a link between British industry and

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the British investor; it should assist in aiding desirable schemes for amalgamation or co-ordination of existing industries; investigate new schemes for development; act as far as may be as the confidential adviser of industry; and it should take up and finance projects to a productive stage and ultimately make issues to the public. Its *imprimatur* on any issue should be evidence to the public that the business in question had been thoroughly and carefully investigated, and that the issuing institution would hold itself responsible for its good management in the future. There is no reason necessarily why there should be only one institution of the kind, and indeed it may be desirable to get away from the idea that the only practicable method is to start a sort of monopolistic semi-government institution. But it is not too much to say that at present there is no institution at all in London which acts in the above relation to the issue of industrial securities.

If the idea were to commend itself to responsible quarters in the City, there should be no great difficulty in making a beginning. There is no lack of money in London, both in the joint stock banks and the trust companies. A number of them could, without difficulty, co-operate to form an institution such as has been outlined above. The amount of capital to be put up at once need not necessarily be very large, though the financial strength and credit of the institution would, of course, have to be undoubted. But if it were known that strong banks and trust companies were backing it, its credit would be secure and its capital could be enlarged from time to time as required. Large dividends could not be expected at once, and this is in itself a strong reason for the capital being provided by large financial institutions. They would have to look not so much to an immediate and direct return, but to the indirect benefit to be derived from the development of the country's industries. The support of strong banking concerns would have the added advantage that the new institution

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would not be tempted in order to earn dividends to go into second-class business and get its resources quickly locked up. It would seem prudent that any such institution should start on a modest scale and that its operations should at first be limited and cautious, so that it might gradually build up its business on firm foundations. Probably at first it would be wise to act mainly as a *Société d'Etudes*. It would require to study carefully the ground and scope of its possible activities before entering on large ventures. There are few institutions, either of a financial or industrial kind, which have not been built up from small beginnings. It is probable and natural that different financial and industrial interests would naturally group themselves round different institutions. If they are found to correspond to a need and are ably managed, they should be able to rely on their own strength and utility.

But the field is a somewhat unknown one in this country, and any such institution would have gradually and often no doubt by difficult experiences to work out for itself its special sphere and the limitations of its activity. It is worth remarking, however, that some authorities are in favour of a more ambitious beginning. Lord Faringdon's Committee, which the President of the Board of Trade recently appointed to consider this particular matter, have recommended the establishment of a British Trade Bank to assist mainly, it would seem, with foreign developments, and appear to contemplate that while such a bank should not receive actual Government assistance, it should be regarded by the Government as the channel through which any financial business in which they are concerned should pass. In other very well-informed quarters there is considered to be a serious and immediate need for a financial institution, not necessarily with any banking functions but with very large resources, so that it should be in a position immediately after the war to provide large sums to enable British industry to compete with the powerful combinations of German and American trusts and

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cartels. If a large capital is to be found at once and if the institution to be founded is to spring into full activity as a sort of "ready-for-service" bank, which will be prepared to plunge into schemes of all kinds, then a Government guarantee of dividends for a certain period would seem almost inevitable. Only so could it feel strong enough to launch out rapidly on large schemes of a promising nature, or indeed be in a position to raise the capital required. A Government guarantee has undoubtedly great attractions. It immediately gives the bank security and strength, and enables it to develop quickly. But it has all the disadvantages of an artificial stimulant. Its subsequent withdrawal might seriously weaken it. It subjects the bank to Government interference and control. And it has other drawbacks, too. Suppose the institution receiving the guarantee were to give its assistance, say, to one group of steel manufacturers in the country and were unable or unwilling in consequence to give it to another. The latter group might with justice complain that the assistance of a State-aided bank given to its competitors was an unfair handicap against it. A third alternative, which is perhaps the most attractive of all, is that some existing institution with a large clientèle at home and abroad should be purchased as a "going concern" and should form a foundation from which to carry out the objects in view.

It is certain that, whatever scheme may be adopted, no little criticism is likely to be provoked in the City. That criticism will take several forms. In the first place, there is a considerable body of opinion in the City, not necessarily very conversant with modern industrial developments, which thinks that our present system fulfils all reasonable needs. A large number of people regard our financial system, just as Burke regarded our Constitution, as something which grows and is not made, and which has by natural evolution grown almost to perfection. It is argued that every country evolves the system which suits it, whether it be the British or the German or the American

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To these critics it is presumably "natural" that the Germans should build Zeppelins and we should not; that we should invent aniline dyes and the Germans exploit them; "natural," too, that the German and American steel industries should increase by leaps and bounds and ours should remain stagnant. It is a form of argument strongly entrenched in the City, but it is not likely to exercise an undue influence on this and the next generation.

A second criticism will be that British industry has all the money it requires. If it does not get it from London, then it gets it, it will be said, from private and local sources. It is, no doubt, quite true that the British joint stocks are quite as liberal as the banks of any other country in providing strictly banking and temporary assistance to industry; it is, no doubt, also true that in the past the money which has gone into industry has been largely found privately. That, however, is not to say, even as regards the past, that the existing system has been adequate. In the future it cannot be doubted that it will be inadequate. Apart altogether from the insufficiency of our machinery for investigating new developments, we cannot be blind to the facts of the world around us. If the world's trade is to be fought for by great foreign combinations and cartels, we, too, must build our industry on a large scale, and large industries require large methods of financing. In other words, the aid of the investor will have to be sought in an adequate way through the financial machinery of London. By our enormous war orders we are pouring fabulous sums into the laps of the great American iron, steel, and engineering industries. They will be vastly more wealthy and powerful than our own industries. Even now the great American basic industries are reaching out to acquire all the best deposits of raw materials they can lay their hands on, wherever they may be. Representatives of American industry, backed by great financial corporations, are seeking new business in all likely quarters of the globe, and in the future we shall have two enterprising

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and powerful countries and not one to compete with abroad. Even before the war, notwithstanding the reputation for integrity which British industry and finance enjoyed, and which still inclines foreign countries in our favour, the tendency has been of late years for Russian, Chinese, and South American enterprises to go to Germany or the United States. A contributory cause is undoubtedly the roundabout, slow, and costly methods of negotiating financial business through company promoters, trust companies, and so forth, in London compared with the immediate and thorough consideration given to them elsewhere by powerful and combined financial and industrial interests.

Another criticism, which has perhaps been particularly provoked by the form of the report of Lord Faringdon's Committee, is that the functions suggested are not such as any bank can or ought properly to undertake. Everyone will agree that they are not such as one of the big deposit banks can undertake. But since it can hardly be argued that they are functions beyond the power of any institution to perform, this criticism resolves itself into the comparatively unimportant question whether the proposed institution should use the name "bank." Whatever the name, it is important that any institution formed should be left a free hand to decide on what functions are or are not incidental to its business. It is not likely to compete unnecessarily with existing institutions on whose support its success will largely depend, and the more "bread-and-butter business" it can properly secure the better.

Other criticisms will be rather in the nature of pointing out the difficulties of the undertaking, difficulties the existence of which no one wishes to deny. It will be said that no such institution will be able to earn a sufficient return on its capital. That surely will depend on the prosperity or otherwise of British industry. Since such an institution is not likely to accept deposits at call, at any rate on any large scale, it would be idle to suppose that it can

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earn anything approaching the profits made by a joint stock bank with a paid-up capital of £5,000,000 and deposits of £150,000,000. Indeed, it has already been urged that high returns should not be looked for, at first at any rate, especially as it would be imperative that strong reserves should be built up as soon as possible. It may be noted that while British joint stock banks earn from 15 to 20 per cent. and over, German banks earn an average of 7 to 8 per cent.

What is undoubtedly essential to success is that British industry should be as prosperous as the industry of other countries. If management is unenterprising, if labour restricts output, if excessive taxes dishearten initiative, or if foreign dumping or artificial aid to exports are allowed to keep British industry "unhealthy," then it will undoubtedly be difficult to persuade the investor that British industrial securities possess any attraction. But if, as is to be hoped, all these handicaps are removed, and British industry is able to build itself up on firm foundations, there is no reason why it should not prosper, and, if industry is prosperous, any institution engaged in financing it should find the means of prospering with it.

Lastly, it is argued that the men capable of managing such an institution do not exist in this country. It is true that success or failure will be decided in the main by management, and that any such institution, if it were managed by men without wide knowledge both of international finance and of industrial conditions generally, might not rise above the level of an ordinary finance company. It is unfortunately true also that the Englishmen are few who have the thorough acquaintance which many Germans have of international banking, of languages, and of other financial centres. That this should be so is indeed a proof of the limitations of our present system. Even as it is, however, one can hardly admit that England is so bankrupt of ability that the men cannot be found. It is interesting to note that the National City Bank of New York has with characteristic American energy put in motion a big

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scheme for training a large number of Americans in international banking and in a knowledge of foreign countries. Other American institutions are following suit. It is work which we also must take up with thoroughness.

In conclusion, then, it may be said that while no one who has had experience of industrial financing is likely to underrate the difficulties involved, a consideration of the above criticisms does not lead one to the conviction that any insuperable obstacles exist to some such development as is suggested. While it is education and brains, the adaptation of knowledge and science to practice which are what our industry mainly needs, and while the main responsibility for the future of industry lies with the leaders of industry themselves, there are good grounds for supposing that the efficiency of our wealth-production, on which the economic health of the whole community depends, would at least be assisted by the co-operation of finance and industry in some manner more effective than that which has been provided by the existing machinery of the City of London.

LABOUR AND RECONSTRUCTION

I. INDUSTRIAL UNREST

BEFORE the war all the signs pointed to the approach of serious industrial trouble. The expenditure of the chief Unions on industrial disputes had risen from an average of £150,000 a year for the years 1904-7 to a sum of £1,350,000 for 1913 alone. And the gospel of direct action, of effecting reform by means of the general strike, which greatly facilitated the triple alliance of miners, railway men, and transport workers, consummated in 1915, was making rapid headway. Capital and Labour, indeed, were set in positions irreconcilable with one another, and both seemed to be preparing for what they regarded as war to the knife.

The outbreak of the war in Europe caused an immediate truce, and for the first months after August, 1914, the industrial world enjoyed unusual peace in face of the greater dangers outside. But the immense demand for munitions, the rise in the cost of living, and the shortage of labour through enlistment in the army, rendered necessary a transformation of the national industries which brought the old quarrels to the surface once more. There followed a period of acute difficulty which manifested itself in strikes, in opposition to compulsory military service, and in resistance to the removal of a multitude of minor obstacles which stood in the way of putting the nation on to a war basis. We need not re-examine the history of how these difficulties were overcome. Fortunately, except

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for problems connected with the rise in the cost of living, they have been overcome by working agreements which will operate for the duration of the war.

But if the war has not solved the capital and labour problem it has produced one far-reaching effect. Whereas three years ago everybody regarded industrial strife with a kind of fatalism, there has now grown up a general conviction that it is an intolerable evil, which must somehow or other be eradicated from the body politic. And this attitude of mind has begun to spring up not only among industrialists themselves, but among the general public as well. Public opinion has realised as never before that industrial warfare not only injures employer and employed, but reacts no less disastrously on the community. Not the least important of the lessons of the war is the growing conviction that the community must grapple with the causes of the hatred and suspicion and unrest which have been gnawing at its vitals ever since the industrial revolution took place.

What are, therefore, the causes of industrial unrest? There are many explanations, but fundamentally they seem to resolve themselves down to two. In mediæval days manufacture was chiefly conducted by guilds of skilled craftsmen, who owned the means of production, and who sold the product of their own labour. The capital outlay necessary to conduct manufacture in these days was inconsiderable, and businesses were so small that journeymen and apprentices usually worked together at their trade. Mechanical invention destroyed this system. As the means of production became more elaborate and more organised, the individual craftsman producer disappeared, and the capitalist who had money to construct a factory and to pay many hired workers, and so produce more cheaply than his rival, took his place.

It is out of these changed conditions that modern industrial unrest has sprung. The first effect of the new methods was the rapid widening of the gulf between

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employer and employed. The employer became more and more preoccupied with the problem of management, with the mechanical side of building up and managing the industry, with that function of higher direction, which includes initiative, organising ability, judgment in buying and selling, and on which the successful conduct of large scale industry increasingly depends. And in his preoccupations as a manager he began to lose sight of the human aspect of industry. Business is largely a matter of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, and early in the days of capitalist production the employer began to treat his now numerous employées not so much as fellow human beings for whose benefit the industry was being conducted equally with his own, but as part of the machinery of industry to be bought for as low wages as possible. On the other hand, the work of the employé became ever more mechanical, and more specialised. He became farther and farther removed from the problems of management, until his main preoccupation became to protect his own conditions of life and to secure higher wages out of the employer, by combination or any other means he could contrive, regardless of the effect on the business as a whole. Thus industry came to be founded not on co-operation between employer and employed for their mutual advantage, but on warfare between them for the division of the product. Each side, struggling for its own hand, became increasingly blind to the point of view and needs of the other, increasingly suspicious and distrustful of the other, and farther and farther away from the only solution of the trouble, the vigorous conduct of industry by all for the benefit of all. From this divorce between the two partners in industry almost all industrial evils have sprung.

This evil was aggravated by the failure of the community. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century the community had always regarded itself as being responsible for seeing that adequate wages and proper conditions of work were

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secured to its citizens—*e.g.*, the statute of apprentices. In consequence it was customary for labourers and artisans to appeal to the magistrates to determine what were fair wages and proper conditions of employment, when they regarded the rates paid by employers as too low. But in the early days of the industrial revolution Parliament abdicated its responsibilities. As new machinery was invented, labour demanded the Parliamentary prohibition of these new methods on the ground that they caused local unemployment, or at least the statutory enforcement of ancient practices which were inconsistent with the new methods and increased output. Parliament, rightly enough, refused to forbid the use of machinery, but, possessed by the *laissez faire* economic doctrines of the day, it went on to abandon altogether its responsibility for safeguarding the conditions and the standards of living of its own citizens, and left the workers to look after themselves as best they could. And, not content with this, when the working classes began to strike and agitate as the only methods left to them of protecting their standards of life, it went on to attack trade unionism as an illegal combination in restraint of trade. The consequences of this attitude were apparent not only in the evils of the industrial revolution but also in the general acquiescence in the system of private industrial war which ensued. The community came to regard this state of affairs as natural or at least inevitable, and confined its interference mainly to keeping the ring and seeing that the law was not broken during the continuous quarrels between the two. It seemed to take for granted that all engaged in industry were selfishly striving for themselves, that in this struggle the weak must go to the wall, and that the state was only concerned to see that the contest did not degenerate into violence and bloodshed.

The Labour Point of View

II. THE LABOUR POINT OF VIEW

AGAINST this state of affairs the working class have always been in revolt. Having been for nearly two hundred years the bottom dog, they have been far more active in challenging the existing order and suggesting ways out of it than the more fortunate governing classes.

In early days the labour world was mainly concerned with organising itself into trades unions, partly for sickness and unemployment and other benefit purposes, and partly for the purpose of fighting for higher wages and better conditions of work by collective instead of individual bargaining. How important the Trade Union movement has now become is shown in the Congress held at Birmingham this year. This Congress, the forty-eighth general assembly of delegates of the Trade Union world, contained 668 delegates—almost exactly the numbers of the House of Commons—representing 2,850,000 members. The total number of Trade Unionists in the United Kingdom is about 4,000,000. In 1913 the income of the chief Unions amounted to about £3,500,000 and their accumulated funds to about £5,000,000. Another indication of the strength of the working-class movement is the co-operative movement. The total retail sales of the movement now reach nearly £90,000,000 per annum; their members are more than 3,000,000, and their share and loan capital exceeds £50,000,000, which would be still greater but for the legal limit fixed for the holding of individuals.

But the interests of the labour world have not been confined to organising the Trade Union movement. They have also been centred on the problem of reforming the whole system of conducting industry which came into existence with the industrial revolution. What has made the Labour movement a political movement and not a mere industrial movement, what unites it not only in each country

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but all over the world in international federations, is the conviction that the capitalist system as it exists to-day is fundamentally unsound and immoral.

The main point of view of the labour world is simple and clear. It sets the human value of the individual worker first, and subordinates every other end of national policy to that of increasing the well-being and equalising and widening the opportunities for every citizen within the State. In its eyes national prosperity must be judged not by banking returns, national wealth, or armaments, but primarily by the conditions and standards of life and work of all the people. Trade, finance, and power are all important in their way, but they are not ends in themselves as they are sometimes loosely taken to be, but means to the true end—the greater happiness and well-being of the whole people. This end the capitalist system in its present form does not achieve. On the one hand the majority of the workers of the British Isles for the last century have been underpaid, underfed, and badly housed. As a result of combination and hard warfare, the skilled artisans have won for themselves a standard of life above the minimum standard of living, but the great bulk of the workers have not. They are always either below the level of proper subsistence or in danger of falling below it. On the other hand the wealth of the rich has grown fabulously. How immense is the volume of wealth possessed by the few has only been revealed by the war. And all this has been produced out of the profits of industry, or the investment of those profits in developing countries overseas. There is something fundamentally wrong, says Labour, about a system which accumulates wealth in this colossal fashion at one end of the scale while keeping immense numbers of men, women, and children starving at the other. Somehow or other it must be transformed, for it shows no signs of transforming itself. And it must be transformed by revolutionary means if peaceful methods fail, for the one essential thing is that it should not go on.

The Labour Point of View

Reaction against the evils of the capitalist system has given birth to many proposals for reform, socialistic and otherwise. None of these constructive creeds has an overwhelming following in the British Isles. But the Labour world is united none the less, and it is coming more and more to concentrate against the evils of what it calls "private profiteering" and "feudalism" in industry. "Profiteering" is susceptible of many interpretations, but, neglecting remoter visions and such obvious evils as the speculative holding up of food supplies, the attack upon it by the best and most sober labourites would seem to amount to this: Labour says it is quite wrong that the primary motive of industry should be private profit. Industry ought to be conducted primarily in the interests of the well-being of the human beings who give their labour, mental and manual, to it. That is the most important aspect of industry from the social and national point of view. Yet it is not the point of view which rules in industry to-day. On the whole, industries are started and managed in order to make profits for owners of capital. And their success or otherwise is judged not by the economic standard of life which they give to those who work in them, but by the amount of profit which they distribute to owners of capital, who do no other work except to lend their money to the business. This, says Labour, is the wrong point of view. Labour does not contend that industries should not be made to pay. They must clearly be well managed so that they shall pay proper dividends and put aside enough to depreciation and betterment as well, for otherwise they will collapse. But the dividend they ought to aim at distributing ought to include not only adequate interest on capital, but better standards of living for all connected with the industry, and a better and cheaper product for the community as well. There can, indeed, says Labour, be no solution of the industrial problem until the dominant motive which underlies the promotion and conduct of industry is no longer private profit but

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the interest of the community, and the social well-being of all those engaged in the business.

Similarly with "feudalism." Industrial feudalism means the control of industry and of all those engaged in it by the owner of capital, and is the complement to "private profiteering." Labour does not object to direction. Industry manifestly cannot flourish or exist unless everybody acts under the orders of a single management which is responsible for its successful conduct. But it does contend that the point of view of that management of industry is very unlikely to change from that of making profits to that of promoting the welfare of all engaged in it, so long as it is responsible to the owner of capital alone. Just as in the political sphere the feudal control of the citizen by the baron or the king ended in the welfare of the individual being subordinated to the glory or power or wealth of the "feudalist," so, inevitably, has the control of industry by the "capitalist barons" ended in the welfare of those who spend their lives in it being subordinated to the profit of the owner of capital.

Speaking very broadly, this may be said to be the point of view of the industrial masses who for nearly two centuries have experienced the evils—the want and suffering and starvation and death—which have been the by-product of the existing economic order. The Labour world throws up endless panaceas, from universal nationalisation to the abolition of interest. And, unfortunately, it is almost always the views of the extremists which find their way into publicity. But, so far as it is possible to analyse the highest common denominator of the best Labour opinion, it would seem to be a common determination to eradicate the predominance of the private profit motive from the control of industry and to replace it by that of the public welfare.

The Trade Union Congress

III. THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS

IN view of the growing strength of the Labour movement and of the general desire to grapple with the causes of industrial unrest the meeting of the Trade Union Congress this year was of peculiar interest. For it gave some indication of the reaction of Labour opinion to the new facts and conditions created by the war and of the angle from which they are likely to approach the problem of industrial reconstruction.

The proceedings of the Congress itself are somewhat misleading. As a corporate body the Congress has practically no responsibility. The resolutions it passes on general subjects are no more than pious expressions of opinion, with no executive effect. Many of them are clearly introduced for window-dressing purposes, or get through because it is not worth while to dispute them. They have often a very one-sided character because there is no opposition present to put forward the point of view either of the employer or the Government. It is, therefore, to the general trend and reception of the speeches, rather than to the resolutions themselves, that we must look as the truest guide of the movement of opinion in that intense democratic life of the Trade Union branches of which the Congress is the outward and visible manifestation.

So far as the actual proceedings were concerned the most important resolutions of a general character demanded immediate action to keep down the cost of living and to limit the speculative inflation of food prices, the restoration of Trade Union rights after the war, an all-round forty-eight hour working week, the conscription of wealth, an increase in the scope of the Old-Age Pensions Act, better facilities for education, the abolition of the Military Conscription Act, and the maintenance of the

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standard of life and of a normal working day after the war. There was a strong body of opinion in favour of the nationalisation of railways, canals, and mines. The Congress declared emphatically against participating in any international congress with Trade Union delegates from Germany and Austria until after peace had been signed. There was a cautious vote in favour of protecting British industry from the competition of foreign goods made under sweated conditions. There was also some discussion about the employment of women, but on this, as on the question of craft *versus* industrial unionism, the Congress was manifestly anxious to avoid a public discussion. The best indication of the practical policy towards which labour opinion is moving is to be found in the resolution submitted by the Parliamentary Committee—the executive of the Congress—and carried unanimously almost without discussion. It reads as follows :

“ NATIONAL ORGANISATION OF INDUSTRY

“The war has proved beyond all doubt the national weakness and danger of our pre-war industrial system and the need for immediate reform.

“Our vital industries should no longer be left in the hands of capitalists whose first object is profits, and workers whose first object is wages. Such industries should be regulated by the State in the national interest.

“ MINISTER OF LABOUR AND INDUSTRY

“A Minister of Labour and Industry shall be appointed whose functions shall be to control and organise, as follows :

“I. *Health of the Workers.*—The wage-earners, being the largest and most important asset of the nation, should have the first care of the nation, therefore all workshops

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and factories shall conform to a national standard of sanitation calculated to ensure, as far as possible the safety and health of the workers employed.

“ 2. *Housing*.—The provision of adequate sanitary housing accommodation, where such is not already obtainable at reasonable rates. Such houses, where possible, should be self-contained, with gardens.

“ 3. *Agriculture and Food Supply*.—

“ (a) National control and direction of use of all land.

“ (b) Security of tenure for tenants. Land and Rent Courts. Compensation for improvements.

“ (c) Shipping. The State to have first claim on the use of all British ships, at rates which will yield a fixed national standard of profit.

“ (d) Nationally owned and controlled storehouses with reserves of grain, frozen meat, dried fish, and all kinds of necessary storable food.

“ 4. *War Munitions, Ships, Railways, Mines, etc.*—

“ (a) Complete national ownership and production of all war material and ships of war, including the auxiliary ships necessary for national emergencies.

“ (b) National ownership and control of all railways, waterways, and mines.” *

The keynote to the Congress was well struck in the President's (Mr. H. Gosling) opening address. After pointing to the difficulties which would face labour immediately after the war, “ problems of women's labour, of the introduction of unapprenticed men to the skilled trades, of piece-work rates—in the settlement of which Trade Unionists will have to be consulted, and must be ready to apply all their technical knowledge and practical wisdom in order to reach a satisfactory conclusion,” he went on :

* Agenda Trade Union Congress, p. 24 (3).

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“ But underlying all these difficulties will be that of the fear of unemployment and the threat of a reduction of the standard rates. If the Government allows unemployment to become prevalent—if the employers refuse to stay their reduction notices—any solution of these problems will be almost hopeless. The key to the after-war position is the prevention of unemployment, and the Government holds in its hand that key.

“ But we hope for something better than a mere avoidance of unemployment and strikes. We are tired of war in the industrial field. The British workman cannot quietly submit to an autocratic government of the conditions of his own life. He will not take “ Prussianism ” lying down, even in the dock, the factory, or the mine. Would it not be possible for the employers of this country, on the conclusion of peace, when we have rid ourselves of the restrictive legislation to which we have submitted for war purposes, to agree to put their businesses on a new footing by admitting the workmen to some participation, not in profits, but in control ? We workmen do not ask that we should be admitted to any share in what is essentially the employer’s own business—that is, in those matters which do not concern us directly in the industry or employment in which we may be engaged. We do not seek to sit on the Board of Directors, or to interfere with the buying of materials, or with the selling of the product. But in the daily management of the employment in which we spend our working lives, in the atmosphere and under the conditions in which we have to work, in the hours of beginning and ending work, in the conditions of remuneration, and even in the manners and practices of the foremen with whom we have to be in contact, in all these matters we feel that we, as workmen, have a right to a voice—even to an equal voice—with the management itself. Believe me, we shall never get any lasting Industrial Peace except on the lines of Industrial Democracy.” *

* Trade Union Congress, Presidential Address, pp. 6, 7.

The Trade Union Congress

The note of this speech is clearly moderation. And this was also the note of the Congress. It is manifest that as the result of the experience of war, the Labour world, like everybody else, is anxious for reconstruction by peaceful means.

It is, indeed, even more clearly indicated in the resolution passed in favour of entering into negotiations with the employers, which reads as follows :

“ In view of the importance of maintaining the trade and commerce of the country in the period immediately following the declaration of peace, when industrial adjustments of all kinds will require to be made, this Congress is of the opinion that every effort should be put forth to preserve industrial peace, and thereby assist to secure the material prosperity of the nation after the war.

“ That, for the purpose of removing causes of friction likely to lead to industrial disturbance, the Parliamentary Committee is hereby instructed to approach the Government and the Employers' Parliamentary Association with the object of discussing terms that will secure the end in view for a period of three years, such terms to include the acceptance of the following proposals :

“ 1. Membership of a Trade Union to be compulsory upon all workers.

“ 2. Compulsory forty-eight hour working week in every occupation.

“ 3. Compulsory minimum wage of 30s. for all adult workers.

“ 4. No reduction of present wages or increase in working hours.

“ 5. Complete recognition by employers of Trade Unions and all agreements entered into between the unions and employers' associations.

“ 6. State unemployment pay for men and women out of work.

“ 7. Settlement by the unions of the conditions of women's labour after the war.”

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Being a gathering of practical men and women, mostly working Trade Union secretaries, the Congress was concerned rather with the immediate steps towards an improvement in industrial conditions than with ultimate solutions of the relations between Capital and Labour. And it was obvious that the problem on which the minds of the members were chiefly concentrated was that of reconstruction after the war. The point of view from which they will approach it is clear. They will endeavour to secure, by every means in their power, that after the war the industrial life of the community shall be built on the foundation of such wages and hours and conditions of work as will enable every worker to maintain a cleanly and comfortable home, and to have leisure sufficient to enable him to continue his education and to help to bring up his children as useful and responsible members of the community. And the practical form in which this principle will probably take shape will be that reconstruction should be based on the maintenance of the highest recent level of real wages, the introduction of a minimum wage of about 30s. a week, and the establishment of a national normal day based on a forty-eight hour working week, without overtime save in the most exceptional emergencies.

IV. THE PROBLEM OF RECONSTRUCTION

WITH this ideal no public-spirited citizen can possibly disagree. The securing of an adequate minimum standard of life would at one stroke abolish half of the problems of poverty and the slum, and would benefit the children to a degree which only those who have marked the improvement in the appearance and clothing of children all over the country since the war began will realise. And a normal working day is almost a necessary condition for the effective working of our constitution,

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for otherwise the elector, who in the last resort decides upon the broad policy to be followed in the intricate and momentous problems of the modern world, cannot fit himself to cast his vote as he should. No greater blessing could come out of the war than that we should build the whole work of reconstruction upon the foundation of a permanently higher standard of living for all engaged in productive industry, and especially for the lower-paid workers. The real problem is to discover the means by which it can be done.

It was at this point that the Trade Union Congress manifested its real weakness. Dogged by that tradition which, as we have seen, inevitably comes from being divorced from any knowledge of or share in responsibility for the problems of industrial management, the Congress made no adequate attempt to tackle the problem for itself. Its members were content to leave the Government and the capitalist to find the way, or to recommend such easy but illusory expedients as nationalisation, and the conscription of capital, or to point to the vast resources of the community as revealed by the daily expenditure on the war as proof that the beneficent reforms they suggested could easily be carried out and paid for if only the will were there. Some of these ideas have much to recommend them as general principles. Some of them may well be realised in the millenium which will be reached after years of those smaller measures which are the foundation of all lasting reform. But they do not meet the practical problem of the situation as it will exist immediately after the war. That practical problem is how to enable industry to find employment for all on the basis of higher wages and shorter hours than were in force before the war. It would seem to be worth while, therefore, to give some thought to this question.

The problem of creating permanently better conditions for the working classes would seem to resolve itself down into two things—increased production and the better

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higher direction of industry. These conditions cannot be created by distributing the accumulated wealth of the rich in the form of higher wages. Not only is most of that wealth not realisable in the form of money, but to distribute capital as working expenses is the shortest road to national suicide. Nor can they be created by diminishing the rate of interest paid in the national staple industries. Excessive profits are often made by monopolies or new industries, which are usually small industries, and capital has often been "watered" in the past. But in the main staples which support the bulk of the industrial population the rate of interest earned in normal times is not excessive nor more than sufficient to enable the industry to obtain those fresh supplies of capital which are constantly required if it is to keep up to date and survive in the competition with rivals at home or abroad. The real evil is not the rate of interest, but the concentration of excessive quantities of capital in a few hands. And that evil can only be dealt with by the State itself through income taxes, death duties, and other means of limiting or redistributing capital holdings. So far indeed from its being possible to reduce the rate of interest on capital after the war, it will probably rise. For the demand for capital after the war will be immense, the interest rate is largely an international rate, and capital will only be obtainable in a market in which the demand will exceed the supply. Further, about four-fifths of the production of every year is consumed in that year. If, therefore, the general level of consumption is to be raised the level of production must be raised also. The truth is that the standard of production before the war was wholly inadequate. It neither provided adequate pay or adequate employment for labour, nor, despite all appearances, did it, on the whole, pay excessive profits to capital, for these profits were not sufficient to prevent the greater part of the national savings, badly needed at home, from being attracted by the far higher rates of profit obtainable abroad. Hence, whatever the far future may bring forth,

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the first plank in the practical politics of reconstruction would seem to be to increase production, so that the annual national dividend may be sufficient both to pay the market rate on capital and to pay high wages as well.

Increased production is a matter both for employer and employed. It is practically impossible without the co-operation of Labour. The foundation alike of industrial prosperity and national well-being can only be a good day's work for a good day's pay. The continuance of ca'canny, the want of adaptability caused by Trade Union regulations, and the general restriction of output, if they continue after the war, will make the payment of high wages impossible. But increased production is no less a matter for the employer. The evils caused by Trade Union policy have been duplicated by conservatism and unenterprising management among the captains of industry. We need not discuss this question here, for it is dealt with in another article in this issue.* If every industry could command the inventive genius, the scientific research, the organising, manufacturing and selling capacity, the public spirit and the hard work of the Ford motor car company and its employees, there would not be much difficulty about increasing production, and with it wages and dividends, and giving low prices to the consumer as well. Increased output, indeed, means a change in all classes, for it means the growth of the gospel of work. The love of ease, and the belief that happiness lies in having no work to do, was strong in all classes before the war. Even now people assume that it will be possible to go back to pre-war standards. That can never be. Faced by necessity and the example of the Germans, we have begun to see how little we understood what work meant. Work does not mean longer hours, or more fatigue. It means more initiative, and more enterprise, and joy in doing one's work perfectly, however simple it may be, because it is one's own contribution towards the national well-

* See *Industry and Finance*, Section I.

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being. We shall never get the right idea of work until we see that at bottom it is public service which everyone ought to perform, rich and poor alike. We have found something of this spirit during the war. We shall only build a happier world if we retain it afterwards.

But increased output as the result of better work and better management deals with only half the problem. Probably the greatest difficulty of all in the way of maintaining higher standards of living all round is that aspect of the higher direction of industry which is concerned with finding markets. The main reason why the working classes, and especially those who were formerly worst off, are, on the whole, better off than they were before the war, is because the war market for industrial and agricultural products at high prices is practically unlimited, because manufactories can therefore flourish despite high wages, and because the demand for labour is greater than the supply. If the effective demand for goods was unlimited after the war nothing would be easier than to work a revolution in the economic condition of the working classes in a very short space of time. But under present-day conditions the effective demand is not unlimited, and it is this fact which is the governing fact of the whole process of industry. For it is no use producing goods for which no market can be found, or at a cost which involves a loss on every product sold. The President of the Trade Union Congress rightly said that the most important thing of all from the point of view of Labour was the prevention of unemployment after the war. That is only another way of saying that the most important thing will be to find markets. They are, indeed, but two aspects of one thing. There can be no real security for the individual worker until there is steady employment at adequate wages. And there can be no steady employment at adequate wages until there is security for steady markets at adequate prices.

Demand, of course, is in essence unlimited. Nobody ever is supplied with all he wants. There are always things

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which he needs or would like if he could get them. But this demand to-day is not effective, and the most urgent problem of the time is to adjust supply and demand so that there shall not be millions of people anxious for goods and services at the same time as thousands are starving because they can find no work to do. The perfect adjustment of supply and demand, however, is not very easy. It certainly cannot be accomplished by slap-dash expedients. It requires almost infinite research and industry. It involves accurate and continuous investigation into markets, the sources of raw material, the supplies of labour, all over the world. It means the most careful consideration of the balance between consumption and the saving required to create the capital necessary for the renewal and extension of industrial plant and buildings. High wages, for instance, are one of the most important factors in creating and maintaining a large home demand. It means the provision of adequate means of transportation and the intelligent and far-sighted adjustment of railway and steamship rates. It is concerned with national and international fiscal policy. It involves great flexibility and adaptability both in the management and in the working man, so that methods and products may be quickly changed to suit changes in demand and so on. All these matters settle themselves at haphazard to-day under a faulty application of the law of supply and demand. If we are to have really better times it will only be because order has been consciously and intelligently introduced into this chaos of ignorance and competition.

Reconstruction, therefore, on the admirable lines desired by Labour depends in part upon better work from the worker and better management from the employer, but still more on the better direction of industry from the point of view of adjusting supply and demand. If we are really to have higher wages and a normal day, not only for our pre-war population but also for the vast numbers of new workers which the war, or high taxation after the war, will force into

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the labour market, it will never come from measures for taxing the rich, or redistributing accumulated wealth, however desirable and urgent such measures may be on other grounds; it will only be because the difficulties in the way of increasing production and finding markets have been successfully overcome. And seeing how difficult and complicated the process of industry is, it is impossible that these difficulties should be overcome so long as the partners in industry are quarrelling among themselves. Successful industry requires constant initiative, constant improvement of method, an intimate knowledge of conditions in every stage from the production of raw material in one part of the globe to the sale of the finished product in another. This delicate work, on which the prosperity not only of the capitalist and the workers, but of the community also depends, cannot be rapidly and efficiently conducted in the midst of intestinal strife. The preliminary to any reconstruction of our industrial life on a higher economic level is the active co-operation of employer and employed throughout all the complicated processes of buying, manufacture and sale of which modern industry consists.

V. THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDUSTRY

HOW is the reconciliation necessary to this co-operation to be effected? It would seem to be by the introduction not so much of changed organisation, though that may follow, but of a new point of view. In the first section of this article we said that the ultimate causes of industrial unrest were the divorce between employer and employed and the acquiescence of the State in the system of private industrial war. The cure for these evils would seem to have been supplied by the war. As is now patent to everybody, industry is public service, for on it the national well-being depends. And it is by looking

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at it from the point of view of its being public service that the solution of the problem comes in sight.

On the one hand, if industry is public service, the main motive of the employer ought not to be private profit. The employer in reality occupies a position of high public trust, for he is responsible for an industry which is not only a source of national supply, but the means whereby a great many citizens and their families gain their living. From the national point of view he is not a successful manager until he conducts the industry in such a way that not only is he able to pay such dividends on capital that he can obtain whatever supplies of fresh capital are required for the conduct or expansion of the industry, but is able to pay wages sufficient to enable everybody employed in it to live as a responsible citizen should. Further, before paying inordinate dividends either to Capital or Labour he ought to consider whether he ought not to reduce the price of his product to the public. Directly the employer recognises that he is in essence a public servant, and that, while he is entitled to adequate remuneration and capital to adequate interest, the well-being of all his employees is, from the national point of view, the most important of the many considerations of which he has to take account, the way to reconciliation will be plain.

On the other hand, the main motive of the employé ought to be to give the best work possible during an adequate working day. He also is a public servant, contributing his mite to the work on which the community lives and entitled to wages and hours which will enable him to acquit himself in other ways as a responsible citizen, provided he works to the utmost of his ability during working hours.

On this basis, and on this basis alone, does it appear possible to effect such a reconciliation between employers and employed that the work of reconstruction will be undertaken in a spirit of zealous co-operation and not of suspicion and conflict. It does not solve all the difficulties

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of the industrial situation, but it affords the starting point from which they can be successfully approached. It does not, for instance, provide for that industrial democracy which the Chairman of the Trade Union Congress said was the only condition of lasting industrial peace. But industrial democracy implies a far more fundamental revolution than Mr. Gosling appeared to realise. Democracy in industry carries with it the same implications as it does in government. It means that Labour must shoulder the whole responsibility for industry. Industry is one indivisible whole, and, in the long run, the final responsibility for it must rest in one set of hands. The capitalist can no more be responsible for one-half of the business and Labour for the other than Cabinet and Opposition can each control a separate share of public administration. Industrial democracy in the true meaning of the word can only mean that the management will be appointed by and responsible to Labour, who will thus be responsible not only for interest on the capital it borrows, but for liabilities undertaken, orders given, and for the whole complicated process of buying, producing and selling from start to finish. According to Mr. Gosling, Labour is anxious to avoid shouldering this responsibility. So long as that is so, the capitalist must continue to be responsible for the conduct of industry as he is to-day, and Labour must work under his direction. There can be no industrial democracy until Labour is willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities as well as the privileges of management. The road of advance is not to create two independent authorities in industry, but to make the one responsible authority representative of all concerned in industry.

But if industrial democracy, the final solution of the industrial problem, is not yet in sight, the conversion of industry from a conflict into a commonwealth is immediately possible. And it becomes possible directly the motive of public service is loyally accepted by both sides. Once that is done, we shall see a second industrial revolu-

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tion, not less far-reaching, but far more beneficent in its effects, than the first. If all the energy and enterprise and enthusiasm which are put into the business of warfare were applied to increasing the efficiency of industry itself, and heightening the conditions of living of all those engaged in it, the creation and diffusion of wealth would be such that in an astonishingly short space of time the worst and most humiliating of our national problems—unemployment, underfeeding, the slums, and the workhouses—would disappear, and we should have not only a nation of adequately provided families, but ample funds for works of public utility as well.

The greatest single obstacle in the way of a good start towards better days is the accumulated grievances which each has against the other. The employer, struggling with the immense difficulties of management, of finding markets and reducing costs in order to sell successfully in them, finds himself thwarted and hindered by Labour at every stage. Organised Labour seems to him to be ineradicably unreasonable, unpatriotic, and self-seeking, and utterly regardless of the problem of managing the industries on which the national welfare depends and of which he feels himself the only responsible guardian. Labour, on the other hand, struggling with the problem of living in a country where unemployment has been rife, and low wages prevalent in many trades, tends to regard employers as a class of people of exceptional heartlessness and greed; as men who scruple not to reduce wages or sack employees regardless of the appalling effects in working-class homes, in order that they may make sure of profits for themselves. In consequence it settles down into an attitude of settled hostility, and regards restriction of output, strikes, and all the other practices of which the employer complains, as legitimate methods by which to maintain the standard of life and protect itself against exploitation. This sea of traditional suspicion and ill-will is fed by a daily trickle of new grievances created by

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bad employers and unscrupulous or ignorant agitators. And thus we get the two sides drawn up in parallel armies, each so suspicious of the other and so set in its belief in the supreme efficacy of force that negotiation is more like the diplomacy of the mailed fist than conference between partners in the same business.

If we are really to reconstruct our country this world of suspicion and hatred must be left behind. It will do no good to remember who was responsible for the evils in the past, or the long catalogue of mistakes on both sides. The only thing is to set to work to build the future, with better work from one side and better pay from the other as the starting point. Fortunately the omens are bright. As we become more conscious of the sacrifices and endurance of those who are fighting our battles abroad, so also grows the determination that nothing must be allowed to stand in the way of building up a happier and more equal commonwealth for them to come back to after the war is over. And part of this commonwealth must be the world of industry. We shall never be a happy country so long as there is warfare, even bloodless warfare, in our midst. And we shall never get rid of that warfare until industry itself becomes a commonwealth, conducted with perfect work from all, for the benefit of all.

THE NATIVE STATES IN INDIA

AT the capital of a small Native State in India, there stands, facing the residence of the Political Officer, a lofty pillar, surmounted by the nude figure of a seated "fakir" with one arm slightly raised. The column and monument are of later date than the house which faces them and were erected by a chief who, except that he was a Rajput, might have sat for Sir Alfred Lyall's portrait of the "Old Pindari."

"Riding a Dekhani charger
With the saddle cloth gold laced
And a Persian sword, and a twelve foot spear,
And a pistol at his waist."

His State lies far from road and railway, landlocked and inaccessible, and it was only at the close of his long reign that he came into touch with British influence. He was naturally not very anxious to provide a lodging for the Political Officer and when at last he did so, he also raised the curious monument above described. The fakir has one hand raised in a threatening attitude, and it is generally believed that its author intended it to convey a menace or at any rate, a warning; but the young Political Assistant who inhabited the house remained gloriously oblivious to this aspect of the matter.

When, at a later date, a high officer of Government visited the State, and enquired from the Raja what this monstrous monolith might be, he was informed in reply, with Oriental courtesy, that it was merely an emblem of

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piety, pointing the way to Heaven. He was diplomatic enough to accept this answer, though doubtless he reflected that the fakir's endeavour to indicate the sky was but a languid effort; and so the column with its strange and uncouth figure continued to throw its shadow daily over the Lares and Penates of the Political Assistant. The menaces of the fakir have long since lost what little terrors they possessed, especially as, in the whirligig of time, the Political Assistant has moved elsewhere, and his former residence has come to be occupied by the Raja's grandson. The fakir on his high pedestal, if not emblematic of piety, is nevertheless an eloquent symbol of a very interesting stage in the history of the relations between the Government of India and the Native States generally. He represents a period of distrust and suspicion, almost bordering on animosity, towards the British Government, which has long since passed away. But to illustrate and explain this remark, it is necessary to trace, as briefly as possible, the composition of the Native States, and how they came to exist in the Indian Empire to-day.

These States lie, scattered in uneven patches, throughout internal India from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas. If the map of India be coloured red for British India, and white for Native States, the general effect would be a broad band of red all round the sea coast and an irregular tessellated pavement of red and white within. In the central area, the proportion of red and white would be about equal. The seaboard strip of British territory may be assumed to account for one-fifth of the entire map; the area covered by Native States is 675,267 square miles, or about two-fifths of the whole. Thus the four-fifths of India comprised in the tessellated central area is, roughly speaking, equally divided between Native States and British territory.

The Native States include a considerable area of desert, and this is reflected in the Census by a lighter incidence of density in their population than in that of British India, but there are, nevertheless, over 70,000,000 persons, i.e.,

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between one-fifth and one-quarter of the total population of India, who are subjects of Native States and therefore not under the direct administration of the Government of India.

It is apparent from these figures that the Native States form an important item in the body politic of India; and this impression is enhanced when one realizes that, exclusive of Burma, there are over 650 such States, large and small, in diverse stages of development. Many of these are insignificant, but some are strong and powerful, and together they form a group which must obviously have a very great influence for good or for evil, in the country. The majority are in direct relations with the Government of India, but the Government of Bombay has a considerable number, including all those in the Kathiawar peninsula, and the Government of the Punjab has another group, known as the Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej States, including the important territories of Patiala and Bahawalpur, in their political sphere. There are, besides, a few scattered States in touch with other local Governments such as Travancore, Cooch Behar, Rampur and Manipur, whose political affairs are under the control of the Governments of Madras, Bengal, the United Provinces and Assam respectively.

The question naturally arises "How did this enormous area and this huge population come to remain outside the limits of direct British rule?"

The processes were various, but generally it may be said that all these Native States are the remnants of old India, preserved by arrangement with the British Power; the residue, now fixed and crystallized, from the fluid mass of strife and anarchy which flooded the country in the eighteenth century; the islands which were deliberately left when the tide of British predominance invaded the whole continent. Some of them, like Udaipur and other Chiefs of Rajputana, trace their history back into the mists of antiquity, having survived the rude shock and assault of the Mogul

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power, only to be nearly overwhelmed by the Mahrattas; others, such as Hyderabad, are kingdoms carved out for themselves by successful Mogul Generals; others, like Gwalior and Indore, are the surviving representatives of the Mahratta power; others, like Patiala and Nabha, were established on the ruins of the Sikh domination of the Punjab; a few, of which Kashmir and Mysore are examples, have been created by the British Government in accordance with the deliberate policy of the time. It would be hopeless to endeavour to particularize more closely, but the more important ones have been mentioned above, and the origin of almost all may be traced to one or other of the sources specified.

The majority of the Native States, as now constituted, are of no great antiquity. Towards the close of the eighteenth century, the Mahrattas were still a power to be feared, and "the ghost of the Mogul Empire, sitting crowned among the ruins of its ancient splendour, still reigned over Delhi."

The Rajput States, it is true, boast a lineage which can be followed up to the extreme limits of the record of history, and beyond that, in the regions of myth, they trace their descent through the deified hero, Rama, one branch direct from the Sun, and the other direct from the Moon. The Maharana of Udaipur, as head of the clan, carries enormous personal influence; and his proud descent is symbolized by the sacred standard representing the Sun—the Surajmukhi—which he carries amongst his "insignia." "From the balcony of the Sun (Suraj gokra)," says Tod in the *Annals of Rajasthan*, "the descendant of Rama shows himself in the dark monsoon as the Sun's representative." The Maharaja of Travancore and one or two others of the non-Rajput races can claim great age, also; but the great majority of Native States do not date back earlier than the fifteenth century, and many are far more modern. The house of Baroda, for instance, did not exist when the two East India Companies of London were amalgamated, and that of

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Hyderabad had not been founded fifty years when Clive fought the battle of Plassey.

The connection of these States with the representatives of Great Britain in India may be rapidly sketched. For this purpose, no deep acquaintance with the chequered course of Indian history is required, but the salient facts of contemporary politics at different phases may be broadly outlined for the benefit of readers less familiar with the subject.

The first charter of the London East India Company had been granted by Queen Elizabeth on the last day of the sixteenth century, but for nearly 150 years after that event, the maritime settlements of the English, like those of the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French, had hung, like limpets, on the coasts of the great eastern continent, occupied far more in their mutual trade disputes and jealousies than in engagements and conflicts with Native rulers. In 1687, it is true, the East India Company had dared to embark on a war with the Mogul Emperor, Aurangzeb, but this was a premature and ill-starred stroke of policy—premature, because the Mogul was still little past the zenith of his power; and unsuccessful, for it ended quickly and ignominiously in the issue of a lofty order of pardon from Aurangzeb, who was fortunately engaged at the time in warlike distractions elsewhere, and little imagined that these British traders could ever prove to be foemen worthy of his steel. Nevertheless, the fanaticism of Aurangzeb was dragging the Mogul Empire rapidly along the path to ruin and decay, and his death, in 1707 A.D., was the signal for its slow disintegration. The Portuguese settlements had by that time sunk into insignificance, and France and Holland were so deeply engaged in ruinous wars with their European neighbours that their dependencies in the East found themselves left without help and without resource. The Dutch settlements scarcely recovered from the strain; but by 1744 A.D., the French, by their energy and enterprise, had recovered most of the ground

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which they had lost. Thus when France declared war against England in that year, the rival Companies of the two countries stood face to face in India, both powerful, both strongly supported from home, but both holding their ground by a precarious title. They still went through the form of obtaining their charters for each new point of vantage from the Mogul Emperor, but the Mogul dominion was obviously crumbling to pieces—and no one could foresee on whom its mantle would fall. New powers and principalities were daily emerging from the chaos; and the European settlers, finding the Mogul sheet-anchor beginning to drag, were compelled, for their own safety, to cast about for whatever might hold out the promise of the safest anchorage in future. It is not surprising, therefore, that during the next fifty years most of the Native States emerged in their present form; nor in view of the sudden growth of European military prestige in India, need we wonder at the rapid process of Empire-building which marked this period. But it is remarkable that this process is intimately connected with the bitter spirit of rivalry and race-hatred, which was so conspicuous in the latter half of the eighteenth century, between the French and English nations. Whenever the forces generated by this spirit rose to the point of explosion, self-protection compelled the acquisition of greater interests and responsibilities; whenever the fever passed, there was a quick recurrence to the policy of non-interference and self-effacement, and a corresponding lull in the process of absorption.

A few illustrations of this remark will serve also to explain the method by which the Native States themselves gradually came under the ægis of the British Government.

In 1744, when war broke out between England and France the most conspicuous European figure in India was that of Dupleix. This patriotic Frenchman, towering head and shoulders above all his European contemporaries, undoubtedly dreamed of establishing a great French Empire in the East. Before his arrival, it had been the standing rule

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and custom among all European settlements in India to observe an attitude of strict neutrality in the quarrels of Oriental rulers. Dupleix boldly discarded this rule. His predecessor, M. Dumas, had it is true, on one occasion secured a valuable strip of territory by supplying money, gunpowder and warlike stores to a pretender to the throne of Tanjore, and on another occasion had given shelter to the family of the Nawab of the Carnatic in Pondicherry, only saving that town from the wrath of the Mahrattas by a timely present of forty bottles of Nantes cordials to their leader. But these were temporary aberrations. With Dupleix actions of this nature were the springs of a settled policy. Not content with the dull operations of commerce, he aspired to make France supreme among the European nations in India; for her aggrandizement, he was ready to take a hand in the hazardous game of Oriental politics, and to enter into definite treaties and alliances with the Native Princes. When the English fleet threatened Pondicherry, he induced the Nawab of the Carnatic to exert his authority to forbid hostilities within his jurisdiction; he was restrained by no such scruples when he himself besieged and took Madras. He pacified the Nawab by promising to hand over the town to him, but coolly disregarded this engagement, when it proved inconvenient, and finally, when the Nawab invested the town, beat him off with heavy loss. The English had at that time no conception of the ambitious schemes which Dupleix had in mind; they certainly entertained no dreams of empire for themselves. They had been compelled to follow his lead, but they did so at first in a half-hearted manner, actuated not so much by the lust of power as by the feeling that compensatory alliances were necessary for their own protection. By the time, however, that the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle brought the war to a close in 1749 A.D., they had thoroughly learned the lesson; they had seen Madras slip out of their hand; they had watched the Governor of the place and his officers figuring as captives in a triumphal procession in Pondicherry; and they were keenly aware that the military

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prestige of the French had been immensely enhanced by the easy victory of St Thome. So when peace was declared in Europe, the conflict continued in deadly earnest in India. The British met Dupleix with his own weapons, and the two Companies simply espoused the cause of rival pretenders in Tanjore, Hyderabad and the Carnatic, and continued, under the flag of opposing claimants, to fight each other more fiercely than before. The English were no match for Dupleix in Oriental diplomacy; it never occurred to them, for instance, to snatch a victory against heavy odds by detaching all the most powerful nobles of the enemy—a triumph of intrigue which Dupleix accomplished without difficulty, when he found himself confronted by the overwhelmingly superior army of Nadir Jung, the Subedar of the Deccan. But the British nevertheless held at that moment, almost without knowing it, the two winning cards in the game; one was the support of British sea-power, even then the dominating factor of the Eastern situation, the other was the military genius of Clive and Stringer Lawrence. Eventually Dupleix's schemes were completely defeated by Clive at Arcot and Trinchinopoly. The French Company, alarmed at the emptiness of their treasury and the poverty of their successes, recalled Dupleix, and solemnly repudiated his schemes, his vaulting ambitions and his dreams. They quickly agreed with the British Company that private war was wicked, and the extension of dominion in India, criminal; and that their only business in India was trade and the pursuit of the arts of peace.

This virtuous resolution lasted exactly two years. In 1756 England and France were again at war, and Count Lally was sent out from France for the express purpose of destroying English trade and English predominance in India. He was carefully warned to abstain from participation in the quarrels of the Native Chiefs; but it would have been quite as reasonable to direct him to discharge his guns without gunpowder. Bussy, Dupleix's Lieutenant, still held a dominant position in the court of the Nizam of Hyderabad,

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and it would have been equally dangerous to abandon him or to withdraw him from that centre. The English were now in league with quite a number of chiefs, and their prestige had been greatly enhanced by Clive's great victory at Plassey. Lally was compelled, in spite of all instructions, to ally himself with the Nizam and other chiefs, but he was deficient in the diplomatic skill for which Dupleix was so conspicuous, and his defeat by Sir Eyre Coote at Wandewash, followed by the fall of Pondicherry in 1761, left the English with a commanding influence in all the States on the East of India from the Carnatic to Murshidabad. Although, as a matter of fact, the hopes of a French dominion in India were extinguished with the defeat of Lally, the fear of France continued, for many years, to be perhaps the most potent motive for the expansion of the Company's rule in India.

When Clive left India in 1767, having buttressed his conquests in Bengal by interposing between them and the tribes of Northern India, the allied kingdom of Oude, he deprecated any further advance or extension of dominions, and his opinions were loudly re-echoed by the London Directors.

Nevertheless, Warren Hastings found himself dragged reluctantly, at the heels of the Madras Government, into entanglements with the Nizam of Hyderabad, with the Sultan of Mysore and with the Mahrattas; and, just as he was on the point of succeeding in getting clear of these troubles, it was discovered that a French agent was in the Mahratta camp, that a French ship from the Isle of Bourbon was landing officers and military stores for Hyder Ali of Mysore, and that the French intended to take advantage of the British reverses in America to declare war against England. All the good resolutions for a strong, self-contained policy were once more scattered to the winds. The English, indeed, had their work cut out in maintaining their position in India at this time. Their sea-power was threatened; a French fleet under Admiral Suffren had appeared off the Coromandal coast; and little help was to be looked for from

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England, for she was herself engaged in a formidable struggle with all the great naval powers of Europe. The English in India were locked in a fierce war with the two most skilful Indian powers of the time, the Mahrattas and Mysore, both of whom had entered into treaty with the French; and they found that Hyderabad had slipped out of their hands and had been forced to join the alliance against them. They sustained the combat with difficulty, Warren Hastings straining every nerve and some points of conscience to find the sinews of war, till fortune once again came to their aid.

In December, 1782, their most formidable foe, Hyder Ali, was removed by death; and in July, 1783, news arrived of the Peace of Versailles. Moreover, the declaration of peace in Europe could no longer be ignored in India, as it had been ignored only 34 years before. In the interval, the reins of home control had been greatly tightened. Public attention had been focussed on Indian affairs, and the sense of public responsibility had begun to be aroused, owing to the impeachments of Clive and Warren Hastings; the impression prevailed that entanglements with Native States were dangerous, and at all costs to be avoided, and was now sufficient to prevent the continuance of hostilities in India. In 1784, Parliament formally declared in the famous Act, known as Pitt's Act, that schemes of conquest in India were repugnant to the honour and policy of the British nation, and when two years later Lord Cornwallis was appointed to be the first Governor-General, he was specifically prohibited from entering on hostilities and from making defensive and offensive alliances with Native Princes, except for the protection of British territory or of our allies.

This solemn and formal protest was entirely futile. Lord Cornwallis came out to India resolved to enforce the new policy; he carried it out so far as to refuse to grant the Nizam of Hyderabad protection against Tippu Sahib of Mysore, but he felt some qualms on the subject; and when Tippu Sahib attacked the Raja of Travancore, his qualms overcame his scruples. In spite of the solemn asseverations

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of the Act of 1784, Lord Cornwallis found himself, within seven years of its enactment, allied with the Mahrattas and the Nizam in a league against Mysore. He realized in India what he failed to grasp in England, viz., that the policy of masterly inactivity was inconsistent with good government or self-preservation. Tippu Sahib was defeated and lost his western sea-board ; but, though crippled, he continued as before to intrigue with the French to an extent just sufficient to keep English wrath and apprehensions alive. His defeat left Mahdaji Scindia, the Mahratta, the greatest native power in India. Scindia's army was well disciplined, and commanded by skilled European officers, mostly French. Lord Cornwallis, still posing, in spite of his experiences in Mysore, as the apostle of non-interference, felt bound to leave him severely alone ; and his successor, Lord Teignmouth, even allowed Hyderabad to be sacrificed to this principle. But once again, the fear of France dissipated the policy of peace and self-abnegation.

Buonaparte had clearly taken up the dreams of Dupleix ; his occupation of Egypt and his march into Syria in 1798 had for their avowed object the destruction of the British power in Asia and the establishment of a French dominion in its place. As far back as 1793, at the opening of our long war with revolutionary France, Lord Cornwallis had felt himself impelled to seize all the French settlements in India and Lord Wellesley very soon after his arrival in 1798, declared that the existence of a French party in the Councils and armies of Indian Princes, was an evil that demanded extirpation. The Nizam of Hyderabad was induced to disband his French levies, and to substitute troops commanded by English officers. The summons to Mysore to abandon the alliance with the French led to the war which finally brought Tippu to the grave and his Mohammedan dynasty to an abrupt end ; while the maintenance of French officers in the Mahratta armies was Lord Wellesley's main justification for breaking up the great Mahratta confederacy, and finally defeating it in detail at Laswari and Assaye. These

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two battles, both fought towards the end of 1803, may be taken as closing this chapter of history, so full of incident and so rich in results, which deals with the consequences of the struggle between French and English in an India in which the effective central government had fallen into decay ; a chapter which begins with British rule extending no farther than the coastal trading stations leased from the Great Mogul, and closes with England in sole possession, and with six of the largest States in India in direct political subordination to her, viz., Oude, Hyderabad, Mysore, Poona, Baroda and Travancore.

With Lord Wellesley a new chapter begins. For the Treaty of Bassein, concluded by him with the Peshwa in December, 1802, and subsequently acknowledged by all the other Mahratta confederates, proved to be the foundation stone of all our later policy towards the Native States. It practically established the constitution of Native States on their present basis ; providing that they should look to us for protection, that all their disputes should be submitted to our arbitration, and that the interference of all other European powers should be rigidly excluded. In return they were left to manage their own internal affairs. Lord Wellesley's own description of his labours in this regard, sounding a note of not unjustifiable pride, may here be quoted. "A general bond of connection is now established between the British Government and the principal States of India, on principles which render it the interest of every State to maintain its alliance with the British Government, which preclude the inordinate aggrandisement of any one of those States by an usurpation of the rights and possessions of others and which secure to every State the unmolested exercise of a separate authority within the limits of its established dominion, under the general protection of the British power." This is perhaps a slight over-statement of the case, as only the six States mentioned above had actually signed these subsidiary treaties, as they are called, when Lord Wellesley left India. But the next few

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years witnessed a rapid and wide extension of the system. The British authorities tried, as before, to avoid definite relations with States which were beyond their immediate touch ; but the position of supremacy they now occupied had its responsibilities. By taking the person, family and nominal authority of the Mogul Emperor, Shah Alam, under the protection of the British Government, Lord Wellesley made the British stand out before all men as the acknowledged heirs of the Suzerain power in India. The smaller States looked to the Suzerain for protection—it was impossible to stand by and see them pillaged by the mercenary troops and freebooters, the residue of the Mahratta armies, known as Pindaries; the States themselves protested and called on us to do our obvious duty of arranging to police them. Lord Hastings accepted the call, and undertook the task of pacifying the whole country. By 1818, the British protectorate had been extended over all the States in Rajputana and Central India as well as those lying on either side of the Sutlej; the custom of appointing Political officers to help and advise the chiefs and to interpret their wishes to the Government, was introduced and the constitution and boundaries of Native States, except those appertaining to the Punjab, became practically fixed.

There followed a period of nearly forty years, during which the only formal changes in the position were the inclusion among the protected Princes, either by treaty or by force of circumstances, of the Chiefs of Khairpur, Bahawalpur, Kashmir and the remainder of the Cis-Sutlej and Trans-Sutlej States of the Punjab—the result of the conquest of the Sind and of our wars with the Sikhs. But during this period there came about a far-reaching if subtle change in the relations of the British and the Native States. Having assumed responsibility for the government of the country, the British applied themselves with such zest to the reform of the administrative machinery in British India that the management of Native States began to suffer by the comparison. Non-interference with the proceedings of

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the Native States in internal matters was, as always, the avowed policy of Government, but when misrule is rampant it is no easy matter for a Government, ultimately responsible, to shut its ears to the cries of the oppressed. Another step forward was inevitable; the Government were driven to realize that higher standards must be demanded, and that they must protect not only the Native States from external enemies but the subjects of those States from the rapacity and oppression of their own rulers.

That interference was called for in the interests of humanity is a proposition capable of easy proof by a long and terrible chain of evidence. It will suffice to mention here a few links of the chain. Justice was freely bartered; office was openly sold; the wives and children of men who were defaulters in the payment of revenue were driven off in hundreds to be sold into slavery; frightful tortures were common, and some States had an official Torture Department, as part of their Police organization. Men were tied with the wrists fixed between split bamboos, which were daily tightened, if they continued obdurate, until the hand dropped off; mutilation was a favourite form of punishment, impalement or trampling to death by an elephant a recognized form of capital sentence, frequently inflicted without any proof or suspicion of capital crime. The prevention of atrocities of this nature was, however, much less difficult to enforce than the prohibition of certain social customs which appear to the Oriental mind laudable, to the Western mind barbarous. In 1832, the Government of India had forbidden the practice of "Satti" or the imolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands; but it continued to be freely practised in Native States long after that date. It has been generally repressed now, but it is difficult for the outsider to realize how rapidly it would again spring into existence in many Native States, if not also in British India, were the checks to be removed. Even as late as 1874, the precautions which had to be taken on the death of the chief of a leading State in Central India were extraordinary.

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The doors of the women's apartments had to be locked and guarded and some of the principal men of the State were made individually responsible that none of the women should escape. When the time came for the corpse of the chief to be carried out to the pyre, according to ancient Rajput custom, richly clothed and covered with jewels, seated in a State sedan chair, canopied in crimson and gold, the excitement among the women rose to such a pitch that they were with difficulty restrained from throwing themselves out of the "zenana" windows.

The existence of these barbaric customs illustrates the difficulties which beset the British rulers of India at this time. Non-interference in the internal affairs of Native States was the guiding principle. Yet indifference to scandalous misrule was impossible for the Suzerain power. There seemed to be no half-way stage between complete aloofness and compulsion, and compulsion meant annexation. For a time logic had its way and led to the annexation of Oude in 1856, and to various other cases of absorption by escheat or lapse to the Crown on the failure of direct heirs in the time of Lord Dalhousie—notably the States of Satara in Bombay, and Jhansi and Nagpur in the Central Provinces. But a *via media* was found. The policy of lapse or escheat left a legacy of apprehension and restlessness in the minds of the Native Chiefs—a phase that is typified by the fakir on his high pedestal, described at the beginning of this article. After the Mutiny, during which the chiefs, almost without exception, remained loyal in spite of their anxieties and apprehensions in regard to Lord Dalhousie's policy, it was abandoned, and was replaced by that of the Adoption Sanads, granted to all important Ruling Chiefs by Lord Canning in 1858 after the Government of India had been transferred from the Company to the Crown by Proclamation of Queen Victoria.

No juster or wiser measure was ever initiated by any Governor-General. In pursuance of the policy of escheat it had been the rule to refuse to allow chiefs to adopt

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collaterals as their heirs. This was really a contravention of one of the cardinal principles of Hindu Law. The grant to the chiefs of the Adoption Sanads—that is the right to adopt collaterals as heirs—remedied this injustice, and has also ensured for all time the integrity of these Native States. It allayed all anxiety and has probably done more to reconcile the chiefs to British rule in India and to improve the government of Native States than any other measure ever devised. When the charters or Sanads were issued, Lord Canning formally declared that the grant would not debar the Government from stepping in to set right such serious abuses as may threaten any part of the country with anarchy and disturbance, or from assuming temporary charge of a State, if necessary. This raised no anxiety or resentment. For the Chiefs readily recognize that the punishment of an individual is sometimes desirable, seeing that intervention does not necessarily threaten the continuity of their dynasties.

The Adoption Sanads, by removing all possible cause for such resentment, made it far easier for the British to influence the course of administration in the Native States towards humanity and civilization. They have, in fact, infused them with new spirit and life; and the progress achieved by Native States as a whole, since the Mutiny, is almost incredible. As time has passed, the confidence of the chiefs has grown and strengthened, and the attitude towards Government has changed from that of a grudging subordination to one of trust and co-operation. The Chiefs generally recognize that their best interests are wrapped up in the welfare of British Rule; its collapse would involve the majority of them in irretrievable ruin; thus their genuine feelings and their material interests equally impel them to line up solidly behind the Throne. A vivid instance of the growing spirit of confidence and co-operation was given when Lord Dufferin in 1890 decided to make this support more effective, by authorizing Native States to entertain “Imperial Service Troops”; that is, a body of troops

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specially drilled and disciplined with European assistance, armed with modern weapons, and able to take their place on active service side by side with British troops, as they did in China by the end of the century. Twenty-nine States have taken advantage of this offer. Moreover, it is abundantly apparent that the higher ideals of law and order introduced by the British in British India are raising standards in Native States also; the effects of improved administration are gradually permeating the whole country; and the Chiefs as a body have come to recognize that arbitrary methods are useless, and good organization profitable.

The relations between the Native States and British India are likely to be profoundly modified in spirit, if not in form, by the great war. During it the Ruling Princes have come forward with enthusiastic generosity. Several Ruling Chiefs, and the near kinsmen of others, went to the front in France, amongst them the veteran Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, whose age was nearly seventy. All the Princes freely offered the resources of their States, and horses, stores, hospitals, have come as gifts to the Empire. Large sums of money have been given: the (Muhammadan) Nizam of Hyderabad presented £400,000, the (Hindu) Maharaja of Mysore £260,000. The Parliamentary Paper of 1914 on the Support offered to His Majesty by the Princes and Peoples of India contains a record for which it would be difficult to find a parallel. Perhaps it has not been sufficiently understood that the contributions made by the Ruling Chiefs of personal services, men, money, and materials, represent an entirely spontaneous movement directed by no legal obligation. To say this is not in any way to depreciate the ready response of British India to the call, the devotion of the British Indian Army, or the generosity and loyalty of the leading men of British India. But while the Indian Army was anxious to be employed on active service, and Indian opinion was delighted that Indian troops should stand beside the other forces of the Crown,

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the responsibility for the co-operation of the Native States rested entirely with their own Rulers.

Five and twenty years ago, witch-burning and mutilation of criminals by way of punishment were not uncommon in Native States, and it is less than twenty years ago that one frontier chieftain boasted that during his rule he had taken the lives of 3,500 men and women. Such things are impossible and indeed almost unthinkable now, but as a contrast to this a case may be mentioned which occurred only a few years ago, where the chief of a small internal State, after causing in a fit of intoxication the death of a woman in his zenana, and after covering up all traces of the crime, himself confessed the facts to the Political Officer, and quietly submitted to deposition in consequence. A story is told to illustrate Native States' methods, of a cultivator who having prepared some waste ground and sown it with wheat, was informed that the orders of the Durbar were that the upper portion of the crop went to the State, while the lower portion went to the husbandman—consequently the revenue collector took all the grain, while the cultivator was left with the stalks; the next year the latter thought to steal a march on the State by sowing carrots and potatoes, but he was foiled again, as the revenue collector informed him that the orders of the Durbar had been reversed, and that this year they were taking the roots.

But it is a pleasing reflection that such stories are scarcely typical now. Although the degree of advancement varies greatly, most Native States have by now introduced a reasonable land assessment, based on a fixed demand with fixity of tenure; and they are ready to organize measures for combating famine, which were quite unknown and unpractised before the advent of British philanthropic ideas. The advantages of education are generally recognized, and most States of any importance have adequate schools and colleges affiliated to the universities in British India, while the most conspicuous example of their zeal in this respect is the establishment of the four special colleges for

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the sons and relatives of chiefs at Ajmer, Indore, Rajkot and Lahore, financed largely by themselves and managed by councils on which they themselves form a majority. In every Department, Police, Medical, Public Works, Irrigation, Finance, the tendency is an approximation towards higher ideals ; and though there is of course back-sliding, the progress has been great. These effects have been and are being produced in various ways ; sometimes, when a chief is a minor, a Council of Regency is appointed, on which skilled Administrators sit, the Political Agent occasionally presiding ; at other times, the chiefs ask for the services of some specialist from British India for a particular branch of the administration ; in some cases, the chiefs themselves are highly educated and powerful organizers. But perhaps the most potent factor has been the encouragement given by the Government of India, and the grant of much-coveted titles and decorations to those who have been conspicuous in helping to raise the level.

There are both advantages and disadvantages in Native State rule. Among the latter are its more arbitrary nature, the dependence on the personality of the chief, the possibility of a relapse to weakness and chaos with a change of ruler ; among the former, the innate devotion of the Indian people to a personal ruler, the freedom from departmentalism and the possibility, not of course always achieved, of a more rapid despatch of business. Two instances of these advantages, may be quoted. The writer once saw a chief whom the Government had found it necessary to depose temporarily for misconduct, return after his seclusion to his capital. Although he had done little to merit their good will, the populace flocked to receive him, and welcomed him with the most genuine acclamation ; and the reflection was irresistible that this was real personal loyalty, such as no British officer, however much he might labour, could command. To illustrate the other point, a case may be quoted of a new college, with three fine buildings, masters' houses, servants' quarters, sanatorium, etc., built in a Native State within

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twelve months, a feat which the Public Works Department of the Government of India, with its complicated departmental procedure, could scarcely hope to accomplish.

But the most marked feature that has occurred in recent years is the establishment of Legislative Councils in some of the Native States. These are of course of a rudimentary character at present; but they contain the germ of a great development. There is no real representation of the people as yet; the control still remains in the hands of the chief; but nevertheless, the autocratic and patriarchal system is challenged. The mere admission of the shadow of democracy into a Native State is a concession full of meaning, it signifies that the chief intends to rule according to the will of his people and not according to his own. The probabilities are that these Legislative Assemblies will long remain merely consultative bodies, but even as such, they should exercise a great influence. Besides finally closing the door on barbarities such as have been mentioned above, they are bound to operate towards deterring the ruler from pursuing arbitrary or unconstitutional methods in any direction.

The natural consequence of the spirit of reform displayed by Native Chiefs and of the trust and confidence engendered between them and the Government of India has been a relaxation of the old policy of isolation. Formerly no State was permitted to communicate with another, except through the Government of India; and since Lord Wellesley's time this was regarded as a cardinal principle of their constitution. But of late, Chiefs have been allowed to visit and confer with one another freely and almost without restraint. Until 1903, the only occasion on which the Chiefs of India had been called together was the great Assemblage of 1877. That was a purely ceremonial Durbar, to inform them that Queen Victoria had fulfilled the purport of the Proclamation of 1858 by taking on herself the title of "Empress of India"; and the Durbars of 1903 and 1911 were of similar character; but in the early years of the pre-

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sent century, Lord Curzon had formed the Councils of the Chiefs' Colleges, on which the Native Rulers were invited to meet together, and to play a really practical part. The first occasion on which the Government of India have invited the Chiefs of India to meet in conclave, not for purely ceremonial purposes, but in order that they might confer on matters of public importance occurred in 1913, when a conference was arranged at Delhi, to discuss the question of a university for the ruling classes throughout India.

The occasion was notable for the speech delivered by His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner, as spokesman for the assembled Chiefs. "I am voicing," he said, "the expressed wish of my brother princes, not only of those who are present, but also of others who are absent, when I say that we trust, and we are confident, that Your Excellency will before long convene similar meetings to deal with other subjects in which we and the States represented are no less closely concerned than in this one of the College, and on which our deliberations will not only be of the greatest advantage to ourselves, our States and our people, but also we hope, of some value to the Imperial Government." Lord Hardinge, in his reply, expressed his sympathy with the suggestion, and it is possible that herein lies the solution of a problem which has long vexed the authorities in India, viz., the part which is to be played by the Native States in the general governance of the Indian Continent. It is obvious that in the legislation daily minted for the benefit of British India, they must frequently have a deep concern; yet they remain wholly unrepresented on the Imperial Legislative Council. The chiefs were, many of them, closely affected by the policy recently pursued by the Government of India to suppress the opium traffic to China; their interests were fortunately strongly pushed by political officers, and a settlement honourable to both parties has happily been arrived at. But it is easy to conceive circumstances where, owing to want of information or the need of urgent action, the issue might be less satis-

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factory. Events are undoubtedly marching to a position where greater solidarity between the chiefs and the Government of India must be attained. The idea of a council of princes was mooted in the time of Lord Lytton, and it came under consideration again when the scheme for Legislative Councils in British India was on the anvil. The plan has many attractive features, for among the Chiefs themselves and their administrative staffs, there are plenty of men of light and leading, and of pronounced loyalty. But in the existing constitution of India the position of a Council of Princes would be somewhat anomalous; and the drawbacks to including it in a fitting manner in the constitution are perhaps insuperable. But it seems probable that room will gradually be found for some kind of representation on the Councils of India of the great area covered by Native States; and two possible developments may here be indicated. One has already been alluded to, viz., the extension of the Conference system in respect of matters of general interest to the Native States. The other is the selection of a few Chiefs of the best type to assist at the deliberations of the Legislative Council. There is no material in India so good as the best of the Native Princes. They may not possess the glibness of tongue, the forensic abilities, the demagogic virtues of the lawyers who, under existing arrangements, find themselves the leaders of Indian opinion. But they know much more of the real India; they are accustomed to the responsibilities of actual personal rule; they realize the Imperial position much more keenly; they have had experience of the limitations and shortcomings of the masses, and of their impassiveness and slowness to change; they are much more likely to be actuated by purely impersonal motives; they are, in fact, likely to be quite as valuable counsellors as many who now attain that position.

In our modern democracies the personal factor is still as great as ever. Much more is this the case in India, which is still at heart conservative and aristocratic. Is it then unsafe to prophesy that the day is not far off when the Government

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of India will be glad to call into their Councils a few of those who represent most obviously the personal element which counts for so much in that country? But whether this be the case or not, the system of conferences will probably develop. This alone will enable men of commanding personality in Native States to make themselves felt, while the chiefs, as a body, will rejoice if the opportunity is given them of formulating their views directly to Government and of enjoying all the advantages of round-table discussion. A further conference of Ruling Chiefs was convened at Delhi by Lord Chelmsford in October; and though no full report had come when this article went to press, it is to be noted that the Viceroy assured the Princes that by their action in the war they "have earned a place in the hearts of the British people which will remain for all time." And on this occasion the Government of India sought from the Chiefs "free and frank advice on questions connected with their States and peoples."

It will be readily seen from the tale unfolded in this article how prominent is the place which the Native States occupy in India, comprising as they do about two-fifths of the whole area, and nearly a quarter of the whole population. It is the settled policy of the Government not to incorporate this huge section in British India, that is the country which is directly administered by the British. In these Native States, therefore, distributed from North to South and from East to West of the country, there is a huge field in which India can experiment and progress on its own lines. They are, therefore, a barometer of the progress of India which no student of its conditions can afford to ignore.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

I. THE IRISH DEBATE

ON October 18 there took place in the House of Commons a debate on the government of Ireland, the first since the breakdown of the negotiations for a settlement and the re-establishment of Castle government. The debate is important, not so much by reason of its effect upon the political situation, but as revealing the present state of the Irish problem. It is worth recording, therefore, at some length.

The debate was opened by a motion moved by Mr. Redmond in the following terms, "That the system of government at present maintained in Ireland is inconsistent with the principles for which the Allies are fighting in Europe, and has been mainly responsible for the recent unhappy events, and for the present state of feeling in that country."

Mr. Redmond made no further reference to the terms of this motion, which was manifestly drafted for the consumption of public opinion in Ireland and overseas rather than for Parliamentary purposes. He was mainly concerned with the present state of Ireland, which he described as "full of menace and of danger," and with the remedies which might be applied to it. In the first part of his speech he deplored the manner in which the unique opportunity for effecting a reconciliation between the English and the Irish people created by the war had been lost. He reminded the House how, at the outbreak of

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the war, "for the first time in the history of the relations between Great Britain and Ireland," the representatives of the mass of the Irish people declared themselves on the British side, and how they had returned to Ireland to promote recruiting, in face of the traditional hostility in many parts of Ireland to the British Army. They had succeeded, he said, far better than they had anticipated or hoped. There was, indeed, at that time genuine enthusiasm in Ireland on the side of the Allies.

This auspicious beginning, however, was spoilt by the conduct of the officials of the War Office, who refused to back up the patriotic efforts of the Nationalists.

"From the very first hour," he said, "our efforts were thwarted, ignored, and snubbed. Our suggestions were derided. Everything, almost, that we asked for was refused, and everything, almost, that we protested against was done. Everything which tended to arouse Irish national pride and enthusiasm in connection with the war was rigorously suppressed."

Mr. Redmond then went on to give instances, the rejection of the offer to use the Nationalist Volunteers for home defence, the refusal to allow regiments to carry the Irish badge, and the manifestation of suspicion and distrust in a thousand small ways. He explained that taking any one of these things singly they might seem contemptible and small, but the cumulative effect was enormous, and they took all the heart out of the efforts which were being made. Day by day the undoubted enthusiasm at the commencement of the war began to die down. Day by day their opponents were instilling into the minds of the people that the Nationalists were just as much distrusted by England as ever, and that in the end they would be cheated and betrayed. Then came the final blow in the creation of the Coalition Government. From the day the Coalition was formed, recruiting for the Army in Ireland declined rapidly. From the day the Coalition was formed, recruiting for the revolutionary, anti-recruiting, Sinn

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Fein party rapidly increased. Distrust and suspicion spread all over the country, and the spectacle of Sir Edward Carson being given a seat in the Cabinet as chief Law Officer meant, in the minds of large masses of the Irish people, that in the end they would be betrayed. As for the offer made to himself to join the Cabinet, of course it deceived nobody. Everyone knew that he would not and could not accept it. He had begged the Prime Minister at the time to leave Ireland out of the Coalition. He refused, and the result in Ireland was fatal.

Then less than a year after the formation of the Coalition Government came the rebellion.

Mr. Redmond's words on this subject are worth quoting textually. At first, he said, "the rising was resented universally by all classes of the people of Ireland. It seemed so causeless, so reckless, so wicked, and I am to-day profoundly convinced of this, that if that rising had been dealt with in the spirit in which General Botha dealt with the rising in South Africa it probably would have been the means, strange though it may sound to hear it, of saving the whole situation. But, unfortunately, it was dealt with by panicky violence. Executions, spread out day after day, and week after week—some of them young boys of whom none of us had ever even heard, and who turned out to have been young dreamers and idealists—shocked and revolted the public mind of Ireland. There were only some fifteen hundred men, according to my information, who took part in that rising, and yet the military authorities scoured the entire country, and arrested thousands—we heard the number of thousands to-day at question time—of perfectly innocent men and young boys. . . . By that proceeding terror and indignation were spread throughout the country, and popular sympathy, which was entirely against the rising on its merits, and against the rising when it took place, rapidly and completely turned round."

After the rebellion came the visit of the Prime Minister

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to Ireland, and the opening of the negotiations for a settlement through Mr. Lloyd George. Proposals were made to the Nationalists by the Prime Minister and Mr. Lloyd George, but when, in the teeth of enormous difficulties, they had secured the assent of their own people to them, the Cabinet threw them over, and reverted to the old discredited system of Castle government with Unionists at its head.

In consequence of all this, said Mr. Redmond, not only was the situation in Ireland disquieting and dangerous, but there was grave danger that it would be impossible to keep the Irish regiments at the front up to strength. "Personally," he said, "I would do anything possible to avert that catastrophe."

"What I feel about these Irish soldiers is this: I feel that by their gallant deeds they have already won a new place for Ireland before the world, a new place in the policy and councils of the Empire. My conviction is that it is for Ireland in her own interests to keep that place, and it is for the Empire in the Empire's interests to enable her and to help her to keep it. How? By removing once and for all all this fog of bad faith and bad management, and by setting Ireland on a basis of freedom and responsibility."

Discussing this question of reinforcements, Mr. Redmond put on one side the question of conscription. "All I will say of that, at this stage—we may have to speak about it later on—is that it would be not a remedy, but an aggravation, and I cannot bring myself to believe that any man responsible for the government of Ireland, either in the civil or military sphere, would, at this moment, recommend it."

After suggesting certain minor measures, Mr. Redmond came to these conclusions as to what ought to be done:

"But I recognise fully—I would not be honest if I did not say so plainly—that these expedients cannot fully meet the case. The case can only be met by boldly grappling with the situation in Ireland itself. So long as

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the present state of government exists in Ireland, so long will the present excited and irritating national public feeling exist there, and so long as that feeling exists, everything will be wrong. So long as the Irish people feel that England, fighting for the small nationalities of Europe, is maintaining by martial law a State Unionist Government against the will of the people in Ireland, so long no real improvement can be hoped for. Let the Government withdraw martial law, let them put in command of the forces in Ireland some man who has not been connected with the unhappy actions of the past. Let the administration of the Defence of the Realm Act be as stringent as you like, but let it be animated by the same spirit and carried into effect by the same machinery as takes place in Great Britain. Let the 500 untried prisoners be released, let the penal servitude prisoners be treated as political prisoners, and, above all, and incomparably more important than all, let the Government take their courage in both hands and trust the Irish people once and for all, by putting the Home Rule Act into operation and resolutely, on their own responsibility, facing any problems that that may entail."

The reply to this speech was made by Mr. Duke, the new Chief Secretary. He repudiated with emphasis the charge that the administration of Ireland was a Unionist administration in any party sense. He said that it was absurd to treat the Sinn Fein rebellion as the work of a few irresponsible men.

"The true case is that for many months, probably for a good part of two years—certainly for more than a year before the rising—those who ultimately gave the signal of revolt had been organising throughout all the counties of Ireland a conspiracy of rebellion which it was intended to carry into effect with Germany's aid. Those throughout Ireland who unfortunately have been involved in the conspiracy were on the alert where they had arms, and they stood to arms. Whether they had arms or not, they

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awaited orders. And with that condition of things in Ireland centralised in Dublin, kept in practical effect by the activities of the men who had devoted themselves with amazing perseverance during the long period before the rebellion, centred upon Dublin but pervading the country, there was that state of peril to the United Kingdom and the cause of the Allies, and what was awaited was the successful landing on the West Coast of Ireland of arms sufficient for the better part of two divisions of infantry. Fortunately those arms, instead of being landed, went to the bottom of the sea.

“I am not speaking of these matters as casting any reproach upon the body of people in Ireland. It would not be true to do anything of the kind. The great body of people in Ireland were indignant at the action which was taken in Easter week. But they could not prevent it, and did not prevent it, and one of the difficulties which you find existing now is that the men who had not arms, and the men who were not arrested, still in one part of the country or another retain their old views, and are a menace to the public security so long as they retain those views, and so long as they persevere in the determination, if they can, to defeat all the hopes of the hon. Member for Waterford; to defeat all the hopes of their countrymen who love constitutional methods and who believe in constitutional progress, and to embark again in some hopeless and bloody adventure such as that of Easter week.”

For these reasons, he said, it was impossible to accept the “easy prescriptions” of the Irish leader. “When you have that state of things, can you sanely and reasonably contemplate amnesty and indemnity as effective treatment for the safeguarding of the public peace, and for giving security to the King’s subjects of all classes in Ireland? In my view of the matter, it is impossible that that view should be taken.”

After dealing in detail with the difficulties in the way of substituting the Defence of the Realm Act for martial law

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on the ground that it would be difficult if not impossible to secure convictions under it, Mr. Duke went on to ask if the speeches of some Nationalists had not something to do with the prevailing unrest in Ireland, and quoted the following remarks made in Kilkenny by a member of Parliament only four days before :

“ I believe myself that the present and past Cabinet of England is composed of the damnedest political tricksters that ever cursed a nation, and I believe, as it is at present, that there was never a greater pack of political tricksters on the face of the earth. They hate Ireland—if they could afford it. Take Easter week, and see the most abominable week of shootings and brutal murders of the best men that Ireland ever produced.”

Martial law, he added, could not be very oppressive when such speeches could be made and their authors not proceeded against.

In dealing with the main question Mr. Duke said that the resolution declared that the treatment of Ireland contradicted the principles for which the Allies were fighting. “ What is the position of Ireland at the present time ? :

“ Her greatest industry is more prosperous than it has ever been. She is immune from the greater part of the griefs of this war which fall upon the people of this country. No man can be present in Ireland for a week without realising how different is the atmosphere there in regard to the war from the atmosphere in England. The war is a distant thing in Ireland. Ireland is protected from the practical perils of being made to feel the warfare by the common enemy by the vigilance of the British Fleet, and by the presence of British forces. In that state of the case this House has refrained from demanding from the manhood of Ireland the degree of sacrifice which it has not refrained from putting upon the men of Great Britain. These things cannot be put out of mind . . . when you are trying to form a just judgment upon the treatment of Ireland by

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Great Britain. . . . The real question with which Ireland is confronted now is whether, when Britain is fighting a war of existence, Ireland, because of passing resentments or of ancient ambitions, or of unfulfilled hopes, shall stand aside from rendering the fullest part she can render in attaining the common objects of all the loyal subjects of the Crown."

Finally Mr. Duke came to the question of Home Rule and the breakdown of the negotiations :

"What was the obstacle to Home Rule in July of this year ? It was that Irishmen were not agreed about Home Rule. It was not that the British Parliament was not ready to concede Home Rule. The British Parliament was ready, so far as I could judge the position of affairs, to have conceded any measure upon which Irishmen were agreed. Is the system of government, and His Majesty's present Administration to be held up to odium in the country, in the Empire, and before its Allies, because of that failure ? The censure is unjust and the reproach is not deserved. The failure was at home in Ireland, and it is there to-day. Last July there were sacrifices in many quarters between the leaders of the Irish party, and there was a great effort on the part of British statesmen, who turned aside from an even greater task to see if they could snatch a success in the settlement of Irish affairs ; but in spite of those efforts there was failure, because upon one proposition Irishmen were not agreed. When you come to test public opinion in Ireland, there are almost as many minds as there are men at the present time upon the question of Home Rule and upon the mode of applying Home Rule in Ireland."

Later on in his speech he once more returned to this note :

"Is it supposed," he said, "that there is any man of sense in England or in the British Empire who does not devoutly wish that Irish grievances might be brought to an end ? . . . Where is the difficulty ? The difficulty is in Ireland. I venture to say that the task which presents itself to Irishmen to-day who believe in constitutional

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action is the task of bringing together their common contribution in order that by united action they may remove the obstacles which lie in the way of Home Rule, and that they, as men of sense, as loyal subjects, as men who have their interests bound up with the interests of Ireland and the Empire, may present to the House of Commons such modifications of the present scheme, or such scheme of their own if they wish. I do not believe this House would put restrictions upon their liberty, and they should present the existing scheme with its appropriate amendments or a new scheme. If they would do this, in the midst of the greatest war the world has ever seen, this House of Commons would turn aside for a reasonable time from prosecuting the war, and would make sacrifices to bring conciliation and peace in Ireland.

“The proceedings of last summer,” he added, “seem to me to forbid anything during the war except a voluntary settlement of this matter.” “But what, in the meantime,” he asked, “is the task of His Majesty’s Government? There are in Ireland at the present time people carrying on their avocations who engage steadfastly in other proceedings, men who are ready, I am satisfied, to repeat the mad and criminal proceedings of Easter week. They have no chance under the present system of doing anything of the kind—I mean no effective chance. . . . In that state of the case His Majesty’s Government must bide its time, and it must ascertain closely week by week and day by day what is the state of the country. It is bound by every consideration of constitutional propriety and of the public good to withdraw every measure of restriction as soon as it can be removed, but in the meantime its primary and paramount duty, as I conceive the case, is to secure to every law-abiding subject of the Crown in Ireland the protection which can be secured to him by whatever means are at the command of His Majesty’s Government.”

The rest of the debate was not very important. In fact an air of unreality necessarily hung over it from the unreal

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nature of the motion from the start. Mr. Asquith made a short speech reaffirming Mr. Duke's declaration about the need for an agreed settlement.

"The bad atmosphere that at present exists in Ireland," he said, "can only be dispersed by an agreed settlement on Irish Government. That is my settled conviction. There is no party and no sane politician in this country or in Great Britain who would not welcome with joy and cooperate with a whole heart in giving to such an agreement, if and when it is arrived at, as I still pray it may be, the most complete and lasting effect."

Mr. Lloyd George admitted that "some of the stupidities which sometimes almost look like malignities, which were perpetrated at the beginning of recruiting in Ireland, are beyond belief. I remember that I was perfectly appalled at the methods adopted to try to induce the Irish people to join the ranks." But he said that "that unfortunate period is passed, and passed long ago," and was largely due to the difficulty of improvising a great machine for recruiting and raising a gigantic army at the same time. After explaining that everything would be done to keep up the strength of the Irish Division, he said :

"What is important is that from the point of view of the war we want in the Army these brave and gallant warlike people who exhibited at the beginning of the war a real desire to help—I should say almost for the first time in the history of our Empire.

"In conclusion, I beg, first of all, the men of this country who know how important success in this war is to the British Empire, to subordinate everything to this securing of the assistance of this great race for us in the combat. I would also appeal to Ireland to approach Great Britain in the same spirit. There are men, and millions of men, in this country who are earnestly anxious to see that justice should be done to Ireland, and more than that, who mean to see that justice shall be done to Ireland. But may I say this : I am appalled at the effect which a failure

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to achieve this will have upon the fortunes of the people of Ireland. I am sure that every right-thinking Irishman who thinks about the future of this country is very anxious to see this conflict of centuries brought to an end and a good understanding established between two races which Providence has put nigh to each other as neighbours."

Finally Mr. Samuel crystallised the essential dilemma which impeded a settlement in the following terms :

"Are Irish Members prepared to leave out the six counties until they are ready to come in? No. If not, are they ready to wait for Home Rule until the six counties are included? No. If neither of these, are they prepared to coerce Ulster? The answer is No. It has again and again been given by the hon. and learned Member for Waterford and others of his colleagues that they are not prepared to contemplate armed coercion in Ireland. If they are not willing to leave Ulster out until she is ready to come in, and if they are not prepared to wait for Home Rule until Ulster is ready to come in, then what is their proposal? That is the difficulty with those of us in the Government and in this House who earnestly desire to secure a satisfactory settlement of the Irish question—that is the dilemma in which we are placed. The most hopeful word spoken to-day was spoken by the hon. Member for West Belfast, who said that so far as he was concerned, he would be only too glad if Irish Members of different views would meet together with a view to overcoming the difficulties that are still outstanding. The Government would be only too glad, as everyone knows, if that could be."

Since the debate took place Sir John Maxwell has been recalled to England to hold the Northern Command, and has been succeeded in Ireland by Sir Bryan Mahon, who is himself an Irishman. The new Under-Secretary in Dublin, Sir William Byrne, is also an Irishman.

There is little to be added to these speeches, for they lay bare the essence of the problem. Geography and history have inseparably linked the destinies of the inhabitants

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of the two islands of Great Britain and Ireland. From every point of view it is better that they should be friends and conduct in co-operation their common affairs. Yet they are deeply estranged to-day. The Irish majority, remembering the past, is inclined to think only of Ireland, and to regard proceedings which have for their object the welfare of the whole people of the British Isles, or of the Empire, as an interference with Irish liberty. The majority in Great Britain, though taking a wider view, find it difficult to realise that they are incapable of managing properly what is the Irishman's own internal business. And this estrangement it is which has caused the present evils. Touched at the outset, as Mr. Redmond said, with the sufferings of Belgium, and the appeal of a noble cause, the majority of the Irish Nationalists rallied to the Empire and its armies. But the suspicion and hatreds of the past arose to interfere with the work of reconciliation. This new gospel of working for something beyond herself, which would have enabled Ireland to forget the past and would certainly have resulted in Home Rule, was met at first not with that sympathy and understanding which has carried the day in South Africa, but with suspicion and distrust. And then the irreconcilables in Ireland itself, profiting by this opportunity, and no less blind to nobler visions, and thinking with fatal self-centredness of themselves alone, destroyed it, at least temporarily, by plunging their country into the horrors of civil war. Since then Ireland has lain paralysed and divided by the hateful memories of the past.

Unfortunately the problem is not one only between Great Britain and Ireland. Had this been all it might have been solved long ago. But Ireland is not united. One quarter of her population, mostly concentrated in Ulster and deeply separated from the other three-quarters by religion, has been as determinedly opposed to Home Rule as the majority have been consistently in favour of it. At bottom it was the Ulster difficulty which wrecked each of the attempts at Home Rule. The experience of

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the last attempt has made it clear that, if Home Rule is to be attained for an united Ireland, it will be enacted with the consent of an Ulster majority or not at all. The problem, therefore, is not only to reconcile Great Britain and Ireland. It is still more to reconcile Nationalists and Ulstermen. For until that is done any settlement on the basis of autonomy for an united Ireland is beyond reach.

But one thing has clearly emerged from recent events, and that is that the first steps towards reconciliation must be taken in Ireland itself. Too often has England tried to solve the Irish end of the Anglo-Irish problem. The Irish must now solve it for themselves. When they have agreed among themselves it will not be difficult for Ireland and Great Britain to come to terms. As the spokesmen for the Government said, and as the negotiations for a settlement showed, the inhabitants of Great Britain are prepared for almost any settlement consistent with the safety and the unity of the Empire which Irishmen can agree to among themselves.

What the basis of settlement should be we cannot presume to suggest. But it would seem that the war is the real ground on which it may be possible to bring all sides together. As Mr. Redmond said himself, it was the war which cast the first healing light upon the situation in Ireland. Despite the first failure it may yet be the war which will do it again. For the most urgent duty of all British citizens to-day is to help to defeat the Prussian menace. Many peoples have found their unity in relinquishing local differences to fight in a common cause. In forgetting itself in fighting in the common effort to save liberty abroad Ireland may yet find that it has won both unity and freedom at home. At any rate it would seem that unless the attitude of the Irish majority towards the war changes, the only basis on which any settlement could be made in the near future will be that of the recently rejected scheme of partition.

London. November, 1916

Ireland since the Rebellion

II. IRELAND SINCE THE REBELLION

THE Englishman and the Irishman are each in his way upholders of justice to an unusual degree. The tragedy of misunderstanding lies in their different conceptions of this virtue. For England justice can hardly be separated from the practical facts to which it is to be applied—an idea which does not appeal at all to the Irish mind. This was probably the underlying reason for the complete breakdown of the Lloyd-George scheme. It was quickly seen in Ireland that the scheme was based upon the necessities of the moment and was to be made palatable by large “considerations”—whose nature was left to discovery instead of being fully revealed—both to the Irish party and to the Ulster Covenanters. Unfortunately, as the event proved, to placate Mr. Redmond and Sir Edward Carson would not necessarily settle the future of the Irish nation or nations. The chief practical effect of the negotiations was to demonstrate to everyone in Ireland what a few people had always known, that neither of these leaders had a free hand. Each had an army at his back and a precipice in front of him, and probably there were no two men more in sympathy with one another during those trying days. Fortunately the possibility of putting different interpretations upon Mr. Lloyd George’s words, and a speech of Lord Lansdowne’s, extraordinarily repugnant to Southern Ireland, made it possible for each party to make at least a pretence of rejecting the scheme on the noblest grounds of self-sacrifice or breach of trust. By doing this they just saved themselves from seeing it wrecked by the country without their will.

Had it not been for the actual tragedies of the rising in Dublin, it is probable that the people would have taken very little interest in these negotiations ; one of the chief difficulties of the Irish situation for a long time past has been

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that both politicians and executive have been utterly divorced from the country and have been carrying on at Westminster a shadowy battle far removed from the realities of Ireland. The Irish people have practically no political knowledge or training, but have an abundance of shrewd insight which is rapidly tending to cynicism. The rebellion was a manifestation of revolt against unrealities on the part of the more hot-headed ; the rise of the Irish Nation League during the " partition " proposals has been a continuance of the same revolt on more sober if not very different lines, without the German influence.

An important part in this revolt against Nationalist authority was taken by the Church, which early declared its attitude of hostility towards all policies emanating from England. For this there were several reasons. In the first place the proceedings of the military authorities under martial law had brought them into conflict with the Church. This was definitely illustrated in the controversy between the Bishop of Limerick and Sir John Maxwell, and also, though less publicly, in the contest which went on in Dublin in connection with the saying of masses for the leaders who died. Secondly, the Church was not unwilling to re-establish her position of ascendancy as against the orthodox nationalist party, which with its progress towards the establishment of self-government had begun to show signs of democratic emancipation. Cynics have long averred, indeed, that there was nothing the hierarchy feared so much as an actual grant of Home Rule, and nothing it was so willing to foster as an agitation for it. Furthermore, the deportations which were so numerous after the rising, and the criticisms levelled at the conduct of some priests, encouraged an attitude which the idea of partition went far to strengthen. The actual initiative was left to the Northern bishops, who were in the strongest position to speak, and their utterance was regarded by most as decisive.

Meanwhile, a lay body had arisen almost spontaneously

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(but with considerable clerical affiliations) under the title of the Irish Nation League, and had held large mass meetings which, like so many other meetings of the kind, were confined to destructive criticism, but extremely effectively made. This body was at once adopted by the independent newspapers which have long been a thorn in the side of the party, and which now devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the destruction of the partition scheme. The *Irish Independent* has a larger circulation than any paper in the country, partly, no doubt, because of its popular price, but largely because it represents the views of an enormous number of people. It is worth while, therefore, that English statesmen should be aware of the views expressed in its columns. From the beginning of the negotiations up to Mr. Redmond's Waterford speech, it was perfectly consistent; its columns contained violent criticism of the Irish party for its spineless policy in not insisting on full satisfaction, support of the Church, and as much implied protection of the Sinn Fein suspects as would suffice to win popularity without suppression. The motives underlying this policy have been variously interpreted, and it is worthy of notice that the paper which had criticised the party for its supine attitude changed its view as soon as Mr. Redmond declared his intention of going into opposition, and began to criticise that policy with almost equal violence. Whatever may be the motives, it is certain that the combination of the Church, the Irish Nation League and the *Independent* has formed an engine which has effectively carried on by peaceful means the anti-party movement which burst out in the rebellion. It would be well to emphasise again how large a part of this movement was directed against the situation created by Mr. Redmond, and against the general neglect of Irish affairs in Parliament, rather than definitely against England, or, still less, against Ulster.

The immediate effect of the breakdown of the negotiations and the concentration of forces which they had caused

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was to make it necessary for the Nationalist Party to restore the efficiency of their machine, which was all but overturned. The situation was very peculiar in one respect—it seemed to many people that the air might have been cleared by suggesting a general election in Ireland. But apart from the fact that it would have been highly inconvenient to the Nationalists, such an election could not have been held. The greater part of the people would have refused to vote for Mr. Redmond's nominees, but they would have had no one else to vote for, as the leaders of the Independents could not have come out into the open, and the rank and file could not have filled the position. The result would probably have been more bloodshed. An interesting sidelight on this matter is provided at the time of writing by the announcement of a by-election in West Cork. The only candidate with official support is put forward by Mr. William O'Brien, and is unable to visit Ireland owing to the Defence of the Realm Act. There is also an unofficial representative of the O'Brien party, and an *unacknowledged* supporter of Mr. Redmond, who used once to be an official candidate. There is little doubt as to which way the voting will go, and there is presumably also a doubt whether a person deported by the authorities can represent his constituency in Parliament.

In these circumstances it was possible for the Nationalist party, during the period of comparative stagnation which followed the breakdown of the negotiations, to reassert its influence by carefully chosen means. The leadership in this matter has almost openly passed from the hands of Mr. Redmond, who was suspected of vacillation, to those of Mr. Dillon, whose unflinching consistency has earned him the title of "Honest John." In the background is the silent but extremely powerful figure of Mr. Devlin, who, through the medium of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, is able to control the rank and file of the orthodox,

The way in which Mr. Dillon has set about his task is sufficiently well known to all newspaper readers. Three

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particular points in the recent treatment of Ireland, beyond the partition proposals, have made it possible to excite popular sympathy without actually espousing Sinn Fein doctrines. These are the deportation and long detention in England of hundreds of Irishmen, the continuance of martial law and the restoration under its protection of the old system of Castle government under much the same type of officials as those who caused it to break down, and the suggestions of applying conscription to Ireland together with the arrest of Irishmen in England under the Military Service Act and the criticism and partial boycott of Irish labourers in Lincolnshire. All these points, to say nothing of the unfortunate happenings at Portobello Barracks and the other alleged misdeeds of the military, have afforded excellent opportunities for an eloquent man to appear as the champion of the people. None of them have been missed by Mr. Dillon, and his points have been successfully made. Meanwhile it has been left to Mr. Redmond to formulate the official policy as best he could. The three steps in this policy are well marked. At Waterford he announced that no further negotiations would be carried on, and that the Irish party would go into open opposition on all matters not connected with the conduct of the war. During the Parliamentary debate he repudiated the idea of a conference and criticised fiercely the recruiting policy of the Government in Ireland. At Sligo, after Mr. Dillon had again been prominent, he announced his complete abnegation of all responsibility for the future government of the country. At the same time he demanded an amnesty for Irish political prisoners and the recall of Sir John Maxwell. The literal manner in which English minds interpret Irish rhetoric is shown by the fact that the latter demand has been complied with—an absolutely unavailing action unless his successor is an angel in human shape. Mr. Devlin's part in contemporary politics is shown by the somewhat sensational adherence of a large number of the Dublin Metropolitan

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Police force to the Ancient Order of Hibernians. The consequences of this action are still *sub judice*, and cannot properly be commented on at present, but there is at least a chance that they may prove far-reaching.

Thus we find that the Irish party in order to reassert its influence in the country has had to go halfway towards championing the cause of Sinn Fein.

The more extreme elements in the country are less apparent at present, but there are three very dangerous symptoms to be observed. In the first place it is believed that the old secret societies, notably the Irish Republican Brotherhood, are being tremendously strengthened by the suppression of agitation; secondly, it is obvious that young boys and girls, particularly in the towns, are being brought up to regard the leaders of the late rising as martyrs, and to believe in force as the only remedy for certain real or imaginary evils; thirdly, severe economic pressure is driving the labouring classes of Dublin to desperation, and they are largely convinced that the British Government is the cause of this pressure.

If good relations between England and Ireland are to be re-established these points must somehow be dealt with; the present misunderstanding seems to be due to the fact that the two peoples are at cross purposes. It would surely be well for the English Government, which is genuinely desirous of putting things right, to be guided by a representative body of Irishmen. For the purpose of creating such a body it would be necessary to know the feeling of Ulster at the present moment, which is an extremely difficult problem. One striking fact has been the peculiar absence of bitter comment from northern sources on the events of Easter week, and the general cessation of controversy and taunts between north and south. There are some observers who hold that bitterness in the north has died down considerably; others believe that it is merely smouldering or due to indifference as to events at the present time. It is hard to say which of

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these views is correct, but it would be safe to suggest that a growing number of people in Ulster are beginning to feel that their future is inseparably bound up with the rest of Ireland, and that their position would be better if they were to take a large share in the government of a united Ireland than if they became a province of Great Britain. If this forecast be correct, it may be that Ulster will herself devise some plan which will enable her to consent to a measure of Irish self-government. It is at least certain that some of the most influential of the southern Unionists are rapidly tending to welcome the idea of an Ireland having the status of a dominion.

In the immediate future it is certain that economic questions will play a prominent part in Irish public affairs. The terribly inflated prices of milk, bread and coal are causing untold suffering in Dublin, and the comparative failure of the potato crop has evoked the shadow of famine. There is a widespread feeling that much of this state of things is due to neglect of Irish administration, the incompetence of Irish departments and the preferential treatment of England and Scotland in economic questions. Only one clause in the report of the Committee on Food Prices attracted attention in Ireland; this was the one recommending the export of milk to England, which created violent indignation. The most significant movement of public opinion in Ireland recently has been the violent anti-agrarian feeling which has arisen in the towns; coupled with it is an increase of anti-English feeling. Public opinion says that the farmers and England are jointly responsible for economic distress. This distress is rapidly verging on starvation, and unless something is done the unrest so created will lend a far more formidable strength than before to the physical force section of the Sinn Fein party. Whatever opinions may be held as to this party, it must be conceded that it contains many of the most enlightened and competent thinkers and workers in Ireland. If these men and women are not able to

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express themselves for good, they will become dangerous, and at the same time the people will be deprived of leadership and sympathy. It would seem as if some great economic policy for Ireland, which would provide work of national service for all parties, ought to be inaugurated as soon as possible

Dublin. November, 1916.

Note.—The result of the West Cork election has been as follows: O'Leary (Redmondite) 1,866, Healey (O'Brienite) 1,750, Shipley (Ind. Nat.) 370. Redmondite majority over O'Brienite, 116.

CANADA

I. THE PRIME MINISTER'S APPEAL

THERE has been a good deal of fretting and irritation in Canada during the summer. From month to month the war affects us more widely and deeply. For a country which never thought of an army it is distressing to have total casualties of over 50,000. Labour becomes scarcer, and business is carried on with increasing inconvenience. The demand for recruits becomes more imperative as men available for military service become scarcer. We are forced to the conclusion that if we are to raise an army of 500,000, at least 450,000 must be secured from the English-speaking communities. With better understanding of the weaknesses and inequalities of the voluntary system the demand for conscription becomes stronger. The English-speaking people feel that they should not bear the whole burden. There is a stern cry for compulsion from those who have lost sons in battle. The leaders of both political parties, however, assure the country that conscription will not be attempted.

Undoubtedly there are weighty reasons for this conclusion. The most profound students of the situation in Canada regard conscription as impracticable. In the Dominion there are 3,000,000 people who do not habitually speak the English language. There are nearly 700,000 Germans and Austrians. There are at least 700,000 or 800,000 Americans, many of whom live in compact settlements in Western Canada. Many of these have come to this

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country during the last ten or twelve years, and one questions if it would be fair or reasonable to conscript them for a war in Europe. Many of these new citizens of Canada perhaps hardly yet regard themselves as citizens of the British Empire. As has been said in previous Canadian articles to THE ROUND TABLE, Americans in Canada have not been distinguishable from Canadians during the war. Still, to apply conscription to the whole body of Americans would be a great exercise of authority. Over solid blocks of Germans and Austrians in the Western Provinces there has been more apprehension than has been admitted, while it is impossible to contend that conscription would not excite deep hostility in Quebec. Those inside and outside of the Dominion who suggest conscription do not fully consider all the phases of our problem: the fact that there is an open boundary of thousands of miles between this country and the United States, and that there is no solid reason for the apparent conviction that this is the only country which is free from German machinations and the effective distribution of German money.

Admittedly recruiting is not as active as during the first two years of the war. We are still, however, well short of the 500,000 which the Prime Minister set as the object of the Dominion. It is recognised, therefore, that we must have better organisation for recruiting if an additional 100,000 men are to be secured. It is equally important that workmen necessary to the efficient operation of munition factories should be kept at home. A national Recruiting Commission has therefore been created with Mr. R. B. Bennett, M.P., as Director of Recruiting, and with associate directors in the various provinces. This Commission will endeavour to organise the industrial resources of the country, to ascertain what amount of female labour is available, and to induce manufacturers to substitute female labour in order that men may be released for military service. Manufacturers have not

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been too willing to employ women, while probably the labour unions are apprehensive of any serious disturbance of wages or working conditions. The Commission will endeavour to co-operate alike with the manufacturers and the labour organisations. It is clear that many women can be secured for industrial service. In so far as they have been employed the results have not been unsatisfactory. The Imperial Munitions Board has made experiments with female labour, and manufacturers have been afforded opportunity to determine just what degree of efficiency has been obtained. In any event the Canadian Army will not easily be raised to Sir Robert Borden's figure, and the task is hardly possible unless women can be freely employed in the factories.

Recognising that greater exertions and sacrifices are required from Canada, the Prime Minister has issued a moving appeal to "the manhood" of the country. He declares that every effort that could honourably be made to avert war was put forth, but that there was no escape from the contest save in dishonour and ultimate disaster. He emphasises the extent and thoroughness of German preparation, points out that Great Britain's first expeditionary force has been increased more than twentyfold and that of Canada more than twelvefold, and that the climax of the war is rapidly approaching. "The last hundred thousand men that Canada will place in the fighting line may be the deciding factor in a struggle the issue of which will determine the destiny of this Dominion, of our Empire, and of the whole world." He pays eloquent tribute to the youth of Canada who have already rallied to the Colours, and whose achievements have crowned the Dominion with imperishable distinction. "Remembering the sacrifice by which that distinction was won, we recall with solemn pride the undying memory of those who have fallen." He states that since the war more than 370,000 men have enlisted in the Dominion, and that 258,000 have gone oversea. For the first months of the year

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the enlistments were one thousand a day, and he estimates that our forces were enlisted and organised more rapidly than facilities of transportation and accommodation in Great Britain could be provided. During the last four months, however, enlistments had greatly decreased, and having regard to future needs, an appeal to the country was necessary. A mightier effort than might be imagined was required to secure a conclusive victory. "This war must have so decisive a result that lasting peace can be secured. We are fighting not for truce, but for victory." The result would depend upon the organisation of the man power of the Allied nations, and "Canada must be strong and resolute in that great endeavour." The Prime Minister concluded :

Under the responsibilities with which I am invested, and in the name of the State, which we are all bound to serve, it is my duty to appeal, and I do now appeal most earnestly, to the people of Canada that they assist and co-operate with the Government and the Directors of National Service in the endeavour for this purpose. To men of military age I make appeal that they place themselves at the service of the State for military duty. To all others I make appeal that they place themselves freely at the disposition of their country for such service as they are deemed best fitted to perform. And to the women of Canada, whose spirit has been so splendid and so inspiring in this hour of devotion and sacrifice, I bid God-speed in the manifold works of beneficence in which they are now engaged, and I pray them to aid still more in every field of national service for which they may feel themselves fitted. Let us never forget the solemn truth that the nation is not constituted of the living alone. There are those as well who have passed away and those yet to be born. So this great responsibility comes to us as heirs of the past and trustees of the future. With that responsibility there has come something greater still, the opportunity of proving ourselves worthy of it. And I pray that this may not be lost.

II. POLITICS IN CANADA

DURING the last few weeks there has been much public speaking in the Province of Quebec. The French members of the Borden Government have made

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many appeals to their compatriots to enlist. It is said that they have not spoken altogether without effect. It is difficult, however, to overcome the general lethargy which prevails, and the effect of Mr. Bourassa's writing and speeches. He becomes bolder as the months pass. In a new pamphlet he declares that "Here in Canada there is being forged around our necks a militarism unparalleled in any civilised country, a depraved and undisciplined soldiery, an armed rowdyism, without faith or law, and as refractory to the influence of individual honour as to that of their officers." Such utterances are denounced by the French Ministers, while Mr. Bourassa himself is as sturdily denounced by Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Mr. Patenaude and Mr. Blandin insist that Quebec's position in the Dominion will be humiliating if recruiting does not improve, and it is not now pretended that what has been accomplished is adequate. Indeed, Mr. J. S. Brierley, the well-known Liberal journalist of Montreal, in a public letter declares that while 36,000 men have been raised in the Province of Quebec at least 23,000 of these have been recruited in the English-speaking communities, although the French population of Quebec is 1,605,339 and the British population only 316,103.

Mr. Casgrain, Postmaster-General, declares that if England were defeated, France vanquished and Russia driven back to her steppes, the first to suffer by a change in social and commercial conditions and liberty would be the inhabitants of Canada. He asserts that to subordinate the question of French-Canadians' participation in the war to the settlement of the school question is bad policy.

We have our rights (he says), but we have also important privileges. It is needless to enumerate them. Think only, for instance, of our civil laws and our relations between Church and State. Where is the Catholic Church better treated than in the Province of Quebec? Where has the French language more rights than it has here? Are we interested to preserve this state of affairs? When I hear certain people speaking of breaking the Confederation

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I would laugh, if it was not so sorrowful to see serious people believing that the menace can be of any use. Confederation is not a pact that can be revoked at will. Confederation is based on an Imperial statute which would have to be recalled by the Imperial Parliament. Since when do minorities govern under a Parliamentary régime? . . . We suffer most from exaggeration from both sides. Do not think that all extremists are in the Province of Quebec. Far from that. There is a certain school in Ontario which seems to have taken as a special mission to render impossible all amicable relations between the two races. I read the papers of the sister Province, and I am revolted in reading, nearly every day in certain papers, the worst calumnies, the most flagrant injustices, and the basest insults. Does anyone imagine that such treatment can conduce to the development of a national spirit or carry a party to power? French-Canadians are the great majority in the Province of Quebec; they are the minority in the other Provinces of the Confederation. They do not ask for favours, but simply to be treated with justice—that is, equal justice for all. And let every one be convinced of a truth amply demonstrated by the history of this country; there is no political party that can survive in Canada unless it deserves and retains the active sympathy of the French-Canadians.

Important speeches have also been made by Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Hon. Rodolphe Lemieux. Both of these denounced an alleged movement of Imperial jingoes to subordinate Ottawa to Downing Street, and Mr. Lemieux particularly attacked Mr. Curtis's *Problem of the Commonwealth*. The jingoes, he said, had a plan already traced which they would like to force the Dominions to accept. The colonies were to be called upon to contribute their part towards the military expenses of the Empire. But the Government was under an illusion if it believed that the voluntary participation in the war of Canada is a step in the direction of the Imperialism dreamed of by the jingoes.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier argued that in England they were preparing a movement to impose on the British people an extreme militarist policy. This was not a new movement. "It has existed for years, but is more accentuated than ever. I have always fought against this policy, and I fight against it still." At London, Ontario, the Liberal

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leader declared that he was still a pacifist and still the uncompromising opponent of militarism. He urged, however, greater enlistment and greater energy in the prosecution of the war

I need not tell you that we meet under the shadow of a terrible war which for the past two years has been desolating Europe and engrossing the attention of the civilised world. Neither would it be amiss if once more I recall that this war is a war for civilisation. If there be anyone in this audience or elsewhere who may be of the opinion that this has been said too often, that it might be left unsaid, I beg to dissent. It must be repeated, and again repeated so as to convince once more one and all in this country that the cause is worthy of every sacrifice.

He added :—

I abate not a jot my life-long profession, reiterated in the House of Commons and upon many a platform of this country, that I am a pacifist. I have always been against militarism, and I see no reason why I should change. On the contrary, I see many reasons why I should not change, but still stand true to the professions of my whole life. But it has been clear to all the pacifists in the world ; to the Radicals of England ; to the Labour party of England ; to all classes in France, to the Radicals of Italy, that in face of the avowed intention of Germany to dominate the world, in face of their blatant assumptions and complacent belief in being the “superman,” in face of their brutal assertions that force and force alone, was the only law—it was clear, I say, to all pacifists that nothing would avail but such a victory as would crush forever from the minds of the German authorities the belief in atrocious theories and monstrous doctrines.

Like Mr. Lemieux Sir Wilfrid was anxious about the projects of the jingoes. There were amongst us, he declared, men consuming the midnight oil and spending much printer's ink in reconstituting the British Empire, not upon the old lines of British freedom, but upon the lines of German militarism. It would, he said, be a sad day if, when we are engaged in a war the object of which is to save civilisation from militarism, if, as a result of this war,

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the victorious nations were to be saddled with militarism. He proceeded :—

Does anyone imagine that if Great Britain had adopted the German system she would have displayed the same power she has since the beginning of this contest? Does anyone suppose that if Britain had adopted the German system, and had taken every generation year after year as they came of military age and removed those young men from the farm, from the shop, from the professions, from schools and universities, and placed them in camps and barracks, and taxed the rest of the nation to keep them under the charge of the drill-sergeant, non-producing—does anyone believe that England would have been able to stand the strain of spending \$25,000,000 every day to finance not only her own part, but Russia, Italy, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and that on a gold basis, out of her own resources? The answer by contrast is that Germany to-day has been obliged to have recourse to a paper currency, which is every day depreciating. No, sir, in the face of this there is no reason to believe that the policy of Britain in the past should be different from the policy in the future. There is an aphorism current that if you want peace you should prepare for war. I do not know the origin of the aphorism. But I assert that the experience of the world shows that the aphorism is apt to be fallacious. No; the experience of the world is that if you prepare for war you will have war. Nothing better illustrates this than the policy of Prussian militarism. Germany in this respect is only an enlarged Prussia. Prussia has dominated the German Empire, and it is an admitted fact that Prussia impregnated Germany with that abominable lust of conquest which is now desolating the world. Prussia is the creator of the system of militarism. The first King of Prussia, Frederick William, invented the system. It has been extended again and again by his successors, but it has not produced peace. On the contrary, more than one-half of the wars which have desolated Europe in the last hundred and fifty years are due to Prussian militarism.

He urged that while we should go on firmly and resolutely until victory is won “the better angels of our nature should then guide our course.” It was idle now to speculate about what would be our relations with Germany after the war. But whether the victory was great or small—and he thought it ought to be great and thorough—“it is not revenge that we are seeking. It is simple justice and

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freedom for the rest of Europe." Always the motto of the British people had been that of the old Roman, "Fight the strong, but be merciful to the weak." There was every reason to believe that when the conflict was over the eyes of the German people would be opened, and as a consequence despotism, feudalism and militarism would be swept away by democracy, and democracy means peace, harmony, goodwill among friends. Concluding, Sir Wilfrid said :—

If you will permit me, after a long life, I shall remind you that already many problems rise before you ; problems of race division, problems of creed differences, problems of economic conflict, problems of national duty and national aspiration. Let me tell you that for the solution of these problems you have a safe guide, an unfailing light, if you remember that faith is better than doubt, and love is better than hate. Banish doubt and hate from your life. Let your souls be ever open to the strong promptings of faith and the gentle influence of brotherly love. Be adamant against the haughty ; be gentle and kind to the weak. Let your aim and your purpose, in good report or in ill, in victory or in defeat, be so to live, so to strive, so to serve as to do your part to raise the standard of life to higher and better spheres.

Though they deal but little with domestic issues, Sir Wilfrid's speeches are taken to foreshadow his attitude in the next general election. It is impossible to say how much the country responds to his arguments on international and Imperial subjects. People are not thinking much at present about the teachings of pacificism or about a *rapprochement* with Germany after the war, and they realise clearly enough that whatever may be said about the competition of armaments both Canada and Great Britain would have been in a sorry plight if the Navy had not been prepared. Nor is there much apprehension over the alleged projects of the jingoes to compel Canada to surrender her liberties. Canadian Imperialists have no thought of an inferior position for Canada in the Empire or of any sacrifice of Canadian autonomy. They do desire equal citizenship in a common Empire and effective organisation of the strength and resources of the Empire for the benefit of all its peoples—a

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reorganisation which can only be carried into effect by the voluntary decision of the peoples concerned.

As yet no reply has come from Sir Robert Borden or any of his colleagues to the speeches of Sir Wilfrid and Mr. Lemieux. It is understood the Prime Minister takes the ground that by agreement between the two parties the life of Parliament was extended, and that in virtue of this agreement Ministers are not free to engage in partisan controversy. If there is not a further extension of the Parliamentary term an election will have to be held by the autumn of 1917. Already it is intimated by influential colleagues of Sir Wilfrid Laurier that no further extension will be granted. It is likely, however, that when Parliament meets Sir Robert Borden will suggest an extension, and if the Opposition opposes, Ministers will be free to defend the Government, its acts and policies before the people. There are now nineteen vacant seats in the House of Commons. No by-election has been held since the outbreak of war. The Government considered that there ought to be no contested by-elections. The vacancies would have been filled if the Opposition had consented to allow members to be returned unopposed and without disturbance of the balance of strength in Parliament. In certain constituencies, however, agreement was found to be impossible, and the Government's conclusion was that a series of by-elections would be only less objectionable than a general election. It is likely that before the Commons is dissolved so many vacancies by death will be created in the Senate as to give the Conservatives a majority.

In Provincial politics there has been nothing of national interest outside of British Columbia and Saskatchewan. In British Columbia in a general election the Conservative Government sustained an overwhelming defeat. In the last Legislature, under Sir Richard McBride, there were only two or three opponents of the Government. Only two of these were Liberals, and they were returned by by-elections for Vancouver and Victoria. In the new Legis-

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lature there will be ten Conservatives, thirty-six Liberals and one Socialist. The new Premier is Mr. H. C. Brewster, a canner of fair ability and good character. Mr. Bowser, who succeeded Sir Richard McBride, in the Premiership, had to meet charges of extravagance, unwise handling of the public domain and improvident dealing with railway builders. During the long period of extreme speculative activity which had preceded the war there had been a happy partnership between the Government and the speculators. When the boom collapsed the Government was also destroyed. This is not to suggest that the Government received less than justice or that there was no substance in the indictment under which it was condemned. Soldiers in training camps and oversea were allowed to exercise the franchise, and apparently a majority of their ballots were cast for Conservative candidates. In Vancouver the resident voters gave a plurality of over 200 against Mr. Bowser, but this was overcome by the votes of soldiers.

In Saskatchewan Hon. Walter Scott, owing to long ill-health, has resigned the office of Premier, and terminated a successful and influential public career. Grave scandals disfigured his last days in office. It was established before Royal Commissions that there was bold thieving by officials superintending appropriations for road building and corrupt payments to members of the Legislature by the liquor interest. Three or four members of the Legislature have been imprisoned. The Speaker has resigned. The Commissions, however, acquit members of the Government of knowledge of these irregularities. Mr. Scott's personal integrity is not assailed. It must be said also that his administration of the affairs of Saskatchewan was distinguished by courage and energy, and that he was responsible for much sound and progressive legislation. Mr. Scott is succeeded in the Premiership by Hon. W. M. Martin, of Regina, who has sat for some years in the House of Commons. In federal affairs he had achieved a good position,

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and he has popularity, ability and integrity. It is expected that a general election will follow the reorganisation of the Cabinet. It is believed that an election is also impending in Alberta. In neither Province is an appeal to the people constitutionally necessary, and it is perhaps unfortunate that elections should be ordered, with so many thousands of the English-speaking citizens of the two Provinces on war service in England and France and Flanders.

III. THE TRIUMPH OF PROHIBITION

THE most momentous social change in Canada since the beginning of the war is that relating to the sale of liquor. Before the war broke out the movement for complete prohibition of intoxicating liquors had made great advances in the United States. About a dozen States had adopted prohibition. Even in the wine-producing State of California the demand for it had such force that the owners of vineyards were and are still seriously alarmed. The manufacture of wine may be prohibited and, though this would kill one of the greatest industries of the State, the prospect of the change must be taken seriously. Of course, such a movement of opinion in an adjacent country affected Canada. It was, however, the war which led to decisive results. Pleading urgently the need of national economy, the temperance workers attacked the waste involved in the liquor traffic. At first the west seemed more easily moved than the east. Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta quickly adopted measures which either prohibited entirely the sale of liquors except for medicinal purposes or placed the sale under such rigorous control by the State that the same result was achieved. In all these three provinces the new law is now in active operation. It was doubted whether British

The Triumph of Prohibition

Columbia would follow the example of the prairie provinces. Its urban population is proportionately much larger than theirs, and cities are less ready than are rural districts for strict prohibition measures. But British Columbia has fallen into line. A plebiscite on the question of the liquor traffic was taken at the time of the recent general election in the Province, and the mandate from the voters was decisively for prohibition. From the Great Lakes to the Pacific coast there will soon not be a single place where the wayfaring man can get a glass of intoxicating liquor.

The movement, however, has had victory in the east as well as in the west. In the Maritime Provinces and in the Province of Quebec there has long been in force a system of local option, and this has been used to prohibit the liquor traffic in so many districts that for many years the bars have been confined to the larger towns. Thus much of what has been done by provincial measures in the west had already been effected in the Atlantic provinces by the action of municipal bodies. In the most populous of the Canadian provinces, Ontario, the strength of the temperance sentiment has long been shown in vigorous fights for local option. It was, however, believed that attempts to carry local option in populous centres like Toronto, Hamilton, and Ottawa would be useless. But the war brought a new temper in regard to the question. The temperance people carried on a very skilful campaign, and the result was that, without an appeal to the people by special plebiscite or at a general election, and without any compensation to the liquor dealers, the legislature of the Province of Ontario passed last spring a measure closing every bar and every shop for the sale of liquor in the province. Not a member of the legislature voted against the measure.

War brings many surprises, and not the least of them is this sudden victory over the liquor traffic. The Ontario Act came into operation on September 16, and there were then some strange scenes. In some respects the law is

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thoroughgoing. Liquor can now be sold only under the strictest kind of Government supervision and for narrowly defined purposes. Clubs may not have liquor on their premises. About last May clubs which had extensive cellars issued invitations to their members to purchase supplies which might remain on hand on the day of fate, September 16. The penalty to the club was heavy if it had not removed all liquor from its premises by that time. The result is that many club members now have a store of excellent wines in their cellars. The dealers, too, were not allowed to have any liquor left in store. Some of them sold off their stock entirely. Others sent what remained chiefly to Montreal. The law does not prevent the shipping direct to the consumer from outside the province of strictly limited quantities of liquor. Private persons may keep in their houses any stores of liquor which they had on September 16. But to add to such stores will not be easy since only a few bottles may be bought in any one shipment. The new law does not interfere with the manufacture of spirits for export from the province, nor with the manufacture and use of native wines.

It is too early to see what will be the effect of the law. Toronto is now the largest city in America in which prohibition is enforced, and it is in such urban centres that the problem is most difficult. Temperance workers are enthusiastic about the results already achieved. There is no doubt that, for the time being at any rate, the number of arrests and the business of the police courts have declined. The smaller shopkeepers express themselves as delighted with the change, since, with the temptation of the bar removed, bills for groceries and other domestic necessities are now paid more promptly. Whether new wastefulness in spending money will grow up to replace the old one is not yet clear. It is said that the "movies" have been more frequented since the bars were closed. There is little evidence yet of the illicit selling of liquor, and the

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police in the cities seem to be remarkably alert to enforce the new law. It has probably had little effect upon habits of life in private houses of the better class, for there is no law to prevent here a continuous if somewhat precarious supply. The most striking change is in the clubs. No longer can members linger at table over a glass of port or play a game of cards with any beverage at hand more exciting than a sparkling cider which must not contain more than two and a half per cent. of alcohol. The inconvenience is less than it seems, for in most of the clubs in Canada, and some of them are luxurious, the consumption of spirits has of late years greatly declined.

IV. CANADA AND THE EMPIRE

TH**ERE** is in Canada no weakening in the resolve to see the war through till a decisive result has been achieved. The losses of Canada have been very heavy, for her dead and missing alone now are drawing near to twenty thousand. Canada realises that, in spite of these tragic losses, she is suffering less than others of the Allies, and public opinion favours not halting in any sense, but doing more. There is no doubt that recruiting has been slow during the summer and autumn. The organisation for recruiting has not been good, but is now being improved. Canadian industry and Canadian agriculture have been obliged to meet heavy demands. Even before the war there was a shortage of labour. Unlike England, Canada had a surplus of males in her population. The result is that if men go away to the war there is not, as there is in England, a large number of unmarried women free to take their places. Exact statistics on such a matter are not now available, but the number of unmarried adult females in Canada is relatively small. This should be remembered as some explanation of the slow rate of recruiting with which we are now confronted.

It would not be safe to conclude that because Canada

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has shown an unclouded sense of unity with Great Britain in respect to the war it is going to be easy after the war to bring about closer political relations. In 1760 British and colonial troops fought side by side in Canada to defeat France, but fifteen years later British and Colonials were fighting each other. Of course, conditions are changed. There will never be any conflict between Great Britain and Canada, and it is fitting to call attention to the fact only because there is danger of a certain cocksureness about the future which may be mistaken. It would not be true to say that, at this moment, Canadians are pondering very deeply what is going to happen after the war. Canada has not leisured men who in quiet studies in country houses can measure the past and the present and try to forecast the future. In the west a recent observant traveller found a reluctance to think of the changes inevitable in the future. He found, too, that returned soldiers were bringing back an enthusiastic sense of brotherhood in arms with the British soldier. But there was also another note, "It is good of you Colonials to come over here to help us," said one well-meaning person to a Canadian officer, and, oddly enough, the Canadian officer was angry. Why? Because the remark implied that he was not a principal, but only an assistant in the war, and the Canadian had felt that he was fighting, not England's battle, but his own. To some the point may appear trivial. But the saying goes to the root of the matter. A proud young nation wishes to fight its own fight, and not as an unconsulted helper of a parent State. It cannot stand by and see Great Britain for ever "run the whole show." The old tie of colony to parent has worn thin in Canada, and either closer relations or more distant ones are inevitable after the war. It would not be easy to overestimate the rapidity with which a sensitive demand for complete political equality with Great Britain is growing. All this is not discouraging but promising for that union of equal States which is the ideal of the future.

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Just now an undercurrent of thought in Canada indicates a certain hostility to the United States for its attitude in regard to the war. The Press of Canada has been extremely tactful, and has said almost nothing that could irritate the Americans. Probably, too, the best informed people in Canada are well content that the United States should not be an active participant in the war. The emotional state of the many cannot, however, be concealed or controlled. In the theatres references to the United States which two years ago would have been applauded are now not so well received. Mr. Roosevelt, once disliked in Canada because of the extreme pressure which he exercised in regard to the Alaska boundary, is now popular because he says the things which Canadians like to hear.

V. FINANCE AND INDUSTRY

THE present rate of war expenditure in Canada is about \$1,000,000 a day. Of this about \$600,000 a day is expended in Canada and the balance in England. This great outlay is being sustained not only with cheerfulness but without any great visible strain. There have been three appropriations by the Dominion Parliament for the war:—August, 1914, \$50,000,000; February, 1915, \$100,000,000; and February, 1916, \$250,000,000—a total of \$400,000,000. After allowing an estimated interest on war loans for the years 1916–17, there is expected to be a surplus to apply to war expenditures, of the annual revenue, of some \$35,000,000.

Since the beginning of the war there have been five loans floated by the Government of the Dominion:—March, 1915, England, \$25,000,000; July, 1915, New York, \$45,000,000; November, 1915, Canada, \$100,000,000; March, 1916, New York, \$75,000,000; September, 1916,

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Canada, \$100,000,000—making a total of \$345,000,000. Of this total \$25,000,000 of the New York loan of July, 1915, matured and was paid in July, 1916. In November, 1915, the amount asked for by the Government was \$50,000,000; but as the subscriptions amounted to \$100,000,000 the issue was raised to that amount, and \$50,000,000 devoted to a credit to Great Britain for the purchase of munitions. This amount has since been used as an offset against the liabilities of Canada to the British Government, amounting on June 30, 1916, to \$162,000,000, leaving a balance of indebtedness of \$112,000,000. This amount has been converted into interest-bearing securities and they in their turn have been used in New York as security for a British loan.

All these five loans issued by the Dominion Government have been notable successes. The call for subscriptions in September of this year by the Government elicited applications for more than double the amount specified. Not only does the credit of Canada stand high abroad, but for internal loans there appear to be ample funds, and the patriotism necessary to provide subscriptions for more than the amounts required.

In the case of both loans in Canada the Banks have underwritten a large proportion of the amount asked for, and only in the first case, and that owing to the doubling of the loan, did the Banks become holders of some \$20,000,000, most of which it is understood has since been distributed. They are, therefore, unfettered in the use of their funds by the holding of large masses of Government Bonds, and still remain in reserve as a financial force ready to step in at any time when public subscriptions may be less free. Thus the Banks have been able to assist the Government in granting credits to the Imperial Munitions Board amounting in the total to very large sums. These credits have been as follows:—November, 1915, \$50,000,000; April, 1916, \$76,000,000; July, 1916, \$24,000,000. They have also undertaken for November, 1916, \$25,000,000, and for

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December, 1916, \$25,000,000. The increase in the Bank Statement of securities is in the main to be accounted for by the Banks' subscriptions to the British loan.

All this signifies an amazing change from the position of Canada in 1913, when it seemed as if our credit had been somewhat strained abroad, and when we were struggling with a large adverse balance of trade. It is easy, of course, on the surface to attribute this immense change to the phenomenal increase in the grain crops in 1915 and the immense munition orders that have arisen from the demands of the war, but underlying that is the great productive power of the country and its population, without which the crop would have been impossible and the munition orders useless. It is true that agriculture has been, and is, suffering from the steady drain of man power for the war, but the decline in agricultural products for this year is the result in the main of bad weather conditions, which must periodically occur.

The productivity of Canada in proportion to its population is very large. Before the war it was clear that there was a considerable surplus of industrial organisation, and various people were calling attention to this fact, pointing out that it was difficult to dispose of the full output of manufacturing concerns without a large export trade, and suggesting various remedies for some apparent defects in the system by which the export of manufactured articles appeared to be cramped. The immense orders for munitions and the like that the war has brought to Canadian manufacturers has filled precisely this need of an adequate exterior market, and fortunately the energy and productive power of the country has been sufficient to enable it not only to assist in providing the necessary supplies of the British Armies, but incidentally to give this country the benefit of an immensely profitable business. The trade figures for the year ending June 30, 1916, showed a total trade of about \$1,600,000,000, which is an average of more than \$250 per head of population, including men, women and children. Apart from the fact that this

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population is spread over an immense area which is extremely rich in raw materials of various descriptions and possessed of a climate on the whole very favourable to energetic work, it is interesting to note that in Canada there are more men than women, and that the average age of the community is lower than, at all events, the older European countries. Further than that, it is undoubtedly true that at the present time the men are, on the average, working harder than usual, and that the places of men who are absent at the war are being taken to some extent by women. That women have entered and are likely to enter less into the sphere of industry than in Great Britain is easily to be accounted for by the fact that there are relatively much fewer of them. Further than that, the system by which the wives and dependants of soldiers at the front are rather liberally pensioned has abstracted from the field of work a considerable number of women who were formerly engaged in domestic work of one kind and another. Still, in spite of the slackness and shortsightedness of the few and of the abstraction from production of the three or four hundred thousand men, it is a subject for congratulation that productive power as a whole has not decreased but increased, even although the occasion of the stimulus is temporary. Many lessons of flexibility and organisation are being learned, and must be of the highest value when the time comes once more to return to normal activities. It shows what a reduced community can effect under the influence of a powerful stimulus, and makes it clear that the burdens contracted during the war can be easily carried. So far so good, and we can look forward with confidence to the work that has to be done.

But there is another side to this, and one that must be faced. During the earlier stages of the war there was unquestionably a real diminution of private expenditure, and that undoubtedly had a beneficial effect on the finances of the country in reducing imports and helping to readjust the balance of trade. The enormous crops of 1915,

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together with the large profits arising from immense orders of \$500,000,000 or \$600,000,000, and with a cessation of expensive railway construction and the like, have changed the entire aspect of our foreign trade. There is something like inflated prosperity in a part of our business, and this has brought about a reaction towards the careless freedom of personal expenditure prevalent before the war. It is regrettable, but true, that economies in this country, even when practised to any considerable extent, were chiefly confined to the well-to-do classes. A full sense of the responsibility of expenditure has never impressed itself upon the working people. High wages and the absence of competition for work have robbed the working man of even what disposition he had for economy before the war. If we are to see through not only the period of actual war but the critical time that must inevitably follow it is of the most vital importance that the necessity for general economy should be brought home to the minds of everybody in the community. Some sporadic efforts in that direction have been made, but they have on the whole been ill-organised and inconsequent. At the beginning of the war there was a disposition on the part of courageous people to encourage themselves and their neighbours into the feeling represented by the phrase, "Business as usual," and with good intentions this stimulus to the continuance and energetic pursuit of ordinary work undoubtedly carried people too far. What is urgently needed is a skilful, continuous campaign to encourage small economies as well as large.

The economic period from 1900 onwards illustrated the effect of immense borrowing power, and great expenditures on construction and the like, upon prices. The reaction of 1913 was tending to bring about a lower level, but with the war have come higher and higher prices for commodities, attributable not only to the scarcity of food supplies owing to the great demand abroad, to the high rates of freight for imported articles, but to the inevitable inflation of credit

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associated with the Great War. Throughout the whole world it would be fair to say that there never has been so much money nor so little production of useful things. Just in so far as Canada is producing munitions for other countries, the money she receives represents a real accession of wealth to the country, but in so far as the production of munitions and supplies is for her own soldiers the money received is not represented by the normal increase of useful things, but is a mere transference of the loans made by the Canadian Government and the taxes raised to the books of the Bank. There is something rather terrible in the use of either the profits or the higher wages arising from the sale of munitions to the British Government for the purpose of increased pleasure, and one cannot but think of the story of David, who, when he was brought water by a soldier who obtained it at the imminent risk of his life, refused to drink it and poured it out as a sacred libation.

The real meaning of the figures of the Bank returns is not easy to interpret, but this much may probably be said:—The great increase in deposits must represent a considerable proportion of what can only be called inflation. Under war conditions, with high prices, great flotations of loans and large expenditures upon things of no economic value, some inflation is not only inevitable, but is common to all the combatant countries. From a selfish economic point of view Canada is better off than most of these because so large a proportion of her war products are paid for by others of the combatant countries. The current loans, on the other hand, have actually decreased, and that in the face of enormous expansion of industrial activity resulting from the war. A part of the reduction of current loans may certainly be attributed to the large liquidation of indebtedness in the west that was made possible by the crop of 1915. The manufacture of munitions is a great industry on practically a cash basis with large profits, so that borrowings on a proportionate scale would be unnecessary, or where they have been made they have been speedily liquidated. The

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grain crops of this year, in point of quantity, appear to be not much over half of those of 1915, but according to some calculations the rise in price has been so great as nearly to offset this diminution in quantity.

Canada. October, 1916.

AUSTRALIA

I. MR. HUGHES'S POLICY

THE measures by which the government of the Commonwealth proposed to ensure the continuance of an adequate number of Australian troops on active service were explained in short statements in both Houses of Parliament on August 30, and at greater length on September 1. The Prime Minister, whose statement was repeated in substance by the Minister for Defence in the Senate, informed the House of Representatives that a referendum would be taken at the end of October, by which the electors would be asked whether the provisions of the Defence Act, enabling the government to call up all citizens, within the prescribed classes, for home service, should be extended so as to enable them to send the men on service abroad. In the month of September an effort was to be made to obtain a number of recruits, specified at 32,500. If by the end of the month that number had not enlisted, the government would exercise the power given it, under the Defence Act, to call up for training all single men without dependents between the ages of 21 and 45. If the decision of the people on the referendum were in the affirmative, the troops obtained by this compulsory summons "for home defence" would be sent abroad as and when required.

In explaining his proposals the Prime Minister addressed himself to two kinds of objections, the existence and the strength of which had been impressed upon him in the Cabinet, in his preliminary tour through the State capitals,

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and in caucus. He had to convince a large body of opinion, confined almost entirely to his own party, that the results of the voluntary system were no longer satisfactory. On the other hand a section of his own party, and the bulk of the opposition, had to be convinced that no more practicable scheme could have been devised to enable this country to continue making an adequate contribution of men to the forces of the Empire. For the first part of his task Mr. Hughes had need of nothing more than to quote official figures already familiar to those members of Parliament who had taken any part in recruiting campaigns. This, of course, did not influence those of his followers, like the Minister for Customs, Mr. F. G. Tudor, since resigned, whose opposition was founded on an objection to any form of "militarist" coercion, nor likewise, the small minority who professed to believe that the manhood of Australia should be kept at home and employed in tasks of national development. The argument was based on the assumption that Australia should comply with the requests of the British Government for the reinforcements required to keep the Australian divisions up to strength. The official figures showed that the number of troops required for this purpose was 32,500 in September and thereafter 16,500 per month. The average number of enlistments per month during the previous three months had been little over 6,000. The number of men in training on September 1 in Australia, in England, and on the water was 103,023, a sufficient number to provide reinforcements at the required rate up to the end of January. After January the authorities would be left with 3,000 men together with those enlisted meanwhile. Assuming that the forces on active service were to be maintained at full strength, the argument as to this aspect of the case seemed complete.

The argument that the method proposed was the most expeditious and the most practicable required a knowledge of the temper of the Labour party which could only be known to the members of its own caucus; and it further

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required an appreciation of the working of the Australian constitution which appears to have been very rare. The referendum was chosen as the alternative to a Bill extending the operation of the Defence Act, or to a dissolution of Parliament. In his statement the Prime Minister showed clearly that he had been unable in caucus to persuade a majority of his followers to agree to such a Bill; and he reminded the House, in referring to the fact that the Senate was the greatest obstacle to his plans, that under the Constitution a double dissolution could not be obtained until the Senate had rejected the same Bill on two different occasions with an interval of at least three months between. If the Senate could be counted on to accept the popular verdict, when pronounced upon a single issue, then the referendum was the most expeditious instrument for securing a change in the law. Taken in conjunction with the arrangements for calling up men "for home defence" it was, in the Prime Minister's view, the method which caused least delay to the Defence Department. The men would be in training before the vote was taken. The only thing that could prevent them being sent to the front, as and when required, would be an adverse popular vote; and as to that, the Prime Minister refused to despair of the Commonwealth.

The feeling aroused by the Prime Minister's statement, amongst those who were conscious of the needs of the situation and sensitive as to Australia's duty, was at first one of intense disappointment and deep resentment. They had in mind Mr. Hughes's speeches in England, and more recently still his Australian addresses from the day of his return, his impatience and scorn of those who were willing that our reinforcements should decline because our financial resources were already too deeply committed, or because our manhood was needed in Australia, or because the War had definitely turned in favour of the Allies. No man had expressed so clearly and forcibly the conviction that the safety, the future development, and the national

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ideals of Australia were involved in the fate of the British Empire, and that victory could not be attained without further sacrifice. Hesitation to act could not in his case be ascribed either to want of knowledge of the peril or to failure to realise Australia's duty. The submitting of the question to the people appeared to involve delay, where time was of the essence of the matter ; a political campaign would create bitterness and produce divisions, where unity was all-important ; while the Referendum itself, whatever its result, would give no more than an expression of opinion, without operative legal effect. The announcement of the disappointing policy appeared to reek of party and caucus, and rudely shook that confidence which the Prime Minister's speeches had taught the country to repose in him as a courageous national leader.

Undoubtedly, Mr. Hughes suffered from the fact that his speeches had, at least to a certain extent, been delivered in one sense and interpreted in another. In his intention they were, it is true, a call to men of all classes and parties, but they were more particularly levelled at elements which he knew to exist in his own party, which were capable of formidable opposition to the course that he believed necessary, and which, though they might not be successful in preventing that course, could go far to detract from the national character of the decision. These had to be apprised of the danger, warned, and if possible persuaded and converted. On the other hand, there was a large section of public opinion which deemed itself in no need of a reminder of either duty or danger, which certainly was heartily in favour of universal service, and which looked upon the Labour Party, and especially upon its organisation and " machine," as the only obstacle to the policy which the country's need demanded ; this section of the public had taken Mr. Hughes's speeches to mean that the main difficulty was overcome and the Labour Party at last converted.

The feelings of resentment and chagrin to a great extent

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passed away when people began to reflect, and to ask themselves what other course was open. To some, indeed, it appeared that the wise course—a daring one—would have been to submit a Bill, or a resolution, to the House of Representatives, and, on its being passed there, put compulsory service into operation forthwith by executive act. But this involved a good many assumptions. In a Labour Cabinet the Prime Minister has not chosen his colleagues and therefore has not the same claim to their loyalty and forbearance as prime ministers in British communities generally have. And there were, in fact, divisions in the Cabinet which might easily have made strong action impossible, for the concurrence of the Cabinet as Executive Council would be essential to give even the form of an Executive Act. As it was, Mr. Hughes was able to face Parliament with the loss of only one colleague. Further, while the House of Representatives would probably have given a majority, it would have been a majority in which the opposition predominated; and there were obvious reasons of national (non-party) importance why the measure should secure the greatest possible support from Labour members.

The main seat of the Prime Minister's difficulties was the Senate. The idea of his critics was that he should boldly have ignored the opposition which had to be met there. But, apart from other reasons which might be adduced, there were two which made this impossible, if any semblance of legality were to be retained. In the first place, it is in the power of either House to put executive regulations out of operation by resolution; hence, if the Cabinet had sought to evade the Senate by using its powers under the War Precautions Act, it would have had to prorogue Parliament. In the second place, the Senate could have withheld supply. The course advocated by the critics therefore led by more than one road to a suspension of the constitution and to government by extra-legal methods; and it might well have put the opponents of the policy into

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the strongest possible position for resistance to the measures so determined upon. If extra-legal methods should become necessary, they will have to be based on the moral support of a national vote.

Some vain regrets have been expressed that Australia should not have had a National Government, instead of government by a party, at this critical hour of her history. This was, however, an inevitable consequence of the highly organised mechanism of the Labour Party, which does not permit the give-and-take with an opposing party necessary to coalition. It is believed that the extreme and irresponsible attitude characteristic of the Labourite Senate was the chief obstacle to the formation of a coalition in 1914, when the Liberal Government was still in power.

For the present, the Prime Minister has thrown himself with even more than wonted energy into the campaign for that decision by the people which no one feels more strongly than he to be essential to the honour of Australia and to her destiny. In this campaign he is being vigorously supported by all the patriotic agencies which are pledged to the successful prosecution of the War; but he is being bitterly opposed by some of the political Labour leagues, one of which, viz., that of New South Wales, the State of which he is a representative, has declared him an outcast from the Labour Movement.

NOTE.—The referendum was defeated, the latest, but not the final, figures being 1,102,227 against and 1,033,753 for.—ED. R.T.

II. INDUSTRIAL UNREST IN AUSTRALIA

AS a feature of our modern social system industrial unrest is more than a century old. Its general causes have been ascertained in so far as they are inherent in the industrial system. Fundamentally, industrial unrest is the expression of the revolt of the wage-earning classes

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against conditions imposed upon them by capitalist industrialism. The increasing concentration of workers and employers into highly organised and mutually hostile camps is indicative of that cleavage between the two great economic classes which the Socialist calls "the class war." But such a broadly general statement hardly explains the special causes of industrial unrest within the last few years, and is still less helpful when we consider the temper and policy of the working class of Australia as recently displayed.

Beyond question one of the causes of unrest is the rise in the cost of living. Since 1905 "effective wages" in Australia—allowing for cost of living and unemployment—have been either at a standstill or decreasing. Since the beginning of 1914 they have fallen heavily. The index-number of cost of living for the six capital cities of the Commonwealth has risen from 880 in 1901 to 1,140 in 1914, and to 1,350 for the first quarter of the current year. As might have been expected, the abnormal rise in the cost of living since the beginning of the war resulted in an increase in the number of working days lost through disputes relating to wages questions. In 1913 the number of days lost in disputes of this character was 187,690, in 1914 302,263 and in 1915 336,806.

While the Commonwealth Statistician's figures show that the number of working days lost in 1915 was only about half the number lost in 1914, it is pointed out that more than half of the number of working days lost in 1914 were lost in the afternoon-shift dispute in the New South Wales coal-mining industry. The number of disputes recorded during the first quarter of 1916 was slightly less than for the last quarter of 1915, but was double the number in the corresponding quarter of 1915, while the number of working days lost does not fall far short of the total for the whole of the year 1915. Thus it would appear that there is no present indication that the workers are prepared to accept the increase in the cost of living, even during this war, without an attempt to secure a compen-

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sating increase in wages. Further, it should be remembered that in addition to strikes there have been a very large number of increases in wages secured as the result of applications to wages boards and other industrial tribunals. These applications have, during the last twelve months, generally been made in consequence of the increased cost of living.

The prevalent unrest, however, cannot be accounted for by these facts alone. There are other grounds in addition to those mentioned. The continued existence and violence of industrial disputes has proved puzzling to many observers, even when resident in the Commonwealth. They point to the evident fact that the conditions of labour, including wages, are far more favourable to the worker in Australia than to his fellows in any other part of the world. The standard of comfort is admittedly high, the power of Unionism very great, all of which advantages are enhanced by excellent climatic conditions. Why, then, it is asked, should the workers be unsatisfied? Those who take this view fail to understand the present stage of development reached by the Labour movement in Australia, or to give sufficient weight to the present policy of Labour. Many historical instances can be quoted to show that a period of prosperity and power is more likely to be a period of unrest than a time of sordid misery and destitution. The men most likely to rebel are those who find themselves arrested in their progress towards a higher standard. Such has been the position of the Australian worker in the last ten years. Add to this the facts that popular education has raised the working class to at least a constantly progressing standard of knowledge, that industrial organisation and the acquisition of political power have given them possession of paramount power, and we go far to account for the phenomenon. The Australian workers have passed beyond the stage at which they revolt against economic pressure almost without consciousness of its meaning, but simply from a vague understanding that the time has come

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to strike out for an improvement. Now they act from policy, with a deliberate and self-conscious endeavour, not merely to maintain the existing standard of life, but to elevate it by an indefinite number of increments to wages. This is clearly shown by the fact that most Wages Boards have to consider continual applications from the same industry for new awards. This tendency is accentuated by the fact that Trade Union secretaries now spend much of their time as advocates before Wages Boards, and are naturally inclined to justify their existence by working for fresh awards. This process maintains a more or less permanent state of friction between employers and workers. It may, indeed, be said that the peculiarly Australian method of bringing about industrial peace largely achieves the opposite end by inducing on both sides a highly organised system of offence and defence, which possibly makes as much for war as for peace. Moreover, it is not sufficiently remembered that whatever the machinery devised for industrial conciliation, if it does not fully satisfy one side or the other, trouble will ensue. It is beyond hope that the workers will ever reach finality in their claims for increments of wages or that the employers will ever concede their demands without a struggle. This general observation is greatly reinforced when we come to consider the defects of the machinery of arbitration which arouse the hostility of the workers.

The most fruitful cause of discontent in this connection is the amount of delay in the issue of awards by Wages Boards. These delays may not result directly in strikes, but they create the atmosphere conducive to industrial dispute, and occasion a feeling of irritation which breaks out in a strike if the award granted falls far below the wishes of appellants. No one could follow the discussions which take place in the Labour Councils and the Unions without noticing the frequency of these demonstrations. Only a few days ago the Secretary of the Railway Workers' Association of N.S.W. stated that the Executive had

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found considerable difficulty in preventing an outbreak, because one of the Wages Boards, dealing with their members, had taken two years to arrive at an award, and another five months to interpret it. Another cause of irritation in this case was the refusal of the Board to make the award retrospective, the amount of wages involved being nearly £1,000,000. Such instances could be multiplied greatly from all the States. Then again, the highly technical grounds on which after protracted inquiry many of the judgments of the Commonwealth Arbitration Court are based prove exasperating to the majority of workers, who see only the plain issue between an increase in wages or improvement in conditions and an adverse verdict. During the war, no inconsiderable degree of delay has been due to the shortage of skilled legal advisers and officials charged with the business of industrial arbitration. Another frequent cause of unrest is the fact that awards are generally made to operate for a period of three years. When a delay of another year is added by the Wages Board, it can easily be understood that the period between two awards wears out the patience of the workers. Further, the awards frequently cover only one section of an industry or a class of labour. The awards applying to different sections are continually expiring and coming up for renewal at different times. It is often too much for the temper of one section to see their fellows enjoying an increased wage, when they may have to wait twelve or eighteen months before the revision of their award. Some of the industries affected in this way during the last two or three years have been the ironworkers, gasworkers and ferry employees. All complex industries are exposed to this danger.

Apart from dissatisfaction with the working of the system of industrial arbitration, there are several familiar and constant causes of dispute that need little more than a passing mention. The invasion of Trade Union privileges and the menace to working-class solidarity account for the

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great majority of these. The growth of solidarity amongst the workers is evidenced by the number of disputes due to alleged victimisation, and the employment of non-unionists. These cases are mostly small and local, but they contain elements of serious disturbance, as is shown in the case of the industrial dispute involving timber-workers in Western Australia, which at first affected only 40 men, but eventually included nearly 4,000 workers and lasted for nine weeks. Absolute preference to unionists is more and more insisted upon by industrial Unions, and is likely to continue to be a fruitful cause of trouble. Long before the war, the introduction of unskilled labour into various trades caused many strikes. An analysis of the disputes of the last six months shows this source of disturbance to have been aggravated by the war. There has been considerable unrest amongst the Engineers within the last year, owing to the unsatisfactory conditions laid down for the dilution of skilled labour with unskilled. The returns also show the continued frequency of demarcation disputes, especially in the shipbuilding and engineering trades. The recent declaration of the President of the Federal Court of Arbitration, that any worker, notwithstanding the grant of an award covering his industry, is entitled to refuse to work for that award, is not likely to diminish the number of disputes.

Not the least important cause of increasing industrial unrest in Australia is the great political success achieved by the Labour Party in the constituencies of both State and Commonwealth. This factor operates most powerfully in N.S.W., which has been under Labour government for the past six years. There is no doubt that the acquisition of political power has increased the assertiveness of the industrial classes. They are more apt to demand concessions and improvements when their own representatives are in power. Things economic seem to them easy of alteration, and they do not hesitate to demand the most drastic changes. New South Wales is industrially

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much the stormiest of all the States. Victoria has only about one-sixth the volume of industrial disturbance of the Mother State. Undoubtedly this is largely due to the fact that the miners count for half the total number of workers involved in disputes throughout the Commonwealth, and in New South Wales mining looms very large. It is none the less true, however, that the temper of the workers generally in N.S.W. is much more aggressive than that of the workers of Victoria, and it is no exaggeration to say that the possession of the reins of government is responsible for some of the difference.

It remains only to mention one other development which tends towards the increase of industrial disturbance. The recent split between the Industrialists and the Parliamentary party in the Labour movement is due, as shown in a previous article, to the dissatisfaction of the more energetic portion of the rank and file with the moderate policy of the Parliamentary Labour Party. The Industrialists, being by nature militant, are certainly influencing the Unions towards more emphatic assertion of their claims. The revolutionary organisation known as the Industrial Workers of the World is using every opportunity to foment the causes of trouble. The Australian press is, however, giving an undeserved advertisement to this organisation, for there can be no doubt that, apart from the smallness of its numbers, its supreme function as an irritant depends for its exercise on abnormal conditions. The heavy defeat of some of its principal members in the recent selection of Labour candidates for Parliament shows clearly the severe limitation of its hold upon the main body of Labour supporters. The present renewal of the movement for the "One Big Union," while it is a further proof of the growing solidarity of the workers, should be taken rather as part of the natural movement towards amalgamation and concentration than any manifestation of an approach to the ideal of the I.W.W.

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III.—RECENT LIQUOR LEGISLATION

FOR some years prior to 1915 there had been a movement in the various Australian States having for its object a restriction of the consumption of alcoholic liquor, the result of more or less organised effort by advocates of temperance, whose reasons were both ethical and physiological. Total prohibition has been the law in parts of New Zealand for a considerable period, and the principles of local option were embodied in an Act of Parliament in South Australia as far back as 1905.

The Commonwealth Government in the early part of 1916 took over the few hotels in the Northern Territory (transferred to it by the State of South Australia under certain specific conditions), and is still conducting them in the ordinary way; but it is possible the businesses may be closed and the territory declared a prohibition area.

Temperance propaganda took a more definite shape in *South Australia* in 1911 by the circulation of a petition for closing the hotels at the same hour as bakers, butchers, etc., and this, together with one for power to vote "No Licence," was presented to Parliament in 1912. A Bill was also introduced at this time by a private member embodying the requests of the petitioners, but specifying eight o'clock p.m. as the hour for closing hotel bars, which, however, was rejected. A second petition bearing 37,000 names was presented in the following session (November, 1913), and the same private member introduced a new Bill providing for six o'clock closing and no more. This shared the same fate as his previous measure, an amendment which read as follows being carried:—

That a referendum be taken of the House of Assembly electors at the next General Election to fix the hour when bar-rooms in premises licensed for the supply of intoxicating liquors should be compulsorily closed.

Recent Liquor Legislation

The then hour for closing was eleven o'clock p.m., and the various temperance societies and sympathetic organisations began a vigorous campaign in favour of six o'clock closing.

The referendum was submitted on March 27, 1915, to the electors whose names were on the roll for the Lower House (adult suffrage, including women), votes to be taken on each hour, six to eleven (on the "cumulative" principle if necessary), and the following was the result of the poll

	On Roll.	% Voted.	6 p.m.	7 p.m.	8 p.m.	9 p.m.	10 p.m.	11 p.m.	In-formal.	Valid Votes.	% for 6 p.m.
Metro-politan Districts	127,914	65.7	46,153	318	653	3,145	693	32,410	709	82,273	55.3
Country Districts	125,477	75.0	54,265	521	1,334	6,720	1,273	28,952	1,037	93,165	58.2
	253,391	70.3	100,418	839	2,087	9,865	1,966	61,362	1,746	176,537	56.8
Total votes for hours between 7 and 11 p.m.										14,755	
Majority for 6 p.m. over totals for all other hours										24,299	
" " as against 11 p.m.										39,056	
" " in favour of earlier than 11 ..										58,813	

It is understood that women's votes played an important part in the result, and probably gave the very considerable majority for six o'clock closing. The Government had previously undertaken to introduce a Bill to give effect to the mandate, providing any other hour but eleven o'clock secured a majority. This was done, the measure was passed by both Houses, became law on March 26, 1916, and, on the following day, the hotels throughout the State were closed at six o'clock. So that *South Australia* led the van in this movement for earlier closing of liquor bars.

In Tasmania the electors voted for six o'clock, but no legislation has so far followed, although it is to be introduced at no distant date.

In Queensland there has been a certain amount of agitation for early closing, but it has not reached any definite stage.

In Western Australia separate referenda gave the following results :—

In Perth and urban areas the vote was for nine o'clock. On the goldfields the vote for six o'clock as against eleven was lost.

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No vote was taken in the country districts.

Definite action has been taken in *Victoria*, Parliament having already passed a measure providing for closing at 9.30 instead of 11 o'clock. Later a Referendum Bill was brought before Parliament with a view to a vote of the electors being taken to decide whether the hour of closing should be earlier than 9.30 p.m. Women have a vote in the State, and it was considered fairly certain that six o'clock would secure the necessary majority. Subsequently, however, the Referendum Bill was abandoned, and a Bill to provide directly for closing at 6 o'clock was introduced, but at the time of writing it has not become law.

In New South Wales considerable agitation preceded any definite action. Pressure was brought upon Parliament to reduce the hours during which bars should be allowed to sell intoxicating liquor, and some measures were introduced in the early months of 1915.

The Government declined to accept the responsibility for any clear direction, and submitted the question to the electors by referendum, the result of which was to hold good until the end of the war; 574,394 votes were cast (not including the Lord Howe Island vote, which could not affect the result), being roughly 50 per cent. of the electors on the roll, the number of men voting being 305,199, and the number of women 269,195.

The result was approximately as under :—

For 6 o'clock closing	345,697
" 7 " "	4,801
" 8 " "	20,900
" 9 " "	176,416
" 10 " "	1,387
" 11 " "	3,182
Informal Votes	22,011
			574,394

The necessary certificates of the results having been received by the Governor-in-Council at 4.45 on July 21,

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1916, the day on which the count of votes was completed, a proclamation was at once issued and hotel bars were closed that evening at 6 p.m., so that no previous official notice whatever was given to licensees of the intention of the Government.

Although the action appears to have been sudden and drastic, it was generally felt that the referendum would result in some alteration of the existing law, and it is therefore claimed that persons interested had really had sufficient warning.

General.—The drink bill of Australia is stated at 21½ millions annually, but how much of this is represented by local production is not material at the present time. Nor can any comparison be made at present as to reduced out-turn of beer by brewers, the period since actual closing of bars at 6 o'clock covering the winter months only.

It is roughly stated that the Stock Exchange estimate of values of brewery shares, owing to recent legislation, represents a fall of, say, 30 per cent., and it is also computed that the values of freehold hotel properties have receded by 25 to 30 per cent. compared with, say, early in 1914. The value of leaseholds, for which large premiums had been paid, have fallen to a much heavier extent; and, in some instances, they may be said to have disappeared altogether.

In all the legislation so far introduced there has not been any provision for compensation for this loss of value, the only relief to the tenant being the constitution of a Rent Court in South Australia to hear appeals from leaseholders for reduction of rents in case no arrangement is arrived at mutually between landlord (or freeholder) and the tenant (or leaseholder).

The temper of a majority of the people is distinctly in favour of restriction, and temperance advocates state that, with the women's votes, they expect to be able, at no distant date, to carry total prohibition for the whole Continent.

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IV. THE COMMONWEALTH MERCANTILE FLEET

THE news that before leaving London Mr. Hughes had bought a fleet of ships for the Commonwealth came as a surprise and was read with misgiving. This was more because of old controversy than from fear of a bad investment, though that was more than feared. Eight weeks have passed and Mr. Hughes is still leaving the transaction to speak for itself. The certain interpretation is that he believes the war will be long, and that freights will keep high for some time thereafter. There are fifteen ships, all of about one capacity, the average net tonnage being 2,725, and gross 4,245. It is not the right size for long-voyage work, and they are not new. One was built last year, one in 1912, two in 1909, and nine in 1906 and 1907, and the remaining two in 1899 and 1900. And the price was £2,068,000. Yet in private hands, and with fair luck, they might pay for themselves in a couple of years. By transfer to the Australian register, the tax on war profits will be avoided; but hitherto they have been worked with coloured crews, and the accommodation is not at all what an Australian crew demands and the Navigation Act requires. It is so necessary to economise time and space that doubtless the alterations will be as few as possible. The immediate task of the ships is to carry what they can of the two million tons and more of wheat that are still on hand. In a semi-official statement it is said that they can move 300,000 tons in twelve months; but if they move 250,000 they will do well. It is partly because this relieves the situation so little that there has been a suspicion that there has been more politics than economy in the venture; it has been called "one good gift which Mr. Hughes is bringing home to the Caucus comrades who may be inclined to gaze disapprovingly at other articles in his wallet." Mr. Cook, the leader of the Opposition, indeed,

'The Commonwealth Mercantile Fleet

has no doubt about it. He said : “ *The Worker* of Sydney gloats over the deal not as something to benefit Australia as a whole, not even as an adjunct to the wheat pool—but as something to help expropriation of capital, which is frankly Labour’s policy all the time. . . . If the wheat problem has really led to the purchase one might look on it with equanimity. . . . The buying of the Strath Line may be carrying out the Labour Party’s policy, but it is not carrying away our wheat.”

Australia. September, 1916.

WE have received the following correction from the Industrial Registrar, Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Melbourne, Australia :

“ At page 560 of your issue of June 1916, your Australian contributor has made a serious mistake. He says :

Until quite recently it was the boast of the Parliamentary Labour Party, and especially of Mr. Hughes, that the trades affected by awards of the Federal Arbitration Court had never gone on strike. . . . They had always loyally accepted the Court’s decisions. But that can no longer be said. . . . The miners of Broken Hill, defiant of the determination of the Court, struck for a forty-four hours’ week.

“ The truth is, that when the miners refused to work the Saturday evening shift, the men were not working under any award at all ; they were working in pursuance of an expired agreement made between the companies and the union, but not even registered in the Court. The Court never had decided any dispute as to the hours of work. There has never yet been a strike extending beyond the boundaries of any one state since the Court was formed to deal with such disputes ; and there has been no breach of any award to my knowledge, by any Union or any employees. Certainly there has been no conviction. There is also an

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error on the next page. It is stated that the men, through the President of their Union, gave an undertaking that they would 'Accept the award.' The last words are put in inverted commas, as if a quotation. There was no such undertaking; but, before the President consented to give precedence to the case, he secured from both employers and employees reciprocal undertakings that they would respectively give work and accept work on the lines of the award. An award of a minimum wage does not, of course, compel an employer to give work, or an employee to accept work, unless they see fit.

"I submit that this correction of the mistake should be published at once by your influential review."

July 25, 1916.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES

THE conclusion of the first session of the second Parliament of the Union has brought about no diminution in the political activities of the two parties which are struggling to gain the support of the Dutch vote. The contention between them still continues as sharp as ever, and has been concentrated lately in a series of Congresses of which the first two met simultaneously on Wednesday, August 23rd, the one in Bloemfontein, the other in Pretoria. General Botha summoned his supporters in the Free State to confer with him in Bloemfontein. General Hertzog marshalled his Transvaalers in Pretoria. Thus each contending faction met in that province which is supposed to be the stronghold of the adversary. The South African Party Congress need not detain us long. General Botha has always held to an unshakeable belief in the ultimate and complete victory of the Allies, has always taken every opportunity of giving expression to it, and did so on this occasion. Moreover, he had just returned from a visit to General Smuts in German East Africa, and was thus able from personal observation to enlarge upon the satisfactory progress being there achieved and to draw attention to the fact that General Smuts is holding an Imperial Command over an army half of which is English.

He was obliged, however, to allude to one unpleasant episode which has once more marred the attitude of the

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Union towards the war, and has served to remind us all again of the fact that South Africa alone amongst the Dominions is not showing a united front in the cause of liberty. An attempt was made this year to stir up a second rebellion. It is inadvisable to discuss it here, as the ringleaders are at present undergoing trial. Perhaps it need not be taken too seriously. As General Botha pointed out, such a movement must be doomed to failure :

“ In the last war we were armed to the teeth, and yet we lost our independence. Can we then to-day allow people who are unarmed to go to destruction ? This idea of rebellion is madness. Our future has to be sought in a different direction.”

General de Wet seems also at last to have realised this, for as soon as the ringleaders approached him on the subject he gave full information of the movement to the Government. In other directions also there are signs of an improved public sentiment amongst Nationalists on the subject of those men who took prominent parts in the rebellion of 1914, some of whom are still in gaol and some of whom were elected while in gaol to the Executive of the Nationalist Party. A by-election has become necessary in the Ermelo District of the Transvaal owing to the lamented death of General Tobias Smuts. A delegate from this district to the Nationalist Congress took occasion to point out that the party would have no chance of winning the seat if they continued to have on their central committee men who had been sentenced for their part in the rebellion, and therefore moved that the central committee must consist of persons in the full and undisturbed possession of all constitutional rights and free to take an active part in politics. This seemingly sensible and eminently practical motion drew down upon the mover's devoted head all the thunder of the big guns of the party, and eventually the motion was withdrawn without being put to the vote, but it was noticeable that when the central committee came to be appointed

Political Controversies

some, at any rate, of the objectionable names had disappeared.

But it is not so much with the attitude of the Nationalists on purely domestic questions that we are concerned as with their outlook on the war and on the Imperial questions which the war has made so prominent. The Imperial issue has formed the groundwork of much Nationalist oratory since the removal of General Hertzog from the Cabinet in 1912 brought the party into existence. Readers of *THE ROUND TABLE* will recollect that it was over the attitude of South Africa towards the Empire that this important event took place. General Hertzog persisted in preaching that South Africa must come first and the Empire second, and then only when South Africa's interests would be served thereby. General Botha deprecated the raising of such a discussion at all, and claimed that it could only be academic and was calculated to hurt the feelings of many good South Africans. But when war broke out the fact that South Africa became involved apparently only because the Empire was at war was hailed by the Nationalists as a proof of the far-sightedness of their leader. Thus *De Burger*, the leading Nationalist organ :

“Only four years have passed since that time—i.e., General Hertzog's removal from the Cabinet—and here we are in the most practical manner up against the question. The Imperialism against which we were so earnestly warned at that time has been fastened upon South Africa by the same hand which removed General Hertzog.”

This is the gravamen of the charge brought by the Nationalists against General Botha. They never have admitted and still refuse to admit that South Africa must necessarily be at war when the Empire is at war ; the final decision must still rest with the South African people, otherwise the liberty enjoyed under our Constitution is a sham. “But when war broke out Generals Botha and Smuts took up the position that England's wars were also necessarily the wars of all portions of the British

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Empire. According to their interpretation, South Africa, in spite of her self-government, had no other choice than to enter as a participant in the European War."

At the Conference recently held at Pretoria General Hertzog described this as "one of the greatest mistakes which General Botha could have made." It was this recognition by General Botha and his party of the common obligation of South Africa to take up arms along with the other Dominions in defence of the Empire which the Nationalists can never forgive and which explains the reason why the rebellion is described as not a rebellion against King George but an armed protest against King Louis. The fact that the obligation was subsequently recognised by the Union Parliament by an overwhelming majority, and, further, in October, 1915, was again confirmed by a general election, does not really affect the principle for which the Nationalists are contending, though it removes any possible justification for the rebellion. From that time they have had to watch their country becoming more and more involved in a struggle with which they never desired to have anything to do. Thus, finding the trend of events against them, they are driven in the opposite direction and become daily more uncompromising. In his opening address Mr. Tielman Roos, chairman of the Transvaal Nationalist Party, defined afresh the attitude of the Party towards the Empire :

"They had grown too strong to say any longer South Africa first and other countries afterwards. It was now South Africa first, second, and third."

Whether the Empire is to come fourth, or, indeed, anywhere, he did not specify, but he proceeded to emphasise this uncompromising declaration by issuing a warning against anyone starting a movement towards strengthening the bonds uniting the component parts of the Empire, as it could only result in a counter-agitation being started in favour of independence. Indeed, on the question of Imperial organisation the Party, as might be expected, is

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thoroughly explicit. General Hertzog thus defined its attitude :

“ England has entered the war because through promises to the Allied Powers by the Ministers of England, England was obliged to do so, and it was to the credit of England that she carried out her obligations. But in that lay the danger that this country through ministerial promises might be involved in all kinds of difficulties. South Africa under that Federation would be a tin attached to a cat's tail, but he felt satisfied that the Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia realised that in the first place they were Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia.” As another speaker expressed it, “ the bonds which are those as between sister States are quite strong enough.” Thus the Empire is to develop on lines of mutual national exclusiveness.

But this provincialism is preached not alone in Imperial matters, but also in that two-stream policy which is to govern the relations between the two white races within the Union. It is even now to be the basis of the organisation of political parties. This fresh application of this guiding principle was explained by General Hertzog in a speech at Zoutpan soon after the Congress had adjourned :

“ The time had arrived when thousands of Englishmen would join the National Party. But also thousands would not do that. They would be able to form a separate party to work shoulder to shoulder with the National Party. That would be much healthier.” Thus not only is South Africa to be kept rigidly out of any Imperial commitments, but the two races in South Africa, even in political organisation, are to be kept strictly apart.

However, soon after this Zoutpan utterance an explanation was proffered to the effect that General Hertzog only desired to provide for those Englishmen who do not understand Dutch. But such explanations cannot serve to hide what is really at the back of the Nationalist mind. This is simply that so far as the South African Union is

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concerned "the Nation" means the Dutch, the English section being more or less of an appendage. General Botha speaking at Wakkerstroom on Thursday, September 28, pointed out what would inevitably be the result of this new application of the two-stream policy :

"General Hertzog wanted his supporters to form the soul and body of the party and the English to form the tail. It was an utterly ridiculous proposal. Supposing it were possible to form such a party, the body would soon find the tail too heavy."

And so we go on in South Africa, in spite of European wars and world-wide cataclysms, and in spite of the many glorious sacrifices made freely by men of both races who have given their lives in the cause of freedom. But herein lies our salvation. The sense of joint sacrifice in a common cause has never been stronger in South Africa than at the present time ; indeed, it can hardly be said to have existed previously at any time in South African history since the Cape passed into the British Empire. But now, no matter how much the Nationalist section may wash their hands of any participation in it, the fact is there and cannot be obliterated. Under the leadership of General Botha we have struggled side by side for the past two years. We have made undreamt of sacrifices of blood and treasure and we look forward to celebrating together a common victory.

II. THE COLOURED CORPS AND RECRUITING

SOUTH AFRICA is perhaps fortunate in being able to help in the war, not only by sending white troops to the trenches, but also by providing coloured and native labour corps to work in the harbours of France. Already a coloured labour contingent, 1,000 strong, has been despatched to France for this purpose, and now 10,000 Kaffirs are to be recruited and organised as a military

The Coloured Corps and Recruiting

force under European officers, and despatched to France for the same purpose. Since the outbreak of the war the contribution of the natives towards the campaigns in Africa has not by any means been a small one. In the German West campaign 40,000 were employed in building military railways and other works. There are over 10,000 natives from the Union at the present time in German East. In addition to these a coloured battalion has for some months been a combatant unit in German East, and this battalion has recently been increased by the addition of two companies. In this way the coloured and native populations are afforded an opportunity of serving, whereas the proposal several times mooted in the House of Commons that they should be trained for combatant service in Europe would, if adopted by the Imperial authorities, raise a storm of opposition within the Union. Here is a way in which they can play a part without raising dangerous controversies which would only add to our already far too numerous internal bickerings, and it is surely a way which will contribute very sensibly to our fighting force by making available white men who would otherwise be employed in the docks.

As regards recruiting South Africa has found her way into a *cul-de-sac*. She has placed about 60,000 men in the field during the course of the war. This, considering her population, is a very creditable performance, and may be said to bear comparison with the other Dominions. But she has now got to that stage or stratum of her population which, for various reasons, cannot, or will not, go unless compelled. This stratum exists in every community. The Recruiting Committee are struggling valiantly with the situation, but it is hard and discouraging work.

The only real solution of the problem is the introduction of Conscription, but this is not possible in a country where a large section of the population is either coldly neutral or openly hostile to the Allied cause. The next

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alternative is moral suasion. But the use of this miserable and humiliating substitute for National Service has been strongly discouraged by the Prime Minister, as it played admirably into the hands of the Nationalist opposition. Then, again, the old question of the pay of the European contingent is continually cropping up and acting as a deterrent. It is to be hoped, however, that the call for reinforcements for German East may soon cease. At the time of writing all recruiting has been concentrated on the European Brigade. The fact is the Union has really got more units in the field than she can properly keep up to strength on the voluntary system of recruiting. This, however, can be remedied when General Smuts has completed the conquest of the last of the German colonies. We shall then be able to reorganise our material and concentrate it all upon providing a South African Division for service in Europe and keeping that division up to strength.

South Africa, October, 1916.

NEW ZEALAND

I. THE PEOPLE AND THE WAR

THE great financial prosperity of New Zealand continues, and indeed increases more and more with the duration of the war. In some measure all classes of the community have benefited from this prosperity, though to a very unequal extent. War bonuses and increased wages have been the lot of unskilled labour, artisans and employees generally. The high prices of produce of all kinds have raised the farmers to a financial position they have never reached before. As in all general advances of this kind the professional classes have benefited least. In general, salaries have not advanced, and in consequence the universal increase in prices has caused much inconvenience to those who are poorly paid.

The general prosperity is reflected in the continued large attendances at race meetings and in the large sums spent in wagering. In spite of the absence on national service of so many of the younger men who in times of peace participate most actively in this sport, there appears to be a constant increase in the official returns of the legalised Government betting system, the totalisator. From time to time public protest is made against such frivolity and unthriftiness, and meets with much support, but in general the community views the whole question with a slightly dissatisfied equanimity. If this is the case in regard to the "Sport of Kings," it is far otherwise with the national sport of football. The majority of the bodies

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which control this pastime have strongly discouraged any men who are fit for service from participating in the games. The result is that the crowded grounds of two years back are now almost deserted, and no important matches are played.

It is now the fact that the community realises how closely the war, its conduct and probable issue affect the welfare of this dominion and of its people. It is indeed a matter of some surprise that in spite of our distant situation, remote from rival and discordant nationalities, and our life of peace for two generations, our people have yet been able to realise the necessity and justice of the Great War, and the imperative reasons for this country taking her part in it. As a community they have flung themselves heart and soul into the conflict, and now even those who at first were dubious are eager to do their bit in accordance with their opportunities.

The great respect in which the community has failed in their national duty is in the matter of thrift. The average person appears wholly unable to realise that small personal economies and slight harassing restrictions of personal pleasures can be of any moment in a national matter, and the attendances at the various centres of amusement show that the individual does not fully realise his obligations to the State at this time of stress. Constant and strong as the urgings of the Press are in this matter, eloquent and persuasive as the public orators may be, yet the great majority of the people fail to understand that their own habits, relaxations and pleasures require any modification and that they owe it to the State to reduce their personal expenditure.

From time to time the attention of the public is drawn to the necessity for keeping trade as far as possible among the nations who are sharing the burdens of the great war for freedom. Within the last few weeks the matter has been more prominent than usual because of the arrival of a large cargo steamer from America, bearing a German

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name, and containing a cargo which consists mainly of motor-cars constructed by a firm with a name that seems to be of Teutonic origin. This was even the subject of a question in Parliament. It appears that inquiry has definitely shown that both the shipping firm and the car manufacturer are long-established American corporations, and the momentary excitement has now subsided.

The public of this dominion have fully realised their responsibilities towards those who are fighting their battles, and the relief funds which have been established in the different centres have been strongly supported. The grand total now probably amounts to £2,000,000, and there is no doubt that this sum will be greatly increased as soon as it is found that the present funds are not sufficient to do what is required. The organisations that have been created to deal with these funds are of a local nature, and much time and negotiation have been lavished to prevent them from overlapping.

The naval victory of Jutland made a strong impression on New Zealanders, who now, owing to the educational activity of the Navy League, fully realise that naval supremacy is the one essential condition for the existence of the British Empire. This truth is brought home with special force to our small distant outpost of British ideals.

It therefore needed no persuasion to induce people to subscribe to the funds that were organised in the various towns. More than ever do the inhabitants of New Zealand understand how miserably small our past financial assistance to the Imperial Navy has been. The memory of the early events of the war will prevent us from lapsing into such a sense of security again. It is, however, the earnest hope of most of our citizens that some means will be found in future of establishing legislative machinery for the Empire which may be able to decide upon the contribution that is the just portion of each unit of the British Dominions. Apart altogether from our entire dependence upon the absolute freedom of sea routes for the conveyance

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of our merchandise, there are the additional facts that sea travelling is so frequent, and our coast line so long, that we naturally breathe the sea spirit, and therefore the Navy is to us the symbol of existence.

II. PARLIAMENT AND FINANCE

THE last session of our Parliament was termed a War Session, and indeed there was little legislation except that referring to finance, the raising and equipment of reinforcements, and measures to encourage thrift. The finance proposals were of a nature that in peace time would have been absolutely startling. The actual proposals for taxation are not regarded as in any way excessive. The income tax was increased by 6d. in the pound on incomes exceeding £700 per annum, and by 1s. on incomes exceeding £1,200 per annum, and in addition a war profits tax has been imposed. This is to amount to 40 per cent. of the excess profits above the average of those of the three last pre-war years. Provision is made for the partial exemption of new and struggling firms which have not established their financial independence. These proposals have been generally accepted with equanimity. It was the proposals for raising loans with which to finance the Dominion's share of the war which were sensational. It was stated that some £16,000,000 would be required during the year, and of this sum the public were to be asked to subscribe £8,000,000. The actual proportion of this sum to the annual revenue of the country is of course far less than the expenditure made by Britain bears to her average income. Even when we subscribe this sum, we are still far from bearing that share of the burden which would be rightly allotted to us on the basis of the proportional resources of all parts of the Empire.

Our history, our present course of development, and the fact that we have relatively few wealthy corporations and

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individuals have, however, previously caused us to disregard our own country as a source from which loan money could be obtained. In past years we have always gone to England to obtain the loans that have been required in ever increasing volume for the development of the country. At two periods of our history a self-relying policy has been advocated, and for the time supported, but in reality only so long as our weakened credit in the London market made it impossible for us to obtain money at the price we were willing to give. With the return of stronger credit, which our constantly increasing trade soon brought, our self-relying principles went to the wind, and borrowing in London was again the order of the day. Knowledge of these facts made many people doubtful whether any large portion of the £8,000,000 could be raised locally. However, the terms were attractive for individuals and firms which had large liquid funds. Four and a half per cent. interest was offered, with the additional provision that this interest would be exempt from income tax. In a country where the income tax is arranged on a sliding scale, and where the heavy expenditure of these years of war gives promise of a largely increased demand for money for State purposes in the near future, this was a tempting provision.

Not unnaturally, the exemption from income tax aroused the strong opposition of the Labour Party, and it caused some debate in Parliament, where it was said that the terms of the loan were wholly in the interests of the wealthy. The Treasurer (Sir Joseph Ward) stated that he refused to offer a higher rate of interest without the exemption because it would have the effect of unduly raising the rate of interest on all financial transactions throughout the country, and would thus bear oppressively on the poor man who was forced to seek for financial accommodation. The clause was passed, after a comparatively short debate, by a large majority. The effect was speedily seen when tenders were called for the loan. The banks which are doing business in the country applied

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for £4,000,000, and within the eleven days allowed for making tenders the subscriptions actually amounted to £9,250,000.

In order to obtain subscriptions from the small wage earner, not only was the loan issued in bonds of £50 and £100, but in addition war loan certificates were offered for sale. These bear $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. compound interest, and they are to be redeemed at the end of seven years. Thus a subscription of 16s. is asked for each £1 certificate payable in seven years. The issue of these certificates is being kept open for some time, and they appear to be in considerable demand in all parts of the country. Much money has been subscribed since the issue of war bonds was stopped on August 21, and the Treasurer now announces that a total of more than £10,000,000 has been subscribed.

Some attention was devoted to the liquor question during the war session. The petition bearing 100,000 names in favour of six o'clock closing was duly presented to Parliament. It was, however, soon announced that the Government intended to pay no attention to this, nor indeed to any demand for the curtailment of the hours during which liquor could be sold. In all the large centres public meetings were held in favour of the petition, and it was evident that there was much public sympathy in this direction, and it was hoped that a resolution might be carried in the House which would force the hand of the Government. To those who watched the doings of Parliament from a distance it appeared that at one time the parties for and against six o'clock closing would agree to a compromise providing for closing at eight or nine o'clock, but divisions on the question soon showed that there was a majority in support of the Government, and all proposals to reduce the hours during which liquor could be sold were regularly defeated.

The proposal of the Government to refuse the sale of liquor to women was carried, as also were the regulations which make "shouting" or treating illegal. These pro-

Compulsory Military Service

posals have now been in force for some three weeks, and it appears that licencees have applied the prohibition punctiliously. Already the newspapers have contained paragraphs which show that the sale of liquor has greatly decreased, and the publicans are said to have had their sales so much affected that a rise in the prices of alcoholic liquors will have to be made in order to enable them to make both ends meet.

III. COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

THE provisions for compulsory military service described in the last number of *THE ROUND TABLE* were duly passed by Parliament. In the Lower House a few of the Labour members were practically the only objectors, but in the Upper House the conscientious objector had rather more sympathetic proposals made for his treatment. In consequence of this, negotiations between the two Houses were instituted, and they became somewhat protracted; and it was not until the middle of August that finality on this relatively unimportant point, so far as the average elector is concerned, was finally arrived at. The enrolment of the first division of reserves was gazetted on September 1, and on the following day that of the second division followed. The enrolment of each division has to be complete in a fortnight, but at the time of writing (September 10) there is no information as to the completeness with which it is taking place; but as substantial penalties will be inflicted on all who fail to enrol, it is expected there will be few deserters. The feeling in the country is practically unanimous on this matter, and except in one place—the small community of Government coal miners at Runanga—no representative voice has been heard in opposition to compulsory service.

It is certainly true that in regard to compulsory Service the Legislature did not lead, but followed some

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distance behind in the wake of public opinion. At meeting after meeting, especially in the south of the country, speakers had advocated this in uncompromising terms, and in all cases the audience had expressed approval. With very few exceptions the Press supported the introduction of legislation that would do away with purely voluntary enlistment. This attitude was not altogether due to a feeling that the necessary reinforcements could not be obtained by the methods that had been employed hitherto. In some parts of the country the district quotas have been supplied regularly and without difficulty. The real feeling that swayed the whole community was recognition of the relative injustice of the operation of the voluntary system. As time went on its unequal incidence became glaring. Some families which showed a fine example of patriotism suffered grievously, while their selfish and unresponsive neighbours suffered not at all. The community has also realised that voluntary enlistment has been responsible for sending to the front most of the best men of the country, both from the physical standpoint and still more from the point of view of practical patriotism. While it is realised that the majority of these will return well and sound, it is also understood that it is those whom the country can least spare who are taking the risks, while the ranks of those who are lacking in public spirit and national feeling are unthinned. In other words, the virile manhood with strong national sentiments and regard for duty will diminish, while those elements of the population who are least desirable from the national standpoint will be relatively increased. Thus, even if force has to be applied in a few instances to support the new law, this force will have behind it the will and determination of an overwhelming majority of the population.

Inter-Imperial Relations

IV. INTER-IMPERIAL RELATIONS

THE publication of "The Problem of the Commonwealth," which has been widely read by the more thoughtful members of the community, has greatly stimulated opinion as to the importance of reorganising the British Empire as a definite and co-ordinated unity. The necessity for action in this respect has long been realised by thoughtful and responsible people in this country, though the difficulties imposed by geographical remoteness are great. Further, our small and insignificant contribution to Imperial defence has rightly prevented us from making any suggestions without a definite invitation to do so. The need for organisation and unification after the termination of the war is now apparent to all.

Whilst it is recognised that we should have some definite representation in that Imperial body by which the ultimate decision of peace or war is made, there is also no wish to interfere in matters that do not concern us. We quite realise that a small body of New Zealand representatives in the British House of Commons would be out of place, and the English people, we feel, would rightly resent any action they might take which would interfere with the work of the government of the British Isles. Clearly any scheme involving the inclusion of overseas representatives in the House of Commons is unthinkable. Yet the Dominion craves for an articulate voice in the great international decisions of the future. If we outsiders realise that we have no place in the British Legislature as it is at present, we also realise that any suggestion of dual control such as that outlined by Sir Joseph Ward at the last Imperial Conference is impossible, as was mercilessly shown by Mr. Asquith.

If such impossibilities as these are put on one side, it appears that the proposals made in the "Problem" are the only ones at the moment that appear feasible or supply a

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basis for argument and consideration. If, as there suggested, it proves possible to establish a supreme Imperial body of representative men who shall have control of those matters only which concern the whole Commonwealth, then the necessary conditions will be fulfilled. Imperial matters are obviously (1) Foreign Affairs, so far, at least, as international arrangements are concerned; (2) Defence, and the financial arrangements required in connection with it. Whether sympathetic treatment makes this a possibility depends more upon the views and the action of the large units of the Empire than upon us, but at the present time we can hope for its ultimate development. There is at present an intention on the part of those who have studied THE ROUND TABLE publications to take steps to discuss these matters fully with the more thoughtful people in the various centres of the country. Thus when these great matters come up for decision and settlement, as they must directly the war terminates, we shall not be without a body of opinion already fully informed and prepared to put the questions fairly and fully before the people of the country.

New Zealand, September, 1916.

THE LAST PHASE

I. THE PEACE OFFER AND ITS SEQUEL.

DURING the winter the conviction has been growing among both groups of belligerents that the war has entered on its final phase. In this country the old complacent notion that the war could be won sooner or later by merely "holding-out" has yielded at last to the conviction that the whole strength of the community must be brought to bear without loss of time and more completely than ever before if we are to make certain, if possible this year, of a decisive victory. If we have hitherto taken unwarrantable risks and counted too much on probabilities, we are determined now so to organise our resources as to limit, as far as may be, the operation of chance. The British people have nerved themselves to a supreme effort, and they will not relax it till the war is won. Still more significant is the change of spirit in Germany. Her rulers have never underrated the value of time. On August 4, 1914, the Chancellor explained to the British Ambassador at Berlin that time was "a matter of life and death for them"; and from that day to this the German General Staff has never ceased trying to force a quick decision in the field. For the first part of last year the probability of achieving such a decision, or, at any rate, of forcing the Allies to come to terms before the moment of Germany's exhaustion could arrive, was still, it seems, a fixed article of faith in Berlin. But the experience of the ensuing months taught the German Government two unpleasant lessons.

The Last Phase

They learned that, according to any sober calculation from the results hitherto obtained, a decisive military success was no longer possible in the West, and, despite the easy overrunning of Wallachia, no longer probable in the East. And they learned also that the stiffening of the blockade and the poverty of the harvest had narrowed the limits of their staying power; that in food supplies for their civil population and in certain subsidiary requirements for the army the moment of exhaustion was nearer than they had imagined. The effect of these discoveries on all their hopes and plans has been even more striking than the change of attitude in England. If we have begun to discern more clearly and to face more squarely the greatness of the effort needed to secure a speedy victory, they have begun to wonder whether they can escape defeat. They also, therefore, are striving by a drastic reorganisation of their military and civil resources to throw the last ounce of their national energy into the scale. They seem, indeed, to feel that only by snatching some measure of success within the next few months can they prevent the ultimate disaster. And this new attitude of desperation is practically self-confessed: the proof of it is to be found in the series of official declarations which began on December 12 and culminated on January 31, and which, it is now evident, stand together in one consistent and dramatic sequence.

At the beginning of the winter the rumour that good news was to be expected before Christmas was sedulously spread among the peoples of the Central Powers; and on December 12 the Imperial Chancellor revealed to the Reichstag what the good news was. "In a deep moral and religious sense of duty towards this nation and beyond it towards humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action towards peace. His Majesty, therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our Allies, has decided to propose to the hostile Powers to enter into peace negotiations." The most

The Peace Offer and its Sequel

remarkable feature of the Note conveying this proposal to the Entente Powers was its recital of military triumphs. The armies of the Central Powers had given "proof of their indestructible strength": their lines stood "unshakable against ever-repeated attacks," while the Roumanian "diversion" had been "speedily and victoriously thwarted." Nor had the limits of achievement even yet been reached. "The general situation justifies our hope of fresh successes." And the Chancellor's speech was tuned throughout to the same high pitch. "Hindenburg's unparalleled genius has made possible things which were hitherto considered impossible. And Hindenburg does not rest: military operations progress." Both Note and speech, in fact, were more like a pæan of victory than an offer to treat for peace. The victors, they affirmed, were now willing to call a halt to their advancing legions if their enemies would accept the conditions they were intending to lay down.

Despite its arrogant and provocative phrasing the Chancellor's proposal was undoubtedly a genuine bid for peace. It had long been obvious that the German Government were as anxious as the German people to make peace, provided its terms enabled them to retain and consolidate the more essential part of the gains recorded on the war-map. The Chancellor knew well enough that the Allies' reading of the military position and its future prospects was by no means consonant with his; but he doubtless hoped that among the Allies there might be some who, not unwilling to make a compromise in face of the appalling cost in life and wealth of continuing the war and discounting his boastful language as intended primarily for German ears, might be ready to negotiate. And, of course, in the privacy of the council chamber the German envoys could safely adopt a less truculent tone.

But the Chancellor can scarcely have been confident that his proposal, however sincere, would be accepted: nor can he have been altogether surprised at its prompt

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and unanimous rejection by the Allies. It is probable, indeed, that he had expected such a result, and that the deeper significance of his declaration lay not so much in its immediate purport as in the conclusions he intended to be drawn from it, not so much in its ostensible object as in its ulterior objects. These ulterior objects would seem to have been twofold—the first directed chiefly towards the German people, the second chiefly towards the neutral States. The peace offer was meant to give to the German people—beginning, as they now were, to show signs of restiveness at the palpable contrast between substantial casualties and deprivations and insubstantial promises of a victorious peace—one more proof that the war had been from the first a war of self-defence. The proposal was skilfully represented as evidence that the supreme head of the Prussian military system was no more responsible for continuing the war than he had been for beginning it. Simultaneously with its publication the Kaiser addressed an Order to his Army and Navy informing them of “the offer of peace” which he had made “under the influence of the victory which you have gained,” but stating also his uncertainty as to whether the offer would be accepted. Immediately on its rejection, he issued a further Order declaring that the enemy had refused to come to terms because they were bent on the “annihilation” of Germany, and calling on his soldiers and sailors to steel their hearts against those who lusted to destroy their Fatherland.

At the time it was made, this seemed the primary object, apart from the immediate question of peace negotiations, of the Chancellor's move; but it is now evident that it had another and an even more important aim. And a hint as to its character would seem, in the light of what has followed, to have been given in the closing passage of the Chancellor's speech:

If our enemies decline, and wish to take upon themselves the world's heavy burden of *all those terrors which thereafter will follow,*

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then, even in the least and smallest homes, every German heart will burn in sacred wrath against our enemies, who are unwilling to stop human slaughter in order that their plans of conquest and annihilation may continue. In a fateful hour we took a fateful decision. God will be judge. *We can proceed upon our way without fear and unashamed.* We are ready for fighting and we are ready for peace.

A few days later a still clearer hint was forthcoming from an unexpected quarter. While the Allied Governments were drafting their reply to the German Note an intervention suddenly occurred from outside the circle of war. On December 18 the President of the United States addressed a Note to the belligerent Powers. Its essential purport was contained in the following sentence :

The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded, and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future, as would make it possible frankly to compare them.

The general significance of this invitation and of the reference made in the Note to the creation after the war of "a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world" can only be rightly estimated in the light of American opinion and is discussed from that point of view in another article.* Our present concern is with the reasons which prompted Mr. Wilson to invite the belligerents to state the terms on which they would be willing to conclude the war.

The terms upon which it is to be concluded they (the Government of the United States) are not at liberty to suggest ; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, *lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done to civilisation itself which can never be atoned or repaired.*

* "The United States and the Future Peace."

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These were startling words, and no one could fail to realise their meaning. Mr. Wilson, it was clear, whether prompted by his own insight into the probabilities of the future or by the receipt of some more or less definite warning from an authoritative source, was expecting that, unless the war were rapidly concluded, it would assume a new and terrible phase. Nor could anyone who remembered the character of previous disputes between the United States and each of the two belligerent groups respectively feel any doubt as to which of those groups Mr. Wilson had in mind. And if Mr. Wilson's Note thus awakened more or less definite suspicions as to what was coming, the German reply to it confirmed them. For it laid special emphasis on the charge that the Allies had "trampled upon right and torn up the treaties" on which international law was based. England, in particular, it was asserted, had been guilty of such actions since "the first weeks of the war." "Owing to her arbitrary measures, a state of lawlessness *began* at sea."

Throughout the war it has been the regular practice of the German Government to preface a new act of "frightfulness" by declaring that similar acts have already been committed by the enemy. It was now manifest, therefore, that at the first suitable moment the German Government were going to take even greater advantage than they had heretofore of "the state of lawlessness at sea." And in this case they had doubly armed themselves against the conscience of their own people and the judgment of the neutral world. Not only had the enemy "begun it"; but had they not also refused the German offer of peace and thus assumed responsibility for "all those terrors" which might follow from the continuance of the war? And so, at last, the policy thus elaborately foreshadowed since December 12 was put into effect. On January 31 the German Foreign Secretary presented a Note to the Ambassadors of the neutral States informing them that from February 1 "all sea traffic" within certain "barred

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zones" to be drawn round Great Britain, France, and Italy and in the Eastern Mediterranean "will without further notice be prevented by all weapons." In other words, German submarine commanders had been instructed to sink at sight all ships in the neighbourhood of the Entente countries, neutral and belligerent alike. The twofold justification of this procedure was duly put forward in the Note. Germany's "new decisions" were represented as the inevitable outcome of the Allies' rejection of her peace-offer and of the illegality and inhumanity of the British blockade.

It is worth noting that this defence was not quite consistent with that advanced by the Chancellor in the Reichstag. Referring to previous discussions on the use of submarines, he said :

I emphasised on each occasion that I was speaking *pro tempore*, and not as a supporter in principle, or an opponent in principle, of the unrestricted employment of U boats, but in consideration of the military, political, and economic situation as a whole. I always proceeded from the standpoint as to whether an unrestricted U-boat war will bring us nearer to a victorious peace or not. Every means, I said in March, that is calculated to shorten the war is the humanest policy to follow. When the most ruthless methods are considered as the best calculated to lead us to victory, and to a swift victory—I said at that time—then they must be employed. . . . This moment has now arrived. Last autumn the time was not yet ripe, but to-day the moment has come when with the greatest prospect of success we can undertake this enterprise. We must therefore not wait any longer.

Now these are considerations of military expediency and nothing else. The rejection of the peace-offer and the character of the British blockade are immaterial to the argument that, if "the most ruthless methods" are the best calculated for victory, they "must be employed." It would seem, indeed, as if the Chancellor were too candid for the requirements of Prussian diplomacy. In 1914 the invasion of Belgium was excused, after the event, on the ground that the victim had virtually abandoned

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her neutrality. But the Chancellor had already blurted out the truth. The excuses for this new "injury to civilisation itself"—in Mr. Wilson's prophetic phrase—were made beforehand. But once again the truth is out. At the close of his speech the Chancellor appealed to the consciousness among his audience of the "resolute strength which says, 'We must and, therefore, we can.'" In the light of his foregoing confession what is this but the creed of "Might is Right" and "Necessity knows no law" ?

It is, indeed, "necessity" that has driven the German Government to the policy of "sink at sight." And that it should be so is proof, as was said above, of the spirit of desperation that has now come over them. For nothing but desperation could have induced them, at the moment when the balance of military strength had already begun to incline in favour of the Allies, to run a risk—and more than a risk—of throwing into their scale the forces of the most powerful neutral State.

2. PRUSSIANISM AND AMERICAN IDEALS.

THE diplomatic rupture between the American and German Governments which has followed the presentation of the German Note is but the material expression of a moral breach which is more than two years old. In the world of ideals war was declared between Germany and the United States in 1914. For in so far as the American people realised that the Prussian masters of Germany had willed the present conflict, and why they had willed it, they realised also that it was at root a conflict between the principles of militarism and autocracy and the principles of liberty and law; and, since those last were the very principles to which they had consecrated the life of their nation since the day of its birth, they could not—in

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the world of ideals—be neutral. Dr. Eliot, the eminent ex-President of Harvard, expressed the general feeling of well-informed Americans in a letter to the *New York Times*, on November 17, 1914.*

Those nations which value public liberty, and believe that the primary object of government is to promote the general welfare by measures and policies founded on justice, good-will, and respect for the freedom of the individual, cannot but hope that Germany will be completely defeated in its present undertakings.

And, again, in a letter dated December 3, 1914 : †

I cannot but think that Europe now has a chance to make a choice between the German ideal of the State and the Anglo-American ideal. These two ideals are very different, and the present conflict shows that they cannot coexist longer in modern Europe.

Indeed, the issue was so clear to thoughtful men from the outset that, if the original German plan of campaign had succeeded, if France had been crushed, if the masters of Germany had seemed already on the point of attaining by a triumph over Europe their stepping-stone to the mastery of the world, then almost inevitably the American people must have intervened in arms. But the Battle of the Marne was widely believed in the United States and elsewhere to have minimised, if not altogether removed, the danger. "This war," to quote again from Dr. Eliot's letter of December 3, 1914, "has already made quite impossible the domination of Germany in Europe or in the world." ‡ From that moment the policy of political neutrality became confirmed ; but there was still no question of neutrality in spirit among the far-sighted and the well-informed ; there was still no doubt on which side American idealism stood.

How far has this position been affected by the progress of the war ? How far has the hard-thinking, the stern self-

* *The Road Toward Peace* (Boston and New York, 1915), p. 126.

† *Ibid.* pp. 136-7.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 138.

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questioning, which the war has enforced on both sides of the Atlantic defined and strengthened this solidarity of sentiment and aspiration between the American people and the British peoples. The answer to these questions has been given by Mr. Wilson in his speech in the Senate on January 22. His main theme, it will be remembered, was the organisation of "a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world" after the conclusion of the present war. He had already put this proposal before the Allies in his Note of December 18; and the Allies in their reply had "associated themselves wholeheartedly" with the plan. But they had pointed out that any such international settlements "ought to be attended by the sanctions necessary to assure their execution." And Mr. Balfour's Note had emphasised this same necessity. Mr. Wilson frankly took up the challenge in his speech. In so far as it lay in his power to do so, he pledged the American people to support a future settlement of Europe not only with their "authority" but with their "power." It is impossible within the limits of this article to discuss the importance of this pledge, historic as it may well prove to be. Suffice it here to say that Washington and London are at one as to the greatest constructive task that awaits the statesmen of the future. We are agreed both as to the desirability of "a league of nations" and as to the means by which such a league can be made effective.

And the agreement seemed still more striking when Mr. Wilson dealt with more immediate problems. His pledge, he explained, was conditional. He declared that the United States would take its share in maintaining the reorganisation of Europe after the war, provided that it approved of its character as determined by the conditions on which peace was made: and he stated the principles on which those conditions must rest.

As regards two of these, "the freedom of the seas" and "the limitation of armaments," Mr. Wilson seems to have

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strayed across the somewhat indefinite border-line between what ought to be decided by the terms of peace and what might be settled by a "league of nations" afterwards. But there is nothing in them with which the British representatives at the council-table of such a league would quarrel. In time of peace the seas have been always free since the English Navy broke down the barriers across them which the autocrats of Portugal and Spain had striven to set up. In time of war, Britain has only interfered with the freedom of the seas in order thereby to preserve the freedom of the land of Europe from the domination of aggressive military despotism. In a concert of nations, then, which had come into existence for the very purpose of forbidding domination and preventing war, there should be little difficulty in deciding by common consent whether and to what extent such interference should be practised in the future. Limitation of armaments, again, is the very object for which British Governments have long and earnestly striven.

The other principles laid down by Mr. Wilson were more directly concerned with the actual terms of peace; and of these the most decisive and far-reaching were the principle of "equality of rights between big nations and small" and the principle that "Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed." Now, Mr. Wilson could scarcely have stated more clearly and concisely the cause for which during all these months we have been fighting. Because in his previous Note he had seemed to set the aims of the Allies more or less on the same moral level as the aims of the Central Powers, and because in his speech he declared for a "peace without victory" and made no reference to the need of shielding Europe "from the covetous brutality of Prussian militarism," he was considered in some quarters to have assumed the pose of an impartial spectator discriminating with olympian aloofness between the rights and wrongs of the warring nations. But such critics had forgotten that Mr. Wilson was the

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responsible head of a neutral state; and that he was obliged by the exigencies of his position, while avowing his intention to face the realities of the situation "without any soft concealment," to turn aside from the sternest of them all. Nevertheless, what may not be spoken outright may be implied; and Mr. Wilson's terms imply the downfall of Prussian militarism. For where in Mr. Wilson's picture of the future Europe is there any room for the Prussian system? Liberty, equality, government by consent—these things are to the principles and practice of the theocratic Hohenzollern and the military caste through which he rules as oil is to vinegar. Mr. Wilson's settlement presupposes, in fact, the death or impotence of the spirit of absolutism, militarism, and ascendancy in Central Europe. And how can this spirit be killed or crippled, save by the decisive victory of the Allied forces? It is clear, then, that by "peace without victory" Mr. Wilson must have meant (as, indeed, the context shows) peace without that crushing and dismemberment of Germany which the Allies have expressly disavowed.

Studied, then, as a whole and studied closely, Mr. Wilson's speech could only be interpreted as a final and authoritative confirmation of the unity in hopes and aims of the American and the British peoples. "These," said Mr. Wilson at the close of the speech, "are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others." "These," we may reply, "are British principles, British policies; and we can stand for no others." So close, indeed, was the agreement thus revealed that there were some who detected in the speech an informal ultimatum to the German Government. "Before you force us to abandon our neutrality," Mr. Wilson seemed to say, "be well assured that, if we do fight, it will be in no selfish spirit, nor merely to safeguard purely local interests, nor to vindicate merely American rights. We have hitherto been neutral in act, but we have never been neutral in

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spirit. Our ideals have always been allied with the ideals of France and Britain. Our aims, if we do fight, will be theirs."

III. THE DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE

IF, thus, from the outset, there has been no real neutrality of spirit between the United States and the Central Powers, the difficulty of maintaining diplomatic neutrality has become more and more apparent with the progress of the war. It was quickly evident that under modern conditions no people in any quarter of the globe can remain entirely untouched by the friction and the damage which a war on a great scale involves. The American Government could not avoid disputes with both belligerent groups; but, though the actions of one group were immeasurably more lawless and provocative than those of the other, and violated not only the rules of international usage but the elementary canons of humanity itself, President Wilson could and did avoid an open breach. And in this he was supported by the great majority of his fellow-citizens.

Men who are fighting with a strong and desperate antagonist to uphold a cause they value above life itself are too preoccupied and impatient to do full justice to the passive looker-on, especially when the cause which he professes appears to be identical with their own. And there were many on this side of the Atlantic who failed to appreciate the overwhelming influence on American minds of a tradition in foreign policy as old as the United States itself and only broken once, a century ago. It was Washington's golden rule for the young Republic that it should avoid entanglement in the concerns of Europe. His reasons were never better put than in a letter he wrote in 1795:

My policy has been, and will continue to be, while I have the honour to remain in the administration of the government, to be

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upon friendly terms with, and independent of, all the nations of the earth ; to share in the broils of none ; to fulfil our own engagements; to supply the wants and be carrier for them all; being thoroughly convinced that it is our policy and interest to do so. Nothing short of self-respect and that justice which is essential to a national character ought to involve us in war ; for sure I am, if this country is preserved in tranquillity twenty years longer, it may bid defiance in a just cause to any power whatever ; such in that time will be its population, wealth, and resources.*

The population, wealth, and resources of the United States have grown immeasurably since then ; and modern science has brought the New World far closer to the Old than Washington could ever have imagined ; but the precept he laid down to meet the circumstances of his own time came to be regarded by later generations of his people as an almost immutable dogma. And its wisdom seemed all the more unchallengeable as the problems of domestic development and organisation within the United States grew year by year more difficult and absorbing.

If the American people have thus tended to shut themselves up, as it were, in their own continental compartment and to wash their hands of troubles and disputes in Europe, it is not for the British people to find fault. It is not very long since the boastful watchword of our own foreign policy was "splendid isolation." We also regarded ourselves as a people apart from the peoples of Europe. Engrossed in the internal problems of a world-wide State, we also considered ourselves justified in holding aloof from European quarrels. We stood aside when Denmark and France were struck down by Prussia. When the same aggressive Power seemed to be threatening new and wider conquests, we were forced, indeed, into an "understanding" with continental States, but we still hoped that peace would be preserved by moral force and mediation, and that, if war proved inevitable, it might not be our duty to intervene. Nor did we make the requisite preparations,

* *Writings of George Washington*, p. 390.

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in case these hopes were disappointed, to enable us to intervene with all our strength. Could we, in fact, have taken more advantage than we did of the protecting and sequestering waters of the Channel? And should we have taken less advantage than the American people, had we been in their place, of the broader gulf of the Atlantic?

For both of us has come the same awakening and by the same means. The professors of *Real-politik* are more instructive than they know; and it is not only to their own pupils that they teach the stern "realities" of a world which contains the Prussian system. When the war-cloud broke over Europe in 1914, the average British citizen, both in this country and in the Dominions, still found it difficult to believe that he and his would be involved in it; and when the Continent was already alive with moving troops, the British Government still hoped that at the very last minute the cataclysm might be averted. And then the whole position, with all its doubts and uncertainties, was made suddenly clear and simple by a single event—the invasion of Belgium. To Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues there were other factors in the situation that helped to point the obvious path of duty; but it was that one act that revealed to the great mass of the people from end to end of the British Commonwealth what sort of evil thing it was that was now abroad in arms and stirred them to an unanimous determination to resist and to defeat it. For the invasion of Belgium displayed in glaring colours and on a big scale the naked truth of the Prussian system. To serve its own ends, to steal a march upon its enemy, it had long and coolly planned to violate the most elementary political rights of a peaceful and industrious people, with whom it had no reasonable grounds for quarrelling whatever, and this despite the fact that it had pledged itself by treaty to guarantee those very rights against assault. The ideal of "splendid isolation" had already begun to lose its grip on the minds of British statesmen before Belgium was invaded, but from that

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moment it was banished utterly from the minds of the whole British people.

And now, exactly two and a half years later, a similar experience has befallen the people of the United States. The German Government are trying to snatch a victory at the end of the war by the same kind of short-cut by which they tried to snatch a victory at its beginning. Once more sentence of death has been pronounced on unoffending neutrals, unless they surrender their liberties at the bidding of Berlin. Once more the Prussian system is engaged, in contravention of its own pledges, in hacking its way through the frail fabric of public right. Once more its masters, in Mr. Asquith's phrase, have declared war upon neutrality. The result has again been inevitable. Mr. Wilson at once broke off diplomatic relations with the German Government and made it plain that, if the new policy should really be put into effect and "if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed," the United States would go to war. In this course, it was at once apparent, he had at his back not only Congress, not only a class of politicians or intellectuals, but the great body of his fellow-countrymen. The American people, like ourselves in 1914, have been rudely awakened from the utopian dream of isolation.

It is still uncertain at the moment whether the German Government may not prevent the diplomatic breach from widening into actual war. But, whatever its immediate outcome, the breach itself has marked a turning-point in history. For it has revealed to the American people the moral unity of the world. They never doubted the existence of an irreconcilable antagonism between American and Prussian ideals, but they believed that friendly relations could, none the less, be maintained between the Governments which professed them. The logic of events has undeceived them. It is clear now that the world of ideals is also the world of facts; that warfare in the one must lead sooner or later to warfare in

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the other ; that idealism is ultimately ineffective unless it is realised in action, and, if needs must be, in arms. It is impossible to estimate all that this revelation may imply for the future of humanity. But one result of it is surely evident enough. Is it not certain now that the disciples of absolutism and ascendancy can never again set out to violate the peace and public order of the world in the belief that the forces of American democracy will stand aside ? And, if any international system can be created when the war is over to guarantee the world against those doctrines, is it not certain now that Mr. Wilson's pledge will be confirmed and that the United States will take its full and effective share therein ? The British people, remembering the ancient bond of origin and language, cannot but regard with special relief and satisfaction the prospect of sharing with American democracy the burden which has rested hitherto on the democracies of Western Europe and the British Empire alone. For it means the fulfilment of the aspiration which, despite the superficial jealousies and bickerings of the past, has remained deep-rooted in the instincts of their race. At last, and after many years, that far-off schism between colonies and motherland, between the United States and Europe, is to be repaired. At last the American and the British Commonwealths are to stand side by side to defend throughout the world the traditions of liberty and law which constitute their common heritage.

IV. THE FINAL EFFORT.

HOWEVER well assured the ultimate co-operation of the United States with the other progressive nations may now be, its entry into the present war is, at the moment, still uncertain. It is important in any case to recognise that no considerations of the part the United States may eventually take in the fighting should blind us

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to our own immediate needs. Germany has played her last card, but it is by no means merely a gambler's hazard. Desperate as it seems to be, it is based, none the less, on careful calculations. "The military situation, as a whole," said Hindenburg to the Chancellor, "permits us to accept all consequences which an unrestricted U-boat war may bring about." The German military experts were well aware that many months would pass before a great country, which is even less prepared than we were ourselves for war on the modern continental scale, could make its weight felt on the battlefield; and that much as the United States could contribute at once to the Entente in naval power, in munitions and in finance, an American army could scarcely hope to intervene in any decisive strength in Europe before next spring. And by then, they profess to believe, Britain will have been starved into surrender. For it is against this country, in the first instance, dependent as it is on oversea supplies, not only for the raw materials of its munitions but for the greater part of its food, that the new weapon is confessedly aimed. The chiefs of the German Navy have declared their "firm conviction, a conviction which has its practical support in the experience gained in the U-boat cruiser warfare, that Great Britain will be brought to peace by arms." The threat is not to be despised. The German submarines are taking a steady toll of our shipping; and the new methods of "frightfulness" may succeed in keeping many neutral ships in port. "The War Staffs of the Central Powers," said Mr. Balfour in his Note to the United States, "are well content to horrify the world if at the same time they can terrorise it." But, if the danger is real (and the official representatives of the Admiralty have not minimised it), the opening stage of the campaign, at any rate, would seem to justify us in believing that we can overcome it. We rely on the Navy and on the Mercantile Marine, whose daily record of fearlessness and endurance is none the less appreciated because it seldom

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meets the public eye ; and we rely on the shipyards to make good our losses as far as possible. But we must rely also on ourselves. Every fresh acre that is cultivated, every household that obeys Lord Devonport's national appeal will help to ease the pressure on our shipping and lighten our seamen's task ; and if, despite all they can do, the submarines succeed in bringing about a certain shortage of food, the health and vigour of the whole community, on whose united efforts the issue of the war depends, can only be maintained by the most careful economy on the part of every individual. "There is no belligerent country on either side," said Mr. Lloyd George at Carnarvon, "where the general public have suffered less than in Great Britain." In Germany, where the losses and privations are incomparably heavier than ours, the people are doubtless being told that all will be well if they can only hold out for a few months longer. If endurance is to be the decisive test of patriotism, it is for each one of us to prove that the British people can at need endure as stubbornly and patiently as the German people.

But the war will not be won by overcoming the menace of the submarine blockade. The new campaign at sea is but a desperate diversion on the enemy's part from the struggle on land. And it is mainly to the issue of the struggle on land that we are looking, as the Germans are aware, to make possible the fulfilment of the aims with which we began the war, and shall carry it on to the end. For, unless the Prussian military system be overthrown, the rule of public right cannot be re-established over Europe. And that is what we mean by victory.

Appalled as every civilised human being must be at the toll of life which the continuance of the war involves, the great mass of the British people in this country and in the Dominions have never questioned from first to last the grim necessity of continuing it until that victory is won. To them the cardinal aim of the war has always

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been not only to prevent the rulers of Germany from making good their present attempt to dominate Europe, but also to make it impossible for them to repeat it. And this, they have always known, requires that "the aggressive aims and unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers," to quote Mr. Balfour's Note, "should fall into disrepute among their own peoples."

That such a happy consummation has already been attained, no level-headed man can venture to assume. To a very considerable extent those aims have been achieved, those methods have proved successful. The armies of the Central Powers have advanced far into the territory of their enemies; one after another the small nations which stood in their path have been swept away; Central Europe and the nearer East have been welded into a compact economic and strategic unit from Zeebrugge to Bagdad. We leave it to another article * to show how these facts are interpreted, as regards the present and the future, in responsible and influential circles in Central Europe. It is enough to say here that in Germany, at any rate, the leaders and exponents of public opinion are not only proclaiming the victorious attainment of Prussian aims in this war, but confidently explaining how the good work is to be consolidated and extended in the coming years of peace. It is likely enough that many Germans (and the Germans rather than the peoples allied with them are the decisive factor in the matter) are beginning to realise that the process of advance has halted, that the initiative is no longer theirs, and that in the coming months their wonderful organisation must be concentrated on the task of setting up an impenetrable defence, possibly on a somewhat less extended front. It is more than probable that German soldiers realise as fully as the soldiers they are fighting that war is not a glorious romance but an almost unendurable horror: it is more than probable, too, that many of their families are suffering more severely

* "The New German Empire."

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than at any previous period of the war from the deprivations it has brought on them. But a revulsion among the German people against the horrors and sufferings of this war does not necessarily involve—though in justice it should do so—a corresponding revulsion against the Prussian system. German docility, it cannot safely be forgotten, is the greatest asset of that system, and its masters have exploited it at least as cleverly since the outbreak of war as before it. It was no small achievement on their part to have indoctrinated the mind of a whole people in little more than a single generation with a fixed belief in the invincibility of Prussian military power and in the infallibility of Prussian statecraft; but perhaps their greatest triumph was the creation in 1914 of a practically unanimous opinion throughout Germany that the war was a war of self-defence against a ring of envious and aggressive foes. From that essential starting-point the process of indoctrination has been shrewdly continued to meet the changing aspects of the war. The initial triumphs of the Central Powers were represented as a divine judgment on the wickedness and levity of those who had forced the German people to turn aside from their chosen path of peace. Every fresh occupation of enemy territory or seizure of enemy property was justified on the same grounds; and so ready was public opinion to take the cue that its spokesmen were soon insisting that sweeping annexations were by no means out of keeping with the defensive character of the war, since only by such means could Germany obtain security against another wanton attack. And, naturally, this belief in the defensive origin of the war could be still more easily maintained when the tide of battle began to turn and the war became actually defensive in the military sense. It has already been pointed out that the offer to negotiate for peace last December was based on the assumption that the Allies were the aggressors, and that its rejection was at once interpreted to prove that the Allies had been inspired all along by the wild hope

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of crushing, dismembering, annihilating Germany. "Our enemies have dropped the mask," proclaimed the Kaiser; but "our glorious victories" in the past are a guarantee that "in the future also our beloved Fatherland has nothing to fear." And doubtless in the coming months that boast will be persistently reiterated. For as long as the Kaiser can repeat it and be believed, he can still hope to keep his hold on German faith. As long, in fact, as the German armies retain their coherence on the main fronts, just so long will it be possible to represent the war *as a whole* as a triumph of defensive strategy and strength against a world in arms and a worthy addition to the great record of Prussian soldiery from the days of Frederick the Great to the days of Sadowa and Sedan. And just so long will the buttresses of the Prussian system—its military and political prestige—remain erect. But, if once the defensive can be unquestionably broken down, if once it is apparent that the Prussian military machine can no longer protect the Fatherland, then both buttresses will fall together. The rulers of Germany may keep up their pretence of innocence, they may claim to have done all that could be done against so many and such implacable enemies; but the old spell—so at least we may hope—will have lost its power. For Germany will remember their earlier prophecies of victory; she will realise that they had promised more than they were able to perform; and she will reflect that, whoever caused the war, Prussian diplomacy, at any rate, must have been based on a miscalculation. And so, it may be hoped, the fetish of infallibility will perish with the fetish of invincibility.

Not for glory or revenge, not to secure "the barren triumph of one group of nations over another," but to realise, if it may be, that one chance of breaking the power and prestige of Prussianism, of so delivering mankind from the greatest danger that has ever threatened its ideals of freedom or thwarted its hopes of peace, and of thereby

The Final Effort

making possible the birth of a new age—these are the purposes which will inspire our armies to endure for yet another season the unimaginable strain and hardship of the war. And it is the same thought that will inspire those they have left at home to do their indispensable part. In the appeals which he has made to all his fellow-citizens to take their share in the final effort without a moment's loss of time and to carry it through without flinching to the end, be it this year or next, Mr. Lloyd George has done well to remind them of the "high purpose" they are called to strive for. A hundred years ago it fell to one of the greatest of his predecessors to make a very similar appeal.

I need not remind the House [said William Pitt in 1804] that we are come to a new era in the history of nations; that we are called to struggle for the destiny, not of this country alone, but of the civilised world. We must remember that it is not for ourselves alone that we must submit to unexampled privations. We have for ourselves the great duty of self-preservation to perform; but the duty of the people of England now is of a nobler and higher order. . . . Amid the wreck and the misery of nations, it is our just exultation that we have continued superior to all that ambition or that despotism could effect; and our still higher exultation ought to be that we provide not only for our own safety, but hold out a prospect to nations now bending under the iron yoke of tyranny of what the exertions of a free people can effect.

The appeal is the same to-day, but it has now a wider range. It goes beyond the people of the British Isles to the people of the Dominions, who have already contributed in unforgettable measure to the common stock of sacrifice, but by whom, as by us, there is more that can yet be done. And it travels on from the Dominions to India and to every corner of the world where members of the British Commonwealth in all their variety of race and nationality, of faith and language, of political development and civic status, can understand the common ideals of liberty and justice which unite them all and can discern what is at stake when those ideals are at war with the doctrines of force and despotism.

THE WAR CONFERENCE OF THE EMPIRE

I. A NEW DEPARTURE

IF the British Empire lasts, Christmas Day, 1916, will mark one of the most important epochs in its constitutional history, for the reason that on this date the Imperial Government for the first time called India and the Dominions to its councils, not merely in an advisory but in an executive capacity.

The Colonial Secretary's telegram was less an invitation than an urgent summons to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions to attend "a special War Conference of the Empire." The full meaning of this message was not immediately understood either at home or overseas. Possibly its full import was not grasped even by those who sent it. At first it excited little surprise. The step seemed so simple and obvious that people were less inclined to wonder why it had been taken at this particular moment, than why it had not been taken long ago. But, like other things which are simple and obvious, this event assumes a deeper significance the more we think of it. What precisely is this War Conference of the Empire to be? And what is it to do?

Mr. Walter Long's dispatch is clear and straightforward. The representatives of India and the Dominions are to attend a series of special and continuous meetings of the War Cabinet, in order to consider (1) urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the war; (2) the possible conditions on which, in agreement with our Allies, we could assent to its termination; and (3) the problems which will

A New Departure

then immediately arise. For the purpose of these meetings the Dominion Prime Ministers and the Secretary of State for India will be included in the War Cabinet.* In other words, they will be members of the supreme executive of the British Empire, the decisions of which will determine the policy to be pursued in waging war, in negotiating peace, and in dealing with various urgent problems which will arise immediately on the cessation of hostilities.

It will be the object of the following pages to consider in a very general way what is implied in Mr. Long's dispatch with regard to the character, method, and purpose of this War Conference of the Empire. It seems desirable that the differences, in these three respects, between the forthcoming conference and its various predecessors should be stated as simply as possible. There should be a clear understanding not merely as to what the conference is to be, but also as to what it is not to be; as to the things which it will certainly undertake, and as to those others—important though they may be—which lie entirely outside the scope of its commission. The need for this is apparent from the readiness with which it has been assumed that the conference has almost boundless possibilities of action. In various quarters hopes are entertained which cannot conceivably be realised; while here and there fears have been expressed which are altogether illusory. In such a matter as this we wish equally to avoid groundless alarm and the bitterness of disappointment.

Perhaps the "atmosphere" of the War Conference of the Empire may be best explained by an illustration which to some may appear trivial. . . . Though the war is now well on in its third year hardly a week passes without some minister, or ex-minister, or other of our public men expressing his "deep gratitude for the noble sacrifices

* The War Cabinet consists at present of the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, the Lord President of the Council, Earl Curzon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Bonar Law, and two Ministers without portfolios, viz., Mr. Henderson and Viscount Milner.

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which the Dominions have made in coming so loyally to fight for the Old Country in her time of trial." In spite of their natural good manners, our fellow-subjects from overseas have, on various occasions, expressed their aversion to this form of compliment with such uncompromising bluntness, that one cannot help marvelling at the force and obstinacy of a tradition which has caused the most eminent persons in the United Kingdom to go on stubbing their toes against the same stump. So far as the Dominions conceive themselves to be engaged in a chivalrous adventure, they are thinking of Belgium, Serbia, and France. So far as they regard the struggle as a practical matter affecting the subjects of King George, it appears to them as one in which they themselves have quite as much at stake as the rest of us. The Dominions are not fighting this war for the Old Country but for the British Empire.

No English politician or journalist would commit the absurdity of thanking Scotland for her noble sacrifices, or of praising the "loyalty" with which Scotsmen have rallied to the assistance of England. They have learned by this time to regard Scotland as an equal sharer in their own interests and perils. But they have not grasped the fact that the Dominions are likewise equal sharers. Though reminded of it again and again, they are constantly slipping back into their old habit of thought. They overflow with gratitude out of season, and never seem able, for long together, to keep their minds free from the idea, that it is remarkably good and kind of the Dominions to come and help them. This is by no means the attitude of the Dominions themselves, who, if the truth may be stated frankly, have divined the actual meaning of the British Empire somewhat earlier and less vaguely than the people of the United Kingdom.

The terms of Mr. Long's dispatch and of the Prime Minister's interview * make it clear that this traditional idea

* Mr. Lloyd George's interview with an Australian journalist, published January 26, 1917.

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about "helping the Old Country" does not cumber the mind of the present War Cabinet, and that at last full official recognition is given to the solidarity of the British Empire as a vigorous political entity, which includes, for certain high purposes and upon equal terms, the United Kingdom, the Dominions and India. It is probably too much to expect that the offending compliment will forthwith disappear altogether from our journalism and oratory; but the idea from which it draws vitality has received its death-blow.

In order to understand the true character of the forthcoming War Conference it is necessary to recall what happened at the previous conferences which have taken place between the self-governing states and the mother country during the thirty years which have passed away since Queen Victoria's first Jubilee.*

There have been, in all, five principal conferences, all of which were held in London, and two subsidiary conferences, one of which was held in London and the other at Ottawa.

At most of these meetings considerable discussion took place upon divers general matters affecting the mutual relations of the parties concerned, such as cable communications, patent rights, naturalisation laws, etc.; and a certain number of useful decisions have from time to time been arrived at tending to diminish friction and produce uniformity. But the main interest of the proceedings has centred round three questions, none of which, however, has yet received a satisfactory answer. The *first* of these ques-

* In writing this summary the following articles in THE ROUND TABLE have been freely drawn upon, viz.: August, 1911 (No. 4), "The Conference and the Empire"; March, 1915 (No. 18), "The Dominions and the Settlement: A Plea for Conference"; September, 1915 (No. 20), the Australian and New Zealand articles; December, 1915 (No. 21), the Australian and New Zealand articles; March, 1916 (No. 22), the Canadian article; December, 1916 (No. 25), "The Making of Peace" and the Canadian article. The subject is also dealt with in *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, by Lionel Curtis (Chapter IX.), in *Imperial Conference and The Britannic Question* by Richard Jebb, and in Keith's *Responsible Government in the Dominions*, Vol. III.

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tions is Imperial Defence ; the *second*, Imperial Reciprocity ; the *third*, Imperial Consolidation—closer union in a political sense, whether by means of co-operation, of definite alliance, or of federation. It will be important to note the different degrees of attention which have been devoted by one conference and another to the solution of these three problems.

II. THE FIRST JUBILEE CONFERENCE (1887)

THE first Colonial Conference, held in the year 1887, is important mainly for two reasons. It was the beginning of a series, and it marks the end of an epoch—an epoch of not less than fifty years—an epoch materially prosperous but historically blind, during which most people of intelligence in all political parties accepted, avowedly or tacitly, the fatalistic doctrine that colonies are like fruit which, when fully ripened, will drop from the tree.

The publication of Seeley's *Expansion of England* some four years earlier had given birth to a new idea—Imperial Federation—and a society had come into existence in order to propagate this principle. But the movement was largely academic ; it was regarded askance by practical politicians ; public opinion, especially in the colonies, viewed it with considerable suspicion. For these reasons discussion of the subject had been expressly excluded from the agenda in the invitation which was issued by the Imperial Government. None the less, the delegates were unanimous in the opinion that the "ripe fruit" theory was obsolete, and in declaring for the unity and solidarity of the Empire as the true goal of constitutional development. Though their expressions were vague, and to some extent sentimental, it was clear that, in theory at least, the principle of Imperial Consolidation was approved by the representatives both of the colonies and the mother country.

As regards Imperial Reciprocity, however, there was

The First Jubilee Conference (1887)

considerably less vagueness and a quite definite disagreement. The colonies supported this idea, and urged the advantages of a "commercial bond" of differential duties in favour of imperial products. Mr. Hofmeyr, from Cape Colony, proposed an imperial tariff of 2 per cent. upon all foreign goods, the proceeds of which were to go into a general fund for the defence of the Empire. . . . To these advances the British Government was unable to make any response. It held itself bound to the fiscal system which was inaugurated by Cobden and adopted in its entirety by Peel and Gladstone, and which had for its fundamental maxim, that no interest in the United Kingdom itself, in India, the dependencies, or the colonies should be placed at any advantage over the foreigner in the home market.

The importance of Imperial Defence was urged by Lord Salisbury. He pointed out that naval developments in European countries and recent inventions in steam and electricity had rendered the colonies less secure than formerly against aggression. The same causes were also laying a steadily increasing burden upon the United Kingdom. It was right that each part of the Empire should take a fair and legitimate part in the defence of the whole. . . . The response of the colonies to these overtures was hardly more encouraging than that of the Imperial Government had been to the idea of reciprocity. Australia agreed to contribute £126,000 a year to the expenses of an Australian squadron, which, however, was not to move out of territorial waters except with the consent of the colonial Governments. None of the other States considered that they were yet in a position to accept responsibility, although Canada explained that she proposed to spend £200,000 per annum on her own land defences.*

* At this time Canada alone was federated. The Australian Commonwealth did not come into existence until 1901, and the South African Union not until 1910.

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III. THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE

SEVEN years later, in 1894, at Ottawa, a subsidiary conference took place. It was essentially an inter-colonial gathering. The Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce presided, while the imperial representative, Lord Jersey, held merely what may be described as "a watching brief," and took no responsibility for the conclusions. The delegates agreed unanimously upon the main object, which was to promote a "general consolidation" of the Empire by diverting into British channels (by means of a judicious adjustment of tariffs) a large portion of the existing trade with foreign countries. This would involve the modification of certain existing treaties with Germany and Belgium so as to allow of inter-British reciprocity. They urged once again the advantages of a customs arrangement between the United Kingdom and the colonies, by which trade within the Empire might be placed upon a more favourable footing than that which was carried on with other nations; and they expressed approval of inter-colonial preferences pending the realisation of their complete scheme of Imperial Reciprocity.

The two other questions—Imperial Defence, and Imperial Consolidation by means of constitutional rearrangements—did not come within the scope of this conference and were not considered.

IV. THE DIAMOND JUBILEE CONFERENCE (1897)

BETWEEN the first regular Colonial Conference of 1887 and the second, which met in London upon the occasion of the Diamond Jubilee, ten years later, various important events took place. The partition of Africa proceeded apace. The ambitions of Germany with regard to colonial

The Diamond Jubilee Conference (1897)

expansion were tolerated and even encouraged by British statesmen; but there was serious friction with France. The partition of China seemed to be imminent. Russia pushed forward in Manchuria, while Japan went to war with China, and emerged from it victorious, only to find herself deprived of the fruits of victory by a combination of Russia, Germany and France. In 1895 Joseph Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary, accepting, to the general surprise, an office which, until that time, had been regarded as of second-rate importance. In the winter of that year the Jameson Raid occurred, and the Kaiser's telegram was despatched to President Kruger. The latter was, to most of our fellow-countrymen, the first intimation of unfriendly sentiments on the part of the German monarchy and people.

The Diamond Jubilee differed from its predecessor in being more of the nature of a family gathering than an assemblage of monarchs and representatives of foreign states. The Colonial Conference which took place upon this occasion was a conference between governments; although the status of these governments was not yet co-ordinated, Canada alone having embraced the federal principle.

The great personality of Chamberlain pervaded this meeting, but the general results were not very different from those of 1887. The idea of Imperial Consolidation upon constitutional lines made but little progress. Chamberlain advocated a true partnership between the mother country and her children overseas. He looked forward to a great council of the Empire, to which the colonies should send representative plenipotentiaries, not mere delegates. But the Prime Ministers saw no need for an imperial council. They regarded the existing political relations as generally satisfactory in the existing conditions. They were not anxious that their respective states should take a share either in the control or the burdens of Empire, or that they should assume any responsibility which would

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involve a proportionate contribution in aid of imperial expenditure. Almost the only advance toward closer political union was their recommendation that periodic conferences should be held for the discussion of matters of common interest.

Chamberlain laid stress upon the trend of foreign policy and the growing importance of Imperial Defence. He pointed out that, pending the realisation of his constitutional vision, this was the most urgent matter for the consideration of the representatives of the imperial and colonial governments in conference. But apparently the Prime Ministers were neither convinced by his arguments nor warmed by his appeal. Arrangements for defence were left pretty much as they were before. The Australian naval subsidy was continued, and the separate states were content to make what military provisions they thought desirable for their own needs.

Again the colonies expressed their firm belief in Imperial Reciprocity as the best means of promoting the union of the Empire ; and again the answer of the Imperial Government was such as to take away all hopes of progress in this direction.

V. KING EDWARD'S CORONATION CONFERENCE (1902).

THE next Colonial Conference took place at the Coronation of King Edward VII. During the intervening five years public interest had been engrossed to a very unusual degree in war—in Indian frontier expeditions, in the freeing of the Nile Valley and the Soudan from the tyranny of the Khalifa, and in the long-drawn anxiety of the South African campaigns. The voluntary and valuable assistance rendered in the last instance by the colonies was felt by many people to mark an important stage on the road to Imperial Consolidation. In January, 1901, the most venerated and august link, which attached the new Empire

King Edward's Coronation Conference (1902)

of democracy to the age of Wellington and the other great actors in the Napoleonic drama, was broken by the death of Queen Victoria.

In spite of events which had brought home to men's minds both the benefits of mutual help and the need for the consolidation of imperial effort—in spite of the lessons of the South African War—in spite of a reluctant but growing suspicion of German policy—in spite of the earnest emphasis of Chamberlain, now the most notable figure in the British Empire—in spite of all these things, the apparent results of the Conference of 1902 were meagre and disappointing. Such progress as there was resembled the movement of a glacier whose annual advance is measured by inches. When we attempt to summarise the conclusions arrived at, they seem hardly worth a separate entry, so similar are they to those of 1897 and 1887.

In Chamberlain's view Imperial Consolidation by means of a federal union was within the limits of possibility. Could any advance be made now upon the resolutions of 1897? Representation of the colonies might be secured by membership either of the Imperial Parliament or of a Council of Empire. It was not, however, for the mother country to urge, or even to submit, a constitutional scheme, for which the colonies considered that the time was not ripe nor the need fully proven. If such a development of political relations was to take place, the demand for it must come from the colonies themselves. But if they chose to ask, it was not to be feared that the mother country would prove backward in calling them to her councils.

But the assembled Prime Ministers were unanimously of the opinion that political union was not a subject which could be considered with advantage. The only advance upon 1897 was found in a slightly warmer appreciation of the benefits of meeting together; and whereas at the Diamond Jubilee the delegates had recommended "periodic" conferences, at the Coronation the "period" was definitely fixed at four years. . . . As regards

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the constitutional machinery of union nothing further was attempted; but a wish was frankly expressed, and in that wish lay the germ of important things. The Prime Ministers were of opinion that the colonies should be consulted before treaties which affected their special interests were entered into with foreign Powers. To this extent existing political relations were realised to be not altogether satisfactory even under existing conditions.

Chamberlain expressed the hope of the Imperial Government that something would be done to recognise more effectively than hitherto the obligation of the nations of the Empire to contribute to the common weal in matters of Imperial Defence. Measured per head of population there was not a fair distribution of the burden of Empire. Almost the whole cost of the Navy and Army was paid by the United Kingdom. This burden was steadily increasing, and could not be borne indefinitely by one state alone. The wars in which we had been engaged during the past two centuries had more often been on account of colonial interests than for any other cause. Moreover, one-fourth of the total sea-borne trade of the Empire was either inter-colonial or between the colonies and foreign countries. Increased naval contributions were hinted at; and it was suggested by the Secretary for War (Mr. Brodrick) that in each colony a certain number of troops should be earmarked for imperial service overseas in case of war.

But as regards the first of these suggestions the old objection against taxation without representation held good. It lay at the back of everyone's mind, even though no one put it forward in a contentious spirit. It weakened the appeal, and it strengthened the refusal to do anything upon a grand scale. And if subsidies were in principle an abomination, so was the kindred idea of earmarking military units for an imperial force, seeing that this force would be wholly under the control of the Imperial Government.

King Edward's Coronation Conference (1902)

None the less, in spite of these objections, the naval contribution was increased to £325,000; and New Zealand, Natal and Cape Colony were prepared—though reluctantly, for the reason aforesaid—to entertain the idea of providing their quotas for the expeditionary army. Canada stood aloof from both proposals. She was at that time contemplating the establishment of a local naval force in the waters of Canada.

And, once again, the problem of Imperial Reciprocity was explored without success. There was goodwill on both sides, and a genuine desire to meet; but, in view of the settled basis of commercial policy in the United Kingdom the colonial ideal seemed to be altogether unattainable. Chamberlain enlarged on the advantages of free trade within the Empire, by which means, within measurable distance, the mother country might be made altogether independent of foreign food and raw material. He plainly indicated, however, that the results of the Canadian preference—granted since the preceding conference—had been largely disappointing, for the reason that, even with this concession, the tariff was still prohibitive in its general effect.

The colonies, needless to say, rejected the idea of inter-imperial free trade as impracticable; which it certainly was, unless they were prepared to change their whole fiscal policy. They returned to their advocacy of inter-imperial reciprocity, which was no less impracticable, unless the mother country was prepared to make an equally drastic revolution. The end of a discussion, marked by good feeling on both sides, was that the Prime Ministers undertook on their return to make a serious attempt to give preferential treatment of a substantial, and not merely of a formal character, to United Kingdom products.

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VI. FROM 1902 TO 1907.

IN 1903 Chamberlain announced his conversion to the doctrine of Imperial Reciprocity as the most practicable way to Imperial Consolidation. But this meant the abandonment of the free trade system under which, for fifty years, the United Kingdom had enjoyed a great measure of economic prosperity. As the event soon proved, a large majority of the electors firmly believed that their prosperity had been due to this system. Though the greater number of Unionists followed Chamberlain in his conversion to Protection, as seventeen years earlier the greater number of Liberals had followed Gladstone in his conversion to Home Rule, the consequences were the same in both cases—party schism and disaster at the polls. The Campbell-Bannerman Ministry was formed in the last days of 1905 and obtained an immense majority at the ensuing election.

In the sphere of foreign affairs the outlook was obscure. Comparatively few, however, in any political party, regarded the future with serious apprehension. By far the greater number, especially among those who had neither time nor means for the study of foreign policy, regarded it with hope. The latter view was very prevalent in America, where public opinion was actively engaged in schemes for the substitution of arbitration for war in case of international differences. But Hague Conferences and resolutions approving of peaceful methods could not conceal the fact, that the great nations were arming themselves more energetically than ever before, and that the pace was being set by Germany.

The German Navy Bill of 1900 had laid down a startling programme of expansion. It had been followed by a second measure two years later which provided for further large increases. It was known well enough in official circles, though not much talked of in public assemblies or in the press, that during the South African War the Kaiser had

From 1902 to 1907

sounded several European nations with a view to combined action against the British Empire. But the rapid development of German sea-power should have given ample grounds for distrust even without this knowledge of an unfriendly disposition.

A British-Japanese alliance had been followed by a Russo-Japanese War. The rise of a new Great Power in the East gave food for reflection to Australasian citizens. Under the Unionist Government we had come to a good understanding with France which cleared away many ancient causes of friction—too many for the taste of Germany, who, scenting danger to herself in the establishment of good relations between two of her neighbours, directed a violent Press campaign against Lord Lansdowne, and demanded and obtained the dismissal of M. Delcassé under a covert threat of war. Following upon our good understanding with France, and largely as a result of it, came a somewhat similar improvement in our relations with her ally, Russia. Old jealousies with regard to Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia were gradually removed. These arrangements were not prompted by hostility to Germany. They were not even prompted to any great degree by suspicion of the motives which underlay her preparations on sea as well as land. They were in the main due to the policy, which King Edward himself as well as his ministers of both parties had much at heart, of improving the relations between the British Empire and all foreign powers.

The Campbell-Bannerman Cabinet was appreciative of the advantages of a good understanding with France and Russia, and was moved by a laudable ambition to arrive at an equally happy situation with respect to Germany. Nor did its ambition halt selfishly at a mere Anglo-German entente. It was honestly concerned, if possible, to establish friendly relations between the Dual and the Triple Alliance. Impelled by these motives, the directors of British policy went so far as to give an earnest of their good intentions by

The War Conference of the Empire

making great reductions in the naval building programme which they had inherited. They cut down expenditure drastically at the Admiralty and substantially at the War Office, although in the latter case they improved the efficiency of the instrument. They hoped great things from the forthcoming Hague Convention. Their eyes were blinded by their own benevolence. If they were good moralists they were certainly bad psychologists.

VII. THE FIRST "IMPERIAL" CONFERENCE (1907)

THE Colonial Conference of 1907 met, therefore, under new auspices and changed conditions. A Liberal Government was in power in the United Kingdom. There were movements throughout the world—tremblings and rumblings as before an earthquake—which seemed to indicate that civilisation was on the eve of some momentous evolution for evil or for good. The importance of the Colonial Conference was overshadowed in the eyes of the British Cabinet by the Hague Conference which was due to meet a few months later.

The Colonial Conference of 1907 suffered in its own and the public estimation from having too little to do. There was no point in discussing Imperial Consolidation by means of constitutional changes, for the reason that neither the United Kingdom representatives nor the dominion Prime Ministers were favourable to this project. There was no point in discussing Imperial Reciprocity (though it was in fact discussed at some length), because the Imperial Government knew such proposals to be in direct opposition to its settled principles, and stated this fact quite frankly both at the outset and at the conclusion of the proceedings. And there was no point—but quite the reverse—in discussing serious measures of Imperial Defence, seeing that the recent actions of the Campbell-Bannerman Ministry aimed at exorcising danger by treating it as an illusion.

But although the atmosphere was unpropitious, this

The First "Imperial" Conference (1907)

meeting was not wholly negligible either in the constitutional or in the military sphere. The name of the Conference was changed from "Colonial" to "Imperial." The British Colonial Secretary was no longer to be its *ex officio* president, but only its vice-chairman. The new duty was imposed upon him of preparing in advance the agenda for each Conference and obtaining the information which the agenda might entail. A permanent staff was to assist him in these labours. An Imperial Conference was to meet every four years. It was to be a meeting between independent nations on an equal footing—between the Dominions and the Imperial Government. All were to be represented by their respective Prime Ministers, and the United Kingdom Premier was to preside at important deliberations. The fundamental principle was to be co-operation, and not union either of the constitutional, fiscal, or defensive kind.

As regards defence the old objections to colonial subsidies—to taxation without representation—were reiterated. Nor could they be controverted. In theory such things were unjust, while in practice their inadequacy was equally or even more so. But it was manifestly unprofitable to waste time in attempting to square the circle. Much more to the point was Mr. Haldane's plea for the co-ordination of the land forces throughout the Empire, and for the creation of an Imperial General Staff in close touch with the military organisations at home and overseas, ready to advise upon all matters connected with their constitution, armament, and training.

We re-read to-day with a somewhat melancholy interest the following sentence from THE ROUND TABLE of August, 1911: "The Hague Conference, while doing much to regulate war and diminish its ferocity, left the question of disarmament severely alone." The last of these statements need not be disputed; but this international convocation proved itself no less futile with respect to what it believed itself to have achieved, than in what it failed to undertake. . . . In the following year Austria, acting with the approval of

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Berlin, took advantage of the revolutionary state of Turkey, and of the weakened condition of Russia after the Japanese War, formally to annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in contravention of the Treaty of Berlin. In this year also there was a third and great increase of the German Navy. This was the reply of the Kaiser to the reduction of the British programme.

VIII. THE DEFENCE CONFERENCE (JULY, 1909).

TOWARDS the end of 1908 there began to be considerable anxiety with regard to German naval preparations. In the early part of the following year there was a panic. The ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs and the Navy made no attempt to deny or belittle the danger. For this admission both Sir Edward Grey and Mr. McKenna were bitterly attacked in pacifist circles, and in those spheres of British politics and journalism where German agencies had been most active in sowing tares in the field of credulity. The German Admiralty had secretly accelerated its ship-building programme. This was expressly stated by British Ministers, but denied in Germany; and, although the denial was credited in some quarters, the word of our own Government was believed against that of Berlin by the great mass of the people throughout the length and breadth of the Empire. Five British Dreadnoughts had been turned out during the previous two years; in this year eight were laid down, despite the loud protests of a small minority.

The Dominions hastened to give substantial proofs of their sense, both of the gravity of the situation and of the essential unity of the Empire, by offers and gifts of ships, and by various preparations. But this action was not deemed enough, and in July a subsidiary conference assembled in London.

This conference, though subsidiary, was perhaps the

The Defence Conference (July, 1909)

most important which had ever been summoned. It met for the purpose of discussing under the Asquith administration that very subject which, two years earlier, under the Campbell-Bannerman administration, it had not been thought either necessary or desirable to explore. It is not intended here to set out the various measures which were undertaken. They were on a grand scale, and for the most part they were duly carried out, or at least resolutely attempted. One of the most important was, indeed, blocked by the Canadian Senate; but this unfortunate action was apparently prompted rather by the hostility of the Senate to the Borden Government than owing to dissent from the general principle.

This general principle may be briefly stated as the desire of all parts of the Empire, in presence of a danger which they could not ignore, to contribute—for the first time upon a real basis of equal sacrifices—to the security of the whole Empire. Plans were made for local navies for the larger Dominions, contributions of ships from the smaller—for unity of command in case of war—for common standards of construction, armament, training and discipline. Mr. Haldane again pressed his plea for co-ordination of the land forces. But although Imperial Defence was now for the first time clearly recognised as the greatest of all common interests, Foreign Policy, upon which, in the final resort, all schemes of defence depend, was never frankly explained or formally considered.*

*The following criticism—after the event—from the "Australian" Article in *THE ROUND TABLE* (No. 20), September, 1915, is of interest in this connection: "The system of communication and co-operation between the different parts of the Empire is defective enough in times of peace. In war, when it is so much the more necessary, its inadequacy is startlingly revealed. Co-operation between a number of semi-independent sovereign bodies is difficult under the best of conditions. The pity is that no attempt seems to have been made to secure such results as were possible from the system. It is clear that at the commencement of the war no scheme of military co-operation existed and no machinery for the organisation of the whole of the Imperial resources had been laid down. The Empire was like a storm-threatened liner whose crew had had no stations assigned and had never had a boat-drill. At the date of the outbreak of war no plan

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IX. KING GEORGE'S CORONATION CONFERENCE (1911).

THE period which elapsed between the Defence Conference of 1909 and the regular Imperial Conference which fell due two years later—by a fortunate coincidence, at the Coronation of King George V.—was one of comparative, or, at any rate, apparent quiescence abroad. Possibly the fact that the United Kingdom was distracted to a greater degree than usual by internal dissensions had some effect, not, indeed, in reducing the danger, but in diverting the attention of British statesmen as well as of the British public from European affairs. We know, nevertheless, that there were moments during the meetings of the Constitutional Conference in 1910 when the delegates turned from their party feuds to regard the writing upon the wall.

The meeting of the Imperial Conference in 1911 coincided not only with the Coronation but with the most acute stage of the constitutional crisis. It was followed within a few weeks by a sensational act of German provocation known as the "Agadir incident."

This conference did not concern itself with the consideration either of Imperial Consolidation or Imperial Reciprocity. A Royal Commission, representative of the various self-governing states, was appointed to report on the resources of the Empire and the possibility of their

or mobilising the whole resources of the Empire existed. The method of drawing upon those resources was left to improvisation to a very large extent. In this improvisation the extent of the contribution of the self-governing dominions was treated as a matter of uncertainty. The Dominion Governments, imperfectly acquainted with the schemes for the prosecution of the war, were uncertain as to their own part in them, and to this want of knowledge the failure to make available at an earlier time the full resources of Australia must be mainly attributed." . . . In other words, what seemed at the time to be a great advance upon all previous efforts now appears, in the light of what has happened since August, 1914, as a singularly amateurish performance.

King George's Coronation Conference (1911)

development ; but as the terms of the reference expressly stated that any suggestions to the end proposed must be consistent with the existing fiscal policies of each part of the Empire, and as these existing fiscal policies were founded upon two irreconcilable principles, the proposed investigation did not seem to promise a very profitable expenditure of time, energy, or money.

The subject which claimed chief attention was Imperial Defence, and its correlative, Foreign Policy. The wonder which now affects our minds is why, coming so close up to the tendencies and causes which led to war three years later, this conference did not succeed in obtaining a clearer vision of the future. We have the feeling that in their councils there must have been more lucidity of statement than light of understanding ; that, although the exposition of what had been observed was no doubt admirable, observation itself—the basis of everything—must have been sadly at fault.

(a) The Foreign Secretary at a secret session passed in review the circumstances of the world, in so far as these seemed to affect the interests and security of the British Empire. His statement has never been published, and in that there is no ground for criticism. But among the encomiums which were passed upon his clear and comprehensive survey, there was one, much quoted at the time, which certainly evokes considerable surprise. The conference was assured that it had been privileged to listen to an account of the foreign situation in its entirety, such as had never been laid before the Imperial Cabinet itself. If this be true, the Union of Democratic Control could hardly find a more pregnant text.

Sir Edward Grey's statement was the most important feature of this meeting. The time devoted to the discussion of Foreign Affairs indicates clearly that, although the question of constitutional development never emerged from the background, an evolution of ideas was taking place which might ultimately lead to momentous consequences.

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The interdependence of armaments and policy was recognised. It was profitless to try to estimate what was necessary for Imperial defence unless the vital interests, and the dangers which threatened these interests, were frankly faced.

6, 1 The things which are recorded as having been "agreed"—when one comes to ponder them—were really only so many marks of interrogation in disguise. . . . It was agreed that there must be one foreign policy for the Empire. But how was it possible to prevent that foreign policy from being a United Kingdom foreign policy unless some machinery were devised for allowing the other nations in the Empire to have a share in making it? . . . The 2 Dominions demanded to be consulted upon foreign treaties before they were signed. Sir Edward Grey agreed. But how was this undertaking to be made good? The proviso, "when time, opportunity, and the subject matter permit" reduced the concession—well meant though it was—to a mere shadow. . . . Sir Wilfrid 3 Laurier claimed that the Dominions had the right, and should be given also the power, to negotiate commercial treaties with other nations independently of Imperial control. This also was conceded. But treaties cannot safely be divided into "commercial" and "political." Economic considerations have ever been closely intertwined with high policy, and no attempt at keeping them in separate watertight compartments can have any real hope of success. . . . The temper of this conference was admirable; the intentions of all parties to it were sincere; but, unsuspectingly, they had run up against an intractable set of problems, which could not be solved, unless the old relations between the Imperial Government and the Dominions were varied to meet the requirements of a new epoch.

The Coronation Conference held its last meeting on June 20th. Early in the following month every European Chancellery was profoundly troubled by the Agadir

The Conference Which Did Not Meet

incident. France and Germany, who were the parties chiefly concerned, ultimately came to an accommodation, which, although it satisfied neither, served for the time being to keep the peace. . . . During the next three years the clouds of anxiety banked up with ever-increasing blackness; while the British nation for the most part, politicians and public alike, conscious of their own honourable intentions, and uplifted by the hopes of innocence and "the valour of ignorance," still cheerfully declined to believe—though there were occasional intervals of suspicion—that German intentions were as shocking as the Germans themselves frankly depicted them. . . . In 1912 there were special negotiations with Germany which arrived at somewhat less than nothing. In the same year there was a Balkan war; in the following year another Balkan war. . . . In 1913 there were a German Army Bill and a German war levy, a French Army Bill and the French war loan. . . . In the last week of June, 1914, the Kiel Canal was opened. The voyage of a German battleship from the North Sea to the Baltic was thereby reduced from 500 nautical miles of open sea to 80 miles of inland waters. There were great festivities on this occasion, and a gallant interchange of courtesies between the navies of King George and Kaiser Wilhelm. At this moment the United Kingdom stood on the brink of Civil War. Five weeks later German armies were marching across Belgium.

X. THE CONFERENCE WHICH DID NOT MEET (1915-1916).

THE Imperial Conference which should have assembled in May-June, 1915, was indefinitely postponed. The duty of the Secretary for the Colonies (at this time Mr. Harcourt) had been fixed by the resolutions passed in 1907. It was his business to summon a conference every four years, or else to obtain the assent of the majority of the nations to a postponement.

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Mr. Harcourt obtained their unanimous assent to a postponement upon a wrong plea. He had little difficulty in persuading all the Dominions "that it is undesirable to hold the normal meeting of the Imperial Conference this year." He might have persuaded anyone outside a lunatic asylum to accept this proposition; for nothing was "normal" in 1915. But the fact that it would have been obviously absurd to summon a number of gentlemen from the ends of the earth, in order that they might discuss constitutional change, preferential tariffs, all-red routes, cable services, naturalisation laws, patents, etc., etc.—the consideration of which subjects formed the normal business of a normal conference—was no reason at all for postponing a meeting of imperial representatives to consider grave and urgent problems, affecting the Empire as a whole, which had arisen out of an "abnormal" situation. All reason, indeed, was in favour of the opposite course. The need for deciding great questions, both of principle and detail, with regard to the conduct of the war and the terms of settlement—how the Empire should fight—what objects it was really fighting for—what conditions must be satisfied before it could agree to leave off fighting—the need for considering all these matters was strong enough to have warranted the summoning of a special Imperial Conference even though none had been due to take place. It was, no doubt, a relief to anxious and over-wrought Ministers to save the time and trouble which a conference would have involved; but the decision not to hold one can only be regarded as a failure of vision and statesmanship.

The Australian Prime Minister (Mr. Fisher) alone disapproved the wisdom of the decision; but he nevertheless accepted it from a patriotic desire not to be the cause of dissension. The others expressed themselves in favour of postponement, the question being put to them as it was. They saw little or no value in the "normal" conference. But it may well be doubted if they would have given the

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same answer had the true purpose of a War Conference been understood, and clearly stated to them, by the Imperial Government.

Even at the beginning of 1915 no one was altogether satisfied with the way in which the war was being waged, or with the haphazard methods of military co-operation between the various units of the Empire. War had come like a thief in the night, and so might peace. Had the Russian resistance not been temporarily broken—a thing which, at the beginning of this year, none of the Allied nations regarded as possible—hostilities might have ceased at any moment. And in official circles optimism was then at its very height. At the conference held in 1911 the Dominions had protested that they had not been consulted before the Hague resolutions were agreed to. It had been admitted that their complaints were well founded. But it was far more essential that the Dominion Governments should learn in advance the mind of the Imperial Cabinet with regard to terms of peace; that they should bear their parts in making a fresh survey of foreign policy; that they should state their particular interests in council, interchange ideas, and put their aspirations and experience into the common stock. But the greatest need of all was that they should concert measures for prosecuting the war. It was impossible to do these things by cable and correspondence. The only way was to meet together and consider the situation.

On the formation of the Coalition Cabinet in May, 1915, Mr. Bonar Law succeeded Mr. Harcourt as Secretary for the Colonies. It was then too late to hold a conference at the regular date, but it would have been quite possible to summon a meeting for the autumn. This was not done, and the year 1916 also passed away without any signs of life and fertility in Downing Street. Apparently the new Unionist Minister was no less blind than his Liberal predecessor had been to the need for calling the Dominions into council to consider the conduct of the war and the terms of peace.

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XI. THE WAR CONFERENCE OF THE EMPIRE (1917)

BY the end of 1916 the danger of not holding an Imperial Conference was beginning to be more widely recognised both in the United Kingdom and Overseas. So far, public opinion had accepted Mr. Harcourt's plea that, as there was no "normal" business to transact, it was purposeless to meet; and had rested content with his promise to consult the Dominion Premiers "most fully, and, if possible, personally, when the time comes to discuss possible terms of peace." The illusory character, both of the objection and of the assurance, had gradually become apparent. If there was no normal business to occupy the attention of a conference there was certainly abnormal business of great urgency and importance. If no meeting took place beforehand to consider and approve the main lines of a settlement, how could the Dominion Prime Ministers be consulted, either personally or fully, unless, by a truly remarkable coincidence, they all chanced to be in London at the time when peace negotiations were begun?

It was clear that mere visits to London—now of one Premier, now of another—would not serve the purpose. Separate private conversations between leading members of the Imperial Cabinet and Mr. Hughes, or Sir Robert Borden, or Mr. Massey, or General Botha, might no doubt be very useful; but they could not achieve the results of a conference at which all these gentlemen should meet face to face round a table, interchange views upon present and future policy, concert their measures for the prosecution of war, consider "how the main objects for which they were spending their blood and treasure should be secured," and agree upon the principles which ought to guide the Allies in making peace. Only by meeting together could the imperial representatives at a Peace Congress be certain of the moral and material support of the whole Empire in entering into obligations for the future.

The War Conference of the Empire (1917)

After the Coalition had fallen, and the National* Government had been formed at the beginning of last December, one of the first acts of the new administration was to summon a War Conference of the Empire to meet in London at the earliest possible date.

It is perhaps not unnatural that the forthcoming conference should have awakened both hopes and fears over a much wider field than it is politically expedient, or even humanly possible, for its deliberations to range. The terms of the invitation make it clear that it will concern itself with the conduct of the war—with the terms on which peace could be agreed to—with measures for solving certain problems which will become insistent so soon as hostilities are at an end. But in many quarters it seems to be taken for granted that it will extend its activities into other regions ; that it will consider Imperial Consolidation—both federation and the alternative of a network of alliances between the various British states ; that it will establish a permanent scheme of Imperial Defence ; that it will inaugurate a League of Nations to enforce peace and justice throughout the world ; that it will accept Imperial Reciprocity and proceed to set up a system of preferential tariffs ; that it will propound a scheme for the development of imperial resources, and take control of all minerals, metals, wool and other raw products of the Empire ; that it will give Home Rule to Ireland, extend the principle of self-government in India, consider the future relations which should subsist between Australia and New Zealand, between Canada and Newfoundland, between South Africa and the adjacent territories ; that it will deal with the various Imperial and Dominion debts, and work out a plan for liquidating the cost of the war. This list might be considerably extended

* This nomenclature has been adopted for the sake of convenience to discriminate between the present Cabinet and its predecessors. It is not intended to suggest that either the Liberal Cabinet, which lasted until May, 1915, or the Coalition, which came to an end in December, 1916, were not also "National" Governments.

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without covering all the subjects—political, social, economic and moral—which have been mentioned within the past few weeks as coming within the purview of the first Imperial Conference which it is intended to clothe with executive powers.

The multitudinous variety of these items is in itself the simplest demonstration of a manifest absurdity. We may consider briefly, in the first place, to what extent the conference can reasonably be expected to concern itself with the four main subjects which have hitherto formed the customary bill of fare of its predecessors—(1) the Minor Business of inter-imperial adjustments, (2) Imperial Consolidation in the political sense, (3) Imperial Reciprocity in the economic sphere, and (4) Imperial Defence. We may then go on to consider the special subjects which are named in the invitation—(5) Conduct of the War, (6) Co-operation throughout the Empire in dealing with the grave problems which can be foreseen as likely to arise so soon as hostilities come to an end, and (7) the principles which should govern the Treaty of Peace.

It seems tolerably certain that the *first*—Minor Business—will be considered only in so far as it may affect directly the prosecution of the war or the work of demobilisation after it.

The *second*—Imperial Consolidation in the political sense—lies outside the true purpose of the Conference. The terms of the invitation make this clear enough; but Mr. Lloyd George in a subsequent interview (26th January) has been at some pains to put the matter beyond doubt.

And if constitutional changes in imperial matters are beyond the scope of the conference, still more so are similar preoccupations with regard to the internal affairs of any individual state. This is not to assert that Irish Home Rule and Indian Administration should never figure upon the agenda of an Imperial Conference; for both of these are questions the imperial significance of which is hardly less than their intrinsic importance. None the less they are not

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matters which can be seriously undertaken at a special War Conference. To attempt such a task would be inconsistent with the understanding upon which the delegates have been summoned. And, moreover, the time necessary for collecting and surveying the necessary information, and the concentration of attention required for coming to deliberate conclusions, cannot be expected of a meeting which will be fully occupied with other business of exceptional urgency and extent.

At the same time there is no good in blinking the possibility—nay, the probability—that the forthcoming War Conference of the Empire, when it comes to deal with its own special problems of war, peace, and settlement—especially with the guarantees for security—may find itself hampered by reason of the defects or inadequacy of existing constitutional arrangements both general and particular. It will learn where the shoe pinches ; and as the cobbler puts chalk-marks at this point or that, where alterations are needed, so may the conference make a record of its observations for future use. It may even go farther and minute its conclusions that such and such matters brook no delay, so soon as the pressing anxieties of war are relaxed. Conceivably it may even be able to devise some interim and purely temporary arrangements which may be acceptable. But beyond this it could not proceed with any hope of success, or even of safety, into the region of constitutional reform.*

It is less clear to what extent the *third* subject—Imperial Reciprocity—may enter into the deliberations of the War Conference. That the delegates will have no warrant to recast the fiscal and economic systems of the various states

*“Of this I am certain, the peoples of the Empire will have found a unity in the war such as never existed before it—a unity not only in history, but of purpose. What practical change in Imperial Organisation that will mean I will not venture to predict. But that it will involve some change is certain. I believe that all the statesmen of the Old Country and of the Dominions who have spoken about it are unanimous on that point. The forthcoming War Council, however, cannot deal with these fundamental post-war problems, but it may afford us some insight into the form which they may take.”—Mr. Lloyd George, January 26, 1917.

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of the Empire, or to devise and conclude preferential arrangements on their own authority is, of course, plain enough. According to the fundamental principles of self-government such things can only be undertaken by the Parliaments of the respective nations at their own time and discretion. But it must obviously be an important part of the work of the War Conference to consider the Paris Resolutions, which were agreed to in the summer of 1916 by the representatives of the Allies. These resolutions covered a very wide field, which as yet has been insufficiently explored. The general aims which underlie these resolutions—rather than the detailed legislation for giving effect to them—are the chief matter for consideration. Is the British Empire as a whole, through the Prime Ministers of its various states, prepared to confirm the principles which were formulated at the Paris Conference—the need for solidarity among the Allies in defending their economic independence against German state-supported policy after the war—for the re-establishment of the ruined territories—for the conservation of their own natural resources against German exploitation—for restraints upon German trade during the period of reconstruction—for facilitating commercial intercourse among themselves—for setting up an international partnership which shall be independent of Germany for the supply of essential articles, both raw materials and manufactures? The question of Imperial Reciprocity clearly has an important bearing upon these problems.

The *fourth* subject—Imperial Defence—merges in the *fifth*—the Conduct of the War. These taken together are the primary purpose for which the conference has been called together. But it is the organisation of defence to meet a particular emergency, and not the establishment of any permanent system, which will be the special concern of the forthcoming sessions. It is plain that under present circumstances permanency would be a fruitless quest, if for no other reason, because the character and extent

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of Imperial Defence in years to come must obviously depend very largely upon the thoroughness of the Prussian defeat, and upon the terms of the Treaty of Peace. It would be unprofitable to lay out an elaborate projection of naval and military preparations for the future, in our present state of ignorance as to the dangers which the future may contain and the securities which it may provide. The special questions of defence to which the consideration of the conference will be chiefly devoted are those concerned with the bringing of the present war to a victorious ending. Consequently, the subject of its deliberations are certain to be practical rather than theoretical—the general strategy of the war ; man-power and money-power ; munitions and shipping ; supplies of food and raw material, and other concrete matters of a kindred character.

The *sixth* subject is Imperial Co-operation for the purpose of dealing with the grave problems which can already be foreseen, more or less clearly, as likely to arise so soon as hostilities come to an end. In this connection the consideration of the Paris Resolutions will again assume great importance, for the reason that the co-operation which we ourselves are contemplating, although it will mainly affect the relations of one part of our Empire with another, cannot be confined to this aspect alone. If the present Alliance is to secure the full fruits of victory—in future strength, prosperity, and independence—co-operation must extend over an even wider field.

The main matters for examination under this heading will, no doubt, be “British”—problems of demobilisation ; of migration between one part of the Empire and another ; of land settlement ; of shipping ; of finance ; of the direction of trade and the supply of labour and capital—during the period of reconstruction. We have to consider, first, the strength and well-being of our own people ; but, having done this, we shall then have to revise our decisions to make them accord with the interests of our Allies. We have made friends during this war—

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it is one of its few consolations—and we must keep them. British policy must, therefore, be laid down on broad and generous lines. It is not enough that our efforts in the near future should not injure our present Allies; they must be directed in such a way as to render help to their recovery and development so far as this is possible. We have fought this war alongside loyal comrades, and up to the present, at least, their sufferings have been far greater even than our own. We should not be more wanting in gratitude than in vision, if, in framing our own policy of Imperial Co-operation, we did not consider the interest of our Allies at every turn.

Finally we come to the *seventh* subject—the principles which should govern the Treaty of Peace. These have been defined in general terms as Restitution, Reparation, and Guarantees for Security. According to the popular phrase the main object of the war has been from the beginning, and still remains, the overthrow of “Prussian Militarism”—the menace of Europe and the world. If this overthrow be complete, if a system (the maintenance of which involves the destruction of civilisation) be brought into utter discredit, then the material guarantees need not be of the same drastic character as if the Prussian machine were only half defeated, and, though maimed and impoverished, were left in a position to begin all over again her organisation for aggression. Even after so many months of war the number of those who desire to see the mutilation of the German people are negligible. In the event of a real victory the word “generosity” may safely return into the vocabulary of nations. But not otherwise. The War Conference of the Empire will have to take all contingencies into account; and it will endeavour to work out in practical detail what has already been accepted in advance in the form of general principles.

War has wrought great changes in the minds of all British nations. When we contrast the coming conference with those which went before, we find evidence of this on

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all hands. There is a wider vision, a more earnest and, at the same time, a more practical aim. The particular interests of the United Kingdom and of the Dominions are no longer the chief subjects for discussion. The inclusion of India is for the sake of the Empire quite as much as for her own. Pacific islands and African territories are matters of importance, but they are far surpassed in magnitude as well as urgency by other problems which hitherto have figured only like shadows on the background of deliberation. Grandiose phrases and ethical aspirations have suddenly been touched with reality. Australia and New Zealand have not fought this war for Pacific islands, any more than South Africa has fought it for adjacent regions to the west and north. They have fought it for certain ideals of freedom, justice and peace far more than for individual advantage. And their chief concern on the practical side is just this—and nothing more—to obtain securities for freedom, justice, and peace. Territorial adjustments are essential to safety, but they are secondary, not merely in a spiritual but in a material sense.

At previous conferences "peace aims" have frequently entered into the discussions, both directly and indirectly. But they were then vague and remote; they are now definite and near. Even now they are confused. They lack order and harmony. To make them in a true sense the "peace aims" of the whole Empire, it is necessary that they should be viewed from the standpoint of every British nation, and enriched by the ideals and practical experience of each.

The Congress of Vienna, which met after a quarter of a century of war, was a tragic failure. Castlereagh alone had vision and courage worthy of the occasion. Its results were for the most part bargains struck, after much selfish haggling, between the clever ministers of dull and narrow-minded dynasties. The spirit of these deliberations was an astute decrepitude. The Congress lacked not only popular sympathies, but practical idealism, and was content to

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patch the tattered robes of kings without daring to devise a new garment for humanity. Civilisation cannot afford such another failure. We hope better things from the Congress of Copenhagen, of Berne, or of Madrid. But, in order that our aim may not miscarry, it will be necessary to bring in the ideas and ideals of a new world to redress the balance of the old—of a new world which has borne its part in this war, which has suffered by it, and learned its hard lessons at first hand.

If the Peace Congress which ends this war is to achieve a lasting settlement, the British plenipotentiaries who attend it must represent the faith and resolution of the whole Empire. It is some thirty years since Mr. John Morley scouted the idea of Australia going to war in defence of Belgian neutrality; but Lord Morley of Blackburn has lived to witness this miracle. And in the case of the other Dominions, as well as of Australia, the miracle has happened, not because they have been perverted by the spirit of Prussian militarism, or caught by the lure of European ambitions, but simply for the reason that they saw in the violation of Belgium, and have seen in the whole procedure of Germany from first to last, an attempt to wrench away by violence the very foundation stones of the whole edifice of freedom, justice and peace which Democracy, with infinite patience and suffering, has been labouring to build.

CONCLUSION.

IF the *first* stage in Imperial Evolution lasted until 1887—when the doctrine of “ripe fruit” and inevitable disintegration was finally abandoned—the *second* stage is now clearly seen to have continued until about 1903. It was a twilight period filled with vague longings and misty shadows—with pale federation proposals—with dim perceptions of danger and need for defence—with

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indefinite and impracticable aspirations towards closer union of the economic kind, either by means of free trade within the Empire, or of protection against the outside world.

Then a *third* stage opens, and lasts until August, 1914. During this stage the idea of concentration is temporarily thrown aside, both in the constitutional and the military spheres. The idea of some loose form of co-operation—by means of a general understanding, harmonious concurrence, or absolute treaty—is substituted. But even here there is a negative and a positive creed. One set of thinkers bases its hopes altogether upon goodwill and frank discussion of imperial and inter-state problems as they arise. The other aims at the close interlocking of trade interests throughout the whole Empire by concerted legislation, and at using tariffs to stimulate development of the resources of the whole Empire, which thereby may be made (so it imagines) not only more prosperous but also more independent of outside influences. The second of these—the positive—becomes the adopted policy of the Unionist party; but as the Liberals are in power and office, the former—the negative policy—is pursued.

A *fourth* stage will end when the War Conference of the Empire meets. The man who ventures to affirm that co-operation has broken down under the stress of war may possibly be right, but his case cannot yet be held as proven. Indeed, co-operation has yielded results far beyond anything which even its most fervent advocate would have foretold before the event. But that the existing machinery of co-operation has shown itself to be inadequate is an indisputable proposition. For thirty months the Imperial Government, which exists by the suffrages of the United Kingdom electors alone, has conducted the war, has controlled the Dominion armies, and has directed British policy, upon its sole responsibility. It has abstained from calling the Dominions to its councils, although it had

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not only the opportunity but an obligation to do so. This omission has at last been remedied. During the remainder of the war the policy of the Imperial Government will be one for which the whole Empire, and not merely the United Kingdom, is responsible.

Having once taken part, through their representatives, in the Executive Council of the Empire, the Dominions are not likely ever again to return to their former blindfold status. They are now summoned to share in the direction of the war, in determining the conditions of peace, and in preparing for the settlement when hostilities cease. The functions of the War Conference of the Empire are designated and circumscribed by its name: it will not be so precipitate as to usurp those of the Peace Conference of the Empire, which must inevitably follow in due season.

THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE

I. THE SPIRIT OF GERMAN POLICY

WHAT sort of a peace does Germany still hope to secure? The question can be answered in a sentence: a peace which will enable her to fulfil in the next war the aims she has failed to fulfil in this. This can best be illustrated by a brief survey of the policies and war aims pursued by Germany's rulers since 1914. Those aims and policies are perfectly definite and can be set forth and analysed with precision. They have been too little studied in this country, where there has been a disposition to regard Germany as though she were simply a "mad dog" and her rulers as though they were suffering from a megalomania which obscured their powers of reasoning and reflection. It is true that Germany's rulers have been blind, but only to forces and considerations which they regard as irrelevant or are unconstitutionally incapable of understanding—to the claims of moral feeling, of international right, of human decency and chivalry. But within the narrow and non-moral limits which they have prescribed for their study their thinking has not been confused or neglectful, but as clear-cut, as well-informed and as conscientious as that of their masters, Bismarck and Macchiavelli. The Germans of to-day pride themselves on not being romanticists like their ancestors, on having abandoned "the kingdom of the clouds" which Voltaire assigned to them, and having acquired in its stead sobriety of thought and judgment, backed up by a

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wealth of technical and scientific knowledge. It is in this spirit that they approach the study of political questions.

The Chancellor's speech to the Main Committee of the Reichstag outlining the course of the submarine controversy and proclaiming the decision to embark upon unrestricted warfare was a perfect example of the German scientific method in politics. So is the discussion of German foreign policy in Prince Bülow's book. Both treat politics as though it were a vast game of chess. Force is marshalled against force: estimates are made of the various chances and probabilities involved; and the issue is decided purely on considerations of power. This is what is called *Realpolitik* or *Machtpolitik*. It is a phenomenon that is strange and confusing to the British public, unaccustomed as it is to this cold, clear, intellectual analysis of facts and forces with every element of feeling and moral value left out. But once it is understood that this *is* the method which is being followed, it is not difficult to detect the different steps by which it proceeds: for the very fact that it is so strictly logical and methodical betrays it. Once grasp the essentials of the problem as the German statesman sees them, and it is comparatively simple to follow out the argument to its conclusion, especially as German writers and speakers in their naïve boastfulness and over-confidence are constantly giving us the opportunity of verifying our hypotheses as to the drift of their ideas. The German method, in fact, by leaving out all the great essential human interests which lend nobility to the study and art of government, has reduced problems of State policy to a naked and transparent simplicity. Just as Macchiavelli's *Prince* is an easier text-book to follow and to understand to the depths than Plato's *Republic* or the New Testament, so the policies of Bismarck and Bethmann-Hollweg are more easily defined and analysed than those of Lincoln and Mazzini or of President Wilson and Viscount Grey.

Let us try, then, to see the history of the war through

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German eyes. It will be necessary to make large use of German sources and to accustom the reader to the language of militarism: for without extensive quotation, not from extremists but from moderate and representative spokesmen, it is impossible to give British readers an adequate sense of the abyss which still separates the thought and feeling of the general public in the two countries. Only one thing can bridge that abyss—the re-discovery of moral values by the great mass of the German people, so that they may once more enter into intelligible intercourse with the civilised world. How is that to be brought about? There are not many present-day Germans endowed at once with sufficient insight to see their own countrymen as others see them and with courage enough to proclaim what they see. One such man, Eduard Bernstein, the well-known member of the Socialist minority in the Reichstag, has lately answered that very question in the pages of an American review, and his answer is the same as that of our own Prime Minister.

The war (he says) is in a high degree the trial of German militarism. Shall it be maintained with its present features or not? For the parties of the middle-class the question is almost settled already. Unless the war ends for Germany in a downright defeat they will maintain it by hook or by crook.*

This estimate is borne out by Professor Hans Delbrück, Treitschke's successor in the Chair of History in Berlin University, who, writing early in 1914, says, in words that cannot be too often quoted: "Anyone who has any familiarity at all with our officers and generals knows that it would take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they would acquiesce in the control of the Army by the German Parliament." †

Thus for the sake of the Germans themselves, whom it has terrorised, no less than for that of the world, Prussian

* Article in the *New Republic*, September 23, 1916.

† *Regierung und Volkswille*, 1914, p. 136.

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militarism, with its strutting arrogance, its cold brutality, its immense and not undeserved prestige for evil, must be "wholly and finally destroyed" as a political and social force in the life of the German people. Then and then only can we hope to see "in Germany as well as in Europe one great emancipated land from the Urals to the Atlantic shores." If there are any other means under heaven to the same end, save victory in the field over the military rulers of Prussia, those means have still to be revealed to us.

II. GERMANY'S WAR AIMS

WHAT has been the general aim of the Kaiser's policy since he expelled Bismarck from the seat of power in 1889 and seized the reins himself? It can be summed up in a few words. Bismarck was unprincipled, but he was prudent. He left Germany the most important single Power on the Continent of Europe. She had won three wars: she had attached to herself in a network of alliances, open and secret, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia and Roumania. Her one inveterate enemy, France, she had driven into isolation. With Britain, who did not cross her path and had many points of friction with France, she was on terms of friendship, almost of alliance.* She was in his own words a "satiated Power."† Under the Kaiser she became a hungry Power. His object was to make her a "world-Power"—to transform her from the dominant State in Europe into the dominant State

* On January 26, 1889, shortly before his retirement, Bismarck said in the Reichstag: "I regard England as our old traditional ally, with whom we have no conflicts of interest. When I say 'ally' I do not use the word in its diplomatic sense; we have no treaty with England; but I wish to preserve the close relationship with England which we have had now for over 150 years, even in colonial questions. And if I was satisfied that we were in danger of losing it, I should be careful to try and prevent that happening."

† Speech on February 6, 1888.

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throughout the globe. This sounds like a dream or a vague aspiration. But its practical implications were worked out by his advisers with German care and thoroughness, in full appreciation of the almost inevitable contingency of war. It is true that there was before the war a school of "moderate" opinion in Germany, dominant among the Social Democrats (whose political power by no means corresponded with their numerical strength) and represented even in high governing circles, which did not desire a war with Britain, and, indeed, hoped to avoid the arbitrament of war altogether. But no one who reads Prince Bülow's book or the present Imperial Chancellor's review of his policy in his speeches can doubt that both these "moderate" men looked forward to a time when Germany, with or without war, would have elbowed her way to the front. Since the outbreak of war the party of relative moderation has ceased to exist, the majority of the Socialists have accepted the official programme, and the imperialists reign supreme. Leaving out of account the Socialist minority, which, so far as numbers go, is insignificant in its public representation, controversy has raged, not between "moderates" and extremists, but between different schools of Imperialism. This was inevitable as soon as the military machine assumed uncontrolled command, and will continue until it has been discredited by defeat.

German imperialists have had two separate and distinct aims in view—one in the West, the other in the East. No doubt their distinctness is more apparent now, both to us and the Germans, than it was before the war, for it has been brought out into sharp relief by the unexpected course of the campaign. But, looked at closely, the two aims always were distinct both in the policy which they involved and in the appeal they made to different sections of the German population. They are distinct, but they are not mutually incompatible. Rather they are complementary. Yet the attainment of either without the

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other would involve a great advance on the Bismarckian position and the achievement of a very substantial measure of "world-dominion."

Let us examine each of them in turn.

Germany's Western aims, as German imperialists conceived them before the war, can be summed up as follows : To decoy or to intimidate Great Britain or (if needs must) to defeat her ; to crush France once and for all ; to overawe Holland, Belgium and Portugal ; to extend her power, in one form or another, over Rotterdam, Antwerp, Calais, and the mineral deposits of French Lorraine ; to break up the extra-European dominions of her victims, including, in the end, the British Commonwealth, and to build up on their ruins a greater Germany beyond the seas.

There is no space here to go into these various points in detail. So far as the proposed European annexations are concerned, it is only necessary to refer to the speech by the second personage in the Empire, the King of Bavaria, on Germany's need to control the mouth of the Rhine ; to the Imperial Chancellor's remarks bearing on the same subject during the negotiations ; to the economic aspects of the General Staff's carefully designed plan of campaign in France and Belgium ; and to the manifesto of the Six Economic Associations*, representing every class in the Empire, peasants included, with the exception of the town workmen. It is in its extra-European aspects that the programme chiefly concerns us.

There it found itself faced at the outset with one insuperable obstacle—the British Navy. "With regard to extra-European politics," says Prince Bülow, in his frank and revealing book, "England is the only country with which Germany has an account to settle." The challenge could hardly be more plainly stated. The same theme runs through speech after speech by the Kaiser and his representatives in their campaign for the growth of the German Navy, from the Kruger telegram onwards. Germany,

* Reprinted in *The Issue*, by J. W. Headlam, Appendix i.

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already predominant in Europe as the first military Power, was to become an extra-European or a "World-Power," with a "place in the sun" beyond the ocean, enjoying "the freedom of the seas" which has been defined on different occasions as "the Empire of the Atlantic," the command of the Suez Canal, or a balance of naval power with Great Britain, but which, closely examined, really means, or meant, a substitution of German for British supremacy. It was in this spirit that Seeley's *Expansion of England* was studied and (thanks to its misleading Prussian title) misinterpreted in German schools. It was in this spirit that Germany looked forward to the inevitable Day.

What sort of a Colonial Empire did Germany hope to attain after winning the freedom of the seas? The ordinary middle-class and working-class voter who supported the Government on the Colonial issue in the Herrero election of 1907 (when the Socialist representation was cut down from 81 to 43) had probably only a very hazy answer to this question. He would most likely have said that he wanted something big and rich and full of good fighting material: generally speaking, in fact, an Empire after what was considered the English style. But the statesmen and the professors had their projects worked out in detail. It is worth while quoting one statement of Germany's Colonial demands, not only because it conforms so closely to the childish popular canons, but because it is from the pen of a man who has more than once endangered his academic position by the moderation of his views.

The first and most important of all the national demands [says Professor Delbrück*] which we shall have to make when the time comes for the signing of peace must be a demand for a very large Colonial Empire, a German India. The Empire must be so big that it is capable of conducting its own defence in case of war. A very large territory cannot be completely occupied by any enemy. A very large territory will maintain its own army and provide numerous reservists and second line troops. If its main centres

* *Bismarck's Erbe*, 1915, p. 202.

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are connected by rail its different districts will be in a position to support one another in case of need. A very large territory can have its own munition and arms factories. A very large territory will also have harbours and coaling stations.

And he adds in a footnote, "in order to prevent misunderstandings," and to explain what he means by "very large," that

the Belgian and French Congo by themselves cannot suffice for the German India which we must try to secure and have a right to demand after our victories. This equatorial territory may provide us with unsuspected treasures in the future, but so far as the next generation is concerned its extraordinarily thin population will prevent it from being profitable to us: indeed, it would cost money. Only when the rich districts lying around it, which are now in English hands, are added on shall we have in sufficient measure the practical pre-requisites for a German India.

These are not the day-dreams of peace. These words were written in April, 1915, after the big check in the West and before the Eastern drive. The views expressed in them are even now not abandoned. Writing in the February issue of a Berlin monthly review,* an ex-governor of East Africa crosses the "t's" and dots the "i's" of Delbrück's statement. "If Belgium," he says,

as we hope and as the Belgians hope, is to be divided after the war between Germany and France, vast portions of the Belgian and French Congo will have to be included in Germany's colonial Empire, which we would then complete by the acquisition of British East Africa and Uganda, in exchange for Kiau Chau, New Guinea, and Australasian islands. Such an Empire could easily be defended from the sea, and it would have to be considered whether we could not exchange Togoland, which is isolated, for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Germany would then have a colonial Empire worthy of her enterprising spirit, and it would yield us all the raw material we need.

Similarly, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, a conspicuously moderate paper, was still two months ago demanding "a compact

* Baron Albrecht von Rechenberg, in *Nord und Sud*, summarised in the *Westminster Gazette*, January 27, 1917.

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Colonial Empire in place of our present haphazard acquisitions."*

Nor is this attitude confined to the official and bourgeois classes. The Socialist majority, though shy about annexations in Western Europe, have from the beginning associated themselves with "imperialist" projects overseas. In an article dated January 17, 1917, one of their leading members, writing on terms of peace, demands for Germany "an extensive Colonial territory which will enable her to import from within her own sphere of government the tropical products which cannot be grown on her own soil." †

It remains to be seen whether these expectations will be realised. They can now only be fulfilled on one hypothesis—the checkmating of British sea power. This is the logic of the introduction of what the Germans call their "sharpest weapon," unrestricted submarine warfare. For it is certain that the great German Colonial Empire is not attainable *by military victories in the present war*. German public opinion in general is, it appears, still far from recognising this. But the German Government knows better. It knows that whether or not it recovers its lost colonies, it has, if things remain as they are, no hope of establishing the great self-sufficient German Empire of its dreams, for such an Empire, even if it could be won through exchanges of territory in a negotiated peace, would be useless for its purpose as a fighting organism without "the freedom of the seas"; and the British Navy still stands undefeated in the way. Moreover, if the territorial arrangements at the peace are settled, as we may hope, on the principle of government by consent of the governed, it is not likely that Germany will recover

* *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in an article criticising the immoderate demands of the German Colonial League. Quoted in the *Manchester Guardian*, January 10, 1917.

† Article by Robert Schmidt, a member of the Socialist party in the Reichstag, in the leading socialist monthly, *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, January 17, 1917.

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even the "haphazard acquisitions" she has lost, still less that peoples living in the tropical zone will be handed about "as if they were property" to meet the needs of a self-sufficient German Empire. That being so, short of a naval victory or a successful submarine blockade, Germany is thrown back upon thinking out an alternative overseas policy until she is ready to resume the struggle against British sea-power, armed by the experience of the present war and under more favourable conditions. We shall see what that policy is.

It is worth while dwelling for a moment on the reason for the failure of Germany's original Western design, for it throws an interesting light on her future plans. She failed because when "the Day" came, after all her talk it caught her napping. In July, 1914, Germany did not intend to raise the Western issue in its full scope. Her Western plans, carefully cherished as they were, and loudly proclaimed as they had to be in order to secure popular support for the Navy, were to be reserved for a future war, which was to be the sequel of 1914, as 1870 succeeded 1866. It was not anticipated that the violation of Belgian neutrality would bring Great Britain into the war. This was unmistakably confessed by the demeanour of the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor on August 4 and 5, 1914. Still less was it anticipated that the victorious resistance of France would give Britain time to bring her full naval and military power into play. This has become abundantly clear in the course of the controversy in Germany about the effects of the British blockade. We know now from the statements of responsible persons* that the German War Staff had not reckoned out the economic implications of a long-drawn war with Great Britain and that, if we had disregarded international law and neutral opinion, as the Germans, judging us, as

* *E.g.*, Dr. Walter Rathenau, the originator of the Raw Materials Department of the German War Office, in a lecture delivered in December, 1915, and since published.

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always, by themselves, naturally expected us to do* and instituted the blockade from the first in its present rigour, Germany would before now have been completely denuded of essential raw materials.

It is for this reason that one of the subjects most discussed in the German Press since the blockade became acute is the best method of economic mobilisation for the next war—that “Second Punic War” against Great Britain which if Prussian militarism retains its hold over the peoples of Central Europe, will follow inevitably from the present conflict. That this design is cherished—and not unnaturally cherished—in responsible quarters could easily be proved at length. It is best illustrated by the practical arrangements for the storage of raw material and the conscription of industrial workers in the next war suggested by Dr. Rathenau in the lecture already referred to as a result of his administrative experience at the German War Office and by the following extract from the official Government paper, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* for October 15, 1916:

The Reichstag Committee for Trade and Industry discussed on Saturday, as already briefly reported, the questions connected with the Economic Transition from War to Peace. The proceedings were confidential. . . . A representative of the Centre (the Roman Catholic party) summarised the main problems to be dealt with as follows: (1) The transition from war to peace; (2) The organisation of economic life on a peace-basis; (3) *The setting up and carrying through of a plan for placing economic life on a war-basis.* The two latter subjects (adds the journal), are of course matters for the future.

The bearing of plans of this kind on Germany's present policy may be left aside for the moment. They provide, however, an interesting testimony both to Germany's

* A composite book under the title *German Food Supply and the English Starvation Plan*, was published in Germany early in 1915. Its preface bears the date December 12, 1914. The entry of food-stuffs into Germany was, of course, not stopped until early in 1915, after the German Government had assumed control of the whole food supply and proclaimed its intention of starving out Great Britain by submarine blockade.

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relative unpreparedness for the full tide of the Western war and to her anxiety to face the logic of the situation which will arise when, as Germany's rulers still hope, the dominant military Power of the world, having emerged from the war with its prestige enormously enhanced and its military strength substantially increased by its Eastern conquests, stands face to face in the East as in the West, in the Persian Gulf as in the North Sea, with the dominant sea Power.

III. THE EASTERN PLAN

FOR though Germany has failed or partially failed up to the present in the West she has succeeded in the East; and it must never be forgotten that it was with Eastern not with Western plans immediately in view that she sped the Serbian ultimatum on its way and backed it up by declaring war on Russia.

In this Eastern adventure Germany's aims can be simply stated. They are as usual twofold—partly military and partly economic. Her military object was, and is, to secure a military preponderance in the Old World by establishing the supremacy of her arms over Central and Eastern Europe and Nearer Asia. Her economic object is clearly stated in the following sentences from the opening essay in an authoritative work recently issued on "The Economic Rapprochement between Germany and her Allies." *

The establishment of a sphere of economic influence from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf has been for nearly two decades the silent unspoken aim of German foreign policy. Our diplomacy in recent years, which has seemed to the great mass of all † Germans

* *Die wirtschaftliche Annäherung zwischen dem Deutschen Reiche und seinen Verbündeten*, issued at the request of the Verein für Sozialpolitik, edited by Professor Herkner, of Berlin, 2 vols., 1916. The quotation is taken from the opening essay, by Dr. Spiethoff, Professor of Political Economy at the German University at Prague, vol. i., p. 24.

† *I.e.*, including the Germans of Austria, of whom the writer is one.

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vacillating and little conscious of its aim, only becomes intelligible when regarded as part of a consistent Eastern design. It is to the credit of Rohrbach to have shown in his writings how the single incidents fit into the general scheme of our policy. It is indeed in this region, and in this region alone, that Germany can break out of her isolation in the centre of Europe into the fresh air beyond and win a compact sphere of economic activity which will remain open to her independently of the favour and the jealousy of the Great Powers. Apart from the defence of hearth and home, no other success could compensate Germany for the enormous sacrifices of the war if she did not secure a really free hand, politically speaking, to pursue this economic goal. It is true that critical observers who have gone carefully into the details of the plan profess themselves sceptical of great economic results and emphasise the fact that the improvement of our relations with these regions cannot compensate us for the loss of our vitally important connections with the Great Powers and other States. They may very well be right. Nevertheless it remains true that a secure future for Germany is to be reached along this road and no other, and that Germany would be missing the greatest opportunity ever offered or likely to be offered her in the history of her foreign relations if she were not now to go forward with vigour and decision to its realisation.

Here it is clearly shown that the Eastern aims in themselves will not at present meet Germany's economic needs. If she is no longer to be "dependent on the favour and the jealousy of the World-Powers" she requires a Colonial Empire in the tropics as well. Nevertheless, the Eastern prize was well worth following up, and with good fortune it might even yield "Western" results. After Great Britain and Turkey had entered the lists and the Moslem Holy War had been proclaimed, sanguine spirits dreamed dreams of an African Empire to be won and kept without command of the sea, and influential scholars and writers spoke openly of the conquest of Egypt and the Soudan, and a Berlin-Cairo-Central African railway. Here, again, expectation has so far outrun performance. Nevertheless, Germany's main object has been achieved with amazing success. She has overrun Poland, Courland, Lithuania, Serbia, and Montenegro, most of Roumania and part of Volhynia, and she has won more signal conquests still over

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her own allies and the adjoining neutrals. Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are no longer free agents. They could not if they would cut themselves loose from the German control, which first pushed them into the war and then saved them from disaster ; and the longer the war continues the tighter must that control become. Turkey, in particular, has become in fact, if not in name, a German annexe. Meanwhile, the smaller European neutrals have been impressed and intimidated by the display of German efficiency and "frightfulness." Thus Germany, cut off from the sea and from the New World, robbed of the overseas Empire of her dreams, has established a new Empire in its stead in the very heart of the Old World. Stretching from Strassburg to Riga, from Schleswig to the Persian Gulf and to Arabia, it has been driven like a wedge through the continent, pushing Russia away from the warm sea into the northern ice and gloom, and leaving the Western Powers isolated in the peninsula of Europe, cut off from land communication with Russia, India, and the rest of Asia.

IV. THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE

WHAT is the character of this new Empire ? What does it portend ? And, in particular, what is its bearing on the future of the British Commonwealth, and of the causes of which it is trustee ?

It may be well to take the last question first, for it can be simply answered. This new German Empire, if it survives, would be regarded as a disaster by all its neighbours, by Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, and Russia ; but it would be most disastrous of all to Great Britain, at whom it would be chiefly aimed. If Germany succeeds, at the Peace, in retaining possession of her Eastern conquests, then Britain will have lost the war. The point need not be argued at

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length, for it is regarded by German writers as a self-evident proposition. It will be sufficient to give two representative German statements of the position of Britain in the event of the permanent establishment of the New Empire. In the course of the book already quoted written in April, 1915, Professor Delbrück remarks :

Whether this war drives the English out of Egypt or not, what becomes of the English supremacy in Egypt if Turkey now maintains her existence, rejuvenates and reorganises herself militarily and economically, and establishes a railway system which will permit her to put great armies and all that pertains to them right on to the Egyptian frontier? Hitherto England has been able, in time of peace, to maintain her hold on Egypt with a garrison of 6,000 Europeans. Whatever the conditions of peace at the end of the war, this idyll of British supremacy has passed away beyond recall.*

The same argument is still more clearly put by Paul Rohrbach, the semi-official writer who has done so much to further Germany's Eastern designs. Writing in his own paper, *Deutsche Politik*, on November 24, 1916, he remarks :

There was a period of the war between the great miscarriage at the Dardanelles and the successful Russian summer offensive, when here and there, in the English Press, the phrase cropped up that there were "two victors" in the war—England and Germany. Behind this lay the idea that English policy might rest content, in case of need, with a "drawn" war. From the English point of view, however, this was a piece of lazy and confused thinking. They know better to-day : and they are perfectly right when they say that if the game between them and us ends in an apparent "draw" it is we who will be the victors and they the vanquished. . . . In point of fact, if the Central Powers, with Bulgaria and the Turkish East, form a solid political block across the Balkans, then, for obvious political and geographical reasons, it is no longer possible for England in the future to conduct her world-policy on its traditional lines. English foreign policy, in contrast to that of all other European Powers, has hitherto rested on the fact that not only England, but

* Delbrück, *Bismarck's Erbe*, Berlin, 1915, pp. 211-2, written in April, 1915. The point here made in print about the defences of Egypt is no new one for the Professor. It was made in his university lectures at least as early as 1902. The Kaiser's visit to Palestine was in 1898.

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also every vital part of her Empire, was unassailable. This was a very pronounced advantage possessed by England as against all other Powers, although the English have for over a century been accustomed to treat it as a self-evident necessity and as a matter of course. . . . But if the English wish Egypt and India to remain unassailable in the future, and if they wish to secure themselves against the German submarine danger, they must defeat us to such an extent so as to sever our connection with the East, to render us powerless to prevent the break-up of Turkey in favour of England and her Allies, and to force us to submit to permanent restrictions as regards the construction and use of submarines. When England has achieved all this, and not one moment sooner, she has won the war. If she has not attained these aims when peace is concluded, then she has, according to her own confession, lost the war. Here, and nowhere else, lies the root of the English fighting spirit. It took an astonishingly long time before the whole of or, at least, the greater part of the English people realised this situation. But now it is realised, and, hence, we may be sure that England will not stop the war, however great her own sacrifices may be, until she admits defeat.

It is characteristic of the German writer that he should attribute the obstinacy of the British fighting spirit to intellectual calculation rather than to intensity of moral purpose. But his reasoning is perfectly sound. The establishment of the Berlin-Bagdad Empire as a spearhead against Egypt and India would strike a fatal blow at British security and would involve a complete transformation in our military and defensive system, with the consequent reactions upon domestic and social policy. So far as purely British interests are concerned the case is unanswerable, as the neutral world is well aware. And if Britain were Germany, and British ideals were Prussian ideals, there would be no more to be said. It is natural that a Great Power, especially a great Naval Power, should have a traditional bent towards the policy of *Divide et Impera* and should prefer to have small or weak States as its neighbours rather than a first-class highly organised military Power. That is the light in which the German writer, accustomed to weighing strength and weakness rather than right and wrong in the balances, regards the issue. All that he sees are two great non-moral World-Powers ranged

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against one another for mastery, and all the "right" that he expects to emerge from the contest is the "right" of the stronger. But there is, of course, a higher point of view than that of purely British interests—the point of view set forth in the Allied Notes and in President Wilson's Message. We have no right to condemn the new German Empire till we have examined the principle on which it is based, the policy which its rulers mean to pursue, and the bearing which its definitive establishment and consolidation in the treaty of peace would have on the future history of the Old Continent and of the world.

What, then, is the character of this new Empire? On what principle of government is it based? Is it a benevolent autocracy based on the desire of the dominant German rulers to promote the welfare of their subjects? Or is it a Commonwealth based upon the exercise of political responsibility by all who are fitted to bear it? Is it based upon the rule of law, or upon the assent of the governed? Will it contribute to the comity of nations and form a corner stone in the new league of Peace? Judged by the touchstone of President Wilson's Message, how does it stand the test? Men of liberal tendencies in neutral countries, ignorant of the local circumstances and safe in the detachment of the New World, have been tempted to welcome it as a large-scale international experiment and to discern in it an element of stability and order—or at least to demand for it a fair trial. "The Allies," says a writer in an American weekly paper, well-known for its progressive tendencies,*

are resolved not to accept a Germanised Central Europe, even though it rests on the acquiescence of the minor Slav peoples; but inasmuch as they may be forced to consent, it is worth while to consider possible compensations. Germany would have acquired more or less political control over a large region whose economic resources are undeveloped and whose inhabitants possess an inefficient political

* *The New Republic*, December 16, 1916. See an article on the same subject in the issue for January 27, 1917.

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and social organisation. German control would not rest on military conquest. . . . The Germans could not treat such peoples as they have in the past treated the Prussian Poles or the Alsatians. The different groups of non-Germans in the Central European system would insist on a substantial measure of self-control. Some kind of federal system would have to be forged, and the making of it would be a slow, delicate and dangerous operation. . . . These non-German peoples will never be politically content unless they can be wrought into an international commonwealth, analogous to that which is needed for British Imperial federation.

In any event the Germans would cease for the time being to threaten British and French sea power.

And the article closes with the suggestion that the establishment of the new Empire and the consequent increase of Germany's prestige "might place fewer impediments in the way of the ultimate creation of a system of super-national law" than would a decisive victory for either side.

Can speculations of this kind be brought to the test of fact? Is there any likelihood or even possibility that the new German Empire can develop, through the free union of its constituent peoples, into a commonwealth analogous to that of Britain?

It would be easy to suggest an answer to this question from the past history of the four partners in the Alliance which has crystallised into the new Empire, or from the past record of the alliances and conflicts between them. Prussian ruthlessness in Alsace-Lorraine, in Schleswig and in Poland, the relentless persecution and matchless hypocrisy of the Magyars in the government of their "national" State,* the suppression of every symbol and vestige of Serbian nationality in their occupied territory by the Bulgars, the simple, cold-blooded Turkish expedient of wholesale massacre, are not promising foundations for a stable edifice of empire. Nor does the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, which was first manifested

* "The whole of public opinion in Hungary holds the principle of nationalities in honour," was Count Tisza's comment on President Wilson's message. Far more respectable was the German comment which advised President Wilson never to mention the subject of Prussian Poland again.

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to the world by the open breach of the Treaty of Berlin, supported by Germany in "shining armour" and then confirmed at the treacherous outbreak of the Second Balkan War, nor the alliance between Germany and Turkey, cemented by the blood of the Armenians, suggest that the new dominion will stand forth as a champion of international right. But these things, after all, are in the past, important and suggestive as they are. It will be fairer, in the space at our disposal, to test the new Empire rather by the future programme set before it by its promoters and sponsors. Let us judge it, not by what it is, but by what those who have brought it into being hope and believe it may become.

So much has been written in Germany on the subject of "Berlin-Bagdad," and there is such unanimity and, indeed, monotony about the views expressed, that it is not difficult to summarise them. This will best be done, not by isolated quotations, which could be multiplied indefinitely, but by reproducing a few connected statements from representative sources. These may make it clear how widely the new German Empire diverges from the ideals and practice of the British Commonwealth as regards both its external relations and its internal policy and organisation.

To take first the question of external relations. "In every discussion on the peace that must follow this war," says President Wilson, "it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by a definite concert of the Powers. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depend is this: Is the present a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new Balance of Power?" How is this question answered by the prophets of the new German Empire? There is only room for one statement of their creed: but it must be given at some length:

The great lesson which the German people has had to learn is to

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think in terms of power (*machtpolitisch denken*); and the present war has taught us more in this regard than all the four centuries of European diplomacy and development that preceded it. For all who have eyes to see and a mind alive to the world around them the Great War has made clear our true situation. We must insist on being a World-Power, or we cease to be a Great Power at all. There is no other alternative. . . . Let no one here say that small States, too, can have a national life of their own. True, so long as the great States around them allow them to exist. But any day may see the end of their existence, in spite of all treaties to the contrary, and every day brings us fresh evidence how little assured is the existence of small States. For *neither alliances nor treaties provide the least security* for the existence of the Great Powers, still less of small States. Anyone who still retains belief in such things is past all argument. A man who has not learnt wisdom from the events of the last two years is incapable of learning anything. Of course every Great Power will always do its best to form alliances with other Powers, great and small, in order to assure its existence against hostile coalitions. But no one of them can feel any security that these alliances will be observed, Germany least of all. . . . We cannot do without alliances, but we can only reckon upon them as promoting our own security so long as they are cemented by the greatest possible sense of common interest. Alliances by themselves are worthless. . . .

Let us sum up the argument. Germany needs, quite independently of her Allies, to be large, strong and powerfully organised; in order to secure herself against the possibility of *being deserted by the small Powers and being treacherously attacked by the Great*.

What does she need as a guarantee of this? The answer is: an extensive Empire, with highly developed agriculture and industry, the best possible strategic frontiers against sudden attacks and the best possible allies—alliances based not upon scraps of paper (*papierene Verträge*) but upon the elementary and vital needs of the allies as regards both defence and economic development. It is unnecessary, nay, harmful, to rely upon the affection and loyalty of *any ally* unless the material basis of the alliance has been soundly laid. If the war has done no more than awake the German people out of love's young dream—that is, out of its reliance on the goodwill and honest dealing of peoples and States—it will have done us a great service. *There are no ethical friendships between States in our day. There are only friendships of convenience.* And friendships of convenience last just so long as the convenience itself.

That is the sheet-anchor of all foreign policy. What we desire for our future therefore is a strong, self-dependent Germany, strong enough to secure that Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey shall find their

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greatest safety and prosperity through the German connection—
and *only* through Germany.

There is nothing new in sentiments such as these. The temper, the argument, even the very turns of phrase, are as old as history. Macchiavelli, in his lore for princes, preached upon the self-same text ; and two thousand years before him the greatest of Greek historians noted how war, “ the most compelling of teachers,” upset all the established conventions of morality and taught men a new code of mutual dealing. “ What an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action.” “ The strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must.” * So ran the writ of blood and iron, in the ancient world, as it runs to-day. What is new, and what must give us pause, even after all we have witnessed of German methods, is the source from which this monstrous doctrine is proclaimed. This new prophet of ascendancy, who lisps in the accents of Macchiavelli and pours scorn on the ideals which, as we are told on high authority, “ every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take for granted,” is no politician or diplomatist, no Prussian soldier, like Bernhardi, familiar from the traditions of his service with the philosophy of the jungle, no hired scribbler paid to dip his pen in poison, but a man known through two hemispheres as a moral educator of the young. Few German writers, indeed, are better known and more esteemed in this country than Dr. Kerschensteiner, of Munich, whose name is inseparably associated with the Day Continuation School system in that city and elsewhere in Germany, and it is with a sense of cruel irony that his English admirers will find his name associated with this solemn and deliberate denial of the very possibility of international right and of a comity of nations. There is no need for further witnesses as to the part the new

* Thucydides. Book iii., ch. 82, Book v., chs. 89 and 109.

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German Empire is likely to play in the "creation of a system of international law." *Ex hoc uno disce omnes*—and their name is legion.*

Let us now turn to the internal policy and organisation of the new Empire. No subject has been more discussed in Germany and among her Allies in recent months; but a brief summary of the general upshot of the debate must suffice. Germany's objects with regard to her new Eastern Empire are two-fold: military and economic. It was the Military General Staff who made the present war. Circumstances, and not least the British blockade, have set at their side, as no less important for the carrying out of Prussian designs, an Economic General Staff. Together they have worked out the possibilities of the new Empire in terms of men and things—of cannon-fodder and material products.

The military question is always regarded as a mere matter of arithmetic. Having waged one war with perhaps a majority of unwilling soldiers in their ranks—Poles, Alsations, Schleswickers, Tchechs, Italians, Roumanians and Jugoslavs among the regiments of the Central Powers, not to speak of the composite Turkish army—the

* *Die Zukunft Deutschlands*, by Oberstudienrat Dr. Georg Kerschensteiner, Member of the Reichstag, Munich, in the *Europaische Staat und Wirtschafts-zeitung*, December 16, 1916. Italics as in the original. Dr. Kerschensteiner is the author of *Education for Citizenship*, English translation, Chicago 1912 and 1915, and *The Schools and the Nation*, English translation, 1914. As regards other literature, the German learned periodicals are filled with articles and reviews of books and pamphlets on current social and political questions, among which Mitteleuropa predominates. Diligent search of the available literature has revealed one single pamphlet which departs from the prevalent materialist philosophy and imports moral considerations into the argument. And of this the expert reviewer sternly remarks: "The author seems to be quite unaware that he is being guilty of an unpardonable confusion of thought. All ethical considerations are completely alien to the State and the State must therefore resolutely keep them at arm's length," adding that it is to be hoped that such "pointless ethical reasonings" will not find imitators. (*Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, July, 1916, p. 317. Review by Professor Eulenberg, of Leipzig, of *The War in the Light of Social Theory*, by William Jerusalem. Stuttgart, 1915.)

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General Staff is justified in laying its plans on the hypothesis that the same thing can be done again on a larger scale. Moreover, the effect of a uniform system of military training upon the populations concerned must not be overlooked. The unity of modern Germany, as Germans are never tired of telling us, is largely the result of compulsory military service. As Germany was unified in the generation after 1871, so Mitteleuropa, they hope, in spite of its composite and refractory material, will be welded into a military, if not an intellectual, unity in the generation after 1914. The process has already been carried far in the present war. The German military system is dominant throughout the armies of the Allies and Germans are almost everywhere in command, in fact if not in name. The very protestations of military independence issued at intervals by the various allied Governments testify to the helplessness of their position. This unified military control is convenient in many ways to the German Government. It enables it to dispose of doubtful units by sending them to fronts where they will be out of harm's way, and to employ them to keep the civil population in order by the use of foreign troops. Turks, we learn, have already been employed to quell a civil disturbance at Munich.* This is indeed a new use for "colonial" troops, but under the militarist regime it is too convenient not to be resorted to.

There is another element in the German military system which must be remembered. Its foundations are laid, as everyone knows, in the national school. It is inevitable therefore, that Germany should seek to control the educational system of her allies—more especially of Turkey and Bulgaria, who are more amenable to such treatment. The influence of German universities and university professors in this direction of recent years has been very great, not only in Europe but in America, and it will, of course, be extended wherever possible after the war. Already a

* Statement from a well-informed—seemingly official—source in the daily papers on February 5.

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university has been established in Constantinople, and although it has made itself ridiculous by proposing the Kaiser for the Nobel Peace Prize it is likely to be more successful in its main object—the spread of German ideas in Turkey. This policy is already put forward under the specious plea of promoting Turkish independence. Everyone who knows Turkey is familiar with the work of the mission schools, a very large number of them American, which have carried on their civilising labours without attempting to use their influence for political purposes. These “alien schools,” we are now told,*

must be turned into true Turkish institutions. This will be a favourable moment . . . to see that German methods are appreciated. . . . The foundations of our power will be stronger and broader if—in harmony with Turkish wishes—we secure our influence, not by the establishment of new schools of our own, but by gradually introducing the German language as the most important second language in the Turkish schools, and thus by the active and increasing collaboration of German teachers implanting a deep respect for the achievements of German culture.

But the economic side of Germany's programme is no less important than the military, and it is round this that controversy most centres. It is best set forth in a series of quotations.

The following extract is taken from the chapter on Turkey in the large, composite and obviously semi-official book on *Germany and the World War* to which most of the best-known “political” professors have contributed.†

The great problem of German-Turkish relations is commonly summed up in the watchword “Berlin-Bagdad.” Enemy statesmen

* *The Economic Rapprochement between Germany and Her Allies*, Vol. II., p. 450, article on German-Turkish Economic relations. It is the standard book on the subject and in its general cautious treatment marks a reaction against Naumann's *Mitteleuropa*.

† *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg*, Berlin, 1916, p. 305, chapter by Professor Dr. Carl H. Becker of Bonn. The preface to the second edition states that “the book has been received at home and abroad as an unprejudiced scientific treatment of the events brought about by the war.” Italics, as in all subsequent quotations, are reproduced from the original.

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have discerned in this the idea of a German political domination. They have spoken of Turkey as a German province, or at least contemplated a German "Protectorate" over the Turks. And yet the problem is not one of politics at all but of economics. . . . Berlin and Bâgdad are linked together as the termini of a mighty railroad that is now nearly completed—a line that will link up lands of widely different economic conditions and render possible an exchange between them which will make them independent of hostile competition, hostile attacks and, above all, the command of the sea. What we have to deal with, then, is a *great closed economic territory as the basis of political friendship*. All the States astride the line—the German industrial States in the North, the great Turkish agrarian State in the South-East, the Balkan States in the centre—will remain free to carry on their own national affairs, but they all have the same interest in exchanging their goods along this artery of communication. Granted that in peace time heavy goods will be mainly transported by sea to save expense, yet the existing crisis has shown us the immeasurable value of a secure line of communication by land, a line which is comparable with the great overland railways of the United States.

There speaks the voice of the bourgeoisie and the official classes. Let us add some representative testimonies from the working class. In the article already quoted Robert Schmidt, a well-known Socialist member of the Reichstag and writer, remarks :

The peace which seems possible to us to-day will leave Germany and her allies in the eyes of Europe as a group of Powers whose sphere of economic control extends from the marshes of the Elbe to the waters of the Persian Gulf. Thus Germany, in close union with her allies, will have won by her arms the kernel of a great sphere of economic control worthy to be set as a closed economic system (*geschlossenes Wirtschaftsgebiet*) by the side of those of the other world-Empires.

In 1915, before the entry of Bulgaria, a number of leading German trade unionists representing the chief industries of the country published a book entitled *Working Class Interests and the Issue of the War*. It was a naked appeal to sectional self-interest, in harmony with the dominant philosophy of the country. Trade by trade the German workman is told that defeat means ruin and

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victory more work and higher wages. But whenever the question of peace terms crops up the familiar exposition of Eastern policy reappears :

A German commercial policy which met the needs of the Balkan States and, above all, of Turkey would bring with it invaluable consequences. It would bind those peoples more closely to Germany, because it would offer them mutual advantages and the possibility of cultural progress. It would suit the interests of the German consumer, because it would assure him of the import of foodstuffs independently of the sea and of England. . . . It would also be of advantage to our industries. The procuring of *industrial raw materials* is extremely important for the trade unionist as for the manufacturer. Already to-day we are importing *wool* from those regions. With the improvement of methods of communication cotton-production would assume a greater importance for Turkey, to the great advantage of the Central Powers. There is no reason to rely for ever on the American supply or to be dependent on the development of Africa. Both these sources can be cut off from the sea. The straight road to Asia is, however, open if only these peoples can be *interested in the prosperity of Germany*.*

The same point of view is dominant in the most interesting Socialist document which has as yet come to hand on the subject, the published report of the proceedings at a meeting between the official representatives of the German and Austrian Socialist and Trade Union movements, held at Berlin early in 1916. From the purely intellectual point of view the discussion was on an extraordinarily high level, and the various conflicting factors and interests in the complicated economic situation were analysed with a wealth of practical and theoretical knowledge seldom found at political gatherings in this country. But the whole discussion is dominated by the materialist philosophy of Marx, which has proved so sinister a bond of union between Prussian militarism and German and Austrian socialism. The moral standpoint is simply

* *Arbeiterinteressen und Kriegsergebniss* : a Trade Union war book, edited by William Jansson (editor of the official organ of the German Trade Union movement), p. 159, from the closing essay of the editor.

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non-existent. "Central Europe" is judged, not from the point of view of justice or moral values, but by whether it is the predestined next step in the economic evolution of the world; and from this standpoint there has been no difficulty in bringing round the great majority of Socialists to the policy of co-operating with the Governments and the bourgeois parties in promoting the closer economic union of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Near East. The general attitude of those present on the question of the rights of small nations may be judged by the following extract from the report of the remarks of the one courageous minority speaker (Ernst Meyer), who ventured to touch on the subject of the wishes of the non-German nationalities concerned :*

From the Socialist point of view, we ought not only to ask what are the interests of the German working-class; we ought also to take into account the interests of the workers in the Balkan countries. . . . Very likely our comrades in the Balkans have other wishes in preference to the *rapprochement* with the Central Powers. . . . We cannot demand that without further ado the wishes of the German workers should ride roughshod over theirs. (Interruption: "Absurd!") Regard for the working-class interests of other countries has not hitherto been regarded by us as absurd (Interruption: "Parish Pump politics!").

Let us complete the picture by an extract from the most widely read, as it is also by far the best written, of all the books that have appeared in Germany on this subject—a very oasis in a desert of sand—Naumann's *Central Europe*. Attention has already been drawn in THE ROUND TABLE† to the significance of Naumann's book in connection with German domestic policy; his

* Verbatim report of proceedings on January 9, 1916, issued by the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party, Berlin *Vorwärts* Publishing Office, 1916, p. 49. The words translated "Parish Pump politics" above are "Montenegriscche Kirchturmspolitik"—*i.e.*, "Montenegrin church steeple politics."

† See the article on the Labour Movement and the Future of British Industry, June, 1916.

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exposition of the underlying meaning and philosophy of Germany's Eastern policy is equally striking :

We have reached the heart of the constitutional problem of Central Europe.* It consists in the marking off of National Government from Economic Government and Military Government. The distinction is fundamental. We started, it will be remembered, with the idea of large-scale economic areas (*Weltwirtschaftsgebiete*). The large-scale economic area of Central Europe must be larger than the existing States of Germany and Austria-Hungary. We have refrained, for obvious reasons, from mentioning the names of neighbouring States to be brought in, merely stating in general terms that further accessions are necessary. But into what sort of a union shall they be brought in ? The answer is : a military union and an economic union. Anything over and above this would be superfluous and positively harmful. In all other matters there must be no derogation of political independence. It is therefore vital to delimit the military and economic functions as so to work them into a new central government. Let us take first the latter side of this new union. or, if the expression be preferred, the new Economic State. . . . This Economic State will have its own customs frontiers just as the military State will have its trench defences. Within these frontiers it will promote a wide and active interchange of commodities. For this a central Economic Government will be required, which will be directly responsible for part of the economic arrangements concerned and will advise the national Governments as to the remainder. Customs, the control of syndicates or trusts, organisations for promoting exports, patents, trade marks, etc., will be under central control. Commercial law, traffic policy, social policy and similar matters will only be indirectly within its purview. But the super-national Economic State, once established, will steadily increase its powers and will gradually evolve an administrative and representative system of its own.†

Here, then, we have the programme. The new German Empire, we now see, is not, and is not intended to be, a political unit in the ordinary sense of the term. It is

* Central Europe is habitually now used by German writers to include the Turkish Empire, though Naumann is more directly concerned with Austria-Hungary.

† *Mitteleuropa*, by Friedrich Naumann. Berlin, 1915 : p. 249. The passage quoted will be found on p. 272 of the English translation (P. S King & Co., 1916).

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ostensibly an alliance—an association of militarised partners, each pursuing objects of their own, but bent on preserving a closed system against the jealousy of the outer world, and submitting to the general direction of the most powerful member of the group. The guiding motive is self-interest, and the terms of alliance are a business contract.* The four Powers are in league for what they can get out of it: and Germany, who holds the others to her by a characteristic blending of cajolery and terrorism, maintains the alliance, with the definite material object of eventually rendering herself independent of British sea-power as regards the import of food-stuffs and essential raw materials, such as cotton and wool. She conceives the world as divided up among a few great World Powers with mutually exclusive economic spheres, and she is determined to carve out her own area of exploitation.

It is hardly worth while to point out to British readers how this conception conflicts at every point with the principles and practice of our own "free, tolerant and unaggressive" Commonwealth, which has kept clear the seas for the trade of the whole world and maintained throughout its dependencies the principle of the open door for all comers. That a system which is based merely on self-interest and repudiates the very suspicion of any deeper unity is built upon shifting sand is a proposition which need not be argued in the pages of THE ROUND TABLE. Yet it is interesting to recall that this strange, new ambitious German scheme is in its general conception not a

* This is brought out most clearly of all in the manifesto, unique in its combination of peasant cunning and *naïveté*, which was issued by the Bulgarian Government previous to its entry into the war. It is reprinted in Herkner, Vol. II. It is perhaps the first time in history that a call to arms has been backed up by statistics. The following extract is typical of the whole: "Germany and Austria-Hungary are cut off from American and Russian imports of corn. If, therefore, we can get our corn to their markets we can sell it free of duty and at the price of 60 to 80 francs per 100 kilogrammes. Bulgaria would be guilty of the greatest of crimes if she did not make arrangements (*i.e.*, by attacking Serbia) to enable our corn to be sold at these high prices" (p. 470).

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novelty but an anachronism. There was a time in British history when we, too, pursued the phantom of the "self-sufficient Empire" and regarded every neighbouring State as an intending highwayman. "Berlin-Bagdad," for all its parade of modern science, is little more than an adaptation to modern conditions of the ideas and policy of the "Old Colonial System," which led to such friction between the Colonies and the Mother Country and ultimately to the disruption of the Commonwealth.*

That friction is inevitable, and is already plentifully in evidence. Germany's allies do not relish the prospect of being treated as the colonial plantations of a modern industrial State. The Turkish Government, for instance, has recently announced a complete revision of the Turkish tariff and German authorities are already complaining of the "industrial fanaticism" by which it is inspired. The Hungarians, whose country is described by Naumann in glowing periods as the "granary" of Germany, protest that their manufactures only need an influx of German capital to develop on prosperous lines. Austrian industrial interests have been so much alarmed at the prospect of

* "Anxiety to make England independent of continental Europe in respect of shipping and of certain raw materials . . . was the motive which prompted English statesmen to favour projects of American colonisation. . . ."

"The policy of British statesmen towards the colonies was moulded by the conceptions of their commercial system. They left the colonists to concentrate their attention on the local affairs of their several communities, in the belief that Britain could bind them to herself by undertaking to defend them against foreign aggression, and by offering a preference to their raw products, in return for which she was to confine the market for those products to herself. . . ."

"The inherent defect of the system lay in the fact that it was one which could not exist without control, and that control lay in the hands of only one of the parties to the bargain. Each side was so situated as to think mainly or exclusively of its own interests, which was but a part of the whole. There was no common control in which all shared, such as might compel them to think of the interests of all—of the interests, that is to say, of the Commonwealth as a whole."

The Commonwealth of Nations, edited by L. Curtis, pp. 245, 307, 309.

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Austria becoming the dumping ground of German goods* that the idea of a Customs Union has already been abandoned for the milder formula of an "economic rapprochement." The disputes which always break out in a partnership where self-interest is the only tie are already in full swing.

But we need not conclude too hastily that these conflicts of interest will undermine the foundations of the new project of Empire. That can be done, and must be done, by the Allies alone. For there are two great outstanding differences between the old Colonial system of Britain and the new Colonial system of Germany, which ensure to the latter, if secure from without, at least a temporary stability. In the first place, Germany has and will retain the undisputed military control over her allies, so that of the two alternatives, tyranny or disruption, the former is the more likely. Secondly, each of her allies is itself a tyrant, practising ascendancy over lesser peoples, so that a sense of common interest and common guilt is always at hand, in case of need, to hold the system together. Berlin-Bagdad represents the ascendancy of Germans, Magyars, Bulgarians and Turks over Alsations, Poles, Danes, Czechs, Jugoslavs, Roumanians, Italians, Slovaks, Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, and other races. In the last analysis, as they know already to their cost, the lesser partners have little voice in the higher direction of the system, just as the German people themselves have little voice in the decisions of their own Government. But they realise that the alternative before them is not the transference of their allegiance to another camp, but in the case of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, at any rate, a drastic alteration both in the boundaries and in the character of their govern-

* Not all Austrian manufacturers share this view. At a conference of the Lower Austrian Union of Trades, on May 14, 1915, a glove manufacturer remarked in all innocence: "In trades like ours taste is the most important factor involved, and we shall all readily admit that we have nothing to fear from German competition in this respect." Herkner, Vol. II., p. 161.

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ments. So they acquiesce perforce in the control of Berlin, a control over the lives of some 150 million people—one-tenth of the population of the world—exercised, directly or indirectly, by the same methods—the combination of prestige and terrorism—by which the old Empires of the East retained their temporary dominion over some of the same unhappy lands ; at the best, organisation, discipline, efficiency, science, material well-being ; at the worst, forced labour, deportation, slavery, massacre.

Such an Empire is not a commonwealth or community of citizens. It is not even an autocracy of the familiar type. It is something different and more sinister : a military and economic unit, a barracks and a plantation, an area in which the normal concerns and functions of government and social life are subordinated to the demands and requirements of an economic and military General Staff. In peace its inhabitants are no more than a “labour-force” ; in war they are simply “man-power.” If it survives the present war and is allowed to be consolidated in the future peace, it will rivet tyranny for yet another generation upon the peoples of Central Europe and Nearer Asia, and make ready, slowly perhaps but inevitably, as its resources develop and a new crop of soldiers grows to manhood, for yet another trial of strength between militarism and the forces of liberty and justice.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FUTURE PEACE

I. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

THE modern system of sovereign states divides the world into sharply defined entities and determines the spirit and nature of interstate relations. Under existing conditions it is practically impossible for the statesman or for the layman to act upon the principle proclaimed by Mazzini: "You are *men* before you are *citizens* or *fathers*." As the inevitable result of this system, the ultimate dedication of the individual must be to his country not to mankind; and, consequently, the foreign policy of every state must be dictated by more or less selfish considerations. At the present stage of social evolution the sense of international responsibility—the willingness to forego self-regarding advantage in mutual service for mankind as a whole—is more or less undeveloped in all peoples and, hence, virtually no state is willing to limit its freedom and independence to the extent necessary to establish an effective supernational authority. No state clings more tenaciously to the theory of sovereignty than does the United States, and the implications and consequences of this doctrine have shaped its foreign policy. While the United States has advocated the highest ideals of international comity, no other state has been more reluctant to limit its freedom of action, either by active co-operation with others in maintaining international justice and right or by willingness to submit to an

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effective supernational authority. No other state has more rigidly held to the theory of sovereignty both in demanding respect for its own unqualified independence and also in respecting the rights of its fellow states fully to regulate their own affairs.

From the doctrine of absolute sovereignty springs the underlying principle which has governed the conduct of America's foreign relations, namely, that "every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other state belonging to the society of nations." * From the same source are derived the American theory of absolute and impartial neutrality, as well as the doctrine of non-intervention, forbidding interference with the political affairs of other states. Translated into practice, these fundamental principles, which are based upon an atomistic conception of interstate society, have kept the United States from resenting any violation of international law that did not adversely affect its own welfare. Similarly, respect for the sovereignty of other states has prevented the United States from intervening in their political affairs. These principles of conduct dating from the early years of the republic were reinforced by practical considerations. In that time of weakness, the United States was confronted by a Continental Europe hostile to republicanism and democracy and more than half inclined to attempt to impose its autocratic system upon America. Hence the two cardinal maxims of foreign policy—aloofness from European affairs and its corollary, European non-interference in America.

Except to the extent that Roosevelt modified the traditional doctrine of non-intervention in so far as the American hemisphere was concerned, these principles and forms of conduct remained virtually unquestioned until the Great War directed the attention of thinking Americans to the fundamentals of interstate relations. A wholesome scepticism as to the validity of the traditional doctrine and policy

* Declaration of International Rights and Duties of Nations, adopted by the American Institute of International Law, January 6, 1916.

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pervades the American intelligentsia. Even the theory of sovereignty has been assailed ; and naturally, the prevailing concept of international law has not escaped attack. Elihu Root forcibly pointed out one underlying defect, when he said :

Up to this time breaches of international law have been treated as we treat wrongs under civil procedure, as if they concerned nobody except the particular nation upon which the injury was inflicted and the nation inflicting it. There has been no general recognition of the right of other nations to object. . . . If the law of nations is to be binding . . . there must be a change in theory, and violations of the law of such a character as to threaten the peace and order of the community of nations must be deemed to be a violation of the right of every civilised nation to have the law maintained and a legal injury to every nation. . . . Next to the preservation of national character the most valuable possession of all peaceable nations, great and small, is the protection of those laws which constrain other nations to conduct based upon principles of justice and humanity. Without that protection there is no safety for the small state except in the shifting currents of policy among its great neighbours, and none for a great state, however peaceable and just may be its disposition, except in readiness for war.*

In the main, however, attention has not been directed towards those fundamental political theories that stand in the way of an effective superstate authority, but towards the traditional policy of self-centred aloofness from Europe. This has been thoroughly undermined among independently thinking Americans. However wise or unwise it may have been in the past—the former is the general assumption—it is realised by them that now it is no longer a tenable policy and that further adherence to it will be disastrous not alone to Europe but to America as well. The war has concretely emphasised the interdependence of the two hemispheres and has discredited the traditional policy among a great part, possibly among a majority, of the thinking people. This has, in all probability, been the most momentous effect of the war upon the United States,

* Address of Elihu Root before the American Society of International Law, December 28, 1915.

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and its future political consequences are bound to be important. But, for the present, the traditional policy still has a firm hold on the bulk of the population, which clings to its provincial isolation. Detached sayings of "the Fathers of the Republic," quoted apart from their context and with entire disregard of the change in condition since their utterance, still control the opinions of the great majority. As arguments they are deemed unanswerable. Furthermore, among many there is a firmly rooted belief that Europe stands for nothing but despotism, while America is the sole home of freedom. However misleading they be, the words of W. J. Bryan represent a considerable section of American opinion. "If we are in a group of American Republics," he said, "we are associated with people having our form of government, but the moment we cross the ocean we tie ourselves to a theory of government from which our people dissented a century and a third ago, and, if I understand the heart of the American people, they still believe that there is an essential difference between a monarchy and a republic." * Such arguments, in that they appeal to deeply-rooted prepossessions, cannot easily be met. They can be controverted only by long expositions and by extensive educational machinery.

Thus there has developed a cleavage between the intelligentsia and the average voter—and with the latter may be included the politician dependent upon him—as to the future course of American foreign policy. This cleavage is, to a certain extent, bridged by the fact that virtually all are agreed that the United States should do something to secure the future peace of the world. While the great awakening of thinking America to the realities of interstate relations has been one notable reaction to the war, another has been the far more extensive spread of pacifist ideals among all classes. The European holocaust has greatly intensified the previously existing powerful aversion from war and has made it an overwhelming force. Peace has

* Address of W. J. Bryan, at Lake Mohonk, May 18, 1916.

The "League to Enforce Peace" Programme become a positive ideal. With nearly all lights concentrated upon her radiant vision, justice and right have become comparatively dim figures in the American Pantheon. The voice of the small dissentient minority is not heard in the virtually unanimous demand that grievous injuries should be overlooked so that the destructive blast may not touch America's youth. And, at the same time, there is an insistent demand that the peace of the future be safeguarded.

All schemes for securing the future peace of the world receive an attentive hearing and elicit an enthusiastic, if not a critical, response. At no previous time have the numerous peace societies of America been so active. Everyone wants the end, but comparatively few are willing to pay the cost. There is, of course, no agreement as to the means. Some perceive what is required, but know that in the present stage of popular knowledge it is not attainable. Not a few are deluding themselves and their disciples with vain hopes as to the efficacy of the world's public opinion and moral judgment. Others, again, more in touch with actual life, have elaborated a plan whose underlying and ultimate aim, it is hoped, will gain the support of the majority and whose present modest scope will not alienate those that have to be gradually weaned from tradition and prejudice. Such a scheme is that formulated by the League to Enforce Peace, which has outstripped all others in the competition for popular approval.

II. THE "LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE" PROGRAMME

THIS widespread movement originated in the dismay and indignation aroused by the outbreak and course of the European War and in the accompanying keen determination to render impossible a recurrence of such a catastrophe. Study of the situation led many to the conviction that this could be accomplished only by the creation of a league of nations whose members should agree

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to use their military and naval forces for the common purpose of maintaining peace and of preventing aggression. Early in 1915 a small group of political scientists, publicists, international lawyers and statesmen, who had arrived at this general conclusion, met in a series of conferences for the purpose of discovering the principles upon which such a future league might be established. Their spirit was intensely practical. The purpose was not to formulate an ideal scheme for reorganising the world, like those of Eméric Crucé and the Abbé de St. Pierre, but to decide as to what portion of their more restricted plan ought to be urged upon the government of the United States and upon those of other countries "as a realisable project." After prolonged discussions, a platform consisting of but four short proposals was adopted; and it was then determined to call a national conference at Philadelphia in order to bring these conclusions prominently before America and the world. With some modifications, the original proposals were ratified by this Philadelphia conference during the summer of 1915 and, unchanged since then, they constitute the modest programme of this energetic organisation.

Its object is to further the creation of a league of nations, of which naturally the United States is to be one, whose members shall bind themselves to four principles. Of these, the first is that all justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to an international judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment. The second provides that all other questions arising between the signatories, and likewise not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation. By the third provision the signatories agree that they will jointly use both their economic and military forces against any member of the league that commits acts of hostility against any one of the signatories before the question at issue shall have been submitted either to the judicial tribunal or to the council of conciliation, according

The "League to Enforce Peace" Programme to the stipulations of the first two proposals. Finally, provision is made for holding periodic conferences of the signatory Powers for the purpose of formulating and of codifying international law; and, unless some signatory shall dissent within a stated time, the law so established shall govern in the decisions of the international tribunal.

These are the sole and only principles to which the league organisation is committed.* No official attempt has been made to work out the details of this organisation, as has been done by the Fabian Society with a parallel scheme.† Apart from the provision for formulating international law, all that is stipulated is the creation of an international court and an international council of conciliation, to either one of which, as the case may be, a member of the league must before going to war submit his dispute with another member on pain of having the economic and military forces of all the other members used against him.

It is naturally impossible to understand the merits and limitations of this simple project without further analysis. Only indirectly is its aim the establishment of justice and right; its primary purpose is merely the maintenance of peace. Even in that respect it is only a minimum programme, for no obligation to accept the judgments of the tribunal or the recommendations of the council is incurred. Submission of the case to the international agencies and abstention from hostilities during its hearing absolve any member from the league's economic and military penalties

* The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorised by the Executive Committee: "The signatory Powers shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic pressure against any one of their number that threatens war against a fellow signatory without having first submitted its dispute for international inquiry, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial hearing, and awaited a conclusion, or without having in good faith offered so to submit it. They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing."

† L. S. Woolf, *International Government*, pp. 371 ff.

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and leave him in the end free to carry out his purpose by force of arms.* The presumption, however, is that in nearly all instances these judgments and recommendations will be accepted. It is reasonably assumed that delay, accompanied by a full knowledge of the facts, will, as a rule, prevent nations from being stampeded into Armageddon.

Thus, on its face, the plan would appear to be one of compulsory arbitration with no expressed or implied obligation to abide by the recommendation or decree. In fact, however, it is considerably less than that. The members of the league do not specifically agree to submit their unsettled disputes to arbitration, but only not to go to war before doing so. The economic and military forces of the league are to be used against such members only as threaten or commit hostilities against a fellow member without submitting their case, but not against those who refuse to go before the tribunal or council to answer a complaint against them.† This is a vital distinction. A possible and probable result thereof is clearly defined by one of the most active exponents of the league movement, Mr. Theodore Marburg. According to him,—

Under the league a dispute may go on indefinitely without any attempt to bring the disputants into court. . . . A people may be practising a gross injustice toward another people, may refuse the demand of the latter for a hearing, and the dispute may even flame up into war without the league having the right to interfere. For there is only one act that the league punishes, namely, the making of war against a fellow signatory without a previous hearing of the dispute or an honest attempt to secure one. In the case imagined above, the injured signatory has made a demand for a hearing and been refused. It is thus relieved of all obligation to the league and is free to attack the offending signatory. The latter in turn is

* "We are willing to concede," Mr. Taft said, "that there may be governmental and international injustice which cannot be practically remedied except by force."

† While the Fabian Society's plan, on the other hand, makes the agreement to arbitrate obligatory, it fails to provide the means for enforcing this obligation.

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not visited with any penalties at the hands of the league, because it is not making the attack but is itself attacked. Lacking the power to hale the offender into court, it is therefore clear that while the demand for a preliminary hearing of the dispute or honest attempt to secure one before a signatory is allowed to attack a fellow signatory will make for justice, the league plan does not pretend to insure justice. It aims simply to discourage war.*

Furthermore, there is another point that requires elucidation before the effectiveness of this programme can be judged. Much, obviously, depends upon the membership of the proposed league. As yet no official decision has been reached, but the general opinion is clear. It is naturally realised that the essential prerequisite is to secure the adhesion of as many of the Great Powers as is possible, preferably of all. There is also a very considerable advantage in restricting the membership to these states. Such limitation would obviate the grave difficulties arising from the legal doctrine of the equality of all sovereign states which wrecked "The Judicial Arbitration Court" planned by the second Hague Conference. This difficulty has continually presented itself to Mr. Taft, the President of the organisation, and apparently his solution is that, when once the league of major states is formed and its institutions are established, then "the smaller Powers will be glad to come in and enjoy the protection that the League will afford against unjust aggression of the strong against the weak." † At present, the general intention is to admit only those minor states that have a long tradition of progress and order as well as considerable resources in numbers and wealth.

With this preliminary information we shall probably be in a better position to estimate what the proposed league could accomplish and where its machinery would prove ineffective. Where continuing injury is inflicted by one

* Address of Theodore Marburg before the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, December 8, 1916.

† Address of ex-President William H. Taft, June 16, 1915.

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member upon another, very little could, apparently, be effected. In the case cited by Mr. Marburg, to which reference has already been made, the party committing the injury would obviously remain quiescent and justice would be on the side of the aggressor. If Turkey had been a member of such a league during the nineteenth century, the continued maltreatment of her Christian subjects in the Balkans and in Armenia could not without her consent have come before the league's tribunals, no matter how insistent Russia and the other Powers had been. Likewise, if such a league had been in existence without Turkey having membership in it, no relief would have been afforded by its agencies. In all probability in that case, however, the league would have proceeded *ultra vires* and would have acted in much the same manner as the Concert of Europe did. On the other hand, it is conceivable that such a league could have composed the dispute between the United States and Cuba, provided both parties had been willing to submit the case to the council of conciliation. The outcome for all concerned would presumably then not have been just what it now is. But if Spain had refused to refer the dispute, then the course of events would have been much the same as it was ; while if the United States, not Spain, had been the unwilling party and had insisted upon attacking the Spanish forces in Cuba, then the league would have been obliged to join its economic and military forces to those of Spain in repelling the attack of the United States.

Leaving a reconstructed past, it will be found advisable to test the league programme by the course of events leading up to the existing war. As Serbia would probably not have been a member of our hypothetical league, Austria-Hungary's attack upon her would not have concerned this organisation until Russia had intervened with a complaint to the council of conciliation. If Austria-Hungary had agreed to allow the case to go to the council, this in itself would have provided no remedy unless the council had had the power, as it is proposed that it shall have, to enjoin the

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military proceedings against Serbia.* Otherwise, in trying to prevent such action and in attacking Austria-Hungary, Russia would have become subject to the league's full penalties. But, judging by what did actually happen, there is little reason to assume that Austria-Hungary would have agreed to a hearing and investigation. In that case, the course of events would probably have duplicated the actual one, except for one possible contingency. This leads to the relation of existing treaties of alliance to the proposed league. It is scarcely conceivable that these alliances will be abandoned until in the fulness of time the league shall have proved its effective vitality. For the purposes of the argument, however, let it be assumed that the alliance with Germany had been abrogated as a condition of Austria-Hungary's admission to the league. In that event, fear of Russia's millions might have given Austria-Hungary pause. But even if the treaties had been in full vigour, the existence of such a league might possibly have altered the course of events. For, if Germany had proceeded exactly as she did, then the whole forces of the league might have been called into action against her. At all events, the situation resulting from the contradictory obligations of alliance and of league would have been a puzzling one.

Turning to the future, an interesting case might arise were Germany to proceed against Colombia or Venezuela for some more or less valid grievance. Presumably the United States would protest. An appeal could be made to the council of conciliation and an injunction against Germany's proceedings could be demanded. This, it is true, would involve submitting the Monroe Doctrine to arbitration; but to this the United States has already

* This power of injunction to stop continuing injuries under adjudication or hearing—presumably backed by the full force of the league—is recognised by the leaders of this movement to be an essential part of the league's machinery, and it should be considered as an element of their programme. "It would doubtless be necessary when some issues arise," Mr. Taft said, "to require a maintenance of the *status quo* until the issues were submitted or decided in one tribunal or the other."

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virtually agreed, though this is not generally realised, when the treaties of 1913 and 1914, providing for the submission of all disputes to an international commission of enquiry, were concluded.* If Germany, however, refused to submit the case, then no injunction could be issued and the United States, as under existing arrangements, would have to appeal to the arbitrament of arms.

From the foregoing examples and from others that the imagination of the reader can easily supply, it is patent that in its present form this scheme cannot accomplish much. The proposed league will scarcely be an effective super-national authority. Apparently even its meagre purpose of diminishing the chances of war can be accomplished only if all the members solemnly agree to allow every dispute, not settled by direct negotiation, to go before the international tribunals and pledge themselves to use their economic and military forces to enforce such submission. Failure to respond to the summons of these tribunals would in many instances be a far surer test of real aggression than is an act of war. But, in addition to all this, what seems absolutely essential to such a league is the establishment of a comprehensive code of public right embodied in a series of treaties which the Great Powers explicitly bind themselves to enforce, both severally and jointly.†

The moderation of the leaders of this movement and their unwillingness to elaborate details are based upon valid reasons. The more details are given, the more points are there for attack, and the existence of one vulnerable spot is not infrequently used to condemn the entire structure. Besides, the programme had to be a minimum one if it were to elicit the support of a people trained for generations to introspective isolation. Moreover, it had

* G. G. Wilson, "The Monroe Doctrine" in *Enforced Peace*, pp. 71, 72.

† "It seems to me that any such system (as the proposed league) must include the better formulation of international law, the establishment of an international court to apply the law, and a general agreement to enforce submission to the jurisdiction of the court."—Elihu Root to Dr. A. Lawrence Lowell, February 10, 1916.

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also to suggest more than it could actually accomplish if it were to arouse popular enthusiasm.* Finally, this organisation is not wedded to any specific details, and its leaders fully realise that their part is much like that of Canning's Tailors of Tooley Street, and that, if ever their scheme comes before an international conference, it will probably be completely overhauled before it is adopted. In their minds the important thing is to have the general underlying principles accepted, because once established, the league will probably continue to grow in vitality and in strength.

Despite the moderation of the programme, it has not escaped serious attack. A number of peace organisations object conscientiously and consistently to the use of force.† Bryan's words: "I prefer to have this nation a moral power in the world rather than a policeman," embody the sentiments of many. Others, again, fear a departure from the traditional policy, dread European interference in America, and oppose all plans of international organisation because any presumptive diminution of the risks of war will strengthen those who oppose further military and naval preparedness. In addition to all this, there is the inertia of a people accustomed to isolation, and, while possibly over-anxious for peace, still ignorant of the realities of interstate life, and hence not convinced that the price demanded for real

* Although his main criticisms are based upon a totally erroneous conception of the league programme, there is considerable justice in some of Roosevelt's animadversions: because many of the propagandists of this movement have not thought out the scheme for themselves and, hence, they both grossly overstate what it can effect and also do not bring home to their audiences the great responsibilities that must be assumed if the league is to be at all efficacious. According to Roosevelt, the proposal is "mischievous folly under existing conditions. Among other things it does us moral harm by still further encouraging our people to make grandiloquent promises, with no consideration as to how they are to be kept and no serious intention of keeping them. . . . We can never accomplish anything either for ourselves or for anyone else by mere words, used to cover inaction, slackness and fear of effort, of risk and of danger."—*Metropolitan*, February, 1917, pp. 66, 72.

† See the *World Court Magazine* for December, 1916, p. 263.

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security is a moderate one. Despite this opposition, the movement is rapidly gaining in popular favour. It has, above all else, been accustoming the American people to the idea that their traditional foreign policy is obsolete. Like all English-speaking peoples, the United States has grown up on what Mazzini justly characterised as the sterile doctrine of rights. They are now slowly learning that rights necessarily have complementary obligations and that their country has responsibilities of deed, not alone of word and example, to humanity. This lesson the league is inculcating. Its distinguished and influential leaders have overcome many obstacles, of which not the least were some abortive attempts to use the organisation to bring pressure to end the present war. However unimportant its very immediate future may be, the movement bids fair to lead to a new era in interstate relations. Its principles have secured the approval of responsible statesmen in Great Britain, France, and Germany.* If carefully handled, the movement may mark a definitive turning-point in American policy, for President Wilson has made its principles his own. Thus, apart from the criticism of certain fundamentals and details, this league organisation deserves sympathetic encouragement, for upon its ultimate success depends whether the great potential weight of America's not inconsiderable measure of genuine idealism shall remain, as at present, largely dead, or shall in the future be cast into the scales of international justice and right.

* At a dinner of the League to Enforce Peace at Pittsburg, on January 18, 1917, were read official messages of general approval from Switzerland, Spain, Denmark, Holland, and Japan.

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III. PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF DECEMBER 18

FOLLOWING some previous public expressions manifesting general approval of the principles for which the League to Enforce Peace stood,* at the first annual meeting of this organisation, on May 27, 1916, President Wilson stated that the United States believed in the following fundamental propositions: first, that every people have a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live; second, that the small states have the same right to their sovereignty and territorial integrity as have the great nations; and third, "that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights of peoples and nations." Continuing, he expressed the firm conviction that the American people were willing "to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realise these objects and make them sure against violation." The type of international organisation that, in his opinion, the United States was willing to join, he defined as:

An universal association of the nations to maintain the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.

In the course of the following weeks, President Wilson reiterated these opinions,† and in the middle of June they

* For instance, on May 8, 1916, President Wilson said: "If the world undertakes, as we all hope it will undertake, a joint effort to keep the peace, it will expect us to play our proportional part in manifesting the force which is going to rest back of that."

† On May 30, at Arlington, President Wilson again stated his belief "that the people of the United States were ready to become partners in any alliance of the nations that would guarantee public right above selfish aggression." On June 13, at West Point, he said: "We are ready to join with the other nations of the world in seeing that the kind of justice prevails anywhere that we believe in."

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were formally included in the platform of the Democratic Party on which he ran for re-election. The words used there followed closely those of President Wilson's speech of May 27, just quoted; and the belief was expressed that the time had arrived when "it is the duty of the United States to join with the other nations of the world in any feasible association" for these objects. Thus these principles became an official part of the Democratic creed. In his formal speech accepting the re-nomination on September 2, President Wilson did not fail to emphasise this feature of the platform, stating that:

No nation can any longer remain neutral as against any wilful disturbance of the peace of the world. . . . The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees that whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life must first be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is attempted.

In the meanwhile, efforts were being made to secure the adhesion of the Republican Party as well to this general programme. In the keynote speech before the Republican Convention at Chicago, Senator Harding said that "this mighty people, idealising popular government and committed to human progress, can no longer live within and for ourselves alone. Obliterated distance makes it impossible to stand aloof from mankind and escape widened responsibility." However, although the league's programme had already secured the approval of Senator Lodge,* who was supposed to be the main instrument in drafting the Republican Party's platform, no endorsement could, in the end, be secured. In place thereof was inserted the well-meaning, even if largely futile, article of faith:

* On May 27, 1916, Senator Lodge said: "The limit of voluntary arbitration has, I think, been reached. . . . I think the next step is that which this league proposes, and that is to put force behind international peace. . . . I do not believe that when Washington warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilised nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace."

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"We believe in the pacific settlement of international disputes and favour the establishment of a world court for that purpose." But in his formal speech of July 31, accepting the nomination, the Republican candidate, Judge Hughes, fully endorsed the league's principles and emphasised the necessity of an international tribunal for justiciable questions, of instrumentalities of conciliation, and of conferences of nations to formulate international rules. He further added :

Behind this international organisation, if it is to be effective, must be the co-operation of the nations to prevent resort to hostilities before the appropriate agencies of peaceful settlement have been utilised. If the peace of the world is to be maintained, it must be through the preventive power of a common purpose.

Thus one of the two great parties and both candidates for the Presidency had formally endorsed the general programme of the league. Apparently, the opportunity was present for an extensive educational campaign, in which the merits and defects of the proposal could have been subjected to wide popular discussion. This highly desirable outcome was, in part, frustrated by the legalistic temper and restricted vision of Mr. Hughes, whose campaign was conducted on narrow lines. During its course, he virtually ignored his own endorsement of the league's programme ; and, in so far as he discussed foreign affairs at all, he confined himself to a comprehensive criticism of President Wilson's handling of the situations in Mexico and in Europe, and to a promise on his own part of a future devoted to the negative ideal of enforcing American rights impartially against all infringing them. On the other hand, President Wilson tried to keep his vision of a better international future in the foreground. At Omaha, on October 5, he stated :

We are ready to lend our force without stint to the preservation of peace in the interest of mankind. . . . It is our duty to lend the full force of this nation, moral and physical, to a league of

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nations which shall see to it that nobody disturbs the peace of the world without submitting his case first to the opinion of mankind.

A week later, at Indianapolis, he again discussed this question in the following words :

I have said, and shall say again, that when the great present war is over it will be the duty of America to join with the other nations of the world in some kind of league for the maintenance of peace.

Finally, on October 26, at Cincinnati, he elaborated these views with considerable detail, stating :

This is the last war of the kind or of any kind that involves the world that the United States can keep out of. I say that because I believe the business of neutrality is over ; not because I want it to be over, but I mean this, that war now has such a scale that the position of neutrals sooner or later becomes intolerable. . . . We have not yet a society of nations. We must have a society of nations, not suddenly, not by insistence, not by any hostile emphasis upon the demand, but by the demonstration of the needs of the time. The nations of the world must get together and say, "Nobody can hereafter be neutral as respects the disturbance of the world's peace for an object which the world's opinion cannot sanction." The world's peace ought to be disturbed if the fundamental rights of humanity are invaded, but it ought not to be disturbed for any other thing that I can think of, and America was established in order to indicate, at any rate in one Government, the fundamental rights of man. America must hereafter be ready as a member of the family of nations to exert her whole force, moral and physical, to the assertion of those rights throughout the round globe.

It is a marked characteristic of a real democracy that an issue cannot be easily forced upon it. In every national election the range of choice is large. The average voter constructs for himself a mental scale of values embracing the various issues involved, and thus largely creates his own issues. He selects the candidate of his preference for a variety of unrelated, but largely subjective, reasons. Unquestionably, the man in the street was not deeply and genuinely interested in President Wilson's international programme. It made a vague appeal to his somewhat

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sentimental idealism, but he failed to grasp it concretely and could not visualise its future significance. There was but scant discussion of it in the Press and, certainly, still less on political platforms and in private gatherings. To some extent, this was of course the inevitable result of the fact that this programme was not the exclusive possession of either candidate. At the same time, however, President Wilson's earnest advocacy of it brought to his support many progressive thinkers who, while far from satisfied with his conduct of foreign affairs, still saw in him the possibility of a better future than was to be expected from Hughes's myopic vision and narrow legalism. In general, however, America's relation to the war and her future part in international affairs were not important positive factors in the election. The exact position of neither candidate was quite clear. Hence, ardent sympathisers with the cause for which the Allies stand could be found in the opposing camps. Similarly, the German partisans were divided in their choice of candidates. But negatively, the war was the decisive factor. Undoubtedly, President Wilson's large popular vote was due to the country's exceptional and wide-spread prosperity and to the very general satisfaction with the fact that he had been able to keep the United States out of the war. With the majority of voters that was the overwhelming argument.

The election, however, placed Mr. Wilson in a rather trying dilemma. He had been elected upon a battle-cry, not of his own direct choosing, but one that had emerged spontaneously from the facts of the situation. At the same time, he had on his hands still unsettled a serious controversy with Germany about the submarine warfare. During the presidential campaign, the American Press had largely ignored Germany's repeated violations of her pledges. The lack of prominence given to these cases—at that time about twenty in all—was in part due to something akin to a conspiracy of silence, but it also proceeded from lack of general public interest, especially in sections remote from the

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Atlantic sea-board. With the passing of time, this silence and this lack of interest naturally reinforced one another. Hence, it was not generally realised that the submarine warfare was being conducted in essentially the same manner as in April of 1916, when President Wilson addressed Congress and described these acts "as wanton and without the slightest colour of justification." Furthermore, there was good reason to expect an increasingly ruthless campaign. The State Department was, of course, aware of the exact situation and knew that it could not continue without either a diplomatic break or national humiliation. But President Wilson was estopped from carrying out his explicit threat of severing diplomatic relations with Germany, not only on account of his own prolonged forbearance and the measure of acquiescence it implied, but because he lacked the necessary popular support. The people had elected him as a peace President.

§ But in addition, President Wilson had been elected upon a platform stating that it was the duty of the United States to join a league of nations to enforce peace. He was in a measure justified in holding that he had received a mandate from the people to this effect, and he could rightfully claim that he was authorised to carry this mandate into effect. It was obviously important for the outside world to know this. Accordingly, it was proposed to send a Note to the belligerents, in order that they should take this new factor into account in determining what territorial re-arrangements were necessary to give them the desired future security. Before this was done the German peace overtures were made and it then became even more imperative that the belligerent world should know of the contemplated change in American foreign policy. Hence, on December 18, before the Entente Allies had officially answered the peace overtures of the Central Powers, President Wilson addressed all the belligerents along these lines.

In this Note, he dissociated himself completely from the German peace movement, and furthermore affirmed that

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his object was neither that of mediation nor of peace-making. He frankly made manifest, however, his earnest desire for peace, stating that the concern of the United States for an early conclusion of the war "arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard" American interests. He also added that the situation of neutral nations was already "exceedingly hard to endure" and might "be rendered altogether intolerable." Within a few hours of its publication, this phase of the Note was officially explained by the Secretary of State in the following delphic words :

The reasons for the sending of the Note were as follows : It isn't our material interest we had in mind when the Note was sent, but more and more our own rights are becoming involved by the belligerents on both sides, so that the situation is becoming increasingly critical. I mean by that that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves, and therefore we are entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks, in order that we may regulate our conduct in the future. . . . The sending of this Note will indicate the possibility of our being forced into the war. That possibility ought to serve as a restraining and sobering force, safeguarding American rights. It may also serve to force an earlier conclusion of the war.

This explanation gave rise to all sorts of wild conjectures, the most improbable of which was that serious difficulties with the Allies were impending. As President Wilson, in his days of academic freedom, had stigmatised the course of the United States during the Napoleonic Wars as one of "deep impolicy," it is inconceivable that he would permit history to attach a similar condemnation to his own administration. The most general assumption was that a break with Germany was imminent. A supplementary statement from Mr. Lansing made it evident, however, that no action was contemplated on account of past violations of the German pledges, but that the Note looked only toward an ominous and unwelcome future. "I did not intend to intimate," he said, "that the Government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality,

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which it has consistently pursued in the face of constantly increasing difficulties.”

If, however, an early peace were not attainable and if the United States were ultimately destined to be sucked into the maelstrom, it was patently desirable that the aims of the belligerents should be clearly defined, so that the United States should not have to fight for ends of which it might disapprove. It was not quite appreciated that the request for such definition might for similar and equally legitimate reasons be as embarrassing as were the attempts to make Lincoln state his plans of reconstructing the Union before the military achievements of the North justified them.* Nor, in spite of some plain evidence to the contrary,† must it be assumed that a trained historian like the President was so ignorant of the ends of the belligerents as a superficial reading of his Note would indicate. “The concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated,” he said, and, stated in general terms, “they seem the same on both sides,” for all the belligerents claim that they are merely seeking guarantees for their future security. Now obviously, if this were the case, if all these claims were sincere, then the fact that the United States was willing to become with the others a guarantor of such security would be an important element in ultimately determining what are satisfactory terms of peace. In addition, such a proffer might even greatly shorten the war.

* In 1863, Mr. Lincoln stated: “I have laboriously endeavoured to avoid that question ever since it first began to be mooted, and thus to avoid confusion and disturbance in our own councils.”—John G. Nicolay, *Abraham Lincoln*, p. 455.

† At Omaha, on October 5, 1916, Mr. Wilson said: “The singularity of the present war is that its origin and objects never have been disclosed. They have obscure European roots which we do not know how to trace. . . . It will take the long inquiry of history to explain this war.” On October 26 at Cincinnati, he further said: “Have you ever heard what started the present war? If you have, I wish you would publish it, because nobody else has, so far as I can gather. Nothing in particular started it, but everything in general.”

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The main purpose of the Note was to bring this new and incalculable, but possibly vital, factor into the situation. Accordingly, after referring to the fact that some of the opposing belligerents had already expressed their readiness "to consider the formation of a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world," President Wilson stated :

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and the Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends when the war is over with every influence and resource at their command.

In these words President Wilson officially informed the entire world, both neutral and belligerent, of the readiness of the United States to enter a league of nations to ensure justice and peace. This is by far the most important part of President Wilson's Note, but its significance was obscured by some infelicities of expression and of juxtaposition in other sections and by quite natural doubts as to its real purport and purpose.

Habent sua fata libelli—and state papers as well. President Monroe could not anticipate the immortality of the message over which he and John Quincy Adams laboured. This document, however, did not reverse a settled policy, but merely embodied doctrines implicit in the conduct and advice of Washington, Jefferson, and their successors. As early as 1814 a Russian diplomat had recognised that the United States was "aiming at a complete revolution in the relations of the New World and the Old, by the destruction of all European interests in the American continent." Moreover, the message was of no especial political importance when it was issued, and twenty-five years later a Senator of Massachusetts declared

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that Monroe's pronouncement had been "dead, buried and forgotten" until President Polk disinterred it in 1845. Its vitality has been greatest during the living generation. It may well be that President Wilson's Note is destined to an equally famous future and also that the future is not a far distant one. At present, however, a world in agony cannot be interested in a more or less remote hypothetical future, but must in the main base its decisions both upon an estimate of the practical value of the league plan and upon the immediacy of American co-operation in it.

IV. THE ACTION OF THE SENATE

PRESUMABLY it is difficult for a European to realise that the President's unequivocal statement in an official note that the United States is willing to join a league "to ensure peace and justice" is not in itself binding. Although the Constitution vests the conduct of foreign affairs in the hands of the President, no war can be declared without the consent of Congress, and all treaties must be ratified by the Senate. From the very beginning the League programme was opposed on the ground that it was unconstitutional, in that it deprived Congress of the right to declare war and vested it in the suggested league. It is quite easy to traverse this legal argument, but the important political fact remains that by joining such a league Congress would, in a general way and in many unpredictable instances, divest itself of the right to determine the belligerency of the United States. An even greater difficulty is the fact that before the United States could enter such a league, the treaties creating it would have to be ratified by the Senate. Such ratification requires a vote of two-thirds of the senators present. This stipulation gives the Senate great influence in shaping foreign policy, and this right has always been jealously safeguarded. There was and still is more truth than jest

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in Secretary Hay's complaint that, "as the Fathers, in their wisdom, saw fit to ordain that the kickers should rule for ever, the chances are always two to one against any Government measure passing." The difficulties that must be encountered in the Senate were made manifest when an effort was made to secure an endorsement of President Wilson's Note.

On the day of the publication of this Note, apparently without the direct support of the Administration, a resolution was introduced in the Senate endorsing the action of the President in "suggesting and recommending the first steps in possible negotiations to arrange the terms of peace," but not specifically approving the contents of the Note. Immediate action was blocked on the ground that opportunity should be given for reflection; and on the following day, a substitute resolution was offered by Senator Hitchcock, of Nebraska, a Democrat, to the effect that the Senate approves the action of the President in sending the Notes to the belligerents "suggesting and recommending that those nations state the terms upon which peace might be discussed."

Immediately after the Christmas recess a determined effort was made by Senator Hitchcock to secure the immediate consideration of his resolution. In urging such action, he stated that this resolution had been carefully worded so "as not to involve the Senate in an endorsement of the President's foreign policy, not even to involve the Senate in an endorsement of the argumentative parts of the President's letter, but to confine the endorsement entirely to an approval of the President's act in asking the nations at war to state terms of peace." In his mind the President's Note was essentially a peace move, and purely as such, he urged, it should be supported by the Senate. Opposition to immediate consideration developed. Senator Lodge, a Republican from Massachusetts, argued that the subject was so very important that the resolution should be referred to the Foreign Relations Committee for examina-

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tion. This course was opposed by the Chairman of that Committee, Senator Stone, who on a previous occasion had publicly expressed serious misgivings as to the feasibility of the league plan * and who now stated that the resolution meant merely an endorsement of the President's action in sending the Note. "The act of the Chief Executive," he said, "was manifestly taken with the hope of opening the door to negotiations which might lead to peace."

Further debate was deferred until the following day, when Senator Lodge in a vigorous, though somewhat rambling, speech attacked the resolution. In the first place, he contended that such action would involve the United States in European affairs, since it would commit the Senate to a general endorsement of the President's Note and to specific approval of his request to the belligerents to state their terms of peace. But these terms, he said, "as the war now stands, are wholly beyond and outside our national interests. . . . Legally and nationally we have nothing to do with them." While avowing keen interest in the restoration of peace, he objected to the mere clamour for it, stating that "the peace which we desire and must desire, not only for our own selfish interests but in the interests of humanity, must be a peace that offers some promise of permanence."

After expressing full confidence in the President's assurances that his Note was in no way connected with the peace overtures of the Central Powers, Senator Lodge pointed out that, coming at the time it did, "it was unfortunate in producing a widespread impression to the contrary." This general misinterpretation, he argued, presented a serious objection to endorsing the President's Note, for "it is quite as possible to be unneutral in entering upon negotiations for peace as to be unneutral during the operations of war." Hitherto the United States had been neutral, but if in the face of this generally prevailing mis-

* Speech of November 24, 1916, at the dinner of the League to Enforce Peace, New York City.

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interpretation the Senate should endorse the Note and the House should do likewise, we are in danger of ranging the United States "on the side of one belligerent in seeking to bring about peace." He favoured continued adherence to neutrality as the best policy for the United States. "I am not willing by interpretation or misinterpretation to have myself ranged by my vote as trying to help one side in the negotiations of peace against the other; particularly I do not want to be ranged against the side which I personally believe is fighting the battle of freedom and democracy as against military autocracy."

In an earlier part of his speech Senator Lodge had refused to discuss the merits of President Wilson's peace league proposal, pointing out, however, that this was so radical a departure from the traditional policy that it should not be taken hastily. "If carried out," he said, "it means an abandonment of the policy we have hitherto pursued of confining ourselves to our own hemisphere and makes us a part of the political system of another hemisphere, with the inevitable corollary that the nations of that other hemisphere will become a part of our system." He now reverted to this phase of the Note, emphasising its importance. Referring to a semi-official statement—whose accuracy, however, has since been impugned—that "it is the administration view that the country can be committed to an abandonment of the policy of isolation, much as President Monroe committed it to the Monroe Doctrine, without Senate action," Senator Lodge contended that President Wilson could by his offer commit no one but himself and his Administration. Senator Lodge, however, not only refrained from attacking the league proposal but spoke rather sympathetically of it, and even admitted the possible advisability of more than is being advocated by the private organisation devoted to advancing this project. But he insisted that the question was one of very grave moment and required serious deliberation. "Co-operation in everything," he asked, "the submission of all possible questions

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to arbitration with the force of the Governments of the world behind it—how far is that to go? Is it to include the Monroe Doctrine? Is it to include the sovereign right to admit and exclude whomever we please from immigration to this country? Where is the line to be drawn?" With increased doubts, he concluded his speech the following day, saying that "an approval of the Note in this general form carries approval, of course, and without limitation, of the principle of general co-operation with European Powers in the affairs not only of Europe but of America." To abandon our traditional policy, "to take this leap in the dark," after only hasty and brief debate, he declared to be "the height of unwisdom."

Senator J. H. Lewis, of Illinois, the Administration's chief spokesman on foreign affairs in the Upper Chamber, replied at great length in a rhetorical speech running over two sessions. He somewhat subtly insisted that the resolution signified merely approval of the action of the President in sending the Note, and in no degree implied any endorsement whatsoever of its contents, either in whole or in part. Although freely stating his approval of all its contents, he treated the action of the President entirely as a peace move pure and simple. He voiced the very general desire in the United States for the early restoration of peace, basing it partly on humanitarian grounds and partly on those of self-interest. He confidently predicted that the war could not continue without the United States "being involved in the conflict." He maintained that Secretary Lansing's "nearing the verge of war" explanation of the Note was the correct interpretation and that "no amount of logic for pacification would avail when America is again aroused to an offence deliberately done her." In concluding, he referred to Senator Lodge's criticisms of the President's offer to join a peace league and claimed that the President's words had been entirely misunderstood. According to him, the President's statement that the United States was ready to do all in its power to aid in the protection

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of smaller nations meant no departure from traditional policy and implied nothing more concrete than such sympathy as had in the past been shown to struggling peoples.

After this strange misinterpretation of the Note, Senator Borah, of Idaho, a leading Republican of the progressive wing, took the floor and devoted his exclusive attention to the proposed league of nations. He pointed out that this Note initiated a radically new foreign policy, and that the endorsement of the Note by the Senate and House would mean a confirmation of this policy. Furthermore, he said, the Senate would not be entirely free to reject a treaty embodying a policy that it had already sanctioned. It should be noted that Senator Borah based his remarks upon the plan elaborated by the League to Enforce Peace organisation. But as he conceived this plan to be one of compulsory arbitration with enforcement of the judgment, his criticisms largely overshot the mark. Whether much less than his hypothetical target would avail for an effective international sanction is, however, a point that merits the most serious consideration.

The gravamen of Senator Borah's criticism is that entrance into the proposed league would project the United States into the storm-centre of European politics and would invite Europe to interfere in America. He cited a possible instance in which, assuming that the arbitration was compulsory, the United States might be called upon to join with Europe in coercing Argentina. He then took as an illustration a possible dispute between Russia and Japan about Manchuria, and premised that the former country had refused a hearing and had moved her troops into the disputed territory. Under the league plan, the United States would be bound to join its fellow-members against the aggressor. But, Senator Borah asked: "Regardless of whether it was Russia or Japan, would we brave our way across the ocean to shed a nation's blood in a war in which we had only the most general concern?" This,

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he continued, is a government of the people, and they would first have to be consulted. "The people would have to do the fighting, and fortunately they also do the voting."

Proceeding to another illustration, he assumed that Mexico and Japan, both members of the suggested league, had negotiated a lease of Magdalena Bay to the latter country. "Would the United States," came then the query with a negative answer presupposed, "submit that question to a tribunal where it has but one vote or voice?" Accordingly he insisted that the issue be met fairly and squarely. If the Democratic majority in the Senate favoured entrance into the projected league, then that issue will be met; otherwise, let it be eliminated in an unmistakable way from the resolution under consideration. "I want you to take the responsibility or renounce it."

The challenge was not taken up. An amended resolution to the effect that the Senate approves of the President's request to the belligerent nations to "state the terms upon which peace might be discussed" was accepted by Senator Hitchcock in lieu of the original resolution. It was also acceptable to Senator Borah, who made no further speech. Before this was voted upon, a substitute resolution from the Republican leader, Senator Gallinger, to the effect that the Senate, in the interests of humanity and civilisation, sincerely hopes for the early consummation of "a just and permanent peace" had to be disposed of. After this substitute had been defeated by a vote of 36 to 27, Senator Hitchcock's modified resolution was passed by a vote of 48 to 17.

This debate demonstrates clearly the formidable obstacles that are in the way of an acceptance of President Wilson's proposal. It is true that the Senate did not pass judgment directly on the question. The Democratic majority, however, declined the challenge and no voice was raised in direct support of the project. While the decision, such as it was, is by no means irrevocable, it means a distinct setback for the movement. On the other hand,

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this debate has brought the plan before the public eye and has led to a more general discussion of its merits and drawbacks than could have been created by the propaganda of even the most active of private organisations. The general tone of the Press is, however, far from encouraging to those who favour the plan. It would be the height of sanguine folly to ignore this. Unquestionably it is not President Wilson but Senator Borah who voices the preponderant American opinion of the day. The opinion of the future is largely conjectural. At the very least the interval between the two cannot be short, unless the United States is forced into the war and is in this way brought to a concrete realisation of the perils of the existing international anarchy. Otherwise the process of changing deeply rooted opinions is slow. *Natura non facit saltum.*

New York. January, 1917.

POSTSCRIPT

ON January 22, after the foregoing was written, President Wilson had recourse to the extraordinary expedient of explaining his views to the world and to America by means of an address to the Senate. Herein he stated that in any discussion of the future peace it is taken for granted that its establishment must be followed "by some definite concert of power," which will prevent a recurrence of any such catastrophic war. "It is inconceivable," he added, "that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise." They cannot, in honour, withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged, namely, "to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world." But the Government would not feel justified in asking the American people "to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace," except under certain conditions. Peace must first be concluded; and, while the United States is to have no voice in determining its terms, upon their nature will depend America's willingness to enter a league for peace. The peace that is created must be worth guaranteeing and preserving. After explicitly stating that no American Government would place any obstacle in

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the way of any terms that the belligerents might agree upon, President Wilson defined the character of the peace that would enlist America's support as one of its guarantors. It will have to be based upon the following principles: (1) It must be a peace without victory, that is, not a peace forced by a victor upon a loser, leaving a legacy of resentment, "for only a peace between equals can last." (2) It must be based upon a recognition of the equality of rights of all States, great and small. "Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend." (3) No peace can, or ought to, last which does not recognise "that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." As an illustration, the case of Poland was cited and the statement was made that statesmen everywhere agreed "that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own." (4) So far as is practicable, every great people "should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea," either by cession of territory or "by the neutralisation of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself." (5) The seas must be free "in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind." (6) There must be a limitation of armaments, both naval and military.

In conclusion, President Wilson claimed that his proposal was no breach in America's traditional policy. "I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world—that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful." In future all nations should avoid entangling alliances for a "concert of power."

In general, this address is in harmony both with the principles outlined in the Allied Note of January 10 to President Wilson and with those also of Mr. Balfour's supplementary Note of January 13. It is, furthermore, in accord with the Tzar's declaration of December 25, 1916, designating as one of the Russian aims "the creation of a free Poland from all three of her now incomplete tribal districts." Whether the "free" of the one statement is equivalent to the "independent" of the other is not clear, but both agree upon "united" and "autonomous." The only divergence is suggested by the characteristically unfortunate use of the unnecessary and

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elastic phrase, "peace without victory," but even here the disagreement is probably more apparent than real. It is difficult to see how "the aggressive aims and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples," to use Mr. Balfour's words, unless there is a consciousness of defeat. Peace without victory does not, however, preclude a victorious war, but only its usual consequences. Finally, the significance of the clause about the freedom of the seas is not plain. For, under the league plan, there would be no neutrals to object to interference with their commerce, and it would be absurd to emasculate sea-power that is used under international mandate against the common foe of all. As contrasted with this general conformity with the aims of the Allies, the address is diametrically at variance with the fundamental political principles of the Central Empires, with their actual treatment of their subject populations, and with their aims in this war.

The address was to some extent directed to the belligerents, and it is for them to determine both the practicability of the suggestions offered and also their immediate importance. In addition, President Wilson's aim was to arouse the American people and the Senate to a realisation of the part their country is called upon to play if international right and justice are to be established on a firm foundation. It is but the second or third step on a path beset by many formidable obstacles, but one leading to a much-needed goal. (New York, January 23.)

METHODS OF ASCENDANCY

THE three following articles are intended to provide a concise and authoritative account of the methods by which the Governments of the Central European Alliance have attempted and are still attempting to impose their will on certain of the peoples in their power. It is in the light of such events as are there narrated that the war stands out most plainly in its essential character as a conflict between the ideals of force and of law, between tyranny and freedom. For the military league which now extends its rule of blood and iron from Zeebrugge to Bagdad is not a haphazard conjunction of forces, nor yet a purely artificial system constructed by the statesmen at Berlin to serve the aims, economic and political, of German expansion and aggrandisement. Just as in the past history of Europe such alliances were knit together by a common religion or a common dynastic interest, so this alliance, widely different though its members are in many ways, is knit together by a community of political circumstance and political creed. The common circumstance is that the State over which each of the allied Governments rules is not a homogeneous national state : in other words, the population controlled by each contains several nations or parts of nations. The common political creed is that those elements of the population which are not of the same nationality as their rulers have no right to preserve their national characteristics ; that there is only room for one nation in one state—the nation of its rulers ; and that into this dominant type those alien elements must be absorbed

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or assimilated. "You are Germans now," the Kaiser used to say to his Polish recruits; "forget that you were Poles." That in its essence is the doctrine of ascendancy to which all the Governments of the Central European League subscribe.

What the doctrine of ascendancy means in practice is written on page after page of the world's history. It is an unvarying record of tyranny and suffering. For men do not willingly forego their national heritage; nor can they lightly, at an alien ruler's bidding, discard the language or the faith of their fathers and assume the trappings of a strange *Kultur*; and so the exponents of ascendancy must needs try to get by force what they cannot get by favour. The method they adopt is simply a question of degree. The expropriation of native land-owners in Posen, the suppression of the Danish language in school and church in Schleswig, the maintenance of a perpetual garrison-regime in Alsace, the elimination of any but the Magyar tongue in education, law and government in Hungary, the periodical massacre of Armenians—all these are variations on a single theme. And, having been driven by their doctrine to adopt these methods as their normal policy in peace time, the rulers of the Central European League have perforce applied them with ever-increasing severity under the strain of war. More than that, they have extended them, logically enough, beyond their own territorial borders. From denying freedom and justice to the small nations within, it is but a short step to denying freedom and justice to the small States without. Neither have any "rights" against the "might" of the ascendant Power; in neither case does it recognise any law but its own needs; and the sufferings which Belgium or Serbia have endured at the hands of the invader are the sufferings which his subjects have long endured, sharpened and envenomed by the "necessities" of war.

It is to save Europe and the world from the exponents

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of this doctrine and the methods it compels them to employ that we are fighting. In their Note of January 10 the Allies declared it to be their aim to secure a reorganisation of Europe "based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great." Similarly, in his speech to the Senate on January 22, President Wilson announced that the only peace he could approve of must be founded on "an equality of rights" between "big nations and small" and on "the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed."

It may be said—it has been said already by the German Government—that in declaring ourselves the champions of free nationality we are once more revealing our special vice of hypocrisy. "Look at the beam in your own eye," they say. "Remember the wrongs of Ireland, before you presume to talk of liberating continental nationalities from foreign domination." We do not need such counsel. We cannot, if we would, forget the wrongs of Ireland. The memory of those wrongs in the hearts of so many Irishmen all the world over is a perpetual source of suspicion, misunderstanding, recrimination, a constant hindrance to the unity and strength of the British Commonwealth. But the wrongs that are thus unhappily remembered are not of our time. They lie buried in the ages to which they belonged, and with them lie buried the standards of political morality of which they were the outcome. The reign of violence in Ireland dates back to the seventeenth century and before it. The oppression of Irish nationality ceased with the abrogation of the Penal Laws in the eighteenth century and the emancipation of the Roman Catholics in 1829. It is, indeed, precisely our quarrel with Prussian militarism to-day that, while the progressive peoples of Europe have long abandoned the methods of ascendancy, its exponents still uphold the standards of the distant past, still preach and practise

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the doctrines of the *ancien régime*, still follow in the reign of William II. the ways they followed in the reign of Frederick the Great. At the root of this war and all its horrors lies the fact that the Prussian system is an anachronism in the modern world.

We can fairly claim on our part to have long since discarded those old-world ways in Ireland. For generations past there has been no comparison between Prussian methods and our own. While the Prussian Government was expropriating land in German Poland in order to settle Prussians upon it, the British Government was expropriating land in Ireland in order to settle Irishmen upon it. While the Prussian Government was prohibiting the teaching of the Polish language and penalising its use, the British Government was subsidising the teaching of Erse in Irish schools. No Englishman nowadays wishes to "Anglicise" the Irish as the Prussians wish to "Prussianise" the Poles. And, finally, while the Prussians still stubbornly decline to grant the Poles in Prussia the elements of local autonomy, a Home Rule Bill for Ireland is now on the British Statute Book, and Home Rule of some sort is the accepted policy of all British parties. The only obstacle that now stands in the way of its realisation is not to be found in England or in Scotland, but in the differences among the Irish people themselves.

Mistakes, hesitations, distrust, failures to think out the real difficulties and to face them boldly, these there have been right up to our own time ; and therein lies the reason, as every thoughtful Englishman regretfully admits, why we have failed to undo the past, to banish those persistent memories, to win over the great majority of the Irish people to a whole-hearted co-operation with ourselves for the general welfare of the British Commonwealth. But there is nothing in the history of our relations with Ireland for the last fifty years and more* which compares

* See *Ireland in the Last Fifty Years*, by Ernest Barker.

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for a moment with the record contained in the following pages.

The first two articles have been contributed by individuals who belong by birth and citizenship to the countries they speak of and are eminent in their intellectual life. In its leading features, at least, the story they tell is only too familiar ; but familiarity is apt to breed indifference ; and, if the Allied peoples are to nerve themselves for the effort needed to overthrow the Prussian system, they will do well to reconsider what the continuance of the Prussian system in power and prestige actually means, what, as a matter of fact, is the price in blood and tears which has been paid, is now being paid, and must always inevitably be paid for the carrying into practice of its fundamental doctrine.

I. BELGIUM

THE existence of Belgium as an autonomous and independent State dates from 1830. But, if we consider the country as a political combination of different provinces and principalities, we must carry its origin back to the fifteenth century. It was then that the Dukes of Burgundy, heirs and successors of the earlier dukes and counts in Flanders and Lotharingia, effected the territorial concentration of all the Belgian provinces and created the central political institutions which are the expression of a politically recognisable State.

And the political unity of Belgium has been emphasised and strengthened since the Burgundian period by the common efforts of the Belgian people to preserve the institutions which united them. Again and again they have defended their liberties against the attempts of foreigners to undermine them, even if the foreigner was by inheritance or succession their own national prince. The revolt against Philip II of Spain in the sixteenth century, the

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struggle against Joseph II of Austria in the eighteenth century, the revolution against William I of Holland in 1830—here lies the record and the proof of the historic determination of the Belgian people to preserve its freedom.

It is this common tradition which above all has made the Belgian State a Belgian nation also. It has been asked whether, indeed, a Belgian nation exists or whether it existed before 1830. It may be replied that the Belgian nation existed not only before 1830, but before the Belgian State created in the fifteenth century. The Belgian nation is the product of the union of two racial stocks—the Flemings and Walloons; and ever since their first appearance, when the Gallo-Romans and the Frankish invaders intermingled in the fifth century, the Flemings and Walloons have lived side by side in the same political and ecclesiastical communities. The county of Flanders includes within its mediæval boundaries men of both races, and it is the same in Lotharingia. The Church, similarly, takes no account whatever of the racial or linguistic frontier that runs from East to West; in the diocese of Liège as in those of Tournai and Cambrai, Flemings and Walloons come to pray and to worship in the same religious centres. From the Middle Ages onward, both races have been subjected to the same laws, have had the same political, religious and economic institutions; but the strongest tie between them has been their common historical tradition. They have fought and suffered together in the defence of their freedom.

Such was the State and the nation which Germany attacked in 1914: and such the tradition of unity and freedom she has tried since then to break. We will now attempt to describe, in summary form, the methods she has adopted to that end.

The familiar story of the invasion and occupation of Belgium may be very briefly told. When Germany invaded

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Belgium, she did not expect the country to resist in earnest.* But Liège dispersed any such illusion; and, on August 9, when the guns of the Liège forts were still thundering, although the town itself had been taken, the German Government offered Belgium to come to an agreement and bade the King and the Government "to spare the country the Horrors of War."† Belgium replied by a flat refusal. Then the "Horrors of War" were let loose. The Belgian Government was informed through a diplomatic channel that henceforth the war would assume "a gruesome character." (*einen grausamen Character*).‡

The system of deliberately committed atrocities, already applied during the fight around the Liège forts, was continued with unabated fury. On August 19, it is Aerschot, with 150 civilians shot and 386 homes destroyed; on the 21st it is Liège, with 29 civilians killed and 55 houses set on fire; on the 21st-22nd it is Tamines, with 350 to 400 victims and 276 houses damaged; on the 22nd-23rd it is Andenne and Seilles, with about 300 people killed and 190 houses burnt; on the 23rd it is Dinant, with 606 civilians slaughtered and 1,263 houses destroyed; on the 25th it is Namur, with 75 people killed and 119 houses set on fire; and finally there comes Louvain, sacked from August 25 to September 2, with a balance sheet of 210 civilians killed in the town and suburbs and 1,120 houses destroyed in Louvain itself. The series is concluded on September 4-6 by the wanton destruction of the open town of Termonde.§

Murder, arson, pillage, took place in 114 places in the diocese of Namur, in 17 places in the diocese of Liège, in 91 places in the diocese of Malines.||

* See the report of Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister in Berlin, on his last meeting with Herr von Jagow, in the *Second Belgian Grey Book*, No. 51.

† *First Belgian Grey Book*, Nos. 60 and 62.

‡ E. Waxweiler, *La Belgique Neutre et Loyale*, p. 198, Paris, 1915; G. Somville, *Vers Liège*, p. 14, Paris, 1915.

§ More than 5,000 civilians were killed during the invasion, among them a large number of women and children.

|| Letter of the Belgian Bishops to the Bishops of Germany and Austria-Hungary, November 24, 1915, Annexe III.

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Meanwhile the most crushing requisitions were imposed; and, contrary to the Hague conventions, these requisitions, far from being applied to meet the needs of the army of occupation, went to increase the wealth of Germany itself. Dr. Rathenau, president of the *Allgemeine Electricitäts-Gesellschaft*, appointed by General von Falkenhayn at the beginning of the war to the Department for Raw Materials at the Berlin Ministry for War, established a scheme whereby the occupied territories were to be stripped of their raw materials, machinery, tools and manufactured goods for the benefit of the German Empire.

What was the result of such a policy of spoliation may be gathered from the fact that by the requisitions in Belgium and Northern France Germany added to her economic resources, up to February, 1915, from 3,500,000 to 4,000,000 marks a day. According to Dr. L. Ganghofer, an intimate friend of the Kaiser, a real "economic war" was waged against Belgium in order to crush her industrially for the benefit of the German workshops. By February, 1915, already far more than 16,000,000 francs worth of machinery had been taken away; and a large amount of raw materials and manufactured articles had been seized and sent to Germany, the whole operation being carried out under the supervision of German civilians, assisted by military detachments. Agriculture, meanwhile, was ruined by the carrying away of draught horses and breeding horses, the requisition of the rolling stock of the light railways, and the consequent lack of transport. On the whole the invaders removed from Belgium agricultural and industrial produce to the value of £200,000,000.*

How can all this be reconciled with the programme of administration which the first Governor-General in Belgium, Baron von der Goltz, laid down in his inaugural proclamation of September 2, 1914?

* Cf. Léon Van der Essen, "Germany's Latest Crime," in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1917, p. 189. See the picture given by a German himself in *Volkswirtschaftliche Betrachtungen ueber Belgien*, by Dr. CURT CALMON, Berlin, 1915.

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At that time, the period of invasion being considered as having come to a close and Brussels being already in German hands, a provisional Government was established by the Germans in Belgium, comprising both a military and civil staff, with its seat at Brussels. On the assumption of his office von der Goltz told the people of Brussels in the aforesaid proclamation :

Every resistance against the German administration will be repressed without pity. It is the dire necessity of war that the punishment of hostile acts shall strike not only the guilty, but the innocent also. . . .

Belgian citizens who are willing to go on peacefully with their occupations have nothing to fear from the troops or from the German authorities. As far as it is possible, commerce will have to be resumed, factories to be set to work again, the harvest to be reaped and brought in.

And the manifesto concluded :

BELGIAN CITIZENS !

I ask no one to renounce his feelings of patriotism, but I expect from you all a reasonable submission and an absolute obedience to the orders of the General Government.

As regards the resumption of commerce and the running of the factories, we have already stated how far the execution of the promise differed from the promise itself. It was precisely the same with other matters. "Feelings of patriotism" were no more respected than commerce and industry were promoted. The Belgian flag—so the people were told*—was regarded by the German troops as a "provocation," and had to be taken away: and this was followed by the prohibition of the display of the Belgian colours in the provinces. German policemen entered shops where the colours were displayed and had them removed. Soon the wearing of tricolour rosettes was forbidden by the Governor of Namur, under a penalty of 500 francs. The

* Proclamation by Baron von Lüttwitz, Military Governor of Brussels, September 16, 1914.

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interpretation put on these measures by certain subordinates was shown by a non-commissioned officer on Sunday, February 14, 1915, at Saint-Gilles. This man brutally snatched away the flag which covered the coffin of a Belgian soldier as it was being conveyed to the cemetery. The Belgian colours found their last refuge in the churches, where they were prominently displayed on the King's Fête Day and the Belgian Independence Day. The Belgian national anthem, the "Brabançonne," shared the fate of the Belgian colours.

Having removed by their decrees all the emblems of patriotism, the German authorities in Belgium believed that the people would submit easily to the arbitrary measures which they intended to impose on them. They found to their surprise that, when the terror produced by the wholesale massacres and incendiarism of August, 1914, had little by little disappeared, the people were as much determined as ever to assert their rights in face of the invader. The German authorities met with resistance from every quarter—from the municipalities, the courts of justice and the Order of Barristers, the State officials, the workmen, the priests, the university professors, the men of letters. Quite characteristic was their disregard for the rights of the municipal authorities. The Belgian Government having been compelled to take refuge in France, the invaders found themselves in touch only with the local authorities—the burgomasters, aldermen and councillors of the cities. It is a well established fact that nowhere is the communal spirit, the spirit of autonomy inherited from the mediæval Communes, stronger than it is in Belgium. The communes have always been the centre of public life in the course of Belgian history and the backbone of resistance to the foreign invader.* That spirit was incarnate in Burgomaster Max. He met the high-handed measures of the German authorities with firmness and

* Cf. Henri Pirenne, *Belgian Democracy*, Manchester, 1915 (English translation of *Les démocraties anciennes des Pays-Bas*, Paris, 1910).

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dignity. He preached submission to the exigencies of the invader when the interests of his administration required it, but he stood out with unflinching courage when these same interests were threatened. When the military governor of Liège had posters placarded on the walls of that town, asserting that Max had declared that France was unable to help Belgium, Max immediately replied by a poster signed by himself wherein he said: "I oppose to that assertion the most categorical denial." When von Lüttwitz demanded the removal of the Belgian flag, Max urged his fellow-citizens to obey, adding: "Let us accept provisionally the sacrifices imposed on us, let us take away our flags to avoid a conflict, and let us wait patiently till the hour of reparation." All this was too much for the German authorities: Burgomaster Max was arrested and condemned without a trial to confinement in a German fortress. He is still there, and he does not even know to-day the legal reason for his exile.*

Max's example has not been lost upon his fellow-countrymen. When the Belgian deportations were about to begin, most of the burgomasters and communal authorities refused to communicate the required lists of unemployed. The municipal authorities of Tournai, having pointed out to the "Etappen Kommandant" that their duty was to resist such orders, were told by this German officer † that "the fact that the municipality allow themselves to oppose the orders of the military authorities in the occupied country constitutes an act of arrogance without precedent. . . . The state of affairs clearly and simply is this: *The military authority commands, the municipality has to obey.*" The methods of German occupation in a nutshell! Is it, then, to be wondered at that the list of municipalities punished by a heavy fine for "disobedience" or for some act committed

* For having made complaints to the attaché of the Spanish Embassy during a visit to Celle-Schloss, M. Max was punished with four days' solitary confinement.

† Major-General Hopfer.

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by one of the townspeople in accordance with the German principle of collective penalty is growing longer day by day?*

An authority who wants everybody to obey when it commands, even if its commands are unlawful, was bound to come into conflict with the Belgian Courts of Justice, the Magistrates and the Order of Barristers. How the representatives of justice were treated by the German authorities appears clearly enough from a speech made by M. Léon Théodor, bâtonnier of the Brussels Order of Barristers. Dealing with the abuses of the legislative power and the creation of extra-legal jurisdictions by the Germans, M. Théodor said in March, 1915 :

The German decrees of the 3rd and 10th February, 1915† have barred all hope of a definite understanding. They are more than legislative acts ; they clearly mark intentions about the nature of which there can be no possible mistake. They are the first sapping of our judicial institutions, they are the first step on the road to the usurpation of the Belgian juridical power by the power in occupation ; they strike at the roots of our rights and prerogatives ; they have wounded us in the heart. To keep silent and look on would be an act of abdication on our own part, an act of treason towards our country ; it would be also a violation of our oaths.‡

On April 17, 1915, the Procureur du Roi at Brussels pronounced the unlawfulness of the German decrees, and in May the first chamber of the Civil Tribunal of Brussels decided not to submit to the new legislation. Moreover, in a letter addressed to Governor von Bissing in the name of the Council of the Order of Barristers attached to the Court of Appeal at Brussels, M. Théodor said : “ Considering the state of things as a whole, without passion and

* The following are some details of the fines arbitrarily imposed on Belgian towns : Brussels, 1,000,000 fr. (in 1916) ; Alost, 100,000 fr. ; Termonde, 50,000 fr. ; St. Nicholas, Lokeren and Eecloo, each 25,000 fr. ; Deynze, 50,000 fr. ; Bruges, 400,000 mk. ; Tournai, 200,000 mk. Up to the time of the Belgian deportations the total of the fines imposed on Belgian communes was estimated at 10,000,000 fr.

† Creating exceptional or extra-legal tribunals.

‡ See the full text of this document in *Le Correspondant* for May 10, 1915.

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without prejudice, the lawyers cannot but recognise that everything in the juridical organisation of the Germans in Belgium is contrary to the principles of law." He went on to explain that the principle of the publication of the law is ignored ; that the creation of German military tribunals has never been publicly made known ; that the penalties imposed by those tribunals have never been announced in their constituent features ; and that large numbers of people have been punished for acts which they did not know to be offences. "This absence of knowledge," says M. Théodor, "is not only the negation of every principle of law . . . it seems to be a permanent threat to all ; and the danger is the more real because these tribunals do not allow the defendant to be informed as to the evidence against him and because the right of defence is not assured to him." The main source of evidence is the secret police and the informers. Add the house-raiding, concludes M. Théodor, "and you have an almost complete picture of the moral tortures to which our aspirations, our thoughts, our liberties, are now subjected."

Such an attitude soon proved unendurable to the German authorities. Bâtonnier Théodor suffered the fate of Burgomaster Max. He was arrested and deported to Germany.*

Besides the communal authorities and the representatives of justice, the Germans have also tried to bully into submission the ecclesiastical authorities. The rebuke they received from the Archbishop of Malines, Cardinal Mercier, is universally known. The publication of his pastoral letter of Christmas, 1914, in which he spoke of the German atrocities and of Belgian patriotism, was received by the German authorities with hot anger. They arrested and fined the printer of the letter, and took steps to hamper the activities of the Cardinal even in purely religious matters. His liberty of speech as regards his relations with members

* Owing to ill-health, M. Théodor has recently been released and sent to Switzerland.

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of his own clergy was suppressed ; he was confined in his Palace from January 2 till January 4, 1915, and ordered to report on the text of his pastoral letter ; and he was prevented from going to Antwerp to discharge his episcopal functions. But the Cardinal was not to be subdued. In March, 1916, after his return from Rome, he published a Lenten pastoral, wherein he described the impression produced by the sufferings of Belgium on His Holiness the Pope. Thereupon, Von Bissing wrote to the Cardinal, accusing him of stirring up the people against the German authorities and threatening him in vague terms with arrest if he did not stop " political agitation."

The Germans have not dared to arrest Cardinal Mercier as they arrested Burgomaster Max and M. Théodor. But they have revenged themselves on the priests of the Belgian dioceses. A large number of them have been arrested, fined, and deported to Germany.*

The patriotism of the working class has been as high and as firm as that of any other. The inevitable result of Dr. Rathenau's policy of ransacking and emptying Belgium was the great unemployment : and this factor had not been omitted from the German calculations. The idea was that the Belgian unemployed should do work of a military character for the German army in Belgium. But, when the military authorities demanded the execution of such work, everywhere—at Ghent, at Luttre, at Malines, at Sweveghem, and at many other places—they met with flat refusal : the workmen preferred arrest and starvation rather than to help the enemy. That is the reason for the terrible deportations now going on. The workmen are being forcibly removed to districts where they can be more easily and

* See the document written on November 25, 1915, by the Abbé Bruynseels, delegate to Holland for Cardinal Mercier, which was published by all the Belgian papers outside Belgium under the title : *Le Kulturkampf en Belgique*. See also the Bishop of Namur's letter of June 15, 1916, to Governor von Bissing ; the text is to be found in *Cahiers documentaires*, published at Havre by the "Bureau documentaire belge," 6^e série livraison 51, pp. 14-16.

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safely compelled to do what they will never do of their own free will.*

One last device of German *Real-politik* remains to be described. We have tried to show how the various efforts of the invaders to dominate Belgium have been checked by the patriotic spirit of the Belgian nation. Forced to acknowledge to themselves the existence of this spirit, they have tried to destroy it by striking at the root of Belgian nationality itself. They have tried to break the age-long union of the Flemings and Walloons. Before the war there was a movement among the Flemings in favour of a Flemish university at Ghent. Governor von Bissing adopted this movement as his own, proclaimed the right of the Flemings to have their own university, and announced publicly that he was going to give them satisfaction. All that he succeeded in obtaining by this clever manœuvre was the separation of the Flemings, for the present, into two opposing camps: those who accept the gift from the invader and those who bluntly refuse it. Those who accept it are not the leaders of the Flemish movement and the number of the signatures appended to their two manifestoes is but 171 in all. Let us compare this with the number of signatures on the manifestoes, which, before the war, asked for a Flemish University from the *Belgian* Government; they numbered 100,000.

All the Flemish leaders outside Belgium, who can freely express themselves, have rejected with scorn the offer of the German usurper: and even in occupied Belgium a large number of prominent Flemings have been courageous enough to sign a protest, wherein they say to von Bissing:

How would history judge us Flemings if, at a moment when our soldiers are still fighting against your soldiers in the trenches, we were willing to accept from the hand of the conqueror any benefit whatever, even if that benefit would seem to repair a previous injustice? We belong to a race who in the past have always wished to manage their own affairs themselves in their own land.

* For the evidence see L. Van der Essen, "Germany's Latest Crime," in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1917, p. 189.

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The German scheme, then, has failed. Nevertheless, despite the rebuke of the overwhelming mass of the Flemings, Governor von Bissing came to Ghent, on October 21 last, to open the "Flemish" University. He made an inaugural speech, ending with the words—"*The God of War has, with His drawn sword, stood godfather to the University May the God of Peace bless it for centuries to come.*" *

It so happened that, as von Bissing's *cortège* was crossing the streets of Ghent, it met suddenly a group of Flemish labourers, who were being led off to deportation surrounded by German soldiers. The words and deeds of German policy towards the Flemish people go ill together.

II. BOHEMIA

THE position which Bohemia occupies in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is best set forth in the following extract from a manifesto issued by the Tchecho-Slovak National Council on November 14, 1915 :—

The Bohemian nation, by the free election of a king of the Habsburg family, united itself in federal union with German-Austria and with Hungary : but the dynasty, following a policy of Centralisation and Germanisation, built up a unified Absolutist state, thus breaking its pledges and violating the independence of the Bohemian State. Weakened by the Habsburg Counter-reformation, the Bohemian nation was unable effectively to oppose this infringement of its rights, until its revival at the end of the eighteenth century, and, more especially, after the revolution of 1848. When the 1848 movement had once been quelled, the rights of the Austrian nations and particularly of Bohemia, were once more sacrificed to Absolutism. After 1866, Vienna surrendered to the Magyars : Bohemia had to rest content with solemn but futile promises. The Bohemians at first adopted an attitude of passive opposition, but later took an active part in the new Parliament, standing up both there and in the Diets for the historic rights of the Bohemian state and the substitution of Federalism for the

* The "Flemish" University contains only some 90 students, Turks and Bulgars among them.

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German-Magyar Dual System. The various attempts at an understanding were frustrated by the ascendancy policy of the Germans and Magyars.

Austria entered upon the present war without the sanction of Parliament. In all the other belligerent States the decision for war was laid before their respective Parliaments ; the Viennese Government alone was afraid to hear the voice of the constituent nations, because the majority of them would have been in opposition to war. The representatives of Bohemia would certainly have protested most energetically, and for that reason the Government did not consult a single Bohemian representative or politician before taking the fatal step. In modern times the Bohemian nation has always upheld an outspoken Slav programme ; and in the present war, which found our nation, like all peace-loving nations, unprepared, the sympathies of the Bohemian lands were from the outset definitely in favour of Russia, Serbia and their Allies, despite the gross terrorism with which every manifestation of the people's real opinions was met. Demonstrations in favour of Austria were actually enforced by the Government. To-day the leading politicians languish in prison, the gallows have become the buttress of an incapable administration, and the Bohemian regiments are decimated, because they have spontaneously acted in accordance with the national programme. The rights of the Bohemian language have been restricted and curtailed during the war. The military, with their absolutist tendencies, treat the non-German and non-Magyar lands as enemy countries. . . .

Hitherto all the Bohemian political parties have striven for national independence within the bounds of Austria-Hungary. The course of this fratricidal war and the intolerable acts of violence committed by Vienna force us to repudiate all connection with Austria-Hungary. She has degenerated into a mere instrument of German ambitions in the East. She has no positive aim of her own, and is quite incapable of creating an organic state composed of nations enjoying equal national rights and free to develop their own culture on progressive lines.

What follows can be little more than a commentary on the above text.

It was obvious from the first that the Bohemian people were absolutely opposed to the war and the official Austro-Hungarian policy. The first signs of this general feeling were of a seemingly inoffensive kind. In the railway carriages in which our soldiers travelled to the Serbian or Russian fronts inscriptions were stuck up in Tchech, such as : " Export of fresh Bohemian meat to Serbia

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(Russia).” Bohemian regiments, when called to the colours, brought their own Bohemian and Slav flags : rumours of riots in barracks were afloat, and soon one heard of many cases of insubordination and of severe punishment : it was even reported that reluctant soldiers had been shot.

It was very difficult to verify such rumours, because the country was placed under martial law, and communication became more and more difficult. It will be remembered that the Central Parliament of Austria had been dismissed in April, 1914. Since the war broke out the army chiefs have been omnipotent throughout the Monarchy. Only Vienna, being the residence of the Emperor, and Budapest as the Magyar capital, have enjoyed some freedom : throughout the rest of the Monarchy absolutism reigns unchecked. “Every corporal is more powerful than a minister” was the saying of an influential member of the Government. Martial law was proclaimed and severely enforced, and all public meetings were suspended. The political parties came to exist only in name, because they were not allowed to do their political work. General distrust pervaded the country. The activities of the secret police soon made themselves felt : Prague and the whole of Bohemia were infested with spies. The papers were not allowed to express their opinions : the military authorities simply dictated what was to be published. The Austrian censor was much more severe than the German. In Prague, for instance, no foreign newspapers were procurable, and even papers appearing in Germany were often confiscated.

The situation rapidly became intolerable and dangerous. M. Klofatch (leader of the National Socialist Party and a well-known Slavophile) and some other public men were thrown into prison. The authorities were especially afraid of Panslav and Russophile sentiment and made a point of displaying a special animus against Russia. When the first Russian prisoners were brought to Bohemia

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the public was forcibly prevented from communicating with them and every attempt to give the prisoners food or cigars was severely punished. In the hospitals in Prague, at the bedsides of wounded Russian soldiers, a sentry with fixed bayonet was posted, and remained on guard even during surgical operations.

None the less the Bohemians persisted in their anti-German attitude. Tchech regiments surrendered on every possible occasion, or declined to fight, although they knew quite well what punishment they had to expect. They were decimated, and it is not known how many thousands perished. The Austrian defeats in Galicia and in Serbia aggravated the situation in Bohemia. All independent papers were suppressed. The famous federation of gymnastic societies, the so-called Sokols, was also dissolved, the General Staff being afraid of an organisation which had branches all over the country. The railwaymen's federation met with the same fate, the desire being to isolate people and to suppress every kind of organisation in the country. Soon all the leading politicians were imprisoned. After a trial lasting some months, Dr. Kramarz, the well-known leader of the young Tchech Party, and several of his friends were sentenced to death, though the sentence was afterwards commuted to imprisonment with hard labour. Mr. Choc, the other influential leader of the National Socialist Party, was condemned to five years' imprisonment. The greatest living Tchech poet, Mr. Machar, was also put under arrest.

The spirit of the Government and of the ruling Germans and Magyars has been revealed by many acts of atrocity. It is to be hoped that current reports as to the number of people who have been condemned to death in Austria-Hungary are greatly exaggerated; but an official paper in Vienna, the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, has announced that up to December, 1915, there had been 1,045 civil executions in Bohemia and Moravia. These figures relate to civilians, but we have none regarding the decimation of

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Bohemian soldiers, and none for the civilians within the last year. Even at a moderate computation these would reach a very high total.

The Government has another no less effective form of punishment. Undesirable persons are drafted into the army. Whole provinces are punished in this way. The average percentage of recruiting up to the spring of 1916 is known to have been 14 per cent., or in round numbers one-seventh to one-eighth of the population. But in districts which the Government wished to punish—notably in Bohemia and Bosnia-Herzegovina—as large a proportion as one-fifth of the population has been called to the colours. In this way countries have been positively drained of able-bodied men and any active attempts at revolution forestalled.

Another method of punishment is the confiscation of property, which is applied even in the case of poor peasants and artisans. Instances of this method of terrorising the population are published daily in the press.

It is not yet possible to give a full account of what is going on in Bohemia and throughout Austria-Hungary, for the frontiers are hermetically sealed. But it has been found possible to obtain certain official documents, which confirm the above statements and throw a glaring light on the internal situation.

When Przemysl had fallen and the Russians were approaching Cracow the Austro-Hungarian Generalissimo, Archduke Frederick, sent on November 26, 1914, to the Ministry in Vienna an urgent warning against the Slavophile attitude of the population in the Bohemian countries (Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia). He denounced their sympathy for Russia, and declared that "they are having an intense and disastrous reaction on the army." The Archduke urged the abolition of the liberties granted by the constitution and the investment of the police and the military with full administrative powers, and, at the same time, asked the Emperor to invest him (as Generalissimo) with

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the power of political administration in the Bohemian countries. To these exorbitant demands Count Stürgkh replied on December 7, 1914, with the impressive warning that the programme of the Archduke would excite and exasperate the population. Count Stürgkh argued that the proposed measures were not necessary, since their aim could be achieved by means of the existing courts-martial. The Prime Minister said in so many words: "Never since the constitution has been in existence have the liberties of citizens been restricted to such a degree as has been the case since the outbreak of this war."

Still more revealing is the official summary of the facts on which the verdict against Dr. Kramarz and another deputy, Dr. Rashin, was based. From this voluminous document the following passages may be quoted:—

The verdict in the Court of First Instance established the fact that Dr. Kramarz, as leader of the pan-Slav propaganda in Bohemia and of the Tchech Russophil movement, acted against his own State both before and after the outbreak of war, by consciously co-operating with undertakings whose aims were the destruction of the Monarchy. Both in hostile and in neutral countries a far-reaching and organised revolutionary propaganda aiming at the destruction of our Monarchy by detaching from it Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, the Hungarian Slovakia and other districts inhabited by Slavs. . . .

The methods of propaganda were: the publication of newspapers almost exclusively devoted to the idea of separation (*La Nation Tchèque, l'Indépendance Tchèque, Cechoslovan, Cechoslovak*), of proclamational programmes and articles in other foreign papers; the formation of societies and committees to further these aims; the organisation of congresses (Prague, 1908 and 1912; Petrograd, 1909, etc.); and, finally, the organisation of legions of Tchech volunteers in Russia, France and England and their employment in foreign armies. Moreover, after the outbreak of war there arose a series of incidents in certain districts among parts of the Tchech population at home, such as not only indicated a pronounced feeling of hostility to the State, but were calculated to hamper very seriously the successful conduct of the war alike in military and economic matters.

The Court is convinced that it is to actions on the part of the accused that these regrettable incidents are to be traced which occurred during the war among a portion of the Tchech population

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and which have seriously hindered a successful conclusion of the war. In this connection special attention is drawn to the circulation of the treasonable Russian proclamation in Bohemia and Moravia ; to the expressions of sympathy for the enemy ; to the numerous criminal proceedings which it was unfortunately necessary to institute for political offences ; to the fact that, mainly owing to the action of Kramarz himself as a T'chech popular leader, the T'chech deputies at the beginning of the war omitted to give the declaration of loyalty which was intended by various Bohemian leaders ; and to the poor response of the T'chech population to the two first War Loans, to the collection of metals, and to the Red Cross collections. Actual events, such as the organisation and employment of T'chech volunteer corps by the enemy, the attitude of many T'chech prisoners abroad in defiance of duty and comradeship, the unreliability of the troops in individual regiments, which repeatedly allowed themselves to be taken prisoners by the enemy without any need, the gross excesses committed by individual T'chech troops against the interests of the State and military discipline, which had most regrettable results for our operations and which by the help they gave the enemy produced a demoralising effect—all this in the Court's opinion is the result of many years' agitation by Kramarz and Rasin. . . .

As an annexe to the above document the following official pronouncement was published by the Viennese newspapers :—

The above extracts from the verdict merely give in outline the picture of the whole anti-State organisation whose development and effects the trial had laid bare. Unpleasant as this picture may be, the trial has, on the other hand, proved that only a relatively small section of the T'chech people and of its leaders has fallen a victim to this criminal agitation. It would, therefore, be a mistake to hold the patriotic section of the T'chech people which sharply reprobates these manœuvres responsible for the deeply regrettable conditions on which the above throws light. And this all the more because a true leadership of the T'chech people is now being established in the earnest endeavour to win back the population as a whole to the Austrian State idea.

These documents speak for themselves ; but a few comments may be added for the benefit of British readers who are ignorant of Austrian political methods. The whole case is vitiated by false assertions and misrepresentations. The Panslav Congress at Prague in the year

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1908 is adduced, for instance, as proof of high treason ; and yet this Congress was held as a public meeting, with the sanction of the police, like all other political meetings and gatherings in Bohemia. Again, the authorities endeavour to represent the whole Slavophil movement in Austria as the effect of the personal agitation of Dr. Kramarz and his friends. That is the official Austrian version. The Austrian police and officials are incapable of understanding to what an extent national sentiment and ideas have become rooted in the whole political education of the nation. And the same blindness or deliberate affectation shows itself in the suggestion, repeated again and again in the Kramarz verdict, that the national movement in Bohemia is the work of an irresponsible minority. Such is obviously the meaning of the reference to the declaration of loyalty which the Government would evidently like to compel the Tchech Deputies to make. Loyal pronouncements have been made at the beginning of the war or during its course by almost all political parties in Austria ; the Tchechs alone have remained silent. The assertion that some of their leaders had intended to make a declaration is incorrect and incomplete. Only the quite insignificant clerical party of Moravia proposed such a declaration, and it was not Dr. Kramarz who prevented it. Such, again, is the inference intended to be drawn from the allusion, at the close of the official pronouncement, to the " true leadership " that is now to be established for the Bohemian nation. This is a reference to the Premier, Count Clam-Martinitz, and to the joint Foreign Minister, Count Czernin ; but these men represent, not the Bohemian nation, but rather the anti-Tchech policy of the Austrian official caste. The true leaders of the Bohemian nation are in prison or in exile.

And the falseness of these suggestions, the shallowness of the whole official case—that the anti-Austrian movement in Bohemia does not reflect the spirit and the purpose of the nation—is unconsciously betrayed by the official

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documents themselves. For they constitute one long confession of the attitude into which all Bohemian patriots have been forced by the policy and the methods of ascendancy at Vienna. They admit the "unpleasantness" of the picture: they admit the numerous criminal prosecutions: they admit the terrible losses of the Bohemian troops—though, indeed, they do not confess that these losses are the punishment of troops who are forced to fight at the most exposed points of the front. They even admit that "the population as a whole" requires to be "won back to the Austrian State idea." How then can they continue to suggest that the Bohemian people are loyal at heart and only need "true leadership" to accept the domination of the German-Magyar clique? How then can they doubt that "the Bohemian nation"—to quote again the manifesto cited at the beginning of this article—"has resolved to take its fate into its own hands?"

III. THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

OTTOMAN Ascendancy, which has overshadowed so many lands and peoples in Asia and Europe, sprang from small beginnings. Its founder was chief of a little troop of Turkish nomads who in the thirteenth century wandered into Asia Minor from Central Asia. The Turkish Sultans already established in the country let the wanderer carve himself out a camping place on their north-western marches—the hill country behind the Asiatic shores of the Sea of Marmora, looking down upon what was then a Greek coast belonging to the Byzantine Empire. The founder's son turned the camping-ground into a State, and, taking the name of Osman on his conversion from paganism to Islam, bequeathed it to his successors. The Osmanlis are those who have carried on what Osman began—and they have been faithful to his ideas. In less than three centuries they added to Osman's few square

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miles of hill-country till their territory stretched from Hungary and Algiers and the Crimea to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and they won the whole of it by military technique. The Osmanlis expanded because they had better drill, better artillery, better military roads than the peoples they overthrew; and they have staved off their extinction by becoming ready pupils of those who have surpassed them in the military art. They have borrowed from Prussia their ability to fight in the present war; the instinct for soldiering is the Osmanli's one and inalienable characteristic.

No other military State has ever so remorselessly exploited its human material. Prussia grew by the conscription of the conquered. The Silesians conquered from Austria in 1740 were drilled to fight against her in 1866; the Hanoverians conquered in 1866 were sent as *canonen-futter* against France in 1870; the Alsatians conquered in 1870 are manning the German trenches at Monastir and Pinsk. But the Osmanlis' system was Spartan. They did not take a mere toll of years from grown men's lives, but men's whole lives from infancy—a tribute of so many children from each subject Christian family, every so many years. These children were separated for ever from their families at the earliest possible age, educated in a military school as Moslems, and drafted into a standing army, fanatically devoted to their corps, to the Osmanli Sultan and to Islam, and with no other ties in the world. The Janissaries (or "New Model Army," as indeed they were) made the Ottoman conquests, and each fresh people they brought under the Ottoman domination became a fresh recruiting-ground. The Ottoman Empire spread with a disastrous momentum, engulfing free peoples and destroying well-grown States—the Byzantine Empire, which had preserved at Constantinople the heritage of ancient Greek civilisation; the young, vigorous kingdoms of Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Hungary; the Roumanian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia;

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the Albanian tribesmen ; the Greek and French and Italian lordships in the Ægean Islands and Peloponnesus. All these were overthrown by the Osmanlis in Europe, and in Asia their conquests were as thorough and as wide. They conquered impartially, not only Christians but Moslems, not only Moslems but Turks. Their bitterest enemies were the kindred Turkish States of Asia Minor, especially the Sultanate of Karaman in the heart of the peninsula. When they had overthrown Karaman, they conquered southward and eastward—Armenia and Mesopotamia from the Shahs of Persia, Syria and Egypt and the Holy Cities from the Mamelukes, lesser Armenia and Trebizond from their national Christian princes. Their hand was against every man's, and none whom they conquered became reconciled to their rule.

Ottoman policy towards conquered peoples has passed through three phases, all bad, but each worse than the last. The first phase may be called the policy of neglect, and Sultan Mohammed II., who conquered Constantinople in 1453 and organised what he and his predecessors since Osman had acquired, may stand as its author. This policy regarded the subject peoples simply as raw material for the production of Ottoman requirements—tribute in children and tribute in kind for the Osmanli Sultan's army, and peasant labour for the estates of the "beys" or feudal retainers whom the Sultans planted on the richest part of the conquered soil. Beyond these servitudes—which were as barbarically simple as Ottoman militarism itself—the Ottoman Empire had no use for its subject peoples. They were beyond the Osmanli's social pale ; or, rather, they were not, in his eyes, even human, but "rayah"—cattle—who might foregather in any kind of herd they liked, so long as they submitted to be milked and slaughtered. Provided they remained docile, it was to the Osmanlis' interest that they should shepherd themselves, and Mohammed II. encouraged the formation of "millets," or subject national communities, within the Ottoman

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State. The "millets" (the most important of which were the Armenian and the Greek) were ostensibly ecclesiastical corporations. At the head of each there was a Patriarch and Council resident in Constantinople, who exercised authority over their nationality through a hierarchy of metropolitans, bishops and village priests. But there was little trace of religion in the institution.

The clergy were raised to power by the Osmanlis because they were the only corporate organisation in the subject peoples which Ottoman conquest had not destroyed. As the last national rallying point, they retained an influence over their countrymen which the Ottoman Government could not override, and, in return for the recognition of it they undertook to wield it as Ottoman officials. The Patriarchs of the "millets" were more than religious primates. The administration of civil law among their nationals was largely left in their hands, and their jurisdiction was supported by the force of the Ottoman State. In addition to this licensed measure of self-government there was much actual liberty among the Sultan's less accessible subjects— Islanders and bedouin and mountaineers. It has been said of this phase of Ottoman domination that countries and peoples prospered under it in proportion to their neglect by the Ottoman Government, and it is certainly true that all the good that has come out of the territory painted Ottoman on the map, since and so long as this territory has been in Ottoman power, has come in spite of, and never through the agency of, the Ottoman Government, and would have been infinitely greater if that Government had never expanded from its original restricted seat.

The only merits, then, of Ottoman policy in this first phase were its indifference and neglect, which gave its subjects liberty to prosper if they could. But this phase only lasted while the Osmanlis were a conquering power, and their military machine, like every other that has ever been made, had a limited span of vitality. The invincible

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Janissaries sank first into a hereditary militia, then into a privileged shopkeeping class. Their privileges were for their sons, and new Christian recruits became unwelcome interlopers. In the seventeenth century the tribute of children was abandoned, through the jealousy of the Janissaries themselves, not through the humanitarianism of the Ottoman Government. The military basis of Ottoman domination was sapped, and during the next two centuries the Ottoman territory shrank almost as rapidly as it had expanded before. A good government would have arrested dissolution by making life worth living for the subject peoples within the Ottoman frontiers, and so giving them a positive interest in the preservation of the Ottoman State. It would have granted fuller self-government to the "millets," more unrestricted freedom to the islanders and bedouin and mountaineers. It would have enlisted the warlike qualities of the Albanians, the seamanship of the Greeks, the horsemanship of the Arabs, the business ability of the Syrians, Armenians and Jews, the industry of the Bulgarian and Anatolian peasantry, and would have drawn all these elements together into a national state. Such things were done by the governments—military, too, in their origin—which created England and France. But between the Osmanlis and those they had conquered a great gulf remained, which the Osmanlis never attempted to bridge. As the Osmanlis were beaten in war, their subject peoples broke away—some to find a better life under other States, some to found new national States of their own, but all outside the Ottoman dominion, and only at the expense of its territorial integrity. Instead of conciliating their subjects, the Osmanlis began to feel that they could no longer afford to leave them the liberty they had allowed them in the past. The subject peoples must no longer be permitted to make the best of themselves; on the contrary, they must be made weaker and more wretched than they were. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the complete extinction of the

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Ottoman Empire was in sight, this feeling was framed into a new policy by Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid.

“Hamidianism” was the second phase of Ottoman domination. Starting with the absence of any impulse to build an Ottoman nationality, but facing the fact that, as Osmanli rule grew weaker, one subject people after another was awaking to a national life of its own, Abd-ul-Hamid decided to exploit these national movements within his Empire by turning them against one another. Instead of developing what was good in themselves, they should be egged on to maim and warp the development of their neighbours. All would thus be weakened more rapidly even than the Sultan’s own government, and he would be making the integrity of his territory secure as he made the inhabitants of it disillusioned and miserable.

Abd-ul-Hamid reigned from 1876 to 1908, and carried his policy out. He ruined the “millets”—not by erecting a Bulgarian Exarchate, which was a just and beneficial act in itself, but by granting this Exarchate jurisdiction over populations which the Greek Patriarchate had a right to consider its own. Bulgarian ambition was stimulated, Greek jealousy was aroused, and the two chief national bodies in the Osmanlis’ remaining Balkan territory were drawn into a fratricidal conflict, which absorbed their energies for evil instead of good. By about 1890, Greek and Bulgarian “bands” had been formed in Macedonia, which “converted” the Macedonian villagers from the Patriarchate to the Exarchate, or vice versa, and back again, by descending upon them alternately and terrorising or massacring all villagers who held to the opposite allegiance. The Osmanli gendarmerie did not suppress these bands. They contented themselves with burning village now and then—“for harbouring them,” though the bandsmen were the least welcome guests the villagers had ever received. As the anarchy and bloodshed in Macedonia grew worse, the free Balkan States were brought to the verge of war on behalf of their suffering fellow-

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countrymen, and the relations of the Great Powers were strained by the fear that a Balkan outbreak might upset the balance between them. And both these catastrophes occurred within a few years of Abd-ul-Hamid's deposition. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13, first of the Balkan League against the Ottoman Empire and then of the confederates against each other, were the direct fruit of Abd-ul-Hamid's policy; and the European War, so far as it was produced by Balkan causes, lies also at his door. This was the Macedonian policy of Abd-ul-Hamid, and it was perpetrated simply in order that certain territories in Europe, which the Osmanlis had no more right to govern than those from which they had been ejected already, should remain Ottoman on the political map.

The same bloodshed and anarchy, with the same purpose, were fomented by Abd-ul-Hamid wherever he ruled. Having set the Bulgars against the Greeks, he encouraged the Albanians to harry the Serbs. The Albanian tribesmen came down from their mountains and evicted the Serbian peasantry from their ancestral villages in the plains of Kossovo, while the Ottoman Government looked on, and the free Serbs beyond the frontier were unable to interfere. But the Sultan's chosen instruments were the Kurds—a race of mountain shepherds in the eastern Asiatic provinces, whom previous Sultans had tried to reduce to order, but whom Abd-ul-Hamid armed with modern rifles and organised into "Hamidian Gendarmerie" for use against the Armenians.

To rob and murder the Armenians was the service asked of the Kurds and the reward given them for it; and here, as in Macedonia, the policy produced bloodshed and anarchy after Abd-ul-Hamid's heart. The Armenians formed counter-organisations; some mountain communities broke into revolt. The Kurds were at once reinforced by Osmanli regulars, the fanaticism of the Turkish Mohammedans in Asia Minor was stirred up, and during the years 1896-7 there were massacres of Armenians from one end

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of the Empire to the other, culminating in a butchery in the streets of Constantinople. Before the Sultan had to yield to foreign indignation, he had killed enough Armenian men, women and children to weaken the Armenian nation for a generation ahead.

Abd-ul-Hamid was overthrown by a coalition of revolutionaries from two of the nations he misgoverned, the Anatolian Turks and the Salonica Jews, who controlled between them the army and finance. Under the name of the "Young Turkish Party" this cabal has ruled the Ottoman Empire since then. It is a secret committee, with branch committees affiliated to it in the chief towns of the Empire, and the Sultan, Ministry, Parliament and Bureaucracy which it has set up are all puppets in its hands. This secret committee—of "Union and Progress," as it styles itself—brought the Ottoman Empire into the European War, in order to obtain a free hand for a new policy of domination, which is the worst of all.

The first phase of Ottoman policy towards subject peoples was neglect, the Hamidian was attrition, but the Young Turkish phase is extermination, and the Young Turks are carrying it out at this moment by every means in their power.

They are "Nationalists," but they do not aim at turning the territory still marked Ottoman on the map into a national State, like Italy or France or Great Britain or the American Union—States in which all the inhabitants of the country are willing citizens with equal rights. That may figure in the Young Turkish programme, but it is too alien to the Osmanli tradition for any Ottoman Government to undertake it, even if the Hamidian phase had not gone before to make it impossible. The Young Turks know that no subject people will now remain under Ottoman dominion by choice; the problem is to fetter them under it by force. The Young Turkish motto is "Ottomanisation," which means that Turkish habits, education, religion, and, above

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all, language, are to be imposed upon every people within the Ottoman frontiers, and that those who cannot be coerced are to be eliminated.

This policy is borrowed from Central Europe, where for the last fifty years 60,000,000 Germans have been engaged in "Prussianising" about 6,000,000 Alsatians, Danes and Poles, and 10,000,000 Magyars more than their own number of Slovaks, Ruthenes, Roumanians and Southern Slavs. The Young Turks have set themselves to impose the nationality of 8,000,000 Turkish-speaking peasants in Anatolia upon almost twice as many people of other races, the majority of whom are their superiors in civilisation. In the "Report of Progress" submitted to the Young Turkish party congress in October, 1911, it was laid down that "Sooner or later, the complete Ottomanisation of all Turkish subjects must be carried out. It is clear, however," the report continued, "that this result can never be reached by persuasion, but that armed force will have to be resorted to. . . . The other nationalities must be denied the right of organisation, for decentralisation and autonomy are treason to the Turkish Empire. The nationalities are a *quantité négligeable*. They may keep their religion, but not their language."

The Ottoman Government emerged from the Balkan War of 1912-13 with a territory reduced to Thrace, Constantinople, the Straits, and the Provinces in Asia, and a population of between 20 and 25 millions (statistics are inexact). In this population there were about 8,000,000 Turks, nearly all living north of a line drawn from Alexandria to Van; 7,000,000 Arabs (Moslem or Christian) to the south of that line; 2,000,000 Armenians and 2,000,000 Greeks, scattered over the northern half of the Empire, the Greeks mostly to the west and the Armenians to the east; and from two to three million semi-independent hillmen—Kurds, Kizil-Bashis, Yezidis, Maronites, Druses, Nestorians, and others. Many of these races of the Empire were represented among the million or so inhabitants of

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Constantinople. About half of these inhabitants were Turks ; there were 150,000 Armenians and 150,000 Greeks ; a handful of Kurds and Arabs ; a strong colony of Jews, and an important foreign commercial population. Constantinople was, and remains, a cosmopolitan city.

This was the Young Turks' field for Ottomanisation. They have been dealing with it piece by piece. Between the end of the Balkan War and their intervention in the European War they dealt with Thrace, the only province left to them in Europe. In 1913 the population of Thrace was predominantly Greek, with a Turkish element round Adrianople and some Bulgarians in the mountains towards the north-east. A year later only Turks were left ; Greeks and Bulgarians had been driven out across the frontier, stripped of their property and their lands. If the Young Turks now claim Thrace as a purely Turkish country, it is well to know how and when it became so. The "Ottomanisation" of Thrace is the most conclusive argument for expelling the Ottoman Empire from Europe as "radically alien to Western civilisation."

At the same time the Young Turks began driving out the Greeks from the western coastlands of Asia Minor. They meant to "solve" their Greek problem altogether, and the kingdom of Greece was on the verge of a second war with the Ottoman Empire on this account when the European War supervened. As Allies of Germany the Young Turks, for reasons of common policy, had to give their Greek subjects a respite ; but, in compensation, they had a freer hand to settle with the other races than they had ever had before. There was no longer any need to stop at eviction and attrition ; they could massacre on an infinitely greater scale than Abd-ul-Hamid had ever dared to do, and no foreign Power could restrain them, so long as they had Germany's countenance and military support.

The Young Turks are using their opportunity. The extermination of the 2,000,000 Armenians is already an accomplished fact. About two-thirds of them were

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“deported”—men, women and children—hundreds of miles, for weeks on end, over roadless mountains, to the semi-tropical swamps and deserts on the Empire’s southern fringes. About half the exiles reached their destinations, and have been dying there since of starvation, exposure, and disease. The other half died of exhaustion on the way, or were murdered by the gendarmes who escorted them and by organised bands of brigands and Kurds. A third of the nation may still be alive—the Armenians in Constantinople and Smyrna were mostly spared ; a certain number escaped by conversion to Islam (though this, for women and girls, involved entrance into a Moslem’s harem); about 200,000 escaped to Russia and Egypt. These 200,000 refugees—10 per cent. of the Armenians living under Ottoman domination in 1914—are the only Ottoman Armenians whose preservation is assured.

After eliminating the Armenians, the Young Turks prepared the same fate for the Arabs, and they have been engaged on this since 1916. The Arabs in the southern provinces have been able to defend themselves. The province of Yemen, in the hinterland of Aden, has been in chronic revolt for years, and the Young Turks have abandoned the attempt to subdue its national rulers. The province of Hedjaz, which contains the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, reasserted its independence a few months ago under the leadership of the Sherif of Mecca, who is the hereditary custodian of the holy cities. But Syria, still held down by Ottoman armies, is being Ottomanised with might and main. The Syrian leaders (Moslem or Christian without distinction, for their common crime is that they are Arabs and not Turks) are either dead or in prison ; the next blow will fall on the helpless masses. It is the same method as with the Armenians—the same organised direction from the “Union and Progress” Committee at Constantinople—and it will have the same end, unless changes in the military situation intervene.

The whole Young Turkish policy was summed up in a

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sentence by an Osmanli gendarme to a Danish Red Cross Sister : " First we kill the Armenians, then the Greeks, then the Kurds." The issue resolves itself into a question of time. Which will be destroyed first ? The subject peoples or Ottoman ascendancy ?

UNITED KINGDOM

I. THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT.

THE outstanding event in the United Kingdom during the last quarter has been the change of Government. On December 5, 1916, the day after the fall of Bucharest was announced, the Asquith Ministry resigned, and two days later Mr. Lloyd George kissed hands on his appointment as Prime Minister. The change came about through the action of Mr. Lloyd George, who believed that victory might prove unattainable without a more vigorous prosecution of the war than he had convinced himself was possible under the existing Cabinet system or with the existing personnel. He consequently pressed upon Mr. Asquith a demand for a smaller War Council. In this, once the issue had been raised, he was backed up by the Unionist members of the Government, and, as the event showed, by a majority of the House of Commons.

The new Government has involved not only a change of personnel but a change of system. Instead of a Cabinet of twenty-two, including the heads of all the chief Departments of State, there is a Cabinet of five, in which none of the Departments except the Exchequer are represented. This "War Cabinet," which sits almost daily, is intended to devote itself exclusively to matters connected with the war. When matters concerned with any particular Department are under discussion the Departmental chief is

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invited to attend. Thus Ministers not in the Cabinet are only called into council when their own particular province is under discussion, and otherwise must act on their own responsibility, subject to the control of Parliament. The Ministry, as a whole, practically never meets, and the traditional system of collective Cabinet responsibility is therefore in abeyance.

The advantages of the new system in promoting the rapid dispatch of business are obvious: the small War Cabinet and the method of conference with selected Ministers are more manageable instruments than the larger body of yesterday. Its disadvantages are equally obvious. There is no regular means of keeping the Departments in touch with one another or of ensuring that the Ministry acts as a homogeneous whole. To meet these difficulties two new pieces of organisation have been devised, the working of which will be watched with interest. The War Cabinet, in which the old Committee of Imperial Defence is for the time being merged, has created a small Secretariat to prepare and record its business. The Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence thus becomes the Secretary to the Cabinet, and is assisted by four Assistant-Secretaries, whose function it is to bring before the War Cabinet questions which require decision, and to communicate its decisions to all Departments concerned. The Prime Minister has established a similar small Secretariat of his own to preserve his personal touch with the Departments. The system is tantamount to the establishment of the administrative dictatorship of a small War Cabinet for the duration of the War. For this purpose it seems well suited; but it must manifestly give place to the old Cabinet system when peace returns and parliamentary life revives.

Mr. Lloyd George also signalled his advent to power by the creation of a number of new domestic departments. Lord Devonport as Food Controller, Sir Joseph Maclay as Shipping Controller, Mr. G. N. Barnes (Labour Member

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for one of the Glasgow Divisions) as Minister of Pensions, Mr. Hodge (a Lancashire Labour Member) as Minister of Labour, Mr. Neville Chamberlain as Director-General of National Service, Mr. Guy Calthrop (General Manager of the London and North-Western Railway) as Controller of Coal Mines, all occupy newly created posts, in some cases with wholly new duties, in others with duties taken over from an existing Department or Committee. It is too early yet to pass judgment on any of these newcomers, or on such other interesting appointments as those of Mr. Prothero, for many years land agent for the Duke of Bedford, to the Board of Agriculture, of Sir Albert Stanley, Manager of the London Underground Railways, to the Board of Trade, and Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University, to the Board of Education. Amongst these, perhaps Mr. Fisher has been welcomed with the greatest measure of satisfaction, not only because his appointment raises wide hopes in itself, but because it marks a definite departure from the vicious system under which the Presidency of the Board of Education was filled by stop-gaps and regarded as a stepping-stone on the path of ministerial ascent.

On the announcement of the new German submarine menace the Food Controller put the nation on "voluntary rations" of 4 lb. of bread (or 3 lb. of flour), $2\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of meat (including bone), and $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. of sugar per week. The food problem is under the joint control of two departments, the Food Controller and the Board of Agriculture, and their mutual relations are being watched by the public with interest and with some anxiety. The aim of the Food Controller has been defined as "to secure an adequate supply of essential foodstuffs, so far as war conditions permit, in as large a quantity as possible, at a price within the reach of the consumer, especially of the poor." The aim of the Board of Agriculture is to stimulate production. There is here a real risk of divergent policies, and there has likely been some evidence that in a premature

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attempt to fix maximum prices for staple commodities Lord Devonport has seriously increased the difficulties of Mr. Prothero. Still more anxiety as to the prospects of home production was caused when the War Office in January called up 30,000 skilled agricultural workers for service, offering men unfit for general service, women, and prisoners in exchange. This was at first described as a "staggering blow" by Mr. Prothero, but the action of the War Office has been upheld and in the light of the examples of France and Italy adduced by the Prime Minister it is difficult to gainsay it. British farmers, indeed, are not lacking in patriotism, but they have been seriously hampered in their plans by conflicting authorities and policies both as regards labour and prices and by the uncertainties of the resulting situation.

The Director-General of National Service has announced the inauguration of a scheme of voluntary civilian service for all men between eighteen and sixty-one, and the appointment of two women well known for their public spirit and ability, Mrs. H. J. Tennant and Miss Violet Markham, to prepare a similar scheme for women. The choice before the Government lay between the method of scheduling certain industries and occupations as non-essential and closing them down, leaving the workers affected to shift for themselves, and the method of calling for volunteers. The latter is undoubtedly the more striking and probably from the democratic point of view the more satisfactory; the inevitable disadvantages of dislocation are outweighed by the moral effect of the call for individual action. It is, however, noteworthy and perhaps regrettable that the first intention of making the new Department responsible for all recruiting, military as well as civilian, has been abandoned.

The new Government is fortunate in its opposition. Mr. Asquith's speeches since his retirement from office have been models of patriotism and dignified restraint and the general temper of the House of Commons has been

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in favour of giving the new Administration a fair trial. The Annual Conference of the Labour Party, which was held at Manchester at the end of January, took the same point of view, and upheld by a large majority—larger than that which registered its support of the Coalition Government a year earlier—the decision of the Parliamentary Party to identify itself with the new Government in its vigorous prosecution of the war.

Mr. Lloyd George believes in taking the nation into his confidence, and his speeches since his accession to power have been striking both in their simple and homely exposition of policy and in their appeals to patriotism and self-sacrifice. The general temper of the nation remains confident and steadfast. The submarine campaign has perhaps, with our prevailing optimism, not everywhere been taken with the seriousness it deserved; but whatever happens the nation means to “see the war through.”

Side by side with the resolve to win the war is growing up in all ranks of the community a feeling that the end of the war will be the beginning of a new epoch, in which the mistakes and neglect of the past must not be repeated. More than ever men are being drawn together, and are dreaming dreams and seeing visions of a better world after the war. There is hardly a household which has not a war memorial of its own, which it desires to keep sacred after the war—some memory of a noble life which it would wish to hand on as an inspiration to those who come after. It is this sense of the need for preserving and consecrating all the best of what the nation has gained in the war which has led to so great a change in the public attitude both towards education and towards industrial questions. In both these spheres, as in that of imperial organisation, public opinion is prepared for a big advance on existing systems and traditions, and the statesman will be wise who takes the occasion at the flood.

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II. TEMPERANCE REFORM IN GREAT BRITAIN.

THE outbreak of the present world-wide struggle was signalised in many lands by exceptional efforts towards a narrower restriction of the drink traffic. Russia, it will be remembered, led the way. On October 11, 1914, the Tsar announced his final decision to prohibit for ever the Government sale of vodka, thus surrendering at a stroke one of the principal sources of revenue. Three months later (January 7, 1915) the French President issued a decree forbidding the sale of absinthe throughout France; whereupon the Chamber of Deputies, by a majority of more than nine to one, suppressed its manufacture for all time, a resolution which was subsequently ratified by the Senate. The Dominions of the Empire have also moved fast in a similar direction; and our last issue recorded sweeping measures of prohibition in Australia and Canada.

Beside such heroic treatment of this perennial problem the sober, tentative procedure of Great Britain may appear to casual observers lukewarm and half-hearted. But a closer inspection, while revealing peculiar complexity in the situation to be faced, reveals also that here, as elsewhere, a social revolution of the first magnitude has been in silent progress during the last two years.

The evils attendant upon drink are notorious and many. The remedies which have been under consideration fall mainly under three heads: (1) Restriction; (2) Prohibition; (3) Nationalisation.

The first of these, Restriction, is the policy which has been in force up to the present. But the times are full of change, and the other two have recently come to the front. It is worth while therefore first to look at what has actually been done, and then to glance briefly at the further measures now under discussion.

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1. *Restriction.*

Minor preliminary enactments, more than one outspoken utterance by the present Premier, and a direct personal lead from the King to the nation (March 30, 1915) heralded proposals for the State restriction of the liquor traffic in war-work areas, Ireland alone excepted. These passed into law on May 19, 1915; and on June 10 a Central Control Board was duly constituted to exercise the new powers on behalf of the State.

The Act is avowedly a special measure for the period of the war, and becomes inoperative within twelve months of its close. It does not apply universally, but is confined to legislative areas—to be defined from time to time by an Order in Council—which contain docks, munition factories, military training centres, and the like. Such areas within the meaning of the Act usually consist of one or more considerable centres of population, surrounded by a protective fringe; and there has been a noticeable tendency, due to modern transport facilities, towards their wide and rapid enlargement. Thus the first area scheduled—Newhaven—extended only to a radius of a mile and three-quarters from the town railway station, with a total population of 8,000. The last area officially recorded (No. 27) includes practically the whole of three counties and sections of five others, the population affected amounting to 1,950,000. Other areas, intermediate between these two in date of proclamation, contain aggregates of two, three, five and even seven millions of people.

It is true, then, to say that as Great Britain has gradually become a single vast armed camp or arsenal a larger and larger part of it has come under the direct cognisance of the Board of Control. To-day about 38 millions out of a total of 40 millions come within the scope of its many-sided activities.

Within all such defined areas the powers of the Board whether restrictive or constructive, are drastic and far-reaching. On the side of restriction its aim has been to

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discourage continuous drinking and drinking apart from meals. The sale of intoxicating liquor for consumption on the premises is usually confined to two and a-half hours in the middle of the day and to three hours in the evening. Thus there are no facilities for drinking during the regular morning and afternoon hours of work. The hours for off-sales are much the same; but in this case spirits are subject to further limitations. Their sale is entirely prohibited on Saturdays and Sundays, and after the mid-day period on other days; the object being to protect the wage-earners and to diminish week-end drinking. The sale of spirits is already totally prohibited within the scheduled area of the North of Scotland. Elsewhere they may be diluted to 35° and must be diluted to 25° under proof. Credit sales and treating in all its forms are strictly forbidden, with the single exception of drink supplied at meals; and clubs of every kind, equally with licensed premises, are subject to these and other stringent regulations.

On the constructive side the Board has wisely recognised how often excessive indulgence is traceable to the lack of wholesome substitutes, whether in food or drink. It has been obliged to reckon, too, with the abnormal influx of workers into districts which are patently unequal to the supply of their daily needs. The maintenance of these newcomers in health and efficiency has been rightly regarded as a primary care. Hence there has sprung up, and is fast increasing, a widely spread system of industrial canteens where nourishing meals may be obtained at a reasonable cost. These canteens have been provided on occasion by the direct action of the Board. More commonly, they owe their existence to the initiative of voluntary societies and employers or to the encouragement extended by the Board, with financial backing by the Government. Their number (November 30, 1916) was 574; and three-quarters of a million war-workers, out of a total of nearly two millions, reap the benefit to-day. In the same connection

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innkeepers have been encouraged, if there be need, to assume afresh their traditional rôle as public victuallers.

The Board is authorised, further, to acquire licensed premises, wherever necessary, either by agreement or compulsion; and has already taken over 170 such houses in four special areas. Its recent purchase of the entire licensed trade, with two or three exceptions, as well as the breweries, in and around Carlisle may possibly establish a precedent for wider action of the same kind elsewhere and is deserving of interest.

Conditions of space forbid any detailed account of the proved effects of the Board's orders. It must suffice to state that its intervention has been invariably attended by a heavy fall in convictions for drunkenness; that a notable improvement is observed in the public order, home life, and general trade of the districts concerned, as well as in the efficiency, time-keeping and output of the workers; and that the reports from Government departments, chief constables and other responsible quarters bear unanimous testimony to a marked shrinkage of abuses and to the oncoming of a brighter day.

2. Prohibition.

Such far-reaching and not unfruitful action on the side of the State finds its unofficial counterpart in the strenuous endeavours of the various liquor reform movements. These are pledged for the most part to the advocacy of the policy of total prohibition in the retail sale of intoxicating drink, either permanently or for the duration of the war.

One such movement, a direct outcome of the war, has recently attracted much public attention. The Strength of Britain Movement, expressly disclaiming any connection with the Churches or Temperance Societies, was launched on its career by a group of business men in June, 1916. Its plea is for total prohibition for the duration of the war. The argument, briefly stated, is that the trade in alcohol is interfering, to danger point, with all the forces which should make for victory and ultimate reconstruction:

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with the Army, by delaying the supply of munitions ; with the Navy, by holding up shipping ; with the Mercantile Marine, by its continuous demand upon extra feet of carrying space ; with the Treasury, as hampering the insistent appeal for economy ; with industry and agriculture, because it monopolises the services of half a million workers, of very many acres of fertile land, and of an immense tonnage of coal, and creates a constant and heavy traffic both by road and rail ; with home life, because of its effect on the womanhood of the nation ; with the national life, because of its subtly demoralising and degenerating influence on all classes.

3. *Nationalisation.*

There remains the third alternative, standing midway between the other two, which has come to command in recent weeks a measure of support. It is contended by the upholders of nationalisation that the path of legitimate progress has hitherto been blocked by an insurmountable barrier—the fact that a trade, admittedly dangerous, and immensely powerful in many spheres (political, financial, social) has continued until now entirely in private ownership. The best way of overcoming this obstacle to reform is, they maintain, that the people themselves should assume the direct management of an industry which so closely touches their welfare, so that all private and personal interest in the entire liquor traffic may be eliminated.

The State would then be, as it has not been hitherto, master in its own house ; and it is confidently predicted that trenchant action would speedily follow. Not improbably a full half of the existing breweries and licensed houses would be found to be redundant, and the saving affected by abolishing those which were superfluous would prove of material assistance to the national revenues.

The proposal is put forward without disguise as a means towards an end—as the best means of bringing about immediately a further great measure of reform. It is argued by its supporters that public opinion is not yet

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ripe for immediate total prohibition, and that further restriction is impossible without settling the question of compensation. Nationalisation, it is said, cuts that Gordian knot by taking the business over as a going concern ; for it is certain that the fairmindedness of the British people will never consent to an act of simple spoliation. The cost of State purchase in England and Wales has been estimated at between £250,000,000 and £300,000,000. A Committee of financial experts has been appointed by the Treasury to devise a workable scheme. The objection to nationalisation lies in the fact that it only substitutes the Treasury for the private owner, and that a national treasury is likely to be almost as much concerned in keeping up its revenues as the brewery shareholders. The advocates of nationalisation meet this objection by proposing a local option clause whereby any borough or county can compel the government to stop or restrict the sale of liquor in their district by plebiscite.

These, then, are the main lines along which Great Britain is attempting to deal with the liquor problem. We cannot here attempt to express an opinion as to which is the right course to adopt in the circumstances of the time—further restriction, prohibition, or nationalisation. What matters is that public opinion should have become alive to the social evils which the drink traffic causes, and should be steadily stiffening in the direction of dealing with it vigorously. The drink problem is not a personal problem, but a social problem. It is not a question of whether or not drink does harm to the individual voter, but whether or not it does harm to the community. All experience goes to show that it does immense harm, and that crime falls, production rises, and social prosperity and happiness increase in direct proportion to the diminution of the national drink bill.

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III. IRELAND AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT

AS long as the life and death struggle between Prussianism and liberty remains undecided the British people as a whole, will continue to regard the situation in Ireland first and foremost in the light of its effects on the conduct of the war. In their eyes, therefore, the most alarming factor in the Irish situation at the moment is the rapid diminution in the number of recruits obtained for the Irish regiments from among the many thousands of able-bodied men still available in Ireland. And no one naturally is more deeply concerned in this position of affairs than the Irish regiments themselves, proud as they justly are of their magnificent traditions. The black prospect which faces them in the near future was frankly stated by Colonel M'Calmont in his response to Major W. Redmond's impressive speech in the House of Commons on December 15 :

What worries the Irish soldier much more out there than anything else is whether the Irishmen at home are going to keep up the Irish regiments. . . . It is not a matter which can be put off. The hon. and gallant Member knows, as well as I do, that if these men are not forthcoming during the next few weeks the Irish regiments, as such, will cease to exist directly the spring campaign is started.

Such in plain words must be the military results of the continued disunion of Ireland ; and it was with this thought above all in mind that the House had welcomed the glad tidings which Major Redmond had brought with him from France. For the burden of his speech had been that in the trenches at any rate the unity of Ireland was already an accomplished fact :

The troops from Ulster and the troops from the other three provinces of Ireland have been in pretty close contact quite recently,

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and I think, without divulging anything which might be improper, they are at the present time in close contact. The officers have met, and the men from time to time meet also, and it is a most remarkable thing, perhaps not to be unexpected, that there has not been, so far as my knowledge goes, under any circumstances whatever, anything but the very best and kindest feeling between these men of the North and the South. Anybody who knows the North of Ireland knows that it takes a very little thing on one side or the other to kindle the fires of trouble, disaffection and antagonism. I myself could not have been a Member for seven years for a district like Enniskillen without being perfectly aware of that. . . . There were those who said that the difficulties between North and South were so ineradicable that they would always burst out under all circumstances. Perhaps it is in the presence of a common enemy in the field, perhaps it is in the endurance side by side of danger sometimes and at all times of great discomfort and privation—perhaps it is these things which have had the result, but the result is there. These men, who in times of political heat may have been unreasonable in their antagonism and even in their physical opposition to each other, have recognised in the face of the enemy that they are brother Irishmen.

And Major Redmond went on to point the moral to those who stay at home :

Nobody who has seen the officers of these various sections of Irish troops entrenched together, no one who has seen the men passing on the road in the performance of their various duties, some of them with the green badge on their shoulder which I wear, and which is worn by all battalions of the 16th Southern Division, although it contains many Ulster men—no one, I say, can see these men passing with this badge on the roads in France and Belgium, in comradeship and friendship with the men who have on their shoulders the Orange badge, without being struck by the newness of the situation, if you like, but with the great hope which is in it, and with the lesson which it teaches, that, while these men are doing their best shoulder to shoulder in the war, irrespective of their differences in the past, recognising that this is a situation which has never arisen before, and recognising that this is against German domination—nobody who recognises all that can help thinking that, whilst these men are so occupied abroad, suffering and sacrificing in a way which, perhaps, many people do not thoroughly recognise, it ought to be the aim and the object of every man and every party in this country to do what, after all, is one of the very best things that could be done for the prosecution

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of the war and the solidarity of the Empire generally, and that is to settle the Irish question on lines to be agreed upon, and mutually satisfactory to the people of the North and the South.

At the time this speech was delivered the new Government was in process of construction : and since it was generally credited with a capacity for swift and drastic decisions—the need of which, indeed, had been its *raison d'être*—hopes were entertained that one of Mr. Lloyd George's first triumphs might prove to be the establishment of a system of Irish government which all parties in Ireland had agreed to accept at any rate for the duration of the war ; the appeasement thereby of the existing discontent ; the renewal of the enthusiasm for the Allies' cause which had swept through Ireland at the outset of the war ; and a final rally of Irishmen of military age to the battlefields on which the issue is presently to be decided. Some, indeed, were sanguine enough to believe that Mr. Lloyd George had come into office with a settlement already in his pocket ; and it was rumoured that the terms of the bargain were the immediate application of Home Rule in some form on the one hand and the extension of the Military Service Act to Ireland on the other. The baselessness of all such reports was soon exposed. On December 19 Mr. Lloyd George made his first speech in the House of Commons as Prime Minister : and, when in the course of his review of the war problems confronting him he came to the Irish problem, he confessed at once that he had little to say. The ill-health, he explained, from which, as everyone knew, he had been suffering, had prevented his doing more than hold a preliminary discussion with the Chief Secretary. But he made it very clear that he did not under-estimate the importance of the matter :

All I should like to say is this : I wish it were possible to remove the misunderstanding between Britain and Ireland which has for centuries been such a source of misery to the one and of embarrassment and weakness to the other. Apart from the general interest which I have taken in it, I should consider that a war measure

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of the first importance. I should consider it a great victory for the Allied Forces, something that would give strength to the Armies of the Allies. . . . I wish that that misunderstanding could be removed. I tried once. I did not succeed. The fault was not entirely on one side. I felt the whole time that we were moving in an atmosphere of nervous suspicion and distrust, pervasive, universal, of everything and everybody. I was drenched with suspicion of Irishmen by Englishmen and of Englishmen by Irishmen and, worst and most fatal of all, suspicion of Irishmen by Irishmen. It was a quagmire of distrust which clogged the footsteps and made progress impossible. That is the real enemy of Ireland. If that could be slain, I believe that it would accomplish an act of reconciliation that would make Ireland greater and Britain greater and would make the United Kingdom and the Empire greater than they ever were before. That is why I have always thought and said that the real solution of the Irish problem is largely one of a better atmosphere. I am speaking not merely for myself, but for my colleagues when I say that we shall strive to produce that better feeling. We shall strive by every means and by many hazards to produce that atmosphere, and we ask men of all races and men of all creeds and faith to help us, not to solve a political question, but to help us to do something that will be a real contribution to the winning of the war.

Mr. Redmond opened his reply with a warm tribute to Mr. Lloyd George's record :

It is impossible, in my opinion, for any man of any party in this House to listen to that speech without recalling the past career of the right hon. gentleman and all that he has meant in the history of this country for so long—of the great labours and of the great ability which he has devoted to the service, not only of his own party but the House of Commons as a whole, and the Empire as a whole. Certainly it is quite impossible for me as an Irishman to speak on this occasion without recalling with gratitude his devoted labours for so many years to realise those ideals for the future liberty and happiness of my country that we have held in common.

Mr. Redmond went on to declare that the Nationalist Party was as deeply interested as any other Party in the speedy victory of the Allies :

The new Government may rest assured, therefore, that on any policy which we honestly believe is calculated to speedily and victoriously end this war they will receive no opposition from us,

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but, on the contrary, a ready support. That, however, does not mean that the right hon. gentleman will be able to count upon a blind, indiscriminate and unquestioning support from the Irish Party. Our attitude from day to day must depend upon the proceedings of the Government.

After this somewhat guarded promise of support Mr. Redmond proceeded to paint in sombre colours the change which had come over the situation in Ireland in the last few months:

We see it in the absolute disappearance of enthusiasm for the War in Ireland, the strengthening of all anti-British forces in that country, the slump in recruiting, the profound disappointment and resentment in every Dominion across the seas.

As evidence of this resentment in the Dominions he cited "the dwindling recruiting" in Canada and "the defeat of the Referendum proposals in Australia."* And, such being the state of affairs, he confessed that the absence of any definite declaration of policy in Mr. Lloyd George's speech had given him "the greatest pain":

In the general programme of energy, promptness, quick decision, is the Irish question to be the only one to be allowed to drift? The enemies of the late Government were very fond of denouncing the policy of "wait and see." Is the policy of "wait and see" to be the policy of the right hon. gentleman with reference to this urgent war problem of Ireland?

"Promptness," continued Mr. Redmond, "is essential," and he urged the withdrawal of martial law and the immediate release of the "suspects" interned in England. He further recommended "a general gaol delivery" of the sentenced rebels also.

There were other conditions besides promptness which Mr. Redmond laid down as required for a successful settlement. In the first place the Government must not

* The various factors which influenced the voting in the Referendum are analysed in the Australian article in this number.

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attempt further negotiations with the parties concerned : they must take the initiative themselves and make their proposals on their own responsibility. Secondly, Mr. Lloyd George's new attempt must be on new lines—"not on the lines he attempted twice before and failed, but on the lines of a united Ireland." Thirdly, he must not confuse the political issue with the question of conscription :

That question must be left to a change of heart in Ireland. You cannot bring that about by attempting to make it a condition of doing justice to the people.

Mr. Redmond's last word to the new Prime Minister was one more appeal for promptness :

He has the sympathy of all men of good will in the Empire, and all I say to him on the subject is, under those circumstances, in Heaven's name, do not let him miss the tide.

It is highly probable that, if he had not been prevented by his unfortunate illness from fully considering the question, Mr. Lloyd George would have announced the release of the "suspects" in his speech ; and Mr. Redmond's suggestion that in that particular matter he had already "missed the tide" evoked from him a vehement remonstrance. Next day, however, Mr. Dillon returned to the charge. Speaking on the motion for adjournment, he described in severe language the failure of previous governments during the war to make good use of their opportunities in Ireland, and again complained that the Prime Minister's speech had contained no "concrete statement of the action taken by the Government to improve the atmosphere in Ireland." The Chief Secretary in reply confirmed Mr. Lloyd George's statement that a full consideration of the question had been physically impossible ; and he protested that without full consideration no one could undertake the responsibility for the release of the "suspects." The number now interned was but a quarter of the number of arrested persons whose cases had been considered by an Advisory Committee comprising an Irish judge, two English judges

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and three Members of the House of Commons. As to this quarter of the whole—562 in all—the Committee had been “unable to advise the Government that they could safely be released.” When, moreover, he had proposed that any of these 562 might be released who gave “a simple undertaking against acts of sedition during the war,” the proposal had been “by common consent rejected.” Under such circumstances it was no light matter to decide on their unconditional discharge :

You cannot make a wholesale order of that kind, which is irrevocable, without making sure of your ground. You cannot do it in that airy way to improve an atmosphere, or to make a pledge of conciliation. The peace of Ireland has to be considered.

The following evening Mr. Duke announced that the decision had now been taken :

It has been, as I said last night, a very difficult duty to balance the risks of release against what I believe to be the great and almost inestimable advantage of limiting interference with personal liberty to the irreducible minimum of necessity. I have come to the conclusion, in view of all the facts within my knowledge, that the time has come in this case when the advantage outweighs the risk. I think (he added), I may justly express a hope that the act of condonation which is now resolved upon in response to so many earnest representations will have the good results, the results of unmixed good, which so many Irishmen have foretold for it.

Every loyal citizen of the British Commonwealth, whatever his race or nationality, must needs echo that hope, but its fulfilment depends primarily on Irishmen themselves. The crux of the matter is no longer a difference between Ireland and Great Britain, but disunity in Ireland. No one on this side of the Channel is minded any longer to deny that Ireland must have Home Rule for the management of her own affairs. The question now is whether Ireland under Home Rule is to be united or partitioned. And that is for Irishmen to decide : for no British Government will now contemplate coercing either section into a settlement it violently repudiates. There, in the briefest compass, is the whole problem : and in the

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light of it Mr. Redmond's advice to the new Government seems of little practical utility. For to ask Mr. Lloyd George, on his own initiative and without negotiation, to improvise a settlement *on the lines of a united Ireland* is to ask him to beg the very question which must be answered, and answered by Irishmen, before any settlement is possible.

Mr. Redmond was nearer the mark when he spoke of "a change of heart in Ireland": and more practically useful than a hundred speeches was the simple lesson which his brother brought from the Irish trenches. The war has taught us that the key to all our problems is the same. We have found that all our difficulties disappear just in so far as we approach them in the spirit of sacrifice for the common weal which dominates the trenches. The nearer men get in imagination to the realities of the war, the more clearly they realise the gravity of the issues at stake and the greatness of the effort needed to make the right prevail, the easier they find it to accommodate the differences—personal social, national—that divide them and to stand "shoulder to shoulder" before their common foe. Again and again this has happened in every kind of war problem and in every quarter of the British Commonwealth. At the outbreak of the war it happened in Ireland: and on the morrow of the Rebellion it seemed for a moment to be happening again. It is still a possibility; but the sands are fast running out. Is it too much to say that the next few weeks must decide it one way or the other? For only if the Irish people throw themselves heart and soul into the last great effort of the war, only if they subordinate their aims in Ireland, however just, to the wider needs of the great Commonwealth to which they all belong and to the common claims of all the world's free nations, can the present deadlock be overcome. Only so will Home Rule for a united Ireland be feasible in the near future.

London. February, 1917.

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IV. IRELAND IN ISOLATION.

TO the casual observer it may seem that the last three months have effected little change in the Irish situation ; the only political event of any note which has appeared in the papers was the release of the interned suspects—an event so long expected as to cause little excitement. Irishmen who have been watching the affairs of their country closely will be justified in taking a different view ; it may, indeed, prove that this period of apparent quiescence has marked a definite step in the direction of a further separation between English and Irish feeling. The reason for this lies not in any overt action on either side, but in the apparent neglect with which the new Government has treated Ireland.

When Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister Ireland was the one war-problem before him which he had already attempted to solve without any success. There were those in Ireland, however, who hoped that that would not deter him from making a new effort at its solution, and that his attitude in the House of Commons betokened an intention to set aside the Parliamentary unrealities alluded to in the last number of *THE ROUND TABLE* and to proceed to a reconstruction which would, perhaps, go half way towards Sinn Fein and yet conciliate thinking Unionism. Such a thing was possible, if there had been time for it. But it appears that there was not time. Nothing whatever was done in Ireland to correspond to what was done in England. Every effort was made to render the Government of England a vigorous businesslike machine, without regard to considerations of party, of sentiment, or of convention. But the Irish Government was left absolutely unchanged. The effect on Irish opinion, which is largely indifferent to the war, has been most unfortunate. It is widely believed that the inaction

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of the new Government was due not so much to the pressure of other war needs as to a policy of deliberate neglect.

Meanwhile, it so happens that economic considerations have become the most important factor in Irish life. Perhaps that was always true, but it was not hitherto admitted.

At the beginning of this year it became at last obvious that some effort must be made to increase the home production of food. Some Irish thinkers had urged for months past that Ireland had a definite part to play in this direction; if she was not to be forced to provide men for the war she might be persuaded to produce food. She is well equipped for such a task by reason, on the one hand, of the investments in land reform made by the British Government and, on the other hand, of the foresight of Sir Horace Plunkett. Ireland should be, now that food is admittedly a munition of war, one of the great munition areas of the United Kingdom.

One thing alone stood in the way—bad administration. The general disposition of the Irish Department of Agriculture—in particular its attitude to the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society—has been a source of widespread dissatisfaction for years. When the preliminary negotiations for an extension of tillage in Ireland were being carried on, everyone hoped that a change would come. Mr. Duke gave some grounds for this hope: but when the scheme was announced it was found to be entrusted entirely to the same people who had controlled the policy of the Department in the past with no conspicuous success, to say the least of it.

If there were space to examine the minutiae of the Irish economic situation, a hundred small details could be brought to light—sugar supplies, army buying, potatoes, and so forth—in which the failure to extend business principles to Irish government is having its effect. But the fact that it is still possible for the co-operative

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movement to be ignored in a scheme which proposes to deal with Irish farmers will suffice as an example.

In Ireland the connection between economics and politics is abnormally close. The effect of the present proceedings is steadily and surely to alienate many sober-minded Irishmen from established parties. They see that the resources of the country are being mishandled ; they blame for that the English administration, and therefore they cannot be Unionists. They see that the Nationalist Party gives advice leading to the same result, and therefore they cannot be orthodox Nationalists. They can be, and are, increasingly discontented. Meanwhile, Sinn Fein is rising from the ashes of Sackville Street as an economic force. It would be well that those who wish to understand this should study the *Irishman*, a weekly paper published in Belfast by a thoughtful extremist. They will find therein a complete economic programme, resting on the assumption that American capital and American initiative are unreservedly at the disposal of Ireland. A glance at the better known Dublin weekly, *New Ireland*, will show how highly the power of American opinion is rated in such quarters.

There is no such thing at present as a Sinn Fein party. But there are numerous little groups each a trifle uncertain of the other, each groping for a policy. Their common interest will crystallise in this programme of economic reform with American help ; and because the help will be American and in no way English, they will use hatred of England as a sentimental appanage. There is every sign that in the rising generation this hatred will become real.

The danger—from England's point of view—lies not in the renaissance of Sinn Fein. There will always be a rebel party in Ireland, however she is governed. It lies in the fact that Sinn Fein has got a good policy to go upon, which will attract to its ranks on the one hand all those who are threatened with starvation, and on the other all

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those who value the prosperity of their country above party considerations and those who are disgusted by the failure of the permanent officials to further this prosperity. Many of these are to be found in the ranks of Southern Unionists.

At this inopportune moment the more uncompromising Unionists have suddenly reasserted themselves by expelling Count Plunkett from his membership in the Royal Dublin Society. Obscurely unfortunate before, he is now the hero of a thousand resolutions and a candidate* for the Parliamentary vacancy in Roscommon. Meanwhile, Mrs. Sheehy Skeffington, after having been placed under surveillance, has succeeded in evading it and in making good her escape to America, where she will add a considerable weight to the already formidable anti-English propaganda which centres round Irish-American politics.

It may seem that too much attention is being devoted to the tactics of Sinn Fein and its relations with America. But it would be impossible to over-emphasise the note of warning. This is a crucial moment in Ireland's history; if England has decided on a policy of neglect for the duration of the war she is likely at the end of it to find a separatist Ireland which expects more aid from American capital than from the meditations of an Imperial conference. That the Nationalist Party recognise the dangers ahead is very clear from their desperate efforts to do some constructive economic work and to regain public confidence. We have only one public utterance of any note to go by; that of Mr. Dillon at Swinford. His speech was almost hysterical, but out of it, out of the proceedings of the Party's agricultural committee and out of the leading articles in the *Freeman's Journal* we can gather one very definite fact. The Irish Party means to have an economic policy of its

* The result of the North Roscommon election was announced on February 5 as follows :

George Noble Plunkett	3,022
Thomas J. Devine (Official Nationalist) ...	1,708
Jasper Tully (Independent)	687

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own ; that policy is a revival of the old anti-grazing land agitation, for which the present scheme for compulsory tillage, with its alleged inequalities of incidence, will form the pretext. The land is the great magnet in Ireland, and the Party has never stood so firmly since 1903 weakened its attraction. It must be remembered that Sinn Fein is at present very largely a movement of the townspeople ; should it spread to the country districts the representation in Parliament will be rapidly changed. Hence, a sudden solicitude for the breaking up of grazing ranches in Tipperary and the granting of a minimum wage to agricultural labourers. In its way the struggle bears comparison with that which raged in Belgium between the Catholics and the Socialists.

Two other developments—widely different, but each significant—call for mention. A body known as the Irish Conference Committee, composed of representative men of moderate views, has been created in Dublin, and is studying the whole Irish question from a constitutional point of view with the purpose of calling a conference and laying before it some suggestions for a settlement by consent. While little hope of any startling results is felt, this body has avoided exciting any violent antagonism and has shown that Ireland is not bereft of men who have more or less retained the faculty of dispassionate thought. This in itself is much ; and we may find in the conclusions of this body, which should be at least well informed and intelligent, the antidote to much raw poison.

Secondly, Labour is reorganising its forces under the leadership of Mr. Johnson, of Belfast. A Trades Congress was held in Dublin on December 16, and it passed a resolution to the effect that, if something were not done to prevent the unceasing rise in the cost of necessary commodities, Labour would be obliged to paralyse the means of communication throughout the country. Those who made this threat are in a position to put it into force. It is one of the most alarming features of the neglect which has

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formed the chief subject of this article that nothing seems likely to be done to meet the demand formulated. Drastic measures must be taken if there is not to be by June or July a hardship which will put the sincerity of this resolution to the test.

Dublin. February 1, 1917

The Canadian and South African articles arrived too late for inclusion in this number.

AUSTRALIA

I. THE CONSCRIPTION REFERENDUM

ON October 28, under the provisions of the Military Service Referendum Act, passed for the occasion, the people of Australia, men and women enrolled as electors, voted on the following question: "Are you in favour of the Government having in this grave emergency the same compulsory powers over citizens in regard to requiring their military service for the term of this war, outside the Commonwealth, as it now has in regard to military service within the Commonwealth?"

It will be observed that the Referendum was in form merely an appeal for an expression of opinion: the vote had no legal effect—the affirmative would have conferred no new power on the Government, the negative withdrew no power that the Government possessed. In this sense the Referendum was extra-constitutional.

The military problem which the Referendum was intended to solve was discussed in the last Australian contribution to THE ROUND TABLE. The Australian Government, with the enthusiastic approval of the people, had sent certain units to the front, and it was necessary to keep these up to strength by adequate reinforcements. The Government, on the authority of the Army Council in Great Britain, stated that reinforcements at a certain rate were required to discharge the obligation. Voluntary enlistment supplied less than half the number; compulsion was proposed as the only alternative. The Senate was

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known to be unfavourable to conscription, though how far it would be prepared to go in its opposition was not known. There are those who think that an immediate announcement of the policy of compulsion on Mr. Hughes' return from England, and the submission of a Bill, or the promulgation of a regulation embodying compulsion, would have found the Senate hostile indeed, but unready to take up the challenge. In such circumstances it is probable that the country would have acquiesced in the decision. But whatever Mr. Hughes' own policy may have been, such a course would have been too bold for a Ministry bound by Caucus traditions, even if its members had been in favour of conscription. Later events showed that in the Cabinet itself the policy of compulsion was that of a minority. In these circumstances a Referendum was the compromise between a surrender of the policy of compulsion and an immediate break-up of the Cabinet and the Labour Party.

Those in favour of compulsion relied on the sense of justice which demands an equality of sacrifice. The appeal to Australians not "to scab on their mates" in the trenches was intended to touch the trade unionist in a sensitive spot; and it was confidently hoped that the soldiers at the front on their part, who were undergoing the hardships there, would take very good care that others who were equally competent to serve should not evade their obligations.

The case for the opposition revealed various standpoints in the course of the campaign. Avowed hostility to the British cause found no responsible exponents on the platform. It was not a part of the case of the anti-conscriptionists that Australia should not have entered into the war, and many of them were emphatic in declaring that they did not desire that she should "cut out." The opinion that "Australia has done her share" was probably rather the retort to reproaches than either the spontaneous or considered expression of a feeling or a conviction. But there can be no doubt that with many the assertion that

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“Voluntaryism will do what is necessary” stood for nothing better than a willingness that other people should make the effort if they cared to, and in the mouths of men who refused to take part in the voluntary recruiting movement lost even the appearance of good faith. The stock arguments of the Labour leaders were that compulsion was undemocratic and that it would be suicidal to bring into Australia the evils of militarism, which to them meant the subordination of industry and of industrial struggles to military rule. The opposition, however, was not a peace movement. Even the Pacifists, who were earnest workers against the Referendum, approached the question more from the standpoint of expediency than of principle.

A sentimental appeal was made to those who had relatives in the trenches not to put other people through the same ordeal against their will. Those who were not liable for service, but voted “Yes,” were painted as selfish monsters. These appeals had an immense effect. Thousands of women voted “No” because of their acute sense of the horrors to which they were asked to commit the male folk of their country. The economic effects of conscription were dwelt upon by opponents from the point of view of the worker—the fear of a “conscription of industry” and the supposed design to supplant white by coloured labour. Little was said of the financial losses of the farmer or the employer through a shortage of labour, or of the heavy burden which universal service would throw on the taxpayer, but these exercised a big silent influence. The influence of organisations was immense. The superior organisation of the Labour Party and the Unions told very heavily. The ranks of Labour and the offices of the Unions contain so large an Irish Catholic element that it is difficult to separate the Catholic and Labour elements and to assign to each its share in the opposition. In Queensland, at any rate, “Irish wrongs” played a prominent part in the campaign, and the violence of a member of

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the Ministry was such that the Governor was compelled to take notice of it. The syndicalist association, "The Industrial Workers of the World," contributed to the campaign threats of incendiary violence, which lacked neither the will nor the means for their execution; for a series of fires in Sydney was traced to a gang of leaders of the organisation, since convicted of treason-felony. A peculiarly degrading feature of the campaign was the number of grotesque canards that were circulated mainly about Mr. Hughes. The chief of these was that his object in striving for conscription was to fill the places of the men sent away by cheap imported labour. It is hard to believe that anyone credited this, but it had great weight. Unfortunately, Mr. Hughes made a false step in the campaign, which, on the principle *ex uno disce omnes*, was readily used to demonstrate his slowness and to discredit his policy, his facts, and his arguments. He had a regulation passed by the Executive Council by which every man who came to vote was to be questioned as to his liability to military service, and whether he had reported under the Proclamation calling eligible men into camp. If the answers were negative, his vote was to be set aside for inquiry. On hearing this, three Ministers who had been present at a previous meeting of the Executive Council and negatived the regulations resigned. The Regulation was withdrawn and the questions were not put, but there is no doubt that the attempt by executive act to use the ballot for penal purposes was a culpable error not to be excused even by the excitement of battle.

The chief point in the discussion, however, and the one on which the Referendum was perhaps determined, was the question whether the men the Government proposed to send were necessary. Such a question, of course, implies an ignorance of the nature of war and its challenge to the civil life of a community. In war the service of every man is necessary to his state, all resources should be at the disposal of the state, and every private interest which

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conflicts with the public interest should be sacrificed. Only by such methods can the danger to the state be rapidly removed and the normal social life restored. War with a limited liability is nearly always more costly than a war in which every resource is mobilised and thrown into the scale. Such an argument has, however, never appealed to any English-speaking community. Most of England's wars have been wars with a limited liability. A similar hesitation to throw the whole of the resources of the country into the war was shown in the United States during the Wars of Independence and Secession.

The argument which was laid before the country was somewhat as follows: Australia's contribution can have little or no actual effect on the conclusion of the war. Germany is confronted with innumerable enemies far exceeding her in numerical strength and her downfall is certain. The Allies have great resources of men still to be called on; within the Empire there are vast populations which have contributed as yet but an insignificant proportion to the armies. One is ashamed to have to record the use of this last argument. The interest of Australia in the result of the war is so great that her moral obligation to supply troops is at least as strong as that of Russia and France. Her people, as the result of the occupation of a vast, fertile continent, are infinitely better off than these people. Yet the people of Russia and France were to be asked to fight that Australians may retain their superior standard of comfort. That there should be Australians again who, while refusing to allow coloured races to enter Australia, should yet be willing to pass on to the people of India the burden of fighting for Australia was the most humiliating revelation of the campaign. For the honour of Australians it should in fairness be explained that these arguments were not widely accepted, and were rather in the nature of excuses on the part of those who felt the obligation to go but were determined not to honour it. The succeeding stages of the argument were more important.

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The anti-conscriptionists suggested that the 32,500 reinforcements which were asked for as the quota for the month of October were not required as such but were intended to form new units. They stated that Australia had 120,000 men in camp to reinforce five divisions, which was ample; and that a further 40,000 men could be expected by voluntary enlistment during the year. Under the circumstances the request for 214,000 men for one year was, they said, excessive, and based on a rate of reinforcement contradicted by all military experience. It cannot be said that this argument was effectively met. It was stated by the Government that if the casualties did not render necessary the reinforcements proposed they would not be sent, and at a late stage in the campaign Mr. Hughes stated that it was quite probable that only 100,000 men would be necessary within the year. But, as a matter of fact, the numbers actually asked for by the Government were clearly needed if Australia was to keep five divisions at the front, which, without any request from England, she had undertaken to do. The anti-conscriptionists seemed to have lost sight of certain vital considerations. In the first place, it was to be expected that the casualties of the Australian troops in France would exceed those they had suffered in Gallipoli. Secondly, the distance of Australia from the front makes it necessary for her to have in training at any time a large number of men. It is nine months between enlistment and the trenches; two months of this time being spent on the transports. It may be said, in fact, that to maintain the five Australian divisions and reinforce them at a rate equal to what experience shows to be their losses, we require to have in camp at any time reinforcements for nine months—that is, 148,500 men. And in putting forward their far lower estimates it is obvious that the anti-conscriptionists failed to appreciate what the effects are of the length of time it takes to train a recruit obtained in distant Australia into a soldier fit for the conditions on the Western Front

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and of the heavy losses imposed by the conditions existing there.

In the absence of a better explanation of the figures than was given at the hustings, it would have been better if the case had been put on the broad ground that every man was required, and that Australia's share should be at least equivalent to that of Great Britain. One of the statements that influenced the decision was palpably false, namely, that Australia had a larger proportion of men in the firing line than Great Britain. This estimate was obtained by comparing the total of the troops enlisted in Australia with a figure obtained from some newspaper that Great Britain had so many men facing the Germans, ignoring, of course, the British reserves and the men in depôts and elsewhere. The way in which the case for conscription was put was disastrous; for it enabled an answer to be made on the figures, and the numbers asked for were so huge that the married men all knew that they would be required in a very short time. In the result the fundamental fact was obscured, namely, that at the present rate of recruiting we shall not be able to replace anything like the number of casualties.

When the Referendum Bill was introduced, the machinery for calling up the men was at once put into operation under the Defence Act, which enables the Government to call up men for defence, though it does not permit of their being sent outside Australia. This was necessary to keep the supply of men continuous, but seems to have been a tactical error. The whole of the unmarried men between 18 and 35 had to register at once, and go into camp if medically fit. This gave everybody affected a practical example of the difficulties and hardships they would have to undergo under the system, and it did not leave them time to get accustomed to the new life before they gave their vote. It was thought that the process of exemption would reduce the number of persons actually affected, and so reduce the selfish vote. But the exemption Courts were notoriously

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capricious and the effect was the reverse. In fact, when they were called upon to vote, a very large proportion of the electors of Australia found that the measure affected more or less adversely their immediate personal interests, and they were placed in the position of having to decide between these very obvious interests and the less tangible, though just as real, national interests. This fact illustrates very aptly the difficult position in which citizens who have to decide such a question are placed. The Referendum may be a good way of settling important public questions, where what is wanted is an expression of people's views as to their interests. The case is different, however, where individual interests may plainly come into conflict with national interests. It has never been suggested, for instance, that questions as to taxation could be settled satisfactorily by Referendum. The same objection applies where people are asked to support a constructive policy which requires sustained effort and varying kinds and degrees of sacrifice from different individuals. What is required in such a case is a knowledge of facts, a breadth of outlook, a capacity to separate oneself from personal feeling and interest, and a sense of responsibility for consequences which are not to be found in the average man and woman. Individual opinion is of little value unless it is expressed with full responsibility for the consequences. There can be no collective assumption of responsibility in the process of the ballot box. Responsibility can only be effectively assumed by chosen leaders who will initiate the policy, stake personal and political reputation on both the practicability and the necessity of the proposals, and face the consequences of failure. In the present case, Mr. Hughes refused to state that he would resign if the Referendum were defeated. The problem was a military one, and he could not disclose the full military situation and discuss the chances of winning the war and the exact purpose for which troops were required. That being so, he virtually said to the people: "I have all the information on the subject. I cannot give

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it to you to enable you to decide the question for yourselves. I tell you conscription is necessary. If you decide it is not necessary, I will still endeavour to carry out the policy of the country and conduct the war by other means." Mr. Hughes simply committed the question to the fog of politics, and the people consulted their own individual interests.

The poll was taken on October 28 and the "No" majority as indicated by the returns published up to December 11, is 71,549. The following are the particulars of the voting :

REFERENDUM, 1916.
PROGRESSIVE FIGURES AND OUTSTANDING VOTES.

State.	Date of Advice.	Yes.	No.	In- formal.	Majority.	
					Yes.	No.
New South Wales ..	December 11th, 1916	356,802	474,523	27,038	—	117,721
Victoria	" "	353,930	328,226	14,538	25,714	—
Queensland	" "	144,017	157,049	7,596	—	13,032
South Australia ..	" "	87,908	119,119	4,009	—	31,211
Western Australia ..	" "	94,049	40,875	5,680	53,174	—
Tasmania	" "	48,490	37,830	1,037	10,660	—
Territories	" "	2,136	1,269	63	867	—
Commonwealth ..		1,087,332	1,158,881	59,961	90,415	161,964

Yes 1,087,332
No 1,158,881
Majority for No 71,549

The distribution is curious and unexpected. The "Yes" majority was not anticipated in Victoria, and the majority in Western Australia is surprisingly great. In South Australia the conscriptionists hoped for an easy victory, but were heavily defeated. In New South Wales, while forecasts of the result differed, no one foresaw that the cause of conscription would have suffered such a crushing overthrow. The majority against conscription in Queensland is smaller than was expected. A striking feature of the figures is the way in which the people discarded their political representatives. In Victoria all the Senators are Labour, and all but one opposed to conscription, yet Victoria voted "Yes." In South Australia and New South Wales the Labour leaders worked generally in favour of conscription, and there it suffered its severest defeats. With reference to parties and sections, it is pretty clear that there was not a solid

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party vote from Labour on the "No" side. In every safe Labour constituency the majority against conscription is less than the majority obtained at the last election by the Labour member. In some City Liberal constituencies the majorities for "Yes" were greater than the majorities obtained by the Liberal member against the Labour candidate at the last election. On the other hand, in the country, the "No" totals are in almost every case far in advance of the Labour totals at the last election. This is especially the case in New South Wales and South Australia. It is fairly clear that an important factor in the "No" victory was a large section, fearful of a shortage of labour, from the farming vote, which at elections usually goes to the Liberals. A considerable number of Labour supporters who were in the first instance inclining to conscription were eventually whipped in by the action of the trade unions and officials of the political Labour Party; but, nevertheless, many men who usually vote for Labour candidates voted "Yes." The parties being pretty evenly balanced in Australia, the large country vote for "No" carried the scale against the proposal. The Roman Catholic vote was very much feared by the conscriptionists, and was, no doubt, in the main hostile, except perhaps in Western Australia, where the Archbishop came out as a strong supporter of conscription.

The effect of the Referendum decision on the political situation has been momentous. Mr. Hughes stated that the decision of the country was not a decision against the continuance of the war, but only against the particular means which the Government sought to employ. He would accept the verdict, and continue to prosecute the war as vigorously as possible with the limited means available. He would endeavour to obtain the necessary reinforcements by voluntary enlistment; and, if this were found impossible, he would again appeal to the country. He did not resign. Before the polling day he had been ejected by the New South Wales Branch of the political Labour

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League from membership. On November 14 a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Caucus was held, and a motion of want of confidence in him was moved. After discussion, Mr. Hughes vacated the chair and left the meeting with some twenty-four followers. He resigned as Prime Minister ; and, having thus got rid of his former colleagues, he formed a new Ministry from his followers, whom he called the "National Labour Party." The remaining members of the Labour Party have called themselves the "Australian Labour Party," and have elected Mr. F. G. Tudor, the late Minister of Customs, their leader.

By retaining office Mr. Hughes undertakes to face the consequences which will result from a policy not of his own choice. He leads the smallest party in Parliament and his Government can exist only on the sufferance of the Liberals, whose support will tend still further to alienate him from his old party and many of his personal following. The Liberals have not guaranteed their support. He is faced also by a hostile Senate. The feeling against him among his revolted followers is intense, and the "Australian Labour Party" will stop at nothing to humiliate him. His power to carry out an effective policy is therefore small, and as his chance of scoring off his opponents is slender, his position in a general election will not be a favourable one. If Mr. Hughes had declined to continue in office, his opponents in the Labour Party would have considered themselves entitled, on the strength of their victory in the Referendum, to form a Ministry. If the Governor-General had been of that opinion and had sent for Mr. Tudor instead of for the leader of the Opposition, there would have been a great risk in placing the conduct of the war in the hands of a party so defective in leadership and so completely dominated by external organisations. This, no doubt, influenced Mr. Hughes in his determination not to cast off the responsibilities of office. But against this course there are the following weighty considerations : The Australian Labour Party allege that Australia's obligations

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can be carried out without conscription. The country has agreed with them. The country therefore deserves no better than to be governed by them. They should certainly undertake the responsibility of making good their claims and facing the consequences. They have a majority in the Senate, and can therefore act effectively and have no excuse for inaction. This extreme Labour Party are very distasteful on other than war grounds to a large number of people who voted "No" on the Referendum, and are clearly in a minority in the country. Assuming the issue of the next election to be whether such a party should govern or not, and assuming that they had to bear all responsibility for their policy and the consequences, it is probable that they would suffer a disastrous defeat. The suggestion is undoubtedly a bold one; but it is a logical application of the principle of responsible government, and it is the only means by which the people of Australia can be made to realise the true character of the party which has defeated the Referendum.

In its constitutional aspect the Referendum campaign is the culmination of a conflict which has been developing in the Labour Party for the last few years between the leader and the machine. Hitherto the theatre has been New South Wales, with Mr. Holman and the political Labour Conference in the principal rôles. Now a national question has forced Labour both in Commonwealth and in New South Wales politics to a parting of the ways. Both Mr. Hughes and Mr. Holman claim for the leader freedom of action in all things outside the party platform, the right to frame a policy and to administer affairs without the leave of either the parliamentary caucus or the external organisation of the party. Their opponents would in substance set up the parliamentary caucus in place of the Cabinet and would bind it even closer by instructions to the party "conference." But the cleavage has an importance which goes beyond constitutional or even political forms and methods. On one side stands an ideal of social betterment

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to be attained through a process which, though it may be slow and gradual, is at any rate educative, and presents the possibility of co-operative effort on the part of all classes. Mr. Hughes' abilities and force of character might have led the country, and not merely a part of it, far on the way towards the realisation of this ideal. On the other side stands the alternative of violence and the class war—the social revolution to be achieved not through education and co-operative effort, not by development of the higher human faculties, not even through the action of the state, but by the brute force of organised unionism with the weapon of the general strike. Tending in this direction are "the industrial unionists" (whose conflicts with the politicals have been described in *THE ROUND TABLE*), the Syndicalists, and the "Industrial Workers of the World"—the last, open advocates of violence and sabotage. Mr. Hughes has always been at daggers drawn with any section which sought to identify the Labour Party with this outlook. He has pointed out with extraordinary power how destitute of promise a movement is which discards every constructive element and uses only the weapons of destruction. The present campaign has been largely a struggle between Mr. Hughes and these forces.

The rank and file of the Labour Party, who have imbibed the set phrases about militarism, and were always led to believe that the International Socialist movement would abolish war, may be excused for shutting their eyes to the logic of facts and believing when they are told that the governing classes of all countries were responsible for the war. But the Australian democracy has never accepted the Pacifist doctrines or the teaching of the philosophic Liberals. The Referendum campaign was not influenced by these considerations to any appreciable degree. The Australian worker has never objected to use force in his own industrial interest. He believes in compulsory unionism and the methods it involves. He excludes the alien from Australia by force. He has never objected to

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compulsory military service where the object is to protect him from the industrial competition of the Asiatic. He tolerated the "direct action" of the Syndicalist. For such men to use the watchwords of the Pacifist and the English Radical, even to use the arguments of the International Socialist, was a gigantic hypocrisy.

But, after all, it is no use blaming a section for the result. The real discredit must rest upon the Australian people. It is true that a very large number voted "Yes," but it cannot be denied that this was very largely a non-combatant vote. The people have lacked sincerity and intelligence in their political life. There has been in the community as a whole no true insight into the basis upon which Australian security and freedom rest. Since the war began, with a few notable exceptions, politicians and press have failed to impress upon the people the terrible seriousness of the position and the critical character of the issues involved. Disasters were shrouded in a shallow optimism and the greatest moral crisis the world has ever known was met in the spirit of "Business as usual." These tendencies were present in England at the beginning of the war, but they have been overcome there, and in her concentration on the sublime purpose of the vindication of liberty and justice in international relations England has reached a spiritual plane from which all sorts of great results will be possible in the future. Australia has not shared this discipline; and when the call to a supreme sacrifice came she did not respond. The moral elevation of spirit which might have come as a product of this dreadful conflict will not be hers, and in the future her politics will be, to a greater degree than before, a dismal record of sordid strife.

It is, of course, difficult for a country so far from the scene of action, a people who have never even been face to face with that silent conflict which has been going on through so many years of so-called peace, to realise as a whole the peremptory claims which righteousness, justice, and loyalty make upon her. Few other nations in history have

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honoured these claims even as well as she has done. But few other nations have been so well-favoured as she has been, and no nation has been so completely and utterly dependent on the protection of another as Australia is on the British nation. Relying on the supremacy of the British fleet, Australia has been free to gather in the riches of a vast continent for the exclusive benefit of a handful of people. She has indulged in economic and social experiments of an unique character. These privileges would have been impossible if she had had to face the world by herself. She has been protected by British arms, by the courage and skill with which they have been wielded, and by the heavy sacrifices out of which they were created. Such guardian effort and sacrifice have piled up a moral debt against Australia which it would be impossible for her ever to discharge. She could, however, do her best, but by this answer to the Referendum she has refused to do it. Relying on conscription in England, whose people are far less favoured, she refuses to make an equivalent sacrifice. It is notoriously difficult "to draw an indictment against a nation," and, conversely, it is difficult for a nation to be collectively grateful. In all processes yet devised for the expression of the national will there is a strong tendency for the nobler elements of the national spirit to be lost. In some respects the attitude of Australia throughout the war has been admirable. The many thousands of her sons who have gone to the war have been well equipped and supported, and millions have been given by the public to carry on the war charities. No Australian soldier has ever complained of the hardships he has endured, none has regretted his sacrifice, or felt that it has been in vain. Australia has never complained of the statesmanship that led to the war, nor the way in which the war has been carried on by British statesmen. This much is extremely creditable. But the national will has not been strong enough to secure support for a policy which would enable it more fully to discharge its moral obligations. It cannot

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be sufficiently emphasised that the broadening of the basis of citizenship which comes with democracy, and the far-reaching economic and social experiments which are a feature of modern politics, imply for their success a higher level of citizenship, a greater power of co-operative action, a more enlightened attitude to public duty than the states of the past have ever shown. If these conditions are lacking, modern democratic developments can but lead to disaster ; and the experience of the Referendum has revealed to us that these conditions are not present in sufficient measure at any rate to enable us to look forward to our future with confidence. Not only have we failed to honour our moral obligations, but we have been callous to the suffering and sacrifice of those to whom we owe everything. We have proved ourselves lacking in that faithfulness which the British masses have always shown to the highest ideals of the race, and without which the "island story" could never have been written.

For our future as an Empire the thing has a deep significance. The governance of the Empire must always be a problem of extreme difficulty and complexity, and can only be solved if a very high level of political capacity is present in all its component parts. Australia has shown herself unable to rise to the level required. No more conspicuous illustration could be given of the evils of the present system in which the Dominions have never been allowed to come face to face with the realities of the position and share the responsibilities of Empire. The "patience of England" can be carried too far ; and if, after the war, a clear understanding is not given to the Dominions of their obligations and responsibilities, and of the way in which they can be discharged, no satisfactory basis can be laid for the future of the Empire.

Nor is it only the prospects of the British Empire that have been darkened by the Referendum. It will make it more difficult for democratic leaders all the world over to rely on the steadfastness of their constituents in times of

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crisis. And, all the world over, military states will be more ready now to flout those states which have adopted democracy as the spirit of their political system.

II. THE COAL STRIKE

THE coal strike followed the Referendum ; but after about a ten days' stoppage the men are now (December 8), with few exceptions, in full work again. Australia is gradually recovering from the widespread industrial and social confusion—a few more days of it would have meant an appalling disaster—into which it was plunged by the sudden and unanticipated stoppage of its coal supplies. The men have got what they want, at any rate for the time being, and the employers are to be compensated by an increase in the price of coal which will cover the increased cost of production. The public, relieved by the removal of actual inconvenience and impending disaster, do not appear to be critical either of the manner or the substance of the settlement. They have got back light and heat for their houses and places of entertainment, and power for their factories, and, so far as one can judge, they are not bothering about anything else.

There are many, however, who do not so regard the matter. Personal convenience and industrial equilibrium can be purchased at too high a price, and they feel that that is what has been done in this instance. It is not too much to say that the whole story—the peremptory presentation of the men's demands, the course adopted by Mr. Hughes, the attitude of the tribunal appointed by him, and the flaccid, peace-at-any-price disposition of many of the leading newspapers and of a large section of the public—has caused a feeling of deep depression among those who realise the great moral issues involved. They cannot help feeling that it is a serious thing that industrial demands, made in breach of a formal undertaking, in open defiance

The Coal Strike

of the law, and with complete indifference to the necessities of the Empire, should succeed by the aid of a judicial tribunal acting under the authority of the Prime Minister.

This is not an exaggerated statement of the case. The actual question in dispute between masters and men was comparatively trivial, and in view of the greater issues raised has become irrelevant. The demand was for eight hours from bank to bank. The men already have this in a sense. All they were contending for was an interpretation of the phrase different from that placed upon it by the masters. In the words of the Miners' Secretary, a concession of half an hour a day in nineteen mines out of seventy would have settled the matter. And the whole question was pending before the Arbitration Court. The men, through their responsible leaders, had given a definite undertaking that there would be no stoppage of work. The only reason why the case had not been heard was that this undertaking had been, and was at the time being, broken. The real question, therefore, was not as to the merits of the men's claim. There was a tribunal ready and willing to adjudicate upon this. The men themselves had invoked its aid.

Notwithstanding all this, an ultimatum was presented to the employers, requiring in the first place a conference on the subject of their demand. Much against their will, the employers, recognising the supreme importance of keeping the mines open, agreed. The conference, however, resulted in nothing. The men then came out. This action was, of course, a clear breach of the law which forbids any strike on account of an industrial dispute. It was also a clear breach of the undertaking formally given to the Court by their leaders.

After some delay Mr. Hughes summoned the leaders on both sides to a conference in Melbourne. As a result of the conference, it was arranged that the men should take a ballot on the question whether they would agree to submit the issue to a tribunal to be immediately appointed. The

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men refused to take such a ballot. Their demand for eight hours from bank to bank, in their sense of the words, represented, they said, their irreducible minimum. A further conference was held, and in the result a tribunal was appointed with a Judge of the New South Wales Arbitration Court as President with plenary powers to settle the dispute. This tribunal met at once, and without any real inquiry gave the men what they asked. Nominally this was agreed to by the employers. In fact, as everybody knew, they agreed because they had to.

The men returned to work, and the inquiry as to the proper increase to be allowed in the selling price, to cover the increased cost of working, is now proceeding.

It is a melancholy history. The law forbidding strikes has often been defied before, but never with quite the same disregard of every consideration of reasonableness, fairness, and patriotism. We have long given up the belief in this country that the law against strikes is an enforceable law. It is a little difficult to see how anyone ever imagined it would be. Unfortunately, however, our Governments have not had the courage to remove it from the Statute Book, with the deplorable result that the idea is growing up that there are two kinds of laws, which require different degrees of obedience, and that laws such as that in question here represent merely pious aspirations which no one expects to be taken seriously. This attitude naturally receives a good deal of encouragement when the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth summons the leaders of the men who are defying the law to a formal conference at which it is agreed that the question whether the rank and file shall obey the law shall be put to a ballot. There are elements of comedy in the situation, but those Australians who care about the reputation of Australia are in no mood, since the Referendum, to appreciate comedy of this kind. We have got our coal, but we have paid very heavily for it.

NEW ZEALAND

I. THE ADVENT OF COMPULSORY SERVICE

THE Coalition Ministry has worked well and has been subjected to little serious opposition. It has given adequate expression to the determination of Parliament and people to do their share in the great task confronting the Empire. The two statesmen who lead it are now in England.

Each, in the past, was esteemed by his party : both now command the confidence of the country. Under their leadership in the early days of the war the people rallied round the flag. Thousands of volunteers drawn from every class and creed in the community left our shores to fight the battles of their country. Whatever of racialism exists in New Zealand tended to emulation and not to distraction. The Maoris answered the call as nobly as their white fellow citizens. They came from their forests and their fern lands and their farms. What else, indeed, was to be expected from the soldier descendants of those people who, fifty years ago, from their Orakau entrenchments defiantly replied to the British summons to surrender to overwhelming numbers "No! the Maoris—men and women—fight on for ever, and for ever, and for ever."

And now, under the increasing strain of two years of warfare, we have passed from voluntarism to compulsion. The first ballot for men for military service has been taken and upwards of 4,000 names drawn. Although there are some symptoms of opposition (referred to more fully later on) it is generally believed that, if firmness

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in the enforcement of the law is shown at the outset, any resistance will be overcome without great difficulty. Compulsion has come, not because the country as a whole failed in its duty, but because the country as a whole insisted on every man doing his duty.

The tribute paid to our Volunteers does not imply reproach to the men now being called up. Many of them have heavy responsibilities: many have been perfectly ready to do their duty as citizens, but have insisted on equality of sacrifice. No distinction in treatment or discipline is made between those who enlisted voluntarily and those called up compulsorily. Once in camp they are all soldiers of the King, and all subject to the same duties and immunities.

The passage of the Military Service Act through Parliament did not evoke any substantial opposition; and although the existence of a body of dissentients was recognised, they were regarded as a small, if not altogether negligible, minority. They comprise conscientious objectors, agitators always ready to fish in troubled waters, and some shirkers; but by far the larger number are men whose dissent is based upon dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions; and it is from this section of the opposition that trouble will come in the future, if it comes at all.

It is proposed in this paper to deal briefly with the prevailing economic conditions in New Zealand in so far as they may affect or cause the present discontent.

II. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

THE outstanding feature in the trade of the Dominion since the outbreak of the war has been the great enhancement in value of all exportable New Zealand products. There has been no great increase in the quantity of the exports, but there has been a phenomenal increase

The Economic Situation

in the prices obtained. The following table compiled by Mr. J. B. Condliffe of Canterbury College and published in the *Christchurch Press* is a measurement of the extent and influence of the rise in war prices and is highly significant :—

Eleven principal exports of New Zealand for the twelve-monthly periods ending July 31, 1915-1916, showing actual values and values when assessed at prices ruling in 1914.

	1914.		1915.		1916.		Diffe- rence.
		Actual Value.	Value at 1914 prices.	Actual Value.	Value at 1914 prices.		
	£	£	£	£	£	£	
Wool	8,216,970	9,990,515	8,473,885	12,926,101	8,162,180	6,280,551	
Mutton, Frozen	1,824,630	2,169,462	1,699,673	2,698,633	2,075,581	1,092,839	
Lamb, Frozen	2,458,504	2,077,882	1,837,354	2,825,537	2,480,801	585,264	
Beef, Frozen ..	637,102	1,367,086	941,570	2,084,920	1,426,177	1,084,259	
Butter	2,220,374	2,332,382	2,204,766	2,816,351	2,189,803	754,164	
Cheese	2,326,983	2,386,517	2,244,231	3,380,427	2,825,809	695,904	
Hides	341,543	426,840	365,063	648,846	500,495	209,128	
Tallow	687,415	702,923	697,611	731,076	540,640	195,748	
Phosphorium	590,077	381,547	394,381	830,483	631,750	185,899	
Timber.. ..	393,775	354,886	355,325	386,640	376,440	9,761	
Gold	1,433,585	355,882	355,882	2,203,212	2,203,212	—	
	21,110,958	22,545,922	19,570,741	31,532,226	23,412,890	11,094,517	

The eleven exports dealt with are representative and account for just over 90% of the principal exports. Details of the remaining exports are not readily available, but they do not affect the general result.

The figures of the deposits with the Banks of Issue in the Dominion tell the same tale. They are :—

	Year	Deposits.
Quarterly average	1913	£25,733,187
Quarterly average	1914	£27,640,507
June quarter ..	1915	£31,433,653
June quarter ..	1916	£38,523,448

Attention may now be directed to the ownership or control of those primary products whose value has been so much increased by the war.

There are in New Zealand, according to the last available returns, 73,826 holders of land in areas of one acre and upwards. Of the total holdings amounting to 40,238,126 acres, 16,551,697 are held on a freehold tenure and the

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remaining 23,686,429 acres are held under leases from the Crown or from the Natives or from Public Bodies. The rate of interest payable on money lent on First Mortgage has not been affected by the war and remains at 5½%. The rents payable by the leaseholders remain in the great majority of cases on a pre-war footing. Land holders therefore, have not materially suffered by increase in interest or rent, but the profits of production have doubtless been affected by increased cost of production, chiefly in the direction of higher wages and a higher cost of living. Making every allowance, however, it is undeniable that much the greater part of the added wealth has been received by the holders of land and those whose avocations are ancillary to land holding.

Before leaving this aspect of the economic situation, it should be noted that within the last few weeks the British Government has purchased the whole of the exportable clip of 1916-17 wool at a price approximating 55% higher than prices ruling immediately before the war. This huge deal was arranged satisfactorily and without much friction, considering the numerous adjustments and conciliations necessary not only with the wool growers, but with the various interested financial institutions, brokers, agents, warehousemen, valuers and wool scourers. The British authorities had previously acquired the total export of New Zealand mutton and lamb, so that they now own the entire carcase, and the Dominion sheep farmer is more or less in the situation of an Agister of the Imperial live stock.

So much for the production of commodities and their export. The following are the import figures for the first nine months of 1916:—

Imports.				
9 months ending	September 30th,	1916	£19,488,499
"	"	"	1915	£16,140,206
				£3,348,293
			Increase ..	

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The two contributing causes of this increase are a rise of prices and a rise of purchasing power owing to the prosperous condition of the country. An examination of the items published in the Government Statistician's return exemplifies the operation of these two factors. The increases are mainly in articles of luxury, and in drapery and soft goods, while the influence of the war is apparent in the diminished importation of such articles as oil engines, obtained now from Britain with difficulty, and of grass seeds, much of which normally come from enemy countries.

The balance of trade shows a largely increased excess of exports over imports compared with pre-war conditions, as the following table shows :—

Year.				Excess of Exports over Imports (excluding specie).
1913	£1,156,731
1914	5,109,698
1915	10,772,102
9 months 1916	9,127,434
9 months 1915	5,055,019

The war is costing New Zealand upwards of £1,000,000 a month and this money is partly spent in the Dominion and partly in maintaining our troops abroad. Of the excess of exports over imports a considerable portion represents payments made to maintain these troops overseas and a considerable portion has been invested locally in the war loan, whereof upwards of £10,000,000 has been raised in the Dominion.

It is obvious, therefore, that in this period of unexampled economic prosperity the profits made, although to some extent diffused throughout the community, find their way to those controlling or interested in the industries of primary production; and further, that little or no endeavour is being made to control private extravagance. It may be added that, in the opinion of many, now is the time, and the profits are the fund, and taxation is the

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instrument, for keeping the country on a sound financial footing, and that the policy of borrowing for the war is fraught with danger.

III. THE "CONSCRIPTION OF WEALTH" CRY

REFERENCE has been made in an earlier part of this paper to the activities of the anti-conscriptionists. The anti-conscriptionist looking around for any available element of discontent attaches himself here, as elsewhere, to that movement compendiously called "labour unrest," which is primarily directed against the capitalist and the landowner. The cry for conscription of wealth is made by many who are determined whatever happens to avoid, if they can, personal conscription or indeed patriotic service in any shape.

Now, no class in the community bears its share of personal sacrifice more readily by sending its men to the front than the landowners and farmers. But the duty of maintaining and developing our farm production for the use of the Empire frequently renders it necessary that skilled shepherds, sheep musterers, and farmers should be exempted from military service. The exemption of a farm hand is frequently just as necessary as that of a coal miner or a seaman, whose duty of stopping at home is acknowledged by all classes. Nevertheless, the claim for exemption of a farmer's son, and particularly of a wealthy farmer's son, is resented; and the cases where it is unjustifiably and unsuccessfully attempted, although few, obtain an evil conspicuousness. A farmer's exempted son is regarded as having it both ways. He enjoys personal safety under the paternal roof and benefits from the paternal profits. Furthermore, the resentment is increased by the constantly rising prices charged to the community for farmers' produce, and it reaches fever heat when some indiscreet farmer at a Farmers' Union or other gathering

The "Conscription of Wealth" Cry

denounces the Administration for attempting to clip these rising prices.

The result of the Australian Conscription Referendum and the great Coal Miners' Strike in New South Wales have inspired the anti-conscriptionists with hopes. The New Zealand Transportation Workers' Federation, refusing to accept an Industrial Arbitration Court Award, was on the verge of a strike and was conciliated by concession. A strike of the miners in one of the largest of our coal mines, the Blackball Mine in Westland, has occurred and is still unsettled. The strikers place in the forefront of their grievances the absence of a Referendum on the Conscription issue. The Blackball strike indeed shows signs of spreading to other coal mines, although it has been disowned by the executive of the New Zealand Coal Miners' Federation. The Ministry, recognising the gravity of a coal strike at the present juncture, has announced that facilities will be afforded to coal miners drawn in the ballot to apply for exemption to the Military Service Appeal Board.* Later on, it was announced that shearers and slaughtermen desiring exemption can make application through the Secretaries of their Unions.

Having regard, therefore, to the legitimate grievances of those who are not profiting by the war and to the labour menace, two things are absolutely necessary for the success of the Compulsory Military Service system and the performance by the Dominion of its duty, namely, resolution on the part of the Government and adequate measures for the removal of grievances. Those members of the Ministry who have been tried in the past have proved themselves not lacking in resolution. We proceed, therefore, to consider what measures the Government has hitherto adopted for the redress of grievances.

* The example of the Blackball miners was only followed at three small mines. Failing to obtain further support, the strikers all resumed work on December 11.

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IV. THE GOVERNMENT REMEDIES AND PALLIATIVES

THE Government has with no great success adopted two methods in endeavouring to grapple with the problems occasioned by the accumulation of war wealth by individuals and the increased cost of living occasioned by the war—taxation and regulation. It may be accepted as axiomatic that no one should be enriched by the war, but it can safely be said that we have not yet attained a standard of ethics where a man so enriched is regarded as disgraced.

The Government when it legislated to tax excess profits to the extent of 45% was confronted with many difficulties. Some arose out of the conditions of a new country. Others arose owing to the previous existence of two distinct systems of direct taxation, one the system of taxing incomes arising from all other sources than freehold land and mortgages and the other the system of taxing the capital value of freehold land and mortgages independently of the income derivable from them or of their productivity. The taxation of freeholds had its origin in the Radical past, when the large landowner was recognised as fair game. The freeholder was saved from financial extinction by the fortunate application of refrigeration to two of the leading products of the land, meat and dairy produce. When, therefore, Parliament decided to tax excess profits, there was an entire absence of data concerning profits or income made by freeholders. In these circumstances the Government was obliged to resort to empirical methods, and by the irony of fate the contemned freeholder in many instances found himself much more fortunately situated than the hitherto protected Crown leaseholder. Many other anomalies were discovered; and the legislation was only saved from general opprobrium by the tactfulness of the Chief Commissioner of Taxes, who was invested with wide

The Government Remedies and Palliatives

discretionary powers and who made a special tour of the Dominion interviewing taxpayers. A war profit should, however, be capable of legislative ascertainment, and it should not be beyond the wit of Parliament to devise a means of reaching it.

As regards the second method adopted by the Government in dealing with the economic problem, namely regulation, it is certain that the regulations which have provoked the most bitter feeling have been those fixing the wholesale price of butter at 1s. 5d. per pound and prohibiting the export of butter or cheese unless manufactured at a factory holding an export license, which is granted only upon the terms that the license holder pay the Crown $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per pound of butter fat used in the manufacture of butter or cheese at the factory. The money so received becomes distributable, after payment of expenses, to holders of export licenses as compensation for loss made by them in selling butter for home consumption instead of export. The validity of the regulations was unsuccessfully attacked in the Supreme Court, on the ground that the license fee was in its essence a tax, and that a tax cannot be imposed except by legislative authority. The majority of the Court was of opinion that authority to levy a fee could reasonably be inferred from the language of the Statute under which the regulations were made. The Chief Justice (Sir R. Stout) dissented, and in the course of an elaborate judgment likened the action of the Executive to the imposition of Ship money without legislative warrant by the Stuart Monarchy. Doubtless in the present crisis the tendency of the judiciary is to uphold the Executive, and it may be that a distinction can be drawn between the conduct of a Monarchy claiming Divine Right and that of an executive body appointed by Parliament and ultimately answerable to the people. Outside of the Law Courts, however, the objection to the license fee is based upon the broader ground that it is not levied for war purposes at all, but is an unjust enrichment of the

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consumer at the expense of the producer of one particular product. The local price of butter is not in itself a question of the first order of importance, but the principle once established is likely to spread. If the exigencies of the situation call for it, regulation and state control during the war are inevitable, and the action of the Imperial Parliament can be invoked as a precedent, if a precedent be wanted. The New Zealand Board of Trade, on whose Report the butter-fat regulations were framed, had previously made exhaustive enquiries into the prices of wheat, flour and bread, and had made a distinctly advantageous arrangement for the Dominion with the Colonial Sugar Company regarding the price at which sugar was to be sold in New Zealand. Its services, therefore, are likely to be utilised by the Government in any future attempt at price control.

So far then, the Government measures have proved to be palliative rather than remedial. With the prolongation of the war drastic efforts will inevitably be made to extinguish war profits completely and to control prices. Whether these aims are capable of achievement remains to be seen.

Voluntaryism, Compulsion, Labour unrest, heroism, "profiteering," each for the moment occupies our attention and then recedes. One thing is certain and enduring. Out of all this conflict and contention a Nationality is rapidly emerging. Hitherto, the people of these Islands, much occupied with their flocks and herds, living prosperously on their fertile lands, and more remote than any other white people from the great centres of civilisation, had not unnaturally developed in their isolation a certain provinciality of character. Especially was this noticeable in the New Zealand born. With the war, they have awakened and found themselves. They find themselves an integral part of a great Commonwealth of Nations, approximating more closely in habits and modes of

The Growth of a Nation

life to the inhabitants of the British Isles than to those of their sister Dominions, yet with an individuality of their own. As the vacant places become filled up, as under pressure of population the mountains and the forest lands become occupied, other influences will arise in national development. Meanwhile, in the country's short history, nothing has so influenced the national character as this great war experience. While affection for their island homes is more intense than ever, contact with the soldiers of the Empire and of France is affecting the outlook of the young New Zealanders. The nation is receiving a new moulding and a new spirituality.

New Zealand. December, 1916.



A WAR OF LIBERATION

“*OUR* victory is certain; I declare it with the profoundest conviction, here in exile, and precisely when monarchical reaction appears most insolently secure. What matters the triumph of an hour? What matters it that by concentrating all your means of action, availing yourselves of every artifice, turning to your account those prejudices and jealousies of race which yet for a while endure, and spreading distrust, egotism and corruption, you have repulsed our forces and restored the former order of things? Can you restore men’s faith in it, or think you can long maintain it by brute force alone, now that all faith in it is extinct? . . . Threatened and undermined on every side, can you hold all Europe for ever in a state of siege?”

There can be few finer examples of courage and faith in politics than this prophecy of ultimate victory in the hour of overwhelming defeat. It was written by Mazzini* in 1849, the year which witnessed the collapse of the great attempt of 1848 to free the peoples of Europe from the network of mediæval despotism re-imposed on them by the settlement of 1814-15. Absolutism, as Palmerston regretfully admitted, was once more in the ascendant; and even Mazzini’s sanguine spirit might have wavered if he could have foreseen how long that ascendancy would be maintained. Nearly seventy years were to pass before the hopes and passions of 1848 were once more set alight

* *Life and Writings of Mazzini*, vol. v, pp. 269-271.

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throughout Europe, before the vision of Europe as "one great emancipated land" came once more within the range of actuality. This time it was the forces of absolutism, not the forces of freedom, which brought the old issue to another open trial of strength; they themselves abandoned the passive "state of siege" and delivered a direct assault; and they found their old opponents, not indeed as wary and well prepared as they should have been, but as strong as ever in faith and resolution. So the struggle which began as a war of domination became a war of liberation; and as a war of liberation it will end.

I. ABSOLUTISM IN THE ASCENDANT.

THE strength and durability of the reaction were mainly due to one man's work. The convulsion of 1848 found Bismarck just at the outset of his career; and the political faith which was to inspire it to the end was never more clearly stated than in the famous sentence of his speech in the Prussian Assembly on March 22, 1849:

The strife of principles which during this year has shaken Europe to its foundations is one in which no compromise is possible. They rest on opposite bases. The one draws its law from what is called the will of the people, in truth, however, from the law of the strongest on the barricades. The other rests on authority created by God, on authority by the grace of God. . . . The decision on these principles will not come by parliamentary debate, not by majorities of eleven votes; sooner or later the God who directs the battle will cast his iron dice.

It was with this simple creed of government by divine right bestowed by the God of Battles—or, in plain words, hereditary military despotism—that Bismarck confronted the three great problems of his political life—the government of Prussia, the union of Germany and the balance of power in Europe. The first of these questions was, as he frankly put it, the question whether the House of Hohen-

Absolutism in the Ascendant

zollern or the House of Parliament should rule in Prussia ; and by the triumph of his " blood and iron " policy he gave it a decisive answer. After 1870 there was no longer any serious conflict on that issue. Democracy was thenceforth dead in Prussia. The exponents of liberalism were disillusioned and impotent, and worse than that, they became docile ; the idea of an executive responsible to the representatives of the people was so completely shelved that many years later, when the progressive Crown Prince Frederick at last succeeded to the throne (1888), Bismarck was able to make it a condition of his retaining office that there should be " no parliamentary government." *

The same " blood and iron " which had welded the yoke of absolutism so firmly again about the neck of Prussia had also bound Germany together. The union was not that democratic fusion of the German peoples which the idealists of 1848 had dreamed of—a fusion which had required the " absorption " of Prussia in the greater whole. It was a federation of governments, mostly monarchies of a sort, and all adhering more or less closely to the " unconstitutional " Prussian type. That the architect of the Imperial constitution regarded his handiwork as a new and powerful buttress of reaction is frankly disclosed in the letters to King Lewis of Bavaria, in which he described it as the " surest guarantee against the dangers to which law and order might be exposed in the free movement of the political life of to-day." † In other words, the German Empire was created as a new " Holy Alliance " against popular liberty. And leading, controlling, dominating the alliance stood absolutist Prussia. ‡ Treitschke, Bismarck's academic interpreter,

* Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. ii, p. 330.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 386.

‡ Prussia has 17 of the 58 votes in the Bundesrat (Article 6). Amendments to the constitution are lost if 14 votes are cast in the negative (Article 78). If opinion is divided on questions relating to the army, the navy, the tariff, etc., the Prussian vote is decisive if cast in favour of no change (Articles 5 and 37). In the event of a tie the Prussian vote decides (Article 7).

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could rightly give to united Germany a "hyphenated" title—*Preussen-Deutschland*.

And in the field of foreign policy Bismarck worked with the same singleness of purpose, the same simple plan of consolidating the forces of reaction against democracy. "I look for Prussian honour," he had said in 1850, "in Prussia's abstinence from any shameful union with democracy";* and twenty, thirty, forty years later he was true to his early creed. The absolutist powers were his natural allies, and he strove, as Metternich had striven, to keep the three great monarchies together. He first crushed and then conciliated Austria and bound her in a close alliance with Prussia-Germany. As a complement to this alliance he negotiated a secret "reinsurance" treaty with Russia and exerted himself unceasingly to quiet her suspicions by strengthening the personal ties between Romanoff and Hohenzollern, appealing to the common interests of the Russian and the Prussian Governments in the suppression of their Polish subjects, and even by suggesting that Austrian policy ought to "withdraw itself from the influence of Hungarian Chauvinism" and allow Russia to occupy Constantinople.† Meanwhile, to make assurance doubly sure, he took advantage of the isolation of united Italy to tempt her into partnership. It was the single exception to his rule against "union with democracy" and very characteristically he represented the alliance as primarily dynastic.

Towards the end of his memoirs Bismarck himself laid bare the whole basis of his foreign policy with his usual lucidity and candour.

The dangers to which our union with Austria are exposed by tentatives towards a Russo-Austrian understanding, . . . may, as far as possible, be minimised by keeping the strictest possible faith with Austria, and at the same time taking care that the road from Berlin to St. Petersburg is not closed. Our principal concern is to

* *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. i, p. 80.

† *Ibid*, vol. ii, pp. 285, 286.

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keep the peace between our two imperial neighbours. We shall be able to assure the future of the fourth great dynasty in Italy in proportion as we succeed in maintaining the unity of the three empire states, and in either bridling the ambition of our two neighbours on the east or satisfying it by an *entente cordiale* with both. Both are for us indispensable elements in the European political equilibrium; the lack of either would be our peril—but the maintenance of monarchical government in Vienna and St. Petersburg, and in Rome as dependent upon Vienna and St. Petersburg, is for us in Germany a problem which coincides with the maintenance of our own state regime.*

The maintenance of our own state regime, the preservation of the Hohenzollern autocracy and the military caste it rests on—to that end the most powerful statesman of nineteenth-century Europe devoted his life; to that end he paralysed liberalism and perverted nationalism in Germany, and held liberty at bay in Europe for half a century.

II. THE NEMESIS OF DESPOTISM

BISMARCK was well satisfied with his work; but its very success was to lead to its undoing. When he declared that Germany was now a “satiated” power, he forgot that by its nature military despotism is insatiable. From the days of the ancient Empires of the East to the reign of Napoleon history has proved again and again that the desire for power, if it be unchecked by the sense of responsibility, is one of the most implacable of human lusts. No sooner was Napoleon master of France than he strove to be master of Europe; no sooner had he mastered Europe than he dreamed of mastering the world. And so with the Prussian monarchy. The domination of Germany and the hegemony of Central Europe—from these achievements the craving for yet more power was bound to conjure up visions of wider conquests. Inevitably, too, the weapons

* *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. ii, pp. 271, 272.

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Bismarck had used, the arguments he had relied on, to widen the range of Prussian power were employed for carrying the process beyond the limits he had set to it. When William I had hesitated to steal Holstein for the purpose of strengthening Prussia's maritime position, Bismarck had recalled the conquering tradition of the Hohenzollerns and reminded him "that every one of his immediate ancestors . . . had won an increment of territory for the state." * What was to prevent the same insidious appeal to a mediæval dynastic pride from stirring the heart of William II? Bismarck, again, had declared in 1850 that Prussia could not "allow anything to happen in Germany without her consent": † and fifty years later almost as a matter of course, came the Kaiser's modern version of that doctrine—"Neither on the ocean nor across it can any great decision be again arrived at without Germany and the German Emperor." ‡

Nor is it only the lust for power that makes absolutism a danger to the world. Absolutism is doomed to be aggressive. For ever engaged in a war with the future, perpetually "threatened and undermined" by the forces of progress, it must for its very preservation be always sharpening its weapons, and from time to time for the same reasons it is compelled to use them. The Kaiser, like every autocrat before him, was bound to foster the military pride of the army on which his power rested; bound, too, in the end, to glut its leaders' appetite for fighting. Like every autocrat, he was bound to use all means for bringing the minds as well as the arms of his people under his sway; to teach them the doctrine of a superhuman State unfettered by morality or law; and to tempt them back across the ages to the barbaric cult of Thor and Odin. And at the last, when despite his utmost efforts the rising tide of Social Democracy began to wash

* *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. ii, p. 9.

† *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 80.

‡ Speech of July 3, 1900.

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the footsteps of his throne, he was driven to adapt for his immediate needs the policy which had served Bismarck so well—to divert attention from domestic to external problems, to eclipse the hope of liberty at home with the glamour of ascendancy abroad, and then, when antagonism was inevitably provoked thereby, to spread the legend of “encirclement,” to raise the old cry of “danger to the Fatherland,” and finally to set the world at war on the plea of self-defence. All this was inevitable under the circumstances if military despotism was to endure in Germany. It *was* a war of self-defence—not, however, for the German people, but, in a sense, against them. If the Emperor and his generals could repeat on a larger scale the triumphs of 1864 to 1870, then the clock could be set back again; the ideas of their “enemies” the Social Democrats and of all the exponents of popular liberty and parliamentary government would be once more discredited and forgotten; and militarism and autocracy would be riveted still more firmly and lastingly about the German people.

So elaborate were their preparations, so immense their military strength, and so great the aggressor’s advantage in choosing his own moment for the war, that the exponents of Prussianism may well have thought it not very difficult to win their game a second time. They could not fail to realise indeed that the obstacles to their success were more formidable than before. In attempting to make Prussia dominant in Germany they had only had to reckon with the hostility of two first-rank Powers, and Bismarck had managed to keep Austria and France apart and crush them separately. But in attempting to make Prussian Germany dominant in Europe they had to face more numerous opponents, and, as it turned out, to fight them all together. The first of these was France—a France which had risen undaunted from the ashes of 1870, with clearer eyes, a steadier heart and a body politic more closely knit together; a France, moreover, with whom Prussianism in the ascendant could never come to terms. For nowhere was the

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conflict of ideals more obvious or more inexorable. Napoleonism had gone down for ever in the red sunset of Sedan : France had made her final choice for liberty, and become once more, as in 1789 and 1830 and 1848, its ringleader in Europe. There could be no harmony whatever between her conception of Europe as a company of free States with equal rights and the Prussian conception of a single dominant State, overriding the rights of all its neighbours, dictating their policy, holding over them a perpetual threat of war.

And the working-out of the new scheme of aggrandisement had necessarily upset the equilibrium so carefully maintained by Bismarck and ranked Russia beside France. "Hungarian Chauvinism" was positively encouraged at Vienna in order that the Hapsburg Empire under the control of a German-Magyar clique might establish its ascendancy in the Balkans and so open the road for German dominion to Constantinople and beyond it to the gates of Africa and India. And this, of course, was an open challenge to Russia's traditional claims as the friend and liberator of the Balkan Slavs. So Russia withdrew from the *entente* of the three Emperors and entered on the Dual Alliance.

One more dislocation of Bismarck's diplomatic system was also unavoidable. Unnatural from the outset, the alliance of free Italy with Central European absolutism could scarcely be expected to stand the strain of a deliberate policy of German expansion. For Italy, despite Bismarck's pretensions, was a democratic, not a dynastic State ; and the Italian people could never join hands with the Hohenzollern and the Hapsburg in an attack on democracy in Western Europe.

And what of England ? William II and his advisers were prepared to face France and Russia : they doubtless relied on securing at the worst the neutrality of Italy : but did they also discount England ? Bismarck had discounted her ; and events, it seemed, had iustified them. Since

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then, indeed, the development of Prussian ambitions had stirred her from her isolation and brought her to a seemingly half-hearted and uneasy "understanding" with France and Russia. But since then, also, Treitschke's reading of English history as one long sordid record of selfishness and duplicity had sunk deep into the German mind. Might not this second Carthage, drowsing over her money-bags, her ancient warrior spirit long since sapped away by luxury, be easily cajoled or bribed or even intimidated into breaking the frail threads of honour—as soon as their maintenance intact should clearly come to mean the sacrifice of English wealth and English lives ?

It must have been somewhat on these lines that Prussian statesmen and soldiers calculated the prospects of their scheme. With increasing emphasis the course of the war has shown how narrow was their outlook and how fatally it misled them. It is the nemesis of despotism not only that it must always be striving to enlarge its power, but also that it should fail to estimate aright the strength of the antagonism its efforts must arouse, till sooner or later it overreaches itself and meets its fate. Schooled in the creed of blood and iron it misjudges the forces of the spirit. It cannot understand the free man's moral hatred of slavery. It thinks that all men measure life by its own material standards ; that democracy has no aim or meaning beyond the appeasement of the mob ; that justice and good faith in international relations are the catchwords of conscious hypocrisy ; that no one in his heart denies that might is right. And so the Prussian autocrat and his advisers wholly failed to foresee that their long-planned *coup* and the manner of its execution would outrage the moral sense of all free and enlightened men, reveal again to a younger generation the half-forgotten evils inherent in autocracy, and force the world to recognise the war as one more trial of the oldest and greatest moral issue in politics, the issue between tyranny and freedom.

They may still be undeceived. They may still think that

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the democracies of Europe are influenced by material interests alone; that millions of free Englishmen, for instance, are fighting now because they are afraid of German power or covetous of German trade. But must they not confess that they have raised against themselves a stronger passion than fear or greed when they look to-day at Russia or turn from the Old World to the New? How can they account in the terms of their crude materialism for the part the British Dominions have played in the war, for the actions and the declared intentions of the United States, or for the Russian Revolution?

III. THE DEDICATION OF THE NEW WORLD

IF proof were needed that absolutism is a relic of the past—a garment outgrown by the moral stature of humanity and doomed in the end to be discarded by all civilised men—it would be found most manifestly in the political character of the New World. To these peoples with their almost immeasurable possibilities of growth it will one day fall to play a greater part than the peoples of Europe in moulding the destiny of mankind; and nowhere among them is there now or can there ever be a place or a hope for absolutism. To them as to us its doctrines are revolting, its pretensions ludicrous, its prestige among the peoples it still dupes and victimises almost inexplicable. To the principles of self-government, on the other hand, they have consecrated their political life. Within their boundaries—in North and South America, in Australasia, in South Africa—democracy in various forms is universal: they regard it as their natural and inalienable heritage and the substitution of any other type of government as well-nigh inconceivable. This allegiance of the New World to a single political creed is one of the most significant facts in modern history; but the counsellors of Prussianism failed to appreciate its force or discern its bearing on their

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plans of conquest. They regarded the New World as too remote from Europe, too ignorant of its affairs, above all, too much absorbed in its own material development, to allow itself to be seriously entangled in a European war. In no immediate danger, with little or nothing to gain and much to lose, why should those distant nations abandon their habitual dreams of peace and exchange prosperity and ease for sacrifice and bloodshed ?

The answer was quickly given by the British Dominions. Legally they were at war as soon as the United Kingdom, but there was no law to determine the part they were to take in it. They were free to choose whether they should remain passively on the defensive or make a half-hearted show of co-operation with the mother-country or throw themselves into the struggle with all their soul and strength. That they chose the last of these and chose it on the instant was primarily due to their prompt recognition of the issues at stake. At the emergency session of the Canadian Parliament, summoned on the outbreak of the war, Sir Robert Borden declared that Canada would fight "to uphold the principles of liberty, to withstand forces that would convert the world into an armed camp."* And the universal response to this appeal for the defence of freedom against militarism, not only in the Dominions but in India also, revealed, as never before, that the unity of the British Commonwealth is above all a moral unity, its binding force a common love of liberty and justice, transcending the ties of sentiment and kinship, surmounting the barriers of race and nationality, linking the West to the East. "This war," says the French Canadian veteran, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, "is a contest between German institutions and British institutions. British institutions mean freedom. German institutions mean despotism. That is why we Canadians have such a vital interest in this war."† The oversea peoples of the British Commonwealth, says the Dutch

* THE ROUND TABLE, December, 1914, p. 182.

† *Ibid.*, December, 1915, p. 144.

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South African soldier and statesman, General Smuts, came forward "solely as free men," because they "felt that the cause of liberty was endangered" and because "our whole ideal was to be free, and to build up new countries . . . without the terror of militarism always overshadowing us."* And the Maharajah of Bikanir describes the enthusiasm of India for the war, her ready sacrifice of life and treasure, as "India's rally to the British flag of freedom." †

Sooner or later the answer of the British Commonwealth to the Prussian challenge to democracy was bound to be echoed by the greatest of all the New World peoples. The American Republic was dedicated to democracy at its birth. It came into existence because British citizens in the thirteen American colonies insisted on their right to enjoy an equal measure of self-government with British citizens in the mother-country and refused, therefore, to pay taxes, even for the maintenance of their own defence, levied by a parliament in which they were not represented. "Governments are instituted among men deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed"—that was the claim which, like their forefathers in England a century before, they asserted and made good by war and revolution; and from that day to this those famous key-words of the Declaration of Independence have stood written on the hearts of the American people as the golden rule of politics. Now, absolutism is the direct negation of that rule; and, as soon as they recognised that absolutism was up in arms in Europe to extend its dominion among men, the American people were bound to meet the challenge and vindicate their faith.

Those Americans who were better versed in the diplomatic history of Europe discerned the true nature of the issue at the outset of the war; and President Wilson, an historian himself, however ambiguous at times his official declarations may have been, must have possessed from the

* Speech at the Guildhall, May 1, 1917.

† *Times*, May 10, 1917.

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first as full a knowledge and as clear an insight as any of his countrymen. The allied democracies of Europe were assured, therefore, of a quick and cordial sympathy from many Americans and of at least a benevolent neutrality from the Government. But it could be no more than neutrality until the great majority of the American people shared in the President's knowledge and insight; and, deep as was the ignorance of European affairs among the mass of the British people in 1914, it was still more profound among the mass of Americans, thousands of miles away from Europe. The enlightenment of this vast body of opinion was slow, but it was sure. The truth would out. Prussianism at war inevitably unmasked itself; it boasted of its strength and its projects of dominion; it displayed, on a wider scale and in a more terrible and indiscriminate fashion than the world had yet seen, the evils that flow from irresponsible power. And so the American people, like their British kinsmen, were awakened to the facts; more than that, they were forced, as we were, to forsake a tradition of isolation from Europe and indifference to its destiny that was older and stronger than ours.

The entrance of the United States into the war is described in another article in this issue. We are only concerned here to point out how it emphasises anew the real character of the conflict; and nowhere has it been more clearly and frankly stated than in the speech in which President Wilson asked Congress to declare the United States to be at war with Germany. At last the fetters of official neutrality were broken and he was free to speak his mind.

Our object (he said) is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish autocratic power, and to set up amongst really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth ensure the observance of these principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom

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of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organised force which is controlled wholly by their will and not by the will of their people.

The war, he went on, was not made with the "previous knowledge or approval" of the German people.

It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days, when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interests of dynasties or little groups of ambitious men, who were accustomed to use their fellow-men as pawns and tools.

In Prussian autocracy, plotting war in this antiquated fashion and preparing for it and aiding it with wholesale spying and intrigue, the President solemnly declared that the United States could "never have a friend": and he summed up in one sentence the final reason why the American people were accepting "the gage of battle" with "this natural foe to liberty," and would "if necessary spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power"—"*The world must be safe for democracy.*"

To such a task we can dedicate our lives, our fortunes, everything we are, everything we have, with the pride of those who know the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and might for the principles that gave her birth.

The spirit of this great speech is true to the noblest of all American traditions. The founders of the American Commonwealth believed that in preserving liberty in America they were working for the future of mankind; and Lincoln once affirmed that to him the most inspiring idea in the Declaration of Independence was "the sentiment which gave liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but I hope to the world, for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men."*

* Lord Charnwood, *Abraham Lincoln*, p. 183.

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Among all the wrong and injury which the Prussian authors of this war have brought upon humanity, they have done it the signal service of breaking through the crust of indifference and aloofness which had hitherto kept the American people from playing their part in keeping the world safe for democracy, and of ranking them beside the British peoples oversea to defend in far-off Europe the faith they hold in common. It was a British statesman who, after a short and bloodless conflict with the absolutist Powers of Europe nearly a century ago, declared that he had "called a New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." A similar fate has now befallen them and this time they have brought it on themselves.

IV. REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

SHORTLY before President Wilson thus defined the issues of the war they had been defined in the same terms and with even more startling significance by events in Europe. In the course of three days, between March 13 and 15, the Russian autocracy was overthrown, and the largest State in Europe and the third largest in the world became a democracy.

Not many years ago Russia was politically the most backward of the European Powers. It was only in 1861 that the Russian peasantry were emancipated by the Czar's *ukase* from serfdom. But at heart the Russian people, despite or rather because of their simplicity, were freer than the German people. The democratic spirit was alive in the personal fellowship and social equality of their village-life, and there was no all-pervading State machine of education devised to drill them, as the Germans were drilled, into unquestioning docility. Thus, while absolutism grew stronger in Germany, it grew weaker in Russia. Under the régime of Bismarck, Berlin, not Petrograd, was its true metropolis. But Bismarck had striven (as has been

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seen) to keep the Russian and Prussian autocracies together. For the ultimate maintenance of absolutism in Europe he desired them to strengthen and support each other ; and he used his influence at the Russian Court to fortify Czardom and to imbue with his own ruthless Prussian spirit the bureaucracy, largely German in its personnel, through which Czardom worked its will. The change of orientation in German foreign policy reversed the situation. Russia soon found herself forced into another diplomatic camp ; and the new alliance with France, the new friendship with Britain, inevitably strengthened the forces of Russian liberalism. It is noteworthy that the secession of Russian foreign policy from the absolutist group coincided with a vigorous effort on the part of the Russian reformers to obtain some measure of popular government, with the winning of the right to free speech and a free press, the creation of the first Russian Parliament and the growth of an industrial democracy. But Prussianism still kept its hold on the Court and the bureaucracy. As his treatment of the Duma showed, the Romanoff was no readier than the Hohenzollern to share his power with the people.

Before the war, then, there was a latent contradiction between the domestic and the foreign policy of the Russian autocracy ; and it was necessarily clarified and emphasised by the war itself. The more evident it became that the war was in reality a conflict of political ideals, the more unnatural seemed the position of an absolutist State among the allied democracies of Europe. Neutrals, and especially Americans, whose country had been in the past the special refuge of Russian fugitives from tyranny, could not but see in it a very solid obstacle to a whole-hearted sympathy with the Allies' cause : and Russian intellectuals and progressives could not but feel that, as long as Czardom prevailed, the cause which Russia fought for could not be quite the same as the cause which France and Britain, Italy and Belgium, fought for ; that she could not fully share in their purpose or their victory. And when it became

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evident that the natural instincts on which the Holy Alliance and Bismarck's league of autocrats had once been founded were again asserting themselves in the *entourage* of the Czar, when it was discovered that certain of his ministers had even contemplated a treacherous bargain with the German Government, the Russian people rose, and, the army being with them, achieved the most sudden and sweeping revolution in history.

There were many, before the war, who believed that such a triumph for liberty in Russia was beyond the bounds of possibility, at any rate for years to come. It is the direct outcome of the war, the first great achievement of those immeasurable forces which Prussian absolutism was fated to raise against itself and all its kind. If the war should end to-day absolutism would have already suffered a disastrous blow. Of its four historic citadels in Europe only Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople would remain in its hands.

The revolution (said Mr. Lloyd George in his message to Prince Lvoff, the new Russian Prime Minister) whereby the Russian people have based their destinies on the sure foundation of freedom is the greatest service which they have yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been fighting since August, 1914. . . It shows that, through the war, the principle of liberty, which is the only sure safeguard of peace in the world, has already won one resounding victory.

In these words of welcome to the new-born Russian Commonwealth, Mr. Lloyd George was speaking from the heart of the British people ; but, profound and spontaneous as it was, our satisfaction was tinged with anxiety. The consolidation of democracy in Russia is in any case a colossal task and its difficulty is immeasurably heightened by the strain of war. The situation is still too obscure for any outside critic to pass judgment on it. But this much at least is clear. Until an assembly can be created with direct authority to express the will of the Russian people as to the future constitution, government must be carried on

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by mutual agreement between the leaders of the revolution. And during this *interregnum* there can be no security against the forces of disorder within or the forces of despotism without unless that agreement is cordial and effective and expresses itself in the maintenance of a single supreme executive with undisputed authority both in internal affairs and in the conduct of the war. For some weeks such unity seemed unattainable. A Provisional Government was established at the outset of the Revolution, but from the first it did not stand alone. Another body, the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, representing the Socialist parties, not only formulated a national policy of its own both in foreign and in domestic affairs, but assumed executive power and issued orders to the people and the armies concurrently with the orders of the Government. Such a "dyarchy" was bound to compromise the prospects of order and good government. Economic reorganisation and the maintenance of military discipline were equally impracticable as long as citizens and soldiers were called on to serve two masters; and the hands of the Government were also tied and weakened in its efforts to maintain unity of purpose and action with the Allies. How serious the situation became was frankly expressed by M. Kerensky, Minister of Justice and the single Socialist representative in the Provisional Government, in the eloquent appeal he addressed on May 13 to a conference of delegates from the armies at the front.*

I no longer feel my former courage (he said), I am no longer sure the Russian people are not rebellious slaves but responsible citizens worthy of the Russian nation. . . . If the tragedy and desperateness of the situation are not realised by all, if our State organism does not work like a machine, then all our dreams of liberty, all our ideals, will be thrown back decades and may be will be drowned in blood. . . . We have tasted freedom and are becoming intoxicated. But we need now the greatest possible sobriety and discipline. History must be able to say of us, "They died, but were never slaves."

* Reported in *Daily Chronicle*, May 15, 1917.

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Anxiety was deepened by the news of the resignation of M. Gutchkoff, Minister of War, and the report that General Brusiloff and General Gurko had asked to be relieved of their commands. But just at this darkest moment the sky seemed suddenly to brighten. On May 15 the proposal that a Coalition Government should be formed was accepted by the Executive Committee of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates and on the following day this decision was endorsed at a plenary meeting of the Council. A definite "statement of agreement" embodying the principle of a single supreme authority having been drawn up and signed, a new Cabinet was promptly constructed containing six Socialists with M. Kerensky as Minister of War. The most authoritative comment on the prospects of the new régime may be found in the statement made by Prince Lvoff, who remains Prime Minister, to a representative of the American press.

The most serious crisis in Russia's modern history has been satisfactorily settled, and conditions already show marked symptoms of improvement. It is my impression that the new Coalition Cabinet will receive the support of all reasonable Russian citizens. . . . Most of the difficulties of my first revolutionary Cabinet arose from the fact that in all questions I and my colleagues were obliged to rely solely upon moral persuasion. There was no actual governmental power with material force, such as you have in America and in the world's other democratic countries. . . . This force could only be obtained if representatives of the Socialist and allied Left parties entered the Government and agreed to support it unshrinkingly in a policy of combined freedom and order. If this solution had proved unreachably we were threatened with general anarchy, followed by national disillusion with the revolution and with a reactionary counter-revolutionary movement as the final stage. This, the normal course of unsuccessful revolution, has, I hope, been avoided as a result of agreement between the temporary Government and the Council of Delegates. The Council has undertaken to support the Government against anarchy and disorder, and further to work for restoring discipline to the army, naturally on the condition, which we granted, that the army should be democratized. . . . In future Russia is democratic, and must not only enjoy freedom, but must take on herself the responsibility of defending

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freedom. . . . During the negotiations which have led to the settlement, representatives of the Council of Delegates showed that they thoroughly understood the dangers threatening Russia and were determined to do everything possible to save the country from anarchy, defeat, and dissolution.

All the world's democracies will pray for the success of the new régime, for Russia's sake and also for their own. For it is not in Russia only that the triumph of liberty is imperilled. The cause of free Russia is indissolubly linked with the cause of her allies. If her strength is sapped and dissipated by dissension and disorder, so much the harder and the longer will be the task of all the other free peoples of the world in breaking the power of Prussianism. But amid all her troubles free Russia can never come to terms with absolutism. She can no more make peace with the Kaiser than she can restore the Czar. The German Government is now straining every nerve to repair the injury its cause has suffered from the Revolution by patching up a peace. In his eagerly awaited statement to the Reichstag on May 15 the Chancellor had not a word to say of the ambitions he still cherishes in the West or in the Balkans, or of the possibility of negotiation with the Western Allies. "In a debate on war aims," he said, "the only guiding line for me is an early and satisfactory conclusion of the war." But to Russia he held out the olive branch. "I do not doubt that an agreement aiming exclusively at a mutual understanding could be obtained which would exclude every thought of oppression and leave behind no sting of discord."

The Russian people will not be deceived. Their peasant soldiers may not be quick to recognise the needs of the domestic situation; they may be puzzled for the moment by the conflict of authority and diversity of interests which cloud the early days of every revolution; but on one point there can be no doubt or confusion in their minds. They know that the German Government is the Kaiser's Government; that the Kaiser's power in Germany is as

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the Czar's power was in Russia ; and that, till Germany also achieves her revolution, she must always be the implacable enemy of Russia's new-born freedom. 'The answer they will give to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's offer was foreshadowed in the manifesto which the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued on the day before he spoke.

The regiments of William (it declared) are destroying Revolutionary Russia. Do not forget, soldiers and comrades (it continued), that peace cannot be achieved if you do not check the enemy's pressure at the front, if your ranks are pierced, and if the Russian Revolution, like an inanimate body, lies at the feet of William. You who are in the trenches, do not forget that you are defending the liberty of the Russian Revolution and of your brother workmen and peasants. . . . The German Army is not a revolutionary army. It still blindly follows William and Charles, emperors and capitalists. . . . Peace will not be obtained by separate treaties, nor by the fraternisation of isolated regiments and battalions. This way will only lead you to the loss of the Russian Revolution, the safety of which does not lie in peace or in a separate armistice.

Such was the attitude of the Council before its concordat with the Provisional Government, and it was clearly expressed in the “statement of agreement,” which declared that “the defeat of Russia and her allies would be the cause of the greatest national disaster” and asserted the principle of the unity of all the allied fronts.

V. “ REFORM ” IN PRUSSIA

THERE is one last card the German Government can play. It can deny the reality of the gulf which now divides the great Slav and Teuton States more sharply than ever did their difference of race. It can admit that events in Petrograd have inevitably reacted in Berlin : that the revolutionary spirit is so contagious that even its own docile people have been in some degree infected with it. And having confessed those disagreeable truths, it can go on to

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make a virtue of necessity, to declare its intention to satisfy its people's needs, and to exhibit as proof thereof its programme of domestic reform. But before democrats in any country allow themselves to be disarmed by the belief that absolutism in Prussia has been converted by its enemies and has already contemplated suicide to make way for a system more amenable to them, they will do well to consider exactly how far the Kaiser and his ministers have been driven by necessity and exactly what measure of virtue they can claim to have displayed.

On March 29 the Chancellor confessed in the Reichstag that "before the war the interests of the labouring classes were placed in an apparently irreconcilable opposition to the interests of the State and of the employers."

I hope (he continued) that the war will cure us of this delusion. For if it does not, if we are not resolved to accept all the consequences of this war unreservedly, in all questions of political life, in the settlement of workmen's rights, in the adjustment of the Prussian electoral system, and in the adjustment of the Diet altogether . . . then we should be moving towards internal disorders the extent of which no man can measure. . . . Woe to the statesman who does not recognise the signs of the times.

Ten days later the Kaiser revealed the scope of the "unreserved" reforms, foreshadowed by his Chancellor, in a rescript of which the essential parts were as follows :

It falls to you, as the responsible Chancellor of the German Empire and the First Minister of my Government in Prussia, to assist in obtaining the fulfilment of the demands of this hour by the right means and at the right time, and in this spirit to shape our political life in order to make room for the free and willing co-operation of all members of our people. The principles which you have developed in this respect have, as you know, my approval. I feel conscious of remaining thus on the path taken by my grandfather, the founder of the Empire, who as King of Prussia with military organisation, and as German Emperor with social reform, typically fulfilled his monarchical obligations, thereby creating conditions by means of which the German people, in united and wrathful perseverance, will overcome these sanguinary times. The

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maintenance of the fighting force as a real people's army, and the promotion of the social welfare of the people in all its classes, have been my aim from the beginning of my reign.

While millions of our fellow-countrymen are in the field the conflict of opinion behind the front, which is unavoidable in such a far-reaching change of the Constitution, must be postponed in the highest interests of the Fatherland, until the time of the homecoming of our warriors. . . .

The rescript then defined the “ far-reaching change ” as “ a reform of the Prussian Diet ” by the abolition of the class-franchise and the institution of direct and secret election for the Lower House and by the admission into the Upper House “ in a more extensive and more proportionate manner than hitherto, men from the various classes and callings of the people who are respected by their fellow-citizens.” These reforms were described as “ the liberation of our entire inner political life.”

I act (the rescript concluded) according to the traditions of my great forefathers when, in strengthening the important positions of our firmly-constructed storm-proof Constitution, I show to my loyal, brave, proficient, and highly developed people the confidence which it deserves. I charge you to make this edict known forthwith.

In form and content this document is less a promise of self-government for Prussia in the future than a reminder of the strength of Prussian absolutism in the present. It reminds us of the grotesquely out-of-date three-class system for the indirect election on a property basis of the Lower House of the Prussian Diet, a system so contrived that “ the largest tax-payers—that is, the richest men, who are, of course, comparatively few in number—choose as many electors as the great mass of labourers.” * It reminds us, too, of the unrepresentative character of the Upper House, of whose members, appointed by the King at will, “ more than one third are hereditary nobles possessing large estates, while another third are nominated by the landowners, so

* A. Lawrence Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, vol. i., p. 305

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that the House is really controlled by the landed gentry.”* And, above all, it reminds us that, despite its oligarchic composition, the Diet possesses no substantial power even over its own destiny. Its reform, its very existence, is a matter for the King’s decision. It was created in 1849 by a constitution, not agreed upon with the consent of the people, but “conceded” to them by the King. And it is now again the King who commands his Chief Minister to submit proposals for its reform to *him*, the principles on which such proposals are to rest having already obtained *his* approval. The whole policy, indeed, is *his*, inspired, as he repeatedly declares, by the “traditions of his great forefathers.” There could indeed be no more direct denial of the first principles of self-government nor more uncompromising assertion of the absolute sovereignty of the Crown than the royal mandate which is to inaugurate “the liberation” of Prussia’s “entire political life.”

It is worth while to look more closely at the power actually wielded by the Prussian Crown. In the rescript of January 4, 1882, the King insisted “on his right to direct personally the politics of his Government”; and government in Prussia is still the “personal” government of the King. The administration is carried on by ministers, appointed and instructed by him, and responsible to him alone. Over their actions the Diet has no effective control. Legislation must receive the King’s consent and is usually initiated by his ministers. The Diet has the right to veto bills; but money-bills are the only bills whose rejection could bring the Government to a standstill; and more than once in Bismarck’s time when the Diet refused to vote appropriations the Government continued to raise and spend money without its consent. It is, in fact, laid down by most Prussian constitutional jurists that the Diet, having no power by itself to repeal laws, has no right to make them inoperative by refusing funds for their mainte-

* A. Lawrence Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, vol. i., p. 302.

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nance and that in the event of such refusal the King is entitled to make the requisite expenditures. To overcome opposition, moreover, the King can at any time close the session of the Diet or dissolve the Lower House: and it has frequently happened that, the elections having proved unfavourable, the King has dissolved a new Diet before it met.*

Scarcely less absolute is the power of the Prussian Crown within the German Empire; for the German Emperor must always be the King of Prussia and the Imperial Constitution only departs from the Prussian pattern where the exigencies of a federal system require it. The Lower House of the Imperial Legislature—the Reichstag—is indeed elected on a basis of universal suffrage;† but it has no more real control over administration or legislation than the Prussian Diet. The Imperial Chancellor has hitherto coincided with the Prussian Chief Minister; and the holder of those two offices is as completely responsible to the Crown—and to no other authority whatever—in the one case as in the other. The Reichstag’s control over finance is limited like the Diet’s; and the same theory is upheld as to “ necessary ” expenditure.

But the backbone of Prussian absolutism, whether in Prussia or in all Germany, lies in its military power. The law of the Imperial Constitution on the question is as follows:

The navy of the Empire is a unitary one under the supreme command of the Kaiser. The organisation and composition of it shall be the duty of the Kaiser, who appoints the officers and officials of the navy, and to whom they, together with the crews, take an oath of obedience. (Art. 53.)

The total land force of the Empire shall constitute a uniform

* See A. Lawrence Lowell, *op. cit.*, vol. i., pp. 298–299.

† Universal suffrage was the “ blackmail to the opposition ” paid by Bismarck during the Austrian war. His famous confession on this point has a direct bearing on the present programme of reform in Prussia. See his *Reflections and Reminiscences*, vol. ii., p. 64.

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army which in peace and in war is under the command of the Kaiser. (Art. 63.)*

All German troops are bound to render unconditional obedience to the commands of the Kaiser. This obligation is to be included in the military oath.

The chief commanding officers of a contingent, as well as all officers who command troops of more than one contingent, and all commandants of fortresses, shall be appointed by the Kaiser. The officers appointed by him shall take the military oath to him. The appointment of generals and of officers performing the duties of generals within a contingent is made dependent in each case upon the consent of the Kaiser. (Art. 64.)

Further, the Kaiser has the right to order mobilisation, including the calling out of the reserves and the *Landsturm* (Art. 63, Clause 4), and, "if in any part of the federal territory the public safety is threatened"—it is for him to decide whether this condition is fulfilled—to proclaim a state of siege, *Kriegszustand* (Art. 68), in which event martial law comes into force, the civil authorities become everywhere subordinate to the military commanders, and the orders of the latter are to be executed without it being permissible to raise the question of their legality. In other words, on the outbreak of war or of any revolutionary movement which in his opinion threatens the public safety, the Kaiser frankly assumes the absolute military dictatorship which at other times is more or less concealed beneath scraps of constitutional paper.

There lies the strength of Prussian absolutism. The most powerful military force the world has ever known is dedicated to the service not of a people but of a single man; and for the use he may choose to make of it that man is answerable to no authority on earth. The stress which the present Kaiser has laid on the personal allegiance of his soldiers to himself has been strictly in accordance with the practice of his "great forefathers." It has naturally

* By the treaty of November 23, 1870, the Bavarian army is to be under the command of the King of Bavaria in peace, but it is to come under the Kaiser's command when mobilisation begins.

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figured in his innumerable speeches to his troops, never more significantly, perhaps, than on that famous occasion on which he told a body of recruits that, if he bade them shoot their fathers and brothers, they must obey him. And if rumours from neutral countries are true, the command to fire on civilians in the streets of German towns has been more than once obeyed in the course of the war.

In face of such realities the Kaiser's promise of reform seems almost ludicrous in its insufficiency. No wonder that a Minority Socialist openly declares his description of the army as “a real people's army” to be “a great untruth.”* No wonder that Herr Harden, the free-lance of Prussian journalism, mocks at the rescript and calls for a real political advance. It was at once manifest, moreover, that the wider question of imperial politics would be very little affected by such tinkering with the Prussian Constitution; and the fundamental question of ministerial responsibility has already been raised in the Constitution Committee of the Reichstag.† On the occasion, finally, of the Chancellor's statement on May 15, Herr Lebedour, the leader of the extreme Left, openly declared for a Republic; and even Herr Scheidemann, the chief of the Majority Socialists, hitherto so loyal to the Government, referred amid a storm of angry protests to the possibility of revolution.‡

* Herr Cohn in the Reichstag. *Times*, May 8, 1917.

† Proposals submitted to the Constitution Committee of the Reichstag by the Centre, the Progressive People's Party and the National Liberals (*Times*, May 5, 1917). Herr Dernburg's remarkable speech at Breslau on April 29 (reported in the *Daily Chronicle*, May 1, 1917) in which he pleaded for parliamentary government, should not be overlooked, but its significance must be estimated in the light of the following facts: (1) that Herr Dernburg belongs to the Prussian governing class, and served as Colonial Secretary under Prince Bülow; (2) that he spoke just before May 1; (3) that his demands were for the future. “If we wish for parliamentary government,” he said, “we must develop necessary strength for it.”

‡ Herr Scheidemann prophesied a revolution, if the Allies should renounce all annexations and “the German Government were then to desire to continue the war for conquest-aims.” Later in the debate he explained that this condition could not be realised because no Government could “ever come into power which could be so perfectly stupid. I do not regard that as possible—not even if the Government were formed of Pan-Germans.”

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But against those who are bold enough to confess themselves unsatisfied are ranged the solid forces of reaction. The excuse given in the royal rescript for postponing the introduction even of the modest Prussian programme till after the war was the "unavoidable conflict of opinion" it would provoke; and the Chancellor confessed that it "would undoubtedly lead to bitter struggles." Indeed the Prussian Conservatives have already asserted their vehement antagonism to the proposed reforms; and that the monarch and his army should be absolutely free from parliamentary interference is a dogma they will never disavow. And they can still, it seems, rely not only on the dumb obedience of the rank and file of the army but also on the general acquiescence of the civil population in the dominance of militarism. The appeal to "blood and iron" is still stronger than "majority resolutions"; and a Prussian War Minister can still disarm and suppress popular agitation by invoking the popularity, or at least the intimidating prestige, of the man who is recognised as the embodiment of Prussianism unregenerate and inflexible. "Who dares," asked General Gröner in his manifesto to the munition workers a few days before the First of May, "who dares to defy Marshal von Hindenburg's call? . . . Who dares to refuse work when Marshal von Hindenburg demands it?" And similarly the Chancellor himself, while he offers his pinchbeck charter of liberty with one hand, rattles the sword of military despotism with the other. On May 15 he refused, as has been noted, to satisfy the Socialists' demand for a definite statement of the Government's war-aims in the West. He pretended, indeed, to be pursuing a middle path between the wishes of the Left and of the Right; but the one clear clue he gave to the general tenour of his policy disclosed to all the world which side he really stood on. "About our war-aims," he said, amid loud applause, "I am in full harmony with the Supreme Army Command." Of course he is. The Supreme Army Command is the

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Kaiser, by whose appointment and with whose consent Hindenburg is working out his plans ; and Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg retains office just so long as he remains in “ harmony ” with his imperial master. But his flash of candour, obvious as the truism it expressed may seem to be, was by no means purposeless. It was more than a mere repudiation of parliamentary control ; it was an appeal for sympathy and unity to all those members of the Reichstag who shrink from revolutionary ideas and still cleave in their hearts to the existing régime, an appeal to the natural instincts of conservatism and to the great militarist tradition of the Prussian monarchy.

As long as such appeals can be made and made effectively, absolutism has little to fear from within the German frontier. Neither the Kaiser nor his generals nor his bureaucrats need submit to popular control as long as they can count on the obedience of the army and the mingled pride and submissiveness with which the people still regard the whole fabric of Prussian militarism. But we may perhaps begin to wonder how long their present security will last. All the world over the spirit of freedom is awake. Can Central Europe alone remain immune from its swift contagion, unshaken by a passion so universal in its power over men ? Since the Russian Revolution and the uprising of America one thing at least, which seemed probable before, seems certain now. Prussian autocracy cannot survive an unquestionable defeat of Prussian arms. Then indeed, if not before, the spell of the old tradition will be broken, the meshes of absolutism cut away, and the conscience of the German people free at last to return to the despised and rejected ideals of 1848.

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VI. A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM

THE events of the last few months have thus re-illuminated the fundamental issue of the war; and, if the spirit with which the Allies entered on their task in 1914 had begun to lose something of its force and freshness under the long strain, it is now stronger and more resolute than ever. The emancipation of Russia, the intervention of the United States, and the first stirrings of popular unrest in Germany have widened the horizon of the war and revealed the full scope of the promise which victory will offer to the world. Never before has so great a part of civilised mankind united itself to attain a single end; never before has so great a hope for all humanity depended on a single decision. The common life of the world has been always overshadowed by the irreconcilable antagonism between despotism and liberty; on that issue, directly or indirectly, most of the wars between its peoples have been fought. But the present war stands out from all its predecessors. It is not only the greatest: if it ends as we mean to end it, it should also be the last. For absolutism in Europe would in that case have received its death-blow. It could never return to Russia; it could not long endure in Central Europe.

No one can yet reckon the full measure of the gain which may thus be won for the world. It is idle to dream of a millennium; in the future as in the past there will still be incompatibilities, misunderstandings, disputes, between States and nations; but, when absolutism is extinct in Europe, the very basis of inter-State relations will be changed. Yesterday the world was divided into two great camps. Life within each was clouded by the prospect of an inevitable war. Foreign policy was primarily a problem of balancing antagonistic forces with the purpose on the one side of facilitating, on the other of

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preventing, Armageddon. To the needs of such a foreign policy, domestic policy was deliberately subordinated and perverted in the one camp ; and in the other, for the same reason, its scope was limited, its highest hopes postponed. In all the leading States of the Old World the welfare of the peoples was being more and more cramped and hindered in order to provide the means for their mutual destruction ; and the New World was destined to discover, when at the last the open conflict came, that it neither could nor would remain outside the circle of strife and waste. And all this was happening yesterday because despotism was in nature bound to fight with liberty, to strive always to enlarge its power, and so to keep the peoples of the modern world, as far as their mutual relations were concerned, chained to the old despairing philosophy of " the struggle for existence." But to-morrow, it may be, they will be free at last to unleash the better forces of human nature and to profess without uneasy reservations a nobler and more Christian creed ; free to apply to their common life the principles of fellowship and co-operation rather than those of permanent division and balanced power ; free to bring together the democracies of the world, new and old, into a " league of honour "—a league which will strive to found the maintenance of peace and justice, not on a diplomacy which must needs be secret so long as it has to work against the " plotting of inner circles who would plan what they would and render an account to no one," but on the public opinion of free peoples who alone " can hold their purpose and their honour steady to the common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own."

It is because such visions of the future can only be realised by the decisive overthrow of Prussian absolutism that the coming months must be regarded as no less than the most momentous in all history. Never before has so wide an opportunity been offered for the betterment of the world's life ; and never before have men been so certainly " the masters of their fate." So great is the time that none

A War of Liberation

of us can hope to be worthy of it ; but, if we discern the value of the prize we are striving for, if we figure to ourselves the actual good which its attainment must ultimately bring to the lives of all our fellow men, if we remember that innumerable men and women have suffered and died for liberty in the past without hope or thought of such a triumph for their cause as is now within range of achievement, then at least we shall not flinch from the sacrifices which still lie in front of us, nor suffer our purpose or our unity to weaken till we have " finished the work we are in."

No one has ever hated war and all its ruthless cruelty more bitterly than Lincoln ; but Lincoln was compelled, as we have been, to take up arms for freedom ; and when, after three years of desperate fighting, victory seemed at last in sight, he would not then consent to purchase peace by any compromise with slavery. " We accepted this war," he said ; " we did not begin it. We accepted it for an object, and when that object is accomplished the war will end, and I hope to God it will never end until that object is accomplished."

THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE

I. THE IMPERIAL WAR CABINET.

WHEN the Asquith Government fell on December 6, 1916, and Mr. Lloyd George was summoned by the King to form a new Administration, few people anticipated that an almost revolutionary change was about to take place in the custom and practice of the British Constitution. Yet a few days later they discovered that the Cabinet as known since the first days of constitutional government, consisting of the heads of the chief departments of State, presided over by the Prime Minister, was in abeyance, and that a new form of Cabinet had come into being, a War Cabinet of five men, only one of whom had administrative duties, while the other Ministers of the Crown presiding over the great departments occupied a somewhat uncertain status outside, being summoned into conference with the War Cabinet usually only when matters for which they were immediately responsible were under discussion. Other innovations which were described in the last issue of this Review, p. 353, were made at the same time. These new arrangements were admittedly provisional. They represented a reaction from a system under which the responsible Cabinet had expanded to the unwieldy number of 23, and were manifestly dictated by the necessities of war. None the less, it is pretty certain that in some way or other they mark the beginning of a new era. If the system of a Cabinet of Ministers without departmental duties is not

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likely to survive a return to peace and the revival of Parliamentary life, neither are we likely to see again the overgrown Cabinets of recent years. Whether the problem will be solved by devolving some of the duties of government on to Cabinets and legislatures, for England, Scotland, and Wales, as well as for Ireland, and so making possible a reduction in the members of the United Kingdom Cabinet, or whether there will be evolved a clearly differentiated inner and an outer Cabinet, we need not consider. It suffices for the purposes of this article to recognise the revolutionary change which has been effected in our institutions for the duration of the war.

But there has been another change silently enacted during the past few weeks which later generations will, perhaps, regard as of greater permanent importance. One of the first acts of the new War Cabinet was to invite the Governments of the Dominions and of India to a special War Conference. In this invitation it was stated that the Conference was to consist of "a series of special and continuous meetings of the War Cabinet in order to consider urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the war, the possible conditions on which, in agreement with our Allies, we could assent to its termination, and the problems which will then immediately arise." The invitation added that "for the purpose of these meetings your Prime Minister would be a member of the War Cabinet." This invitation was accepted by all the overseas Governments except that of Australia, which found itself in the throes of a general election, and the delegates, including three representatives from India, assembled in London in the middle of March.*

* The names of the representatives were as follows : Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada ; Mr. W. F. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand ; General Smuts, special delegate from South Africa ; Sir Edward Morris, Prime Minister of Newfoundland ; Sir Joseph Ward, Minister of Finance, New Zealand ; Sir George Perley, Minister of Overseas Forces, Mr. Robert Rogers, Minister of Public Works, and Mr. J. D. Hazen, Minister of Marine, Canada ; the Maharaja of Bikanir, Sir James Meston, Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, and Sir Satyendra Sinha, India

The Imperial War Cabinet

Almost at once, however, under the stress of necessity the meetings seem to have changed their intended character. The original idea had clearly been that the overseas representatives should sit as members of the ordinary War Cabinet, enlarged for the time being to include them. But in practice, while the special series of meetings of what came to be called the Imperial War Cabinet were held as originally intended, the pressure of facts made it necessary to hold during the same period meetings of the ordinary War Cabinet for the transaction of urgent war business and for the consideration of the domestic affairs of the United Kingdom, and also meetings of an Imperial War Conference for the consideration of other Imperial business not immediately concerned with peace and war, which were not attended by members of the War Cabinet proper. There thus came to be differentiated, not by design but by the necessity of the time, three bodies: the ordinary War Cabinet of the British Isles, an Imperial War Cabinet consisting of the British War Cabinet and the Prime Ministers or other plenipotentiaries of the Dominions sitting in Cabinet together, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and an Imperial War Conference consisting of representatives of the Governments of the Empire with certain British Ministers, but not the members of the British War Cabinet, sitting under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the discussion of ordinary Imperial business not directly concerned with peace and war.

The significance of these proceedings must be apparent to any student of constitutional government. They were set forth with great lucidity by Sir Robert Borden in his speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association on April 3 :

It may be [he said] that in the shadow of the war we do not clearly realise the measure of recent constitutional development . . . the constitutional position which has arisen from the summoning of an Imperial War Cabinet. The British Constitution is the most flexible instrument of government ever devised. It is

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surrounded by certain statutory limitations, but they are not of a character to prevent the remarkable development to which I shall allude. The office of Prime Minister, thoroughly recognised by the gradually developed conventions of the Constitution, although entirely unknown to the formal enactments of the law, is invested with a power and authority which, under new conditions demanding progress and development, are of inestimable advantage. The recent exercise of that great authority has brought about an advance which may contain the germ and define the method of constitutional development in the immediate future. It is only within the past few days that the full measure of that advance has been consummated.

For the first time in the Empire's history there are sitting in London two Cabinets, both properly constituted and both exercising well-defined powers. Over each of them the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom presides. One of them is designated as the "War Cabinet," which chiefly devotes itself to such questions touching the prosecution of the war as primarily concern the United Kingdom. The other is designated as the "Imperial War Cabinet," which has a wider purpose, jurisdiction, and *personel*. To its deliberations have been summoned representatives of all the Empire's self-governing Dominions. We meet there on terms of equality under the presidency of the First Minister of the United Kingdom; we meet there as equals, he is *primus inter pares*. Ministers from six nations sit around the council board, all of them responsible to their respective parliaments and to the people of the countries which they represent. Each nation has its voice upon questions of common concern and highest importance as the deliberations proceed; each preserves unimpaired its perfect autonomy, its self-government, and the responsibility of its Ministers to their own electorate. For many years the thought of statesmen and students in every part of the Empire has centred around the question of future constitutional relations; it may be that now, as in the past, the necessity imposed by great events has given the answer.

The Imperial War Cabinet as constituted to-day has been summoned for definite and specific purposes, publicly stated, which involve questions of the most vital concern to the whole Empire. With the constitution of that Cabinet a new era has dawned and a new page of history has been written. It is not for me to prophesy as to the future significance of these pregnant events; but those who have given thought and energy to every effort for full constitutional development of the oversea nations may be pardoned for believing that they discern therein the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth.

The Imperial War Cabinet

It is clear that this new development will be permanent. Speaking on May 17 in the House of Commons the Prime Minister said :—

The Imperial War Cabinet was unanimous that the new procedure had been of such service not only to all its members but to the Empire that it ought not to be allowed to fall into desuetude. Accordingly at the last session I proposed formally, on behalf of the British Government, that meetings of an Imperial Cabinet should be held annually or at any intermediate time when matters of urgent Imperial concern require to be settled, and that the Imperial Cabinet should consist of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and such of his colleagues as deal specially with Imperial affairs, of the Prime Minister of each of the Dominions, or some specially accredited alternate possessed of equal authority, and of a representative of the Indian people to be appointed by the Government of India. This proposal met with the cordial approval of the Overseas representatives, and we hope that the holding of an annual Imperial Cabinet to discuss foreign affairs and other aspects of Imperial policy will become an accepted convention of the British Constitution.

I ought to add that the institution in its present form is extremely elastic. It grew, not by design, but out of the necessities of the war. The essence of it is that the responsible heads of the Governments of the Empire, with those Ministers who are specially entrusted with the conduct of Imperial policy, should meet together at regular intervals to confer about foreign policy and matters connected therewith, and come to decisions in regard to them which, subject to the control of their own Parliaments, they will then severally execute. By this means they will be able to obtain full information about all aspects of Imperial affairs, and to determine by consultation together the policy of the Empire in its most vital aspects, without infringing in any degree the autonomy which its parts at present enjoy. To what constitutional developments this may lead we did not attempt to settle. The whole question of perfecting the mechanism for "continuous consultation" about Imperial and foreign affairs between the "autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth" will be reserved for the consideration of that special Conference which will be summoned as soon as possible after the war to readjust the constitutional relations of the Empire. We felt, however, that the experiment of constituting an Imperial Cabinet, in which India was represented, had been so fruitful in better understanding and in unity of purpose and action that it ought to be perpetuated, and we believe that this proposal

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will commend itself to the judgment of all the nations of the Empire.

It is manifest that this piece of constitutional machinery is only a rudimentary growth, whose functions and composition have not yet become clearly defined. It is also clear that its existence will raise a number of new and difficult problems which as yet have not been solved. Before, however, going on to consider these, it is necessary to consider the important resolution on the constitution of the Empire passed by the Imperial War Conference.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESOLUTION OF THE IMPERIAL WAR CONFERENCE.

THE debates of the Imperial War Conference had not been published when this article was written. But the constitutional resolution passed by the Conference shows that they must have been of great importance. That resolution reads as follows :

The Imperial War Conference is of opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the war, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

It deems it its duty, however, to place on record its view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognise the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine.

Resolution of the Imperial War Conference

This resolution is of such importance and compresses so much within its narrow compass that it is worth while to analyse it in some detail. It first of all recognises that a stage has been reached when the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire must be undertaken, and makes provision for the summoning of a special Imperial Conference to consider the matter "as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities." It then goes on to lay down the principles upon which, in the opinion of those who passed it, the special conference must proceed. These principles are three in number. The resolution declares first of all that any constitutional readjustment must be "based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth and of India as an important part of the same"; second, that any such readjustment must "recognise the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine"; and, third, that any readjustment must provide for "thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs."

It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of these decisions. At a date which cannot be far distant, an Imperial Conference will assemble, the purpose of which will be to consider what further steps can be taken to transform the Empire from a State in which the main responsibilities and burdens of its common affairs are sustained and controlled by the United Kingdom into a Commonwealth of equal nations conducting its foreign policy and common affairs by some method of continuous consultation and concerted action. It behoves every citizen therefore to give serious

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thought to the problems which may then come up for settlement.

If the terms of this resolution are considered, it is clear that it was the opinion of those who moved and accepted the resolution that the constitutional development of the Empire should proceed along the lines of improved consultation and co-operation rather than that any attempt should be made to convert it into a true Federation. The double emphasis laid upon the word "consultation" makes that clear. Whatever steps, therefore, may be determined upon by the special Imperial Conference after the war, the decision to-day is against any federal reconstruction immediately after the war. Let us, therefore, consider first of all what the system which it is proposed to inaugurate really means and the modifications in the older procedure of Imperial co-operation which it is likely to involve, and, secondly, its relation to the ultimate solution of the fundamental problem of the Government of the Empire. In view of the short time which has elapsed since these decisions were made public it is not possible in this article to do more than review their significance in their broadest aspect.

Up to this year the most important common deliberative organ possessed by the Empire has been the Imperial Conference. The Imperial Conference has been an assembly of the Prime Ministers of the Empire, meeting quadrennially, under the presidency of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, for the discussion of inter-Imperial problems and the concerting of measures for dealing with them. It is evident, however, that the institution through which the improved Imperial system will chiefly work will be the newly constituted Imperial Cabinet. The Imperial Cabinet will be different in some important respects from the Imperial Conference. It will meet annually instead of only once in four years. It will be concerned more particularly with foreign policy, which the Imperial Conference has never yet dis-

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cussed,* and its members will have access to all that confidential information which is necessary to enable them to come to decisions in regard to it. Its proceedings will consequently be secret, and presumably no report of them will be published, or even taken. It will also consist of the most important British Ministers, sitting in conclave with the Overseas Ministers instead of the Secretary of State for the Colonies alone as has been usually the case hitherto. During the war the British members have been the members of the War Cabinet. Afterwards they are likely to be the Prime Minister and those of his colleagues, such as the Foreign Secretary, the Colonial Secretary, the Secretary of State for India, the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, who are specially concerned with Imperial affairs. All of these characteristics will differentiate the Imperial Cabinet sharply from the old leisurely quadrennial gatherings, which discussed inter-imperial relations in their less important aspects, but never came to grips with the real problems of Imperial policy and Government.

None the less, the Imperial Cabinet will not be different in essential principle from the old Imperial Conference. It will still be a Council of Governments. It will, as a body, have no executive authority. It will have no departments to administer, it will have no legislative or taxing powers. Its power will consist in the fact that the representatives who attend its meetings will, between them, command a majority in each of the Parliaments of the Empire, and will therefore be able to come to decisions about both legislative and executive action to which they will be able to give effect just in so far as they are able to obtain the approval to them of their several Parliaments. In these respects and in the strict sense of the word it will

* The statement on foreign affairs made to the members of the Imperial Conference by Sir Edward Grey in 1911 was made in the Offices of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and neither the statement nor the discussion which followed appears in the records of this Conference

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not be a Cabinet at all. It will have no collective responsibility; it will be responsible to no one Parliament, and its decisions, to be effective, will require separate and simultaneous action by a number of different Governments and Parliaments all over the Empire. In Sir Robert Borden's words, "Ministers from six nations sit around the council board, all of them responsible to their respective Parliaments and to the people of the countries which they represent. Each nation has its voice upon questions of common concern and highest importance as the deliberations proceed; each preserves unimpaired its perfect autonomy, its self-government and the responsibility of its Ministers to their own electorate." It will, in fact, be the old Imperial Conference in a new and more executive guise.

The appearance, however, of this new body is bound to influence profoundly the character of the old. During their recent meetings neither the Imperial War Cabinet nor the Imperial War Conference appears to have come to any conclusions as to the relations which are to exist between the two. At first sight it would seem likely that the Imperial Cabinet would absorb the Imperial Conference altogether, for it will take over many of its functions as a Conference of Governments with new and important ones added of its own. But, apart from the objection to suppressing a constitutional organ of twenty years' growth which has proved of great value, there is one difference between the Imperial Cabinet and the Imperial Conference of cardinal importance. The proceedings of the Imperial Conference were reported and published. The proceedings of the Imperial Cabinet, by their very nature, will necessarily be secret. Yet if one thing is certain after the war it is that the peoples of the Empire will never again tolerate the same secrecy about foreign policy and foreign engagements as existed before the war. Every nation within it will insist on full public discussion of the relations of the Empire with other nations, relations which if not

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properly maintained may involve them in war. If, therefore, the foreign policy of the Empire is to be agreed upon as the outcome of consultation between the heads of its different Governments, sitting in Cabinet together under conditions of Cabinet secrecy, there ought to be some provision for enabling the general lines of this policy to be publicly discussed and different opinions in regard to it ventilated, also in a body which can look at Imperial problems as a whole. The natural forum in which such a discussion should take place would seem to be the Imperial Conference.

If, however, this discussion is to take place in the Imperial Conference, whose proceedings are reported and published, it would seem as if it must alter its composition. To-day it consists in the main of the same people who attend the Imperial War Cabinet. A discussion, however, of foreign and Imperial policy in the Conference by the same representatives who had already come to conclusions in regard to it in the Cabinet would be a singularly unreal and unconvincing affair. The suggestion which has often been made, that the Imperial Conference should be enlarged to contain the representatives of Oppositions as well as of Governmental Parties, might be the way out of the difficulty. If this step were taken the Imperial Conference would become a committee of the Parliaments of the Empire just as the Imperial Cabinet is a committee of the Governments of the Empire, but with deliberative rather than executive functions. This is certainly an interesting suggestion, but it raises many problems of great complexity which we have not yet had time to consider, but to which we shall return later. These problems, however, are precisely the questions which will come up before the special conference which will assemble at the end of the war, and it behoves every citizen to begin to give thought to them without delay.

What matters, however, at this moment is to realise clearly the general lines along which, in accordance with

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the resolution of the special War Conference and in view of the innovation of an Imperial War Cabinet, this special conference is to undertake the work of "readjusting" the constitution of the Empire. These lines would seem to be unity in policy, co-operation in giving effect to this policy—that is to say, the creation of a system whereby the aims and objects of Imperial policy, and the defensive preparations, financial expenditures, and fiscal and administrative action which each Government should undertake, in order to give full effect to that policy as a whole, will be settled between the responsible representatives of all the Governments of the Empire, assembling in Cabinet once a year, and possibly publicly discussed in an Imperial Conference as well, after which the representatives will disperse, to obtain the approval of their own Parliaments to their undertakings, and to act as trustees for the execution of that part of the agreed policy which falls to their lot, until the next Cabinet of the Empire assembles.

III. A VALUABLE ADVANCE.

WHAT is the bearing of the changes now foreshadowed on the ultimate problem of the British Commonwealth? That they constitute a valuable advance is clear. They admit the representatives of the Dominions and of India to a full consultative share in determining the foreign policy of the Empire. They provide a simple yet elastic machinery, well suited to a period of universal reconstruction, which will enable all the Governments of the Empire to keep in constant, if not continuous, consultation on every aspect of Imperial policy, and which will enable all its peoples to understand far better their common problems. They do so in the only satisfactory manner, that of bringing the statesmen of the Empire face to face with one another at regular intervals round a table. Most important of all, perhaps, they carry us a long stage nearer to establishing

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that equality between "autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth" which the resolution of the Imperial War Conference had in view. It may be urged that in breaching the system which has prevailed hitherto, that of concentrating the whole authority in foreign affairs in one of its Governments, and substituting for it a system whereby foreign policy will be determined as a result of discussion between the heads of the different Governments of the Empire and under which all its Parliaments are bound to begin to discuss that policy, a step has been taken which must tend towards the further disintegration of the Empire. It is true that these changes may force on a more fundamental reconstruction sooner than any now expect. But to those who recognise that a real organic unity of a British Commonwealth can only be built upon the free consent of the nations which compose it and not upon attachment to constitutional forms or procedure which have outgrown their use, changes which must tend to produce equality and a better understanding between the parts, and a clearer comprehension of the problems and interest of the whole, can only be welcome.

On the other hand, valuable and far-reaching as these changes are, it is no use pretending that they will in themselves solve the fundamental Imperial problem. The improved system for conducting Imperial affairs will still leave in existence the essential weaknesses of the existing order. In the first place, it cannot give the Dominions more than a consultative voice in Imperial and foreign policy. It cannot give them real partnership in the control. So long as the Empire remains one State, it must speak and act, in its international relations, with one voice and through one authority. For the present that authority must continue to be the Government of the United Kingdom, a Government which is subject to the control of the British Parliament alone. Whatever, therefore, may be decided by the Prime Ministers of the Empire sitting in Imperial Cabinet together, it will be the will of the British

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Parliament which will finally determine the attitude of the Foreign Secretary and the King's ambassadors abroad. The British Ministers in the Imperial Cabinet will only be able to agree to policies to which they believe they can secure the support of the House of Commons, and that House will have no means of ascertaining directly the views and interests of any other part of the Commonwealth than the British Isles. The system proposed will greatly increase the influence of the Overseas nations in foreign policy and that influence is bound to affect profoundly the policy recommended by the British Ministers to their Parliament. But it will in the last resort still be the British Parliament which will decide. In essentials the existing order will remain unchanged, for, as George Washington said, "influence is not government."

The second weakness which the new system will leave unremedied is not less important. The Ministers who will be responsible for framing and carrying out the policy of the Commonwealth will not be representative of, nor responsible to, the people of the Commonwealth: they will be representative of, and responsible to, separate nations within it. Imperial policy will be determined either as the result of an agreement between a number of different nations, or through the acquiescence by the rest in the decisions of the "predominant partner" among them; it will not be settled by the consensus of opinion among the self-governing citizens of the Commonwealth acting or voting as a whole. The security of the Commonwealth, therefore, and its power for good in the world, will be increasingly dependent upon unanimity among a number of different Governments and Parliaments scattered all over the world. The inability of one of the nations to accept a policy agreed upon by the rest, or its refusal to carry out its share of the executive action necessary to give effect to an agreed policy, may produce paralysis of Imperial action—an event which, as the weeks immediately preceding the war prove, might

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well be disastrous, especially as the nations of the Commonwealth grow more equal in strength and influence and assume more equal shares of responsibility for the execution of Imperial policy. And when such disagreement does arise, as is at least probable between nations so widely separated and so diverse in temperament and interest, there will be no method whereby the judgment of the citizens of the Commonwealth as a whole, or an assembly representative of, and responsible to, them all, can be ascertained, in order to settle what the policy of the Commonwealth should be to which its Governments should conform.

3 This is not to say that the system of consultation about foreign policy and co-operation in giving effect to it, may not be made to work for many years. In its earlier form of the full trusteeship of a "predominant partner" it has sufficed in the past, and has produced during the war results which, a few years ago, would have been deemed miraculous. And in its improved system providing for continuous consultation with autonomous nations it may also work satisfactorily for a time. But we believe that sooner or later it will prove inadequate to our needs. The system has often been tried before. It was tried between England and Scotland, between Great Britain and Ireland, and in a more completely co-operative form, between the revolted American Colonies, and between the colonies now united into the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia and the Union of South Africa, and in each case it eventually failed. Sooner or later, we believe, it will also fail in the case of the British Commonwealth, not through any want of goodwill or through any reluctance to make it work, but because it offends against the cardinal principle upon which a Commonwealth is based.

The loose constitutional fabric known as the British Empire, over which the King reigns, must, in the long run, either dissolve into an alliance of independent sovereign States, each thinking first and foremost of itself, or it must become a Commonwealth of nations in which each nation,

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while jealously preserving its own autonomy, yet recognises that its first duty is to promote the well-being of the whole. It cannot halt indefinitely between the two. And if it is to be a Commonwealth founded on democracy, and not an Empire resting upon authority, its citizens must be able to act as one people, through a Parliament representative of them all, responsible to them all, and able to make laws binding on them all, within that constitutional sphere which includes their common affairs. We cannot repeat too often that the reconstitution of the Empire as a Commonwealth does not involve any infringement of the lawful autonomy of the nations within it, any "standardisation" of civilisation, or any suppression of national individuality. Interference with national freedom would be as inconsistent with the principle upon which a Commonwealth is based as interference with the liberty of the individual would be. Nor is there any limit to the number of strongly individual nations a Commonwealth of Nations could include. But to be such a Commonwealth it must have a representative assembly, sovereign within its own sphere, at its head. What the powers of such a Parliament should be it is impossible at present to define. They will probably be very different from those which have existed in any federation hitherto. We need not consider them until we see what the world will be like at the end of the war, and the arrangements which may be established for international conference, about armaments, and for co-operation with our Allies. But whatever its functions may be, if the peoples of the Empire are to render the most loyal service to one another, if they are to be faithful to the principle of democracy upon which their political institutions rest, if they are to help most effectually the peace and progress of the world, they can never be content with a system which is no more than alliance, and must declare themselves members of one body politic, with a representative legislature as the organ of their common will.

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Such an achievement is a political task far harder than any yet achieved by mankind. It represents as great an advance over anything which now exists as the American federation represented over anything previously known. It depends upon the ability of the peoples of the Empire to take another constructive step in the science of human government, upon their power to utilise national feeling not to divide but to unite, to bind together in one Commonwealth great nations separated from each other "by the unplumb'd salt estranging sea," to recognise that citizenship of a Commonwealth of many nations is a greater thing than that of a national State and a necessary step towards the unity and peace of the world.

We need not consider this question further now. The creation of a true Parliament for the Commonwealth may not come within the sphere of practical politics in the near future. It is useless, unwise, and dangerous to take short cuts. For the present our task is to think out the best means of making effective that new Imperial machinery, which the special Imperial Conference is to perfect and regularise. But in welcoming the recent changes let us not suppose that they will in themselves solve the fundamental problem which lies at the root of the politics of the Empire.

There is one other aspect of the recent change to which a reference must be made. Hitherto India has occupied the status of a dependency within the British Empire. No representatives from India have ever before attended the councils of the Empire. On this occasion Indians have taken part in all the deliberations both of the Imperial War Conference and of the Imperial War Cabinet. It is now announced that this representation is to be permanent both in the Imperial Conference and the Imperial Cabinet. India's right, therefore, to a voice whenever the common problems of the Empire are under discussion is now specifically admitted. This is a most welcome step. It pays a tardy recognition to the enormous importance of India in the Empire. It is evidence of the confidence and trust

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which the rest of the Empire feels in the loyalty and goodwill of the Indian people towards the Commonwealth, of which it is a part. It is a proof that India's status in the Empire is now, to quote Mr. Lloyd George at the Guildhall on April 27, that of a partner nation. It is, too, of special value at the present time. There are many difficult problems calling for solution in India itself. The gradual change over from bureaucracy, however benevolent, to self-government, in a country, or rather a continent, containing 315,000,000 people of many diverse religions, races and languages, and dominated by traditions and customs which are a heavy handicap on progress, must necessarily be a slow and gradual progress. Nobody now disputes that a further step must be taken towards the ultimate goal at the end of the war. The recognition of India's status in the Empire and its councils cannot fail to make that step easier of accomplishment than it would otherwise be.*

The representation of India in the councils of the Empire has another and no less important significance. It shows that the British Commonwealth can not only unite nations, but that it can also bridge the difference between them even when they are profoundly divided by colour and civilisation. It proves, indeed, that if its peoples live up to those ideals of liberty and unity which give it life, it will be the greatest of all peace-makers in the world. For it enables even East and West, whom many suppose can never unite, to meet and understand one another as members of a single commonwealth.

The recent innovations in our institutions and the recognition of India as a partner nation within it clearly illumine the real destiny of the British Empire as a true Commonwealth of Nations. Its institutions now provide a clear road not only to self-government, but to participation in its common affairs, to all the varied peoples and nations

* Another most useful piece of work has been the approach which has been made towards settling the immigration problem on the basis of reciprocity.

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within it. There never yet has been such a commonwealth. Great Empires have been reared in the past upon the basis of autocratic military power. They have never before been founded so completely upon liberty and democracy. The British Commonwealth has already been the greatest fountain of political freedom in the world. It has nursed young nations to maturity in peace. It has laid the foundations of self-government among countless millions of politically backward peoples. It has proved the bulwark against which the forces of autocracy and reaction have cast themselves in vain. As we have already said, if its peoples are to rise to the full level of the responsibilities which rest upon them they have yet to bring into being a democratic organ of its will. But if that greatest of all political tasks is accomplished they will have created the institutions which will eventually give liberty and unity and peace to the world. For they will have proved that nations and peoples of almost every race and colour, speaking almost every variety of language, professing nearly every form of religion and civilisation, and scattered over the four corners of the globe, can yet be united into a single whole—a whole in which every part is self-governing or approaching self-government, and in which there is also an assembly through which its responsible citizens can think and act together as one people.

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NO definition either of education or of the citizen is offered. Definitions are dangerous tools to handle. They are never entirely or permanently true of the facts of mind or of the world of spirit, for these have no fixed boundaries: they do not shut out one another, and none of them is static or can bear being "fastened down." You cannot say where beauty begins or truth and goodness end. The domains of art and morality, of knowledge and religion overlap. They imply and serve and even may pass into one another. The virtues of the home—if they be not nipped and blackened by a frost—become the excellencies of the citizen as naturally as the bud opens into the full-blown flower; and the virtues of the citizen pass into—nay, derive all their true value from the fact that in serving his country he is serving a cause wider even than humanity and more permanent than time.

On this account the sciences of human life, as compared with the natural sciences, suffer from a grave inconvenience. The latter can isolate one aspect of a fact and make it the sole object of their enquiry. And natural facts can sustain this kind of treatment, for their unity and singleness are not intense. They are not mutilated by the separation of their elements, and the elements themselves retain in their isolation some reality and valid significance. But it is not so with the sciences of man. They not only distort the truth when they endeavour to confine themselves to single aspects but destroy their object. The living and, above all, the life which is not only physical but sensitive and self-conscious or rational, and therefore

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capable of a rightness and wrongness which have no finite limits, has no separable aspects. Every phase implies and holds by the whole, both borrows and dispenses meaning, and is saturated with relations. Even the difference of natural and spiritual, though by no means surface deep, is not a severance. Economic theory, in the degree in which it is divorced from ethics, stands out as the most dangerous falsehood of our times. Ethical theory, on the other hand, in the degree in which it forgets the natural setting of the moral life loses all its truth as a doctrine and all its practical use for conduct. Ethics must have regard to the nature of man; and if a cross section could be taken at any moment of man's spirit it would be seen to be a sample of the *wholeness* which is infinitude, and an emblem of eternity in which time is at once produced and overcome.

The sciences of man are branches of the tree of *philosophy*, and they will not grow as "cuttings." According to Plotinus the choir of souls, standing around the choragus, sing out of tune so long as they turn away from him, but "when they turn to him they sing in perfect harmony, deriving their inspiration from him." And the Muses, when they dance, hold one another by the hand.

It follows that to educate man we ought at all times to respect this principle of unity and wholeness. But as a matter of fact it is consistently overlooked and violated. If we speak of a man as "citizen" we think of him in some simple relation, not as standing amidst the complex totality of his spiritual obligations and opportunities, but as having duties and privileges which are special and particular, and therefore relevant and obligatory only on certain occasions, as when he is casting his vote or sitting on a jury or engaged upon some social or charitable work. As a family, or business, or religious man, and in times of peace, his citizenship is not in his thoughts, and he demands nothing of the State except that it shall be somehow in the background, lest the need of it should arise.

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When we speak of "education" our horizon is limited in a similar way, and we think of a mere fragment of life. Our imagination as a rule does not travel beyond the primary and secondary school, or at most, and in the case of a very small minority, the university. Education is in fact supposed to be a preliminary and introductory matter. When "real life" begins education, whether it has been good or bad, is normally assumed to have come to an end. Experience grows and character matures, but even those who continue to be "in earnest about their souls" do not usually regard "the improvement of the mind" as a part of the process of saving them.

I. BRITISH AND GERMAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION

THESE limited notions of the meaning of citizenship and education are rendered still less effective by the fact that the British people, unlike the German, has not seriously endeavoured to define the purpose which should guide the process of educating the nation. The difference is striking and instructive. Germany knows definitely what it wants from education, and what manner of product its schools and universities are intended to turn out. "The ultimate aims of a national system of education should be to train men and women *for the advancement of the State.*" "Technical training is indispensable in the economic, and for the girls in the social, *interest of the State.*" "Technical and craft training alone are not thought enough to secure the general welfare; they may promote merely the egoistic side of man, but the outlook of the individual should be widened to include an understanding of other trades and other nations, and an appreciation of his *duties to the community and the State.*"*

* Board of Education Pamphlet 18, *Compulsory Continuation Schools in Germany*, p. 23.

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No purpose could be more definite and none could be more consistently pursued or systematically sustained: it is education *by the State for the sake of the State*. And the results have been stupendous. They cannot be reckoned in terms of the industrial or commercial prosperity of the German people, great as these have been, nor even in the indescribable military might of the German armies. These are, in the last resort, only external manifestations of a deeper force within, partial expressions of a far more significant fact. What Germany has revealed to the world, in a light and on a scale never known before, is the power that lies in national education when persistently and strenuously used. Autocratic rulers by means of this instrument have shaped a nation's mind to their own purposes, and thereby determined beforehand what a whole people shall desire and will and do. Its aspirations and activities, its passions and opinions, its loves, its hates, its character have been as soft wax in their hands. *Germany's education is Germany's fate.*

Impressed by these facts, seen as they are in the red light of war, the British people has begun to reflect, and there are sure signs that it desires to take its own educational agencies in hand in a more earnest and purposeful manner than it has ever done before. Nations at war observe one another's ways very closely. When the war is over it is found that the combatants have been borrowing from, and lending to, each other; and it frequently happens that the victorious nation borrows most, and least wisely. It is not impossible that Germany may learn from us something of that willingness to let *others* "have a place in the sun," which has made our Empire strong because it is free and loyal; while we, desiring to adopt the educational method which has made Germany strong in the economic sense, may catch the contagion of her materialism. One thing is certain—namely, the greatness of the responsibility of determining the educational ways of a nation. It is to interfere vitally with its soul.

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It is not certain that we are about to rise to the level of the issue. We may perhaps allow our educational methods to be hustled along at the mercy of shallow conceptions of national well-being. There is no conclusive evidence of any profound belief in education on our part as a people. Its uses are not usually computed in terms of *character*—that is, of an efficient and happy manhood. The saving power of a deep intellectual passion is not recognised. The man in the street, who is supposed to have a monopoly of that most precious of gifts—namely, common sense—is hardly ready to endorse the conviction of R. L. Stevenson, that “To be wholly devoted to some intellectual exercise is to have succeeded in life.” By “success” we mean something different. And the bearing of the culture and use of the intellect upon the emotions, the will and conduct is not admitted except with grave doubts. “Intellectualist” is not a term of respect: any more than is the word “academic” or “theorist.” And who trusts the judgement of a “professor” or “philosopher”?

It is true that there has been advance. “A hundred years ago it was commonly said that the mass of the people did not need any education at all. Fifty years ago it was sufficient to teach the children of the workers to the age of ten. Twenty years ago we were told that it was enough if they stayed at school till twelve or thirteen.” And now continuation schools are to be instituted and made compulsory; we are promising to pay the school teacher a better salary, and possibly to educate him better, and even to treat him as a member of a “liberal profession”; and, above all, we are resolved to set up and equip and make a large use of institutions for scientific and technical training—*possibly* without sacrificing the humanities. But these new-found educational virtues, limited as they are, are not quite safe as yet: they are at the stage of good intentions. The voice of Mr. Fisher in the British Parliament the other day travelled clear and strong and inspiring along the depressed ranks of the teachers, like the voice of

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a hero on the battlefields of old. He may retain his vigour, although he is breathing the air of office; and continue, like the leviathan, "to churn the blackness hoary." But everyone around Whitehall has his answer ready to the question asked by Job: "Canst thou take out leviathan with a hook? And bind him for thy maidens?"—"Certainly! There is no difficulty, if you give me red tape."

The health of the mind is not on the same level in public estimation as the health of the body. Education is not held to be an indispensable condition of national well-being as sanitation is. It is one of the good things which can be postponed on occasion, or even done without beyond the bare minimum, if a community can plead poverty or high taxes. The Public Health authorities command, the Educational authorities plead—when they have sufficient courage. The very first war economy in some localities was at the expense of the education of the children; and the council of one large city exposed its intelligence, soon after the war began, by withdrawing a grant of fifty pounds which it had made for a few years previously to the School of Social Studies.

But to recur to the main question. Assuming that continuation schools are established, and that more education of a vocational and technical character will be given, especially now that something of the incalculable practical significance of the natural sciences has been at last realised, "What more?" and "What then?" We know that a nation may prosper exceedingly in the things to which a national system of education of this kind can contribute and yet be doomed to stand before the world as the greatest blunderer and criminal in its whole history. If education has had a primary place amongst the forces which have made Germany great, it is its education also which has perverted its spirit, corrupted and enslaved its soul, and made it the concern of civilisation either to destroy this people or to change its desires and its will. The educational projects which are discussed

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and advocated in the press and on the platform are mainly of one kind. To carry them out were to follow the example of Germany in the things in which she is strong. Are there any plans for avoiding the example of Germany in those things which are leading her to her doom? Germany, as we have shown, has had an educational purpose, and it has systematised all her agencies; she has shaped the mind of the nation and shaped it ill. For her purpose was wrong. What, then, is the right purpose? What goal shall *we* seek?

There will be grave reluctance on the part of the British people to setting up any such purpose. It is one matter, it may be said, to control the machinery of education for industrial and commercial purposes; it is another matter for the State to presume to control the souls of its citizens by means of its educational schemes. Character is complex, the forces of the moral world are many and they are little understood. It is better to let character grow, as at present, rather than meddle with it by means of any coarse, general scheme. It is wise "to doubt our capacity to choose a good national ideal; and it is right to dread the consequences of choosing a bad one more than the consequences of being without any ideal at all." Besides, we are not accustomed as a nation to map out our future: we have always preferred in the past to deal with circumstances as they arise. And we have done not badly. No doubt our ways may appear to a German precisian to be contemptibly haphazard and disorderly and wasteful. They *are* haphazard. They are also costly and, at times, exceedingly risky. But if our ways are illogical, they are not unreasonable. If they have been methodless, they have not been ruinous or disgracefully evil and stupid—as their opposite is proving to be. If we have only muddled along, groping our way in the erratic and hazardous fashion of sheer empiricism, we have nevertheless somehow gathered more gear than the Germans themselves; and we have built an Empire which is not only large and strong

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but also free and loyal and not unhappy—possibly, with all its defects, the most wonderful structure in the history of man.

But there are weightier considerations which make us hesitate to adopt anything at all analogous to the German scheme of predestinating a nation by means of its educational agencies. We do not want to be fashioned on the likeness of the German people. We are not prepared to magnify the State as they have done—if, indeed, to annul its moral obligations be to magnify it. We are not willing to be made mere “instruments of its advancement.” We can be loyal to our country without having our individuality manipulated in the schools and colleges by the Government, and without being all our lives long subject to its discipline. Least of all shall we suffer the last indignity and gravest of all wrongs—namely, that of having our minds shaped by “a power not ourselves” and our wills thereby subdued to purposes not truly our own. For in such a case nothing can really be our own. He has neither possessions nor rights who does not own himself. Man used as *means* is no longer man. He is a chattel. To employ education for the formation of the soul for any purpose other than its own direct good is to pervert the uses of education. Its value and end is to emancipate, not to enslave. Education is the condition of freedom, as freedom is the condition of all the virtues.

We can appeal to results in this matter of individual character just as we have done in that of Empire building. It is better to refrain from describing the results achieved by the German method, for it is not possible to call them admirable. The soul of the German people has been so deformed by the pressure of discipline and dogmas that they know no better than to dedicate their attainments and such liberty as remains to them to the sordid service of a shallow and limited moral end. For their “highest” is “the advancement of a State” which recognises for itself no code of honour, and their “All-highest,” who *is* the

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State, is William the Second. No kind or amount of attainment can compensate for this perversion. "Every schoolboy in Germany procures himself a *Weltanschauung*, a World-point-of-view, with his first razor, and can talk your head off about religion or humanity, or art or World-power long before he can be old enough to know what the words mean." But the British product is somehow preferable. It is difficult to condemn British school education, or to despair of the future of the Empire, if we observe not merely the children of the well-to-do in the cricket fields but those of the working men as they pour out of the elementary school into their shamefully small playgrounds—filled with more energy than they can control and more happiness than they know what to do with. "In Germany, even before the War, there was an increasing number of suicides amongst timid types of children in all classes of society." British boys and girls do not commit suicide.

Such are the arguments employed in excuse of the apparently chaotic character of our national education, and in defence of the limited regard for reflective research in matters of character.

But the arguments are unsound. The premisses on which they rest are not true. Our education, where it has been successful—that is, in the schools—has not been haphazard. It has been governed by a purpose. The ideal by which it has been guided has not been placarded across the public consciousness after the German fashion; nevertheless, it cannot be described as "subconscious," or "unconscious," or even "intuitive," if these words are meant (as usual) to exclude theory and the use of the processes of thought and reasoning. Hence it does not follow that, in contemplating educational reforms, we can let the education of character go unguided and uncared-for, while we confine our attention to those subjects which will contribute to our material prosperity. Our economic well-being is the one matter which, whether in peace or war, we never

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forget or undervalue, and is the safest of all our national interests—provided only it is not hindered or nullified by national defects which are not commonly associated with economic inefficiency. The nation's true mettle, its place and destiny and value for the world, will find the trial come from quite another quarter.

II. EDUCATION AT SCHOOL AND IN THE TRADE.

A MORE true rendering of the educational situation, with its risks and possibilities, must be attempted. First, then, while successful, so far as it goes, our education goes only a little way, and even in our present ardour for reform it is not proposed to carry it far. We assume that in the case of all save the few who are to be gentlemen of leisure, economic conditions preclude that possibility. The child of poor parents must begin to earn his livelihood and the youth whose parents have more means must enter the office or learn his profession. *We acquiesce in the total suspension at a very early age of all deliberate and sustained and systematic efforts at further enlightening his mind or forming his character.* These things, speaking broadly, are left at the mercy of the calling to which the youth is committed.

No one can deny the educative value of an honest calling. The tailor's or shoemaker's workshop, where it is small, where master and man work side by side, where each worker produces an article from beginning to end, leaving upon it stamped indelibly and unmistakably the features of his own character, can be the happy home of art and the school of virtue. Estimated in terms which are *human*, there are few happier or more beautiful places in the world.

But it is obvious that the conditions of modern industry have made these things very difficult. The large works are not educational institutions or schools of art or of gentleness as the little workshops were ; and the relations between the

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employers and the employed are not, from any point of view, either creditable or profitable to either side. The business men and the workmen are responsible between them for the greatest social muddle, and for the meanest and the most stupid moral relations. And they are exposing the British people to the gravest national danger in the future. "Complacent assurance as to our social solidarity" is not any longer possible even for the foolish. Wise men are anxious. "The horizon seems to be composed of lowering and threatening clouds. There was an ugly temper abroad before the outbreak of the war," and such peace as has been maintained during the war has been effected by methods of compromise; and the compromise is temporary. In fact, there is not peace; there are only suspended hostilities. The problem is not solved: it has been put aside "till the war is ended." And it is like the problem of the Sphinx, *to be solved on pain of death*.

These facts show that the education which has thus come in the wake of modern industrialism, if valued in terms of individual character and social well-being and security, is a disastrous failure. It is narrow in range and it is wrong in kind. It is not ruled by "the handsome passions," and the wisdom which it seeks is not high. It does not secure happiness nor promote virtue. Too often it distorts as well as starves the souls of men. "The fundamental truth in modern life, as I analyse it," says President Wilson, "is a profound ignorance. I am not one of those who challenge the promoters of special interests on the ground that they are malevolent, that they are bad men; I challenge their leadership on the ground that they are ignorant men, that when you have absorbed yourself in a business through half your life, you have no other point of view than the point of view of that business, and that, therefore, you are disqualified by ignorance from giving counsel as to common interests. . . . If you immerse a man in a given undertaking, no matter how big that undertaking is, and keep him immersed for half a lifetime, you can't expect him to see any

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horizon ; you can't get him to see life steadily or see it whole."

There is no solution of these difficulties except by a change of national temper, and there is no way of bringing that change about except by rescuing education from the clutches of industrialism. We must have a purpose. We must revert to the principal and main purpose which, in the British homes and in the schools, has fashioned young lives whose mettle has been tried hard by their country in its time of need, and has not been found wanting. And we must make it clear, hold it consciously, and carry it out resolutely.

That purpose is in one respect opposite to that of Germany, which has treated its youth as State-fodder ; for its essence is that in all stages of education, from the lowest to the highest, the individual himself shall be the *sole end of the process*, and that ulterior considerations should have no more place in our schemes than they have in the mind of the mother when she suckles her infant at her breast. There is only one kind of school which gains a sensible man's entire trust—it is that in which the lessons, the games, the societies, the whole training, whether vocational or other, is meant to terminate and reach its final goal in the boys and girls themselves. The child is taught for his own sake, not in order that he may "promote the efficiency of the State"—that is the German conception ; nor for the sake of industrial efficiency—that is the conception of men tempted to regard the children of the workers as industrial pabulum.

It is difficult to maintain the purity of the educational motive as the boys and girls grow up. At first their uselessness, whether for economic or State purposes, helps to protect them. Later on, the relative value of educational ends is not so easily discerned, and an unfortunate and entirely unnecessary conflict is allowed to emerge between the livelihood and the life. For vocational training, too, can and always ought to awaken the powers, form the

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taste, strengthen the character, and prepare the way for a life that is upright and honourable, on which not only the livelihood follows with a security that very rarely fails, but something of that nobility of bearing and moral worth which even parents who have made a mess of their own lives, *and know it*, not seldom pathetically desire for their children.

III. THE SOLE END OF EDUCATION—THE CITIZEN HIMSELF

TO say that this *moral* education is the only education that should ever be given, whether in the schools or afterwards, would appear to be extravagant. It is the simple truth. *Neither State nor Church, nor teacher, nor parent, nor any other authority has any right to form a people's mind or tamper with its personality, except for the people's good.* This is fundamental. In the last resort there is only one justification for the pressure of discipline or of dogma, or for any other kind of compulsion—we may fashion to virtue, constrain to duty, 'force to be free.' The State may do this for its citizens. According to Plato it is its sole business. The end of the State is the citizen; and the State which exists for the sake of its citizens is safe in their hands. It will find that its citizens will in turn be responsible for its good and dedicated to its well-being.

States may even do this for one another: that is to say, they may escape from the moral confusion into which Germany has fallen, and respect one another's "personality." For this is the essence of morality, public and private, national and international, and the very perfection of behaviour—"to treat humanity," wherever it is found, in white or coloured, civilised or uncivilised, wise or foolish, good or evil, "always as end and never as means."

But, it will be asked, how can it be reasonably said that the only education permissible is moral education? What of the arts and of religion, and of the whole series of crafts and industries, trades and professions?

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The question proceeds on a false assumption, committing the error which was exposed at the outset : it assumes that morality is a separate province or an exclusive aspect of life. But morality *is* religion operative, the highest incarnating itself in deeds, the process of transmuting natural circumstance into spiritual privilege. It is divine service. All man's ultimate ideals are adjectives of one another ; the good is beautiful and the beautiful is good, and they are both true. Art and morality are not at war ; and as to the crafts and industries, they are moral opportunities, a chance of rendering a service which is free.

The question also implies that moral education must be theoretic and doctrinal rather than practical, conveyed by lessons and lectures rather than by the doing of the things which are right. But the way *to* morality, which moral education ought to be, as well as morality itself *is* practice. *Morality is the process of extracting from the station which we occupy, and the events which happen to us, the highest value that is implicit in them.* The natural environment, nature itself, is a musical instrument, whose discords and harmonies depend on the player's touch. And it is never out of tune if the touch be true enough. Morality is not possible except "in the stream of life" and under the stress of events. "The harper," says Aristotle, "is not made otherwise than by harping, nor the just man otherwise than by the doing of just deeds."

Because moral education must be in close relation to practice, and illumined by the experience of the pupil himself, *theoretic* ethical instruction in schools is apt to be futile. The value of talking about morality to boys and girls is doubtful. Even "the moral" of stories meant to illustrate the virtues should not be allowed to obtrude. There is a reticence and reserve about the matters of the inner life which is more natural to the British people than to others, and it should not be lightly valued. Our boys and girls are not coarse of fibre, and they rarely fail to understand the meaning of silence. The unpremeditated

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flash of approval or disapproval, the happy look in the mother's or father's face when a gentle deed is done, some inevitable and unpurposed tenderness in the teacher's voice as he reproves or commends, has indefinitely higher worth than systematic lessons. These things are close to facts and practice. They indicate the high price which is set on deeds of courage, or truthfulness, or kindness—such deeds as the child can understand. And, whether it be in the home or in the school, the moral education that seems thus to spring at the touch of circumstance from the character of the parent or teacher, like fire from flint, and which implies a steadfast attitude of the soul, a compelling habit of admiring what is morally fair and of reverencing what is morally noble, is as nearly perfect as anything human can well be. Moreover, it is a way of giving instruction which can be followed *always*. Indeed it is this purpose which informs all that the good teacher does. He may be teaching the multiplication table or the paradigm of a Greek verb, or his instruction may be what we call "vocational" or "technical," but his permanent care is, by any or all of these means, to liberate the possibilities of character in his pupils.

But it must not be inferred, because moral theory should have little place in the schools, that it should have little place in the education which follows. This were a cardinal error. A time comes when the pupil can participate in the ethical purpose of his teacher, and when that purpose must be pursued *consciously* by both alike. As life goes on, especially if it grows in worth, to distil the ethical meaning of facts and events becomes more and more clearly man's highest duty and most precious privilege. For it is not merely the working man who "does not know how to spend his high wages": there are very poor people among the very rich, because the human values latent in their wealth are beyond their reach. They are not educated to the level of their opportunities: they have not the alchemy in their character which can extract their uses. The

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pictures on the walls of their palaces, the literature on their shelves, mean no more to them than the mountains of gold could mean to the Australian aborigines.

It is by no means true that moral practice is independent of moral theory, or that moral progress can come without knowing the truth—the highly complex and intricate truths of moral matters. The divorce of conduct from knowledge or of the will from the intelligence is foolish and very mischievous. It is the fashion for the moment to esteem the “intuitions” and “feelings” more highly than thought and to trust to them in matters of conduct rather than to “reason and its processes.” It is not recognised that the moral “intuitions” of to-day were doubtful truths yesterday—hard to grasp and harder to believe, while the day before they were the dreams of unpractical visionaries. What we attribute to the feelings and call “instinctive” is the wisdom of the past become traditional, and on that account instilled into us and assimilated by us as we grow. We do not realise that every shred of that wisdom has cost thought as well as volition, exercised the reasoning powers as well as the emotions. It is a dangerous doctrine that morality is not a matter which men need think about or try to understand. We recognise in part the labour which it has cost mankind to change the hunger-haunted nakedness of the lake-dweller into the wealthy man’s command of the wide world’s commodities. We have not trusted the affairs of the world of economics to “the heart” rather than the head. Or is it in its sleep that mankind has established the institutions, constructed the social relations, discovered the truths that have changed the crude and cruel passions of the cave man into the spirit which wears righteousness as a robe and intelligence as a diadem, which is sensitive to the beauty and the meaning of the world and devoted to its good? Is it the thoughtless who have led the world to betterment? Or are not the paths of spiritual progress stained with the blood of the pilgrims?

No one can estimate the loss which modern civilisation

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has suffered from the low value which has been set upon the free search for truth in moral matters and the absence of enterprise in this realm of the spirit. There is prejudice against such enterprise. We attribute the moral bankruptcy of Germany to its "*intellectualism.*" "No one," we are told, "can accuse the Germans as a nation of having neglected the cultivation of the intellect: it is proved to demonstration that they have not been equally regardful of training the character."*

The diagnosis is characteristic, and it is false. The bankruptcy of Germany is due *not* to intellectualism, but to *ignorance.* And it is an error to say that "the Germans have not been regardful of training the character." They have trained character, as is well known, with an assiduity and resoluteness and systematic thoroughness to which there is no parallel. But they have done it to a wrong purpose; and their purpose was wrong because of their ignorance. The falsity of their educational end and their blundering ignorance of the nature of man, of the nature of the State, of the mutual rights and obligations of the State and its citizens, and of morality itself are exposed in the disasters which are now flowing from them. They are bad "psychologists," as all the nations of the world know; they are worse philosophers and moralists.

Now why is it that we attribute their error to "intellectualism"? We should not think of calling an analagous misinterpretation and wrong use of the forces of nature by that name. We should call it ignorance, we should attribute it to lack of enquiry and to low regard for truth in the domain of nature; and we should seek for remedy in research. It is because we ourselves undervalue research in the domain of morals. There are more systematic students of mathematics than of morals in the British islands, and there is more confusion about moral values, which are alone the ultimate values, than there is about

* *The Hibbert Journal*, July, 1916, p. 1917.

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plants and chemicals, or pounds and pennies. No doubt knowledge is not the *only* condition of individual or national well-being, any more than an organism needs nothing but brains ; but knowledge is indispensable all the same. No one can be good by virtue of ignorance ; and there is no ignorance so costly for a nation as ignorance of the conditions of moral well-being.

The right to moral education is the supreme right of the citizen, and to accord the means to this education is the supreme duty of the State.

This is, above all other things, the lesson we should learn from Germany—the risks of moral ignorance and stupidity. Who doubts that its doom is due to its moral confusion ? Or that the confusion is very deep and general amongst learned and unlearned alike ? It is difficult to determine what policy could show less insight than that of using man as means, as the German State has done, unless it be that of setting up a State, conceived in terms of physical force, as possessing an unqualified and unconditional right to his services and his life. Man is never means, not even when he is coerced to a duty which he does not recognise—for the rights of an ignorant conscience are limited. Man can bow his soul (and prosper) only to the categorical imperatives of the moral law ; and States themselves can prosper on no other terms. There is no law which is absolutely binding, except the law of freedom ; neither is there any other law of life for either men or nations. And the State cannot claim service, except it be itself in the service of a still higher authority—the authority which is rooted in the righteousness that is “ like the everlasting mountains.”

But, on the other hand, provided that a State's authority is rooted in righteousness, provided that in its dealings with its citizens it be itself a ‘ suppliant for the control ’ of the Law of Duty, there is then no limit to its authority, and none is desirable. Nor is any service or sacrifice stunted by the citizens of such a State : their service of it

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is freedom and joy, and their one way to self-respect. "It is not true," says one who has bled for England, "that what nerves men to fight is always, or even generally, the desire to assert the power of the country to which they belong against that of the country to which they do not." To the men who fifty yards from one another "freeze and starve and sweat in the same mud and rain and heat, who look out on the same shattered villages and unploughed fields, and hunger with the same passion for the return of peace, there must be some higher sanction for their actions than the mere interests of their own country. Both life and death were insupportable if there were not. The national impulse which creates the national armies springs from the feeling that a country is identified with certain principles whose claims are absolute. They do not fight because the State chose that they should. The State fights because they chose that it should. They do not fight to protect England and France. They fight to prevent England and France ceasing to be England and France, as they would if Englishmen and Frenchmen did not fight when their consciences told them to do so. They fight not that their country may exist, but because it would be better that it should cease to exist than lose its soul for the sake of existing."*

Such views as these are held in Germany to be absurdly antiquated, and those who teach them as "guilty of an unpardonable confusion of thought. All ethical considerations are alien to the State, and the State must, therefore, resolutely keep them at arm's length." "If the war has done no more than awake the German people out of love's young dream—that is, out of its reliance on the goodwill and honest dealing of peoples and States, it will have done us a great service."† Germany believes this preposterous doctrine as to the nature of the State; she has endeavoured

* "Democracy or Defeat," by a "W.E.A. Soldier," *Welsb Outlook*, January, 1917.

† Dr. Kerschensteiner, quoted in *THE ROUND TABLE*, March, 1917, p. 272.

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to put it into practice, and is finding that her hypotheses will not work. She has obeyed the command to “think in terms of power” (*machtpolitischen denken*) and turned her soul away from her old idealisms. She has been devoting her mind to other matters than morality, dedicating her intellectual resources to the discovery and the use of the forces which make for economic and military power. And the consequences are both obvious and inevitable. Knowledge, as usual, has proved to be power. Germany would be to-day the envy of the nations and the marvel of human history if human well-being could be reckoned in her gross terms. As things are she is their warning. Her ignorance concerning the real conditions of national strength, her ignorance of the things which are best worth knowing and having—the things which have absolute worth in themselves and give their worth, as Aristotle says, to all other ends—has led her to deal with her citizens in educating them, and to endeavour to live amongst her neighbouring States, in a way and upon conditions that are self-destructive.

This, then, is the one supreme truth which is being taught the world: *That which occupies the mind enters into the conduct, just as that which is near the heart invades the intelligence; and what enters into conduct fashions fate.* It is not safe in educating citizens to think of nothing but industrial and commercial success and to forget morality. Germany has done so. Her delight has not been in the law of the Lord. She has meditated therein neither day nor night. And she shall not be like a tree planted by the rivers of water, that bringeth forth fruit in his season. Her leaf shall wither, and unless she changes her soul nought that she doeth shall prosper. She has issued a challenge to the nature of things, which is moral; and she is in process of being worsted in the fight.

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IV. THE NATION'S APPEAL TO THE UNIVERSITIES.

NOW, the explicitness with which Germany has repudiated moral obligations on the part of the State, the blatancy with which it has declared its belief in mere power, the elaborate perfection of its schemes for subjecting the souls of its citizens to its own coarse ends, the obvious danger in which the world stood from Germany's arrogance—all these things taken together have made it relatively easy to discover its errors and to rally the forces of civilisation against its purposes. The errors of an enemy are usually plain. It is our own which are difficult to detect, especially if they are shared by our neighbours and have fashioned the traditions and habits of our times, and become our "intuitive beliefs." Moreover, the British people is not given to looking at its own face in the mirror. It is of all peoples the least "reflective." Hence, if we are told that "the enemy we are fighting is not anything so transitory or unstable as modern Germany, but a spirit which lies in wait for every nation; that though that spirit is rooted in the historical tradition of Prussia, what makes it dangerous is not that it is alien but that it is horribly congenial to almost the whole modern world," we can scarcely understand what is meant. When the same powerful writer adds "that the temper of German imperialism is the temper of modern industrialism," and "that the moral atmosphere which has fed the spirit in Prussia, till it swelled from a barbarous peculiarity into a triumphant philosophy of empire, has been imported into Germany largely from England direct, partly through the mediation of America,"* we are hardly willing to listen further.

Possibly the best hope of the times is to be found in the fact that in some quarters, by some men, the philosophy of life implied in industrialism is being questioned. The war

* "Democracy or Defeat," by a "W.E.A. Soldier," in the *Welsh Outlook*.

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has brought into relief other aims than those with which industrialism has steeped and stained its spirit. A startling light has been thrown upon our ethical and even our theological creeds. We have seen young men, in their hundreds of thousands, go forth to prove that it is better to die for some things than it is to live for some others. The selfishness of the competitive materialism of the customary economic world has little place in the fields of France. It is not there that rates are cut or production limited ; that the risks are rolled on the next man, as the seller rolls the rise of prices on the next buyer ; that the country's need is converted into a chance of private gain ; or that operations are suspended till the spoil is divided between the men and their managers, and the stronger force carries away the larger share. It is not there that salvation is sought by allowing another to die in one's stead.

And we are beginning to ask whether such ways of life and creeds as are beneath the level of the morality and religion of war can be good enough for peace. Or, to put the same truth in the opposite way, we are beginning to reflect whether it be not possible to introduce into our civil ways of life something of the influences which have clothed the men on the fields of battle with imperishable spiritual splendour ; and reflected that splendour back on many a quiet hearth in very quiet parts of our vast empire, where the mothers have loved their sons too wisely and too well not to be willing that they should " follow the gleam."

Why should the economic life of a people capable of this moral heroism be squalid and its economic spirit that of the moral slums ? Is it not possible that the purpose which is supreme and dominant in war, and has in it sufficient potency to convert the horrors of the battlefield into the service of a sacred cause, might let in some clean light and pure air into the board-rooms of industrial directors and dissipate something of the smoke of the factories ?

Supposing the experiment were tried of putting our lives in times of peace at the service of the same sacred

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cause ; supposing the well-being of our country—not as a brute State that knows no law save its own will to aggression, but as the living repository of our whole spiritual inheritance in literature and art and all the sciences, as the security of our economic interests and the protection of the hearth and of all the institutions of freedom and happiness, and as the principle of loyalty and order throughout the whole—supposing the well-being of a State conceived in that way stood in the background of our industrial enterprise, would they also not gain a new value, and all the men engaged upon them move and live thereby on a higher and happier plane ? And would they lose one jot of their economic efficiency ? Or would not the sense of a common service, whether as employers or as employed, substitute for the material and spiritual waste which conflict and suspicion and animosity bring, the sense of comradeship and the spirit of help which is gain all the way, for body and soul, citizen and State.

These are the questions that are being asked now in many ways and on many hands, both in England and in France. If, on the whole, what still occupies the foreground of ordinary thought on education and fills many columns of the popular press, is either the industrial use of natural science or the rival claims of technical subjects and the humanities ; and if the late British Government (leading when pushed and obedient to the forces of mediocrity, after the manner of Governments) has appointed committees to consider the sciences as instruments of producing goods and modern languages as means of selling them, as if it had no concern with men but only with money, still there is evidence that a deliberate national purpose of another kind is being slowly formed : the purpose—namely, so to educate the British people as to make it more fully and more intelligently aware of the unspeakable privileges and obligations of their citizenship.

One of the most significant and promising movements towards this end is that joint enterprise of the English and Welsh universities and the English and Welsh

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working man which is called "The Workers' Educational Association." So far the movement has not prospered in Scotland; the workers suspect the universities of being "capitalistic institutions," and the richer industrialists fear they are socialistic! And the Scottish national temper is apt to be thorough. Compared with the magnitude of its undertaking the W.E.A. is small; but it is not possible to witness the soundness of its aim, the practical sagacity of its methods, and the enthusiasm which it is eliciting, without believing that once more "there is lighted such a candle in England as shall not be put out." Its purpose is towards the whole people. Recognising, as is natural, the vital importance of vocational and professional training, it still knows "the use of humane education, even to miners and engineers and weavers," and affirms that industrial training "ought to be *secondary* to the liberal education that gives health and vigour to the body, knowledge and wisdom to the mind."* Its aim is the aim of all true reformers, said William Temple, its president, "to bring a genuine human life within the reach of every citizen."

But the main significance of this enterprise will be found in its recoil upon the universities themselves. The education of the working man at the industrial centres by means of tutorial classes is the most wholesome task to which they have put their hands in modern times, and in the performance of it they will henceforth interpret their functions more generously and prove a new and much greater power in the national life. The universities, and more especially the older English universities, will be led to reform themselves in the direction of serving citizenship more directly *and much more widely*.

It is claimed that in the great public schools and universities no "divorce exists between our scheme of education and our political ideal." On the contrary, the youths subjected to their peculiar discipline and impressed with

* *What Labour Wants*, by J. M. Mactavish, Secretary to the W.E.A.

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their *ἦθος* pass into the service of the Empire at home and in distant parts bearing with them the spirit of liberty and individuality, and they administer and rule with such strength and justice and good sense and devotion as to go far to account for the freedom and the loyalty of the peoples they govern and the secure stability of the British Commonwealth.

This is a great claim and it is valid. But the test is narrow, while the possible imperial uses of the universities are very wide. The men who pass from the universities into the higher civil services are relatively few in number, and they are the *élite*; and if Oxford and Cambridge cater superbly for these, and for all others of their *alumni* who bring with them the promise of eminence in any of the arts or of the sciences, there are others committed to their charge whom they might serve better and help more. The large majority of the undergraduates are brought up in the great public schools, and are the sons of well-to-do parents. They enter the older universities when about 19 years of age, healthy in body, wholesome in mind, and sound in character. Some of them lack the ability, more of them lack the ambition or the temperament which produces the scholar or the scientific man. They bring with them no store of learning of any sort; they have not been in contact with the forces which make or unmake nations. They were too young. They have not felt the power of ideas. After a happy three years, spent under the genial guidance and the light hand of the college tutor, and the sterner discipline of their comrades on the river and the fields of play, they go forth into their world, and in the natural course of things take upon themselves the numerous and varied responsibilities of citizenship. More of these responsibilities are laid upon them than upon the quiet scholars whom they have left behind. They become landowners, manufacturers, traders; they come into intimate touch with the lives of men; they have tenants to deal with, workmen to employ and rule, the

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nation's commerce to sustain and guide, and the civil institutions of the community to maintain in their use and strength.

What do the colleges do for them in the way of preparing them for these responsibilities? They continue the smattering in the classics or mathematics, or rudimentary science, just as if the calls of citizenship were never to fall upon their ears. That the young men leave their university ignorant of the details of civic institutions and of local administration is relatively a small matter. But they are not aware of the magnitude of their civic inheritance, and they are not able to enter into possession of the educated man's portion of it. They have not felt the power of their country's literature, nor have they been intoxicated with any one of the fine arts. They have read in the *Republic* of Plato and *Politics* of Aristotle, but they do not know their own times; they have not felt that the contrast between the Civic State of Athens or Sparta and the vast tumultuous Modern Empire is as the contrast between the old battlefields where the arrows flew or the shields rang and the fields of carnage on the Marne and the Somme; while the economics of modern industrialism mean as little for them as the social arrangements of the book of Leviticus. They are unaware of the long toil of good men in the slow service of the invisible issues of the ethical world, and know nothing of the making of a nation's mind. They do not understand what civilisation has cost, and they have never tried to measure their debt to their people. They have never asked what customs, what manners, what morals, what religion, what language, even, or what shred of those things which make men human they would possess had they not been nursed on their country's knees and "suckled its breasts."

The universities should enlighten them. They should train these men—these "ordinary" undergraduates who are capable of so much and are helped so little—with a *direct view to citizenship, with even such a direct view as*

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they now train men for the learned professions. It is in the power especially of the older universities to widen the outlook of the undergraduates now so elegantly neglected, to put them in the way of enriching their lives, of deepening their sense of gratitude to their country, and of making them less prejudiced, more happy and much more efficient in its service.

And this reform need not bring the least detriment to the scholarly and scientific purposes now pursued so prosperously by the universities, nor lower in the least their ardour for research. That were a sacrifice not lightly to be made. But side by side with their labour in the fields of science and advanced scholarship it should not be difficult to devise and establish means of educating these other good citizens in a more purposeful way than at present. The requirements for a pass degree in citizenship are, in the main, as obvious as those for a degree in medicine and theology. The course for the degree would be inadequate to its subject, just as these are ; but it would not be more inadequate, nor of less social utility. And it would not be less attractive and informing.

Is it presumption to offer a rough sketch of a scheme of study suitable for this purpose ?

All undergraduates reading for the pass degree in citizenship should be required to attend, through one academical year, courses of instruction in the following subjects :—

First Year.—(a) *A course of lectures in English literature.* The objects of the course would not be those of technical or minute scholarship. Its purpose is to introduce the undergraduate to the master minds in prose and poetry and to enable him to feel their power. Oxford knows from its professors of poetry and from others what such lectures may signify ; and the Scottish universities have learnt from John Nichol and Masson, Bradley and Saintsbury and their successors, something of the value of such a study both in the life of the student at college and afterwards.

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(b) *A course of lectures of the same broad character in any other literature, ancient or modern.* Once more the emphasis would not fall upon the niceties of scholarship, valuable as these may be ; for it is the *pass* man who is in question. The undergraduate, whether he read Greek or Latin, French, German, Spanish, Italian, or Russian would be guided in the same way to knowledge of the masters, and he would read widely in them for himself.

Some of the undergraduates might be expected to be inspired with the ambition of the scholar and should pass into the honours school. The others, it is easy to believe, would read more, and know better what to read, ever after.

Second Year.—(a) A course of instruction in English or, rather, British history. It would deal slightly with things long ago and more and more fully on the way down to the events of the present. Its purpose would be to help the student to witness the growth of national custom, of moral and religious opinion, and of the institutions in which these embody themselves ; and to recognise in some degree how great a fact the British Commonwealth is and what it has cost to found it.

(b) *A course of instruction by class lectures and laboratory experiment in any science.* Its object would be to help the undergraduate to appreciate the method and catch something of the spirit of scientific enquiry and to know the uses and the joy of labour in the natural field.

Third Year.—The courses of instruction should concentrate directly on citizenship and deal :

(a) *With economics.*

(b) *With the ethics of individual and social life.* The purposes of these courses would be to enable the undergraduate to recognise and, so far as possible, to understand the nature and to estimate the value of the economic and moral forces that conflict and combine in modern life ; to realise the intimacy and multiplicity of the relations and the limits and grounds of the mutual rights and claims of the modern citizen and modern State ; and to lift him out of

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the reach of the narrowing influences and prejudices which cling so easily to the station in life which he happens to occupy.

Can it be doubted that were the older universities to follow such a scheme for educating the ordinary undergraduate—with whom alone we are at present concerned—his three years at college would be less empty, his after life fuller, and the debt of the British people to its highest institutions of learning much deepened ?

But there are two other directions in which the universities might increase their power and greatly enhance their value to the British Commonwealth.

(a) They have undertaken to help the working man towards knowledge, and to foster within him the spirit of an enlightened citizenship. They should strengthen their assault upon the narrowness and hardship of the outlook of the working classes, and the assault should be much more general. The universities should feel more deeply their responsibility for the continued and advanced education of adult men and women. They should be guardians of the adult mind. No town of ten or fifteen thousand inhabitants should be without a tutorial class every winter on some one subject bearing not too remotely on good citizenship. At every centre of national life the pulse of the spirit of the university should be felt and known to beat—the spirit that values and seeks for truth, and thereby makes life larger and more free.

(b) Besides the workers there are the employers and managers of labour. These men, too, are, *as a rule*, cramped by their industries, and not seldom the victims of ignorance and of hard prejudice. They are, as a class, not much more liberally educated than the workers ; they are not less responsible for the barbaric relations which now prevail in the economic world ; and, in any case, their ignorance and distortion of mind is a graver danger to the community. Their education should not stop, in so far as it is humane and liberal, when they leave the school and enter the office

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or engineering shop. At sixteen or eighteen years of age it is not possible for them to have felt the power of intelligence and justice in the affairs of men. They are not treated well in this respect by their parents. It should be recognised as a grave injustice and as a social disadvantage—as “bad form”—for the sons of the well-to-do not to have known what university life can mean, and not to have learnt to set a high and intelligent value on humane letters and the sciences both of man and of nature. And it is a wrong to the State. We do not wisely in committing hundreds and thousands of workers in the great centres of industry to the charge of ill-educated men. The service which such men are rendering to their country by anticipating and meeting its economic wants is incalculably great. They should receive their reward: the spirit of citizenship should be awakened and fostered within them by means of a more generous education, so that their service shall be on a better level, and be to them what his profession is to the minister of religion, or the doctor, or the man of learning and science, a thing to live *for* and not merely to live *by*.

It is time that the universities throughout the Empire should widen their aims and be less niggard in the expenditure of the civic virtue that is latent in them. They are national institutions, they have national obligations, and their obligations are their opportunities. Their students should be many times as numerous as they are at present. They have no right to be cloistered and to minister only to the few. Wales, it is believed, is on the way to demand to be taxed for the purposes of higher learning, and about to set an example to the Empire of abolishing university fees and making college education free. It is to be hoped that its example may prove contagious, especially in the great centres of industry such as Leeds and Sheffield, Birmingham and Newcastle, Bristol and Liverpool and Manchester.

It is not to be denied that the responsibility for the moral education of the people lies first of all upon the Churches. But when social reformers seek for agencies which shall

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foster and not frustrate the spirit of scientific and undogmatic enquiry into the matters of the spirit, or which shall, in these times of economic danger, moderate the antagonisms and raise the level of the aims of capital and labour, it is not to the Churches that they look. It is to the universities. From them must flow those influences which shall form the mind of the people to the purposes of a harmonious, peaceful, secure, progressive, happy and noble citizenship.

AMERICA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR

IT is difficult in the extreme to describe and it is impossible to summarise the course of public opinion in a populous and highly diversified democracy whose citizens resent unofficial leadership that is obtrusive and demand the right of exercising their own unfettered judgment. But despite all the variations of time and section, it is an indubitable historical fact that the great majority of the American people were from the outset of the war and throughout its entire course impressed with the general justice of the cause for which the Entente Allies were fighting. A very small minority of the intelligentsia saw clearly the great issue and favoured intervention even so early as the autumn of 1914. Their numbers were considerably increased by the *Lusitania* tragedy. But even the great majority of this independently thinking class adhered steadfastly to the traditional doctrine of aloofness from European entanglements, and, much in the spirit of Cobden's internationalism, held that it was the function of the United States to advance the comity of nations by an example of goodwill to all sister States and by a scrupulous regard for their rights. The great bulk of the people from the very beginning did not see clearly that international right and justice had to be vindicated if the world were to continue to be a livable one and, as time went on, this great issue was obscured by minor questions that confused the mind of a people unaccustomed to such problems and unable to gauge their relative importance.

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The mists of uncertainty and doubt were gradually being dispersed during the opening months of 1917 by the manifestation of the hollowness of Germany's peace offer, by the systematic devastation of France which followed hard on the Belgian deportations, and by the resumption of the unrestricted submarine warfare. Secretary Zimmermann's inept attempt to embroil the United States with Mexico and Japan further disclosed the insidious nature of the German menace, while the Russian Revolution conclusively demonstrated the mediæval isolation of the Teutonic Powers in a progressive world of freedom. As a result of all these factors, the haze became thinner and thinner and, in the course of three months of hesitation and doubt, the American people had definitely made up its mind that the fate of democracy was involved in the war and that no stable or just international future was possible in a world where one State arrogated to itself the right to ignore solemn treaties, long-established inter-State usage and generally accepted principles of morality and humanity, whenever these interfered with its imperious will to power. But the making or the marring of the situation depended predominantly upon the stand taken by President Wilson, for the American citizen traditionally follows the lead of the Chief Executive in foreign affairs and tends to regard as unpatriotic all opposition to his guidance. The entrance of the United States into the war on the large issue of democracy against autocracy is due primarily to Mr. Wilson's decision.

I. ARMED NEUTRALITY

THE steps in this crystallisation and clarification of American opinion succeeded each other rapidly. President Wilson's eirenicon of January 22 led to a renewed discussion in the Senate of the feasibility of a league of nations to ensure justice and peace. The Administration forces tried unsuccessfully to ward off debate and did not discuss

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the plan on its merits. Senator Hitchcock, one of the Democratic leaders, supported the proposal mainly as a move in favour of the early restoration of peace. On the other hand, considerable opposition was manifested to the entrance of the United States into a loose league of unlimited liabilities, whose scope could not be foreseen.* Senator Lodge definitely withdrew the general support that he had formally given to the underlying principles of the project. This important discussion was rudely cut short by Germany's sudden announcement of the resumption and extension of her unrestricted submarine campaign against enemy and neutral commerce. This completely changed the situation and focussed attention on the activities of the submarines to which little notice had been paid during the preceding nine months. On February 3 President Wilson announced to Congress that he had severed diplomatic relations with the German Empire. But he stated at the same time that he refused to believe that the German authorities intended "to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do." "Only actual overt acts on their part," he continued, "can make me believe it even now." But if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed, the President added, then he would again come before Congress "to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas."

Contrary to the general expectation, "the overt acts" did not take place immediately, but, in the meanwhile, Germany was accomplishing a part, at least, of her purpose since the passenger ships of the American Line were deterred from sailing to Europe. Even in the absence of

* Senator Cummins said: "If this country shall do what the President proposes we will be involved, either in almost continuous war waged all over the world, or we will be engaged in almost constant rebellion against the authority which he proposes to set up over us."

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any markedly flagrant offences against American lives and property, the situation had become intolerable. Accordingly, on February 26, the President again addressed Congress, pointing out that the German submarine campaign was acting as a virtual embargo on American shipping and asking for authority to supply American ships "with defensive arms should that become necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas." The proposal simply was to protect the elementary rights of the United States as a neutral nation and the means suggested were those of armed neutrality which, the President said, "we shall know how to maintain and for which there is abundant American precedent." President Wilson again gave expression to his devotion to peace and to the hope that these arms would not have to be used, and he specifically stated that he was not "proposing or contemplating war or any steps that need lead to it." At this stage of the proceedings, the policy of the Administration was merely one of protecting American rights against German depredations, and, apparently, there was no intention of departing from an attitude of neutrality towards the Entente Allies.

Congress proceeded forthwith to give effect to the President's recommendations. On March 1, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 403 to 13, passed a Bill authorising the arming of merchant ships, but not the use of the requested "other instrumentalities." In the Senate, however, the broader programme was considered, but as a result of the antiquated procedure of this Chamber, no vote could be secured in the few days before March 4, when the session of the legislature came automatically to an end. Before this expiration, however, an overwhelming majority of the Senate signed a manifesto in favour of the Bill.

This filibuster on the part of a dozen Senators, whom

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President Wilson stigmatized as "a little group of wilful men representing no opinion but their own," aroused intense indignation throughout the country and greatly strengthened the Administration. A similar effect was produced by the publication of Secretary Zimmermann's instructions of January 19 to the German Minister in Mexico to negotiate an alliance with that country, in the event of the proposed submarine campaign leading to war between Germany and the United States. The offer to Mexico of the "lost" provinces of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico did much to open the eyes of the Middle West and South West to the Prussian peril. Similarly, the suggestion that Japan should be seduced from the Entente and induced to enter this alliance aroused considerable feeling on the Pacific coast, whose imagination is at times somewhat morbidly haunted by the fear of a Japanese invasion. In general, however, the project seemed so fantastic that its humorous features obscured in a measure its direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. One clause of the German proposal which at the time, however, did not elicit much popular comment, completely knocked away the props of armed neutrality. This policy assumed that, as soon as peace between the Entente and Central Powers was re-established, all differences between the United States and Germany would automatically vanish. But Germany's instructions were to propose to Carranza to "make war together and together make peace." Gradually more and more people realised that even armed neutrality must have a negotiated settlement. The possibility of having to conclude peace with a Germany unhampered by war with the Entente was far from an alluring one. Some doubts as to the practicability of armed neutrality beset President Wilson within a week of his enunciation of this policy. In his inaugural address on March 5, he said :

We have been obliged to arm ourselves to make good our claim

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to a certain minimum of right and of freedom of action. We stand firm in armed neutrality, since it seems that in no other way we can demonstrate what it is we insist upon and cannot forego. We may even be drawn on by circumstances, not by our own purpose or desire, to a more active assertion of our rights as we see them and a more immediate association with the great struggle itself.

The march of events with remorseless logic was asserting its sway over decisions that did not meet the facts.

With the increased popular support for energetic action, President Wilson proceeded to use the constitutional authority of his office to arm American merchantmen and to man their guns with crews from the American Navy. While this was proceeding, news came of the Russian Revolution, which aroused widespread enthusiasm and greatly strengthened popular sympathy for the Entente Allies. But, in the meanwhile, the submarines were pursuing their gruesome task and overt acts succeeded one another rapidly. On one day three American ships were sunk under circumstances that aroused general indignation. In response thereto, the date of the meeting of the special session of Congress was advanced a fortnight. When, on April 2, this body had assembled, President Wilson made a momentous address defining the objects and scope of America's entrance into the War. This immediately clarified the whole situation.

II. THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY

THE opening paragraphs of Mr Wilson's address constitute a cogent indictment of the entire German submarine campaign against commerce, both when it was somewhat restrained as well as when it was entirely unrestricted. During the former period of this "cruel and unmanly business," the precautions taken were, he said, "meagre and haphazard enough," but when all restrictions had been swept aside, vessels of every description, whether

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of belligerent or of neutral nationality, including hospital and relief ships, were indiscriminately and "ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board." This submarine campaign against commerce, the indictment concluded, was both "warfare against mankind" and "a war against all nations." "The challenge is to all mankind," and each state must decide for itself how to meet it.

The President then frankly stated that, when he had addressed Congress on February 26, he had thought that "it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms," but now it appears that armed neutrality is impracticable. "Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; . . . it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents." Therefore, he advised Congress to declare that the course of the German Government was nothing less than war against the United States and to take immediate steps "to exert all its power and to employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war." This will, he said, involve on the one hand "the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to these Governments of the most liberal financial credits." On the other hand, it will involve the mobilisation of America's material resources, the full equipment of the navy, and the organisation of a large army. But these preparations, he urgently warned, should be so arranged as not to interfere with the "very practical duty" of supplying the Entente Powers with the materials they required. "They are in the field and we should help them in every way to be effective there."

Had President Wilson stopped here, the address would have been complete in itself. It was a lucid enunciation of the policy of protecting American rights and a statement of the only possible means of accomplishing this end under the existing circumstances. It would have clearly expressed

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the occasion of America's entrance into the war, but it would have ignored the deeper causes of this action. President Wilson knew that the most earnest advocates of active measures against Germany were far from militaristic by nature and that they would readily have foregone even extensive commercial rights rather than have thrust America's youth into the holocaust. But to them the submarine campaign was merely one of many manifestations of the Prussian materialistic and non-moral political creed that has to be discredited and discarded if life in the future world is to be tolerable for its self-governing peoples. Fully realising this, the President raised the entire question from the narrow basis of neutral rights to the high plane of fundamental principles upon which interstate order and justice depend. In ringing words, he proclaimed his firm adherence to the programme of an organised society of States, renounced the constraints of neutrality, and arraigned the Prussian code.

I have exactly the same things in mind now (he said) that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22nd of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the 3rd of February and on the 26th of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organised force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their Governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilised States.

Mr Wilson then exonerated the German people and said that the United States had no quarrel with them, since

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they were not responsible for the war. He completely dissociated them from their autocratic Government, whose long-continued policy of aggression, intrigue and espionage he unsparingly condemned.

Self-governed nations (he said) do not fill their neighbour States with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

Turning to the future, in which he hopes to see established a league of nations, President Wilson emphasised a fundamental fact that had not escaped American and British critics of this project. Its success depends primarily upon reciprocal confidence and upon a universal will to co-operation. One insincere member could work incalculable havoc with its machinery and could use it to delude the others with a false sense of security. With such thoughts in his mind, President Wilson further said :

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away ; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Instead of the all-inclusive league that he had previously advocated, the President now proposed one confined to the world's self-governing democracies and he was in reality constituting this league by bringing the United States into

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the war. In the making of this decision the Russian Revolution had played a great part. After a well-deserved tribute to this great event and to the democratic spirit of the Russian people, President Wilson hailed the new Russia as "a fit partner for a League of Honour."

The Prussian autocracy was not, however, allowed to escape with this comprehensive indictment. Full emphasis was placed upon its flagrant conspiracies and espionage within the United States and upon its intrigues with Mexico. In conclusion, Mr. Wilson summed up the situation as follows :

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose, because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend ; and that in the presence of its organised power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included : for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the trusted foundations of political liberty. . . . We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

As its consequences are bound to be momentous, history will probably give high rank to this document. But intrinsically as well its merits are conspicuous. It is notably the finest of the many State papers that Mr. Wilson has written since the world has been at war. Freed from the trammels of neutrality, he was for the first time able to express his genuine convictions on the fundamental issue. Moreover, the language is uncompromisingly explicit and there are no ambiguous phrases to perplex and confuse the reader. And, finally, in spite of its lofty

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idealism, close contact is always preserved with the actualities of an embattled world anxious to escape from the woes of international anarchy. The differentiation between the German people and their Government is not wholly sound, for there is no reason to believe that the people are not impregnated with the imperialistic creed of the autocracy, bureaucracy, and pedantocracy. But it has served a useful purpose in retaining the loyalty of many a German-American and, when once the document is studied in Germany, it will probably lead to some reevaluation of accepted tenets and to some stimulation of the democratic impulse.

III. THE DECLARATION OF WAR

AS the Constitution vests the authority to declare war in Congress, it devolved now upon that body to carry into effect the recommendations of the President. In both Houses was introduced a resolution which, in its final form, stated that the German Government had committed repeated acts of war against the United States, declared that a state of war had been thrust upon the United States, directed the President to employ "the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government," and pledged all the resources of the country to bring the conflict to a successful termination. As Senator Stone, of Missouri, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, continued in opposition to President Wilson's policy, the resolution was introduced into the Senate on behalf of the Democratic majority by Senator Hitchcock, of Nebraska, who himself was avowedly but a half-hearted supporter of positive action. As he frankly favoured further adherence to armed neutrality, his advocacy of a measure that he accurately described as "a declaration of war" was largely perfunctory. From the Democratic side, the initial speech genuinely supporting

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the resolution came from Senator Martin, of Virginia, who devoted his main attention to a cogent condemnation of the German submarine campaign from its very inception. According to him, America's fundamental grievance was the invasion of her inalienable rights and the vital issue was the freedom of the seas that Germany was destroying. He incidentally stated that, "while thus battling for our most vital interests, we are also contending for the rights of humanity and civilisation," but this was a mere *obiter dictum* on which no emphasis was placed.

On the other hand, Senator Lodge, though of the opposition party, more closely reflected the thoughts of Mr. Wilson and fully supported his recommendations. He pointed out that it would be madness to wage a lone war with Germany and that co-operation with her other enemies was essential. Moreover, he insisted :

The worst of all wars is a feeble war. War is too awful to be entered upon half-heartedly. If we fight at all, we must fight for all we are worth. It must be no weak, hesitating war. The most merciful war is that which is most vigorously waged and which comes most quickly to an end.

As to the main issue, his words were absolutely explicit :

We do not enter upon this war (he said) to secure victory for one nation as against another. We enter this war to unite with those who are fighting the common foe in order to preserve human freedom, democracy, and modern civilisation. They are all in grievous peril ; they are all threatened. This war is a war, as I see it, against barbarism, not the anarchical barbarism of what are known as the Dark Ages, but organised barbarism panoplied in all the devices for the destruction of human life which science, beneficent science, can bring forth. . . . The work that we are called upon to do when we enter this war is to preserve the principles of human liberty, the principles of democracy, and the light of modern civilisation. . . . I am glad that my country is to share in this preservation of human freedom.

The ensuing debate was not very illuminating as to the real sentiments of the Senate, primarily because the overt

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opposition was slight and the majority, comprised of both parties, being anxious for an early vote, avoided the delay of unnecessary speeches. As the passage of the resolution was inevitable, an indeterminate number had decided to vote for it, primarily to avoid giving the enemy an impression of divided counsels. In general, however, the change in the Administration's policy had come too suddenly to allow minds inflexibly adjusted to neutrality to adopt a new standard overnight. Yet the debate was far from listless and gave rise to several lively passages of arms. Those vocal in opposition were but a handful, almost equally divided between the two parties, and they based their views upon a variety of arguments. In general, the contention was that under all circumstances war was an abomination, that America had no concern in this European quarrel, that both groups of "war-maddened" belligerents had infringed America's rights, not with malice aforethought, but only incidentally in trying to strike their real adversaries. According to Senator Stone, America's entrance into the war was "the greatest national blunder of history," and Senator Gronna concurred in this verdict. Senator Norris, of Nebraska, aroused considerable ill-feeling by the following remarks :

We are going into war upon the command of gold. . . . We are about to do the bidding of wealth's terrible mandate. . . . I feel that we are committing a sin against humanity and against our countrymen. . . . I feel that we are about to put the dollar sign upon the American flag.

During the spirited and not too orderly colloquy that followed these words, which were characterised as treasonable, Senator Norris was accused of being so obsessed with a fear of "money" and of "profits" and of "fortunes" as to obscure his mental vision. Similarly, Senator La Follette's laborious attempt to place the Entente blockade of Germany and the German submarine campaign on the same legal and moral level aroused a vehement protest from

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Senator Williams, of Mississippi, who epigrammatically accused his colleague from Wisconsin of not being able to distinguish "between a prize court and a torpedo." In general, he charged Mr. La Follette with having delivered a speech that would better have become Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg than an American Senator and one that was "pro-German, pretty near pro-Goth, and pro-Vandal."

But a number of the speeches in favour of the resolution sought to reach the President's high plane. Senator Myers, of Montana, said :

We have more than our rights at stake in this war—far more. The democracy, the civilisation, the Christianisation of the world are at stake ; and I believe that America should be proud of the opportunity to engage in a world-wide fight of democracy against autocracy.

Senator Colt, of Rhode Island, did not wholly agree with this characterisation of the conflict as one between democracy and autocracy. According to him, the battle was between democracy and Prussian militarism. "It is the domination of the military power of Prussia," he asserted, "which is a menace to the world, to civilisation, and to democracy." The submarine controversy, he further showed, was a mere incident in "a system of cruelty, of outrage, of the non-recognition of international law and of all human rights." And this system, he concluded, had "arrayed the civilised world against Germany."

The speech of Mr. John Sharp Williams, of Mississippi, was notable not only for its vigour, but also for its emphasis upon some fundamental facts which American politicians have in the past been prudently prone to ignore. As to the issue in general, he drew a valuable distinction when he said :

There are two things about this situation that I face. One is the necessity of it. I face the necessity because I must. The other is the opportunity of it, and I face that because I will. I am glad that I and the American citizenry shall have the opportunity of

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fighting on the side of liberty and democracy and free speech and free institutions against Prussian militarism and autocracy.

Mr. Williams further protested against the habit of "twisting the British lion's tail," which he claimed was never indulged in by those whose forefathers had fought in the War of Independence, and he characterised George Washington as "the greatest Englishman that America ever produced." He admitted that he loved his race, "the English-speaking race," better than any other, and he asked whence does America get her laws, her literature, her ethical philosophy, and her general ideas of religion. "From the people," he himself answered, "who sired our fathers before they came here." Continuing with this theme, he said :

I am tired of men telling me, Welshman, Scotchman, Englishman in blood, as I am, that the hereditary enemy of the United States is England or Wales or Scotland—that it is Great Britain. Magna Charta, the Declaration of Rights, the Bill of Rights included in the Constitution in its first ten amendments—the very principles embodied in the Constitution derived from colonial experience under English rule—all came from England, a country whose high priest is John Milton, whose sweet singer was Burns, whose great intellect was Shakespeare, whose great warriors for liberty were Hampden and Sidney and Simon de Montfort.

Such historical views and Senator Williams' subsequent description of British government as "even more democratic than our own" have rarely been heard within the walls of Congress or in any corner whatsoever of the American political arena. Their increasing prominence is one of the most important results of the thinking engendered by the war and foreshadows the probable displacement of the old traditions by new ones resulting from America's participation in the actual struggle.

After a full day's debate, on April 4, the Senate passed the war resolution by the overwhelming vote of 82 to 6. The following day it came up for discussion in the House of Representatives. It was introduced on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs by Mr. Flood, of Virginia.

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He took the same high ground as the President, when he said :

We will take our stand by the side of the allied nations who have been fighting humanity's battle for two and one-half years, determined that our power, our resources, our men, if needs be, shall be so employed that complete victory shall crown their efforts and our efforts and that Prussian militarism shall be crushed forever from the face of the earth, and that the world shall be delivered from the threat and danger of the Hohenzollern dynasty. . . . For wrongs committed by the German Government to democracy, to humanity, and to civilisation we have ample cause for declaring war ; for wrongs done to American citizens and the American flag we have no course but to go to war.

A few of the other speakers likewise emphasised that something more was at stake than merely American rights and that the world would not be a tolerable place for any state if one dominating military Power were allowed with impunity to flout the customs and agreements of the family of nations. Thus Mr. Harrison, of Mississippi, pointed out that " it is the inexorable logic of events that has driven us into this war, and we enter it asking nothing for ourselves save the glory that comes of fighting for the rights and liberties of mankind." Mr. Gardner, of Massachusetts, took the same view and declared that " too long have we allowed other nations to fight our battle for civilisation and popular government." Another Congressman emphasised the fact that the issue was not only between democracy and absolutism but also between permanent war and permanent peace and " that it involves both the future safety and the honour of our country." Another speaker stated that, " if the allies, who are fighting the battle of the free democracies of the world, shall fall before the mailed fist of Prussian militarism, the United States must be the next victim." Again, another declared :

Our indictment against the German Government consists of hostility to the sovereignty of the United States, to civilisation, and to all mankind. . . . For the crime committed by Cain, God placed a mark upon him ; civilisation to-day places a similar mark

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upon the German Government for her crimes against mankind. . . . No longer shall we refer to the Entente as *the* allies. By our decision to-day they have become *our* allies; our interests are in common; and by the adoption of this resolution the doom of the autocratic misrule of the German Government is for ever sealed.

To complete the account of this segment of Congressional opinion, the following sentences of Mr. Linthicum, of Maryland, should be quoted :

We strike to liberate, not to enslave; to free and not to burden the peoples of Central Europe. We strike at the Prussian military oligarchy, at Hohenzollern and Hapsburg mad dreams of world dominion.

Such recognition of the vital underlying issue was, however, far from universal. In the main, the insistence was upon the defence of American rights, and the issue emphasised was the freedom of the seas which Germany was nullifying to an unheard-of extent and by intolerable means. Thus, one of the representatives from the Middle West supported the resolution, as he stated, "not because of anything the Entente Powers are fighting for but to vindicate the rights of America." Hence, many shied at the idea of close co-operation with the Entente Powers. Mr. Kahn, of California, for example, spoke as follows :

This resolution does not absolutely commit us to any foreign alliance. I for one hope that the war can be confined so that it shall be an American war. Let us protect American rights, let us protect American citizens, let us protect American lives, and let us protect American property.

Many gave voice to such sentiments. They were reinforced in some by the traditional formulæ of isolation and by the vivid fear that the Monroe Doctrine might be weakened, if not invalidated, by America's interference in European concerns. To such arguments, Mr. Dempsey, of New York, sanely rejoined :

She (Germany) must, as her intrigues with Mexico prove, have fixed an ambitious eye on the land to the south of us, and have recognised that to acquire any part of it she must overthrow the

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Monroe Doctrine through a struggle with us. . . . The invasion of our rights on the sea . . . demands . . . the ultimate resort to arms. Back of it all looms Germany's ambition to expand, in the way of which stands our support of the Monroe Doctrine.

When it came to the actual voting, those opposed to the passage of the resolution numbered only 50, as opposed to 373 recorded in its favour. At the outset of the discussion, this minority was even smaller, but its size had been considerably augmented by the fact that Mr. Claude Kitchin, of North Carolina, the leader of the Democratic Party in the lower house, had declared himself against the Administration's policy. "My conscience and judgment after mature thought and fervent prayer for rightful guidance," he said, "have marked out clearly the path of my duty, and I have made up my mind to walk it, if I go barefooted and alone." He objected to entrance into the war, because the entire universe would then become "one vast drama of horrors and blood." After contending that the rights of the United States had been constantly infringed by Great Britain's use of sea power, he asked why should the United States not submit as well to Germany's submarine campaign, which is likewise not aimed at neutrals but at her enemies? Furthermore, he stated :

The House and the country should thoroughly understand that we are asked to declare war not to protect alone American lives and American rights on the high seas. We are to make the cause of Great Britain, France, and Russia, right or wrong, our cause. We are to make their quarrel our quarrel. We are to help fight out, with all the resources in men, money, and credit of the Government and its people, a difference between the belligerents of Europe to which we were utter strangers.

Those opposed to the resolution used, in the main, such arguments. Without much knowledge of international law and without a firm grasp of the essential facts, they grossly exaggerated the departures from precedent and principle in the use of sea power so as to minimise the grievance against Germany. Some of the crassest and most current

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misconceptions were completely demolished in an able speech by Mr. Lenroot, of Wisconsin. One of his colleagues from this State, with its large German population, Mr. Cooper, and Mr. La Follette, of Washington, were especially vehement in their denunciation and equally unsound in their arguments. The latter further distinguished himself by the inept suggestion of purchasing from England all parts of the British Commonwealth in the American hemisphere. As the wielder of sea power on the part of the Allies, Great Britain had to bear the brunt of such adverse criticism. Some of it was so grotesquely unfair as to deserve only the smile of amusement. Thus, a Congressman from Nevada said :

All crowned heads look alike to me, and I do not want to sleep with any of them, whether it be the Kaiser, the Mikado, John Bull, or even the Sultan of Turkey. This fight is not of our making, and we had better keep out of it. I do not think Uncle Sam looks good mixed up with any of them. . . I want to tell you that every man, woman, and child in the country would applaud if we would take both John Bull and the Kaiser and bump their royal noddles together, open up all seas, and treat them both alike.

This perdurance of the anti-British tradition even to a sporadic extent and in a diluted form is, however, quite a serious matter, and it was plainly manifested during the debate

On a survey of the entire situation, it is plain that the House of Representatives was in a state approaching bewilderment. Its members had not been prepared for such a momentous step and they were not infrequently thinking in the terms of an irrevocable past while they were voting for a radical departure from traditional policy whose consequences they had not attempted to fathom. There was an air of unreality about the entire proceedings. The instinctive reaction to the discarded categories at times produced spontaneous applause for sentiments and opinions totally at variance with the spirit and purport of the resolution to which overwhelming approval was about to be given. This did not escape the attention of all. Thus Mr. Hull, of

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Iowa, said that he believed that "the great majority of the common people" were opposed to this resolution and that while he was urged "to stand by the President," it was more befitting a member of Congress "to stand by the people." Mr. Britten, of Illinois, went even further. He stated that when he asked his fellow-members if they were going to vote for the resolution, they replied: "Yes; I hate like the devil to vote for it, but I am going to." On this statement being challenged, he asserted that probably 75 per cent. of the House were opposed to the proposed measure and that 90 per cent. of the people "are distinctly opposed to our going into that bloody mire on the other side." Despite considerable exaggeration, there was a measure of truth in these assertions. Bred in long-established traditions of isolation, the American citizen had throughout the war been officially enjoined to be neutral both in thought and action, and had by no means fully readjusted himself to the changed situation and to the new policy. Thirty odd months of official neutrality found him somewhat unprepared both mentally and morally for complete alignment with the cause of the Entente. Such, however, is the traditional authority of the President in foreign affairs that both Congress and the people quickly rallied to his support, and he has behind him a unified country that is patriotically anxious to perform the part that their chosen leader has selected for them. Whatever be the real opinion of some, few dare to incur the popular odium of opposition and criticism. When war has been declared, the United States insists upon a united front against the foe

IV. RETROSPECT AND OUTLOOK

HAD Germany not made it impossible for America to preserve peace without loss of self-respect, it is probable that the course of neutrality would have been resolutely maintained throughout the war. The American people,

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like their cultural kin of the British Commonwealth, are by training and nature unable to take long views of foreign policy and they have an instinctive feeling that future perils are largely the mirages of imaginative and possibly interested scare-mongers. For a long time the average American regarded the war as an unmitigated abomination such as could never afflict his sheltered hemisphere. His lack of historical background and his remoteness from the European agony led to a physically detached attitude similar to that of the British people at the beginning of the crisis. On July 25, 1914, Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British Ambassador at Petrograd: "I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel." What Serbia was then in British eyes, Europe continued to be for some time in those of America—a subject of interest but not of immediate practical concern. German deeds and words during the war, however, opened the eyes of the average man to many unsuspected international possibilities. The slaughter of his fellow citizens on the high seas, the extensive plots and conspiracies on his native soil, the activity of the U-53 just off his coast, and the German plan to enlist the support of Mexico and Japan demonstrated that his feeling of security was based upon an illusory remoteness. On the whole, however, he was opposed to entering the war unless Germany rendered peace an impossibility and, in that event, he was far from disposed to link up his fortunes with those of the Allies whose specific aims were not quite clear to him.

That the United States has entered the war, not merely on the narrow question of neutral rights, but on the broad issue of public right, and with a distinct purpose to ensure the future peace of the world against aggression, is distinctly a triumph for the intellectual classes who have steadily and consistently tried to formulate a new foreign policy based upon the interdependence of the modern world. They could, however, have accomplished little if they had not

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secured the support of President Wilson. His immense authority as the chosen leader of the people and as their constitutional guide in foreign affairs was the decisive factor and has silenced all but a covert and negligible opposition.

In determining foreign policy, the authority of the American President is probably greater than that of the executive of any other democratic state. But even more unlimited is his power after war has been declared. As Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, he then becomes a virtual dictator.* Congress, of course, must provide the armaments, and the funds, but he decides how to use them. Similarly, while Congress declares war, the President determines when the time for peace has arrived. Furthermore, in waging war, he decides the nature and extent of the co-operation with other states and may even conclude with them informal agreements that do not require ratification by the Senate. The effectiveness of American participation in the war and the future part that America is to play in interstate relations depend primarily upon the decisions of President Wilson. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that he is just beginning a new term of office and that, unless something untoward occurs, he will be at the helm for four years more.

Those who are deeply convinced that the progressive spread of liberty throughout the world and the orderly and peaceful development of its component nations depend largely upon the closest co-operation between all the self-governing English-speaking peoples, perceive, when they survey the past three years, that they have very much reason to be grateful to the crass stupidity of German statesmanship. One shudders to think what would have been the outcome if Germany had strictly regarded her bond towards Belgium, had defended her short frontier against France, and had hurled her hosts against Russia. But even after the grave initial blunder of trying first to

* W. A. Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction*, pp. 14, ff.

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realise the western part of her grand plan, the situation might have been somewhat retrieved had not von Tirpitz inaugurated the submarine campaign. At the outbreak of the war, it was confidently predicted by many close students of American life that, within six months, the United States would be involved in so vexatious a controversy with England over the use of sea power that the growing friendship of the two countries would be effectively undermined. It was primarily due to Germany's treatment of Belgium and to her submarine warfare against commerce that these prophecies did not come true. But even during the period of restricted submarine activities, the situation had ominous potentialities. There was developing a new schism between the English-speaking peoples, with estrangement and irritation on both sides. In England and in the Dominions there was possibly too little patience with the pacific temper of the American people and also a failure to understand the hold of traditional formulæ upon the popular mind. The latter is less comprehensible than is the former, when it is remembered to what an extent all English-speaking peoples live upon catchwords. On the other hand, in the United States, where political thought is distinctly legalistic, there was, especially in political circles, a tendency to disregard the principles involved, and to emphasise England's departures from the letter of international law. As a result, it was generally held that sea power had been used in an arbitrary manner and that American rights had been grievously invaded. That all this has now chiefly an historical interest is due to Germany's insistence upon completely ignoring American rights when they interfered with her ends. Just as German pressure was a potent factor in making the British Commonwealth a coherent entity, so it is now creating an even larger English-speaking entity whose future consequences are incalculable. The German imperialists who thought most deeply of the political future were prone to regard this entity as accomplished and considered

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the so-called "Anglo-Saxon *bloc*" as the greatest obstacle to their world-wide ambitions. Despite certain clear potentialities, it was, however, a unity of but slight concrete political value. On the American side, especially, the memory of former wars and controversies had kept alive a measure of distrust, whose extent was, in general, in inverse ratio to the educational attainments of the people. In the text-books used in the lower grades of America's democratic school system, patriotism is still largely taught, not merely by appreciation of the nation's ideals, but also by exaggerated depreciation of the country's pristine enemies. England was still regarded by many as the traditional foe. In forcing the United States into the war, Germany is breaking this tradition. New traditions are likely to displace it. Active co-operation for common ends in a concert of high purpose, if wisely and tactfully handled, can make the English-speaking cultural unity a real and effective force in directing the future evolution of the world.

New York. April, 1917.

TURKEY—A PAST AND A FUTURE*

I. A COAT OF MANY COLOURS

WHAT is Turkey? It is a name which explains nothing, for no formula can embrace the variety of the countries marked "Ottoman" on the map: the High Yemen, with its monsoons and tropical cultivation; the tilted rim of the Hedjaz, one desert in a desert zone that stretches from the Sahara to Mongolia; the Mesopotamian rivers, breaking the desert with a strip of green; the pine-covered mountain-terraces of Kurdistan, which gird in Mesopotamia as the hills of the North-West Frontier of India gird the Plains; the Armenian Highlands, bleak as the Pamirs, which feed Mesopotamia with their snows and send it the soil they cannot keep themselves; the Anatolian Peninsula—an offshoot of Central Europe, with its rocks and fine timber and mountain streams, but nursing a steppe in its heart more intractable than the Puszta of Hungary; the coast-lands—Trebizond and Ismid and Smyrna, clinging to the Anatolian mainland, and Syria interposing itself between the desert and the sea, but all, with their vines and olives and sharp contours, keeping true to the Mediterranean; and then the waterway of narrows and landlocked sea and narrows again, which links the Mediterranean with the Black Sea and the Russian hinterland, and which has not its like in the world.

The cities of Turkey are as various as its climes: Adrianople, set at a junction of rivers within the circle of the Thracian downs, a fortress since its foundation, well chosen for the tombs of the Ottoman conquerors;

* Maps showing the land-surface features and the distribution of languages in the Turkish Empire will be found facing p. 546.

Turkey—A Past and a Future

Constantinople, capital of empires where races meet but never mix, mistress of trade routes vital to the existence of vast regions beyond her horizon—Central Europe trafficking south-eastward overland and Russia south-westward by sea ; Smyrna, the port by which men go up and down between Anatolia and the Ægean, the foothold on the Asiatic mainland which the Greeks have never lost ; Aleppo, where, if Turkey were a unity, the centre of Turkey would be found, the city where, if anywhere, the races of the Near East have mingled, and now the half-way point of a railway surveyed along an immemorially ancient route but unfinished like the history of Aleppo herself ; Bagdad, the incarnation for the last millennium of an eternal city that shifts its site as its rivers shift their beds—from Seleucia to Bagdad, from Babylon to Seleucia, from Kish to Babylon—but which always springs up again, like Delhi, within a few parasangs of its last ruins, in an area that is an irresistible focus of population ; Basra amid its palm-groves, so far down stream that it belongs to the Indian Ocean—the port from which Sinbad set sail for fairyland and from which less mythical Arab seamen spread their religion and civilisation far over African coasts and Malayan Indies ; these, and besides them almost all the holy cities of mankind : Kerbela, between the Euphrates and the desert, where, under Sunni rule, the Shias of Persia and India have still visited the tombs of their saints and buried their dead ; Jerusalem, where Jew and Christian, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant, Armenian and Abyssinian, have their common shrines and separate quarters ; Mekka and Medina in the heart of the desert, beyond which their fame would never have passed but for a well and a mart and a precinct of idols and the Prophet who overthrew them ; and there are the cities on the Pilgrim Road (linked now by railway with Medina, the nearer of the *Haramain*) : Beirût the port, with its electric trams and newspapers, the Smyrna of the Arab lands ; and Damascus the oasis, looking out over the desert instead of

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the sea, and the harbour not of ships but of camel-caravans.

The names of these cities call up, like an incantation, the memory of the civilisations which grew in them to greatness and sank in them to decay: Mesopotamia, a great heart of civilisation which is cold to-day, but which beat so strongly for five thousand years that its pulses were felt from Siberia to the Pillars of Hercules and influenced the taste and technique of the Scandinavian bronze age; the Hebrews, discovering a world-religion in their hill-country overlooking the coast; the Philistines and Phœnicians of the Syrian seaboard, who were discovering the Atlantic and were too busy to listen to the Hebrew prophets in their hinterland; the Ionians, who opened up the Black Sea and created a poetry, philosophy, science and architecture which are still the life-blood of ours, before they were overwhelmed, like the Phœnicians before them, by a continental military power; the Hittites, who first transmitted the fruitful influences of Mesopotamia to the Ionian coasts—a people as mysterious to their contemporaries as to ourselves, maturing unknown in the fastnesses of Anatolia, raising up a sudden empire that raided Mesopotamia and colonised the Syrian valleys, and then succumbing to waves of northern invasion. All these people rose and fell within the boundaries of Turkey, held the stage of the world for a time, and left their mark on its history. There is a romance about their names, a wonderful variety and intensity in their vanished life; yet they are not more diverse than their modern successors, in whose veins flows their blood and whose possibilities are only dwarfed by their achievements.

There were less than twenty million people in Turkey before the war, and during it the Government has caused a million or so to perish by massacre, starvation or disease. Yet, in spite of this dæmoniac effort after uniformity, they are still the strangest congeries of racial and social types that has ever been placed at a single Government's mercy. The Ottoman Empire is named after the Osmanli, but you

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might search long before you found one among its inhabitants. These Osmanlis are a governing class, indigenous only in Constantinople and a few neighbouring towns, but planted here and there, as officers and officials, over the Ottoman territories. They come of a clan of Turkish nomads, recruited since the thirteenth century by converts, forced or voluntary, from most of Christendom, and crossed with the blood of slave-women from all the world. They are hardly a race. Tradition fortified by inertia makes them what they are, and also their Turkish language, which serves them for business of state and for a literature,

This artificial language is hardly a link between Osmanli officialdom and the Turkish peasantry of Anatolia, which speaks Turkish dialects derived from tribes that drifted in, some as late as the Osmanlis, some two centuries before. Nor has this Turkish-speaking peasantry much in common with the Turkish nomads who still wander over the central Anatolian steppe and have kept their blood pure; for the peasantry has reverted physically to the native stock, which held Anatolia from time immemorial and absorbs all newcomers that mingle with it on its soil. Thus there are three distinct "Turkish" elements in Turkey, divided by blood and vocation and social type; and, even if we reckon all who speak some form of Turkish as one group, they only amount to 30 or 40 per cent. of the whole population of the Empire.

The rest are alien to the Turks and to one another. Those who speak Arabic are as strong numerically as the Turks, or stronger, but they too are divided, and their unity is a problem of the future. There are pure-bred Arab nomads of the desert; there are Arabs who have settled in towns or on the land; there are Druses and Maronites who speak Arabic but are not reckoned Arabs by themselves or by their neighbours; there are Kurds in their innumerable clans; there are Armenians and Greeks, who are, or were, the most energetic, intellectual, liberal

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elements in Turkey, the natural intermediaries between the other races and western civilisation—"were" rather than "are," because the Ottoman Government has taken ruthless steps to eliminate just these two most valuable elements among its subjects. And finally, to compensate for its depopulation of the countries under its dominion, the Ottoman Government, during the last fifty years, has been settling them with Moslem immigrants from its own lost provinces or from other Moslem lands that have changed their rulers; and these "Mouhadjirs" are reckoned, from first to last, at three-quarters of a million, drawn from the most diverse stocks—Bosniaks and Pomaks and Albanians, Algerines and Tripolitans, Tchetchens and Circassians.

All this is Turkey, and we come back to our original question: What common factor accounts for the name? What has stained this coat of many colours to one political hue? The answer is simple: Blood. Turkey, the Ottoman State, is not a unity, climatic, geographical, racial or economic; it is a pretension, enforced by bloodshed and violence whenever and wherever the Osmanli Government has power.

But the Osmanlis are passing at this moment as other military empires in Western Asia have passed before. They lost the last of Europe in the Balkan War, and with it their prestige as increasers of Islam; the growth of national consciousness among their subjects, not least among the Turks themselves, has loosened the foundations of their military empire, as of the other military empires with which they are allied. They forfeited the Caliphate when they proclaimed the Holy War against the Allied Powers, inciting Moslems to join one Christian coalition against another, not in defence of their religion, but for Ottoman political aggrandisement; they lost it morally when this incitement was left unheeded by the Moslem world; they lost it in deed when the Sherif of Mekka asserted his rights as the legitimate guardian of the Holy Cities, drove out the

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Ottoman garrison from Mekka, and allied himself with the other independent princes of Arabia. All the props of Ottoman dominion in Asia have fallen away, but nothing dooms it so surely as the breath of life that is stirring over the dormant lands and peoples once more. The cutting of the Suez Canal has led the highways of commerce back to the Nearer East; the democracy and nationalism of Europe have been extending their influence over Asiatic races. On whatever terms the war is concluded, one far-reaching result is certain already: there will be a political and economic revival in Western Asia, and the direction of this will not be in Ottoman hands.

We are thus witnessing the foundation of a new era as momentous, if not as dramatic, as Alexander's passage of the Dardanelles. The Ottoman vesture has waxed old, and something can be discerned of the new forms that are emerging from beneath it; their outstanding features are worth our attention.

II. TURKISH ECONOMICS

ANATOLIA and the new Turkish Nationalism may be dismissed from our survey. Shorn of their pretensions in Armenia and the countries south of Taurus, the Turks may experiment in the art of government without the tragedies which their present domination has brought upon mankind. The other lands and peoples of Western Asia, when they have ceased to be "Turkey," will be restored once more to the civilised world. What forces will shape their growth? Not, even indirectly, the discrowned Turk, for, if he were not banned by his crimes, he would still be doomed by his incapacity.

The relative qualities of the different Near Eastern races are not in doubt. A German teacher in the German Technical School at Aleppo, who resigned his appointment as a protest against the Armenian atrocities in 1915, thus

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records his personal judgment in an open letter to the Reichstag* :—

The Young Turk is afraid of the Christian nationalities—Armenians, Syrians and Greeks—on account of their cultural and economic superiority, and he sees in their religion a hindrance to Turkifying them by peaceful means. They must, therefore, be exterminated or converted to Islam by force. The Turks do not suspect that in so doing they are sawing off the branch on which they are sitting themselves. Yet who is to help Turkey forward if not the Greeks, Armenians, and Syrians, who constitute more than a quarter of the population of the Empire? The Turks, *the least gifted of the races living in Turkey*, are themselves only a minority of the population and are still far behind the Arabs in culture. Where is there any Turkish trade, Turkish handicraft, Turkish industry, Turkish art, Turkish science? They have even borrowed their law and religion from the conquered Arabs, and their language, so far as it has been given literary form.

We teachers, who have been teaching Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, Turks and Jews in German schools in Turkey for years, can only pass judgment that of all our pupils the pure Turks are the most unwilling and the least talented. When for once in a way a Turk does achieve something, one can be sure in nine cases out of ten that one is dealing with a Circassian, an Albanian, or a Turk with Bulgarian blood in his veins. From my personal experience I can only prophesy that the Turks proper will never achieve anything in trade, industry or science.

From a German teacher who has worked in Turkey for three years this verdict is crushing, and the chief exponent of Turkish Nationalism† virtually admits the charge. “It is true,” he writes, “that the Turkish character is usually lacking in the qualities most essential to trade or economic undertakings, but these may be acquired by a reasonable and methodical training and organisation.” The only “organisation” that seems to occur to him is the Boycott, which has been popular with the Turks since the Revolution of 1908.

* *Ein Wort an die Berufenen Vertreter des Deutschen Volkes: Eindrücke eines deutschen Oberlehrers aus der Türkei*, von Dr. Martin Niepage, Oberlehrer an der deutschen Realschule zu Aleppo, z. Zt. Wernigerode. (Printed in the second pamphlet issued by the Swiss Committee for Armenian Relief at Basel; English translation, *The Horrors of Aleppo*, London, 1917: Hodder and Stoughton.)

† Tekin Alp: *The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal*.

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The unaccommodating attitude of the Greek Government was sufficient excuse (he remarks, in reference to the Boycott of 1912); the real motive, however, was the longing of the Turkish nation for independence in their own country. The Boycott, which was at first directed solely against the Greeks, was then extended to the Armenians and other non-Mohammedan circles, and was carried out with undiminished energy. This movement, which lasted in all its rigour for several months, caused the ruin of hundreds of small Greek and Armenian tradesmen. . . . The systematic and rigorous Boycott is now at an end, but the spirit it created in the people still persists. . . . It can now be asserted that the movement for restoring the economic life of Turkey is on the right road.

The real effects of the Boycott of 1912 are described by a celebrated German authority in a memorial printed in Germany for private circulation. He tells us how, under the patronage of the Young Turkish Government, associations were formed which intimidated the Moslem peasants into buying from them, when they came to market, instead of from the Christians with whom they had formerly dealt.

The peasants came to their old dealers (the memorial continues), lamented their fate, and asked their advice as to how they could save themselves from the hands of their fellow-countrymen. They were delighted when at last the Boycott came to an end, and they could once more buy from Greeks and Armenians, where they were well served and got good value for their money.

If the Turkish Nationalists had confined themselves to economic weapons, the Turks' economic ineptitude would have prevented them from doing serious harm; but by abusing the political and military powers of the Ottoman State to perpetrate the recent atrocities they have struck a mortal blow at the prosperity of Western Asia.

In the whole of Asia Minor, with perhaps one or two exceptions (the same German authority states), there is not a single pure Turkish firm engaged in foreign trade. . . . The extermination of the Armenian population means not only the loss of from 10 to 25 per cent. of the total population of Anatolia*, but, what is most serious, the elimination of those elements in the population which

* The writer includes Armenia under this term.

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are the most highly developed economically and have the greatest capacity for civilisation. . . .

And this is the universal judgment of those in a position to know.

The result of the deportations (the American Consul at Aleppo declared in an official report) * is that, as 90 per cent. of the commerce of the interior is in the hands of the Armenians, the country is facing ruin. The great bulk of business being done on credit, hundreds of prominent business men other than Armenians are facing bankruptcy. There will not be left in the places evacuated a single tanner, moulder, blacksmith, tailor, carpenter, clay worker, weaver, shoemaker, jeweller, pharmacist, doctor, lawyer, or any of the professional people or tradesmen, with very few exceptions, and the country will be left in a practically helpless state.

The German memorialist presses the indictment :

You cannot become a merchant by murdering one. You cannot master a handicraft if you smash its tools. A sparsely populated country does not become more productive if it destroys its most industrious population. You do not advance the progress of civilisation if you drive into the desert, as the scapegoat for decades and centuries of wasted opportunities, the element in your population which shows the greatest economic ability, the greatest progressiveness in education, and the greatest energy in every respect, and which was fitted by nature to build the bridge between East and West. You only corrupt your own sense of right if you tread the rights of others under foot. The popularity of an unpopular war may temporarily be promoted among the Turkish masses by the destruction and spoliation of the non-Mohammedan elements—the Armenians most of all, but also, in part, the Syrians, Greeks, Maronites and Jews—but thoughtful Mohammedans, when they realise the whole damage which the Empire has sustained, will lament the economic ruin of Turkey most bitterly, and will come to the conclusion that the Turkish Government has lost infinitely more than it can ever win (it is a German writing) by victories at the front.

* Dated August 3, 1915. See British Blue Book, Misc. No. 31 (1916), p. 548.

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III. GERMAN POLICY

WHAT forces will be released in Western Asia when the Turk has met his fate? Who will repair the ruin he leaves behind?

The Germans? They have been penetrating Turkey economically for the last thirty years. They have organised regular steamship services between German and Turkish ports, multiplied the volume of Turco-German trade, and extended their capital investments, particularly in the Ottoman Debt and the construction of railways. In 1881, when the Debt was first placed under international administration, Germany held only 4·7 per cent. of it and was the sixth in importance of Turkey's creditors; by 1912 she held 20 per cent., and was second only to France.* Her railway enterprises, more ambitious than those of any other Foreign Power, have brought valuable concessions in their train—harbour works at Haidar Pasha and Alexandretta, irrigation works in the Konia oasis and the Adana plain, and the prospect, when the Bagdad Railway reaches the Tigris, of tapping the naphtha deposits of Kerkuk.† Dr. Rohrbach, the German specialist on the Near East, forecasts the profits of the Bagdad Railway from the results of Russian railway building in Central Asia. He prophesies the cultivation of cotton in the regions opened up by the line, on a scale which will cover an appreciable part of the demands of German industry and will open a corresponding market for German wares among the new cotton-growing population.‡ “Yet the decisive factor in the Bagdad Railway,” he counsels his German readers, “is not to be found in these economic considerations, but in another sphere.”

* *Die deutsch-türkischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen*, by Dr. Kurt Wiedenfeld, Professor of the Political Sciences at the University of Halle (Duncker and Humblot, 1915).

† *Die Bagdadbahn*, by Dr. Paul Rohrbach (Berlin, 1911), pp. 43, 44.

‡ *Die Bagdadbahn*, pp. 49, 50.

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Dr. Wiedenfeld drives this home :

Germany's relation to Turkey (his monograph begins) belies the doctrine that all modern understandings and differences between nations have an economic origin. We are certainly interested in the economic advancement of Turkey . . . but in setting ourselves to make Turkey strong we have been influenced far more by our political interest as a State among States (*das politische, das staatllich-machtliche Interesse*). Even our economic activity has primarily served this aim, and has in fact originated to a large extent in the purely politico-military problems (*aus den unmittelbaren Machtaufgaben*) which confronted the Turkish Government. Exclusively economic considerations play a very subordinate part in Turco-German relations. . . . Our common political aims, and Germany's interest in keeping open the land route to the Indian Ocean, will make it more than ever imperative for us to strengthen Turkey economically with all our might, and to put her in a position to build up, on independent economic foundations, a body politic strong enough to withstand all external assaults. The means will still be economic ; the goal will be of a political order.*

And Dr. Rohrbach formulates the political goal with startling precision. After twelve pages of disquisition on recent international diplomacy he brings his thesis to this point : the Bagdad Railway links up with the railways of Syria, and

the importance of the Syrian railway system lies in this, that, if the need arose, it would be the direct instrument for the exercise of pressure upon England . . . supposing that German-Austro-Turkish co-operation became necessary in the direction of Egypt.

Written as it was in 1911, this is a remarkable anticipation of Turkish strategic railway building since the outbreak of war ; but it is infinitely remote in purpose from the economic regeneration of Western Asia, and even when the German publicists reckon in economic values they generally betray their political design.

As Rohrbach and Wiedenfeld point out, this "Macht-

* The author rubs in his point in his concluding section : " All economic measures we may take in Turkey are only a means to an end, not an end in themselves " (p. 77).

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politik” underlies all Germany’s economic efforts in Western Asia, and we can see how it has warped them from their proper ends. The track of the Bagdad Railway, for example, has not been selected in the economic interests of the lands and peoples which it ostensibly serves. Dr. Rohrbach himself admits that

the Anatolian section of the Bagdad Railway cannot be described as properly paying its way. It is otherwise with the (French) line from Smyrna to Afiun Kara Hissar, which links the Anatolian Railway with the older railway system in the west. . . . The parts of Asia Minor which were thickly populated and prosperous in antiquity lie mostly westward of this first section of the Bagdad Railway, round the river-valleys and (French and English) railways leading down to the Ægean.

“There are other once flourishing parts of the Peninsula,” he continues, “which the Bagdad Railway does not touch at all”—the Vilayet of Sivas and the other Armenian provinces. The original German plan was to carry the railway through Armenia from Angora to Kharput, but Russia not unnaturally vetoed the construction, so near her Caucasian frontiers, of a line which, by the nature of the Turco-German understanding, must primarily serve strategic ends,* and the track was therefore deflected to the south-east. This took it through the most barren parts of Central Anatolia, and in the next section involved the slow and costly work of tunnelling the Taurus and Amanus mountains.

If merely economic and not political advantages were taken into account (Dr. Rohrbach concedes), the question might perhaps be raised whether it would not be better to leave the Anatolian section alone altogether, and begin the Bagdad Railway from Seleucia (on the Syrian coast). The future export trade in grain, wool and cotton will in any case do all it can to lengthen the cheap sea-passage and shorten correspondingly the section on which it must pay railway freights. The fact that the route connecting Bagdad with the Mediterranean coast in the neighbourhood of Antioch is the oldest

* *Die Bagdadbahn*, pp. 29, 33.

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greatest, and still most promising trade-route of Western Asia is independent of all railway projects.

It is worth remembering that a railway following this route from the Syrian coast to the Persian Gulf has more than once been projected by the British Government. As early as the 'thirties of last century Colonel Chesney was sent out to examine the ground, and in 1867 the proposal was considered by a Committee of the House of Commons. For the economic development of Western Asia it is clearly a better plan, but then Dr. Rohrbach bases the "necessity for the East Anatolian section of the Bagdad Railway" on wholly different grounds.

The necessity (he declares) consists in Turkey's military interests, which obviously would be very poorly served (by German railway enterprise) if troops could not be transported by train without a break from Bagdad and Mosul to the extremity of Anatolia and *vice versa*.

The Bagdad Railway is thus acknowledged to be an instrument of strategy for the Germans and for the Turks of domination—for *vice versa* means that Turkish troops can be transported at a moment's notice through the tunnels from Anatolia to enforce the Ottoman pretension over the Arab lands. Militarily, these tunnels are the most valuable section of the line; economically, they are the most costly and unremunerative. And the second (and longer) tunnel could still have been dispensed with if, south of Taurus, the track had been led along the Syrian coast. "Economic interests and considerations of expense," Wiedenfeld concedes,* "argued strongly for the latter course, but—fortunately as we must admit to-day—the military point of view prevailed." Thus the Turco-German understanding prevented the Bagdad Railway first from beginning at a port on the Mediterranean coast, and then from touching the coast at all.† "The spine of Turkey,"

* P. 23.

† Except by a branch line from Adana to Alexandretta. Rohrbach (pp. 27, 36, 37) laments the economic drawbacks of this strategic necessity.

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as German writers are fond of calling it, distorts the natural articulation of Western Asia.

What will be left to Germany in Western Asia after the war? She may keep her trade, though Wiedenfeld confesses that "the exchange of commodities between Germany and Turkey has never attained any really considerable dimensions," and that "the German export trade commands no really staple article whatever, of the kind exported by England, Austria and Russia"—unless we count as such munitions and other materials of war.* Except for the last item, this German trade will probably remain and grow; but the German hegemony, based on railway enterprise, will scarcely survive the Ottoman dominion.

IV. THE AMERICAN MISSIONS AND ARMENIA.

HAPPILY there are other representatives of culture, other indigenous nationalities, other possibilities of economic development, which will remain to Western Asia when the Turk and German have gone, and which may be equal to repairing the ruin they will leave behind.

For nearly a century now the American Evangelical Missions have been doing work there which is the greatest conceivable contrast to the German *Kulturpolitik* of the last thirty years. A missionary, sent out to relieve the first pioneers, was given the following instructions by the American Board:

The object of our Missions to the Oriental Churches is, first, to revive the knowledge and spirit of the Gospel among them, and, secondly, by this means to operate upon the Mohammedans. . . . The Oriental Churches need assistance from their brethren abroad. Our object is not to subvert them; you are not sent among those Churches to proselytise. Let the Armenian remain an Armenian if he will, the Greek a Greek, the Nestorian a Nestorian, the Oriental an Oriental. . . . Your great business is with the fundamental doctrines and duties of the Gospel.†

* On which Wiedenfeld lays stress, pp. 19, 22.

† *Leavening the Levant*, by Rev. J. Greene, D.D. (Boston, 1916: The Pilgrim Press), p. 99.



THE NEARER EAST

Land Surface Features

(Based on map in D.G. Hogarth's "The Nearer East")

English Miles

0 50 100 200 300 400 500

- Cultivated and available for cultivation
- Steppe partly available for cultivation
- Steppe Desert
- Utter desert
- Mountain vegetation








The Nationalities of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE

- Turks
- Greeks
- Armenians
- Lazes
- Kurds
- Nestorians
- Arabs

Constantinople





The Roman Empire
 The Nationalities of the

- Roman Provinces
- Roman Colonies
- Roman Dependencies
- Roman Client States
- Roman Protectorates
- Roman Alliances
- Roman Vassal States
- Roman Tributaries
- Roman Allies
- Roman Friends
- Roman Enemies
- Roman Subjects
- Roman Citizens
- Roman Free Men
- Roman Slaves
- Roman Freedmen
- Roman Freedwomen
- Roman Freedmen's Sons
- Roman Freedwomen's Daughters
- Roman Freedmen's Sons' Sons
- Roman Freedwomen's Daughters' Daughters
- Roman Freedmen's Sons' Sons' Sons
- Roman Freedwomen's Daughters' Daughters' Daughters



The American Missions and Armenia

In this spirit the American missionaries have worked. They have had no warships behind them, no diplomatic support, no political ambitions, no economic concessions. As Evangelicals their first step was to translate the Bible into all the living languages and current scripts of the Nearer East. For the Bulgars and Armenians this was the beginning of their modern literature, but the jealousy of the Orthodox and Gregorian clergy was naturally aroused. Native Protestant Churches formed themselves—not by the missionaries' initiative but on their own. They were trained by the missionaries to self-government, and as they spread from centre to centre they grouped themselves in Unions, with annual meetings to settle their common affairs. But the work of the Americans was not confined to the new Protestant community. The translation of the Bible led them also into educational work; they laid the foundations of secondary education in Western Asia, and their schools and colleges—still the only institutions of their kind—are attended by Gregorians as well as Protestants, Moslems as well as Christians, Moslem girls as well as boys. As they opened up remoter districts they added medicine to their activities, and their hospitals, like their schools, have been the first in the field. And all this has been built up so unassumingly that its magnitude is hardly realised by the Americans themselves. In the three Turkey Missions, which cover Anatolia and Armenia—the whole of Turkey except the Arab lands—there were, on the eve of the war, 209 American missionaries with 1,299 native helpers, 163 Protestant churches with 15,348 members, 450 schools with 25,922 pupils; Constantinople College and six other colleges or high schools for girls; Robert College on the Bosphorus and nine other colleges for men or boys; and eleven hospitals.

The war, when it came, seemed to sweep away everything. The Protestant Armenians, in spite of a nominal exemption, were deported and massacred like their Gregorian fellow-countrymen; the boys and girls were carried away from

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the American colleges, the nurses and patients from the hospitals; the empty buildings were "requisitioned" by the Ottoman authorities; the missionaries themselves, in their devoted efforts to save a remnant from destruction, suffered as many casualties from typhus and physical exhaustion as any proportionate body of workers on the European battlefields. The Turkish Nationalists congratulated themselves that the American work in Western Asia was destroyed. In praising a lecture by a member of the German Reichstag, who had declared himself "opposed to all missionary activities in the Turkish Empire," a Constantinople newspaper* wrote:

The suppression of the schools founded and directed by ecclesiastical missions or by individuals belonging to enemy nations is as important a measure as the abolition of the Capitulations. Thanks to their schools, foreigners were able to exercise great moral influence over the young men of the country, and they were virtually in charge of its spiritual and intellectual guidance. By closing them the Government has put an end to a situation as humiliating as it was dangerous.

After the war the Turks in Anatolia may still be infatuated enough to banish their best friends, but in Armenia, when the Turk has gone, the Americans will find more than their former field; for, in one form or another, Armenia is certain to rise again. The Turks have not succeeded in exterminating the Armenian nation. Half of it lives in Russia, and its colonies are scattered over the world from California to Singapore. Even within the Ottoman frontiers the extermination is not complete, and the Arabian deserts will yield up their living as well as the memory of their dead. The relations of Armenia with the Russian Democracy should not be more difficult to settle than those of Finland and Poland; her frontiers cannot be forecast, but they must include the Six Vilayets—so often promised reforms by the Concert of Europe and so often abandoned to the revenges of the Ottoman Government—

* *Hilal*, April 4, 1916, quoted in Misc. No. 31 (1916), pp. 654-656.

Syria and Palestine

as well as the Cilician Highlands and some outlet to the sea. One thing is certain, that, whatever land is restored to them, the Armenians will turn its resources to good account, for, while their town-dwellers are the merchants and artisans of Western Asia, 80 per cent. of them are tillers of the soil.

V. SYRIA AND PALESTINE

WHAT the Americans have done for Armenia has been done for Syria by the French.* There are half a million Maronite Catholics in Syria, and since the seventeenth century France has been the protectress of Catholicism in the Near East. In 1864, when there was trouble in Syria and the Maronites were being molested by the Ottoman Government, France landed an army corps and secured autonomy for the Lebanon under a Christian Governor. But French influence is not limited to the Lebanon Province. All over Syria there are French clerical, secular and Judaic schools. Beirût and Damascus, Christian and Moslem—for there is more religious tolerance in Syria than in most Near Eastern countries—are equally under the spell of French civilisation; and France is the chief economic power in the land, for French enterprise has built the Syrian railways. In Syria as elsewhere the war has given the Young Turks a free hand. They have confiscated the railways and deprived the Lebanon of its autonomy; even Rohrbach deprecates the fact that “only a few of the higher officials in Syria are chosen from among the natives of the country, while almost all, from the Kaimakam upwards, are sent out from Constantinople,” and he attributes to this policy “the feeling against the Turks, which is most acute in Damascus.” This is Rohrbach’s periphrasis for Arab Nationalism, which will be

* Though the work of the American Presbyterian Mission at Beirût must not be forgotten.

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master in its own house when the Turk has been removed. The future status and boundaries of Syria can no more be forecast than those of Armenia at the present stage of the war ; yet here, too, certain tendencies are clear. In some form or other Arab Syria will retain her connection with France, and her growing population will no longer be driven by misgovernment to emigration.

Syrians and Armenians have been emigrating for the last quarter of a century, and during the same period the Jews, whose birthright in Western Asia is as ancient as theirs, have been returning to their native land, not because Ottoman dominion bore less hardly upon them than upon other gifted races, but because nothing could well be worse than the conditions they left behind. For these Jewish immigrants came almost entirely from the Russian Pale, the hearth and hell of modern Jewry. The movement really began after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, which threw back reform in Russia for 36 years. The Jews were the scapegoats of the reaction. New laws deprived them of their last civil rights, *pogroms* of life itself ; they came to Palestine as refugees, and between 1881 and 1914 their numbers there increased from 25,000 to 120,000 souls.

The most remarkable result of this movement has been the foundation of flourishing agricultural colonies. Their struggle for existence has been hard ; the pioneers were students or trades-folk of the Ghetto, unused to outdoor life and ignorant of Near Eastern conditions ; Baron Edmund de Rothschild financed them from 1884 to 1899 at a loss ; then they were taken over by the Palestine Colonisation Association, which discovered the secrets of success in self-government and scientific methods.

Each colony is now governed by an elective council of inhabitants, with committees for education, police, and the arbitration of disputes, and they have organised co-operative unions which make them independent of middlemen in the disposal of their produce. Their production has rapidly

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risen in quantity and value, through the industry and intelligence of the average Jewish settler, assisted latterly by an Agricultural Experiment Station at Atlit, near Haifa, which improves the varieties of indigenous crops and acclimatises others.* There is a Palestine Land Development Company which buys land in big estates and resells it in small lots to individual settlers, and an Anglo-Palestine Bank which makes advances to the new settlers when they take up their holdings. As a result of this enlightened policy the number of colonies has risen to about 40, with 15,000 inhabitants in all and 110,000 acres of land, and these figures do not do full justice to the importance of the colonising movement. The 15,000 Jewish agriculturists are only $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the Jewish population in Palestine and 2 per cent. of the total population of the country; but they are the most active, intelligent element, and the only element which is rapidly increasing. Again, the land they own is only 2 per cent. of the total area of Palestine; but it is between 8 per cent. and 14 per cent. of the area under cultivation, and there are vast uncultivated tracts which the Jews can and will reclaim, as their numbers grow—both by further colonisation and by natural increase, for the first generation of colonists have already proved their ability to multiply in the Promised Land. Under this new Jewish husbandry Palestine has begun to recover its ancient prosperity. The Jews have sunk artesian wells, built dams for water storage, fought down malaria by drainage and eucalyptus planting, and laid out many miles of roads. In 1890 an acre of irrigable land at Petach-Tikweh, the earliest colony, was worth £3 12s., in 1914 £36, and the annual trade of Jaffa rose from £760,000 to £2,080,000 between 1904 and 1912. "The impetus to agriculture is benefiting the whole

* See *Zionism and the Jewish Future* (London, 1916: John Murray) pp. 138-170; for the agricultural machinery on the Jewish National Fund's Model Farm at Ben-Shamen see the Report of the German Vice-Consul at Jaffa for the year 1912.

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economic life of the country," wrote the German Vice-Consul at Jaffa in his report for 1912, and there is no fear that as immigration increases the Arab element will be crowded to the wall. There are still only two Jewish Colonies beyond Jordan, where the Hauran—under the Roman Empire a cornland with a dozen cities—has been opened up by the railway and is waiting again for the plough.

But will immigration continue, now that the Jew of the Pale has been turned at a stroke into the free citizen of a democratic country? Probably it will actually increase, for the Pale has been ravaged as well as liberated during the war, and the Jews of Germany have based a policy on this prospect, which is expounded in a pamphlet by Dr. Davis-Trietsch, of Berlin.*

By an ingenious exploitation of aversions, Dr. Trietsch expects to deposit the Jews of the Pale over Western Asia as "culture-manure" for a German harvest; and if the Jewish migration to Palestine had remained nothing more than a stream of refugees, he might possibly have succeeded in his purpose. But in the last twenty years this Jewish movement has become a positive thing—no longer a flight from the Pale but a remembrance of Zion—and Zionism has already challenged and defeated the policy which Dr. Trietsch represents. "The object of Zionism," it was announced in the *Basle Programme*, drawn up by the first Zionist Congress in 1897, "is to establish for the Jewish people a publicly and legally assured home in Palestine." For the Zionists Jewry is a nation, and to become like other nations it needs its Motherland. In the Jewish colonies in Palestine they see not merely a successful social enterprise but the visible symbol of a body politic. The foundation of a national university in Jerusalem is as ultimate a goal for them as the economic development of the land, and their

* *Die Juden der Türkei* (Leipzig, 1915: Veit u. Comp.). Pamphlet No. 8 of the *Deutsches Vorderasienscomitee's* series: *Länder u. Völker der Türkei*.

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greatest achievement has been the revival of Hebrew as the living language of the Palestinian Jews. It was this that brought them into conflict with the Germanising tendency. In 1907 a secondary school was successfully started at Jaffa, by the initiative of Jewish teachers in Palestine, with Hebrew as the language of instruction ; but in 1914, when a Jewish Polytechnic was founded at Haifa, the German-Jewish *Hilfsverein*, which had taken a leading part, refused to follow this precedent, and insisted on certain subjects being taught in German, not only in the Polytechnic, but in the *Hilfsverein's* other schools. The result was a secession of pupils and teachers. Purely Hebrew schools were opened ; the Zionist organisation gave official support ; and the Germanising party was compelled to accept a compromise which was in effect a victory for the Hebrew language.

What is the outlook for Palestine after the war ? If the Ottoman pretension survives, the menace from Turkish Nationalism* and German resentment† is grave. But if Turk and German go, there are Zionists who would like to see Palestine a British Protectorate, with the prospect of growing into a British Dominion. Certainly, if the Jewish colonies are to make progress, they must be relieved of keeping their own police, building their own roads, and the other burdens that fall on them under Ottoman government, and this can only be secured by a better public

* Dr. Trietsch admits that Jewish colonisation in Palestine was retarded because " the leading French and British Jews remained under the impression of the Armenian massacres " (of 1895-7) " as presented by the anti-Turkish French and British Press. . . . In reality, the butcheries of Armenians in Constantinople were a convincing proof that the Jews in the Ottoman Empire were safe, for . . . not a hair on a Jewish head was touched." One wonders how he will exorcise the " impression " of 1915.

† As early as 1912 the German Vice-Consul at Jaffa betrayed his annoyance at the progress which Zionism was making. He admits indeed that " the falling off in trade last year would have been greater still than it was if the economic penetration of Palestine were not reinforced by an idealistic factor in the shape of Zionism " ; but he is piqued at the " Jewish national vanity " which makes it advisable for German firms to display their advertisements in Palestine in the Hebrew language and character.

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administration. As for the British side of the question, we may consult Dr. Trietsch.

There are possibilities (he urges) in a German protectorate over the Jews as well as over Islam. Smaller national units than the 14½ million Jews have been able to do Germany vital injury or service, and, while the Jews have no national State, their dispersion over the whole world, their high standard of culture and their peculiar abilities lend them a weight that is worth more in the balance than many larger national masses which occupy a compact area of their own.

Other Powers than Germany may take these possibilities to heart.

VI. NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA

HERE, then, are peoples risen from the past to do what the Turks cannot and the Germans will not in Western Asia. There is much to be done: reform of justice, to obtain legal release from the Capitulations; reform in the assessment and collection of the agricultural tithes, which have been denounced for a century by every student of Ottoman administration; agrarian reform, to save peasant proprietorship, which in Syria, at any rate, is seriously in danger; genuine development of economic resources; unsectarian and non-nationalistic advancement of education. But the Jews, Syrians and Armenians are equal to their task, and, with the aid of the foreign nations on whom they can count, they will certainly accomplish it. The future of Palestine, Syria and Armenia is thus assured; but there are other countries—once as fertile, prosperous and populous as they—which have lost not only their wealth but their inhabitants under the Ottoman domination. These countries have not the life left in them to reclaim themselves, and must look abroad for reconstruction.

If you cross the Euphrates by the bridge that carries

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the Bagdad Railway, you enter a vast landscape of steppes as virgin to the eye as any prairie across the Mississippi. Only the *tells* (mounds) with which it is studded witness to the density of its ancient population—for Northern Mesopotamia was once so populous and full of riches that Rome and the rulers of Iran fought seven centuries for its possession, till the Arabs conquered it from both. The railway has now reached Nisibin, the Roman frontier fortress heroically defended and ceded in bitterness of heart, and runs past Dara, which the Persians never took. Westward lies Urfa—named Edessa by Alexander's men after their Macedonian city of running waters;* later the seat of a Christian Syriac culture whose missionaries were heard in China and Travancore; still famous, under Arab dominion, for its Veronica and 300 churches; and restored for a moment to Christendom as the capital of a Crusader principality, till the Mongols trampled it into oblivion and the Osmanlis made it a name for butchery. From Urfa to Nisibin there can be fields again. The climate has not changed, and wherever the Bedawi pitches his tents and scratches the ground there is proof of the old fertility. Only anarchy has banished cultivation; for, since the Ottoman pretension was established over the land, it has been the battle-ground of brigand tribes—Kurds from the hills and Arabs from the desert, skirmishing or herding their flocks, making or breaking alliance, but always robbing any tiller of the land of the fruits of his labour.

If once (Dr. Rohrbach prophesies) the peasant population were sure of its life and property, it would joyfully expand, push out into the desert, and bring new land under the plough; in a few years the villages would spring up not by dozens but by hundreds.

At present cultivation is confined to the Armenian foothills—an uncertain arc of green from Aleppo to Mosul. But the railway strikes boldly into the deserted middle of the land, giving the arc a chord, and when Turco-German

* Edessa from Thracian βεδύ = Slavonic voda.

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strategic interests no longer debar it from being linked up, through Aleppo, with a Syrian port, it will be the really valuable section of the Bagdad system. The railway is the only capital enterprise that Northern Mesopotamia requires, for there is rain sufficient for the crops without artificial irrigation. Reservoirs of population are the need. The Kurds who come for winter pasture may be induced to stay—already they have been settling down in the western districts and have gained a reputation for industry; the Bedawin, more fickle husbandmen, may settle southward along the Euphrates, and in time there will be a surplus of peasantry from Armenia and Syria. These will add field to field, but unless some stronger stream of immigration is led into the land, it will take many generations to recover its ancient prosperity; for in the ninth century A.D. Northern Mesopotamia paid Harun-al-Rashid as great a revenue as Egypt, and its cotton commanded the market of the world.*

Southern Mesopotamia—the Irak of the Arabs and Babylonia of the Greeks—lies desolate like the North, but is a contrast to it in every other respect. Its aspect is towards the Persian Gulf, and Rohrbach grudgingly admits † that down the Tigris to Basra, and not upstream to Alexandretta, is the natural channel for its trade. It gets nothing from the Mediterranean, neither trade nor rain, and every drop of water for cultivation must be led out of the rivers, but the rivers in their natural state are worse than the drought. Their discharge is extremely variable—about eight times as great in April as in October; they are always silting up their beds and scooping out others; and when there are no men to interfere they leave half the country a desert and make the other half a swamp. Yet the soil, when justly watered, is one of the richest in the world, for Irak

* *Muslin* is named after Mosul, and cotton itself (in Greek, Latin, Arabic and Turkish) *bombyx* or *bambuk* after Bambyke (Mumbij).

† *Bagdadbahn*, p. 38.

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is an immense alluvial delta, more than five hundred miles from end to end, which the Tigris and Euphrates have deposited in what was originally the head of the Persian Gulf. The Arabs call it the *Sawâd* or Black Land, and it is a striking change from the bare ledges of Arabia and Iran, which enclose its flanks, and from the Northern steppe land which it suddenly replaces—at Samarra, if you are descending the Tigris, and on the Euphrates at Hit. The steppe cannot compare with the *Sawâd* in fertility, but the *Sawâd* does not so readily yield up its wealth. To become something better than a wilderness of dust and slime, it needs engineering on the grand scale and a mighty population—immense forces working for immense returns. In a strangely different environment, it anticipated our modern rhythm of life by four thousand years, and then went back to desolation five centuries before industrialism (which may repeople it) began.

The *Sawâd* was first reclaimed by men who had already a mastery of metals, a system of writing, and a mature religion—less civilised men would never have attempted the task. These Sumerians, in the 4th millennium B.C., lived on *tells* heaped up above flood-level, each *tell* a city-state with its separate government and gods, for centralisation was the one thing needful to the country which the Sumerians did not achieve. The centralisers were Semites from the Arabian plateau. Sargon of Akkad and Naram Sin ruled the whole *Sawâd* as early as 2500 B.C.; Hammurabi, in 1900 B.C., already ruled it from Babylon; and the capital has never shifted more than sixty miles since then. Babylon on the Euphrates and Bagdad on the Tigris are the alternative points from which the *Sawâd* can be controlled. Just above them the first irrigation canals branch off from the rivers, and between them the rivers approach within 35 miles of each other. It is the point of vantage for government and engineering.

Here far-sighted engineers and stronghanded rulers turned the waters of Babylon into waters of life, and the

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Sawâd became a great heart of civilisation, breathing in man-power—Sumerians and Amorites and Kassites and Aramæans and Chaldeans and Persians and Greeks and Arabs—and breathing out the works of man—grain and wool and Babylonish garments, inventions still used in our machine shops, and emotions still felt in our religion.

The land (writes Herodotus,* who saw it in its prime) has a little rain, and this nourishes the corn at the root; but the crops are matured and brought to harvest by water from the river—not, as in Egypt, by the river flooding over the fields, but by human labour and *shadufs*.† For Babylonia, like Egypt, is one network of canals, the largest of which is navigable. . . . It is far the best cornland of all the countries I know. There is no attempt at arboriculture—figs or vines or olives—but it is such superb cornland that the average yield is two hundredfold, and three hundredfold in the best years. The wheat and barley there are a good four inches broad in the blade, and millet and sesame grow as big as trees—but I will not state the dimensions I have ascertained, because I know that, for anyone who has not visited Babylonia and witnessed these facts about the crops for himself, they would be altogether beyond belief.

Harnessed in the irrigation channels, the Tigris and Euphrates had become as mighty forces of production as the Nile and the Ganges, the Yangtse and the Hoang-Ho.

This (Herodotus adds)‡ is the best demonstration I can give of the wealth of the Babylonians. All the lands ruled by the King of Persia are assessed, in addition to their taxes in money, for the maintenance of the King's household and army in kind. Under this assessment, the King is maintained for four months out of the twelve by Babylonia, and for the remaining eight by the rest of Asia together, so that in wealth the Assyrian Province is equivalent to a third of all Asia.

The "Asia" over which the Achaemenids ruled included Russian Central Asia and Egypt as well as modern Turkey

* Book I., Chap. 193.

† *Cp.* Sir William Willcocks, *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, p. 5 (London 1911: Spon).

‡ Book I., Chap. 192.

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and Persia, and Egypt, under the same assessment, merely maintained the local Persian garrison.* Its money contribution was inferior, too—700 talents as compared with Assyria's 1,000; and though these figures may not be conclusive, because the Persian "Province of Assyria" probably extended over the northern steppes as well as the *Sawâd*, it is certain that under the Arab Caliphate, when Irak and Egypt were provinces of one empire for the second time in history, Irak by itself paid 135 million *dirhems* (francs) annually into Harun-al-Rashid's treasury and Egypt no more than 65 million, so that a thousand years ago the productiveness of the *Sawâd* was more than double that of the Nile.

Another measure of the land's capacity is the greatness of its cities. Herodotus gives statistics† of Babylon in the fifth century B.C.—walls 300 feet high, 75 feet broad, and 58 miles in circuit; three and four storeyed houses laid out in blocks; broad straight streets intersecting one another at regular intervals, at right-angles or parallel to the Euphrates. Anyone who reads Herodotus' description of Babylon or Ibn Serapion's of Bagdad, and considers that these vast urban masses were merely centres of collection and distribution for the open country, can infer the density of population and intensity of cultivation over the face of the *Sawâd*. When the Caliph Omar conquered Irak from the Persians in the middle of the seventh century A.D., and took an inventory of what he had acquired, he found that there were 5,000,000 hectares‡ of land under cultivation, and that the poll-tax was paid by 550,000 householders, which implies a total population, in town and country, of more than 5,000,000 souls, where a bare million and a half maintains itself to-day in city alleys and nomads' tents.

And in Omar's time the *Sawâd* was no longer at its best,

* Herodotus, Book III., Chap. 91.

† Book I., Chaps. 178-183.

‡ A hectare is approximately equal to two and a half acres.

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for, a few years before the Arab conquest, abnormally high floods had burst the dykes; from below Hilla to above Basra the Euphrates broadened into a swamp, and the Tigris deserted its former (and present) bed for the Shatt-el-Hai, leaving the Amara district a desert. The Persian Government, locked in a suicidal struggle with Rome, was powerless to make good the damage, and the shock of the Arab invasion made it irreparable.* Under the Abbasid Caliphs of Bagdad the rest of the country preserved its prosperity, but in the thirteenth century Hulaku the Mongol finished the work of the floods, and under Ottoman dominion the *Sawâd* has not recovered.

Can it still be reclaimed? Surveys have been taken by Sir William Willcocks, as Adviser to the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works, and his final conclusions and proposals are embodied in a report drawn up at Bagdad in 1911.†

The Tigris-Euphrates Delta (he writes) may be classed as an arid region of some 5,000,000 hectares. . . . All this land is capable of easy levelling and reclamation. The presence of 15 per cent. lime in the soil renders reclamation very easy compared with similar work in the dense clays of Egypt. One is never far away from the giant banks of old canals and the ruins of ancient towns.

But he does not expect to make all these 5,000,000 hectares productive simultaneously, as they are said to have been when Omar took his inventory. "It is water, not land, which measures production," and he reckons that the average combined discharge of the rivers would irrigate 3,000,000 hectares in winter, and in summer 400,000 of rice or 1,250,000 of other crops. This is the eventual maximum; for immediate reclamation he takes 1,410,000 hectares in hand. His project is practically to restore, with technical improvements, the ancient system of canals and

* *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate*, by Guy le Strange (Cambridge, 1905: at the University Press), pp. 25-29.

† *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia*, by Sir William Willcocks, K.C.M.G., F.R.G.S. (London, 1911: Spon). The Report is dated Bagdad, March 26, 1911.

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drains, using the Euphrates water to irrigate everything west of the Tigris (down to Kut) and the Shatt-el-Hai, and the water of the Tigris and its tributaries for districts east of that line. Adding 33 per cent. for contingencies to his estimate for cost of materials and rates of labour, and doubling the total to cover interest on loans and subsequent development, he arrives at £29,105,020 (Turkish) * as the cost, from first to last, of irrigation and agricultural works together; and he estimates that the 1,410,000 hectares reclaimed by this outlay will produce crops to the value of £9,070,000 (Turkish) a year. In other words, the annual returns on the gross expenditure will be more than 31 per cent., and under the present tithe system £7,256,000 (Turkish) of this will remain with the owners of the soil, while £1,814,000 will pass to the Government. This will give the country itself a net return of 24·9 per cent. on the combined gross cost of irrigation and agricultural works, while the Government, after paying away £443,000 (Turkish) out of its tithes for maintenance charges, will still receive a clear 9 per cent. per annum on the gross cost of irrigation, to which its share in the outlay will be confined.

Unquestionably, therefore, the enterprise is exceedingly profitable to all parties concerned. Looking further ahead, Sir William proposes to supersede the navigation of the Tigris † by railways, and so set free the whole discharge of the two rivers for irrigation. He contemplates handling annually 375,000 tons of cereals and 1,250,000 cwt. of cotton, and estimates the future by the effects of the Chenab Canal in Northern India,

a canal traversing lands similar to those of Mesopotamia in their climate and in the condition in which they found themselves before the canal works were carried out. . . . In such a land, so like a great part of Mesopotamia, canals have introduced in a few years nearly a million of inhabitants, and the resurrection of the country has been so rapid that its very success was jeopardised by a railway

* £1.00 Turkish = approximately £0.90 sterling.

† In his immediate project he intends to keep the Tigris navigable and allots £48,350 (Turkish) for its improvement.

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not being able to be made quickly enough to transport the enormous produce.

“A million of inhabitants”—that is the crux of the problem. Labour is as necessary as water for the raising of crops; Sir William’s barrages and canals, without hands to turn them to account, would be a dead loss instead of a profitable investment; but from what reservoir of population is this man-power to be introduced? The German economists are baffled by the difficulty.

It is useless (as Rohrbach puts it) to sink from 150 to 600 million marks in restoring the canal system, and then let the land lie idle, with all its new dams and channels, for lack of cultivators. Yet Turkey can never raise enough settlers for Irak by internal colonisation.*

She cannot raise them even for the minor enterprises at Konia and Adana,† and evidently the *Sawâd* must draw its future cultivators from somewhere beyond the bounds of Western Asia. From Germany, many Germans have suggested; but German experts curtly dismiss the idea. The first point Rohrbach makes in his book on the Bagdad Railway is that German colonisation in Anatolia is impossible for political reasons. “No worse service,” he declares, “can be done to the German cause in the East than the propagation of this idea,” and the rise of Turkish Nationalism has proved him right.‡ There remain the Arab lands.

But even (he continues) if the Turks thought of foreign colonisation in Syria and Mesopotamia, to hold the Arabs in check (the political factor again), that would be little help to us Germans, for only very limited portions of those countries have a climate in which Germans can work on the land or perform any kind of heavy manual labour.

And Germany herself is hard up for men.

For all prospective developments in Turkey (writes Dr. Trietsch)

* Cp. Wiedenfeld, pp. 62-64.

† *Die Bagdadbahn*, pp. 57, 61.

‡ Cp. Wiedenfeld, p. 64.

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not merely scientific knowledge, capital and organisation are wanted, but men, and Germany has no resources in men worth speaking of for opening up the Islamic world.

It is one of his arguments for bringing in the Jews, but the colonisation of Palestine will leave no Jews over for Irak. Rohrbach * disposes of the Mouhadjirs—they are a drop in the bucket, and are no more adapted to the climate than the Germans themselves. “There is really nothing for it,” he bursts out in despair, “but the introduction of Mohammedans from other countries where the climatic conditions of Irak prevail.”

That narrows the field to India and Egypt, and drives Turco-German policy upon the horns of a dilemma :—

The colonists must either remain subjects of a foreign power, a solution which could not be considered for an instant by any Turkish Government, or else they must become Turkish subjects—

a condition which, to Indians and Egyptians, as well as Germans, would be prohibitive. No one who has known good government would exchange it for Ottoman government without the Capitulations as a guarantee.

The Ottoman Government has its own characteristic view. In a memorandum on railways and reclamation, published by the Ministry of Public Works in 1909, a *résumé* is given of the Willcocks scheme.

In due time (the memorandum proceeds) a comprehensive scheme for the whole of Mesopotamia must be carried out, but, apart from the question of expense, it is clear that the public works involved will not be justified until Turkey is in a position to colonise these extensive districts, and this question cannot be considered till we have succeeded in getting rid of the Capitulations.

This is the Ottoman pretension. Egypt, rid of the Osmanli, and India, where he never ruled, have kept their ancient wealth of harvests and population, and have manpower to spare for the reclamation of the *Sawâd*. All the

* *Bagdadbahn*, p. 83 ; *cp.* Trietsch, p. 11.

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means are at hand for bringing the land to life—the water, the engineer, the capital, the labour; only the Ottoman pretension stands in the way, and condemns the *Sawâd* to lie dead and unharvested so long as it endures.

The last voyage I made before coming to this country (wrote Sir William Willcocks at Bagdad in 1911) was up the Nile, from Khartum to the great equatorial lakes. In this most desperate and forbidding region I was filled with pride to think that I belonged to a race whose sons, even in this inhospitable waste of waters, were struggling in the face of a thousand discouragements to introduce new forest trees and new agricultural products and ameliorate in some degree the conditions of life of the naked and miserable inhabitants. How should I have felt if, in traversing the deserts and swamps which to-day represent what was the richest and most famous tract of the world, I had thought that I was a scion of a race in whose hands God had placed, for hundreds of years, the destinies of this great country, and that my countrymen could give no better account of their stewardship than the exhibition of two mighty rivers flowing between deserts to waste themselves in the sea for nine months in the year, and desolating everything in their way for the remaining three. No effort that Turkey can make (she was then still mistress of the *Sawâd*) can be too great to roll away the reproach of these parched and weary lands, whose cry ascends to heaven.

Turkey, which claims the present in Western Asia, is nothing but an overthrow of the past and an obstruction of the future.

UNITED KINGDOM

I. THE LEGISLATIVE PROGRAMME

A TRUTHFUL survey of the life of Britain during the last three months would be a record of inward experience rather than of external events—or, rather, of the impact upon the mind and spirit of Britain of events taking place beyond her shores. Never, surely, since English history began have the people of this island felt themselves at once so much alone and yet so much at one with the whole civilised world. At the very moment when the enemy is staking his last hope of victory on isolating the island centre of the Commonwealth and reducing her once more to the little England of Shakespeare's day, the march of history in the East and in the West has made us feel that our cause has found understanding and acceptance in the wider world, and that the freedom first cradled in this island is drawing her girdle round the earth.

Despite the speeches in Parliament and elsewhere and the America Day service at St. Paul's, the recent events in Russia and America have been but inadequately commemorated in public. Yet the impression which they have made on the mind not of this or that section of the public, but of the nation as a whole, must be counted an important event in British history, even if, in British fashion, it has found but little expression in words. In particular, the adhesion of America to the Allied cause brought us the first unalloyed happiness which we have had since August, 1914, and the first perceptible lightening of our load. It

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brought back blue into the sky. It rewarded the patient, the stout-hearted and the idealist. It rebuked the doubter and the pessimist. It strengthened the ties that bind us to the overseas world, and prepared our minds for the international tasks which lie as yet behind the horizon of victory. If temporary weakness and a slow convalescence are the price of the emergence of the Russian Commonwealth, and if, in consequence, the task of our own armies is made more difficult, Englishmen do not complain. They are proud, if so it must be, that they, too, are paying part of the price of Russian freedom. All they would ask of their Russian allies—and surely it is not too much for the Mother of Freedom to ask of her youngest-born daughter—is confidence in the strength of our democratic faith. They are no friends of humanity, under whatever label they may masquerade, who, at this crisis of human history, would sow suspicion and discord in the ranks of the army of Freedom.

The sense of the world-wide nature of our cause has been heightened by the meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet and by the various public addresses of the Dominion and Indian representatives. The nation has not yet had the leisure to realise the full import of the proposed constitutional changes upon the powers of the electors of the United Kingdom, but it has thoroughly understood the main fact of the situation—the presence of Dominion and Indian representatives in the Imperial Cabinet as equal partners for the first time in a Commonwealth of United Nations.

In domestic affairs we seem definitely to have entered upon a period of revolutionary change. Legislative projects which, according to pre-war standards of political action, it would have taken years or even decades to prepare and to promulgate are now being carried through Parliament, almost as a matter of course, in the space of a few months. This is partly due to the increased power and driving force of the executive and to the cessation of party

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controversy under the pressure of war-time conditions. But this is in itself not so much a cause as a symptom of a more deep-lying change: for the existing War Cabinet, however much it may have put Parliament into the shade, could not possibly take action had it not the overwhelming mass of public opinion behind it. The House of Commons may not, under present conditions, wield so great an authority and find so large a scope for its deliberative activities: but it retains its sovereign power, unquestioned and unimpaired. The Prime Minister is no Cromwell, as some ignorant hotheads would pretend. A vote of censure could force him at any moment to the judgment of the polls. Even now, under the stress of war, the British constitution is still, as we believe, the most effectively democratic in the world; and if the feeling has grown up in all classes of the community that the Britain of pre-war days has passed away beyond recall and that the times are ripe, indeed over-ripe, for far-reaching changes, those changes are conceived as making not for reaction but for the wider application of democratic principles.

Perhaps the most important, because the most far-reaching, sphere of contemplated reform is that of education. The new President of the Board of Education, Mr. Herbert Fisher, made his long-expected statement on April 19. Speaking as he did on the Estimates, he was prevented by the rules of parliamentary procedure from outlining any definite plan of legislative reform. His speech was an eloquent statement of the aims and achievements of English education, a survey of the special needs to be met and an inspiring bid for national support in meeting them; but it also foreshadowed a definite and comprehensive programme to be presented to Parliament in the near future. Certain definite changes have already been made in the allocation of grants to local education authorities, with the object of stimulating them to better the status and pay of the teachers and to increase and improve the provision of secondary education. These new arrangements embody

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the principle of the "area grant"—*i.e.*, the payment of grant according to the general policy of the local body rather than on particular items, an arrangement which should make the central control at once firmer and more elastic, and at the same time stimulate local interest in the improvement of educational conditions. The speech was received with intense interest not only by the House of Commons, always glad to welcome a talented new-comer, but by the country as a whole. Education used in pre-war days to be regarded as a dull and forbidding subject; but that this is no longer the case is shown by the fact that Lord Haldane told the House of Lords on May 9 that "during a recent tour in the north of England he delivered a series of addresses on education, and instead of there being only two or three hundred people present, as would have been the case before the war, there were two or three thousand present on almost every occasion. Nothing was more striking than the new interest which the democracy of the country was taking in the subject of education." A still more striking testimony is afforded by the recent Conference organised by the Workers' Educational Association, which was attended by some 800 delegates from 408 different bodies, 250 of them being definitely labour organisations. The Conference was summoned to strengthen Mr. Fisher's hands, but the working-class delegates present were evidently more than a little afraid lest Whitehall should not rise to the height of the present opportunity, and resolutions were passed embodying a programme considerably more ambitious than that so far adumbrated by Mr. Fisher. The controversy centres round the point of greatest wastage—the years between 14 and 18. If a liberal scheme of education during those years, embodying at least half-time attendances is set on foot, it is not too much to say that it will transform the whole character of working-class life and of British democracy within the next two generations.

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Another sphere in which reform is being carried into effect is that of the franchise. The Speaker's Electoral Reform Committee, consisting of members of all parties, recently presented a report embodying a large agreed measure of franchise reform, together with a majority resolution in favour of the extension of the suffrage to women. On March 28 Mr. Asquith raised the subject in the House of Commons in a motion urging the prompt introduction of legislation on the lines of the Report, which he described as "one of the most remarkable concordats in our political history." He took the opportunity to announce his conversion to the principle of Women's Suffrage, laying the chief stress upon the part women are destined to play in the work of reconstruction.

The questions which will then necessarily arise [he said] in regard to women's labour and women's functions and activities in the new order of things—for, do not doubt it, the old order will be changed—are questions in regard to which I, for my part, feel it impossible, consistently either with justice or with expediency, to withhold from women the power and the right of making their voice directly heard. And let me add that, since the War began, now nearly three years ago, we have had no recurrence of that detestable campaign which disfigured the annals of political agitation in this country, and no one can now contend that we are yielding to violence what we refused to concede to argument.

Mr. Lloyd George, in accepting the resolution on behalf of the Government, based his argument on similar grounds. An amendment to confine the franchise changes to soldiers and sailors was defeated by 341 votes to 62, and Mr. Asquith's resolution was agreed to. As a result, the Representation of the People Bill, embodying the resolutions of the Speaker's Conference, including Women's Suffrage, was introduced into the House of Commons on May 15. The provisions of the Bill may be summarised as follows :

1. The franchise qualifications for men of twenty-one and over to be six months' residence or occupation of business premises

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of a yearly value of not less than £10. All existing franchises to be swept away, except the University franchise, which is to be extended to graduates of the younger Universities.

2. The franchise to be conferred on any woman on the Local Government register and on the wife of any man who is on that register, if she has attained the age of thirty years.

3. No elector to have more than two votes, one for residence in one constituency and one for business premises in another or for a University.

4. Half-yearly revision of the register. A registration officer to be appointed for every county and borough, and an appeal from his decision to lie to the County Court.

5. Redistribution of seats in Great Britain.

6. Proportional representation in constituencies returning three or more members and alternative voting where there are more than two candidates for one seat.

7. All polls at a General Election to be held on one day.

8. Returning officers' charges to be paid by the State.

9. Stricter limitation and definition of candidates' expenses.

10. Soldiers, sailors, and Red Cross and ambulance workers of full age to be qualified to vote in the area in which they ordinarily reside.

Thus the Bill not only greatly simplifies electoral and registration arrangements, strengthening the democratic forces, but adds a very large number of new voters, men as well as women, to the roll; and its effect may well be to bring quite new issues and a new spirit into British public life. A great deal will, however, depend on how the various political "machines" adjust themselves to the changed situation and on whether certain underground influences, which no Government has yet had the courage to extirpate, can be effectually combatted. All good citizens will watch with anxious interest the fortunes of the Party war-chests.

Next in importance to the question of franchise reform is that of the revival of British agriculture and the rehabilitation of country life. For more than a generation past this has been a subject for pious vows; but the depredations of the submarine have brought it suddenly and painfully home to the public mind. The urgency of the problem is intensified by the fact that the agricultural labourers now with the colours are not likely to return to their old life

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unless its conditions are fundamentally changed for the better. It cannot be said that the late Government showed either courage or insight in grappling with the problem, which, as Mr. Runciman himself admitted, cannot be settled by *laissez-faire* methods.

By the appointment of Mr. Prothero to be President of the Board of Agriculture and by associating with him Mr. A. D. Hall of the Development Commission, the new Government enlisted the best available experience and ability in the country and paved the way for a comprehensive and well-considered treatment of the whole subject. A great deal has already been done in a very short time to increase agricultural production. Mr. Lloyd George stated at the Guildhall on April 27 that a million acres of fresh land had been brought under cultivation within the last three or four months. A few sentences from his speech are worth quoting :

When we came in, in December of last year, the wheat cultivation of this country had been allowed to go down by 15 per cent. There were 250,000 fewer acres cultivated of wheat than in the previous year, and that is the winter wheat, which is the important wheat. So we began with a deficiency. We took the matter in hand immediately. We had, of course, the same shortage of labour in January as you had in November, and we had the very worst weather. We reorganised the Board of Agriculture. We have reorganised all the War Agricultural Committees throughout the kingdom ; we gave them new powers of control. We issued an Order in Ireland, where they had labour, that the farmers must cultivate at least 10 per cent. more of their land, and they have done it. We manufactured and we purchased abroad agricultural tractors for ploughing the land. We utilised to the full every tractor we could lay our hands on in this country. We drew upon the Army, who supplied us with drivers for the tractors, skilled ploughmen, and agricultural labourers to the extent of 40,000 men. . . . We are taking steps now for the harvest of 1918, and not a minute too soon. We have already got our plans, and if these plans are carried out there will be 3,000,000 fresh acres of land put under cultivation, and we can guarantee that without a ton of foodstuff from abroad no one can starve us.

But in agriculture, as in industry, the problems of the

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present and of the post-war period are inextricably intermingled. If the farmer is to produce cereals now, he needs a safeguard for the future. The Government proposals to this end have been embodied in a Corn Production Bill now passing through Parliament. The Bill proposes to effect an increase in the arable area by means of minimum prices for wheat and oats under a system by which the farmer, at the end of the year, will receive the difference between the guaranteed price and the average price ruling in the market. The guarantee is to operate until the harvest of 1922, and is an ingenious way of giving the farmer a stimulus for the cultivation of cereals without the setting up of a tariff and its accompanying uncertainties and inconveniences. Associated with the guaranteed price for the farmer is a guaranteed minimum wage for the labourer. This part of the Bill, promising as it is, is capable of much improvement. The minimum has been fixed at the very low figure (especially allowing for war-time prices) of 25s., and the provision by which allowances can be calculated in lieu of wages opens the door to the reintroduction of the vicious system of truck. In the debate on the second reading of the Bill Mr. Runciman, who was President of the Board of Agriculture from 1911 to 1914, made an elaborately critical speech attacking the bounty proposals, but his positive suggestions—the storage of corn, an adequate labour supply, rural housing, the extension of agricultural education, co-operation and farm experiments—though admirable as a peace programme, sounded singularly unhelpful in the present crisis of the war. He did not, however, oppose the second reading of the Bill, which was carried by 288 votes to 27.

The liquor question has also once more been brought to the front. The Liquor Control Board has now been working for two years and has brought the greater part of the country within the operation of its schemes. Public opinion is ripe for drastic treatment of what has always been regarded by foreign observers as one of the crying

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scandals and stupidities of English life. It seems probable that the State will seize the opportunity to secure the control of the whole liquor trade, not only closing a large number of licensed houses, but allowing the electors greater freedom for dealing with the remainder.

There have been only two contested by-elections during the last three months at which public feeling on the war could be tested—one at Stockton, in the Durham industrial area, and the other at Aberdeen. In both cases a "Peace Negotiations" candidate, standing in favour of immediate negotiations with an undefeated Germany, was at the bottom of the poll with a wholly negligible number of votes. The country welcomes its new Allies and means to see the war through; but meanwhile it is passing through a great spiritual, intellectual and social revolution. Those who are responsible for controlling its destinies have an immense opportunity. If they remain true to their highest professions, if they do not allow momentary passions and ambitions to cloud their vision and obscure their ideals, they will not only have an undivided country behind them in staking the whole power and prestige of the Commonwealth upon the attainment of victory and of a just international settlement, but they will be able to follow it up by far-reaching measures of social and political reform such as will give all classes of the community an enduring sense of the meaning and value of the citizenship for which so many of our best have laid down their lives.

II. THE LABOUR SITUATION

THE first fortnight of May witnessed the sudden spread of one of those waves of labour unrest which have been characteristic of the British Labour world during the last few years. A widespread cessation of work took place among the skilled men in the engineering industry, and there was some sympathetic response among miners

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and others. The ostensible cause of the friction among the engineers was two-fold. First, the introduction into Parliament of a new Munitions Bill, extending the principle of "dilution"—*i.e.*, the substitution of unskilled and semi-skilled for skilled labour—from Government orders to private commercial work; secondly, the abrogation by the Government, with the reluctant acquiescence of the central Trade Union leaders, of the "trade-card" scheme, by which members of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and other skilled engineering unions were protected from enlistment. The extension of "dilution," though it involved the cancelling of undertakings given in 1915 and 1916, really followed logically from the men's previous acceptance of the principle; but the British workman is not a very logical being, and he was prepared to make sacrifices for the State which he could not face making for the "profiteer." The feeling on this point was specially strong in Lancashire, where it was expected at one time that "dilution of private work would bring out all the men."*

The "trade-card" dispute was of a more tangled character. It is mixed up with a controversy between the skilled and unskilled unions, and is complicated by the cumbrous constitutional machinery of the chief skilled union in question—the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. Undoubtedly the "trade-card" system provided a system of exemption for young skilled mechanics which the unskilled workers regarded as unfair. Mr. George Dallas, for instance, the London representative of the Workers' Union (to which the unskilled men largely belong), stated:

This is not a strike against the Government or the employers. It is a strike to force all unskilled or semi-skilled men of military age into the Army before any members of the A.S.E., whether they are nineteen or forty, single or married, are called upon. . . .

* Mr. Kellaway, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions stated this in the House of Commons on May 14.

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It is because of this unfairness in the working of the trade-card system that the Government decided to abolish it and set up a new system, which gives the skilled men certain preference, but is much more equitable and just than the trade-card system. It was largely due to the efforts of the Workers' Union, the Gasworkers' Union, and other societies which cater for unskilled and semi-skilled workmen, that this unfair trade-card system has been done away with. We don't want the A.S.E., or any craft society to be treated unfairly, but we take the strongest possible objection to their sheltering their younger members from military service at the expense of the older married men of the semi-skilled and unskilled organisations.*

That some revision of the privileges enjoyed by the skilled men was needed is shown by the fact that the governing bodies of the skilled unions accorded it. Unfortunately, however, the "delegate meeting" of the A.S.E., which made the concessions in question, consists of men elected before the outbreak of the war, and is out of touch with the feeling among the rank and file of the members, whom they are therefore unable to control. It cannot be said that either the "delegates" or the Central Executive (another wheel in the A.S.E. constitutional coach) have played either a very brave or a very straightforward part in the whole matter. Their admonitions to their recalcitrant members have not given the impression that they fully realise either the grave responsibility of their own position as leaders or the shameful indignity to which their organisation is exposed in the eyes of the country as directly contributing to the prolongation of the war and the death of thousands of their fellow-countrymen. At the same time they have not made it clear what attitude they would take up should the Government adopt the disciplinary measures which they are unable to take themselves. Yet, on the wisdom or unwisdom of such "strong" measures the whole situation turns.

On the other hand, the skilled men have a case which is much easier for those who are associated with them to understand than it is to put on paper. The Parlia-

* *Star*, May 14, 1917.

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mentary Secretary to the Ministry of Munitions described it as "psychological": it is perhaps best summed up in the vulgarism "fed-up." "Many men," said Mr. Kellaway, "after nearly three years excessive labour are nerve tired. The strain has begun to tell on them, and things that in ordinary times they would have settled by ordinary means are now made the occasion for rash or extreme action."

The men at the front are tired, too, and so, too, are the drilled and docile slaves of absolutism who oppose them. Fatigue is no excuse for unpatriotic action. But, if no excuse, it is an explanation. The workers care, and care intensely, for their country's cause—the cause of liberty. If they interpret it in their own way, and see it through other eyes than the ruling classes, it is not so much their own fault as that of the Government, which has done so little either to lead or enlighten them.

The chief articulate cause which is at the back of the unrest is what is described as Prussianism. The economic issues involved are relatively unimportant. Bitterness is felt not against employers, but against the Government. The men protest against methods of legislation and administration which offend the working-class idea of what is reasonable and necessary, even in time of war. It is inevitable under the existing industrial system and with the existing personnel in administrative authority and the existing deficiency of competent working-class brains to replace them, that Munitions Acts, Defence of the Realm Regulations, and the rest of the strait-waistcoating to which every free country has to submit in time of war, should not be carried through without friction. But the difficulty has been greatly enhanced by unwise and uncalled for action on the part of the authorities concerned.

The indiscriminating rigidity of the censorship, interference with postal and telegraph facilities, the adoption of espionage and such-like methods in connection with labour matters, all these are expedients which are regarded as

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un-English and resented accordingly, and they tend inevitably to discourage responsible leadership and to drive the movement of discontent to dangerous underground channels.

By the time these lines appear the particular crisis will, it may be hoped, be over, but, unless new methods are adopted no permanent remedy will have been found. If so, it is only a question of time before another crisis supervenes. Better feeling will not be restored, and patriotism will not have full play till the trouble is touched at the root.

The root of the trouble is want of confidence between the organised workers and the Government. The real responsibility for the present state of feeling rests with the late Government, which allowed the labour problem to drift for want of firm handling. They missed the great opportunity of putting wages and profits on a fair and equal footing at the beginning of the war, and trusted to the policy of *laissez-faire* which has proved so disastrous in many other spheres. From the moment that the Government coldly announced their intention, in March, 1915, of leaving food prices to the law of supply and demand Labour's confidence was lost, and, though representatives of Labour have since been admitted to the Government, it has never been restored. Still more deplorable was the Government's want of firmness in securing obedience to its orders, so that Labour has learned by repeated experience that most demoralising of all lessons—that demands, whether justifiable or not, can often be secured most quickly when they are enforced by a threat. The Government's own policy and procedure have given rise to a widespread feeling that it is as untrustworthy in its pledges and promises as it has time after time proved futile in its attempts at intimidation. The irritation against the Government is aggravated by the bewildering multiplicity of official departments dealing with labour matters, which leads to constant confusions, misunderstandings, and conflicts of policy. The Ministry of Munitions, the Admiralty, the

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Board of Trade, the Home Office, the Ministry of Labour, and the National Service Department—the two last-named creations of the present Government—are all simultaneously attempting to do their duty by the Labour question. Some simplification is urgently required, if only that good citizens may know whom and what is the State to which their obedience is due.

Strong action will probably be needed. It is indeed almost overdue. But it is idle to enforce obedience till confidence is restored. England, Scotland and Wales cannot be ruled on Prussian lines. If such a policy were attempted the sword would break in the State's hands. The pre-requisite to strong action is a stable Government in close contact with the actual conditions, equipped with first-hand recent knowledge of existing organisations and states of mind, and thereby deservedly enjoying the confidence of working people. The Government and its advisers have been living from hand to mouth. Busy day and night with the cares of the war, they have allowed the labour situation to go by default, flinging the men here and there a concession or a promise as the need arose. It is no discourtesy to the Government's labour advisers to say that they have been too long away from their workmates to have followed the recent working of their minds. Younger and more sympathetic interpreters are needed: for let it not be overlooked that in England, as in Ireland, it is the younger men, the unofficial leaders of to-day, the official leaders of to-morrow, whose case it is most important for us to understand. It is a grave misfortune at this juncture, when men's minds and outward events are moving so fast, that Trade Union tradition and procedure should permit leaders who have lost the confidence of their followers and cannot exercise authority to retain office and place. It is evidently necessary that the Trade Union movement should find some more rapid constitutional means of effecting changes in its government. Meanwhile it is idle for the Government to ignore the realities of the situation. Some-

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how or other contact must be re-established between it and the moving spirits in the world of organised Labour. When touch has once more been secured, when the Government knows and has weighed all the facts, psychological as well as material, then let it give the nation and the workers the strong lead for which they look.

If that lesson of the crisis is rightly learned and used, it may yet, on a long view, prove a blessing in disguise by leading to the abandonment of a policy which was not only jeopardising our success in the war but daily diminishing the chances of re-establishing our industrial life on a better basis at its close.

London, May, 1917.

III. IRELAND AND SETTLEMENT.

FOR many weeks Irishmen have been observing with a mixture of satisfaction and bewilderment the sudden restoration of their country to a place of foremost importance in the eyes of the world. So fiercely has the battle raged over our fate in the Press of almost every other country that there has been a period of something very like stagnation over here—a period which will no doubt endure until the continued practice of announcing that a statement will be made in Parliament some time next week is brought to an end.

If English statesmen would only grasp the possibility of handing the matter over to Irishmen to settle for themselves it would seem to an onlooker both the simplest and the most satisfactory plan. Their eyes might be opened if any of the various parties in Ireland were in a homogeneous condition with a leader or leaders who commanded universal respect. This, however, is far from being the case. The Irish Party has openly confessed itself an anachronism, and appears to have neither

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unity nor leadership. It is, in fact, impossible to see how Major Redmond, Captain Gwynn, and others of their way of thinking can be satisfied with a policy laid down by Mr. Dillon in his present frame of mind. Nor is a party which makes a dramatic exit from the House of Commons—and then comes back again—likely to win applause in sardonic Ireland. Had Mr. Redmond led his followers to Dublin he would have aroused enthusiasm and widespread support. Sinn Fein, immeasurably better endowed in respect of a policy, is even worse off for leadership. The great gathering of Count Plunkett's forces in the Mansion House of Dublin, under the fatherly protection of the Metropolitan police, revealed these facts. Many of the conclusions reached would seem at the present time to commend themselves to most Irishmen, but the meeting was not impressive, nor were its chances improved by a controversy between Arthur Griffith and the Count over the problems of revolutionary terminology. Rumour from Ulster has it that there is a dissension even there; it seems that the leaders are more and more out of touch with the rank and file, and it is now freely said that they have ceased to agree among themselves. However this may be, Ulster will not help either England or Ireland in the settlement of the problem. Often accused of bluffing herself, she now applies the same criticism to the statements that the Empire is endangered and the successful conduct of the war jeopardised by her own attitude. But no doubt if an Irish conference were suggested Ulster would see her way to be represented and even to play a prominent part.

There is yet another strongly marked party now in existence—represented by the Irish Conference Committee. Members of this loosely organised but very respectable body are mainly drawn from the ranks of the descendants of the old ascendancy party; many of them have been classed hitherto as Southern Unionists, while others long recognised as moderate Nationalists have not taken a prominent part in official politics. On both sides these

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men have stood aloof from the clamour of the hustings and the bitterness of party controversy; their tendency to compromise, dictated by social and educational circumstances, has been ascribed to weakness and their value to the country underestimated, not only in Ireland but also by successive British Governments. But they have never ceased to think constructively on the needs of their country, and their present determination to give publicity to their views in an organised fashion must be welcomed as a most hopeful sign.

The position taken up by the Committee is a broad one which does not postulate any detailed political views on the part of individual members. Three main propositions are laid down: first, that a settlement is absolutely necessary; secondly, that such a settlement must be a permanent and satisfactory one; and, thirdly, that the only way to bring it about is by a conference of representative Irishmen. While they do not pledge themselves to any definite suggestions as to the nature of the settlement—for to do this would obviously be to prejudge the work of the conference which they propose—the general trend of mind of many of their leaders may be supposed to appear in the article which Lord Monteagle has contributed to the current number of the *Quarterly Review*. The writer expresses himself clearly in favour of “dominion self-government” for Ireland, and it may be noted that this idea is gaining favour daily even among those who but recently were the most determined Unionists. It commends itself for two great reasons, the avoidance of partition in Ireland and the revision of the financial and economic proposals which make the present Bill unpalatable to practically all Irishmen. The two things are largely bound up together. As Lord Monteagle says: “Southern Ireland, Unionist and Nationalist, hates exclusion, but Ulster does not love it. The separation of Ulster from the rest of Ireland is even more unnatural than the separation of Ireland from Great Britain.” This is one aspect

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of the matter ; it is well supplemented by the following passage : “. . . autonomy, if it is to insure anything like a permanent settlement and to have any vitalising effect, must be accompanied by undivided responsibility ; . . . nothing short of the full powers of taxation, including customs and excise, will fulfil this condition. . . . Of the opposite system Sir Wilfred Laurier remarked, in a passage quoted in the report of 1911, ‘ If there is one system which I think indefensible, it is the creation of a body which should have the power to expend at its own sweet will, without having the responsibility of providing the revenue to carry on the expenditure.’ ” Compare this with the views expressed by Mr. William Murphy in a letter to *The Times* of May 3. He writes :

The financial straits of the Irish Parliament would be such (under the present Act) that their main, if not their sole, function would be the apportionment amongst the Irish services of their net cost at the time of the passing of the Act. In other words, the distribution of patronage. There would be no inducement for economy, as any savings would remain in the British Treasury. From the start the Irish Constitution would have the seeds of corruption in it, as the Parliament would enjoy the spending of the Irish revenue without any responsibility for raising it.

From these grounds he goes on to argue for treatment of Ireland in the same way as Canada, with safeguards for the protection of Ulster—“such safeguards . . . as will not only protect them from any unfair treatment but will give them an effective share in the management of their country’s affairs.” He ends by a statement which all Irishmen will accept—“that the partition of Ireland, temporary or permanent in any shape or form, will settle nothing.”

This close parallel between Lord Monteagle and the owner of the *Irish Independent*, between the Catholic and the Protestant, the successful business man and the hereditary landlord, is so remarkable as to suggest that Ireland is at last making herself articulate. She is perhaps

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prepared to do the one thing which England has so long awaited, to formulate her own policy of settlement. The time is therefore ripe for her to be given an opportunity of doing this and also of making some attempt to deal with the uncompromising attitude of Ulster. This can be done, not by entrusting the matter to overseas statesmen, who, however well intentioned, are not informed on the peculiar problem, still less by further wrangling or procrastination at Westminster, but only by giving Irishmen a chance to appoint their own representatives in Ireland.

That a settlement is urgently required seems to be the one point on which English public men are agreed. It has been brought home to them by the pressure from the Dominions and our new Ally. The Press has been at some pains to prove that America and England can never be friends until the Irish question is settled, and the Government seems to be firmly impressed with the truth of this statement, although it is extremely hard to believe for anyone who has intimate knowledge of the American people. The deputation which waited upon Mr. Balfour was not an impressive one from this point of view. In any case the theory has appeared most opportunely for the anti-Ally party in Ireland. As was pointed out in a previous article, these people placed their main reliance on America and looked to her to express the world's repudiation of all England's professions. Her entry into the war on the allied side and her immediate adoption of the allied point of view have been a severe blow, to which only one answer was possible. That answer, namely, that America would never really help England until she granted self-government to Ireland, has been furnished by the whole Press in the most convenient manner. Probably it serves as well as any other argument to bring home to a certain kind of English person and also to the inhabitants of Ulster the necessity of settlement. The real grounds for this necessity are, as has been pointed out before, largely

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economic. They have not grown less urgent with the passage of time.

Presumably people in England who are now at grips with the hard facts of war every day have little time to consider or worry over the minutiae of their Government. In Ireland, however, a leisurely criticism is still possible, and is, in fact, practised. To anyone who indulges in such criticism the present form of "business government" affords ample scope, particularly in the matter of food supplies. The endless difficulties of red tape and lack of knowledge which have accompanied the demand for increased food production have borne particularly hard on this country; it is at least irritating for a farmer to be told to cultivate an additional 10 per cent. under threat of penalties and then to be prevented from getting either machinery or fertilisers. In the distribution of food matters are even worse. Sugar, milk, potatoes have been for many months an unheard of luxury for the greater part of the poor of Dublin, not because they could not be made available, but because they are not. This hardship is not apparently accompanied by any diminution in the standard of living practised by the Irish well-to-do. There are as a result thousands of people at the present time living on bread and tea (without milk), and the price of bread is one shilling, as against 5½d. in pre-war times, although the highest known increases in wages do not exceed 40 per cent. The answer to all this will no doubt be made in the stereotyped phrase, "these are war times"; but that applies with equal force to France, and in France the price of bread now is exactly the same as it was on the outbreak of war.

The actual consequences of this policy, or lack of policy, are not making themselves felt at present. The events of Easter, 1916, went so far to confuse political and economic considerations that in this as well as in more obvious ways they weakened the strength of the working classes in Ireland. For this reason, as well as from the very fact

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of their perpetual starvation, they are at present slow to make articulate protest, and organised meetings are forbidden. But to base upon this any hopes of security for the future is undoubtedly to live in a fool's paradise.

Dublin, May 8, 1917.

IV. THE IRISH PROPOSALS

A BRIEF record must be given of the development of the Irish question in Great Britain. On March 6, Mr. T. P. O'Connor introduced a motion in the House of Commons in the following terms in order to test the attitude of the new Government to the Irish question :

That, with a view to strengthening the hands of the Allies in achieving the recognition of the equal rights of small nations and the principle of nationality against the opposite German principle of military domination and government without the consent of the governed, it is essential without further delay to confer upon Ireland the free institutions long promised to her.

The debate was awaited with much interest as it was hoped that the Prime Minister might be in a position to make an important announcement. The earlier part of the discussion was memorable for a touching and eloquent speech by Major William Redmond. Speaking in the name of the Irish troops at the front, he appealed to the House to apply to the Irish question the new spirit which had been generated under the stress of war.

If anything (he said) can tend towards strengthening the resolve which is still strong in the Irish troops to do their duty it would be a feeling that a better and a new chapter with Great Britain was about to be opened and that their country was about to be trusted with the rights and freedom of self-government. . . . What I want to ask in all simplicity, is this, whether . . . it is not possible to make a new start. . . . Whether it is not possible on your side, and on ours as well, to let the dead past bury its dead, and to commence a brighter and a newer and a friendlier era between the two countries ? Why cannot we do it ? Is there an Englishman

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representing any party who does not yearn for a better future between Ireland and Great Britain? There is no Irishman who is not anxious for it also. Why cannot there be a settlement? Why must it be that, when British soldiers and Irish soldiers are suffering and dying side by side, this eternal old quarrel should go on?

He went on to remind the House that the Irish question not only affected Ireland and the United Kingdom, but the whole British Commonwealth, and indeed the whole world. He made an appeal to the First Lord of the Admiralty and his followers to—

shake hands with the rest of their countrymen . . . here in the name of men against whom no finger of scorn can be pointed; in the name of men who are doing their duty, in the name of men who have died; in the name of men who may die, and who at this very moment may be dying, to rise to the demands of the situation.

Major Redmond was followed by Sir John Lonsdale, an Ulster spokesman, who restated the Ulster case, but with studied moderation. The Prime Minister then rose to make his long-expected statement. Hoping to make a practical contribution, he tried to bring the House down to the real difficulties in which the question was involved. He asked the House to “face the facts.”

Are the people of this country prepared to confer self-government on the parts of Ireland which unmistakably demand it? The answer which I give on behalf of the Cabinet is that the Government are firmly of that opinion, and they are firmly of the opinion that that represents the views of the vast majority of the people of this country. The next point is this. Are the people of this country prepared to force the population of the North-Eastern corner of Ireland to submit to be governed by a population with whom they are completely out of sympathy? In my judgment, and here I speak on behalf of the Government, there is but one answer to that. They are not.

He concluded by proposing as a settlement the immediate introduction of Home Rule for that part of Ireland which clearly demanded it, and the exclusion of that part to which it was repugnant. Unfortunately, in attempting to do fairness to both sides, he over-elaborated the Ulster argument under a running fire of interruption from the

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Nationalist members, and the main purport of his speech was not fully understood until the end of the evening.

He was followed by Mr. Asquith, who attempted to pour oil on troubled waters, and suggested enlisting the assistance of the overseas representatives to the approaching Imperial Conference.

Mr. John Redmond then replied in an indignant speech, in which he reiterated the old demand that the Home Rule Act should be put into immediate operation. He then withdrew with his followers from the House as a protest against what he described as a "useless, futile and humiliating debate." The Prime Minister took occasion to make it clear in a second speech that the Government's proposal was to grant Home Rule at once "to that part of Ireland which clearly demanded it, but that we could not take any action to enforce Home Rule on the part of Ireland to which it was repugnant." He also expressed the willingness of the Government to proceed by way of conference or commission, if this would contribute to a settlement.

Two days later Mr. Redmond and his followers issued a manifesto to Irishmen abroad protesting against the action of the Prime Minister and urging that the undertaking given by the Nationalists last July, when they consented to forego their demand for the coercion of Ulster, referred to a "strictly temporary war arrangement with the express undertaking that one year after the ending of the war things would revert to the *status quo ante*." Anticipating the effect which the renewed failure to arrive at a settlement would exert on the situation in Ireland, the manifesto appealed to the "millions of the Irish race in the great Dominions of the Crown, and in the United States of America, to come to the aid of those who have rescued Ireland from being made a cat's paw and tool of Germany, and are struggling against terrible odds to keep open the road to Irish liberty through peaceful and constitutional means." On the same day Lord Robert Cecil took occasion at a public meeting to interpret the dominant

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feeling of Great Britain in paying Mr. Redmond a tribute of respect for his action during the war, and to express the hope that a settlement might still be possible.

A week later Mr. Bonar Law dropped a hint that if the Nationalists went into active opposition it might be necessary for the Government to appeal to the country on the ground that the Nationalist members "would not let them get on with the war." He added that the Government had received no communication from any of the parties in Ireland since the debate of the previous week, but that in spite of that the Government was considering whether any action on their own part was possible.

Less than a week later the question was again raised in the House of Commons on the same day on which congratulations were addressed to the Duma. Mr. Bonar Law stated that the Government had decided to make another attempt on their own responsibility to secure a settlement. The most noteworthy passage in his speech was a frank abandonment of the old Unionist position. "During nearly the whole of my life," he said, "the people of this country have desired to act towards Ireland not only justly but generously. If the form of self-government which they ask for, *which I confess I would like to see them get*, in the parts of Ireland which unmistakably demand it, were in force, of course they would have a government that would suit them." He went on to say—and here the leaven of the Russian Revolution can be seen working—

how can you compare Ireland with a country that is subject to the most intensely autocratic government, when we know that she has in reality precisely the same rights and liberties as are enjoyed by the rest of us, that she has received a large measure of local self-government, and—I hope hon. gentlemen will not object to my stating my point of view in this matter—that she has a representation that gives her an influence in proportion to her population enormously greater than that which is possessed by any other portion of the United Kingdom. That does not alter, in my mind, the need for some change.

The following weeks were rendered noteworthy by an

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endeavour on the part of a section of the press to bring American opinion to bear on the question. The attempt was valuable in that it gave the British public an insight into the view held on the Irish question by the people of the United States and brought home to them the damage which the Irish embroglio has done and is doing abroad. It cannot, however, be said that many of the suggestions were very helpful, nor did all the writers realise as fully as Colonel George Harvey, of the *North American Review*, "the elementary fact that the opposition to Home Rule comes to-day not from the British people or the British Government but from Ireland herself."

Meanwhile opinion began to crystallise round the idea of a settlement based upon the exclusion of such counties as voted themselves out, and the constitution of a joint council representative of the two areas to adjust the relations between them. The next event of importance was a manifesto of a number of Irish Catholic and three Protestant Bishops against "partition" in any form which was published on May 8 with a characteristic postscript by Archbishop Walsh asserting that the protest was probably too late, as Ireland was betrayed already. That letter decided the South Longford bye-election, where the Sinn Fein candidate (a political prisoner) was returned on May 10 by 1,498 votes against 1,461. This added a new element of complication to a situation which was already too complicated: for it now became doubtful whether the Nationalists had the moral authority to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the majority of the Irish people, while it made it quite impossible for them to look at a settlement which provided for exclusion by county option.

On May 16 the new Government proposals were published in the form of a letter to Mr. Redmond. After explaining that it was impossible for the Government to attempt anything but an agreed settlement during the crisis of the war, Mr. Lloyd George advanced two alternative proposals. He first set forth a plan for an immediate settlement, based

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(a) upon the application of the Home Rule Act to Ireland, but excluding the six counties of North-East Ulster ; (b) upon the establishment of a Council of Ireland consisting of delegations from the two areas, equal in numbers, and empowered, by a majority vote of each delegation, to make legislation passed by the Irish Parliament applicable to the whole of Ireland, to initiate proposals for legislation, and, subject to the consent of a majority of the voters within it, to agree to the inclusion under the Home Rule Act of the excluded area ; (c) upon the setting up at once of a representative Conference to consider a bill embodying these proposals which would be authorised to suggest any alterations it saw fit in the Government scheme.

He then went on to set forth an alternative plan, in case the above basis did not prove to be one upon which an immediate settlement of the Home Rule question could be built. It is worth quoting the terms of this paragraph in full :—

If this should not be the case, there remains an alternative plan which, though it has been sometimes seriously discussed, has never been authoritatively proposed : that of assembling a Convention of Irishmen of all parties for the purpose of producing a scheme of Irish self-government. As you will remember, the Constitution of the Union of South Africa was framed, despite most formidable difficulties and obstacles, by a Convention representative of all the interests and parties in the country, and the Government believes that a similar expedient might, in the last resort, be found effectual in Ireland. Would it be too much to hope that Irishmen of all creeds and parties might meet together in a Convention for the purpose of drafting a Constitution for their country which should secure a just balance of all the opposing interests and finally compose the unhappy discords which have so long distracted Ireland and impeded its harmonious development ? The Government is ready, in default of the adoption of their proposals for Home Rule, to take the necessary steps for the assembling of such a Convention.

There seems to be little doubt that the first proposal will be rejected, and that a serious attempt will be made to give effect to the second. If so the proposal to hold an Irish Convention will mark a new era in the history of

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the Irish problem. For whether it succeeds immediately, or only after a delay, this experiment will put an end to the system under which Irish parties have looked to England to gain for them their Irish ends, and English parties made use of the quarrels of Ireland for their own purposes. It will, too, by bringing Irish opponents face to face, bring to light the real difficulties which have stood in the way of an Irish settlement and dispel the illusion that the root of the trouble was a conflict between Great Britain and Ireland.

We need not attempt to anticipate the deliberations and the findings of the Convention. Its members will need to manifest much patience if they are to live up to the responsibility which will rest upon them. For if they are not to confine themselves to discovering a *modus vivendi* between two hostile communities, they will have to effect a transformation of the point of view of both sides in Ireland. The Ulster opposition to Home Rule, apart from its religious foundation, has largely rested on the determination of the Ulstermen not to lose their citizenship of the United Kingdom and become part of a separatist Irish nationality. Fundamentally it has been resistance, not to self-government in Ireland, but to the Irishising, if we may use the word, of Ulster—to the doctrine that Ireland was a nation independent of and separate from its fellow nations of England, Scotland and Wales, and not forming part of one Union with them, and that of this nation Ulster must be made a part. Starting from this point of view, it has not been difficult for Ulstermen to drift, in their effort to resist legislative attempts to overcome their opposition, into an attitude which advocates resistance to self-government for Ireland, and isolation from the rest of Ireland, as ends in themselves.

If the Ulstermen are to abandon this latter attitude, the people of the rest of Ireland will have to abandon the extreme form of nationalism. Nationalism, when it takes the form of the doctrine that every race should live unto itself alone, should realise itself, regardless of the rights of others

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and of its duties to its fellow-citizens, is the very thing which has produced those boundary disputes, and has made possible those militarist autocracies, which have drenched Europe in blood in this war. Its evil pride is one of the curses of the earth. How much of this kind of nationalism there is in Ireland can be seen from the literature of Sinn Fein. It is utterly incompatible with self-government for a united Ireland. If the Convention is to be successful, therefore, it must not only overcome the isolation of Ulster, it must also abate the passion of nationalism into that legitimate aspiration to assume the responsibility for national government which sees its own strength and glory in the work the nation can do for the greater Union of which it is part.

The ultimate settlement of the Irish question is not difficult to forecast: it will follow the recognition that a united Ireland can only be attained through loyal partnership in a United Kingdom. The creation of an Irish Convention is the first step towards bringing about a reconciliation on this basis. How long it will take to accomplish will depend upon the wisdom and restraint of the people of both Great Britain and Ireland. Hitherto the Nationalists have been the untiring apostles of the principle of self-government, the Ulstermen the faithful champions of the principle of union. As every federation shows, these principles are not incompatible but complementary. But before a final settlement is made it may well be that the people of Great Britain may be called upon to undertake a reconstruction of their own constitution in order that true unionism and true nationhood may have full play.

London, May, 1917.

CANADA

I. THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES

CANADA welcomes the American declaration of war on the side of the Entente as an event of signal importance in the history of the world as it is in the history of the present conflict. It is realised that the war power of a hundred million people with unlimited industrial and financial resources must greatly affect the situation. Whatever American preparedness may amount to, whether or not the United States has benefited from the lessons of the struggle, Canadians know that the ultimate results of American participation will not be inconsistent with American tradition. There is satisfaction and relief in the Dominion that the greatest of the neutrals has abandoned its neutrality. Such emotions are not due merely to the importance of the event in the present international situation, but to the realisation that world history in the future must be affected profoundly by the American decision. The Monroe doctrine can no longer be a living issue in United States policy. The decision of Congress makes the United States for ever an influence in world affairs and a partner in international activities and responsibilities. America has drawn the sword in defence of that freedom and civilisation which her people have so long regarded as their unquestioned, if not particular, birthright, and for which they have paid great sacrifices and endured nobly in the past.

The action of the Government at Washington is wel-

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came here for intimate as well as international reasons. It is a fact that some of the public declarations of President Wilson in the past and the unfortunate reluctance to distinguish between the parties in the conflict have distressed friends of America in the Dominion and caused much criticism of the policy of the Republic. The result has been a public temper which for short periods threatened estrangement and which if established could have had a deplorable effect on the relations of the English-speaking peoples on the North American continent. We have, perhaps, been too ready to attach importance to pro-German manifestations in the United States and not given sufficient attention to the public declarations of ex-Presidents like Colonel Roosevelt and Mr. Taft and such men as Mr. Root and Mr. Choate. With the declaration of war, the balance is restored; and there is a very real feeling of relief now that the English-speaking peoples of this continent are united as they should be in common service for civilisation.

There is no disposition to underrate either the immediate value of American intervention or the tremendous power which organised war mobilisation will enable the United States to exert in the European struggle. America has been slow to act, but with the decision taken the forces that have made her formidable in the commercial and industrial world will make her equally formidable in war theatres. Superficial and even thoughtful students of Canada would not have predicted two and a half years ago that the Dominion would have responded so splendidly to war demands. There is a very large foreign element in the United States, but the body of the people are of the same stock and rejoice in the same traditions as the English-speaking people of Canada and the Empire. The true America of to-day is the America of Lincoln and Washington. That America, now finding expression, will not do less than is consistent with the domestic power and authority of the United States.

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The American declaration of war not only ensures unity and sympathetic co-operation between Canada and the United States for the duration of the European struggle, it establishes a common bond of service in a common and great cause. The action of Congress links the two nations together for the present. It is pregnant with promise for the future unity of the English-speaking peoples in fundamental activities which may make for the peace of the world, the protection of small nations, and the freedom of the individual.

II. THE LABOUR QUESTION IN CANADA

1. *The Organisation of Labour*

THERE is in Canada no Labour Party as a distinct political entity. Once or twice in the course of a generation movements in that direction have been noticed, but beyond the election, occasionally, of a member of the Dominion Parliament, and, somewhat more frequently, of one or two members of a Provincial Assembly, Labour has not secured direct representation in the Legislatures of Canada. The Dominion House of Commons contains at present one member who is accepted as in some sense a Labour representative, Mr. A. Verville, who is, however, ranked substantially as a member of the Opposition. For some years prior to 1911 an outstanding figure of the Labour movement in Canada was Mr. Ralph Smith, a former English miner, who, being elected to the Federal Parliament as a Labour member from Nanaimo, British Columbia, had become somewhat closely identified politically with the Liberal party. Mr. Ralph Smith lost his seat at Ottawa in the debacle of 1911 and when, towards the close of 1916, a new administration was being formed in British Columbia he accepted office as Finance Minister for that Province. While no doubt retaining a close intimacy with Labour

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leaders and with workmen generally, Mr. Smith had fallen into line practically with one of the older political parties. Unfortunately Mr. Ralph Smith died suddenly a few days after taking office in the British Columbia administration. It is in this same province of British Columbia perhaps that Labour has pushed furthest into politics, and, so far as the electorate is concerned, it is the socialist element which has scored the largest successes in recent years. The reason is found perhaps largely in the fact that the mining industries are those which have been most largely developed, and these also are the industries in which the workmen have been most concerned with enterprises touching politics.

It is interesting and important to note that in these matters pertaining to Labour, whether as to the formation of political parties or the enactment of legislation, there has been a certain cleavage in the English-speaking world, the result of which has been to place the mother-country and the Australasian Dominions in one group and Canada and the United States in the other. Labour scored its first political successes in the Southern Dominions some years before the emergence of the Labour Party into British politics, and the same Dominions became great experimental stations, as it were, in social legislation of an advanced type. The Unionist defeat of 1906 in Britain was the prelude to a period of almost startling activities in the same direction, although the legislation was by no means on identical lines. A Labour Party was not, as we have seen, developed in Canada, and the same is true of the United States. The field of social legislation has been but lightly touched by either country. And he would be rash who ventures to say positively if the negative attitude which has on the whole characterised Canada and the United States in these matters has brought good or ill fortune. The marvellous material progress in North America during the two decades preceding the war explains much. The astounding rush of population during those years from the older countries of the world to the Dominion and the United States, and for

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that matter from the United States also to the Dominion, show the existence of a widespread view that human welfare depends perhaps less on legislation than on the free play of human energy.

Public sentiment in the United States and Canada having in these matters moved on lines approximating each other, it is perhaps less surprising to find that Labour organisation on the two sides of the boundary is not only of the same type but has practically obliterated the line. Union workers in Canada, with comparatively trifling exceptions, belong to organisations having their headquarters and the bulk of their membership in the United States. Those who have not had occasion to watch the development of this situation and who therefore become suddenly aware of its existence are apt to view it, from the national point of view, with unconcealed alarm. Enquiry seems hardly to justify the alarm. The Canadian membership in the different trade unions is, as a rule, almost a negligible quantity, and, as is customary with minorities, it receives more, instead of less, than its proportion in the way of officers, while in some of the larger unions the system has grown up of giving particular officers resident in Canada a large measure of authority over Canadian matters coming up. It is no doubt during the stress of a great war that a strain on international trade unionism would have been most likely to make itself felt, but no word has reached the public of any development in this direction. If the number of strikes in a particular community is to be accepted as a criterion of the degree of industrial unrest, Canada is the most fortunate of countries. Not to enter into any extended comparison on the point, it may be noted in passing that, whereas the strikes in Canada during 1916 numbered but 75 (double the number of 1915), the strikes for Australia during the same period numbered 330. If we take the figures since the beginning of the war, the result is yet more favourable to Canada. In Australia the number of strikes from August 4, 1914, to December 31, 1916, was

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800, an average of about one per working day ; in Canada the total from August 4, 1914, to December 31, 1916, was 120. The comparison is less striking, but is still in favour of Canada, if we turn to the figures published for the United States or to those for Great Britain. It may be objected that figures as to strikes are without value unless they are accompanied by statements showing the extent and duration, etc., of the strikes. But, from the published reports, comparisons made from these various points of view are still to the advantage of Canada. There has not been in the Dominion since the onset of war, or for some time previously, any very serious or prolonged strike. Such a statement must be made guardedly, for, of course, every strike brings trouble and loss to some people ; but so far as can be learned there has been no dispute bringing disaster on a wide scale or interfering for more than the briefest period with the production or conduct of any public utility. International trade unionism certainly does not appeal to the patriotic instinct ; but Canada, whether in spite of it or because of it, has for a good many years escaped any serious industrial disturbances, while disasters of this nature have fallen heavily, for instance, on Australia. Canada and Australia are, of course, at the opposite poles with respect to proportions of unionised workers, Australia leading the world in its ratio of unionists to population, while Canada is, so far as concerns Western Europe and English-speaking countries from which returns are printed, at the foot of the list. The actual number of trade unionists in Canada has fluctuated in recent years, and, according to figures given out lately from Ottawa, stands at present approximately at 160,000. This is the same figure as three years earlier, but between 1913 and 1916 there was a considerable falling-off. This is, of course, but a small proportion of the workers of Canada, particularly if we give a broad interpretation to the term "worker" and include the very large number of those concerned in agriculture, farmers as well as labourers.

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Leaving aside these last-named classes, who are found rarely in any country in the ranks of trade unionists, we still find the vast proportion of manual labour in Canada to be unorganised. Organisation is fairly close in the upper grades of railway service and, in some localities, in the coal and metal mining industries, while occasionally a less notable but highly skilled trade, such, for instance, as plate printing, is organised as closely as a learned profession. As a rule organisation diminishes in intensity as we descend the ladder of skill, the tendency being marked by exceptions of which space forbids mention.

On the whole, then, Labour in Canada is but thinly organised and organisation is chiefly on an international basis. It would be a mistake to underrate the influence of an active and organised minority; and, were the entire strength of international unionism in Canada wielded through or by a particular agent, the agent would speak with a relatively powerful voice. This situation, however, can hardly be said to exist. The position of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada approximates to that of a national organ, and is the only body which has any substantial claim to speak for Labour with a national voice. This body does not represent the whole of organised Labour in Canada, nor the whole of international unionism in Canada. The higher grades of railway workers, locomotive engineers and firemen, conductors and trainmen, etc., callings in which Labour organisation in Canada, as also in the United States, reaches the highest level of authority and influence, are not represented in the Congress, which also is without representation from the comparatively small minority of organised Labour found in unions having no international affiliations. The Dominion Trades and Labour Congress is nevertheless the official mouthpiece of a trades union membership of about eighty thousand workmen, a larger constituency than that of any other Labour organisation in Canada. The Congress maintains at Ottawa a paid President and a Secretary who is paid for

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certain duties. Delegates duly elected come together once a year for about ten days at an industrial centre selected a year earlier. Most of the delegates will have had little opportunity of informing themselves closely as to the sentiment of the union membership in different sections of the Dominion, and the system of receiving reports on such matters from the executives of the respective provinces, while helpful, does not go very far. The organisation of the Congress, while, considering the number and class of membership and the vast areas involved, as close as could be perhaps expected, does not lend itself to the study of intricate social problems, but such problems are none the less dealt with and, as a rule, summarily disposed of. We should be careful to give neither too little or too much importance to the conclusions of such a convention as that of the Dominion Trades and Labour Congress, which, with its delegates gathered almost at haphazard from a hundred different centres, seems nevertheless to have been on the whole led discreetly, and, if industrial conditions in Canada are a criterion, not ineffectively. If there is in Canada a minimum of industrial unrest, is it not in a measure traceable to the relatively fortunate condition of the worker ?

2. Labour After the War

It will be seen that a conspectus of the Labour situation in Canada will not, under these circumstances, be easily obtained. The areas of the Dominion, the slimness of Labour organisation, and the complexity of the subject unite to render incomplete any such undertaking. We find evidence of many kinds that there is a shortage at the present time in most lines of labour, that work is more regular and that wages are higher than probably at any previous period in the history of Canada. Of course, prices are higher and one is immediately confronted with the eternal spiral in which wages are chasing prices

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and prices are chasing wages ; no one knows where or when the chase began or will end. The labour shortage is, of course, created by the war, which has drawn off some 400,000 men for the Army, while, on the other hand, special employment in munitions work is being given to as many, say, as 200,000. The net outcome has been a large prosperity, chequered unhappily by the more tragic aspects of the war. Some tell us gloomily that it is a prosperity that must perforce disappear with peace ; at the same time we hear authentic statements that new and extensive shipbuilding industries are springing up on both our sea coasts and at industrial centres in the interior, and a moment's reflection will suggest that here at least is an industry capable almost of indefinite expansion, the activity of which is likely even to be accelerated with the arrival of peace. Agriculture, too, is crying out for labour and the demand can be met, if at all, only by efforts of a quite extraordinary character ; here, too, the demand tends to increase year by year, and will hardly be checked by the close of the war.

The prospect of having some 600,000 men thrown suddenly on the labour market has appalled many minds, and it is in any event sufficiently formidable, unqualified by further considerations. But its worst aspects are mitigated by contemplation. Granted that peace comes suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, even as the war came, that men are fighting on Monday, as it were, and free on Tuesday to return to their respective countries—the proposition is absurd, but it is absurdities often that terrify—there would be still the gigantic task of bringing the Canadian soldiers back to Canada, not to speak of the yet greater work of carrying to their homes the millions of British and Australians and New Zealanders, of South Africans and Indians, from France and Salonica and Mesopotamia and elsewhere, as well as the countless other duties which will fall to the shipping. It will take time to bring back to Canada the two or three hundred thousand men now

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in France or England. The discussion takes on an infinitely more painful aspect when we reflect that the number of those returning may be terribly smaller than the figures given ; so much may happen before they begin to return. But leaving the figures unreduced and granted that when peace comes Canadian soldiers are free to return as soon as ships can bring them, it may still easily take a year to see them all in Canada. But there are, besides, the soldiers who have not left Canada, and the munitions workers, numbering perhaps 300,000. These, too, will find at least their occupation gone. The munitions workers, however, have been scattered well over the country. Countless firms have been engaged in the munitions business. In many instances the manufacture of munitions has been added to the former business without displacing or supplanting it. The chiefs of these enterprises may be depended on to keep well in mind the danger of a slump at the end of the war and to be prepared, each in his own way and at a different point, with plans for the mitigation of the threatening evil. The ante-war business of many of these concerns has been slackened only or suspended, and the cash which has been paid for munitions will, as a rule, permit the quick reversion to old lines, improved in many cases by the experiences gained during the years of war work. One hears, too, but somewhat uncertainly, that there is already a falling off of munitions work, and there is more than a possibility that before the great war ends a considerable proportion of the munitions workers will have been absorbed back into their former callings. Many of the munitions workers and some of the soldiers have been drawn from callings in which war has induced a particular slackness, the building trades, for instance. Is it to be supposed that the widespread suspension in building operations which began in the depression of 1913 preceding the war will continue when peace comes ? The suspension affected not only private enterprises but public works of all kinds, those of Dominion and

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Provinces, cities, counties, and towns, and it will be lifted from all. Here and there will be dislocations, but not more serious probably than one was accustomed to hear of before the war.

3. *Land Settlement*

Back, however, of all minor means for employing labour after the war is the inexhaustible supply of land. Now there is no doubt of the need of the land for labour, but it is not quite so clear that labour especially desires the land. In practically all industrial countries for a good many years past the movement has been from the land to the city. Even in Canada, despite the Immigration Act restrictions on immigration other than that destined for the land, the urban population has increased more rapidly than that of the rural districts, many of the latter having, particularly in older Ontario, actually decreased. Why it should be so is an intricate and difficult problem lying outside the province of the present article, but it indicates a situation which was causing grave apprehension during the few years before the war. Now, despairing optimists and cheerful pessimists alike point to the land as the panacea for the conditions which according to them will exist at the close of the war. On the face of things, it is not quite a reasonable view. So far as the soldiers are concerned, men who have been during the last two or three years mingling intimately with their fellows, in trench or barracks, sometimes in hospital even, are likely to feel, when peace comes, more and not less gregarious than before the war, and are unlikely, therefore, to be specially attracted by the prospects afforded by prairie farming. One young soldier invalided home expressed probably the views of many of his comrades when, with the memory of long months in the trenches, he dismissed the idea of agricultural work with the remark, "No, sir, no farming for me; I want an indoor job for the rest of my life." Such a view must not, of course,

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be taken too seriously. Some of the soldiers will take to agriculture kindly, and their inclinations will be encouraged by the numerous agencies formed to that end ; but various public statements of late have indicated that the " Back to the land " idea is not popular with the returning soldiers, and one cannot but feel that as a practical issue it is weakened somewhat by the fact that its chief advocates urge always that others, not themselves, should go to the land.

If we cast our minds back to the years 1912 and 1913 we find that at that time immigrants were streaming into Canada at the rate of 400,000 a year, men, women and children of many nationalities, about half the number being men. These people were coming to a land strange to them, many of them unable to speak English, and most of them poorly equipped. The 400,000 who came in 1912 were followed by the 400,000 of 1913. The country was not alarmed, but rather rejoiced, found itself prosperous and was more than content. Commercial depression, it is true, came in 1913, but this was generally attributed to causes far removed from the prodigious influx of new citizens during the few preceding years. Why, then, should we fear so greatly the return to Canada during the year or so following the close of the war of an equal number of our own sons and brothers, each known in some city or town or village of the Dominion and surely with friends, not slowly and painfully acquired as in the case of the immigrant, but waiting with open arms to greet them. One hears hasty and excited cries for the creation by the Dominion Government of extensive and costly machinery to meet the emergencies which heated imaginations have pictured. The skill and experience of the great immigration service of Canada, which seems to have proved adequate to the gigantic task placed on it in the years when it aided in the distribution over the vast expanses of the Dominion of countless hordes of newcomers, are still available, but presumably have as yet been hardly called into requisition. Normal immigration, at any rate, will not be resumed on

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the declaration of peace. Other matters apart, the lack of shipping will be itself an effective check ; but, were there danger of a premature rush of immigration, it could be prevented. In addition to the immigration service, which, with its fine equipment of skilled agents spread carefully over the length and breadth of Canada, is in touch with the land and its necessities and opportunities as is no other service, there are other bodies which the times have called into existence and which the public seems hardly to take into account. First and foremost there is the Military Hospitals Commission, with headquarters at Ottawa, appointed by the Dominion Government and directly under its control. The Prime Minister in the closing days of that portion of the 1917 session which preceded his visit to England discussed in some detail the work of the Commission and showed how by its system of interlocked provincial commissions, working in close co-operation, practically all the soldiers returning to Canada, and physically fit for work, down almost to the date at which Sir Robert Borden was speaking (February 5th), had been provided with employment. The figures given by the Prime Minister showed a total for all the provinces of 5,886 returned soldiers employed and 148 for whom no employment had been found. These figures are relatively tiny as compared with the prospective after-war figures, but it should be remembered that they refer to the most difficult class of cases with which any authorities will have to deal—namely, soldiers invalided home, unfitted in many cases to work at their former callings and needing therefore to be re-trained. The small residue of cases where employment had not been, at the moment the Prime Minister was speaking, found for returned soldiers, represented, no doubt, the cases last to hand, and likely to be disposed of in due course, but no particulars were given as to this point. The system of organisation of which the Military Hospitals Commission (a less cumbrous and confusing title should be of some assistance to the Commission) is the centre and controlling

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force is apparently so framed as to be capable of large expansion, municipal or local committees or commissions being established to co-operate with the provincial commissions just as the latter co-operate with the central commission itself. A point which should be by no means overlooked is that the M. H. C. (if one may so designate the Commission) has jurisdiction also over the most vital matter of re-training, so far as necessary, returned soldiers unfitted for their former avocations but qualified physically for certain other work.

4. *The Attitude of Labour*

So far as can be discerned the attitude of organised Labour in Canada as to the war or as to after-war conditions is not differentiated in a marked degree from that of the community at large. The number of trade unionists is placed as we have seen, at about 160,000. The number of enlisted trade unionists is placed in round figures at 20,000. At the first thought the proportion is small, but it must be immediately remembered that the workman does not, as a rule, join the union in the first flush of youth, and trade union membership is composed very largely of middle-aged and elderly men, heads of families. Their sons, there is every reason to believe, have been given as freely as those of other elements of the population. The proportion at the front of Labour in the larger sense is hard to estimate, but it is not probably beyond the mark to claim for it the bulk of the citizen soldiers of Canada; of what, otherwise, in fact, could the majority consist? Here and there, at trade union councils and other Labour conventions, there have been flutters of excitement with regard to national service and talk of conscription, and the Executive officers of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, the most representative Labour body, as we have seen, in the Dominion, have expressed themselves on the subject in terms that were guarded rather than vehement. Certainly

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no general antagonism to the war has been manifested, but countless resolutions have been carried, doubtless with enthusiasm, demanding in emphatic terms that the rights of Labour must be conserved in matters arising after the war. Such resolutions do nothing but good in so far as they assist in directing the attention of the authorities to the absolute necessity of caring for the disabled and re-training them industrially, if possible; of providing properly for widows and orphans; and of endeavouring to arrange demobilisation, when it comes, in such a way as to cause the least possible degree of dislocation. These are the points on which organised Labour has been specially outspoken, and as to which the rest of the community should feel cordially at one with them.

5. Comparison between British and Canadian conditions

One important aspect of this subject is not perhaps taken sufficiently into account. The Canadian public mind has been, as indicated above, saturated, perhaps satiated, with predictions of the social chaos which, in the older countries in the war, will come when war ends. Next to what are essentially our own affairs from this point of view, we are necessarily most interested and concerned in present and prospective conditions in the mother-country. While we receive a larger measure of information in these matters as to Britain than in the case of any other of the warring communities, our actual knowledge is none the less severely limited and the popular view at least is based on a flood of disconnected and expurgated statements from the news agencies and from correspondents who perhaps vainly try to live up or down to the regulations of the censors, on the promiscuous talk, sometimes guarded and sometimes otherwise, of our soldiers, officers, business men, statesmen, who have seen Britain in war time, and on innumerable magazine articles and pamphlets and books, of which copies drift across the ocean. Now, though it may not be possible to

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see clearly through the political and economic clouds that lower over Britain at the present time, some outstanding features have emerged, and it may be well to glance for a moment at these features and endeavour to see to what extent the conditions they reflect or suggest are differentiated from those we believe to exist in Canada. It is quite certain that the conditions here and there will be, in the ultimate working out, more or less intimately inter-related.

The most outstanding feature of the economic situation in Britain is the extent to which the State has, since the outbreak of war, found it necessary to take over the direct control of vast industries—railways, shipping, coal mines, munitions, in this last class being included practically all work needed for the purpose of the war. Even agriculture as an industry comes under governmental influence in various ways, first, of course, by conscription, which claims young men unless they are specially exempted; secondly, by the fixation of prices, which materially affects the farmer's point of view as to crops to raise; and thirdly, by the determining, as announced by Mr. Lloyd George in February of this year, of a minimum wage of twenty-five shillings a week for farm labourers.

Manifestly in all industries conscription gives the State control for military purposes of all labour of military age, and not physically unfit, unless it has been specially exempted on the ground usually that it is imperatively needed for war industries. The slips on this point, of which one hears here and there, are no doubt inevitable, and successive "combing" have remedied most of them. Railways, shipping and coal mines have been operated through Commissions, the munitions industries through the Department of Munitions. The State theory of control is understood to be to cause or allow the minimum of interference with the normal management of the individual company or owning concern, but the Commission or the Department is the ultimate authority. It is the munitions

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industries in which have occurred the largest departures from normal conditions. Here the State came into contact with numerous mechanical trades, those trades particularly which before the war had been most closely unionised and most active in the framing and enforcement of regulations as to relations between employers and workmen. By conference between the Government and responsible Labour leaders it was arranged that union regulations of a restrictive nature should be suspended during the war, the Government pledging itself to the full restoration of these regulations at the close of the war. The mutual agreement or understanding on this point has since been extended to practically every important industry. The agreement includes such vital matters as wages, hours of labour, piece-work, overtime, union rules, suspension or dismissal of employees, methods of presenting grievances, employment of non-union labour, substitution of women for men and all the thousand and one minor points (minor, yet leading frequently to bitter disputes) falling under one or other of these heads. The substitution of women for men, one may note in passing, is supposed to have added about three-quarters of a million to the ranks of women engaged in industrial work.

Over two years of war have passed since the making of this agreement. The industries concerned, involving several million workers, have been practically re-created. They have been organised as never before for production. The interests of employer and workman, and those, above all, of the State, have been conserved more effectively than in the past. The Government stands pledged to restore the ante-war conditions. English writers and thinkers on these matters are beginning to doubt if employers and workmen will not, when peace comes, unite in cancelling this onerous governmental obligation and prefer to continue their working relations on the higher and more effective level to which the necessities of war have lifted them. The industrial system in Britain, too, one must not forget, is overlaid with a fine network

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of machinery required in the operation of the Labour Exchange System, the Unemployment Insurance Act (the two are administered from the same offices), the National Health Insurance Act, and the Old Age Pension System. The many thousands of officials required in the administration of these laws bring different branches of the Government into intimate contact with the great majority of the working classes, and the Government will therefore almost perforce acquire a closer and more intimate knowledge of the conditions of the people than has been the case in the past.

Perhaps we may glance for a moment at yet another agency which, in Britain, is quietly and unobtrusively, but none the less effectively, assisting in the re-creation of labour, the Workers' Educational Association, a body hitherto little known in Canada. The W.E.A. (as it is generally called) came into existence about ten years ago at a joint conference of trade unions, co-operative societies, friendly societies, and educational associations. The movement secured the endorsement and assistance, both moral and financial, of the universities, Oxford leading. The Association was, at the outbreak of the war, beginning to spread rapidly. Its object was to give working men and women the benefits of higher education, and the plan adopted was the creation of a system of university tutorial classes. The system has already enabled many thousand workers to obtain education of the highest type. In 1907 there were two classes and sixty students; by 1914 the numbers had grown to 179 classes and 11,430 students. The war naturally prevented progress, but the movement has held its own, and those in closest touch with it believe it will advance with rapid strides when peace comes. It is the first occasion when the university and the trade union have been found working together on a generous scale. The Education Department has given its blessing to the movement and, better still, bears a proportion of the necessary expenditure. The ideal aimed

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at—an educated democracy—has never before been put on a basis at once so practical and inspiring.

These are the more marked features of the industrial situation in Britain. They contrast strikingly with the conditions found in Canada. Here the Government has not taken over any industries, and one cannot say there has been serious demand or occasion for such action. Canada has furnished no inconsiderable quota of munitions, and the manufacturers have been remarkably free of governmental control. In Great Britain there are over 5,000 "controlled" establishments, some of them famous mammoth firms; in Canada there is not one "controlled" establishment. No doubt there have been in many cases effective working agreements between employers and different unions, and various branches of the Dominion Government have probably had their part in these matters; but there has been no general undertaking as between the Government or the firms collectively on the one side and union officials on the other; nor has there been any formal abandonment by Labour leaders of union conditions of any kind, or, of course, any corresponding pledge of restoration. Women's labour has been introduced into Canadian industries, perhaps particularly into munitions industries, but the total number of women industrially employed does not appear to have been greatly increased; there has been a good deal of shifting from one industry to another. Little difficulty on this point will arise after the war. One hears sometimes the suggestion that women have not responded in Canada as freely as those in the United Kingdom to the call of the war. A point not always recollected is that whereas in Great Britain before the war there was a vast numerical superiority of females, placed approximately at 2,000,000, the situation was reversed in Canada. The census of 1911 shows there was then in Canada a numerical superiority of males, totalling 432,000. Immigration during the three following years, 1912, 1913, 1914, increased considerably this male

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excess, male immigrants always outnumbering the females, and the male excess at the outbreak of war was hardly less than 600,000. The male excess was chiefly in Western Canada, but extended to Ontario. Women have, nevertheless, long engaged considerably in industrial work in Canada, but the numbers so engaged have been of smaller proportions than in Britain, and the reserve of labour now available in Canada in this direction is not large.

There is no doubt an agricultural problem here as in most other countries, our particular difficulty being that of getting satisfactory labour for the farmer. This is hardly a war difficulty. It existed before the war ; it will probably be less pressing for some time after the war ; for, though the land may offer no panacea, it will yet assuredly furnish some assistance. The higher wages which the English agricultural labourer is to receive will not increase his disposition to come to Canada. In Canada we may have to follow Mr. Lloyd George's lead and increase the wages of the farm hand, though not necessarily by law. Not immediately, perhaps, but ultimately the occupation of the farm hand in Canada and elsewhere must be brought up approximately to the wage level of other callings. We have certainly in Canada no land problem of the type found in Britain, where the existence of vast estates in relatively tiny areas has bred bitterness and caused startling inequalities removable only by legislation which strikes at the roots of many existing and almost basic institutions. It is an encouraging sign of the times in Britain that the consensus of opinion seems to be not only unopposed to such legislation, but even to be preparing to recommend it. In Canada the chief difficulty presented by the land, apart from the labour question, which, after all, is but an item in the larger industrial problem, is the evil of speculation, the remedy for which comes inevitably in time by natural process ; it may be hastened, however, by legislation, federal and provincial, calculated to penalise those who seek or secure fat incomes or profits out of the

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unearned increment. The evil is no doubt akin to landlordism, and is sometimes worse in the suffering inflicted on the community, but is more easily remedied if taken in time.

6. *The Outlook*

One word in conclusion. As we have seen, the record of Canada and her provinces in what may be termed social or industrial legislation is meagre, especially when compared with that of the mother-country and the Southern Dominions. Our industrial history seems also to show that the Dominion has had during recent years and prior to the outbreak of war less than its share of the economic troubles of the day, thus escaping any penalty for its legislative inactivity. There is a growing feeling, however, that we are entering on an era when in Canada also our federal and provincial authorities will be required by circumstances to depart from the negative attitude which as to these matters seems to have been hitherto not inadequate. Under our constitution the preponderant share of jurisdiction in social legislation would seem to fall within the sphere of the provinces, though the situation invites or permits evasion or duplication as the respective authorities may interpret their duties or the British North America Act. The thorny question of industrial disputes seems to have been taken over definitely as within the Dominion sphere, and the provinces, presumably nothing loth, seem content to leave it there; the Dominion statute known popularly as the "Lemieux Act" is a remarkable exception to negation or passivity in industrial legislation, and the statute itself is unique in the interest its principles, machinery and administration have excited in other countries, and are at the moment of writing exciting, for instance, in the United States, where the cardinal principle of the statute, that of compulsory investigation (in certain industries) before a lock-out or strike is lawful, seems to have been accepted wholly by President Wilson. Such questions as child

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labour, industrial training and technical education, regulation of women's work, hours of labour, compensation for injuries, minimum wage, old age pensions, health insurance, unemployment insurance, etc., are now frequently canvassed and discussed in the public press, and reasonable legislation upon some of these matters has been passed in certain of the provinces. It may be that legislation as to many of these subjects would be premature or unwise, and the public would be in some instances satisfied with evidence simply that the matters in question were receiving that "careful attention," with the assurance of which deputations are content to receive their dismissal from a distinguished minister. At present no authority seems charged with any such duty. Many who have looked below the surface in these matters are inclining to the view that the time has arrived for the remodelling and expansion of the federal equipment of machinery and facilities. The Department of Labour was established as a bureau in 1900 and received a minister with the full Cabinet portfolio in 1909. Both have, let us suppose, served admirably their respective purposes, but the times are changing. The Ministry of Labour is continually the centre of acrimonious contention, above all where industrial disputes are concerned, and the number of industrial disputes which have political aspects is no doubt greatly larger than the average man would realise. A view much favoured in non-official circles is the creation of a body to be known as a Labour Commission containing, say, five members, two representing the point of view of the employing class, two that of the workers, the chairman to be a man of ministerial rank, though by no means necessarily a politician; the Commission to be charged with the administration of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act and other statutes now administered by the Minister of Labour, and in fact to take over substantially the work and equipment of the Department of Labour, modified and enlarged as might be determined. The theory of those supporting the Commission proposition is

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that only in this way can such difficult matters as industrial disputes and cognate subjects receive careful and impartial attention and entirely escape the atmosphere of party contention. The State of New York established such a Commission a year or two ago, and the Industrial Relations Commission established by President Wilson recommended the establishment of such a Commission for the United States, a recommendation which has not yet been carried out. Whether or not in Canada such a Commission should also administer the Immigration Act and some other laws now controlled by other Departments is a point on which opinions differ. The Railway Commission is commonly cited in Canada as a pattern administrative body independent of politics (and universally admitted to be so) and wholly free to deal, from the point of view of the public interest, and from that point of view alone, with matters coming to it for action. Propositions along these lines have been carefully elaborated in unofficial circles and have been brought even to the attention of the Government. The extent to which they may be favourably regarded by the Government and whether or not any legislation on the subject is under consideration must remain a matter of conjecture ; all are, however, aware that no such legislation was forecast in the speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament this year.

Regarding the industrial situation in Canada as a whole, one is inclined to the view that the Dominion will not soon make any abrupt departure from past practice. The smaller troubles which may follow the removal of the staggering burden of the war will not apparently overtax official and voluntary resources. If to the factors making for industrial harmony and betterment in Canada we could hope to add the beneficial influence of a Canadian W.E.A. (and there are efforts in this direction), the outlook would be further improved.

Canada. April, 1917.

AUSTRALIA

I. COMMONWEALTH POLITICS

THE last number of THE ROUND TABLE contained an analysis of the Referendum on compulsory service and of the factors which brought about the defeat of the Government proposals. When the campaign was over there were many Australians who believed that the whole country would set itself by a united effort to efface the impression made by the decision of a narrow majority. They had regard principally to the claims to patriotism made by many of the opponents of compulsion, to the established fact that many of them had already made great personal sacrifices for the national cause, and to certain patent defects in the management of the campaign. Their optimism was shared apparently by many qualified observers in England and America. If any of the hopes then formed and expressed have survived the past three months, they can have done so only in the minds of men who take very long views and who refuse to judge their countrymen by their elected representatives. The period between the reassembling of Parliament and the Referendum has been the most depressing in the history of the Commonwealth. It has seen party and personal bitterness flourishing in the midst of war. It has not seen any united effort on the part of politicians to find the reinforcements which were not to be obtained by compulsion, nor any desire on the part of responsible statesmen to convince the country that their refusal was based on mistaken grounds. Parliament has

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proved itself capable only of hindering the necessary work of the Government. The Opposition, which might have done much good by criticism if its professions were genuine, has discredited itself by its personal bitterness. Nor has the Prime Minister shown among his great gifts the qualities of leadership that were needed in these times. He has realised the internal and external dangers to this country and exposed them as no other man could have done; but he has fallen into errors which a minister of less ability and foresight might have escaped. If he had been able to ignore the personal animus against himself in the attacks made upon his Ministry, his enemies would have been silenced or discredited. Such a renunciation would not have been easy to a man who, besides having a strong case, has been accustomed to practise a ready and bitter wit on all his opponents. But it would have gone far to prove that Mr. Hughes can lead a national party as well as supply it with emotions and ideas, and that inference would have been strengthened had he been willing to inform the electors of his knowledge or his intention when no public interest could be served by concealment.

Many of the electors were first made aware of the elements which brought about the disastrous record of this Parliament during the progress of the Referendum. Until the Labour Leagues began to expel the advocates of compulsion among their members, none but the Labour leaders had fully realised the pretensions of these bodies. For some time prior to the Referendum a two-fold process had been developing itself within the Councils. As Labour had come to hold office more frequently in the States and in the Commonwealth the leadership of the political unions had degenerated and their claims had become more exacting. An antagonism had developed between Labour ministers and those political unions which had passed under the control of men who were extremists by temperament and had no experience of the practical work of government. Simultaneously, the leagues which had formerly been con-

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tent to bind any member to the platform signed by him before election advanced a claim to regulate his vote by any resolution they might pass from time to time. This tendency, which had been watched with apprehension by Labour ministers, revealed itself at the time of the Referendum in the expulsion from the leagues of all members, small as well as great, who were prepared to vote or speak in favour of conscription. The members of the leagues naturally resented their punishment, since the intention of the expulsion was to exclude them from political life for the future. But their resentment was nothing to that of the leagues who were defied by the obstinacy of their former members and by their decision to continue in office without any licence but that of their constituents. If the Referendum had been fought with less bitterness, or if Mr. Hughes had been successful, it is possible that the leagues might have sought a reconciliation as the only means of retaining their former authority. They could claim that their pretensions had been recognised when Mr. Hughes sought conferences with them in the several States before announcing his scheme. They might have endeavoured to co-operate with a successful leader in the hope of still influencing the control of public affairs and of keeping them under the direction of Labour. As a party insulted and triumphant, however, they had no thought of reconciliation. The leagues resented the defiance offered to them, they thought they could avenge it, and were determined to do so. They were supported by the small section in the country who are opposed to making any sacrifices for the sake of the Empire and who apparently do not realise the impotence of Australia to protect itself, by some members who believe the control by the leagues necessary to party discipline, and by others who were afraid that without the support of the leagues their political careers were ended. These elements had one feeling in common, a strong personal dislike of Mr. Hughes, which he did not attempt to diminish, and a feeling of distrust which was deepened by

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his use of the censorship and by such political manœuvres as those to which we referred in the last number of **THE ROUND TABLE**. The inevitable collision occurred at the party meeting held after the defeat of the Government proposals had become practically certain. The meeting was not public and various versions have been given. The result was that Mr. Hughes left the official Labour Party with a number of his followers and formed a new Ministry. By itself the new Ministry could not carry on business for a day in either House. But being a Ministry formed solely for the purpose of enabling Australia to do her share in the war it was assured of the support of the Liberals, and with their support would have a majority in the House of Representatives, though Liberals and Ministerialists combined were in a minority in the Senate.

The new ministers were chosen by the Prime Minister instead of being elected by the Caucus. Partly for that reason and partly because the members of the official party were not candidates, some new ministers were able to show a fitness for office which should be recognised in the future. The Treasurer, Mr. Poynton, revised and greatly altered his predecessor's taxation proposals when he proposed an additional income tax, a tax on amusements, a modified wealth tax to be allocated solely to the repatriation of soldiers, and a far less drastic tax on war profits. An honorary minister, Mr. Laird Smith, speaking for the Defence Department in the House of Representatives, gave evidence of both administrative ability and tact. Senator Lynch began to administer the Works Department with a degree of firmness and knowledge which showed at once his sense of the need of giving the taxpayers value for their money and his freedom from pressure on the part of the Labour unions. The Ministry, having abandoned conscription, had the nominal support of the Opposition in its efforts to find recruits by the Voluntary system and to help the Empire by the only practical means open to it: the dispatch of raw material for the munition

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factories and of skilled labour. Being in substantial agreement with the Liberal Party on its taxation proposals, the Ministry might have carried on business for the remainder of the life of Parliament but for two factors, one of them entirely unforeseen, the personal animus of the Opposition to the Prime Minister and the invitation issued by Mr. Lloyd George to an Imperial Conference. As soon as the invitation was received, the Prime Minister appears to have decided that, if possible, a Ministry should be formed representing all parties and, failing that, a coalition with the Liberal Party. There was never any substantial hope of forming a Ministry of all parties for the reasons already given. The official Labour Party would have preferred to co-operate with the Liberals than with Mr. Hughes, whom they professed to suspect of some plot to deprive Australia of its power of self-government ; and many of its members, in spite of their professions, never sincerely admitted that their sectional aims could or ought to have been made subordinate to the protection of the honour of the country or the defence of the Empire. The negotiations with the Liberal Party were prolonged in a manner that excited criticism and reproach. But many of the critics who saw only the common national danger failed to appreciate the real difficulties of the parties. Both parties had to look to the next election not from selfish but from patriotic motives, and to see that the national dislike of a fusion did not leave them victims of the common enemy. Both parties realised that the anti-conscription majority would be invoked against them, that the majority had been made up almost equally of Liberal and Labour votes, and that there was some risk of consolidating one of these votes against them without conciliating the other. Apart from questions of policy there was a good deal of intrigue for place in the negotiations, but it is unjust to the Liberal leaders to assume that they were not actuated by a desire to increase the efficiency of certain departments, notably of the department of Defence,

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and it is trebly unjust to Mr. Cook not to acknowledge that he showed the same patriotism and unselfishness throughout the negotiations that he has shown throughout the war. The result of the negotiations was that a Ministry was formed, that the Defence Department remained in the hands of Senator Pearce, who in his long term of office had suffered both from the absence of the best members of his staff on active service and from his own decision not to allow free public criticism of his administration, and that three delegates were chosen to attend the Imperial Conference. In the House of Representatives the Ministry had a majority, but not so in the Senate, and the Senate proved determined and able to defeat Mr. Hughes' plans. Mr. Hughes declared that he could not be absent from Australia when elections were being held, and therefore proposed that, as Parliament in the ordinary course would come to the end of its term in October, a Bill should be passed requesting the Imperial Parliament to prolong it until after the conclusion of peace. The Bill passed the House of Representatives, but failed in the Senate in circumstances which have yet to be investigated.

The Coalition Government will have faced the electors before this article is printed.* As yet it has had no opportunity to show its quality. It contains a majority of Liberal members, and the Labour minority does not include those new ministers who promised to give strength to the Ministry of Mr. Hughes. It is agreed on the necessity of vigorously prosecuting the war, but it will not propose conscription unless circumstances make another referendum advisable. If the new Ministry is to be reasonably successful in the future, the Senate must suffer a great change in its composition or must recognise the verdict of the House of Representatives. The Senate has always been weaker than the House of Representatives in personality, and far more under the control of the external machine. Since the constituency of each Senator is a whole State, it is

* The results of the Election are given on p. 613 below.

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impossible for candidates to be tested against each other as they are in the electorates, and necessary that they should depend more on organisation; but what they lose in independence and character they gain in fixity of tenure and the whole House gains in the inability of the Government, except on rare occasions, to send more than half of it to the country at one time. In this election Mr. Hughes will suffer from the extent of the Labour victory in 1914; for, since Labour Senators were then in the majority of cases at the head of the poll in each State, the greater number of those who remain for a six years term will be his declared opponents. In the campaign the balance of ability will be enormously in his favour; for Mr. Tudor, the Caucus leader, can make no stand against him, and the second best platform orator in the Commonwealth, Mr. Watt, is now one of his ministers. Mr. Hughes can appeal for support to the declared policy of his party, for none of his demands can exceed Mr. Fisher's promise of the last man and the last shilling which was enthusiastically endorsed by the party before the elections. All that is needed now is a return of the Mr. Hughes who gained numberless victories for the Labour Party in the past, who will abandon personal abuse and intrigue, and who will remember that there is nothing so exasperating to the mass of his countrymen as an air of mystification in a leader who appeals to them for their confidence.

II. THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

THE new political institutions which the war is forcing upon us, and the unsettled thoughts of which they are the expression, are reflected in the uncertainty of our political vocabulary.

In introducing his Ministry to the House of Commons on December 19, Mr. Lloyd George declared his intention

The Imperial Conference

at an early date to summon an "Imperial Conference to place the whole position before the Dominions and take counsel with them." An interview reported in a section of the Australian press on January 25, however, speaks repeatedly of the "Empire War Council," which is apparently to be distinguished from the "Imperial Conference," for Mr. Lloyd George says that one of the first acts of the new Government was to ask the over-seas Prime Ministers to come over, not to a formal Imperial Conference, but to sit in the "Executive Cabinet of the Empire." In the speech which appeared in the Australian press on February 5 he refers to the "approaching Imperial Conference," which is to be the "first Imperial Cabinet ever held."

We can imagine the future historian groping among the memorials of to-day in a vain attempt to find the several bodies here spoken of, much as our historians of to-day or yesterday have spent themselves in the pursuit of the elusive *concilia* which spring up so abundantly in our mediæval chronicles. The uncertainty of terminology is characteristic of an institution in the making. It is in this case probably significant of some lack of precision in the speaker's mind as to the nature of the meeting or the body. In 1906 and 1907 there was a good deal of discussion as to the connotations of *Conference* and *Council*, and the "Imperial Conference" owes its name to Canadian susceptibilities. The Canadian Government considered that the term *Council* indicated a "more formal assemblage possessing an advisory and deliberate character, and in conjunction with the word 'Imperial' suggesting a permanent institution which, endowed with a continuous life, might eventually come to be regarded as an encroachment upon the full measure of autonomous legislative and administrative power now enjoyed by all the self-governing colonies." We may conjecture that Mr. Asquith, with a less rich imagination and with less daring in execution, would have given us a simpler vocabulary and a clearer definition of the constitutional status of the assembly.

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But, then, we might have had no call to take counsel together at all, at any rate at this stage.

From the various statements made by British Ministers and by Mr. Hughes it is clear that the "Council"—we must give it some name—will deliberate on all matters directly relating to the war or arising out of it: the conduct of the war, the peace negotiations, and after-war policy. As to the first, conference is necessitated by the fact that the war is actually being carried on by the co-operation of several Governments, British, Dominion and foreign. With the best of good will, there must be a certain want of complete knowledge and accord in direction and execution. The frequent conferences which have taken place in London, Paris or Rome between the representatives of the allied Governments have usually been followed by further assurances of difficulties or misunderstandings removed and more perfect co-operation attained. The same necessity has required conference between the British and the Dominion Governments.

As to the peace negotiations, while the British Government and the allied Governments are no doubt in full agreement as to the main points to be insisted on, there must be numerous matters affecting particular interests which will require adjustment as between the Allies themselves, and it is of the first importance that this adjustment should be effected before a peace congress assembles, lest the congress itself—as many a peace congress in the past has threatened—should create new fissures, and enable the enemy to divide the Allies. An adjustment can only be made by taking into consideration the whole situation and viewing the particular interest in the light of common dangers. So far as concerns the several parts of the British Empire, the need is substantially the same. The British Government needs to know the views of the Dominions, but there is also the need for the Dominions to be fully informed of the facts of the whole situation, as they were informed in outline by Sir Edward Grey in 1911. Counsel

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must be based on knowledge ; and, when the time comes for decision, there must be a certain amount of give and take. We have been reminded of this aspect of affairs by Mr. Lloyd George. He agrees with other British ministers who have declared that the Dominions must be consulted on the peace terms ; but he strikes a new note when he treats this consultation less as a reward of their sacrifices than as a responsibility they must assume. "It is unthinkable that these questions can be settled without the Dominions taking the responsibility of considering the issues, not as separate, but as part of the settlement of the great war problems which must inevitably follow the end of the great war."

Concerning after-war policy, the matter of trade relations stands out as the most obvious of these, and the report of Lord Balfour of Burleigh's committee may bring up the subject of preference. Mr. Hughes, at any rate, instances preference as one of the subjects for discussion. But trade is not the only matter—the question of the Pacific in its various phases will demand consideration ; and Mr. Hughes even enumerates "the Constitution of the Empire" amongst *agenda*.

A few important considerations stand out. There have been difficulties in assembling the Conference, but it may be surmised that there will be still greater difficulties in dissolving it. Decisions arrived at on certain assumptions and in the light of certain facts can be tentative merely and must be subject to revision. New matters will be constantly thrusting themselves on the Conference, as urgently demanding common counsel as those which have been disposed of. The war itself, the sensitive peace negotiations, the protracted labours of a peace congress—all these will produce their questions and situations. These will all have to be taken into consideration by someone, and it is hardly conceivable that they should be determined without consultations of the same kind as that which framed the original policy. In regard to after-war measures in particu-

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lar, it will be apparent that these will demand constant supervision and reconsideration—that they cannot be disposed of once and for all. Thus the Conference will, apart from any determination to enter upon the subject of the Constitution of the Empire, be driven to consider the means for securing continuity in its work, and thus be brought to the threshold of the constitutional problem.

In constitution, the Conference appears to have already outgrown the plan of the Secretary of State's invitation. That invitation was addressed to the several Prime Ministers who were to be members of the War Cabinet. Canada, however, is sending three delegates, the Commonwealth Ministry nominated three, and New Zealand has for some time had two in London. It is plain that not all these representatives can be members of the War Cabinet, a body whose first principle is its severe restriction in size. Presumably, therefore, our constitutionalists will have to note an "Imperial Council" or "Imperial Conference" outside the "Executive Cabinet of the Empire."

We are in some doubt as to the status of the Dominion Ministers in the Cabinet. Are they to be summoned always, except when matters relating purely to the domestic affairs of the United Kingdom are under discussion, or are they to be summoned only when it is conceived that the matter for discussion affects the Dominions in some direct way? Are they to be present *ad tractandum* merely, or does their function extend *ad ordinandum*: have they a vote in Cabinet or merely a voice? If they take part in the decision, to whom is such a Cabinet responsible?

The circumstances attending the Australian representation at the Conference point clearly to one weakness in the present system. The invitation to Conference found Australia in a turmoil of political disturbance, with a Government in office in anomalous conditions and in a precarious situation, and with party feeling excited to an extreme degree. What was asked for was the representation of the Australian Government, and the first thing

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therefore was to secure a Government of sufficient stability to make its representation possible. This matter and its developments are the subject of the preceding section of this article. Here it is enough to say that the achievement of this object did nothing to lessen the bitterness of hostility between Government and Opposition. The consequence is that not merely is Australia's proposed representation at the Conference a party representation—which is the normal condition at a conference of Governments—but it is a representation which the Opposition will exert itself to the utmost to discredit with the country, and whose every act will be prejudged by the hostility and distrust excited by its personnel. In other words, Australian party and personal quarrels, new and old—for they are founded in matters earlier than the Conscription Referendum—obtrude themselves into Imperial issues, and these issues themselves are confused—it may be fatally—by the fact that a number of his former associates have a long account to settle with Mr. Hughes, and that fourteen years ago Sir William Irvine broke up a railway strike in Victoria. By the delegates chosen the Australian Government would be ably represented at the Conference. But in the present condition of political feeling no man can represent Australia, and the Opposition would certainly have refused to join the Government in the delegation as they refused to join the Ministry itself, or would have accompanied their nomination with conditions which would have made its acceptance impossible. The result gravely detracts from the value of the Conference so far as Australia's part in it is concerned, and it reveals a danger which may recur so long as the conference is a conference of Governments or of Government nominees.*

Anyone acquainted with the temper of the Australian people knew that sooner or later the war would evoke strong

* After the above lines were written, the whole question of Australia's representation was held up pending the General Election. The Election did not take place till May, and no Australian representatives attended the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet and Conference.

Australia

views on the position of Australia in the Empire, and the relation of the great drama in which she had taken part, to her ideals and the realities of self-government. The process of forming opinion has been quickened by the events of the last few months. Mr. Hughes's speeches in England, the Conscription Referendum, and the project of the Imperial Conference have all stimulated discussion. For the 1917 Conference of the Australian Natives Association in Victoria three branches have set down motions dealing expressly with the matter, and two deal with the interests of the Dominion in the Pacific. Of the first three, one advocates an Imperial Convention for the constitution of an Imperial Parliament to deal with foreign affairs and defence, another advocates an Imperial Council, and a third protests against Australia being bound by any determinations of the Imperial Conference without the people first being consulted. The Convention of the powerful Australian Workers' Union has carried a resolution, "That in view of the possibility of Australia being dragged into a scheme of Imperial Federation which would abrogate our rights and privileges under responsible government, and seriously undermine that palladium of our liberties—the Commonwealth Constitution—this Convention of the Australian Workers' Union places on record its stoutest opposition to this Dominion of the Empire being governed by the plutocrats of England, which the proposed scheme would involve." There has been a lively discussion in the *Sydney Worker*, and other Labour organs have with varying degrees of vehemence expressed views similar to those of the Australian Workers' Union.

There is a touch of humour in the Australian Workers' Union, of all people, describing the Commonwealth Constitution as a "palladium of our liberties," which prevents our taking the resolution too seriously as an expression of opinion. In fact, the attitude of Labour orators and the Labour Press is a good deal due to the absolute distrust with which the "Official" Labour Party (which is in a

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peculiar degree a party of Labour officials) now regards Mr. Hughes and the fierce hatred with which it pursues him. It is enough that it is Mr. Hughes who is going to the Imperial Conference to discredit the Conference and all its works. But there is something deeper than this in the stir which is now visible. The conscription campaign brought home for the first time to large numbers of people of impeccable "loyalty," the fact that Imperial citizenship imposed an unlimited obligation of service, and found them unready to honour it. So we have revived the notions which we thought had gone with the old "Colonial" days, that Australia's Imperial service consists in the development of her territory, or that British defence of Australia rests upon the protection of British investments there. Australia has really passed too far into the national stage for such arguments to have an air of reality, but they represent a sullen resentment which is anxious not to countenance anything which might admit an obligation or make it effective. As the nation in one department of its life after another feels the effects of the great war, it realises that it is less mistress of its own fortunes than it had supposed. In the pre-war time actual responsibility for foreign policy and defence was so completely centred in England that Australia was rarely reminded of its existence. Now, with constitutional government by Parliament in the main superseded by executive government under the War Precautions Act, as one restriction after another is imposed "at the request of the Imperial Government," or "in consequence of information received" from the War Office or the Admiralty, Australians in general are beginning to feel that their self-government is somehow less than it was. This feeling inevitably leads to a consideration of future political relations. The simpler reaction is found in murmurs of "too much Imperial Parliament," a recrudescence of the old sensitiveness as to "Downing Street," and suspicions of further attacks on our autonomy by schemes threatening "Imperial Federation" or "organic

Australia

union." Mr. Hughes, on the other hand, has no doubt that the self-government in internal affairs which Australia has enjoyed in the past is, in the light of our present knowledge, no self-government at all; the war has disclosed a state of things which is the negation of Australian self-government in her most vital concerns, a state of things which, in his opinion, cannot continue; and the only way in which responsible government can be organised is through some constitutional reconstruction.

The extreme Nationalist opinion still clings to the "loose system of co-operation on which the existing structure of our Empire is founded," and continues to talk vaguely of the "family alliance of free and independent nations." Here, so far as concerns participation in the general policy of the Empire, the standpoint is similar to that of Canada some years ago, or of some mediæval parliaments towards the projects of the Crown several centuries ago, participation in policy is to be avoided because it implies a responsibility to take measures for carrying out that policy or to acknowledge an authority which defines the obligations which that policy involves. Deep, even passionate, resentment is excited or expressed at the suggestion that Australia demands or will demand any share in Imperial government, and it is even insisted that the Federal Government should intervene to set Britain right in regard to the "misrepresentations" which suggest the possibility of such a demand. Accustomed to deal with all matters merely from the standpoint of Australian interest or Australian opinion—each often as narrowly conceived as it is ably maintained—the exponents of this view believe that Australia can make herself felt more effectively under the present system than under any form of closer union. In plain words, Australia is encouraged to believe that she can hold a unique political position, wherein, having passed out of the stage at which she can submit to the control of her policy by a paramount Government, she can exercise power and pursue policy without the restraint

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which responsibility imposes on independent nations, or which springs from the pooling of interests and experience in a common system of government. No situation could be imagined more surely fatal to the moral nature of the nation that filled it, and ultimately to its political existence. There is reason to hope that such a position will not satisfy Australia's political instincts when once she understands what it means in actual fact.

Australia. March, 1917.

POSTSCRIPT

According to the returns at present available, which do not include the whole of the votes recorded by the Australian troops, the results of the General Election are as follows :—

House of Representatives

Coalition Government : before the Election, 49 seats ;
now, 54.

Labour Opposition : before the Election, 26 seats ;
now, 21.

Previous Majority for the Government, 23.

Present Majority for the Government, 33.

Senate

Coalition Government : before the Election, 17 seats ;
now, 24.

Labour Opposition : before the Election, 19 seats ;
now, 12.

Previous Majority against the Government, 2.

Present Majority for the Government, 12.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. POLITICAL PARTIES

THE present political situation in South Africa presents some curious features. The Government has not a majority in the House of Assembly. It has, however, while it pursues its present policy in regard to the war, the support of the Unionist Party, and between them they number 93 (excluding the Speaker) out of 130. Besides these there are the Nationalists counting 27, the Labour Party of three, and a few Independents.

The Nationalists are in direct and open opposition to the Government policy. Their general attitude in regard to the war was explained in the December number of *THE ROUND TABLE*. The war and questions which raise the racial issue are the only matters on which they are keenly interested. Some of them advocate from time to time the nationalisation of the gold mines, and proclaim in somewhat vague and general terms economic doctrines which, if taken seriously, would indicate an affinity between them and the Labour Party. The great mass of their supporters, however, are, where their own interests are affected, ultra-conservative in their views on all questions affecting property and the relations of employers and employed. Their opposition to the Government is not based on social or economic grounds. It begins and ends with the policy which General Botha has followed in regard to the relations of South Africa to the Empire, and, more particularly, in regard to the war, because it is the war which has put his policy to the test.

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The Labour members in the House of Assembly at present number only three, but this representation can hardly be said to be adequate to the position of the Party in the country. The Party, like the Unionists, pledged themselves at the general election to support General Botha in seeing the war through. In Parliament, however, they have interpreted that as leaving them free to oppose the Government, and to do what they can to defeat it, in matters where its line of action does not commend itself to their judgment. This was well illustrated in the debate which took place in the last session of Parliament on the pay of the South African troops serving oversea. The Unionist members, while strongly dissenting from the Government policy of refusing to make up the pay of the men serving oversea to the same rate as was being drawn by those serving in East Africa, would not press their views to the extent of risking the resignation of the Government. They interpreted their pledge to the electors as requiring them to look first at the larger issue, and, if the Government was, on the whole, adhering to its policy of supporting the Imperial Government, to refrain from attacking it in such a manner as to threaten its existence. The Labour Party, on the other hand, were ready to drive the Government out of office on this question.

The Government, therefore, in Parliament is faced with the uncompromising opposition of the Nationalists. From the Labour members it receives support in matters directly furthering the prosecution of the war, but otherwise, as a rule, opposition. The Unionists, on the contrary, have definitely and unconditionally promised their support during the war while the Government continues to support actively the cause of the Empire. There is no arrangement between them and the Government Party, still less any coalition. The Unionists have no share in or responsibility for the acts of the Government. They profess to adhere to their party programme, though much of it is necessarily in abeyance just now, and they exercise the

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right of criticising Government policy and administration, but stop short where their attack threatens the stability or prestige of the Ministry.

Whether such a loose and unstable arrangement will last for the period of the war is open to question. As an opposition the Unionist Party—comprising nearly one-third of the members of the House of Assembly—is obviously condemned to be largely, if not wholly, ineffective. They may, of course, expose defects of administration or secure by agreement changes of policy. But they must abstain from what, after all, makes criticism or opposition really effective—the direct challenge of a division. The exigencies of the situation may, and no doubt do, completely justify this system of suppressed opposition. But as time goes on the leaders find it more and more difficult to restrain their followers from going “all out” against something which seems more than usually provocative on the part of the Government, and nothing is more disheartening than damped-down enthusiasm and suppressed speeches. Similarly, members themselves find it more and more difficult to carry with them the support of their constituents in what, to outsiders, seems a policy of barren acquiescence.

To this must be added the fact that the Government dares not acknowledge any obligation to the Unionist Party. It is the stock grievance of almost every Nationalist speaker against General Botha that he is working in alliance with the Unionist Party, or rather that, in return for their keeping him in office, he has submitted his policy entirely to their direction and plunged the country at their dictation into a mad imperialism, which ignores the national aspirations and the true interests of South Africa. Absurd as this charge might seem to an outside observer, it is one to which General Botha and his Ministry seem to be extremely sensitive; and, in consequence, they adopt an attitude of studied aloofness and even of hostility towards the Unionist Party, which, to say the least of it,

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is not likely to make the situation any easier on either side. Recently one of the Unionist members sitting for a division of Johannesburg was understood to be contemplating resignation; and, though the seat was, and always had been, a Unionist one, the Government Party put a candidate in the field, and announced that he would receive their official support. The expected resignation did not take place; but, since then, a vacancy has occurred by the death of another of the Unionist members in Johannesburg, and it is understood that the Government Party will contest the seat, though it again has always been held by a Unionist. It will be an interesting contest from the point of view of a student of the humorous side of party politics, but it is undoubtedly another step towards the break-up of the present precarious combination.*

The avowed objects of General Botha and the Unionists in regard to the war are fundamentally the same, though they are often mis-stated on either side. First comes, of course, the supreme object of victory for the Empire and its Allies. But, along with the supreme object, and very often operating as a restraining influence on the Government in taking active measures for its attainment, is the secondary but most important object of preventing the war from becoming a cause of racial division in South Africa. As contrasted with the Nationalist ideal that the Dutch-speaking people of South Africa should be united in an attitude of neutrality towards the war, and in protecting the people from any participation in it, is that which in its essence is common both to the Government Party and to the Unionists, namely, that those who are loyal to the Imperial connection, whether of Dutch or English race, should stand together on that principle. Those of us who feel that South Africa has done little in contrast with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand must

* The candidates and the votes cast at the Troyville bye-election, Jan. 26, were as follows: Colonel H. F. Creswell (Labour), 883; Dr. Macdonald (Unionist), 368; Colonel Furze (South African Party), 175; Mr. Colin Wade (International Socialist), 32.

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not lose sight of the fact that after all the long history of strife between the two races in South Africa, with the last war still fresh in men's memories, the Government, led by men of Dutch race, and supported by a majority of men of both races, has been able, even at the cost of a rebellion, to carry through a policy of loyal support of the cause of the Empire.

The outside observer of political affairs is apt to ask why, if the Government Party and the Unionists have these two main objects in common, they should continue to exist as separate parties and even to oppose each other to the detriment of the common cause. Why, he asks, does not General Botha form a Coalition Ministry? Or, again, why does not the Unionist Party simply wind itself up and become absorbed in the South African Party, so as to give General Botha the unqualified support which he needs in order to maintain his position in the House of Assembly? The answer to the first question probably is that General Botha apprehends that an alliance with the Unionist Party under present conditions would cause the secession to the Nationalist ranks of a certain number of his followers, and that his position would be still further weakened by the personal friction which a reconstruction of his Cabinet on coalition lines would certainly cause. Rather than face these risks he prefers to go on with the present haphazard arrangement so long as it will serve him. He probably calculates that the Unionists are not likely to turn him out, because they could not form a Government themselves—nor indeed could anyone else with the House of Assembly constituted as at present. The inevitable result of his resignation, therefore, would be a general election, which no one outside the Nationalist Party is desirous of seeing while the war continues.

The other question is one which was frequently put to the Unionist candidates during the last general election and was answered by them much as follows: They were prepared, they said, to pledge themselves unconditionally

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to support General Botha through the war in carrying out the policy to which he had so unmistakably pledged himself. But, looking to the needs of the country after the war, they did not consider that they would be justified in abandoning the programme for which they have always stood and accepting that of the South African Party. There are two important reforms which they as a party have always pressed, and on which the attitude of the Government Party has been one of indifference or hostility. One is the opening up of the land for closer settlement, and the other encouragement of European immigration. Both these questions, they argued, would be of even more vital importance to the country after the war ; but, if they were to allow themselves to be absorbed by the South African Party, there was no guarantee that anything would be done, and there would be no party whose business it was to keep them prominently before the public attention.

Such are probably the answers which an inquirer on this point would receive. Whether he would think them adequate is another matter. Perhaps he would regard them as indicating that, in this as in other matters, public opinion in South Africa does not yet grasp the full significance of the war and all that is at stake, but thinks of it still as something external to its world. He might also think that the differences between the parties are less important than these answers would imply if he judged solely by the views held by the moderate supporters of either side. In practice, however, the actions of the two parties (as is the case with most other political parties) are governed largely by the views of their extremists and, unless some at present unforeseen emergency occurs, it is probable that for the period of the war at any rate relations will remain as they are.

A curious but interesting light was thrown on the division between the followers of General Botha and the Nationalists by the recent celebration of Dingaan's Day. In the days of the Republic December 16 was observed

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in the Transvaal as a day of solemn thanksgiving for the victory of the Voortrekkers over Dingaan, the Chief of the Zulus, and also, in course of time, as a day of thanksgiving for the achievement of independence. The chief feature of the day was a gathering at the national monument at Paardekraal, at which the significance of the day was marked by religious services and by addresses from leaders of the people. Since Union it has been kept as a public holiday all over South Africa, and the public celebrations have commemorated the victory of the Voortrekkers as the bearers of civilisation against the hordes of barbarism.

This year General Botha undertook the organisation of the ceremony at Paardekraal on a great scale. He appealed to Afrikaners all over the Union to come together for a national celebration as a step towards restoring unity in their ranks. The Nationalists, however, professed to see in this a political move on General Botha's part, and ostentatiously held aloof from participation in it. They denounced the Paardekraal ceremony as having been perverted from its true significance for political purposes, and, as a counter-stroke, promoted gatherings at other centres, the most notable of which was one held at the grave of General Beyers on the banks of the Vaal River. This gathering is said to have been attended by 5,000 people. The speeches were, unfortunately, not reported.

Shortly before December 16 the last of the prisoners undergoing sentence for participation in the late rebellion were released as an act of clemency on the part of the Government.

II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

THE war has brought to South Africa at once a great call to action and a paralysing division of sympathy. Putting aside the call (which no doubt appeals very differently to different sections of the people) to stand side by

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side with the other peoples of the Empire in a world-wide battle for freedom, we have in the war a direct incentive to and a great opportunity for a more active policy of economic development. It has brought home to South Africans, as nothing else would have done, the extent to which our production of the prime necessities of life is still short of the demand and the dangers of dependence on external supply. One would think it was but a step from the realisation of this to the conviction that a solemn duty lies on the Government and all of us to bring under cultivation our wide stretches of untilled land. But here comes into play, as far as the Government is concerned, the paralysing effect of politics. It has become almost an article of religion with a certain section of the Dutch land-owners to cling to the land at all costs. It is preached to them also by their political leaders—notably by men like General Hertzog and the late President Steyn—as a duty to their people on no account to sell land. In many cases the land-owner has not the capital or the ability to cultivate even inefficiently a twentieth part of the land which he occupies. But it is better, so he is told and believes, that he should let the rest of it lie waste, in the hope of providing in years to come a “place” for his descendants to the third and fourth generation, than that he should sell a part of it and allow the outlander to get a footing on the soil. Fortunately, the natural pressure of economic forces is pushing aside this dog-in-the-manger doctrine. Slowly but surely farms are being broken up into manageable size, men with capital and enterprise are making their way on to the land, and agricultural production increases. But any move on the part of the Government for undertaking as a national duty the cultivation of the unused lands would at once arouse intense suspicion, out of which would be created a political agitation which, constituted as it is, it will hesitate to face.

The question of the future of the European population is another on which the war has helped to open the eyes

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of thinking men. Thousands of the flower of our youth have gone oversea on active service, and many of them will not come back even if they survive the chances of war. Without this drain the European population was already dangerously small in numbers, if South Africa is to be classed in the future as a European State. The war has accentuated the danger, but it has also provided an opportunity in the numbers of men who after peace will be unwilling to return to their old surroundings and will be looking for a new life oversea. Here there is ample room, and, with suitable government organisation, it is certain that a large number of desirable immigrants could be settled in South Africa. But here, again, the paralysing influence of political and racial divisions comes in. In the eyes of the Afrikaner of the narrow type, to whom everyone outside the fold of "our people" is an intruder, or, in the words of one of his leaders, a "foreign adventurer," immigration has always been peculiarly abhorrent. His leaders make the most of these sentiments and impress upon him (what he is only too willing to believe) that those who advocate state-aided immigration do so with the ultimate object of swamping the political influence of the true Afrikaner people by hordes of aliens (British and others from oversea). So powerful is this appeal that the Government has practically promised that it will not sanction the use of public funds for promoting immigration. The need is urgent and the opportunity is here, but it will not be used. The ideas of the old-fashioned Afrikaner on these questions are not easily turned out of their traditional channels. And, according to these traditions, the land of South Africa belongs to him and his people by a sort of divine right. The native and coloured population will be kept in their place, if necessary by force; and will be prevented from ever holding land by any legal title and from rising above the status of unskilled labourer in the fields and in the industrial centres. Above all, they will be prevented from exercising any political

The late President Steyn

rights. The position of the European being thus, as he thinks, secured, why, he asks, should anyone trouble if he owns 10,000 acres and only uses a couple of hundred? The rest can wait as they are until his children's children are ready to take their shares. And so he is lulled into security, and does not see that the rising tide is already pouring over his unsubstantial barriers.

In the meantime the Government has pledged itself against State aid to immigration.

III. THE LATE PRESIDENT STEYN

BY the sudden death of Martinus Theunis Steyn, ex-President of the Orange Free State, a notable figure has passed out of South African public life. He was President of the Free State before and at the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, and, as is generally understood, was a champion of the policy which favoured an appeal to armed force. Whatever may be thought of his judgement on that issue, everyone must respect the courage with which he stood by the cause for which he fought and refused to admit the possibility of defeat. He came through the war so broken in health that his life was for some time despaired of, and he has since then lived in seclusion, unable to take an active part in public affairs, but respected, consulted, and almost revered by a large section of the Dutch-speaking people, and more especially by those who have only accepted under protest the present settlement as between the two races. The sacrifices which he made personally and as a public man endeared him to his people but put a limit to his political outlook. The overwhelming sense of what they had lost when they surrendered their independence seemed to blind him to the vision of a greater South African nationality, built on the ruins of past conflicts and including in its ample scope room for both the races whose wars and rivalries had made South Africa a centre

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of unrest for a century past. That vision which has been given to some of his people was denied to him, and he lies buried, appropriately enough, at the foot of the monument erected to commemorate the women and children who died in the Concentration Camps—a monument of grief and protest with no redeeming sense of the dawning of a better day.

South Africa, January, 1917.

NEW ZEALAND

I. THE MILITARY SERVICE ACT

ON August 1, 1916, the Parliament of New Zealand enacted "The Military Service Act, 1916," establishing the Expeditionary Force Reserve. That Reserve consists of every male natural-born British subject resident in New Zealand, between the ages of 20 and 46 years inclusive, except members of the Expeditionary Force or men discharged from it, criminals, lunatics, and natives. The Act may be extended to include natives by proclamation.

¶The Reserve is divided into two divisions. The first includes unmarried men, men married since May 1, 1915, except those who have a child under 16 by a previous marriage, widowers with no children under 16, men divorced or judicially separated from their wives and who have no children under 16. The second includes all other Reservists. The Act provides for the preparation of a Register of the Reserve by the Government Statistician, for the proclamation of the enrolment of the Reserve, and for the calling up and selection by ballot of as many men as the Minister of Defence thinks necessary. The names of the men called up are gazetted, and from that time they are deemed to be members of the Expeditionary Force as if they had voluntarily enlisted and taken the oath of allegiance.

Section 35 authorises the Minister of Defence to give notice to a family consisting of two or more brothers who belong to the First Division of the Reserve to show cause

New Zealand

why they should not be called up for service quite irrespective of the ballot.

Every man called up was given the right to appeal to a Military Service Board on one of the following grounds (in addition to cases of error as regards membership of the Reserve or of the division or class called up).

(a) That by reason of his occupation his calling up was contrary to the public interest.

(b) That by reason of his domestic circumstances or for any other reason his calling up for military service would be a cause of undue hardship to himself or others, it being sufficient evidence of such hardship that the appellant was the sole surviving son of his parents who was of military age and that at least one of his brothers had been killed in the war.

(c) That he was at the beginning of the war and had remained a member of a religious body according to whose doctrines (as well as according to his own conscientious religious belief) the bearing of arms and the performance of any combatant service were contrary to divine revelation, provided that his appeal should not be allowed on this ground unless he was willing to perform such non-combatant work or services as might be required of him at such rate of payment as might be prescribed.

Voluntary enlistment was to continue side by side with conscription until it was proclaimed that such enlistment should cease.

II. THE ACT IN WORKING

THE enrolment of the First Division of Reserves was gazetted on September 1 and on the following day that of the Second Division followed. It took some time to prepare the register and to ascertain what would be a fair quota from each recruiting district, and the first ballot was not taken till November 16, 1916. At the same time

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the provisions of section 35 with reference to the non-enlisting brothers were put into operation. Up to date (February 28, 1917) four ballots have been taken. It was found that an interval of one month between the ballot and the calling up was insufficient in which to dispose of the appeals and medical examinations and to allow the time required for the men to arrange their affairs. Henceforth, therefore, a period of two months will elapse between the time that a man "draws the lucky marble"—to use the patriotic catchword of the moment—and the day that he goes into camp.

The numbers drawn to date, as well as the repeated warnings from the Military Service Boards and the counsel engaged, have brought forcibly before the men in the First Division the necessity for their getting their affairs into order and making arrangements for the carrying on or disposal of their business and stock, so that they may be ready to go into camp two months after they are drawn. Married men are also beginning to realise that the time is not far distant when they will be required and are making their plans accordingly. The present estimate is that the first ballot for the Second Division will be in September and the first batch of married conscripts will go into camp in November.

Almost the first case under section 35 was that of three brothers, single men, the sons of a wealthy elderly farmer. The Board dismissed the appeals of two of the brothers and left the third to carry on the work of the station. This was a useful object lesson, as a clear indication that under conscription there would be no class distinction, and that no man, whatever his wealth and social distinction, would escape the duty of serving his country. But even in this first case the facts disclosed in evidence left a doubt in the minds of those who had no sympathy with the family whether the work of the farm could be efficiently carried on by the one son left, a doubt which was accentuated by a question of the soldier-lawyer in cross-examination as to

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whether it would do the farm any harm if part of it were allowed to go out of cultivation for a while. In general, the principle adopted by the Boards in cases under section 35, where no question of dependents arose, was to leave one of the family only to "carry on."

We cannot but be proud of the spirit shown by the men who have been drawn in the ballot. This fortunate country is so far from the war that its people cannot possibly visualise it in the same way as those who are within sound of the guns in Flanders. New Zealanders have been for years taught to look to the State for everything they require. They have enjoyed an abundant prosperity and a freedom from anything like discipline or enforced economy. A great many of them have been brought up as spoiled children accustomed to have all they want and their own way in everything. It might have been expected that compulsory military service would have been violently opposed and that complaints of hardship would have been frequent and bitter. Except among certain extremist partisans the reverse has been the case. Conscription has been accepted by the great mass of the people as the only fair and democratic method of conducting a great war. The experience of the Boards has been that even the men who appeal, because they think their circumstances warrant it, accept the adverse decision of the Board cheerfully, once it has been given, and go into camp as readily as if they had volunteered. The Board has had numerous instances of men who, realising that they would have to dispose at a loss of their farms or the businesses that they had spent years in making "payable propositions," have only asked for a month or a couple of months in which to wind up their affairs. The term "shirker" is scarcely ever heard or even read.

Nor were the apprehensions as to the possible antagonism between "the wents" and "the sents" justified. There was, it is true, one slight affray in camp caused by a tactless volunteer referring to a recent recruit as a conscript, which

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began by the conscript promptly knocking the volunteer down, and the friends on both sides joining in until the combat became general, but the disturbance was no more than is apt to take place between rival reinforcements where fiery spirits come into contact, and it had the usual result that a fair fight generally has among British stock, of clearing the air and creating better blood between the antagonists. No distinction now exists between the volunteer and the conscript, and perfect harmony prevails between the two classes. There probably never was a more democratic army nor one in which there was less class distinction. The utmost concession granted to the man, whatever his social position, who holds no commission but who is intelligent and used to handle men, is that he begins in the non-commissioned officers' class, where he receives special training from the beginning. Except for this advantage he has to win his spurs from the outset. A university professor, who enlisted as a private in the Main Expeditionary Force, distinguished himself at Gallipoli and is now a colonel in France, is an example of what may be accomplished by an able and courageous man. Commissions are not confined to members of the N.C.O. class, but those men from the ranks who show capacity receive promotion and are given the opportunity of sitting at the examinations for commissions. The most undemocratic feature of the little New Zealand army is the fact that the second lieutenant and his wife and family are, speaking generally, worse off than a sergeant and his dependents, owing to no separation allowances being granted to the families of commissioned officers.

III. THE ATTITUDE OF LABOUR

THE first question that would naturally be asked elsewhere would be, How did Labour take Conscription? There were, of course, rumblings and rumours, suggestions

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that the first wharf labourer called up by the ballot would test—by an application for a writ of *habeas corpus*—the validity of the law that enabled the Government to compel a man to leave New Zealand and fight elsewhere; that the Government would never set the law in motion against defaulters; that, if it dared do so, a general strike would result. These rumours may have had something to do with the policy of the Government in putting representatives of Labour on the Appeal Boards and thus giving Labour an equal share in the administration of the law and an equal voice in the prevention of undue hardship to any individuals. The “No” vote in Australia encouraged the Socialist Anti-conscriptionists to enter upon a campaign, in which it was claimed that Parliament had no mandate to initiate compulsory military service; that, had a referendum been taken in New Zealand, conscription would have been negatived as in Australia, and that the Military Service Act should be repealed or a referendum taken. On December 14, 1916, war regulations were gazetted which made punishable with twelve months’ imprisonment or a fine of £100 seditious utterances or publications which interfered with recruiting, discouraged the prosecution of the war to a victorious conclusion, encouraged opposition to the enforcement of the laws relating to compulsory military service, or excited disloyalty. Under these regulations half a dozen or so prosecutions took place of prominent socialists and pacifists and of some of the “stormy petrels” on the extremist wing of the Labour Party. In several of the cases the presiding magistrates expressed the opinion that the defendants were able men, that in ordinary times no very great objection could be taken to the remarks made, but that, under the regulations, the remarks, which were aimed at securing the repeal of the Military Service Act, had a seditious tendency. In each case of a conviction the maximum sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment was awarded. Appeals have been

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lodged against the convictions, and the appeals are to be heard at a sitting of the full court next month, when it is understood the constitutional question is to be fought out.

Just before Christmas an Anti-Conscription Conference was held in Wellington at which numerous Labour bodies were represented. Resolutions were passed recommending a national campaign to secure the repeal of the Military Service Act. It was decided that representatives of the National Labour Party should take legal opinion as to whether the Act is in agreement with the Act of Constitution and—if that opinion justifies the course—take a test case to the Supreme Court. It was also resolved that a movement should be organised for the release of the men now in gaol. A deputation from this Conference waited on the Minister of Labour. The Government, it urged, was irritating the workers almost beyond endurance: New Zealand had already sent to the front sufficient men in proportion to her population: and there was great danger of the essential industries suffering. After repeating the arguments against Conscription mentioned above, the deputation finally complained that the Government had taken away the liberty of speech and demanded the summoning of Parliament to consider the repeal of the Military Service Act. The Minister, while holding out no hope that the requests of the deputation would be granted, gave a soft answer that turned away wrath—for the moment. At the end of January trouble began on the wharf in Wellington owing to the refusal of the men to “dump” cargo (*i.e.*, to discharge it in nets instead of slings) or to work after 5 p.m. when required; and to their restricting the number of boxes of butter in any one hoist to 30 instead of 48 as usual. In addition to these specific instances, which the employers alleged to be a breach of the existing agreement, there was evidence of the introduction of a general “go slow policy,” the result of which was to delay the shipment of produce to England. When the

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men declined to carry out the work in the manner prescribed by the employers, the latter intimated that there would be no work at all. The employers promptly proceeded to cite the waterside workers to appear before the Conciliation Commissioner ; and, as the latter would not appoint representatives, these were appointed by the Commissioner. A date at the end of February was fixed for the hearing of the dispute, but on that date the hearing was adjourned, pending the holding of a Dominion Conference.

Meantime the Government could not allow the continuance of a deadlock which held up food supplies for Great Britain. On February 10, under "The War Regulations Amendment Act, 1916," new War Regulations were published for the maintenance of industries essential for the public welfare. These regulations declared the lading and unloading of ships to be such an "essential industry" and gave the Government power to declare any wharf a Government wharf and to appoint a Controller with authority to employ such wharf labourers as he thought fit, to enter into such contracts as he deemed reasonable, and to clear or close the wharves. Incitement to refuse effective service as a wharf labourer and other utterances or actions calculated to interfere with or delay loading or unloading of ships were declared "offences." Work is now proceeding as usual, pending the holding of the Conference.

Early this month (February) evidence before one of the Appeal Boards disclosed the fact that concerted action was being taken throughout the Dominion by the coal miners for the adoption of a "go slow" policy, with the object of forcing the mine owners to give the men a conference. The owners, some seven months ago, met the miners and granted a war bonus of 10 per cent. and thought the matter settled. The evidence showed that the men had received instructions not to earn more than 12s. a day, and that the output in the mine that was under consideration by the Board had fallen by a third since the instructions were given.

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To this move the Government again responded by War Regulations, forbidding any seditious strike or lock-out, namely, one which has a tendency to interfere with the effective conduct of the war, the production or carriage of goods required by His Majesty in connection with the war, the lading or unloading of any vessel with any such goods, or the production or carriage of goods in connection with an industry essential for the public welfare. Pursuant to these regulations the coal mining industry has also been proclaimed an "essential industry," and under them forty-nine informations have been laid against wharf labourers for refusing to coal two steamers owing to their objection to the use of tackle known as the Burton block.

A Dominion Conference of coal miners and mine owners' representatives took place this month and has just broken up without any agreement being arrived at.

IV. PROBLEMS OF EXEMPTION

History is repeating itself in New Zealand in the records of the Military Service Boards. The Government here has failed to take advantage of the lessons to be learned from the experience in England, and has shifted onto the shoulders of the Military Service Boards the burden which it should itself have borne. It was obvious a year ago that the Government should then have compiled a record of those essential industries which must be kept going and of the resources in labour available for the purpose, should have declared certain industries essential and placed their workers in the Second Division, exempting them until a "combing out" process became necessary, and should have set up certain standards and laid down certain general rules for the guidance of the Boards. The problem of reconciling the demands of the army with the claims of essential industries is a delicate one that should have been grappled with long ere this. With ten different Boards at

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work different standards are adopted and conflicting decisions given, and a distinct difference in policy may be noticed between a permanent Board and the supplementary Board that is assisting it in the same district. Some of the Boards scarcely realise that the production of food and the maintenance of the mercantile marine of the British Empire are as essential at the present time as the maintenance of the output of men, and are apt to regard their whole function as being to get men for the reinforcements and to overlook their duty of keeping back those men whose special abilities should be utilised elsewhere than in the firing line.

The conduct of some of the Medical Boards has been the subject of adverse criticism. There has been a good deal of complaint that the examination is inadequate, that there is a tendency to consider the conscript who exhibits no manifest external defect a malingerer, and that the passing as fit of men with substantial defects has now gone to almost the same extreme as the rejection under the voluntary system of men whose defects were of the slightest possible nature. It is too early yet to say how this will affect subsequent reinforcements, and it is only fair to point out that up to the present the high physical standard of departing drafts has been well maintained.

The Government policy varies from time to time. There is a scarcity of doctors, and some time ago one minister not only found himself obliged to decline the request of the British Government to send a special contingent of medical men to England, but recalled all medical students from Gallipoli to complete their studies in New Zealand. Another minister now announces that only fourth and fifth year students will be exempted and all others drawn in the ballot must go to the front. With reversals of policy such as this on the part of the Government, no one can blame the Boards if their policies conflict with those of other Boards and if one lot of decisions seems inconsistent with another.

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Meantime the Cabinet has been keeping the question of essential industries "steadily in view," and has submitted the data that it has collected and certain proposals of the Minister of Defence for the organisation of the manpower of the Dominion to an Industrial Efficiency Board, which is to consider and report to the Cabinet on the position of the essential, partially essential, and non-essential industries, the amount of labour available to carry them on, how that labour can best be used, and how to deal with the business of men who have to go to the front ; the development of industries after the war ; the utilisation of waste products ; and the increase of production. The Board has presented three reports to the Government which deal chiefly with the agricultural industry but have not yet been published. The members of the Board are all able business men, but it was singular that upon such a Board, as at first constituted, there was no direct representative of the most essential of all our industries, agriculture. Subsequently, however, to the Board's presentation of its reports on the agricultural industries to the Government, and to the demands of conferences of farmers for the appointment of a representative farmer on the Board, the Government has appointed a fifth member of the Board—the President of the Wellington branch of the New Zealand Farmers' Union, who is himself a dairy farmer.

It is particularly in regard to agriculture that the Government should have laid down a definite policy before the Military Service Boards began operations, and should have formulated certain principles upon which the Boards should proceed when considering applications for exemption. There is, and has for some time past been, a shortage of competent agricultural labour, and, although no statistics on the subject have been published, many farmers and station owners, large and small, are finding it hard to carry on. Here is a typical letter from one East Coast settler, whose "last ewe lamb," in the form of his last skilled hand, has been enlisted compulsorily :—

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“ I know an appeal will not be sustained,” he writes, “ but on these back-country stations it is absolutely necessary to have men who are physically sound and fit. After forty years a man does not seem to stand the eternal horse-work. Every sound, fit man we had is enlisted ; and from June until now we have had no shepherd on the place. There is a lad who is just of age, and who drives the bullock team, runs the engine, etc. He and I have had to do the whole sheep work of the station, and now he is to go.”

There has been a tendency recently on the part of the Boards to give to those single farmers who are working their own farms no exemption but only sufficient time to enable them to sell their property or to make arrangements with some neighbour to work it, although, as has been pointed out by the president of one of the Farmers' Unions, such men are often the skilled farmers and would do more work than two or three uninterested men who might be called in to work such farms. Dairy farmers, who form a large proportion of our North Island population, are finding it hard to procure milkers, and one hears of cases where the cows have been allowed to become dry. The policy of this country has been to settle as many farmers on the land as possible ; but there have been complaints that the aggregation of farms is beginning, by the rich farmer over military age buying out his small neighbours who have been balloted, while in Christchurch a syndicate is said to have been formed to buy the farms of soldiers who, being called up, are compelled to sell out. In the Wairarapa, at Te Awamutu, and in Canterbury, the farmers have taken action for themselves and formed Boards of Trustees for the purpose of assisting the Military Service Boards and of undertaking the management and supervision of the property of farmers and farm labourers on active service and of keeping properly audited accounts.

The feeling of a large section of the community is reflected by the resolution carried at last week's meeting of the Advisory Board of the War Relief Federation and by the remarks of the mover. The resolution was as follows :—

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The Advisory Board begs to call the attention of the Government to the grave economic danger which will result from excessive enlistment of men employed in primary industries. The Board also desires to bring under the notice of the Government the hardship inflicted by practically compelling men drawn in the ballot to dispose of their properties, and is of opinion that Government action is urgently necessary to secure the retention of such property to the owners, and to prevent exploitation by unscrupulous persons.

In proposing this resolution Mr. Dougall said that our primary industries were being affected and would be very seriously affected soon. The area under crop had fallen from 329,207 acres last year to 218,877 this year, and in the season coming an even smaller area would be under crop, because labour was scarce and farmers were being conscripted. Men were forced to sell by the attitude of the Military Service Boards, and those who bought were wealthy men, ineligible for service, who simply added to their own coffers at the expense of the men who were forced to go to the war. Last year we produced 7,108,000 bushels of wheat and 7,653,000 bushels of oats. This year we grew 2,000,000 bushels less wheat and 2,000,000 less oats. This season we had not produced again enough grain for our own use. Racing was still permitted, and a large number of men were engaged in racing, and a racehorse consumed from 15 to 16 pounds of oats per day.

In Taranaki a large meeting of the dairy farmers formed a committee to watch over and present appeals and to safeguard the producers' interests and passed the following resolutions :—

That this meeting is of opinion that it is absolutely essential that the production of the Dominion be maintained at its maximum ; that, while recognising that the winning of the war is of paramount importance, the operation of the Military Service Act is depleting the Dominion of so much skilled labour that it must shortly create a serious and dangerous diminution in the products that are of the utmost importance to the Empire ; that we urge :—

(1) That the Government at once take steps to organise the necessary production to prevent grave dislocation and loss of production ; (2) that in view of the national importance of main-

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taining our primary industries the Government should establish a board, comprising practical men, for directing and organising these industries.

In Canterbury the Amuri farmers have urged the Government to define as soon as possible essential workers in connection with agricultural and pastoral pursuits. It was suggested that ploughmen, horsemen, chaff-cutters and threshers should be exempted. At present the only class of agricultural labour that may be said to be exempted as a class is that of shearers, but even in that case each shearer has to make separate application and to give an undertaking that until the next shearing season he will engage in useful agricultural or pastoral work. Besides the shearers the following classes of labour have been exempted or, speaking by the card, have had their cases adjourned *sine die*, conditionally on their retaining their present occupations: coal miners (but since the go slow policy only on condition that the normal output is maintained), seamen and ships' firemen, ships' officers (advisedly in this order), wireless operators, marine engineers (until March 2 only, when their position is to be reconsidered), railway servants (although in this case there has been an inclination on the part of the Boards to discount the Railway Department's warning as to the danger of employing inexperienced men and to suggest that the staff might be reduced by the discontinuance of race and tourist traffic), sanitary plumbers, slaughtermen, experts in trades, police, and civil servants. Sawmillers, save in exceptional cases, have been held not to be essential. For teachers there are few appeals, and even in those cases where a term's leave is asked to enable the head master to find a substitute, a much shorter period is granted. There is a dearth of dentists and medical practitioners.

Meanwhile race-meetings continue as in peace time, and a crowd in the street outside the newspaper offices indicates as a rule not the latest news from the Western front but the results of the day's racing. Employers of industry who

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have been struggling for the exemption of their hands have pointedly called the attention of the Board to the anomaly of taking to the front the skilled workmen and leaving behind the jockey and race-course tout. Save for clerical work, there has been no organisation or training of women to replace men. The tramway and railway services, even the restaurant cars on the railway, employ men only. The only woman in a grocer's shop is the cashier. Two years ago the Government was urged to organise women's labour, but without result, and, willing as the women of this country are, they will require a thorough and systematic training before they can replace men. Even if the Essential Industries Board were now to suggest a scheme for the employment of women, it would be the end of 1917 before practical effect could be given to it. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the number of men who have gone to the war, it has become more difficult than ever to get domestic servants, and any soldier's wife or widow, left badly provided for, would find no difficulty in earning high wages in this occupation.

One of the most difficult problems that the Boards have to solve is that of the exemption or not of ministers of religion. The conscientious objector's case presents no difficulty before the Board, which considers simply :

(a) Does he come within the exception in the statute, and, if so,

(b) Is he willing to perform non-combatant services ?

As the majority of conscientious objectors decline to do non-combatant work under military control, the Board has no option but to dismiss their appeals. The trouble will begin when these men are treated as defaulters and brought into camp. They are, however, a comparatively small number, and, whatever their fate, no sectarian question will arise. Over the case of ministers, on the other hand, a considerable controversy has arisen, and here it has proved impossible to avoid sectarian strife.

In connection with the intimation by some of the

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Boards that the whole of the First Division—no matter how essential or how expert—should be exhausted before the Second is called up, the principle appears to be that married men should be kept back for two reasons :

(a) That the employment at the front and the loss of a married man costs the State on the average more than that of a single man.

(b) That most married men have the responsibility of young families on their shoulders.

If this principle is sound, married men should not be accepted as volunteers. But the enrolment of married men goes on.

Anti-conscriptionists have freely stated that the Government would not have backbone enough to arrest those men who turned a deaf ear to the call of their King and country. Last week a modest list of 60 Reservists who are wanted by the military authorities was gazetted, a few warrants have been issued and one defaulter has been arrested and taken to camp to be court-martialled, it being hoped that, if an example is made of one or two recalcitrants and it becomes clear that the Act will be fairly and impartially enforced, the laggards will fulfil their obligations without further pressure. There are, however, some hundreds of men on the roll of the First Division of the Reserve, whose whereabouts cannot be traced.

At the present moment conscription in New Zealand is at the critical stage. It will doubtless have its setbacks and hitches, there will be plenty of anomalies and hardships, the Government will be swayed hither and thither, as even National Governments are, by tactical considerations, but in the long run the sturdy patriotism and the hard common-sense of the community will solve all difficulties, and New Zealand at the end of the war will be able to say that she sustained to the finish the loyal effort with which she began.

New Zealand, March, 1917.

AFTER THREE YEARS

THE war has entered on its fourth year. Last winter it was widely believed on both sides that peace would be attained this autumn. There were many in this country, for example, who thought that the steady accretion of military strength on the part of the Allies—especially the full development of British fighting power and the adequate equipment of the Russian armies for an offensive—would make it possible in this year's campaign to force a decision by a united effort on all the fronts. The Germans, similarly, if they no longer expected to do more than maintain an unbroken defensive on land, were told by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in January that the "unrestricted" use of submarines would deal England a "decisive blow" and lead to a "swift victory." These hopes have not been realised on either side; and if the disappointment is certainly great among the Central Powers, it is great also among the Allies. It shows itself in a deeper and more general impatience with the prolongation of the war, in the more insistent raising of the crucial question: "Why *must* the appalling business of destruction still go on?"

The average British citizen's answer to the question is simple. "We have not won the war," he says; "and we have got to win it." But he is not quite so clear as he was three years ago as to what "winning the war" means or why it must be won. As the struggle drags on through month after month of daily effort, the issues stand out with less definite and unmistakable force than they did in 1914. But if the war is to be ended in the same spirit of

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national unity and devotion in which it was begun, there must be the same clear certainty as to why we are fighting as there was in 1914. It may be worth while, therefore, to remind ourselves that our purposes now are the same as they were then, that they have not yet been fulfilled, and that it is no less obviously our duty now than then to strive for their fulfilment. It will mean reconsidering, as briefly and simply as possible, some very familiar facts ; but it is just because they are familiar that after three years they tend to awaken a less immediate and overwhelming response from mind and conscience, and sometimes, it might seem, to be almost forgotten.

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WHAT, then, in 1914 was the first purpose of the British people in going to war ? It was to rescue Belgium from her invaders and restore her independence. Our sympathy was deeply stirred by her sufferings during the invasion, and it became our additional aim to exact reparation for her injuries. But the original purpose had been formed before the coming of the refugees, and the pity and indignation their terrible story aroused were scarcely needed to confirm it. For by the violation of Belgian neutrality, without any additional provocation, the whole of the British people were immediately convinced of the necessity for war. The mass of men and women understood at once that a pledge, as precise and binding as any pledge could be, undertaken by a group of States, including Germany, Belgium, and Britain, had been broken by Germany and kept by Belgium, and that it must be kept by Britain too. Those who had studied the elements of foreign policy realised also that Germany had deliberately repudiated the one rule of international conduct which all civilised States are bound unvaryingly to obey if there is to be any possibility from day to day of friendly intercourse

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between them. The doctrine of the inviolability of public right had been the dominant tradition in British foreign policy. Generations of British statesmen had regarded the sanctity of treaties as the keystone of the peace of Europe. "England will never consent," said Pitt in 1793, "that another country should arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure the political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by consent of the Powers." "We can have no security for Europe," wrote Palmerston in 1830, "but by standing upon a strict observance of treaties." "The greatest triumph of our time," said Gladstone in 1870, "will be the enthronement of public right as the governing idea of European politics." And Mr. Asquith's statement in the House of Commons on August 6th, 1914, of our reasons for going to war was in keeping with this unchanging tradition. "If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle . . . that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power."

This, then, was our first purpose in 1914—the liberation of Belgium, with reparation for the injuries inflicted on her. Three years have passed, and Germany is still in occupation of all but a fragment of Belgian soil. Nor has anything happened in those three years to make the fulfilment of our purpose one whit less binding a debt upon our honour, and the appeal to our pity and humanity has been deepened by the conduct of the German Government towards the Belgians in their power.

Our second purpose was the defence of France. It

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needed no deep study of foreign policy for Englishmen to realise that Germany's first war aim was to deal France a crushing blow and, if possible, to cripple her for years to come. The essential facts as to the origin and result of the Franco-Prussian War were widely known, and to the average Englishman the recent development of the Entente Cordiale—perhaps the feature in our foreign policy most clearly understood and warmly approved by public opinion in this country—seemed to imply a tacit obligation on our part to assist France, if she ever needed it, to defend herself against another such deliberate assault as that of 1870. When, therefore, the tide of German invasion swept beyond Belgium deep into French territory, when our Expeditionary Force, for all its gallantry, proved far too small to prevent the outflanking of the French armies and fell back with them to the very outskirts of Paris, it became the unanimous determination of the British people to multiply its armies till they were strong enough, side by side with the French, to drive the German armies back across the frontier. From the first, moreover, they held it just and right that France should recover those provinces which were torn from her by force in 1871, against the passionate desires of their inhabitants and the solemn protests of their representatives.

We have become, for the first time in history, a military Power on the continental scale; but after three years the German armies, though one stage of withdrawal has been forced on them, still occupy some of the richest and most populous French districts. And Alsace-Lorraine is still an appanage of the German Empire.

Next to the liberation of Belgium and France came the liberation of Serbia. This was not our purpose in 1914, because Serbia succeeded in defending herself against invasion; but it at once became our purpose when, a year later, the defence was at last broken down and Serbia suffered the fate of Belgium. Serbia was not protected by any treaty of neutrality. Our good faith, therefore,

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was not involved in the same strict sense as in the case of Belgium. But the same principle of public right which lay behind the Belgian treaty was involved. In July, 1914, Austria-Hungary had suddenly refused to respect the status of independent sovereignty accorded to Serbia by the Congress of Berlin. Only those provisions in the unprecedented ultimatum of July 23 had been rejected by Serbia the acceptance of which would have implied the surrender of her sovereign rights. And if from the first the principle of public right had been involved, so also when the disaster came was our honour—the honour not in this case of a guarantor but of an ally. For a year Serbia had successfully engaged large Austro-Hungarian forces, and to that extent had relieved the pressure of our common enemies on other fronts. The subsequent collapse of her resistance was not due to any lack of courage or foresight on her part. Its primary causes were the faithlessness of King Constantine and the ambition of Czar Ferdinand. But the disaster might never have occurred without mistakes in diplomacy for which each of the Allies had a share of responsibility and without our own military failure at the Dardanelles. Our obligation, therefore, to fight for Serbia's redemption could not have been plainer; and the sentiment of the whole country was expressed when, on February 23, 1916, Mr. Asquith extended to Serbia the public pledge he had already given with regard to Belgium, and when, a few weeks ago, the pledge was renewed by Mr. Lloyd George.

The liberation of Serbia, then, became our third purpose; and after two years it remains, like the first and second, unfulfilled. All but a fragment of Serbia is still in the enemy's hands; and the fate of the surviving population has been even more cruel than the fate of the Belgians.

All these purposes were, so to speak, negative: they aimed at undoing what had been done. But our final purpose was positive: it aimed at breaking the power which had done those things and at making it impossible,

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as far into the future as might be, for anything like them to be done again. This final purpose was defined by Mr. Asquith on November 9, 1914, in the well-known words : " We shall not sheathe the sword . . . until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed."

The British public had quickly realised that the primary cause of the war was a calculated attempt on the part of the ruling military caste of Prussia to secure a position of undisputed hegemony in Europe. To that end they had taken advantage of a local dispute to precipitate a general conflict, as the result of which they expected to cripple the military power of France and Russia, to occupy Belgium and Serbia, and by means of annexations and indemnities to increase the strength of Germany in material resources and strategic position so that for the future her will would prevail unquestioned throughout the Continent. The instruments for achieving these objects were, first, the willing obedience of practically the whole German population of the Empire, who had been indoctrinated with the belief that power was the primary object of the State, that the future prosperity of Germany required the acquisition of more power at the expense of her neighbours, and that the Prussian military machine could be relied on to secure it, as it had done so triumphantly in 1870 ; secondly, the whole-hearted co-operation of the Magyars in Hungary ; thirdly, the support of the Germans in Austria, or at least the dominant military and official classes among them ; and, fourthly, the enforced service of the Slav peoples of the Hapsburg Empire, who could not escape from the control of their masters at Buda-Pesth, Vienna, and Berlin, however little they might sympathise with their ambitions.

More than once before a similar attempt had been made by a strong military State to become by force of arms the mistress and arbiter of Europe. A successful resistance to these attempts had been the great tradition of British warfare ; and, as the most efficient preventive of such attempts,

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the doctrine of the inviolability of public right had been, as has already been pointed out, the great tradition of British statesmanship. Nor had this British attitude in foreign policy meant, as was argued in Germany, that Britain desired to maintain the *status quo* perpetually unaltered. No one denied the need for making adjustments from time to time in the political system. But British statesmen held that such adjustments should be made by mutual agreement and not by force, just as adjustments within a State should be made not by breaking laws but by amending them. And they had striven with increasing earnestness, in co-operation with the representatives of most other civilised States, to better the machinery for peaceable adjustment by extending the principle of international conference, improving the code of international usage, and strengthening the moral authority of the Hague tribunal for the settlement of international disputes. From all this the rulers of Germany had stood aloof. The immutable basis of all such plans for promoting peace and harmony in the world was the doctrine of public right: and they had determined to repudiate that doctrine.

In upholding that doctrine British statesmen had not only been inspired by a genuine wish to preserve the peace of Europe and by a sincere respect for public faith, they had been actuated also by national self-interest. It was always evident that the establishment of any single dominating Power upon the ruins of the European system would be, as it was in the days of Napoleon, a direct menace to the liberty of Britain. In those Englishmen, therefore, who realised whither it might lead, the westward march of the German armies at once aroused the instinct of self-defence, and on August 3, 1914, Sir Edward Grey frankly warned the House of Commons of the danger which would straightway arise if Germany were to succeed in occupying the French and Flemish coasts. If the British public, steeped in the immemorial tradition of insular security, did not at first regard their own country as being in any real peril or

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conceive the war as in any real sense a struggle for the preservation of their own freedom, the facts were soon driven home by the frank avowals of German publicists, by the proved strength of German military power, and, later on, by the effectiveness of the submarines. It became clearer and clearer that the liberation of Belgium was required to meet the needs of self-defence as well as the claims of honour. Nor was it only in the West that danger threatened. It seemed that militarist circles in Germany had long cherished the design of winning control over the Balkans and the Turkish Empire, and so striking at those vital points in the straggling fabric of the British Commonwealth—the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. Pan-German enthusiasts, it appeared, outdreaming Napoleon's dreams, had already fashioned in their minds the great strategic roadway of the future German Empire, branching from Anatolia south-west to Cairo and Central Africa, south-east to Bagdad and India. In the light of such ambitions the position of Serbia was quickly seen to be akin to that of Belgium. Serbia was "the guardian of the gate" in the East, as Belgium in the West.

It was, then, to defend the safety of the British Commonwealth, as well as to vindicate the principle of public right and to restore the peace and liberty of Europe, that we set out three years ago to destroy the military domination of Prussia. This last was our supreme purpose, embracing those other purposes, its fulfilment ensuring theirs. And after three years it has not yet been fulfilled. Indeed, from one point of view, the military domination of Prussia has been strengthened and extended. The armies which obey the Prussian will have done more than keep their grip on Belgium and North-East France and Serbia. They have driven across Roumania and penetrated far into Russia. And new armies have submitted themselves to the same allegiance. Bulgaria and Turkey have become the vassals of Berlin; the overland road to Asia and Africa has been opened up "according to plan"; and but for the British

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troops at Gaza and Samarra Prussian generals might now be organising the invasion of Egypt and the occupation of the Persian Gulf. If Prussian militarism, indeed, were allowed to maintain the position it has won and to consolidate this block of Central European peoples into one compact military and economic system, its domination over Europe, so far from being threatened with destruction, would be well-nigh indestructible.

To review the purposes with which we entered on the war and to find that none of them are yet fulfilled might seem at first sight discouraging. But such an inference, it scarcely need be said, would be wholly one-sided and invalid. It would leave out of account the fact that our record during the last three years has been a record not of impotence and failure but, despite mistakes and accidents, of steadily increasing power and success. It would ignore the underlying reality beneath the outward aspect of the war-map—namely, that the balance of actual war-strength, military and economic, has turned against the Central Powers. The fulfilment of our purposes may have been delayed far beyond our first sanguine expectations, but it has never been more certain than now. One last effort of endurance in the spirit of 1914 and the aims of 1914 will be achieved.

II

THE assurance of ultimate victory for the Allies rests first on the clear superiority of their resources. The temporary demoralisation of the Russian armies relieved the German High Command from what would otherwise have been a critical if not a desperate situation. But under the strong hand of M. Kerensky discipline is already being restored; the Russian armies are now rallying; they may be able before long to maintain an unyielding front, even perhaps to renew the offensive. And in any case the

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leaders of free Russia are determined to fight on. "I am certain," said M. Kerensky in his message to the King on August 13, "that the Russian people will find the necessary strength to surmount the serious trials of the present time and to conduct the world-war to an end which will be worthy of the terrible sacrifices already made by every nation which is struggling for right against might." In the West, meanwhile, at regular intervals the Italian offensive is resumed, and each time the Austrians fall back one more stage towards Trieste. With the same regularity the German attacks on the dominant French positions are thrown back with heavy losses, while the British armies, never so strong as now in men, material, and experience, have wrested from the Germans all the higher ground along their front, despite the years of labour spent on making it impregnable, and are steadily pressing them back in France and Belgium. And while the armies of the Western Allies in Europe are thus month by month wearing down and overcoming the Austro-German power of resistance, a great American force, its vanguard already thrown forward into France, is quietly gathering, arming, drilling to take the field next spring. And in the United States, as in Russia, behind the armies-in-being lies an almost inexhaustible reserve of man-power. Nor is it only in military and naval resources that the United States has increased the strength of the Allies. Its entry into the war and the prompt adhesion of many lesser neutrals have marshalled the financial and economic resources of almost all the world against the Central Powers. The tightening of the blockade has been facilitated; and the fact that their enemies now control practically the whole supply of those raw materials on the importation of which, in the future as in the past, German industry and trade depend for their very life is clearly adding to the load of anxiety and increasing the moral strain which the rulers of Germany, and in so far as they realise the truth the German people also, have to bear.

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And the pressure is not only from outside, nor only from material forces. A world of ideas has gathered against Prussianism as well as a world of men and goods. For many years the autocracies of Central Europe have stemmed the tide of political progress, but the war has shaken their barriers, and at last, "by creeks and inlets making," the waters are beginning to come in. The ideals of civic and national freedom are now the common creed of all the Allies, but they are not their monopoly, they appeal to the natural instincts of mankind. Since in 1848 they sprang for a moment into actuality they have never wholly died in Germany, and in Austria they have continued vigorously alive. And now the contagious effects of the Russian Revolution, working on populations suffering far more acutely than the Allied peoples from the losses and deprivations of the war, and far more restless, far more desperately impatient for peace than they, have produced in both countries a strong revival of democratic and nationalist agitation.

Events in Austria have been kept too closely shrouded by the censorship to be revealed to the outer world in full detail, but the main facts are known. From the first days of the war the Austrian Government had trouble with its Slav subjects, unwilling as they were to fight against their Serb and Russian kinsmen. That was undoubtedly the chief reason why it did not dare to summon the Austrian Parliament, the Reichsrat, and continued to govern in virtue of the notorious Paragraph Fourteen of the "Fundamental Laws" of Austria* without any reference whatever

* The following is a translation of the text of Paragraph Fourteen: "If at a time when the Reichsrat is not assembled the urgent necessity of such orders as require its sanction according to the constitution should become apparent, then these orders can be issued by Imperial decree under the responsibility of the Ministry as a whole—in so far as they do not aim at any alteration of the fundamental law of the State nor relate to any permanent charge upon the Treasury or any alienation of State property. Such decrees have provisional force of law, if signed by all the Ministers and if promulgated with express reference to this provision of the fundamental law.

"The validity of these decrees expires if the Government has neglected

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to the representatives of the people. Under this absolutist *régime* the non-German nationalities, especially the Czechs and Southern Slavs, were rigorously suppressed. Regiments were decimated or deliberately exposed to hostile shell-fire. Thousands of civilians were executed or imprisoned.* The situation became more and more strained, and the assassination of the Austrian Premier, Count Stürgkh, last October seemed like the first thunderclap of an approaching storm. A few weeks later the Emperor Francis Joseph died, and with the accession of the Emperor Charles came naturally a change of attitude, a readjustment in the circle which surrounds the throne. The appointment of Count Clam-Martinic, a Bohemian nobleman, as Austrian Premier was believed in some quarters to betoken an attempt to satisfy nationalist aspirations. But it soon appeared that the policy he relied on was not concession, but coercion; his plan, it seemed, was to strengthen the existing system by a constitutional *coup d'état*; and the Reichsrat was not convoked until the effect of the Russian Revolution made it more dangerous to refuse than to concede the general demand for it. What happened when, on May 3, after more than three years' suspension, the Reichsrat met? The Nationalist agitation, at last allowed its constitutional outlet, broke forth with all the greater force because of its long repression. With one voice the non-German Parties declared against the Government. Czechs, Southern Slavs, Ukrainians, Poles—all demanded the establishment of national auto-

to submit them for sanction to the next Reichsrat which meets after their promulgation, and in the first instance to the House of Representatives within four weeks of its assemblage, or if they do not receive the sanction of one of the two Houses of the Reichsrat.

“The Ministry as a whole is responsible for such decrees being put out of operation as soon as they have lost their provisional legal validity.”

* In January, 1916—*i.e.*, more than 19 months ago—the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* was allowed by the Censor to announce that the total of executions for high treason, etc., in Austria and Bosnia was 3,463. According to the *Prager Tagblatt*, the German Radical organ at Prague, 18,000 prisoners were released as the result of the recent political amnesty.

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nomy on a democratic basis.* Parliamentary government, in fact, was shown to be impossible unless and until official circles at Vienna were compelled to tear up the very roots of their political faith, to renounce the doctrine of ascendancy, and—here lies the heart of their difficulty—to discard and disentangle themselves from those Magyar and Prussian allies on whose support their power has always rested. So, after sitting for six weeks, the Reichsrat was prorogued; and Count Clam-Martinić having resigned, the unenviable task of carrying on the Government was entrusted to a hitherto obscure official, Ritter von Seidler. On that position the veil has once more fallen; but behind it, there can be little doubt, the forces of disintegration are fast undermining the cumbrous structure of the Hapsburg Empire.

About the same time a political crisis in Germany revealed that there also the disturbing ideas provoked by the Russian Revolution were at work, though far less potently in that compact and relatively homogeneous State than in its neighbour. The German people are beginning to understand the breadth and reality of the political gulf which separates the Central Powers from the Allies, and, indeed, from the rest of European civilisation. Why was it, many Germans must have asked themselves, that the downfall of the Russian Government and the wholesale transformation of the forces and ideas which controlled Russian policy, whatever their material or military results, proved to be a moral gain to the Allies? Why was it that, when the leaders of the Revolution repudiated the whole political programme of the Czar's

* The formal declaration of the Czech League, comprising all the Czech Parties in the Reichsrat, insisted on the necessity of transforming the Hapsburg Monarchy into "a federal State of free and equal national States." A leading young Czech deputy (Dr. Stransky) interpreted this demand as involving "the restoration of political independence and of the sovereign constitutional law of the Bohemian nation on the historic territory of the Bohemian crown." See the reports of the Reichsrat speeches given in *The New Europe* for June 21 and July 5, 1917.

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régime, they made it the one exception that the war must still be carried on? The Russians themselves supplied the answer. They were fighting, they said, to destroy not Germany but German Imperialism. And when the German Social Democrats went to Stockholm in the hope of finding some basis of agreement with the Russian revolutionaries and with their old comrades in the international socialist movement in other countries, they received the same reply. No one could speak at Stockholm with more authority than the Swedish Socialist leader who presided over the negotiations, and M. Branting was quite uncompromising in his condemnation of the imperialist system in Germany, "which has always demanded expansion and new possibilities, while not granting to other States the same rights." "I believe," he said in an interview, "that the real peace negotiations will be postponed as long as the present German rulers are governing—that is, the Kaiser and the ring around him who forced on the war, the Junkers and the military party." M. Branting, in fact, used similar language to that of President Wilson, M. Ribot, and Mr. Lloyd George. The German representatives at Stockholm could not fail to learn their lesson, and when Herr Scheidemann returned to Berlin he declared that Germany must be "completely democratised." "It is not our enemies but our friends—alas! so few out there—who keep on repeating to us: 'The time has come at last when you must alter your home political conditions. You must show the outer world that the differences between you and it are not so great after all and are not unbridgeable.'""*

The sense of political isolation may not affect the German people widely. The majority of Germans may only pay respect to the opinions of the outer world in so far as they are supported by advancing armies. But they are finding reasons enough of their own for dissatisfaction with the existing machinery of government. The prestige

* *Vorwärts*, June 24, 1917.

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of the Prussian system (as is explained in a subsequent article in this issue) rests on real achievements; and in the field of foreign affairs it rests on the military glories of 1866 and 1870 and the long series of Bismarck's diplomatic triumphs. But the pride of a young nation was not content with those realities, and a tradition grew up in Germany that the Prussian machine had proved itself practically omniscient in statecraft, practically omnipotent in warfare. Now these beliefs have been assailed during the last three years by a succession of hard facts. The first blow was the entrance of the united British Commonwealth into the war. The anger of the Berlin crowd when the news came was symptomatic of the surprise and disappointment which ran through all Germany. The public had been taught to believe that Britain, though an implacable enemy of Germany and always inciting other States against her, was too decadent and mercantile to take part herself in a Continental war, and that the British Dominions were too distant and self-centred to allow themselves to be embroiled in a European quarrel, if, indeed, they did not take advantage of it to assert their complete independence of the mother-country. How, then, had the impossible thing happened? Was it sheer ignorance or inept diplomacy? In any case Prussian statesmanship had blundered. The second blow was the Battle of the Marne. It could not be concealed that the German armies had retreated. Could it be that the Prussian military machine was not invincible?

Such doubts must have forced themselves on many German minds with growing insistence as the war dragged on. True, if the armies gained no ground in the West, they gained plenty in the East. But yet the enemy did not confess defeat: the war did not come to an end. And then, after heavy fighting and disastrous losses, the line in the West again fell back. Official declarations, profuse and vehement as ever in their assertions of invincibility, began to lay additional stress on the *defensive* character of German aims. The Kaiser no longer talked of a decisive

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victory in the field. Attention was diverted to the submarines. The German navy, it appeared, not the German army, was to win the war. Nor was the promise of the submarines maintained at quite its first high level. The language of Dr. Michaelis in July was more guarded than that of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in January. The "submarine war" was to make it impossible for England "to hold out against the necessity for peace much longer." All this, to say the least, was very different from 1870. It had been a short, decisive trial of striking power then; it was seemingly a long contest of endurance now. And considering the unremitting pressure of the blockade and the prospect of an American army in Europe, was it by any means certain that time was on the side of Germany?

The process of disillusionment has in fact begun. The situation in the East may still enable the High Command to make a parade of victory; but mere victory, it is said, no longer rouses the old popular enthusiasm. It is victory *and* peace the German people want, and looking at the war-map and seeing so many square miles of enemy territory in German occupation, they wonder why that need must still go unsatisfied. The soldiers have done their part: what are the statesmen doing? A story has been current that while Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff were driving down the Unter den Linden on July 14, on their way to a consultation with the leading members of the Reichstag, their motor-car was surrounded by a throng of men and women, crying: "Give us peace!" True or false, the story is a representation in miniature of the new attitude of the German people towards their rulers. It not only shows itself in domestic affairs, in the recent agitation for constitutional reform in Prussia. It has now appeared also in the field of foreign policy, the conduct of which has hitherto been left almost without question in the hands of the Government. For the first time a majority of the Reichstag has attempted to exert its will in foreign affairs. The result has been a series of

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dramatic events in Berlin not altogether unlike those enacted in Vienna. The Reichstag reopened on July 5, and it was soon apparent that a majority of the House, consisting of a group of Parties allied for the purpose, was determined to pass a resolution defining the Reichstag's war aims with or without the Government's approval. A political crisis of the first importance ensued. On July 11 the Kaiser issued a decree promising in fuller measure and more definite terms the reform of the Prussian franchise he had foreshadowed in his decree of April 7. Two days later, after consultation with the Crown Prince and the military chiefs (which was regular enough) and a personal colloquy with the leaders of the Reichstag parties, including the Majority Socialists (which was quite unprecedented), he dismissed Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and appointed as Chancellor Dr. Michaelis, a Prussian bureaucrat almost as obscure as his Austrian confrère. Finally, on July 19, the Reichstag passed the war-aims Resolution by 214 votes to 116. The new Chancellor, while he gave the Resolution his somewhat equivocal approval, took occasion to declare that he could not share his responsibility with the Reichstag. "I consider it desirable," he said, "that relations of confidence between Parliament and Government should be made closer by calling to the leading executive positions men who, in addition to their conciliatory character, possess the confidence of the great parties in the popular representative body." But he added: "All this is possible, of course, only on the assumption that the other side recognises that the constitutional right of the Imperial Administration to conduct our policy must not be narrowed. I am not willing to permit the conduct of affairs to be taken from my hands."

On the next day the Reichstag was adjourned till the middle of September. There—for a time—the progress of democracy in Germany rests.*

* The political situation in Germany is more fully discussed in the article entitled *The Internal Problem in Germany*.

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For a time only : for in Germany, as in Austria, if the Government has succeeded in surmounting the last crisis, it will soon be confronted by another. In both countries as long as the war lasts the internal agitation cannot be suppressed by Imperial promises or ministerial changes. It will continue with ever-increasing momentum as the toll of losses grows, as the winter months bring their greater hardships to the poor, as the Allied armies tighten their encircling hold. It would be crass folly on our part if we so far counted on the domestic troubles of our enemies as to allow ourselves to relax for an instant our military effort ; but it is not inconceivable that the popular unrest, especially in Austria, might swell at any moment to such volume as to impair disastrously the strength of the Central Powers in the field. Such a possibility, it may be, was in Mr. Lloyd George's mind when, in his speech on August 6, he said, comparing the Allies' steady progress towards victory to the upward struggle of a mountaineer : " No one has any idea —no one in Britain, France, Italy, or Russia, nor in Germany, nor in Austria, how near the top may be."

III

THERE may be some who, contemplating the growing difficulties of the Central Powers, marking the gradual change of tone in the German Press, and attributing a very positive importance to the Reichstag resolution, are tempted to believe that the war has been won already. There is a simple cure for all such illusions. The most sanguine of such optimists will not deny that our winning of it means the fulfilment of the purposes with which we entered on it. Let him, then, reconsider those purposes (as was attempted in the earlier pages of this article) and squarely face the question whether or not they have yet been fulfilled. Has Belgium been liberated and indemnified ? Have the occupied French provinces been evacu-

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ated, with compensation paid for the wanton damage inflicted on them? Has Serbia recovered her sovereign independence? Has Alsace-Lorraine been restored to France? It may be answered that the Governments of the Central Powers are now willing to concede most, if not all, of these demands. But there is only one certain proof of such willingness—the frank avowal of it. And, however it may appear at first sight, neither the recent declaration of the new Chancellor nor indeed the resolution of the Reichstag really contain that frank avowal.

The essential part of the Reichstag resolution was as follows :

The Reichstag strives for a peace by agreement and for a permanent reconciliation of the nations. The forcible acquisition of territory and political, economic, or financial usurpation are incompatible with such a peace. The Reichstag rejects all plans which strive for economic exclusion and animosities between peoples after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Economic peace alone will render possible a friendly community of life among the nations. The Reichstag will energetically promote the organisation of international law.

The latter part of this declaration, it will be noticed, deals with the conditions of international harmony after the war : it lays down principles which are upheld by none more warmly than by the Allied democracies, and as regards “the organisation of international law” in particular, the Allied democracies are as keenly desirous of its promotion after the war as they were before it, when the chief obstacle to their energetic efforts to promote it was the candidly obstructive attitude of the German Government. But it is the first two of the sentences above quoted which chiefly concern the present theme. Their purport is inevitably vague, and it has been variously interpreted both in the Allied and in enemy countries. But the only interpretation that has any practical importance at the moment is that put upon it by the Chancellor. For the

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Reichstag, as the Chancellor so pointedly reminded it, does not at present control the Government's policy, and whatever terms of peace it may resolve on, they cannot be put into effect unless the Government adopts them as its own. Now Herr Michaelis did not adopt the resolution, nor, on the other hand, did he reject it. In his speech in the Reichstag he did not take the resolution for his text: he proceeded to expound his own programme of war aims; and he made no reference to the Reichstag's programme till his exposition was almost completed. This section of his speech must be quoted in full:

Germany (he said) did not wish for war, and did not strive for expansion of her power by violence. Therefore she will not prosecute the war a single day longer after an honourable peace is obtainable merely to make conquests by violence. What we wish is, first, to conclude peace as those would who have successfully carried through their purpose. . . . A nation of not even 70 millions which, side by side with its loyal allies, has held its place, weapon in hand, before the frontiers of its country against the manifold superiority of masses of nations, has proved itself unconquerable.

To me our aims are clear from this situation. First of all, the territory of the Fatherland is inviolable. With an enemy who demands parts of our Empire we cannot parley. If we make peace we must in the first line make sure that the frontiers of the German Empire are made secure for all time. We must by means of an understanding and "give and take" guarantee the conditions of existence of the German Empire upon the Continent and overseas. Peace must build the foundations of a lasting reconciliation of the nations. It must, as expressed in your resolution, prevent the nations from being plunged into further enmity through economic blockades, and provide a safeguard that the league in arms of our opponents does not develop into an economic offensive alliance against us.

These aims may be attained within the limits of your resolution as I interpret it.

There is nothing new in Herr Michaelis's definition of the main purpose for which Germany is fighting. The word "security" was often on his predecessor's lips, and it can be used to cover a multitude of ambitions. It

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was for the "better security of our frontiers in East and West" and "not from a policy of conquest" that the Six Industrial Associations, in their famous manifesto of March 10, 1915, demanded the retention of military and economic control over Belgium, the annexation of French territory up to and beyond a line drawn roughly through Belfort and Verdun to Calais, and the annexation of Russian territory from the Baltic Provinces southwards. And who can doubt that, if the Allies were willing to make peace on such terms, the Chancellor would justify on the same plea the retention of all the territories now occupied by German armies? Mr. Lloyd George quite rightly, therefore, insisted in his prompt reply on the equivocal character of the speech—"a facing-all-ways speech," "the speech of a man waiting on the military situation."

There are phrases for those who earnestly desire peace—many. But there are phrases which the military powers of Germany will understand—phrases about making the frontiers of Germany secure. That is the phrase which annexed Alsace-Lorraine; that is the phrase which has drenched Europe with blood from 1914; that is the phrase which, if they dare, will annex Belgium; and that is the phrase which will once more precipitate Europe into a welter of blood within a generation unless that phrase is wiped out of the statesmanship of Europe.

If, however, there is no doubt that the German Government will "take all it can get" in the way of territorial "security," it may well be doubted whether with the military situation as it is now and as it promises to be next year it believes any longer that they can "keep what they have." That is why to the old word "security" the Chancellor adds a new word *Ausgleich*. He proposes that the belligerents should forthwith settle their dispute by striking a bargain, by a process of "give and take." And, vague though his language is, the general terms of the bargain he has in mind are clear enough. The Allies' contribution is to be first, the cession of strategic areas in Europe—for that is what the "security" for the existence of the German Empire upon the Continent

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must mean: secondly, the restitution of the German colonies, with the addition, perhaps, of other territory in Africa—for the “security” for the existence of the German Empire overseas might well mean that*: thirdly, the concession of such favourable commercial treaties as would incapacitate the Allies from maintaining their present control of raw materials after the war to Germany’s disadvantage—for that is clearly the meaning of the Chancellor’s reference to “economic blockades” and “an economic offensive alliance.” And what is the German contribution to the bargain? It can be nothing but the evacuation of territories now occupied by German armies.

To any such proposals the British peoples can never consent. It is not only that they regard the Allies’ economic control as a weapon of war like their armies and navies, and will not pledge themselves to drop it till the war is ended. Nor is it only that they can never agree

* The views held as recently as last June by Professor Delbrück, who has always been more “moderate” than the Pan-Germans, are worth noting. Instead of annexations in Belgium and France he proposes that “Germany should secure a great colonial empire in Africa.” “If our victory is great enough we can hope to incorporate the whole of Central Africa together with our old colony in the south-west—Senegambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Dahomey, the populous territory of Nigeria with its harbour Lagos, the Cameroons, the rich islands of St. Thomé and Principé, the French and Belgian Congo, the promising country of Angola with its excellent harbours, the mineral district of Katanga, Northern Rhodesia, Mashonaland, Moçambique with Delagoa Bay, Madagascar, German East Africa, Zanzibar, Uganda, the Azores, with the great completed harbour of Porto Delgado, a most important and much-frequented coaling station, and Horta, a main centre of the transatlantic cables. In the Atlantic Ocean there are very few points offering such strategic, geographical, military, and naval advantages as the Azores once they passed into the hands of a strong naval power, writes Hans Meyer (*Deutsche Politik*, No. 20). To-day they belong to Portugal who is at war with us; Portugal also possesses the Cape Verde Islands with their chief harbour, Porto Praia, one of the most frequented coaling stations in the East Atlantic. All these territories together have over one hundred million inhabitants. United in the hands of a single Power they would offer immeasurable possibilities, since their various products and characteristics supplement one another. They are rich in natural products, rich in possibilities of settlement and profit, rich in manpower, such as could be made available not only for labour but for warfare.” (*Prussische Jahrbuecher*, June, 1917.)

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to traffic in the welfare of millions of native peoples, to hand them about "from potentate to potentate as if they were property," and to settle "who shall be the trustees of these uncivilised lands," without taking into account "the sentiments of the people themselves," but only regarding the wishes of a Government that has yet to learn the theory of trusteeship. These questions are altogether subsidiary to the question involved in the German share in the "give and take." And on that question the British peoples can never admit even the possibility of a bargain. They can never regard the liberation of the occupied territories as a question of compromise or a medium of exchange. It is plain to them that the rulers of Germany are offering what is not in their right to give. They are trying to bargain with stolen goods. It is not by such a process, they argue, that law-breakers are compelled to right, as far as they can be righted, the wrongs they have committed.

Thus the Chancellor's proposal, so far from bringing the combatants nearer together, serves to reveal anew the breadth of the gulf between them. But if the policy of the *Ausgleich* is wholly useless as a basis for peace negotiations, it can be used to quiet the growing agitation in Germany against continuing the war for the sake of conquest. This policy, it is urged in effect, is not a policy of conquest. Germany, it is true, acquires territory by force of arms, but, "fraternising" with the Revolutionary principle of "no annexations," she does not annex it. She exchanges it "by means of an understanding" for other territory and for economic concessions. And this final process, it is suggested, can scarcely be described as the "forcible acquisition of territory" repudiated by the Reichstag. "These aims," says the Chancellor, "may be attained within the limits of your resolution *as I interpret it.*" Nor can there be any doubt that the Reichstag approves the policy of the *Ausgleich*, and that, on this point at any rate, its own interpretation of the resolution coincides with the Chancellor's.

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Such, then, is the answer to anyone who might be tempted to believe that the German attitude is no longer any real obstruction to the fulfilment of our purposes. The *Ausgleich* does not mean the restoration of Belgium and the French provinces and Serbia, still less the payment of indemnities for injury. It means their sale, and the only indemnities are the payments which the Allies are to make for them. Nor would the German Government itself suggest that it means the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. The Chancellor's allusions to the frontiers of the German Empire rules out the *Reichsland* from the bargain.

And what of our final purpose? Can any "give and take" peace ensure the destruction of the military domination of Prussia? It is just because it cannot that the rulers of Germany are pressing for an *Ausgleich* now and will press for it with increasing urgency, and, maybe, with a gradual lowering of their terms, throughout the coming winter. For if only they can retain some of their present war gains or exchange them for other gains, they can still hope to preserve the mainspring of the Prussian system—its prestige. At an earlier and more hopeful period of the war Prince Bülow wrote as follows:

In view of the ill-feeling against us which this war is bound to bring in its train, the mere restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* would mean for Germany not gain but loss. Only if our power, political, economic, and military, emerges from this war so strengthened that it considerably outweighs the feelings of enmity that have been aroused shall we be able to assert with a clear conscience that our position in the world has been bettered by the war.*

The masters of the Prussian system may no longer hope to achieve such drastic alterations of the *status quo ante bellum* as were probably in Prince Bülow's mind two years ago, but for *some* increase of Germany's strength, *some* betterment of her position in the world, they must still hope and go on hoping till by the breakdown of their military power they are forced at last to confess themselves impotent to

* *Imperial Germany* (2nd Edition), p. 18.

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attain it. For if at the end of the war they have nothing to set against its appalling sacrifices, their last chance of saving Prussian absolutism from the rising forces of democracy in Germany is gone. But if, on the other hand, they can point to any substantial profit from the war, to a rectification here or there of the German frontier, to commercial treaties exacted from the enemy like the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, to a wider place at last acquired in the tropical sun, they can claim to have achieved, in part at any rate, the aims for which they went to war : they can claim to have enforced the German will against the will of almost the whole world. Above all, they can point to the unquestionable triumph of their absolutist system against a league of democracies, vastly superior in man power and material resources, and leave the German people to draw the obvious moral. Thus perhaps, and only thus, could the German people be persuaded to drop their agitation for democracy as they dropped it sixty years ago, to leave the control of foreign policy and the army in the hands of the militarist *régime*, to allow the "great decisions" to be made, as of old, not by resolutions of the Reichstag but by the Kaiser and his military chiefs.

If that were indeed the outcome of this war in Germany one thing can be predicted with reasonable certainty—another war. The events of the last three years have by no means wrought a "change of heart" in Prussian militarism, nor persuaded its leaders to abandon the great Hohenzollern tradition of conquest. They might perforce content themselves for the moment with a peace of "give and take." General Ludendorff himself is known to have promised an early peace. But he promised also a renewal of the war in ten years' time. And in ten, twenty, or thirty years' time the military chiefs of Prussia would doubtless find a way to do again what they did in 1914, if only they could retain their irresponsible control of German policy and German power. Doubtless also they would do it better. They would strive by every means to break up

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the present combination of their enemies and to undermine the unity of any league of nations into which it might develop. Meantime they would consolidate the offensive power of Central Europe : for the triumph of Prussianism in Germany would mean its triumph also in Austria-Hungary, in the Balkans, in the Turkish Empire. And so at last, with a new generation of soldiers, with still more ingenious and devastating methods of scientific destruction, with vast stores of cotton and copper and all those materials necessary for warfare the supply of which from oversea the British Navy might again succeed in cutting off, and finally with a great fleet of submarines, they would make a second bid for the mastery of Europe and the world.

It is easy to imagine the bitter disappointment of the British people if they should find themselves, in the course of a generation, caught once more in the old network of international antagonism—their plans for social welfare crippled, their liberty itself confined, by the inexorable needs of self-defence, and their dreams of a new Europe, where freedom and public right should be enthroned as the guardians of peace instead of power and ascendancy, shattered once more against the Prussian will to war. With what anger and remorse they would look back at their failure, after so many sacrifices patiently endured, to make the one last effort needed for the freeing of the world ; at their willingness to compromise between honour and dishonour, between victory and defeat ; at their betrayal not of the destinies of Britain only but of the hope of humanity. It is needless to dwell upon that intolerable prospect. The British people are resolved to fulfil the purposes with which they entered on the war, and they have not lost their special quality of perseverance. They will endure till Prussian militarism is defeated and discredited, till Germany is “ made powerless or made free,” just as their forefathers endured through a struggle far more protracted and far richer in checks and disappointments till the military domination of Napoleon was wholly and finally destroyed.

THE INTERNAL PROBLEM IN GERMANY

IT is a sound instinct which had led not only our own nation, but impartial observers in neutral countries, to put in the forefront of our controversy with Germany the nature of the internal constitution of that country, and to insist that if we are to enquire for the ultimate cause of the present war, it is to be found in the character of the German Government. As an evident corollary to this there follow the recognition that there is no security against a similar catastrophe in the future except in a change of the German Constitution, and the demand that in one way or another such a change must be brought about either before the war is concluded or as an integral part of the final settlement. It is not necessary perhaps that this should be actually embodied in the terms of peace, but it is necessary that Europe should be assured that the form of Government which has made the war possible should not continue.

This has led to the demand for what has been called the democratisation of Germany; it has taken many forms. The most popular is the cry, "No peace with the Hohenzollerns"; it has been given a more statesmanlike aspect by the statement of the Prime Minister that we should approach Germany in a very different manner if we had to do with a Democratic Government. Others have demanded that the terms of peace must be ratified by the nation and not simply agreed on with the Government. Some have gone so far as to put forward as a war aim even the dissolution of the German Empire and the restoration of the Germany which existed sixty years ago.

The Internal Problem in Germany

It is proposed in this article to make some attempt towards an analysis of the real political and constitutional condition of Germany, with the object of investigating what is, in fact, the present form of Government, what is the attitude of the Germans themselves towards it, and what changes in it are possible and necessary for the future security of Europe.

I. PRUSSIA AND GERMANY

IT is not in the letters and paragraphs of a written constitution that we must seek for the true life of a nation. We know this of our own experience in our own country, but we are apt to forget that this is not an accidental local phenomenon, but a universal law of world-wide application. A constitution is only of value when it embodies and sums up results which have already been attained in practical political life. No formal paragraphs can confer either on King or Parliament the power of ruling a country unless they have the will and capacity to do so. If we wish to explore the secret of the political life of any community, our search must not be limited to the legal documents, but we must find out where resides the power of action, the resolution to govern, the courage and persistence in execution. In every State which is worthy of the name, and which has the tenacity to carry on from generation to generation (and among all qualities of a State surely the most important is this of permanence), we shall, when we get to its life centre, find some principle or power which seems to exist almost as a living creature exists, and is a guiding and living principle that gives life to the whole organism. In France we have that centralising, ordering, arranging, civilising power which has for a thousand years emanated from the City of Paris and by which, century after century, the whole of the modern territory of France has been fused into a single entity—a principle which has

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survived all the catastrophes of Europe, so that in a way we can feel that the France of to-day, the France of the Revolution, is identical with the France of the *Grand Monarque*, and even of St. Louis. In England we should be ever conscious that the principle in obedience to which the nation was created remains the principle on obedience to which its strength and unity must always rest—the rule of law, built up by the Norman kings, developed by the Plantagenets, strengthened by the Tudors, changed and popularised by the Great Rebellion, still controls the whole life of the nation. Every nation is the creation of conscious and deliberate human effort ; that by which it is created is that by which it continues to exist, and when this vital principle is removed then the nation falls in pieces.

If we are to understand modern Germany, the first thing which we have to remember is that this work of nation-making has only just been completed. Germany is in the stage in which England was under Edward I., or France under Louis XI. ; and just for this reason the vital element is more obvious and obtrusive than in other and older States in which it has been swathed round and obscured by the concretions of centuries. And what is it by which the nation has been created ? Surely the process has been exactly similar to that which in bygone periods we know of in other countries. As a mere historic fact in all the great European States unity has been attained through the sense of loyalty to an hereditary kingship. It is the court of the king, the power of the king in war, the authority of the king in maintaining civil order, to which France and England owe their existence ; and that which was done in bygone centuries by the House of Valois and the Bourbons, by the Plantagenets and the Stuarts, has also been done in our own day by the House of Hohenzollern. All that they have done is precisely similar in kind. Round their court has been built up the army, civil service, courts of law and principles of

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administration. The essence of modern Germany is to be found—as the Prussian historians, in what to us is wearisome reiteration, have told us—in the nucleus of authority created by the early electors of Brandenburg; and it is from the Mark of Brandenburg that the influence and control of the institutions they created has spread, with a persistence which has in it something of epic greatness, over the whole of the rest of Germany. It is this and this alone that has welded together this crude, amorphous mass into a conscious, living, self-reliant, political entity. And the instruments by which this has been done are closely parallel to the instruments which the other state-creating dynasties of Europe have used—the army, the civil administration and the law courts.

If we are to understand the modern feelings of Germany towards Prussia we must keep these great historical facts in mind. There is much talk as to whether men like Prussia or dislike it. It may be suggested that from one point of view this is supremely unimportant. What is important about Prussia is not the question merely whether it is attractive and amiable, but its strength and its power. If we look over the history of Germany during the last century, we are always conscious of a great question which was then being debated. The national forces of Germany demanded, and rightly demanded, a national State. The real point at issue was whether this should be established in the form of a new creation springing out of the spontaneous forces of cohesion, which would drive all the different parts of Germany together in a process like the crystallisation of minerals which have been contained in diffusion in a liquid, or whether the change should take place by accretion round the existing Prussian State. It was this problem which was in fact fought out throughout the years following the expulsion of the French, and it was this which came to a head in the two decades after the year 1848. The real crisis was in the year 1848. It was then that in a moment of enthusiasm

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the words were proclaimed: "Prussia is dissolved in Germany." They were untrue. The attempt was made to create a Germany without Prussia, and it failed. The forces of cohesion were not strong enough; the will and power required for State creation were not there; the Parliament of Frankfurt met and talked and resolved and made a constitution, and then its members gradually dropped away, and it left—nothing. Prussia remained unchanged, unshaken, and when the year of anarchy was over it was the Prussian armies who marched from Berlin to Saxony and Baden to re-establish authority. Again, in 1866 it was the Prussian armies who conquered Germany. It was not 1870 but 1866 which was the turning year of German history. Hanover, Saxony, Württemberg, Bavaria, every one of these was prostrated before the power of Prussia, and it is by this means that Germany was created.

There is a certain school of German political writers who in their desire, a desire with which we completely sympathise, for a reform of German institutions fix their eyes on this fact and draw from it the deduction that Germany has been diverted from the right track: they regret that the revolutionary movement of 1848 failed, they deplore the direction given to German public life and public thought by Bismarck, and they come to the conclusion that they should adopt the cry: "Los von Bismarck." They would undo his work and start again on other lines. But the work of the past cannot be undone, the failures cannot be made good. Germany has not been created by its own efforts, but by Prussian conquest, and all talk of going back to the past is futile. Especially in such a time as the present we have to do with what is, and what is includes united Germany, hard, compact, a living, conscious political entity, such as is France or the United Kingdom—a Germany the capital of which is Berlin and the binding elements in which are the Prussian army and Prussian administration.

The work of Bismarck cannot be undone. We may

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approve or disapprove of it, we may discuss it as we discuss the French Revolution or the English conquest of Ireland ; but there it is, there it stands, and from it we must make our start. If Germany is to be democratised it is not by going back to the past : it is by accepting the present and making that the beginning for further progress.

That which the Germans feel, and rightly feel, is that the existence of the nation depends on the strength and continuity of the Government that has been established at Berlin. Whether they like it or not is a matter of quite subordinate importance. There is much in it that they may and do wish to modify and improve, and they will do much to bring about changes in it. But these changes are secondary ; they can only be made in that which exists, and with the destruction of it there would be mere anarchy and destruction. Germany is and will remain Prussian, and from a revolution, if there was a revolution, it would emerge, it may be, altered and purified, but it would still be Prussian. Let us never forget that the strongest party of opposition—the Social Democrats—are in their spirit as Prussian as any Berlin bureaucrat.

Nor is the monarchy the essential point. We may do what we wish with these Hohenzollern princes, but that will matter little. The crown was torn from the decadent son of Edward I., and he ended his days by a miserable death in a dungeon ; the descendants of Henry of Navarre were dethroned and executed, but none the less Edward I. and the founder of the Bourbons remain. The names and examples of Frederick the Great, of the Great Elector, of William I. would shine all the more brightly if they were not obscured and dimmed by less worthy successors. These things are and will always remain. So long as there is a Government at Berlin the shades of the great king and the great minister will brood over and inform it. The living tradition will be handed down from father to son, and from general to general, from Geheimrath to Geheimrath. Stuarts may

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be succeeded by the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth by the Restoration, the Whig aristocracy by the democracy of our own time ; but ever behind them all there is the inspiration of the great names, of Elizabeth and Cromwell and Chatham and Pitt, and behind all the trappings of modern life there is, as external observers see perhaps better than we do ourselves, the hard, unbending character of which our modern statesmen are the exponents as truly as was Burleigh.

II. THE LIBERALISM OF PRUSSIA

THE Germany we have to deal with is, then, a Prussianised Germany, a continuation of the old Prussian State, enlarged and in some ways modified, but remaining in its essence that which Prussia has been ever since this great reorganisation which took place in the early years of the nineteenth century. What, then, is this Prussia ? What is the *êthos*, the character of the State ? In order to answer this question it will not be sufficient to dismiss it with the customary words of criticism and disparagement—it will not be sufficient to say that it is military, feudal, medieval, reactionary. For no one can understand modern Germany unless he distinguishes two elements, both of which are represented in the Prussian Government, but which, closely connected though they may be, are in fact different in character and have often been at open variance. Prussia is spoken of as the home of reaction. It may be so, but let us recollect that in the past Prussia has often been regarded—and regarded with truth—as a great Liberal State. In one way nothing is so incorrect as to speak of Prussia as medieval. To do so is to ignore the most important and prominent qualities of Prussian administration. Medievalism there is, indeed, as there has always been, in North and North-Eastern Germany ; but if we mean by medievalism the feudal power of the

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nobles exercised over the peasants, the maintenance and recognition by the State of the differences between the social classes, of the nobleman, citizen, peasant, the continuation of patriarchal jurisdiction exercised by what we call the manorial courts, what the Germans call the *Rittergutsbesitzer*, then we must recognise that Prussia has been the chief enemy of medievalism. If we want to find true remnants of the old medieval society we must go, not to Prussia, in which the nobles have been subjected to the all-controlling power of a great administration, but to a State such as Mecklenburg, in which the Government is still in the hands of the nobles, and in which they still maintain many of their old privileges on their estates. The whole history of Prussia has been the subjection of the landed aristocracy to the Government and to the Central Institutions; but the essence of medievalism is local privileges. Prussia is not a medieval but a modern State. It is the offspring of the eighteenth century; it was formed in the age of reason under the ideal of the enlightened ruler. It is the ordering, arranging, systematising of a highly educated bureaucracy which assimilates and uses for public purposes all the products of modern science. It is government by applied intellect.

At this moment it is natural that men in thinking of Prussia should turn their minds first to the military and monarchical side of the State; they would do better to begin with the internal administration, for it is on this that the real claim of the Prussian and the German Government to the allegiance of the people and the admiration of the world is made. If we challenge any educated German for a comparison between his own Government and that of any of the other great civilised States, he will at once accept the challenge and point out the great achievements of his own country—achievements in law, in finance, in commercial, industrial, and social legislation. He will refer us to the great work done by Frederick the Great in the eighteenth century by the codification of the Prussian

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Law ; he will point to the land legislation of Stein and Hardenberg, to the self-government instituted in the cities, to the institution of compulsory education ; he will go on to point out that it was the Prussian Government which was the first to adopt the principles of free trade, and the same Government which, by the establishment of the *Zollverein*, made possible for the first time the industrial development of Germany. And he will point out that this work has been continued with unceasing diligence since the establishment of German unity. From the very first years of the Empire it undertook with confidence and success the great task of bringing system, order, and intelligence into the internal affairs. A defender of the German system would refer us to the reform of the coinage, the revision of banking laws, the careful system of internal communication by railways and canals, the great success which, notwithstanding the complications introduced by the federal system of the Empire, has attended its financial policy ; and in particular he would point to the great scheme for social legislation and State insurance which has become a model for every other civilised country ; and he could end up by pointing to what is in truth the most striking outcome of legislation, the introduction of a common legal procedure throughout the Empire and the codification of the Civil Law.

The catalogue of legislative work is indeed an impressive one, and as we inquire further we will find that in nearly every case this legislation may well claim the title of Liberal. Liberal perhaps in the continental rather than the English sense, for we must always recollect that what Liberalism means upon the continent of Europe is first and foremost profound antagonism to anything in the nature of clericalism, and especially catholicism. Secondly, and closely allied to this, a continued struggle against the privilege of the nobles and what we may call the romantic doctrine which regards society as an organised structure consisting of separate estates. It is opposed to the doctrine of the King by the grace of God, and regards with profound intellectual

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contempt the smaller German States with their paraphernalia of monarchy. Above all, it desires centralised modern institutions. It is this form of Liberalism which in Germany has especially been represented by what was formerly the great National Liberal Party. As it has been expressed by a well-informed observer, they look upon the nation and the country as a great business concern, a syndicate; they desire the most competent management, and naturally desire also an expansion in the wealth and power of the firm. This view is very largely held by men of business, bankers, leaders of industry, capitalists of all kinds, and we must remember that German Liberalism has always been closely allied with capitalist industries. Liberalism of this kind is in many ways anti-democratic, and it is entirely without sympathy for the sentimental side of democracy which has recently become so prominent. Now it is in this sense of the word that we are justified in calling the Prussian administration Liberal. Liberal indeed, but anti-democratic; Liberal, but with little regard for the personal liberty of the individual. The state of society to which it looks is not one such as that which we in England value so highly—one in which each man goes his own way, living his own life, unregulated perhaps, but uncramped, free from Government interference and control—but rather one in which his course is laid out for him by a wise, beneficent, and all-seeing administration—Liberal perhaps, but authoritative.

Now between this Prussia, the Prussia of the enlightened bureaucracy, and parliamentary institutions there is no insuperable incompatibility. The relations between the Parliament and the Government offices will be different from that which we have in England—different, among other reasons, because in Prussia the Government offices were there in full power and activity long before Parliament had been thought of. There would therefore be less insistence than there is in England on the absolute control of Parliament, but there could be, perhaps, more intelligent

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co-operation. And, in fact, we find that this co-operation was soon established between the Government and the newly established Reichstag. In all the great schemes of legislation by which modern Germany has been fashioned the Reichstag has always played an important and sometimes a major part. The Liberal legislation in the first years of the Empire was carried through with the assistance of the Liberal Parties, which then had the majority ; it was often inspired and even initiated by them. And though during more recent times the Government in their new economic and social legislation have depended to an increased extent on other parties and the great influence of the Liberals has died away, that of Parliament has always been effectively exercised. The forms are different from those of our own Parliament ; much of the work, and often the best of the work, is done in committees, and has therefore to a great extent been withdrawn from public knowledge. But the Reichstag can justly claim that it has taken a great share in the building up of modern Germany. On the whole, this co-operation of the Government and the Reichstag, though it does not satisfy the desires of some political parties, does, so far as we can judge, satisfy the nation. In home affairs things appear generally to go well. Much good work is done ; the nation has been prosperous, and though Parliament has not the full sovereignty, it is able to check, and often has checked, legislative proposals distasteful to large sections of the people.

III. THE PRUSSIAN MONARCHY

BUT the Prussian Government has a double aspect. So far we have said nothing of the King, who has now become the Emperor. It has not been necessary to do so ; in the internal government of the country, in the management of the departments, in the political matters dealt with by legislation, the King in fact has little to do. And let

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the King, the Emperor, be removed, and the great machine of administration will continue its work. His absence would hardly be noticed. In matters such as the establishment of the Customs Union, the Reform of the Currency, the great Economic Revolution, even in social legislation, in the codification of the law—*i.e.*, in all that has enabled Germany to take the place it held before the war as a model State to which men went from every country to study its organisation and institutions—in all this if the Emperor has had indeed any share it has been that of a constitutional Sovereign, and so far as these matters have been referred to him for his decision, this has been given necessarily on the advice and report of his Chancellor or his Ministers.

There is much exaggeration in all that we hear about the Hohenzollerns. The picture has been assiduously spread about in Germany, and from Germany it has made its way to England, of this great ruling family to whose inherited virtue are due the merits of the Prussian and the German Government. This is in fact far from the truth. For the last hundred years the part played by the Kings in the machinery of the State has been small. Too often the personality of the Sovereign has been a mere impediment, as was, indeed, the case with Frederick William III. and Frederick William IV. during the whole of their reigns. Remove the King, remove the Emperor, and three-quarters of the work which has been done in Germany would have been untouched. This would not, it is true, have applied to the eighteenth century; then and earlier the first Prussian Kings were, as were the Electors of Brandenburg, the working rulers of their own dominions; but for the last century, though there has been much talk of the Great Elector and Frederick the Great, it is not to them that in fact the Prussian monarchy has gone for its inspiration. It is not in the eighteenth century, it is in the early years of the nineteenth century that we must trace the spirit by which the Prussian Court is inspired. It springs from the reaction

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against the revolution; it has learned and has never forgotten the teaching of the romantic movement; it is not a true medieval monarchy such as that of England which has been intertwined for centuries with the changing life of the nation; like all that springs from the romantic movement, based as it is upon sentiment and illusion, it is suspicious—often timid, embarrassed, and always on the defensive. It is to this period, to the years after 1815, that we owe the fantastic doctrine of the King the representative on earth of the Deity, the King by the grace of God, the doctrine of Lemaitre and Bonald and Charles X.; not the expression of the natural instinct of a people steeped in medieval Christianity, but the deliberate creation of intellectuals who are striving to combat the forces of Liberalism, democracy, and revolution.

This new doctrine of the monarchy, without historical foundation and antagonistic to all modern thought, was that which Prussia and Austria tried to press upon Germany during the years which followed the restoration, and this has been carried on from the old Germany to the new. It is the doctrine which will put obedience to the King above patriotism to the Fatherland. A short time ago a curious illustration of this was given us in Dresden. During a debate in the House of Representatives it was seriously pointed out that the motive which inspired the Saxon army in this war was not so much loyalty to the King as attachment to their country. The truth of this was acknowledged and regretted. What can we say of the blindness of men who would ever have allowed this antithesis to be put forward? As soon as respect for the King is separated from and placed in opposition to love of country is not the monarchy doomed?

Now in Prussia and in modern Germany there are certain departments of the State which have deliberately been withdrawn from even that moderate control of the Reichstag which has been established in other matters and reserved as the peculiar prerogative of the King and

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Emperor. These are foreign policy and the army. The secret of German constitutional history during the last forty years has been that every effort of the Reichstag to establish itself as one of the dominant factors in the government of the country has been deliberately checked and thwarted for fear that it might extend its power over that which is regarded as the proper domain of the Emperor.

But it is not only the internal position in Germany which has been distorted, it is also the international position. It is impossible to read over again the history of these years without coming to the conclusion that the German people have been deliberately taught a specific and wholly false view of European relations in order to make them believe that the safety and very existence of the country depended upon the management of foreign affairs and the control of the army being left in the hands of the King and the Chancellor appointed by him, freed from any control or supervision of Parliament. What has been the doctrine which was constantly taught to the people not only by Bismarck but by his successors? It was that Germany, situated as she was in the centre of the Continent of Europe, was confronted on either flank by a powerful and jealous enemy, that they must be always *en vedette*, that any relaxation in the armaments of the Government would at once be followed by the creation of a coalition which would be fatal to the country. And as a corollary to this there was drawn the conclusion that the army was something too important, too sacred, to be entrusted to the wavering and uncertain hands of a parliamentary majority. The classical expression of this great issue is to be found in a speech of Bismarck's during the Army Debate in 1887:

If we dissolve, then we do so not because of the mere question of time (whether the increase should be voted for three or for seven years), it is on the question of principle, whether the German Empire is to be guarded by an Imperial army or a parliamentary army. That is what we write on our banner at the dissolution, whether the

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changing majority shall determine every two or three years whether Germany is to retain her army according to the principles laid down in the constitution, or whether it can be reduced.

This was the question put to the people. The answer was a vote of confidence in the Government ; it was against the Reichstag—it was for the monarchical control of the army. That was the answer given then, and at every subsequent election at which a similar question has been put. What other answer could be expected if the account of foreign affairs by which this speech had been prefaced were indeed the true one ? But was it true ? Is it not rather the case that the danger from without was deliberately called into being in order to make it appear that the increase of the army was necessary, and was not the whole conflict arranged not because of any real pressure from outside but in order that a fictitious danger might be used to preserve the monarchical supremacy ? For now, looking back to those days, will anyone believe that, if the Army Bill of that year had not been carried, France would have made an unprovoked attack upon Germany ? Boulanger himself owed half his notoriety to the advertisement that Bismarck gave him. What is this whole doctrine of the armed peace under which Europe has been suffering for a generation ? Is it not a false, and wilfully false, reading of the condition of Europe, sedulously taught and propagated in order to persuade the German nation that they were so closely surrounded by enemies that their only hope of safety was to keep their sword sharp and ready, and as a means of this to leave the sole control of the army in the hands of the Emperor ? Had the answer to the Bill of 1887 been different, had the decision been to establish the right of the Reichstag to keep the same control over military expenditure and military legislation as it did over civil affairs, would the result have been a war and the destruction of Germany ? Far from it. The only result would have been the relaxation of the tension throughout

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Europe; the constant outbidding of one another by the War Offices and General Staffs would have ceased; in every country the military expenditure would have been diminished and the drift towards war would have been stopped.

Since 1870 Europe has passed through a constant succession of alarms and panics. Each one of these has been followed by an increase in the German forces and a corresponding increase in the armies of other States. This period differs from the preceding period from 1850-1870, for in the earlier years there were in fact important questions involving the existence of nations which could scarcely be settled in any way but war. No peace was possible on the Continent of Europe so long as Italy and Germany remained ununited. But in this latter period we can find no similar question. There was no longer, as there had been before, a problem which could not be postponed and to which war was the only solution. Why then did the crises occur? It is impossible now to read the record of these years without seeing that they were to a great extent fictitious. It was always represented in Germany that the Army Bills were necessary to meet some external danger. Would it not be truer to say that the external danger had to be invented or created in order to make an excuse for the Army Bills? The proper function of an army is to be an instrument ready for use in the last resort as a weapon of foreign policy; in Germany foreign policy has been used as an excuse for making the army necessary. And why was the army necessary? Because if it no longer existed as the prime and central pivot of the State, then it would no longer have been possible to place the Emperor-King above all else in the State as the God-appointed man in whose hand was the sword, the sole defence and bulwark of the country.

And it is to this that is also due the spread of the creed of war. Why, when every other nation was striving to secure a stable peace, was it reserved for Germany alone to preach the doctrine of armed supremacy? Why but

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because this was inextricably bound up with the constant internal struggle? Once the German people were allowed to believe that, if they wished, the world in its international relations could be guided by reason, compromise, agreement, justice, then the inevitable conclusion would have been drawn, as it has in every other country, that the conduct of foreign affairs could with advantage be entrusted, as it is elsewhere, to those conversant with these things. It would no longer have been the Emperor in his capacity as head of the army who would have had the decisive voice; it would no longer have been the leaders of the army, the strategists and the generals, who would have been called to his privy councils; it would no longer have been they who would have told him when the time had come that the councils of patience and moderation should be discarded and that the sword should be unsheathed.

The ultimate truth is this: it was not the dangerous foreign position that made it necessary to maintain a great army; the foreign danger had to be kept alive in order that the army might still be maintained, and with the army the whole social structure of which the army is the basis and the Emperor the centre.

IV. GERMAN POLITICAL LIFE

IT is the maintenance of the monarchical system in Germany which has envenomed the whole national situation, and it is this also which has prevented the normal development of constitutional government. When the Empire was formed the Liberal Parties fought hard for an extension of the political powers of the Reichstag. They could not get all that they desired, but they acquiesced in the situation, believing, as it was natural for them to do, that with the process of time there would take place a development in the Liberal sense similar to that which has taken place in other European States. In this they have

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been disappointed. On the whole the position of the Reichstag has deteriorated rather than improved, and in particular its power and influence in the country is probably less than it was. If we compare Germany now with Germany forty years ago, we do not find politicians wielding the authority and exercising the influence which belonged to men such as Bennigsen, Windhorst, Lasker, and Richter. It may be said that now, outside the Socialists, there is not a single member of the Reichstag who carries political weight and authority beyond the narrow group of his own political adherents. What is the cause of this decadence? The theory generally put forward in Germany is that it is to be attributed to some fundamental defect in German intellect and character. We are told that the Germans are particularly deficient in practical political sense, and the conclusion is drawn that they cannot be trusted, as men of all other countries are, to manage their own affairs. They are children in politics, and they require, therefore, the guiding and helping hand of the Emperor and the Chancellor, and the Chancellor is to stand towards the people not as a trustee chosen by them, and therefore if he fails in his position to be dismissed by them, but as the mere representative of the Emperor, who presides over the destiny of his people with the irresponsible authority of a *paterfamilias*.

This is a doctrine to which Prince Bülow has proclaimed his adherence, and he has devoted a singularly offensive chapter in his study of modern Germany to the exposition of the theme that the political incompetence of the Germans makes it impossible to entrust them with the management of their own affairs. He points out, quite justly, that one characteristic of modern Germany is the narrowness of party loyalty: "Our party system has inherited the dogmas, the small-mindedness, the moroseness and the spite which used to thrive in the squabbles of the German tribes and States." "We have small parties which are sometimes formed for the sake of very narrow

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interests and objects to carry on a struggle of their own which it is hardly possible to include in the affairs of the great Empire." * So far as this criticism expresses the facts of modern German political life it is undoubtedly true; but might it not be suggested that Prince Bülow errs when he attributes this to some immutable character in the German nation—an explanation of a kind common enough among superficial thinkers, who will always fly at once to a large general idea in order to explain some small phenomenon which puzzles them?

A study of German political life since the establishment of the Empire may suggest another explanation for the facts which he describes. Right judgment in political action, political sense, tact, quickness of apprehension, the instinct which guides an individual, or a party, or a nation, all these can come only from experience, and experience can come only from responsibility. When Prince Bülow says: "We are not a political people. . . . What we often lacked is the . . . art of doing the right thing politically from a sure creative instinct instead of only after much thought and considerable cogitation," and when he goes on to show that German political thought has run into academic lines so that Germany can boast of a particularly flourishing state of political science, and especially of political economy, but that on the other hand "there is an obvious disproportion between our knowledge and our power, and that the influence of deep learning on practical politics is seldom felt," is there not a very much simpler explanation of this than that which he puts forward? How does he expect that the Germans would have attained these qualities, the absence of which he regrets, except by prolonged experience, the experience which can only come from responsibility?

It is indeed very instructive to contrast the nature of political parties in Germany with those in England. In England a political party is ultimately a union of men joined

* *Imperial Germany* (Second Edition), p. 171.

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together for the attainment of definite objects by close political association. It is created essentially for parliamentary action, and as the government of the nation is in the hands of Parliament, if a party is strong enough to command a majority in Parliament its end will be attained. In Germany this governing condition is absent, because the control is not in the hands of Parliament; Parliament may wish, but the Government decides. The inevitable result is that the bond of union between the members of the party is to be found not so much in a definite object which they wish to attain but in adherence to some abstract principle of thought. How different is the position in English politics is clear from the history of the great parties. The Liberal Party, for example, has always been able to associate together and keep within itself men who in the nature of their thought, their attitude of mind, their home influences, are very divergent from one another. It was the stress or the necessity of common action, and this alone, which enabled or compelled men so far apart as, for instance, Lord Melbourne, Lord John Russell, Lord Durham, Mr. Grote and Mr. Hume, to co-operate with one another, just in the same way as nothing but the insistent call to carry on the war could hold together the members of the present Government. With the rapid development of democratic ideas in the course of the nineteenth century, the fissiparous tendency naturally pressed with greater force on the party of change and reform. The strain was always felt; rupture was often imminent, and at an exceptional crisis, such as that created by the introduction of Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill, rupture occurred. But generally the cohesion of the party was maintained, and this was because the leading members of it were either sitting together in the Cabinet administering the affairs of the nation, or because even when in opposition they were always conscious that the time would sooner or later come when they would have willy-nilly to bear these joint responsibilities.

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It is impossible to over-estimate the value of the political training which comes from such association. And this is what Germany has altogether lacked. There has been no common action springing from common responsibilities, and, as a result, there has been no restraint on the division of parties. If to-day we have, for instance, the National Liberals, the Freisinnige, the Volkspartei, and the Majority Socialists, each with their separate group, each insisting in season and out of season on the particular principles and theories which that group has been established to maintain, the real cause must be found not in some peculiar perversion of the German intellect. Rather the perversion of the intellect is a result of the circumstances. Given German conditions, the outcome is inevitable. Men will more and more insist on abstract principles ; their speeches will become academic ; parties will become societies of theorists ; and the men of practical ability, real political insight, and energy will become less and less inclined to devote their lives to the empty thrashing of parliamentary husks.

V. THE COMING CHANGE

THERE is only one solution. The origin of all the difficulties, external and internal, is the same ; everything is sacrificed in order to maintain the principle of autocracy in military and foreign affairs. This fact will have to be fairly and clearly met. The Reichstag must definitely claim and secure full right to criticise, control, and direct the external policy of the State, and also to assert its supremacy over the army. The conception of the army as a monarchical and not as a national institution is one that in modern times—and especially with universal service—cannot be maintained in any civilised country. It is in recognition of this that the committee appointed to consider reform have put forward as one of their recommendations that the appoint-

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ment of officers shall be taken from the Emperor's Military Cabinet and transferred to the Minister of War, who is responsible to the Prussian Parliament. But with the details we are not concerned now—only with the general principle.

If the full control over the army were secured by Parliament, then there would inevitably result the gradual disappearance of the whole doctrine of militarism which has for the last thirty years been such a poisonous element in German intellectual life. This doctrine in the extreme form of which we have heard so much has been deliberately encouraged and fostered by the Government; it would be impossible for it to be maintained if it was subjected to the free criticism which is the very element of all parliamentary institutions. It is in fact a doctrine against which there have been constant protests in Germany itself. We need only refer to the crucial instance of Zabern. It was in this episode that the doctrine was translated into practice in the crudest and most offensive manner; it led, as it could not but lead, to acute criticism, and it produced something new in German politics, what in effect was a formal vote of censure upon the Chancellor. We all know the result. The Reichstag were told that this was a matter outside their competence, that he was responsible not to them but to the Emperor, and that it was in the hands of the Emperor that control of the army rested. The Reichstag acquiesced; they had not the will or the power to enforce their opposition. Why were they so weak? The real reason must probably be found in the fact to which we have already referred, that they seriously believed that, if anything was done to tamper with the military system as it existed, it would react upon external politics and bring about disaster to the country. The Zabern incident was the shadow of the coming war; it was the first breath of the storm that was approaching.

But in truth a great and powerful Government such as

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that which has existed for the last generation in Germany cannot be overthrown except by its own fault. Its fall, when it comes, will come from internal weakness or from its own blunders. In particular all theoretical discussions as to whether a particular form of government is in harmony with the spirit of the times, whether it accords with the formulas put forward by particular thinkers in its own or other countries, are merely ripples on the surface of the water. A great Government is not overthrown by these means. It creates its own atmosphere, it forms opinion. And if appeal were made to the principles of democracy, to the theories of constitutionalism, the German Government and its apologists could answer: "These things may be true for other countries and other times; they do not apply to the Germany of to-day; those who use this language are merely reiterating the worn-out formulas of bygone generations. The German Government is by its existence, its strength, its success, a new contribution to the science of politics, and no criticism is worth considering which is merely repetition of what men said who had not had the advantage of studying this new growth." Such was in fact the line of argument which at the beginning of the war was pursued by the best apologists of Germany. When there was presented to them the contrast between the free institutions of France, England, and America on the one side and those of Germany on the other, they did not shrink from the comparison; they welcomed it. They adopted a tone not of humility, of apology, of explanation, or of deference, but they came boldly out in the field and challenged the world to say that German institutions had not in fact been more successful in producing all that is essential to good government than those founded on the rival system.

The world's condemnation, therefore, is not enough. The overthrow of the German system requires that the German Government itself should decree its own fall by so

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managing the affairs of the nation that it brought about some great catastrophe. It is necessary that it should fail, and fail in such a manner as to leave the German people no alternative except to interfere themselves, to take the reins of authority out of its hands, and thus in fact to establish a new form of government. This was what happened in England in the seventeenth century. The monarchy was so firmly established by the Tudors that with reasonably good government, with ordinary sense and discretion, it could have ignored or divided the attacks made upon it by what were, after all, the insignificant parties of opposition, and this although the Parliament had behind it even then the traditions of centuries and was able to appeal to the immemorial traditions of English freedom. What brought it down was not the opposition from outside, but the internal incompetence of the first two Stuart Kings. It was financial mismanagement, coupled with a weak and often disastrous foreign policy. And even then the overthrow would probably not have taken place had not the Government, with an extraordinary blindness, stirred up rebellion in Scotland, and found itself compelled to appeal to the Parliament and the people in order to defend the country from an attack for which they themselves were responsible. It was not the criticism of the Encyclopædists, of Rousseau, and of Voltaire which of itself overthrew the *ancien régime* of France. It fell because, though the King ruled over the richest country in the world, though he had great possessions, a great army and a great navy, though he had among his subjects the most accomplished nobles and the most highly educated middle class and the most laborious peasantry, he had allowed the affairs of the country to fall into financial disorder, and by perpetuating an unjust system of taxation had condemned the peasants to penury and starvation.

And so it will be with the German Government. It will fall because it has brought the country to disaster. And already thoughtful Germans are beginning to recognise the

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truth. A careful study of the newspapers and periodicals during the last weeks reveals, severe as is the control of the censor, the growth of a conviction that there has been and is some fundamental fault in the management of affairs, and this is not in the internal administration, but just in that department which is the peculiar reserve of the Emperor and the Chancellor appointed by and solely responsible to him. In one thing indeed there is unanimity in Germany, in the emphatic condemnation of the Foreign Office, both during and before the war. The belief has been growing that it was official incompetence that led to one catastrophe—the war—and is fast leading to another catastrophe—defeat. It was this belief that brought about at last the interference of the Reichstag, an interference which for the moment showed an energy and force of will rare in that body. Nor was it by any means unsuccessful. It led to the fall of the Chancellor, to a change in the personality. A new Chancellor was appointed, though in the choice the Reichstag was not consulted. For the moment the agitation was stilled, but no one who watches the movement of opinion can doubt that it will soon be renewed; for what requires change is not the person but the system. This has been brought out by Prince Lichnowsky in an interesting article which appeared a few weeks ago in the *Berliner Tageblatt*. After referring to the successful conduct of foreign affairs under previous Ministers and contrasting it with the weakness which has become apparent in recent years, he continues:—

I deliberately refrain from all personal observations, but if I am to keep to the point, I must ask myself: "Does not the fault lie in the system?"

The system puts all on one card, plays, so to say, for the great stake. The fate of the nation lies in the hands of a single official, who, however, is only rarely qualified for such a task—the "one-man system" as the English call it. While with them every question of importance is first of all brought before a Cabinet, a college consisting of some twenty members, which again remains in constant touch with the parliamentary majority, and in important questions

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of foreign policy also with the Opposition, among us everything lies in the hands of a single Minister, who allows himself to be advised by irresponsible and often unsuitable or unbalanced subordinates.

He has indeed to take the orders of the Monarch, and he makes the final decision.

But, he goes on to explain, the influence and decision of the Emperor is much more rarely used than is generally supposed, for he is in reality dependent upon the reports made to him by his Minister, and it is on the Minister that the real responsibility rests.

Will this system [he continues], the system of individualised responsibility, of the unlimited power of the officials, be maintainable after the war? Must the monarchical idea be endangered if the responsibility rests on a broader basis, if in place of a single man a college is there, and if this college again, without having to consist of members of parliament, finds itself in closer relationship with the representatives of the people and with the majority parties in organic co-operation? Real questions which decide the fate of a nation continue to be determined in the bureaucratic patriarchal manner without transferring the principle of self-government to the business of the State and of the nation, and giving to the nation a widened right of self-determination.

Here, then, is an experienced, thoughtful man, who has never taken much part in internal affairs, but who has had the opportunity of studying at first hand the working of other systems, joining in the criticism which comes from the Socialist and the Liberal camps. It will be noticed that the whole weight of it arises from the fact that the system criticised has in fact failed—failed whatever now may be the final issue of the war. For even if by some strange chance the Germans emerged from the war without complete and absolute disaster, it is inconceivable that any impartial critic in the future would not repeat the judgment that the occurrence of the war at all in the form which it took was conclusive evidence of mismanagement in the highest places. It is, as Prince Lichnowsky says, the system which is at fault.

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The same criticism has been made in even stronger words by an anonymous writer in the Press : *

That is the great misfortune of the German nation, that its external business is traditionally weighed down with the whole weight of internal struggle. This poisonous internal atmosphere destroys our diplomacy at the birth. The leaders of great historical parties, who usually speak of patriotism and loyalty, are not ashamed of blowing into flame the spark of war, which is always in existence somewhere, in order to cook their broth, and a whole retinue of professors and journalists gives them their assistance.

But this criticism of the system, which is now appearing in growing volume in Germany itself, is in its essence identical with that which is made in this and other countries, that the fundamental fault was that the final decision lay not in the hands of the representatives of the people but in those of a small group of men whose actions were withdrawn from popular or parliamentary control, and who in the last resource depended on the advice of an unofficial clique.

There is only one remedy : the system must be altered, the military power of the Emperor must be overthrown ; and, when this is done, perhaps we shall see a time when the foreign affairs of Germany are managed with something of the skill and success which have attended the internal government with which the Emperor has little to do. This change can only be made by the German people themselves and it will not be made until it has become clear to them that they are suffering from the incompetence of their rulers. Then, but not till then, they will act, they will take the management of their own destinies into their own hands. This will be the inevitable result of a defeat—victory would have been fatal to any hopes of German liberty. And a reformation of the German Government would not, as is wrongly insisted by many German writers, make Germany weak and helpless, or leave her at the mercy of a hostile coalition ; it would by itself dissolve the hostile coalition,

* *Frankfurter Zeitung*, quoted in the *Westminster Gazette* of July 31, 1917.

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for it would remove the causes of it ; it would make Germany weak indeed for aggression and violence, but it would leave her as strong as she ever was for defence. The example of France and Britain will at least have taught the German people this—that a great army, fighting to the last with unconquerable courage, is not, as they have been told with a childish perversion of every fact, the monopoly of an autocratic State ; and they will learn that a free Germany can be as patriotic, as strong, as resolute as other free countries.

FINANCE AFTER THE WAR

SEVERAL articles have already been published in THE ROUND TABLE dealing with the financial problems of the war. They have dealt with the existing state of things and have been based on a study of existing conditions. In the present article it is the future which will be considered, and a future the distance of which from the present is still uncertain. We shall be moving, therefore, in a region not only of conjecture but of conjecture contingent on the period of the war's ending. The financial position will not be the same if the war ends this year as if it ends next year or the year after.

To follow each alternative in detail and to make a guess at the probable conditions in each case would be a waste of speculation. Let us take the simplest case and assume that the war comes to an end now; and on that hypothesis consider as far as we can see them the financial conditions which we should face. If our conclusions are in any way correct they will at least be a guide in estimating the conditions which are likely to prevail at the termination of the war at an uncertain later date.

I. RISE OF PRICES : ITS EFFECT ON INTEREST BURDEN

IF the war should end to-morrow perhaps the most general change in financial conditions from those of the pre-war period would be the rise in prices of commodities throughout the world. In the United Kingdom the index number

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—the fingerpost of commodity prices—has risen from 2,565 in July, 1914, to 5,379 in April, 1917. In some other countries commodity prices have risen more, in others less. But in all there has been a rise, and a great rise, which would have been even greater but for the artificial restrictions imposed by Governments on prices and on the general dealings of trade.

The causes of this rise in prices are various, and different in the cases of different commodities. But a general cause and probably the most important of all is the general expansion of currency—in belligerent European countries, through the issue of large amounts of paper money; in the United States and to a less extent in some other countries, through the importation of large amounts of gold; and in all countries through the inflation of credit.

This cause of high prices will not disappear at the advent of peace, nor will some of the others. There is no reason therefore to expect that peace will bring any great fall in the prices of commodities, speaking generally, although it may in individual cases.

Now, one result of high commodity prices is to lessen the burden imposed on a community by interest-bearing debt. For the rate of interest has been fixed beforehand and the interest is ultimately paid in commodities which are the product of the labour of the community. If the price of commodities is high it needs a lesser quantity of them to pay the same amount of interest; that is to say, the proportion of the annual production of the community which is absorbed in the payment of interest charges on borrowed money will be less. This applies to the interest on private as well as on public debt.

This reduction in interest burden, if the interest be reckoned in terms of commodities, will be a set-off against the increase in the burden of public debt which the communities of the belligerent countries will have to bear on account of the war loans contracted by their Governments. The result, of course, will work out differently for each

Prices and Interest Burden

country according to its circumstances. Let us take the case of the United Kingdom. At the outbreak of war the national and municipal debts of the United Kingdom amounted, in round figures, to 1,200 million pounds sterling. The capital invested in railways in the United Kingdom was, in round figures, 1,300 million pounds sterling. We have thus a total capital liability of 2,500 million pounds on which the interest charge is practically fixed, either by law or by the custom of expecting a certain rate of interest from certain securities, such as railway shares. The annual interest charge in respect of this capital liability of 2,500 million pounds may be put at an average of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., say $87\frac{1}{2}$ million pounds a year. It is difficult to obtain statistics of the non-variable charges of other joint stock companies, operating in the United Kingdom, in the way of interest on debenture debts or on preference stocks, but we shall probably not be overstating the amount in putting it at from 20 to 25 millions annually. This will bring the fixed interest charges payable in the United Kingdom before the war to a figure of about 110 millions annually in respect of the particular class of indebtedness specified above.

During the war the National Debt has been increased in round figures by 2,400 million pounds sterling (after deducting loans to the Allies and the Dominions so as to arrive at the net increase in indebtedness). The annual interest on this increase at five per cent. is 120 million pounds. Apart from the increase in the National Debt the increase in the indebtedness of the community has been small, as private borrowing has been insignificant. The fixed interest charges on the community of the United Kingdom may therefore be taken to have risen from 110 millions to 230 millions, or by 110 per cent. But the increase in commodity prices, according to the index figures given above, has been practically the same, viz., about 110 per cent. Assuming these figures to be a fair guide to the increase in the prices of commodities produced in the

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United Kingdom, it is clear that the proportion of the production of the United Kingdom required to pay the above fixed interest on the indebtedness of the community will be no greater than before, although the amount of interest will be much higher reckoned in terms of money.

The above calculation takes no account of the great volume of private indebtedness existing before the war in the shape of mortgages, etc. Its inclusion would, of course, make the effect of the rise of prices in lessening the real interest charge on the community still more apparent.

It may be objected that one man's gain is another man's loss, and that, if a community gains in one way by having to devote a less proportion of its annual production to paying interest charges, the members of the community to whom the interest is due lose in a corresponding degree. This is true, but it nevertheless remains true that the burden on the community is lessened. For, though there are exceptions, it may be stated as a general rule that the effect of income arising from interest is to enable the individuals receiving it to live either without labour or with less labour than they would otherwise have performed; in other words, to increase the number of drones—using the word in no offensive sense. The payment of interest charges, therefore, is a real burden on the community, even though the interest be paid to individuals composing the community, because it enables those individuals to live without productive labour, and generally leads to their doing so, and thus diminishes the number of workers.

If prices after the war went back to pre-war figures the interest on the pre-war indebtedness of the community, reckoned in terms of commodities, would be the same. The interest on the war debt would have to be added to it and the real burden on the community would be doubled. But, as shown above, the interest on the pre-war indebtedness of the community, reckoned in terms of commodities, has shrunk through the rise in prices, in the same pro-

Prices and External Debt

portion as the amount, in terms of money, has been increased. The actual burden on the community is not therefore any greater than before.

II. RISE OF PRICES : ITS EFFECT ON EXTERNAL DEBT

THE effect of the above change in prices will be felt in relation to external as well as to internal debt. It will act to the advantage of debtor countries and to the disadvantage of creditor countries. Let us still consider the case of the United Kingdom, which is a creditor country and which lives partly on the yearly interest of its accumulated capital invested abroad. The total amount of this invested capital has not been greatly changed by the war. It is true that the United Kingdom has realised a great part of its capital investments in the United States and to a less degree its Canadian investments and some others. It has also called in its floating balances abroad. Thus it has decreased its loans to various countries and the amount of the annual interest derived therefrom. In addition it has incurred an external debt by borrowing in the United States a sum which may be estimated at two hundred million pounds* on which it will have to pay interest in future, the amount of which is a set-off against its income from foreign investments. But, on the other hand, the United Kingdom has made loans to its Allies and the Dominions to the extent of nearly one thousand million pounds sterling. This is probably a somewhat greater amount than the amount of the floating balances called in plus the amount of various investments realised or pledged plus the amount of the loans contracted in the United States. One transaction balances the other. After the war the United Kingdom will draw as much interest from abroad as it did before, in terms of

* This does not include the borrowings against collateral securities. The pledged securities are a set-off against this.

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money : but it will draw the interest from a different debtor, for example, from France and Russia instead of from the United States.

Nevertheless, though the amount of interest will be the same in terms of money, the real value of the amount will be so much less on account of the higher prices of commodities prevailing. The United Kingdom will receive a smaller amount of commodities which will represent the same amount of interest in terms of money. If the interest on these various loans brings in a smaller amount of commodities than before the country will in reality be poorer to that extent, just as the man with a fixed income arising from investments becomes poorer when prices rise.

On the other hand, a debtor country, such as Canada, will benefit because it will be able to pay its interest charges with a less quantity of commodities than before. It may well be that this benefit, for some debtor and belligerent countries, will more than counterbalance any actual increase in the amount of their external debt. Certainly it will be so in the case of Canada. Before the war Canada's indebtedness to external investors may be put in round figures at five thousand million dollars, carrying an interest charge of two hundred and fifty million dollars yearly. It is doubtful if the external debt of Canada has been increased much, even in terms of money, during the war. For the external loans contracted by Canada in the United States are probably offset by the extent to which private liabilities due from Canada to the United Kingdom have been paid off during the war. The external interest charge on the Canadian community will therefore be the same, reckoned in money, but reckoned in commodities it will be much less than before. If the commodities which Canada produces have risen in price by as much as the general average rise, that is, by over 100 per cent., Canada will have to pay only half as much in terms of commodities to discharge the same amount of interest as before the war.

Producing and Consuming Capacity

If the production of commodities in Canada after the war is the same as it was before, a less proportion of it will be eaten up by the interest charges of the external debt and the country will be so much the richer.

Similarly, France will be poorer and Russia richer after the war than before, in so far as the interest due to the one and payable by the other will be dischargeable by a smaller amount of commodities than it was before.

III. INCREASE IN PRODUCING AND CONSUMING CAPACITY

IF the war ended to-morrow the actual impairment of the world's wealth caused by it would probably be found to be much less than is generally supposed. This impairment of wealth may be divided under two heads: first the destruction of property in the fighting zone: second, the running down of the machinery of production and transport and of the equipment of life in the belligerent countries and in others affected by the war. Of these two items the second is the more important, though it is the less evident at present to the eye. The actual destruction of property in the ground fought over by the armies has, of course, been considerable. But it is not relatively extensive, nor, except in certain small regions, complete. Some of it, no doubt, has already been repaired—for example, in Belgium. Some of it will only be repaired slowly.

But in all the belligerent countries the ordinary work of repair and betterment and improvement—especially so far as concerns the amenities rather than the necessities of life—has been checked or altogether suspended. Expenditure on railways, roads, and buildings has been severely cut down. The machinery of transport by sea and by land has been used to its utmost, and, on the whole, destroyed faster than it has been replaced. All the belligerent countries will have much to do to bring their equipment

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in the above matters to the same condition as that in which it stood before the war.

On the other hand, it seems probable that the productive capacity of the world has not diminished but increased during the war. The actual machinery of production has been destroyed comparatively little and has been largely added to. It is true that much of the new machinery has been established for the purpose of producing munitions of war, but a large part of it can be turned to other purposes. In the United Kingdom and probably in most other countries there has been a great extension in the boundaries of the class performing productive labour. This and a greater intensity of labour have the result that, in spite of the enormous number of men withdrawn for service in the field, the total production of the country in all lines taken together is greater than it was before the war. When the armies in the field return to the ranks of producers the productive capacities of all the belligerent countries should therefore be much higher than before—though allowance must be made for the difficulty with which returned soldiers settle down again to habits of regular industry.

As the producing capacity of all the belligerent countries after the war will be much higher than before, so the demand for consumption will be higher ; partly on account of the necessity of replacing what has been lost, wasted, or gone out of repair ; partly on account of the higher standard of living among the mass of the working classes in all countries, brought about by high wages and war expenditure.

IV. INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY AFTER THE WAR : RETARDING FACTORS

THE conditions indicated above as prevailing at the end of the war—high prices, abundance of currency, easing of the burden of interest charges on private debtors, an extraordinary demand both for the common articles of con-

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sumption and for the material and supplies required for replacement and betterment of the world's equipment, an increased capacity for production through the addition of new machinery and an increase in the numbers of the labour force—all these conditions point to nothing else but a period of unusual activity in industry and commerce.

There are, however, three other conditions to be mentioned which may prove retarding factors. The first factor is certain but temporary. The other two are merely possible, and whether they come into play or not depends mostly on psychological considerations.

The first retarding factor will be shortage of transport. The merchant ship tonnage of the world may be less at the end of the war than at the beginning; and most of the ships will be badly in need of rest and repair. The railroads of the world will certainly be in bad condition, with their roadbed and equipment deteriorated and their rolling stock worn out and short in quantity. Until these deficiencies are repaired the transport of goods by sea and land will be more than ordinarily long and expensive. That will be a retarding factor to commerce.

The next retarding factor, which may or may not come into play, is that of difficult credit. Currency will be abundant, and if bankers follow their usual tendency and are governed in their attitude toward credit by the position of currency reserves, credit will be plentiful and it will be easy to get money for new business. It is possible, however, that a feeling of uncertainty about conditions may make the financial world timid; and that the business of taking up and putting into permanent form the great amount of floating Government liabilities created during the war may absorb the best part of their energy. This may lead to a stringency in credit which, of course, would hamper commercial activity. It is not a necessary nor on the whole a likely condition, but it must be mentioned as a possible factor of retardation.

The last factor which is also uncertain is the possibility

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of widespread labour unrest, arising on the one hand from the reluctance of the returned soldiers to settle down again to habits of plodding industry and from their difficulty in conforming to the standards of intensive industry set during the war; on the other hand from the reluctance of employers to pay the higher wages which will be generally demanded. It will be a calamity for the world if these conflicting feelings lead to a succession of industrial wars between employers and employees. It cannot, however, be dismissed as an impossibility. Whether and to what extent it comes about will depend mainly on the frame of mind in which the end of the war finds the classes concerned.

V. PROBABLE LATER DEVELOPMENTS

IT seems, therefore, that we should expect the end of the war, if it came to-morrow, to be followed by a period of intense industrial and commercial activity—possibly modified in some countries, or even generally, by one or all of the retarding factors mentioned above. There will follow an extraordinary production of commodities in every direction. For some time this will be absorbed by the increased consumption of daily life and by the replacement of the material which has been destroyed, and by the repair of the world's equipment which has run down. When the latter task has been overtaken—and it will not take very long—there will be a possibility of a condition of over-production setting in, with the usual attendant circumstances of falling prices, curtailment of credit, increase in the real burden of debt, and spreading stagnation.

It is not, however, necessary that this should happen. The production which is no longer needed for replacement and repair may be absorbed by the development of new countries. Here, again, the question will be a psychological one. There are large areas of the globe now comparatively unproductive, where capital can be spent to the

Later Developments

ultimate advantage of the world, if people can be found to take the trouble and self-denial of accumulating it and the risk of employing it. But for schemes of development where the return is certainly distant and not certainly assured, easy credit is essential. Credit depends partly on actual conditions, partly on the temper of banks and financial institutions. If those who manage the world's finances are inclined, when the period of over-production draws near, to throw themselves zealously into the development of new countries to a greater productiveness, the period of stagnation may be avoided. If, on the other hand, they find themselves in a timid and conservative frame of mind, credit will grow difficult, and the over-production of commodities, finding no new fields to absorb it, will soon make itself felt, with the usual consequences.

It is worth while here to emphasise the fact that, from the point of view of the world, development of productiveness in new directions is good, although the return on the capital invested in the development may be poor. For the alternative may be that the capital is not employed at all or is not even brought into existence. To take a concrete example. From the point of view of the individual investor it is bad that he should put his money into a new railroad—say, in Russia or South America—unless it will bring him in an average return on his money—say, five per cent. But the world may be the richer for the railroad being built even if the investor only gets one or two per cent.—even though he gets nothing—if the productiveness of the world and the supply of useful commodities is thereby increased. For the alternative may be, not that the capital invested in the railroad would have been more productively employed, but that it would never have come into existence at all. The materials in the shape of steel rails, and so on, might have remained in the ground and the labour employed on manufacturing and laying them might have been left unemployed and in idleness.

This argument is not to be taken as a general defence

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of non-paying enterprises. Generally speaking, the question whether an enterprise will pay the usual rate of interest or not is a good rough test of its usefulness. Even this is not universal. Road-making has never paid from the time of the Romans down, but without question it has made the world richer. The general argument, however, is that while a less paying enterprise may not be beneficial to the world if a better paying enterprise could have been undertaken with the capital employed, it may be beneficial if the alternative is that no enterprise is undertaken at all and that the real capital employed in the form of commodities is not brought into existence at all but is left a mere potentiality in the shape of unused raw materials and idle labour.

VI. THE PROBLEM OF THE NATIONAL DEBTS

WE have left until the last the enormous increase in the national debts in the belligerent countries which will be an outstanding feature of financial conditions after the war. If the war ended to-morrow the national debt of the United Kingdom would stand at over three thousand millions sterling, after deducting the advances made to the Dominions and the Allies. A similar condition of public indebtedness will confront France and Russia. To deal adequately with the problem thus set up will be a task worthy of the best thought of public financiers. The subject is one which requires fuller discussion than it is possible to undertake in this article. It may be worth while, however, to mention some of the alternative suggestions which have been made for dealing with it.

One way suggested is to leave the whole amount as a permanent funded debt—that is, to reckon only on providing the interest and a comparatively small annual sinking fund out of current taxation. Another suggestion is to pay off the whole or the greater part of the war debt at once by a levy on capital. A third is a compromise between the

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first and second methods—namely, to extinguish the debt within a limited time by devoting to that purpose some special taxation, which would probably in effect be a levy on capital—for example, a special scale of death duties—but which would take effect over a number of years instead of at once.

The argument for the first method is that it is conservative and simple and involves nothing new or experimental. Against it, first of all, is the consideration that it lays so great a permanent burden on the State revenues that they will be overweighted and inelastic. It is argued that this will lead to chronic embarrassment and probably to unsound methods of taxation. A further objection is raised that this huge State debt will absorb the savings of the community, and will be a constant drawback to the employment of capital in reproductive enterprises. Still another argument is that the time to pay off debt is when prices are high, and not to leave it until a fall in prices may make the real burden, measured in terms of commodities, so much the greater.

The second method proposed—namely, to pay off the war debt at once by a levy on capital—is at first sight somewhat startling. The advantage in it as compared with the first method is that it cleans the slate and leaves the public finances in an unembarrassed condition. The main objections to it are, first, the difficulty of applying it; second, the fact that the burden would fall exclusively on the present owners of property. The latter objection is the more serious. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the sacrifice is necessary, and that even if the war debt be funded the bulk of the taxation necessary to provide the interest and sinking fund would have to be laid on the propertied classes. Assuming that to be so, it may be indifferent to the capitalist whether he gives up at once, say, a sixth of his capital or is compelled to give up annually a sixth of his income in the form of extra taxation. There is this difference, however, that in the latter case future accumula-

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tions of capital also would pay, while they would be exempt if the war debt were wiped out at once. It is arguable that this would be to the advantage of the community, since it would put a greater premium on future exertions.

The difficulty of applying the method of a levy on capital is probably not so great as appears at first sight. Take, for instance, the case of the United Kingdom. The total capital wealth of the community may be estimated at about 24,000 millions sterling. To pay off a war debt of 3,000 millions sterling would therefore require a levy of one-eighth. Evidently this could not be raised in money, nor would it be necessary. Holders of war loans would pay their proportion in a simple way, by surrendering one-eighth of their scrip. Holders of other forms of property would be assessed for one-eighth of its value and be called on to acquire and to surrender to the State the same amount of war loan scrip. To do this they would be obliged to realise a part of their property or to mortgage it. But there is no insuperable difficulty about that. In the case of property already mortgaged the holder of the property might be responsible for the whole levy and might be allowed to raise a prior mortgage to cover it, and thereafter to deduct the proper proportion from the capital amount due to the previous mortgagee. Thus, a man having a property assessed at £80,000, encumbered with a mortgage for £40,000, would raise a prior mortgage of £10,000 and pay the levy on the whole property. But the capital amount of the old mortgage would be reduced from £40,000 to £35,000.

In this connection a suggestion may be mentioned for combining a levy on capital with a reform of the currency which has some elements of ingenuity. A considerable part of the accumulated capital of the United Kingdom is represented by the share capital and debenture debts of limited liability companies. It has been suggested that a decimal system of currency might be introduced by making the shilling worth tenpence and reducing the weight of

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gold in the sovereign by one-sixth, leaving the sovereign worth twenty shillings. The nominal capital and debenture debts of all limited liability companies would be left as at present in pounds. At the same time they would be required to pay to the State in the shape of war loan scrip an amount equivalent to one-sixth of the assessed value of their assets. As their real liability to debenture holders and shareholders would also have been reduced by one-sixth through the change in value of the pound, there would be no real change in the financial position of the companies, and in effect the levy would fall on debenture holders and on shareholders *pro rata* to their interest in the company. Such a levy would only cover the particular form of property which is represented by shares and debentures. Other forms of property would have to pay the levy in a different way.

The third method of extinguishing the war debt over a period of years, by earmarking some special form of taxation for that purpose, is neither open to all the objections against the second method nor would it carry all its advantages. It would be comparatively easy in application and could be arranged so as to fall on future as well as present accumulations of capital, and even on current earnings as well. On the other hand, like the first method, it would necessitate the devising of new ways of raising revenue on a large scale, to provide interest charges until the war debt was paid off.

Enough has been said to indicate some aspects of this problem. The fuller discussion of it must be left for another occasion.

SOME PROBLEMS IN DEMOCRACY AND RECONSTRUCTION

NOT the least striking consequence of the war has been the immense and quite unexpected expansion of governmental activity. It is hardly too much to say that almost every citizen capable of doing useful service is now engaged, directly or indirectly, in public service, and that all the great industries, from agriculture to engineering, are producing mainly on Government account, and in greater or less degree under some form of Government control. This does not mean that the whole nation is now organised as if it were a single economic organism. It rather means that the vast majority of the most important enterprises which had previously been producing on private account have now been co-ordinated, on conditions as to profit-making laid down by Parliament, so as to produce on public account, and that Departments of State have now sprung into being whose chief function is not to do the work of production themselves, but to supervise and control private enterprise for national purposes. The community has not been converted into the Servile State dreamed of by some reformers, and dreaded by others, in which every citizen is a civil servant in a vast commercial machine. It has rather become integrated so that the unity of the nation previously manifest in Legislation, the Civil Service, or the Army and Navy has now begun to display itself in the field of commerce and industry as well.

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The day, in fact, has dawned when the principles of organisation are being consciously applied to the whole life of the nation. We have begun to realise that it is uneconomical, and, indeed, immoral, that the provision of the vital needs of the nation—food, raw material for industry, coal, communications, and so forth—should be left to an immense number of private agencies, each thinking first and foremost of its own private interest and competing desperately with its rivals in the business. The community has been driven by the war to recognise that, if adequate supplies of these articles and services are to be available at reasonable prices for its citizens, it must exercise much more supervision over national industry than it has done in the past—a course which is bound in turn to transform international economic relations, because every country will deal with foreign countries both as a buyer and as a seller. It is now, indeed, apparent to most people that the principles of harmonious organisation—principles which prevent waste from competition, overlapping, over-production or under-production, which give to each individual a share of useful work, and which require that every citizen, whether he be employer or employed, capitalist or land-owner, should employ his services or his possessions in some measure on public account and not entirely for his own private ends—must be applied to the national life as a whole.

It is easy enough to state these general propositions. It is quite a different matter to apply them. For we are faced by a problem different from any which has yet presented itself to the world, and which it will take much patience and good will to solve. It is easy enough to conceive of a community in a high state of national organisation, if every citizen and every business were willing to obey implicitly orders given by a few supermen at the top. That, indeed, was the Prussian dream, and Germany has gone some way to realise it during the war. But such an idea is repellent to every free mind. We have entered

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the war largely to prevent it being applied to the whole world by a triumphant Military State. To the Anglo-Saxon mind, and to all people who understand freedom, order and progress come not from blind obedience to human authority, but from conduct by the individual in obedience to law. The Prussian idea involves the surrender of all individual reason and initiative to the thinking of the few; the free idea involves the understanding by every citizen of the principles which govern national life and activity, so that he may take an intelligent and spontaneous part in promoting them. To free men the purpose of the State is not the achievement of some triumph or end by the community organised from the centre for the purpose, but to enable every citizen to live the best life he can, in accordance with his own choice, provided that in so doing he recognises his duty to respect the rights and to contribute to the well-being of his neighbours. And it does this not by magnifying the prestige of authority, but by maintaining the reign of just law, which is the means whereby the leading of the life of freedom can alone be made possible for all.

When we come to apply these ideas to the problem of national organisation as it will present itself after the war, it is at once apparent that the simple Prussian method cannot succeed. The true purpose of the State is to enable every citizen to understand the responsibilities of citizenship and to enjoy freedom. But in a democratic State the citizen must not only submit himself to the reign of law, but assume equal responsibility with all his fellow citizens both for framing and defending the law, and if the life of the community is to be healthy he must also perform his due share of the work necessary for the communal well-being. In the organisation of that service it is of the essence of the case to preserve the maximum of initiative and enterprise and local autonomy for the individual, whether that individual be a worker or a firm, provided that a sufficient part of his efforts is in a direc-

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tion consistent with or required by the national well-being. Freedom will be realised in the national organisation of production and distribution exactly in proportion as the work of national supply is based upon the spontaneous, public-spirited activity of the citizens, co-ordinated from the centre on clearly defined principles, and not upon orders issued from the centre and unthinkingly or sullenly obeyed by the individuals at the extremity of the organisation.

The experience of the war has given us some indication of the kind of national economic organisation to which we may look forward. The most characteristic feature of the new war order has been the appearance of the controllers of production and distribution. They have appeared under different names, but their functions are very similar. There is the railway executive board which has charge of the national railways. There are the Ministry of Munitions, with the double function of producing shells, guns and other munitions for the Army and Navy, and of providing raw material in the shape of metals of all sorts and kinds for the national industries. There is the Shipping Controller, the Food Controller, and the Coal Controller. There are other less important bodies which control timber and petroleum, wheat, sugar, and other articles. In all these cases the universal rule has been to utilise all existing private agencies, to organise and correlate them so that their activities are more and more on public account, and to fix the maximum rate of profit which may be made. We have here in development an entirely new system. The Controllers do not conduct business. In close association with the representatives of both employers and employed they supervise businesses hitherto entirely privately owned and managed, to see that they are conducted to the best advantage of the community. It is certain that this system will not wholly disappear. To abolish it would simply be to hand over to private hands what would, in view of experience and knowledge and habits created during this

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war, rapidly become monopoly trusts in all the more important national industries now organised under the various Controllers and Ministers. Somehow or other the organic unity so established, not only between the many small firms in each of these national industries but between the national industries themselves, must be preserved. As a consequence of this, it will be possible for the first time to base production and distribution on a reasonably accurate knowledge of national demand, thereby immensely diminishing the risks and uncertainties incidental to unlimited competition, to ensure an adequate supply of the national staples, and especially of food, raw materials, and transportation, at reasonable and relatively constant prices, and to enter into economic relations with other nations with a sound knowledge of what the nation has to sell or wants to buy abroad. At the same time the national industrial life will still be based upon freedom and not on centralised autocracy. There will be left the fullest room for local autonomy and individual enterprise, always provided it is exhibited in directions consonant with the general good. But, what is most important of all, it ought to be possible so to develop the system thus brought into being in the war as to make it possible in each industry for the representatives of the employers, of the trades unions, and of the State to control together the higher direction of the industry as a whole and the conditions as to hours, wages, and profits under which it is conducted.

There is another aspect of the expansion of Government activities which it is important to consider. There can be no doubt that a great part of this expansion is going to be permanent. There will doubtless be some contraction, but the scope of national activity is bound to be far greater after the war than it was before. This must involve a very considerable change in our constitutional system. It will involve a change for two reasons. In the first place, the old Cabinet system, involving, as it must under modern conditions, a Cabinet of at least thirty people, has proved

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itself quite unfit to deal with the endless complications of modern organised national life so long as the control is centralised in the hands of one set of men. Under the pressure of war it has been found necessary to concentrate supreme power in the hands of a small Cabinet of six men, only one of whom has departmental duties, who exercise a vague but unquestionable supervision over the activities of a number of Ministers, each of whom speaks for his own department in Parliament, but who have a very undefined share of responsibility for the national policy as a whole. This system, which works well enough during the war, when both Ministry and Parliament are absolutely united in working to win the war, is not likely to survive the return to peace, when differences of political opinion again become acute and Parliamentary life revives. Ministers will be unwilling to accept the overruling authority of a body like the War Cabinet, and Parliamentary opposition will make inevitable the revival in some form or other of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet.

The second reason why change is inevitable is because our existing system is becoming increasingly incompatible with responsible government. In previous articles in *THE ROUND TABLE* it has been pointed out that even before the war the expansion of the governmental business concentrated in the hands of a single Cabinet and Parliament was making practical democracy more and more difficult. It inevitably increased the autocratic power of the Cabinet, because it was becoming more and more impossible for Parliament to master the immense complexity of the business for which it was responsible, and because the members dared not vote against the Government on one issue since they thereby endangered its policy on another. It therefore increased the rigidity of the party machinery, and diminished the independence of the individual member by making him more and more of an animated ballot paper, cast not in accordance with his

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deliberate judgment, but as his leaders directed. Finally, it nullified the effective control of the electorate over Parliament and Cabinet, because it involved asking the electorate to adjudicate on a vast number of separate issues, each of immense importance, by means of a single vote. There is little doubt that the absence of any effective Parliamentary or electoral control over foreign policy before the war was in great measure due to the pre-occupation of Parliament and electorate with domestic affairs. There was no authority responsible to the electorate whose principal business it was to deal with external affairs.

For both these reasons it is fairly certain that considerable changes will have to be made in our constitutional system after the war if we are to combine efficient government with effective democracy. Democracy does not mean, as many seem to think, government in accordance with the whims and opinions of a vast electorate, ignorant of the practical problems involved, and played upon by every wind of rumour and suggestion. Mob rule is usually no better than tyrant rule. In reality good government means government in accordance with wisdom and justice and brotherhood and nothing else, and democracy is better than autocracy mainly because it throws the responsibility of seeing that the laws are wise and just on all the citizens instead of on a single man or class, and because an electorate is never likely to permit such bad laws to be passed as an autocrat or an oligarchy will impose upon docile subjects. In practice the essence of democracy is that the responsibility for government should be clearly located, and that the electorate should be able to decide at regular intervals, and at any time when the question is in doubt, whether the Ministry and Parliament responsible for the conduct of its affairs possess its confidence or not.

We do not propose in this article to offer any detailed conclusions as to the reforms which will be necessary if

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we are to combine the efficient conduct of the greatly enlarged field of governmental activity with the effective responsibility of those who conduct public affairs to the governed. We are only concerned to put forward one or two leading ideas on the subject.

The problem may be considered under three heads. There is first of all the question of external relations. This problem is greatly complicated by the inauguration of the Imperial Cabinet. Up to the present the British Government has conducted foreign relations as it has thought best, as trustee for the whole Empire. The evolution of the Imperial Cabinet is a practical recognition that foreign policy is now equally the concern of all the nations of the Empire. Under existing circumstances, therefore, it is bound to be discussed in all the national Parliaments. How control over foreign policy by the various national Parliaments within the Empire is to be reconciled with the fact that if the British Commonwealth is to remain a unity it must act and speak with a single voice and through a single authority is a difficulty still unsolved. As a matter of practical politics the difficulty might be dealt with in one of two ways: the British Government might be left for a time responsible for the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy and the major part of defence, subject to ever-increasing consultation and support from the Dominions, assembled in Imperial Cabinet and Imperial Conference: or the control of foreign policy, certain aspects of defence, and the finance necessary thereto, might be transferred to an Imperial Cabinet, separate from the British Cabinet and Parliament and responsible to an assembly representative of all the nations of the Empire. The first, which could only be a transitional arrangement, is not really consistent either with democracy or the full nationhood of the Dominions. The second, however, presents political difficulties of great complexity, which only the recognition of the paramount importance of the maintenance of the organic unity of the British Empire as a Commonwealth of

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Nations to the future not only of its peoples, but to the peace and freedom of the world, is likely to overcome.

Whatever method, however, is adopted for dealing with this aspect of the problem, it will not seriously simplify the difficulties which have arisen from the expansion of governmental activity and the over-concentration of responsibility in one set of hands. For, even if the Imperial Cabinet becomes differentiated from the British Cabinet, it will only relieve it of the responsibility of foreign policy and of certain aspects of defence—which are only a very small part of the field of the present-day public activities. There are two other ways in which the problem of congestion might be dealt with.

The first is that adopted in America and all the British Dominions, the method of administrative devolution on geographical lines. Leaving out of account the special political difficulties connected with Ireland now under consideration by the Irish Convention, and assuming that the Union is in principle preserved, this method would mean entrusting the control of, say, all local national affairs to national legislatures and Cabinets for England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. How little administrative change this would involve may be seen from the fact that the following departments are already separately administered in England, Scotland, and Ireland—local government, public health, education, franchise and elections, civil rights, agriculture, fisheries, ecclesiastical affairs, the administration of justice (except in the supreme courts), police, liquor traffic, hospitals, asylums, charities, reformatories, and prisons. Nothing would be easier from the administrative point of view than to lighten the load of the central government by transferring the control of these matters, together with the necessary taxing powers, to national legislatures representing the several kingdoms of which the United Kingdom is composed. Whatever opinions, however, may be formed about the right areas, and the powers which ought to be entrusted to the assem-

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blies representative of these areas, the method of geographical devolution has immense advantages. It relieves an overburdened central government of some of its excessive duties, it divides the responsibility for public affairs between two different sets of men, each of which is able to give its whole time to its work, and it enables the electorate to decide at separate elections upon disputed questions of policy, and on the rival aspirants for public office, in each sphere.

But there is one other method of dealing with the problem presented by the extension of Government activity, the possibility of which has only become evident during the war. There may well come to be a functional delegation of powers as well as a geographical. The integration of the great national industries during the war has already been described. This integration has been effected mainly through the action of the Government Controllers. But it has been successful only as the result of constant consultation with and active co-operation from the employers and the trades unions concerned. For reasons already given, it is certain that this work of co-ordination in production and distribution will not disappear after the war, though the almost despotic control now exercised by the State during the war will have to be greatly abated. Is it too much to expect that a means will be found whereby the supervision of the multitudinous firms and trades unions now co-ordinated into the staple national industries will be placed in the hands of a body which will be able to combine in itself the directing experience of the employer, the point of view of the employees and the authority of the community as a whole? Is it not possible that the higher direction and control of these great co-ordinated industries, now conducted by Ministers responsible to Parliament, will be devolved on to bodies representative of the principal partners in those industries, as well as of the State, which will wield statutory powers, without interference from the Government save in the event of

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scandalous mismanagement? It is, at any rate, worth while to suggest that consideration should be given to the possibility of devolving some of the new functions now concentrated in the hands of the existing Parliament and Cabinet at Westminster along these lines.

The outstanding fact of to-day is that we are approaching a period of national and international organisation quite unlike anything which has existed in the past, and that at a time when the movement for effective popular control, both over the political and the economic life of this nation, is rapidly growing. All this was inevitable owing to the development of industrial invention on the one side and of popular education on the other. It required the war, however, to awaken people sufficiently out of old habits of mind and old ways of doing things to see the new world which lay ahead, and to adapt themselves to it. It is now no longer a question of restoring pre-war conditions. It is rather one of seeing with clear eyes the immense possibilities of well-being for the human race which can come, after the war is won, from a resolute combination of democratic institutions with the conduct of public affairs in the spirit of the golden rule. Economic discords, like political discords, have come in the past from the concentration of the individual, the party, and the class on its own selfish interests and ideals. The war has brought to the surface a power of self-sacrifice for the common good, a sense of national unity and of the duty of every individual to render active service to his community, a recognition of the perils of autocracy in all its forms, and an appreciation of the necessity for friendly co-operation between all the members of the family of nations, which will be a priceless endowment when it comes to reconstruction. It only remains for those who survive the perils of war to face the work of reconstruction, looking forward and not backwards, unafraid of change, full of the joy of honest work, and determined that public service and not private profit shall be the motive of their lives.

THE UNITED STATES AT WAR

FIVE years ago the average American would have calmly and somewhat contemptuously ignored the prophecy that in the near future his country was destined to be involved in a world-wide war. So absorbed was he in his own domestic affairs, so aloof from the broad stream of world development, and so convinced that peaceful intercourse was to be the future inter-state dispensation, that he paid scant heed to what was happening beyond the national frontiers and belittled all adverse portents. Even the Great War did not fully reveal to him the underlying facts in recent international history and did not wholly enlighten him as to the reality and imminence of the German menace. For over thirty months he kept clinging tenaciously to the somewhat comforting delusion that the rest of the world had gone mad, that with the passing of this temporary aberration all would again be well, and that it was his own supreme duty to avoid the mighty suction of the European maelstrom.

Thus, when early in April Congress declared that a state of war with Germany existed, the American citizen was somewhat dazed at a situation which he was not accustomed to envisage as an actuality, and quite perplexed as to what it really implied. At first, his general impression was that America's participation in the contest would be limited to cordial and generous financial, industrial, and moral support to the Allies, supplemented by extensive relief work and medical assistance, and possibly also by the dispatch of comparatively unimportant naval and military

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expeditions to the European field of action. It was widely assumed at the outset that Germany would be constrained to acknowledge defeat before America would be able to intervene on a large scale.

These initial expectations were quickly seen to be illusory. The early undue optimism as to the virtual failure of the German submarine campaign soon gave place to an equally unwarranted exaggeration of its effectiveness, which, in turn, has been displaced by a sound realisation of the economic and military gravity of this situation. At the same time, serious and disturbing doubts arose as to the nature and extent of Russia's future part in the war. The informal armistice on the eastern front during the spring months, which disarranged the plans of the Allies elsewhere, seemed to demonstrate conclusively that a military decision was not attainable this year and made it evident that the United States was facing a most serious situation. This new outlook became even more precise after the British and French Commissions had described the position in Europe and had explained the vital urgency of extensive co-operation not alone in such matters as the construction of shipping, but in the very theatre of military action itself. Instead of merely assisting the victorious Allies in giving the *coup de grâce* to an already defeated enemy, the United States had to face the necessity of entering a war of indeterminate duration as one of the principals whose liabilities for successful prosecution were unlimited.

It is to the credit of American citizenship that this serious situation with its inscrutable future was faced with the necessary courage and that the individuals have responded with alacrity to every demand made upon them by the authorities. The Selective Draft Law did not arouse any extensive popular opposition, and the day of registration, when nearly ten million young men were enrolled for potential military service, passed with practically no disturbance. "Hyphenism," in so far as the American-born was concerned, was conclusively proved to be an evil much

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overrated in depth and extent. Similarly, the two billion dollar loan was largely over-subscribed by more than three million applicants and about two-thirds of the aggregate—to be exact, 65 per cent.—was allotted to those subscribing for ten thousand dollars and less. Although the interest rate— $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.—was below the normal one of the market place, and although the average American of moderate means is not accustomed to invest his savings in Government bonds and could not benefit at all proportionately to the very rich from the tax-exemption clause in the loan, comparatively small subscribers applied extensively. In most of these cases this implied a direct or indirect sacrifice of income. The remarkable popular success of the loan afforded full warrant for the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. McAdoo, that it was “a genuine triumph for democracy . . . the unmistakable expression of America’s determination to carry the war for the protection of American rights and the re-establishment of peace and liberty throughout the world to a swift and successful conclusion.” Equally notable and significant was the fact that in eight days more than a hundred million dollars were collected by the Red Cross, exclusively from private sources.

These are all decidedly encouraging features. They indicate clearly that the core of the American people is sound as of yore and that American citizens can be counted upon to do their patriotic duty in the national emergency. But coincident with the recognition of the seriousness of this emergency there arose a feeling of helplessness. It was realised that, even if America’s manhood had been carefully trained to arms and ready for immediate mobilisation, it would have been impossible to send large forces to Europe unless ships were available to transport them and to keep them supplied. This feeling of helplessness was irritating in the extreme and led in a romantic and impatient people, such as is the American, to rapidly succeeding hopes that the difficulty might be removed by dramatically sudden

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means. At first, the hope was in wooden ships, which were to be miraculously fashioned in large numbers from the virgin forests in an incredibly short time. Then it was expected that American ingenuity and inventiveness would find some sovereign remedy to render the submarine innocuous. And finally, America's special part was to build a vast horde of aeroplanes with which to carry the war into the heart of Germany and to "blind" her armies at the front. From these and other hopes something will emerge, but not in the short span that a generous people impatient of its helplessness would like.

In the meanwhile, the work of planning America's participation in the war was being undertaken deliberately and on sound lines by the Administration, which was recognising in increasing measure the serious responsibilities that had been assumed in consequence of the war that Germany had forced upon the country. The United States entered the conflict almost entirely unprepared to cope with the situation. Financially, owing to the new banking system inaugurated in 1914, and to the enormous influx of gold since then, conditions were most propitious and no disturbance of credit conditions ensued. Similarly, the general economic situation was one of exceptional prosperity, due largely to the abnormally large exports at high prices of the preceding two years, which, in their turn, had greatly stimulated domestic commerce. There were some dark spots on the horizon. The prospects for an adequate winter wheat crop were poor. Railroad facilities had fallen behind the country's needs, as the stringent system of regulation and the reluctance of the Government to permit the desired advances in rates had diverted capital to enterprises that promised larger and safer returns.

This very prosperity, accompanied as it was by inordinately high prices that bore absolutely no relation to the cost of production, presented certain grave difficulties such as had not beset the other belligerents. They had initiated their system of control and taxation with commodities on

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a normal and subnormal basis, while the United States was obliged to grapple with these problems when raw materials were exceedingly scarce and dear, while labour was not only greatly in demand and receiving unwonted compensation, but was also fully conscious of its power. The situation was and still is a difficult one, and it has rendered the task of economic mobilisation decidedly complicated. The advantage of "the flying start," gained from having supplied the Entente with munitions of war, was largely offset by other factors.

Moreover, Congress was not inclined to abdicate and to give plenary authority to the President. The legislators had with great promptitude passed the Declaration of War, the Conscription or Selective Draft Bill, and the law authorising the borrowing of seven billion dollars, but they balked at giving the Administration full control over the business of every American. For this reason, as well as for others, there has been considerable delay, at which Americans are grumbling in the manner characteristic of all English-speaking peoples. Those too close to the democratic political machine are prone to ignore the very real momentum in their irritation at the loose bearings and the lack of lubrication at places of friction.

Such delay is especially inevitable under the American political system, because it is based upon the doctrine and practice of the separation of powers. The separation of the Executive from the Legislature necessarily involves some lack of co-ordination. In addition, the rules of Congress are mechanical and antiquated. The greater part of the constructive and deliberative work is done in committee rooms, not upon the floors of the Chambers; and the chairman of each one of these all-important committees is merely that member of the dominant party who has served longest upon it. Nothing but seniority in service counts. Thus it has happened that in several of the most important Administration Bills the Democratic chairmen of the directly interested Senate and House Committees

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were actually opposed to the measures in question. This unfortunate contingency occurred in the case of the Declaration of War, the Selective Draft Bill, and that for the control of food, while the Bill authorising the seven billion loan was actually piloted through the Lower House by a man who had just earnestly opposed America's entrance into the war. Under such circumstances the celerity of action that can be attained by the system of responsible government on the British model is clearly impossible.

Furthermore, it should be remembered that Congress in large part voted against its convictions in authorising participation in the war on the broad issue defined by President Wilson. The members as a whole are genuinely ready to support the Executive loyally, but they are equally determined not to pass without careful consideration measures that remove the traditional safeguards to individual freedom, revolutionise the economic life of the country, and give the Administration unprecedented powers of the broadest scope. They are not men who submit tamely to dictation. While not adequately representative of the intellect and education of America, the members of Congress are as a rule men of character, of shrewd intelligence, and, pre-eminently, of a certain will power that has enabled them to reach their coveted position in the stress of competitive politics. They have emerged from this rough strife and are the chosen leaders of the groups that have sent them to Washington. They are somewhat provincial in outlook, full of traditional prejudices, intensely—even naively—nationalistic, credulous, and lacking in background and knowledge rather than in good intentions and intelligence. While somewhat unduly intent upon party advantage, they are above all keenly patriotic and can be counted upon to see that the United States does not default upon any of the obligations that it has assumed in entering the war. They are rapidly learning what these obligations are.

Under these hampering conditions the Administration arranged America's part in the war. The naval preparations

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were most simple, consisting merely in mobilising the fleet and in bringing it up to its full strength. The patrol of the major portion of the Western Atlantic released British and French cruisers for other duties. A squadron of destroyers was also sent to Europe to aid in hunting the submarine and to render safer the main-travelled commercial routes. A new type of submarine chaser is being constructed, and it may also be that some especially effective means are being devised to counter the submarine offensive against merchant shipping and commerce.

But in so far as warfare on the surface of the water is concerned, it is in general realised that the American Navy can accomplish but little. Its aid, however, renders doubly certain the already assured supremacy at sea of the Allies. With land forces it is far otherwise. Immediately on the outbreak of war steps were taken to expand to their full force the regular army and the state militias—the National Guard which corresponds to the British Territorials. This presumably will permit of several hundred thousand men being sent to Europe in the near future, and, while they are being transported, arrangements have been made to call out approximately 500,000 men from those liable to military service for training in the sixteen cantonments that are being constructed. Unfortunately, a large force cannot be available until the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918, but in the spring of that year the American soldier should be able to render an important account of himself, provided that Germany and her satellites have not recognised by that time the futility of further fighting. The potential part that an American army can play and the firm intention of the country that this army shall be formed, drilled, and equipped must enter into the calculations of German statesmen and may vitally affect the outcome even if the bulk of these forces should never have to leave American soil.

In other respects, and apart from the relief work in Belgium, the hospital units, doctors, and ambulances

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that have been furnished, the engineers and woodmen that have been sent to Europe, American co-operation has been and will continue to be of increasing value. The loans to the Allies have obviated the necessity of their financing the supplies purchased in the United States and have relieved the exchange situation. Great strength has been added to the financial structure and, in addition, the overhanging dread of a possible suspension of special payments has been largely removed. While the financial burden has been eased, American participation has at the same time rendered it possible to make the blockade of Germany more stringent and to prevent American supplies or their equivalents from leaking into Central Europe through Scandinavia, Holland, and Switzerland. The position of these countries is admittedly difficult, but as a belligerent the United States has decidedly less sympathy with neutrals than when it acted as the champion of their rights. President Wilson has ample authority to control exports, and public opinion will demand that it be used in the manner best calculated to bring pressure upon Germany, even if this should entail some incidental hardship to her neutral neighbours.

One of the unfortunate elements in American unpreparedness was the failure to take advantage of the scarcity of shipping and high freight rates and to expand betimes the American mercantile marine. Some steps towards this end had been taken and the shipbuilding capacity had been greatly expanded ; but, as this problem had in the main been left to private initiative and as other enterprises promised equal, if not greater, profits combined with more future security, comparatively little had been accomplished when America became a belligerent. Since then the German and Austrian ships have been taken over and, in spite of the preventative damage inflicted upon them by their owners, they will soon be available for use. In addition, extensive preparations have been made by the Government for building a large number of ships, both in

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wood and in steel. Partly owing to friction between the heads of this important enterprise, some delay has occurred. Considerable difficulty was also occasioned by the price of ship-plates, which had risen to fabulously exorbitant prices in the open market. But a fair start has been made in response to Mr. Lloyd George's appeal for "ships, ships, and ships"; and excellent, if somewhat belated, results will be forthcoming later.

This question of the high price of ship-plates brings up another difficult problem which has also been a factor in retarding full economic mobilisation. The entire question of the prices for governmental supplies was considered quite apart from the tax on excess profits to be imposed upon the manufacturer. But these are intimately interrelated subjects. The manufacturer was naturally loath to bind himself to comparatively low prices until the nature and extent of this tax had been determined. The individual was quite ready to make sacrifices, but he naturally wanted them distributed equitably throughout the entire community. The Government has authority to commandeer goods, the prices of which are to be determined later on a basis of fair profits; but there is a natural hesitation to use this authority, as such prices are considerably less than those prevailing, unless some scheme be devised so that each member of the trade shall bear his proportionate share of this negative burden.

By others it was contended that these complications could be avoided if the Government were to pay market prices and were then, through drastic taxation, to recover the greater part of the abnormal war profits. But to this again it was objected that America's Allies would thus have to pay extravagant prices from which, in turn, the United States would derive a considerable revenue. In this connection, also, arose the whole question of purchasing jointly for all the Allies, so as to avoid the conflict and competition between distinct purchasing agencies anxious for the same goods and thus driving up prices—a question which

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positively bristles with difficulties—administrative, political, and economic. Business interests have shown a commendable willingness to co-operate and, in many instances, have furnished large quantities of raw materials and finished products at far less than current prices. Numerous business men of proved ability have dropped their private enterprises and are assisting the Government to establish an equitable system. This is the especial task of the Council of National Defence with its many advisory committees of prominent men of affairs. Ability and experience, as well as unselfish public spirit, are available in plenty, but it is taking considerable time to nationalise an individualistic economic system and to overcome the special interests of groups and localities. It probably cannot be done completely, but sufficient has been accomplished to warrant the confident expectation of adequate results in the prosecution of the war.

Finally, the participation of the United States, in combination with the Russian Revolution, has indelibly stamped the war as one between democracy and autocracy. Not only has the action of America been a factor in strengthening the position of those Russians who saw clearly that the fate of their infant democracy was intimately bound up with the defeat of Prussianism, but it has emphasised anew the moral isolation of the Central Powers in a world of progressive freedom. It has weakened the partisans of Germany in the neutral countries of Europe, besides facilitating the overthrow of the unconstitutional *régime* in Greece. Not the least important was its effect in Latin America. The belligerency of Cuba and Panama, the severance of diplomatic relations by Brazil, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and Haiti, bode ill to Germany's future trade in Latin America. As China has also broken off relations, there is no large market in which the German merchant will not in the future have to overcome some more or less potent prejudice against his wares. It is the Nemesis of *hubris* and also its remedy.

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In spite of great governmental activity and extensive private work among all sorts and classes of people—which indicates a fine spirit of service—the war is remote and hence somewhat unreal. There is no conceivable danger of invasion and apparently only the slightest chance of a raid by a stray submarine. When the first casualty lists are published the reality will presumably become more apparent. But under no circumstances at present imaginable can the war be as vivid and as concretely serious to the United States as it is to Russia and France or even to Great Britain and the Dominions with their huge toll of suffering. The temper of the people is worthy of all praise, but they have not as yet been called upon to make any marked sacrifices. They have given freely, but it has come from a surplus accumulated during two years of unwonted prosperity. In general, the people are ready to do their duty, no matter what it be, and are calmly facing the prospect of a war of unknowable, but presumably long, duration. The citizen is prepared for everything except for an inconclusive peace, and is demanding that, as a result of his efforts, be they great or small, the life of the future world shall be made more secure for all its peoples and that means be devised to prevent a recurrence of the catastrophe. It is generally expected that some form of inter-State organisation, however rudimentary it be, should succeed to the international anarchy of the modern system of sovereign States. The general aim of the American people has been quite accurately defined by Maximilian Harden in the following courageous words :

The goal of our enemies is democracy and independence for every race ripe for freedom, a real and not a sham reduction of armaments, and a court of justice before which all who are suspected of being responsible in greater or less degree for the outbreak of war must present themselves.

The Administration is likewise looking ahead to an organised society of States. There is little or no talk about

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“peace without victory,” for it is being increasingly recognised that defeat is the only means of eradicating Prussianism. The President’s views as to this menace to the civilised world have been expressed on many an occasion since his memorable address to Congress of April 2. Thus six weeks later he said :

We believe that the very principles upon which the American Republic was founded are now at stake and must be vindicated.

It is widely assumed that Mr. Wilson’s personal convictions as to the significance of the war have been greatly strengthened by his intimate conversations with Mr. Balfour. Certain it is that no one of the Entente statesmen has more clearly defined the fundamental issue than has America’s President. In his Flag Day Speech of June 14 he said :

The facts are patent to all the world, and nowhere are they more plainly seen than in the United States, where we are accustomed to deal with facts and not with sophistries ; and the great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a People’s War, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German people themselves included ; and that with us rests the choice to break through all these hypocrisies and patent cheats and masks of brute force and help set the world free, or else stand aside and let it be dominated a long age through by sheer weight of arms and the arbitrary choice of self-constituted masters, by the nation which can maintain the biggest armies and the most irresistible armaments—a power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in the face of which political freedom must wither and perish.

The President’s staff of administrative officers, the members of his Cabinet, have fully adopted this broad interpretation of the war. The Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Lansing, stated at Princeton on June 16 :

We have cast our lot with the brave nations which are fighting for democracy. We have taken up the sword and with God’s help we will not lay it down until Prussian despotism has yielded to the

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united democracies of the world, and liberty, the liberty of Europe, the liberty of America, the liberty of Asia, is made sure for all time.

Equally explicit was Mr. Franklin K. Lane, the Secretary of the Interior. On June 4 he said :

We did not wish to fight Germany. She made the attack upon us ; not on our shores, but on our ships, our rights, our future. . . . The invasion of Belgium, which opened the war, led to the invasion of the United States by slow, steady, logical steps. Our sympathies evolved into a conviction of self-interest. Our love of fair play ripened into alarm at our own peril. . . . The nation that would do these things proclaims the gospel that Government has no conscience. And this doctrine cannot live, or else democracy must die. For the nations of the world must keep faith. There can be no living for us in a world where the State has no conscience, no reverence for the things of the spirit, no respect for international law, no mercy for those who fall before its force. What an unordered world ! Anarchy. The anarchy of the rival wolf packs.

The political significance of these utterances cannot be over-emphasised. In foreign affairs the President is the paramount leader, whose utterances not only shape, but actually determine, public opinion. This is the American tradition. Marked and overt divergence from the official interpretation is considered unpatriotic. Hence these views have definitely become those of the nation. By them the United States stands or falls. The line has been sharply drawn and no compromise is possible. So firm is this stand, so clear is the conviction that the goal is not yet in sight, that there is less talk in America about the terms of the future peace than there is in Europe. In fact, this question does not occupy a prominent part in private or in public discussion. The Press was even officially advised by Washington to be wary of a subject so pregnant with potential discord. It is vaguely but generally recognised that the time is not yet ripe for the determination of these points and that each and every detail of the territorial rearrangements is subsidiary to the fundamental question of breaking the will and power of Prussia-Germany to dictate to the rest of the world.

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The official attitude, which public opinion fully sanctions, is embodied in President Wilson's Note to Russia, published on June 9. Herein he vigorously combated the baldly literal interpretation of the formula, "no annexations and no indemnities," and dissociated the United States absolutely from the negative and futile programme of a mere restoration of the *status quo ante* from which, as he said, "this iniquitous war issued forth." "That status must be altered in such a fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again." The basic principles of such a readjustment he defined in the following lucid words :

We are fighting for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be righted, and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again. We ought not to consider remedies merely because they have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the result. Effective readjustments will ; and whatever readjustments are necessary must be made. But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain. No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples.

After having thus outlined the principles upon which the necessary territorial rearrangements should be based, President Wilson emphasised his further programme for an organised inter-State society :

And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in some common covenant, some genuine and practical co-operation that will in effect combine their force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase ; it must be

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given a structure of force and reality. The nations must realise their common life and effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of autocratic and self-pleasing power.

The soundness of the principles of readjustment outlined in this Note will scarcely be questioned. They are in full accord with the official statements of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George. But they are only very general principles. How they should be applied in practice is an entirely different matter, about which American public opinion has not as yet become crystallised. Possibly it may never reach that state of solidity and clarity, because it is at best very difficult to determine the essential facts. The average American is confused by the mass of contradictory evidence and allegations. He has neither the historical knowledge nor the personal experience that would enable him to winnow the approximate truth from the medley of contradictory statements presented by zealous partisans. In general, however, German statements are suspect and very much more confidence is naturally given to those of America's Allies. And they accept the main outlines of the Allied programme of settlement as they understand it. So warm is the feeling for France and so deep is the admiration for her valorous defence, that public opinion would gladly welcome the return to her of Alsace-Lorraine. Very considerable sympathy is similarly accorded to the ideal of a reunited Poland formed out of the three parts of that nation which were taken by Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Little support, however, will be forthcoming for those Polish chauvinists who demand the restoration of the Poland of 1772 with its large Ruthenian and White Russian elements. There is no definite sentiment about Lithuania and Courland or even about Finland, except the conviction that their peoples should be allowed freely to determine their own future political associations.

No very deep general interest is taken in Italy's unredeemed peoples in the Trentino and in Trieste—though these aspirations are recognised to be legitimate—partly

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because Italy's case has been too predominantly presented in the realistic words of the *sacro egoismo*, but mainly because the American people cannot see the justice in the claim of some Italians to all of Dalmatia, nor do they sympathise with the aim of the nationalistic party to make the Adriatic an Italian lake. To the extent that these aspirations are purely imperialistic—the heritage of Venice's golden past or of "the grandeur that was Rome"—and ignore the present and future rights of the Slav peoples in the Balkans American public opinion will not actively support them.

In so far as Ireland enters at all into this question of future arrangements—and to a limited extent it has entered—there is a growing feeling of impatience, not with English statesmanship, but with the extreme Nationalists and Sinn Feiners. The most enlightened opinion in America has fully appreciated those difficulties of the problem that arise from the Irish temperament. From personal experience in American political life alone it is recognised that there is probably a large element of truth in the saying attributed to an eminent French statesman of the last century: "The Irish do not know what they want and they will never rest until they get it." While the immigrants from North Ireland—the so-called Scotch-Irish—have formed one of the most constructive and progressive elements in American life and have produced an exceptionally large number of able leaders, those from the South have been markedly less valuable both politically and economically. Tammany Hall and the liquor saloon are by no means their sole activities, but to many they seem to be the most typical ones. To the comparatively few Americans who really understand the manifold complexities of the Irish problem, the coercion of Ulster implies the very negation of the Entente principles upon which the United States entered the war; and to them the imperialism of Nationalistic Ireland towards the Protestant North is as repugnant as is that of Germany towards Schleswig and Posen. But men

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holding such views are in a decided minority and popular opinion is largely shaped by the inaccurate statements of elderly Irish-Americans who, living in the past, do not know the Ireland of recent decades and by young Gaelic intellectuals, who hate all imperialism except that of Celtic Ireland, who preach the doctrine of humanity and are yet insistent that mere geographical facts should ruthlessly override human ones of deep vitality. So vociferous are these elements that they cannot be ignored, and it is indisputable that, were this vexatious question definitely settled, an important source of discord in Anglo-American relations would be eliminated.

American public opinion is probably less clear and more unsettled about the future of Austria-Hungary than about any of the problems that the war has thrown into the melting-pot. The average citizen has not the requisite knowledge to determine whether this "ramshackle empire" shall be dismembered into its component national parts, or whether it shall be completely reorganised with international guarantees securing economic and political liberty to its Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, and Roumans, as well as to the hitherto dominant Germans and Magyars. In this connection, however, it is of considerable importance that the Government has through its official bureau of information widely emphasised the peril to the world's freedom inherent in the *Mitteleuropa* project and that President Wilson, in his Note to Russia, has placed especial stress upon this phase of German ambitions. The United States is not committed hereby to the creed of *la victoire intégrale*, in so far as the Czechs and Slovaks are concerned, but the elimination of the mid-European menace necessarily implies at least the full restoration of Serbia and the erection of a strong Balkan barrier between the Central Empires and Turkey.

So engrossed was the United States in war preparations that comparatively little attention was paid to Mr. Lloyd George's important speech at Glasgow on June 29. The

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announcement made there that those people of non-Turkish race who had been freed by force of arms would not be returned to "the blasting tyranny of the Turks," but that their future status would be determined at the peace conference, cannot but meet with America's approval. Likewise, Mr. Lloyd George's statement that the sentiments of the people in the former German colonies must be the dominant factor in determining "the future trustees of those uncivilised lands" is in accord with American principles. But American opinion is by no means clear as to the most equitable dispositions of these colonies. This question has been insidiously used by covert pro-Germans and by doctrinaire pacifists to becloud the real issues of the war and to taint the Allied cause with alleged imperialistic aims. Some measure of success has been attained, mainly because the real spirit of British imperialism is very frequently misunderstood throughout the United States. But those Americans who remember that the return to France in 1748 of Louisbourg, in whose capture Massachusetts gloried, was a potent factor in alienating the former American colonies from the Mother Country and who also realise that the Monroe Doctrine embodies an underlying desire to have no aggressive neighbours, will appreciate both the difficulties of English statesmen and also the attitude of Australasia and South Africa towards their conquests. In general, however, it is not widely recognised that there is in England no desire to retain these possessions for themselves, but that the self-governing Dominions are insisting that they remain free from troublesome neighbours against whom constant vigilance is essential. Nor is there a wide knowledge of the sinister and aggressive course of German colonial policy in the Pacific and in Africa or of those events during the war which have rendered Germany's retention of these lands highly undesirable. As yet, American opinion has far from solidified, but there is a tendency to favour the experiment of developing and governing what was German East Africa and other tropical lands as well under

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joint international control as an important feature of the future organised society of States.

These questions, however, are kept at present in the background. The sound common sense of the people recognises that they are of subsidiary importance and must remain so until victory is plainly in sight. Moreover, it is realised that such premature discussion of details is not only futile but dangerous, in that it tends to sow discord among the Allies and to divert attention from the immediate work in hand. Some of this discussion has been quite disingenuous, its chief object being to befog the main issue. Similarly, the partisans of Germany—there are still quite a number under cover—have tried to use the pacifist movement for their own ends. These pseudo-pacifists, whose aim is to reduce America's part in the war to a minimum and to bring about an early peace, have tainted the entire peace movement and have rendered suspect the motives of all who do not favour a vigorous prosecution of the war. The American people have always been somewhat intolerant of opposition in time of war and will not patiently allow a small minority to prejudice the welfare and safety of the nation.

New York. July, 1917.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

I. THE NATION AND THE WAR.

The Temper of the People

THE opening of the fourth year of the war finds the country still determined, still patient, and still, in spite of manifold disillusionments, indomitably idealistic. As there has been a good deal of confused incident during the last quarter, some of it important enough to be recorded in these pages, it may be well to state clearly at the outset, what should never have been questioned either in governing circles at home or by foreign observers, that the nation is still thoroughly united as to the prosecution of the war. The instinct of the British democracy on large moral issues is sound. The plain man knows little of the details of the diplomatic and military situation, and he would not try to understand it if he could. But he has long since made up his mind once and for all what it is that has brought this catastrophe upon civilisation, and he knows that the stable peace he longs for can only be attained when the German Government is forced to admit defeat.

This simple and fundamental attitude is firmly fixed in the consciousness of the nation. It is mirrored in the strategy of the General Staff, which, wisely or unwisely, has proceeded on the theory of going straight for the enemy in the main theatre and avoiding all ingenious strategical attempts to find a "way round" to the desired goal. The nation, too, is not looking for a way round: it knows

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that the war will be mainly decided by the armies in the field, and that the issue cannot be evaded by discussion and conference. This realisation is common property among all but negligible sections of opinion: among those who are fond of proclaiming their patriotic determination as among the much larger body of those who disguise the native strength of their feelings, British-fashion, under an air of cheerful and almost ultra-reasonable detachment. Bitterness and vindictiveness are indeed so foreign to the national character, tolerance and fair play are so ingrained, and moral indignation, sustained for years at the same pitch, is found so fatiguing, that an observer unfamiliar with the British temperament might easily misread the national mood. There is among the mass of the people little outward and visible expression of "hate." Even words like "Hun," which were intended to convey that emotion when first adopted, sometimes acquire on the lips of an invincibly tolerant enemy a half-humorous significance, strangely mingled with the contempt and disgust that are always being kindled afresh.

It is something of a misfortune that this traditional national attitude of sensitiveness and broad humanity is not everywhere appreciated at its true worth by the leaders of opinion. Appeals to the national *morale* have sometimes of late been conceived in a spirit of ill-timed vulgarity. It is a pity that the silent rebuke of the people cannot reach the statesmen and the journalists who make them. They should realise that the cheap phrase-making which passed muster in pre-war days falls with an ill sound on ears attuned to the note of sacrifice. To the nation in its present mood, steeled by suffering and filled with sacred memories of its heroic dead, none but the highest and most generous note can make appeal. If to some it may seem that its idealism is in danger of going astray, the fault rests with those in authority who have at times seemed to lack faith in their own countrymen. All that the nation asks from its leaders is moral leadership. Blunders it will

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forgive, and has forgiven. Blunders, it knows, are human. But intemperate and boastful speech and writing it reser ts as an insult to its dead and to their cause.

The last three months have necessitated a certain readjustment of perspective as regards the duration of the war and the extent of the sacrifices required for the attainment of victory. The nation had been encouraged to fix its hopes on the continued spring offensive ; but the spring brought the Russian Revolution and a temporary collapse on the Eastern Front, with its inevitable reaction upon Allied progress in the West. The war has not ended with the end of the third year, and the end is not in sight. Final victory is delayed, though in compensation its " quality," as the Prime Minister said, is likely to be improved. But there has been an awkward period of transition. The nation had looked forward to 1917 as the last lap and had been spending its energies too recklessly on what it now realises to be a long-distance race. The transition found it in large part tired, overstrained and not unnaturally fretful. A great deal of the " unrest " by which the past quarter has been signalised may be set down to this simple fact. The readjustment has been made and the nation is braced for further efforts ; but it has not been easy.

Industrial Unrest and the Whitley Report

In the last issue of THE ROUND TABLE some account was given of the strike of engineers and other workers which took place in various parts of the country in the first half of May, and the view was expressed that it was urgently necessary that the Government should be more closely informed as to the feelings and wishes of the rank and file of workpeople. The strike itself came to an end on May 19 as the result of an interview between the Minister of Munitions and the Executive of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers on behalf of the unauthorised strike leaders,

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who were present at the interview. The main proposal at issue, that of "dilution" on commercial work, though incontestably necessary on national grounds, had to be referred back for further consideration, and after forming the subject of negotiations between Mr. Winston Churchill, who has succeeded Dr. Addison at the Ministry of Munitions, has been dropped for the moment, in order to secure the enactment of other less contentious measures before the recess. This is a good instance of the way in which "more haste" leads to "less speed" when sufficient trouble is not taken at the outset to secure the consent and co-operation of the interests concerned by a policy of frankness and confidence. Meanwhile powers have been taken to repeal the obnoxious "leaving certificate" as soon as it is possible to do so without causing a flow of labour from skilled to better paid unskilled jobs.

The strike was so widespread and its ostensible causes so relatively slight that deeper currents of feeling were realised to be involved. The Government therefore wisely took steps to probe the roots of the trouble. Early in June, eight small Special Commissions of three were appointed, each consisting of representatives of employers and employed and an "impartial" chairman (in most cases a judge), with the broad instruction to "enquire into and report upon labour unrest and to make recommendations to the Government at the earliest practicable date." The Commissions carried through their work with commendable thoroughness and promptitude and their reports, some of which will undoubtedly take rank in the future as historical documents of the highest value, throw such a flood of light on the conditions prevailing in the industrial areas that they are worth quoting at some length for the benefit of readers in more fortunate regions.

The reports differ considerably on some of the details of the field explored. The strength and character of the opposition to the liquor restrictions, for instance, was found to vary greatly from district to district. But on the

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two most important points their testimony was unanimous : that the great majority of the working class was unshaken in its attitude towards the war, and that there was serious and justifiable resentment at the working of the domestic policy of the Government.

A few quotations may be given under both heads. Thus the Welsh Commissioners report :

We have had no evidence that the great majority of the workers have any sympathy with pacifist views : nevertheless when cases come to their knowledge in which conscientious objectors have been harshly treated, even those who have no sympathy with the pacifist attitude show considerable resentment.

The North-Eastern Commissioners desire to

record their opinion that, apart from a small minority, there is no section of the industrial classes who are not prepared to take their part in military service.

The West Midlands Commissioners say :

The Government have all through been too much afraid of the public. They have not realised how solid and unbroken is the determination to finish the war :

whereas the East Midlands Commissioners attribute a measure of the unrest, not to any change in the attitude of the workers themselves to the war, but to suspicions of a change on the part of the Government, and suggest a more definite statement of war aims by the Government " in the spirit of the formula that the object of the Allies is ' to make the world safe for democracy.' "

With regard to the prevailing unrest the London Commission reports :

The unrest is real, widespread, and in some cases extreme, and such as to constitute a national danger unless dealt with promptly and effectively. We are at this moment within view of a possible social upheaval or at least extensive and manifold strikes. No tinkering schemes will meet the requirements of the situation. It is necessary to secure to the working man a fair share of the product of his labour, and a just participation in the establishment of the

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conditions of industry. The workmen consider that they should be dealt with as men.

The causes of the unrest are numerous and operate with a cumulative effect, but, with the exception of South Wales, where, as the report points out, the unrest in the coalfield is chronic and due to special local causes, which are ably analysed, the complaint is generally, not so much against the employer or "capitalist" as against the arbitrary action or inexplicable inaction of the Government. As causes of unrest due to Government action may be instanced the administration of the Munitions of War Act and the Military Service Acts and, to a much lesser degree, the Liquor Control Regulations. Government inaction, on the other hand, is especially blamed in relation to food prices and "profiteering" generally, to the housing problem, and to the vexatious delays and vacillation resulting from the over-centralisation of the Government departments and from the amenability of the highest authority to pressure from contending interests. It is clear from the reports that what is resented is not so much what is sometimes wrongly described as "Prussianism"—that is, the limitations on civil liberty and private enterprise rendered necessary in war time—as inefficient and one-sided governmental action. The vagaries of the War Office would not have been so much objected to had recruiting officers always followed the ordinary rules of civil courtesy; nor would the administration of the Munitions of War Act have been attended with so much friction had the Department shown a little more human understanding of the men with whom it had to deal. For those who do not realise how important a part temper and "atmosphere" play in industrial negotiations the following extract from the presidential address by Mr. O'Grady, M.P., at the annual council meeting of the General Federation of Trade Unions on July 5 may be suggestive:

The relationship between organised labour and private capitalists was on the whole very good, and the very few disputes occurring had

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been settled by a reasonable acknowledgment of the workmen's claims, but . . . he had never known a time when the relations between the Government Departments and organised labour were so bad as now. . . . The whole confusion and danger which had arisen he attributed to the fact that the Government would continue putting the workers under the control of men who had never handled workmen and did not understand them.

The same criticism, which runs through all the reports, is well expressed in the following passage by the North-western Commissioners :

There is no doubt that throughout this area there is grave discontent with the way in which the departments in London exercise the control that is necessary during the war to maintain the upkeep of munitions. The complaints are that every little detail has to be referred to London, that there are wholly unnecessary delays in taking up and settling disputes that have arisen, that contradictory orders and directions are sent out from different Departments, and that the industries in this area are being interfered with by London officials who do not understand local conditions, and that this is very detrimental to industrial peace.

The employers are even more outspoken in their discontent about matters than the workmen. They complain very much of what they call the vacillating and uncertain policy of the Government in dealing with labour problems. Promises are given one day, threats are used another, and things that are said to be decided upon and which are already half acted upon are withdrawn and altered without any consultation with leading local employers. They point out that since strikes were made illegal many strikes have occurred without penalty, and thereby the law and the Government are brought into disrepute. The men complain that their grievances do not receive a hearing, or that the hearing is delayed, or that it is brought before tribunals and arbitrators who are unsympathetic and untrained in the history and practice of modern industrial conditions. . . .

We think that the system which tries to regulate every petty detail of the industrial machinery of the area from offices in Whitehall imposes upon the men who are asked to work it an impossible task. The trenches of industrial warfare are in Lancashire and other like centres, and in our view it is not a business proposition to try and command the great industrial army of these areas with a staff two hundred miles from the base, and nearly all the generals and commanding officers capable of giving direct orders and taking immediate responsibility when labour troubles arise away from the battlefield.

We have been surprised that in this area there are so few high

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officials on the spot ready to undertake the settlement of disputes and the determination of matters of administration, and that so much has to be referred to London for decision. It seems to us that there is over-centralisation and that this is a cause of unrest, and that it should be considered whether it would not be possible not only to leave employers and workmen to settle more matters themselves but to arrange that high officials of labour and munition departments should reside in the area, and be within close touch and ready to visit at a moment's notice localities where unrest manifests itself at the earliest possible moment.

All the reports bore witness to widespread and deep-felt irritation on the subject of food prices, the complaints arising not from any unwillingness on the part of workmen to bear privation if it were necessary in the national interest, but from the conviction that with better and more drastic administration the hardships imposed on their women and children could have been avoided. Thus the Yorkshire and East Midland Commissioners report :

It became unnecessary to ask each witness to state in detail many of their points, it being found that in every case, from every district and class, the primary causes (of the industrial unrest) were asserted as being relative to the common domestic difficulties and actual privations following upon the high price of food and the necessary commodities of life with, in many cases, the utter inadequacy of wages, even though higher than the pre-war rates, to secure the bare essentials for living at a much lower standard of comfort than was considered essential in their homes before the war.

In connection with the high price of food, complaints were general as to profiteering, coupled with statements that the discomforts experienced would be borne with comparative composure were such felt to be necessary to win the war, but from the published results of trading and shipping companies and from speeches and other information everywhere obtainable, the conviction was general that insufficient steps had been taken by the Government Departments to prevent profiteering, exploiting, and plundering, such as made the poor contribute heavily to the abnormal advantages of those traders and others who by their selfishness secured immense gains from the sacrifices and sufferings of the poor.

Were the food problem immediately and drastically dealt with a very large measure of the unrest, it was stated, would be allayed, and there might then be restored some measure of faith and confidence in the Government, such as unquestionably does not appear to exist,

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either in employers or employed, in any one of the various industries we have investigated.

And the Scottish Commissioners concur in this view. "It was stated," they report, "that workmen would gladly give up their war-time increases if the cost of living could be reduced to pre-war figures."

One Commissioner, Mr. J. J. Mallon, whose opinion on such a matter carries weight, refers to the prevalence of strong feeling as to the inequality of the sacrifice demanded from rich and poor during the war. He states that

the hardship following upon the inflation of the currency, the increase in the rate of interest due to the extension of credit and the consequent upward movement in prices and the redistribution of national income in favour of those who were already wealthy, is a profound and indeed fundamental cause of industrial unrest, causing as it has a more acute sense of social inequalities ;

and recommends a careful review and substantial increase of the income tax "as regards those incomes which are capable of curtailment without any real loss to the amenities of life."

Serious as the grievances as regards food prices and departmental administration undoubtedly are, the most terrible exposure in the reports is on the subject of housing. This question is prominent both in the Welsh and the North-Western reports, and the account given in the latter of the conditions at Barrow is so appalling that it is worth while quoting it at some length, if only to afford occasion for surprise that the "unrest" which it produced had not come to a climax long before.

The simplest method, as it seems to us, of bringing home to the minds of those who are so far removed from the real conditions which are largely responsible for industrial unrest in this town, is to set out without comment or criticism the facts of the case. The first point to appreciate is the numbers of the population and the number of houses to contain that population. To those who have the rare power of translating statistical figures into the facts of human life the following figures will be convincing. In order to

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understand what a terrible indictment they form against the rulers and governors, whoever they may be, who are responsible for providing homes for the workers, many of whom are legally prevented from leaving their employment without permission of a Tribunal, it must be remembered that at the outbreak of War there was a well-recognised shortage of houses in Barrow, and this was, or ought to have been, understood by the authorities. The following are the official figures as given by the Borough Treasurer of Barrow :

Population at December 31, 1911	64,594
Population at December 31, 1916	85,179
Number of houses at March 31, 1912	12,902
Number of houses at March 31, 1917	14,791

But for the fact that Barrow lies in a very isolated position and that it is considered inadvisable to inform the public through the medium of the Press of many of the evil conditions of industrial life, we cannot believe that the facts we propose to set down could so long have remained actual conditions of domestic life in England in the twentieth century. We had no power to examine witnesses from London as to why no remedy had been attempted, nor do we desire to lay any blame upon officials for what has happened and is still happening. The fault lies, of course, in the centralisation in a corner of the South of England of the only people who have any power to set things right, and their ignorance of the problems they are supposed to deal with. The witnesses from whose evidence we quote a few statements were not drawn from any one class, and indeed no decent person who understands the conditions of housing in Barrow could do anything but condemn them. One who thoroughly understands these conditions made a report to us at once when we were first appointed. "I put," he writes, "the housing question in the forefront. For the majority of the workers here there is no home life. In some instances the wife is engaged on munition work, but in the majority of cases she is occupied with looking after lodgers. The housing question is acute. The number of beds occupied by night and day on the Box and Cox principle is very high and runs into thousands. . . . Also I would point to the very inadequate provision for maternity cases. In many homes it is impossible to deal with them, at any rate with decency. The alteration in the train service and the reduction in the number of trains has made the housing question even more acute. In consequence of the withdrawal of trains to and from Ulverston people in business have had to come and live in Barrow, as otherwise they could not have got to work in time. . . ."

What adds to the troubles of the worker is that as he must find

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accommodation somewhere he is bound to pay any price, however exorbitant, for lodgings when he cannot obtain a house of his own. A witness pointed out that although "the house owner is prohibited by Act of Parliament from raising his rents in munition areas, there is no prohibition as regards tenants increasing the price they ask for lodgings or rooms, and I have come across many cases where 12s. per week is the charge for one room unfurnished in a house of which the rent is from 7s. 6d. to 9s., and I believe in many cases even more than that is being charged."

The report goes on to add that while the State, either in the form of Government, or Department, or Municipality, had taken no action at all in the matter up to the time of the investigation, a local firm,

"which did not take three years to discover that there would be such a thing as a housing problem in Barrow," was instrumental in building some 270 cottages.

Under conditions such as these it is not surprising that "unrest" should have developed, and that its most conspicuous feature should have been a suspicion and distrust of the constituted authorities. When matters are obviously ill-organised and neglected, when flagrant grievances remain unredressed and are aggravated by unnecessary delays and by conflicts of jurisdiction between the officials or departments concerned, the ordinary man lumps the blame comprehensively on "the Government" and "the authorities," and in the last analysis he is right. This is the psychological explanation of the fact that the unrest has crystallised into a "rank and file" movement led by "shop stewards" wielding an authority unrecognised in many cases by the authorised trade union movement. Much could be written as to the significance of the "Shop Stewards Movement," which is in essence an outgrowth of the spontaneous democratic sentiment of large bodies of workpeople, many of whom feel that their constitutional leaders have lost touch with them owing to their absorption in official duties, and have learnt by experience that the best way to secure the quick redress of their grievances

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by an overdriven Government is by taking independent action. As the London Commission remarks, the movement itself is divided into moderates and extremists, and its spirit varies greatly from place to place; but they wisely point to the "danger that unless some satisfactory arrangement be made for representation of the workpeople in shop negotiations a large section of the shop stewards proper will make common cause with the revolutionary group."

It is worth while, however, laying stress on the fact that, anti-governmental as the movement tends to be in temper, it is in no sense pacifist. It accepts the war, but it accepts also the reactions of the war on the bargaining power of labour. Narrow though its attitude is, it is not unpatriotic, and those who would use it to forward the purposes of the small minority who are opposed to the war find it more politic, in dealing with them, to conceal the drift of their thoughts.

While the Industrial Commissions were engaged upon their work, a report was issued from another official quarter which was seized upon by all of them as standing in the closest possible relation to the problems on which they were engaged. A strong and representative sub-committee appointed by the Reconstruction Committee—since created a Department—had been for some months considering the broad problem of "relations between employers and employed" with a view to post-war conditions. Its first published recommendation* took the form of a short report advocating

the establishment for each industry of an organisation, representative of employers and workpeople, to have as its object the regular consideration of matters affecting the progress and well being of the trade from the point of view of all engaged in it, so far as is consistent with the general interest of the community.

* Cd. 8606, 1d. *Interim Report on Joint Standing Industrial Councils*, known, from its Chairman, as the Whitley Report.

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In other words, what this committee of employers, workmen, and social students desire to see is some regular machinery for bringing together employers and employed on an equal footing to discuss not, as too often at present, matters where the interests of the two sides are divergent but the much larger number of questions relating to their common business on which their interests are substantially at one. The establishment of a living symbol of partnership in a common service would not only improve mutual relations and prevent the growth of misunderstanding, but would give a new status and dignity, a sense of professional pride, to all who are engaged in activities which are, after all, in the truest sense national and social services. After setting forth the establishment of such Joint Standing National Councils in every industry as the ideal to be aimed at, the sub-committee recommends their immediate establishment in the well-organised industries, where the means are ready to hand, and lays stress on the fact that they should be closely linked up in every case with district councils similarly composed and with works committees in individual factories "to act in close co-operation with the district and national machinery." No more hopeful proposal has issued from any official quarter during the war. The comments made on it both in the Press and in the Commissioners' reports indicated that its suggestions were not only practicable but urgently necessary; and it is satisfactory to know that the new Ministry of Labour, to which they have been referred for executive action, is actively engaged in promulgating the scheme and devising means for its adoption. It is difficult to see in what other way the complex and contentious industrial problems which will arise in the post-war period, and in which neither side desires to see the State play too prominent a part, can be handled with full understanding and to the satisfaction of both sides.

The Report has, indeed, been so well received that it is tempting to carry the line of thought which it suggests a

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step farther. If the proposed industrial councils are created they might eventually, either individually or acting in association or through some central body, come to play an important and much-needed part in the improvement of the national life. No one can reflect upon our existing industrial system—its unwieldiness, its jostling individualism, its distorted scale of values, its enthronement of “things” over men—without feeling the urgent need for some authoritative body which shall attempt to think out the problems of industry as a whole in a practical temper, but from a human or Christian standpoint, and to build up what will become, in the best sense of the word, a professional spirit and code of conduct among all who are engaged on the manifold forms of social service comprised within its range. As the history of State intervention during the war has abundantly shown, it is not the system of private enterprise which is at fault but the spirit and motive with which it is too often conducted. The “revolution” which is sometimes lightly spoken of as imminent in our industrial arrangements cannot from the nature of the case take place from without: it must come from within, from those who alone have the knowledge of men and things, and the power to use it. There is abundant evidence that the lessons of the battlefield are slowly finding their way back to the workshop and the counting house, and that, difficult as the hour is, the inner change is already in process which must end by bringing the *morale* of “business” into line with the high sense of public service which the war has revealed in all classes.

The Education Bill

These things lie as yet hidden in the future. They will not come to the test to-morrow or the day after, but in the slow years of recuperation which will follow the war.

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How far the hopes men entertain to-day for a better England will be realised depends, more than upon any other single factor, upon the development of our system of national education. To-day the torch is in the hands of the fighting men. To-morrow, when they rest, it will have passed to the great army of teachers. To the forward-looking mind, therefore, the introduction of Mr. Fisher's long-promised Education Bill on August 10 is the most important domestic event of the last quarter. It cannot be said that his proposals quite rise to the level of the unique opportunity. Nevertheless, as was said in the course of the debate, the Bill, if it passes, even in its present imperfect form, "will mark the greatest advance in the education of the general people of the country since Mr. Forster's Act of 1870"; and it derives additional significance from the fact that it is introduced by one who is familiar with the practical work of teaching and knows that the essential problem in education, so often forgotten in the complexity of administrative detail, is simply to "bring together the right teacher and the right students under the right conditions."

The principles of the Bill had already been foreshadowed in a previous speech. Its main provisions may be briefly summarised :

(1) The universal extension of the elementary school age to fourteen without exemptions, with powers to the local authority to raise the age to fifteen. This involves the abolition of the half-time system in certain parts of Lancashire and Yorkshire, affecting 30,000 children between the ages of twelve and fourteen.

(2) The provision of nursery schools, generally in the open air, for children under five, to be accompanied, when this provision is adequate, by powers to the local authorities to raise the age, at which normal instruction in the elementary school begins, to six.

(3) The prohibition of the employment of children for profit under the age of twelve. Strict limitation of the employment of children between twelve and fourteen,

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subject to veto or regulation on the report of the school medical officer.

(4) Compulsory "continuation" education in daylight hours for boys and girls between fourteen and eighteen for a period of 320 hours a year, or the equivalent of eight hours a week for forty weeks. Classes not to be held on Sunday or any normal holiday or half-holiday, and the instruction to be partly physical, partly general, "with a vocational bias, the force of which will be graduated according to the age and occupation of the pupil." Local authorities to be empowered to provide school camps and social training for associations dealing with juveniles. This is the part of the Bill which is most disappointing. Opinion is undoubtedly ripe for a "half-time" measure. The proposed eight hours will be far too little to provide at once for physical, vocational and liberal training, and a half-time arrangement would in many ways be more convenient to employers. The extension would involve a large increase in the number of teachers required; but if the call is made in the right spirit the teachers will be forthcoming.

(5) Extension of school medical service to secondary and continuation schools.

(6) Improved provision for higher elementary education—*i.e.*, for the last two years of elementary school life—and for transference to secondary schools "at suitable ages."

(7) The submission on the part of local education authorities to the Board of Education of schemes "to provide for the progressive development and comprehensive organisation of education in their respective areas." Removal of the twopenny limit on the higher education rate. Statutory authority for the formation of "provincial associations," consisting of two or more authorities acting together for certain purposes.

(8) Provision of free inspection for (non rate-aided schools when asked for, and compulsory powers to call for parti-

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culars from "every school or educational institution," including private venture schools.

(9) Consolidation of elementary school grants.

The Bill will excite lively discussion in the country and should be strengthened before it reaches the Statute Book.

Of even more immediate interest to the general public was the resignation of Lord Devonport from the post of Food Controller and the appointment of Lord Rhondda as his successor, with Mr. J. R. Clynes, one of the ablest of the Labour members, as his Under-Secretary. Lord Rhondda was known as a "strong man," and the situation certainly demanded strong measures. His first action was to appoint as his chief of staff Mr. U. F. Wintour, the Director of Army Contracts, who had devised a policy in that department which has proved one of the administrative successes of the war. Briefly stated, the policy of the War Office Contracts Department, which it is now intended to apply to the food trades, is to obtain control of the supplies, both imported and domestic, and, having obtained it, to regulate prices and profits on the articles in question on the basis of ascertained costings. It has been applied with success to wool, leather, jute, clothing, boots, barbed wire, cutlery and medicines, as well as to the supplies of jam, tinned meat, tea, and oats for Army use. To apply it to the food trades involves a large organisation, which will be carried through in the light of the previous experience; but it also involves a measure of control over the retail stage which did not arise in dealing with the Army. If the principles applied in the previous sphere hold good, "profiteering" in food will be effectually checked and the most potent cause of unrest removed. No such policy, however, can do away with the hardship arising from the rise in the price of food due to causes which no administration can prevent. The Department has therefore embarked on a further experiment—that of selling bread below cost price at the expense of the Exchequer. On September 1 the 4 lb. loaf is to be brought down from the neighbourhood

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of a shilling, where it now stands, to ninepence. The cost to the taxpayer is estimated very roughly at £40,000,000 a year.*

Another departmental matter which must be mentioned is the transference from the War Office to a civilian department of the control over recruiting—abandoned by Lord Derby with a gesture of eloquent despair during the course of an inquiry into the conduct of the medical examinations for the Army. Very great indignation had been caused in the country at the treatment of the medically unfit, both civilians and discharged soldiers, and the inquiry demonstrated that once more the popular impression was justified. It is only fair to say that the War Office witnesses showed clearly the enormous difficulties involved in the sudden transformation without adequate forethought of a “registering machine” into a “thinking machine”; but they could not excuse—indeed nothing could excuse—the behaviour of some of their local “jacks in office.”

The Resignation of Mr. Henderson

This brief record cannot close without reference to an incident which may prove to have an important influence on the domestic politics of the country and its attitude to the war—the resignation of Mr. Arthur Henderson, Secretary of the Labour Party and now once more Chairman of its Parliamentary group, from the War Cabinet. As Labour representative in the British Cabinet Mr. Henderson had been dispatched by his colleagues, like his French compeer M. Albert Thomas, to Petrograd to report upon the Russian situation. Whilst there he was met by the request of the Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Delegates to facilitate British participation in an International Socialist Conference at Stockholm at which the peace

* Reply by Mr. Clynes in the House of Commons, Aug. 8. For details as to the War Office Contracts policy see the departmental memorandum (Cd. 8447, 3d.) and the *Daily Chronicle* for July 6.

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programme of the International should be discussed. The Russian Socialists desired that the Conference should be of a "mandatory" character—in other words, that its decisions should be regarded as binding upon the parties even if this involved action, possibly even rebellious action, against their own national Governments. Mr. Henderson naturally deprecated a Conference upon these lines; but his stay in Petrograd convinced him that some sort of International Conference was desirable in the interests of Anglo-Russian friendship and of the international working-class movement in general, and he expressed his intention on his return home of using his influence in favour of a Conference of a purely "consultative" character. On July 24 he returned to London on the expiration of his governmental mission. On July 25 at a meeting of the Labour Party, at which he was present as secretary, he reported the results of his Russian visit, recommended the acceptance of the Russian invitation to Stockholm on the conditions laid down, and advised the summoning of a Special Labour Conference, which was called for August 11. It was also decided at the same meeting to accept the French Socialists' invitation to send a delegation to Paris. The French, it may be remarked, were already committed to Stockholm by a decision of the Socialist National Council on May 28. Mr. Henderson, Mr. Wardle, and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald were the members selected, and in the last days of the month they proceeded to Paris. Mr. Henderson entered into the arrangement for the trip without informing his colleagues in the Cabinet, but they reluctantly acquiesced in it at a Cabinet meeting before his departure, apparently on the understanding that arrangements were to be made for an allied Socialist Conference in London, but that no decisions should be taken in regard to the Stockholm Conference with the enemy. The Prime Minister, who was absent in Paris at the time of the meeting in question, defended Mr. Henderson when the matter was brought up in the House of

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Commons on August 1, but it was clear that the "embarrassing duality of his functions" was causing difficulty to his colleagues and that they did not see eye to eye with him in the question of the Stockholm Conference. The Prime Minister referred to the subject in his speech on August 4, when he stated that "the nation as a whole makes war . . . and the nation as a whole must make peace," adding that "the other way is not the way to a satisfactory peace, and I am sure that those in Russia who at one time thought so have ceased to be of that opinion to-day."

Meanwhile the Labour Conference, called for August 11, was approaching. What happened during the days preceding it is not quite clear. Mr. Henderson claims that he had in no way altered his opinion as to the desirability of British participation in a consultative Conference. The Prime Minister and the other members of the Cabinet were emphatically of the opinion that he had, and expected him to use his influence against it at the Labour Conference. Just before the Conference a telegram arrived from the Russian Government making it clear that the new Coalition Ministers were in no way associated with the Conference, which they regarded as a Socialist party matter. Nevertheless, Mr. Henderson, in his speech to the Conference, urged the acceptance of the Stockholm invitation on the twofold ground that it would improve Anglo-Russian relations and that it would be an effective use of the "political weapon" against the enemy. His speech carried the delegates, who voted acceptance by a three to one vote, the skilled unions being mainly in the majority and the unskilled in the minority.

Next day Mr. Henderson resigned from the War Cabinet, and the Prime Minister took the unusual course of writing him a public letter, in the course of which he charged him with having dealt unfairly by his colleagues. The matter was discussed in the House of Commons on August 13, when it became clear that Mr. Henderson's double *rôle* had

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put him in an impossible position. On the same day it was announced that, in conformity with the decision of the French, Italian, and American Governments, the British Government would not grant passports to Stockholm. Next day the Labour Party Executive decided to renew their representations to the Government on the matter, which will be further considered at another Labour Conference on August 21. On August 16 a Russian official statement was published, declaring "that it is useful that questions concerning war and peace should be submitted for discussion at the Socialist Internationale" and deprecating "any obstacles whatever to participation in the Stockholm Conference," but at the same time emphatically denying that a Party Conference can "claim to formulate decisions which could in any way bind the Government." M. Kerensky, in an interview published next day, took up a markedly neutral attitude. He did not express opposition to the Conference, nor, on the other hand, approval. "Our Conference," he said, "the Conference of Governments, is the London Conference. The Swedish Conference is the Conference of Labour Parties." Meanwhile, one of the conveners of the Conference, the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee, hastened to accept the "non-mandatory" basis desired by the British Labour Conference.

Here, at the moment of writing, the matter rests. Obviously it has a twofold importance, international and domestic. Its international bearings are beyond the scope of this article. Its domestic importance arises from its possible effect on the relations between the Government and the Labour Party. It would be a serious misfortune, not only to the country but to the whole Allied cause, if the incident were allowed to lead to a cleavage of policy and sentiment between the large and important body of opinion represented at the Labour Conference and the Government which is at the moment the protagonist in the struggle for human freedom.

Irish Settlement by Consent

Fortunately there is and can be no manner of doubt as to the substantial agreement and unity of the aims of both parties. On the very day of the meeting of the Labour Conference the Labour Party Executive issued a draft of a statement on war aims destined, if approved by the adjourned Conference, to be laid before the Inter-Allied Socialist Conference on behalf of the British party. It is a document which will take rank as the most constructive contribution ever made by British Labour to the policy of nations and as the fullest and clearest statement yet issued on peace-terms from any authoritative quarter. Not only does it reaffirm the general aims of the Allies, with which the public is familiar, but it works out many of the principles involved in closer detail and makes a number of practical, if in some cases contentious, suggestions. The production of a document of such breadth and scope by a party which has hitherto been somewhat parochial in its outlook is a matter for congratulation and should effectually dispose of the idea that the working class is not equally qualified with other sections of the community to bring its opinions on international policy to bear on the Government of the day. It will be interesting to see what steps the party proposes to take to urge its views upon the responsible authorities and also what effect it will have on public opinion not only amongst our Allies and neutrals but also in Central Europe

London. August, 1917.

II. IRISH SETTLEMENT BY CONSENT

AFTER the kaleidoscopic confusion of many months past, events in Ireland have brought us to a point where the whole situation stands out clear cut and well defined. Never was Convention summoned at a more opportune time or staged with more appropriate dramatic appointments than that which sits in Dublin at the present time to decide the future of Ireland.

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The first necessary step in the clearing up of the situation was the granting by England of total amnesty to the political prisoners of the rebellion. This measure—inevitable for a long time if any settlement were to be arrived at—was delayed until Mr. Dillon and his friends had had time to make it appear as though they had wrung it from a grudging Government. It came just too late to prevent a peculiarly brutal murder in the streets of Dublin—made possible by the mingled weakness and audacity of Count Plunkett's accidental leadership—but just soon enough to prevent that incident from having any definite political or legal consequences. The prisoners were received with enthusiasm and a little, but not much, rowdyism, which they quelled as promptly as possible. They lost no time in settling down to business, and the effects on the country have been altogether remarkable. Sinn Fein was a loosely knit body of sentiment, based to a large extent on the memory of the dead, owing allegiance to disunited, shadowy, ineffective leaders, and articulate only through the methods of hooliganism. It was being used as a sort of lever by Mr. Dillon and some of the more extreme members of the Irish party to gain back lost ground for that party in Ireland, and incidentally to gain for themselves the leadership on the ground that Mr. Redmond could not combat this movement. Had such a state of things persisted there might well have been more bloodshed, another ineffective revolution, costing probably far more than the earlier one and leading not only to further measures of repression by England but also to a deeper division between Irishmen, both Nationalist and Unionist. Settlement in Ireland would then have been impossible for a hundred years.

But with the return of the prisoners the situation changed. The leaders immediately asserted themselves and were at once recognised by the people, as men who assert their claims to leadership usually are. Count Plunkett and his nebulous régime sank into the background, and Sinn Fein became an organised body, with a head, a

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centre, and a policy. One interesting fact may be commented on. Mr. De Valera was, by virtue of his American citizenship, a survivor among the actual leaders of the rebellion, and this fact entitled him to first place in the Sinn Fein party on his return. But among the prisoners was also Mr. John McNeill, who by withdrawing himself and his large army of followers at the eleventh hour had robbed the rising of much of its force. Public curiosity was rampant as to the position which he would occupy when released. By many he was regarded as a traitor, and there were those who said that he would not dare return to Ireland or, if he did, he would pay the penalty with his life. But his election while still in prison as president of the Gaelic League showed that his political career was not closed, and Mr. De Valera took him down to East Clare to join in the campaign. Thus Mr. McNeill's position was made secure, and at the same time Ireland had an opportunity to see that in the new Sinn Fein party there was a place for moderation; the ancient doctrine of "he that is not for us is against us" was not to be applied in all its fierceness.

The results of the organisation were strikingly demonstrated in East Clare. Only the known strength of Sinn Fein sentiment throughout the country made any observer contemplate a victory for De Valera. The boldest prophets only suggested a margin of a few hundred votes, and frequently wavered even in that. A few days, even a few hours, before the poll was declared the odds were in favour of Lynch. The voters of East Clare did not talk—and, what perhaps is more remarkable, they did not fight among themselves to any appreciable extent. But about eighty per cent. of them went to the polls, and the result was a landslide for the leader of Sinn Fein, at which he and his friends were almost as much taken aback as the rest of the world.

Thus a man who had voluntarily and enthusiastically made the supreme sacrifice for the British Empire, a man of the blood of the leader of the Irish Party which Clare had

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so long supported through thick and thin, was succeeded in this remote and conservative constituency by a man who had been prepared to make the same sacrifice in fighting to destroy that Empire and that Party.

To close observers the aftermath of the election was even more interesting than the election itself. There seems no reason to doubt that Mr. De Valera was thoroughly surprised by the extent of his victory, and that it caused him considerable embarrassment. A young revolutionary party thrives best in precarious conditions of struggle; the Sinn Fein party was enjoying such conditions and expected in East Clare to add one more hard won triumph which would justify a continuance of the same tactics. Instead of that the clean sweep in East Clare proved that the policy had conquered the country. Irishmen—and Englishmen too—were now entitled to turn to Mr. De Valera and say: “You have proved your point, the country is behind you, and your policy is accepted without the need of further by-elections. Now all you have to do is to tell us what your policy is, and we can see how far it can be put into practical operation.” Such a position would be extremely gratifying, no doubt, in many ways to the Sinn Fein leaders, but it would also be most embarrassing to them in the event of their not having any practical and constructive policy to declare. This, in fact, seems to be their position. The Nationalist party fought for many years for an ideal which it called Home Rule, and when the prospect of victory seemed within its grasp people discovered that it had never enunciated any facts whatever or defined the details of the measure which it claimed to secure. By this weakness it was forced into the position of having to allow Englishmen to draft the Bills intended to give effect to Home Rule; thereby it became itself practically a wing of the English Liberal party, and so brought about a weakening of confidence in itself, and finally its own fall. Similarly the Unionist party has been condemned for years to be a mere negation of the Nationalists,

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and because the people of Belfast agreed in this negation they, who should be among the most advanced thinkers on industrial and labour questions, have been perforce almost disfranchised and wholly inarticulate. It has been to a great extent the want of any constructive policy among the official parties which has thrown so many Irishmen into the arms of Sinn Fein ; but now the results of East Clare seemed to exhibit Sinn Fein itself in practically the same light.

Mr. De Valera's dilemma is a very real one. He is so prominent before the world now that on the one hand he must enunciate a policy and make every effort to carry it into effect—while, on the other hand, he can hardly afford to retreat, except very gradually, from any position he has already taken up. The latter difficulty is no doubt accentuated by the fact that the world's opinion of his position is largely derived from newspapers which are neither too accurate nor too well disposed towards him. One position he has definitely assumed, and it is supposedly on its appeal to Irish opinion that his success rests. He demands a free and independent country untrammelled either by the English connection or by the forms of monarchy—in other words, an Irish Republic. This freedom is to be won by force of arms if necessary, the conditions being that revolution must only be undertaken when it has some prospect of success ; in the alternative it is to be demanded as a concession of right from the assembled peoples of the world at the Peace Conference—whenever and wherever that body may meet. Such, at any rate, is the general conception both among friends and enemies of the East Clare programme. But Mr. De Valera is a man of too much intelligence and education not to be aware that this programme is one which is valuable just so long as his party is a minority struggling against tyranny, and no longer. As a practical policy which he may be called upon to carry out it has little value. Complete freedom of this kind is obviously more than England will or can ever grant, and the expectancy of successful revolu-

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tion is, as he well knows, a fatal will-'o-the-wisp. Evidently he must desire to find a safer, more practical and more constructive policy on which to build up a new Ireland. It was suggested that a means to the end might be found in the Peace Conference if Sinn Fein representatives attended it. But in place of such hopes for the future now stands the immediate reality of the Convention. It must be uncomfortably obvious to the leaders of Sinn Fein that in establishing this Convention England has taken the wind out of their sails. She has said: "I see that the Irish people are dissatisfied with things as they are; I see that they differ among themselves as to how things should be made better. I have learned from experience that my own statesmen cannot understand or reconcile these differences, so I will allow them free opportunity to settle the matter for themselves." In saying this England issues a plain invitation to Sinn Fein to state its case, and Mr. De Valera knows that the opinion of all nations will turn against the party which refuses to come into this Convention. The claims Sinn Fein can make to justify its abstention from the Convention are that the subject of an Irish Republic was ruled out, that Ulster was given a guarantee against coercion, and that the promise of a referendum on the decision of the Convention was withheld. The question for Mr. De Valera is, will he stand by these claims or will he find a means of entering into negotiation with the Convention? What hampers him in the latter course is that, as we have already pointed out, this matter of the Irish Republic is the one definite point on which he is pledged to his followers. That he is making some effort to bridge over the difficulty seems clear from reports of recent utterances, if these are taken as accurate. Thus, when asked by an enterprising reporter why he did not abandon these impracticable schemes in favour of something more within reach, such as Colonial status, he is said to have replied that whenever any scheme consistent with freedom was put before the Irish people they would con-

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sider it. More recently, too, he remarked that the chief revolution Sinn Feiners wanted was a revolution against the methods by which the Irish party sought to govern Ireland. This is an aspiration with which most of his fellow-countrymen agree. Signs of other kinds are not wanting that if a good compromise is offered in the right way it will be accepted.

Meanwhile the Convention sits in Dublin, with the good wishes of most people and surrounded by a useful veil of mystery created by the Defence of the Realm Act. Its first official action, the choice of Sir Horace Plunkett as chairman, won the approval of the whole country and quite changed the attitude of Irishmen towards the subsequent proceedings.

Before the Convention actually assembled the prevailing feeling even amongst those who wished it well was one of profound pessimism. The abstention of Sinn Fein and of some elements of Labour as well as of the O'Brienites and the apparently uncompromising attitude of the Ulster delegates combined to give the whole proceeding an air of unreality. The basis of representation by chairmen of County Councils elected on an obsolete register was not calculated to restore confidence and the long period of delay and uncertainty led to alarming rumours. It was also believed that as soon as the Convention met a fierce struggle would take place as to the election of officers, and the belief that this difficulty would be got over by the arbitrary appointment of English nominees caused great concern. But the *fait accompli* has a wonderful force in Ireland, the mere fact that the Convention had met without disaster was sufficient to change the feeling of spectators, and when it was further announced that a man respected throughout Ireland for his constructive work and bound by no party pledges had been unanimously elected to the chair, optimism reasserted itself.

The difficult stages of approving of a secretariat, a standing committee and a plan of procedure having also

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been arranged without dissension, it may be taken for granted that the Convention will have very wide support for any conclusions at which it may arrive. We have suggested what the attitude of Sinn Fein might be. It now seems that Ulster also is not beyond persuasion. A remarkable letter in the Irish papers of August 8 from Mr. Thomas Sinclair, of Lisburn, shows that there are some Unionists in the North who are disposed to agree that changing conditions have rendered the old uncompromising opposition no longer valid. Mr. Sinclair is no doubt a free lance, but it is inconceivable that he would have written such a letter had he stood entirely alone in his opinions. Sufficient safeguards, suitably chosen concessions, such as it is understood both the English Government and the Irish politicians are willing and anxious to offer, may yet render even an advanced measure of Home Rule acceptable to Ulster.

The Convention has a difficult and delicate task before it, and the authorities have wisely tried to prevent its being rendered impossible by the order enjoining silence on the Press.

It may be of interest to refer to two of the many pamphlets and articles which the calling together of this assembly evoked. Mr. George Russell's (A.E.) pamphlet "Thoughts for a Convention" contained perhaps the most brilliant and at the same time well-informed review of political thought in Ireland which this country has seen for many years. It had a circulation which for Ireland was unparalleled, and the number of people of different parties who read it and accepted it as a sincere and valuable document is as good an augury for settlement as it is a testimony to Mr. Russell's observation and ability. A very different document is "Suggestions for an Irish Settlement" in which "Two Irishmen" presented a definite draft of a Bill for setting up an Irish Colonial Government with provincial administration. This was remarkable as being the first attempt to reduce a large amount of Irish political thought to a cut and dried basis which might be debated in

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detail. It is probable that the Bill, which is drafted with knowledge and ability, goes as near to representing the desires of a majority at least of the moderate-minded men in all parts of the country as any proposal at this time could go. Its authorship is an open secret in Dublin and it is satisfactory to note that both persons responsible are at present attached to the staff of the Convention.

One interesting feature to those who have been interested in this phase of Irish life will be the prominent part which Sir Horace Plunkett and those who believed in his economic ideals are now called upon to play in this political reconstruction. The followers of the co-operative movement, in spite of constant misrepresentation, have steadily refused to identify themselves with any political party but they have never ceased to interest themselves in the political future of Ireland as seen from the wider non-partizan point of view. The value of this body of opinion is now appreciated, and we may safely prophesy that the experience and the fair-mindedness of these men will have a marked effect on the deliberations and conclusions of the Convention.

We are thus reminded of the economic considerations, to which considerable attention has been paid in previous articles. Persistent agitation has had some slight effect in ameliorating conditions in Dublin, and some attempts have been made in the direction of providing work for the unemployed and also in the raising of wages. Nevertheless, the position remains very serious, and dissatisfaction in Ireland against England's economic administration and also against local employers is reaching an acute stage. At the present time, while the townsman becomes more and more embittered against the farmer, the latter is feeling a deep sense of grievance against the Government, and if home-grown food supplies are to be assured in the future some settlement must undoubtedly be arrived at without further delay. The harvest which is now rapidly approaching will see an enormous increase—estimated at about

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40 per cent. on previous years—in the Irish grain crop. The increased area of tillage needed to produce this result was, in the main, willingly taken up by Irish farmers in direct response to the demand of the Government, and it is safe to say that most of the work would have been done without the spur of compulsion. At the same time, the farmers definitely understood that they would be adequately rewarded for the arduous and in many ways precarious labour and the large investment of dear money involved. They were, in fact, definitely guaranteed certain attractive but, in their judgment, not excessive prices. The delay over the passage of the Corn Production Bill, the incomprehensible nature of its clauses, especially in regard to the method of payment, the obscurantist attitude of the Department of Agriculture and the general neglect of Irish interests in existing legislation combine to make them feel that they are now to be deprived of this reward. Recent orders with reference to flax and to prices of cattle have strengthened this opinion and have caused the liveliest dissatisfaction, while the proceedings of the Committee appointed to fix maximum butter prices have without any question been grossly unfair to one of the staple industries of this country. Meanwhile the Press, the townsmen, and even Government authorities continue to point to the farmer as the worst of profiteers. It is not denied that certain large farmers are reaping great prosperity from war conditions, but this is certainly not true of the average smallholder in Ireland. Probably consumers who eat expensive butter hardly realise that the Irish producer is supposed to be well paid with 7d. a gallon for milk and his skim milk back. Compare with this the recommendation of a recent Committee that in England during the coming winter the price of milk to the farmer shall be 1s. 8d. a gallon and the Irishman's grievance may be well understood. As a matter of fact, there has been more bankruptcy among small farmers lately than for many years past.

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The clue to the mystery seems to lie in the fact that neither the people nor the Government can be brought to realise the number of middle profits which the farmer has to pay before he obtains his raw materials and his domestic necessities, and the corresponding number of tolls which increase the price to the consumer of what that farmer produces. As an example, cheese is being freely sold at 1s. 8d. a pound, and for the milk which produces it the farmer is getting about 8d. If these facts were fully understood it is inconceivable that the authorities would not think it worth their while to encourage the growth of co-operative agencies which can and do eliminate profiteering and wastage, and to insist that the machinery of organisation which exists in Ireland should be used to the fullest extent in this direction. So far, however, there is no indication of anything of the kind being done; the provisioning of the army with fat cattle, the storage of the surplus grain crop, the handling of the wool clip—all these matters, as well as the distribution of agricultural machinery, are entrusted to committees of middlemen, usually described as “existing agencies,” who are frankly hostile to the farmer and indifferent to the consumer. That the Department of Agriculture tolerates and encourages such a procedure is well known; that it is hopelessly out of touch with the views of Irish farmers has been known for years; it has been discredited times without number. But the Government continues to uphold and even to glorify it.

So long as this state of things continues the Irish farmer will be dissatisfied, and the more he is abused by the rest of the public the more resentful he will become. Unless steps are taken now at the eleventh hour to improve the position of affairs, by issuing and giving wide publicity to reasonable and definite orders which he is able to understand and which give him some hope for the future, the triumph of this year's increased tillage will never be repeated, however desperate the country's war needs may be and

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even though compulsion be made more widespread than before. Furthermore, the farmer will not content himself with passive resistance; he will become politically malign. Sinn Fein in its extreme form would never have attracted Irish farmers had it not been for their economic grievances. The Nationalist party began to decay after the passage of the Land Acts because at that point the farmers' interest in politics declined. That interest is now being rudely reawakened, and the Sinn Fein party appears as the champion. What the results of such an alliance may be has been amply demonstrated in the East Clare election, which would have been an impossibility a few years ago. It is a combination to which the Government should pay the most careful attention, the more so as to purely sentimental nationalism there is here added what would be a genuine grievance in any country—the burden of economic oppression by vested interests.

Dublin. August, 1917.

CANADA

CONSCRIPTION AND COALITION.

THE decision of the Government to establish conscription in Canada has produced a difficult and disturbing political situation. It was foreseen that any attempt at compulsion would be a hazardous political experiment. As THE ROUND TABLE has often reminded its readers, this is not wholly an English-speaking country. Out of 7,500,000 or 8,000,000 people we have at least 3,000,000 who do not habitually speak the English language. We have between 500,000 and 600,000 Germans and Austrians and over 2,000,000 French people. It is true that a very high percentage of all these have a fair knowledge of English but ordinarily they use the tongue of the nationality to which they belong. Few Germans or Austrians are represented in the Canadian Expeditionary Army. Those who enlisted in the first Canadian regiments were regarded with suspicion when they reached England. Probably few crossed to France or Flanders. In the older German settlements of Canada, however, there has been generous giving to patriotic objects and no open manifestations of sympathy with Germany. One of the most impressive speeches in favour of conscription in the debate in the Commons was delivered by Mr. W. C. Weichel, a German Canadian and member for a German constituency. We may feel, perhaps, when we think of the revelations of German character elsewhere, that Canada has been fortunate in the attitude and action of this element of the population.

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It is far more difficult to interpret the French people of Quebec. The official figures of enlistment are depressing. They fall below all calculations and estimates. There are 1,600,000 French people in Quebec ; from among these 6,979 recruits have been obtained. There are fewer than 400,000 English-speaking people in the Province, but these have furnished 22,000 recruits to the Canadian army. Probably no other element of the population in any Province has responded so freely to the call of country and Empire. Five-sixths of the French people of the Dominion live in Quebec, but the one-sixth scattered throughout the English-speaking Provinces has provided 5,904 soldiers, or only 1,000 fewer than were secured in the French Province. There were only 1,217 French-Canadians in the first contingent. The accuracy of the official figures is disputed, but there is no reason to think that there has been deliberate miscalculation or misrepresentation. It would indeed be a crime against Canada to underestimate the French contribution to the army. Many of those who are severe in criticism of Quebec would rejoice if a more satisfactory statement could be furnished ; they would rather praise than blame. No doubt there have been unwise and mischievous utterances by English writers and speakers. There have been deliberate appeals to racial feeling and to deep-seated antipathies and prejudices, the old unhappy spirit of "Orangeism" has been stimulated, and the failure of Quebec has been exploited for political objects. But the masses of the Canadian people are essentially liberal and tolerant. They have been schooled in the wisdom of generous dealing with racial and religious minorities. In the main the extremists speak to "empty benches" and exercise no considerable political authority. There is, therefore, profound distress throughout the country that the war which brought France and Britain together in the great struggle for free institutions should have produced a quarrel between French and English

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in Canada more bitter and ominous than any dispute which has divided the country since Confederation.

When Sir Robert Borden returned from the War Conference he found that the demand for the draft in the English Provinces had become very general and formidable. This demand was not rooted in hostility to Quebec but in recognition of the imperative need for reinforcements for the Canadian divisions in France. The attempt to raise a force of 50,000 for home defence by the voluntary system had failed, or at least had produced no considerable results. In Quebec, where it was said there would be ready enlistment for home defence, Major-General Lessard and Lieut.-Colonel Blondin, who resigned a seat in the Cabinet in order to raise a French regiment, secured only 100 recruits. In the English Provinces it was apparent that the possibilities of the voluntary system were practically exhausted. Such representative organs of Liberal opinion as *The Toronto Globe* and *The Toronto Daily Star* urged the Government to apply the Militia Act, which, as amended by the Laurier Government, made every citizen available for military service outside Canada as well as for defence against invasion. Mr. N. W. Rowell, K.C., leader of the Liberal Opposition in the Legislature of Ontario, also demanded compulsory measures and the organisation of a National Government. Save Sir Wilfrid Laurier he speaks with more authority than any other Liberal in public life. He has the full confidence of the Liberals of Ontario and is highly regarded by Liberals in Western Canada. Many newspapers in general sympathy with the Government admitted that conscription was inevitable, while commercial bodies, municipal councils and patriotic organizations united in a vigorous and often vehement demand for compulsion. The temper of military officers merged on belligerency. For many months they had employed every legitimate device to excite opinion in favour of the Militia Act or a selective draft. They emphasised and exaggerated the failure of voluntary

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recruiting : they declared that a force for home defence could not be secured by the voluntary method. Possibly they were not too eager to support the recruiting agents. Certainly they could not be persuaded to believe that conscription was surrounded by political difficulties and dangers. It was a favourite theory of Conscriptionists in the English Provinces that the French of Quebec were a docile people who perhaps could not understand an appeal to enlist, but would promptly respond to a command. In any event the Prime Minister on his return from London discovered that a formidable feeling for conscription had been developed in the English communities, that the voluntary system had become infertile, and that the public temper was sharpened by the long roll of casualties at Vimy Ridge and Arras.

Aside from these considerations, the Prime Minister himself was convinced that sterner measures to secure reinforcements for the Canadian divisions in France must be taken. He came home with knowledge of conditions at the front and with a deep consciousness of the strain on Britain and the agony of Europe. Before he went away unfriendly critics would have said that he was "safe" but not bold. They would have said that he suffered fools too gladly and would not drive if he could not persuade : that he was embarrassed in the conduct of the war by the exigencies of party leadership : that he hesitated to establish compulsory national service for fear of alienating political support in Quebec. In all such criticism of Sir Robert Borden there would have been misunderstanding and injustice. There has always been wisdom in his patience and strength in his restraint. He knew that with or without conscription he would receive no considerable political support in Quebec. Probably he doubted if a Government that would include Sir Wilfrid Laurier could prosecute the war with greater vigour or agree to any measure of compulsion. It is no secret that for many months the Prime Minister saw that conscription probably would become

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inevitable and that only a Coalition or National Government could make the draft system effective. His own view was that coalition until it became inevitable was impracticable. He knew that devotion to party was almost a religion with multitudes of the Canadian people. He saw clearly that Quebec would be slow to submit to compulsion and he believed that national unity was the supreme consideration unless prosecution of the war under the voluntary system became impossible. When he got back from London he knew that the hour for decision had come. Probably he had resolved to announce conscription and to attempt the organisation of a union Government before he left England or was brought into contact with the new temper of Canada. This decision was not the result of any Imperial suggestion or pressure. He had learned the desperate need for reinforcements for the Canadian army. He resolved that, if he had power to direct the action of Canada, the call from the trenches should not go unanswered. Hence a few days after he reached Ottawa he induced the Cabinet to agree upon a measure of compulsion, and in a comprehensive and luminous statement of the deliberations and recommendations of the War Conference and conditions at the front he announced the momentous decision.

Throughout the English-speaking Provinces there was instant relief and rejoicing. It was not so in Quebec. In the French Province there was angry protest from the extreme Nationalists. There was strong feeling among French Conservatives. There was open revolt among French Liberals. Great public meetings at Quebec and Montreal applauded violent speeches and adopted condemnatory resolutions. Windows were broken in newspaper offices. There was incipient rioting and rough encounters between soldiers and civilians. But the rioting was not serious ; there was no loss of life, nor much damage to property. Mr. Bourassa, the Nationalist leader, from the platform and in *Le Devoir*, deprecated disturbance and intemperate utterances, but urged active and thorough

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organisation against conscription. Colonel Armand Lavergne was more extreme than his leader. Less responsible agitators and certain weekly French publications talked wildly of civil war, disruption of Confederation, and a French Republic on the St. Lawrence.

A group of Labour leaders met at Ottawa and declared against conscription. It is not clear that they had authority to speak for the masses of organised Labour. The more powerful Unions of Canada are affiliated with international organisations which in the United States are favourable to National Service. It is doubtful if they can have one policy for Canada and another for the neighbouring country. It is even more doubtful if the Canadian Unions, by no means generally subject to Socialistic control, will resist conscription. There has been no reluctance to enlist among Canadian workmen; and Labour will not deny reinforcements to their brothers in the trenches. But all these manifestations revealed more clearly the deep differences of opinion among the people and the urgent necessity for co-operation among the political leaders if conscription was to be enforced and the Canadian divisions strengthened.

It is said that Sir Robert Borden should have consulted the Liberal leader before he announced that a Bill to authorise the draft would be submitted to Parliament. It was by deliberate design, not through careless neglect, that the Prime Minister did otherwise. He reasoned that, if he took the responsibility upon his own shoulders, he could appeal with better prospect of success to Sir Wilfrid Laurier. At most Sir Wilfrid would have to support a declared policy, unpalatable to Quebec, for which he had no original responsibility. Assuming joint responsibility, he would be more open to suspicion among his own people and more directly exposed to the misrepresentation and denunciation of the Nationalists. It must be remembered that the Liberal leader had steadily and continuously opposed conscription. The Prime Minister, however, had refused to give definite pledges, and it was well understood

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that he would not hesitate at compulsion if the voluntary system failed to give adequate results. But whether or not there should have been consultation with Sir Wilfrid before the draft was announced, at least there was no thought of personal or party advantage in the course which the Prime Minister pursued. Moreover, if it be admitted that the draft was a measure which should have been proclaimed, failure to secure Sir Wilfrid's concurrence in the Government's decision would have prejudiced the whole position.

There is no disagreement between the leaders as to the details of the negotiations for a coalition. There was nothing evasive or equivocal in the Prime Minister's proposals. There was no trading or bargaining. Sir Wilfrid was invited to nominate half the ministers, exercise equal authority in council, and assume equal responsibility for the measures of the Administration. It was not stipulated, as has been whispered, that certain Conservative ministers should be retained. Sir Wilfrid was granted absolute freedom of action in choosing his colleagues. The only condition was that the union Government should adopt and enforce conscription. And that condition the Liberal leader would not accept. The negotiations were prolonged. There was a cry of anger from the English Provinces when they proved to be fruitless. In Toronto a great mass meeting of Liberals, at which Mr. Rowell and Dr. Michael Clark, M.P. for Red Deer, were the chief speakers, adopted resolutions in favour of the draft and against a referendum which it was understood Sir Wilfrid Laurier would suggest. Many Liberal newspapers censured Sir Wilfrid in language of stern if affectionate severity. They adhered to the demand for conscription and coalition, and they urged that despite the action of the official leader of the party the negotiations for coalition should not be abandoned. Chief among these newspapers was *The Winnipeg Free Press*, under the vigorous and resolute editorship of Mr. J. W. Daffoe, which exercises a remarkable authority in

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Western Canada. It is not suggested that these newspapers expressed any special confidence in the Government beyond admitting the sincerity of the Prime Minister in the movement for coalition. At best, aside from two or three brilliant ministers, the Cabinet has been commonplace. Under the strain of war it shows the marks of age and weariness. If the negotiations for a union Government fail finally, there must be a radical reorganisation with the best material the Conservative party can provide. But Sir Robert Borden has shown almost invincible persistence in the determination to effect a Coalition. Failing with Sir Wilfrid Laurier, he made advances to Mr. Fred Pardee, chief Whip of the Opposition. To Mr. Pardee just such proposals as Sir Wilfrid rejected were submitted. A conscriptionist himself and possessing the full confidence of his political associates, Mr. Pardee was urged to consult with Liberals favourable to conscription, inside or outside Parliament, who might be available for seats in the Cabinet, or who might constitute a committee to advise in the selection of Liberal ministers. As with Sir Wilfrid, the Prime Minister held that half the seats in the Cabinet should go to conscriptionist Liberals, since any lesser representation would assure Conservative predominance, and probably fail to command the approval of Liberals in the constituencies. During the long debate on the National Service Bill these negotiations were pursued. It is believed that Mr. Rowell, Mr. Pardee, Dr. Michael Clark of Alberta, Mr. F. B. Carvell of New Brunswick, and Hon. A. K. Maclean of Halifax were active in the movement among Liberals for conscription and coalition. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, however, exerted all his powers of persuasion against it: and greater persuasiveness, greater power to command personal allegiance, no man has had in the public life of Canada.

In moving an amendment to the Military Service Bill in favour of a referendum Sir Wilfrid made his position clear to Parliament and the country. He pointed out that

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the country had had repeated and continuous assurances from the Government that there never would be resort to conscription. He recalled the statement of Sir Robert Borden when enlistment of a Canadian army of 500,000 was authorised: "I have already stated that the Government has no intention of introducing conscription and I now repeat that statement with emphasis." Sir Wilfrid argued that, if there had been any suspicion that compulsion was contemplated, the life of Parliament would not have been extended. He insisted that "a rump Parliament" had no moral authority to pass a Bill so fundamental in principle and so utterly in conflict with Canadian tradition and sentiment.

I ask my right honourable friend if he is doing fairly by the people of Canada, if he is doing fairly by everybody in this country, when he asks this moribund Parliament to enact such a law as this? Yes, it is not only a moribund Parliament, it is a rump—it is nothing but a rump at the present time. There are twenty seats vacant of the members elected in 1911. There are twenty more seats to be filled, which must be filled by the new Provinces of the West, whose population justifies this additional number being added to their representation. So that you have vacancies of forty-eight members out of a little over two hundred and thirty members, almost twenty-five per cent. of the whole membership of this House, and yet you are asking that this Parliament should take on itself to pass such a law as this. For my part I say, and I place myself in the judgment of the country, and of this Parliament also, that when this Government asks this moribund Parliament to pass such a law as this it is an abuse of the authority which has been placed in its hands by the people of Canada.

The leader of the Opposition admitted that the life of the British Parliament had been extended, and that, although living by its own decision, it had enforced conscription. But in Britain compulsion was applied after long preparation. Moreover, all vacancies occurring during the war had been filled and Parliament was complete. Thus the House of Commons was kept in touch with the people. But for two years in Canada there had been no

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bye-elections save when Ministers of the Crown were compelled to consult their constituencies. It was true that the United States had established conscription, but the American Constitution was drastic and rigid, while that of Canada was elastic, and the whole theory and practice was that revolutionary proposals should be submitted to the people. In any event, he could not agree to conscription, nor could he enter a Coalition Government. He insisted that if his co-operation was desired he should have been consulted before conscription was announced.

I stated to the Prime Minister that I could not agree to go into a conscription Government. And I stated that I could not agree to go into the Coalition Government. I suggested to him that if my humble advice in regard to this law would be useful, I should have been brought in sooner, so as to discuss the principle itself. It seemed to me, according to the fitness of things, that that would have been the proper course in the interest of the country, that the services of the Opposition, such as they may be, should have been called in for the purpose of initiating a new policy, and the first thing to be done was to consult the Opposition in regard to that policy. I was called upon to be an adjunct, an appendix, to endorse a law which had been already framed, and to go into a Government one-half of which would have had to go out if I had come in.

Sir Wilfrid contended that there was a deep cleavage in the country over conscription, not only between Provinces but among classes of the same origin and language. Labour was restless and hostile. The position of workmen was that, if they must give their blood, the wealthy classes must give their money. They asked to have the people consulted, and "in the name of union and good will I personally present their plea at the Bar of the House." Better consultation with consequent union and universal satisfaction than compulsion with irritation and bitterness and a sense of intolerance and injustice. He declared that the fact that French-Canadians had not enlisted in larger numbers was not evidence that they had degenerated. He doubted if the official figures were correct. He thought, upon what information he could obtain, that the total

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should be 20,000 instead of 14,000. "Even at 20,000," he said, "the figure is very small compared with that which represents the enlistment of English-speaking Canadians." He continued :

If the enlistment of French-Canadians does not compare favourably with the enlistment of their compatriots speaking the English language, it is to be noted that the disparity between the enlistment of men who are Canadian-born and men who are British-born is also somewhat marked. What can be the cause of this disparity ? The English-born are at the top of the list, the Canadian-born speaking the English language come next, and the Canadian-born of French origin are at the bottom of the list. It is suggested that enlistment has proceeded negatively in proportion to the length of time that the men have been in the country. The French-Canadians have been longer in the country than any other class of the community ; they contributed fewer men than the other classes. Those who were British-born, and have not been in the country as long as the other classes, contributed the largest number of men to the Expeditionary Force. At all events, the French-Canadians have had no relations with France since 1760. I am sure that not one man in the Province of Quebec has any relatives in France, unless as a result of recent marriage. I think it may be truthfully said also that there is not an English-speaking family in Canada which cannot claim relatives in Great Britain. Immigration has been constant, and the connection between the British settler and his motherland has been maintained. This is not the case as between the French-Canadian and old France.

The Liberal leader recalled the unfair and violent attacks of Quebec Nationalists, under Mr. Bourassa's direction, upon the proposal of his Government to organise a Canadian navy. The first article of the Nationalist platform was "no participation by Canada in Imperial wars outside her territory." As a result of those attacks twelve seats were lost by Liberal candidates in the last general election, and the Conservative or Nationalist representation in the Commons from Quebec was increased from 15 to 27. "And every one of those twenty-seven was elected on the platform and the promise that Canada should never participate in the wars of Great Britain. The polling figures are still more significant. The Liberal vote

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polled in that election was 164,281, and the Conservative 159,299, and so the people were divided pretty equally." Thus, when the Government desired the people of Quebec to enlist, it could appeal to only one half of the Province and not to the other. He argued also that the Government had been unwise in its methods of appeal to Quebec. It was unhappy in its selection of recruiting agents. "If the Prime Minister had put at the head of recruiting in Quebec a man of French-Canadian flesh and blood the results would have been different." He deplored the differences in the country, but under British institutions there was only one way of meeting differences. That way was to appeal to the country, and to appeal to the whole country, not to one section, but to all sections. In closing he said :

What I propose is that we should have a referendum and a consultation of the people upon this question. I have taken the referendum, not that I have been very favourable towards it, but I find that the idea of the referendum has made enormous progress in Canada, and that it has been adopted by the political associations in the Western Provinces as a method of political action. If we are to have peace, if there is to be unity, we must meet the wishes of the labouring classes who have asked for this privilege. When the consultation has been made, when the verdict has been pronounced, I pledge my word, my reputation, that to the verdict, such as it is, every man will have to submit, and I claim to speak with knowledge at least so far as the Province from which I come is concerned. Is that an unfair appeal? Can anybody say that it is not in accordance with true democratic principles? In presenting this motion I do not intend—and I beg to make myself perfectly clear upon that—to speak for those who stand behind and around me, and with whom I share the honour of representing Liberalism in this House. If there is ever to be a time, of all times, this is the time when every man should think for himself, decide for himself, and act for himself. This moment is too solemn, the issue is too great, the questions involved in the measure are of too far-reaching importance, to have them decided by any other voice than the voice of each man's individual conscience. I am very firm in the belief—I am unshaken in it—that when the voice of every man has spoken, the aggregate will be the right voice and the right solution. At all events, it will have this effect : that it will be the final arbiter, and it

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will put an end to the agitation which is now going on : it will bring about harmony, now much shaken, and it will be a vindication of that spirit of democracy which we hope and believe must be the future social inspiration of the world.

There was much depression among English-speaking Liberals over the action of Sir Wilfrid Laurier in rejecting conscription and coalition. There was indignation as well as depression among thousands of those who have followed his standard with pride, affection, and enthusiasm for half a generation. Many of them believed that he could have reconciled Quebec to conscription and have effected that happy union of creeds, races, and Provinces essential to prosecution of the war with full energy and complete absorption. One doubts, however, if even the Liberal leader could have imposed compulsion upon Quebec. He could have moderated passions and prejudices within Quebec and checked the rising feeling in the English communities against the French Province. He could have reared a statue of himself in the hearts and minds of English-speaking people which could never be defaced or discrowned. A French subject of the British Crown, a Roman Catholic in religion, he would have commanded the reverence of those of other faiths and tongues through the centuries. And by his sacrifice and courage he would have become the fortress of the rights and privileges of his compatriots. But whether at the moment he could have withstood the assault of Mr. Bourassa in Quebec is far less certain. The French have been educated to suspect "Imperialism." They have been taught to regard the quarrels of Europe as no concern of Canada and particularly no concern of Quebec. Every Government, whether Conservative or Liberal, has been denounced as the agent of "Downing Street" by Oppositionists seeking deliberately to create suspicion and excite feeling in the French constituencies. We remember that so sound a British patriot as Sir Charles Tupper told

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Quebec that "Laurier was too British for him"; and that Sir Wilfrid himself repeatedly declaimed against "the vortex of European militarism." Does the Nationalist attack upon the "Laurier Navy" differ so much from the Laurier attack upon the proposal of Sir Robert Borden to build three battleships for the Imperial Navy? Where so much wind has been sown it is easy to produce the whirlwind. The whirlwind Sir Wilfrid Laurier foresaw, and he sought shelter in the referendum.

He knew that Mr. Bourassa was eager to dominate Quebec and was animated by peculiar and relentless hostility to himself. Why this is so no one fully understands. When Mr. Bourassa entered Parliament in 1896, in the contest which brought Sir Wilfrid into office, the Nationalist leader was ranked as the most brilliant of the younger Liberal members from Quebec. He was honoured by the personal favour of the Liberal leader. It was not doubted that he would secure early admission to the Cabinet. Sir Wilfrid himself believed that Bourassa would succeed to the leadership of the federal Liberal Party. There was no more brilliant speaker in Parliament alike in French and English. He was clean-handed and he has remained so. He gave an early impression of breadth and strength. But war came in South Africa; he opposed the organisation and despatch of Canadian contingents; and failing to persuade Sir Wilfrid Laurier against intervention, he resigned his seat in the Commons in protest against the action of the Liberal Administration. Ever since he has shown peculiar hostility to Sir Wilfrid and has struggled to destroy his ascendancy in Quebec. An extreme Ultramontane, he has been the faithful mouthpiece of the Hierarchy. A tribune of his countrymen, he has had the virtue of integrity. An orator of power and eloquence, he has been able to play with effect upon the traditions and sentiments of the French people.

Bourassa demands a General Election, opposes a National Government, and insists that any Coalition designed to

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enforce conscription would be "a formal and definite invitation to insurrection." He predicts national bankruptcy from the sacrifices of Canada in the war. He denies that Great Britain is ever disinterested. He contends that Canadian soldiers should be employed only in defence of the Dominion against invasion. It would be folly to doubt that these arguments are influential in Quebec. It is significant that only five French members of Parliament will vote for conscription. Two of these have seats in the Cabinet; two represent constituencies in the English Provinces. It may be that if Sir Wilfrid Laurier had joined forces with Sir Robert Borden a greater measure of French support for compulsion could have been obtained. But one doubts if even he could have prevailed against Bourassa and the general hostility of the curés to enlistment. Moreover, Sir Wilfrid cherishes the affection and confidence of his own people beyond all other political considerations. Long estranged from the Church, he has returned to its bosom not with servility but with independence and dignity. A cautious, even a doubtful Imperialist, his attitude towards the Empire is affected by that of French Canada and by a jealous concern for national autonomy. No one doubts his complete sympathy with Britain and France and Belgium and his ardent desire for victory over German autocracy. But he is an intellectual continentalist, inured to the tradition of Pacifism, detached in relation and outlook, and not fully responsive to the stern resolve of the combatant.

What will be the effect of his action in Parliament may not be predicted with confidence. He may persuade conscriptionist Liberals not to enter a Coalition or National Government. But it is impossible to believe that he can again command the undivided allegiance of Liberals in the English constituencies. They are as absorbed in the war as are the masses of the Conservative Party. They are as eager for conscription. There is evidence that the West is in revolt against Laurier's leadership and unimpressed by

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the Government. The *Winnipeg Free Press* declares that the West recognises no leader at Ottawa. There is at the moment hopeless confusion and division among Liberals in Ontario. A majority of the Liberal members from the Atlantic Provinces, where party bonds are stronger, perhaps, than in any other portion of Canada, may vote with Sir Wilfrid even against conscription. But he will hold few of his Parliamentary supporters from Ontario and the Western Provinces. Much depends upon the character of the reorganised Cabinet. Much upon the Prime Minister. Since his return from London Sir Robert Borden has impressed the country as he never did before, and upon the wisdom of his counsel and the vigour of his action in the crisis through which we are passing hang great consequences. Whatever reorganisation of the Cabinet may be effected, a General Election seems to be inevitable. There are now 22 vacant seats in the Commons. The West is greatly under-represented. Parliament is fretful, ineffective, unequal to its responsibilities, unresponsive to the new temper of the country. Unfortunately, there is grave fear that the contest would degenerate into a quarrel between Quebec and the English Provinces. There is always danger in issues which affect race and religion. Though leaders may be sober and reticent, writers and speakers of lesser responsibility sow the seeds of unhappy harvests. We cannot deny to Quebec a proportionate authority in the councils of the nation. Conciliation rather than coercion is the essential principle of government in a federal Commonwealth. But, undoubtedly, the attitude of Quebec is resented in the English Provinces, and we are probably at the threshold of a long period of domestic discord and unsettled government.

The second reading of the Compulsory Service Bill was carried in the House of Commons by 118 to 55. Sir Wilfrid Laurier's motion in favour of a referendum was

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lost by 111 to 62. The majorities for the Government on both divisions were even greater than was expected. Twenty-five English-speaking Liberals and one French Liberal supported conscription and twelve French Conservatives opposed. In all but twelve English-speaking Liberals voted with Sir Wilfrid Laurier and only three of these represented constituencies in Ontario and the West. During the discussion on the second reading and in Committee there were few deliberate appeals to prejudice and passion. If the debates did nothing to produce a better feeling between Quebec and the English-speaking Provinces, it is just as true that Parliament was not discredited nor the public temper aggravated and excited.

Canada. July, 1917.

AUSTRALIA

I. POLITICS IN AUSTRALIA

THE Federal Elections on May 5 were the last act in a period of agitation and dissension, which began when the Referendum on conscription was proposed in the Commonwealth Parliament. Of the intervening eight months there has not been one during which the policy of the country could be regarded as settled. Since the defeat of conscription there have been two changes of Ministry, each under the premiership of Mr. Hughes, and two rearrangements of Parties. The first was forced on the Prime Minister by the secession of the majority of his followers, the second was brought about after tedious and protracted negotiations in order that Parliament might be prolonged and Australia represented by Ministers at the War Conference. The Commonwealth Parliament was dissolved in March and the month of April was devoted to an election campaign of unusual energy and personal bitterness. The Parliament of New South Wales was dissolved at the end of February and that State spent the whole of March and part of April in a General Election. There is no need to enlarge on the damage which was caused to the ordinary business of the country or to the special business of recruiting by so much turmoil. The consequences of lack of supervision and of delay in securing the attention of Ministers have been revealed in numberless instances. The whole of the energy of the Prime Minister

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has been absorbed in platform campaign and in Party negotiations. Other Commonwealth Ministers have scarcely had time to become acquainted with their departments before being asked to resign to facilitate a Coalition or being sent to the constituencies to defend the Coalition when formed. The States have suffered through the intervention of their Ministers in Federal contests and in the case of New South Wales through the State Election. But the most lamentable result of the political struggle has been the accentuation of class and Party divisions. The responsibility must be shared by both Parties, although there have been notable examples of fairness among the leaders, especially in New South Wales. But the Prime Minister by virtue of his position must bear the greater part of the blame. It was part of his electioneering tactics to brand the whole of the Opposition as disloyal. The charge in its indiscriminate form may have been provoked by the universal hostility shown to Mr. Hughes by his former colleagues. But it was ludicrously untrue, as could be demonstrated by the recruiting figures. The next three years will show whether the outcome of so much turmoil will prove an adequate compensation for departmental neglect and national disunion. The main purpose of the Coalition has failed since Australia was not represented at the War Conference. But the Elections in the Commonwealth and in New South Wales have given the Coalition or Nationalist Parties majorities which should keep them in power for the lives of their respective Parliaments. There will be compromise both in legislation and administration, but in each case the compromise will represent the decision of the Government and not its concessions to a third Party, and there should be no sanctioning of waste or idleness to satisfy the orders of a Party organisation outside Parliament.

The State Elections for New South Wales must be treated in an article on Federal Politics because they were subject to many of the same influences and because the

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Nationalist victory in the State disheartened the Labour organisations in the Commonwealth and revealed many of their weaknesses. The three years' term of the State Parliament came to an end in November and but for the Conscription Referendum and a split in the Labour Party there would have been a General Election immediately. The split in the Labour Party had the same effect in the State as it ultimately had in the Commonwealth. Mr. Holman, without attempting to carry on with the residue of his followers, coalesced with the Opposition, then under the leadership of Mr. Wade. Before doing so he had brought in a Bill to prolong the life of Parliament for a year and carried it by substantial majorities. Such a use of a newly formed majority provoked vigorous protests from some of the Government supporters as well as from the Opposition, and induced the State Governor to call upon the Premier to resign on the ground that although his Bill was supported by a majority in Parliament he himself was the leader of a minority only, a summons which was withdrawn the day after its issue on the joint representations of Mr. Holman and Mr. Wade. The reason given by Mr. Holman for the extension was not that a General Election should never be held in war time, but that, if it were held on its due date, it would be decided by considerations irrelevant to State politics. The electors were still under the impression of the conscription campaign. State Members as well as Federal had spoken on the Referendum and had become identified with one side or another. Since the State Parliament has no jurisdiction over defence it was necessary to allow an interval to elapse during which the electors could turn their minds to State issues. The answer of the State Opposition was that no majority could be justified in using its power to prevent the electors exercising their judgment at the time appointed by the Constitution Act, that the precedent created by Mr. Holman might be cited afterwards for any object, however corrupt, and that Mr.

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Holman would not have cared whether the issues were irrelevant or relevant if New South Wales had not voted strongly against conscription and if he had not anticipated defeat. The force of these objections was undeniable, but the question was decided not on principle but by the special circumstances of the day. It was known that New South Wales had to look forward to bad times. The State had grown accustomed to spending eight millions a year of loan money and had scarcely reduced its expenditure during the first two years of war. Since the London market was practically closed and the Federal Government required all the money that could be raised locally, it was certain that great numbers of workmen would be dismissed and every unprofitable undertaking discontinued. The responsibility for raising money fell entirely on the State Ministers, for Mr. Holman had refused to be a party to the agreement by which the other States had arranged with the Commonwealth to do their borrowing for them. Under these conditions it was thought that any expedient was justified which would prevent the electors—then under the illusion that they were still opposing conscription—from handing over the government to men of no experience, some of whom had thought wildly of the confiscation of wealth and the restriction of incomes and whose actions were controlled by a body of extremists outside Parliament. It is no doubt open to question whether Mr. Holman had not undervalued the intelligence of the electors or overestimated their resentment. During the brief campaign in March the Opposition did their utmost to persuade them that conscription was the real issue, suggesting that though it could not be enforced by the New South Wales Parliament, yet a vote for the Nationalists would be taken by the Federal Ministry to signify a change of heart. This argument was met by a pledge signed by Ministers and a majority of their candidates declaring that, if a Referendum were again introduced, they would not support conscription, and by a statement from Mr. Holman that,

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if conscription were promised by Mr. Hughes in London, he would oppose it. The pledge was a humiliating document, for its signatories a few months before had made the support of conscription a test of loyalty. It was intended to conciliate the farmers, among whom the opposition had been strongest and whose support was essential to a Nationalist victory. But the unattached electors would not vote for the leaders of the official Labour Party because their careers had given no ground for confidence and because some of them were suspected of sympathy with the doctrines of the Industrial Workers of the World. In the industrial suburbs of Sydney and in mining towns the official Labour Party retained its former majority. In the country, however, it was evident that the split had been followed by a considerable transference of votes and that the Liberal electors who had voted against conscription were now supporters of the Coalition. Some of the Labour supporters of Mr. Holman lost their seats, but the Government was returned by a very substantial majority, and shortly before the meeting of Parliament the Premier, whose electioneering skill had largely contributed to the victory, left for England in order to add his persuasiveness to the authority of Mr. Wade in obtaining money for the State.

Very many features of the New South Wales election were reproduced in the Federal election which followed it. The result was decided by the contrast between the opposing leaders. The Labour Party was said to have blown out its brains when it expelled Mr. Hughes and his followers. It had at least dethroned the ablest politician in Australia and a master of electioneering in order to make way for a careful and honest administrator of little personal force. Mr. Tudor's assistants did not supply the qualities which he lacked. With few exceptions they were men of no eminence in the Party; many of them owed any reputation they possessed outside their own constituencies to their failure to admit the need of any

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real national sacrifice in war time. In the Senate, where they were strong enough to defeat the Government, their personal weakness had been most conspicuous, and their subservience to the Party machine most apparent. Naturally the needs of the war were much more prominent in the Commonwealth than in the State, but again the personal test was decisive. The electors might justly have resented the charge of disloyalty directed against Mr. Tudor, knowing that he and some of his supporters had made the truest sacrifice on the altar of patriotism. But they could not suppose that he would prove strong enough in an emergency to shake off the influence of indifference or of disloyalty, in the caucus with whom the claims of class or Party always came before those of the country, or in the section of Irishmen who, in Australia as in other parts of the Empire, were ready to oppose every effort to send help to the Allies. It cannot be said that the majority for the Government showed that the country had repented of its vote for conscription, but it did show that the country was against the forces which claimed to have brought the conscription vote about. The majority voted for the Nationalist Party because, without clearly defining the means, they believed that it was far more capable of expressing the genuine loyalty of Australia than Mr. Tudor and his friends. An attempt to dissuade Labour voters from supporting the Coalition on the ground that it would practise economy by cutting down Old Age Pensions and reducing wages did more harm than good to its authors. The figures show that in Victoria especially a great number of electors who had formerly voted Labour had followed Mr. Hughes into the Coalition. What was more important, the Government was believed capable of carrying out the work of repatriation, and to be sincere in its promise to do so on a generous scale.

In announcing the policy of the Coalition in Parliament Mr. Hughes had declared that it would respect the verdict of the people on conscription, that it would practise

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economy, but without reducing wages, and that it would provide for the representation of Australia at the War Conference. In his opening speech delivered at Bendigo he said nothing about public as distinct from individual economy, and defined his attitude on conscription by undertaking not to impose it through his Parliamentary majority, and not to propose another Referendum unless some disaster to the Allies made the demand for men imperative. The War Conference at that date had begun its sittings, and it was impossible to say whether an Australian delegation which started after the Election would be in time to take part in it. But the refusal of the Labour Party through their representatives in the Senate to consent to Parliament being prolonged by an Imperial Act in order that Mr. Hughes might have left Australia furnished one of the main grounds of the appeal. Mr. Hughes warned his supporters that it would not be enough for him to maintain his majority in the House of Representatives or even to increase it. He directed their special attention to the Senate Elections, in which, although the franchise is the same, different results are often produced through the States voting as a whole and not through separate constituencies. Since only half of the Senate were to go before the electors, and since of the eighteen who remain eleven were his confirmed opponents, it would be necessary for the Government to gain a majority of the aggregate vote in all but one of the States if they would have a working majority in the next Parliament. The speech included a defence of the Government's conduct of the wheat pool which had been criticised by representatives of the farmers. But all its items were subordinate to an appeal that Australia should be enabled to place all her resources in men and money at the disposal of the Allies, and for this purpose to return a Government which appreciated the magnitude of the dangers still existing, and was not handicapped by any association with disloyalty.

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In the election campaign the Government received a general support from almost all the leading newspapers in the Commonwealth. Its chief opponents in the Press were the *Bulletin* and the *Worker*, of which the former had given a warm support to conscription, and the latter, the organ of the Australian Workers' Union, had greatly increased its influence by the vigour and ability as well as by the unscrupulousness of its opposition. With some of the grounds of the *Bulletin* criticism there was a good deal of sympathy, even among supporters of the Government. The use of the censorship to prevent criticism of policy or of administrative acts, the arbitrary application of the powers conferred by the War Precautions Act for purely domestic purposes had provoked very general resentment. The refusal of the Government to hold another referendum on conscription simultaneously with the General Election and its undertaking not to introduce a Bill into Parliament had aroused many protests, including one from Sir William Irvine, who was to have been a delegate to the War Conference.*

Disappointment had not been reduced by the Prime Minister's explanation. He defended his compromise on the ground that, if the prospects of the Allies were realised the reinforcements to be obtained under the voluntary system would be sufficient. His policy speech had been dominated by the idea that the cause of the Allies was still in the gravest peril. He laid himself open to the charge that the Nationalists were willing to compromise their aim of winning the war for the sake of winning votes, and did not overcome the instinctive dislike of the bulk of his fellow-countrymen to the exploitation of the heroism and the suffering of the Australian soldiers on Party platforms.

The ground on which the *Bulletin* and the *Worker* agreed was in warning the electors against allowing Mr. Hughes

* Sir William Irvine so far dissociated himself from the declaration of the Government that he expressed the hope that no one would vote for him who was not in favour of conscription.

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to represent them at an Imperial Conference. They appealed against him to the fear that Australia would be deprived of some of her powers of self-government, and the ideal of a White Australia would be endangered. The retort that Australia could not defend herself alone was obvious and was effective. But this ground of opposition was strongly pressed, and was pointed by reference to speeches by Mr. Lloyd George and to a supposed sympathy between him and Mr. Hughes.

These objections may have diminished the enthusiasm of supporters of the Government. In view of the success of the result it is impossible to believe that they turned any votes. The result was a triumph beyond anything that Mr. Hughes had predicted. The Government candidates for the Senate were returned in all the States, including Queensland, which had been regarded as beyond hope.* In the House of Representatives the Government majority was increased. Several constituencies which had formerly returned Labour candidates supported the Coalition, only two of the members who had left the Labour Party with Mr. Hughes were defeated, and in the greater number of the Victorian industrial electorates Labour

* VOTING FOR THE SENATE.

Votes counted up to 12th May, 1917.

State.	Nationalists.	Labour.	Nationalist Majority.
Victoria	987,482	828,580	158,902
New South Wales	1,101,744	918,472	183,272
Queensland	409,389	393,076	16,313
South Australia	282,575	225,208	57,367
Western Australia	214,401	107,857	106,544
Tasmania	124,680	92,220	32,460
Commonwealth Totals	3,120,271	2,565,413	554,858
Number of electors on Commonwealth roll	2,836,177
Number of electors whose valid Senate votes have been counted	1,912,828
Percentage of total votes cast for Nationalists	54'37
Percentage of total votes cast for Labour	44'70
Percentage of total votes cast for Independents	00'93

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candidates who had been accustomed to majorities of more than one hundred per cent. were barely returned. It was obvious that, if it had been possible to send the whole of the Senate to the country as in 1914, the newly elected House would have unanimously supported the Coalition. Under a scheme of proportional representation the Labour Party would have had approximately eight out of the eighteen Senators elected. Under the system at present in force they had none, for although there had been considerable dissatisfaction with the choice of candidates the electors on either side voted the whole Party ticket. The poll was a very heavy one, though not quite so heavy as on the conscription referendum. It showed that the Coalition had gained approximately 100,000 votes which were cast for Labour in 1914, and that they were supported by many thousands who in 1916 had voted against conscription. The Government majority was neither a class nor a Party vote. It represented all classes and all interests. It is a proof of the instinctive loyalty of Australia to the Empire and of its sympathy with the cause of the Allies. But it would be going too far to argue that it demonstrates a change of opinion on the subject of conscription. The electors were asked to show their loyalty by their votes, but they were asked for no specific sacrifice, and with the single exception of Sir William Irvine's constituents they cannot be said to have voted for any advocate of conscription here and now.

The Coalition has now a free hand to carry out what measures it considers expedient to ensure that Australia will give the help that is needed and can be given without the introduction of compulsory service. The effects of its victory have already been seen in increased financial confidence. It will certainly welcome every scheme for increasing the supplies of recruits under the voluntary system. It has an opportunity such as no Australian Ministry has had in the past ; for it has majorities in both Houses and has no need to make concessions to a third

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Party or to listen to the orders of a controlling body outside Parliament.

There would be little doubt of its prospects if the Prime Minister had showed any disposition to reconcile himself for national purposes with the Party opposed to him. It is not suggested that the personal hostility at present existing between him and the Labour Party was provoked by Mr. Hughes. But a truly national leader would not have perpetuated it as he has done. The suggestion that, because there are disloyalists in the Opposition, a substantial portion of the many hundred thousand who voted against the Government are disloyal or indifferent is a silly libel. It has been handsomely disavowed by Senator Millen, the leader of the Nationalists in the Senate. Mr. Hughes must do so by act, if not by speech, if the Ministry is to do a truly national work. So long as the charge is repeated, appeals for recruits will not succeed, conscription will be impossible, and industrial disputes will continue to flourish. Nor will Parliament be able to conduct its business if criticism is denounced as disloyal opposition. Vigilant criticism is always needed in the Commonwealth Parliament, and Mr. Tudor is quite capable of giving it. The want of it, both in the Press and in Parliament, during the war has been one of the chief causes of administrative blunders. Mr. Hughes will retain the confidence the electors have shown in him if he treats criticism as a necessary element in the conduct of business and no longer confuses opposition to his plans with disloyalty to the Empire.

Within the Government majority the former members of the Labour Party are considerably outnumbered by the Liberal element. The certainty that this must be so was used throughout the elections to support the warning that a victory for the Coalition would be followed by reduction in pensions and by the repeal of much industrial legislation. The warning was clearly rejected by the electors if they can be said to have considered anything but the course of the war. The new Ministry is bound to

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economise, for the National Expenditure on non-military objects has increased at an alarming rate. But economy will be effected, if at all, by the stoppage of public works not immediately necessary and by closer supervision. There may be industrial legislation, but its intention will be to secure the settlement of disputes with greater expedition and at less expense. There is, of course, a danger that the Coalition may dissolve, since many of its Ministers were a short time ago opposed to each other on personal as well as on political grounds. But it will continue so long as the war lasts and there is still need to have Australia represented at an Imperial Conference. There is no warrant for saying that many of the votes cast for Mr. Hughes at the General Election were influenced by a desire to punish the Party which prevented him from attending the War Conference. There has been so much secrecy about Foreign Policy in the past and the published results of the Imperial Conference have been so trivial that the vital importance of this War Conference has never been fully realised. But the resolutions cabled, tentative as they were, have convinced Australians that their interests may be seriously affected and that in the future they must be represented and represented by their ablest Ministers. If Ministers look beyond the war they can see that the union of so many different materials affords an opportunity for the serious consideration of the questions which have hitherto been delayed by Party divisions. The element most difficult to calculate is the personality of the Prime Minister. He will prove his statesmanship if he can ignore the provocation of the minority and admit the good faith in their professions of patriotism. He will be a successful head of his Ministry if he will check a tendency to monopolise all administrative control in his own hands which, however natural in a man of outstanding ability, is fatal to the efficiency of the department and the harmony of the Cabinet.

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II. QUEENSLAND POLITICS

THE General Election for the Commonwealth was accompanied in Queensland by a State referendum on the subject of the abolition of the Legislative Council. By an Act of 1908 Queensland made provision whereby Bills twice rejected by the Council (a nominated body) should be referred to the people, and if approved, be presented for the Royal Assent ; and the present proposal was referred by the Government under this sanction.

The submission of the question to electors when they were recording their votes at a Commonwealth election had, no doubt, something to recommend it on the score of convenience and economy ; but the course is seriously objectionable as mixing the issues of State and Commonwealth politics. In the present instance the Premier of Queensland and his Ministers have been in sharp conflict with Mr. Hughes over conscription, and now belong to the section of the Labour Party that has repudiated him. The Labour Party is rent on the question of control of the Ministry and the Parliamentary Caucus by the external organisations of the Party. Mr. Hughes claims a certain freedom of action ; Mr. Ryan accepts the " Official Labour " principle of control, and the Commonwealth and Queensland Ministers had other grounds of public difference. In the result Queensland surprised the other States by returning Ministerialists for each of her three Senate seats, while the scheme for the abolition of the Legislative Council was negatived by 166, 664 to 105, 732.*

The referendum was not allowed to take place without challenge of its legality by some of the Council members. They applied to the Supreme Court for an injunction on the ground that the referendum was unconstitutional

* These are the figures given up to May 26th. A few returns had still to be dealt with.

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both as being beyond the powers of Parliament and as bad in point of procedure. The Supreme Court of Queensland granted the injunction; and the statement of some Ministers gave ground for the fear that a conflict between the Executive and the Judiciary was to be added to the political strife. An appeal to the High Court was expedited and came on for hearing a few days before the referendum. On the suggestion of the Court the referendum was allowed to proceed "without prejudice," and the appeal is therefore still pending in the High Court.

The attack by the Ministry on the Council is the culmination of an hostility between Council and Assembly which is the most recurrent fact in the political history of every State in the Commonwealth, and made its appearance long before the advent of the Labour Party in either its earlier or its later guise. It has been a common feature of these conflicts that, as in the present case, a Government having the firm support of the Assembly has been in a minority in the Council. Ministerialists contended that the Council had obstructed the Labour programme as endorsed by the people in 1915; that practically all the Council's life nominees were appointed by previous Liberal Governments; and that the Chamber was, according to the Premier, "an anachronism and excrescence on the body politic." The case had become one for ending by abolition rather than mending by the nomination of a sufficient number of members to alter the political complexion of the Council. The counter argument was the traditional one, the need of an unhurried chamber of revision: and there was considerable warrant, in the valuable revisory work of recent years, to support this contention.

A general survey of the legislation, actual or proposed, of the State of Queensland during the régime of the present Ministry is not possible here. Some of it has been by general consent admirable, much of it has been highly controversial and bound to provoke the resistance of a body which claimed to stand for moderation in politics.

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Labour Governments, in a position to do so, are active in establishing State industries. New South Wales and Western Australia have a long story of such enterprises ; and the Queensland Ministry in its brief tenure of office has but followed the lead with meat shops, hotels, cattle stations, timber yards, etc. It has, however, greatly surpassed other Australian Labour Governments in introducing contentious legislation during war time. For illustration, the cases of pastoral leases and insurance may be referred to. Queensland pastoral leases contained a provision that the rentals were to be revised every seven years, but no increase upon the previous rental was to exceed 50 per cent. Under this contract between the Crown and the lessee many mortgagee third party interests have arisen : while a great number of these leases have changed hands, a clear inducement to the purchaser residing in this limitation. The Labour Government brought in a measure to cut out the limitation, and the Council threw out the Bill on the ground of unwarrantable repudiation of contract. The Government brought it in again, the two Houses conferred, and, in order to secure other features of the Bill, the Government finally agreed to excise the contested clause.

Queensland passed in 1905 a Workmen's Compensation Act, largely on the model of the British Act. Several companies promptly set up the requisite machinery to cater for the business. The Labour Government passed an Act in 1916 to compel every employer (1) to insure his risk, and (2) to do so with the newly created Government Department, as from July 1, 1916. A clause in the Act, incomprehensible in view of the context, entitled the private companies, on payment to the Treasury of a £5,000 deposit, to apply for a licence to trade on like terms with the Government. They complied with the conditions : but it was not mandatory upon the Government to grant the licences. The Government refused in every case. The Council had been under the impression that it had saved the companies

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from this act of confiscation ; but, owing to inexcusable bungling, the Bill left that Chamber in a form which permitted of Ministerial action in the manner indicated.

The Government has also set up a State Fire Insurance Department, and has taken the requisite powers to create other departments for marine risks, motor cars, fidelity, etc. The fire business is on the basis of 80 per cent. of pre-existing rates ; and the Fire Department has stated its intention to distribute any profits as dividends to the policy holders. The private companies have adopted the 80 per cent. basis, and they are still operating ; but it is stated, on good authority, that the various Government departments (*e.g.*, Agricultural Bank, Public Trustee, Public Curator, etc.) are using strong influence to deflect insurances from the private companies to the Government Department.

The stock embargo was an act of administration, not legislation. In 1914 the Liberal Ministry passed the "Meat Supply for Imperial Uses Act"—with wide powers to commandeer and purchase stock and meat intended for export. As New South Wales passed a similar Act about the same time, it is not a violent presumption that the originating suggestion came from the United Kingdom. The Labour Government, which succeeded the Liberals, arranged with the Meat Companies a price of 4½d. per pound for beef for Imperial uses ; but stipulated for a maximum of 12,000 tons during 1916 for home consumption at 3¾d. to supply the meat shops which the Government had set up in several places. They closed the border absolutely to fat stock, while store stock could only cross on payment of a deposit of 16s. per head of cattle, 6d. per sheep, with an undertaking on the part of the grazier to bring the stock back into Queensland within six months.

On the face of it this appeared to be in violation of a fundamental principle of the Commonwealth, embodied in the terms of the Constitution, that trade and commerce among the States should be absolutely free. The action of the Government was, however, supported by a majority

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of the High Court on the ground that a State has power to acquire property and to control the rights of property holders within its territory, and that this is not impaired by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of trade. Legal or not, the action of the Queensland Government excited great indignation among Queensland producers, and not less feeling amongst the other people and Governments in Australia, irrespective of Party.

Finally, Queensland enjoys the distinction of being the one State in Australia governed by a Ministry avowedly and actively opposed to conscription.

Australia. May, 1917.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. THE SESSION.

THE second Session of the second Parliament of the Union of South Africa opened in Cape Town on February 16th. The political situation as it existed immediately prior to this event was fully dealt with in the last number of *THE ROUND TABLE*. In this article it is proposed to trace the effects of the Session on the relationship between the four parties into which the House is divided. On the dominating issue of the war there is, of course, no change to record. General Botha can rely on the support of a commanding majority, composed of his own party, the Unionists and the Labour members; indeed, he can do so now with far greater confidence than formerly, for the one serious stumbling block in the way of this support being fully accorded has now been removed by the settlement of the vexed question of the pay of our overseas contingent in France. This has been solved by the Imperial Government agreeing to pay the full South African rates (3s. a day) as from January 1st last, while the Union Government at the same time has undertaken to make a free grant of £1,000,000 towards the general expenses of the war. This obstacle having been removed, it may be said with confidence that General Botha's position as leader of South Africa in this war has been strengthened as regards the English section, a result to which the series of speeches made by General Smuts during the sitting of the Imperial War Cabinet has also very materially contributed.

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But there are other matters, more domestic in character, which have been dealt with this session, and which have raised serious and somewhat bitter debates. It is interesting to compare the division of parties which has resulted in each case, for this serves to show how unstable the present political situation is. Three main topics have produced full-dress and prolonged debates. They are given below, and against each is set the way in which parties divided (with the exception of one or two individuals whose departure from the strict party classification does not materially affect the argument).

1. *The War and the late Rebellion.* South African Party, Unionists and Labour Party *v.* Nationalists.

2. *The Native Administration Bill.* South African Party and Nationalists *v.* Unionists and Labour Party.

3. *The Bewaarplaats Bill.* South African Party and Unionists *v.* Nationalists and Labour Party.

It will be observed that in each case the Government secured a substantial majority with the aid of different allies. The first topic has already been alluded to, and it is not necessary to go into it in any detail. The whole subject was raised and discussed at interminable length on the Budget; indeed, the country's finances were only fitfully mentioned by a few speakers in a debate in which 83 members out of a House of 130 took part, and which filled 14 sitting days. The division of parties during this hurricane of words may be described as normal, in so far as the attitude of South Africa towards the war is concerned. But on the other two questions abnormal situations arose which will repay some study.

In THE ROUND TABLE of September, 1913, an article was published entitled "South Africa and its Native Question." In this article the natives were divided into three classes: (1) Natives living in their own communities in reserves specially set apart; (2) natives who do not belong to any native community, but live individually or in groups on the Europeans' land, or in towns and industrial centres;

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and (3) natives brought into the Union from outside under labour contracts. The Bill we are discussing in no way concerns the last class, but deals only with the first two. Nor is it necessary for our purpose to deal with the proposals of the Bill with regard to the natives in the first class, for its ultimate object is to apply that policy as regards native administration which has been followed with comparative success in the Transkeian district and which was described in the article already referred to. But it was around the proposals of the Bill for dealing with natives falling within the second class that the main controversy raged. The fundamental principle of the Bill is the territorial separation of the white and native inhabitants of the Union—that is to say, that as regards the ownership of any interest in land the native races shall be strictly segregated. When once this principle has been put into effective operation, we shall have white and black communities existing side by side and developing on parallel lines, each in its own way. This policy may best be stated in the following extract from General Smuts's speech in London on Tuesday evening, May 22nd :

I am talking of the idea of creating all over South Africa, wherever there is a considerable native community, independent, self-governing institutions from the native population, instead of mixing up black and white in the old way, as we have done, confusing everything, and not lifting up the black, but degrading the white. We are now trying to keep them apart as much as possible in our institutions. In land ownership, in forms of government, and in many ways we are trying to keep them apart, and thus lay down an outline of policy which may take a hundred years to work out, but which in the end may be the solution of our native problem. It will certainly be that in South Africa you will have, in the long run, large areas cultivated by blacks and governed by blacks, where they will look after themselves in all forms of living, and in suitable parts you will have white communities which will govern themselves according to accepted principles. The natives will come to work in the white areas, but as far as possible the forms of political government will be such that each will be satisfied and developed according to his own proper lines. This is the attempt which we are now making in South Africa.

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It will be observed that the policy outlined above is one of absolute territorial separation so far as concerns the ownership of land ; development on parallel lines so far as concerns political institutions ; while in the sphere of industry the principle of strict segregation is to be departed from, and the native is to be allowed, and will no doubt be encouraged, to leave his native territory in order to seek service under the white. Thus the Bill aims at nothing less than to lay for all time the foundations of a policy which in General Smuts's opinion it may take a century to evolve. The first step had been taken in 1913, when by the passing of the Natives' Land Act * certain areas, representing the existing native reserves, were scheduled, outside of which natives were prohibited from buying or hiring land, except with the consent of the Government. Similarly the purchasing or hiring of land by Europeans within the scheduled areas was forbidden. At the same time a statutory Commission was appointed to demarcate the whole country into native and non-native areas. The Commission was required to report within two years, but the outbreak of the war, and still more the Rebellion, interfered so seriously with its labours that Parliament was obliged to extend this period for a further year. Finally, the Commission handed its report to Parliament during the Session of 1916. The report was allowed to remain in the hands of the country until the present Session, when the Government introduced the Native Administration Bill, which embodied the territorial division of the country recommended by the Commission. It must be remembered that the Act of 1913 was a purely temporary measure, introduced primarily for the purpose of preventing speculation in land which might have been indulged in by enterprising people anxious to anticipate the proposals of the Commission. It must also be remembered that it deprived the natives of rights of acquiring property which they had possessed hitherto in the Transvaal and Natal

* ROUND TABLE, September, 1913, p. 666.

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without any compensating privilege being accorded them. It attempted similarly to limit the rights of natives in the Cape Province, but in this it failed, for, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Union, which forbids any interference with the existing Native Franchise in the Cape, a clause was inserted providing that no restrictions on the acquisition of property should be in force in the Cape Province which would prevent any person from acquiring the necessary property qualification to be enrolled as a voter. A recent decision of the Appeal Court has ruled that this proviso excludes the whole of the Cape from the operation of the 1913 Act. As far as the Cape is concerned, therefore, the position remains as it was before 1913. In the Orange Free State also the 1913 Act made no difference, for there the natives never have possessed the right of acquiring interests in property. In the Transvaal and Natal they could do so, and the 1913 Act deprived them of this privilege. What the Native Administration Bill therefore sets out to do is permanently to limit the right of the natives to acquire property, and as compensation to set apart additional areas to the existing native reserves in which natives will be allowed to purchase land and from which the white landowner shall be excluded. It is obvious that when these areas come to be demarcated two questions will at once arise—first, are they sufficiently large to allow for the natural expansion of the natives, and to give a fair chance to natives both now and in the future to acquire land ; and secondly, are they composed of lands suitable for native occupation, and of a quality good enough to allow the native a fair chance of farming successfully ?

The necessity for careful weighing of these two points of view becomes all the more necessary when it is remembered that the interests of the white man and the native are not identical. In the first place, the white man will not willingly agree to hand over large areas of good land from which he is to be permanently excluded, and naturally claims that if his farm is to be included in a native area

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the Government must be prepared to expropriate it. This, however, the Government has announced it is not prepared to do ; but it will allow him to sell to a white man if he cannot find a native purchaser, while at the same time it reserves to itself the right to buy him out. This is, in effect, giving a perpetual free option to the Government, and is perhaps naturally regarded as unsatisfactory by the white farmer who finds himself condemned to be included in a native area. Secondly, the white man looks to the native to provide his labour. This point is made clear by General Smuts. Though the two races are to develop along parallel lines, the native is to go freely into the white territory to seek work. This being so, the white man, who alone has control of legislation, may be tempted to limit the opportunities afforded to the native in order to induce him to seek work in a white area. It was on the above grounds that the Bill was mainly attacked. Sir Thomas Smartt, as leader of the Opposition, on the Order for the Second Reading, moved an amendment to the effect that the Order be discharged, and the subject matter of the Bill be referred to a Select Committee, in order to obtain further information as to whether it could be put into operation without injustice. He also pleaded that such a controversial measure and one so intimately affecting the interests of natives should not be proceeded with during the continuance of the war. This motion the Government found itself unable to accept, with the unfortunate result that the House divided on definite racial lines, the English supporters of the Government voting with the Opposition. It is certainly regrettable that a racial division should take place on such a question as the native question, but its significance should not be exaggerated. It must be remembered that probably the vast majority of the members of the House of Assembly are in favour of the principle of territorial separation if it can be equitably applied ; indeed, the preliminary Act of 1913 went through without a division. There is

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also a cross division of opinion on the native problem, represented on the one hand by the more liberal policy of the Cape and on the other by the less liberal policy of the Northern provinces in the past. It is to be hoped that, if the country is to be divided on the native problem, it will be so on the latter rather than on the former basis.

The division on the Bewaarplaats Bill brought about a combination between the ultra-Conservative party, represented by the Nationalists, and the Labour Party, which, of course, is Socialistic.

This curious combination found a common enemy to attack in the form of the big Rand mining houses. The nature of the Bewaarplaatsen and the problem connected with the distribution of the proceeds of the disposal of the mining rights under them have already been explained in THE ROUND TABLE. The Government, after putting it off for several years, determined to settle the question this Session, and to settle it on the basis of the State taking half the proceeds and the owners of the land—who as it happens are mostly mining houses—the other half. As upwards of two million pounds is involved, it is clear that it was a considerable carcass round which the eagles were gathered together. The contention of the Nationalists and the Labourites was that the State should retain the whole, whereas the Government's proposal was an equal division based on the rights conferred by a resolution of the Volksraad of the South African Republic passed in 1896. Our purpose here is not to discuss the merits of the case, but to draw attention to the tendency of the Nationalists and the Labour Party to come together on questions in which the interests of the mining houses are involved. On the part of the Nationalists, however, this tendency towards the Labour point of view has its limitations; for when a member of the Unionist Party introduced an Industrial Diseases Compensation Bill, in which anthrax was scheduled as a disease, it was hotly opposed by the Nationalists on the ground that, although farmers are

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expressly exempted as employers from liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the inclusion of anthrax in the schedule might have the effect of reducing the prices paid by dealers in hides, etc., seeing that they would be liable to compensate any employee who might contract anthrax in handling such articles.

II. FINANCE.

THE Minister of Finance, in his Budget statement on March 30th, was able to present a more satisfactory account of the finances of the year just ended than had been foreshadowed in his statement twelve months before. In place of a deficit which had then been anticipated of upwards of £600,000, he was able to estimate a surplus for the year of £400,000. This was accounted for mainly by an increase in the revenue from customs and from diamond mining. The customs revenue for the year had been estimated at a low figure in anticipation of greatly diminished imports through shortage of freight. The restrictions on freight, however, had not been so serious as was feared, and the internal prosperity of the country had made itself felt in an increased demand for imports. In the result the customs revenue exceeded the estimate by £447,000. Similarly the revenue from diamond mines had been estimated at a very low figure in the belief that the depression in the diamond market which existed at the beginning of 1916-1917 would continue. But during the year there was a marked revival in the diamond trade, and this was reflected in an increase in the revenue from this source over the estimate of £454,000.

Business was good throughout the year. The gold output on the Witwatersrand was fully maintained, and the farmers, though suffering in some districts from the effects of drought, were able to dispose of their produce at exceptionally high prices. As regards the revenue of

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the year just closed the Minister was therefore able to present a very satisfactory picture.

For the current year the one doubtful element in the outlook was whether ships would be available to carry the produce of the country to the oversea market. Industrial development, though stimulated by the restricted imports and high prices of manufactured articles, is still only in its first stages ; and many of the products of the country, such as wool, mohair, hides, and fruit, find their principal market oversea. The increased activity of the submarine campaign and the calls on shipping for military purposes made it impossible to count with any certainty on a continuance of export facilities. The same uncertainty affected the outlook in regard to imports, as did also the increased restrictions imposed on the manufacture and export of large classes of goods in the United Kingdom. The Minister therefore estimated for a drop of £830,000 in the Customs revenue for the current year ; and the actual figures since April 1st show a falling off even greater than the estimate.

The total revenue for the year 1917-1918 is estimated in round figures at £18,170,000 and the expenditure at £18,509,000. The deficit is to be provided for mainly by a tax on excess profits, on the lines of that introduced in the United Kingdom in 1915 at the rate of 25 per cent. on excess profits earned after July 1st, 1916. The tax is to apply to all trades and businesses, except professions where the income depends on personal qualifications and does not require capital, life insurance companies, and gold mines, which are already burdened with special war taxation. The produce of the tax is estimated at £250,000. An extension of the export tax on diamonds is proposed which is estimated to produce £170,000. A reorganisation of the income tax as regards its incidence on companies is also expected to yield a small increase in revenue. Otherwise there is no increase in taxation.

The increased expenditure is accounted for chiefly by an increase in interest and debt charges and by an increase in

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the expenditure of provincial administrations arising from growing demands for educational facilities. War expenditure is not directly reflected in these figures, because the whole burden of such expenditure since the outbreak of the war—including the cost of suppressing the rebellion, of conquering, garrisoning and administering the German South West Protectorate (over and above what is defrayed from revenues raised there), and of maintaining the internment camps has been thrown on the loan account. The expenditure on the revenue account is increased thereby, to the extent of the increased amount required for interest and debt charges, but except for this, and for an increase in the ordinary administrative expenditure due to the granting of a war bonus to public servants, no war expenditure is provided for from the revenue account. The cessation of hostilities will not therefore of itself bring any reduction in the expenditure side of the ordinary budget, and unless other economies can be effected, the revenues derived from the so-called war levy on gold-mining profits and from the excess profits tax, which is in terms limited to six months after the duration of the war, will have to be found in some other way.

The figures of revenue and expenditure given above do not include the Railway and Harbour Administration. Under the Act of Union the revenue and expenditure of the Railway and Harbour Administration are kept separate from the general exchequer account, and there is therefore besides the general budget of the Union a separate and self-contained budget for the Railways and Harbours. For the year ended March 31st last the revenues of the Railways and Harbours account showed an increase over the estimate of over £1,000,000. The expenditure on the other hand showed also a substantial increase over the estimate, but the result was a surplus of £685,000 in place of an estimated deficit of £41,000 with which they had begun the year. This increase in revenue was largely due to a very great expansion in the receipts from coal traffic owing principally

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to abnormal demands for bunkering at the ports. The surplus was paid into the renewals fund, with the exception of £100,000 paid towards a deficiency in the Pensions fund.

The total public debt of the Union on March 31 last was £155,762,000. Approximately £23,000,000 has been added to the debt of the Union in respect of war expenditure since the outbreak of hostilities. As against this may be set the fact that the German South West Protectorate has been added—temporarily it may be—to the Union. What the ultimate disposal of this territory may be no one knows at present, and, in the meantime, in any attempt to divide the amount of the debt as between productive and unproductive the whole of the war expenditure must be classed with the unproductive. It is always difficult to arrive at an agreement as to what should be classed as productive and what as unproductive debt. Applying, however, a rough division as between loan moneys expended on undertakings which return the interest and debt charges on their capital, and those for which these have to be met from general revenue, we get an approximate figure of 70 per cent. for the former class and 30 per cent. for the latter. This division applied to a total debt of £155,000,000 would give a figure of approximately £46,000,000, which could in that sense be called unproductive debt.

In respect of £40,000,000 of the debt, viz., the Transvaal and Orange Free State loans guaranteed by the Imperial Government, there is a statutory sinking fund of 1 per cent. There are also statutory redemption provisions in respect of certain Cape and Natal loans amounting to £3,600,000. In addition to this any surplus of ordinary revenue over expenditure is automatically paid over to the sinking fund. The capital of the Railways and Harbours amounts to roughly £102,000,000, of which approximately £90,000,000 is from loan, and as long as adequate provision is made for depreciation and renewals there is no need to maintain a sinking fund in respect of that portion of the loan. On the

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present figures, therefore, the loan position may be regarded as satisfactory.

The criticism which has been directed against the Government in respect of its finances has centred on the arrangement by which the whole war expenditure has been defrayed from loan account, while special war levies and excess profit taxes have to be imposed to meet expenditure which will not appreciably diminish when the war is over, but on the contrary may be expected to go on increasing unless a more economical policy is adopted.

An interesting return has been published showing the growth of expenditure since Union and for some years before. Any comparison of the public expenditure before and after Union opens up certain controversial questions, and therefore has to be used with caution. The figures since Union, however, admit of a more accurate comparison. The following figures are given for the ordinary expenditure for 1908-1909 (the last complete year before Union), 1911-1912 (the first complete year after Union), and the year just ended.

1908-1909	1911-1912	1916-1917
£13,773,571	£16,128,333	£19,312,764

Comparing 1911-1912 with 1916-1917 we find that the main items of increase are Law, Order and Protection, £1,030,000; Education, £868,000; Posts and Telegraphs, £240,000; and Debt charges and interest, £1,684,000.

The increase under the first mentioned head is accounted for almost entirely by the expenditure under the Union Defence Act of 1912. The increase under Education corresponds with a remarkable increase in the number of children attending school, due not so much to increase in the population as to a much larger proportion of the children of school age having been brought into the schools since Union. The others call for no explanation. These figures are cited by the Government and its supporters to refute

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the charge of extravagance which is constantly brought against them by their critics in the Opposition ranks, and, on the face of it, the comparison does not give much ground for attack, if regard is paid to the remarkable increase in business and in production which has taken place since Union. It does not, however, dispose of a criticism which goes beyond a mere comparison of present with pre-Union figures and asks whether the scale of our expenditure as a whole is not too high for the permanent resources of the country.

There is unfortunately no accurate census of production as yet, though steps are being taken to prepare one. Taking, however, the exports for the year 1913—the last complete year before the war—we find that out of a total of £65,000,000, gold and diamonds amounted to £49,600,000. The great bulk of the public revenue of the Union is raised from its gold and diamond mines and from the population who directly or indirectly derive their living from the working of these mines. Now the gold industry which at present is producing something like £40,000,000 per annum is, in its nature, not a permanent industry. Several of the older mines are already worked out, and, though these will no doubt be replaced by new mines now being opened up on the far east of the Witwatersrand, the production of gold at the present rate cannot go on indefinitely. Even before the gold-bearing reefs are actually worked out the value of the gold per ton of rock may fall below the point at which they can be worked with profit. Some of the largest producers on the Rand, whose ore reserves are sufficient for many years' working, are finding their profits seriously reduced from this cause and unless things improve will come to a premature end. The effect of this on the industrial communities which have sprung up along the Witwatersrand would be most serious and the whole business of the country would be severely affected.

Gold mining is, in fact, a speculative business, and, just as individuals who live by it are inclined to be extravagant

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in their expenditure and reckless of the future, so in States whose wealth comes mostly from that source the ease with which large revenues are raised tends to make Governments lavish in their outlay and forgetful of the uncertainties of the source from which it comes. No doubt the counsel of perfection would be that all revenues arising from the exploitation of mineral assets, the duration of which is limited to a comparatively short period of time, should be devoted to reproductive works for the development of the more permanent resources of the country. But only the Government of the benevolent despot could carry out such a policy. It certainly will not be done by one depending on the support of a political party, and being constantly reminded that, as Burke said, "to tax and to be popular is not given to man." A step in this direction has been taken by an Act the passing of which during this Session has been referred to above. It provides that the revenue arising from the disposal of *bewaarplatsen* and from the lease of mining areas under the gold law of 1908 are to be paid to the loan account. The first of the areas given out under lease has just reached the producing stage, and that, and the other areas given out since, will in time yield very large revenues, and these will be devoted to capital expenditure which otherwise would have had to be financed by borrowing.

In regard to expenditure, the reform most urgently needed is the establishment of a sound system of local government under which local works and administration will be largely provided by funds raised locally and administered by local councils directly responsible to the people of the locality. That, however, is a matter which cannot hope to receive attention in these times of stress and anxiety.

South Africa. June, 1917.

General Hertzog's Speeches

III. GENERAL HERTZOG'S SPEECHES.

THE Cape newspapers of May 5 and 12 contain reports of two speeches by General Hertzog to the young Afrikaner students at Stellenbosch. These speeches attracted a good deal of attention locally, and were the immediate cause of Mr. Merriman's resolution condemning the "manifestations of a republican propaganda now being carried on in the country," which was carried in the Union House of Assembly on June 18 by 72 votes to 21, the minority consisting wholly of General Hertzog's Nationalist followers.

The Stellenbosch speeches tell us nothing new about General Hertzog's political position. He is still the apostle of extreme and uncompromising Dutch nationalism. Recognising the presence of a British population in South Africa as inevitable, he would have the British and Dutch populations develop in "two separate streams" which must never intermingle. And he would dissociate South Africa altogether from any operative connection with the parts of the British Empire outside her borders.

It is not the purpose of this article to deal with the practical consequences which would follow if General Hertzog's views were to prevail with the majority of his fellow-countrymen. General Botha has dealt with that aspect of the matter with his usual robust common sense, and the Union Parliament has made plain its attitude towards it. But since Mr. Merriman's motion has excited some attention in this country, even in the midst of the tremendous events which surround us, it is worth while to pay some attention to his Stellenbosch speeches, not as the formulation of a practical programme, but as the exposition of a constitutional doctrine. General Hertzog is a man of parts and learning, an ex-judge of the old Orange Free State, a man more at home in the university than

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in the back-veld; and in his Stellenbosch speeches he was bidding not for the votes of ignorant Doppers, but for the intellectual support of impressionable undergraduate students. His appeal was to the intelligence of the rising generation, as is shown in a passage calculated to tickle the vanity of academic youth at the expense of General Botha. "Nobody," he said on May 11, "will reasonably expect the Prime Minister to be able to express an independent judgment in regard to juridical questions of such a complicated nature as we have discussed here this evening. Yet he does so, and that in such a presumptuous manner as if he were really qualified to express an opinion. . . . The most ignorant view of the most incapable Prime Minister weighs more heavily in matters of State than the most expert opinion of the ablest private individual."

It is thus on the basis of its juristic soundness that General Hertzog's constitutional doctrine invites criticism.

The central point of this doctrine is that South Africa owes allegiance to the King, but stands in a relation of complete independence from every other community owing allegiance to the same King, including the United Kingdom.

In support of this thesis General Hertzog recites the clauses of the South African Union Act of 1909, which confer on the Union Parliament the full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Union, and provide for the executive power being exercised by the King's Ministers for the Union. Thus, he says: "As far as the territory of the Union is concerned, we have been placed in possession of a perfect State organism of which the life-power rests with us. . . . In no single essential respect can any difference be observed between our State Constitution and that of Great Britain. . . . In fact, no self-government in the true sense of the word can exist without such independence from all other Governments of other countries, as also that of Great Britain. . . . We

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stand in no way under Great Britain or its Parliament or Government. The only bond which binds us together is our common King, but under him we each stand separately and independently of each other."

Now if all that General Hertzog meant by this was that the South African Parliament and Government has full power to make and administer its own law for its own purposes, that its autonomy so far as its local and domestic affairs are concerned is complete, no one, least of all General Botha, would quarrel with him. It would be almost pedantic to raise the technical legal point that the King, acting on the advice of his British Ministers, could veto Acts of the Union Parliament or that the British Parliament which passed the South African Union Act could amend or repeal it. No sane person supposes that there is the least likelihood of these legal powers being exercised, though Lord Buxton appears to have brought upon himself an outburst of wrath from the Nationalist press in South Africa for having publicly enunciated this indisputable proposition. But the matter does not end here. The fallacy of General Hertzog's whole position is that he claims for South Africa in the sphere of external relations or foreign affairs the same complete autonomy or independence (in Dutch, "zelfstandigheid") that she admittedly enjoys in the sphere of her purely domestic affairs, and does so while still avowing allegiance to the King who happens to be Sovereign not only over South Africa but over all the other parts of the British Empire as well. In reality the successful repudiation of that allegiance would be a necessary condition precedent to the establishment of General Hertzog's claim, and he is guilty of a contradiction in terms when he speaks of South Africa having been placed in possession of a *perfect State organism so far as the territory of the Union is concerned*. No State organism can be perfect if its functions are confined within the limits of its own territory, for no State can live in isolation from the rest of the world, and the conduct of foreign affairs

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necessarily involves the exercise of functions outside the limits of the State's own territory. The advantage of owning allegiance to the King is obvious, for it carries with it the right of claiming the protection of the King, armed with all the powers he derives from all sources, in the event of attack upon South Africa by a foreign Power; but General Hertzog does not seem to see that if the people of South Africa are to enjoy this advantage and yet to bear no share in the responsibility for the conduct of affairs outside the four corners of South Africa, they must leave in the hands of other than South African advisers of the King the power of dealing with those matters on which the issues of peace and war depend. Yet General Hertzog represents it as a great injustice that "the right of remaining neutral in case of war between Great Britain and another Power is denied us." He forgets that just as it takes two to make a quarrel, so it takes two to keep the peace, that the King from the point of view of international law is a single Sovereign, that if he is at war with another Sovereign all the communities under his sovereignty are *ipso facto* in a state of belligerency whether they like it or not, that his enemies will make war on all parts of his dominions that they can reach, and that they will be within their belligerent rights in doing so. General Hertzog cannot have it both ways. True, he defines neutrality as "the right not to take part in a war"; but here he is involved in a confusion between what is and what is not within the competence of the Parliament and Government of a self-governing dominion such as South Africa. It is within their competence to decide whether they will take part in a war in the sense of providing men and money to help in the waging of it: it is not within their competence to decide whether they will be in a state of belligerency or whether they will, in the only correct sense of the word, be neutral.

There have been many wars in which the self-governing Colonies took no active part, but this does not mean that they were neutral in them. For neutrality involves

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obligations towards the belligerent states, and if a colony were really neutral in a war in which Great Britain were engaged it would be its duty to oppose, by force of arms if necessary, any attempt by His Majesty's Government to use the territory of that colony as a base of operations against the enemy, just as it would be the duty of neutral Holland to oppose by force of arms any attempt on the part of Germany to use Dutch territory as a base of operations against England. General Hertzog is entitled to say if he likes that the right of neutrality "is an unassailable right and must necessarily be so of any country which possesses the right of self-government," but if he goes to this length he must mean by "self-government" something more than the right of autonomy in local affairs which South Africa, along with Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland, enjoys. He must mean the right of full independence enjoyed only by sovereign international states; and a claim to this right would be inconsistent with a profession of allegiance to the King. For the Crown is one and indivisible. War cannot be conducted on the principle of limited liability, and the King cannot be at war with the German Emperor in Europe and at peace with him in Africa. General Hertzog's theory would, indeed, lead to absurd and extravagant consequences. Presumably he would be the first to subscribe to the doctrine that the King is constitutionally bound to act on the advice of his Ministers. If his South African Ministers, for reasons of their own, advise him to go to war with a neighbouring State, is he bound to do so? Is he bound to do so even if the neighbouring State happens also to owe him allegiance as its Sovereign? Presumably he is. And are other British self-governing states free to take part in the war on one side or the other, or to remain "neutral," as may seem good to them? Presumably they are. There must be something wrong, even from the point of view of the most academic jurist, in doctrines which logically lead to such ridiculous conclusions. But there is nothing

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new in these doctrines. They have been held, for example, in Canada, where they have been expressed by Mr. John S. Ewart, of Ottawa, in his pamphlet "The Kingdom of Canada," published some years before the present war. Happily they have been discredited by the criticisms of distinguished lawyers, and, what is far more important, they have been scouted by the practical good sense of the vast majority of a courageous and patriotic people. There is no reason to doubt that they will be scouted with equal emphasis in South Africa; and, though they have been examined here from the juristic point of view from which General Hertzog in his Stellenbosch speeches propounded them, the plain man who rejects them because he realises that, as Mr. Duncan recently put it in the Union Parliament, "the Allies are fighting for the democratic freedom of the world," has said the final word in the matter.

London. August, 1917.

NEW ZEALAND

I. THE LEGAL ASPECT OF CONSCRIPTION.

TWO matters of importance mark the history of the past three months. The Court of Appeal has pronounced the Military Service Act to be valid, and we have had a coal strike—short, indeed, in duration and insignificant in its direct results, but disturbing in origin and perilous in the manner of its settlement.

The Court's decision was given on April 4 in connection with the appeals against the conviction of a number of men for utterances in breach of War Regulations, a matter to which reference was made in the last issue of THE ROUND TABLE. The question was raised only incidentally, and a decision upon it proved in the result to be unnecessary, because even if the compulsory provisions of the Act were *ultra vires*, the War Regulations and the statute under which they were made were plainly valid, and the Court had no difficulty in finding that a breach of these had been committed. The legality of the Act, however, was fully argued on both sides and the Solicitor-General expressly invited the Court to give a ruling upon the point, with the result that the judges (four in number) unanimously expressed the opinion that the Act was *intra vires* of the Dominion Parliament. They held that the power given by the Constitution Act to our Parliament to make laws for "the peace, order, and good government of New Zealand" was ample to justify it in sending a force, and

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compelling men to serve in it, beyond the territorial limits of New Zealand. "I do not know," said the Chief Justice (Sir Robert Stout), "that any enabling words can be clearer than the words in our Constitution Act, which enables the Parliament of New Zealand to do everything that is necessary for the peace, order, and good government of New Zealand." Mr. Justice Chapman, in the course of his judgment, said :

A necessary power in connection with the defence of the Dominion is power to take part in the defence of the Empire as a whole, and that may, and at present does, involve sending expeditionary forces to other parts of the Empire and to foreign countries. Any argument to the contrary involves the suggestion that this country could not maintain discipline in a naval expedition which Parliament authorised the executive to send to attack some naval base in the Pacific which was a growing menace to New Zealand. Such a contention would further involve the proposition that the people of a Dominion or colony with land frontiers, of which there are three in America, and as many in Africa, would have to watch the growth of an enemy force close to its border while it might, for want of legal sanction, prove powerless to attack. Such propositions seem to me to carry their own refutation when plainly stated.

The decision has been received with general satisfaction. Had it been the other way, our Military Service Act would have required an Imperial statute to validate, or at least to supplement, it; and while this could doubtless have been obtained, the delay and discussion inevitable in such a matter might have seriously handicapped the efforts we are making to keep our reinforcements up.

II. THE COAL STRIKE.

FOR many months past it has been a matter of common knowledge that an organised attempt was being made to restrict the output of coal throughout New Zealand, and realising the gravity of the situation the authorities

The Coal Strike

introduced the Regulations referred to in the last New Zealand article. Early in April nine miners—six from the North Island and three from the South Island—all prominent in Labour circles, were arrested on charges of being parties to a “seditious strike” within the meaning of the Regulations, the strike alleged not being a complete cessation of work, but a deliberate and organised limitation of output. These arrests were shortly followed by a number of others. The police had apparently been working quietly for a considerable time, and upon making the first arrests seized a number of incriminating letters and other documents. A day or two after the arrests, and while the men were still in custody under a remand, a strike broke out in the coal mines, including the State Mine, on the West Coast of the South Island, and in all the northern mines except one.

Owing to the continuance for several months of the “go slow” policy, stocks of coal had become everywhere short before the strike was declared, and when the men ceased work the country was faced with the possibility of a severe coal famine. Without delay train and tram services were curtailed and urgent warnings to economise issued to the public. The Acting Prime Minister (Sir James Allen) and the Minister of Mines (Hon. W. D. S. McDonald) went to the West Coast to interview the strike leaders. The position was rendered more ominous by the fact that the men openly and emphatically announced that the sole reason for their action was Labour’s objection to conscription. “We wish to state,” said a manifesto, “that we have no quarrel with the companies whatever. In the present instance it is conscription alone, and nothing but conscription. The strike has nothing to do with the recent arrests, or the adverse decision of the appeal cases, nor is it the result of the failure of the recent negotiations with the mine-owners.” Such a position was somewhat difficult to understand, because the Military Service Boards were granting exemptions to all miners so long as they re-

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mained in their employment, and later events have gone to show that the reason given was by no means the only one, and that it was adopted and emphasised for the purpose of obtaining the sympathy of that section of opinion which was opposed to compulsory service in the Expeditionary Force.

The two Ministers remained on the coast for some time engaged in conference with the strike-leaders, but no news came as to what progress, if any, they were making. One cheering event took place: the men at Huntly (North Island) decided by a small majority not to go out. The Huntly mines are large producers of coal for domestic uses rather than for steam purposes, and the absence of West Coast coal was still a very serious matter, but none the less this decision was important because it had, without doubt, some influence upon the Southern men. Public opinion, too, was strongly against the strikers, who it was felt—even by many who disliked conscription—were making an improper use of the power possessed by them as men employed in an industry of vital importance to the war.

On April 25 the welcome news came through that the strike was over and the men about to resume work. No mention was made of the terms upon which this had been achieved, but the people breathed freely again. On the same day the adjourned hearing of the charges against two of the nine men arrested was commenced in Auckland, and the Crown Prosecutor in a lengthy speech outlined the case for the Crown. Quoting from actual correspondence and official entries, he plainly exposed a deliberate organisation of a "go-slow" policy, with open exhortations and threats to "keep down the tonnage," and commented with the utmost vigour upon the defendants' disregard of the consequence of their action to this or any other country. The case was then adjourned till the following day, when evidence was to be called. Almost immediately after this came the news through a Labour quarter of the terms upon which the Government had settled the strike. They were stated to be as follows:—

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(1) It was to be made plain to the Military Service Boards that every essential worker in coal and gold mining should have his appeal allowed ; (2) the Government agreed not to press for penalties in the cases of men arrested on account of the "go slow" policy ; (3) the Government should do its best to arrange a conference between mine owners and the employees within a fortnight ; (4) every man should go back to work as before the strike ; (5) the delegates undertook to do their best to induce the men to resume work on April 25th and abandon the "go slow" policy ; (6) if any proceedings should take place the Government would not press for penalties. The absence of any denial of these terms by the Government was an admission that they were correctly stated, and the general feeling was that peace had been purchased at too high a price.

When the pending cases were again called on, an adjournment was asked for and granted, and when next—after some delay—they came before the Court a plea of guilty was entered by the defendants. The Crown Prosecutor referred to the settlement terms and informed the magistrate that the Ministers were induced to enter into the arrangement by representations—bearing every appearance of sincerity—that the leaders who had been arrested were "really not to blame," but had been "forced into the present position" by others who had not been arrested. These representations may have been correct, added counsel, so far as the strike on the conscription issue was concerned, but it was perfectly clear that they were untrue so far as the "go slow" strike was concerned, and that was the matter before the Court. He pressed for no penalty, but asked for an adjournment in the meantime, to be followed by a further adjournment, or possibly a final disposal of the case. The defendants' counsel repudiated the anti-conscription agitation as a reason for the "policy," and urged that it was caused by the action of the mine owners. The magistrate, in pronouncing sentence, stated that he was unable to recognise the com-

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pact made by the Government. He was bound by his oath to administer justice without fear or favour, and he could not become a party to any such agreement. Sentences varying from two to nine months' imprisonment were then imposed. Next day the men were pardoned by the Governor and released.

It is only right to add that the course taken by the Government has caused grave and general dissatisfaction. Several men are undergoing imprisonment for less serious offences than those admitted by the miners, and it is felt that quite apart from considerations of policy it was wrong to make a bargain with regard to men who were already arrested and upon their trial for breaches of the law. If their offence was unconnected with the anti-conscription campaign, and if their arrest had no influence in the direction of causing the coal strike, it is hard to understand why their case should have been introduced into the negotiations for a settlement of the strike. That the strike was due in part to anti-conscription sentiments is proved by the agreement to grant all miners exemption.

The position of Ministers was admittedly difficult, and they appear to have adopted the view that the end justified the means. General opinion condemns their action, and the acting Prime Minister can hardly be said to have improved matters by emphasising, as he did, in his own defence against criticism, the enormous power given by the ability to strike in the case of men employed in an essential industry like coal-mining. The conduct of the men at such a time as this was a bitter disappointment, and has driven us to the conclusion that while many (probably most) of them are loyal citizens, they are as a class dangerously susceptible to the influence of evil counsels on the part of a few.

A conference between coal mine owners and men was held early in May, but broke up without any agreement being reached.

The Working of Conscription

III.—THE WORKING OF CONSCRIPTION.

IT would be profitless to give much space to details of variations in our machinery for keeping up our supply of men while protecting as far as possible our essential industries. The enrolment of reinforcements proceeds regularly under a system which, though far from perfect, is working tolerably in practice, and is gradually becoming co-ordinated and improved. Our reinforcements have been kept up to strength, notwithstanding a stiffening of the standard of fitness required. The medical examination is more rigorous now, the object being to take only men of undoubted fitness rather than trust, as was done for a few months, to the unfit being weeded out in camp. The results of the men's appeals for exemption show that the Military Service Boards have adopted a fairly uniform policy of exempting all farmers whose labour is genuinely required. Gold and coal miners are also generally exempted. Outside these classes a strong individual case of "public interest" requires to be shown before a man is exempted. Conferences between the different Boards have rendered the practice fairly uniform, and the good sense usually displayed by these bodies has prevented the defects of the system from causing much dissatisfaction. The National Efficiency Board has done a good deal of work both in classifying industries and in other directions, and its labours will doubtless have a profound influence upon the work of Parliament in the coming session.

Another ballot for the Expeditionary Force has just been drawn, and there are still some 40,000 men left in the First Division (unmarried men and childless widowers). As is only to be expected, the number of exemptions and rejections is increasing as the class approaches exhaustion, and it seems certain that the Second Division will begin

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to be drawn upon by the end of the year at the latest. This division has been subdivided as follows :

Class A.—Men between 20 and 46 without children.

Class B.—Men between 20 and 34 with 1 or 2 children.

Class C.—Men between 34 and 46 with 1 or 2 children.

Class D.—Men between 20 and 34 with 3 or 4 children.

Class E.—Men between 34 and 46 with 3 or 4 children.

Class F.—Men between 20 and 46 with 5 or more children.

Allowing for the voluntary enlistments that have already taken place from these classes it is estimated that they embrace fully 80,000 men.

We cannot doubt that many difficulties will be encountered in determining what men should be sent and what should remain in the country, but it is equally certain that so long as men are needed they will be forthcoming. Dislocation of business is inevitable, and many hardships will be caused, but there is little grumbling on our own account. The real anxiety is lest our ability to assist with the supply of foodstuffs may be impaired by depleting our country of men ; the only serious question asked is whether we can best assist the Mother Country by supplying men or supplying food. At present the problem is not acute, for we can still find the men and keep our industries going, but as the months go by we shall have an increasing difficulty, and if the war lasts much longer the question may have to be faced. When that time comes we want a clear and frank intimation from those who are best able to weigh the conflicting issues.

At present we feel that our duty lies plain before us. Speaking recently on this subject, Sir James Allen used these significant words :

“ I want to say, and I am speaking after very deliberate consideration, and with information, that the most urgent claim on New Zealand at the present time is that reinforcements should be kept up. It is evident to any thinking man that it is to the advantage of the Mother Country and her Allies that they should exert as much pressure on

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the enemy as they can during this summer in order to bring this war to a climax this year. . . . Next to the need for men to keep up our reinforcements—and we are not asking for more than the usual drafts—comes the need for keeping up our exports of food supplies for the use of the armies and of the people in the homeland. But this need is second to the need for men to fill our reinforcement drafts. Even for those engaged in the producing industries it will be good policy to try to finish the war this year.”

A very drastic reduction in the railway service has been effected this month. Details of the rearrangements had been almost completed before the declaration of the coal strike, the prime object being to release as many men as possible for military service. The strike hastened the matter in a very practical way, and rendered necessary a reduction even beyond that originally contemplated. That, however, did not last long, and the present curtailed time-table does not depend upon coaling difficulties, but represents the endeavour of the Department to set men free for service. By reducing train services one complete shift of men has been cut out, the carriage of goods has been restricted, and many privileges encouraging traffic withdrawn. Naturally there are local complaints over what are regarded as anomalies or unnecessary curtailments, but the principle of economy and the saving of labour is everywhere approved. The Minister has taken a firm stand in regard to these local complaints and has said bluntly that this is only the first cut and that when occasion arises he is prepared to make a still more drastic one. Meantime, he declines to make any modification which will interfere with the cardinal object of the scheme—namely, the freeing of one complete shift of railway servants.

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IV. THE IMPERIAL WAR CABINET.

THE Imperial War Cabinet has concluded its special sitting, and within a few weeks the two leaders of our National Government should be back in New Zealand. We are naturally curious to know how much we shall learn from them of their adventures in Imperial politics. In the meantime, how has New Zealand regarded this epoch-making conference? Perhaps when we have learned more about it we shall more deeply appreciate its significance, but it cannot honestly be said that down to the present either the invitation to the Dominion representatives or the results—as far as we know them—of the conference have made any strong impression on the popular imagination. The fact that our representatives were already in England when the special sitting was arranged robbed the invitation given to them of a good deal of its dramatic effect, and the more or less rhetorical leading articles which appeared in the New Zealand Press had little more significance than the average speech made at the opening of a new town hall. The general interest would probably have been smaller still but for Australia's failure to be represented, a failure which naturally excited comment and gave a gentle fillip to our pride. There was a certain pardonable satisfaction in being able to feel sorry for Australia, a comfortable sense that we were not quite as other men. But besides stimulating this very human emotion, Mr. Hughes's difficulties did set many people thinking and talking seriously, and the object lesson of the disturbing effect of domestic politics upon the politics of the British Commonwealth was not entirely lost. Now, if ever, was the occasion for co-operation; now, if ever, the Dominions had earned the right to be consulted; now, if ever, domestic dissensions should be stifled and attention turned to matters of higher moment. Yet

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Mr. Hughes had to stay at home to look after himself and his supporters, and but for the happy chance that she had a stable National Government New Zealand herself might have been in a similar plight. People had not forgotten the other object lesson provided by Mr. Hughes when, after his visit to England, he failed to carry conscription, and by his failure provided a neat text for a discourse upon responsibility.

When once the sitting of the Cabinet began without Australia we ceased to think about the matter, and as we got very meagre news of the proceedings of the Conference little interest was kept up. Our knowledge is still entirely confined to the reciprocity resolution, the Indian resolution and the official statement made by Mr. Walter Long at the close of the session, and while we all assume that very useful work was done in reference to matters connected with the war there has been no material supplied for discussion.

Nor has there been much serious consideration of the conference as part of the machinery of government. Frankly, the people of the Dominion are not yet in a position to appreciate the constitutional nature of the innovation. We are told in somewhat grandiloquent language both here and by Englishmen that the sitting of the War Cabinet represents a new departure in the government of the Empire. We are proud and pleased that our representatives have been admitted into the inner circle of the Empire's councillors, that a full and free disclosure has been made to them of the needs, the projects, and the policy of the Commonwealth, and that through them the oversea Dominions may at once voice their opinions and desires and be instructed as to how they may best discharge that duty which lies, a solemn obligation, upon them. We welcome this further recognition of our citizenship and take pride in this expression of trust. The attendance of Dominion statesmen at the Imperial War Conference makes for co-ordination and efficiency, and is the outward

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manifestation of that sense of unity which animates the ponderous body of the British Commonwealth. But the problems which will come up for solution in the near future will demand that we think clearly and precisely, and refuse to be deceived by mere phrases. It is therefore not out of place to consider from a Dominion point of view the significance of the new precedent. Is it a change in kind or only in degree?

We are told that the real significance of the change lies in the fact that the body to which our representatives were summoned is an *executive* and not merely a deliberative body; that the votes cast upon the matters under consideration will be translated into action and not operative merely as indices of opinions and pious hopes. Our representatives, we were told, would be "members of the supreme executive of the British Empire, the decisions of which will determine the policy to be pursued in waging war, in negotiating peace, and in dealing with various urgent problems which will arise immediately on the cessation of hostilities." *

The same point is pressed in the following passage from a New Zealand paper † which has shown a deep interest in the Imperial problem:

When Mr. Lloyd George was reported some two months ago to have said that the Conference would be the first Imperial Cabinet ever held, we pointed out that it would be Imperial in a representative sense to which a Cabinet drawn solely from the United Kingdom could lay no claim, but that, though distinguished from an ordinary Imperial Conference by the supreme gravity and urgency of the agenda, a body without executive functions could only be very loosely described as a Cabinet. It now appears that we were wrong—not wrong in our reasoning, but in the assumption of fact upon which it was based. The powers of the body which is now meeting in London are not to be limited to those of deliberation and advice. . . . It is not merely as distinguished strangers or confidential advisers, but as fully privileged members, that the Prime Ministers of the Dominions have been asked to attend these special meetings

*. ROUND TABLE, March, 1917.

† *Wellington Evening Post*, 30th March, 1917.

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of the War Cabinet. In all the functions of this Cabinet, including its executive powers, they are to share.

So, too, we have read in the *Times* that the new body "is to be a Cabinet for war, and all the conditions, contingencies, and consequences of the war will be within its province. It will review and determine British strategy by sea and land."

Now we have often been reminded that the British political genius is prone to manifest itself in working changes without altering old forms and institutions, but there is sometimes a tendency to proclaim a change when no real or vital change has taken place. And we in the Dominions are puzzled to know exactly what is meant by the phrase "the supreme executive of the British Empire." The War Cabinet is doubtless an executive body, but two comments may be made on this statement. In the first place it is an executive which is politically responsible only to the people of the British Isles. We do not for a moment understand that the Dominion votes could force a course of action upon the British executive. Such a position would be intolerable, at all events unless the British votes could force a decision binding upon us. Could the votes of the Dominion members "determine British strategy by sea and land"? If so, what obligation is there on the part of the Dominions corresponding to this right? If Mr. Hughes had been present to what extent could he have pledged his country? We are not without a precedent on this point, nor does anybody imagine that on their return Mr. Massey and Sir Joseph Ward can do any more than represent facts to their colleagues upon which they are free to act or not, as they think fit. Nor need Mr. Massey resign if he cannot secure the adoption of his policy. That the risk of conflict is small does not alter this statement of the position.

In the next place, although the War Cabinet is an executive body, the session attended by our representatives was a "special" sitting, at which, as far as we can gather, no "executive" resolutions were submitted. While one may

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be morally certain that most valuable work was done, one may also assume that the proceedings were rather in the way of consultation upon matters of policy and general intention, and that the agenda was (necessarily) so arranged that resolutions of a really executive character were not forthcoming. The importance of the conference surpasses that of other Imperial Conferences not because it embodies a constitutional change but by reason only of the circumstances in which it was conceived and held, the urgency of the questions under consideration, and the fact that Britain was represented by her War Cabinet. In this sense, but in this sense only, it is what Mr. Lloyd George has recently termed it, a landmark in the constitutional history of the British Empire. We can, and do, believe with him that the fresh minds and views of the Government's colleagues have been of immense help, and we share his opinion that the Conference has been of such service, not only to its members but to the Empire, that it ought not to be allowed to fall into desuetude. It represents the best method available under existing conditions for ensuring consultation and co-operation between the scattered members of the Commonwealth, but—at least from a Dominion point of view—it does not represent any real constitutional change, and we obscure our vision if we say that it does.

New Zealand. May, 1917.

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