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RUSSIA AND EUROPE

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RUSSIA AND EUROPE

Alexinsky, Gregor 1871-1917

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TRANSLATED FROM THE MANUSCRIPT

BY

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TO
MY WIFE

G. A.



PREFACE

IN *Modern Russia* I dealt particularly with all that distinguishes Russian life from the life of Europe. But even then I felt the necessity of presenting the other aspect of the matter—of showing how Russia has Europeanized herself, of summing up the action of European influences in the past and the present of the great Slav Empire.

The happenings of the present time, and the participation of Russia in the formidable struggle against Prussian Imperialism, increase the importance of the question of the relations between Russia and the West.

I shall be happy if the present volume will help the English public to study these relations.

G. A.

PS.—My sincere thanks are due to my translator, Mr. Bernard Miall, for his valuable collaboration, which has so greatly contributed to the success which my works upon Russia have obtained with my English readers.



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PART THE FIRST

THE MATERIAL BONDS BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND EUROPE



RUSSIA AND EUROPE

CHAPTER I

- I. The foreign elements in the origins of Russian history. II. The Byzantine influence—The opinion of a modern Russian philosopher.

I

THE origins of Russian history present us with two half-real, half-legendary factors: the foundation of the first principalities and the "baptism of Russia." In both popular tradition admitted an active participation of foreign elements.

According to legend, the Russians of the ninth century had as yet no organized States, but were living in discord. Weary of this anarchy, they are said to have applied to *foreign* princes (Varangian or Scandinavian), and to have said:—

"Our soil is wide and fruitful, but order is lacking there. Be our princes and come to govern us."

And three Varangian princes are said to have consented to come into Russia and to have founded three principalities in the north.

Foreigners also created the principality of Kiev, whose first sovereigns bore names of Scandinavian origin: as Igor (from Ingvar) and Olga (from Helghi), etc.

As for the "baptism of Russia," which took place in the year 988 A.D., popular legend has handed down the story.

Prince Vladimir the Holy, dissatisfied with the

paganism of his subjects, is said to have sought to put an end thereto. With this object in view, he is related to have sent into various countries special envoys who were instructed to make a study of their religions. The religion, or rather the ritual, which charmed him most was the Byzantine. Thereupon Vladimir is reported to have invited the priests of the various cults to repair to Kiev, there to explain to him their character and their advantages. As a result of this competition the Prince of Kiev is said to have set his choice on the Orthodox Byzantine Church, which thereupon became the Orthodox Russian Church.

In order to grasp the possibility of this extraordinary admixture of Greek and Scandinavian contributions in the first phase of the historical period, we must remember that Russia formed the connecting link between Scandinavia and Byzantium. Thus we may say that in the dawn of her history Russia served as intermediary between West and East, if we admit that her two neighbours represented the two general types.

But what I chiefly wish to emphasize is the rôle of the State in this first introduction of foreign elements: the Scandinavians entered the State in the quality of princes and organizers—in short, of governors; while the Greeks brought their religion into the State on the prince's invitation. We shall see that down to our own days authority in Russia has continued to favour the foreigner, often even to the detriment of the native Russian.

II

The bond connecting Scandinavia with Byzantium, across the wide Russian plain, which embraced two points of great importance, one in the region of Novgorod and one in that of Kiev, could not long hold fast.

The Scandinavian influence, powerful enough at the

outset,¹ waned very rapidly ; for shortly after " the coming of the Varangian princes " (in 862 A.D., according to the Russian chronicles) no trace of their northern principalities was left. Some centuries later, it is true, Russia was again to encounter Scandinavia ; not the Scandinavia which sent her brigand-princes to govern her, but the kingdom of Sweden, with its twelfth Charles, the object of the simultaneous hatred and admiration of Peter the Great.

In the meantime Northern Russia was subjected to Western influence in another form : by its close relations with the commercial League of the " Free Towns " of the Hansa, which greatly contributed to the development of two of the great Russian Free Towns — Novgorod and Pskov, and to which I shall refer later on.

The Byzantine influence succumbed before the invasion of the Asiatic hordes, which seized upon Southern Russia, thus cutting it off from Byzantium. But the Eastern Empire, for the Russia of the tenth and eleventh centuries, was the road to the civilization of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. Hence the interruption of relations with Byzantium was greatly to be deplored. The celebrated Russian historian S. Soloviev says in this connection : " The nomads not merely attacked Russia, but they cut her off from the shores of the Black Sea and destroyed her communications with Byzantium. . . . Asiatic barbarism strove to deprive Russia of all the roads and all the breathing spaces opening upon cultivated Europe."

Another great Russian historian, V. Klutshevsky, expresses the same idea : " A thousand years of the hostile neighbourhood of the rapacious Asiatic nomads will by itself justify many times over the absence of the European spirit in the history of Russia."

¹ The title of *kniaz* (prince) which the Russian Slavs employed to designate the head of the State is borrowed from the Scandinavian, and is only a modification of the Scandinavian title of *kunning*.

In my *Modern Russia*¹ I have already explained the general consequences entailed by the invasion of the steppes of Southern Russia by the Asiatic hordes. We know that the principal result was the displacement of the centre of economic and political gravity, which shifted from the region of Kiev to that of Moscow and Vladimir. Muscovite Russia was for a long time deprived of her relations with Byzantium, and lost even all contact with the Russia of the South-West—that is, with Volhynian and Galician Russia, the most highly Europeanized and civilized of all the principalities of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It was at this time that Volhynia and Galicia began to lead a separate existence, and at a later date were subjected to the influence of Poland.

As to the Byzantine influence in itself, and the loss which Russia must have suffered in being deprived of this influence in the twelfth century, the various Russian authors are in disagreement. A contemporary publicist and philosopher of some considerable repute, Professor Boulgakov (a Neo-Slavophil), endeavoured quite recently to attribute a great importance to the rôle of the Byzantine factor :—

“The Oriental orthodoxy of Byzantium contains, in potential, all Hellenism in its immortal worth. In general Hellenism is a principle of natural orthodoxy. . . . This is why, in the heritage of Greek civilization, our own share is richer than that of the West, the legatee of Hellenism by an indirect path, by the intervention of the Roman Church, and, at a later date only, of Humanism by a pagan restoration.”²

To this pretentious assertion, which seeks to invest Russia with a kind of supremacy over Western Europe, we can easily oppose a few positive and decisive facts.

In the first place, it is not true that Byzantium received the legacy of pure Hellenism while the West knew it only by a deformation. On the contrary,

¹ *Modern Russia*, trans. Bernard Miall, T. Fisher Unwin, 1914.

² S. Boulgakov, *The War and the Russian Mind* (Moscow, 1915), p. 33.

it was Byzantium which distorted the original Hellenism. For the democracies of antiquity it substituted a semi-Oriental monarchical *régime*; for freedom of belief, expressing itself in a free art which seized the imagination, a dry and scholastic "orthodoxy" which amounted to iconoclasm. There was no real return to "Hellenism" save by that very "pagan restoration" which was the Renaissance.

Assertions such as those of M. Boulgakov would induce us to believe that the influence of Byzantium on ancient Russia was purely spiritual, and was destined to teach the "eternal meanings of Hellenism." In reality, the Greeks who came to Russia and the Russians who went to Tsargrad (Constantinople) were not concerned with these abstractions. The true motive of their relations was commercial, as was the principal motive of the relations between Russia and Scandinavia, for the Scandinavian dynasties, the creators of the first Russian principalities, were at once brigands and merchants. It was by following in the footsteps of the Greek merchants that the Greek priests brought orthodoxy to Kiev. And if the Byzanto-Russian and Russo-Scandinavian relations were broken off in the twelfth century, it was because the commercial highway "from the Greeks to the Varangians" was closed.

CHAPTER II

- I. The appearance of true European elements—The Hanseatic League and its commercial relations with Novgorod. II. Europeans in Russia under Ivan III and Ivan the Terrible—The English merchants. III. The eighteenth century and the development of trade between Russia and Europe—State monopolies and commercial capitalism.

I

WHILE the southern regions remained completely isolated by the invasion of the nomads, the north of Russia maintained and developed its exchanges with the West: in the thirteenth century, for example, the Hanseatic League held a considerable place in the trade of Novgorod.

Modern historians have proved that even at the period of the principality of Kiev foreign trade was assuming a prominent place in Russian life. For example, M. Nicolas Rojkov states that during this period agriculture and industry occupied a secondary position. Hunting and agriculture, or rather the gathering of honey in the woods, were the principal occupations. Foreign trade, on the contrary, or, more precisely, the exportation through the princes and their companions of what they obtained by hunting, honey, and all that the princes received from the population as *dani* (taxes paid in kind), was much in vogue. The aristocracy sent their merchandise to Byzantium, where they exchanged it for weapons, wine, stuffs, etc. But these relations, confined to a minority, were of no immediate interest to the great masses of the people.

In Novgorod and Pskov the position was quite

different. There the bulk of the population traded and lived by trade. Agriculture occupied a secondary place in the regions of Novgorod and of Pskov as well as in that of Kiev. The activities of these regions were absorbed by foreign trade. The local chronicles, and the popular poetry also, give irrefutable evidence of this fact. Who is the principal hero of the *bylinas*—that is, the epic songs of Novgorod? Sadko the Rich, the merchant, might not by the sword but by the purse.

The trade of Novgorod extended over a much vaster region, and included a much larger quantity of products, than the trade of Kiev. Skins, butter, fat, meat, flax, honey, wool, wheat, etc., were bought by the merchants of Novgorod in various parts of Russia and were sold or exchanged for foreign merchandise.

“Commercial interests led foreign merchants and adventurers along the waterways of inland Russia, and laid the foundations of the Russian State. On the success of external trade was based the ephemeral wealth of the region of Kiev, which became impoverished and lost its political influence with the disorganization of this trade. What really was the importance, in the trade of Kiev, of the foreign merchants, we can only imagine and conjecture, owing to the lack of precise data. But as regards the rôle of foreign intermediaries in the trade of Novgorod it is already perfectly evident. The ‘Gothic’ and ‘German’ ‘courts’ or ‘yards,’ founded in Novgorod in the twelfth century by the merchants of Gothland and Lübeck, and united in the fourteenth century under the direction of the Free Towns of the Hanseatic League, monopolized, for some centuries, all the Russian trade passing through Novgorod. The attempt on the part of the men of Novgorod to found a Russian company which should trade with foreign countries did not enable them to create their own merchant fleet, and the oversea voyages of certain Russian merchants in foreign boats, and even the warehousing of Russian merchandise in foreign countries, were only the isolated

attempts of individual venturers. The Novgorodians had to content themselves with the rôle of monopolist-middlemen between the buyers of merchandise in Northern and South-Eastern Russia and the factories of the Hanseatic League. The foreign trade of Russia was able to free itself from the Hanseatic domination only when the foreign competitors of the League came to its assistance; when, by their own efforts, they opened up means of direct access to Russian merchandise. In the fifteenth century, and early in the sixteenth, these competitors were the Swedish traders and the towns of Livonia, which drew the movement of merchandise into another direction than that familiar to the trade of the Hansa towns. In their footsteps appeared the representatives of the principal capitalistic nations of the new Europe, whose merchandise had until then formed the object of the Hansa trade. These were the English and the Dutch." ¹

At the same time, the city of Novgorod began to make way, in the matter of external trade, for the city of Moscow.

II

Under Ivan III (1452-1505) Russia was delivered from the Tartar yoke, and under Ivan the Terrible (1534-89) the principality of Moscow established direct economic relations with Europe. In the fifteenth century there came to Moscow those European traders and artisans who "laid the foundations of the principal urban trades." The first comers were for the most part Italians. Architects, engineers, experienced physicians, masters and artisans of various crafts, were called from Italy to Moscow. Among them were celebrated masters like Fioraventi-Aristoteles (of Venice or Bologna), Petro Antonio, and Marcus Aloysius. Aristoteles taught the Muscovites how to make bricks and lime and the use of machinery; he founded cannon

¹ P. Milukov, *Studies in the History of Russian Culture*, Part I, pp. 105-6 (1st ed., Russian, Petersburg, 1900).

and constructed a floating bridge near Novgorod. "He was the renovator of many crafts in Russia."

From this time onward the influence of Europe in the economic life of Russia increased by leaps and bounds.

In the sixteenth century, under Ivan the Terrible, Russia became for the first time the theatre of an energetic rivalry between the traders of Germany and England. The Germans had long maintained relations with Russia by way of Novgorod. The English arrived in Russia by chance: an English expedition went astray in the Arctic Ocean and eventually reached the Russian coast. The Tsar, Ivan the Terrible, having received the news of the strangers' arrival, expressed to them his ardent desire that permanent relations might be established between their country and his kingdom, and the town of Arkangelsk or Archangel became the base of the Anglo-Russian trade.

In 1566 Ivan the Terrible addressed himself to Elizabeth through the British Ambassador, Jenkinson, begging her to send to Russia some good artisans and craftsmen. The Queen granted his request, and in 1567 sent him an English physician, Reynolds; a pharmacist, Thomas Curwin; an engineer, Humfry Lock, with his assistant, John Fenton; a goldsmith, Thomas Green; and other specialists.

In 1569 the Tsar granted some English manufacturers a patent for the establishment of a metallurgical works at Vytchegda, in the Government of Vologda. The English penetrated yet farther, into the Ural Mountains, and prospected for iron-mines in the region of Perm.

Ivan the Terrible also sent a special envoy to Germany to obtain the same services from the German Emperor, and to recruit in Germany some hundreds of "learned men, artists, and artisans."

But the preference of Ivan IV was given to the English, and the English merchants, thanks to privileges granted to them by the Tsar, entered the lists in opposition to the German traders, who were grouped

under the Hanseatic League and who traded through Novgorod. The importation of English cloth and linen was fatal to German competition, already enfeebled by the general decline of the economic activity of Novgorod. This market was ruined by the Muscovite sovereigns, who could not endure the existence of a free city, with a government almost republican, side by side with their own monarchical State.

The sympathies of Ivan the Terrible for the English were such that he was called "the English Tsar," and in the time of Elizabeth, England declared that in no other country did her trade bring her such profits as in Russia.¹

III

I have explained, in my *Modern Russia*, the general nature of the economic evolution, or revolution rather, which occurred in the Russia of the sixteenth century. Then it was that the internal market was unified, and relations and stable connections were established between the various regions of the country, under the influence of an intensive commercial exchange.

The foreign element played a most important part in the birth of the new state of affairs, as it greatly contributed to the development of the movement of trade along the two principal trade routes: that from Novgorod to Moscow and that from Archangel to Moscow.

But at the beginning of the eighteenth century this economic development was interrupted by a great political crisis, known as the "Period of Disturbances," which lasted until the year 1613, and the installation on the Muscovite throne of the Tsar Mikhaïl Feodorovitch, the first representative of the House of Romanov.

Under this Tsar and his successor, Alexeï Mikhaïlovitch, the economic relations with the outer world were rapidly multiplied and became increasingly complex.

¹ G. Schultze-Gavernitz, *Studies in the National and Political Economy of Russia* (Russian trans., Petersburg, 1900), p. 6.

Among the most noteworthy phenomena of the economic history of Russia in the seventeenth century we find, in the first place, the multiplication of exchanges with Europe. After the English, who contrived to establish their factories along the entire route from Archangel to Moscow, other Europeans began to trade in Russia: and firstly the Dutch, who used the route from the Arctic Ocean and the White Sea, as did the English, and also the Baltic route, as did the Germans, the Danes, and the Swedes. As early as 1603 we find an English writer complaining that after seventy years of extensive trade with Russia the English were beginning to be outstripped by the Dutch. At the end of the sixteenth century a report was presented to the States-General of the Netherlands, whose author asserted that the maritime trade with Russia might be as profitable to Dutch traders as the trade with Spain—that is, with America, through the medium of Spain. “Neither Germany nor our Netherlands,” he positively stated, “can dispense with trading with Russia.” Russia had therefore become, at this period, a necessary factor of the world’s trade.

Muscovite Russia, in the seventeenth century, benefited by international exchanges in a twofold manner. On the one hand, she served as a means of communication between West and East, Europe and Asia. She bought Oriental merchandise (for example, silk, in Persia) and delivered it to Western commerce. Silk occupying a place of enormous importance in the commercial life of the time, both private individuals and European Governments endeavoured more than once to obtain free transit through Russia for their communications with Persia, the principal source of this precious commodity.

In 1614 a representative of England (John Merik) came to demand, in the name of his king, the right to make use of the Volga highway. In 1629 a French ambassador presented a similar claim. In 1630 the Dutch followed suit. But the Muscovite Government

invited all these claimants to procure their Persian goods by buying them of the Russians.

The traders of the duchy of Holstein were more fortunate: they obtained the monopoly of the trade with Persia for an annual payment to Russia of 600,000 *efimoks*—about 5,000,000 roubles. But it appeared that “in Holstein theory was stronger than practice, and that the folk of this country knew more of ciphering than of payment. When it came to paying, the necessary money was lacking, and the ambitious enterprise came to a very pitiable end in a diplomatic quarrel between the Government of the Tsar Mikhail and the Duke Frederick.”¹

In general the Government preferred not to allow Europeans to cross its territory in order to reach its eastern frontiers, being loth to lose the profits which the trade with Asia assured to the Treasury. It even went so far as to seek to monopolize, for its own profit, the exportation and sale to foreign countries of a portion of the native commodities, notably of skins and articles made of leather, furs, caviare, wheat, etc.

In 1630 the States-General of the Netherlands proposed through a special ambassador an ambitious plan to exploit and “valorize,” by means of Dutch capital, the agricultural and forestal resources of Russia. It was proposed to grow vast crops of wheat for exportation, and also to exploit the vast forests lying along the banks of the Northern Dvina. But the Government decided to keep the trade in Russian products in its own hands. It admitted the principle of the monopoly while preferring to apply it on its own account. It also established a series of commercial *régies*—for example, that of alcohol—which was resuscitated by Count Witte at the end of the nineteenth century and abolished in 1914 at the beginning of the war.

In the exploitation of these *régies* the Government, in the seventeenth century, employed the wealthy

¹ M. Pokrovsky, *Russian History*, vol. i. p. 95 (Russian ed.).

merchants as its agents and representatives. These intermediaries made large private profits by the purchase and sale of the State commodities. If, as an English author says, "the Tsar was the first merchant in his dominions," other merchants also enriched themselves by monopolizing foreign trade, and they began to form a powerful corporation of capitalists, to which, moreover, foreigners trading with Russia had access, sometimes holding an important place therein. These foreigners, with more experience and capital, became the rivals even of the Russians, and in certain respects supplanted them: for instance, in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, Kilburger reported that all the trade of Archangel was centred in the hands of a few Dutchmen and merchants of Hamburg and Bremen, who had their representatives and their clerks in Moscow.

At this time there was a sudden increase of imports also, which assumed considerable proportions; for example, in 1671 there were imported into Russia, through the port of Archangel, 2,477 tons of herrings, 783,000 needles, 5 tons of colours, 809 barrels of indigo, 28,457 reams of paper, 1,957 bars of iron, etc.

Thus, under the influence of foreign relations, developed that *commercial* capitalism whose formation fills the history of the seventeenth century. From foreign trade it spread to internal trade; but industrial production, in the seventeenth century, still retained the characteristics of *la petite industrie*, industrial capitalism dating only from the reign of Peter the Great. However, in some parts of the south and west (as in the Ukraine), and above all in those parts which were in dispute between Russia and Poland, there existed before the days of Peter the Great an already somewhat extensive industry (including distilleries, making a corn spirit, glassworks, foundries, etc.). Here, again, we mark the increasing influence of Europe, which traversed Poland and had its two maritime centres at Riga and Königsberg.

CHAPTER III

- I. The period of Peter the Great—The problem of Europeanizing the national economy of Russia. II. The forerunners—The basis of the economic reforms of Peter I. III. Did Peter the Great wish to denationalize Russia?—National and international motives in the programme of reforms devised by Peter the Great—Russian mercantilism. IV. The balance-sheet of industrial Europeanization under Peter the Great—Contradiction between the European and Russian elements in Peter's work.

I

THE reforms of Peter the Great have been much discussed. Some regard his work of reform as a veritable Europeanization of the country, a cataclysm almost, in which the ancient Russia, Muscovite and Asiatic, perished, and out of which emerged the new, civilized, European Russia. Others, on the contrary, are inclined to deny that the influence of Peter the Great was of this character, and to regard it as far more limited in scope.

In addition to this genetic and historical problem, a question of teleological import arises. Was the work of Peter the Great really positive and useful? Or, as many Slavophiles assert, did Russia merely suffer, as a result of this sovereign's efforts, a deprivation of her normal existence, a morbid and harmful crisis, artificially provoked in the course of her natural and logical development?

The best, that is, the surest means of judging objectively these controversial questions, and of deriving solid instruction therefrom, is to analyse the economic phenomena of the reign of Peter the Great. For although it is fairly easy to "reform" a few juridical statutes and

other external manifestations of the public authority, the national economy of a people, which is the true and intimate substance of its social and political existence, is far more refractory to force. Reforms are valued by their economic results ; if their imprint on the life of the people is profound, if they have contributed to its development, we may admit that their influence is important ; but if they have merely grazed the surface of life they fall into place merely as negligible incidents.

II

The first appearance in Russia of industry on the large scale, the creation of the first large factories and workshops, is very often referred to the period of Peter the Great, and is attributed to the exclusive influence of the foreigners in Russia. " Peter the Great was the true creator and the great teacher of Russian industry," says M. Ischchanian, the Armenian economist.¹

It must be noted, however, that industry on the large scale was not unknown in Russia before the reign of Peter the Great. A century and a half earlier it was already in existence ; the first paper-mill was established under Ivan the Terrible, as was also the first printing-press. In the seventeenth century other works were established ; the first cloth-weaving establishment was founded in 1650 by a foreigner (Johann of Sweden). Metallurgy was even earlier in the field ; in 1632 the Government granted to Vinius, a Dutchman, a patent to found and exploit a large foundry, and two years later another foreigner (Kojet) obtained permission to erect a glass-works.

This proves that wholesale industry and the participation of foreigners preceded the advent of Peter the Great.

Before his time, it is true, the small industry predominated ; the birth of great undertakings was merely

¹ B. Ischchanian, *Die Ausländischen Elemente in der Russischen Volkswirtschaft* (Berlin, 1913), p. 19.

a sporadic phenomenon, and it was only after his reign that it became regular and systematic. Nevertheless, in order that this transformation should be possible, a material foundation was essential, which did, in fact, exist.

“In Russia, before Peter the Great, there was no *industrial* capitalism, but a *commercial* capitalism was already completely developed. The concentration of commercial capital which we observe in this Russia was not due to governmental measures, but to the spontaneous development of trade and the recognition of the advantages presented by commerce on a large scale as compared with petty trading. It was precisely this commercial capital which furnished the foundation of the greater industries under Peter the Great. To convince ourselves of this we need only consult the lists of contemporary manufacturers; we shall see that, contrary to a very prevalent idea, they were, in a great majority, purely Russian, and belonged to the corporation or guild of merchants.”¹

Such is the verdict of Professor Toughan-Baranovsky, the leading historian of Russian industry.

“The foreigners and the nobles owned only an insignificant proportion of the factories existing under Peter I. . . . The owners of the greater number of these concerns were Muscovite capitalists of the old stock—merchants. The fact that they were so shows that the greater industries developed in a favourable environment, created by the whole past of the Muscovite State, more especially in the heart of the great commercial world. This environment was not the work of Peter; without it, industry on the larger scale would have found it impossible, in Russia, to attain any considerable extension.”²

But, as we know, commercial capitalism on the greater scale was able to wax fat and increase in Muscovite Russia only thanks to foreign relations. Con-

¹ M. Toughan-Baranovsky, *The Russian Factory in the Past and Present*, vol. i. p. 8 (Petersburg, 1898, Russian ed.).

² *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11.

sequently we are justified in saying that the exchanges with Europe rendered the advent of the great Russian industries possible by, affording them the necessary soil.

As for the part played by Peter the Great and his Government, it translated itself chiefly in measures which were half-encouraging and half-coercive, but which were designed to attract commercial capital to the business of industrial production. We know what these measures were: privileges and monopolies for the founders of industrial undertakings, State contracts to supply the army and navy, etc. To the period of Peter the Great, therefore, we must refer the origin of those close relations between the Government and the great commercial capitalists which even to-day appear as one of the most characteristic traits of Russia, and are of great significance. On account of these relations the wealthy middle classes of Russia are always greatly subject to the action of the State, which has formed the habit of intervening in the economic life of the nation and of tackling its problems directly. The principle of *laissez faire, laissez passer* has never been that of the Russian State, which is for ever carrying on various undertakings, exploiting, as a private individual, railways, distilleries, mines, factories, forests, etc. I believe we shall nowhere else find a State so greatly concerned with trade and industry.

To understand how it has come to assume such a function we must go back to its first great ventures into the economic sphere, under Peter I, not forgetting that it then found the soil prepared. For we know that as early as the seventeenth century the State was adding to its administrative functions the exercise of trade, and notably that it carried on an extensive trade with foreign countries. Thus conditions came into being which were propitious to the reforms of Peter the Great and to that economic "Europeanization" of Russia which he so resolutely undertook.

III

But it must not be supposed that Peter the Great intended to "denationalize" Russia, or that he was the enemy of the truly Russian elements of the nation. On the contrary, his system was fully national in character, and one of the authors who have studied it was able to say of him with reason that Peter the Great was merely an *enlightened nationalist*.¹

Peter I was a representative of the mercantile doctrine. But the mercantile doctrine is merely an economic nationalism.² This theory, as far as it applied to Russia, was expounded by Baron von Luberus in a scheme which he proposed to Peter:—

"To set the general economy in a solid and stable order it is extremely necessary to give this structure a suitable life or soul. This last consists in the amount of credit which your Majesty enjoys abroad." As for this credit, it is necessary to the development of trade and industry in the interior of the country; for "one must take pains to improve the production of one's own country"; must no longer remain dependent on foreign industry, but must obtain an active balance in favour of Russia, and "create one's own manufactures."

Such was the advice of Luberus.³ And such was the opinion of Peter himself, who was familiar with the mercantile doctrine not only through the theories of Luberus and other "projectors," but also in practice—in the Netherlands and other European countries

¹ See the work already cited of M. Ischchanian, p. 20.

² Mr. H. Higgs, the well-known English economist, says of the "mercantilists": "The mercantilists were always extremely anxious to solve the following problem: By what means may a Government contribute to the well-being of the nation? Nationalism, State intervention, and particularism constitute the essentials of their economic policy."

³ Cited from Milukov's *The Economy of the Russian State during the First Quarter of the Tenth Century and the Reform of Peter the Great* (Petersburg, 1892, p. 528, Russian ed.).

through which he had travelled. However, he could not be a "mercantilist" according to the Dutch or English pattern. In the Low Countries and in England industry was created far more by private initiative than by the public authorities. French mercantilism—"Colbertism"—was already more governmental. In Russia the rôle of the public authorities had perforce to be greater because private initiative was feeble, and very often the Russian *bourgeoisie* was even hostile to the introduction of new methods of economic exploitation and to the "Europeanization" of the national methods of production. Thus, for example, one of the leading Russian publicists and economists of the time of Peter I, Ivan Pososhkov, advised the Tsar to "stop all the chinks" through which Russia placed herself in communication with the West, and to suppress even postal communication. Pososhkov and many others were partisans of a *conservative* and *retrograde* economic nationalism, while Peter I represented an *enlightened* and *progressive* nationalism. And as the resisting force of the conservative nationalists was insufficient, the authorities were able to effect changes in the domain of economics which to us appear almost "a revolution from above."

IV.

What were the practical results of the "Europeanization" of industry under Peter I?

The figures relating to the Russian industry of the period are by no means negligible, for on the death of the Tsar there were in Russia 233 large industrial establishments belonging to the State and to private individuals, the mines being excepted. We may even say that they satisfied immediate requirements. But if we consider the elements and possibilities of future evolution, the spectacle is less brilliant.

A superior economic system imposing itself upon a country whose general level is inferior to it produces a twofold effect. On the one hand, it stimulates the

forces of production, whose means it tends to modernize and improve. But at the same time it exerts a destructive effect: it disintegrates and dissolves the forms which preceded it, and which are no longer adapted to the new requirements which it has evoked.

This is precisely what happened under Peter I. While with great activity a new equipment was elaborated and a new technique came into being, the representatives of the old conceptions of life and labour waged a truly desperate campaign against all "innovations" and all that was "foreign."

Great material, social, and moral suffering was caused by this clash between the old economic state and the European form of exploitation introduced by Peter the Great. These sufferings have impressed many Russian historians and investigators to the point of inspiring a condemnation of the entire work of industrial renovation accomplished by this monarch.

One of the foremost of these writers, M. Korsak, is of opinion that Peter's whole economic policy was simply a huge mistake: that far from founding large establishments in the European manner he should have applied himself to organizing the small national crafts and trades and the small local industries which existed long before his time. "Instead of turning the artisans into industrial workers, it would have been far better to have made them independent industrial master-craftsmen," and "instead of building factories on account of the State and afterwards placing them in possession of merchants and nobles, it would have been better to entrust their exploitation to the communes, villages, and towns." M. Korsak, whose work on *Some Forms of Industry* appeared in 1861, was of opinion that "the new form of industry (established by Peter I) was in absolute contradiction to all the modes and habits of Russian life."

But it is to be noted, in the first place, that the concentration of small enterprises and the communal exploitation of which M. Korsak speaks could not have

been realized in the eighteenth century, for even in our days the "commercialization" of industry encounters many difficulties and advances very slowly. Peter's reign was a period of wars; and the Government was too much taken up by the necessities of external conflict to exercise any choice; it merely borrowed from Europe what it found there.

The question, then, is not what Peter the Great *should* have done, but what he was able to do.

On the other hand, was the new form of production, as M. Korsak states, absolutely contrary to the modes and habits of Russian life? In this connection we must remember that commerce on the grand scale, as we have seen, was not unknown before the reign of Peter, so that industry had only to follow the example of commerce. We may admit, however, that the general economic conditions and "the new form of industry" were in disagreement. But they were so precisely because the one was superior to the others, as being more progressive.

Fully to grasp the nature of this contradiction we must consider and solve a special problem which complicated the process of "Europeanizing" Russia—namely, the problem of labour.

The efforts of Peter the Great to develop Russian industry were confronted by a scarcity of "hands." The founders of the first factories were not serf-owning nobles, but merchants and foreigners, who owned no serfs. The Government, in granting them a patent for the establishment of an industrial undertaking, left them at liberty to recruit Russian or foreign workers "by paying them a proper wage." The principal contingent of these "free" workers consisted of ex-serfs who had of their own will left their noble masters. The nobles, greatly vexed by this defection, demanded that they should be sent back from the factories to their villages. But Peter I, by a ukase dated 1722, forbade the surrender of these peasants, turned artisans, to their lawful masters.

Reading this ukase, one would naturally suppose that in the conflict between the old national *régime*, based on serfdom and forced labour, and the new industrial exploitation, which enjoyed the co-operation of free labour, Peter the Great was in favour of the second, and that he would thus have arrived at the idea of abolishing serfdom. Nothing of the kind! In the preceding year (1721) Peter, by another ukase, had authorized "merchant folk" owning factories to buy peasants on condition that they bought them by the whole village, and that each village was attached not to the person of the manufacturer, but to the industrial undertaking itself.

So, in their struggle against innovation, the "old habits," unhappily, won the day; and instead of hastening the disappearance of serfdom, as it did in Europe, the new industry, as soon as it made its appearance in Russia, adapted itself to its environment, and took as its basis the same forced labour of the serfs which was the basis of agriculture.

More than a century elapsed before a true "Europeanization" of industrial production became possible in Russia by means of the liberation of the serfs.

CHAPTER IV

- I. Foreign influences under the successors of Peter the Great—The conflict between Western tendencies and the Russian system of government—Catherine II—The ukase of 1763. II. European colonists in the Russian countryside—Why is the Russian moujik poor and the immigrant farmer rich? III. The true method of "Europeanizing" the economic system of Russia.

I

THE immediate successors of Peter the Great did not continue his economic policy. We may even say that they followed a totally contrary line of conduct. Instead of developing the forces of the country, they occupied themselves only with their own . . . consumption. They wasted far more than they created. The general character of such European influences as they did not avoid underwent a total change. Peter I summoned to Russia able specialists in industry, trade, the sciences, and the military art—engineers, officers, and merchants; his successors fell into the hands of adventurers.¹ The Tsars, and above all the Tsarinas (incapable of resisting the charms of foreign beauty), distributed to their favourites the property of the State, large sums of money taken from the Treasury, lands, and entire villages peopled with serfs.

What was even more serious was that without having borrowed from Peter the Great one single positive and fruitful idea, his immediate successors repeated and revived his errors.

¹ M. Emile Haumant mentions this fact in his remarkable work on *French Culture in Russia*, stating that the wave of French immigration into Russia became "more turbid" after the reign of Peter I. It was the same with the immigration from other European countries.

The ukase of 1721, which confirmed the principle of serfdom, was doubtless an error in that it worsened the situation of the labouring masses ; but at least it recognized an equality of rights between the industrial capitalists and the nobles, and did not reserve the labour of the serfs exclusively for those who had until then been their masters. Under Peter's successors the nobles had their revenge. They applied themselves to depriving the merchants and manufacturers of the right of owning serfs, so that they could thenceforth monopolize industry without risk of competition.

Under the pressure of their demands a law was passed in 1762 forbidding persons not belonging to the nobility to purchase serfs and to employ them in factories and workshops. This law was only the logical climax of a series of measures whose aim was to re-establish the supremacy of the nobility in the industrial domain, and was thus entirely opposed to the tendency then prevailing in Europe, where the *bourgeois* system was advancing by rapid strides. This "ennoblement" of Russian industry had disastrous results, as I have already explained elsewhere.

"Thanks to the law of 1762 and the small number of free workers, the nobles were not slow to monopolize all the principal branches of industry. . . . But if the serfs were bad industrial workmen, the nobles themselves were deplorable organizers. Accustomed to live by gratuitous labour—that of their serfs—the nobles possessed neither the energy nor the initiative essential in a good manufacturer. . . . Having no competition to fear, they had nothing to stimulate them to improve the technique of their production." †

The advent of Catherine II seemed bound to cause a revival of the economic policy and a return to the positive conceptions of Peter the Great. Like him, Catherine II resorted to the European element as to a ferment.

† *Modern Russia*, 2nd ed., p. 81.

In the second year of her reign (on the 22nd of July 1763) she published a ukase inviting foreigners to enter Russia, promising them (1) entire liberty of religious conscience and subventions for the institution of their various cults ; (2) perpetual exemption from obligatory military service ; (3) exemption from taxation during a certain period ; (4) communal autonomy in respect of matters of administration and police, with the right to elect their own administrators, and the creation of a special superior body having the general direction of the relations between the immigrants and the State ; (5) a special jurisdiction for matters as between one immigrant and another.

These provisions attracted to Russia a multitude of Europeans, who considerably reinforced the foreign coefficient in the Russian economy. At the end of Catherine's reign, for example, out of 163 factories and workshops then existing in Petersburg 35, or 21.47 per cent., belonged to foreigners, 7 to Englishmen, 7 to Frenchmen, 5 to Germans, 3 to Bulgarians, 2 to Italians, 1 to a Swede, and 10 to persons of unknown origin—probably, for the most part, to Germans. In Moscow, too, a European colony established itself, consisting principally of Germans.

II

But the most important result of the ukase of 1763 was the appearance of immigrants in the agricultural regions.

From 1764 to 1776 a great influx of Rheinlanders and Westphalians entered Russia, to found villages on the banks of the Volga (in the Governments of Saratov and Samara), where they occupied an expanse of territory 100 versts in length. In 1783 another wave of Europeans penetrated the south of Russia (in the Government of Yekaterinoslav), on the banks of the Dnieper. It consisted of Mennonites (a Protestant sect), half Dutch and half German in origin, who established agricultural colonies.

The immigration of European agriculturists continued under Alexander I and Nicolas I. In 1803 a vigorous group of Mennonite families set foot in one of the Caucasian regions. It was followed by other colonists, who at first were exclusively German, and then Czech and Bulgar, who established themselves in South-Western Russia.

A few figures will show how rapidly Southern Russia was peopled with foreign agriculturists.

In 1775 there were in Russia only 23,000 individual colonists. In 1877, a century later, there were 86,000 *families*, and in 1905 there were 158,500. In 1877 they owned 2,894,500 *desiatins* of land; in 1905 3,190,000 *desiatins*.¹

The greater part of the agricultural immigrants is concentrated in the Governments of Kherson (61,000 families), Bessarabia (27,500), Samara (21,000), Saratov (19,000), Yekaterinoslav (17,000), and the Crimea (11,500).

Here we are speaking only of agriculturists who have become Russian subjects. There are in addition to these a certain number of landed proprietors who are foreign subjects. In 1905 the number of estates belonging to them was 868, and they possessed 350,000 *desiatins* of land. Most of them are large landowners who have been able to acquire property in Russia by means of their personal connections.

As for the peasant colonists, we must admit, and all writers on the subject will confirm the fact, that their economic situation is far superior to that of the Russian peasants. For certain economists this phenomenon is due to the "individualism" prevailing among the immigrants, whereas the Russian peasants have remained attached to the communism of the *mir*. This theory must even, to a certain point, have inspired the famous agrarian reform of the Minister Stolypin (the ukase of

¹ I cite these figures from the results of the statistical inquiry into landed property in Russia in 1905 (published by the Ministry of the Interior, Petersburg, 1907, pp. xxiv-xxvii).

9/22 November 1906), whose central principle was the dissolution of the agricultural commune and the substitution of individual exploitation.

I am not a great admirer of the Russian *mir*, but I must, however, say that the well-being of the immigrants and the poverty of the sons of the soil are not imputable to the system of property, but to the difference of general conditions to which they are severally subject. If the Russian Government, which granted privileges to the foreign immigrants, had treated the Russian peasants in the same manner, if it had not crushed them by taxation, had exempted them from military service, and had left them free to administer their own affairs, instead of keeping them under the terrible yoke of serfdom, we may be sure that they would have given equal proof of their capacity for labour and organization.

On the other hand, we should remark that the lands of the colonists are far more extensive than those of the Russian *moujiks*. According to the official inquiry of 1905, a *dvor* (court or household) of colonists comprises an average of 20·2 *desiatins*, while a *dvor* of Russian *moujiks* comprised only 6 to 9 *desiatins*; and millions of *dvors* of Russian *moujiks* average only 3 to 4 *desiatins*.

This lack of land is the greatest obstacle to the development of rural exploitation in Russia. In 1908 the *zemstvo* of Samara made a comparative statistical inquiry into the state of agriculture within its government. It admits that a family of Mennonite colonists possesses an average of $33\frac{1}{3}$ *desiatins*, while a Russian peasant family possesses only 7 *desiatins*. The authors of this inquiry, who are greatly in favour of individual exploitation, nevertheless remark :—

“ Only a given quantity of land can maintain the life of a Mennonite family at the level of affluence to which it is accustomed. With the decrease of territorial property begin those troubles which result in diminished

exploitation and, finally, in the loss of the property itself." ¹

The same conclusions result from the facts to be observed in other parts of Russia: for example, in the Government of Kiev, where there are Czech and German agricultural colonies. Their prosperity results from the fact that their properties are much more extensive than those of the moujiks, and are cultivated under different legal and social conditions.²

III

The special and favourable treatment of foreign colonists proves that Catherine II and her successors held the European element in great esteem, but had little understanding of the process of "Europeanizing" their State. The transformation which they were seeking could not be obtained by creating oases of European culture in the desert of general poverty. What was needed was to raise the native population by offering it the possibility of living and working as in Europe. Their false conception diminished the effects expected from Western immigration. And we are always struck by the contrast between the European colonies and the surrounding Russian countryside.

Any progress in general politics, on the contrary, has made way for a fresh economic impulse, and has added to the real Europeanization of Russia. For example, the great events of the period 1860-70—the abolition of serfdom, the reform of the administration, etc.—gave it the strongest impulse. It is enough to say that three-fourths of the industrial undertakings to-day existing have been born since then.

However, despite all errors of domestic policy, increasingly powerful ties were binding Russia to Europe,

¹ *Individual Exploitations in the Government of Samara*, vol. i. p. 177 (Samara, 1909).

² See M. A. Yarochevitch, *Essay on the Individual Exploitations in the Government of Kiev* (extracted from the Inquiry held by the Zemstvo of Kiev). Kiev, 1911.

making her inseparable from the international economic organism. And all through the nineteenth century we may observe an increasingly close correlation between the evolution of Russia and that of the countries with which she maintained relations.

To limit ourselves to a single example, let us take the textile industry, whose development was continuous throughout the nineteenth century, even at times when depression and even stagnation prevailed in other departments of production.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the whole business of weaving cotton cloths was monopolized in Russia by two Englishmen—Chamberlain and Cosens—who had a large establishment in Petersburg. Since then relations between the Russian textile industry and that of England have been unbroken, surviving the suppression of the privilege granted to the two Englishmen. During the whole of the nineteenth century a remarkable parallelism was observable between the fluctuations of Russian and English production. All crises occurring in the latter were followed by crises in the former; and any recovery or revival was communicated from the English to the Russian industry, notwithstanding Russian protectionism and the very high import duties which it placed on woven stuffs.

Each crisis in the textile industry (for example, that of 1820, 1837, 1840, etc.) lowered the price of thread and yarns in England, and these were articles imported into Russia. A comparison of figures proves the existence in Russia of the same state of affairs at the same periods. The fall of prices, in its turn, provoked in England changes of technical methods, the use of improved equipment, and the more extensive use of machinery, and we find the same process going forward at the same time in Russia. "Thus," says Professor Toughan-Baranovsky, in commenting upon these facts, "the evolution of our textile factory is explained, above all, by the general international conditions of industrial evolution. Russia has been caught in the wheels of the

capitalistic development of England, and has profited by the technical successes of the latter." ¹

During the second half of the nineteenth century the tendency indicated by the history of the textile industry became generalized, and affected other important branches of Russian production. The alternations of progress and arrest in the capitalistic economy were almost simultaneous in Russia, in Europe, and in the rest of the world.

We might point to other analogies and correlations of the same kind between Modern Russia and Europe. Some economists (notably J. Hobson in his *Evolution of Modern Capitalism*) declare that all periods of intensive railway construction in England, on the Continent, and in the United States were succeeded by moments of economic depression and stagnation. The same phenomenon appeared in Russia after the attacks of "railway fever" in the seventh and ninth decades of the nineteenth century, when periods of prosperity and speculation were terminated by "smashes"; by the ruin and disappearance of dozens of industrial enterprises.

In general it may be said that the industrial and capitalistic economy of Russia lives the same life as that of Europe.

¹ M. Toughan-Baranovsky, *The Russian Factory in the Past and Present*, vol. i. p. 65 (Petersburg, 1898).

CHAPTER V

- I. European influence and the national economy of the Russia of to-day—The increase of imports and exports—The general character of Russia's foreign trade. II. Human immigration from Europe into Russia—Its composition. III. The penetration of European capital into Russia. IV. Its forms and its dimensions—State loans and private industry—National capital and foreign capital in Russia. V. The distribution of foreign capital among the various branches of industry. VI. German capitalism and its influence on the Russian economy.

I

HAVING glanced at the main outlines of the history of the economic relations between Russia and Western Europe, let us now examine, in a general manner, the penetration of the European element into the national economy of Russia.

The total value of the Russian exports and imports amounted, on the average, during the first quarter of the nineteenth century to 112,300,000 roubles; from 1825 to 1849 it was 221,200,000; from 1849 to 1874, 525,000,000; and from 1875 to 1900, 1,092,000,000. In other words, the commercial movement of Russia upon the international market increased, in a hundred years, by 972 per cent.; that is, it became nearly ten times what it was. And thus Russia's isolation with regard to the other Powers became ten times less; while her ties with the other nations became ten times more solid and complete.¹

At the beginning of the twentieth century the *rôle* and the importance of Russia in the exchanges of the world

¹ See my *Modern Russia*, T. Fisher Unwin, 1914, p. 97.

continued to increase. During the first five years of this century alone the total of her foreign trade increased by one-third. In 1905 it reached the sum of 1,702,000,000 roubles; in 1910 it amounted to 2,533,000,000 roubles; while in 1913 it amounted to 2,690,000,000.¹

These figures are those of the international trade of Russia, coming from all sources and going to all destinations. But most of it passes by way of her European frontiers. For the five years between 1907 and 1911 inclusive, for example, the goods crossing these frontiers represented an annual average of 2,083,700,000 roubles, while the Asiatic frontiers saw the entrance or exit of only 202,700,000 roubles' worth of trade, or less than one-tenth of the former sum.

There is no exaggeration in declaring that if, as regards political forms, Russia is still far from being truly Europeanized, at least her economic ties and aspirations bind her far more closely to Europe than to Asia.

What is the merchandise which Russia obtains from Europe?

Alimentary products form the smallest part of the Russian imports of European origin, which is natural in the case of an agricultural country. In 1902 their value amounted to 82,300,000 roubles; in 1912 it was 140,200,000; so in ten years the increase was one of 70 per cent. The imports of "manufactured articles"—industrial products—were valued at 150,300,000 roubles in 1902 and 375,700,000 in 1912; this was an increase of 150 per cent. But the greater portion of the imports consist of "semi-manufactured articles" and the raw materials of industries. Of these 295,000,000 roubles' worth were imported in 1902, and in 1912 this figure had risen to 518,000,000; an increase of 75 per cent. for the decade.

¹ See the Report of the Minister of Finances on the Budget Proposals of 1914, Part II, p. 20 (Petersburg, 1913).

These figures, taken from the official Report of the Minister of Finances on the Budget of 1914, enable me to say that unreservedly to attribute all the advantages of the commercial relations between Russia and Europe to Europe, and all the disadvantages to Russia, would be to fall into hyperbole.

The better to show that the introduction of foreign industrial goods to the Russian market is of secondary importance, I will cite two examples:—

In 1912 there were imported into Russia 2,150,000 poods of wool, while the home production of wool was 13,500,000 poods; that is, the wool of foreign origin formed only 14 per cent. of the total Russian consumption (if we regard it as equal to the sum of the home production *plus* the amount imported). In the same year, 1912, 306,000,000 poods of coal were imported into Russia, while the country produced 1,887,000,000 poods, or 87 per cent. of the total consumption.

The sole class of products whose importation really plays an enormous part in Russia, and in respect of which the country remains dependent upon the outer world, is machinery, of which in 1912 there was imported 146,000,000 roubles' worth, while in 1902 this figure was only 51,000,000. But this rapid increase of the demand is in itself a fresh proof of the development of national industry, and the promptitude with which its technical equipment is being improved.

II

The immediate influence of the Europe of to-day is not confined to the introduction of merchandise; it manifests itself under two additional forms; the export, into Russia, of men and of capital.

To realize the character and the extent of human immigration we must repair to the results of the census of the population of the Russian Empire—the only one, alas!—which was taken in 1897. There we find that

Russia contained 605,500 foreign subjects, which makes $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total population.

Some writers believe the proportion of foreign subjects in Russia to be even less, and give the comparative figures of immigration relating to other European countries. In Switzerland the number of foreigners per 1,000 inhabitants is 77; in France, 30; in Belgium, 24; in Holland, 10; in Germany, 9; in England, 8; in Austria-Hungary, 5; in Scotland, 4; in the Scandinavian countries, 3; in Ireland, 3; in Italy, 2; and in Russia, 1.

Even in those parts of Russia which most attract him, the foreigner is not very numerous; in the Caucasus he forms 1.69 per cent. of the total population; in Poland, 1.15 per cent.; in Siberia, 1.08 per cent.; in Central Russia, 0.27 per cent., etc.

According to race, the foreign subjects in Russia were distributed thus:—

Germans, 158,000; Austro-Hungarians, 121,500; Turks, 121,000; Persians, 74,000; Chinese, 47,500; Koreans, 13,000; Greeks, 12,500; French, 9,500; Bokharans, 8,000; English, 7,500; Swiss, 6,000; Italians, 5,000; Roumanians, 4,000; and others, 18,000.

There is a great difference between the immigrants of Asiatic and those of European origin, as regards their economic functions. M. Ischchanian defines it as follows:—

“The foreigners entering Russia from the West form, in the urban professions and especially in industry, trade, and transport—the camp of the contractors, the directing and administrative staff of the upper strata of the technical and commercial hierarchy, the foremen, and, to a less extent, the skilled artisans (this almost exclusively in Russian Poland). The foreigners of Asiatic origin, on the other hand, go to form, as a rule, the middle and inferior strata in such callings as that of the small trader, the commercial traveller, the manual worker, and above all the great mass of those

who are known by the specific term of *tshernorabotchié* (that is to say labourers, unskilled workmen)."¹

We may say, then, that Russia lies midway between Europe and Asia, economically as well as geographically. Of the Asiatics she already asks no more than simple manual labour; for Europeans, Russia is a field for the employment of their capital and their intellectual faculties.

Of the 605,000 foreigners residing in Russia in 1897, 244,000 were women. But, as women, economically speaking, are for the most part a passive element, enjoying no independence, we need hardly consider them in our argument, but only the men, who number 361,500.

Forty-one per cent. of the foreigners residing in Russia in 1897 were living in towns; 59 per cent. in the country. Now, of the total population of the Empire the inhabitants of the towns, in 1897, formed only 25 per cent. It is obvious that in Russia the foreigner furnishes a far larger proportion of urban inhabitants than the native population. But an even more interesting fact is that 30 per cent. of all the immigrants are gathered together in the four great cities: Petrograd, Moscow, Odessa, and Warsaw.

However, all the foreign nationalities represented in the Empire have not an equal predilection for urban life: the Germans, the Czechs, and the Bulgars prefer to settle outside the towns. Of the Austro-Hungarian subjects 77 per cent. live in the country, as do 58 per cent. of the Germans and 57 per cent. of the Bulgars. This fact is due to the numerous German, Czech, and Bulgarian colonies in the south of Russia and on the banks of the Volga. More than three-fourths of the French in Russia, on the other hand (82 per cent.), are town-dwellers, and 80 per cent. of the English, 60 per cent. of the Belgians, and 78 per cent. of the Italians.

As for their professions, the French and English

¹ This word is made up of two words: *tsherny* = black, and *rabota* = labour.

are mostly engaged in trade and industry; of 100 "active" Frenchmen, 44 are engaged in industry; 20 in trade and transport; 28 are servants, while 5 are farmers and 3 are engaged in other callings. The English furnish 48 technical or industrial experts per 100; 28 are engaged in trade, 28 are servants, etc., while only 1 per cent. are farmers. Of the German subjects the farmers form a much greater proportion—22 per cent.; while 32 per cent. are engaged in industry and 11 per cent. in trade.

The proportion of those engaged in trade and industry is relatively much larger among the foreigners than among the native inhabitants, the same census giving 12 per cent. as the proportion of the latter engaged in industry, while $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. are engaged in trade and 70 per cent. in agriculture.

III

But it is by the penetration of capital that Europe exerts the most powerful influence in Russia, for it is through the foreigner's money and his novel forms of capitalistic exploitation that the old state of things is undergoing the most profound upheaval.

European capital enters Russia in three distinct ways: through the creation in Russia of industrial undertakings by Europeans, whether by private persons or companies; through the participation of European capital in undertakings organized by the Russians, whether singly or in association; and through loans raised by Russian municipalities, or the State, in European markets; the municipal loans being devoted, as a rule, to various public works in the cities (trams-ways, waterworks, etc.); of the latter (that is, the State loans), only a portion profits private industry, through the medium of official contracts, payment of which is assured by these loans; the greater portion goes to defray the costs of administration.

It is not easy to determine the total sum of the European capital engaged in industry, and the Russian

loans. M. Ischchanian claims that at the beginning of the twentieth century it was 7,145,600,000 roubles, of which 4,400,000,000 was French, 1,920,000,000 German, 372,000,000 English, and 253,000,000 Belgian, while 200,000,000 came from other European countries. But M. Ischchanian's calculations are very inexact; in reality the European interests in Russia are considerably greater.

Thus, according to the data given in 1912 by the French review, *Le Correspondant*, France alone had 17 milliards of francs invested in Russia, or £680,000,000.¹ M. A. Neymarck asserts that England, by 1907, had £180,000,000 invested in Russia, £80,000,000 of this being in State loans. Of the 680,000,000 sterling owed to France, £424,400,000 has been absorbed by external State loans, and £53,600,000 by internal loans; £16,000,000 by the loans issued by the various governments and municipalities, and £190,000,000 by industrial undertakings.²

In this connection a Russian economist makes the very justifiable remark that "the economic dependence of Russia in respect of foreign countries is principally manifested by the indebtedness of the State," and that "in comparison, the sums loaned to Russian trade and industry appear insignificant."³

While readily admitting the justice of the *comparison*, we must, however, admit that the *absolute* rôle of European capital in Russian industry is very considerable. And what is even more important is that of late it has been rapidly increasing. Before 1890 there were only 16 shareholders' companies operating in Russia with funds of foreign origin. Between 1891 and 1900 no

¹ In 1914, a few months before the war, Russia had arranged for a new State loan in Paris, of the sum of £100,000,000, the first instalment of which (£20,000,000) was issued the same year.

² *Le Correspondant*, December 25, 1913, p. 1050.

³ A. Finn-Yenotaevsky, *Sovremennoye Khoziaïstvo Rossii (The Modern Economy of Russia)*, Petersburg, 1911, p. 481.

less than 215 were promoted ; between 1900 and 1910, 160 more ; and 82 between 1911 and 1913. In this last period 774 companies were founded with Russian capital. Thus one-fifth of the new undertakings originating in a term of three years were the work of foreigners. In reality the latter have contributed even more considerably to the development of Russian industry ; for the average share-capital of the foreign companies was 1,736,000 roubles per company, while the average share-capital per Russian company, was 1,220,000 roubles.

In order correctly to appreciate the rôle of foreign capital in Russian industry we must compare it not with the external indebtedness of the State, but rather with the national revenue and the national capital.

Here is an example :—

In 1910 the annual revenue of all the industrial and commercial undertakings in Russia (counting only those whose income was over 1,000 roubles) was 856,000,000 roubles. The total of the foreign capital invested in authorized shareholders' companies in the year 1911 was 80,000,000 roubles. Supposing that the Russian capitalists were in a position to devote even 50 per cent. of their revenue to the creation of fresh undertakings, we see that they could invest some 400,000,000 roubles, that is, only five times the foreign capital invested in the same year.

IV

By the figures already cited the reader will have seen that Europe exerts, on the Russia of to-day, a considerable economic influence ; but it is not true that Russia is completely dependent upon Europe. The Russian Empire is no longer economically isolated, though it has not lost its autonomy.

However, we must not overlook certain specific traits of European participation in Russian affairs.

In the first place, we must note that relatively speaking the foreign industrial undertakings in Russia are

more vigorous than the Russian. For example, the capital of the shareholders' companies of European origin established in Russia between 1911 and 1913 averaged 1,736,000 roubles per company, while the average capital of the Russian companies founded during the same period was only 1,222,000 roubles. Competition, therefore, is a difficult matter for the Russian capitalist.

The situation as regards national capital is complicated by the distribution of foreign capital throughout the various branches of industry. The most important branches—for instance, metallurgy, coal-mining, weaving, etc.—are largely under the control of European capital.

Here are some significant facts and figures :—

In the basin of Southern Russia, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 75 per cent. of the coal produced came from 15 large concerns, of which two-thirds, furnishing 62 per cent. of the annual yield, belonged to Europeans. In the Dombrova mines, in Poland, out of 13 large undertakings 6 are the property of foreigners, yielding 86 per cent. of the total production.

As for iron, we find the same state of affairs. For example, in the basin of the Donetz, at the beginning of the twentieth century, out of 23 large steelworks, only 2 were the property of Russians; 15 are the property of foreigners, or "mixed" companies in which the foreign element predominates.

At Baku, once more, the foreign domination is indisputable. In 1909 Baku exported 371,932,500 poods of petroleum and by-products, the yield of 45 enterprises. But more than 45 per cent. of this quantity, or 167,982,000 poods, represented the contribution of 5 great companies of European ownership.

As for the textile industry, one of the first fields to be invaded by foreign capital, it already boasts of a few centres, particularly in the region of Moscow, in which it has become fairly Russianized, and most of

the names of foreign origin borne by the heads of industrial houses in this part of Russia are the names of Russian subjects. But in other parts the weaving of fabrics is almost entirely controlled by foreign capital. Such is notably the case at Lodz, in Poland, and in the surrounding district.

These facts enable us to state without exaggeration that European capital is still a very great power in the principal departments of Russian production.

Which nations provide the capital that feeds Russian industry?

In the metallurgical industry, British, Belgian, and French capital predominates. The real creator of metallic exploitation in the Donetz region was an Englishman, the famous John Hughes, who was also the pioneer of coal-mining in the European manner in the same region. The memory of this energetic pioneer is perpetuated in the name of one of the leading industrial centres of Southern Russia, Youzovka (*Hughes* being pronounced as *Youz* in Russian, hence *Youzovka*, "the town of Youz").

After him some French capitalists established themselves in the Donetz region, at Krivoi Rog (in 1880). Ten years later a well-known Belgian company, Cockerill & Co., established a large works near the town of Yekaterinoslav. A host of industrial promoters of various nationalities followed them, among whom were even Americans, but the principal contributions of foreign capital to the industries of Southern Russia were due to English, French, and Belgian investors.

The petroleum industry in the Caucasus is the work of Swedish and English capital. A Swede, Robert Nobel, arriving in Baku in 1877, established, five years later, a company for the production of petroleum, which, as far as Russia was concerned, effected a veritable revolution in the industry and gave new life to a whole region. In 1886 the house of Rothschild (of Paris) joined Nobel on the Apcheron peninsula, there to conduct, with him, the "petroliferous apostolate."

It treated with the English house of Lane and McAndrew for the exportation of the product on commission. From that moment there was an influx of English capital for the exploitation of Russian petroleum. The English were able not only to buy most of the enterprises already existing in Baku and the district, but have also monopolized nearly all those which have since been undertaken.

German capital has been attracted by the mines and foundries of Poland (at Sosnowice and Dombrova), where the first large works were established, between 1856 and 1863, by Count Renard and Major von Kramsta, who came from Prussia. But it has since then been attracted more especially by the textile industry, which, although it was introduced by British, Dutch, and French capitalists, none the less received a powerful impulse at the hands of a German, Ludwig Knoop, who came to Moscow in 1839 as the representative of an English house, and there established, first with the assistance of British capitalists, but afterwards independently, 122 weaving-sheds in the regions of Petersburg and Moscow. A popular proverb enshrines his memory: *Gdié tserkov, tam pop, gdié fabrika, tam Knoop*—"Where there is a church, there is a pope; where there is a factory, there is a Knoop," and the addition is sometimes made: "*Gdié izba, tam klop*—"Where there is an inn there are bugs."

But to-day, as I have already stated, the rôle of German capital in the textile industry of Central Russia has decreased. In Poland, on the other hand, it is enormous; and the city of Lodz is not Polish, but half German.

V

We shall now touch upon a particularly serious question: the weight and the tendency which each of the foreign elements exerts upon the economic system of Russia.

In the industrial undertakings of the country the

French and English are first. But this is not the case with the general economic relations of Russia with Europe—that is, when we come to deal not merely with the investment of European capital in Russian industries, but also with the commercial exchanges between Russia and the various countries of Europe, and the loans concluded by the Russian State in the various European money markets. As to loans, France occupies an exceptional position. She has lent the Russian Empire 10·617, milliards of francs (£424,000,000) in external loans and 1·344 milliards (£53,760,000) in domestic loans, besides the 310,000,000 (£12,400,000) lent to the *zemstvos* and municipalities, and without counting the so-called “railway loan” of 500,000,000 (£20,000,000) concluded before the present war and the military loans issued in the course of the war.

But the commercial exchanges between France and Russia leave much to be desired, and in this respect Germany is ahead of France.

“Towards the middle of the nineteenth century the commercial transactions, exportation and importation, between France and Russia on the one hand and Russia and Germany on the other, were of almost equal dimensions; the average at this period (between 1841 and 1850) was 74,000,000 francs (nearly £3,000,000) for France and 85,000,000 (£3,400,000) for Germany, the inequality being relatively unimportant. The progressive development, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, of the trade exchanges between Russia and the rest of Europe had as its basis the Russian customs tariff, which was uniform for goods of whatever origin, yet to-day¹ Germany has reached, in respect of her exports to Russia, an annual average of 500,600,000 francs, or £20,024,000, her imports from Russia being valued at 426,000,000, or £16,800,000, while the French exports to Russia stand at 66,660,000 francs, or £2,666,000, and the imports at 168,000,000 francs or £6,720,000.

¹ In the last years of the nineteenth century.

“ Thus in the last fifty years the German trade with Russia has grown to eleven and a half times what it was, while the French trade is only three times what it was.”¹

Such was the situation at the end of the last century. At the beginning of the twentieth century the trade relations between France and Russia are shown by the following figures :—

Years.	Exports from Russia to France (in millions of francs).	Exports from France to Russia (in millions of francs).
1901-5	157·5	71·8
1908	171·8	88·3
1909	237·0	130·3
1910	248·9	158·0

These figures, taken from the statistics published by the Russian Customs Administration, are published by M. A. Giraud, Secretary to the Russian Chamber of Commerce in Paris.² To permit of a comparison, M. Giraud also gives some statistics of German trade in Russia. From these we see that “ the trade relations between France and Russia, compared to those of Germany, are deplorable.” This will be seen by the following table, which gives the proportion of French and German exports to Russia as compared with the total sum of Russian imports :—

Years.	German exports to Russia (per cent. of total Russian imports).	French exports to Russia (per cent. of total Russian imports).
1901-5	35·8	43
1906-10	39·5	45
1911	42·0	49
1912	50·0	53
1913	52·7	46

The absolute figures are no more consoling to French trade. “ While in five years (1908-12) the German imports have risen from 331 to 519 million roubles, the French imports have increased only from 35 to 55 millions. The customs tariff is still the same for

¹ M. Halpérine-Kaminsky, *France et Russie: Alliance économique*, Paris, E. Flammarion, pp. 4-9.

² A. Giraud, *Le Commerce extérieur de la Russie*, Paris, 1915, p. 10.

all countries; and the question of distance cannot be invoked as a reason for this inferiority, since Austria-Hungary, which has a common frontier with Russia, comes far below France, while, on the other hand, the United States, which are ten times as distant, show very much larger figures; in 1912, for example, 85·7 million roubles, as against 55·2 for France.”¹

The commercial superiority of Germany is crushing, not only with regard to France, but also as compared with the other countries of Europe. The following figures prove this for the years 1908 and 1913:—

RUSSIAN EXPORTS TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES, 1908
(England excepted)*

	1908.	1913.
Germany	278·9	452·6
Holland	93·5	177·4
France*	64·6	100·8
Austria-Hungary	49·0	65·2
Belgium	34·4	64·6
Italy	29·9	73·6
Denmark	31·5	35·7
Turkey	21·5	34·4
Roumania	12·8	21·6
Sweden	4·7	11·4
Norway	5·8	8·6
Spain	5·0	8·9

RUSSIAN IMPORTS FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES
(England excepted)

	1908.	1913.
Germany	331·8	642·7
France*	35·7	56·0
Austria-Hungary	26·4	34·6
Holland	11·5	21·5
Italy	12·9	16·7
Turkey	7·1	16·9
Sweden	10·1	16·1
Norway	8·7	9·8
Belgium	8·1	8·6
Denmark	8·7	12·8

¹ A. Giraud, *op. cit.* p. 17.

² The figures relating to France do not entirely coincide with the percentage already cited. This is due to the fact that they are drawn from different sources—the reports of the French and of the Russian Customs.

The United States, in 1908, exported 75.4 million roubles' worth of goods to Russia and imported goods to the value of 2.8 million roubles. In 1913 the exports were 74.1 millions and the imports 14.1 millions.

As for England, her place on the Russian market is far larger than that of the other European countries, excepting Germany.

England's imports from Russia in 1908 were 220.1 million roubles and in 1913, 226.8 millions; her exports to Russia in 1908 were 119.9 millions and in 1913, 170.3 millions. A comparison of these figures with those of Russo-German trade shows that in this period of five years (1908-13) the German exports to Russia increased by 311,000,000 roubles, while the British exports increased by only 50,000,000, making the relative increase respectively 193 per cent, and 41 per cent.

It appears, therefore, undeniably that, as far as Russia at least is concerned, the German lamentations as to British competition are without foundation. Far from being prevented by England from making colossal conquests on the Russian markets, it is the Germans who little by little are ousting all their competitors, and are doing their best to monopolize the market.

VI

What are the causes of the commercial supremacy of Germany in Russia?

In the first place, geographical proximity, which favours penetration. We have already seen that for 9,421 French and 7,481 English subjects the census of 1897, numbered 158,103 German subjects who had immigrated into Russia. But we must not forget that besides these Germans who are still German subjects there are the inhabitants of the Baltic provinces, the farmers of the Volga basin and Southern Russia, and so forth. According to the census of 1897, the inhabitants of Russia whose mother-tongue was German

made a total of 1,790,500 persons, who to-day must have increased to at least 2,000,000.

Contiguity facilitates the economic Germanization of Russian Poland. It also facilitates commercial exchanges. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the foreign trade of Russia was carried mostly by sea: from 1802 to 1804 88 per cent. of the exports and 78 per cent. of the imports went by sea. A century later, on the other hand, a considerable part of this trade—a third of the exports and half the imports—was already crossing the terrestrial frontiers, and the greater portion of it the German frontier. Germany also possesses a very large part of the maritime trade of Russia, thanks to the proximity of the German and Russian ports on the Baltic Sea.

The Russian customs tariffs are the same, or almost the same, for all countries, and they are extremely high (on an average they amount almost to a third part of the value of the merchandise). Nevertheless, German industry has invaded the Russian market and has easily beaten all competitors, without excepting the English, as is shown by the following figures, published by the Russian Professor Goldstein, one of the best authorities on this subject.¹

Year.			Russian imports from Germany (per cent. of total imports).	Russian imports from England (per cent. of total imports).
1898-1902	34·6	18·6
1902-7	37·2	14·8
1908-12	41·6	13·4
1912	45·4	12·2
1913	47·5	12·5
Jan.-June 1914	49·6	13·3

The geographical conditions, and even the advantages of the Russo-German commercial treaty in 1904 and the complaisance of the Germanophile and reactionary bureaucracy, are not sufficient to explain the triumph of the Germans in our country.

¹ See his article on *The German Yoke* in the *Rousskoïé Slovo* for the 27th January, 1915, Moscow.

The real cause of this is to be found in the special system adopted by the German industrial syndicates: the system of "export bounties," which permits them not only to face the import duties, but even to sell their products more cheaply abroad than at home.

Here are some of the results thus obtained:—

In 1909 the Rheinland-Westphalia Coal Mines Syndicate sold in France a large quantity of coal at 15 francs 50 per ton. Import duties and expenses of transport being deducted, this coal was sold at 5 marks 21, while on the German market it was selling, at the same moment, for 10 marks 50, or double the price. At the end of 1900 a German syndicate of wire-drawers (the wire in question being employed in making nails) decided to fix the price of their product at 185 marks per ton for Germany and 115 marks for the foreign market. The German alcohol distillers' syndicate, or *Spiritusring*, sold its product (in 1904 and later) at 22 marks the hectolitre in Germany and 11 marks in London.¹

The Germans make use of this system in exporting their goods to Russia, where it has won an even easier victory than in countries which are, economically speaking, ahead of Russia, such as France and England.

With the help of export bounties and various other measures, Germany has thus made a rapid conquest of the Russian market, from which she has ousted all competitors.

In 1902 the Russian Ministry of Finances published an official note, in which it characterized the work of the German industrial syndicates in the following terms:—

"The policy of exporting merchandise at prices lower than those of the home market is extremely painful and disastrous to those countries which have to suffer its employment, as it ruins the native industry. . . . There is to-day only one means of struggling against

¹ These figures are taken from a recent Russian work by M. Goldstein: *The War of the German Syndicates, Russian Exports, and the Economic Isolation of Germany* (Moscow, 1916).

the evil of cheap goods exported by these syndicates : it is, to defend native industry by increasing the customs duties. But this means, to which the Russian Government has been forced to resort, has its disadvantages and its dangers as regards native industry, as it implies frequent modifications of the customs tariffs and an exaggerated system of protection. . . . Besides, this increase of the tariff is unjust ; provoked by the actions of the syndicates of one or of several countries, it penalizes all the foreign States, which to-day are all bound together by economic treaties." ¹

Thus the stratagems of the German exporters' syndicates damage not Russian industry alone, but that of other countries. Moreover, the German population itself is forced to submit to an artificial increase of prices in order to provide the syndicates with the means of carrying on their system of forced exports at low prices.

Yet another consideration presents itself. As I have explained in my *Russia and the Great War*,² the general character of the economic relations between the two countries reveals an obvious tendency on the part of Germany to make Russia her colony. I will not repeat what I said in the aforesaid work ; I merely wish to draw the reader's attention to a peculiarity which is by no means understood. A great difference is to be remarked in the relations between Germany and Russia : Russia imports from Germany principally *manufactured* goods and exports *raw materials*. This is to say that German industry buys its raw materials at a low price from Russia and sells them after manufacturing them. This is precisely the function of a metropolis.

Such a conception of exchange is contrary to any real economic "Europeanization" of Russia, for this process cannot be conceived without the free co-operation of all the European factors in the interior of the country, followed by the free development of the forces of indigenous capitalism, which would gradually acquire European forms.

¹ See the *Financial Messenger* (Petersburg, 1902, No. 25).

² *Russia and the Great War*, trans. B. Miall, T. Fisher Unwin, 1915.

PART THE SECOND
RUSSIA IN ARMS AND EUROPE



CHAPTER I

I. Is the Russian people warlike? II. A little philology and arithmetic .

I

ALL those who are familiar with the masses of the Russian people are unanimous in declaring that they are devoid of warlike aspirations and fundamentally pacific.

The *popular* poetry and religion of Russia, for example, are remarkable for the profound love of peace which has penetrated them from birth, and has survived into our own times. This love of peace is revealed by even the most ancient manifestations of the popular genius.

“After the end of paganism, as before it, warlike subjects play not the smallest sensible part in the religious thought of the mass of the Russian people. The Russian Olympus is distinguished by the profoundly peaceable, and, if we may say so, the civilian character of its divinities. This is particularly striking if we compare it with the Olympus of the ancient Greeks, or with the world of the ancient Germanic or Scandinavian divinities. Instead of Pallas-Athene, protected by her cuirass, pagan Russia had her Moist Earth-Mother, and Christian Russia her Saint Sophia, the Most Wise, whose only weapon is her gentle wisdom. Instead of Jupiters and Neptunes waging war among themselves and upon humanity, we find, in ancient Russia, Voloss, the protector of flocks and herds, and Peroun, of whose bellicose tendencies no record has survived; while the forests of ancient Greece were the dwelling-place of Diana Huntress, with her bow

and arrows, the forests of pagan and Christian Russia are peopled with *Roussalkas*, into which young girls are transformed 'who do not die at their death,' and who dance their rounds in the soft moonlight.

"Although, in these pagan beliefs of the Russian Slav, or in the tales and legends of his modern descendant, we sometimes witness the appearance of some sanguinary being, who slays men and is thirsty for their blood, this is neither a god nor a goddess, but an 'impure force.'

"When the pagan divinities of the Russian Slavs, being Christianized, assumed a new vesture and a new exterior, becoming the God and the Saints of Christianity, they did not on that account lose their pacific character. For example, let us take St. George, the type of the warrior-saint. Of the steel-clad warrior, lance in hand, mounted on his great charger, the Russian peasant has made a peaceable and useful auxiliary of his laborious life. He has given St. George the care of the village pasture.

"In the spring of each year, on the 23rd of April (Russian style), which is St. George's Day, the peasants of all Russia leave in the fields their herds of cows, their horses, and their sheep, exhausted by the long winter sojourn in the byre. Early in the morning of this day the peasants and their womenfolk make the round of the sown fields, begging St. George 'to rise early in the morning, to open the soil and to sprinkle the dew on the rebellious barley with its fine ears and beautiful grains.' Then they let out their flocks and herds, which they drive with branches of willow blessed in the church, and pray to 'the kindly George to guard their herds in the fields and the woods from the greedy wolf, the cruel bear, and every evil beast.'

"A village shepherd, a farmer instead of a knight ! Such is the metamorphosis undergone by the traditional figure of St. George when the saint found his way into the midst of the Russian peasantry !

“ Pacific sentiments and a natural aversion from war are to be found also in the Russian proverbs, which realize plainly that ‘ war loves blood,’ but that ‘ blood is not water,’ and, consequently, that ‘ a bad peace is better than a good war.’ ”¹

When we come to look into the *heroic* Russian epopee—the epic of the *bylinas*—we shall expect to find a warlike element. But, in reality, even in these essentially warlike songs pacifism is predominant, and the warriors give way before the labourers, the peaceful workers. One of the *bylinas* represents an encounter between Volga Vseslavitch, a proud and noble knight, and Mikoula Selianinovitch, a peasant and a tiller of the soil, who triumphs over Volga even without a fight.

“ Mikoula is the rustic Hercules. . . . The Russian epic is perhaps the only one (save the Finnish epic, the *Kalévala*) in which a great heroic part is played by a tiller of the soil ”—so M. Alfred Rambaud remarks in his book, *La Russie Epique*. “ It is by this above all that we realize that the *bylinas* were made by the people and for the people. The French *chansons des gestes*, for example, are of a more aristocratic character ; our *trouvères* thought before all else of their auditors, barons and noble warriors ; never would they have dreamed of humiliating them before a base-born hero.”²

The same comparison may be made between the Russian epic and the German epic.

“ In the Germanic epopee Thor, the patron of the toilers, is constantly overridden by Odin, the warrior ; it is just the contrary in the Slav epic.”

The best loved and the most popular hero of the Russian *bylinas* is Ilya Mourometz, *the peasant's son*—this is the epithet which invariably accompanies Ilya's

¹ Quoted from my article *La Guerre et les soldats dans la poésie populaire Russe*, in *La Revue de Paris*, 1916.

² Alfred Rambaud, *La Russie Épique* (p. 37). This work was published forty years ago (in 1876), but it has remained to this day one of the best works on the history of the poetry of ancient Russia.

name in all the *bylinas*, as the epithet *Selianinovitch*—meaning “the villager” or “the son of the villager”—accompanies the name of Mikoula.

Ilya, the peasant's son, who performs a great number of varied exploits, commences by a rustic exploit—by tilling the soil. Having received from his father, the aged peasant, the commandment “to plot nothing against the Tartar, not to kill the Christian on the bare plain,” and to busy himself “with good and not with evil works,” Ilya strives religiously to observe this commandment. He uses his strength only to struggle against evil and injustice, to defend his country against enemies from without. He is a peasant warrior, who seeks neither aggression nor conquest, and who accepts battle only as a means of legitimate defence.

War, in the Russian *bylinas*, is as a rule accepted only as a means of defence; indeed, the *bylinas* represent it only as such. No doubt the poetry of the populace considered it unworthy to sing of offensive war. The hero of the Russian *bylinas* is above all the defender of his native soil, but by no means the conqueror of foreign territory; he is the guardian of his people's independence, but by no means the oppressor of other peoples.

II

If my readers will permit me a brief incursion into the domain of philology, I would call their attention to a very curious fact: the terms which serve to denote the heroes of the Russian *bylinas* are not of Russian origin. *Bogatyr* and *vitiaz*, which are equivalent to the words “valiant knight,” or *preux chevalier*, are derived, the one from the Turco-Mongolian words *batyr* or *batour*, *bagadour* or *baghatour*, and the other from the Scandinavian word *viking*. Certainly, to denote the heroes of whom they sing the *bylinas* also employ the two words *polenitsa* and *khorobre* or *khrabre*; but these two words have not a specially warlike significance. The first signifies “giant,” “man of great

size"; the second (which we find again in the modern adjective *khrabyi*) means "courageous or virile man." As for *bogatyr* and *vitiaz*, they have a more definitely bellicose and aggressive meaning. Now, both are of foreign origin; the one comes from the Turco-Mongols, against whom the Slavs of Russia fought for ages; the second from the Scandinavians, or *Variags*, who, according to the legend, as we know, were the first political and military organizers to enter Russia.

We cannot but regard as characteristic the fact that the first words denoting the warrior by vocation in the ancient Russian epic are non-Russian words, taken from foreign tongues, so that the ancient Russian vocabulary evidently has no special term to denote the professional soldier. It is obvious, then, that this calling did not play any important part in the life of the ancient Russian Slavs.

Lastly, I would remark that the foreign elements still have a very perceptible and even a preponderant influence on the ulterior development of the military forces in Russia. We can follow and estimate this influence by studying the composition and the history of the Russian vocabulary in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which were those during which the Russian regular army was being organized, and which enriched the language with a host of terms which were nearly all borrowed from foreign vocabularies. The names of nearly all ranks or grades, from the simple *soldat* to the *gueneralanchéf* and the *gueneralissimus* are taken from the French or German; as are *unteroffitzér* and *feldjebel*, *kapténármus* and *bombardir*, *grenadér* and *dragoun*, *goussar* and *feierwerker*. The pupils of the secondary military colleges are known as *kadéty* (cadets); those of the officers' schools are *junkerá*. The officer who carries orders for a general or colonel is the *adjutant*, and the soldier who fulfils the same function for an officer is an *ordinaretz*. The terms which denote the different arms of the service are also of foreign origin: such are *artillériia*, *kaval-*

lériia, sapióry (sappers), and those which serve to denote various military constructions: such as *bastión, shántzy* (from the German *schanzen*), *fortifikátsiya*, etc. Of alien origin also are the terms denoting the institutions of the medical service and the military supply service: *góspital, lazaret, intendantsvo*, etc.¹

But I must not linger over these details, although they are interesting and worthy of attention.

In confining myself to these few brief hints and returning to the general problem, I must remark that the pacific mentality of the Russian people has been preserved by the labouring masses down to our own day, and we shall find it, for example, in the ideology of the numerous religious sects of our times. While still a pagan, the Russian Slav had not, among his gods, any god of war analogous to the Greek Ares or the Roman Mars. Having become a Christian, he attributed pacific characteristics even to those of the Christian saints whom the West had endowed with a bellicose character. The religious strata of the mass of the Russian people had no need of a god of war, cruel, vindictive, murderous, and destructive. In the profoundest manifestations of their religious sense and their poetical genius they have constantly introduced an element of hostility to war, an ideal of peace (which in general, however, has admitted of defensive war), and very large numbers of Russian sectarians have paid by imprisonment or deportation for the crime of preferring the god of peace to the god of war.

The natural pacifism of the Russian people, which is attested even by military specialists (for example, by General Kuropatkin in his *Memoirs of the Russo-Japanese War*), is of great importance in that it facili-

¹ However, some military terms have for some time been originated from Russian words. Such, for example, is the onomatopœic *púshka*, for cannon. The common soldier is known as *riadovoi*, from *riad* (rank); the sentinel is called *tshassovoi*, from the word *tshas* (hour), etc. The machine gun has been newly baptized: it is known as the *pulemiót*, from *púlia* (bullet), and *metat* (to throw); and so forth.

tates the possibility of establishing amicable relations between Russia and other nations. It is an incontestable fact that after a war fought by Russia against this or that other nation, our people retains no resentment, no hatred of its recent enemy, and is ready on the morrow of a sanguinary conflict to treat him as a friend.

The Russian people is a pacific people, and yet its history is full of wars. In the last two centuries—the eighteenth and the nineteenth, to confine ourselves to these—no less than 128 years and 4 months were times of armed conflict, which leaves 71 years and 8 months of peace. Of the 35 wars which Russia fought during these two centuries, 2 were internal and 33 were external. Twenty-two were wars of conquest, their object being the extension of the national territory, and these inflicted upon the nation 101 years of warfare. Four were purely defensive wars; these lasted $4\frac{1}{2}$ years. The rest were of a mixed or special character, and absorbed only 10 years. As for the internal wars (in the Caucasus and in Asia), these lasted 65 years.

This long succession of wars called to arms at least ten millions of men (according to the official statistics, which in this case are not inclined toward exaggeration!), and a third part of them was lost.¹

We shall concern ourselves, in the present work, only with those of Russia's wars which were waged against European States, or which were connected with the problems of Europeanizing Russian life.

¹ General Kuropatkin, *Memoirs of the Russo-Japanese War*, ch. i.

CHAPTER II

- I. The struggle for the shores of the Baltic Sea as a "window facing Europe"—The Livonian wars of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. II. The "Period of Disturbances"—The wars of the seventeenth century—The Russo-Swedish War under Peter the Great—Its results and its influence.

I

FROM the beginnings of her history down to the end of the fifteenth century, when (in 1480) she shook off the "Tartar yoke," to which she had been subjected for more than two hundred years, Russia was confronted, in the south and the south-east, by the invasions of the Asiatic tribes, which rose again and again in gigantic waves. But the moment she was free from the Tartar dominion she resolutely turned her arms and her diplomacy against her Western enemies and neighbours ; for the first time she was really in contact with Europe.

On this side she at first encountered Livonia, then in the hands of the Livonian Order, and allied against Russia with Lithuania and Poland.

The real conflict with Livonia, however, commenced only later, under Ivan the Terrible, whose Government had set itself the definite aim of winning ports (Narva and Reval) on the Baltic Sea. Thus the desire to possess a "window open upon Europe," which is always attributed to Peter the Great, very obviously existed in the mind of his terrible ancestor, who was a tyrant to his subjects, but who was very well aware of Russia's need of relations with the Western world.

So Russia's "love affair with Europe" began mid-

way through the sixteenth century ; and it still survives, after passing through alternate periods of diplomatic negotiation and military activity to the impulses of affection and of passionate and disinterested sympathy which the *élite* of Russia conceived for "the West."

"The object of the Livonian War was to gain possession of commercial highways. . . . Subsequent events have proved that for Russia the possibility of a process of economic evolution, however it might advance, was almost entirely subordinated to the existence of direct relations with the more progressive nations of Europe. Contemporaries felt and expressed this very plainly. The port of Narva (Narew), which remained in Russian hands even after her first losses, seriously preoccupied our competitors. 'The Muscovite sovereign is daily augmenting his power by the acquisition of objects imported through Narva,' wrote the Polish king, in his embarrassment, to Elizabeth, Queen of England, seeking to divert the English from trading with Moscow ; 'for they import by this route not only merchandise, but also weapons which to him (Ivan IV) were unknown before. . . . Hitherto we have been able to conquer him because he was without learning and knew nothing of the arts. But if the trade with Narva continues, what will remain unknown to him?' In Moscow, too, this was understood ; and as the port of Narva was only a narrow wicket-gate opening upon the West, they wished to acquire a wider path of access by seizing one of the large ports of the Baltic Sea. But the repeated attempts to conquer Reval (in 1570 and 1577) ended merely in a war with Sweden, in which the Muscovites lost even Narva—and also its Russian suburb, Ivangorod. They were thus completely cut off from the Baltic Sea. During the last years of his life Ivan the Terrible thought no more of conquest in the West ; he was driven to defend himself, and was thankful not to lose what belonged to him." ¹

But although the Livonian wars did not yield Ivan

¹ M. Pokrovsky, *Russian History*, vol. ii. p. 128.

III, Vassili III, and Ivan the Terrible the desired fruit, they did at least convince them of the great difference between East and West, even in this one matter of the art of war. Those who had defeated the Tartars found themselves powerless before the Europeans. This lesson was of profit to them. They began to take foreign soldiers into their service, at first singly, but then in batches. These soldiers formed private corps, but presently, in the first half of the seventeenth century, they were occupied principally in the work of instructing Russian recruits, who were made up into "regiments organized in the foreign mode." Finally, in the second half of the seventeenth century, the old militia was wholly suppressed, and was replaced by cavalry consisting of *dragouny* and *réitary* and infantry of "regiments of *soldáty*."

The Livonian wars assisted the Europeanization of Russia in a very curious fashion. The prisoners taken by the Russians—Lithuanians, Poles, Germans, Livonians, etc.—were transported into the interior of the country, and there became the sponsors of Western culture.

On the 24th of February, 1556, the Governor of Novgorod received from Ivan the Terrible an order couched in the following terms: "In Novgorod, in the suburbs, provinces, and market towns, you will on divers occasions cause it to be cried in the market-places that it is not permitted that the sons of *boyars*, nor any other persons, shall sell German prisoners to the Germans of Livonia, nor send them to Lithuania, but only to Muscovite towns. I shall bestow marks of my favour on the sons of *boyars* who shall inform me that any one has sold German prisoners to the Germans; and a man of base condition will receive 50 roubles from him he has denounced. As for the vendors, they will be thrown into prison while awaiting our decision. If in the house of a son of a *boyar* or another there should be found a German prisoner who understands how to discover silver ore, or how to treat silver, gold,

copper, or tin, or is acquainted with any other trade, you will give orders that this prisoner shall be brought to me in Moscow."

M. Ischchanian remarks in this connection: "Such is the irony of fate that the bearers of Western civilization were forced as slaves to cultivate and Europeanize the barbarous East."

Russian history in this particular repeats a phase of Roman history, for the Greek prisoners of ancient Rome imported with them the high culture of Hellenism.

Some of the prisoners brought back from Livonia by Ivan the Terrible were distributed among the various provincial towns; others, taken to Moscow, had assigned to them a special quarter known as the *Nemetzkaïa Sloboda* (literally the German suburb; but the word *nemetz*, which signifies "German" in modern Russian, formerly meant "foreigner"; it is derived from *nem*, *nemoi*, the meaning of which is *dumb*). The Tsar granted those prisoners established in Moscow certain fiscal privileges; they had the right to sell brandy without a licence. Very soon this little colony was in a flourishing condition. But in a fit of tyrannical fury Ivan the Terrible treated these strangers in a manner already so familiar to his Russian subjects; in 1578 the *Sloboda* was pillaged, ruined, and laid waste, by direct order of the Tsar, by his famous guard of *opritshniki*.

However, the foreign prisoners appeared so useful to Russia that Boris Godunov accorded them various favours; he restored their personal liberty, and granted them the rights enjoyed by other inhabitants of the Russian States.

Under one of the first Tsars of the Romanov dynasty the re-establishment of the "foreign suburb" was authorized in Moscow. This was in 1652, and once again there existed, in the midst of the Russian capital, a little town peopled by foreigners.

This colony, consisting at first of a few voluntary immigrants and prisoners of war, became the centre

of a stable and permanent influence ; and the *Inozem-skaïa Sloboda*, established in 1652, was Peter the Great's first European school.

II

The period extending from the reign of Ivan the Terrible to the accession of the first Romanov, which is known by the expressive name of the *Period of Disturbances* (literally "the troubled times"), was full of civil discord, in which were involved not only the various classes of Russian society, but also the foreigners. The most famous protagonist of this great upheaval, Dimitri-Samozvanetz (the Impostor), who claimed to be a son of Ivan the Terrible, and who for a few months even occupied the Muscovite throne, was the instrument of the *boyar* opposition, and, at the same time, of Poland, who provided him with arms and soldiers. His rival, Vassili Shnisky, was supported by a section of the *boyars* and the middle classes and by the English traders. He also applied to the Swedes, and, in order to fight Dimitri, he engaged a corps of Swedish soldiers commanded by his young nephew, Prince Mikhaïl Skopine-Shnisky.

Frenchmen also took part in the struggle, as volunteers ; some—the Huguenots—serving under Shnisky with his Swedes ; others—the Catholics—on the side of Dimitri and his Poles. One of the Catholics, Captain Margaret, has left us an account of his sojourn in Russia, in which he informs his compatriots that the land of the Tsar is "greater, more powerful, more abundant and more populous than is supposed," that it "extends Christianity far into the East," and that the Russians felt a peculiar esteem for France and the French king.¹

While the French went to fight in Russia only as amateurs, each according to his preference, and actuated by a thirst for glory, gold, and adventure, the Poles and Swedes were incited by their political ambitions.

¹ Margaret, *Etat de l'Empire de Russie*.

Profiting by the disorder prevailing in Russia, Poland occupied the Russian territories of the West, together with the city of Smolensk. Sweden seized upon Novgorod. The Poles penetrated as far as the walls of Moscow, which they besieged (in 1610) in company with one of the numerous false Dimitris, imitators of Dimitri I and pretenders to the Muscovite throne. The Polish crown prince, Vladislav, also attempted to gain the throne. In 1610 the *boyars*, and the *dворяниé*, weary of the struggle, recognized him as the Tsar of Russia, after concluding a treaty with him which granted certain political and social privileges to the nobility, and in particular increased its power over the serfs.

For a time, then, the orthodox Russia of the Tsars, a semi-Asiatic Power, shared a common dynasty with Poland, Catholic, feudalized, and "Europeanized," and was subjected to the tutelage of Poland. Who can say what would have been the course of Russian history had the Polish Tsar remained in power? But he was unable to overcome the opposition of the *bourgeoisie*, the peasantry, the clergy, and a portion of the provincial nobility. A great popular movement was initiated to "unite" Russia and to put an end to the constant disturbances. Directed against the intrusion of foreigners, it was of a national and patriotic character.

"Enemies are rending the Muscovite State on every side ; we have become an object of shame and reproach to all neighbouring sovereigns," said a proclamation issued in 1612, calling the people to the defence of the country. In 862, according to the legend, the Russians spontaneously invited certain Scandinavian princes to come and reign over them ; in 1612 they rose that they might no longer be subject to a Polish prince. So in eight hundred years they had learned to regard themselves as a nation, opposed to other nations, even to others of Slav origin.

Vladislav was driven from the throne, but he would not renounce his claims nor surrender to Russia the

western provinces which were occupied by Poland. Only in 1634, after two long campaigns, did Vladislav abandon his "rights" to the Russian throne, but he still retained Smolensk and some other towns. Another war broke out in 1654, and continued, interrupted by an armistice, until 1667. It left the city of Smolensk in Russian hands, and the whole of the Ukrainian territory on the left bank of the Dnieper, together with Kiev, while Lithuania remained Polish. The provisional treaty, which was concluded in 1667 for a term of thirteen years, was confirmed in 1686; Russia thereupon signed a "perpetual peace" with Poland, and entered the league of Poland, Austria, and Venice against Turkey.

The war with Sweden for the recovery of Novgorod commenced immediately after the advent of the first Romanov. At the end of four years, in 1617, Russia recovered the city of Novgorod, but the Swedes retained a considerable portion of the territory of Novgorod and the Baltic shore. Forty years later a fresh war with Sweden enabled Russia to occupy a good part of Livonia, together with Dünabourg (Dvinsk) and Dorpat (Youriev); but complications in the Ukraine forced her to make peace in 1661 and to restore her conquests.

Finally, Sweden remained mistress of the whole of the Baltic shore, whence she could constantly menace Russia and cut off all direct communication with Western Europe.

Thus the road to the sea undertaken by Ivan the Terrible was not completed until the reign of Peter the Great, who had to repeat all the efforts of his predecessors.

III

The war between Peter the Great and Charles XII lasted for twenty-one years. On the Russian side a total of 1,700,000 men took part in this war. Of these 120,000 perished, and 500,000 were discharged

on account of sickness. The war ended in 1721 with the final triumph of Russia, whose territory was increased by the addition of Ingermanland, Esthonia, Livonia, and a small portion of Finland, the whole covering an area of 180,000 square miles.

The true value of this conquest, to Russia, resided not in the territorial aggrandizement which it accomplished, but in the ports, those outlets to the Baltic Sea, on which her whole future depended, and whose possession assured the realization of many other plans.

"He had need of a port on the east of the Baltic Sea for the *execution of all his ideas*," said Voltaire of Peter the Great in his *History of Charles XII*.¹

The most important of these ideas was to open a direct and rapid means of communication between Europe and Russia.

From the economic point of view, this result was attained by the conquest of Riga and the "construction" of Petersburg (in 1703). After creating the port of Petersburg, Peter concentrated the foreign trade of the country there, to the detriment of Archangel, which toward the end of his reign fell into a state of decadence.

Between 1717 and 1719 the value of the annual import trade of Archangel was 2,344,000 roubles, and that of Petersburg only 269 roubles. In 1726 the imports of Archangel had fallen to 285,000 roubles, while those of Petersburg had risen to 2,403,000.

As for Riga, Narva, and Reval, Russia had had commercial relations with these ports before the Russo-Swedish war of 1700-21, which certainly increased her chances of conquering the littoral, as these relations had resulted in a wave of "Russophilia" among the influential representatives of the wealthy *bourgeoisie* of Riga, and even the Livonian nobility.

The victory of Russia enormously affected international relations with that country. Sweden was then

¹ Book I.

one of the most powerful States of Europe, and her conqueror could not fail to acquire a great prestige. Possibly Voltaire exaggerated in saying of Russia that "this immense country was hardly known in Europe before the Tsar Peter." But it is true that under Peter "the Muscovite State, for the first time, entered, as an active and inseparable member, the family of the European Powers, and played its part in international relations."¹ It mingled in them even during Peter's campaigns, because "with his principal enemies Peter fought in another manner to that of his predecessors; he waged war by means of coalitions and alliances."

As a mark of the great development of Russo-European relations, we may note the appearance in Europe of Russian consular agents. On the 15th of March, 1715, Jean Lefort was appointed Russian agent in Paris by Peter the Great, with the title of "Commercial Councillor"; and his brother Amédée Lefort was appointed "Commercial Consul," also in Paris. In the deed of appointment it is stated that "the good order of trade and the necessity of foreseeing all difficulties require that Russia shall have in the ports and other localities of the kingdom of France, where our subjects, merchants or others, may exercise their trade, a reliable person having experience of trade, who might in such difficulties as arise, and in all other cases, be of assistance to our traders."

Consuls and commercial agents were next appointed at Spa, Antwerp, Breslau, Vienna, Liége, Bordeaux, and Cadiz.

The war with Sweden brought Peter into contact with the German States. "Unhappily, amid his allies he numbered Brandenburg and Hanover, whose Elector became, at this very moment, King of England, and a new passion seized upon Peter: the desire to intervene in German affairs. He dispersed his nieces

¹ Klutshevsky, *The Course of Russian History*, Part iv. p. 66, Moscow, 1910.

in many obscure corners of German territory ; he married one to the Duke of Courland, another to the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin ; Peter was thus drawn into the petty court intrigues and participated in the petty dynastic interests of the enormous feudal spider's web which enveloped the great cultivated nation."¹

I insist on these facts because they had the effect of bringing German influence to bear on the highest governing circles in Russia. Some years after the death of Peter this influence placed a German Duchess on the throne. It had other consequences also, of which I shall speak further on.

The war with Sweden, which altered the international situation of Russia, at the same time left its mark on her internal politics. All the historians of Peter the Great's reforms are agreed on this point. Professor V. Klutshevsky even asserts that "the war was the most important of those factors to which the reforms of Peter the Great owe their character."

Having entered upon a desperate conflict with a truly European Power, Russia could only fight that Power with the same European weapons. This necessity was Russia's great motive power. By "weapons" we do not mean simply the instruments of military action : men and material. These it was not difficult to procure, and Peter succeeded in procuring them in a manner more or less satisfactory, with the assistance of his foreign councillors ; he reorganized the land army and created a fleet, the germ of which was an old English canoe, found by Peter among the objects of all kinds which attracted his childlike curiosity. But the question was not merely one of armaments ; the entire fabric of Russian life was to be reconstructed. The military failures, which were almost uninterrupted during the first eight years of the war, were extremely useful in this connection, as they showed Peter that he would have to go to school with his conqueror. And he himself was

¹ Klutshevsky, *op. cit.* p. 75.

fond of saying that he had spent "three scholastic periods" in this school (the duration of studies being, in those days, seven years).

History has preserved for us the words spoken by Peter at the banquet which followed the victory of Poltava (July 8, 1709), to which he invited the Swedish generals who had been taken prisoner.

"To the health," he said, "of my masters in the art of war!" Rehnskold asked him who those were whom he honoured by so fine a title. "You, the Swedish generals," was the Tsar's reply.

It was indeed a fact that Peter's government had taken Sweden as its model. We shall presently see that it more than once endeavoured to copy Sweden.

IV

The war with Sweden, the principal source of the internal reforms introduced by Peter, had a very unfavourable influence on the appearance and development of these reforms.

"The work of reform went on amid the tumult and confusion which habitually accompany a war. The necessities and embarrassments continually provoked by military action forced Peter to hurry himself. Pressed by circumstances, the work of reform assumed a feverish pace, and was effected with unnatural precipitation. Amid the anxieties of the war Peter had no time to pull up, to discuss his measures quietly, to deliberate over them at leisure, to determine on their execution, and to allow them to ripen naturally. He demanded rapid performance and immediate results. . . . Peter relied only on the power of authority; he did not attempt to win men's minds. Governing the State from a campaigning-carriage or a posting-house, he could perceive nothing but the matter in hand; he did not think of the human element, and, trusting to the power of authority, he reckoned too little with the power of the passive masses . . . amid which the structure of his novelties encountered but insecure and shifting foun-

dations. His reforms fell like a waterspout on the people, alarming every one and remaining an enigma to all."

So spoke one of those who knew Peter best, and who at the same time was one of his fervent admirers. The people did not comprehend the tendency or the bearing of all the changes which were imposed upon it, and had no time for reflection. Throughout almost the whole of Peter's reign Russia was fighting a very onerous war. The continual levies of men and the uninterrupted increase of taxes presented only the worse side of Peter's work to the people. And this was all the people could see. Hence its hatred for the Tsar; hence the legends which spread through the Empire, representing the innovator as the enemy of his own subjects, as a "foreigner," an impostor, and even as the Antichrist.

Peter's internal policy, under the spur of war, thus assumed the aspect of a catastrophe and a revolution. Now, although the people will often gladly accept a revolution which is its own work, it usually refuses to approve of one coming "from above." The conjunctures in which Peter operated, his system of acting by violence—*manu militari*—aggravated the popular discontent. When the Tsar died the public opinion was that he could not have lived longer because "the people had cursed him."

CHAPTER III

- I. The war of 1812 and the Russo-Swedish War. II. The causes of the war against Napoleon—Economic relations between Russia and England—The “Continental Blockade” and its effects on Russian economy. III. Two periods of the war of 1812—Official patriotism and popular patriotism. IV. The Holy Alliance and Legitimism—The Russian reaction. V. The effects of the war on the people and the “intellectuals”—The Decembrists. VI. The effects of the war in Poland.

I

THE war designed to acquire the “window opening upon Europe” was *national* as regards its general and remote results, because it promised a whole country the possibility of free development and of maintaining relations with other more civilized nations. But it was not national in the sense that it was understood and sanctioned by the people, for it was the Government which decided upon the war and brought matters to a head, despite the opposition of the people.

The war of 1812 was very different: it may be regarded as the first really national and popular war undertaken by Russia. But it did not immediately become so.

II

At the outset Russia's conflict with Napoleon was powerless to rouse the people, because it resulted from problems of European significance, rather than the national interests of Russia. Its first cause, as we know, was the rivalry between France and England.

At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia was maintaining highly developed economic relations with England. She sent her agricultural products thither and received in ex-

change threads and yarns, which she wove into cloth. "England furnished us with the products of her manufactures and her colonies in exchange for the raw products of our soil," says a contemporary (Fonevazine). "This trade opened up the only routes by which Russia received all that was necessary to her. The nobility made certain of drawing the revenues of its estates by exporting oversea wheat, timber for shipbuilding and for masts and spars, tallow, hemp, flax, etc." The Russian export traders also had close relations with England; so that two highly influential sections of Russian society were economically inclined to be Anglophile. This was well understood in France, and in 1803 the French Ambassador in Petersburg wrote to his Government that Russia was too closely attached to England by her trade to be particularly desirous of maintaining peace with France.

Moreover, the majority of the greater nobles and of the governing classes hated France as a revolutionary country.

An alliance of Russia and England against France was thus inevitable. It is true that Alexander I was restrained by the fear of Napoleon's bayonets, and was even impelled to effect momentary reconciliations with France, but these only emphasized the solidity of the Anglo-Russian friendship and the fragility of the Franco-Russian ties. Particularly was this the case after the Peace of Tilsit (1807), which brought Russia into the orbit of the French economic policy, by associating her with the Continental Blockade which was directed against England. The Treaty of Tilsit was signed in July 1807, but by October of the same year the French Ambassador to Russia, Savary, stated that the closing of Russian ports to English vessels was causing great dissatisfaction to the Russian commercial classes, as their exports were threatened, and also to the buyers of English produce. In vain did Savary endeavour to raise the exchange value of the rouble, which had fallen upon the interruption of relations with England, spreading the rumour in Petersburg

that France was proposing to buy twenty million francs' worth of Russian merchandise ; this promise offered only a very meagre compensation for the great losses incurred.

It is true that although agriculture suffered by the Continental Blockade, certain industries gained greatly thereby, owing to the elimination of English competition. But the middle-class manufacturers and industrialized nobles who were benefited by the blockade were only a small minority, and had no say in matters of foreign policy.

Two years after the Peace of Tilsit the blockade was in reality broken by Russia, as she authorized the importation of English merchandise under the American flag. The rupture with France, which had become inevitable, was hastened by other causes of a political and even of a personal nature. In 1812 the "patriotic war" commenced and the Russian Army crossed the Niemen.

III

We must distinguish two periods in this war. The first was the period of official and superficial patriotism, of thoughtless boasting, of pompous proclamations which denied the courage of the French Army. It ended, as might have been expected, in a series of Russian defeats and the occupation of Moscow.

The Government and the nobility were overwhelmed. Alexander I hid himself from the people in his palace ; and his sister, the Grand Duchess Yekaterina Pavlovna, wrote to him uncompromisingly that "he must very well understand what happens in a country whose ruler is despised." Many of the nobles were afraid at once of Napoleon and of their own peasants, whom they had oppressed, and who might have found, in this war, an opportunity to revolt.

But it was precisely the masses of the people, the peasants, who in 1812 represented the true patriotism, together with an enlightened minority of nobles, from which issued, at a later date, the first Russian Constitutionalists.

“Salvation came from below, from this mass of serfs, who commenced, in a spirit of abnegation, a popular war. Stein (the Prussian Minister) was perfectly right when he said (in a letter to Gneisenau) that ‘the people has reached the supreme degree of fury, and the Emperor could not conclude peace—at least, if he had any regard for his personal safety.’ The popular war was the natural consequence of the gloomy distrust which the people entertained in respect of authority. . . . The fundamental, principal, and almost the only cause of the victory of 1812 was the coming into action of the popular masses against the armies of Napoleon.”¹

The memoirs relating to the war of 1812 leave us convinced that it was not the Government which, as in the war with Charles XII, displayed the greatest vigour and activity; it was the people which, intervening like a force of nature, saved Russia from the Napoleonic invasion.

“All the orders and all the efforts of the Government would not have sufficed to expel the Gauls and the dozen other peoples who invaded Russia with them, had the people remained in its old condition of torpor,” said a witness of events, the Decembrist Yakushkin. “It was not upon the order of the authorities that the inhabitants of the country withdrew into the forests and marshes on the arrival of the French, surrendering their homes to be burned. It was not upon the order of the authorities that the whole population of Moscow left the ancient capital with the army. To the right and the left, along the Riazan road, the fields were covered by a many-coloured host, and I can still remember, to-day, the words of a soldier who was marching beside me, ‘Thanks to God, all Russia is on the march!’”

This Russia which was “on the march” saved herself, despite the collapse of her Government. And

¹ N. Rojkov, *The Year 1812 and its Influence on Contemporary Russian Society* (*Sovremanny Mir*, 1912, vii., Petersburg).

it was only when the war of legitimate defence was over, and the enemy driven from the national soil, that the Government resumed the direction of the war, passing to the offensive and pursuing the French armies across Europe, in company with two professional masters of international spoliation: the Prussian and Austrian monarchies.

IV

The triumph of Alexander I over Napoleon enabled him, in 1815, to form, with his two autocratic allies, the Holy Alliance, which was perfectly natural, for between the three Conservative monarchies—Russian, Austrian, and Prussian—there existed a reciprocal attraction. But they were united only in their hatred of France and of Napoleon, himself a despot, but “the offspring of the Revolution.” By their victory over him it seemed to them that they had overcome the revolutionary movement. In the dogma of legitimacy, the defence of which constituted the essential point of the policy of the Holy Alliance, was expressed not merely the antipathy of the “hereditary” monarchs for a “parvenu,” but also the claim to inviolability put forward by autocratic power regularly transmitted.

In order to be regarded as inviolable, the authority of the monarch must prevail by supernatural virtue. The fortunate issue of the war against Napoleon, to which Alexander I personally contributed so little, impelled him towards mysticism. Unwilling to refer the success of his armies to the efforts and sacrifices of the people, he attributed it to Divine intervention. “In this great task, which was above human strength, we recognize only the Providence of God,” he said in his manifesto. He expressed the same idea in a private conversation held at Vilna, when he stated that “the Lord Jesus alone is the true conqueror, and has liberated the country from the invasion of ferocious enemies.”

Alexander never doubted that it was logical that

the Divine Providence and the will of Jesus should select the Russian Tsar as their instrument upon earth. If he appeared fairly modest in his conversations with Mme. de Staël—"I am," he told her, "merely a happy accident in the life of the peoples"—he spoke more frankly to Baronne de Krüdner, assuring her of his conviction that his acts were in perfect harmony with the will of God.

This doctrine bore disastrous fruit in the foreign policy of Russia, as well as in her domestic policy. The Holy Alliance began its work in defence of legitimacy by the restoration of the royal power in France, where two bloody revolutions were necessary to repair its error.

From 1815 onwards the Russian autocracy became a sort of "international policeman," and acted accordingly. It was thus led into grievous errors, the chief of which was committed in 1848, when the successor of Alexander I, in the name of order and legitimacy, placed his armies at the service of the Austrian monarchy, in order to crush the Hungarian revolution, saving Austria from inevitable ruin and irremediably alienating from Russia the best elements of Hungarian society. The results of this policy are perceptible even to-day.

As for the domestic life of Russia, the war of 1812 inoculated it with two species of germs. On its subjects the autocracy, from 1815 onwards, imposed the system of which it was the champion abroad; and it was they who suffered the worst effects of this system. An era of the gloomiest reaction was inaugurated, and, according to the expression of one of the men most prominent at this period, the people were treated "like a flock of sheep," who had to be "sufficiently nimble" to make it possible to "lead" them towards the goal of their enemies. This oppression, which was steeped in mysticism, had certain points of likeness to the Holy Inquisition: for instance, in the zeal of the monks, its most notable and its best-qualified instruments.

V.

On the masses of the people and the more enlightened minds of the country, the war of 1812 had quite another effect.

The Decembrist, Yakushkin, whose *Memoirs* I have already cited, states that it "awakened the Russian people to life, and formed an important period of its political existence." Another Decembrist, A. Bestoujev, in his letter to Alexander I, wrote that "Napoleon having invaded Russia, the Russian people, for the first time, was conscious of its strength. It was precisely at this moment that the desire for independence arose in every heart; political independence first (that is, *external* independence), and then popular. This was the birth of Liberal aspirations in Russia." Bestoujev also explains, in a fashion even more characteristic, the state of mind prevalent in Russia after the war:—

"The soldiers said: 'We have spilt our blood, and they make us sweat in our lords' fields; we have freed our country from the tyrant, and we are tyrannized over by our masters.'"

As a result of the war, therefore, the protest against serfdom became keener and keener amid the rural population; and after the lapse of a few years a series of rural disturbances commenced which continued, with intervals, until the abolition of serfdom (in 1861).

The influence of the war of 1812 caused an even more direct and remarkable upheaval in the intellectual world.

At first this upheaval took the form of a general awakening of the spirit of citizenship among the officers, who then formed a sort of intellectual *élite*. A contemporary states that the campaigns of 1812-14 "exalted the soul of our army in an extraordinary fashion, especially in the case of the young officers. . . . The majority of the officers of the Guard and the Staff returned to Petersburg in 1815 with a consciousness of their dignity and full of a sublime love for their native country."

Moreover, their sojourn in foreign countries had made an immediate impression on them.

“During their marches across Germany and France our young officers learned to understand European civilization, which impressed them all the more in that they were able to compare it with what they beheld at every step in their own country: the enslavement of the great majority of Russians, the cruelty of chiefs toward their subordinates, the abuses of power of every kind, the arbitrary rule which everywhere made its rigour felt. All this revolted the educated Russians and hurt their patriotism.”¹

M. Emile Haumant, in his *Culture française en Russie*, cites a number of such observers:—

“Many of us,” writes one of the officers who took part in the war, “became acquainted with German officers who were members of the *Tugendbund*, and afterwards with some of the French Liberals. . . . In conversing with them we made our own, although we did not realize this, their manner of thinking and their love of representative institutions, and we blushed for our own country, humiliated by tyranny.” The more they saw of the countries moulded by French institutions, the more the spectacle of their relative prosperity impressed the Russians. A mere rebellion of the lower classes—a *jacquerie* pure and simple—could never have created such wealth; so that there were evidently beneficent revolutions. On the other hand, events went to prove that the stability of thrones, for which they were fighting, was a very uncertain dogma. “We saw on every side thrones restored and overthrown . . . so that our minds became accustomed to revolutions, their possibility, and the profit to be derived from them,” and this all the more rapidly because, in the general chaos, “the majority of the revolutionary institutions were preserved, and, therefore, were recognized as good.” “Finally,” says M. Haumant, “the conquerors perceived that with all their glory they were not so well off as the conquered.”²

¹ Rojkov, *op. cit.*

² Emile Haumant, *op. cit.* pp. 320-21.

The Russian officers profited by their stay in France to become acquainted with French ideas and with the political literature of France. While the other Allies mostly frequented the Royalist salons, the Russians ventured to enter into close relations with the revolutionaries, and even the "suspects," and to study the formation and the statutes of the secret political societies. Prompt to utilize what they had lately learned, they began to teach their soldiers, applying to the process the Lancastrian method. According to several observers, "the blows which were constantly given in the other Allied armies were banished from the Russian corps stationed in France."

So it was with new habits, a new spirit, and a new state of mind that all this military youth returned to Russia. But there disillusion awaited it. An oppressive reactionary *régime* barred the way to generous aspirations and schemes of liberation. A clash was inevitable; it came ten years later, on the 14th of December, 1825; some officers who had taken part in the campaigns of 1812-14 attempted a military insurrection with a view to establishing a Constitution.

So it was that the war of 1812 gave rise to a "revolution from below," just as the struggle with Charles XII had caused a "revolution from above." Peter I had imposed his authority, despite the opposition of the people. The Decembrists took up arms for the liberation of the people from autocratic authority.

One of these Decembrists, the poet Lorer, has summed up the meaning of the war of 1812 in some verses which put into the mouth of Napoleon the following words:—

. . . Russia is my rival,
 But Fate my conqueror. . . .
 I followed not the steps of Batou-Khan,
 I fought not without reason; was not moved
 By the vanity of glory . . .
 I have seen Moscow's ashes, but am not
 Another Erostrates. . . .
 . . . I willed, with iron hand,
 Sudden to seize the centuries' coming void;

Those centuries I summoned ere the hour,
To snap the rusty chain of prejudice,
And urge the idle giant upward still
Toward a higher goal of life.¹

The "idle giant," Russia, was rudely shaken by the war upon Napoleon, but not sufficiently so to snap the rusty chain of the *ancien régime*. The rising of the Decembrists was stifled by the Government, and it was only thirty years later, after a fresh international upheaval, after the Crimean War, that the fetters of Russia began to fall off her.

VI

But we must speak a few words as to Napoleon's relations with Poland.

While the great Revolution was nearing accomplishment—while in France the old order was falling in ruins—Poland, in 1795, was finally destroyed, and shared between the three neighbour monarchies—Russia, Austria, and Prussia.

From the standpoint of the interests of Russia (that is, of the whole Russian people, and not only of the bureaucracy and the ruling circles) it was a great mistake to take a hand in the murder and dismemberment of her neighbour. Even to-day this is very evident. Russia has deprived herself of a barrier between herself and the Germanic States, and is in immediate contact with Germany and Austria. The dismemberment of their little kingdom, which would have been impossible without the participation of Russia, filled the Poles with hatred of the Empire. Their enslavement became a painful wound in the flank of the Russian Empire, which on two occasions bled profusely, in 1831 and in 1863.

The violence done to Poland was and is still exploited by Russia's rivals, and has complicated the external situation without in any way fortifying it.

Napoleon I understood the profit to be derived from

¹ Lorcr, *Napoleon*. (See the collection, *The War of 1812 in Russian Poetry*, p. 129, Moscow, 1912.)

Poland, utilizing her as one of the levers of his anti-Russian policy ; all the more easily because, before the last partition of Poland, many of the irreducible Polish patriots had taken refuge in France, and a mutual sympathy united the defenders of national independence and the French democracy. Here Napoleon had a means of action at his disposal, and he made use of it, during and even before the war of 1806-7, posing as a champion of the Polish claims. But he offered the Poles a mirage only ; for in 1807 he did not impose on Alexander, as a condition, *sine qua non*, of peace, the restoration of Poland. The Treaty of Tilsit confined itself to creating a Grand Duchy of Warsaw, formed out of Prussian Poland, and given as booty to the Elector of Saxony.

But, thanks to this symbol, this fiction of an independent Polish State, Napoleon was able to retain the sympathies of the Poles, for whom he was the only friendly monarch in Europe. And in 1812 the Polish Eagles hovered above the Franco-Russian battlefields beside the standards of Napoleon.

Napoleon's Polophile diplomacy had its effect upon Russian politics, for Alexander I could not allow the Poles to regard France as their liberator. He himself said, in his secret instructions to Novossiltzev, who was charged with confidential negotiations with England :—

“ The most powerful weapon which the French have employed hitherto, and with which they are still threatening all other States, is the idea, which they have managed to diffuse abroad, that their cause is the cause of the liberty and happiness of the nations. . . . The welfare of humanity, the true interest of the legitimate authorities, and the success of the undertaking meditated by the two Powers (Russia and England) demand that these shall wrest this formidable weapon from the hands of the French, and, having seized it, use it against the latter.

It thus appears that the proposal to set up an

autonomous Poland, on which Alexander so insisted at the Congress of Vienna, and his desire to create a "phantom Poland," were chiefly due to the necessity of competing with France and Napoleon.¹

The rebirth of the Polish State, the work of the French Army, and accepted—we know not if it was sincerely—by Alexander I, was accomplished on the 15th of November 1815, by the granting of a Constitution to the kingdom of Poland. But as this kingdom was under the tutelage of Russia, and as Russia herself was not a constitutional country, the contradiction between this semblance of constitutionalism and the Russian autocracy was to break forth anew and engender a sanguinary conflict in which the political individuality of Poland disappeared yet once again.

The confidence of Poland, who had come to regard France—even the France of Napoleon—as her friend and liberator, was yet further confirmed by a series of measures taken by Napoleon in 1807 and 1808, which were fruitful of results.

Napoleon effected the introduction into the constitutional law of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw of an article by whose terms serfdom was abolished and all citizens made equal before the law. In virtue of this principle, a decree passed about the end of 1807 authorized the peasants freely to leave their masters. Unhappily, the serfs, while they received their liberty, were at the same time dispossessed of the lands on which they had lived, which were recognized as the property of their seigneurs. Thereupon a portion of the agricultural population rapidly became a proletariat, which was quickly invaded by pauperism. But, taking it all round, the abolition of serfdom gave a great impulse to the economic and social development of the country; it was the ruin of the feudal system, but profited the middle classes of society.

Another very important measure was the introduction

¹ See the *Mémoires* of Talleyrand (Paris, 1891, vols. ii. and iii.) and the *Mémoires* of Prince Metternich (Paris, 1886, vol. ii.).

into Poland of the Code Napoléon. Concerning the action of this reform, one of the best historians of Polish economy remarks :—

“ The widest breach in the civil *régime*, and above all in the property system as it existed in Poland, was made by the Code Napoléon, which was introduced into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1808. It implanted the juridical forms of the modern *bourgeois* system in the economy of a naturally feudal system of exploitation. Incapable by itself of transforming the means of production, it nevertheless dealt the most damaging blows to the old property system, and hastened its fall. The abolition of the special system affecting leased property wrested landed property from its immobilized condition and drew it into the current of exchange.”¹

In 1809 and 1812 the Government of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw invited foreign manufacturers, experts, and artisans to settle in Poland. They were granted various privileges, for example, exemption from military service, taxes on landed property, customs duties, etc.

In its “ kingdom of Poland ” the Russian Government retained this policy, and between 1816 and 1824 it issued a series of Imperial ukases, whose object was to favour industry and to attract foreign capital and capitalists.

As a result the general character of economic and social life underwent a radical change. But the origins of this new state of affairs must be traced back to the brief existence of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and the triumph of the middle classes, when “ the barriers which divided them from the nobility were broken,” and when they were enabled to seize upon all the means of conquering the productive forces of the country. So that it was said that “ the *embourgeoisement* of the political life of Poland was in great measure the result of French influence.”²

¹ Rosa Luxembourg, *Industrial Evolution of Poland*.

² L. Janowicz, *A Sketch of the Evolution of Industry in the Kingdom of Poland* (Warsaw, 1907).

CHAPTER IV

I. The Crimean War—Its origins. II. Causes of defeat—The contrast between the old Russia and the new Europe. III. The Eastern question—The Slav problem and the Europeanization of Russia.

I

FROM 1812 to 1814, Russia, in alliance with England, was fighting France. Forty years later the two Western States were allied against the Russian Empire.

The composition of this alliance enabled the enemy, in 1854, to represent the conflict as that of the West against the East, Europe against Asia.

On the other hand, the immediate cause of the Crimean War, or rather its immediate pretext, was the possession of the keys of the church of Bethlehem; the Orthodox monks and their Catholic competitors disputed the right of possession. So that the struggle seemed thus to be between Orthodoxy and Catholicism.

In reality it was much more material and concrete. Once again it proceeded from the economic relations existing between Russia and Great Britain.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, as we have seen, these relations were very close, and we may even say that Russia and Great Britain could not do without one another. Toward the middle of the century the situation underwent a change. The commercial ties between the two countries suffered a general relaxation, due at first to the condition of the world-market, and then to the economic policy of Russia.

England obtained from Russia chiefly raw materials and cereals. But in the second quarter of the century

the European market offered corn at moderate prices and in fair abundance. England was therefore enabled in great measure to dispense with the importation of Russian corn. As for Russia, her industry, having experienced the elimination of competition during the short period of the Continental Blockade, was beginning to manifest her predilection for an increasingly definite protectionism. English merchandise gradually disappeared from the Russian market, and about 1830-35 the British Press was complaining that while British trade with other foreign States was more or less rapidly increasing, the trade with Russia remained at the same level, or was decreasing. The English especially complained that Russia was seizing upon the Trans-Caucasian regions and the shores of the Black Sea—Georgia too, and Bessarabia; and she was meditating the acquisition of Asia Minor, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles; that is, the highway by which British trade penetrated the East.

Moreover, Nicolas I was endeavouring to establish an absolute political hegemony over Europe, its character being reactionary.

There was therefore more than one pretext available for an Anglo-Russian conflict.

If France decided to take part in this conflict, it was, according to modern historians, "not because of her hostility towards Russia, but because of her friendship for England." The Russian author who thus defines the motive which France is supposed to have obeyed bases his opinion on arguments of a material order. He observes that at this period France was not a competitor of England, but rather a collaborator; for nearly half the total trade of England was carried in French vessels.¹ "And, similarly, the East, with its ports and its trade routes, was acquiring a particular interest for the French Government. About the same moment de Lesseps was appealing for French capital to construct the Suez canal, and Napoleon III

¹ M. Pokrovsky, *Russian History*, vol. v. p. 34 (Moscow, 1914).

recalled the traditional protectorate exercised by the French sovereigns over the Catholic inhabitants of Turkey. As we know, it was the intervention of France in the affairs of Palestine which provoked an explicit conflict between the new Emperor of France and Nicolas I. The keys of the temple of Bethlehem opened the temple of the God of War, which had been closed for forty years."

II

The God of War, so favourable to Russia during the first half of the nineteenth century, deserted her in 1854; Russia was defeated.

It may at first sight appear astonishing that so great a State should have been forced to declare herself vanquished, and to place herself at the mercy of her enemies, because of a defeat suffered at Sebastopol; that is, at one remote point of her immense territory. There are qualified Russian writers who assert that Russia could and should have continued the Crimean War, and that she would have had a good chance of emerging victoriously. Here, for instance, is the opinion of the celebrated Russian historian, S. Soloviev, as recorded in his posthumous notes :—

"Peace was concluded after the fall of Sebastopol, while Sebastopol was playing the same *rôle* as Moscow in 1812. At this very moment Russia should have declared that the war was not finished, but was only beginning, in order to compel the Allies to renounce it. . . . Foreign affairs were by no means in so desperate a condition that an energetic sovereign could not have emerged from the struggle retaining his dignity and some essential advantages. In the interior of the country there was no exhaustion, no extreme distress. The new sovereign, whom all wished to love, because he was new, could have raised enormous forces by appealing to the love and patriotism of the people. The war was difficult for the Allies; they ardently desired its termination. Before a Russian sovereign

who spoke firmly, asserting his intention to fight until the conclusion of an honourable peace, they would have drawn back."

General Kuropatkin shares this opinion; he considers that "finding inspiration in the example of Peter I and Alexander I, we should have continued the war, in order to 'drive the enemy into the sea.'"

But both writers—the scholar and the professional soldier—have themselves represented the condition of affairs in Russia at the end of the Crimean War under such an aspect that the impossibility of continuing the war is obvious to those who are capable of objective judgment. Soloviev states that Alexander II, at the moment of his accession, had neither the breadth of view, nor the courage, nor the initiative, nor the energy necessary for the continuation of the struggle, and that among those who surrounded him "there was not a single man endowed with intellectual and moral power," "not a single man capable of lighting the darkness." As for General Kuropatkin, he draws the following picture of Russia before and during the war:—

"The movement of liberation which originated in Russia after the Napoleonic wars, which penetrated even the ranks of the army, was followed (under Nicolas I), by a powerful bureaucratic pressure, which weighed heavily on all manifestations of public activity and on all ranks and classes of society, including the military. It was as though all Russia had donned the same uniform, close-buttoned from top to bottom, and was standing motionless. Russia and her army could only say: 'I obey you,' 'You are right,' and 'All goes well.' The soldiers were cruelly treated. Their food was bad. Thefts of all kinds were habitual phenomena in the army. The command of regiments was given to landed proprietors who had squandered their fortunes in order that they might make them again. The Imperial Guard enjoyed oppressive privileges. Every act of spontaneous initiative was

punished by law. The Press was timid and silent. Any discussion in a military journal, even in respect of the soldier's clothing, was often regarded as the sign of a subversive mind. The army, therefore, in spite of its great numbers, was backward in the matter of intellectual force. And in the matter of material strength we were equally backward, compared with the European armies." ¹

General Kuropatkin, as we see, attributes the sorry condition of the Russian Army on the outbreak of the Crimean War to the general *régime* of reaction then prevailing. So it was not the Russian Army which was conquered at Sebastopol by the Allied troops, but rather, and especially, the social and political system of the old autocratic Russia. A serf-owning country could not hold out against more civilized States.

It is a curious fact that this very backwardness, which was responsible for Russia's weakness, and which condemned her to defeat, was represented, by the "patriots" of various shades of opinion, as giving Russia an advantage over Europe. Such was the opinion not only of the official chauvinists, with their insincere optimism, but even of the sincere and honest patriots of the Slavophile camp. The harangues in prose and verse in which they contrast "Holy Russia" with "pagan Europe" read very strangely to-day.

"What are you counting on?"—so Mey, one of the patriotic poets of 1855, addressed the enemy. "On the courage of your troops? But every Russian soldier is not merely brave in battle, he is intrepidly calm. For everywhere, from the banks of the Neva to Sebastopol, he stands erect to defend Russia and religion. He does not stand for a chimera of the Press, nor for the vanities of representative chambers."

Another Slavophile poet, A. Khomiakov, proclaims in a poem written in 1854 that "God has bestowed His love upon Russia, and has given her a fatal might

¹ Kuropatkin, *Memoirs*.

that she may destroy the malevolence of blind, unreasoning, and barbarous (*sic*) forces."

Is this aberration or hypocrisy, or an unconscious attempt to justify the blemishes of Russia by her supreme predestination?

However this may be, in the same poem the poet does not hesitate to tell his country the following truths :—

Remember that to be the instrument
Of God is difficult for earthly creatures ;
His judgment of His servants is severe ;
And thou, alas ! dost bear the burden of
So many dreadful crimes. For in thy courts
Reigns black injustice ; thou dost bear the brand
Worn by the yoke of slavery ; thou art full
Of impious flatteries and pestiferous lies,
And all abominations.

Khomiakov himself realized that in truth his country "was unworthy of the divine election," but he nevertheless believed that she was elected, and that "she would smite her enemies with the sword of God."

This miracle did not come to pass. The defeat of Russia at Sebastopol, so insignificant from a military point of view, had an enormous political and moral effect, because it opened the eyes of all more or less discerning and conscientious Russians to all the evils from which their country was suffering. The immediate result of this defeat was the "period of the great reforms," followed by the movement known by the name of Nihilism. The military downfall of Russia made an end of the legend of Russian supremacy which had been prevalent abroad ; and within Russia it shook the principle of autocratic government. The "negation" of the old ideas of authority, and of all those prejudices on which the old life was based, was a logical result of this catastrophe. This is why "negation" formed the basis of Nihilism.

III

The antithesis established by the patriots between "Holy Russia" and "pagan Europe" at the time of the Crimean War was to a certain extent justified by the presence of Turkey in the coalition formed against the Empire of the Tsar, which enabled the Russian Government to pose as the defender of brother Slavs and Christians against the "infidel," "heathen" Mahomedans.

It is true that the situation of the Christian and Slav peoples in the Balkans was at this time unendurable. But the Government of Nicolas I, a reactionary and an oppressor of his own people, had no moral right to arrogate to itself the *rôle* of defender, since its whole previous conduct had been in absolute contradiction to the mission which it claimed to fulfil. Alexander I, after the Congress of Vienna, had declared himself openly hostile to a rising of the Balkanic peoples against the Turks. For example, in 1821 (at the Congress of Laybach), he severely condemned the Greeks' desire for independence, regarding it as a manifestation of the revolutionary spirit.

In order to confirm his opinion by action, he dismissed Prince Ypsilanti from the corps of officers of the Russian Army, because he had assumed the command of the Greek insurgents; and he dismissed Count Capo d'Istria, a Greek citizen and Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia, who fomented the revolt of his compatriots against the Turkish rule. The liberated Greeks having elected Capo d'Istria President of their Republic, the Russian Government attempted to induce him to subserve its reactionary policy in Greece, thereby provoking a protest on the part of the advanced parties of that country and the assassination of Capo d'Istria by two Republican patriots, the brothers Mavromikhalis.

Enlightened Russians did not approve of the obscure and reactionary policy of their Government. The

famous poet Pushkin encouraged the Greek insurrection in the following lines :—

Arise, O Greece, arise !
Not in vain is thy striving,
Not in vain does war shake Olympus,
Pindus, and the crags of Thermopylæ.
Beneath the secular shadow of their peaks
Was born the liberty of ancient time,
The sacred marbles of Athens,
The tombs of Theseus and Pericles.
Land of heroes and of slaves,
Shatter the chains of slavery,
Singing the fiery songs
Of Tyrtæus, Byron, and Rigas !

Austria encouraged the reactionary interference of the Russian Government in the domestic affairs of Greece, being well aware that it would thereby suffer the loss of Greek sympathies ; and Alexander's opposition to the movement of liberation was due to the counsels of Metternich.

France and England, on the other hand, declared themselves in favour of the establishment of a constitutional *régime* in Greece ; but they were guilty of another mistake in supporting the candidature of Prince Otto of Bavaria to the Greek throne, thereby permitting German influence to get its first roots into the Greek soil.

Half a century later another example occurred of the deviation impressed by internal reaction on the external policy of the Empire : the Government attempted to enforce the complete submission of Bulgaria, whom the war of 1877-78 had rendered independent, to its tutelage. It merely succeeded in exciting an anti-Russian movement which carried Stambouloff into power, and allowed Germany and Austria to implant their influence in the country.

We find the same blunder exemplified in the present war. A considerable portion of the Russian (Ruthenian) and Polish population of Bukovina and

Galicia, dissatisfied under the Austrian domination, gladly welcomed the Russians when they occupied the two provinces. But the civil officials who followed the armies immediately began their work of reaction and oppression, irritating the indigenous population by the persecutions of their police.

It is true that the Prussians too used to treat the Poles abominably, and that the situation of the Slavs in Austria and Hungary was extremely difficult; but Germans, Poles, Austrians, Czechs, Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Serbs are divided among themselves, politically and ethnically, while Russia, being akin to the Slavs, might have been a true friend and protector, had it not been for her bureaucrats.

It is now clear that the Slav problem is, for Russia, bound up with the problem of her own progress, her own Europeanization. Although fifty years ago Russia, albeit herself but half-civilized and despotically governed, drew to herself the Slavs of the Balkans, then subjected to the terrible yoke of the Sultans and leading an almost barbarous existence, to-day her *protégés* have become independent, and have entered upon a process of rapid civilization and Europeanization; they have even, in some respects, outstripped their sometime liberator, Russia. They possess highly democratic Constitutions, Parliaments, an intense political life, while in Russia the constitutional *régime* is hardly born, and many vestiges of the old *régime* remain. Consequently, the gaze of her sometime clients is turning toward Western Europe, not to her. Austria and Germany have contrived to profit by this change. As for the Russian bureaucracy, it does not yet understand.

In my *Russia and the Great War* I cited the opinion of Baron Rosen, member of the Imperial Council, who states that Russian influence has declined among the Balkan Slavs, and that "the great Slav idea" is, for Russia, "devoid of all real foundation."

"All undertakings inspired by this idea—as, for

example, the Slav Bank, the exhibition of Russian products, the Russian libraries in Slav countries, etc.—either remain in the condition of mere projects, or drag themselves through a miserable existence. . . . In the domain of material civilization Russia has no need of the Slav world, or the Slav world of Russia. In the Slav States of the Balkans our industry, which has at its disposal a vast home market defended by extremely high protective tariffs, could only at a loss compete with the Austro-German industries; as for the Slavs of the South, their commercial relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, their neighbour, will always be more advantageous than their relations with distant Russia. From the intellectual standpoint the Slavs of the Balkans (and still more those of Austria), despite a somewhat factitious Germanophobia, evidently prefer—and this is very natural—to tap directly and at first hand the Western sources, and principally those of Germany.”

Baron Rosen regards this situation as the normal one. He does not seem to see that a “Europeanized” Russia could group around her her brothers by race, forming a veritable federation of Russo-Slavic civilizations. This simple idea does not occur to him, and he advises his Government to abandon the Balkans to Austro-German Imperialism, and, having bid the West adieu, to turn again toward Asia.

“By abandoning to Germany supremacy in the Western portion of Europe, and by dissociating herself completely from all rivalries between European powers based on interests purely European, Russia would assure herself of the security of her Western frontier, and would have her hands free for the accomplishment of her mission in Asia.”

For M. Rosen believes and proclaims that Russia is “more especially an Asiatic Power.”

CHAPTER V

- I. The war with Europeanized Japan—The Asiatic question. II. The German barrier isolating Russia from Europe—The Baltic Sea and the Straits—The great European conflict, and its general import from a Russian point of view.

I

THE theory advanced by Baron Rosen, that is, that Russia should seek her objective in Asia, was by the end of the nineteenth century supported by other representatives of the *ancien régime*. It also had the support of the German Government, which was anxious to urge Russia to enter upon adventures in the Far East, in order that Germany and Austria might thereby enjoy full liberty of manœuvre in Europe, the Balkans, and Asia Minor. It is undeniable that Russia's advance towards the frontier of Korea and Port Arthur was encouraged by German diplomacy.

But, curiously enough, in the Far East Russia encountered Europe! Not only because Europe, in the shape of the gold of old England, stood behind Japan, but also because Russia came into conflict with the civilization of Europe, which, since the revolution of 1868, had entirely transformed the economic and political life of Japan, and had given birth to new forms of capitalist production, new industrial methods, and novel means of warfare.

It should be remarked that the revolution in Japan, and the beginning of the Europeanization of the country, coincided with the "period of great reforms" in Russia. But Japan had more sense of progress. Having undertaken to modernize the country, the Japanese

applied themselves to the task without intermission, with the assistance of all the energies of the nation, which were left free to develop themselves and to manifest themselves in Parliament, the Press, the schools, the industries of the country, etc. The Russian Government, on the other hand, after some concessions granted to the people in the time of Alexander II, halted midway, and then began to draw back, and to restore the *ancien régime* in all its most lamentable forms. The energies of Japan, exploited according to European conceptions, became relatively greater, or rather more deeply rooted and readier for action, than the still unformed and sluggish energies of the vast Russian Empire. And Russia was beaten by her puny adversary, and with unexpected ease. In reality it was once again the West which triumphed over Russia in 1905.

I shall not speak here, having done so elsewhere, of the results of this unhappy war with Japan as regards the internal life of Russia. I will merely observe that then was finally determined the general position of Russia between the East and the West, between Europe and Asia. The reader will have heard the famous query: "Is Russia the most Western of all the Asiatic States or the most Eastern of all the European States?" The Manchurian War gave the best possible answer to this question by suppressing it. The war demonstrated, in effect, firstly, that the terms Eastern, Western, Europe, and Asia are merely relative and retrospective, the remotest of the States of the Far East having become European, and having entered the Concert of the European Powers. On the other hand, it imposed, on Russia's action in Asia, the same law which conditioned her action in Europe. Forced to become European if she did not wish to remain in the rear of her brothers by race, Russia was also obliged to become European in order to maintain her rank among the Asiatic States which were becoming modernized—such as China and Persia.

II

This process of evolution is all the more necessary to Russia in that the unhappy result of her adventure in the Far-East has thrown her back upon Europe. But Germany, during the war, seized the opportunity of carrying out her Pangermanist schemes in Western Europe, Turkey, and Asia Minor. These schemes, dangerous to all European States, were especially a danger to Russia, for they threatened the very basis of her future development. She had laid hands, or was preparing to lay hands, on the Baltic Sea, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus.

The construction of a powerful Navy and the cutting of the Kiel Canal had made Germany the absolute mistress of the Baltic Sea, from which the naval forces of Russia had disappeared in 1905. Thus the work of Peter the Great, a maritime highway communicating with Europe, was, if not destroyed, at least entirely at the mercy of the German Empire, which could at any moment close it with its submarines and ironclads.

To measure only the economic significance of the mastery obtained by Germany, it is enough to reflect that about 30 per cent. of all Russia's exports (£49,080,000 out of a total of £162,160,000 in 1913) travels by the Baltic Sea. As for the political and intellectual value of Russia's connection with Europe by way of the Baltic, it is incalculable.

But the Dardanelles route is no less necessary to Russia; it is perhaps even more necessary. From the ports of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov a third part of the total exportation of Russia leaves the country; in 1913 its value was £51,440,000. Cereals in particular go by way of the Dardanelles; in 1913, of 10,670,000 tons exported, 7,900,000 tons, or more than 80 per cent., went by this route, which is that followed more particularly by the grain destined for Italy, Switzerland, France, Belgium, Holland, and England. Of the corn imported in 1913 by the following

countries, the amounts furnished by Russia were : 881,000 tons to Italy, the total imports being 1,811,000 tons ; to Holland, 1,715,000 tons out of 3,883,000 ; while 40 per cent. of the corn consumed by Switzerland was of Russian origin.¹ The Dardanelles route is thus of prime importance to Russia and to the countries of Europe. It is also of prime importance to the industrial future of Russia, for it forms the outlet by which she exports the products of the mining regions, coal-fields, and petroleum-fields of the South, and imports an ever-increasing quantity of European merchandise.

The Dardanelles, while in the exclusive possession of Turkey, were open to Russia, Turkey by herself not being strong enough to dare to close them. But of late years German Imperialism has installed itself in Constantinople, there to commence the execution of its gigantic scheme of the Bagdad Railway. Again, but this time on the South, a Germanic barrier was to divide Russia from the West, while the German Army and Navy hemmed her in on the West.

That one of the aims of Germany in installing herself on the Bosphorus was to separate Russia from Europe has long been admitted by the Pangermanists themselves.

" Turkey opposes an obstacle to the penetration of the Mediterranean by the mighty Eurasian nation—Russia," wrote Colonel Rogalla von Bieberstein in a military review (1902). " This obstacle resides rather in the fortified works on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles than in the international treaties concerning these straits. Germany also is greatly interested in the maintenance of this barrier. It is greatly to the interest of Germany that this barrier should be maintained, and that Russia should not penetrate the Mediterranean." ²

¹ I cite these figures from *L'Europe' devant Constantinople*, by Max Hoeschiller (Paris, 1916), p. 101.

² Cited from M. André Chéradame's work on *La Question d'Orient. La Macédoine. Le chemin de fer de Bagdad* (Paris, 1903), p. 253.

German Imperialism had two reasons for wishing to keep Russia apart from Europe.

The first reason is expounded as follows by a German military writer, Colonel Hildebrandt :—

“The advantages acquired by Germany by the conclusion of the treaty relating to the Bagdad Railway seriously diminish the influence of Russia in Asia Minor ; and the activities of Russia are once more turning toward Central Asia, which is, for that matter, her true sphere.”¹

Russia thrown back upon Central Asia, the German domination would spread without hindrance through the Balkans, Turkey, and Asia Minor.

Finally, separated from Europe, Russia would inevitably have become a German colony, an object of exploitation for the subjects of the Kaiser.

This colossal and permanent blockade would have arrested the economic development of Russia, awarding the final supremacy to the Germanophile reaction in the Russian Government.

It is therefore the fact that in its present resistance to German Imperialism the Russian people is fighting, not merely for the defence of its territory, but for its whole future, for liberty of communion in the life of the West.

Happily it has, for its companions in arms, the most advanced of the Western Powers. France, Belgium, England, Italy, and Serbia (which is the most civilized of the Slav countries of the Balkans), form, with Russia, a single resistant mass to oppose the scheme of subjection attempted by Germany and her allies, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

I will not repeat here what I said in my book on *Russia and the Great War* concerning the effect of the present war upon Russian life. I will only call the reader's attention to those facts which best exhibit this effect.

The present war with Germany presents this analogy

¹ Chéradame, op. cit. p. 255.

with the war of 1812—it has a national character. All the democrats in Russia recognize in this war the cause of liberty, external and internal. On the other hand, for the reactionaries, the ante-bellum Germanophiles, to fight against the *junkers* is the worst of calamities. For a long time they had maintained close connections with their political co-religionists in Prussia, and were visibly full of complaisance toward them. Kaiserism contrived to profit by this weakness of the Russian bureaucracy and autocracy, which became its instruments ; the German advance upon Bagdad, the Austrian penetration of the Balkans, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were regarded with complete favour by the friendly reactionaries of Russia, who subordinated the international interests of the Empire to their own domestic interests. They regret the rupture with Kaiserism, which is one of the principal props of the present monarchical *régime*, and the union of their country with republican France and the constitutional States of Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium. The champions of progress are of a precisely opposite opinion, seeing in the present fraternity of Russia and the Western nations a force tending to democratize and Europeanize their country. This is why they believe that their country will achieve its own liberty when it reaches the end of the road leading to victory over the external oppressor.

PART THE THIRD
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE
STATE



CHAPTER I

- I. A European State in ancient Russia: the Free City of Novgorod.
- II. The birth of the absolute monarchy and its conflict with feudalism—Western influences in Russian feudalism.

I

THE historians of the old national school love to attribute an external cause to the vices of the superannuated political system which has survived in Russia. For some, the Tartar yoke vitiated the normal development of the nation. Others accuse the contagion of the West of having corrupted the purity of Russian morals and the patriarchal relations existing between the people and its sovereigns. Both look to the remote past for the "true" character and the "national" political spirit cited so often and so readily in the histories of the "urban republics" of Novgorod and Pskov, which they claim to be of purely autochthonous origin.

Impartial criticism has destroyed this legend, and has proved that the republican institutions of the Free Cities of Novgorod and Pskov owe their birth and their development to a direct external influence—to their economic relations with the Free Towns of Europe.

What was the political constitution of Novgorod? The city was governed by a *vetche*, that is, by a body composed of all the citizens. The *vetche* elected *tysiatskié* (from the word *tysiatssha*, meaning thousand) and the *posadnik*, that is, the president of the republic. The *tysiatskié* with the *posadnik* formed a council which directed affairs. *Mutatis mutandis*, this is the same urban oligarchy which we find in all the trading cities

of the Middle Ages, on the shores of the Adriatic (in Venice) and the Mediterranean (in Genoa), as on the shores of the North Sea (in Flanders, Holland, and Germany).

But Novgorod traded with the Free Towns of Germany. As early as the twelfth century it possessed "markets of Gothland and Germany," founded by foreign merchants from Gothland and Lübeck. In the thirteenth century it entered into relations with the Hanseatic League; and it was precisely at this period that the burghers freed themselves from the domination of princes and set up elective authorities. The moment when the foreign trade of Novgorod attained the highest pitch of prosperity coincided with the moment when its republican institutions were at their apogee.

The oligarchical form of the Government was borrowed by the Russian cities from the foreign urban republics with which they were connected by a current of exchanges.

"The success of the foreign trade, which had become the principal focus of urban life," says Klutshevsky, "resulted in the creation of certain great houses, which placed themselves at the head of affairs, and subsequently assumed the direction of the civil administration. This aristocracy governed only *de facto*, and without the establishment of the democratic forms of the Novgorodian constitution."

II

This constitution was forcibly suppressed by the Muscovite Tsars in the fifteenth century. Then commenced the autocratic Tsarist *régime* which has lasted until to-day.

As I have already stated in my *Modern Russia*, the Muscovite monarchy, in order to become a real autocracy, had to stifle not only the republican institutions of the burghers of the Free Cities of the North-West, but also the feudal and separatist tendencies of other princes, princelets, *boyars*, etc.

Recent historical researches have demonstrated that there is an analogy between feudal Europe and the Russia of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. There are similarities even in the terms expressing the relations of sovereignty and law between the suzerains and vassals of mediæval Europe and their Russian colleagues.

One question presents itself : Do these resemblances arise merely from a coincidence of evolution, or from the more or less direct influence of the West?

It seems to me that this influence cannot be disputed. Still, it cannot positively be observed except in the western provinces, neighbouring on Lithuania and Poland. Poland, as we know, retained, until the loss of her independence, a very active and profoundly rooted feudal system. The frontier regions of Great Russia and the Ukraine were affected by their contact with Poland and Polish Lithuania, and it was their local nobility which opposed the most obstinate resistance to the absolute power which came into being in Moscow. To Lithuania and Poland fled those Muscovite *boyars* who were in conflict with the princes and tsars ; for instance, Andrei Kurbsky in the reign of Ivan the Terrible.

The influence of the West was also very perceptible in Galician Russia, where the relations between prince and *boyar*, in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, were precisely similar to the relations between the European suzerains and their feudatories. The Galician princes even made use of seals of Western pattern, and the language of their ukases was Latin. At one moment they endeavoured to make themselves princes of all the Russias. If they had succeeded, events might have followed quite a different course. But Asia intervened, in the invasions of the nomads and the Tartar yoke, which divided South-Western Russia from North-Eastern Russia, and forced it into other paths.

The Government of the Russian State retained the imprint of the Tartar yoke. During a long period

the Russian principalities remained under the Asiatic domination, and the Prince of Moscow, although High Prince of Russia, was the principal vassal of the Tartar Khan, and was subject to his tutelage. It was very natural that his Government should be modelled on the despotism of Asia. Foreigners who visited Russia in the sixteenth century—that is, at the time of the formation of the Muscovite autocracy—were amazed by what they saw, and wondered whether they were in Europe or Asia. “The Russian State greatly resembles the Turkish, which the Russians endeavour to imitate,” said the Englishman John Fletcher (who visited Moscow in 1588) in his work *On the Russian Commonwealth*. “Their Government is purely tyrannical; all its actions serve the profit and the advantage of the Tsar exclusively, and this in the most open and most barbarous fashion.”¹ The power of the central authority, and the foundation of the autocracy, were alike favoured by the necessities of the struggle against external enemies: firstly against the Asiatic hordes, and then against Russia’s Western neighbours. With the Asiatics Russia was at war until the end of the sixteenth century, and her triumph over the Tartars coincided with that of the Tsars over the feudal system. The historian Klutshevsky is right in asserting that the victory of Russia over the Mongols was the victory of Europe over Asia. But Georg Plekhanov states, with equal reason, that “Europe conquered the Asiatics only because she herself had become Asia.”² M. Plekhanov develops this idea in a few remarkable pages of his

¹ I may remark in passing that the first edition of Fletcher’s work, published in England at the end of the sixteenth century, was burned by order of the English Government, which was anxious to avoid offending the Tsar by permitting the expression of certain disagreeable truths. In Russia the first edition of this book was published in 1848, in a historical review. The number in which it appeared was burned, and the editor had anything but an agreeable time, what with the censorship, the police, and the gendarmerie.

² G. Plekhanov, *History of the Social Idea in Russia*, vol. i. p. 98 (Moscow, 1914).

masterly *History of the Social Idea in Russia*, the two volumes of which have lately appeared. In the formation of the State in Russia and in Europe M. Plekhanov perceives these essential differences:—

“ In Russia, as well as in Europe, the central authority was able to overcome the centrifugal aspirations of the feudal seigneurs. But in France, for example, the kings, while imposing their authority on the nobility, did not deprive the latter of the right of possessing landed property, and did not subject them to obligatory service. Or, as M. d’Avenel remarks, ‘ privilege was not the recompense for service rendered, but the right of birth.’ In Russia it was quite otherwise. There property in land became a State fund, into which the Tsars dipped when they wished to repay the services of a noble. And what the nobles did for the peasants, in putting lands at their disposal in exchange for compulsory labour, the Tsars did for the nobles, who were thus, in a manner of speaking, merely superior serfs.” This condition of affairs was typical of ancient Chaldea, ancient Egypt, and Persia, and in general of all the great despotic States of Asia. M. Plekhanov is right in comparing Muscovite Russia with these States, and in perceiving the elements of Asiatic despotism in the evolution of the Russia of this period.

But Russia did not remain in the stage of political development which these States retained until their final dissolution. “ Russian evolution offers the peculiarity—and this time it is in favour of progress—of a great resemblance to Asia followed by a very slow but irresistible turning toward the European West, while the Asiatic States, properly so called, do not present us with examples of the tendency toward Europeanization until after the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan being the foremost.”¹

¹ G. Plekhanov, op. cit.

CHAPTER II

- I. Military power and the reform of the State administration under Peter I—Swedish influences. II. The palace revolutions of the eighteenth century and the influence of Europe. III. German domination, and the anti-Germanic movement under Anna—The participation of France and England in the *coup d'état* of 1741—A Duke of Holstein the Russian Tsar—His Prussophilia. IV. The conspiracy of 1801 and British diplomacy.

I

AT one particular and very important point the formation of the Russian State was unlike that of the European States. This point was the organization of the military forces.

In the Western monarchies, thanks to the rapid increase of pecuniary wealth, the kings—for example, in France—were enabled to take into their service mercenary troops, and, consequently, were no longer dependent on the seignorial militia. The replacement of the militia by paid troops forced the kings to depend on the Third Estate, the source whence they derived the necessary money.

In Russia, on the other hand, the urban *bourgeoisie*, even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was too weak to be of material help to the Tsars, and the military needs were too great to be filled by mercenary troops. The military organism had to be constituted otherwise than in Europe.

Until the year 1705 the Russian Army consisted of a seignorial cavalry—that is, a mounted militia, a few regiments of paid infantry and cavalry. The war with Sweden forced Peter's Government to draw with-

out delay upon other sources. It adopted the principle of compulsory recruiting, which was applied, for the first time, in 1705, when the Government ordered the population to provide it with recruits at the rate of one recruit for every twenty peasant *dvors*.¹

Towards the end of the reign of Peter I the Russian Army already numbered 200,000 men of the regular troops and 100,000 Cossacks and other irregulars. The upkeep of these numerous effectives was costly—5,000,000 roubles, to which must be added 1½ million for the maintenance of the fleet, so that the total military expenditure on land and sea forces amounted to 6½ millions, which would be equivalent, in present values, to from 52 to 58 millions.

The suppression of the militia and the creation of a standing army demanded a new administration; the old administration consisted of a few very rudimentary central bodies known as *prikazy*, which were directed by *boyars* who had received from the Tsar a *prikaz*—that is to say, an order of attendance. The local administration was confided to the *voïevody* (from the words *voïn*, soldier, and *vodit*, to lead), whose name indicates their origin and their function; they were civil and military administrators in one. The *voïevody* received no fixed salary from the State, and had to "maintain themselves (according to the official phrase) at the expense of the population."

This system of administration, based on the principle of the local militia, was not adapted to the new organization, and Peter wished to replace it in order to centralize the military machine, and above all its revenues.²

As Sweden, his enemy, appeared to him the most powerful of States, and owed, or so he believed, her strength, to her good administration, he sent thither a foreigner (Tick) in order that he might discover, buy, or at need steal, information as to the administra-

¹ *Dvor* means a court or yard, and signifies a family or an economic peasant unity.

tive institutions of Sweden. Moreover, he took into his service the Silesian Baron Luberas, of whom I have already made mention, and who had the reputation of a very extensive knowledge of Swedish affairs.

What is more, he was able to initiate himself directly into Swedish methods by watching them at work in the Baltic provinces, which he had conquered. One of his ukazes ordered the adoption of these methods in certain administrative services.

He borrowed also from other Western States. After his first journey to Holland he created the *ratushi* and *bourmistry*, in imitation of what he had seen there. In 1714 he wrote to his "projector"—that is, the official who elaborated his schemes of reform, Soltykov by name—that he was to send him "the laws which he had extracted from the English and other European laws, those of the republics excepted."¹ Among the "laws" which Soltykov sent him was a proposal relating to entail, the idea of which was borrowed from England, and which was introduced into Russia under the modified form of the inalienability and indivisibility of seignorial properties.

But as a source of inspiration the other States occupied only a secondary place; Sweden was the model to be copied and faithfully reproduced. In the eyes of the Russian Government she not only appeared worthy of becoming an object of emulation on account of the excellency of her military resources, but she was also the only country in Europe in which the absolute monarchy had finally defeated the feudal system, which elsewhere was still perceptible. Moreover, the Swedish administration had the reputation of being the best of its period. For this very reason its adaptation to Russia was a highly audacious undertaking—perhaps too audacious.

¹ This dislike of republicanism was manifested by an earlier monarch, Ivan the Terrible, who, despite all his symptoms of Anglophilia, interrupted commercial relations with England because "the English, according to his own expression, had committed a very evil deed: they had put their king, Charles, to death."

Peter I borrowed from Sweden all the external forms of public authority, and created *kollegii* (colleges) to replace the old *prikazy*; and the Senate, which consisted originally of the first presidents of the *kollegii*; the *gubernatory* (governors) administering each one of the eight *gubernii* into which Russia was divided, and which were subdivided into *provintsii* (provinces) and *distrikty* (districts).

His ukases more than once indicate that "the instructions and regulations" according to which the new administration was to function were to be drawn up "in the Swedish fashion," or "with certain changes."

While he was replacing the old governmental machine, Peter believed it necessary to replace the aristocratic hierarchy by a bureaucratic hierarchy. In 1722 he promulgated, in a ukase, the *tabel o rangakh* (table of ranks)—that is, the scale of *tshin* (or grades), civil and military, in which nearly all the names of the bureaucratic posts are borrowed from the Latin or German (*kollejsky assessor, major, etc.*).

Believing that one "cannot act according to the books alone, for in these all circumstances are not foreseen," Peter did not confine himself to collecting foreign laws and statutes. In Germany, Bohemia, and Holland he recruited jurists, writers, and administrators. Baron von Luberas alone engaged no less than 150 officials to enter the service of his Government.

Having created new administrative bodies, with new denominations, having replaced the Russian names by European names, Peter believed that he had Europeanized the Muscovite State, whose capital, baptized with a European name, he had removed, geographically, towards the West. But he was deluded.

To his thinking, the Senate, constituted in 1711, should have seen to the general supervision and higher direction of affairs of State; but from 1715 onwards he was obliged to subject the Senate itself to the supervision of a "General Reviser," whose duty it was to attend the sessions of the Senate and to denounce

to the Tsar those of its members who were neglecting their duty. Five years later another official was appointed to see that in the Senate "all should be done properly, and that there should be no babbling, shouting, or other things." He had to note, by the aid of an hour-glass, if the deliberations were sufficiently prompt, and to determine their duration. A year later, as he was not sufficient for his task, he was replaced by an officer of the Guard, who had the right to arrest senators who made use of language unseemly or insulting towards their colleagues. At the end of yet another year the Senate was finally subordinated to a *General-prokuror* (Procurator-General), in whose hands it became, from being the highest body in the State, a mere tool.

The history of the Senate and the other institutions created under Peter is deplorable. The senators and members of the colleges "played at law as at cards," and "mined the fortress of justice" (this is Peter's phrase), applying themselves continually to theft and intrigue, and to quarrelling. Nearly all the high officials disregarded the interests of the State, and thought of nothing but their own. At one session of the Senate, toward the end of his reign, Peter, when the reports of their dishonesty were read to him, ordered the immediate publication of a ukase according to which any person who stole from the State even the price of a rope should be hanged. His favourite, Yagujinsky, General Procurator of the Senate, inquired: "Does your Majesty wish to remain Emperor by himself, without any subjects? We all steal; only some steal more and less discreetly than others."

The condition of the local administrations was no better. The new *gubernatory* and *landraty* (from the German *landrath*), in spite of their European names, robbed the people and the Treasury as thoroughly as did the Muscovite *voievody*. The generals and other officers, travelling through the provinces, beat and plundered the civil officials. The population, im-

poverished by wars, taxation, and rapine, fled into the steppes or forests, and there formed bands of brigands. Peter issued ukase after ukase, threatening and chastising, without effecting anything. "The Petersburg official, the general, the provincial seigneur, threw the ukases of the terrible Reformer out of the window, and, like the forest brigand, recked little that there were in the capital an absolute Senate and nine or ten 'colleges,' constituted in the Swedish manner, with systematically defined attributions. The imposing exterior of legal order hid a general disorder."¹

The attempt at Europeanization made in Peter's reign failed, we must remember, because it coincided with incessant warfare. Although war did enforce reforms, it also gave them an accidental and provisional character. The aim of the new institutions was fiscal and military rather than social and political. Of the nine colleges created in 1718, six were to deal with finances and military and foreign affairs, one with justice, and two with trade and industry. There was no department of the higher administration to watch over the interests of agriculture, which nevertheless was the principal occupation of the people. The rural population, the real foundation of the State, was absolutely neglected by the Government, which sought rather to increase the power of the nobles over the moujiks.

The condition of the Russian peasants, which had never ceased to grow worse since the end of the sixteenth century, became more and more like that of the agricultural serfs of the despotic States of the East. Peter the Great did not attempt to improve it; on the contrary. Any real Europeanization of Russia was therefore impossible, and administrative reform was condemned to sterility.

¹ A foreign observer—Fokkerodt—wrote a book upon his sojourn in Russia, in the reign of Peter the Great, in which he stated that the Tsar despaired of reclaiming his officials, and therefore determined to exterminate them by the axe and the gallows, so that wholesale death sentences might be expected. However, Peter died first.

II

The general disorder which harassed Peter I during the last years of his life persisted and increased under his immediate successors.

Peter the Great, for the first time since the reign of Ivan the Terrible, realized the "ideal" of absolute autocracy. In one of his laws he proclaimed that "his Majesty was sovereign and autocratic. It need reckon with no one in the world." He crushed all the forces which might have opposed him; old *boyar* families were exterminated; the patriarchate was replaced by an ecclesiastical Chancellery (Holy Synod), subordinated to a civil official. The enforcement of the "table of ranks" was intended to signify that precedence depended not on birth, but exclusively on the grade in the bureaucracy occupied by the will of the Tsar or his mandatories. The transformation of the *Tsarstvo* or Tsardom into an Empire and the Tsar into an Emperor rendered the rupture with the *ancien régime* still more evident. The Emperor concentrated in his person, fully and conjointly, the powers of the State; he became the supreme head of the army, the head of the Church, the head of the bureaucratic hierarchy.

In 1613 the first Romanov was *elected* to the throne by the representatives of the population. After this the crown was transmitted by inheritance. Peter I, rejecting the two principles of election and heredity, published in 1721 a ukase asserting the Emperor's right to appoint his successor. The monarchical power became not merely absolute, but arbitrary and personal.

It must, however, be admitted that Peter I did not employ his power exclusively for his own advantage, but for the good of the State. We may say that he often applied means and methods which were those of Asiatic despotism to European and progressive ends. His successors retained these methods, but to attain

different ends ; and they confounded their own affairs completely with those of the collectivity.

An absolute monarch, in reality, is absolute only in name, because he always is dependent on his entourage, his favourites, or his guards. This truth is fully confirmed by the history of the Russian monarchy in the eighteenth century. Directly the principle of autocracy was officially proclaimed, the throne fell into the hands of those who surrounded it.

On the night of the 28th of January, 1725, while Peter the Great lay dying, the officers of the regiments of the Guard proclaimed as Empress his wife, Catherine I, thus ruining the plans of the high officials, who themselves wished to find Peter's successor. But the bureaucracy and the aristocracy took their revenge by persuading Catherine to form a sort of oligarchical Government, which went by the name of the Superior Secret Council (in 1726). At the instigation of the Council, Catherine left the succession to her grandson, Peter, who in 1727 became the Tsar Peter II. Three years later, in 1730, the Superior Secret Council, with the aid of the Guard, raised to the throne the niece of Peter I, Anna Ivanovna, Duchess of Courland, who, before she died, chose for her heir Ivan Antonovitch (aged two months), to be known as Tsar Ivan VI in 1740. Anna Ivanovna entrusted her favourite, the famous Biron, with the regency. But a fortnight after the death of the Empress the mother of Ivan VI, Anna Leopoldovna, Princess of Brunswick, with the aid of the officers and men of the Preobrijensky regiment, started a palace revolution, deported Biron, and proclaimed herself Regent. A year later a company of the same regiment effected a fresh *coup d'état*, replaced Anna Leopoldovna and Ivan VI by the daughter of Peter the Great—Yelisaveta Petrovna—who reigned for twenty years, and in dying transferred the power of the throne to her nephew, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, Peter III. The reign of this prince was very brief ; at the end of six months his wife

Catherine, born a princess of Anhalt-Zerbst, deposed him, with the assistance of the Guards, and assumed the reins of power. She remained on the throne for thirty-four years (from 1762 to 1796), leaving the crown to Paul I, who was deposed and killed in 1801 by the officers of the Guard.

Europe was no stranger to all these events. Sometimes her inspiration may be very plainly distinguished therein, and even her intervention; of this there is documentary proof.

In 1726 the French Ambassador in Petersburg, Campredon, wrote to Versailles that the Russian aristocracy wished to diminish the personal power of Catherine I and to organize the Government in the English manner. The same opinion was expressed in 1730 by the Secretary of the French Embassy, who stated that in Moscow men were speaking, in the streets and in private, of the British Constitution and the rights of the English Parliament. During the crisis of 1730 the nobles who elected Anna Ivanovna also desired to limit the absolute power of the throne, and were seeking in the West for the best system of government. "The Constitutions of those countries glitter in their eyes like jewels in a shop window, each more beautiful than the next, and among them all they do not know which to choose." The European Ambassadors reported that there were, in 1730, partisans among the nobles of the parliamentary monarchy as in England, of the elective monarchy as in Poland, and of the monarchy sharing its power with an aristocratic oligarchy as in Sweden; there were even republicans.

The Swedish mode won the day, and the election of Anna Ivanovna greatly resembled that of Ulrica Eleanora, sister of Charles XII, who became Queen of Sweden in 1719. The Superior Secret Council, on investing Anna with the power, forced her to sign the "points" which limited her authority and subjected her enactments to the approval and ratifica-

tion of the Council. Just as in Sweden, the middle and the lesser nobles protested against the usurpation of the high aristocracy; and Anna Ivanovna, relying on this resistance, tore up the *konditzii* (conditions) which had been imposed upon her. As for this oligarchical Constitution, it was devised after the Swedish model.

As to the material participation of foreigners in the domestic affairs of Russia, politics, the palace revolution of 1741 and the murder of Paul I in 1801 offer two extremely interesting examples of such participation.

III

The military pronunciamiento which solved the crisis of 1741 lent a certain greatness to a mere palace revolution. It was an expression of the national and patriotic revolt against alien interference in the government of the country.

As I have already remarked, Peter I had established connections with the German world. The conquest of the Baltic provinces added a numerous German population to the Empire. In 1731—that is, only six years after Peter's death—the Russian throne was occupied by a Duchess of Courland, who was half a German. Anna Ivanovna, coming to Petersburg, brought with her to the capital her whole entourage, composed of Courlanders and Livonians.

“Distrusting the Russians, Anna placed herself under the protection of a crowd of foreigners whom she had imported from Mitau and various corners of Germany. The Germans spread over Russia as sweepings escape from a torn sack; they installed themselves in a crowd at the Imperial Court, encompassed the throne, and slipped into all the lucrative administrative posts. All this motley crew was composed of the *kleotoury* (creatures) of two powerful patrons: of a ‘cur of a Courlander’ who had but one talent—that of discovering pedigree dogs (we are speaking of Biron), and

of a 'cur of a Livonian,' the auxiliary and eventually the rival of Biron—Count Loewenwold, *oberstallmeister*, liar, incurable gambler, and peculator. In a dissipated Court which had no other occupation than the sumptuous fêtes organized by another Loewenwold, the *oberhofmarschall*, even more maleficent than his brother, the whole crew glutted themselves, gambling with the money extracted from the people by means of the bastinade. It was not without reason that the maintenance of the Court cost, under Anna, five or six times as much as under Peter I, although the revenues of the State had not increased, but had rather diminished."

The German bureaucrats, according to the same author—Klutshesky—"took up their positions round the throne like hungry cats round a bowl of milk, and subjected the Empire to the most abominable methods of oppression: executions, deportations, torture, and persecution." "The Tartar invasion repeated itself, only this time it came not from the southern steppes, but from the Russian capital."

This picture resembles those drawn in their reports by the foreign Ambassadors of Anna's reign; they, too, recorded the intolerable insolence of the favourites—German favourites and bureaucrats—and predicted a revolution.

An anti-Germanic movement was forming among the officers and soldiers of the Guard and the middle and lesser nobility. Having assisted Anna to rid herself of an oligarchy recruited from the Russian aristocracy, the nobility saw, with irritation and amazement, the results of its fidelity to the new Empress turned to the advantage of a German oligarchy. The idea of a *coup d'état* very naturally entered their minds, and the conspirators decided to place Yelisaveta on the throne. By one of the ironies of history, and perhaps its justice also, the daughter of Peter I, who in his lifetime was regarded as a "foreigner" and a "German," as an enemy of her

people, became the incarnation of national feeling in revolt against the Germanic tyranny.

But, which is even more singular, the success of this undertaking was assured by the support of foreigners, French and Swedish. La Chetardie, the French Ambassador, Lestocq, the French doctor, and his Swedish colleague, Nolken, were the principal motive forces of the plot against the *bironovshtshina* (the rule of Biron), assisting it with their counsel and with pecuniary support.

It may seem surprising that Sweden should have served the ambitions of the daughter of Peter the Great, the enemy who had deprived her of the Baltic littoral. The fact is that she hoped to obtain in recompense for her assistance the restitution of a portion of her former territories; and Nolken even requested Yelisaveta Pavlovna to engage herself, by secret treaty, "always to defend the interests of Sweden." There was then a rivalry between Sweden and England, the ally of Austria, with whom neither Sweden nor France was on good terms. Moreover, these two Powers feared the economic and political domination in Europe of England, and particularly in Russia. And the English Government and English traders were buying favour of Biron and other of the German "creatures."

However, the Germanic intrigue was not completely defeated by the accession of Yelisaveta, who confined herself to pensioning some of the most notorious of the German bureaucrats. The mutiny of a regiment of the Guard against its German officers was severely repressed. It is true that in Yelisaveta's immediate entourage and among her principal political advisers there were no Germans, but in choosing as her successor Charles Peter Ulric, Duke of Holstein, Yelisaveta was not only leaving the crown to a German, but was Germanizing the dynasty: the Russian House of Romanov was from that moment replaced by the House of Romanov-Holstein-Gottorp, which was German rather than Russian. Becoming Tsar under the name of Piotr

Fedorovitch (Peter III), the Duke of Holstein "could not enlarge his narrow Holsteiner mind to the measure of the vast Empire which destiny had bestowed upon him ; on the contrary, once on the Russian throne, he became more the Holsteiner than he had been at home."

He sought in all things to imitate Frederick II, King of Prussia ; but such a model was too mighty for his petty faculties, so that he only succeeded in caricaturing it. He bore himself like a Prussian soldier, publicly kissing the bust of Frederick and kneeling before his portrait ; he wore the Prussian uniform, which he imposed on the Russian Army ; he himself mounted guard before the apartments of Frederick's Ambassador in token of his respect for his master ; he made the Russian Army the guardian of the glory and the benefits acquired by the King of Prussia. He ordered the Holy Synod to "purify the Russian churches"—that is, to remove the ikons (those of Jesus and the Virgin excepted)—and to impose on the popes the costume and external appearance of Lutheran pastors ; and he recruited Prussian soldiers and corporals in order to form a private Holsteiner Guard.

In this way he contrived to get himself dethroned, and, a week later, killed, by officers of the Russian Guard.

This was a fresh check to the German penetration of Russia. But the "German party" was not destroyed. It merely became more prudent, and was thus able to increase and retain its privileges. In the Imperial Court the names of the dignitaries even in our days are German : as *freiline* (*fraülein*), *Kammerfrau*, *Kammerjunker*, *Kammerherr*, *stallmeister* ; *hofmeister*, etc. In the upper civil and military bureaucracy the elements of German origin were, and still are, very numerous. This state of affairs has been summed up by an eminent contemporary, Emile Vandervelde, in the following sentence : "Russia is the greatest democracy in the world, ruled by a small German colony."

IV.

The *coup d'état* of 1801, which deprived Paul I of his throne and his life, was not the retaliation of patriotism, as was the fall of his father, Peter III, or the elevation to the throne of Yelisaveta. But foreign influence played a very large part in it.

The Russian nobility, as we have seen, was extremely dissatisfied with the economic policy followed by Paul I in respect of England. "The rupture with England, which was injurious to the material interests of the nobility, increased its hatred of Paul, which had already been whetted by a cruel despotism. The thought of annihilating Paul, by whatever means, became almost general," writes a contemporary.

But the foreign policy of the Tsar was still more odious to the English Government and to English trade. This explains why England, in the person of the English Ambassador, was involved in the plot against Paul.

"English diplomacy did all it could to overthrow Paul. The English Ambassador in Petersburg, Whitworth, took an active part in the first conspiracy against Paul (the plot was spun in the spring of 1800, that is, about a year before the final catastrophe) . . . whose very form was 'English': Paul was to have been declared insane, as George III of England was a little later; and Alexander Pavlovitch would have become Regent. The enterprise was so far decided upon that Panine (in touch with Whitworth and the leader of the conspiracy) was already inquiring of foreign diplomatists as to the forms with which such an action would be invested abroad; this was necessary, for England, a parliamentary State, could not furnish Russia with any juridical precedent."

And the failure, or rather the miscarriage, of the first conspiracy, according to the same historian, was due to the fact that Whitworth had left Petersburg; but from abroad he still remained in touch with the Russian nobility, Paul's enemies, and continued to aid

in fostering the excitement which prepared the way for the second conspiracy and the violent death of the sovereign.

British diplomacy was not deceived in its calculations, for the overthrow of Paul resulted in the immediate "reconciliation of Russia with England," as Prince Adam Czartoryski remarks in his *Memoirs*.

Profitable to England, the death of Paul was by no means disadvantageous to Russia, for he was one of the worst tyrants known to history.

One might add that by contributing, on this occasion, to the deliverance of Russia, England made up, to some extent, for the support which she had formerly given Biron and his German acolytes, the exploiters and oppressors of the Russian people.

Although the nobles who overthrew Paul I received advice and perhaps material help from England, the ideas which gave birth to their conspiracy and the pleas in its favour were borrowed from France. Certain memoirs of contemporary Russian nobles endeavour to justify the murder of the tyrant by arguments taken from the French revolutionary authors. They speak of the just and holy hatred of tyranny in the expressive language of the *sans-culottes*; so that a Russian Conservative, Count Rostopshin, jestingly remarked that in Russia the aristocrats had aims which in France were the speciality of cobblers.

But, as we shall see, this comparison is not exact.

CHAPTER III

- I. The renaissance of feudalism—Catherine II and the European sources of her ideas. II. Attempts to Europeanize Russia under Alexander I—Anglophilia—Central institutions—Speransky and his French loans. III. The Decembrists—The European elements in their ideology and their actions—The Spanish model—The reaction of Austro-German origin—The Baltic nobles crush the insurrection of the Decembrists.

I

WE must not exaggerate the social amplitude or political significance of those "revolutions" which from time to time, during the eighteenth century, shook the Russian throne. Despite all the violence which they displayed, they were yet limited to a clash between the central power and the nobility, and the great masses of the people did not take part in them.

Despite their phraseology, often extremely democratic, the nobles were in reality contending merely for their own class interests, which during this century achieved an increasingly complete supremacy. In the seventeenth century and the first quarter of the eighteenth, service in the civil or military administration was obligatory for the nobility, and the law established two categories of landed property as affecting the nobility: the *votschina* and the *pomiestié*. The first was a true hereditary estate, the second was merely a benefice of which the Tsar remained the proprietor, granting the usufruct to the nobles in payment for services. In 1731 the nobility obtained a ukase which abolished the distinction between the two kinds of property, and the *pomiestié*, with the peasants attached

to the soil, belonged thenceforward unconditionally to their holders. In 1753, under Yelisaveta, the State undertook the material support of the nobility and created the Nobles' Bank to grant them credit on favourable terms. But these privileges did not satisfy them, and they demanded the abolition of obligatory service. Yelisaveta gave way, and in a manifesto, published in 1762 by her successor, Peter III, and known as "the Manifesto concerning the liberty of the Nobility," exempted the nobility from service in the civil administration and the army, so that what had been a legal obligation was now only a moral duty. From that time the *dvorianié* (nobles) ceased to be the serfs of the State. They became its masters, for about this time they themselves had realized the advantages attaching to the possession of administrative posts of any importance. The "table of ranks" remained legally in force, but in fact the bureaucratic hierarchy began to correspond with the aristocratic hierarchy, with its "genealogical books": as on the one hand officials who had reached a certain grade obtained a title of nobility, while on the other hand the nobility reserved for itself the majority of the higher posts, so that the "table of ranks" lost the character which Peter the Great had wished it to preserve, and little by little became, at least in respect of its higher grades, a fresh means of reinforcing the power of the nobility.

The seigneurs, absolute and irresponsible masters of their serfs in their *pomiestiés*, dealt with affairs of State in the same spirit. The administration of the Empire resembled that of a seigneurial domain. Public interest was assimilated to private interest in that the officials whose duty it was to watch over it subordinated it to their personal aspirations and made use of it to enrich themselves. All other classes—the *bourgeoisie*, higher and lower, the peasantry, and the clergy—were regarded as inferior to the nobility. Russia had become a State of nobles.

II

In one of the chapters of the first Part of this book I have demonstrated that the increasing power of the nobility was opposed to the economic evolution of the country, and also checked the development of capitalistic industry. From the third quarter of the eighteenth century an opposition between the economic tendencies and the political forms of the State became increasingly apparent.

Moreover, the peasants, exploited by the nobles, began to grow impatient. As early as the reign of Yelisaveta a series of disturbances broke out in the midst of the rural population.

All these disorders on the one hand, and on the other the invasion of European ideas, impelled the Government of Catherine II to attempt certain reforms.

As to the foreign inspiration of Catherine's ideas, modern historians have discovered that it was far more extensive, although far more superficial, than was formerly supposed. It has been proved that the most important political work of this sovereign, that known as the *Nakaz*, was merely a systematic plagiarism of Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*. M. Pokrovsky states that Catherine simply stole from Montesquieu. M. Haumant, more chivalrous in his dealings with this crowned head, expresses the same opinion with more politeness. "Indeed," he says, "in the *Nakaz* it is Montesquieu who, wielding the pen of Catherine, treats of government, of justice, of the rights of the citizen—excepting when, as occasionally, it is his disciple Beccaria."

Catherine wrote her *Nakaz* (Instructions) so that it might serve as instructions to the Commission which was to elaborate the new code of laws; a Commission invoked by her in 1767, again under the impulse of Western Liberalism. This body was composed of delegates of the various classes of society, the clergy and the peasantry excepted. This exclusion of the

peasantry shows that the Government's views were not sufficiently broad to assure *all* citizens of the possibility of making audible their complaints and their desires.

The labours of the Commission, whose members, coming from various regions of Russia, presented the *nakazy* of their electors, brought to light, in the first place, a conflict between the nobility and the *bourgeoisie* of the cities, the latter being prejudiced by the privileges of the former, and, secondly, the fact that the nobles themselves were not satisfied with the situation, but desired to extend their rights by limiting the power of the monarch. Severe criticism was expressed by the members of the Commission, and Catherine replied by dissolving the assembly. Thus died, before it had really entered upon life, this feeble imitation of the States General of France.

This brief incident shows how far Russia then differed from France. The convocation of the States General in France led to the revolutionary movement and the end of the monarchy; the rapid dissolution of the Commission of 1767, on the other hand, proves that in Russia the monarchical power won the day against the forces which might have become hostile to it. In France the Third Estate, having become economically stronger than the noblesse, was in a position to seize upon the political reins also; whereas in Russia the noblesse, economically and politically, kept the upper hand. The last States General convoked in France resulted in a clash between the Third Estate and the nobility, which was supported by the power of royalty; the Russian Commission of 1767 betrayed only the most superficial disagreement between the nobility and absolutism.

The dissolution of the Commission irritated the nobles; but a social and political danger made its appearance, which suddenly reconciled them with the central power: the insurrection directed against them both by the Cossacks and the peasants, led by Yemelian Pugatshev, during the years 1773-75.

Pugatshev's rising had nothing anti-monarchical about it; indeed, its leader, in order to gain the sympathies of the population, assumed the title of the Tsar Peter III (who had been deposed and put to death by Catherine II's supporters). The Cossacks and peasants led by him rose against the Empress in the name of the "lawful Tsar"; another dissimilarity to the beginnings of the French Revolution, in which the republican tendencies were so evident.

But the *Pugatshevshchina* had well-defined social aims: it was directed against the nobles, of whom more than fourteen hundred (according to the official figures) were hanged by Pugatshev and his partisans.

Catherine had reasons for fearing this revolt. She herself had aggravated the economical and legal conditions of the peasants; by one of her ukases she forbade serfs to lodge complaints against their masters in the courts or with the Government. This inhuman measure dated from 1767—that is, the very year in which the Empress convoked the famous Commission which was to elaborate the new code, and copied, in her manuscript books, the liberal propositions of the French Encyclopædists. Three delegates sent to Petersburg, despite the prohibition, by serfs employed in provincial industries, in order to lodge complaints against those who were exploiting them and torturing them, were cruelly punished, each receiving a hundred blows of the knout, after which their noses were burned with hot irons and they were deported to Siberia for life.

While discussing lofty problems of justice and liberty with the French philosophers, Catherine extended serfdom, introducing it in regions in which it had never yet existed (in the Ukraine). She distributed lands with the peasants dwelling thereon to many of her favourites. She was thus personally interested in the *régime* against which Pugatshev had taken up arms. The *Pugatshevshchina* reconciled her with that portion of the nobility which the fate of the Commission inclined to rebellion. In face of the danger threatening them,

peasants, nobles, and the autocracy were united. The phraseology of the "cobblers" was quickly rejected by the alarmed nobles.

Later on it was the French Revolution which gave the masters of Russia another lesson of the same kind. The schemes of liberal reform were finally forgotten by Catherine, and the country, at the end of her reign, retained the same seigniorial *régime* as before her time. It is true that Catherine II wished to make certain concessions to the middle-class citizen, and she published, in 1785, the "Charter granted to the Cities," which enabled them to elect municipal councils or *dumy*. But these *dumy* had no real power and no real rights; they were empowered and intended merely to supervise the incidence and collection of the taxes, whose tariff was determined not by them, but by the Government. The sovereign authority, on the other hand, became still more powerful. The number of the governors increased, and their powers were extended, under Catherine II, who created new *gubernii*, and then a mass of administrative and judicial machinery in each *guberniya*; the *gubernskoyé pravlenié* for general administration, the *kazennaya palata* (fiscal chamber), and the *kaznatsheistvo* (treasury), and certain general and special tribunals. This system brought a certain external order into the working of the machinery of oppression, and it subsisted into the middle of the nineteenth century, until the "Period of the Great Reforms," under Alexander II. But at bottom it was half-bureaucratic, half-feudal. The governors, officially termed "masters of the *guberniya*," justified their title by exercising an absolute power, and the memory of the "satraps of Catherine" is even yet not extinct. These officials were selected from among the noble seigneurs.

The nobility also obtained a "charter" from Catherine; it bore no resemblance whatever to the charter of the cities, but completed the emancipation of the nobility, which was commenced by the mani-

festos of 1762. Finally liberated from all responsibility toward the State, it was endowed with a corporative Constitution, with the faculty of forming, in each *guberniya*, a privileged body, and the right of representation in all the various administrative bodies. It therefore shared with the Crown in the direction of affairs.

Such were the reforms of Catherine, the pupil of Voltaire, Diderot, and Montesquieu. Such was the orientation of the life of the Russian Empire at the precise moment when the noblesse of France was on the eve of losing all its privileges and the French people was changing the monarchy for a Republic.

II

A few changes of form were thus introduced in the local administrations, but Catherine left intact the entire central organism of the Empire and its entire social basis. Yet she herself perfectly well understood that it was precisely here that the real Europeanization of the Government must commence.

The principal peculiarity of the modern European State, which distinguishes it from the feudal State-domain, in which the private interest of the master replaces the public interest, and of the Asiatic despotism, in which the personal will of the sovereign is above all laws, consists precisely in the fact that its legislation is not subject to the arbitrary will of an absolute monarch. This principle was still unknown to the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century.

Catherine II wished to remedy this grave defect. She devotes a page of her *Nakaz* to proving the necessity of establishing a juridical distinction between a law, which is a stable disposition, and a ukase, which it issued on account of a particular and ephemeral need. In order that the laws should derive from another source than the Governmental decrees, it was therefore necessary to create legislative institutions. Catherine II did nothing of the kind; she maintained the omnipo-

tence of the autocrat, the legislator, and the master of the Government. In this respect, therefore, the Empire was inferior to the Muscovite *zemstvo* of the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, which comprised a *Boyarskaiya* (Council of *Boyars*) entrusted with the preparation of new laws, and the *Zemskié Sobory* (territorial assemblies), to which the representatives of the various provinces were convoked from time to time in order to discuss the principal problems of legislation.

Catherine's successor was completely hostile to all ideas of national representation.¹ He preferred to govern by means of ukases, issued at random, which dealt with the most important affairs of State and the pettiest questions of private life, conditioning even the shape of hats or carriages. The permanent intervention of the supreme power contributed greatly to increase the hatred felt for it by its subjects. Alexander I had to devote several months to issuing a series of ukases annulling those of his predecessor.

Then Alexander I and his collaborators began to elaborate schemes of reform. The necessity of re-establishing the alliance with England having been one of the principal causes of the fall of Paul I, his son, at the beginning of his reign, displayed a certain degree of Anglophilia, under the influence of his "young friends," Novossiltsev and Kotshubey. There was some question of creating a House of Lords and a responsible Ministry, after the English pattern. The celebrated English jurist, Jeremy Bentham, was asked for his advice.

But in place of a House of Lords the year 1801 saw the birth of a Permanent Council (*Nepremenny Soviet*), appointed by the Emperor, whose mission was "to establish the power and the prosperity of the Empire on the immovable foundation of the law." He also

¹ The following fact proves the strength of this hostility: Paul I undertook a journey in the east of Russia in the company of a member of his suite, who showed him a wood, saying, "Your Majesty, these are the first representatives of the forests of the Ural." Paul was so offended by the phrase that he disgraced the person who had employed it.

created responsible Ministries, but they were responsible only to the Emperor. The Senate, in 1802, obtained the right to make "representations" to the Emperor respecting defective laws and ukases; but when it ventured to make use of this privilege the Emperor appeared to be so greatly displeased that it did not repeat the experiment. The first years of Alexander's reign did no more than introduce a few superficial modifications of the bureaucratic machine.

In reality, a fancy for reform and the real aspirations of the absolute power were irreconcilable. "Alexander positively desired that the ministers should be responsible. 'But if a minister refused to countersign a ukase of your Majesty's,' some one objected, 'would that ukase nevertheless be valid?' 'Certainly,' he replied; 'my ukase must in any case be executed.' That is how he conceived responsibility."¹

Ten years later Alexander was attacked by a fresh access of the reforming fever, and entrusted Speransky with the preparation of a scheme of complete renovation as regards the central institutions of the State. An admirer of Napoleonic France, Speransky borrowed therefrom nearly all the essential elements of his structure. He admitted the principle of the separation of powers, concentrated the executive in the hands of the Council of Ministers, referred the judicial power to the Senate and the legislative power to a State Duma (*Gosudarstvennaya Duma*), consisting of deputies elected according to the principles of the French Constitution of the year VIII.

This system was fairly favourable to the *bourgeois* influences in social and economic life. A modern historian even regards Speransky as "the interpreter of a *bourgeoisie* enriched by the Continental Blockade, and aspiring to overthrow the autocracy and the privileges of the nobles by means of a Constitution." It is to be

¹ A. Pypine, Member of the Imperial Academy of Petersburg, *The Social Movement in Russia under Alexander I*, 3rd ed. (Petersburg, 1900), p. 118.

remarked, by the way, that it was under Alexander I that the *bourgeoisie* was finally permitted to buy landed property, a privilege previously confined to the nobles.

But the "Third Estate" of Russia once more proved too weak to despoil the nobility, and Speransky's plan was executed only very imperfectly.

The State Duma projected by him, although consultative and deprived of any right of initiative, seemed too dangerous to the autocracy, and a Council of State only was established (*Gosudarstvennyi Soviet*), appointed by the Emperor. According to Speransky, the legal decisions of this Council were to possess the force of law only after the approbation of the Emperor, while the Imperial ordinances, issued in the form of ukases, could not be regarded as laws. But Alexander never regarded himself as bound by the decisions of the Council; very often he approved of the recommendations not of the majority but the minority, and sometimes he would even take the part of a single member against all the rest, annulling the entire work of the Assembly by a stroke of the pen.

Toward the end of his reign the *rôle* of the Council of State was reduced to the vanishing-point, and the Council of Ministers possessed itself of the entire legislative power, submitting directly to the Imperial approbation measures which should have been passed by the Council of State.

After 1815 the spirit of reaction finally got the upper hand, raising to power a brutal and unintelligent man, the cruel Count Araktsheev. The official attempt to reorganize and Europeanize the State was thus checkmated. "Russian progress does not follow a straight line, but zigzags," and "the fair commencement of the days of Alexander" ended in a gloomy regression.

III

The power of the State continually failing to realize any real amelioration of the political system, the Liberals and progressives endeavoured to make up for

its deficiencies. The solution adopted by the Decembrists was more radical than that of the "young friends" of Alexander and Speransky. Instead of a subtle distinction between a "law" and a "ukase," between a legal measure voted by the Council of Empire and a personal decree of the sovereign's, they intended to evade even the possibility of a conflict between the two authorities, and to confine legislation to one single and constitutional source.

The Decembrists sought models in Europe; their projects for a *constitutziya* (constitution) were copied from Western institutions.

The more modern were borrowed from England. That of Nikita Muraviev consisted, according to the testimony of his comrade Yakushkin, of "an abridged reproduction of the British Constitution." Some historians assert (and M. Emile Haumant repeats in his *Culture française en Russie*) that the partisans of Nikita Muraviev had obtained the essential points of their system from the laws of the United States. "The Constitution of the United States furnished most of the articles relating to the power of the prince." This is an obvious error, for the United States knew nothing of the "power of the prince," so could not afford any precedent on this point. A contemporary says of Muraviev's project: "Admitting the monarchical form of government, it differed fundamentally from the American Constitution in the aristocratic principle of its franchise. . . . It granted the enjoyment of political rights to a fairly considerable franchise as regards eligibility, and a smaller, but still indispensable rating, as regards the electorate." It was, therefore, not from the American Constitution that the moderate Decembrists obtained the fundamental elements of their own project, but only its details. For the general provisions of the scheme it was always to England that they applied.

Nikita Muraviev even placed under contribution some articles of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, this being at the time the newest, although its origins went back

to the French Constitution of 1791 and the Declaration of Rights.

His comrades, more radical, having Pestel at their head, were the immediate pupils of France. Pestel followed Destutt de Tracy step by step; to him he owed all that was essential in his conceptions; a strongly pronounced republicanism, an absolute rejection of hereditary monarchy, and governmental centralization. In France also he found an organization of the powers of the State suited to his Russian Republic: a Directory resembling that of the year III, two legislative assemblies, like the Council of Ancients and the Five Hundred, judicial institutions, etc.

The Decembrists were the disciples of Europe also in the matter of the means by which they should attain their ends. The political societies which they founded reproduced the European models which those of their party who had served in the last wars against France had learned to know in the West. The statutes which they drafted were an adaptation, sometimes an almost literal translation, of those of the German *Jugendbund*. Naturally, the Decembrist associations, being illegal and revolutionary, had no other resemblance to the *Jugendbund*, which was legal and conservative, having been formed "to support the throne of the sovereign of Prussia and the House of Hohenzollern against the immoral spirit of the period"—that is, the revolutionary spirit. This is why the Decembrists, while borrowing the phrasing of their statutes from the *Jugendbund*, borrowed the spirit of their activity from Republican France and her institutions.

They were particularly impressed by the Spanish revolutionary movement, which was directed, like their own, by officers. The leader of the military rising of 1820, General Riego, who was executed, was for them a "holy martyr," and they distributed his portrait in Petersburg in a spirit of propaganda. The history of Spain filled some Russian Liberals with hatred of the monarchy and attached them to the Republic. The

author of one of the projected Constitutions, Count Dmitriev Momanov, wrote that the Spanish system was a very wise one, but was not entirely suited to Russia, since it retained the monarchical principle. "What has become of the members of the Cortès?" he asks indignantly. "They were deported, tortured, condemned to death—and by whom? By an animal for whom they had preserved the crown."

M. Haumant reproaches the Decembrists with not having reckoned sufficiently with the spirit of the public, which was not ready for the transformations imagined by them, and with having sought "to transplant France into Russia." This reproach is not merited, for the Decembrists made many concessions to the ideas and conditions then prevailing, and even to the interests of the nobles, to which class they belonged. Other modern historians accuse the Decembrists of having been too moderate in the social department of their programme.

What is certain is that the love of country animated the Decembrists and guided all their aspirations. On the other hand, the reactionary policy which they were fighting so ardently was truly inimical to the nation, hindering its development, and was only too often inspired by alien influences, as is very clearly demonstrated by the Russian academician, A. Pypine, in his excellent work on *The Social Movement in Russia under Alexander I.*

"Shortly after the Congress of Vienna the peoples emerged from their enchantment. Instead of free institutions the reaction created that 'policeman's State' which, says a German writer, 'knew nothing of citizens dwelling in a fatherland, but merely ruled herds which were brutish as domestic cattle.' This form of 'policeman's State' had long been established in Germany and Austria. During the later years of Alexander's reign an attempt was made to extend it to Russia; the procedures and the language which this form of government had invented were adopted, and were for a long time to maintain themselves intact in our country. After the

Congress of Vienna, Alexander was surrounded by the inspirations and the secret counsels of the German reactionaries. . . . Hatred of popular liberty reached an especial development in Austria. In Vienna the aristocratic reaction was hatching its schemes. Metternich and his right hand, Geuz, invented a theory of reaction ; and the house of the Russian Ambassador, A. Razoumovsky, became, among others, an asylum for aristocrats from all parts of Europe. The higher circles of Russian society, which prided itself on its political influence, and liked to think itself a power in European affairs, readily absorbed the ideas of the Austrian feudalists and the French *émigrés*. . . . Austrian diplomacy, as early as 1813, was suspicious of the democratic movement in Prussia. . . . The King of Prussia readily assented to these suggestions, and even went beyond them. . . . We know, on the other hand, what were the opinions of the French Emperor, who could not suffer the word 'constitution,' even in the medical sense. Such were the men to whom the Emperor Alexander joined himself to form the Holy Alliance. . . . We will not enter into the details of the ways in which the European reaction crept into Alexander's mind ; it is enough to say, that by 1820 he shared its views, and the last years of his reign presented a strange imitation of the measures then invented by the German 'policeman's State' against pretended conspiracies and an imaginary spirit of revolution." †

The work of the external reaction was reinforced internally by that of the aristocrats and the foreign bureaucrats in general and the German bureaucrats in particular. Even during the war of 1812 certain Russians were annoyed by the preponderating power exerted by the aliens in Alexander's immediate entourage, and by the German generals in particular, certain of whom were thoroughly incapable, like the famous General Pfuhl, of whom Tolstoj gives us so

† A. Pypine, *op. cit.* pp. 431-33.

living a portrait in his *War and Peace*. This clearly explains the ultra-nationalistic traits to be found in the projected Constitutions of the Russian Liberals and Radicals of Alexander's reign. Thus Dmitriev-Mamonov held that the members of the House of Lords which he considered necessary should be of the Græco-Russian faith, and none were to be elected to the second chamber but Russians, members of the Orthodox Church. The Order of the Knights of Russia, the precursor of the Decembrist societies, aimed, among other things, at "depriving foreigners of all influence in affairs of State," and even at "deporting for good and all, and even putting to death, foreigners occupying posts in the State." One of the Decembrist leaders, A. Muraviev, on founding the political society known as the Union of Security, stated that it was destined to "fight the Germans in the service of Russia."

Among those who took part in the insurrection of December 14, 1825, we find very few bearers of German names. Pestel, and Pushkin's friend, the poet Kuchelbaecker, were sincere Russian patriots, though of German birth. The very names of the Decembrist and anti-Decembrist societies proclaim their nationalism; the Order of *Russian* Knights, the Society of United *Slavs*.

Among their adversaries, the aristocracy and the reactionary bureaucrats, German names were of common occurrence; and the Germans displayed a great activity. The first disturbances in the Imperial Guard, which occurred in 1820, were provoked by the hateful brutality of the German colonel, Schwarz, commander of the Semenovskiy Regiment. The Decembrist insurrection itself was crushed by German hands. When the insurgents assembled in the Place du Sénat in order to demand a Constitution, and began their armed attack (which was not well prepared), the Russian generals did not know what to do. But "the Baltic officers decided to take the initiative, and it was on the advice of Baron Tol that artillery fire was opened upon the conspirators." Nicolas I desired, later on, to "draw a

veil over the part played by the Germans in the repression of the rising," says M. Pokrovsky, but "when one runs through the list of the champions of the 'rightful cause' against the revolt, one is struck by the abundance of Baltic names: those of the Benkendorffs, Grünwalds, Frederichs, and Kaulbars gleam from every page." In fact, says M. Pokrovsky, the German noblesse of the Baltic provinces "was the most strongly feudal of all the nobles of the Empire."

"The most loyal of the Germans" was Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, general in the Russian Army; and it was he who assumed the command of the troops hurled against the insurrection.

CHAPTER IV

I. The Tartaro-Prussian Empire under Nicolas I—The knout and the *shpitzruteny*—The necessity of reforms. II. The "Period of the Great Reforms" and its European sources—A fresh step to the rear.

I

THE revolution once suppressed, and the Decembrists hanged or deported and legal order re-established, it only remained for the Government of Nicolas I to maintain it. How disastrous were the measures taken with this end in view we have already seen by the opinion quoted on an earlier page, of General Kuropatkin, ex-Minister of War. Under Nicolas I the despotic Asiatic conceptions of government attained their greatest expansion, and the Russian Tsar became "the most powerful sovereign in the world." In order to preserve his power intact, the Government endeavoured to separate Russia from the civilization of the West by hermetically sealed partitions. The only "European" model which it regarded as worthy of being followed in Russia was the police and military system of Prussia. To combine the slavery of the East with the discipline of the Prussian barracks—this was the naïve ideal of the autocracy and the bureaucracy.

It was realized to perfection in the "military colonies" organized by Count Araktsheev. The peasants attached to these colonies lived in houses of the same dimensions and the same colour, which were ranged along the street like a rank of soldiers. They cultivated the soil, divided, like soldiers, into companies, under the supervision and command of

“leaders.” Their agricultural labours were thus veritably “militarized” in the Prussian manner, and their life as well. Every action, every movement of these peasants was regulated and ordered beforehand.

The administration was convinced that the authorities ought to inspire a “salutary dread” in the people. The Tartar knout and the German *shpitzruteny* were its principal instruments.¹ Here is a description of the punishment of the *shpitzruteny* introduced by Arakshiev, whose name (*spitzruten*) indicates its origin:—

“A thousand brave Russian soldiers stand in two ranks, facing one another. In the hand of each man is placed a rod—*shpitzruten*; the living ‘green lane’ is gaily waving, swaying in the air. They bring the criminal, naked to the belt; his arms are attached to the stocks of two muskets; before him march two soldiers, who make sure that he shall go forward slowly, so that the *shpitzruten* shall have time to leave its marks on his skin. Behind him, on a sledge, is a coffin. The sentence is read; the lugubrious rolling of the drum is heard. One, two! And the green lane begins to lash the victim on the right side, then on the left. . . . In a few minutes his body is covered with broad stripes, red and contused; the drops of blood spring to the surface. . . . ‘Have pity, my little brothers!’ This cry pierces the dull rolling of the drum. But to have pity is to be beaten in turn, then and there. So the lane of birch-rods strikes more fiercely. Soon the back and sides are simply one wound; here and there the skin comes off in strips. The living dead advances slowly,

¹ M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu states that the word knout “seems rather of Aryan origin, if it is not Germanic; it has at all events the same root as the German *knoten*” (*L’Empire des Tsars et les Russes*, vol. ii. p. 414, 3rd ed.). “For the rest, corporal punishments were characteristic of ancient Russia, in which the Byzantine influence was perhaps in reality more ancient than the Tartar influence.” To this assertion we may oppose that of Count Orlov, who declared, as long ago as 1861, that “where Russia was able to develop without the direct influence of the Mongols and the *tshinovniki* there were no corporal punishments.”

bound to the rifle-butts, covered with tatters of his own flesh, wildly rolling his leaden eyes. . . . He falls. But he must still be beaten—for a long time yet. The body is placed on the sledge and again he passes, and again, between the two ranks, whence fall without intermission the blows of the *shpitzruteny*, which cut into the bloody pulp. The moans have ceased ; one hears only a sort of clapping sound, like the sound of a stick striking the water, and the funeral drums are muttering still.”¹

A State in which such savagery survived—even though ordered and disciplined in the Prussian manner—could not long co-exist with civilized States. Russia was forced either to fall asunder or to transform herself.

II

When the *débâcle* of the Crimea had opened the eyes of all those who were capable of understanding, demonstrating the impossibility of maintaining the *ancien régime*, Russia, as in her earlier crises, applied to the civilization of the West for remedies. The “great reforms” of 1860-70 were thus merely a phase of Europeanization. Thus they appeared to their partisans, as well as to their adversaries.

One publicist, for example, a noble and a reactionary, opposed them in order to preserve the old institutions:—

“Each *volost* (canton) is governed by a parliament ; in each *ouyezd* (district) there is a parliament ; in the *gubernii* there will probably be the same,” he complains with indignation, “and finally, the centre of the State must be transformed in the same manner. Thus centralization is adopted for the basis of the administration, and a condition of this centralization is parliamentarism. And the surroundings necessary to this monster, we have them, too : justice rendered publicly, oral procedure, the division of powers, and, to cap it all, the jury. In

¹ Gregor Djanshiev, *The Period of the Great Reforms*, 9th ed. (Moscow, 1905), pp. 187, 188.

a word, instead of Russia we see a Western State. Gentlemen, in the matter of the reactionary demands of the Liberals, have you not gone too far along the path of transformation?"¹

The partisans of this "transformation" considered, on the other hand, that the reforms ought to be carried as far as possible, precisely because the state of Russia was so backward; and that no compromise with the old Russia was acceptable. Here, for example, is what a provincial Procurator wrote during the discussion of the judicial reform, which was effected in 1864:—

"In England the people and the Government, society and justice, develop simultaneously. The result is that these factors agree and collaborate, and the law is a common product and a common possession. As for our society, it participated in nothing; it existed in a state of lethargy."

Replying to those who wished to "go slowly," the same writer replied:—

"On the contrary, we must transform things more rapidly and more resolutely. Deliberateness in reforms is always harmful; the help of all is necessary. Half-measures never lead us to the goal; they are almost always disastrous. Everything must be transformed at the same time. For, if the old system is not good, it must be suppressed entirely, not in part; we must not mix the old with the new. . . . If we were not alive, humanity existed. That which humanity has acquired, with that we must endow our resurrection, and by means of reforms take our part of the good which belongs to all the peoples, and for which the advanced peoples have laboured in the interests of humanity."²

To those who expressed the fear—generally factitious—that sudden reforms might provoke administrative

¹ Among the most notorious agents of reaction and oppression under Nicolas I we find, as always, the bearers of aristocratic German names, the Counts Adlerberg, Benckendorf, Kleinmichel, etc.

² J. Guessen, *The Reform of the Judiciary* (Petersburg, 1905), pp. 82-4.

disorder, the champions of progress cited the experience of the European States.

“Among others, the example of Hanover (where the situation, as regards the judicial organization, was perhaps even worse than with us) demonstrates the possible rapidity and facility of such transformations. Publicity of judicial debates was in Hanover introduced at a single stroke, by the law of the 8th of November 1850; and the oldest magistrates and advocates accepted it with enthusiasm. It was the same in Piedmont. This proves that there is no need of any gradation in reform.”

The same divergence appeared in respect of each separate question. In the course of the discussion on the introduction of the jury system, a Conservative Senator wrote :—

“Authentic information as to this form of jurisdiction dates only from the reign of Henry III, from a time when the struggle against revolt had ceased only after the King had confirmed the *Magna Charta Libertatum* of John Lackland. . . . The jury, born of a period thus full of disturbances, and under the conditions described, was doubtless regarded not as a means merely of ameliorating the judicial system, but also as a weapon to defend the interests of the people against the encroachments of the supreme power.” And as Russia, he adds, is an autocracy, “the jury will be in absolute contradiction to the fundamental laws of the State.”

To these excesses of loyalism a provincial advocate objected the modern history of England. Against the proposal to withhold political crimes from the competence of the jury, he fulminates in the following terms : “It is said that these exceptions are in imitation of France, and that they do not exist in England. One may inquire, however, where the greatest tranquillity reigns—among the French people or the English.”¹

European experience was of service not only in philosophic discussions of a private nature concerning the

¹ J. Guessen, op. cit. p. 93.

“great reforms,” but also in the labours of the official bodies which were preparing the texts of the new laws.

Thus the Government instructed a special commission to study the organization of the judiciary in Europe, and particularly in France and England. In the rescript relating to its labours, which was published at the beginning of 1862, it is stated that the new judicial system is to be established “according to the teachings of science and the experience of the European States.”

As M. Leroy-Beaulieu remarks in his *Empire des Tsars*, “neither the teachings of science nor the counsels of experience were lacking among the promoters of the judicial reform.” In its liberty to do all things and attempt all things the St. Petersburg Government had on this occasion by no means set its mind upon doing something new. The reform of the courts was less an original creation than a combination and adaptation of various elements, nearly all of which were borrowed from the more advanced nations of Europe.¹ M. Leroy-Beaulieu considers that the reorganization of the judicial system was more successful than the other “great reforms” precisely because of the preponderating influence of European examples.

“If the judicial reform was the most largely conceived and the most resolutely executed of all the great reforms of the Emperor Alexander II, it was for this reason: instead of being based on empirical data and the convenience of the moment, it had a rational basis, reposing at once on general ideas accepted by all modern peoples, and on the practice of the more civilized States. Thus, despite the repeated deviations of a Government always too liable to go back on its own laws, this reform displayed what was often lacking to contemporary reforms: unity and consistency.”

In this connection, how was it that the teaching derived from Europe was most plainly evident and most closely followed in the domain of justice in particular? The reason is that the attempt to Europeanize

¹ A. Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Empire des Tsars*, vol. ii. p. 289.

Russia which was made in Alexander's time had its point of departure in the *embourgeoisement* of Russia. A stable, prompt, and uniform judicial system is an essential condition of the civil and economic relations of a *bourgeois* system of Government. We know, for example, that the invasion of Oriental countries by Europeans and European capital has always led to the establishment of the system of "capitulations," which renders them amenable to special tribunals and protects them from native justice. European forms and elements having permeated the economic life of Russia, it became necessary to Europeanize the judicial institutions, wholly archaic and Asiatic, which well merited their characteristic cognomen of *volokita* (from *volotshit*, which means to protract, to spin out). And as the old Russian justice was in reality the negation of all justice, it was necessary to suppress it altogether and to replace it by an entirely new system. Even the nobles and the bureaucrats understood that this necessity was absolute, and they did not oppose the judicial reform as energetically as they opposed other reforms, in which the influence of Europe was less apparent.

In my *Modern Russia* I have explained the character of the "great reforms" accomplished by the Government of Alexander II, and notably of the agrarian reform of 1861, and the introduction of local self-government in 1861 and 1870. Even then the seigneurs and bureaucrats were striving to maintain their domination and to safeguard their interests. The peasants, although now liberated, remained in economic and juridical dependence on the nobles. The *zemstvos* were subject to the property franchise, and the system of electoral curia, in which the nobles predominated. Members of the urban municipalities also were elected by a property franchise. The *zemstvos* and the municipalities were placed under the tutelage of the Governors; and the presidency of the *zemstvos* became a privilege of the marshals of the noblesse. In 1863 corporal punishments were abolished in principle, except

in the case of peasants, on whom the rural tribunals could still inflict such punishment. In short, the "great reforms" emerged from the hands of the Governmental commissions diminished and mutilated; the feudal system was not definitely overthrown, and a little later, under Alexander III, it took its revenge.

The counter-reformation accomplished by this monarch is in a certain measure to be explained by international causes, but indirectly only. As I have already pointed out in my *Modern Russia*, it really originated as a slackening or relative decline of economic activity. The agrarian crisis, which had hampered the progress of agriculture and other forces of production in general, lowered the standard of material life, and, consequently, of social and political life. The reinforcement of old economic forms and relations resulted in the revival of the old political spirit.

Now, the agrarian crisis and the economic regression which occurred about 1880 resulted from a factor of world-wide importance: the appearance of American wheat in the European markets, where it eliminated its competitors, and, consequently, the cereals of Russia. The falling prices which resulted from this invasion started the crisis in Russia. The Government of Alexander III was incapable of remedying the evil by progressive means; it could discover no other resource than regression.

The seigneurial restoration reached its apogee in 1889, in the institution of the *zemskié natshalniki* ("chiefs of the soil"), who were functionaries recruited from the nobility, and invested with administrative and judicial power over the peasantry. This was, in fact, a partial return to serfdom.

For the rest, the American invasion of the European market, and the sudden changes which it occasioned, were not the only factors of the political and social reaction which Russia then underwent; the governing classes must also be held responsible. The spirit of caste had warped the work of reformation under

Alexander II ; the directing circles had limited the Europeanization of Russia by clinging as far as possible to the old order of things.

It is a singular fact that they themselves went to Europe for their ideas. For example, they quoted in favour of the re-establishment of corporal punishment an English peer who, so they claimed, had declared that humanity could be perfected only by means of the rod. The celebrated Pobiedonostzev, opposing the jury system, invoked the testimony of European experts (English in particular), who were opposed to this "unhappy institution." As for their measures against the Press, the Russian reactionaries sought for precedents in the France of Napoleon III and the statutes of his censorship.

The Germans were no strangers to the doings of the reaction which occurred toward the end of the nineteenth century. To please the Conservatives, the Government placed at the head of the Ministry of Justice a Baltic *Junker* of the Protestant faith—Count Palen—whose appointment, according to another well-known Conservative, Meshtshersky, "was intended as a corrective of the excess of Liberalism occasioned by the new judicial institutions." Sometimes the Germans remained behind the scenes ; such was the case with the Tsar's aide-de-camp, General Grünwald, who occupied the modest post of Master of the Imperial Stud, but who opposed a powerful resistance to the reformation of the Russian Army (he was opposed to general and obligatory military service, which, mingling young men of education with the simple sons of the soil, might have served to enlighten them) ; and he helped to introduce into Russia the classical school, disciplined in the Prussian manner. Somewhat later the talent for organization displayed by the Germans—but in the service of reaction rather than in that of revolution—was brilliantly exemplified in the person of Count Plehve, who was killed by the Terrorists after he had employed his police to terrorize the whole Empire.

CHAPTER V

- I. The problem of national representation under Alexander II and the constitutional movement. II. The Duma—Foreign elements in the representative system in Russia—Is the political mentality of the Russian people Asiatic or European? III. Some documents.

I

DESPITE all their imperfections, which were aggravated by subsequent remodelling, the institutions created during the "Period of Great Reforms" constituted a considerable advance. But their operation, and their existence even, were extremely precarious. We might in this connection cite the opinion of a Russian Conservative, who, when certain innovations were being discussed, declared them to be incompatible with the basic principle of the Russian system—that is, the autocratic power. He was right, and the more improvements were involved by the new state of things, and the more "Europeanism," the more profound, necessarily, was the hostility between them and the *ancien régime*. M. Guessen, the historian of the judicial reformation, makes this remark. He considers that the new justice, from the first days of its introduction into Russia, "entered into the organism of the State like a foreign body, which, according to the general law of physiology, must be assimilated or eliminated." One might say as much of the other great reforms of Alexander II, and of local self-government in particular.

The imminence of a conflict between the organs which had just been created and the old central power was obvious from the time of their appearance. Also, the reactionaries protested against the reforms, while

the Radicals and Liberals demanded their complement : they believed that it was indispensable "to crown the edifice"—that is, to reconstruct the State on constitutional principles. Immediately the *zemstvos* were created, several of these assemblies in various Governments of Russia presented addresses to the Tsar in which they expressed their desire to obtain the "crowning of the work." The secret political societies published proclamations in favour of the Constitution. And as the Government, far from giving way, increased its measures of repression, the movement of liberation assumed the morbid form of Terrorism.

The Terrorist agitation became particularly active after the war of 1877-78, which contributed to the political preoccupations of the Russian people and greatly irritated the more advanced spirits against the governmental system. For them it was not admissible that the Russian people, the liberator of the Balkan Slavs, could be unworthy of the parliamentary system conceded to their liberated brethren. M. A. Leroy-Beaulieu, who had occasion to study on the spot the spirit prevailing in Russian society after the war against Turkey, describes it in the following words :—

"It is painful to the Russians to remain politically inferior to the other States of Europe, almost all of which are to-day provided with Constitutions ; inferior even to their younger brothers of the Balkans, who are still minors, and were emancipated only yesterday. . . . Many Russians find it difficult to grasp the very serious reasons which render a liberal development more difficult in the great Empire of the North than in these lesser States, which were liberated by the Russian arms. Their eyes are offended by a contrast which the years will but render more sensible and more revolting."¹

The Government, which was not ignorant of these considerations, remained, however, immovable. Alexander II avowed that he saw nothing to object to in the constitutional system, but added that he

¹ A. Leroy-Beaulieu, *L'Empire des Tsars*, vol. ii. p. 581.

refused to assume the responsibility of introducing it into Russia. But he thereby burdened himself with a far heavier responsibility: that of depriving the people of its sole lawful means of expressing its will. And he became the victim of his own inconsequence, and of the violent struggle which the reformers, whose aspirations were awakened at the beginning of his reign, undertook against the return of the reaction.

It was a singular thing that the hesitations of Alexander II were provoked by the example of the French Revolution, whose lessons the Emperor did not sufficiently comprehend. Some weeks before his tragic death his ministers wished him to convoke a *consultative* assembly of Russian representatives. Alexander II replied to them: "Gentlemen, what is proposed to us is the assembly of notables of Louis XVI. We must not forget what followed." And "he postponed for some weeks the publication of the Act on which depended the future of the Empire and his own existence."¹

M. Leroy-Beaulieu recalls in this connection that Louis XVI also had shuffled and hesitated.

We must not, however, attribute to the ministers of Alexander II a foresight superior to his own. His Prime Minister, Loris-Melikov, in a report dated the 28th January 1881, denied the possibility of representative government in Russia.

"Russia cannot accommodate herself to a national representation invested with forms borrowed from the West. These forms are not only foreign to the Russian people, but might even shatter all the foundations of its political conceptions, and occasion a complete upheaval of ideas, of which it would be difficult to foresee the consequences. Similarly, we regard as inopportune the propositions advanced by certain of the supporters of the ancient forms of the Russian State, to create in Russia a *Zemskaiâ Douma*, or a *Zemskii Sobor*. Our period is so far removed from

¹ A. Leroy-Beaulieu, op. cit., vol. ii. p. 509.

that in which this ancient method of representation existed . . . that it would be difficult merely to resuscitate it. In any case it would be a dangerous attempt to return to the past." ¹

It goes without saying that to remain at a dead stop, without advancing toward Europeanization nor returning to national representation practised in Muscovite Russia, was a solution even less practical than resignation to the boldest Constitution.

II

After the violent death of Alexander II, those who governed, with the new Emperor at their head, discussed the question left in suspense by the defunct Tsar. Alexander III adopted the advice of Pobiedonostzev, his friend, who pronounced himself as absolutely opposed to any constitutional *régime*, and advised the Tsar not to add a central "debating society" to the local "debating societies," which, according to him, already existed, in the shape of the *zemstvos*, juries, etc. Instead of a national representation, even of the consultative type, Russia was subjected from that moment to a government by autocracy and the police, which was more and more accentuated as time went on; and not until a quarter of a century later were realized, very imperfectly, those ideas of parliamentary government which had penetrated Russia from Europe at the beginning of the century.

I will not here go into the European origins of the charter published on 17/30 October 1905, and known as the "Manifesto concerning Liberties." I will confine myself to drawing the reader's attention to the fact that the worst aspects of the "Constitution" at present existing in Russia are modelled upon the example of Prussia. Such is the system of the electoral "wards," which divide the electors into classes, like so many horses put into isolated stalls in a stable.

¹ S. Svatikov, *The Social Movement in Russia, 1700-1905* (Russian ed.), Rostov on the Don, 1905, pp. 129-30.

It is the same system as that on which the Prussian Landtag is based.

One might establish yet other points of resemblance between the representative system of Russia and that of Prussia, which are at the same time points of dissimilarity between the Russian constitutional legislation and the true parliamentary system of Western Europe. None the less, in spite of all its defects, the system of national representation which has been operating in Russia since 1906—with too many interruptions and dissolutions, it is true—has played a great part in the political evolution of the country.

The principal distinction between the European State and an Asiatic despotism is that in the former the population has the possibility of expressing its desires and its will, while in the latter it is destined to obligatory silence. Before the year 1905 the Russian people had not the right of speech. A long time ago a Russian Senator defined the principal character of the political life of Russia as dumbness.

“The Russian people is dumb,” said the Senator, “and has no power of reaction against abuses.”

The revolutionary movement of 1905 and the convocation of the Duma in 1906 established a line of demarcation between this ancient speechless Russia and the new Russia which can speak and dares to do so. And immediately after the introduction of national representation in Russia it became apparent that the popular masses of Russia were far more conscious and better prepared for constitutional government than was supposed.

III

When the independent Press insisted on the necessity of establishing a constitutional *régime* in Russia, the reactionaries always objected that the demands for reforms did not emanate from the people, but were an artificial product conceived in the brains of the intellectuals, who were alien to the people. The people

itself—asserted the reactionaries—had no thought of any modification of the political system, and had no organic need which corresponded with the constitutional demands.

The beginnings of the Duma gave the lie to these assertions in a striking fashion. In proof of this I will here quote some documents which have hitherto been very little known to the European public, but which have a great significance for those who wish to study the political mentality of the popular masses in Russia, and to solve for themselves the question whether this mentality is of a barbarous and Asiatic character, or whether, on the contrary, it is European and progressive.

These documents are the *nakazy*, concerning which I have already published a few passages in the English Press.¹

Just as in France in 1789, at the elections to the States-General, the populace drew up the famous *cahiers*, in which it set out its needs and troubles and gave hints to its representatives, so in 1906 and 1907, at the elections to the first two Dumas, the population of the Russian Empire presented its deputies with "grievances" or *nakazy*, in which it indicated the causes and the details of its discontent, and formulated its various economic and political desires.

While painting a gloomy picture of the condition of the country, the democratic electors pressed upon their representatives in the Duma demands for those changes which they considered necessary, at the same time indicating the manner in which these demands should be realized.

The drafting and presentation of the *nakazy* was no easy matter, and not without danger for the electors. Although the Government had summoned the population of the country to elect representatives, at the same time it directed all its efforts toward rendering it impossible for these representatives to express the genuine

¹ See *Darkest Russia*, 1913 (September, October).

will of their electors, and toward preventing any permanent and living connection between the constituencies and the deputies. "Untrustworthy" citizens who had been guilty of drawing up or signing a *nakaz* to their deputy were everywhere subjected to searches by the police, followed by acts of persecution. When, on the dispersion of the second Duma, searches were made at the residences of the deputies of the Left, the gendarmes and agents of the *Okhrana* were particularly zealous in ferreting out *nakazy*, letters, and complimentary addresses from electors.

The receipt of such communications figured as the chief count in the indictment of the Labour members of the second Duma. In the demand for the surrender of fifty-five Social Democratic deputies presented by the late M. Stolypin to the second Duma, these deputies were charged with having "received *nakazy* from troop units of the Vilna and Petersburg garrisons," and with having "collected the revolutionary demands of the poorer classes of the population."

But in spite of prohibitions and persecutions the electors were eager to communicate with their deputies. The deputies of the Left in the first two Dumas were overwhelmed by telegrams, letters, greetings, and mandates from every corner of the country, and from the most varied elements of the population. From the Northern Dvina and the Caucasus, from the Baltic and the Urals, from the shores of the Volga and from distant Siberia, from the village peasant and the city proletarian, from the artisan and the clerk, from the political exile and the Cossack of the Don, from the soldier and the sailor—from every quarter expressions of the popular desires and demands were showered upon the Duma. These were the genuine and authentic voice of the popular masses themselves.

The *nakazy* contained a very severe criticism of the state of affairs created in Russia by the inertia and malevolence of the bureaucracy and the egoism of the aristocracy.

“Arbitrariness and violence have reached their highest pitch,” declares the mandate of the employees at Duig’s factory in Petersburg.

Here are some examples of the contents of these *nakazy*.

The peasants of the canton of Kiinsk, in the Government of Novgorod, complain :—

“The condition of the lower classes has become unbearable. Everywhere . . . the hovering phantom of death is seen. The plunder of the people’s money and the abuse of authority on the part of officialdom has attained terrifying proportions.”

Especially bad was the condition of the peasantry.

A memorial to the second Duma from the subordinate employees of the Nicolas Railway (Petersburg-Moscow) thus describes the treatment of the peasants by the landowners :—

“You look upon the peasant as something worse than a useless dog, to whom one throws a gnawed crust of bread so that it shall not growl and go mad with hunger. There only remains one thing that you want—to restore serfdom, your former joy. But the people have not forgotten the old song. It is difficult to catch a bird once released from its cage.”

The peasants, when secretly communicating with their representatives in the Duma, connect the ruin of the villages with the general condition of the country, and find the source of their calamities in the autocratic and bureaucratic *régime*. In their mandate to the deputies for the Kuban province the peasants and workmen of one of its districts write :—

“You know, of course, without any reminder from us, that the whole of Russia is languishing under the yoke of an autocracy that has outlived itself. She is suffering from the arbitrariness of officials who rob the Treasury, who have disgraced Russia by an unfortunate war, who have ruined the country by unbearable taxes and imposts, and who have purposely kept the whole people in ignorance and slavery. You know that the

whole of Russia has been turned into a conquered country, with field courts-martial, martial law, extraordinary and increased *Okhrana*—a country where hundreds and thousands of men are butchered, shot, hanged, imprisoned, and sent to penal servitude, and where a simple mortal can invoke no laws whatever for safeguarding his honour and property.”

The workmen of a brickyard in the Caucasus conclude their mandate by complaining :—

“ In the absence of liberty of association we are compelled to gather secretly late at night in a half-lighted hut in order to draw up a mandate to our deputies.”

The workmen of the village of Novoselki, in the Government of Vladimir, make a pitiful appeal to their representatives :—

“ Try, in the Duma, to obtain rights for the oppressed and the downtrodden. Do not forget that far away, in a damp basement, something black and grimy is creeping about. The rays of the sun can hardly penetrate thither. Stretch out, therefore, a helping hand to your brethren.”

While painting the condition of the country in sombre colours, the democratic electors pressed upon their representatives demands for those reforms which they considered necessary, at the same time indicating the manner in which those demands should be realized.

The first and most urgent demand expressed in the mandates was for an amnesty for political exiles and prisoners, for the release of these champions of the people's liberty from their living tombs. “ We demand an amnesty for our fathers and brothers who have fought for the people's cause . . . for all those who have suffered for their political convictions. . . .” The inmates of the Morshansk prison pointed out to the members of the Duma that they owed their election, and the very existence of the Duma, to the fighters for liberty. . . . The amnesty must be complete and general. All those regarded by the Government as

“political criminals” must be liberated without any restrictions.

The electors of the town of Kustanay, in the province of Turgay, declare, in their mandate :—

“There must be an amnesty, because the men who are now languishing in prison and in exile have been endeavouring, by spreading the truth, to enlighten the ignorant people, to throw off the yoke of slavery from their shoulders, and to lead them toward a bright future, when the kingdom of God will be established upon earth—the kingdom of liberty, equality, and fraternity. They are men who keep firmly in mind the commandment of Christ to love one’s neighbour as oneself. Such men should receive gratitude and appreciation, instead of being persecuted and allowed to rot in prison.”

In these mandates the amnesty is regarded not as an act of grace or pardon but as the *lawful right* of men suffering from the arbitrary lawlessness of a despotic reaction, and it is claimed that this right should be recognized and realized through the Legislature. As the workers of Archangel put it :—

“Demand an amnesty in all political and religious cases—as a legislative measure—a full amnesty, not as an act of grace . . . but as a restoration of rights and liberties which have unlawfully been taken away, and see that it is extended to all those who have been judicially condemned or persecuted administratively for having fought against the Government.”

Other *nakazy* demand that the amnestied prisoners shall receive “temporary material provision,” or be restored to their homes at the expense of the State.

“An amnesty and the abolition of capital punishment is the cry which issues from the breast” of the democratic electors of Odessa. Indeed, it was obvious from the mandates that this demand was the unanimous cry of the whole country. Among the thousands of mandates, greetings, and letters received by the deputies there was not one that did not contain this claim. An amnesty was regarded by the people as the indispensable

preliminary of the political and social renovation of the country.

The workers of the Ural demand "the prosecution of the Minister of the Interior and other officials for infringing the Manifesto of October 30th, which granted the people inviolability of the person, liberty of conscience and of speech and of the Press, and which declared that no enactment should have the force of law without the sanction of the Duma."

A mandate from the Kuban province requires "the immediate dismissal of all Government authorities, who should be replaced by officials elected on the basis of a universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot." A mandate from the Government of Vladimir demanded the abolition of all class restrictions on the person and property of the peasants, as well as of all payments and burdens arising from class differentiation. . . . "The peasantry," affirm the Simbirsk peasants, "must be equalized in their rights with all other classes. The State must only consider the personal merits and capacities of its citizens, without reference to their origin."

"We demand the total abolition of classes. Let there be neither peasants nor burghers nor noblemen, but only Russian citizens," say the working men of Shuya.

Great importance is attributed to financial reform, including a radical change in the system of taxation. Indirect taxes should be replaced by a progressive income-tax. (In mandates from Petersburg, Kertsh, Archangel, Vladimir, Turgay, and elsewhere.)

Next comes a demand for the reform of local self-government, now in the hands of the upper classes.

"We demand that all local self-government bodies, whether urban or rural, shall be elected by secret ballot on a universal, equal, and direct franchise, so that the *zemstvos* and town councils shall no longer serve exclusively the interests of the rich, but shall administer to the needs of the whole population" (mandates from Archangel, Nijni Novgorod, Kiev, etc.).

Perhaps in no other country is the Church in greater subjection to the State than in Russia, where the clergy have become the administrative and police agents of the autocracy. The mandates demand the separation of Church and State, complete religious toleration, and the autonomy of the various denominations. The mandate of the Mussulman inhabitants of Petropavlovsk demands that "the ordinances of the Shariat, which regulate the entire religious, political, civil, and domestic life of the Mussulmans, shall be secure from violation by the Government. This demand is not only printed on paper, but is written in the hearts of our deputies."

As to the national question, not a single note of chauvinism is to be met with in any of the mandates.

Full equality of rights for all the nations inhabiting Russia and complete liberty of development—such is the claim of the democracy. Some of the mandates even go so far as to advocate the federative principle.

"We demand," runs a mandate from the Turgay province, "the autonomy of the provinces and communities, both urban and rural; the widest possible application of the federative principle in the mutual relations of the various nationalities; and the recognition of their absolute right to self-organization and proportional representation."

The mandates reflect in striking fashion the hostile attitude of the Russian democracy toward the Government's anti-Semitic policy. The workmen of the Vladimir Government demand "the committal for trial of all the pogrom executioners and their expulsion from the Duma."

Another illustration of the extreme aversion of democratic Russia from the pogrom campaign and its authors may be found in the following congratulatory mandate sent to the Duma by the Peasants' Assembly of Pokrovskaya, in the Government of Samara:—

"We greet the members of the Duma, and wish them to carry out our mandates. Our greetings do not extend, however, to Krushevan (who organized the

Kishinev pogrom) and his like, since the free sons of the Volga can have no sympathy with those who extinguish the light and the truth."

One of the Government's favourite assertions is that the Russian revolution was "created by the Jews." A most interesting reply to this is to be found in the mandate of the workmen of Albertin, in the Government of Grodno :—

"The parties of the Right pretend that it is the Jewish speakers who imbue the people with sedition. But, as a matter of fact, we have several speakers created by the Government itself. We can give you their names. (1) Hunger and cold, which are caused by the Government ; (2) heavy taxes imposed by the Government on the necessities of the labourer's and the peasant's life, while alleviations are granted to squires and manufacturers."

Complete liberty of education is the watchword of many mandates.

"In order to control and to squander with impunity, the money of the people, the Government has to keep the latter in darkness and ignorance, depriving it systematically of education and placing obstacles in the way of obtaining it. The Government schools, beginning with the parish schools, aim at killing all aspirations toward light and liberty."

There is a pathetic ring about the mandate of the boy apprentices of the Yurevsky works in the Government of Kharkov :—

"We, the younger generation of Russia, observing the ignorance of our grandfathers, do not wish to be like them. We have the desire and the zeal to learn, but the bureaucratic system does not give us, the children of poor toilers, the chance of developing our intellectual capacities."

The Russian democracy is well aware that the development of education and the public consciousness requires a radical change of political *régime*. "At present," say the peasants and burghers of the Odessa

district, "we do not know whether the taxes are collected from us properly, or how they are spent, or whether any Government measure is in the interests of the people or to its detriment. We have much to learn, and we want to be free to learn it."

The demand for complete political liberty and for the democratization of the State system is to be found in all the mandates. "It is time to put an end to blindness, and to untie our hands, for we have outgrown our swaddling-bands and require no nurse," say the workers of the Yurevsky works at Altchevskaya.

A large number of mandates call for the restoration and execution of the Manifesto of October 30, 1905. This Manifesto, which promised the establishment of constitutional guarantees, is not regarded as a voluntary concession on the part of the autocracy, but as the victorious achievement of the people.

"We demand the promulgation of a law guaranteeing all the civic rights and liberties won by the people's victory on October 30th" (mandate from the Byelozersk district of the Government of Novgorod).

The establishment of a parliamentary system and a democratic representation constitutes, according to a mandate from Ekaterinoslav, the foremost need of the country. There should be no other authority than that appointed by the people, and responsible to its representatives, declare the peasants of the Government of Simbirsk. Ministers must be responsible to the popular representatives. The Council of State, which "buries the Bills born in the Duma," ought to be abolished. The present electoral system should be replaced by universal suffrage.

The following are some typical complaints:—

"In the present Duma there is no genuine popular representation."

"Our participation in the elections by no means implies recognition of the Duma as a genuine organ of popular representation."

"We are well aware that the present Duma cannot

be considered a genuine organ of popular representation."

"Your first task," declare the electors of Archangel to their representatives, "must be a struggle for full popular representation, making the Duma not an organ of agreement with the Government, but a revolutionary centre for the organization of the masses. You must open the people's eyes to the fact that the Duma is not genuinely representative, that it is merely consultative in character."

But in spite of all this, even the partisans of the extreme Left understood that the creation of the Duma constituted a new phase of the history of Russia.

When I was elected deputy for the city of St. Petersburg, among the greetings and congratulations I received on that occasion was one from several revolutionists lying under sentence of death at Samara:—

"We hail you as a member of the People's Parliament," they wrote. "We shall now boldly ascend the scaffold, seeing the dawn of a new light."

Here I quote some of those *nakazy* in which the electors endeavoured to give the deputies hints as to the tactics to be followed:—

"In sending you to the second Duma we do not cherish the hope that the Government will accede to the popular demands. Indeed, since the workmen of St. Petersburg, who, on January 22, 1905, bore a petition to the Tsar, expressing their own needs and those of the peasantry, were met by a hail of bullets and bayonets, and since the Government dispersed the first Duma for giving timid and partial expression to the popular demands, we have realized that we cannot expect any amelioration of our condition from the autocratic Government, which by its nature is opposed to our demands. It is our sworn enemy," (mandate from the Government of Perm).

"Remember that the whole people is with you. Do not make any partial concessions to the Right, but insist on full popular government," write the peasants of Novo-Kubanskoyé.

“Remember,” said a mandate from the same province, “that the people have sent you, not to petition Ministers and bow down to them, but to snatch liberty from them.”

“We do not elect deputies for the purpose of drafting laws which, since they have to pass the Council of State and the Star Chamber, will never see the light. No, we have elected you in order that you may fight in the Taurida Palace for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, for land and liberty” (mandate of the citizens of Tekaterinburg).

The Sebastopol electors beg their deputy “not to stop half-way in the struggle against autocratic government.”

The majority of the mandates, like that from Tekaterinburg, express the opinion that the radical transformation of the entire political system requires the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, which alone can effect pacification and secure liberty; and for this purpose the electors offer their support.

“We are anxious,” write the Mussulmans of Petropavlovsk, “to keep in touch with the Duma. It is for you to organize that connection with us. Let our thoughts and feelings become those of the Duma; the victory will then be sure and final.”

“In the struggle with the Government for the realization of the popular demands,” say the citizens of Maikop, “the Duma must rely on the support of the great masses of the population who are in sympathy with it.”

The peasants of the Syzran district instruct their deputy as follows:—

“The first Duma, which rightly championed the people’s needs, has been dissolved because the people was not sufficiently organized, and could lend no support to the Duma. We therefore request you to undertake . . . the organization of the people locally, in order that at the decisive moment the people may stand up for the Duma as one man. Only let the Duma explain the nature of the support needed, so as to avoid mis-

taken and isolated acts, and the whole of Russia will stand up for its right to land and liberty, which we have sent you to obtain for us."

The same idea was still more vigorously expressed by one of the workingmen's mandates :—


"We instruct our deputy not to submit to the demands of the Government, and not to return to us without having carried out our mandate. If the gang of torturers of the people should disperse you with bayonets, then all of us who have elected you will rise in defence of the deputies struggling for the liberty and happiness of the people."

Such are the popular desires expressed in the *nakazy*. Commenting upon them, an eminent English publicist remarks :—

"Some of the demands, we recognize, are in advance of the political and social conditions obtaining even in the most liberally governed countries of Western Europe. Their great importance is derived from the light they throw upon the political development of the Russian masses. *Only a people that has arrived at a high pitch of self-consciousness could have produced such documents as these.* They constitute a powerful argument in favour of the full emancipation of the proletariat from the state of semi-serfdom in which it still exists, and a proof that Russia is now more than ripe for a Constitution based on democratic principles. Those who object that the transference of the governing power into popular hands would result in confusion and anarchy would do well to study the present *régime* in the provinces, where every official is a law unto himself, and where clean government, free from tyranny and corruption, is practically unknown. We have always had great faith in the Russian people, and are convinced that, once the deadening influence of the bureaucratic administration has been shaken off, the true genius of the country will manifest itself in a manner that will compel both amazement and admiration."

PART THE FOURTH

EUROPEAN TENDENCIES IN RUSSIAN
LITERATURE



CHAPTER I

The theory of races—Non-Russian blood in the veins of Russian writers. II. The formation of the literary language and its European ingredients.

I

I AM not a partisan of that theory of races which seeks to explain the various phenomena of our life by racial influences, by a remote heredity, and endeavours to establish a more or less impenetrable barrier between the various races. This theory is especially inapplicable to Russia, whose population is composed of a great mixture of different races. It will suffice to recall that the *vielikoruss* people (the Great Russian people) is composed of an amalgam of the Slav element and the Finnish element.

But there is perhaps no more startling proof of the insufficiency of the theory of races than that which is afforded by Russian literature, in which representatives of all the races have collaborated.

A Russo-Polish writer who has interested himself in this question has established, by a careful inquiry, that non-Russian blood has often flowed in the veins of Russian writers.

“By attentively studying the biography of the Russian writers, one recognizes that a large number of those who constitute the pride and glory of Russian literature, a considerable proportion of its lights, its stars, its leaders, and its ‘kings,’ are not of Russian origin; that they are of mixed blood, that they are not originally Russian in the precise sense of the word.”¹

¹ S. Librovitch, *Non-Russian Blood in the Veins of Russian Writers* (Russian ed., Petrograd).

In support of this assertion the author gives us the following examples :—

The real creator of the true national poetry of Russia, the celebrated Alexander Pushkin, had as a maternal ancestor an Abyssinian negro who married a German woman ; the child of this strange inter-continental union was the poet's grandfather. On the paternal side Pushkin had among his ancestors a Prussian immigrant (who entered Russia in the time of Alexander Nevsky, and who was probably of Slav origin) and an Italian woman.

Another great Russian poet, Mikhaïl Lermontov, was of Scottish origin. In the twelfth century there lived in Scotland a famous bard, Leirmont or Learmount by name, who is said to have predicted the destinies of his country, and who was celebrated by Sir Walter Scott. A branch of his family emigrated into Poland, and in 1613 George Leirmont entered the Russian military service with sixty other Scots and Irishmen, and busied himself, under the Tsar Alexei Mikhaïlovitch, reforming the first regiment of regular cavalry known in Russia.

The poet Lermontov was extremely proud of his extraction, and referred to it in his verses :—

Why am I not a bird, a crow of the steppes

Which passed just now above me ?

Why can I not hover in the heavens

And love liberty alone ?

Toward the West, toward the West I would direct my rapid
flight :

There blossom the fields of my ancestors,

Where, in an empty castle on the misty mountains,

Repose their forgotten ashes.

On the ancient wall their hereditary buckler

And their rusted sword are suspended.

I would fly above the buckler and the sword

And with my wing unhang them.

I would touch with my wing the string of the Scottish harp,

And the sound would die away in the vaulted roof ;

Heard by one alone and by one alone engendered,

It would die even as it broke the silence.

Many other Russian writers were of foreign origin. The first Russian satirist, Prince Kantemir, was the son of a Moldavian sovereign and a Greek woman. Another satirist, who was also the great Russian publicist, Radishtshev, was of Tartar descent.

The father of Russian romantic poetry, Vassili Jukovsky, had for his mother a Turkish prisoner. His contemporary Delwig, also a romantic poet, belonged to a noble German family.

The poet Ogariov, the friend of Herzen, had Tartar ancestors. Herzen was the illegitimate son of a German woman and a Russian noble.

The brothers Aksakov, writers and founders of the Slavophile movement, counted Norwegian kings among their remote forbears.

The well-known novelist and writer of short stories, Grigorovitch, was the son of a Frenchwoman, an *émigrée*.

The parents of Fete, a remarkable lyric poet, were a German woman and a Russian noble.

The Jewish people has given many poets and novelists, etc., to Russia; for example, the poet Semion Nadson, whose name marks an epoch in the history of literature.

Among modern writers also we find many who are not of Russian origin.

The celebrated Leonid Andreev is the son of a Polish mother. Balmont, the well-known poet, has Scottish and Scandinavian ancestors on the paternal side, and on the maternal side Tartars.

This enumeration might be continued. But the facts here cited are enough to show that what is called race does not play a decisive part in the formation of literary genius. What is of importance is the historical and social *milieu* in which this genius is evolved; and in studying the European influences which have affected Russian literature we should occupy ourselves not with anthropological inquiries, but with phenomena of a different order and significance.

II

Before speaking of the Western elements introduced by Russia into her literature, there are a few points to be considered respecting the influence of Europe in the formation of the literary language of Russia.

The whole historic evolution of a people is reflected in its language. It is so with the Russian language, which presents many highly interesting phenomena in the province of pure linguistics and also in that of general history.

The popular language and the literary language of Russia were very differently formed. In the first are to be perceived the movement of the population, the colonization of the great Eastern plain by Slavo-Russian tribes, and their commerce with other peoples, Mongols, Finns, Poles, Lithuanians, etc. The three principal dialects of the Russian language—the Great Russian, Little Russian, and White Russian (Vielikoruss, Maloruss or Ukraïnian, and Bieloruss)—retain traces of these contacts.

As for the literary language, the Great Russian is, properly speaking, the only Russian to possess such a thing, for with the White Russians (who inhabit the country bordering on Lithuania and Poland) literature is not yet sufficiently developed to possess its means of expression, and with the Ukraïnians, although they already possess a very rich literature, its instrument of expression is still in process of formation, and is nearer the popular speech than literary Great Russian. It is also subject to that same instability which is so characteristic of the popular tongue; so that the writers of the Russian Ukraïne employ an idiom which differs perceptibly from that of the Ukraïnian writers of Bukovina or Galicia (Ruthenians).

The literary language of the Great Russians has formed itself upon a stable and well-defined basis. In this it differs greatly from the popular tongue, which

is by no means uniform, and is composed of numerous differing *patois*.

The formation of the Great Russian literary language may be divided into three principal phases, two of which proceed from two distinct external factors. The first phase begins with the evangelization of Russia; it is therefore Bulgar or Græco-Bulgar in character. It will be remembered that Russia received Christianity from Bulgaria, or rather from Macedonia, whence came also the clergy and the first religious and ecclesiastical books. The Russian literary language was, in the beginning, the language of religion, and it is known by the name of the "Slav Church language." It was entirely "foreign" to that of the people, and hardly understood by the latter. But after some time the second language became diffused into the first, and the written language approximated to the living popular speech. However, their resemblance is chiefly phonetic. In its lexicology and syntax the scholarly language remained Bulgaro-ecclesiastical. In this language—Russian by consonance, foreign by inflexion, the construction of words, and the turn of phrases—are written the first historical chronicles and the first juridical acts of the principality of Kiev.

After the removal of the capital from Kiev to Vladimir, and thence to Moscow, an urban language sprang up, which was distinct from the rural tongue, and which, as Moscow increased and developed into a Grand Duchy and a Russian *Tsarstvo*, became the language of the State. "The Governmental Chancelleries are obliged to speak from Moscow to all Russia in a comprehensible language. Thus a language of the Chancellery, simple and precise, which is not without picturesqueness and expressive power . . . a finished, and perfected language, which had a chance of lasting unchanged as long as the needs and the mentality of which it was born. . . . But from the beginning of the nineteenth century all is again unsettled. The language detaches itself from its quite

recently constituted basis and moves onward at random, accumulating, without any discretion, the raw material of foreign terms and concepts. A moment comes when Russian writers prefer, not without reason, to have recourse to foreign languages in order to express themselves with sufficient art and precision. After the calm, the solemnity, and the exactitude of the solid Muscovite tongue, convulsive efforts are made to represent the afflux of new thoughts and feelings. The veil of uniformity cast over the literature of the sixteenth century disappears as by enchantment.”¹

Thus the evolution of the literary language in Russia corresponds with the general development of the country. The linguistic invasion of Russia by Europe, which took place at the beginning of the eighteenth century, coincides with the first great effort to Europeanize Russia under Peter I. The two movements do not merely coincide; they are profoundly correlated. There is a close connection between the linguistic imports and the general multiplication of communications between Russia and Europe. Commercial exchanges brought a host of new terms into the Russian vocabulary, names of articles of merchandise and the terms defining transactions. The adoption of European methods by the Russian Army also necessitated, as we have seen, the employment of new military terms. The same thing happened in the case of Government institutions: almost all the names of the new organs and officials (from the *Senat* to the *landrat*) were borrowed from Europe.

It should be noted that even in the days of Peter I it was realized that these importations ought not to be mechanical, and Peter I often employed himself by correcting the translations of foreign books into Russian.

The Academician A. Chakhmatov states that during the first half of the eighteenth century “the Russian

¹ P. Milukov, *Studies in Russian Culture*, Part II, p. 176 (Petersburg, 1897).

tongue was placed in a difficult position by the host of foreign words which invaded it, coming from the West in an irresistible stream." ¹ But during the second half of the century the literary language was already rapidly assimilating these European importations which were transforming it. Moreover, at the close of the eighteenth century Europe was affecting the Russian language in a different manner to that observed at the beginning of the century. Under Peter I the European additions travelled by what we may call the official path: that of translations commissioned by the Government, diplomatic documents, etc. Under Catherine II the Russian writers were spontaneously delving into the linguistic wealth of Europe, and their acquisitions were of a different kind. They were not limited to technical terms, to the vocabularies of trade, industry, and government; they even extended to the expressions which interpret the intellectual phenomena peculiar to cultivated minds, abstract ideas, and the movements of the heart and the soul.

Karamzin energetically contributed to this development. Leader of the "sentimentalist" school, he could not find, in the old literary Russian, all that he needed to depict the inward life of his characters. To remedy this penury of sentimental interpretation, and also to build up the vocabulary required for his historical and philosophical works, he created a great number of words, proceeding by analogy and following the model of the Latin tongues. He also "Europeanized" Russian syntax, introducing more flexible and more agreeable constructions.

This reorganization of the Russian language met with considerable resistance on the part of the extremer nationalists, one of whom (Shishkov) published a violent protest against the "novelties" imported by Karamzin and a defence of the "old style." The hostility of Shishkov and his followers is in part explained by

¹ A. Chakhmatov, "The Russian Tongue," in Brockhaus and Efron's *Encyclopædia*, vol. 55 (Petersburg, 1899).

the exaggerations which certain of the innovators permitted themselves ; some of them even went so far as to say that they detested the Russian tongue and preferred the French. But Karamzin and the best of the protagonists of "Europeanization" were in no way responsible for these extravagances. Karamzin did not "denaturalize" the literary language ; on the contrary, he put life into it. Bielinsky, the famous critic, was perfectly right when he asserted that "before Karamzin's time no one read, for the little there was to read was so frightfully heavy."

But Karamzin was obliged to seek for his means of expression in European literature, and especially in French literature. When asked how he had accomplished this transformation, he replied that "he had some foreign authors in his mind," and that "he had in the first place imitated them." But his imitation was not blind or mechanical ; for, as M. Haumant observes, he "Russified more or less happily" the materials (for the most part French) which entered into the construction of his Russian prose. He could not therefore be accused of having "denaturalized" the language of his country ; but he made it fruitful by means of the powers of expression which he brought to it from the West.

What Karamzin did for prose, others did for poetry. "The pains taken by the poetasters of the banks of the Moskva to achieve the elegance of their colleagues on the banks of the Seine," says M. Haumant, "were not entirely fruitless." Those rhymesters of the early nineteenth century, who had, without exception, learned in the school of Europe, prepared the way for the muse of Pushkin, whose style was thus formed upon the teaching of foreign authors, and whose verse was the first manifestation—as yet unequalled—of the Russo-European synthesis in Russian poetry.

Since the days of Karamzin and Pushkin the literary Russian language has had the benefit of a solid foundation for its subsequent development, which has

been entirely national and original ; but it will not forget that much of the material of these foundations came from Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

This language was, at the time of its formation, and is now, the language employed by the world of thought ; it is alien to the people. The Europeanization of the language, like the process of Europeanization in general, has not yet touched the masses. Although the spoken language of the cities is very close to the written language, the heavy, rustic idiom in common use among the moujiks is still far removed from it. But the diffusion of the Press, which is spreading from the towns into the country, the development of political life, and the awakening of the rural population to intellectual interests and the progress of popular education are gradually lessening the difference.

CHAPTER II

- I. The literature of the people and the literature of the cultivated writers—The first Western influences. II. The importation from Europe of literary forms and subjects.

I

FOREIGN influences were plainly perceptible in Russian literature even in the earliest period, when popular poetry and oral tradition had their birth. In the early written literature they were even more perceptible.

The written literature appropriated and absorbed these foreign influences far more skilfully than did the popular poetry ; intentional imitation being plainly perceptible, while in folk-lore the borrowing of foreign elements was effected unconsciously.

The general origin of foreign inspiration, its source, and its paths of diffusion, differed considerably in both literatures. Oral poetry in Russia is often the daughter of the East, while the written literature draws vitality from the West ; in the case of the latter Asia gives way to Europe.

But this change of orientation was gradual. In its beginnings Russian literature was forced to remain under the severe discipline of the Byzantine Church and its ascetic subjects. This quenched the radiance of poetic imagination. Not until the sixteenth century and afterwards did the literary influence of the West hew out a road for itself—a road which was not at first direct, but which followed a long and roundabout course.

The first literary intermediaries between Russia and

Europe were the Southern Slavs—Bulgars, Serbs, and Dalmatians—whose relations with their northern brothers were facilitated by the common alphabet invented in the ninth century by Saint Cyril, the famous apostle of the Slavs. Through them European literature found its way into Russia, and there produced quite a spiritual revolution. The “Slavo-Roman” novels (as the Russian historians and philologists call them)—that is to say, the Slav version of the various romances of chivalry (Tristan and Iseult, the Knight Bova, Attila, the Fair Helen, etc.) made their way through Russia and gave rise to a new world of ideas and feelings and sympathies. The exploits and adventures of knights, the glorification of their heroism, and other similar subjects which furnished the matter of the “Slavo-Roman novels,” afforded a diversion, a relaxation, to minds wearied by the monotonous moral and religious parenetics which for centuries had been their only mental fare. The legends of France, Brittany, and Italy, having passed through Serbia and Dalmatia, reached the Muscovites, in whom they re-awakened the poetic traditions of the period of Kiev, with its epic songs (*byliny*), which had been pitilessly persecuted and exterminated by the Church. Some of these productions (for example, the Italian romance of the Knight Bova) became, and have remained until our days, the favourite reading of the great masses of the Russian people.

Love, as a subject, was an especial novelty to the Russians, who had for so long been subjected to an ethical system of Byzantine origin, which, in accordance with the teaching of the Church, strove to depict woman as an “evil being,” a “diabolic vessel,” while the story-tellers and poets of the West idealized her and openly professed the cult of beauty and of love.

In the seventeenth century it was through her two most cultivated neighbours—Poland and the Ukraine, then to a great extent Polish in thought and language

—that Muscovite Russia received her literary importations from Europe.

“In Polo-Ukrainian attire they came to us—Melusina, the gracious fairy, who mysteriously transforms herself into a little snake; Count Peter of Provence with his faithful Magellonne; Prince Brunswick, followed everywhere by his lion; pairs of lovers, courageous knights, touching or pathetic visions.”¹

At the same period Russia became familiar with the gay scenes of the celebrated humorous writers in whom the West abounds, the French *fabliaux*, and the episodes of Boccaccio's *Decameron*. This revelation, says Professor Veselovsky, who has made a special study of European influences in Russian prose and poetry, “produced a definite alteration in the tastes and judgments of the reader, by at last setting free the eternal aspirations, passion, love, laughter, dreams—all that was oppressed by the doctrine of abstinence and false modesty.”

II

European literature, while it developed the taste of the Russians, was also a school, in which the foremost representatives of prose and poetry were glad to study. Before this period there were only two forms of literary production: the *lietopis*—that is, the historical *chronicle*—and the religious homily. Europe taught Russia to employ other forms; the ode, the drama, the romance.

In the seventeenth century the south-west of Russia (and Kiev in particular) saw the creation of literary centres, where writers composed syllabic verses according to the rules of pseudo-classicism, and attempted to build up dramas of a sort. An embryo theatre even was established, organized by the students of the ecclesiastical colleges of the Ukraine. At the same time, society for the first time made the acquaintance of the periodical newspaper. It is true that the first

¹ Alexis Veselovsky, *Western Influence in Modern Russian Literature*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1896), p. 24.

Russian newspaper was founded very much later, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in fact, but in the seventeenth century the Government caused foreign newspapers to be translated into Russian.

From the beginning of the eighteenth century the literature of the West had a direct effect upon Russia, independent of Poland as an intermediary. Russian writers began to come into immediate contact with their European masters.

The first Russian satirist, Prince Antioch Kantemir, who attacked ignorance and glorified knowledge, maintained personal relations with Montesquieu, Voltaire, and others. It is obvious that he found inspiration in Boileau, for he repeats almost word for word the famous avowal that "the word, in order that it may delight the reader, has often cost the author tears." "He laughs in his verses," says Kantemir, "but in his heart he weeps over unprincipled men." He also imitated La Bruyère, Mathurin Régnier, and Voltaire.

Another Russian poet of the first half of the eighteenth century, Vassili Tretiakovsky, learned the poetic art abroad. He travelled in Holland and in France, and attended lectures at the University of Paris. Lacking money, he had to go afoot for a great part of the journey to Paris. He said of this city that "only a man whose soul is bestial can fail to love this beautiful spot, these beloved banks of the Seine." The poetical talent of Tretiakovsky was not very remarkable (he wrote better verses in French than in Russian), but he was the true pioneer of Russian versification. By comparing it with French versification he convinced himself that Russian versification must be based upon the tonic and not on the syllabic principle. Thanks to the revolution which he effected, Russian poetry was able to develop freely, liberated from the conventional rules of Latin or syllabic versification.

Another lyric poet, Bogdanovitch, the immediate precursor of Pushkin (he wrote late in the eighteenth century), was also a pupil of the French. The sub-

ject of his romance *Dushenka* is borrowed from La Fontaine's *Psyche*. He also translated poems by Marmontel, Voltaire, etc.

Tragedy too was an importation from Europe. The pioneer in this department of letters, Sumarokov (1717-77), was known as "the Russian Racine," and he certainly attempted to imitate Racine—and also Voltaire. He even wrote a poem in glorification of these two poets and Molière, in which he expressed the conviction that "Molière's *Tartufe* will not be forgotten so long as the world endures." Sumarokov was also the founder of Russian journalism; he established a monthly review, the forerunner of the periodical publications of the close of the eighteenth century. These early examples of Russian journalism were still imitations of European journals; they were merely copies of the English *Spectator* and other publications of the kind. All the Russian contemporaries of the *Spectator* were full of translations and adaptations of articles appearing in the *Spectator*. In this connection we may mention that the form of the *Vision of Mirza*, a poem by the celebrated writer of odes, Derjavin (1743-1816), was taken from the allegorical poem by Addison, published, under the same title, in the *Spectator*.

At the same period two other forms of literature were developed in Russia: the comedy and the fable. In these, again, the Russian authors, even the most independent and the most truly national, were merely the docile disciples of Europe. In this connection the evolution of talent in the well-known fabulist Krylov is extremely interesting. He began by writing tragedies, following the rules of the French classics. Then he wrote comic operas and comedies, in which he borrowed from Molière, Beaumarchais, and other French writers. Krylov's comedy *A Lesson for Young Women* is word for word a reproduction of *Les Précieuses Ridicules*. When Krylov finally devoted himself exclusively to the fables which made him famous not only

in Russia but throughout the world, he was still following in the footsteps of his Greek and French originals. The French biographer of Krylov, M. Fleury, and a number of Russian critics have demonstrated that Krylov imitated La Fontaine and remained an adapter even in those fables which he professed to regard as original and which seemed to bear all the marks of invention.

As for the comic writers, the two best known at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century were Count Kapnist and Fonvizin. In Kapnist's well-known comedy *Tabeda* (Trickery), which vigorously attacks the venal and inequitable justice of Russia, we find traces of the *Misanthrope* of Molière, and one of the principal characters in this comedy is almost the twin brother of *Alceste*. Fonvizin, the father of Russian comedy, and indeed of the Russian theatre, presents a still more curious example of Western influence. Fonvizin was a militant opponent of "Gallomania"—that is, the excessive admiration professed by Russian society for French literature, French ideas, French manners. Nevertheless, he himself, in his comedies, "subjected French authors to a devastating invasion" (in the words of M. Veselovsky), taking from them whatever he could. He plundered Duclos, La Bruyère, Voltaire, La Rochefoucauld, etc., and even went to the length of actual plagiarism. What is more, the very comedy in which he strikes his shrewdest blows at "Gallomania"—his *Ivanushka*—is by no means an original and national work, but a mere adaptation of a comedy by Holberg, the Danish author of *Jean of France*, the hero of which was a young Dane who was over-Gallicized. Fonvizin did not even change the name of the leading character, but merely translated it, *Ivanushka* being the diminutive of Ivan or John or Jean.

To close this examination of the origins of the various forms and departments of Russian literature, we must not omit to mention what in Russia is known as

“publicist” literature, that is, the literature of political and social propaganda, which plays an enormous part in Russian life. This species of literature made its first appearance at the end of the nineteenth century, and its first memorable example was the *Voyage from Petersburg to Moscow* by Radishtshev. This “book, which suffered greatly” (like its author), which was placed on the Index by the Russian Government, and was prohibited for a term of a hundred years (!), contained a fiery and audacious protest against the horrors of despotic rule and of serfdom. A piece of noble audacity, it proceeded directly from two foreign books: Sterne’s *Sentimental Journey through France and Italy* (1796), and the *Philosophical and Political History of European Trade and Settlements in the East and West Indies* (The Hague, 1774). To the English author Radishtshev owes the outward form of his work and a whole series of episodes; to the French author, the condemnation of Indian slavery, to which Russian serfdom bore a great resemblance.

It is thus clearly proved that the most celebrated monuments of eighteenth century Russian literature are the offspring of European literature—and of French literature especially; and that the principal literary forms and models reached us from the West. The eighteenth century was for Russian writers the *didactic* century, during which they were shaping themselves in the school of Europe.

The two first decades of the nineteenth century also belong to this period. The best Russian novelist of this period, Karamzin, found the type of his sentimental romances in Rousseau (*La Nouvelle Héloïse*) and Goethe (*Werther*). The best-known poet of this period, Jukovsky, wrote ballads modelled on those of Bürger, and other German romantics, and elegies in imitation of European poets.

It was only towards the end of the second half of the nineteenth century that the mighty trio arose—Pushkin, Lermontov, and Gogol—and Russian literature

weaned itself from its parent, and began to lead a truly independent and national existence. Not that it was thenceforth closed to all foreign suggestion. The genial creations of Pushkin, Lermontov, and Gogol, like those of their predecessors, were matured by the beneficent warmth diffused by the literature of the West. But mechanical and explicit reproduction was replaced by an organic appropriation and a national transformation of international ideas and expressions.

Russian literature still keeps its eyes fixed upon Europe ; perhaps more steadily than of old ; but it no longer follows in another's wake, like a vessel under tow ; it moves upon its own course.

CHAPTER III

I. Various European influences in Russian literature—Classicism, sentimentalism, and romanticism—Shakespeare in Russia. II. Russian realism. III. Byronism in Russia—Dostoievsky's opinion of Byronism.

I

My readers will understand that European influence in Russian literature is not confined to the formal side of the latter—to the language and the different creative forms. It has also affected the spirit of literary production in Russia, and all the principal "movements" of European literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries will be found in Russian literature, from classicism to symbolism (or even, if you will, to futurism!).

The literary movements of Western Europe find their way into Russia, and there undergo transformation. Some of them strike only very feeble roots into Russian soil; others, on the contrary, become thoroughly acclimatized and yield remarkable fruit.

A French historian, M. André Lirondelle (Professor in the University of Lille), published some three years ago a very interesting work on *Shakespeare in Russia*. This volume, which is a true literary incarnation of the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance (the work of a French scholar investigating the influence upon Russian literature of a great English writer!), affords us excellent concrete material for the formation of an exact idea as to the general character and the relative power of the various literary movements in Russia.

The Russians made their first acquaintance with Shakespeare perhaps in the seventeenth century. But

this first acquaintance was neither extensive nor profound, and down to the end of the following century, the influence of Shakespeare was small in the extreme. This will be readily understood, for the eighteenth century was an age of classicism. Even at the beginning of this century a well-known Russian writer—Feofan Prokopovitch—gave evidence of “a classic temperament,” and derided the liberties taken by the Russian imitators of the Jesuit dramas: “The Tsars, on their stage, utter imbecilities; they weep like women and speak like artisans,” he indignantly complains. A historian of Russian literature, citing this remark, concludes with justice: “With such ideas Feofan would certainly have criticized Shakespeare and exalted Corneille and Racine.”¹

During the whole of the eighteenth century the literary influence of France became more firmly established in Russia, and the influence of classicism increased simultaneously. And it was through the medium of his French translators and critics that Shakespeare made his way into Russian literature. He was a “Frenchified” Shakespeare. But he nevertheless helped to weaken the influence of French classicism, because, as M. Lirondelle very justly remarks, the Russian temperament itself was an aid to the diffusion of the Shakespearian influence. The propaganda of the new German school of drama (that of Lessing) was also of assistance. The protest of this school against the narrowness of the classic school was bound to be extremely effective in Russia. “To speak of the abrogation of rules, to recommend simplicity and what is natural, was to gain one’s cause beforehand with minds impatient of constraint.”²

However, we must not exaggerate the extent of the anti-classical reaction which took place in the time of Catherine II. The liberation from the rules of the classical drama was only formal and external. As

¹ André Lirondelle, *Shakespeare en Russie*, pp. 14-15 (Paris, 1912).

² *Ibid.* p. 32.

for the true Shakespearian spirit, it was still unknown to the Russian literature of that period. The best proofs of this statement are the dramatic works of Catherine II, who renounced the "three unities" of classicism and imitated Shakespeare in the construction of her historic dramas, but was at the same time anxious that history and the reality "should not be too disagreeable." In her "imitations" of Shakespeare Catherine misrepresented him rather than imitated him, and the most original of Shakespeare's types suffer, at her hands, metamorphoses which are utterly incredible. For example, in one of her plays "Falstaff, a Flemish drunkard," the whale with belly swollen with tuns of oil that is cast ashore at Windsor, has become an elegant coxcomb, always dressed, shod, and barbered in the latest fashion. Considerations of a political order entered into literature. Catherine eliminated from her imitations of Shakespeare every really popular or democratic element. In "a free adaptation" of *Timon of Athens* she suppressed, for example, all mention of the Greek democracy and its political conflicts.

The age of Catherine was too deeply steeped in "enlightened despotism" and false classicism to adopt the robust and popular realism of Shakespeare. These are the words in which a Russian review, in 1769, expressed the prevailing opinion of Shakespeare:—

"Shakespeare, that old tragedian, still adored by the English, had thoughts of a very lofty order, and was witty and scholarly, but wayward, and his taste was bad. All his tragedies have now become curious farces, in which the characters are described and intermingled without selection. In his *Julius Cæsar*, pleasantries which would be natural to coarse Roman artisans are introduced into the very important scene between Brutus and Cassius."

This was written in 1769. Twenty years had not elapsed when a very different opinion was expressed. Karamzin, the leader of the "sentimentalist" movement,

published in 1787 a translation of *Julius Cæsar*, and in the preface to his translation he speaks of Shakespeare as follows :—

“ Few writers have penetrated human nature so profoundly as Shakespeare ; few have known so intimately as this astonishing artist all the most secret forces of man, his most hidden motives, the individuality of every passion, of every temperament, of every manner of life. All his magnificent pictures directly imitate nature ; all the changing lights of these pictures astonish those who examine them attentively ; in his work every class of mankind, every age, every passion, and every character speaks its own language. For every thought he finds an image, for every feeling an expression, for every movement of the soul the best interpretation.”

Karamzin defends Shakespeare against the attacks of “ the celebrated sophist Voltaire ” (*sic*), who “ strove to prove that Shakespeare was an indifferent author, full of great and numerous defects,” and who held that the tragedies of Shakespeare were “ tragico-lyrico-pastoral farces, without plan, without unity, with no connection between one scene and the next ; a disagreeable mixture of the base and the sublime.” Karamzin explains Voltaire’s opinion by personal motives—and asserts that “ being indebted to Shakespeare for the best elements of his tragedy, Voltaire feared to praise Shakespeare lest he should thereby abase himself.”

“ That Shakespeare did not observe the rules of the theatre is true,” continues Karamzin. “ The real cause of this non-observance was, I believe, his ardent imagination, which could not subdue itself to any prescribed rule. His mind soared like an eagle, and could not measure its flight by the measure of a sparrow. . . . He did not wish to confine his imagination within limits ; he considered nature only, caring for nothing else. . . . His genius, like the genius of nature, embraced the sun and the atoms in its gaze.”

But although the Russian “ sentimentalists ” were

better able to appreciate Shakespeare than the representatives of pseudo-classicism, they were as yet unable to grasp the real meaning of "Shakespearism." The violent passions of Shakespeare's heroes and his brutal realism were too much for the tender sentimentalists. One experiences a very curious impression on observing their endeavours to discover "melancholy" in Shakespeare, and on reading their lamentations over the shocking attitude of his buffoons, who offend our sensitive "melancholics" by their noisy cries and vulgar pleasantries.

The writers of the romantic period, which in Russia, as everywhere, followed the period of sentimentalism, seek to exploit Shakespeare to the advantage of their own literary school. Russian romantic poetry was strongly influenced by its German sister, and followed the latter in its preference for the fantastic and mysterious. And these are the qualities which our romantic poets discover in Shakespeare, while his realism offends them almost as greatly as it revolted our sentimentalists. For example, the leader of the romantic school in Russia, Jukovsky, "is fascinated by the terrifying scenes of *Macbeth*, the fantastic witches, the monologue which precedes the crime, the somnambulism of Lady Macbeth." But "the pleasantries of Shakespeare strike him as lacking in refinement."¹ Nevertheless, Shakespeare is officially classified by the romantic critics and philosophers of Russia as among the romantic poets, and his works "were the subject of many great debates in our 'philosophical clubs' of the years 1830-40." The youthful members of these clubs (of which I shall speak presently) drew upon the Shakespearian drama for material to illustrate the abstract ideas of their masters, the German philosophers (Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel).

But at this same period Pushkin—first of all the Russian writers—attained to a thorough understanding and a just appreciation of Shakespeare, and expressed

¹ A. Lirondelle, *op. cit.* p. 128.

the opinion that the popular laws of the English drama were better suited to the Russian theatre than the "courtly tradition" of the school of Racine. And in his historical drama *Boris Godunov* Pushkin faithfully observed the laws of the Shakespearian drama. *Boris Godunov* became the starting-point of the new dramatic art and of the new Russian literature in general ; the watchword of the latter being *realism*.

II

All who are acquainted with Russian literature and are able to appreciate its function consider that its realism constitutes its principal virtue and attraction. And it is this realism which makes it an international literature. The connection between the realistic character of Russian literature and its universal quality is very well defined by M. Venguerov in a recent volume. This is what he says :—

"Are not all the great *Russian* writers at the same time *international* writers? Must we not place them in the front rank of humanity? . . . If we limit the comparison to the modern period of Russian literature—that is, to the second half of the nineteenth century,—and if we enumerate only the best-known authors, we see that its place is quite different. Are the works of Tolstoy, Turgenev, and Dostoievsky, on the same level as the English and American productions of the same period, the most eminent of which are the novels of George Eliot and Mrs. Beecher Stowe, the short stories of Bret Harte, the nebulous poetry of Browning, the sugary idylls of Tennyson? Are they on a level with the contemporary literature of Germany, the most notable examples of which bear the names of Auerbach, Freitag, Spielhagen, and Paul Heise? Lastly, is the place of Russian literature quite on the same level with that of French literature, although this is illumined by such talents as those of Dumas *fils*, Flaubert, and Guy de Maupassant?

"No ; we may say it without any chauvinism ; in the

individual genius of its protagonists and, above all, in its fundamental tendencies, the Russian literature of the second half of the nineteenth century is absolutely on a higher plane than the modern literature of Western Europe, which reached its apogee not in the second but in the first half of the century, with Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Byron, Balzac, Hugo, George Sand, Dickens, etc. Has not realism—which quite recently, in Europe, appeared to be the last phase of literary progress—has not realism, with us, been predominant for some eighty years? And again, can any man with a cultivated sense of the artistic fail to realize how far the famous European ‘realism’ of 1870-80, so nearly akin to pornography, and absence of the ideal, is inferior to the realism of the Russian writers? With the Russians life is represented with a fidelity which amounts to complete reproduction, and this reproduction, which attains the very limits of the actual, is yet illumined by the ideal and full of a love of humanity of which there is not even a trace in the greater European realists. . . . And there is no doubt that it is precisely this difference which explains the mystery of the stupendous success which the Russian writers have achieved with the public and the critics of Western Europe. Every one was conscious that the stagnant waters of European literature had been stirred by a fresh current, full of fresh colours, which were the result, not of putrefaction, but of the organic labour of forces which were still young, virgin, and incorruptible. The barbarians of yesterday were speaking a new language, which was to echo profoundly through European literature.”¹

But while admitting all this, we must not forget that Russian realism was born under the influence of a few European authors, and in particular of Shakespeare, whose mighty shadow hovered over the cradle of the young literature. To-day, when all humanity has just been celebrating the tercentenary of Shakespeare, Russia has reason to be peculiarly grateful to him.

¹ S. Venguerov, *The Heroic Character of Russian Literature* (Petersburg, 1911), pp. 21, 22.

III

M. Lirondelle, in his work on *Shakespeare en Russie*, touches on the important problem of the conflict between the influence of Shakespeare upon Russian literature and that of Byron. Speaking of the impress of Shakespeare upon Pushkin, the father of Russian prose and poetry, M. Lirondelle remarks that "Pushkin did not, upon coming into contact with Shakespeare, incur the danger which Byron brought upon him by leading him toward an exaggerated subjectivity." The same idea is expressed by many historians of Russian literature, who assert, moreover, that Shakespeare delivered Pushkin from the peril of Byronic subjectivism.

I do not share this opinion, for the following reasons :—

In the first place, I do not understand why Byronism should be, or should be said to be, more dangerous to Russian writers than "Hamletism," which has left a deep imprint upon our literature. "Hamletism" is the scepticism of a superior mind devoid of all moral energy, all power of action. These characteristics were predominant in the Russian "intellectuals" of certain periods of the last century, as I have already stated in my *Modern Russia*. As for Byronism, the lack of will so typical of "Hamletism" is unknown to it. During its first diffusion through Russia Byronism was accepted by our "intellectuals" more especially as a revolutionary protest of the individual against the old political and social forces which oppressed it. Byron, to the Russians, was not merely the author of *Don Juan* and *Childe Harold*; he was also the poet of the Greek insurrection and of liberty in general. It is of great importance to realize that of the three principal currents of Western romanticism, that which had the most influence over Russian literature was not the romanticism of Germany, with its fantastic ballads, nor the romanticism of France, with its conservatism and mysticism, but the romanti-

cism of England. And it was not the fault of the Russian writers and "intellectuals" that the external conditions of their country did not allow them to realize, in actual life, their Byronic impulse, which was for them an impulse toward liberty and truth. It was not their fault that this impulse, shattered by the social and political conditions of the country, lost its energy and degenerated into a passive "Hamletism."

In the Russian life of the nineteenth century there were moments of the most intense social and political activity. At these moments the young "intellectuals" were often extremely hard upon the "Byronians." In 1877, when Dostoievsky pronounced a funeral address over the tomb of the poet Nekrassov, beloved by the vanguard of Russian youth, he compared the dead poet to Pushkin and Lermontov, whereupon a voice from the crowd about the tomb cried out that Nekrassov was superior to Pushkin and Lermontov, because they "were only Byronians." Dostoievsky himself had not much love for the Russian "Byronians"; they were anti-pathetic to him as "Occidentalists," and men who felt themselves detached from the national soil. More than once he derided them; more than once he was unjust to them. In 1861 he wrote of them as follows:—

"There were in our country Byronic natures. The 'Byronians' usually stood about with folded arms, without even taking the trouble to damn things, like the head of their school. They were content to smile bitterly from time to time, and they derided their English original because on occasion he wept or lost his temper, which was entirely unworthy of a peer. Their quiet disdain permitted them to spend their time junketing in restaurants, growing fatter not daily only but hourly; and their gentle bitterness filled them merely with an amiable hatred of property. Some there were who, in their disinterestedness—in respect of others—dipped into the pockets of their neighbours and enriched themselves at their expense. Some became

'Grecians.' We regarded them with admiration. 'To think,' we used to tell ourselves, 'that what these fine fellows do they do on principle!'"

But later on Dostoievsky abandoned this point of view, and when his auditors by the coffin of Nekrassov sought in turn to belittle the Byronians, he took it upon himself to defend the latter. In this connection Dostoievsky published in his *Diary of an Author* a remarkable passage descriptive of Byronism:—

"In the first place," he says, "it seems to me that one should not employ the word 'Byronian' as an insult. Byronism was only a momentary phenomenon, but it was not without importance, and it came at the right time. It appeared at a period of anguish and disillusion. After a frantic enthusiasm for a new ideal born in France at the end of the eighteenth century—and France was then the foremost nation of Europe—humanity recovered itself, and the events which followed were so little like those which had been expected, and men understood so clearly that they had been tricked, that there have been few sadder moments in the history of Western Europe. The old idols lay overthrown, when a powerful and passionate poet revealed himself. In his songs echoed the anguish of man, and he wept that he had been deceived. His was a muse as yet unknown—the muse of vengeance, malediction, and despair. The cry of Byron found an echo. How could it fail to do so in a heart as great as Pushkin's? Any real talent was bound, at that time, to pass through a Byronic period. In Russia many grievous problems were still unsolved, and it was Pushkin's glory that he discovered, in the midst of men who barely understood him, a way of escape from the dismal situation. This way of escape was to return to the people."

As for Lermontov, "he," says Dostoievsky, "was also a Byronian; but thanks to the power of his originality he was a Byronian of a peculiar kind, disdainful and capricious, believing neither in his own inspiration nor in his Byronism." And if death had not

stopped him on the way, "he too would have found his way directly to the national truth."

For Dostoievsky, the essence of Russian Byronism consists of the opposition between "the type of Russian tormented by Europeanism" and "the people." Dostoievsky saw the solution of this conflict in the submission of the "Europeanized intellectual" to the "national truth," the truth of the common people. The Occidentalists, on the contrary, saw it in the Europeanization of the people themselves. But I do not wish to lay stress upon this point. What I do wish to emphasize is that Dostoievsky very correctly understood and defined the historic significance of Byronism in Russia. That this Russian Byronism achieved so great an expansion was due precisely to the fact that it offered a ready-made formula for a real phenomenon. We cannot, therefore, compare "the danger of Byronic subjectivism" with Shakespearean objectivism when comparing the influence exerted by the one and the other poet in Russia. With us, to be Byronic meant, at certain periods, to be faithful to the objectivism of the life which gave rise to the Byronic type within the walls of Petersburg and Moscow.

For this reason, perhaps, we should not be surprised by the undoubted fact that "Byronism," like "Shakespeareism," was a factor present at the very origin of literary realism in Russia.

PART THE FIFTH
IDEALS



CHAPTER I

- I. The first collision between nationalist ideals and Western influences—The first Russian *zapadnik*. II. Two Muscovite *émigrés*. III. The first Slavophile in Russia.

I

WE have seen under what conditions Europe penetrated the economic and political life of Russia. Let us now consider how Europe contributed to form the Russian mentality, the national consciousness of Russia.

To gain a proper understanding of the subject we must once more ascend the stream of history and commence our examination at the period when the first collision occurred between European ideas and the soul of ancient Russia—that is, the eighteenth century.

At the same time appears the very curious and very characteristic figure of the first Russian *zapadnik*.¹ This was Prince Ivan Khovrostinin, the champion of Occidentalism, which was finding its way into Russia through Poland.

During the ephemeral reign of Dimitri the Impostor, Khovrostinin was attached to his Court, in which there were many Poles. In this environment Khovrostinin became acquainted with Latin civilization and Catholicism. Full of the ideas derived from these sources, he rebelled against Muscovite manners and the Orthodox religion. After the fall of Dimitri I he was accused by the old Orthodox Russians of "Latin heresy," and was deported to the monastery of St. Joseph, "there to do penance." Shortly afterwards he was set at

¹ *Zapadnik*, derived from *zapad* (west), signifies a partisan of Western ideas, an admirer of Europe.

liberty. In the "Period of Disturbances" he commanded a regiment of the Muscovite army against the Poles and their allies. He even became a Muscovite dignitary.

But the transformation was too great; he could no longer feel any sympathy for the old Russia. He attacked her again, once more, for his compatriots, becoming a "heretic"; once more to be accused by them of pride and contempt for his country. In 1623 the Tsar gave orders for his imprisonment in the monastery of St. Cyril, where he was to be placed "under the orders of a good ancient (monk)." The instructions of the patriarch were that the princely heretic "did not pass a single day without prayers and canticles." A year later he signed a deed of abjuration, denying his heresy, and was released, to die in 1625, "reconciled" with Orthodoxy, and having assumed the monk's robe.

It is highly probable that his submission was only apparent. The old faith and the old ethics of Muscovite Russia were too repugnant to Khovrostinin to admit of his sincere conversion.

Professor Klutshevsky describes him as "an original Russian freethinker with a Catholic bias, who was imbued with a profound antipathy for the dry ritualism of the Byzantine Church, and for the whole life of Russia, which was steeped in this ritualism." Klutshevsky even compares Khovrostinin to Tchuadaev, of whom we shall speak later on. But it must not be thought that Khovrostinin deserted Orthodoxy for Catholicism. In his writings and the memoirs of his contemporaries we find no evidence of his conversion. What he knew of Catholicism and the West in general did not lead him toward any positive new faith, but merely made him sensible of the defects of his own. He was an atheist. The indictment brought against him asserted that not only did he not go to church, but he did not allow his serfs to do so, and in case of disobedience he used to beat them and otherwise

punish them. His accusers also pretended that he was lacking in respect for the Tsar, and that he spoke of him as "the despot."

What particularly impresses us in Khovrostinin is his profound moral and intellectual isolation. "Europeanized" mentally, he was above his environment. If it is true that he assumed the gown of a monk towards the end of his life, it was because he himself was conscious of his spiritual solitude; he would willingly have quitted a world with which he could not possibly live on peaceable terms.

Such was the first case known to us of rupture between a "Russian European" and his country.

II

Thirty-five years after the death of Prince Ivan Khovrostinin had disembarrassed the Orthodox Church and the government of the Tsar of his hostility, the Muscovite Chancelleries had occasion to deal with another "refractory"—the young *boyarin* Voïn Ordyn-Nashtshokin, who took refuge abroad (in 1660) because Russian life "made his gorge rise."

Voïn Ordyn-Nashtshokin had been taught by his father, a Muscovite diplomatist of some repute, to hold things European in respect, and his education was confided to Polish professors who succeeded in inspiring him with a great affection for the lights of Western civilization and a great contempt for his own backward country. Dominated by these feelings, he emigrated first to Poland and then to France. The Moscow Government was so irritated by his departure that it sought to "put an end to his earthly existence." But this was useless; for after four years abroad the young *boyarin*, overcome by a profound nostalgia, repented, and was "pardoned" by the Tsar, who at first ordered him to live on one of his father's estates, and afterwards confined him for some time in the monastery of St. Cyril, where he was obliged to be present at the daily offices, in order to strengthen his orthodoxy.

Thanks to the solicitations of his father he was able to leave the monastery in 1667, and ended his days as a provincial *voievoda*.

The Russia of his days "made his gorge rise." Yet he returned of his own free will. Why? M. Plekhanov explains the fact as follows:—

"Men like Prince Ivan Khovrostinin and Voïn Nashtshokin were 'nauseated' by Moscow; foreign lands attracted them. But they found it as difficult to adapt themselves to Western Europe. Their misfortune, their great and irreparable misfortune, was that they were foreigners either side of the Muscovite frontier."¹ They were "the first victims when Muscovy turned toward the West."

The third eminent *zapadnik*, Grigory Kotoshikhin, was attracted by Sweden. He was an official of the *Prikaz* of Foreign Affairs. He established relations with a merchant of Narva, of Russian origin, but a Swedish subject. He also came into contact with Swedish diplomatists. He carried his complaisance toward them to the length of giving them certain secret information. The following year, in 1644, he left Russia and settled in Sweden, where he entered the administration. But three years later misfortune overtook him in his new country; he mortally wounded a Swede in a quarrel, and was condemned to death.

It was not to escape punishment for his act of "high treason" that Kotoshikhin left Russia; the venality of the Muscovite bureaucracy was such that it was accustomed to such indiscretions. Kotoshikhin had other reasons for his actions: the same as had previously impelled young Ordyn-Nashtshokin to leave his country. A man of great intellectual ability (*vir ingenio incomparabile*, says his Swedish biographer), he was incapable of descending to the level of his compatriots.

In his remarkable work on *Russia under Alexis Mikhaïlovitch* he paints in exact but pitiless colours

¹ G. Plekhanov, *History of Social Ideas in Russia*, vol. i. p. 276.

the fashionable Muscovite society of the mid-seventeenth century, the administration, the juridical system, and the manners of the day. The impression produced by his description, even at a distance of two and a half centuries, is extremely painful. The population is ignorant, even in its upper classes; above all the women, who are imprisoned between the four walls of their homes. The Tsarina cannot be allowed to assist at the official reception of the ambassadors, because she is too unintelligent, and does not know how to behave in the presence of foreigners. The inhabitants even of the capital lack the most elementary security; the brigands are the masters in the streets of Moscow. The public administrations are composed of individuals chosen not for their intelligence, but on account of their birth; and the *boyars* who sit in the Duma are dense and stupid; they "rest their beards" on the table, understanding nothing.

All this, in Kotoshikhin's opinion, because Russia was isolated from Europe.

"They (the Russians) do not send their sons to be educated abroad, because they fear that, having become acquainted with the religion, the manners, and the excellent liberty of other countries, they would proceed to abandon their own religion and embrace another, without giving a thought to returning to their homes and their parents."

III

The Slavophiles bitterly reproached Kotoshikhin for his attacks upon the old Russia. They often contrasted him with another moralist of the same period—Jury Krijanitsh.

Of Serb origin, born in Croatia in 1617, a pupil in the Catholic seminary of Vienna, he entered Russia in 1646, and lived there for five years. In 1660 he returned to Russia, but in 1661 he was deported to Tobolsk in Siberia, where he lived for fifteen years. Between 1676 and 1680 he was in Poland. After 1680 we lose sight of him.

Krijanitsh, according to his own statement, was drawn to Russia by his love of the Slavs. He searched among the Slavs for a people which had not as yet been denationalized by foreign influence. He regarded the Slavs of Pomerania, Silesia, Bohemia, and Moravia as finally Germanized. The Slavs of the Balkans, according to him, "had long ago lost not only their national formations, but their power, their language, and their understanding." "Their States cannot be re-established at present, in these difficult times; one can only open their mind's eye by means of books, so that they may learn for themselves to understand their dignity, and to dream of their independence." Krijanitsh had more hope of the Poles, but he believed they would need help from Russia, whose assistance and protection were still more necessary to the other Slavs.

But in order to protect and guide the Slav world, Russia, said Krijanitsh, ought to emancipate herself from her "xenomania," that is, from her exaggerated love of foreign things and persons. Krijanitsh considered that foreigners weakened the two principal bases of Russia's power: her material wealth and her military forces. Foreign merchants exploited the population, buying its products at a low price and selling their own goods to it at a high price; they exported grain, which the country needed for the increase of its population, and imported articles which helped to corrupt the Russians and to introduce foreign tastes among them. As for the military force of Russia, the participation of foreigners in its transformation was an evil, because the organization established by them was adapted to wars upon the Western frontier, but not to the struggle against the nomads of the South, who were particularly dangerous. The appointment of foreigners as officers resulted in the rejection of Russians, and the soldiers, who were given orders in a foreign language, had no confidence in their officers, and were losing confidence in themselves.

Krijanitsh reached a very simple conclusion. The foreigners must be expelled ; European merchants were to be tolerated only in a few mercantile towns near the frontier ; as for the foreign " colonels," they were to be dismissed and sent home to their own countries as soon as they had transferred their knowledge to the Russians—which they had already accomplished.

However, Krijanitsh was not a reactionary nationalist after the pattern of those which Russia knew in the nineteenth century. He recommended the Russian people to follow " a middle path," equally removed from the two extremes ; one of which, according to Krijanitsh, was represented by the Byzantine Greeks and the other by the Europeans. He compared the action of these two factors, and described it in a very interesting manner :—

" There are," he writes, " two peoples which lead Russia into temptation by offering baits of a contrary nature. . . . They are the *Niemtzy*¹ and the Greeks. Despite all their differences, these two peoples are in perfect agreement upon one point: that is, as to the fundamental aim of the temptations which they offer, and this agreement is such that one might well believe in a conspiracy against us.

" 1. The *Niemtzy* recommend us to accept all sorts of novelties. They want us to abandon all our old and praiseworthy institutions, and to adopt their customs and their depraved laws. The Greeks, on the other hand, condemn all novelties, without exception. . . . They tell us again and again that every new thing is an evil thing. But reason tells us that nothing can be good or bad simply because it is new. Every good thing and every evil thing has begun by being a new thing. . . . We cannot accept novelties without discussion, frivolously, for in that case we might be mistaken. But we must not refuse that which is good because of its newness, for in this case also we might be in error. . . .

¹ The name of *Niemtzy* was then applied to Europeans in general. To-day it is reserved for the Germans.

“ 2. The Greeks taught us long ago the Orthodox religion. The *Niemtzy* preach heresies which are impure and have a disastrous effect on the soul. Reason counsels us in this connection to be very grateful to the Greeks, to avoid the *Niemtzy*, and to detest them as though they were devils or dragons.

“ 3. The *Niemtzy* try to induce us to go to school with them. . . . They advise us to make the free sciences—that is, the philosophical sciences—a common possession, accessible to every moujik. The Greeks, on the contrary, condemn all knowledge and all the sciences, and recommend us to remain ignorant. But reason says: Avoid diabolical enchantments like the Devil himself, but believe that ignorance does not lead to good.

“ 4. The *Niemtzy* set the preaching or the reading of the Gospel above everything; they hope to achieve salvation thereby, without any help of penitence or good works. Moreover, they provoke us to argument. As for the Greeks, they have entirely suppressed and condemn the preaching of the Word of God. And they have condemned and prohibited disputes and assemblies. But reason counsels us (1) to be zealous in the matter of penitence and good works; (2) not to despise the preaching of the Gospel. But the first-comer must not be permitted to preach. . . . Only the bishop or one of the most ancient monks may do so. As for mere priests—and even this is not fitting for all—it is enough for them to read sermons from books. Now, in Germany and Poland any drunken priest may preach the word of God.

“ 5. The *Niemtzy* advise us to abandon ourselves to all the pleasures of the body and teach us to despise the life of the monks, vigils, and all mortifications of the flesh. The Greeks require that we shall observe the true and praiseworthy Christian temperance, but besides this they propagate a special kind of false piety and pharisaical superstition. They seek to wash away, spiritual taints by means of corporeal ablutions, and they think

to cleanse the impurity of the body by the prayers of priests, etc. But reason says: One must by no means suffer corporeal debauchment and despise the acts of penitence nor the mortification of the flesh. As for pious practices which are new and suspect and unknown to our fathers, they should be carefully examined beforehand.

“ 6. In political matters the Greeks advise us to act in all things according to the example of the Turkish Court. Themselves devoid of political knowledge and experience, they can only tell us of what they have seen at the Porte. As for the *Niemtzy*, they condemn all the customs, laws, and institutions of the Turks. Anything that bears the name of Turkish is, in their country, by that sole fact, reputed as barbarous, inhuman, and bestial. But reason says that even in Turkey there are some institutions which are excellent and worthy of imitation, though not, of course, all.

“ 7. The *Niemtzy*, maintaining that no one should be punished because of his religion, take their stand upon the Gospel, which says: ‘Judge not, that ye be not judged.’ The Greeks avail themselves of another text: ‘Let him that shall preach unto you that which you have not heard be excommunicated,’ and they deduce from this passage and others like it that we must set them apart and believe them without discussion. But if reason counsels us to reject without re-examination the German heresies, and all others already condemned, when a fresh controversy arises we must first of all become acquainted with it and properly examine it, and not condemn it without having informed ourselves of its nature.

“ 8. The Greeks flatter us and seek to gain our favour by means of fables, exaggerating the antiquity of the Russian State ; and in reality they disparage and insult it. They have called Moscow the third Rome and have imagined the ridiculous idea that the Russian State should be a Roman State, having a right to the insignia of the Empire. The *Niemtzy* calumniate us

and seek by all means to prove that the Russian State is only a simple principality, and that the Russian sovereigns are merely High Princes. Both Greeks and *Niemtzy* refuse to this State the name and rank of kingdom; both agree in this imposture that the Roman State could not be a mere kingdom, but something superior, and that Russia could not be its equal save by an investiture which would be conferred upon it by the Roman State. But reason says that God alone can create sovereigns, and not the Roman Emperor. . . . The Russian State is as great and as glorious as the Roman State, has never been subjected to the latter, and is equal to it in power.

“9. By all the foregoing we see plainly the danger and diversity of the temptations to which the *Niemtzy* and the Greeks expose us, while giving us, moreover, counsels which are diametrically opposed. In fact, the former want to contaminate us with their novelties, while the latter condemn all novelties as a whole, and foist their aberrations upon us under cover of a false antiquity. The former sow heresies; the latter, although they taught us the true religion, have mingled schism with it. The former offer us a mixture of the true and the diabolical sciences; the latter glorify ignorance and regard all the sciences as heresies. The former cherish the vain hope of saving themselves by the word alone; the others despise the spoken word and prefer complete speechlessness. The former, the partisans of every licence, draw us toward the broad road of destruction; the others resort to pharisaical superstition and exaggerated devoutness, marking out for us a path even narrower than the true and difficult path of salvation. The former regard all institutions of the Turkish State as barbarous, tyrannical, and inhuman; the latter profess that everything about the Turkish State is good and praiseworthy. The former hold that we should judge no one; the latter assert that we should condemn without hearing the defence. The former refuse to this State the honours which are

its due; the latter confer upon it honours which are fictitious, vain, absurd, and impossible. Thus, in disagreement upon almost every point, they are in perfect agreement to regard our people with equal hatred, to despise and belittle it and load it with the most dreadful calumnies and accusations."

As we see, Krijanitsh, often regarded as the father of the Slavophile movement in Russia, was pretty severe upon "Byzantism," which is so highly esteemed by the Slavophiles.¹ It is especially significant that he opposes the theory, introduced into Russia in the fifteenth century, by the Balkan Slavs, according to which Moscow should be "the third Rome," the heiress of the first two Romes (Rome and Byzantium). This theory had a great vogue in the Muscovite Court under Ivan III, who had married Sophia Palæologus, niece of the Byzantine Emperor. It was essentially a conservative theory; lest she share the fate of the first and the second Rome, Russia must change neither her habits nor her customs nor her institutions, for "the country, which changes these does not endure much longer." Krijanitsh held that Russia should turn aside from the conservative traditions of Byzantium as well as from the civilization of Western Europe and should follow her own path.

He considered that Russia enjoyed many advantages over the West. The Russians, he says, lead a simpler life than the Europeans. In Russia the distance between the rich and the poor is not so great as in Europe, where on the one hand you find a "Sardanapalus" lapped in luxury, and on the other a starving artisan who possesses nothing. "In Russia, thanks to God, everybody, the poorest as well as the richest, eats rye bread, fish, and meat," and lives in a well-warmed house, while in the West the indigent suffer from the cold because "wood is sold for its weight in

¹ I refer the reader to the opinion of M. Bulgakov, one of the leaders of the modern Slavophiles, cited at the beginning of the present volume.

gold." "Thus the life of the peasants and artisans is better in Russia than in many countries."

In this connection a modern writer (G. Plekhanov) says that Krijanitsh paints the condition of the Great Russian people in too rosy a hue. "But there was truth in his picture. In countries in which a natural economy prevails, articles of prime necessity, such as bread and meat, are much more accessible to the people than in countries in which commercial exchanges are largely developed. We know to-day that the division of social labour in Western Europe has resulted in the impoverishment of the laborious masses. There is thus undeniable truth in this antithesis between Muscovite Russia and the West. Krijanitsh is the first writer to make it. . . . This antithesis provided a sufficient and logical basis for the doubt: Is it not a sin against the people to favour the productive forces of the country? The question did not occur to Krijanitsh himself. But the Russian "intellectuals" of the nineteenth century, to whom the interests of the labouring masses were very dear, must have spent perhaps the greater portion of their energies in trying to solve this "accursed" question. In this respect the Serbo-Russian philosopher of the seventeenth century was the precursor of our contemporary *narodniki*.

Krijanitsh recognized that the character and the life of the Russians presented many defects. For example, he very severely condemns "the hideous drunkenness" prevalent in Russia, the idleness and prodigality, the lack of education, etc. He admitted that Europeans were more civilized than the Russians, and he realized that a cultivated and educated people always exploits a more ignorant people. He even admitted the necessity of education and civilization, but he thought that the time had gone by for the Russians to "sit on the benches of the European school," and that they could now "expel the *Niemtzy*" and live without their aid. He demanded "the closing of the Russian frontiers." Yet, at the same time, when

it came to giving the Russians practical advice, he again took Europe as his example, and looked to Europe for useful lessons. Showing the necessity of developing the economic forces of Russia, he proposed England and the Netherlands as examples. To the "bad legislation" of Russia he opposed that of France, "which was good."

Krijanitsh was the determined opponent of Byzantine and Oriental despotism. He was in favour of an enlightened monarchy, based upon the privileged classes, to which it should grant proper liberties. And again he referred to the experience of Europe: "Among the French and the Spaniards the great enjoy certain liberties which they owe to their birth, and thanks to which the kings are not exposed to any outrage from the people nor from the army. Among the Turks, on the other hand, where there are no liberties proper to the nobility, the sovereigns are exposed to the stupidity and insolence of mere infantrymen."

In the existence of privileges and liberties for the upper classes Krijanitsh saw a means of "changing a rigorous government or a tyranny into a moderate government." M. Milukov compares this system with that of the "intermediary powers" of Montesquieu, which was expounded a century later.

This brief glimpse of the ideas of Krijanitsh shows that the first Russian "Slavophile" was by no means radically inimical to Europe, and that he sought lessons from the Western civilizations. If we are tempted to regard him as the first representative of nationalism in Russia, we must not forget that he was not of Russian origin, that he came from the West, and that he brought all these ideas from the West.

We shall see later on that the Slavophiles of the nineteenth century, like Krijanitsh, borrowed from the thought of Europe.

CHAPTER II

I The impossibility of a compromise between Muscovite Russia and European tendencies. II. The Russian Voltaireans—The “historical superfluities”—The opinions of Klutshevsky and Herzen on the Russian Voltaireans. III. Radishtshev and Novikov.

I

THE middle way, recommended by Krijanitsh' was not followed, and Russia passed from one extreme to the other.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, the Europeans were within an ace of being expelled from Russia, as Krijanitsh recommended. The populace, excited by the priests and other representatives of Byzantine conservatism, subjected them, in Moscow, to a regular pogrom. At the instance of the clergy the Government of the Tsar Mikhaïl Fedorovitch gave the order to demolish the three Lutheran churches which then existed in Moscow, prohibited the wearing of European costume by Russians, confined foreigners to a residential zone in Moscow, forbade them to employ Russian servants, and expelled the English merchants from all the towns excepting Archangel.

But, as a Russian historian has remarked, “to expel the foreigners from Moscow, while it was impossible to do without them, was to make it compulsory to go to them, to their own countries, there to seek knowledge.”

Under Alexeï Mikhaïlovitch the nationalist insurgency came to an end. But this sovereign strove to maintain a certain equilibrium between the indigenous reaction and European progress. Russian historians represent him with one foot beyond the Western frontier and one planted on his native soil, “congealed in an attitude of indecision.”

This state of affairs could not last long, for no co-existence, however brief, was possible to Byzantine conservatism and "Europeanization." The history of the schism proves in a most striking fashion that the partisans of the old Russia rejected even the most necessary "novelties." The order given by the Patriarch Nikon, that the text of the book of ritual employed by the popes should be revised with reference to the originals, because the errors which it contained were frequently of great importance and extremely gross, was denounced as a "heresy" by the conservatives, who opposed it with all their might. From this arose the great schism of the Orthodox Church. To disturb nothing, to preserve everything as it had been for centuries: such was the watchword of militant nationalism. Its excesses explain those of the spirit of innovation which appeared in the reign of Peter I. The two conceptions were too violently opposed for any possibility of reconciliation. But the material force being on the side of authority, the opposition could do nothing but submit, or leave a country invaded by European "heresies" and "novelties."

In the first half of the seventeenth century the partisans of European influence had to seek refuge in the West from the persecutions of Byzantine conservatism. In the second half of the same century and the beginning of the next it was for the conservatives to fall under the blows of the "innovators," or, in their flight from Western "civilization," to escape into the immense forests of the Ural and the North, or the vast steppes of the South.

But it must be admitted that in the reign of Peter I it was no battle of ideas which broke out between the old Russia and the new. The "Europeanization" undertaken by Peter I was material, and brutal in its practical materialism. Its immediate aim was, so to speak, the transformation of the external aspect of men and things, beginning with the long beards of the *boyars* and ending with the names of State institutions,

and it coincided with the burden of conscription and taxation. For this reason it is very difficult to say whether the conservatives protested and fled *en masse* for spiritual reasons (as did Ordyn-Nashtshokin) or for reasons of temporal interest.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, under Catherine II, the conflict between Russia and Europe was far more abstract, and was extremely interesting from the standpoint of the history of ideological evolution.

II

While in the seventeenth century a Europeanized Russian was regarded by his contemporaries as a heretic, at the end of the eighteenth century he was known as a *voltairianetz* (Voltairean) or a *farmazon* (Freemason). The first term is especially characteristic, as it proves how great was the influence in Russia of French philosophy in general and of Voltaire's in particular.

But the Russian *voltairianetz* of the time of Catherine II was not merely an admirer of Voltaire, as many were in all European countries; the Russian *voltairianetz* was a veritable social and historical type, and no student of the history of Russian culture can omit him from the scope of his inquiry.

Many of our historians have dealt with the Russian *voltairianstvo*. But hitherto the best description of it—I would even say the one unique and truly classical description—is that of the poet-historian Klutshevsky. I profit by this description all the more readily as it is only to be found in the lithographed and extremely rare examples of the lectures which Klutshevsky delivered at the University of Moscow.

Under Yelisaveta, the "merry Tsarina," the impetus which came from Europe was rather of an æsthetic quality: Russia took from Europe what was capable of embellishing life, in the purely material sense of the word. Under Catherine II the desire to adorn the mind

was added to the desire to embellish the material aspect of life. In the reign of Yelisaveta society was fully prepared for the enjoyment of intellectual pleasures ; it had learned French and acquired a taste for *belles-lettres*. For the society of the day France had become the school of worldly elegance just at the moment when French literature was proclaiming new ideas in books which found an echo on every hand. The Russians, who were entirely ready to receive these new ideas, welcomed them with an avidity which was favoured by the Court. Even in Yelisaveta's reign the Court had established relations with the great French writers. Voltaire became an honorary member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and was commissioned to write a history of Peter the Great. Catherine, in her youth, had been fascinated by the masterpieces of French literature ; once on the throne, she hastened to enter directly into communication with their authors. Carried away to some extent by the general tendency, Catherine was also obedient to diplomatic considerations: she sought to win the good graces of these masters of opinion, because she attached a great importance to the approval of Paris. Her correspondence with Voltaire is a proof of this. She wished to entrust d'Alembert with the education of the Crown Prince Paul, the heir to the Russian throne, and reproached him keenly and at length for his refusal. She extended her favours to Diderot: having learned that the editor of the *Encyclopædia* was in want of money, she bought his library for £600 and entrusted the care of it to d'Alembert, paying him a salary of £40 a year.

Fashionable Russian society shared the enthusiasm of the Empress. The Russian seigneurs engaged French tutors for their children. The republican La Harpe educated Catherine's grandson, the future Alexander I. Romme, the future Montagnard, did the same for Count Stroganov, the friend of Alexander. The sons of Count Soltykov were confided to the brother of Marat.

The lesser nobility could not afford the luxury of such tutors, and contented itself with books. French works circulated freely and extensively throughout the Empire, finding their way to the remotest corners of the provinces. To-day we can hardly realize the immense number of French volumes which were translated into Russian and offered for sale in the reign of Catherine II. A Ukrainian *dvorianin*, Vinsky, an officer of the Guard, mentions in his memoirs some very interesting details bearing on this point. During his residence in Petersburg he found all the best French authors in the houses of his friends, whether military or civilian. Shortly afterwards he was deported to Orenburg, for some such prank as was often committed in the Guard. In that remote town he began, as a distraction, the translation of French authors, his versions being circulated in manuscript. A few years later he had the pleasure of receiving several of his own manuscripts from Siberia, sent him as a curious "novelty." On the banks of the Volga, at Simbirsk, at Kazan, and elsewhere, French literature was known and appreciated.

Under its influence the relations between Russian society and Europe were modified. In the reign of Peter I the nobles used to go abroad to study the art of war or navigation. Then they did so to acquire *le bon ton*. In the reign of Catherine they went to France to salute the philosophers. Russians appeared from time to time among the guests of Voltaire at Ferney, and Catherine wrote to him that many of her officers were delighted with their visits to him. Frenchmen who visited Petersburg at the end of Catherine's reign were equally delighted with the intellectual youth which they met there, some going so far as to declare it the most cultivated and "most philosophical" in Europe.

The reign of French literature and philosophy was the last phase of intellectual and moral development traversed by Russian society after the death of Peter I. The fashionable gentleman, the artilleryman or naval

officer of the time of Peter, a dandy under Yelisaveta, became, under Catherine, a "man of letters," a free-thinker, and a freemason or Voltairean.

What has remained in Russia of this Western impress? To understand this we must recall the character of French Encyclopædism. It was the first revolt against the order of things based upon Catholic and feudal tradition, to which it opposed a host of logical conceptions and systems. This was the philosophy which made the conquest of enlightened minds in Russia, where feudality, properly so called, and Catholicism did not exist. In France the Encyclopædic theories expressed the very real and concrete pretensions of the Third Estate, which aspired to apply them. The Russian sectaries, on the other hand, did not regard these theories as of any practical importance; they regarded them only as dogmas, intended to remain in the domain of the absolute, not to control the relations between man and man; as noble ideals, expressed in fine phrases, which gave one an air of distinction, which would help a man to emerge from the common ruck, but which must by no means be regarded as rules of actual conduct. Their sensibility and philanthropy were only verbal; under this outer garment they kept intact their egoism, their hardness, and their old moral habits.

Klutshevsky depicts for us a few types of these Russian "Encyclopædists." A wealthy noble in the Government of Penza, Nikita Strouisky, conceived a passion for *belles-lettres*, and himself wrote verses, which he willingly read to his friends, allowing himself to be so far carried away by the heat of declamation that he would sometimes pinch his auditors till the blood came. This gentleman was greatly interested also in jurisdiction, and instituted on his estates a tribunal in accordance with the latest teachings of European science, only retaining the old Russian method of torture. The celebrated Princess Dashkov was the most enlightened of all her contemporaries; she was

even appointed President of the Russian Academy of Sciences. At the age of fifteen or sixteen she conceived such a passion for French that she read the works of Beyle, Voltaire, and Rousseau until she contracted a nervous malady thereby. At the end of her brilliant career she lived in Moscow, in isolation, in which her true nature revealed itself. She received no one, was completely indifferent to the fate of her own children, beat her servants, and concentrated all her feelings and all her activities upon some rats which she had tamed. The death of her son caused her no grief; but if any ill befell one of her rats she was stricken to the depths of her soul. To begin with Voltaire and to end with a tame rat—only the subjects of Catherine were capable of such eccentricities.

What was really the condition of the nobility to which all these "Voltaireans" belonged? It lived by political injustice and in a state of social inaction. From the hands of a *diatshok*¹ (precentor) the Russian noble passed into those of a French tutor; he completed his education in the Italian theatre or the French *cabaret*, applying the ideas thus acquired in the *salons* of the capital, and ending his days in his study, in Moscow or on his country estates, employing his time in reading Voltaire. His manners, his habits, his ideas, the sentiments which he had made his own, and the very language in which he thought, all were of foreign origin, all were imported from Europe. No living tie, no organic function, united him to the population which surrounded him; he did no serious work, despite his share in the local administration, where he was subordinated to the governors, and the exploitation of his estates, which was based upon the labour of serfs. He was a useless member of society. A *historical superfluity*—such is the phrase which Klutshesky applies to the species.

This verdict, which is that of our foremost historian,

¹ The precentors or lay clerks gave primary instruction in those days, and even now they teach in the "parish schools."

may be compared with that of Herzen, our foremost political writer, who in his youth had many opportunities of observing the survivors of Russian *voltairianstvo*.

"The eighteenth century produced in the West," he says, "a wonderful generation, especially in France, which possessed all the weaknesses of the Regency and all the energies of Rome or Sparta. These prodigies, Faublas and Regulus combined, flung open the door of the Revolution, and were the first to rush through it, pushing their way in, only to leave by the 'window' of the guillotine. Our century produces no more of these vigorous and homogeneous natures; the last century, on the contrary, evoked them almost everywhere, even where they were *superfluous*, where they could develop only by an anomaly. In Russia, those upon whom the great Western wind had blown became not great historical figures, but 'originals.' Foreigners in their own country, foreigners abroad, passive spectators, spoiled for Russian life by their Western prejudices, and for the West by their Russian habits, they appeared as an intelligent superfluity, astray in an artificial life."¹

Although they agree as to the external type of the Russian *voltairiantzy*, Klutshevsky and Herzen do not see eye to eye as regards the mind concealed by this outward aspect. Klutshevsky states that these amateurs did not suffer from the opposition between their ideals and the surrounding realities; that they did not even feel it; that they were cheerful and had nothing to say against the existing order of things. Books embellished their minds, gave them a certain brilliance, and sometimes even provided them with a nervous thrill. But there the influence of French ideas stopped short; it did not impel them to form any decision or to take action of any kind. It gave a charm to their lives, leaving them indifferent to the lives of others.

Herzen gives a different picture of these Voltaireans. He speaks of "their malicious raillery, irritability, re-

¹ A. Herzen, *Œuvres*, vol. vi. p. 99 (Geneva-Lyons, 1878).

moteness from humanity, suspicion, and rancour, a result of the clash between things so different as the Europe of the eighteenth century and the life of Russia."

However, Klutshevsky did recognize individual cases in which the incompatibility between the ideals of the West and the realities of Russia gave rise to great suffering, and even to despair. A tragic example of this despair is afforded by one Opotshinin, a seigneur of the Government of Yaroslavl, who, as a result of his European education, found it impossible to resign himself to the condition of affairs in Russia, and finally, in 1793, took his own life. In his will he explains that "his repugnance for Russian life is precisely that which constrained him spontaneously to decide his fate." He then spoke of his library :—

"My beloved books, I do not know to whom I should leave them ; I am sure that no one in this country has need of them ; I humbly beg my heirs to burn them. They were my greatest treasure ; they alone sustained me in life ; without them my life would have been nothing but a perpetual regret, and I should long ago have left this world in disgust."

A few minutes before his death Opotshinin had the courage to begin the translation of those verses of Voltaire's which begin—

O Dieu, que nous ne connaissons pas . . .¹

III

What Opotshinin understood of his own accord the Government enabled other *voltairiantzy* and *farmazonzy* to realize.

We know what a sudden change was produced in Catherine II, toward the end of her life, by the French Revolution. From the admirer of the Encyclopædists she became the enemy of all liberal ideas, and she hunted everywhere for signs of the "French contagion," in order to exterminate it pitilessly. Voltaire's bust,

¹ Klutshevsky, *Lectures on Russian History*. Lithographic edition of lectures delivered at the University of Moscow, Part IV, pp. 264 *et seq.*

which used to adorn her study, was, by her orders, relegated to the lumber-room.

Two remarkable Russian writers fell as victims to this reaction. They were Radishtshev and Novikov. Both were true *zapadniks*, but they represented very different tendencies.

Alexander Radishtshev (1749-1802), the author of "the work which suffered greatly," the *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, was in 1766 sent by the Government, in company with other young men, to the University of Leipzig. There he attended the lectures of Professors Gellert and Platner. But he preferred French philosophy to German science, and read Voltaire, Helvétius, Raynal, Mably, etc. Under their inspiration, to which we must add that of Rousseau and the English sentimentalists (and of Sterne in particular), he wrote his famous book. His *Journey* is full of rationalistic ideas, such as were preached by the Encyclopædists, concerning the rights of the man and the citizen. "Man is born into the world equal in all things to other men. We all possess the same organs ; we all possess reason and will. . . . We are all equal, from the time we leave the maternal womb, in natural liberty ; we must be equals, too, in the face of the restrictions which are imposed upon this liberty." Russian society, in which we do not find the slightest trace of the liberty and equality demanded by Radishtshev, he condemned implacably. Catherine II, now a reactionary, could not tolerate this courageous criticism, and although the *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow* had been published with the authorization of the censor, the Empress found that "the intention of this book is visible on every page ; its author is filled and infected with French error ; he seeks in every way and by every means to diminish the respect due to authority and the power of the State, and to incite in people a feeling of indignation against masters and rulers." Catherine gave orders that legal proceedings should be instituted

against Radishtshev, and entrusted the examination to the cruel police-officer Sheshkovsky, who put his victim to the torture in order to extort the confession of his errors and to induce penitence. Radishtshev could not bear the torture ; he retracted, declaring his book to be "unreasonable and harmful." He was then condemned to death for his writings, but the capital sentence was commuted for one of perpetual deportation to Siberia, whither he was sent *in chains*. Paul I restored him to liberty, and after the accession of Alexander I he even became an official. But his adversaries would not leave him in peace ; and in 1802, fearing fresh persecutions, he poisoned himself. In his person a fervent and sincere partisan of European civilization succumbed to the resistance of the old Russia.

Nicolas Novikov (1744-1818) was no more fortunate. He, too, may be regarded as a *zapadnik*, but of another school. He was a pupil of the German freemasons and pietists. German pietism was diametrically opposed to the rationalism of the French Encyclopædists ; its sole aim was the moral renewal of man. This doctrine attracted Novikov, who found himself under the immediate influence of the German freemasons, and of a certain Schwarz in particular. But he was not one of those masons who admit only of mystical means of human "perfection." On the contrary, he united to his mysticism a great and sincere love of science and an enthusiasm for public instruction. He founded printing-presses, learned societies, and schools ; published school textbooks and other volumes, reviews, etc. He was, moreover, a philanthropist, and in 1787, during the famine, he came to the aid of the peasants. This beneficent activity was enough to arouse the suspicions of Catherine. She instructed an ecclesiastical inquisitor, the Muscovite Archbishop Platon, to examine the publications of Novikov and to "test" his religious convictions. Platon declared that a portion of the books published

by Novikov was useful and filled a gap in the existing scholastic publications; another portion (the mystical volumes) appeared to him incomprehensible; a third portion, consisting of the writings of the Encyclopædists, he considered to be harmful. As for Novikov's religious opinions, Platon spoke of them in the following terms:—

“I pray the most generous God that there may be, not only amid the garrulous flock confided to me by Him and by thee, most gracious sovereign, but all over the world, such Christians as Novikov.”

Thanks to these attestations, Novikov was left at liberty, but not for long. Catherine always regarded him as a manifestation of the “French contagion,” as she had regarded Radishtshev.

In 1791 Novikov saw that it was expedient to close his printing establishments, to cease publication or propaganda of any kind, and to retire to his country estate. This voluntary isolation did not save him; in April 1792 a detachment of hussars was sent to his house, in order to make a search and arrest him. Dragged away amid the tears of his peasants, who loved him greatly (which was unusual), he was transported first to Moscow, then to the fortress of Schlüsselberg. There the above-mentioned Sheshkovsky “attended” to Novikov. . . . In August 1792 Catherine issued a ukase in which she declared that Novikov deserved a “pitiless punishment for his crimes” (of which the ukase said never a word), but that the death penalty would be commuted for fifteen years' imprisonment in a fortress.

The injustice committed in respect of Novikov was so obvious that, according to a witness worthy of credence, Paul I, having liberated him in 1796, after his accession, was said to have asked pardon for his dead mother, and even to have knelt before him.

Si non e vero. . . .

Four years' captivity in a fortress cost Novikov dear. He emerged aged and infirm, and incapable of further work.

CHAPTER III

- I. The nationalist reaction under Catherine II and Alexander I—Shtsherbatov and Karamzin—The Russian reactionaries and the French Revolution—The royalist *émigrés*. II. The positive influence of the ideals of the French Revolution—Some opinions.

I

THE story of Novikov proves yet again that Russia opposed almost insuperable obstacles to the diffusion of Western ideas, even of the most moderate nature. Moreover, in addition to persecuting them by means of the police, the reactionaries endeavoured to attack them in their essentials, and to deny that their adoption could be in any way useful. A volume written by Prince Mikhail Shtsherbatov, *The Depravation of Morals in Russia*, is a memorial of this conservative prohibition. Shtsherbatov considered that Peter I had gone too far and too swiftly along the path of reform, and that the "changes" introduced by him were "excessive." According to Shtsherbatov, Peter I wanted to obtain in a few years such results as might have been obtained in the course of normal and natural evolution at the end of "three generations." The sudden and forcible transformation of the old Russia into a European State was an evil, and resulted in the depreciation of Russian manners.

But there were traces of the European spirit even in this champion of conservatism. His historical conceptions came from the West; his theory of the "science of causes" was borrowed from Hume; and he owed something to Rousseau and to freemasonry.

Shtsherbatov's ideas had their effect upon Karamzin.

This "Europeanizer" of the Russian language was at the same time one of the chief leaders of the political and intellectual conservative nationalists. He wrote a great *History of the Russian State*, of which Pushkin said, in a biting epigram:—

The grace and simplicity of his history
 Demonstrate for us with impartiality
 The necessity of autocracy
 And the beauties of the knout.

Karamzin expounded his ideas in a memoir *On the Old and the New Russia*, which he presented to Alexander I. Like Shtsherbatov and all the other partisans of the old Russia, he condemned, in this memoir, the reforms of Peter I, and protested against his work of "Europeanization." But his especial antipathy was the "liberalism" born of the French Revolution.

Karamzin was in Paris during the Revolution, but he understood nothing of it, and was not even very greatly interested in it. It is enough to say that in his *Letters of a Russian Traveller* he describes (in 1790!) the gardens and the works of art to be seen in Paris, but scarcely remarks upon the fact that the city was in a state of effervescence. However, having been to see the National Assembly, he decided with regret that "its sittings were devoid of all pomp or grandeur." This indifference was replaced, toward the end of his life, by hatred of everything connected with the Revolution, and, as happened to many others, this hatred was extended to the West in general. A fervent *zapadnik* in his youth, he became one of the heralds of absolute nationalism.

This complete change of face was to be observed in other Russian thinkers, some of whom were anterior to Karamzin. We know what an effect the French Revolution produced in Russia. But its effect in the domain of ideas—of which effect Karamzin affords us only a poor example—was far more extensive, indeed almost

incalculable. Some of its results were immediate, while others were more general and more remote.

At first the Revolution could affect only the upper classes. The masses of the people knew nothing about it. By the Russian aristocracy it was accepted almost as it was accepted by the French aristocracy. Some of them applauded it. Count Paul Stroganov, among others, who was in Paris at the beginning of the Revolution, was present at the sessions of the National Assembly, and posed as a true Jacobin, declaring that "the happiest day in his life would be that on which he should see a similar revolution in Russia." In Petersburg the fall of the Bastille was celebrated; Grand Dukes declared themselves the partisans of the Republic. But this enthusiasm did not last.

Catherine II was the first to understand that the introduction of the principles and procedures of the French Revolution would be dangerous to the monarchy and its nobility, and she began to oppose them, taking no pains to restrain the expression of the anger with which she regarded the "hydra with twelve hundred heads" (the National Assembly), the "monster who sought to be king" (Egalité), and the "asses of liberty" (the members of the National Assembly). In 1780 Catherine said, with pride: "In my country every one is free to speak his mind." After the fall of the monarchy in France she suppressed the toleration hitherto enjoyed by the freethinkers and French philosophers whom she had so greatly admired, and asserted that "in publishing the *Encyclopædia* Diderot and d'Alembert had two objects: firstly, the destruction of Christianity; secondly, the destruction of monarchies." She ordered Russians resident in France to leave that impious country without delay, expelled the French residing in Russia, and prohibited, firstly, the sale of the *Encyclopædia*, and then that of any French book. This prohibition became even more stringent under Paul I. After the brief phase of liberalism under Alexander I it was revived and ex-

tended by the Government of Nicolas I ; not only French books, but all foreign books whatsoever were proscribed. A strict censorship was instituted for all books imported into the country, and this system is still in force to-day : a foreign publication cannot enter Russia until it has passed the "Central Committee of the Foreign Censorship."

As for the interdict placed upon the residence of French subjects in Russia, this was abolished soon afterwards in favour of the *émigrés*, who were well received by the Russian aristocrats and reactionaries, and by the Government also, some being even appointed to administrative posts.

With the Royalists and Jesuits, for they too were readily welcomed, the Catholic propaganda made its way into Russia. During the early years of the nineteenth century numbers of Russians became Catholics, which induced Joseph de Maistre to remark "that the adhesion of the mind to the Catholic faith is a very speedy matter in Russia, and the conversions to Catholicism are remarkable, as much for the number of persons converted as for the worldly position which they occupy."

The majority of these "conversions" were only ephemeral, and were due to a desire to be in the fashion, as a contemporary assures us, many persons (especially women) having been converted merely by following the prevailing current, and returning to the bosom of the Orthodox Church as soon as it ebbed. In 1821 the Jesuits were expelled, and the Catholic proselytism exercised by the *émigrés* came to an end.

However, this proselytism left traces—not extensive, but profound—in the heart of Russian society ; and from time to time extremely interesting cases of conversion to Catholicism occurred, notably that of Tshaadaev.

But before speaking of Tshaadaev I must say something more of the positive effect of the French Revolution.

II

I have already explained to my readers the immediate effects of the Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars upon the political movement then developing in Russia. But the ideological influence of the French Revolution exceeded the limits of these immediate effects, and has survived until our own days.

Even to-day in Russia the great Revolution of 1789 is for some an object of hatred, for others an object of admiration. One may say that the attitude which this or that Russian politician assumes toward the revolutionary past of France, and his manner of appreciating it, will in a very great measure enable us to estimate his own opinions. In my *Russia and the Great War* I have cited the declaration made from the tribune of the late Duma (1909) by the deputy Markov, leader of the Right, to the effect that "the French Revolution is the most odious and contemptible act of modern history," and that "the Republic means the reign of male and female prostitutes." This is not merely the personal opinion of Markov himself; it is that of all the Russian reactionaries, some of whom go to such lengths in their hatred of republican France, the home of the Revolution, that even during the present war they have expressed a desire that France should be crushed by Germany, the home of monarchy and conservatism.

The Russian democrats, on the contrary, love France precisely because she is the incarnation of revolutionary tradition. A true cult for the French Revolution exists among the democratic elements in Russia. Even as a schoolboy the young Russian indulges in this cult, although the conservatives do their best to inspire him with aversion for the traditions of 1789. I have before me the *Memoirs* of a Russian lady, in which she describes the impressions received during a course of lectures on French history which were delivered by one of the professors of the Moscow girls' school at which she was a pupil.

“ . . . To-day our professor began to tell us about the French Revolution. After drawing the general outlines of the condition of France and the mentality of the French on the eve of the Revolution, he described the men of the Revolution. He began with Mirabeau. My God, what a wonderful man was this Mirabeau ! . . . It was a beautiful day of spring when Mirabeau quitted this life. He gave orders for the window to be opened. The sound of the bells entered his room. And in the street the urchins were crying : ‘ Treachery of Count Mirabeau ! ’ . . . Oh, why, why did he end like that? Great men should make a different ending ! . . . After Mirabeau, Marat. His severity frightens me. Everything about Marat is powerful and distressing. Perhaps I am too small to understand him, but he gives me the impression of a stupendous force, which is to be dreaded ! . . . Then the Girondins ! Madame Roland ! What energy, what determination, what love for her country, what enthusiasm, what faith she displays ! How proud she is at the moment of death ! . . . Vergniaud, that brilliant orator ! And Camille Desmoulins ! On the eve of execution, in prison, they gather together, they sing hymns to liberty. Camille Desmoulins holds in his hand a rose which his wife has sent him. On the following day, ascending the scaffold, he speaks to his wife. . . . *Ma chérie!* . . . A few days later his wife, Lucile, stood calmly before the guillotine awaiting death.

“ I cried while the professor was telling us this. Thanks, thanks, my worthy professor ! You understood so well how to stir and awaken what was sleeping in the depths of my soul. Thanks ! I know now what is the real meaning of life !

“ . . . When Danton was advised to escape, he replied proudly : ‘ Can I carry my country with me on the soles of my shoes ? ’ And he remained. Then, the execution. He is taken to the Place. He stands before the guillotine. He speaks to the executioner : ‘ You will show my head to the people—it is worth seeing ! ’

"This is real life! These are men! My God, how I envy them! What am I saying? I do not envy them, I quiver with admiration for them, for the wife of Desmoulins. If I had been in her place should I not have gone to my death as courageously, following the example of my husband, as she did! Oh, surely, surely, I should have gone joyfully to my death!

"I don't remember the moment when the class broke up. . . . I rushed up to the professor and begged him to tell me of books on the Revolution. He told me of some. . . . Directly the classes were over I ran home, and then, without delay, to the library."

This extract from a private and personal diary enables us to understand better than a long description just what the young Russian feels about the events and the men of the French Revolution.

The history of the Revolution has become, in Russia, the object of a profound scientific investigation; and we find the names of Russian scholars among the most eminent students of the period.

On the other hand, the ideals of the Revolution, and even its phraseology, have found their way into the programmes and the practices of our political parties. For example, among the demands of all the parties of the extreme Left we find that of the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. The idea of the confiscation of the landed property of the great seigneurs for the benefit of the peasants, which forms part of the programme of these parties, is another inheritance from the Revolution. One of the favourite songs of the Russian workers is a "Labour *Marseillaise*," that is, a Russian socialist hymn sung to the air of the French *Marseillaise*.

The tradition of the French Revolution survives and finds an echo even in the debates of the Russian Duma, when Mirabeau or Robespierre is quoted, or the epithet of "Jacobin" is hurled from one bench to another, or the Tsar's Ministers are reminded of the fate of Louis XVI.

We may therefore say with Dr. Sarolea, the author of *The French Revolution and the Russian Revolution*, and with M. Haumant, that the French Revolution, for the Russians, "is not a thing of the dead past, already remote, but a living actuality."

The love and admiration which the Russian democrats feel for France, as the home of the Revolution, explains the amazement with which they sometimes, indeed frequently, observe the indifference displayed by middle-class French society as regards the internal political situation in Russia. To be sure, we cannot say that the French *bourgeoisie* has displayed any sympathy for the Russian reaction ; but it is perhaps too tolerant of it. I can very well understand that the possibility of German aggression and the necessity of maintaining the Franco-Russian alliance has obliged France to be sparing of her criticism of her ally's policy. Still, as I demonstrated in my *Russia and the Great War*, this policy was harmful, even in its effects upon our military strength.

On the other hand, the reserve displayed by French society in the matter of "Russian affairs" is explained by the fact that France is our creditor. A creditor, in general, thinks only of the payment of interest and the repayment of the principal of his loan ; the methods by which his debtor acquits himself do not greatly concern him.

What does principally concern the creditor is the advantages of his investment. Nothing else matters greatly. Hence, for anything but his money, an indifference which often amounts to cruelty. Moreover, the French capitalists acquire Russian stock by the offices of the Russian Government, behind which they fail to perceive the Russian people. But a people and its government are not necessarily the same thing. There are moments when a government has need of money in order to stifle the just revolt of its people, and a people does not consider that it owes a debt of gratitude to those who lend money to its oppressor.

For example, by subscribing to the loan of 1906 republican France prevented the fall of the Tsarist autocracy. Has she any right to feel indignant because the Russian democrats, against whom she sided, allowed her to perceive their profound amazement and their bitter disappointment, even if these were expressed with violence and scant politeness, as in Maxim Gorky's letter "to beautiful France," whose hand, he said, "had closed the path of liberty to a whole people"?

M. Emile Haumant, professor in the Sorbonne, in his interesting work on French culture in Russia, explains the resentment which is often displayed by the Russian democrats by the ideal which they have formed of the duty of France; they look to her, he says, for a "perpetual repetition of the revolutionary gesture."

"For them we are the dancing dervishes of the Revolution!" he says. "Turn, turn, turn for ever!"¹

M. Haumant is mistaken. The Russian democrats reproach France not with refusing to continue the Revolution, but for the aid which they lent the dancing dervishes of the counter-revolution.

"Whatever we do, we shall always shock those idealists who consider that our past condemns us to the indefinite repetition of the same gesture," says M. Haumant. But I think M. Haumant himself understands that the past does involve an obligation, and that the Russian democrats have the right regretfully to compare the doings of the Frenchmen of the Revolution, who carried liberty into foreign lands on the points of their bayonets and overturned thrones, with the action of their descendants, who often bestow money and security upon autocrats. But in spite of all, there is, in the democratic circles of Russia, a vast and inexhaustible store of sympathy for France. Her intellectual influence in Russia is enormous. Even Gorky, who "spat blood and gall" into the face of France, is, like all his political co-religionists, a great admirer of the French people, of the history of France, so full

¹ Haumant, *La Culture française en Russie*, p. 431.

of heroic deeds, and of her noble literature. Interviewed by a contributor to *Le Temps* in 1910, Gorky "assured him that he never ceased to advise Russian writers to read the French writers, and again the French writers, always the French writers."

The affection of the Russian democracy for France and her heroic traditions has survived even the most painful tests, not the least of which was the war of 1870. A well-known Russian critic, M. Kranichfeld, has recently described the aspect of Russian society during this war, and this is what he says:—

"The war between France and Prussia was of absorbing interest to the more cultivated minds of Russia. 'It introduced hatred and discord into our life,' said a great Russian review, *Otetshestvennyia Zapiski* (*Annals of the Fatherland*), which appears in Petersburg and enjoys a great authority. 'The father took arms against the son, brother against brother, husband against wife, and all this because some sympathized with France and desired her to win, while others sympathized with Prussia, and hoped for a Prussian victory.'

"'The majority of notable Russians,' says the same review, 'are on the side of Prussia. As for the defence of France, that has been undertaken by the small fry.'"

Another writer of the same period (M. Nikitenko) states in his memoirs:—

"In the upper circles the sympathy is for Prussia, while throughout the people there is an equally powerful hostility toward them."

But it is in the work of our great satiric writer, Mikhaïl Soltykov (unhappily unknown abroad), that the love of France finds its most inspired expression:—

"Poor France!" he wrote in 1870. "Once again you become the expiatory victim! The world regarded you as a flame which rekindled the life of humanity, and now any native of Mecklenburg-Strelitz can without restraint describe you as a collection of imbeciles. Let him be, this native of Mecklenburg-Strelitz! He

has taken from you all that he lacked. At the end of the eighteenth century you gave him the desire for liberty ; in 1848 you gave him the desire to establish 'the great Fatherland.' Nevertheless, you are guilty. You are guilty because you were not able to create 'order.' . . . While you were creating liberty the Mecklenburg-Strelitzer, having no need to create that which already existed, thanks to you, preferred 'a certain narrowness rather than a breadth of principle.' Under protection of your political and social convulsions, he secretly examined the problem, far more accessible to his intelligence, of the alliance between dishonesty and imposture on the one hand, and patriotism on the other, and it must be admitted that he has solved it in a fairly satisfactory manner (without exceeding the mean, which is so familiar to him). . .

"Yes, you are guilty, France ! Pursuing aims of world-wide scope, you have forgotten the existence of millions of little domestic details, whose accomplishment assures life against usurpations, and forgetfulness of which may condemn even the best intentions to annihilation. The Mecklenbergers, the Hessians, the Hohenzollerns have understood this better than you, although, on the other hand, they have not, perhaps, sufficiently understood that at times, no matter what care may be given to the petty details, the house may be built upon the sand, if the general ideas which you proclaim have not been used as foundations.

"A native of Meiningen, in his paltriness, does not work out the smallest idea except for his own exclusive use. A *dummkopf*, on the contrary, casts even the grandest ideas before poor minds. . . . The Gallic cock knows how to raise a principle to its true height."

Soltykov was a radical and freethinker. Here is the opinion of the great Russian philosopher, V. Soloviev. A Christian, and an enemy, in principle, of the methods of the Revolution, he yet considered that the French Revolution, and the whole history of France in general, were of universal significance :—

"The period of the great Revolution and the Napoleonic wars," writes Soloviev in one of his works (*The Justification of Good: Moral Philosophy*), "is, if not on account of its content, at least on account of the internal tension of popular life and the amplitude of external action, the culminating point of the national development of France; it was then that this country best expressed her universal importance. Of course, the rights of the man and the citizen were half imaginary; and the revolutionary trinity—liberty, equality, fraternity—was realized in a sufficiently curious manner. In any case, the enthusiasm of this people for these universal ideas shows plainly enough that it was a stranger to any form of narrow nationalism. . . . Apart from this period, France has always been distinguished by her universal intelligence and her communicative character; she is acquainted with, and is anxious to assimilate, the ideas of others, to give them a completed form, and then to give them to the world. This peculiar quality, which makes the history of France a brilliant and lucid summary of European history, is so conspicuous, and has so often been remarked, that there is no need to insist upon it." ¹

If from the Christian and anti-revolutionary philosopher we turn to the atheist and anarchist, Prince Kropotkin, we find in him the same opinion as to the universal character of the great Revolution.

"The work of the French Revolution," writes Prince Kropotkin in his work on this subject, "is not confined merely to that which it obtained and that which it maintained in France; it extends also to the principles which it bequeathed to the following century, to the landmark which it planted for the future. . . . Whatever nation may to-day enter upon the path of revolution, it will inherit that which our ancestors performed in France. The blood which they shed was shed for humanity. The sufferings which they endured

¹ J. B. Séverac, *Vladimir Soloviev. Introduction et choix de textes*, French ed., p. 144.

they bore for the whole of humanity. Their struggles, and the ideas which they put forward, and the clash of these ideas—all this is the inheritance of humanity.”¹

Thus, when the Russian democrats adopt the ideals of the French Revolution, they make common cause with humanity itself.

¹ P. Kropotkin, *La Grande Révolution*, Paris, 1909.

CHAPTER IV.

I. Catholic influence in Russia—Tshaadaev and his philosophy of history. II. Vladimir Soloviev and the ideal of the Universal Church.

I

TSHAADAEV reminds us slightly of Khovrostinin, for he, too, was a *zapadnik* with a Catholic shell, though this was far thicker than Khovrostinin's. The latter had only a veneer of Catholicism; he used his religion merely as a standpoint for his criticisms of the old Russia, while Tshaadaev was steeped in Catholicism.

Born in 1794, Piotr Tshaadaev received a brilliant education in an aristocratic environment. He studied at the University of Moscow. Then he took part, as an officer of the Guard, in the war against Napoleon. He lived in Petersburg until 1821, enjoying the reputation of a philosopher. We find him among the future Decembrists. In 1821 he left the Guard and the *salons* of Petersburg and passed two years in solitude. In 1823 he went abroad, and while suffering from a nervous malady he became influenced by the mystic Jung-Stilling. He had prepared himself for this influence by the reading of the works of the French Catholic writers—Joseph de Maistre and Chateaubriand. In 1826 he returned to Russia, where, after the failure of the Decembrist movement, the reaction triumphed "in the atmosphere of the gallows." Again he retired from the world, passing four years as an anchorite. In 1830 he returned to the intellectual world, taking part in the debates of the literary and philosophical societies of Moscow, where two great movements were in process

of formation: the Slavophile movement and Occidentalism. He was more in sympathy with this last movement, but his own Occidentalist ideas were based upon Catholicism, while other *zapadniki* based themselves upon the idealistic philosophy of Germany or the utopian socialism of France. Tshaadaev expounded his opinions in his *Philosophical Letters*.

The first of these *Letters* appeared in 1836, in a Muscovite review, and produced an echo, according to Herzen's expression, "like that of a gunshot in a dark night," provoking quite a tempest of indignation in official and "right-thinking" circles. It was an indictment of the old Russia, and an ardent hymn of praise to the glory of Western civilization, the highest manifestation of which, in Tshaadaev's eyes, was Catholicism. Of course, a "Russian patriot of German origin" appeared (a certain Viguel), who did not scruple to denounce Tshaadaev as suspect of subversive ideas. Another "Russian" patriot of like origin, Count von Benckendorf, chief of the gendarmerie (the political police), undertook to look into the matter, and having examined the culprit's *Philosophical Letter* (of which, no doubt, he did not understand very much), he discovered it to be written with criminal intent.

Nicolas I, at von Benckendorf's suggestion, gave the order that Tshaadaev should be officially declared insane, and should be confined to his house, where he was to be under police and medical supervision. After a year of this supervision a new decision of the Emperor *forbade* Tshaadaev to write.

Despite this absurd prohibition, Tshaadaev did not cease writing; he even published a remarkable *Apology of a Madman*, in which he defended himself against the attacks of his adversaries, and against "those whose cries had unsettled his quiet life, and had once more launched upon the ocean of human wretchedness his ship, which had grounded at the foot of the Cross." But the persecution to which the Government subjected him made it impossible for him to live and write in

tranquillity, and hampered the expression of his ideas. This is why this great thinker was unable to give to his country and to the world all that he might have given under other conditions.

However, what we have of Tshaadaev's is of the highest interest, as it is the first noteworthy attempt to construct a philosophy of Russian history against a background of international history.

What is this philosophy?

Its principal point, its basis, consists of the statement of Russia's moral and spiritual isolation in the world.

"It is one of the most deplorable features of our singular civilization that those truths which elsewhere are among the most trivial, even in peoples far less advanced than ourselves in some respects, have yet to be discovered by us. This is because we have never gone forward with the other peoples ; we belong to none of the great families of the human species ; we are neither of the West nor of the East, and we have the traditions of neither. Situated, as it were, outside the times, the universal education of the human species has passed us by." ¹

Comparing the history of Russia with that of the other nations, Tshaadaev found that the difference was not to the credit of his own country. There is, he said, for every nation a time of violent upheaval, of passionate restlessness, an age of intense emotions and great undertakings, when the nations bestir themselves impetuously, with no apparent motive, but not without advantage to posterity. All societies have passed through these periods. But "we Russians have gone through nothing of the kind. First a brutal barbarism, then a period of gross superstition ; then a foreign domination, ferocious and debasing, the spirit of which was later on inherited by the national power ; . . . a dull, gloomy existence, without vigour, without energy . . . there is the mournful history of our youth."

¹ *Œuvres choisies de Pierre Tshaadaev* (Paris, 1862), pp. 14-15 (French ed.).

Unlike the Russian Slavophiles, Tshaadaev denied that the past of Russia possessed any value, or any moral or educative significance.

"Glance down the centuries we have traversed," he says, "over all the ground we have covered ; you will not find a single affecting memory, not a single venerable monument, which will speak to you of the past ages with the power that recalls them in a living and picturesque manner. We live only in the narrowest present, without a past and without a future, in the midst of a dead calm."

Having no traditions of her own, Russia has no traditions common to her and the rest of European humanity: "Our first years, passed in an immovable stupor, left no trace upon our minds, and there is nothing individual upon which we can base our ideas ; isolated by a strange destiny from the universal movement of humanity, we gathered none of the traditional ideas of the human species. Yet the life of nations is founded upon such ideas ; their future grows out of these ideas, and their moral development proceeds therefrom."

These traditional ideas give all the peoples of Europe a "common physiognomy, a family expression." Tshaadaev believes that "in spite of the general division of these peoples into the Latin branch and the Teutonic branch, into Southern peoples and Northern peoples, there is a common tie which unites them all in a single group, a tie plainly visible to those who have studied their general history." This "inherited patrimony of ideas" gives these peoples "a certain mental method" which is lacking in the Russians. "The syllogism of the West is unknown to us," says Tshaadaev. "There is something more than frivolity in our best heads. . . . There is nothing of that wanton lightness with which the French used to be reproached long ago, and which after all was only a facile manner of conceiving things, which excluded neither depth nor breadth of mind, and which added an

infinite grace and charm to intercourse ; it is the heedlessness of a life without experience and without foresight, which refers itself to nothing further than the ephemeral life of the individual detached from the species. . . . The experience of the ages means nothing to us ; periods and generations have gone by but have brought us no fruit. One would say, to look at us, that the general law of humanity had been revoked for us. Solitaries in the world, we have given nothing to the world, we have taught nothing to the world. . . . Not one useful thought has germinated on the barren soil of our country ; not one great truth has sprung up in our midst."

To those who would oppose to Tshaadaev's indictment the age of Peter the Great as the period of Europeanization, when Russia entered the family of the Western peoples, Tshaadaev replies by the following argument, in which he seeks to emphasize the external and superficial character of Peter's work :—

"Once a great man determined to civilize us, and, in order to give us a foretaste of the light, he threw us the mantle of civilization ; we picked up the mantle, but we did not touch civilization."

Tschaadaev then proceeds to explain all these sad peculiarities of the mind and the history of Russia. He finds his explanation in the schism which occurred in the Christian Church, dividing it into the Catholic Church and the Byzantine Church, to which latter the Russians adhered.

"While the edifice of modern civilization was rising from the thick of the struggle against the vigorous barbarism of the Northern peoples and the lofty ideas of religion, what were we doing? Impelled by a fatal destiny, we were about to seek in miserable Byzantium, the object of the profound contempt of these peoples, the moral code which was to educate us. A moment earlier an ambitious mind (Photius) had removed this family from the universal fraternity ; it was this idea, disfigured by human passion, that we accepted at that

time. The vitalizing principle of unity animated everything in Europe. Everything emanated from this idea; everything converged upon it. The whole intellectual movement of the time tended only to establish the unity of human thought, and every impulse was derived from the urgent need of arriving at a universal ideal which is the genius of modern times."

Only the Russian people remained "alien to this wonderful principle." It remained outside that other great European movement: the Renaissance. "By turning back to pagan antiquity, the Christian world discovered those forms of the beautiful which it had so far lacked. Secluded by our schism, nothing of what was happening in Europe reached us. We had nothing to do with the great business of the world. The notable qualities with which religion had endowed the modern peoples . . . those new forces with which it had enriched the human intelligence; the manners which submission to an unarmed authority had rendered as gentle as they had at first been brutal; nothing of all this took place in Russia. . . . While the world was entirely reconstructing itself, nothing was built in Russia; we remained hidden in our hovels of poles and thatch. In a word, the new destinies of the human race were not for us. Christians though we were, the fruit of Christendom was not ripening for us."

In this extreme pessimism as regards the destinies of Russia, Tshaadaev was in profound disagreement with the foolish and hypocritical optimism of the ruling circles and the reaction, the typical representative of which, Count Ouvarov, was convinced, and publicly declared, that the past of Russia was admirable, its present more than admirable, and its future would surpass imagination. A veritable religion, a veritable adoration of the existing system, was proclaimed by this spokesman of the official Russia.

Ouvarov and others like him believed that they loved Russia and that Tshaadaev hated and despised her. Tshaadaev was of the contrary opinion. In his *Apology*

of a Madman, in which, according to his own expression, he "attempted to discover what are the relations of a man smitten with insanity by order of the supreme tribunal of the country to his fellow-creatures, his fellow-citizens and his God," Tshaadaev holds that "there are several ways of loving one's country; the Samoyed, for example, who loves the native snows which render him myopic, the smoky *yourt* in which he remains hidden for half his days, the rancid fat of his reindeer, which surrounds him with a nauseating atmosphere, certainly does not love his country after the same fashion as the British citizen, proud of his institutions and of the high civilization of his glorious island. . . . Love of country is a beautiful thing, but there is one finer thing, and that is the love of truth. . . . It is not by the road of the fatherland, but by the road of truth, that we ascend to heaven." ¹

It must not be supposed that Tshaadaev consciously intended to belittle and humiliate his country and its peoples, as his adversaries asserted. On the contrary, he was convinced that it was by an unhappy chance that Russia had strayed from the great highway of universal civilization, and that her place was with the European peoples. He protests against "the European peoples, who are strangely mistaken with regard to the Russians." "They persist in surrendering us to the East: by a sort of instinct of European nationality they thrust us back into the East so that they shall not meet us again in the West," writes Tshaadaev in a letter to Alexander Turgenev. But for Tshaadaev Russia had the right of communion with the West. "We are situated in the East of Europe, that is certain, but we have never for all that been a part of the East. The East has a history which has nothing in common with that of our country. We are simply a Northern country, and by our ideas as much as by climate we are very far removed from the 'perfumed vale of Kashmir' and the sacred banks of the Ganges." ²

¹ *Œuvres choisies de Pierre Tshaadaev*, p. 127.

² *Ibid.* p. 141.

Tshaadaev cherished the dream that "a day would come when the Russians would find a place in the midst of intellectual Europe, as we already stand in the midst of political Europe; more powerful then by virtue of our intelligence than we are to-day, by virtue of our material strength."

But in order that this dream should be realized it was essential that the spiritual and moral unity between Russia and the West, now shattered, should be re-established. And as Tshaadaev was convinced that Catholicism was the best and only true guardian of the spiritual unity of Europe, he called upon his people to adopt the Catholic ideal.

It would not be difficult to indicate the weak points and the errors of Tshaadaev's argument. It would be very easy to demonstrate that the European and universal civilization which he so greatly valued was not merely the work of Catholicism, and that many of its important and primordial elements were, on the contrary, born of the conflict between secular society and the Catholic Church. But to Tshaadaev the Catholic ideal was in reality of importance not as an ecclesiastical and religious ideal, but rather as a political and social ideal. To him it was the symbol of the unity of European civilization. And he wished his country to play its part in that unity.

"Believe me, I cherish my country more than any of you," he declared, addressing his adversaries. "I am ambitious: I wish to see her glorious. . . . But I have not learned to love my country with closed eyes, with bowed head, with shut lips. I consider that one can be useful to one's country only on condition of seeing it clearly; I believe that the time of blind love is past, that to-day one owes one's country the truth before all else. I love my country as Peter the Great taught me to love it. I have not, I admit, that fatuous lazy patriotism which slumbers amid its illusions, and with which, unhappily, many of our best minds are to-day afflicted. I think that if we came after the rest

it was in order that we shall do better than the rest."

And Tshaadaev hopes that Russia's long isolation and solitude will perhaps be of value to her in the accomplishment of her future mission, because "the great things have always come from the wilderness."

II

Half a century later the Catholic tradition found expression in the works of another remarkable Russian thinker, Vladimir Soloviev, whose name I have already had occasion to mention. His French biographer and commentator, M. J. B. Séverac, says of him that "Vladimir Soloviev deserves to be described as 'the first Russian philosopher.' And, indeed, until his day Russia had possessed no philosopher in the Western, European sense of the word." ¹ Without exaggerating to this extent, we may, however, admit that Soloviev was one of the most original figures in the world of Russian thought toward the end of the nineteenth century.

Born in 1853 and dying in 1900, Vladimir Soloviev left behind him, in addition to his philosophical works, a reputation for great honesty and great moral courage. Although by no means a revolutionary, he protested against all kinds of injustice, and he fought for liberty. When, after the assassination of Alexander II (on the 1st of March 1881), people were waiting for the execution of the Terrorists, who were accused of this act, Soloviev made a public speech in which he appealed to Alexander's successor to pardon his father's murderers:—

"To-day," he said, "the regicides are undergoing their trial, and they will probably be condemned to death. But the Tsar has the power to pardon them, and if he really feels the tie which binds him to the people he must do so. The Russian people know nothing of two truths. Now, God's truth says: 'Thou shalt not kill.' Here is the solemn moment of justifica-

¹ J. B. Séverac, *Vladimir Soloviev. Introduction et choix de textes*, p. 14 (Paris).

tion or condemnation. Let the Tsar show that he is before all a Christian. But if he transgresses God's commandments, if he enters upon this sanguinary path, then the Russian people, the Christian people, can no longer follow him."

For these generous words Soloviev was dismissed from his post as Professor of Philosophy in the University of Petersburg, "and was forced thereafter to lead an uncertain and wandering life, his pen providing him with a living."¹

I cannot here expound Soloviev's philosophical ideas in all their bearings. What concerns us chiefly is his historical and religious philosophy and his opinions on Russia's place in the world and her relations with the West. But I must not omit to emphasize the fact that with Soloviev the problems of philosophy in general were related to his philosophy of history and his ideas as to the relations between Russia and Europe.

"The necessary and most recent results of the development of Western philosophy," he writes in his work on *The Crisis of Western Philosophy*, "are the affirmation, in the shape of rational knowledge, of the same truths which, under the form of faith and spiritual contemplation, were affirmed by the great dogmas of the East (of the East of antiquity as regards a portion, but more particularly of the Christian East). Thus the most recent philosophy, with the logical perfection of its Western form, tends to reunite with the contemplation of the East. On the one hand it is based on the data of positive science; on the other it joins hands with religion. The realization of this universal synthesis of the science of philosophy and religion . . . should be the supreme aim and the ultimate result of the evolution of thought."

We see that for Soloviev even a purely metaphysical problem becomes a vital question, leading him to seek for the grounds of a reconciliation between the East and the West.

¹ J. B. Séverac, op. cit. p. 12.

As for the distinction between the Eastern mind and the Western mind, it is described by Soloviev almost in the same terms as those employed by Tshaadaev, who defined it as follows :—

“The world was from all time divided into two portions—the East and the West. This is not merely a geographical division. . . . We have here two principles, which correspond with two dynamic forces of nature, two ideals which embrace the entire economy of the human species. In the East it is by concentrating itself, by recollecting itself, by turning inward upon itself, that the human spirit builds itself up ; but in the West it does so by expanding itself externally, by spreading itself in every direction, by struggling against all obstacles. Society naturally constituted itself on these primitive data. In the East, thought withdrew into itself, seeking seclusion and repose ; it hid in the wilderness, and allowed the social power to become the master of all earthly possessions ; while in the West thought projected itself in all directions and embraced all forms of happiness, founding authority upon the principle of justice. . . . The East was the first-comer, casting upon the earth the streams of light that came from the womb of its solitary meditation ; then came the West, which, with its immense activity, its eager speech, its all-powerful analysis, engrossed itself in its labours, finished what the East had commenced, and finally enveloped it in its vast embrace.”¹

Soloviev is less condemnatory of the past of Russia than Tshaadaev, because at the outset of his philosophical and literary activity Soloviev came under the influence of the Slavophiles. At this period he did not (as did Tshaadaev) demand the submission of the East to the West, of Russia to Europe, of Orthodoxy to Catholicism ; he spoke of a “synthesis,” and in his lectures on *The Human God* he even said that “in the history of Christianity the Church of the East represented the divine principle ; the West, the human prin-

¹ P. Tshaadaev, *Œuvres*, pp. 137-8.

ciple. Before it became the fecundating principle of the Church, reason was forced to divorce itself from her, in order to develop all its forces in freedom. Once the human principle had become completely individualized and had felt the weakness of this isolation, it was able freely to enter into conjunction with the divine foundation of Christendom preserved in the Church of the East, and, by this free conjunction, to give birth to spiritual humanity." This was written by Soloviev in 1879, but ten years later he proclaimed the supremacy of Catholicism over Orthodoxy, and proceeded to draw all the practical deductions therefrom.

Soloviev asked himself this question: "What is Russia's *raison d'être* in the world?" He distinguished three principal phases of Russian history: the first phase was the period of the formation of a great national monarchy; it ended under the Tsar Alexei, the father of Peter the Great. Peter opened a new era in the history of Russia: he sent Russia to school with the civilized peoples of the West, in order that she might assimilate their knowledge and their culture. But at the close of this second phase it was needful to know what Russia was to do after her years of apprenticeship; for "if one was right in asking: 'What is barbarian Russia to do?' and if Peter the Great replied correctly by answering: 'She must be reformed and civilized'—then," says Soloviev, "one has no less the right to ask: What is the Russia reformed by Peter the Great to do? What is the aim of modern Russia?"

Soloviev is satisfied neither by the reply of the Slavophiles nor by that of the simple positivist "patriots." When the first say that Orthodox Russia is sufficient to herself, and that she has nothing to do with "the West, which is in a state of decadence," Soloviev objects that in speaking thus they reduce the final aim of the history and the *raison d'être* of the human species to the existence of a single nation.

"A return to the ancient Judaism is proposed to us," says Soloviev, "with this difference: that the excep-

tional *rôle* of the Jewish people in the schemes of Providence is attested by the word of God, while the exclusive importance of Russia cannot be affirmed save on the word of certain Russian publicists, whose inspiration is far from being infallible." ¹

As for the "more prosaic patriots," who, "in reaction against the vague and sterile poetry of Panslavism," have asserted that it is not indispensable that a people should bear within it a determining idea, and that one should simply strive to render one's country wealthy and powerful, without speculating as to its superior purpose in the comity of nations, Soloviev believes that "this amounts to saying that the nations live by daily bread alone, which is neither true nor desirable." Soloviev holds that "the historic peoples have lived not only for themselves but also for all humanity, purchasing by their immortal labours *the right* to assert their nationality." "One does not ask what is the historic vision of the Ashantis or the Esquimaux," but "modern Russia, which for two centuries has not ceased to manifest herself on the stage of world-history, did not quite know whither she was going nor what she intended to do." It is therefore important to know what idea Russia contributes to the world; what she has done and what she has yet to do for the good of humanity as a whole.

Soloviev's reply to this question is determined by his general ideals. A convinced and sincere Christian, he believed that human history was an incarnation of "the Word," a gradual realization of the Divine Will in the life of men. But the incarnation of the Word and the realization of the Divine Will does not come about by the intervention of a single man, but through the intermediation of human society, which should be a *theocracy*; that is, it should be based on the religious principle and directed by an ecclesiastical authority.

In his original work on *Russia and the Universal Church*, which he had to publish in French (in 1889),

¹ V. Soloviev, *La Russie et l'Eglise universelle* (Paris, 1883), p. 3.

as in Russia the ecclesiastical censorship would not have tolerated the publication of a book so imbued with Catholic ideals, Soloviev compares the two existing Christian Churches, and likens them to two saints of whom a charming Russian folk-tale speaks.

These two saints—St. Nicholas and St. Cassien—who were sent from Paradise to visit earth, saw one day upon their path a poor peasant, whose cart, loaded with hay, was deeply mired, and who was making fruitless efforts to urge his horse onward.

“Let us give a hand to this worthy man,” said St. Nicholas.

“I would rather not,” replied St. Cassien. “I should be afraid of soiling my chlamys.”

“Then wait for me, or else go thy ways alone,” said St. Nicholas, and, fearlessly plunging into the mud, he vigorously assisted the peasant to drag his cart from the slough.

When the task was completed St. Nicholas rejoined his companion. He was covered with mire, and his chlamys, rent and soiled, was like a poor man’s blouse. Great was the surprise of St. Peter to see him arrive in this condition at the gate of Paradise.

“Well, what has made such a sight of you?” inquired St. Peter.

St. Nicholas related what had happened.

“And you,” asked St. Peter of St. Cassien, “were you not with him in this affair?”

“Yes, but I am not in the habit of meddling with what does not concern me, and, above all, I did not wish to soil the immaculate whiteness of my chlamys.”

“Well, well!” said Peter, “as for you, St. Nicholas, because you were not afraid to dirty yourself in helping your neighbour out of his trouble, you shall henceforth be fêted twice a year, and you will be regarded as the greatest of the saints after me by all the peasants of Russia. And you, St. Cassien, you may content yourself with the pleasure of having an immacu-

late chlamys: you will have your festival only in Leap Year—only once in four years.”¹

“The Oriental prays; the Occidental prays and works. Which of the two is right?” asks Soloviev, and replies as follows:—

“Jesus Christ established His visible Church not only that it might contemplate heaven, but also that it might labour on earth and fight against the gates of hell. He sent His apostles not into solitude and the wilderness, but into the world, to conquer it and to subject it to the kingdom which is not of this world; and He recommended them to be not only as meek as doves, but also as wise as serpents.”²

From this point of view Soloviev believes that although in the East there is a “Church which prays,” there is not a “Church which acts,” and which labours to reform the whole social life of the nations according to “the Christian ideal.” To accomplish the true will of Christ, the Eastern Church must frankly accept Catholicism¹ as its companion *and its guide* on its terrestrial journey.

Soloviev very severely criticizes the present position of the Orthodox Church, in which, he says, there is no truly spiritual government. The Orthodox Church is in complete dependence upon the power of the State, and, in the words of the Slavophile Ivan Aksakov, cited by Soloviev, it “presents the appearance of a sort of bureau or colossal chancellery, which applies to the office of the shepherd of Christ’s flock all the methods of the German bureaucracy, with all the official falsity which is inherent in them. . . . The ecclesiastical government is organized like a secular departmental administration. . . . The spiritual sword—speech—is replaced by the sword of the State, and near the precincts of the Church, instead of the angels

¹ The Orthodox Church celebrates the feast of St. Nicholas on the 6th of May and the 6th of December, and the feast of St. Cassien on the 29th of February.

² Soloviev, *La Russie et l’Eglise universelle* (Paris, 1889), p. 4.

of God, we see gendarmes and police inspectors—those guardians of the Orthodox dogmas, those directors of our conscience.”¹

For Soloviev the situation of the Church was incompatible with its spiritual dignity, its divine origin, and its universal mission. But there was only one means by which the Orthodox Church could escape from this situation ; this was to unite with the Catholic Church. The popular basis of faith is identical in Orthodoxy and Catholicism. From the evangelical and historical point of view the Catholic Church should be the guide. By analysing at length the texts of the Gospel, the deliberations of the Conclaves, etc., Soloviev arrived at the conclusion that the Roman Papacy was truly charged by Christ to represent Him on earth, and as “to Christ, the one Being, the centre of all beings, the Church should correspond, a collectivity aspiring to perfect unity,” so Orthodoxy should be reconciled with Catholicism and submit itself to the power of the Pope. In his “spiritual fatherhood” the unity of the human species will be realized. We shall then accomplish the will of Christ, who “in uniting all His disciples in one sole communion did not falter before national divisions. He extended His fraternity over all the nations. And if this mysterious communion of the Divine Body is true and actual, we, in partaking of it, do truly become brothers, without any distinction of race or nationality.”²

Thus, by re-uniting itself with Catholicism, the Orthodox Church and all Russia with it would win the possibility of participating in the great work of “the incarnation of the Word,” the perfecting of human nature and society.

¹ Ivan Aksakov, *Works*, vol. iv. p. 84. Soloviev cites from the same author the story of the shoulder-knots of a general's aide-de-camp, with which Mgr. Irinée, Archbishop of Pskov, and a member of the Holy Synod, was decorated under Paul I, which are highly significant of the relations between Church and State in Russia.

² Soloviev, *op. cit.* p. 329.

Herzen had said of Tshaadaev that in him was incarnated "the reasonable and social aspect of Catholicism." One might also say this of Soloviev. His religious faith, his mysticism even, are directed toward the problem of the welfare and the happiness of mankind.

But neither Tshaadaev nor Soloviev, despite all the power of their original minds, was able to control and master Russian thought, which remained, in general, far removed from the path followed by these two remarkable philosophers, who were all their lives tormented by the great problem of the relations between "the Orient and the Occident," between Russia and Europe, seeking to solve it by the religious unity of one and the other.

CHAPTER V

- I. The idealist philosophy of Germany—Hegelianism. II. Bielinsky—The influence of Schelling and Fichte. III. Bielinsky, a Hegelian of the "Right" and a conservative—His antipathy for French ideals. IV. His conversion—French influences—Social aspirations.

I

A FRENCH poet has said that when one has no support in heaven, one turns one's eyes toward the earth. This aphorism is correct in the inverse sense also. When one finds no support on earth one turns to heaven again. The intellectual life of Russia proves this most emphatically.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, after the Decembrist movement had been suppressed, when political and concrete aspirations had been violently stifled, a period of abstract and nebulous speculation set in. This was the period of the Russian *hegelianstvo*, that is, of the cult of Hegel and the idealistic German philosophy in general. In the place of the late secret political societies which discussed the French, British, American, and Spanish constitutions, philosophic "clubs" were formed, whose members passed their time in discussing the most complex problems of metaphysics.

"There is not a single paragraph in all the three parts of the *Logic* of Hegel, in the two parts of his *Æsthetic*, or in his *Encyclopædia*, etc., which has not for some nights been the subject of furious discussion. People who regarded one another with affection would have nothing to do with one another for weeks after

a disagreement respecting the definition of 'the intercepting mind,' and would regard opinions concerning 'the absolute personality' and its autonomous existence as personal insults. All the most insignificant pamphlets which appeared in Berlin or the various provincial cities of Germany, which dealt with German philosophy and contained even the merest mention of Hegel, were bought and read until in a few days they were torn and tattered and falling to pieces."

Such is the artistic description of life in these philosophical clubs as given by Herzen, who himself entered into it heart and soul.

The influence of the idealistic philosophy of Germany was very great, and played a very important part in the spiritual history of Russian society. Its positive aspect consisted of the fact that it developed, in its Russian adepts, a love of abstract thought and a habit of logical argument. Certain of these Russian disciples of the German school of philosophy became absolute "monstrosities in their terse dialectic and their luminous perception of ideas in their essence" (this was Proudhon's opinion of Bakunin). This habit of "dialectic" and argument liberated the Russian youth of the time from many prejudices, and from docile submission to the naïve beliefs of their fathers. Reserving for man a supreme position in the system of the world ("man is the completion of nature"), German idealism fortified their sense of human dignity.

But German philosophy had also its negative and perilous aspects. Fichte, representing the "external world" as the product of the human mind, compelled his Russian disciples toward an exaggerated subjectivism, toward the concentration of all interests in their *ego*, and toward the neglect of real life. Schelling, who completed Fichte's theory by the addition of the poetic element, and who declared that nature was the work of the artistic and creative imagination of man, impelled them toward an exaggerated "aestheticism." Even Hegel, whose dialectic and philosophy of history were,

for Herzen and his friends, an "algebra of revolution," concealed, in his abstract formulæ, great dangers for the Russian mind, as we shall see later on.

We must here add that an excessive enthusiasm for German metaphysics was often, in Russia, accompanied by an aversion for "French ideas." Happily, this aversion was only ephemeral, and it was precisely these "French ideas" which paralysed the action of the evil aspects of the influence of German philosophy, and permitted the Russian intellectuals to emerge from its labyrinth without the loss of their best human feelings.

II

The 'thirties and 'forties of the nineteenth century were very rich in men and in ideas. All the chief literary and ideological movements of the century had their roots in these years. The period is adorned by a whole Pleiad of illustrious names; the Slavophiles, Khomiakov, the brothers Kireevsky, and the brothers Aksakov; the *zapadniki*, Granovsky, Bielinsky, Herzen, Ogariov, Stankievitsh, and Botkin. Bielinsky was influenced by the destructive genius of the impassioned philosophic and æsthetic romanticism of Schelling. In an article entitled *Literary Musings* (or *Elegy*) he reproduces, almost word for word, the "definitions" of Schelling, and speaks of "the divine world, immense and beautiful, which is nothing more than the breath of a unique and eternal idea (of the thought of the unique and eternal God), and which manifests itself in innumerable forms, as a great spectacle of the absolute unity in an illimitable variety. Only the enkindled sentiment of a mortal can conceive, in its moments of clairvoyance, how great is the body of this soul of the Universe, whose heart is fashioned of stupendous suns, whose veins are Milky Ways, and whose blood is the pure ether." Only art and poetry can seize the essential of this universal life; art, for Bielinsky, is the expression of the great idea of the Universe in its infinitely variable manifestations.

Bakunin was formed by this period. It also gave birth to the Russian novel, and to that literary criticism which for a long time fulfilled the part of a guide, not only in the province of literary taste, but also in that of the social and moral life of the Russian intellectuals.

All those who wish to obtain a real knowledge of this astonishing period should begin with a thorough study of the ideas and the works of Vissarion Bielinsky. Such a study will be of the greatest interest to those who wish to understand the formation of the Occidental and Slavophile movements and the nature of those European influences which have affected the Russian mind.

Endowed with an unusually active mind, and bringing to the expression of his thoughts and feelings a remarkable sincerity, sensitive in the extreme to all impressions and impulses, Vissarion the Impetuous, as his friends used to call him, reflected in his spiritual development and in his works the principal factors of the intellectual life of the period between 1830 and 1850.

At the outset Bielinsky was a disciple of Schelling. *Æsthetic* pleasure, in his opinion, consists of "a momentary oblivion of our *ego* in a keen sympathy with the universal life."

The history of humanity is also a series of manifestations of the same divine idea, and "each people fills, in the great family of the human race, its own place, which is appointed by Providence." This historical and national romanticism has not, in Bielinsky's works, a democratic or popular character: "Our national physiognomy is best preserved in the lower strata of the population, but the superior *life* of the people is concentrated principally in the higher strata." It was to these higher strata that Bielinsky looked for all progress in Russia, and he already saw signs of such progress in the "enlightened activity of the well-known dignitaries, the advisers of the Tsar in the difficult matter of the administration," who entered "the temples

of Russian learning," pointing out to the youth of Russia "the path leading to civilization, based on orthodoxy, autocracy, and the national spirit"; in "the grateful nobility," who gave its children "a solid education"; in the "class of merchants," who "were rapidly learning"; in "our clergy," who "took an active part in the holy work of national education."

With the same optimism Bielinsky considers the past of the Russian people, and finds it full of favourable phenomena. As for Russian literature, a consideration of which forms the principal subject of the *Elegy*, he condemns all its satyric or pessimistic works, pronouncing in favour of "pure art," which is equivalent to saying that he demolishes the principal monuments of the Russian national genius.

This exaggerated indulgence and this desire to see in Russia nothing but what was good was obviously antagonistic to the reality. It is enough to say that the same Count Oubarov, Minister of Public Instruction, who was the "well-known dignitary" mentioned by Bielinsky, expressed during a visit to "the temple of learning," namely, the University of Moscow, the desire "that Russian literature should finally cease to exist," because he regarded it as a vehicle for liberal ideas; he also believed that it was the duty of the Government "to multiply spiritual barriers wherever that is possible."

The striking contradiction between the "literary musings" and the reality could not fail to distress Bielinsky's mind. He sought a remedy, or rather a spiritual asylum, in Fichte. Under the influence of his friend, Mikail Bakunin, who later became the father of anarchism, Bielinsky absorbed the idealism of Fichte.

In a letter to Bakunin he writes that "the ideal life and real life were always divided in his conceptions," but that, enlightened by Fichte, he understood that "the ideal life is precisely the real life, positive and concrete, while what one calls real life is only a negation, a phantom, a nothing, a futility." In another letter

(1837) Bielinsky says that "apart from thought all is a dream, phantasmal; thought alone is substantial and real. What are you yourself? A thought clad in flesh . . . which is the more important: an idea or a phenomenon, a soul or a body? Is the idea the result of the phenomenon, or the phenomenon the result of the idea? Without doubt the phenomenon is the result of the idea."

Putting these theories into practice, Bielinsky "fled to his books at the top of his speed," as he jestingly observed later, seeking to seclude himself in the "ivory tower" of philosophy.

"Submerge yourself, hide yourself in science and art," he advises one of his friends. "Do not seek God in the temples created by man, but seek Him rather in your heart. . . . Philosophy—that is what should be the object of your activities. . . . Philosophy alone will give peace and harmony to your mind. . . . You will not be in the world, but the world will be in you. . . . Above all, *leave politics alone* and beware of any political influence upon your judgment. Politics, with us in Russia, has no meaning, and only empty heads can bother themselves with it."

This determined external indifference concealed, as does all systematic indifference, a conservative tendency.

"Russia is still in her infancy," he writes later on. "To give liberty to a child is to destroy it. To give liberty to Russia, in her present state, is to destroy her. The liberated Russian people would resort, not to the Parliament, but to the drink-shop. All Russia's hope lies in education, not in upheavals, revolutions, and constitutions."

Russian conservatism is always hostile to France. Bielinsky forms no exception to this rule.

"There have been two revolutions in France," he wrote (in 1837); "their result was a constitution, and behold! In constitutional France there is much less liberty of thought than in autocratic Prussia. And

this is because constitutional liberty is a conventional liberty, while the veritable and absolute liberty is realized in the State in proportion to the success of education, based on philosophy, on a speculative and not on an empirical philosophy."

Further on Bielinsky condemns French thought in the following terms :—

"Down with politics! Long live science! In France, science, and art, and religion have become, or, to tell the truth, have always been, the instruments of politics; this is why there is neither art nor science nor religion in France. Avoid French science then, and above all French philosophy; fear them even more than French politics. . . . The French deduce everything from the present state of society; this is why they have no eternal verities. . . . A philosophy based on experience is nonsense. The French of to-day have mastered the Germans, but they do not understand them, because a Frenchman can never attain to universality. . . . The devil fly away with the French! Their activities have never brought us anything but evil. We have imitated their literature, and we have killed our own. . . . Germany is the Jerusalem of modern humanity. . . . To youthful and virgin Russia, Germany must transmit her family life, her social virtues, and her philosophy, which embraces the universe. . . . We must take the initiative in this union with Germany."

Bielinsky, in his Germanophilia and Gallophobia, went so far as to praise the reactionary government of Nicolas J, because it allowed "the products of German thought" to penetrate Russia, while it proscribed ideas of French origin.

III

The next phase in the mental development of Bielinsky was dominated by the philosophy of Hegel, or, more precisely, by a one-sided and erroneous interpretation of a few propositions of Hegel's. "A new,

world is vouchsafed to us," wrote Bielinsky, describing the impression produced upon him by Hegelianism. "Might is right, and right is might. No, I cannot describe to you the feeling with which I heard these words—it was a liberation. I understood the fall of kingdoms, the legality of the actions of conquerors ; I understood that there was no barbarous material force, no domination by the sword and the bayonet, that there was no such thing as despotism. And lo, the mission of the teacher of the human race, the mission which I undertook in respect of my native land, appeared in a new light. . . . The word *reality* has for me become synonymous with the word *God*. . . . Blessed is that word which is able to illumine the very laboratory of the idea of the infinite !"

As we see, Bielinsky is always tormented by the same contradiction : the contradiction between the idea and the reality. And he seeks to reconcile the two by the law of necessity, and the lawfulness of all that exists. We must admit that the historic philosophy of Hegel might be interpreted in the sense which Bielinsky attributed to it. Hegel says that "all that is real is reasonable, and all that is reasonable is real." Which is to say, that all that exists may be explained by the reason, that is, that it has reasonable causes. And, on the contrary, that which reason foresees as a logical necessity of future evolution is *real*, that is to say, will be realized in the future. On the other hand, it results that all that exists to-day may and must perish to give life to something new. Everything now existing includes the germ of something new ; every thesis supposes an antithesis.

Bielinsky's error was this : he perceived only a single aspect of the Hegelian formula ; "all that is real is reasonable." And this one-sided conception led him logically to justify the existing order of things as "necessary" and "lawful." This error was all the more explicable in that Hegel himself gave this interpretation of his historical philosophy (officially at least),

and approved of the Prussian Government as being "reasonable."

It is therefore not surprising that Bielinsky should have tripped over the same stumbling-block. A sincere, ardent thinker, who "did not change colour over the most formidable deductions," Bielinsky endeavoured to reconcile himself entirely with real life, with all its violence and injustice and its vileness, with the "bayonet," the "sword," and the "laboratory," and to show that all that existed in Russia was "reasonable." He had the courage not to keep his opinions for his own personal consumption; he expounded them in a series of startling articles. In one of these articles—which spoke of the anniversary of the battle of Borodino—Bielinsky represented the history of the Russian State as the manifestation of the "mysterious substance" of the "kingdom of the Infinite." The State is not a human institution, but a phenomenon of divine origin. The autocratic power is not derived from election or a contract (as a little liberal French abbé would say). This power, "including in itself all individual wills," is "a transformation of the monarchy of the eternal reason." The very name of monarch is a mystic and sacred thing. The needs and desires of individuals must not be taken into consideration, because "an objective world should vanquish a subjective world." All is reasonable and necessary. Those who do not think so and revolt against suffering and injustice are only "voluntary martyrs" and insane. A poet or an artist should not concern himself with the contemporary world, which is only "a beginning without middle and without end." The moralists are "vampires who kill life by the chill of their touch, and seek to bind the Infinite within the narrow limits of their reasoned but unreasonable definitions."

French literature, being far from this almost super-human detachment, is violently attacked by Bielinsky. The works of Racine and Molière consist, for him,

merely of "insipid statements in insipid verse." Voltaire is "an impudent scoffer at all things which humanity holds sacred and holy." Victor Hugo and Eugène Sue are "worshippers of the violence of bestial passions," "butchers who pose as tragedians and romance-writers." George Sand thinks of nothing but introducing, into literature, the sectarian ideas of Saint-Simonism, which lead us toward the annihilation of the holy ties of marriage, kinship, and the family," and transform the State first "into the scene of a bestial and impudent orgy, then into a phantom, formed of idle words."

It should be noted that at this period Bielinsky had a great antipathy not only for French writers, but also for such of the German writers as displayed the same tendency toward protest and "moralism." Later he said of Schiller, the German Hugo :—

"Schiller was then my personal enemy ; and I had the greatest difficulty in restraining my hatred for him and to keep within the limits of the conventions to which I was able to subdue myself. Why this hatred? Because of his moral and subjective point of view ; because of his horrible ideal of duty ; because of his abstract heroism ; because of his conflict with reality, because of all the suffering which the mention of his name caused me."

IV,

The conservative and almost servile ideas professed by Bielinsky greatly displeased the lettered youth of Moscow ; and some of his friends broke with him, Herzen being one of them. Happily for Bielinsky and Russian thought, the period of his "reconciliation" with reality, or rather his resignation, was not a lengthy one.

At the end of 1839 Bielinsky, having left Moscow to live in Petersburg, was then able to observe the worst aspects of "Russian reality," due to the "militarized Byzantism" of Nicolas I. And by

November 1839 he was writing to his friend Botkin : "Piter [the popular name for Petersburg] has an extraordinary gift of offending anything holy there is in a man." And he added : "The more I see and the more I think, the stronger and more intimate my love for Russia becomes ; but I am beginning to understand that my affection for Russia is for its essence, and its form or method of expression is driving me to despair ; it is filthy, disgusting, repulsive, and inhuman." Early in the following year he wrote to the same friend that "Petersburg was for him a horrible rock on which his simplicity ran aground." He considered that "this was necessary." He suffered at the rupture with those who were revolted by his theory of reconciliation, and he denied his abstract aspirations, his "life in books." "The French disgust me as formerly," he wrote, "but the social idea has taken a firmer hold of me. . . . All that one sees revolts the mind, offends the feelings. . . . No, the devil take all aspirations and all superior aims. We are living in a terrible period ; it is our destiny to sacrifice our personal interests ; we have to suffer so that our grandchildren may live better."

In a letter to K. Aksakov, Bielinsky declared (in June 1840) that "scientific reality is the reality of life"—which must be the basis of science. He renounced his recent ideas concerning Russia and her past ; he declared that "he would pay a great price for the power to destroy what he had written on those subjects."

"China is an abhorrent State ; but still more repugnant is the State in which exist abundant elements of life, but which is oppressed by chains of iron." Shortly after this he broke finally with all his old philosophy.

"I curse my abominable leaning toward reconciliation with the abominable reality ! Long live the great Schiller, the noble advocate of humanity, the shining star of salvation, who emancipated society from its

sanguinary and traditional prejudices ! . . . The human personality is for me, to-day, more than history. . . . I will not reconcile myself to the insipid reality. . . . Reality is an executioner. . . . Negation constitutes our historic right . . . and without it the whole history of humanity would become a stagnant and foetid pool. . . . And the enormities which I used to vomit in my rage against the French, that vigorous, generous nation, which sheds its blood for the most sacred rights of humanity. . . . Of course, the French do not understand the absolute in art, nor in religion, nor in science, and it is not their part to do so. Germany is a nation of the absolute, but a shameful State. . . . Of course, in France there are many brawlers and phrase-makers, but in Germany there are many *hojfräthe*, philistines, pork-butchers, and other reptiles." And Bielinsky rejoices because "the Germans have at last divined what the French are," and because, as the fruit of French ideas, "there has appeared in their country that noble company of enthusiasts of liberty known as 'Young Germany,' at the head of which is Heine, such a wonderful and beautiful personality."

In 1841 Bielinsky amended his Hegelianism. "I have been suspecting for a long time that Hegel's philosophy is only a factor, however great ; but the absolute character of his deductions is worth nothing ; it would be better to die than to adopt them. . . . The subjective, in Hegel, is not an end in itself, but a temporary means of manifesting the objective, and this objective appears, in him, in its relations to the subjective, as a sort of Moloch, for after a brief adhesion he discards it like an old pair of breeches. . . . The fate of the subjective, of the individual, of personality, is, for me, more important than the destiny of the Universé and the good health of the Chinese Emperor—that is to say, of the Hegelian *Allgemeinheit*. . . . I thank you profusely, Yegor Fedorovitch," continues Bielinsky in a bantering apostrophe to Hegel. "I salute your philosopher's cap, but with all the esteem

befitting your Philistine philosophy I have the honour to inform you that if I had the chance to ascend to the topmost rung of the ladder of evolution, I would even then call you to account for all the victims of life and history. . . . Otherwise I would fling myself from the top of the ladder. I do not desire happiness itself gratuitously obtained if I am not easy in my mind in respect of all my brothers by race. . . . It is said that discord is a condition of harmony ; this is very advantageous and agreeable for the melomaniacs, but not for those whose own fate is to furnish discord."

Bielinsky explains with a great deal of depth and subtlety the crisis through which he passed, and the essential difference between French thought and German thought :—

"In seeking a solution we flung ourselves eagerly into the fascinating domain of German contemplation, and we hoped to create for ourselves a pleasant world full of warmth and light, a world of the inward life. We did not understand that this contemplative subjectivism is an objective interest for the German nationality, that for the Germans it is what the social sense is for the French. The reality aroused us," continues Bielinsky, and he sides with the French : "The social sense . . . that is my watchword. What does it matter to me that the Universal lives if the individual suffers? What does it matter to me that genius, on earth, inhabits the summits, if the crowd wallows in the mire? What does it matter to me that I understand the Idea, that the world of the Idea reveals itself to me in art, religion, and history, if I cannot share all this with those who should have been my brothers in the name of humanity . . . but who are strangers to me, and hostile, on account of their ignorance? What does it matter to me that happiness exists for an *élite*, if the majority do not even suspect the possibility of happiness? Away with happiness, if it belongs to me alone amid thousands. I want none of it if it is not common to me and my brothers."

Bielinsky applauded the criticisms brought against Hegel's conservative abstractions by the Hegelians of the "Left"; he regarded these attacks "as the proof that even the Germans may possibly in the future become men and cease to be Germans."

Bielinsky's opinion of French literature also underwent a transformation. He prostrated himself before Voltaire—"What a noble personality!" he cried; before George Sand also, "an inspired prophet, the vigorous champion of the rights of women"; and he admired the Saint-Simonians. But he retained all his old independence of thought and judgment; for example, he was up in arms against Rousseau, condemning his personal life; while in Auguste Comte he did not find even "the traces of genius."

In a letter dated 1847 he says of himself: "Mine is not a Russian character. I would not be a Frenchman even, though I love and esteem the French nation more than the rest. The Russian character is so far nothing but an embryo, but what strength and amplitude it contains! How stifling and horrible all mediocrity and narrowness seems to it!" Bielinsky regards the spirit of criticism, protest, and negation as the most precious gift of the Russian mind, and in respect of his old ideas concerning reality he says:—

"That which exists is reasonable. But a hangman exists, and his existence is reasonable and real; nevertheless it is abominable and repulsive. . . . Negation; that is my god. In history my heroes are the destroyers of the things whose time is past: Luther, Voltaire, the Encyclopædists, the French Terrorists, Byron (*Cain*), etc. Reason is for me, to-day, superior to the reasonable. This is why I set the blasphemies of Voltaire above all submission to authority and religion and society."

This new phase in Bielinsky's intellectual development is most completely depicted in his *Letter to Gogol*, which will always remain among the most remarkable models of Russian literature. Gogol, a

famous satiric writer, had himself condemned all his ideas concerning Russia, had retracted all the just accusations which he had made against her ills, and had exhorted the thinkers of Russia to mystic resignation, humility, and reconciliation with the Orthodox Church and autocratic power. Bielinsky wrote him a crushing reply, in which he stated that "Russia beheld her salvation not in mysticism, nor asceticism, nor pietism, but in the success of civilization, enlightenment, and humanity."

At the end of his days Bielinsky began to be influenced by the philosophy of Feuerbach, on the one hand, and by Fourierism, on the other. But in the spring of 1848 phthisis, that "malady of occupation" of Russian writers, brought him to the grave. Death came in time to save him from persecution. The Government of Nicolas I, which had no objection to Bielinsky's Hegelian conservatism, could not tolerate his later principles, and at the very hour when he lay dying the gendarmes came to his house to arrest him. But it was too late.

CHAPTER VI

- I. Bakunin, the Germanophile and conservative. II. The Slavophiles—Their attitude toward the Europeanization of Russia. III. European element in the *slavianophilstvo*. IV. The Slavophiles and the *zapadniki*. V. Herzen's ideological and moral crisis.

I

THE intellectual and moral crisis undergone by Bielinsky was reproduced with individual variations in the case of a great number of his more eminent contemporaries. His story is typical. Let us, for example, examine the path followed in his ideological development by the father of anarchism, Mikhaïl Bakunin. In his youth he belonged to the same circle as Bielinsky, over whom Bakunin exerted a very considerable influence, inciting him to plumb the very depths of the metaphysical idealism of Germany. But he himself hesitated before none of the logical results of the Hegelian philosophy as he understood and interpreted it. In an article on Hegel, his apology for reality and his aversion for the French lead him perhaps even to greater lengths than those of which Bielinsky was guilty. He speaks with contemptuous irony of the empirical "philosophications" of Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, d'Alembert, and other French writers, who had assumed the gaudy and unmerited title of philosopher. He contrasts the peaceful and anti-revolutionary Germans with the turbulent and recriminative French. Expounding the difference between the mentality and the history of the Germans and those of the French, Bakunin condemns "the furious and sanguinary scenes of the Revolution," rejoicing that

“the profound religious and æsthetic feeling of the German people” had saved it from the “abstract and illimitable” whirlwind which “shook France and all but destroyed her.” Bakunin’s reconciliation with reality was so complete that he sought to justify all ills and all suffering. “Yes,” he writes, “suffering is good; it is that purifying flame which transforms the spirit and makes it steadfast.”

At this period Bakunin had very conservative ideas respecting Russia and the duty of the Russians. He believed that the real education is that which “makes a true and powerful Russian man devoted to the Tsar,” and that “reconciliation with reality in all its relations and under all conditions is the great problem of our day.” Hegel and Goethe were, for him, “the leaders of this movement of reconciliation, this return from death to life.” These leaders must therefore be followed, and the French ideals which are contrary to their teaching must be repudiated. “In France the last spark of Revelation has disappeared. Christendom, that eternal and immutable proof of the Creator’s love for His creatures, has become an object of mockery and contempt for all. . . . Religion has vanished, bearing with it the happiness and the peace of France. . . . Without religion, there can be no State, and the Revolution was the negation of any State and of all legal order. . . . The whole life of France is merely the consciousness of the void. . . . ‘Give us what is new—the old things weary us’—such is the watchword of the young France. . . . The French sacrifice to the fashion, which has been their sole goddess from all time, all that is most holy and truly great in life.”

This “French malady,” said Bakunin, had attacked the Russian intellectuals, who “filled themselves with French phrases, vain words, empty of meaning, killing the soul in the germ and expelling from it all that is holy and beautiful.” It was therefore necessary that Russian society should “abandon this babbling” and ally itself with “the German world with its

disciplined conscience" and "with our beautiful Russian reality."

One of Bakunin's Russian biographers has recently published a letter written in his youth to his parents. "The Russians are not French," he wrote; "they love their country and adore their monarch, and to them his will is law. One could not find a single Russian who would not sacrifice all his interests for the welfare of the Sovereign and the prosperity of the fatherland."¹ If we compare this extreme conservatism with Bakunin's later opinions, and with his anarchist propaganda, which is too well known to call for mention here, we shall realize that the moral and intellectual crisis which Bakunin underwent was even more violent and more profound than it was in the case of Bielinsky. But we must not fail to remark that this crisis not only cured Bakunin of Germanophilia—it also explains why French ideas were finally triumphant over him. His transition from political and religious conservatism to anarchism, atheism, and other "subversive" doctrines coincides with a radical change in his way of regarding the conceptions of French and German thinkers. From a Germanophile and Francophobe he became a Francophile and Germanophobe. And as though he wished to advertise his change of front, he signed with a French pseudonym (Jules Elisard) the first article² in which he proclaimed his rupture with conservatism and his adhesion to the Hegelians "of the Left."

II

The struggle between various European influences which has caused the individual development of nearly all the most remarkable minds of Russia has also given birth to, and greatly influenced, the two great

¹ Cited from M. Kovalevsky's article in the *Viestnik Yevropy*, 1915, x., Petrograd: *The conflict of French and German influences at the end of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth.*

² This article appeared in the *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, in 1842.

currents of Russian thought, Slavophilia and Occidentalism.

To study the *slavianophilstvo* we must resort more especially to the works of Konstantin Aksakov, who was, in the words of his biographer (M. Venguerov), "the militant advance-guard" of the movement. It was Aksakov who expounded the Slavophile ideals to the great public, while his co-religionists (the brothers Kireevsky, Khomiakov, and Samarin) devoted themselves to historical, philosophical, religious, and other studies, and occasionally mitigated the Slavophile theory. Herzen said of Aksakov that he "was refractory, like every militant, for with a calm and deliberate eclecticism one cannot wage war." So in Aksakov we find the simplest, clearest, and most precise expression of Slavophilia.

"The world has perhaps not seen as yet," says Aksakov, "that universal force, at the service of all humanity, which it will discover in the great Slav race, and in the Russians in particular."

For Aksakov, as for other Slavophiles, "Russian history possesses the value of a sacred history. It will be read like a hagiography." The docile Russian people is the chosen people of God; "the doctrine of Christ is the profound basis of the life of the Russian people," and "the history of the people is the history of the only Christian people in the world."

The Western State was founded on the coercion of servitude and antagonism, while in Russia the life of the people is of a totally different character; "Russia is a wholly original country, which has no resemblance to the European States." In the West the people has acquired the ideal of the State; in Russia it is in love with a moral ideal. The most democratic States of the West are those which shock Aksakov the most. In the United States, for example, he finds, "instead of the people, a State machine composed of men." The external order of the United States is brilliant, but "this brilliance is only superficial; good

order prevails there, but it is only the order of a machine." In other words, the democratization of the State does not lead to good results. "The Republic is the people's attempt to be itself the State, to transform itself, as a whole, into the State; it has therefore striven to abandon once and for all the path of moral liberty and inward truth in order to enter upon the outer paths of 'statism.'"

Russia took quite a different direction. "The Divine grace has descended upon Russia, who accepted the Orthodox faith, while the West followed the path of Catholicism." Unlike the West, "Russia did not adopt slavery; she knows neither slavery nor liberalism. She is a free country. The West began by slavery, proceeded with revolt, and boasts of her insolent liberalism, which is only the insolence of a slave." Law, duty, and the State, or, generally speaking, an "external dogma," prevails in the West; while a free conscience and the inner truth prevail in Russia, where "the State has never seduced the people, nor flattered its dreams." "The West is accustomed to vice. There is a great difference between a sin and a vice. In ancient Russia there were sins, but no vices."

According to Aksakov there was, in ancient Russia, no aristocracy and no paganism. "The State" never dominated "the soil." Only after the reforms of Peter the Great did the external norm of the West begin to subdue the internal norm of Russia. Aksakov cherished a genuine hatred of Peter the Great. He even devoted some verses to him, in which he describes him as follows:—

O mighty genius, O bloodstained man,
Far from the confines of the fatherland
Thou standest erect in the blaze of a horrible glory
With an axe covered with blood.

In the name of utility and knowledge,
Borrowed from an alien land,
More than once thy powerful hands
Were empurpled with the blood of thy people.

All Russia, all her previous life
 By thee was misconceived,
 And upon thy stupendous work
 Is set the seal of malediction.

Pitilessly didst thou repudiate Moscow,
 And far from the people
 Thou didst build a solitary city :
 No longer could you dwell together.

In another poem, entitled *The Return*, Aksakov invites the Russians to return "home" :—

Uprooted by a mighty hand,
 We have left our native country ;
 We have fled far away, enchanted by a foreign land,
 Despising the life of our own . . .
 The cloud has lifted ! Before our eyes
 Russia has reappeared.
 Ended, ended is the aching separation,
 The long-desired end of exile has come,
 The voices of our country flock into our souls,
 And our gaze is fixed, full of love, upon the East.
It is time to turn homeward. Our natal soil awaits us,
 Our country, great in its speechless anguish.

Aksakov recurs to this idea of the "return" in a later article :—

"We must return to the principles of the native land. The path to the West is a false track ; it is shameful to follow it. Russians must be Russians, must take a Russian path, the path of faith, submission, and the inner life. . . . We must liberate ourselves wholly from the West, from its principles as well as its tendencies, its habits, and its morals . . . in a word, from all that bears the imprint of its mind."

The social and political life of Russia must not be based upon a Constitution of the European type, but on a moral understanding between the Government and the people. "To the Government, unlimited State authority ; to the people, full moral liberty. To the Government, the right to act and consequently to

legislate ; to the people, the right to judge, and therefore to speak."

An "Assembly of the Soil" (*Zemsky Sobor*) convoked by the Government, and having a consultative voice ; such was the only kind of "Constitution" admitted by Aksakov.

"We shall be told," he writes, "that the people and the authorities may betray one another ; therefore a guarantee is necessary !—No, no guarantee is necessary ! A guarantee is an evil. When a guarantee is necessary nothing is well ; let life disappear rather when nothing is well."

Regarding the manifestations of public opinion and liberty of speech as the principal right of the people, Aksakov presents a brilliant justification of this right :—

"Nothing can be more harmful than the intrusion of brutal force in moral problems ; the only weapon of moral truth is free conviction, is *speech*." Speech is, for Aksakov, "the only sword of the spirit," "the banner of man upon earth." "Created by man, even as sound was created, all imbued with consciousness, speech animates the visible world and gives a body to the invisible."

As a rule the Slavophiles of this period were not, subjectively speaking, reactionaries ; in their nationalistic and conservative romanticism we find many democratic characteristics, the chief of which is the antithesis of the "simple" people and the "high society" corrupted by Europe.

"The simple people is the basis of the whole social edifice of the country. Both the source of material welfare, and the source of inward power and inward life, and, lastly, the source of the national ideal, reside in the simple people."

So it is throughout the world. But with us, in Russia, the *rôle* of the "simple people" is greater than elsewhere, because with us "the people alone is the guardian of the national and historical assizes of

Russia ; it alone has not broken with the past, with the ancient Russia."

Aksakov speaks in very sarcastic terms of the educated and Europeanized society which he calls "the public," and which he contrasts with the "simple people." The scission between the "public" and the people is due to the reforms of Peter I. Before the building of Petersburg "there was no public in Russia ; there was the people." "The public constitutes our permanent tie with the West, and is only a deformation of the popular entity," says Aksakov.

In a famous article published in 1857, Aksakov established this parallel between the "public" and the people in Russia :—

"The public imports from oversea ideas and sentiments, mazurkas, and polkas ; the people draws its life from its native source. The public speaks French ; the people Russian. The public wears foreign clothes ; the people the Russian costume. The public follows the Parisian fashions ; the people adhere to their Russian customs. The public still slumbers when the people has long been awake and at work. The public works (usually with its feet on a wood floor) while the people sleeps, or is already awakening to go to work anew. The public despises the people ; the people forgive the public. The public is only a hundred and fifty years old ; the age of the people is untellable. The public passes away ; the people is eternal. In the public there is gold and dross ; in the people there is gold and dross ; but in the public there is dross in the gold, and in the people there is gold in the dross."

Alexander II, having read this article, found that it "was conceived in a bad spirit."

In a poem, *To a Humanitarian*, Aksakov addresses these cultivated men and invites them to restore the ties between them and the people, to "rediscover themselves in the people," to "submit to the collectivity," informing them that "otherwise they are only impotent egoists, their fair-seeming life is void, their aspirations futile, and their dreams deceitful."

III

It might be supposed that the Slavophile theory—so essentially nationalistic—was of national origin. But such a supposition would be erroneous. In reality the Russian *slavianophilstvo* is objectively far less remote from European ideals than its representatives were personally alienated from the West.

Russian Slavophilia presents a close analogy with the romantic nationalism of the West. I do not share the opinion of Schulze-Gävernitz, who seeks to compare the Russian *slavianophilstvo* with European mercantilism. Mercantilism was a middle-class theory; it appeared for the first time in Russia under Peter the Great, at the period of the first *embourgeoisement*. The Slavophiles were, on the other hand, the desperate enemies of *bourgeois* society, and of the *bourgeois* State of the Occident. This is precisely why they opposed the work of Peter I. Their dissertations on the evil of “written guarantees” and the necessity of a moral agreement between the rulers and the ruled were merely an attempt to embellish their theory of a “paternal authority,” a feudal theory dear to the seigneurs, who loved to regard themselves as the “fathers” of their serfs. And it is no fortuitous coincidence that these ideas were first professed just as serfdom and the seigneurial right were on the eve of abolition.

Slavophilia is a Russian transformation of that romanticism which flourished all over Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century.

“The mass of the public is accustomed to consider the birth of Slavophilia as a purely original and native phenomenon. . . . But the intellectual history of Europe proves that almost every country in its day was subject to a movement resembling our *slavianophilstvo*.” This was the case with Bohemia, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, and above all in Germany, where, “combining their efforts, romantic poetry and philosophy prepared all the forces of the Germanophile movement: the idealiza-

tion of the past, fortified by the cult of its memories, and the predominance of the religious principle in the legends and the life of olden times, lent its prestige to a morbid piety and mysticism; the search after the providential mission, which is the *raison d'être* of the German people, gave rise to the principle of inflated nationalism, by introducing the habit of resolutely condemning everything that did not harmonize with this principle. . . . Instead of launching itself into the vast domain of an advance extending to the whole of humanity, thought confined itself within narrow limits, and there struggled as though in chains, denying the eternal law of the march onward and setting its ideals behind it. . . . We know what was the lamentable end of these romantics, with what a religious and political fanaticism they became imbued, becoming the faithful servitors of any reactionary government, and the inspiring cause of all the persecutions inflicted upon modern thought, which did not bow before their archaico-nationalist theories." ¹

The points of contact between the romantic philosophy of Germany and the *slavianophilstvo* of Russia are plainly visible. From Fichte the Slavophiles borrowed the comparison between internal truth and external truth; from Schelling they acquired a sort of contempt for science, to which the German opposed artistic intuition, which they replaced by "the profundity of the intuition of the Fathers of the Church, original and inaccessible to European minds, living and integral"; an intuition preserved by the Orthodox Church and by the "simple people." From Hegel they borrowed the dogma of the people elected by God and by Him predestined to a lofty mission; but while Hegel reserved this privilege for the German people, they claimed it for the Russians.

If it were necessary, I could add biographical data which would tend to prove that the idealism and

¹ Alexis Veselovsky, *Western Influences in the New Russian Literature*, pp. 185-6.

romanticism of Germany had a direct effect upon the Russian Slavophiles. But I believe this point is sufficiently established.

IV.

I must add that the best representatives of Slavophilia, while preferring the "inner truth" of Russia to the "outward truth" of Europe, did not demean themselves by a blind hatred of Europe. According to Herzen, Ivan Kireevsky, the theorist of *slavianophilstvo*, was "an admirer of liberty and of the great period of the French Revolution." Kireevsky himself, in one of his works, gives a synthesis of the Russian truth and the European truth. "The love of European civilization and the love of Russian civilization mingle at the latest point of their development and become the same love, the same aspiration toward a living civilization, complete, and embracing all humanity, and truly Christian."

Later, the leaders of the Occidentalist movement were of opinion that there were far more points of similarity between the Slavophiles and the *zapadniki* than had been supposed. Herzen declared that Slavophilia and *zapadnitchestvo* were in reality but a Janus whose two faces looked in different directions, but which had but one heart. Herzen even asserted that "the Occidental party in Russia will only have the rank and the power of a social force when it masters the subjects and the problems which the Slavophiles have put into circulation."

According to Herzen, Russian society saluted in the *zapadniki* "the thought of the West, burning with the desire for liberty, the desire for intellectual independence, and the desire for conquest. Through the Slavophiles it protested against the Bironic arrogance of the Petersburg Government, which wronged the sentiment of nationalism."

But all these comparisons were made at a later date; we may even say that they were made too

late ; for at the time of their origin the two great ideological movements of Russia were in violent conflict.

The *zapadniki* of all shades became compacted by their condemnation of the Slavophiles. The Catholic Occidentalist Tshaadaev wrote as follows of their efforts to base their theory upon history and archæology :—

“ Our fanatical Slavophiles may well, in their various researches, exhume from time to time curiosities for our museums or libraries, but it is, I think, permissible to doubt whether they will ever succeed in extracting from our history anything which will fill the void in our souls, or concentrate the vagueness of our minds.”

Tshaadaev criticized the Slavophilia of his day with extreme severity :—

“ A veritable revolution is taking place in our midst, and in our national thought ; a passionate reaction against the knowledge and the ideals of the West ; against that knowledge and those ideals which have made us what we are, and of which this very reaction is the fruit.”

Bielinsky was induced by his antipathy for the Slavophiles to recommend his friends to break off all personal relations with them. “ I am a Jew by nature,” he wrote, “ and I cannot sit at table with the Philistines.” He believed the nationalist propaganda of the Slavophiles to be useless : “ If a nation possesses internal forces it need not trouble about its national originality : this will express itself spontaneously and naturally.” Stankievitch, Bielinsky’s friend, writes as follows : “ Why trouble about our nationality? We must aspire to the things which concern humanity at large ; what concerns the individual will come about despite our efforts.”

But this does not mean that the *zapadniki* were cosmopolitans and enemies of their country. Bielinsky states in one of his articles that “ without nationalities humanity would be only a lifeless logical abstraction, a word without meaning, a sound without significance.”

V. Botkin, one of the most interesting *zapadniki* of his times, wrote to one of his friends: "The Slavophiles have spoken a true word—which is, *nationality*. This is their great merit. They were the first to feel that our cosmopolitanism leads us only to empty argument and idle babbling. . . . In general they were justified in their criticism. But their good qualities are confined to criticism. Directly they tackle a positive subject they display narrowness of mind, ignorance, an archaic mentality which is positively stifling, a misconception of the simplest principles of economic and political science, intolerance, obscurantism, etc."¹

The *zapadniki* could not endure the idealization of ancient Russia of which the Slavophiles were guilty, in the first place because it was contrary to reality and historic truth. Then the reconciliation with the past too readily degenerated into reconciliation with the present, which was by no means beautiful under Nicolas I, for all Russia was groaning under the heavy sceptre of the Byzantino-Prussian *régime*. If the feelings of the Slavophiles were injured because their adversaries were often lacking in respect for the national past, the feelings of the *zapadniki* suffered even more, on account of the disdain which the Slavophiles professed for the "false" civilization of Europe and their obstinate belittlement of this civilization.

We must not forget that Europe, as we have already observed,² was to the Russian Occidentalists of those days "the promised land," and they expected so much of the Europeanization of their country, they hoped such great things from it, that any attack upon the object of their cult was regarded by them almost as a personal outrage.

¹ I cite this letter and Bielinsky's letters from an excellent collection of documents relating to the Occidentalism movement in Russia, published in Russian under the title *The Zapadniki from 1840 to 1850* (Moscow, 1910).

² See G. A. Alexinsky, *Russia and Europe*, trans. B. Miall (Fisher Unwin), pp. 388-528.

On the other hand—and this is a point of great importance—the Slavophiles had “friends on the Right” as their auxiliaries in their conflict with the *zapadniki*. These reactionary nationalists, among whom we must mention more especially Professors Shevyrev and Pogodin, made very practical use of the theories of the Slavophiles. Although the best of the Slavophiles observed a certain moderation in their reprobation of the Occident, their “friends on the Right” professed without any mitigation that the West was “rotten,” that Europe was “carrion,” etc.

The official and governmental world was also involved in the conflict, and sought to profit by it. Although it was shocked by the essential democracy of some of the Slavophiles, it found their conceptions far less dangerous than those of the Occidentalists. The government of Nicolas I was afraid of the example of Europe. Count Ouvarov stated that “all the Western peoples are changing their conditions of life,” but that “Russia is still young and virgin,” and “must not acquire a taste for sanguinary upheavals.” “Russia’s youth must be prolonged,” he declared. “If I could keep Russia for fifty years aloof from what these theories are making ready for her, I should consider that my duty was accomplished, and I should die content.”

Ouvarov even conceived a theory of official conservatism: Russia does not resemble the European States, and her life is based on three immovable foundations: autocracy, Orthodoxy, and the Russian nationality. For the salvation of this precious trinity the Government punished all aspirations toward independence and progress, and employed against the *zapadniki* all the might of its police mechanism.

Official nationalism did much to compromise the Slavophiles by its adhesion to their ideas, and often exploited them. The Slavophiles should not be held responsible for the somewhat indecent procedures of their “friends on the Right,” and I do not share the opinion of the Czech Professor Masaryk, who goes

so far as to say that the Slavophiles, "with the help of German philosophy, erected Ouarov's programme into a system."¹ Nevertheless, the heat of polemics might have resulted in a certain understanding, and the *zapadniki* were possibly not always without justification when they accused the Slavophiles of official and reactionary support, and asserted that they did not always hold themselves aloof from the nationalist Extreme Right.

Thus the conflict between the two great currents of Russian thought became envenomed, and they could no longer co-exist in a peaceable manner.

V

Occidentalism was no longer entirely homogeneous. Besides the Bakunin-Bielinsky-Stankievitsh group, the *zapadniki* were also represented by the circle of Herzen and Ogariov and their followers. Herzen has defined the difference between these two elements as follows:—

"Between our group and that of Stankievitsh there was not a great deal of sympathy. Our tendencies, being almost exclusively political, did not please them. Theirs, being almost exclusively speculative, did not please us any better. They regarded us as French and fault-finders; we regarded them as Germans and sentimentalists."

The French influence in Herzen and his friends was betrayed in the first place by a genuine cult of Saint-Simonism, of which we shall speak later on, and for George Sand. The latter possessed so great and so beneficent an authority that even Dostoievsky, who had none too much sympathy with France and French literature, glorified her at her death.

"Oh, be sure, there will be people who will smile at the importance which I attribute to the influence of George Sand," he wrote, "but the scoffers will be

¹ Th. G. Masaryk, *Russland und Europa—Zur Russischen Geschichte, und Religions Philosophie. Soziologischen Skizzen*, vol. i. p. 209 (Jena, 1913).

wrong. George Sand is dead. But all that made us feel, at the time of the poet's first appearance, that we were hearing a new voice, all that was universally human in her work, all this found an instant echo in our hearts, in our Russia. We experienced a profound and intense impression, which has not faded, and which proves that every European poet or innovator, every new and powerful thought coming from the West, inevitably becomes a Russian force." And Dostoievsky places George Sand among those European writers who "rising yonder, in the country of blessed miracles," have drawn to them, from our Russia, an enormous sum of thought, of love, of noble impulses, of profound convictions, of life."

The ideas of George Sand and of the great French Utopian Socialists, to whom the memories of the French Revolution gave an added prestige, inspired the Russian *zapadniki* with a feeling of religious love and admiration. Herzen, speaking of this period in his *Memoirs*, states that "*he illumined Europe with magical colours; he believed in Europe, and above all in France.*" Another great *zapadnik*, Soltykov-Shtshedrin, in spite of all his scepticism (he was a satirist), speaks of France with touching affection, and states that the France of George Sand, Saint-Simon, Louis Blanc, Cabet, and Fourier shed upon Russia the fair light of hope and the conviction that "the best years of humanity, its golden age, are not behind us, but before us."

The influence of French thought upon Herzen's mind was not exclusive, as he succeeded in combining it with Hegelianism "of the Left" and the philosophy of Feuerbach. As for Hegelianism, Herzen appropriated only its revolutionary algebra; that is, the idea that nothing is immutable, and that every social condition contains the germs of a radical change.

With an ardent faith in the West in general, and France in particular, with a faith no less ardent in a revolutionary cataclysm, Herzen went to Europe. Dis-

illusion awaited him there. A brief sojourn abroad deprived him of all his enthusiasm and all his hopes. This he declared openly and with entire sincerity. He confessed that he was ashamed of his affection for Europe; that he "*blushed for his prejudices.*" The first origin of this disillusion was the events of 1848 in France. The general check which the Revolution received throughout Europe intensified the crisis in Herzen's mind, which resulted in the publication of several remarkable works, notably his book *From the other Shore*, which is full of a veritable universal sorrow.

"We were young two years ago; to-day we are old," wrote Herzen in 1850, describing the effect produced upon him by what he had seen in Europe. From that moment he renounced his old "belief in words and flags, in the deification of humanity and the illusion that salvation can only be effected by the Church of European civilization." For Herzen the West was dead. It was an old world from which nothing was to be expected.

Then began Herzen's famous "return to Russia." He did not return to Russia in person, however, for until the end of his days he remained a political *émigré*, and he died far away from his country. His old confidence in Europe was replaced by his trust in the future of Russia.

The Nationalists, the Slavophiles, the conservatives, and all the other Russian adversaries of Occidentalism, sought to exploit Herzen's change of front in order to combat European ideals and the Europeanization of Russia. Strakhov, the friend of Leo Tolstoy, has devoted to Herzen quite the half of his curious work, *The Struggle against the West in our Literature*:

"Herzen," says Strakhov, "was the first of our *zapadniki* to abjure the West, and he consequently lost his guiding line. He turned to the West in order to draw from it wisdom and moral perfection, and

he understood, after long and patient research, that he could find nothing stable there, nothing positive.”¹

Strakhov sought to draw from this a deduction of a more general nature. In his opinion Herzen, by abandoning his illusions as to Europe, was continuing the genuine tradition of Russian literature. “Occidental civilization and ideals of European origin are not at bottom suited to Russia,” says Strakhov. Russia may borrow from the West its “astronomy and mathematics”; simple elementary truths, such as “two and two make four”; but “as a whole” the spirit of Europe can be of no service to Russia, who must follow her own individual path.

“For a long time now—very conspicuously since the time of Karamzin—every Russian writer of worth passes through intellectual changes, which in general are fairly similar. He begins by falling in love with European ideas, by seizing upon them greedily. Then comes disillusion, in one form or another, for one reason or another; he doubts Europe and feels an antipathy for her principles. Lastly begins *the return homeward*, a love, more or less happy, for Russia, and it is in Russia that he seeks for the assured destiny, the solid foundations of thought and life.”²

In support of his theory Strakhov cites the names of Karamzin, Griboiedov, Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoievsky, and Tolstoy; “all,” he says, “have passed along this road.”

These examples differ too greatly to be convincing. We know that Karamzin, at the end of his life, became a conservative and anti-Occidental. But this fact cannot be regarded as characteristic of every Russian writer, because it was due to causes of a general kind which at that period were in operation all over Europe; there was everywhere, at that time, a movement of reaction, the inevitable result of the events of the French Revolution. As for Griboiedov, he was by no means

¹ N. Strakhov, *The Struggle against the West in our Literature*, p. 83.

² *Ibid.* p. 94.

an anti-Occidental. Although the hero of his immortal comedy, Tshatsky, fulminates against the abuse of a "vain, servile, and blind imitation of Europe," he is not referring to European civilization, but the false imitation, the caricature of this civilization which is offered by Russian fashionable society. And he attacks with even greater energy those representatives of a pretended "national civilization" who want to "replace Voltaire by a sergeant-major." In a letter to a friend Griboiedov complains bitterly of the painful lot of "an impassioned dreamer in a country of eternal snows." As for Pushkin, Strakhov's error is even greater; Pushkin, to the last day of his too brief life, remained a convinced Occidental; never did he condemn European civilization. Moreover, Pushkin was, without doubt, the most national and the least nationalistic of the Russian poets. He had a "universal mind," as Dostoievsky very justly remarked, which combined a capacity for universal sympathy with the essential traits of the true Russian character.

"What has the reform of Peter the Great meant for us?" writes Dostoievsky in his lecture upon Pushkin. "Has it not meant merely the introduction of European costume, European science and inventions? Let us consider. Perhaps Peter the Great undertook his reform, in the first place, with a purely utilitarian aim; but later he certainly obeyed a mysterious feeling which induced him to prepare a vast future for Russia. The Russian people itself saw at first nothing but material and utilitarian progress, but it soon understood that the effort which it was being forced to make was to lead it farther and higher. We soon attained to the conception of universal human unification. Yes, the destiny of Russia is Pan-European and universal. To become a true Russian means, perhaps, only to become the brother of all men, *the universal man*, if I may so express myself. This division between Slavophiles and Occidentals is only the result of a gigantic misunderstanding. A true Russian is as much

interested in the destinies of Europe, in the destinies of the whole great Aryan race, as in those of Russia. . . . Yes, all Russians in future will realize that to show oneself a true Russian is to seek a real basis of reconciliation of all the European contradictions."

This quotation is highly typical of Dostoievsky himself, who, in his best moments, was able to rise above nationalistic exclusiveness. I may observe in passing that we cannot draw any comparison between the defection of Dostoievsky and the disillusionment of Herzen, for between Dostoievsky the member of the Fourierist club and Dostoievsky the believer and conservative lies an interval of several years' detention in a "house of death," that is, in a convict prison. His case is almost pathological. Still more pathological is the case of Gogol, another instance of which Strakhov boasts. Just before his death Gogol, suffering from a mental malady, fell into the power of a monk, denounced all his "liberal" opinions, condemned his satirical works, burned his manuscripts, and invited Russian thought to kneel before the political reaction and the Orthodox Church.

Neither can any logical comparison be drawn between Gogol's crisis and that of Herzen. Herzen, until his death, remained the determined enemy of the political and religious reaction. He adored neither the autocracy nor the Orthodox Church, and he was convinced that the "Germano-Byzantine" combination of the two was one of the chief causes of the popular woes and sufferings.

And Leo Tolstoy? In the first place no comparison is possible between him and Gogol or Dostoievsky. The latter, impelled toward conversion by exceptional circumstances, became good servants of the Tsar and faithful children of the Church. Tolstoy, on the other hand, broke with the autocracy and with Orthodoxy, and was persecuted by the one while he was excommunicated by the other. Moreover, Tolstoy never posed as the enemy of European civilization, as Russia's

hostility toward Europe was quite foreign to him. He thought not of this or that nation, but of humanity in general. The problems which he attacked were far more general than those of the Nationalists. They were the problems of progress, of human civilization in general, which Rousseau had already discussed in a different manner.

We may say, therefore, that Strakhov was mistaken in interpreting the task of Russian literature as a "struggle against the Occident," and in degrading it to the level of a narrow nationalism.

As for the revolution which Herzen underwent, this was the origin of it: Herzen himself admits that before leaving for Europe he knew nothing of it, and had embellished it with "marvellous colours." It had for him the attraction of a "forbidden fruit." (It will be remembered that the Government of Nicolas I sought to withdraw Russia from the intellectual attraction of Europe, and above all, from that of France.) On beholding in reality this Europe, of which he had formed too fair an image, Herzen was disappointed. What struck him and angered him most was the crushing of the labour movement in France in 1848 and the fusillades in Paris. What an overwhelming experience for this man, who was steeped in the utopian socialism of France, and who had devoted himself to its cult with the fervour which only the Russians can feel for that revelation which reaches them through the writings of foreigners! For, as Dostoievsky said, if I mistake not, "what to a European scholar is only a hypothesis is an axiom for a youthful Russian."

Herzen had received the advanced ideas of the West as absolute dogmas, as axioms. Although he believed that he understood the dialectic algebra of Hegel, the true laws of historical evolution escaped him. He was convinced that all was ready in Europe for the reign of utopian socialism (which he, of course, did not regard as utopian). His hopes having been deceived,

he asked himself whether his ideal was false or whether Europe was incapable of realizing it. We know the reply: he did not condemn his ideal, but Europe.

For the rest, the ideal of political and economic enfranchisement professed by Herzen and his friends was not of Russian origin, but had come to them from the Occident.

Thus we cannot say that Herzen was an anti-Occidentalist. If he condemned contemporary Europe, it was because Europe had failed to keep its promises, because it remained inferior to its own ambitions.

Herzen did not extend his condemnation to Western ideas; he confined it to men and to situations. This is where he differed so profoundly from many of the "penitents" and "converts," and from Dostoievsky in particular, who followed the Slavophiles in contrasting the "Russian ideal" with the "European ideal," as two essentially contrary things.

Herzen's "return to Russia" was not an abdication. In his own words, he "was saved from the despair which the events of 1848 would have inspired in him by his faith in Russia." But what was this faith? Dostoievsky, returning from Siberia, became the admirer of the people and its prejudices; he shared—whether sincerely or not—all its simple beliefs, its primitive cult for the Tsar, the Orthodox Church, etc. Herzen did not give way to the superstitions of the people; he chose other objects of admiration, notably the *mir*, the rural commune, in which he saw the embryo of a future "socialization" of Russia.

The real secret of Herzen's "return to Russia" is revealed by Herzen himself in his open letter to Michelet. "The man of the future in Russia is the moujik, just as in France he is the artisan."

This aphorism dates from 1851, three years later than the Revolution of 1848; so that we cannot say that Herzen had entirely lost his confidence in Europe. He was disappointed by the "old" *bourgeois* Europe, which he regarded as *embourgeoisé* to excess; but

he continued to count on the future of working-class socialism.

It is especially significant that Herzen placed the Russian moujik on a level with the French artisan, in whom, for him, the very idea of progress, liberation, and revolution was incarnated. He did not believe that the Russian moujik was reduced to a destiny of submissiveness and resignation. He proposed for the *moujik* the aim of the European socialist artisan; the end was the same; the only difference was in the ways and means of attaining it. Herzen believed that Russia, thanks to the existence of the rural *mir*, would establish the socialist state without previously passing through the capitalist phase of evolution.

Many more beside Strakhov have sought to rank Herzen with the anti-Occidentalists, and above all with Dostoievsky, but in vain. There was nothing of the narrow-minded nationalist about Herzen. While Dostoievsky often demeaned himself by anti-Semitism, Herzen remained always superior to blind chauvinism, even during the Polish insurrection of 1863. At that terrible period, when the Russian soldiers and the insurgents were battling in the forests of Poland, he pronounced in favour of the Polish cause, together with the whole of democratic Europe, although he ran the risk of alienating a portion of his Russian readers, and did, indeed, so alienate them.

The mental and spiritual contrast between Herzen and Dostoievsky is most strikingly revealed in that chapter of the *Diary of an Author* in which Dostoievsky speaks of Herzen with barely concealed irritation, calling him ironically a "citizen of the world." Well, Herzen was a citizen of the world in the best sense of the term, and as such he could not be either anti-Russian or anti-European. This he understood perfectly well, and he himself said that for the Slavophiles he was a man of the Occident, while for the *zapadniki* he was a man of the Orient.

CHAPTER VII

- I. Dostoievsky and his contradictory qualities.
- II. The disintegration of the *slavianophilstvo*—Katkov, Pobiedonostzev and Leontiev.
- III. The Occidental sources of reactionary nationalism in Russia.

I

DOSTOIEVSKY was the only Slavophile of the "second *ban*" who was able to maintain the ideals of that school at a certain level. This, perhaps, was precisely because he was not a pure Slavophile. This he could not be, for the true Russian Slavophilia is a product of the seigneurial mentality, while Dostoievsky was a true representative of the middle-class intellectual world, the world of the *declassés*, which constitutes, according to Klutshevsky's remarkable definition, "the fluid element of Russian society." And as such, Dostoievsky united in himself ideals which were often highly discordant. He condemned the revolutionary movement as foreign to the popular spirit and anti-national. He even went so far as to represent the men of the advance-guard as a sort of herd of swine, inhabited by demons, capable only of committing insane actions and of destroying themselves. At the same time, he remained the admirer of Bielinsky, George Sand, Byron, and many other extremely "subversive" personalities. He attacked European civilization, stating that "the people would never welcome a Russian as one of themselves." But when the conservatives demanded that the "false light" of Europe should not be allowed to shine upon the people, and sought to suppress public instruction as the instrument of Europeanization, Dostoievsky protested against these

ideas and proved that they served none but those who were exploiting them. "The character of the Russians differs so greatly from that of all the other European nations that their neighbours are really incapable of understanding them." "Russia is a country which resembles Europe in nothing. . . . How can you expect Russia to be enthusiastic about a civilization which she has not created?"

You will often find such aphorisms in Dostoievsky's works. And in addition to these there are many which are totally different, and which reject all ideas of a chauvinistic nature. We have already seen, for example, that he attributed to the Russians a pan-human and universal destiny. To this idea he frequently returns. "In Russia," he writes, "the impenetrability and intolerance of Europe does not exist. Russia finds it easy to accommodate herself to universal influences, to assimilate all ideas. . . . The Russian is able to speak all foreign languages, thoroughly seizing the spirit of them, grasping the finer shades, as though they were his own: a faculty unknown to the other European peoples, at all events as a *universal national faculty*." This faculty of assimilation is greatly valued by Dostoievsky, and—which distinguishes him profoundly from the Slavophiles—he sings the praises of Peter the Great as an eminent representative of this faculty, and says of him that "he understood, by the intuition of genius, the true mission of his country, and the necessity of enlarging its field of action." We are a long way from Aksakov and his maledictions of Peter the Great!

II

But in spite of all the powers of his genius, Dostoievsky did not exercise a marked influence over the younger generation of his time, nor over the Pleiād of the "Slavophiles of the first *ban*," the brothers Aksakov, Kireevsky, Khomiakov, and Samarin. In 1862 the "new master of nineteenth-century thought,"

the leader of the "thinking realists" and the positivist *zapadniki*, Dimitri Pisarev, described the Slavophiles as "Russian Don Quixotes," and according to him a sensible man would not even waste his time in arguing with them. In his article on the works of Ivan Kireevsky, Pisarev stated that Slavophilia was a psychological phenomenon, due to the fact that the Slavs wanted to love and believe; now, as in real life nothing was deserving of love or of faith, they had to idealize the reality. "Slavophilia is the Russian Quixotism; where there are but windmills the Slavophiles see armed knights."¹

Although on its romantic side Slavophilia seemed entirely inoffensive, even to the Nihilists of 1860 to 1870, it contained other elements which were leading it toward a more and more emphatic conservatism and toward degeneration. The first Slavophiles were "archæological liberals," as some one has called them, and they demanded the moral support of "the old Russia" in order to combat the injustice and oppression to which a Prussianized bureaucracy was subjecting the people; but their successors were archæological, or perhaps we should say archaic, *reactionaries*.

This deviation from the old Slavophilia, caused above all by the development of the general reaction at the end of the reign of Alexander II and under Alexander III, involved even those of the first Slavophiles who had the misfortune to survive. Such was Ivan Aksakov (brother of Konstantin), who, at the beginning of the reign of Alexander III, violently opposed all liberal or democratic elements as a European intrusion.

The leaders of the Slavophiles described the West as "rotten," and proclaimed the necessity of keeping Russia untouched by European progress. The partisans of official nationalism drew practical deductions from this judgment. Katkov, Leontiev, and Pobiedonostzev

¹ D. Pisarev, *Works*, vol. ii. p. 234 (Petersburg, 1894).

constructed a complete "true Russian" system, a system which was Orthodox, autocratic, and nationalist.¹

Katkov, an old disciple of Hegel and Schelling, a member of the circle of Stankievitch and Bielinsky, and afterwards (from 1856 to 1860) a moderate liberal and Anglomaniac, was after 1861 the theorist of the reaction. Russia, he said, had no need of European reforms; she needed a strong State, based on national union, a single language, a single religion, and the rural *mir*. No adhesion of Russia to the ideals of the Occident was possible or desirable. Instead of striving to Europeanize Russia, an attempt should be made to Russify all the heterogeneous elements inhabiting the Empire, which were already affected by the policy of "Europeanization." The execution of this programme would mean a desperate struggle against all the non-Russian and unorthodox nations (especially against the Poles and Finns) and against the world of thought (and especially against the students), the builders of Occidental chimeræ, who were strangers to the true Russia.

Pobiedonostzev and Leontiev expounded more particularly the "moral" and religious side of the conservative and nationalist system. In his *Muscovite Miscellany*, Pobiedonostzev attributed a divine origin to the autocracy. "One of the falsest political principles," he wrote therein, "is that of the sovereignty of the people." Such was the false idea which had "unhappily been diffused since the French Revolution"; the idea that "all power should emanate from the people and should be subject to the popular will." Hence was derived "the theory of parliamentarism, which hitherto has led into error the mass of those who are known as intellectuals, and which has penetrated, unhappily, our crazy Russian heads." "We find in France an example of the bad effects of parliamentarism," says Pobiedonostzev. "In France

¹ Compare Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationalism with Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity (Tr.).

nationalist thought is greatly demoralized, and the political sense of the whole nation is enfeebled." England "is already attacked by the same malady."¹ Constitutional and parliamentary institutions and guarantees—this is the evil from which Russia must be saved, says Pobiedonostzev, echoing the old Slavophiles. But while Aksakov and his co-religionists allowed the people "liberty of opinion," Pobiedonostzev opposes this liberty. Abstractions and general principles, especially those inculcating liberty, equality, and fraternity, "with all their applications and ramifications," are to him detestable. He opposes the Press, the schools, and all that might contribute to the awakening and enfranchisement of thought. The only education which is truly national and admissible in Russia consists in "maintaining mankind in rigorous submission to order."² This is the business of the State authority, which is "great, terrible, and holy."

The "true Russian" conservative doctrines were most completely expressed by Konstantin Leontiev (1831-91). In his youth he was an adept in "George-Sandism," which he later declared to be "diabolical." Then he became a convert to Orthodox mysticism, and inaugurated the theory of Russian Byzantism. In the domain of morals he prescribed the absolute submission of the individual to the laws of the Church—not of the Christian Church in general, but of the Orthodox Church. For him Christianity was not love and charity, but the *fear* of God. Human nature is corrupt and evil. Only a salutary fear, a severe discipline, and punishment can correct it. "It is a lie to represent the idea of God as being that of love. Faith in God is a yoke which should be borne with humility. Autocracy is a Divine institution, and the power of the Tsar should inspire the same fear in his subjects as that which the power of God inspires in believers."

¹ K. Pobiedonostzev, *Movkowskii Sbornik (The Muscovite Miscellany)*, pp. 30-31 (2nd ed., Moscow, 1896).

² *Ibid.* p. 86.

Science and the education of the people are useless, because they do not lead to the knowledge of God ; they are even harmful, because they destroy the religious conscience. All progress, all novelties are superfluous and maleficent, not excepting even the mere knowledge of reading and writing.

Leontiev invented a theory of the ages of humanity. In Europe, the period of the great migrations of the peoples was youth ; the Middle Ages was maturity. At the end of the eighteenth century, with "atheist" philosophy and the Revolution, Europe entered into decrepitude and is approaching death. The same fate threatens Russia ; to avoid it, Russia must be "congealed," must be maintained in a refrigerated condition, so that she shall be unable to live and develop. Down with all reforms : away with Europeanization !¹

Happily, Leontiev's fantastic ideal was not realized ; economic evolution, on the one hand, and European penetration, on the other, have relegated it to the world of dreams, and Russia, frozen at the end of the nineteenth century, is now, in the early years of the twentieth century, thawing and beginning to live again.

III

It is particularly interesting to note that national and anti-Occidental conservatism owe their existence very largely to that Europe which their prophets so hate and detest. We have already seen that the first Slavophiles were the nurslings of German philosophy. Those that followed them were even more dependent upon Europe. Vladimir Soloviev, with his remarkable knowledge of Occidental philosophy, was able to demonstrate this fact with ease and in a manner which left nothing to be discussed.

Thus the Slavophiles of the second *ban*—that is, of

¹ The conceptions of Leontiev and other anti-Occidental reactionaries have been excellently described by Professor Masaryk (*Europa und Russland*, vol. ii. Part IV).

the last quarter of the nineteenth century—found their gospel and their textbook in Danilevsky's *Russia and Europe*, a work which caused a great sensation and was accepted as essentially original. It depicts the "types of civilization" which characterize the development of the various peoples. No communion is possible between these "types," which are separated one from another as though by impassable walls. Hence it follows that Russia, representing a particular type of civilization, will never be able to "Europeanize" herself.

Now this theory, as Vladimir Soloviev has proved, is borrowed in its entirety from the German historian Heinrich Rückert. Danilevsky's work is merely "a Russian copy of the German original," asserts Soloviev, and he proves his accusation by quotations.

"The supposedly Russian and original theory which was to annihilate all European theories of the science of history is in reality only a poor copy of a German theory, published twelve years earlier. Of course, the theory of the German scientist is neither improved nor worsened for being restated by a Russian writer, and by him enlarged by means of pseudo-patriotic additions. But those conceptions of Danilevsky's which amount to a denial of our spiritual ties with Europe are gravely compromised by the fact that in order to justify them in theory, or rather to seem to do so, he was forced to borrow one of the second-rate products of the German mind."¹

For the nationalists of the Extreme Right, Katkov, Pobiedonostzev, and Leontiev, the essential and most "national" portion of their ideas was provided, as Soloviev has shown, by the Catholic reactionaries, and in particular by Joseph de Maistre.

"The Russian disciples of Joseph de Maistre, instead of speaking in the name of their master, have spoken in the name of the Russian people, who, however, have

¹ V. Soloviev, "A German original and a Russian copy" (*Works*, vol. v. p. 294).

never or in any manner expressed any sympathy with the doctrine of the Savoyard squire. In our past and in our present there are assuredly many things which correspond with the principles of Joseph de Maistre. But the truth is that the Russian people as a whole has never constructed absolute truths out of certain episodes or characteristics of its life. It has never made idols of its national defects, or of the necessities to which it has been subjected. Yes ; individuality and the social relations are not greatly developed in Russia ; the precepts of law and justice are not yet rooted in our minds, and because of this (as some one has remarked) honest men are more uncommon than saints in Russia. All this is true. The faithful votaries of Joseph de Maistre believed that things must be so ; but does the Russian people believe it also? That is another question.”¹

As Soloviev very justly observes, the only originality of the pseudo-nationalist and anti-Occidentalists of Russia is that it seeks to clothe European thought in a tattered Tartaro-Byzantine “kaftan.”

¹ V. Soloviev, “Slavophilia and its degeneration” (*Works*, vol. v. p. 220).

CHAPTER VIII

- I. The *zapadnitshestvo* triumphant. II. Nihilism—Its European origin—Dobrolubov and Pisarev—The “destruction of æsthetics” —Nihilism and anarchism—Pisarev’s opinion of the French and English—The social problem and “æsthetics.” III. Tshernyshevsky —His materialism—The popularization of Occidental ideas—Tshernyshevsky and Feuerbach—The secularization of Russian thought—English influences.

I

TO-DAY Slavophilia may be regarded as dead. It is true that from time to time a Russian politician or author attempts to exhume its remains and warm it back to life by means of heady rhetoric. But such attempts are idle, for the social, economic, and political bases of the old Slavophilia have disappeared. They no longer exist either in the interior of Russia, where *bourgeois* relations have taken the place of the old “patriarchal” system, nor in the rest of the Slav world. This outer Slav world is more fully Europeanized than Russia herself.

Lately an attempt was made to revive the Slavophile formulæ in order to embellish the Imperialist tendencies professed in certain circles (happily not numerous) of the Russian *bourgeoisie*; notably the claim to hegemony, in the Balkans and the conquest of Constantinople, which the speeches of the Neo-Slavophiles represented as the “communion” of Russia with the Divine Wisdom (in allusion to St. Sophia of Byzantium). But orators and audience were well aware how little all this archaic phraseology was adapted to the tendencies of modern Imperialism. No one will be able to revive the old

Slavophilia. Occidentalism remains the sole master of the battlefield. But the *zapadnitshestvo* of to-day is no longer the Occidentalism of Bielinsky's days and Herzen's. That also has passed through a development which has not led it to its death, as was the case with the old Slavophilia, but which has subjected it to great transformations.

Let us glance at this latter phase of its history.

II

The great poet Nekrassov has said of the Russian intellectual:—

What the latest book has told him
Will remain on the surface of his heart.

This means that he will always be in love with the last idea with which he has made acquaintance, and that previously acquired ideas will be easily forgotten.

There is an undeniable justice in this observation; the currents of thought in Russia often displace one another with extreme suddenness. The history of Russian Occidentalism proves this statement, but it also shows us that in spite of these frequent and sudden changes of what has for a moment prevailed, something always remains, I do not say immovably, but it does remain, more or less stable, and it constitutes the national peculiarity of our Occidentalism.

The first great turning on the road followed by the *zapadniki* was reached at the "Period of the Great Reforms," or during the "'sixties," which formed the period so named in Russia.

This was the period of "Nihilism." In my *Modern Russia* I have described the general character of Russian Nihilism, and its social origins. But I have not spoken there of the European influences which have affected it, and which were extremely potent. One may even say that the basis of Nihilism is a determined struggle of

European ideas against the old principles and ancient forms of Russian life.¹

Nihilism had three protagonists: Dobrolubov, Pisarev, and Tshernyshevsky. All three were convinced Occidentalists. Dobrolubov (born in 1836, died of phthisis in 1861), a literary critic of high talent, was the disciple of European authors. One of his friends said that "Dobrolubov, during the years which determined the shaping of his intellect, was nourished upon our great Occidental masters. Books and articles written in Russian might please him, might delight him, but they could not possibly furnish him with the knowledge and the information which he owed to his reading."

One may object that Dobrolubov was not a true "Nihilist" and "negator." These qualifications would apply rather to Pisarev (1841-68). Dead at the age of twenty-seven, Pisarev wrote only for nine years, of which four were passed in prison (on account of the publication of a "subversive" article). In this brief space of time he succeeded in writing some thousands of pages which were destined to propagate "Nihilism," and *pisarevshchina* has become synonymous for Nihilism *par excellence*.

What was Pisarev's Nihilism?

In the first place, he rejected what was, for the *zapadniki*, the most conspicuous trait of the preceding generation: idealistic philosophy and "æsthetics." Pisarev displays a profound contempt for "the husk of Hegelianism" with which the ideals of Bielinsky, his predecessor, were covered. But it was especially "æstheticism" which he attacked. In his efforts to destroy it he went so far as to describe our great poet Pushkin as a "sublime *crétin*," and asserted that Beethoven had the same social value as a skilful chess or billiard player.

¹ I insist on this point because certain foreign writers have misunderstood the real nature of Russian Nihilism, and have represented it as rejecting all European culture in general and all French culture in particular. M. Haumant has not avoided this error (see pp. 500-3 of his *Culture française en Russie*).

However, M. Haumant commits a sensible error in comparing Pisarev's Nihilism to negation for negation's sake, or even to the anarchism of Bakunin. Pisarev was not by any means an anarchist, and had no idea of contesting the *raison d'être* of the State. This is clearly proved by his article on the *Historical Ideas of Auguste Comte*, in which the parallel established by Comte between the political institutions of continental Europe and those of England is compared with the parallel drawn by Buckle. Now, Pisarev ranged himself on the side of Buckle, and wrote as follows :—

“ The Anglomania cultivated in France by the disciples of Montesquieu and the co-religionists of Guizot, and with us by a certain school of moralists and professors, has excited an extremely strong reaction against it, which in its turn has gone too far, or at least has assumed a false direction. Of course, it is absurd to prescribe the British Constitution as a panacea for all social evils ; it would be unreasonable to transplant upon the European Continent institutions under whose protection all the beauties of a colossal pauperism have blossomed. It was necessary to denounce, with the utmost energy, the social maladies of England, in which these doctrinaires beheld a Paradise. But it would not have sufficed to content oneself with mere reprobation. It was enough merely to say, without more ado, that there was much evil in England, without inferring that this evil did not exist, or was less, on the Continent. To set any continental country whatsoever above England, or even to pass over the enormous advantages which distinguished England from all other European countries, would have been to fall into a very perilous and harmful paradox. . . . To convince oneself of this it will suffice to glance at the gravest evil of English life—its pauperism. The condition of the British labourer is extremely painful, it is true. But, in the first place, the position of the French working-man is no better ; secondly, in England there are incom-

parably greater resources for a satisfactory solution of the labour question than in France, or in any other continental country. These conditions are due to the fact that the English are in the habit of managing their own affairs, and enjoy the greatest political and civil liberty.

“ It has often happened to me to read or hear dissertations as to the indifference with which a man dying of starvation would regard political rights and guarantees. These dissertations are correct if the man is *literally* dying of starvation or some other evil ; for example, of dropsy or phthisis. In this case, indeed, he is not interested in a Constitution, nor in political meetings, nor in the Habeas Corpus Act, nor in the liberty of the Press. But for a man who is living and who enjoys a certain degree of health, who struggles like a fish under the ice, who makes every effort to better his position and to escape from a crushing poverty, the laws and customs of the country in which he must live and labour are of great importance.”¹

As we see, Pisarev has nothing in common with the anarchists, who are adversaries of the principle of the State, and for whom all States and all Constitutions are the same.

In the same article Pisarev compares the political mentality of the French with that of the English (we must remember that this article was written in 1865, that is, in the time of Napoleon III) :—

“ The French know how to conquer, but after victory, when the last barricade has disappeared, they hasten to put all their hopes in one father or protector, no matter whom, who, to reward their simplicity, will not fail to force them, a few years later, to erect new barricades, which will evoke new hopes and a new ingenuousness. . . . Until that day the Frenchman is reduced to repeating : ‘ If the Committee knew ! If the Consul knew ! If the Emperor knew ! If the King knew ! If the President knew ! ’ . . . As for the Englishman, he

¹ Pisarev, *Works*, vol. v. p. 432.

is familiar with rights, which are necessary to him, to such a point that without them life itself is impossible to him." ¹

To complete our demonstration that Pisarev, whatever one may wish to discern in him, was not in any case an anarchist, I will quote a passage from his article on *The Realists*, which is his profession of faith :—

"To arouse public opinion and to form conscious leaders of popular labour, this is to open to the *labouring* majority the wide and fruitful road of intellectual development. But to accomplish these two tasks, on which the whole future of the people depends, it is necessary to act exclusively upon the cultivated classes of society. The fate of the people is decided not in the primary schools but in the Universities." ²

Wherein does this intellectual aristocracy resemble the glorification of "holy ignorance" which we find in Bakunin?

And why does Pisarev fall foul of "æsthetics"? Because he prefers positive science and social utilitarianism.

"We shall try to destroy æstheticism in order to concentrate the attention and the intellectual energies of society upon a minimum of imperious and unavoidable objectives of primordial importance," writes Pisarev. These objectives are, on the one hand, the destruction of all routine and all prejudices, and on the other hand the moral and material uplifting of the masses. All this may be accomplished by the aid of the positive and natural sciences. Pisarev sings a veritable hymn in honour of scientific naturalism, and hopes that "æsthetics will transform itself into a dependency of physiology and hygiene, as alchemy has become chemistry and astrology astronomy." He wrote articles in which he endeavoured to popularize the theories of contemporary European "naturalists" and to preach the study of Buchner, Moleschott, Huxley, Tyndall, Carl

¹ Pisarev, *Works*, vol. v. p. 435.

² *Ibid.*, vol. iv. p. 140.

Vogt, Comte, Darwin, and other Occidental materialists and positivists.

As for æsthetics and art, one should not make too much of them, as for the most part they only end in a loss of time. Now, time should be economized, especially in Russia, a poor and backward country.

We must admit that Pisarev was to a certain extent right. The preceding generation of Russian Occidentalists were concerned to excess with abstractions and big phrases, and all that is implied by the term "æsthetics." And the big phrases of the Europeanized seigneurs were only too often glaringly inconsistent with serfdom and the condition of the people. Nekrassov well depicted the character of this generation in a poem describing those who

. . . Wander through the world
Seeking some gigantic task,
Because the heritage of opulent fathers
Has exempted them from petty toil.

Was Russian society to abandon itself to the dreams of an Italian *lazzarone*, or to acquire the realistic and practical common sense of the American? asked Pisarev, and he himself pronounced in favour of realism and practical common sense.

In reality, however, there was no resemblance between the Russian Nihilists, or Pisarev himself, and the typical Yankee. Despite all their pleas for materialism, despite all their industrious endeavours to appear "hard," "egoistic," and "materialistic," they remained the true sons of their fathers, idealists of the "'forties."

Pisarev wished to condemn and annihilate æsthetism. By what means? He "based his realistic conception of science and art," according to his own admission, on the following idea of Pierre Leroux: "From my lofty point of view the poets are those who, from period to period, express the woes of humanity, just as the philosophers are those who concern themselves with healing and safeguarding humanity." In-

spired by this idea, Pisarev stated that "one must always draw the attention of society to economic and social problems, systematically opposing and condemning all that diverts the intellectual energies of cultivated persons from their mission. If among the objects which distract them we find art in general, or certain branches of art, it should be understood as a matter of course that art also is to be opposed and condemned."

Accused by his adversaries of "vandalism," Pisarev replied as follows :—

"If you choose to tell me that Beethoven's sonatas ennoble, uplift, and exalt humanity, etc., I shall advise you to tell these fables to others, not to me, who will never credit them. Each of my readers knows, no doubt, a number of true melomaniacs and profound connoisseurs of music, who, despite all their love for the great art, and despite the depth of their musical knowledge, remain frivolous, pitiable, good-for-nothing creatures."

It is a curious thing that Pisarev's theory, as the reader will see, resembles Tolstoy's. For Tolstoy also, at a later period, rejected æsthetics in the interest of the suffering masses. He, however, went farther than Pisarev, condemning science also as a useless thing "which leads men astray."

Vladimir Soloviev used to say that the Russian Nihilists had a logic all their own, and that they deduced their social programme from their naturalistic materialism with the aid of peculiar "syllogisms," such as the following: "Man is descended from the ape. *Therefore* our duty is to sacrifice ourselves for the happiness of the people."

This pleasantry is not very far from the truth.

To complete the portrait of the "Nihilists" it must be mentioned that personally they led an extremely modest and virtuous life. Pisarev, the chief of the "negators" and the "destroyers," the incarnation of all mortal sins (it was thus that the reactionaries regarded him), was an affectionate and respectful son, and his principal work was dedicated to his mother.

Tshernyshevsky, at the age of twenty-four, wishing to marry, asked himself what he would do if his *fiancée* did not please his mother: could he marry against his mother's will? And what did he decide? To kill himself in such a case, as he could not vex his aged mother, yet could not live without the woman he loved. But we must speak of Tshernyshevsky separately.

III

Nicholas Gavrilovitsh Tshernyshevsky was born in 1828. At the age of twenty-five he had made a name in literature. From 1855 to 1862 he was one of the most conspicuous leaders of the intellectual and social movement in Russia. In 1862 he was arrested for the "crime" of subversive opinions, and was condemned to fourteen years' hard labour and life-long deportation to Siberia. Only in 1883 did he receive the authorization to return to "European Russia."

He died six years later, in 1889. Although Pisarev's influence was ephemeral, Tshernyshevsky's has endured until the present day. During the last few years a number of historians, critics, *littérateurs*, sociologists, and economists have undertaken a complete study of his works and his ideas, and have arrived at the conclusion that "his life belongs to history, and his name will never cease to recall itself to all those who are interested in the destinies of Russian literature, and who are able to appreciate wit, talent, knowledge, courage, and abnegation."¹

The prevailing influence in Tshernyshevsky's mental life was that of the ideas of the European vanguard. In general, the period of "nihilism" was the period when the Occidental spirit was completely triumphant in Russia—the spirit of materialism and positivism, which under Nicolas I was regarded by State and Church as contrary to the Orthodox doctrine and the

¹ G. Plekhanov, *N. G. Tshernyshevsky* (Petersburg, 1910), p. 78. This large volume gives a complete analysis of Tshernyshevsky's ideas.

autocratic system, and which thereby received its most undoubted titles to success. After the Crimean disaster the police supervision of the intelligence of Russia was slightly relaxed; the educated youth of Russia, by a wholly natural reaction, hastened to pluck the forbidden fruit of European thought. Positivism and materialism, then known by the common title of *realism*, became a powerful weapon of warfare against the religious prejudices supported by official pressure.

But the materialism of the Nihilists was not of uniform quality. In Pisarev it took the form of "naïve realism," everything being proscribed that was not justified by the immediate statements of the natural sciences. Of all the social sciences, Pisarev admitted the necessity only of anthropology, geography, and statistics. As for philosophy, he regarded it with superb disdain. Even the materialistic philosophy of Feuerbach appeared to him useless and superfluous, fit only for "those who seek to erect a whole building with a score of bricks."

Tshernyshevsky did not share these opinions; he did not seek to confine thought within the narrow limits of the exclusively naturalistic positivism of the *pisarevshchina*. But he agreed with Pisarev as to the task imposed on Russian writers and scientists. He used to say that in the West men have the right to serve pure art or pure science. "Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Leibnitz, Newton, Humboldt, Liebig, Cuvier, and Faraday worked steadily on, thinking of science in general, not of what such or such a country, their native land, required at a given moment. We do not know and we do not ask ourselves if they loved their country. By virtue of their works they are cosmopolitan. It is the same with many of the great Western poets." Tshernyshevsky names Shakespeare, Ariosto, Corneille, Goethe. "Their names," he says, "make us think of their artistic merit; not of any special and predominant devotion to their native countries."

Matters are very different in Russia. "For the

moment a Russian has only one fashion of really serving the lofty ideals of truth, art, and science: namely, to work at diffusing them throughout his country. The time will come when in Russia also, as elsewhere, thinkers and artists will devote themselves exclusively to science and art; but as long as we are not on the same level as the more advanced nations there is another task which must be dearer to each of us: to contribute according to his strength to continue what Peter the Great began. This task has hitherto demanded, and in all probability will demand for a long time yet, all the moral and intellectual forces of the best endowed of Russia's children." ¹

Tshernyshevsky, who suggested that the immediate and effective duty of Russian thinkers was to popularize European thought, and who himself undertook this duty, showed a much greater breadth of mind in his manner of fulfilling it than did Pisarev. For example, he did justice to the philosophy of Hegel. He very truly said of Hegel that "his principles were extremely ample and vigorous; his deductions were narrow and impotent."

More particularly did Tshernyshevsky adopt Hegel's maxims "that there exists no such thing as abstract truth"; "truth is concrete"; ² and that "one cannot judge of good and evil without taking into account the circumstances in which a given phenomenon occurs." The Hegelian idea of constant change, caused by the internal contradictions contained by every phenomenon and every condition, was also accepted by Tshernyshevsky. But he relied especially on Feuerbach, and, as he himself declared, he sought "to apply Feuerbach's fundamental ideas to the solution of various problems."

The most important of these ideas was that of the unity of the human being: this implied the rejection of the old dualistic conception which divided "soul" from "body," the "spiritual" from the "material" element.

¹ Tshernyshevsky, *Works*, vol. iii. p. 120 (Petersburg, 1907).

² Hegel himself does not always abide by this rule.

For Tshernyshevsky, as for Feuerbach, there was only one "sole human nature, real and unique," and the "spiritual" life of man was only the "subjective aspect" of certain objective and material facts.

The recognition of such a principle had capital results for Russian thought, for it struck a terrible blow at the Orthodox Byzantine ideology, which saw two principles in man: the one "celestial," holy, spiritual, the other "terrestrial," diabolic and material; an idea which was the basis of the ascetic doctrine of submission to the Divine Will, to the power of God and His representatives on earth: spiritual and temporal authorities.

The materialistic monism proclaimed by Tshernyshevsky was thus a true secularization of Russian thought. As Plekhanov remarks in his work on Tshernyshevsky, this was a step in advance compared with the naïve realism of Pisarev and the German naturalists, Buchner and Carl Vogt, his masters, who reduced the whole problem of the human soul to the structure and the functioning of the brain. Plekhanov asserted that Feuerbach, without realizing it, had approached the French materialism of La Mettrie and Diderot, which was less narrow and more profound. Professor Masaryk discovers in Tshernyshevsky a strong predilection for English thought, which distinguishes him from the majority of Russian thinkers. But I must say that in this Tshernyshevsky was by no means exceptional, for at that period English thought in general exerted an immense influence in Russia. At the risk of shocking some of my readers I will venture to assert that Russian "nihilism" is for the most part the child of English positivism. A Nihilist was almost always a Darwinian, and the "Buckle-book" (that is, Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*) was one of the textbooks of nihilism; it was their gospel. The names of Darwin and Buckle were no less detested by all Russian obscurantists than that of Feuerbach.

CHAPTER IX

- I. Socialism in Russia—Socialism and religion. II. The earliest European influences—Saint-Simonism in Russia. III. Fourier and Robert Owen. IV. The *narodnitshestvo* and Marxism—The “Bakunists” in Russia. V. “Blanquism” in Russia—Terrorism. VI. Philosophy and the reality—The present situation of the *narodnitshestvo* and Marxism.

I

THE literary productions of Tshernyshevsky are closely bound up with the history of Russian socialism.

One might certainly attribute this socialism to remote origins. Peter Kropotkin believes that European socialism in general may be referred to the French Revolution, which, he says, “repeated, in its turn, the work of the English Revolution,” and “was the source of all the anarchist, communist, and socialist conceptions of our times.” Kropotkin asserts that “modern socialism has as yet added nothing, absolutely nothing, to the ideas which were in circulation among the French people during the year II of the Republic. Modern socialism has only arranged these ideas in systems, and has found arguments in their favour, either by turning certain of their own definitions against the *bourgeois* economists, or by generalizing the facts of the development of industrial capitalism during the nineteenth century.” According to Kropotkin “there is a direct filiation from the Enragés of 1793 and Babeuf (1795) to the International.”¹

If one were to accept this verdict of Kropotkin’s, doubtless one might trace Russian socialism back

¹ Peter Kropotkin, *The Great Revolution*.

through Occidental socialism to the French Revolution. But it is possible to go farther and to find the source of communistic ideas in Christianity ; not the Christianity of the Orthodox Church, but that of the first Christian communities.

In Russia some interesting attempts have been made to justify the Communist and Socialist demands by Christian doctrine. Leo Tolstoy invokes the name of Christ in his attack upon the rights of private property. Various rural religious sects make the Gospel the basis of their agrarian communism. Dostoievsky recommended educated Russia to bow before the Orthodox truth of the moujiks, which, according to him, is identical with the principle of social justice. Herzen, although quite without Dostoievsky's respect for Orthodoxy, advised enlightened minds to reckon with the religious convictions of the peasants.

But what is much more curious is the existence of such ideas, during the last few years, in the Russian Social-Democratic party. M. Lenin, although a convinced Marxist, proposed, some years ago, that the party should profit by the religious convictions of the peasants, for whom the earth is "the property of God," and cannot belong to any one. The Socialists should make use of this ingenuous faith, says M. Lenin in his pamphlet on the agrarian question, in order to persuade the peasantry that it is necessary to confiscate all landed property and to effect the "nationalization of the soil"; that is, to declare the private lands the property of the State. But none of the sections of the Social-Democratic party cared to adopt this demagogic plan, and to enter upon a still more demagogic exploitation of the superstitions of the peasantry.

For the rest, such an artifice was destined to encounter a check, because, for the majority of the moujiks, "the soil is the property of God" in a sense entirely special, which has nothing in common with true socialism. What the peasant regards as the "property of God" are the estates of the nobles, the

great landed proprietors, which he wishes to expropriate for his own benefit. God is merely a pious pretext for the wholly material aspirations of the peasantry.

Another small group of Russian Social-Democrats wished to do better than to make religion its auxiliary ; it meditated erecting socialism itself into a religion. The leader of this pseudo-socialist "chapel" published two volumes intended to prove that socialism is a religious doctrine, that the Socialist groups are merely a new Church Universal ; that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were the successors of the prophets of Israel and of Christ, and that the dogma of the proletariat must replace that of God. As for the application of his doctrine, the inventor even composed a new Lord's Prayer, in which the name of God is replaced by that of the proletariat, and it is to the latter that the prayer is addressed that "its reign shall come as soon as possible."

The founders of the "Socialist religion" chose for its propagation the period following the rising of 1905-6, when the reaction was triumphant in the political, social, and intellectual domains. They professed to be able to cure Russia of the despair into which she had been plunged by a disastrous war and an abortive Revolution. Nevertheless, and in spite of the aid of the celebrated writer Maxim Gorky, they met with no success, and the only trace which remains of their enterprise is the ironical nicknames of "the Proletarian God" and "the Saint" which the Socialist Press bestowed on the founder of the new pseudo-religion.

This little episode shows that socialism and religion are in Russia divided by such an abyss that no attempt to reconcile them can be regarded seriously.

Nihilism has left behind it such a vigorous ferment of positivism and materialism, both of which were so widely diffused by Pisarev and Tshernyshevsky, that the Russian intellectuals, with very rare exceptions, remain completely deaf to religious prejudices, and accord a very cold welcome to those who seek to reintroduce them.

In nearly all European countries, however, some attempt has been made to combine socialism with religion. In Austria and Germany the Catholic and Protestant clergy take part in the labour movement, and do their best to unite, in a peculiar and extremely reactionary mixture, the doctrine of the Church and the aspirations of the labouring masses. In Switzerland and in England there are among the Socialists believing and practising Christians who are extremely sincere and in no way reactionary. We find nothing of the sort in Russia, where there are no labour organizations directed and protected by the Church ; one cannot even cite individual cases in which socialism is combined with a belief in God. A Russian Socialist is always an atheist.

II

To return to the share of the French Revolution in the development of socialism, I should mention that in Russia at least we do not find that filiation of which Kropotkin speaks. In Russia we find that men's minds have been influenced by the *political* conceptions of the Revolution of 1789, and not by its "communism," which was in general extremely vague. The enlightened Russians have turned toward socialism precisely because the revolutionary tradition has in Russia been confined to politics. Herzen is the best witness of this natural reaction ; he experienced it in person. This is how he describes the diffusion in Russia of the Saint-Simonian ideals, which may be regarded as the point of departure of Russian socialism.

"The embryo liberalism of 1826, which was gradually formed according to the French conceptions, recommended by such men as Lafayette and Benjamin Constant, and which was sung by Béranger, lost its power of seduction, as far as we were concerned, after the fall of Poland. It was then that a portion of our Russian youth hastened to make a profound and serious study of Russian history ; others studied German philo-

sophy. As for Ogariov and myself, we belonged to neither party. We were too deeply rooted in other modes of thought to abandon them so quickly. Our faith in a revolution *à la Béranger*, to be accomplished sitting at table, was shaken, but we were seeking for something else, which we could find neither in the Chronicle of Nestor nor in the transcendental idealism of Schelling. While our minds were thus struggling amid conjectures, and efforts to understand, and the doubts which alarmed us, some of the pamphlets of the Saint-Simonians fell into our hands, and we became acquainted with their doctrines and the proceedings brought against them. . . . We were impressed by these pamphlets. They proclaimed the new faith; they had something to say; they had good reason to cite before their tribunal the old order of things which wanted to try them according to the Code Napoléon and the Orleanist religion.

“On the one hand, the emancipation of woman, her access to community of labour, her destiny restored to her own hands, and union with her as with an equal; on the other hand, the redemption and rehabilitation of the flesh!

“These great formulæ involved a world of new relations between men, a world of health, wit, and beauty, a world naturally moral and consequently morally pure.

“What courage was required to speak openly in France of emancipating oneself from a spiritualism so strongly established in the ideas of France and so utterly absent from the conduct of the French!

“A new world was knocking at the door; our minds and hearts opened to it. Saint-Simonism took its place as the basis of our convictions, and there, in all its essentials, remained for ever.”¹

We see, however, that the essentials of Saint-Simonism were not, for Herzen, the same as for the Saint-Simonians themselves. The positive organization

¹ A. Herzen, *Works*, vol. vi. pp. 195-6.

of Saint-Simonism, its social and religious constitution, did not compel Herzen's admiration. The following generation of Russian thinkers, the "Nihilists," pronounced with decision against Saint-Simonism precisely because of its religious character. The force of repugnance aroused in the Nihilists by all that savoured of religion may be gauged by the example of Pisarev, who, a "popularizer" of the positivism of Auguste Comte, never forgave him for introducing a sort of religious element into his philosophy.

"Having completed a stupendous work," said Pisarev, "Comte was unable to stop where he should have stopped; and he spoiled his own work, as far as an individual person can spoil that which is of value to the whole of humanity, by creating a new religion, of which these have no need, while those can obtain no satisfaction from it."

In his article on the trial of the Saint-Simonians Tshernyshevsky protests against their attempt to base a new social order on an authority of a religious nature.

"Authority," he says, "always prevails in prejudices and routine, that is, in those matters in which the reason has no part. Reason is aware of facts, is convinced by proofs, but accepts nothing on authority. . . . To think otherwise, to believe in the possibility of an authority to which an established reason would readily submit, is a thing that no one but a fanatic could do, and a fanatic inspired by an unjustified belief in the ancient benefits of the Papacy." Tshernyshevsky does not accept love either as the basis of the new society, because love influences men only in rare moments of exaltation, while in general men are swayed by calculation, usage, and habits. For him the Saint-Simonians were drawing-room reformers.

At the same time, however, Tshernyshevsky considered that the fundamental idea of Saint-Simonism was "simple and pure," and he expresses his opinion of it in the following words:—

“For the pacification of society it is necessary that the moral and material existence of the most numerous and most poverty-stricken class of society should be ameliorated as rapidly as possible.” Tshernyshevsky declares that “the duty of every good citizen, of every honest man, is to devote his energies to this task.”

Tshernyshevsky was thus able to distinguish between the sublime ideal of Saint-Simon and his disciples and their errors of practice. Their doctrine is regarded even to-day with attention and sympathy in Russia. It forms a subject of study and examination in the Universities. Fifteen years ago, in the faculty of history and philology at the University of Moscow, when I was following the course there, it was made the subject of special lectures. Many textbooks of the history of economics employed by Russian students devote chapters to it. Even the most *bourgeois* scholars regard it very favourably.

Here, for example, is what Professor Toughan-Baranovsky, the well-known economist, has to say of it :—

“The position which Saint-Simon occupies in the history of thought is so tremendous that it cannot be exaggerated. We regard him as the most vital social thinker of the new age ; we believe he has, with a sure hand, laid solid foundations for the scientific structure at whose completion many generations have yet to labour. Saint-Simon’s ideas refer not to one isolated science, but to the whole cycle of sciences relating to human society. The philosophy of history, sociology, political economy, and, to a certain extent, jurisprudence in its broad general principles, all date from Saint-Simon.”¹

M. Toughan-Baranovsky also believes that “the whole of the ‘positivist philosophy’ was borrowed by Comte from Saint-Simon,” and that “this remarkable

¹ M. Toughan-Baranovsky, *Sketches of the History of Contemporary Political Economy and Socialism*, 2nd ed., p. 98 (Petersburg, 1905).

thinker, with far more reason than Marx, may be regarded as the creator of modern social science."

III

Despite this homage, Saint-Simonism has had no effective influence upon the socialist movement in Russia. The ideas of Fourier and Robert Owen hindered its diffusion, and those "Nihilists" who had been unable to accept the doctrine of Saint-Simon became the most enthusiastic "Fourierists."

Tshernyshevsky, during his imprisonment, wrote a novel (*What's to be Done?*) which acquired enormous popularity, although, considered merely as literature, it leaves something to be desired. This novel is full of "Fourierist" ideas, and it did more to diffuse them throughout Russia than all the theoretical works taken together.

"Tshernyshevsky proposed nothing new," says his biographer and critic: "he merely made known the deductions at which Occidental thought had long before arrived. . . . But he gave the ideas of Fourier a vogue previously unknown in Russia. He taught them to the great public."¹

Plekhanov observes that, under the inspiration of Fourier, Tshernyshevsky was the first of the Russian Socialists to imagine socialist society of the future organized upon the basis of a very highly developed technique and wholesale production by gigantic undertakings. Certain of his successors, who believed, on the contrary, that the future would see a federation of small communes and pigmy enterprises, were really behind him in their ideas, for if socialism is a *superior* form of economic organization, it must make use of the technical victories won by the capitalist world, instead of returning to the small *bourgeois* ways of the pre-capitalist era."

But this error was inevitable, because the imagination always reflects the reality, and a communal *petit-*

¹ G. Plekhanov, *N. Tshernyshevsky*, p. 75.

bourgeois ideal of socialism was bound to come into being in Russia, the country of small rural exploitations.

Tshernyshevsky himself was unable entirely to escape from this conception ; he continued to favour it, tracing the social function of the rural commune in Russia.

In general Tshernyshevsky was a convinced Occidental. He used to say of the Slavophiles : " Their sight is so peculiarly constituted that any Russian filth they may see appears to them excellent, and admirably suited to reanimate moribund Europe." He severely criticized Herzen's opinion concerning " young " Russia and the " old world " of Europe ; protesting against this species of national pride, of which Herzen was not always innocent. Tshernyshevsky believed that Europe has nothing to learn from Russia, because " she herself understands better than we what new conditions she has need of, and the way to create them." But on the subject of the *mir* Tshernyshevsky agreed both with Herzen and certain of the Slavophiles, who asserted that that which in the West was still an aspiration had in reality already passed away in Russia, because the Russian rural commune succeeds in reconciling the principle of individuality with the interests of the community. He, too, asserted that in Russia " there exists in reality what in the West appears to be a Utopia." In Russia " the popular mass regards the soil as a common possession," while private estates are not numerous, and the individualistic conception of property is not rooted in " the soul of the people." In the West the dissolution of the rural commune has had the most unfortunate results ; it has engendered pauperism and poverty. So " we must not ignore the example of the Occident, and must maintain the commune in Russia." In the Occident " the individual is already accustomed to exercise unrestricted rights over his private property," and " the prevalence of a better system in economic relations would demand sacrifices there ; this is why it is difficult. Such a system is not in agreement with the habits of a French or English

peasant." In Russia, thanks to the existence of the commune, this moral and juridical obstacle does not exist.

We shall see later on that the *mir* became the subject of long and violent discussion between the two great schools of Russian socialism which took shape towards the end of the nineteenth century (*narodnitshestvo* and Marxism). Now, this question had already been brought into prominence by Tshernyshevsky and his contemporaries. Europe was not unaware of this. In the first place, the first serious study of the Russian *mir*, in its social and economic relations, was the work not of a Russian but of a German (von Haxthausen), who veritably "discovered" the rural commune in Russia, and explained its full importance to the public. This was in 1847. Tshernyshevsky and several of his compatriots and contemporaries were acquainted with von Haxthausen's work, and found therein the elements of a verdict upon the institution.

Then the Utopian Socialists, French and English, with their schemes of "associations" of producers—among others Louis Blanc and Robert Owen—led the first Russian Socialists to seek for a practical form under which they might install the "new social order" in Russia. And as the method of capitalistic exploitation was not then very highly developed, and as there was as yet no industrial proletariat in Russia, they could find no subject but the rural population. In this they had to seek for a basis of association. They believed they had found it in the *mir*.

Some European Socialists also shared this positive appreciation of the Russian rural commune. This is what Proudhon says in his posthumous work of the communal ownership of the soil:—

"This form of ownership is essentially equalitarian: in Russia the commune, which is regarded as sole proprietor, has to provide each household with a quantity of cultivable soil, and if the number of families increases the division has to be modified so that no one is

excluded. This method is common to all the Slav peoples ; it has been maintained in Russia by the decree of emancipation (of 1861).”¹

Proudhon considered that “ political economy itself ” can require nothing better than this form of ownership, “ which is contrary to inequality,” and which, therefore, should be “ regularized and confirmed.”

I may remark in passing that there are other points of agreement between Proudhon and Tshernyshevsky, notably in the theory of economics. There is no doubt that Proudhon exercised a certain ascendancy over Tshernyshevsky.

But M. Plekhanov, in his work on Tshernyshevsky, asserts that of all the great Utopian Socialists of Europe it was Robert Owen who made the strongest impression of Tshernyshevsky, and he explains this by certain peculiarities of Tshernyshevsky's. “ By the nature of his temperament, in which reason predominated, he was inclined to sympathize with those of the great founders of the socialist systems who were less guilty of yielding to the temptations of fantastic imaginings. Thus Robert Owen was assuredly more akin to him than Fourier.”²

Plekhanov thus confirms what I have already said in a more general form of the influence of English thought upon Russian “ nihilism.” But it must not be supposed that Owen's ideas could have received a *practical* application in the Russia of those days, as was possible in industrial England. It is only to-day that Owen's ideas are guiding the effective action of certain Russian Socialists, notably those who are collaborating in the co-operative movement. For the promoters of co-operation in Russia Owen has become a guiding star. In the working-men's clubs his life and work are studied and his precepts are taught, while articles and pamphlets are devoted to these subjects which find tens of thousands of readers.

¹ Proudhon, *Œuvres Posthumes*, vol. i. p. 89 (Paris, 1866).

² Plekhanov, *op. cit.* p. 302.

Robert Owen, like Saint-Simon and Fourier, has won a place in the academic life of Russia. Professor Toughan-Baranovsky states that the influence of Owen is "an instructive and glorious page in the social history of modern England." "The whole co-operative movement of to-day is the result of Owen's propaganda. . . . Millions of workers in England and all the world over, who are at present deriving real economic advantages from co-operation, have to thank none other than the ingenuous dreamer Owen, who in his day was so riddled by the scorn of the representatives of so-called common sense, who were only too clairvoyant as regards their immediate advantage, but were completely unable to see into the future."¹

But, I repeat, the practical application of "Owenism" in Russia has only become possible in our days. As for Tshernyshevsky's time, the Russian Socialists were able to adopt only the theory of "Owenism." Tshernyshevsky in particular borrowed from Owen a very important and wholly materialistic principle: the impress of the social environment upon the actions and feelings of mankind.

Still, Tshernyshevsky, like Owen and the French Utopians, had retained a great measure of metaphysics and idealism. He was inclined to explain historical events as a rationalist. He believed that men had been and were unfortunate because they were insufficiently "educated" and "conscious." It would, therefore, suffice to explain to them the justice and convince them of the necessity of changing the existing state of things, to win them over to a good "scheme" of a new order, and the social problem would be solved.

This belief in the power of reason, which links Tshernyshevsky and other of the Russian "Nihilists" with the Encyclopædists and the French Revolutionists, played a great part in the evolution of socialist theory and the revolutionary movement in Russia. If it is reason which rules the world, who, then, is the master

¹ Toughan-Baranovsky, op. cit. p. 89.

in the struggle for liberty and the happiness of the people? Not the masses of the people themselves; but the enlightened men of the country, the professional representatives of reason, so to speak. The task incumbent upon the intellectuals in the socialist and revolutionary movement in this way became one of the most burning questions of the day, and Russian socialism split upon this rock into two violently opposed camps.

IV

In the general evolution of Russian thought in the nineteenth century we observe a very significant change in the attractive forces which our Occidentalists obeyed. In 1830 and in 1850 they were chiefly captivated by the abstract ideas of philosophy and metaphysics. Nihilism gave the preference to the natural sciences. But Tshernyshevsky betrayed a great interest in the problems of sociology and history and economics. This tendency became preponderant in his successors, and the conflict between *narodnitshestvo* (Populism) and Marxism, which almost wholly occupied the intellectual life of cultivated society in Russia at the end of the last century, was fought over problems of history, sociology, and economics. Maxim Kovalewsky, an ocular witness of the change of front, compares it with the happenings in France at the end of the eighteenth century. He says:—

“In a country in which political debates are unknown, the discussions of the great problems of social science, above all those which concern the present situation in a direct or indirect fashion, occupy a position which they could never attain in a more disturbed environment. It being the fashion to debate such problems, everybody in our days is either a sociologist or an economist, in speech at least, neither more nor less than in France, a few years after the *krach* occasioned by John Law, the famous Dr. Quesnay inspired the people who had recovered from their infatua-

tion for the system of protection by his doctrines of free trade and natural economic laws.

“ This is not, moreover, the only trait of resemblance between modern Russia and the France of a century or more ago. Like our grandfathers, the men of the Constituent Assembly, the young generations in Russia are steeped in the conviction that a new social era is shortly to open. They believe that they are called upon to facilitate its advent by the judicious employment of the scientific data and the social experience acquired by the European Occident.

“ These are generous ideas, which assuredly do not merit the belittlement and animosity with which they have been received by those who declare themselves unmitigated partisans of the secular bases of our economic system.”

The analogy drawn by M. Kovalewsky between the passion excited by economic problems in France at the close of the eighteenth century and that observable in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century is interesting, but the explanation which he gives of the Russian interest in such matters is insufficient. He is not correct in saying that people became enamoured of economics because the Government would not allow them to meddle in politics. The interest in matters of economics was due to two factors: in the first place, to the fact that after the suppression of serfdom in 1801 Russia entered upon a period of very intense commercial, industrial, and financial activity, which could not fail to draw the attention of all open minds; and in the second place, because economic questions were inseparable from political questions, so that at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century parties were divided on both political and economic principles, a certain political system being always attached to a certain economic system; and the adherent to the one system was necessarily a supporter of the other. A *narodnik* belongs to a given school of economics, and also to a given

school of politics. The term "Marxist" denotes not merely a supporter of Marx's doctrine of "economic materialism," but also a member of the Social-Democratic party.

These two beliefs—Populism and Marxism—literally monopolized the minds of the Russian democrats before the movement of 1905. The entire youth of Russia was caught in the cogs of the theoretical conflict to which they devoted themselves. Their divergences were principally on account of the following points :—

What is the Russian type of economic development? Is it identical with that of Western Europe, or different?

What, in particular, is the future of rural economy and the *mir* in Russia?

What is the *rôle* of the peasantry, of the *bourgeoisie*, of the industrial proletariat, and of the intellectual world? What, in general, is the *rôle* of the individual in history?

All these questions, abstract and theoretical at first sight, were in reality of great practical importance, because the political parties regulated their programmes and their tactics according to the response which they received, which, of course, varied according to the social mentality of those who responded.

Thus between 1870 and 1885, in the opinions and actions of the revolutionaries were perceptible the characteristics of the educated classes from which they were exclusively recruited: extreme rationalism and an exaggerated idea of the *rôle* of "personality" in social life. On the other hand, these same men adopted the thesis of Bakunin respecting the communist mentality of the popular masses in Russia. According to the resulting theory, it is they who are the conscious upholders of the same communist ideal which is, so to speak, innate in the masses of the Russian population.¹ They have, therefore, only to draw closer to

¹ An analogous idea is developed by Prince Kropotkin in his *Modern Science and Anarchy*, in which he regards anarchy as a thing which "does not come from the Universities, but from the creative energy

the people, to descend into the depths of the people, there to carry on propaganda, distribute pamphlets, and sow revolt.

Russian literature has kept the record of this great attempt at communion :—

A passport, a wallet,
A baker's dozen of "publications,"
Sturdy legs,
Many places, many dreams.

Fields and meadows,
Clearings, the wealth of nature,
Empty roads,
The distress in the peasants' houses :

But in every house
Bread is ready for the "traveller" ;
Eagerly the people listen
The words of truth.

In the villages are gendarmes,
Fines, duties, taxes.
"There will be a revolution, little brothers!"
One hears on every side as they talk.¹

But the poetic records were fairer than the effective results of the propaganda. In vain did the "intellectuals" mingle with the people and summon the peasants to "revolt" ; with rare exceptions the peasants, to whom the agitators attributed "a collective cranium," refused to bestir themselves or revolted *against* the propagandists, tying their hands and presenting them to the authorities. This revolutionary campaign among the peasants miscarried, not, as might be supposed, because they could not understand it, nor

of the people," and at the same time as "an attempt to apply generalizations acquired by the inductive method of the natural sciences to the appreciation of human institutions, and to divine, taking its stand on this appreciation, the future progress of humanity along the path of liberty, equality, and fraternity, for the greatest possible happiness of each unit of human society" (*Modern Science and Anarchy*, London, 1901).

¹ M. Mouravsky, *Among the People* (poem written in 1874).

because they were indifferent to "politics." The majority of the propagandists did not seek to excite the political susceptibilities of the Russian population, but its economic aspirations. Many of them believed, with Proudhon and Bakunin, that the labouring masses have nothing to do with politics or changes in the system of government. The germ of this theory is to be found in Herzen's *Open Letters* to Linton, a well-known English writer, in which he states that if the Russian people one day revolts it will not be to replace the tyranny of a Tsar by that of a President or a *bourgeois* Parliament, but to attain a "veritable and complete" liberty. This true political nihilism, which puts all systems and all governments into the same basket, reflects both the anarchism of Europe and the indifference of the contemporary Russian peasant. The "Bakunists" beheld in it a proof of the communist mentality of the Russian people, which, according to them, should already have understood the vanity of all political transformations, so that they would accept only a *social* revolution.

Russia's backwardness was reacted into superiority over Europe.

The Marxists, who attacked the "anarchizing" movement of the *narodnitshestvo*, were easily able to demonstrate that the reality did not correspond with the imaginings of the "propagandists," and that the Communist movement, starting from Europe, was born of the resistance of the workers to the capitalist system, while the Russian peasants were still living in the pre-capitalist age. On the other hand, the Russian peasant, who readily accepted the idea of a "just distribution" of the soil when the property of the great landowners was at stake, will have none of it when his own property is concerned. Moreover, the *communal* possession of the soil does not signify any sort of actual communism, for while possessing the soil in common the peasants cultivate it individually; and individually they profit by the product of their labours.

We must not, therefore, count on the "collective cranium" of the *moujik* to effect a social revolution. We must look to the industrial proletariat for that.

The check suffered by the "descent" of the intellectuals upon the rural districts proved that the Marxists were right.

But as between 1870 and 1880 the Russian proletariat was as yet neither sufficiently strong nor sufficiently numerous to inspire Russian thinkers with the hope that their aspirations were soon to be satisfied, they preferred to choose another "shorter" way: the way of conspiracies and of terrorism.

As early as 1875 a revolutionary organ (*Nabat*, which is to say *The Tocsin*) protested vigorously against the anti-State theory of the "Bakunists," opposing their federalistic ideas by the idea of a centralized revolution, which would take the form of a *coup d'état*.

"In the West, as at home," said the *Nabat*, "we observe two movements; one is purely utopian, federative, and anarchist; the other is realistic, centralizing, and 'statist.' Failing the forcible capture of the governmental power by the revolutionary party, no solid or radical changes in the existing social order are possible."¹

But the people were not yet capable of seizing the reins of power. This was not an obstacle, as a "revolutionary minority" might do so for the people.

"It goes without saying that the fewer revolutionary elements there are in the people, and the smaller the dimensions of its revolutionary energy, the smaller must be its part in the realization of the social revolution, and the greater must be the *rôle*, the power, and the influence of the revolutionary minority. . . . The revolutionary minority, having liberated the people from the yoke of the terror and awe with which the Govern-

¹ Cited from P. Lavrov's *The Propagandist Narodniki of the Years 1873-78* (Petersburg, 1907), p. 172.

ment inspired it, would provide it with the possibility of manifesting its revolutionary power of destruction. . . . The revolutionary minority, profiting by the destructive power of the people, would destroy the enemies of the revolution, and, basing itself upon the general spirit of the positive ideal of the people (that is, on its conservative energies), would lay the foundation of a new and rational social order.”¹

The distrust with which the ideologists of this “revolutionary minority” regarded the people was so great that they declared that “never, neither to-day nor in the future, would the people, left to itself, be capable of effecting a social revolution. We alone, the revolutionary minority, might achieve it, and we *must* do so as soon as possible.”

V

The Marxist critics of this theory of the “revolutionary minority” have pointed out the fact that it is by no means original, but that its prototype is to be found, on the one hand, in Jacobinism, and on the other in the ideas and activities of Auguste Blanqui, who also believed that a small number of well-organized revolutionaries might, at a propitious moment, make an attempt which would be crowned by success. And the theory of the revolutionary minority is known in the history of the socialist movement in Russia as *Russian Blanquism*. But Russian Blanquism was more “Blanquist” than Blanqui himself. We know that Blanqui, extreme revolutionary though he was, had the sense to wait when it was necessary, and even to restrain his more impatient comrades. The leaders of Russian Blanquism used to tell their disciples: “The people is always ready for the revolution. . . . Wait? Have we the right to wait? We shall tolerate no waiting, no delay. . . . We cannot, we will not wait! . . . Let each take that which he has, as speedily as may be, and move forward!”

¹ Cited from P. Lavrov, *op. cit.* pp. 173-4.

The contributors to the Blanquist organ declared any person to be a renegade who, belonging to the revolutionary party, did not believe in the possibility of an immediate revolution.

The Russian "Blanquists" sought to justify their tactics by aid of highly original arguments. Notably they asserted that these tactics were best suited to the national conditions of Russia. Their leader, Peter Tkatshev, expounded these arguments in his open letter to Friedrich Engels:—

"We in Russia have at our disposal none of those means of revolutionary conflict which you possess in the West. . . . We have neither urban proletariat, nor liberty of the Press, nor national representation. . . . We cannot think, in our country, of publications for the workers; but even if they were possible they would be useless, as the majority of our people cannot read." But all this does not mean that the victory of the social revolution is more problematical in Russia than in the West. By no means! "We have no urban proletariat, it is true; also there is no *bourgeoisie*. No middle class, in Russia, divides the suffering people from the despotism of the State which oppresses it; our workers can only bring *political* force into the battle; the power of capital, with us, is still embryonic." ¹

"Our revolutionary party of intellectuals is not numerous, it is true. But it pursues none but socialist ideals, and its enemies are still more powerless than it. . . . Our Government appears strong only from a distance. In reality its strength is fictitious and imaginary. It has no roots in the economic life of the people. . . . Among you Europeans the State stands with both feet on capital. With us it is suspended in the air."

This wholly unreal and erroneous theory was matched by equally erroneous and ineffectual practical applications: men believed in the possibility of changing

¹ Cited from Plekhanov's *Our Dissensions* (Petersburg, 1906), p. 47.

the system of government by means of conspiracies and acts of terrorism. The whole of the close of Alexander II's reign was marked by plots and attempts upon the Tsar, who was killed on the 1st of March 1881. But the violent death of Alexander II demonstrated in the most obvious fashion how useless were the efforts of the conspirators and terrorists. The autocracy emerged from the crisis not enfeebled, but stronger than before.

But twenty years later, at the beginning of the present century, we witnessed a revival of political terrorism in Russia. The Revolutionary Socialist party, which continues the tradition of the old *narodnitshestvo*, makes terrorism one of its levers of action. It creates "fighting organizations" and "flying columns," which hunt down Grand Dukes, Ministers, Governors of provinces, etc. But after some years of a highly intensive terrorist campaign the political inefficacy of terrorism became obvious. More: we may say that individual terrorism is more dangerous to the party which employs it than to the Government.

The tactics of individual terrorism weaken the effectiveness of the revolutionary party, which loses its best members, the most energetic and the most devoted; it weakens the organization and even the propaganda; for why waste time in organizing the labouring masses if one can command an instrument so "effective" and giving such rapid results as terrorism in the imagination of those who apply it? Again, terrorism offers such scope to the *agents-provocateurs* that in the end the whole organization of the party becomes a plaything in the hands of the secret police, which very thing has happened to the Revolutionary Socialist party in Russia. M. Bourtzev has shown that during more than ten years all the central organisms of the party were under the supervision, if not under the direction, of a certain Azev, "the greatest *provocateur* in the world."

The dismal history of the terrorist organization of the Revolutionary Socialist party provoked a reaction against the tactics of terrorism among the members of the party itself. In 1909 (subsequently to the revelations of Bourtzev), at the meeting of the council of this party, some of the delegates declared against the terrorist method, and proposed that the party should officially renounce it. In support of this proposal they employed the arguments which are always employed by the Marxists in their polemics against individual terrorism. They stated that terrorism was at one time plausible, that "it was imagined that the political conflict in Russia was of a Titanic character—that is, that it partook of the character of the struggle of a group of individuals against another group of individuals"; but actually "when the political struggle has become a class conflict" one cannot allow terrorism, because an act of individual terrorism cannot change the social system.¹

However, the majority of the party leaders would not admit this argument, and decided to retain terrorism, if not in practice, at least in principle.

It must be mentioned (as I have already said in *Modern Russia*) that the "principle" of individual terrorism agrees with the mentality of an intellectual, because an intellectual, not participating directly in the material mechanism of economic life, and being "independent" of it, is very slightly sensible of the bond between him and the social mass, is inclined to oppose his "personality" to society, and considers the phenomena of social life as the manifestations of individual wills. Seeing in the social organization a combination of individuals, an intellectual easily comes to believe that one may alter this organization by suppressing such or such a person.

¹ See the report of the *Debates upon Terrorism in the Council of the Russian Revolutionary Socialist Party*, May 1909 (*Le Socialiste Révolutionnaire*, No. 2, Paris, 1910).

VI

To understand the political mentality of a Russian intellectual, we must have recourse to the works of those writers who have formulated the social and moral philosophy of Populism, above all the works of Peter Lavrov and Nicholas Mikhailovsky.

"How has history progressed?" asks Lavrov in his celebrated *Historic Letters*. "What has pushed it onward? Isolated personalities. . . . Energetic, fanatical men, risking everything and ready to sacrifice everything, are necessary. Martyrs are necessary, whose real qualities and effective merits are often far surpassed by their legend. They will be endowed with energy which they did not possess. The noblest thoughts, the finest sentiments elaborated by their disciples, will be put into their mouths. To the crowd they will become an inaccessible ideal, impossible of realization. But their story will inspire thousands of men with the energy which is necessary for the conflict. . . . The number of those who perish does not matter. Legend will multiply it to an extreme limit . . . the whole of social progress depends on the activity of isolated personalities."¹

The same idea is expressed by another eminent *narodnik*, N. Mikhailovsky, in his work on *The Heroes of the Crowd*. It is interesting to note that the theory of "personalities which create history," which, in its day, was popular in the West, receives a sort of local colour in Russia. In particular, our *narodniki* assert that in Russia the rôle of a "conscious personality" may be much more important than in Europe. Why? Because the social environment of Russia is more uniform, less varied. Therefore an idea or an example may have a great power of contagion in such an environment. As we see, a defect is once again transformed into a virtue; the uniformity and the unim-

¹ P. Mirtov (pseudonym of Lavrov), *Historical Letters* (Petersburg, 1870), pp. 108, 109, 121.

portant variation which are the proofs of a backward condition become, for our *narodniki*, an advantage.

The problem of the *rôle* of personality in history is narrowly connected with the philosophy of history in general. It was especially upon this point that the discussion between the *narodniki* and the Marxists was centred. The *narodniki* declared that the objective, determinist method offered by Marxism for the explanation and appreciation of historical phenomena is not sufficient, that it must be replaced by the subjective or ethical method. A historian must be at the same time a moralist, said Mikhaïlovsky. He must not only establish the causes and consequences of events, but must judge them according to its ethical and social ideal.

This historical and moralizing "subjectivism" is in reality merely a form of dualism in historical and social science. We shall find this dualism again in the Nihilists. Materialistic monists in the natural sciences, they were spiritualists and dualists in the domain of history and sociology, and in Pisarev we find almost the same subjectivist conception of philosophy as in Mikhaïlovsky. But Pisarev felt that the subjective method as applied to the social science was in contradiction to the materialistic monism of the naturalistic philosophy. Not knowing how to resolve this contradiction, Pisarev simply excluded the social sciences (geography, anthropology, and statistics excepted) from the domain of "exact" and positive sciences. Mikhaïlovsky did worse—he sought to legitimize the subjective and anti-scientific method in the social sciences.

The Russian Marxists believed, on the contrary, that they ought to continue the materialistic tradition, and apply it to the social sciences and to the philosophy of history. They declared that ideals are only a forecast of historical necessity, and that any attempt to construct a social ideal outside this forecast is futile. Human ideals are determined by social conditions, not by class interests. Those ideals are justifiable and progressive

which belong to the progressive classes. As the industrial proletariat is a class of the future, and one of the most progressive forces, it is the ideal of this class which must be accepted and defended by all those who wish to contribute to the progress of humanity. But as the industrial proletariat develops and becomes more and more numerous, powerful, and conscious as capitalism develops, a true partisan of progress and the revolution cannot uphold in any measure an institution which places obstacles in the way of this development.

From this point of view the Marxists pronounced against all attempts to artificially maintain the *mir*, while the *narodniki* even demanded a special legislation to maintain it. The Marxists declared vain all the socialistic hopes which the *narodniki* based on the peasants, and easily demonstrated that the peasants did not represent a single social class; that in the interior of the rural commune an economic differentiation has come about, and a social conflict has developed. They also oppose the idea that the "intellectuals" constitute a separate social group, and assert that class conflicts and class mentality are reflected in the ideology of the various groups of intellectuals.

The conflict between the *narodniki* and the Marxists was extremely violent. The *narodniki* interpreted the economic determinism of the Marxists as a form of admiration of capitalism, and accused them of being friends of the exploiting classes.

The insurrection of 1905 put these two doctrines to the test. The *narodnitshestvo* was divided, during and after the revolution of 1905, into three different currents; and this division very plainly revealed the weak points of the movement. Its left wing, inspired by the idea that personality "creates" history, and that the laws of capitalistic evolution are not applicable to Russia, adopted a sort of anarchism, proclaiming the "maximalist" theory, according to which Russia might immediately, without any delay, realize the maximum programme of the Socialist party; that is to say, might

bring about a social revolution and leap directly from the semi-feudal autocratic *régime* into the Socialist Paradise. The "maximalists" began to effect the "social revolution" by inviting the workers to possess themselves of the factories and workshops, and by forming "groups" which committed acts of terrorism and expropriation. This movement very soon degenerated into simple brigandage.

The right wing of the *narodnitshestvo*, on the other hand, assumed the character of a peasants' party, not particularly socialistic, but extremely democratic as far as its political programme was concerned. The Labour group in the Duma and the "Popular Socialist" group represent this tendency. The "Centre" of the *narodnitshestvo*, represented by the official organizations of the Revolutionary Socialist party, remains the guardian of the orthodox doctrine of the movement. Its programme is an eclectic mixture of communal federalism of a semi-Bakunist type and State Centralism, and the naïve belief in the "communist" sentiments of the members of the rural *mir* and the desires of the industrial proletariat. The disintegration of the party continues; certain of its elements are inclining toward the "Labourites," others toward the Anarchists, and others toward Social Democracy.

As for Social Democracy, it remains far more united, from the point of view of theory, than the *narodnitshestvo*. But in Russian Social Democracy there are also internal movements. Even before the Revolution of 1905 there were lively disputes among the Russian Marxists. Some of those who had accepted the Marxist doctrine afterwards found it necessary to "revise" it. They renounced historical materialism, returning to the metaphysical conceptions of Kant or of Nietzsche. Many of the leaders of the Liberal movement in Russia (such as Peter Struve, founder of the "Cadet" party) formed their present ideology by means of revising Marxism.

After the Revolution of 1905 we witness a new

"revision" of the Marxist doctrine. But this time it is not based upon the philosophy of Kant or of Nietzsche, but on "Machism," that is, on the ideas of Ernst Mach, a well-known Viennese physician. This attempt did not meet with much success. The "Machists" were received by the violent criticism of the orthodox Marxists, and Plekhanov in particular. Thirty years earlier the chief duty of upholding Marxist ideas in Russia had fallen upon him, and he had acquitted himself with the greatest brilliancy. "Machism" recruited a few disciples among the intellectuals, but the Social-Democratic workers remained indifferent to it.

As to their theoretical opinions the Socialist workers in general are far more stable and conservative in Russia than the "intellectuals." From the moment when Social-Democratic Marxism had penetrated the labour world, it acquired a very strong position. Russia, who gave to the world Marx's most powerful enemy, Bakunin, has become, by the irony of history, in respect of its Socialist proletariat, one of the chief fortresses of Marxism. But, as I have elsewhere remarked, Marxism and Russian Social Democracy are not identical in German eyes.

The Russian Marxists are fond of saying that the true revolutionary Marxism is a synthesis of three elements: the dialectic philosophy of Germany, the revolutionary practice of France, and the history of economic evolution in England. Generally speaking, the Russian Socialists and Revolutionists are to-day divided, in the matter of tactics, into two schools: those who want to "speak German," that is, they recommend a gradual organization and a reforming opportunism, and those who wish to "speak French," that is, those who prefer that the revolutionary impulses of the popular masses should work out their own destinies. The adherents of the "French method" are in the majority among the more thoughtful elements of the party.

CONCLUSION

WE have followed the development of the relations between Russia and Europe, and the diffusion of European influences in the various domains of the material, social, political, and intellectual life of the Russian people. We have seen that the influence of European elements in Russia is already several centuries old, and is very extensive—more so, perhaps, than Europeans themselves believe.

The facts expounded in the present work show that the destinies of Russia are closely bound up with the future of Europe. Not only in the sense that Europe has struck indestructible roots in the economic domain and the political life of Russia, but also because for Russia the general type of life and historic evolution is the same as for the West.

Of course, we cannot say that the Europeanization of Russia is already accomplished. Economically speaking, that is, as regards the forms of labour and exchange, it is already complete in Russian industry, and more or less complete in Russian commerce. In rural exploitation it is still very incomplete.


But it is especially the political system of Russia which is out of date and too Oriental, and which consequently offers a striking contrast with that of the European States. At the present moment, then, it is to the political system that the process of Europeanization must be extended, in order to adapt it to the economic environment, and to subject it to the conscience and aspirations of society. This conscience is well expressed by these words of Dostoievsky's:—

"We Russians have two countries: our Russia, and Europe."

What do we need? That our country shall cease to be a European Russia and shall become a Russian Europe. This formula synthetizes what is good in Russia and in Europe. Its realization will allow Russia to work in common with other European countries for the future of the human species.

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