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CORNELL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

No. 9

SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM

OF

KANT'S THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

BY
Andres
RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF, A.B.

FORMERLY SCHOLAR AND FELLOW IN THE SAGE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

A THESIS

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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
FOURTH AVENUE AND THIRTIETH STREET

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PREFACE.

The writer has found the literature on Schopenhauer in English comparatively meagre on the technical side, particularly with respect to Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian philosophy. Professor Caldwell's article on "Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant" in *Mind* (Vol. XVI, 1891, pp. 355-374) is, of course, a direct contribution to the subject, but, in his bulky volume, *Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance* (New York, 1896), Professor Caldwell does not discuss in any detail Schopenhauer's "opinions upon Kant and Kant's works" (p. x), believing quite seriously "not only that Schopenhauer himself made little serious attempt to correlate his own thought with any other system in existence (save perhaps the Kantian philosophy), but that he did not care in the least to be *understood*" (p. 35). The articles containing the controversy between J. Hutchison Stirling and Edward Caird concerning Schopenhauer's interpretation and criticism of Kant, particularly with respect to the deduction of the categories, in the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (Vol. XIII, pp. 1-50, 215-220; Vol. XIV, pp. 49-134, 353-376), comprise, to the best of my knowledge, the longest discussion in English of problems directly connected with the subject of the present investigation. But Caird's articles are concerned mainly with explaining his own interpretation of Kant, and lay little stress upon Schopenhauer's particular criticisms; whereas Stirling's articles, written in a too controversial spirit and full of irrelevant personal disputation, fail, I think, to approach the problem from a significant point of view. Professor Colvin's thesis, *Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Thing-in-itself and His Attempt to Relate It to the World of Phenomena* (Providence, 1897), contains a discussion of that problem from an historical point of view, but I have had no occasion to make direct use of it. Professor Wallace's *Life of Arthur Schopenhauer* (London, 1890), in the *Great Writers* series,

is much the best book on Schopenhauer that has appeared in English. Wallace's portrayal of Schopenhauer is admirable, and the book as a whole is as good an introduction to Schopenhauer's philosophy as could well be desired. But, of course, it is no more than a brief introduction can be, and is not concerned with the technical treatment of Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant.

Of the standard works on Schopenhauer in German and French, few contain any at all extended treatment of his relation to Kant. In Kuno Fischer's systematic study of his philosophy, *Arthur Schopenhauer*, in his *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, Vol. VIII (Heidelberg, 1893), only a few pages are devoted to the technical treatment of our particular problem; and Johannes Volkelt, in his lucidly written volume, *Arthur Schopenhauer, seine Persönlichkeit, seine Lehre, sein Glaube* (Stuttgart, 1900), in *Frommanns Klassiker der Philosophie*, while having the Critical point of view clearly in mind in his analysis of Schopenhauer's epistemology, is nevertheless concerned chiefly with Schopenhauer's own position, and does not therefore discuss in detail the significance of Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's philosophy. Ribot's *La philosophie de Schopenhauer* (Paris, 1890) and Bossert's *Schopenhauer, l'homme et le philosophe* (Paris, 1904) each devote a chapter to a brief outline of the "Appendix" to *The World as Will and Idea*.

There are several monographs having a more or less direct bearing upon the subject of the present study. I should mention first of all Dr. Raoul Richter's dissertation, *Schopenhauer's Verhältnis zu Kant in seinen Grundzügen* (Leipzig, 1893), a study which, in painstaking analysis, keenness of penetration, and lucidity of exposition, already promised what that scholarly author has fulfilled in his later works. Dr. Richter approaches the problem by contrasting Kant and Schopenhauer as men, thinkers, and writers, and exhibiting a corresponding contrast between their systems. The technical nature of my own study has led me to lay less stress upon the psychological aspects of the problem, and to consider rather the inherent incompatibility of the two systems themselves. I regret that I did not have access to Dr. Richter's dissertation until after my work had been

nearly completed. Nevertheless, I have made occasional references to his views in the footnotes. Georg Albert's *Kant's transscendentale Logik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Schopenhauerschen Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie* (Wien, 1895) is a well written and very suggestive monograph. Mscislaw Wartenberg's articles, "Der Begriff des 'transscendentalen Gegenstandes' bei Kant—und Schopenhauers Kritik desselben : Eine Rechtfertigung Kants," in *Kantstudien* (Vol. IV, pp. 202-231; Vol. V, pp. 145-176), contain a systematic discussion of that particular problem, and show a thorough grasp of some fundamental issues.

References could be made, of course, to many other books on Schopenhauer, were it not for the fact that they have no very direct bearing upon our special problem. It has not been my intention to give here a list of the books which I have had occasion to use. I merely wish to call attention to the fact that the better known writers on Schopenhauer have not given his criticism of Kant's theory of experience the share of attention which I think it deserves.

In making references to Schopenhauer's works, the Grisebach edition of the *Werke*, in Reclam's *Universal-Bibliothek* (Leipzig, 6 volumes) has been used throughout. The inaccurate and unreliable character of Frauenstädt's edition, formerly regarded as the standard, has been pointed out by many recent writers on Schopenhauer, and Grisebach's edition has gained in popularity. (Cf. Kuno Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-146; Bossert, *op. cit.*, pp. vi-vii; Paulsen, *Schopenhauer, Hamlet, Mephistopheles*, Berlin, 1900, p. 3. Volkelt, *op. cit.*, p. 359, also refers to the "muster-gültigen" edition of Grisebach.) Quotations from *The World as Will and Idea* are given according to the admirable English translation by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (fourth edition, London, 1896), in *The English and Foreign Philosophical Library*. The references to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the first edition unless otherwise stated; cross-references are always given to Max Müller's translation (second edition, New York, 1896), which has been used for the quotations.

I wish to express my gratitude to Professors J. E. Creighton, W. A. Hammond, and Frank Thilly, of The Sage School of

Philosophy, for valuable suggestions and generous help in the course of my work. Professor Thilly also kindly allowed me access to his collection of Schopenhauer literature. Above all, however, I am profoundly indebted to the sympathetic guidance and helpful criticism of Professor Ernest Albee, who is largely responsible for whatever this monograph may possess of logical coherence and technical accuracy, though not, of course, for the particular views expressed. I wish also to thank Professor S. F. MacLennan, of Oberlin College, my first teacher in philosophy, who introduced me to the study of both Kant and Schopenhauer, for his kindness in looking over the proofs.

RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF.

NEW YORK CITY,
May, 1911.

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INTRODUCTION.

Schopenhauer's interpretation and criticism of Kant's theory of experience is also an indispensable commentary upon the technical side of his own philosophical system, and for this reason alone would deserve more serious attention than it has generally received. That Schopenhauer professes to base his own philosophy directly upon that of Kant,—or upon that part of the Critical philosophy which he approves of,—must be evident to all readers of *The World as Will and Idea*. His scornful repudiation of the other Post-Kantians is almost as evident as his reverence for the master, when he says in the Preface: "The philosophy of Kant . . . is the only philosophy with which a thorough acquaintance is directly presupposed in what we have to say here."¹

But, though Schopenhauer is fond of representing himself as the true successor of Kant, he is anything but a mere disciple of the older philosopher. His thoroughgoing criticism of Kant's theory of experience, at once highly technical and decidedly unconventional, is generally suggestive and often illuminating, even where it signally fails to offer adequate solutions of the problems considered. As might be expected, Schopenhauer shows little capacity for sympathetic interpretation. His style is almost invariably controversial, his point of view always distinctly his own. To reinterpret and rectify Kant in the spirit of his own epistemological phenomenalism and voluntaristic metaphysics, and, while laying bare the inconsistencies of his master, clearly to indicate the inevitableness of his own proffered solutions, and thus establish firmly the grounds of his claim that between Kant and himself nothing has been done in philosophy and that he is Kant's immediate successor,—these are the aims of the Appendix

¹ G., I, p. 13; H.K., I, p. xii. For the sake of convenience, Grisebach's edition of Schopenhauer's works is referred to as G., Haldane and Kemp's translation of *The World as Will and Idea*, as H.K., the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, as *Kr. d. r. V.*, and Max Müller's translation, as M. The other references are self-explanatory.

to *The World as Will and Idea*, which contains the major portion of Schopenhauer's systematic criticism of the Kantian philosophy. It is as an apologist for and defender of Kant at his best, and often against himself, that Schopenhauer constantly addresses himself to his readers. He would free Kant's philosophy from its excrescences and show its essential meaning; he would expose the charlatantry of the university professors who have distorted the master's doctrine. His own system is intended not so much to supersede as to complete Kant's work; for the essential principles of Kantianism, he always insists, can never be superseded.

Perhaps the most convenient way to indicate the general spirit of Schopenhauer's interpretation of the Kantian philosophy will be to state briefly what he considered to be Kant's three incontestable achievements in the quest of truth.¹ Kant's greatest merit in philosophy Schopenhauer finds in the fact that he distinguished clearly between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. The inner nature of reality is hidden from our knowledge by the intercepting intellect; our experience is fundamentally 'intellectual.' In reaching this momentous conclusion, Kant clearly formulated and carried out to its logical results a doctrine already implicit in Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Locke explained the so-called 'secondary qualities' of things as mere affections of the senses. This line of argument, which Locke had employed only in the case of the 'secondary qualities,' Berkeley and Hume extended to the whole range of experience. Berkeley, as Schopenhauer says, first showed himself in earnest with the subjective standpoint, and may thus be regarded as "the originator of the proper and true Idealism,"² in that he shows the identity of existence and perceptibility. But Berkeley did not know where to find the Real,³ and borrowed from theology the notion of spiritual substance, while rejecting that of material substance. Hume, making a more consistent and thoroughgoing application of the method

¹ The following outline will adhere in the main to Schopenhauer's order in the "Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy," as given in the "Appendix" to *The World as Will and Idea*.

² G., IV, p. 26; Bax, *Schopenhauer's Essays*, in *Bohn's Library*, p. 13.

³ G., IV, p. 26; Bax, p. 14.

which Berkeley had followed to the extent of disproving the existence of material substance, showed that the notion of spiritual substance was equally untenable. Moreover, his destructive analysis of the law of causality led him to the conclusion that no necessary connection obtained in experience.

Kant, correcting the conclusions which Hume had drawn from his wider application of the Lockean method, indicated the real significance of the empirical point of view and systematized the results of British empiricism. That is to say, Kant reinterpreted the meaning of these results; for him they did not lead, as they did for Hume, to any sceptical conclusions concerning experience. He first brought out clearly the general implications of the idealistic point of view,—a thing which Berkeley had been unable to do, because of the narrowness of his line of attack, confined as that was to one point.¹ The distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves, and the necessary limitation of experience to the former,—principles which now for the first time were consistently formulated,—revealed the half-hidden meaning of dimly felt truths in Plato and the Vedic writers; they showed at the same time the fundamentally false starting-point of Kant's rationalistic predecessors, with their demand for 'eternal truths.' The recognition of the fact that these truths themselves had their origin and basis in the human mind, and that their supposedly absolute validity was, as a matter of fact, restricted to phenomenal experience, shook the very foundations of pre-Kantian dogmatism. No wonder that Mendelssohn, 'the last of the sleepers,' called Kant "den Alleszermalmer."² This is the Copernican reversal of method which Kant inaugurated. Instead of starting with certain ultimate and immutable truths, as the rationalists had done, Kant took these truths themselves as problems, and, by discovering their real source in the human mind, and their purely experiential validity, laid the foundations of a real philosophy of experience.³ His theory of knowledge, however, involved a frank recognition of the fact that our experience con-

¹ G., I, p. 542; H.K., II, p. 15.

² G., I, p. 537; H. K., II, p. 9.

³ Cf. G., I, pp. 537 f.; H.K., II, pp. 9 ff.

cerns only phenomena, and does not extend to things-in-themselves.

A second immortal achievement of the Critical Philosophy, according to Schopenhauer, is its assertion of the primacy of the Will. For Kant, the nature of the thing-in-itself remained in a large measure an untouched problem. Yet, in so far as he established its non-intellectual character, and, furthermore, explained the undeniably metaphysical significance of human action as passing beyond the pale of the phenomenal,—in so far Schopenhauer thinks that Kant was dimly conscious of that truth which he himself was the first clearly to expound and formulate, the truth, namely, that the Will is the *Weltprincip*. That this truth of all truths should have been implicitly present in Kant's thought, Schopenhauer regards as a deeply significant fact, in that it connects his own philosophy with that of Kant.

The third permanent result of Kant's philosophy, Schopenhauer thinks, is its complete refutation of Scholasticism, which had treated philosophy as ancillary to theology and had dominated the thought of almost every philosopher since Augustine, Giordano Bruno and Spinoza being the notable exceptions. The deathblow which the *Critique of Pure Reason* dealt to the rationalistic psychology, cosmology, and theology was salutary alike to philosophy and to natural science; it liberated both from the shackles of creed-prejudice and allowed philosophical investigation free play in its search after truth.¹

The salient points of Schopenhauer's appreciative introduction to his criticism of Kant's philosophy have been noted briefly. The problems it raises, touching as they do epistemology, metaphysics, and theology, and suggesting the tenor of Schopenhauer's whole philosophy, cannot be considered to advantage until after a detailed examination of what Schopenhauer asserts to be Kant's epistemological errors, and a discussion of the fundamental principles of his own philosophy, which he invariably advocates as offering the only logical solution of every real Kantian problem. It will be well, however, to keep in mind from the very start these three conclusions of Kant's philosophy,

¹ Cf. G., IV, pp. 118 ff.

which Schopenhauer regards as most significant and, indeed, as incontrovertible. (1) Philosophy must recognize the purely phenomenal character of knowledge. This indicates, positively, the phenomenalist character of Schopenhauer's own epistemology; negatively, it opens the door to illusionism. (2) Philosophy must realize the primacy of Will over Reason. Positively, again, this may be interpreted as an insistence upon the dynamic nature of experience, as opposed to the contrary tendency of rationalism. Negatively,—and it is the negative side that is unduly prominent in Schopenhauer's own system,—the recognition of the primacy of the Will leads to the dogmatic assertion of the ultimately irrational character of reality, and points to a pessimistic conclusion. (3) Philosophy must be kept distinct from theology. This means the rejection of any transcendent principles of explanation, and the repudiation of all dogmatism. These three aspects of Kant's philosophy, as interpreted by Schopenhauer, are merely indicated here. To analyze them closely and to inquire into their consistency and philosophical significance, as well as to determine as nearly as possible their historical value as interpretations of Kant's philosophy, will be the object of this study.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE AND GENESIS OF EXPERIENCE: PERCEPTION AND CONCEPTION.

The problem of the relative functions of Perception and Conception in the genesis of experience raises the fundamental epistemological issue which split early modern philosophy in twain, and the partial solution of which is one of the most substantial achievements of modern logic. At the dawn of modern philosophy we find the old scholastic dispute of Nominalism *vs.* Realism assuming a new form. The rationalistic world of 'eternal truths,' while having a certain abstract coherence of its own, lacks any vital relation to the flesh-and-blood world of sense-experience. If the actual facts are not in accord with its conceptual scheme, then, Schopenhauer says, experience is "given to understand that it knows nothing of the matter and ought to hold its tongue when philosophy has spoken *a priori*."¹ The revolt against this worship of the abstract universal was represented by empiricism, which grounded its truths in sense-experience and sought to explain all knowledge as having its origin in perception. Rationalism had distrusted the impressions of the senses, and viewed Reality from the standpoint of its conceptual system, constructed by a process of logical deduction from certain truths which were regarded as axiomatic. For empiricism, on the other hand, the test of Reality was to be found, not in the formal coherence of an abstractly deduced system of concepts, but in the vividness and immediate certainty of actual sense-experience.

Reality itself was conceived by both schools as in some sense the transcendent ground of experience, either as the ultimate basis of the rationalistic system of concepts, or else as the 'I know not what,' accounting for the immediate presence of sense-experience. Empiricism and Rationalism differed as to whether

¹G., I, p. 538; H.K., II, p. 11.

the real nature of things was more adequately to be defined in perceptual or in conceptual terms; that is to say, the dispute between them was primarily an epistemological one. But pre-Kantian philosophy was unable to solve the problem as to the relation between perception and conception precisely because of its inadequate understanding of the relation between experience and reality. And here is where Schopenhauer finds the great significance of Kant's reconstruction of philosophy. "The main tendency of the Kantian philosophy," he says, "is to place before us the complete *diversity of the Ideal and Real*, after Locke had already broken ground."¹ Kant proved that the categories of knowledge cannot apply to the Real, and thus ended dogmatic philosophy once for all. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, Schopenhauer thinks, showed the spanless chasm which, for epistemology, separates cognitive experience from Reality. But he holds that Kant, while restating the problem of perception and conception and putting it upon a new epistemological basis, was far from clear and consistent in his own treatment. Schopenhauer criticises severely what he calls Kant's "unfortunate confusion"² of perception and conception, and regards this as responsible for a mass of inconsistencies in the *Critique*. "After he has . . . dismissed this whole world of perception which fills space and time, and in which we live and are, with the meaningless words 'the empirical content of perception is given us,' he immediately arrives with one spring at *the logical basis of his whole philosophy, the table of judgments*."³ But "the world of perception," Schopenhauer argues, "is infinitely more significant, generally present, and rich in content than the abstract part of our knowledge."⁴ If Kant had given as much attention to the concrete content of experience as to the pattern of its formal organization, he would have realized, Schopenhauer thinks, the fundamental distinction between perception and conception, a distinction which for Schopenhauer himself determines the plan of his whole epistemological structure. The Kantian 'object of experience' is neither

¹ G., IV, p. 106; Bax, *Schopenhauer's Essays*, London, 1891, p. 99.

² G., I, p. 558; H.K., II, p. 32.

³ G., I, pp. 549-550; H.K., II, p. 23.

⁴ G., I, p. 551; H.K., II, p. 24.

perceptual nor conceptual: it is "different from both, and yet both at once, and is a perfect chimera."¹

Schopenhauer's way of looking at the matter is not wholly wrong, but he misses what is after all the fundamental significance of the Critical position. Kant's insistence upon the phenomenal character of our whole experience, perceptual and conceptual alike, certainly helped to emancipate philosophy from the unwarranted assumptions of the earlier dogmatism. The *Critique of Pure Reason* has no pledges to keep: its fundamental postulate is the inevitable one of respect for its own problem, the postulate, namely, of the intelligibility of experience. To show that experience is possible and that it is somehow intelligible, is no problem for any philosophy that realizes its proper task. To explain the nature of experience and the manner of its organization, however, is *the* problem. Only in this sense can we ask: How is experience possible? Experience is not a cryptogram, to be transliterated by the use of any transcendent formula; it carries its solution in its own bosom. No one of its aspects has significance apart from the rest. This standpoint, involved in the very presupposition of the intelligibility of experience, determines at the outset the Critical procedure. For neither are concepts mere mutilated copies of sense-impressions, nor are perceptions confused concepts, but the perceptual and the conceptual are both factors in the organic unity of experience. "*Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.*"² This is the fundamental guiding principle of Kant's entire philosophy: the transcendent must give way to the transcendental, and a Critical epistemology supplant its ontologizing predecessor.³

Whether Kant himself, in denying the possibility of a science of metaphysics, denied along with it the metaphysical significance of experience,⁴ and whether he carried his epistemological intention consistently through, are matters which had better be discussed later. The point here is, that the *raison d'être* of the

¹ G., I, p. 558; H.K., II, p. 32.

² *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 51; M., p. 41.

³ Cf. *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 12; M., p. 10; G., IV, pp. 101 ff.

⁴ Cf. Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus*, Vol. I, Leipzig, 1908, p. 584.

Critique of Pure Reason, the significance of its novel standpoint, and the reason why in it both empiricism and rationalism were *aufgehoben* (in the twofold Hegelian sense of that term¹), are to be found, not in its solution of the specific question as to whether perception or conception is epistemologically prior, but in the fact that it indicated the true method of approaching the problem. In dealing with our experience from the transcendental point of view, Kant showed that the conflict between empiricism and rationalism lacked all ontological significance. Neither perception nor conception alone could any longer possibly claim to represent reality, for both were shown to be mutually involved in the very nature of experience.

Schopenhauer recognizes the importance of Kant's account of the relation of experience to reality, but he fails to realize that the Critical method necessitates a restatement of the whole problem of perception and conception and of the genesis of knowledge. In order to understand at once the significance and the inadequacy of Schopenhauer's position, one should follow carefully his consecutive analysis and criticism of Kant's theory of knowledge.

Schopenhauer's admiration for the 'Transcendental Æsthetic' is evident. "The Transcendental Æsthetic," he says, "is a work of such extraordinary merit that it alone would have been sufficient to immortalize the name of Kant. Its proofs carry such perfect conviction, that I number its propositions among incontestable truths, and without doubt they are also among those that are richest in results, and are, therefore, to be regarded as the rarest thing in the world, a real and great discovery in metaphysics."² In demonstrating that "space and time, no less than causality, are known by us *a priori*, that is, lie in us before all experience, and hence belong to the subjective side of knowledge,"³ Kant not only completed the work of Hume, but, in completing it, reconstructed it and gave it an entirely new significance.

Up to a certain point Schopenhauer seems right. Indeed, an interesting parallel might be drawn between the development

¹ *Logic* (Wallace's transl.), Oxford, 1892, p. 180.

² G., I, p. 558; H.K., II, p. 32.

³ G., IV, p. 32; Bax., p. 20.

of the phenomenalistic conception of space and time and the genesis of modern epistemology. The scholastic conception of space, as a metaphysical entity enclosing the finite universe, proved inadequate to meet the issues of modern theory of knowledge. In early rationalism, to be sure, something corresponding to the old notion long retained a lodging place. In Descartes's philosophy space is indubitably real, since it is regarded as the essence of corporeal substance,¹ and Spinoza insists that extension is one of the infinite attributes of God.² This realistic theory of space Descartes and Spinoza held side by side with an opposite estimate of time, which they explained as subjective, derived from the mere correlation of represented motions, and jacking all metaphysical reality.³ British empiricism, however, grew emphatic in its insistence on the experiential character of space and time alike. In Locke this tendency finds expression in his opposition to Descartes's identification of space with corporeal substance.⁴ Locke's protest is based largely on his agnostic attitude concerning substance; this remained for him the 'I know not what,' to identify which with extension he regarded as a serious fallacy.⁵ The idea of space, according to Locke's theory, has its origin in our sensations of sight and touch;⁶ and time is likewise considered from the standpoint of experience, as explainable only in terms of the succession of ideas.⁷ This method of approaching the problem of space and time gained confidence and exactness of expression in Berkeley and Hume: space is defined by them as our idea of the orderly distribution of co-existent objects; time, again, is atomistically viewed as the succession of discrete moments, corresponding to the sequence of simple ideas.⁸

¹ Cf. *Princ. phil.*, Pars II, viii.

² *Ethics*, Part I, prop. xv, schol.

³ Cf. *Princ. phil.*, Pars I, lvii; Spinoza, *Cog. met.*, I, iv; *Eth.*, II, xlv-xlvii. Leibniz's theory of space and time differs materially from that of Descartes and Spinoza, and it has therefore seemed advisable to refer to it separately, after having indicated the differences between the earlier rationalistic position and that of British empiricism.

⁴ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Vol. I, Oxford, 1894, p. 226.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 228. Cf. also Book II, chapter xiii, pp. 218-37.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Book II, chapter iv.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 239; cf. Book II, chapters xiv and xv, pp. 238-269.

⁸ Cf. Berkeley, *Works*, Vol. I, Oxford, 1871, pp. 206, 282; Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Oxford, 1888, pp. 26-68, esp. pp. 36, 38, 53.

Leibniz's theory of space is relational, quite the opposite of the Newtonian doctrine of absolute space as the infinite collection of actual points. Mr. Bertrand Russell considers Leibniz fairly strong in his argument against the monistic theory of space as an attribute, but inconclusive in establishing his own conception of space as an assemblage of relations, a position logically necessitated by his monadism. Time Leibniz distinguishes from duration: duration is an attribute of objects; time is the ideal measure of duration. Interpretations of Leibniz differ as to the metaphysical reality of time in his system, and a discussion of these would necessitate closer attention to his general theory of monads than seems relevant for the present purpose. Whether space and time, as ideal relations, obtain in the ontological order of monads or not, however, the space and time of experience Leibniz clearly regards as ideal.¹

Thus one sees, alongside of the persistent speculation in modern philosophy regarding the status of space and time in the transcendent world of 'Reality,' a growing recognition of the fact that for us they are significant only in terms of experience. And the development of modern philosophy is characterized by an increasing realization of the intimate relationship between space and time, as co-essential aspects of experience; there is, as it were, a growing *rapprochement* between the two.

In Kant's doctrine of the transcendental ideality of space and time, all the partly thought-out and imperfectly formulated views of their phenomenal character come to a focus. Space and time are for Kant the *a priori* forms of outer and inner intuition respectively. Their reality is purely experiential; they find their application solely within the scope of finite experience, outside of which they would be utterly meaningless, but within which they are indispensable, representing as they do its intuitional basis. The doctrine of the 'Transcendental Æsthetic' is among the very few Kantian theories which Schopenhauer accepts unreservedly; the modifications he recommends are only by

¹See, in this connection, Russell's discussion of Leibniz's theory of space and time in his admirable book, *The Philosophy of Leibniz*, Cambridge, 1900. Cf. chapters ix and x, especially pp. 112 ff., 118 ff., and also his collection of leading passages from Leibniz, pp. 230-59.

way of emphasis and addition. "From the doctrine of the Transcendental Æsthetic," he says, "I knew of nothing to take away, only of something to add."¹ As against the conceptually reasoned out procedure of the Euclidean geometry, which Kant regarded as explainable only on the basis of his theory of space and time, Schopenhauer champions a new geometry, based on pure immediate intuition and unimpeded by roundabout, irrelevant demonstrations.²

It is not necessary to discuss here the principles of the 'Transcendental Æsthetic' in their relation to the Euclidean method in geometry.³ Suffice it to say that Schopenhauer's is no voice crying in the wilderness: his teacher, G. E. Schulze,⁴ is one of the many who have believed that the 'Transcendental Æsthetic' suggests a needed reconstruction of geometry. The significant point in this connection is Schopenhauer's insistence upon the distinctly intuitive character of space and time. Critics of Kant have sometimes characterized his view of space as conceptual;⁵ others have regarded Euclidean space as distinctly intuitional.⁶ There can be no room for doubt as to Schopenhauer's own attitude on the subject. The infinite divisibility and expansion of space and time are for him matters of pure intuition; they represent the *principium rationis sufficientis essendi*, as the basis of mathematical relatedness underlying geometry and arithmetic respectively.⁷ This their mathematical character is

¹G., I, p. 559; H.K., II, p. 33.

²Cf. G., I, pp. 114-119; H.K., I, pp. 90-96.

³Cf. Fritz Medicus, "Kants transscendentale Aesthetik und die nichteuklidische Geometrie," in *Kantstudien*, Vol. III, pp. 261-300.

⁴G., I, p. 559; H.K., II, p. 33. "One of Kant's opponents, and indeed the acutest of them," Schopenhauer calls Schulze, in referring to his argument as presented in the *Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie*, Book I, sect. 15. Schopenhauer is not so appreciative when Schulze's views do not happen to coincide with his own conclusions.

⁵Cf., e. g., W. Caldwell, "Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant," in *Mind*, 1891, p. 363.

⁶Cf. Goswin Uphues, *Kant und seine Vorgänger*, p. 120. Cf. also Richard Hönigswald's discussion of this point in *Kantstudien*, Vol. XIII, "Zum Begriff der kritischen Erkenntnislehre," pp. 409-456, especially pp. 420 ff.

⁷Cf. Schopenhauer's Table of the "Prædicabilia a priori of Space and Time," G., II, pp. 60 ff.; H.K., II, pp. 219 ff. The following brief outline of Schopenhauer's 'four classes of objects,' as presented in the *Fourfold Root of the Principle of Suffi-*

foreign to empirical perception; the world of perceptual experience is not a space-world and also a time-world, but a space-time-world.

Now, after the intuitive basis and the form of perception have received such a thorough-going treatment at the hands of Kant, what of its content? Schopenhauer says: "The whole teaching of Kant contains really nothing more about this than the oft-repeated meaningless expression: 'The empirical element in perception is *given* from without.'"¹ And here it is that Schopenhauer discovers Kant's *πρωτον ψευδος*. "Our knowledge," Kant says, "has two sources, receptivity of impressions and spontaneity of conceptions: the first is the capacity for receiving ideas, the second that of knowing an object through these ideas: through the first an *object* is given us, through the second it is thought."² This theory of the conceptualizing of the material of sense-impressions into so-called 'objective' experience, Schopenhauer repudiates as false. The object, the *Vorstellung*, is not 'given' us. What is actually given, he insists, is the raw sensation, *i. e.*, the mere stimulation of a sense-organ. By means of the twofold form of space-time, whose union yields causal relatedness, the understanding transforms this primal meaningless sense-organ stimulation into a perception, an idea, a *Vorstellung*, "which now exists as an object in space and time, and cannot be distinguished from the latter (the object) except in so far as we ask after the thing-in-itself, but apart from this is identical with it."³ "It is only when the *Understanding* begins to act

cient Reason, does not follow Schopenhauer's own order (*principium rationis sufficientis fendi, cognoscendi, essendi, agendi*); it has been adapted rather to the order of the general argument in the *Kritik der Kantischen Philosophie*, which order has been the one usually followed in this monograph. The change in the order of exposition does not affect the force of the argument as presented in the *Fourfold Root*, and it indicates more adequately and with greater clearness, I trust, Schopenhauer's fundamental epistemological principles, as distinguished from those of Kant.

¹ G., I, p. 560; H.K., II, p. 34.

² *Ibid.*; cf. *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 50; M., p. 40.

³ G., I, p. 560; H.K., II, p. 34. Cf. also Section 21 of the *Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (G., III, pp. 64 ff.; Hillebrand's translation, Bohn's Library, pp. 58 ff.), in which Schopenhauer demonstrates at length the *a priori* character of the conception of causality and the 'intellectual' character of empirical perception.

. . . only when it begins to apply its sole form, *the causal law*, that a powerful transformation takes place, by which subjective sensation becomes objective perception. . . . Accordingly our every-day *empirical perception* is an *intellectual* one. . . ."¹ Experience, then, arises for Schopenhauer, not through the conceptualizing of the intuitions of sense, as he understands Kant to hold, but through the intervention of the understanding, which he regards as the perceptual faculty *par excellence*, common to man and brute alike. The multiform relatedness obtaining in the perceptual order thus originated, Schopenhauer finds epitomized in the *principium rationis sufficientis fiendi*, *i. e.*, Causality. Spatial co-existence and temporal succession here fuse into the concrete perceptual process involving causally connected changes.

It should be observed here that Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's account of the genesis of experience ignores the factor of the productive or creative imagination. Kant says, for example: "We must admit a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination which forms even the foundation of the possibility of all experience."² And again: "The whole of our experience becomes possible only by means of that transcendental function of imagination, without which no concepts of objects could ever come together in one experience."³ Such passages clearly imply that unity-in-variety is the condition of the very possibility of experience, *i. e.*, that experience is implicitly, intrinsically organic. Kant's theory of the productive imagination, in spite of its vagueness and its too free use of metaphors, as when he speaks of its work being done 'in a dark chamber of the soul,' is, after all, his confused expression of a most profound truth. The organic unity of experience is for Kant a presupposition of its very possibility; Kant felt that the unity was there somewhere in the very essence of experience. This failure on the part of Schopenhauer to give due recognition to the fundamental rôle played by the productive imagination in the Critical theory of experience, should be kept in mind in estimating the value of

¹ G., III, pp. 66, 67; Hillebr., pp. 60, 61.

² *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 101; M., p. 84.

³ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 123; M., p. 101.

his criticism of what he calls the conceptualizing of the perceptual material in Kant's epistemology.

Schopenhauer spares no pains to impress upon his readers the exclusively phenomenal character of causality. The 'Principle of Becoming' affects changes of states alone, changes conditioning each other in a definite way. "*Every change in the material world can only take place because another has immediately preceded it; this is the true and the whole content of the law of causality.*"¹ Substances, *Dinge*, are altogether beyond its scope. The cause-effect relation is never a vague one: by 'cause' we always understand the temporally antecedent change which actually evokes the consequent 'effect.' The change formerly considered as effect then turns cause, evoking in its turn a new change, and so on *ad infinitum*. There is a logical as well as a temporal irreversibility of cause and effect, according to Schopenhauer's theory, to ignore which irreversibility is to ignore the entire significance of the causal relation.

In accordance with the equality or inequality of the two causally connected changes, Schopenhauer distinguishes three kinds of causation. He says: (1) "I call a cause (*Ursach*), in the narrowest sense of the word, that state of matter, which, while it introduces another state with necessity, yet suffers as great a change itself as that which it causes; which is expressed in the rule: 'action and reaction are equal.' Further, in the case of what is properly speaking a cause, the effect increases directly in proportion to the cause, and therefore also the reaction."² Here belong the mechanical causes of unorganized nature, operating in the phenomena dealt with by mechanics, chemistry, and the physical sciences generally. (2) "On the other hand," he says, "I call a stimulus (*Reiz*), such a cause as sustains no reaction proportional to its effect, and the intensity of which does not vary directly in proportion to the intensity of its effect, so that the effect cannot be measured by it."³ This is the causation of organic and vegetative nature. (3) We have, moreover, to consider motive, or 'animal cause,' *i. e.*, causation on the con-

¹ G., II, pp. 52-53; H.K., II, p. 211.

² G., I, p. 169; H.K., I, p. 149.

³ *Ibid.*

scious plane, operating through knowledge. This is the causality determining the purely animal functioning of all animals, and the conscious activity of all conscious beings.¹

Man's faculty of being determined by motives expands his sphere of causal functioning. In the conflict of motives, however, the one which actually proves strongest is a cause as truly necessary as that impelling the inanimate object in its motion. In this respect, there is no fundamental distinction between the two. The consciousness we possess of our ability to determine ourselves through motives is the only consciousness we have of ourselves as subjects.² That is to say, the subject of knowledge, as such, can never be known, never become an object of representation. To adapt a passage from the Upanishads: "Id videndum non est: omnia videt; et audiendum non est: omnia audit; sciendum non est: omnia scit. . . ."³ The subject of knowledge, the knower himself, is known only as willing: a proposition which Schopenhauer regards as 'synthetic *a posteriori*,' derived as it is from our inmost experience. "Introspection always shows us to ourselves as *willing*."⁴

Looked at from this point of view of volition, the basis of relatedness of Schopenhauer's next general class of objects becomes manifest, *principium rationis sufficientis agendi, i. e., Motivation*. Here, where the subject of knowledge itself is in question, the rules affecting objects of representations no longer apply. The "actual identity of the knower with what is known as willing—that is, of Subject and Object—is *immediately given*."⁵ Schopenhauer calls this the inexplicable nodus of the universe, "das Wunder κατ' ἐξοχην."

The bearing of the question of motivation upon the issue of man's freedom, and the fundamental metaphysical problem of the relation of knowledge to the Will-Reality, will be duly considered along with the examination of the Dialectic of

¹Schopenhauer makes a nice distinction between activity of animals and animal activity. Cf. *Fr. d. Willens*, G., III, pp. 410-411. In regard to the threefold division of causes, cf. G., I, pp. 169 ff.; II, pp. 228 ff.

²G., III, p. 158; Hillebr., p. 165.

³G., III, p. 158; Hillebr., p. 166.

⁴G., III, p. 161; Hillebr., p. 168.

⁵G., III, p. 161; Hillebr., p. 169.

Pure Reason and the discussion of the Will as the thing-in-itself. The significant point in this connection is that, in the three classes of objects which have been discussed so far, Schopenhauer has disclaimed any need of conceptions. Space and time yield the principle of intuitive relatedness: taken separately, they are non-perceptual pure intuitions; when they are united in concrete experience, the understanding finds its sole function in transforming sense-excitations into causally connected perceptions. The action of motives, also,—the consciousness of self-determination,—while raising metaphysical problems, is yet an immediate matter, foreign to all conceptual thought. "*The action of motives is causality seen from within.*"¹ The whole range of immediate experience, intellectual and volitional alike, has thus been covered without any reference to abstract thought. Our concrete experience, Schopenhauer declares, requires no thinking, no concepts, no abstract categories, to dictate to it any organization whatever. Perception leaps out of its sensation-shell complete and perfect. If, however, we abandon concrete experience and look for help from conceptions, then, he says, we find the intellectual faculty of the understanding to be of no avail. Thoughts are not present in perceptual, that is to say (for Schopenhauer) concrete experience; they are the result of abstraction, and the faculty operating in the process which releases them is what Schopenhauer calls Reason (*Vernunft*).

Here, then, we have Schopenhauer's clear-cut distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* in so many words. Understanding is the faculty of perception, which man shares with the higher animals. Its machinery is quite simple: through the union of space and time it endows the material of sensation with causal relatedness. Reason, on the contrary, is the faculty of reflection, and of reflection alone. Its stock in trade is conceptions, which are derived from perceptions by a process of abstraction; but they "form a distinct class of ideas, existing only in the mind of man, and entirely different from the ideas of perception."² Perception always remains the asymptote of conception;³ what a

¹ G., III, p. 163; Hillebr., p. 171.

² G., I, p. 77; H.K., I, p. 50.

³ G., I, p. 99; H.K., I, p. 74.

conception gains in range of application, it loses in concreteness of meaning: "the content and the extent of the concepts stand in inverse relation to each other, and thus the more is thought *under* a concept, the less is thought *in* it. . . ."¹

Schopenhauer's view of conception is thus not unlike Hume's: "Reflection is the necessary copy or repetition of the originally presented world of perception, but it is a special kind of copy in an entirely different material. Thus concepts may quite properly be called ideas of ideas."² Reality and certainty are given only in perception, not in the conceptual structures of science. These latter generalize, systematize, and store for future reference our knowledge of ideas; but the concrete test of their validity Schopenhauer finds in terms, not of immanent organization, but of perceptual immediacy. The connection obtaining in the process of abstraction, which yields conceptions by the selective elimination of differences, is that of reason and consequent,—corresponding to the cause-effect relation of the perceptual world of the understanding. This is the last form of the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: *principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi*. Just as the demonstration of a causal connection between two perceptible changes establishes the phenomenal reality of the process considered, so, by virtue of the fact that a judgment has a sufficient reason, the predicate 'true' is applicable to it.

Conceptual relatedness is a form of the selfsame principle which, in the world of perceptual changes, assumes the form of causality, though the cognitive content involved in the two cases is fundamentally different. Schopenhauer repudiates any confusion of the *one* Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason with the multiform character of its several spheres of operation.³ Reasoning clarifies the abstract content of concep-

¹G., II, p. 74; H.K., II, p. 236.

²G., I, p. 78; H.K., I, p. 52.

³The tendency, already present in the *Fourfold Root*, to insist upon the four different classes of objects, while stoutly maintaining the oneness of the fourfold principle, becomes clearly manifest in Schopenhauer's later writings, where the sharpest separation is maintained between perceptual knowledge and conceptual thought. The principles of Becoming and of Knowing part company, and one discerns a fatal tendency to regard the Fourfold Root as four roots. This fact shows the inadequacy of Schopenhauer's fundamental epistemological position, which will be discussed later, in the critical portion of this chapter.

tions, assigns their limits of application, and establishes their perceptual genealogy. But conceptions are never 'what is first,' they provide the thinking subject with no new knowledge; far from being the necessary conditions of the possibility of perception, they themselves "receive their content only from the perceptible idea, which is therefore *primary knowledge* (*Urerkenntnis*), and has consequently alone to be taken account of in an investigation of the relation between the ideal and the real."¹ The concept is a vassal in epistemology, lacking all autonomy; you can take out of it only what you first put into it through perception. Schopenhauer follows Hume in demanding of each conception its passport showing a legitimate perceptual ancestry, and regards all self-originating 'rational' concepts as the vain fictions of "the pure self-thinking absolute Idea, the scene of the ballet-dance of the self-moving conceptions,"²—an expression which calls to mind Mr. Bradley's famous turn of the phrase.³

How does this apparently clear and consistent theory of the relation between perception and conception compare with what Schopenhauer regards as Kant's account of the genesis of knowledge?

With his characteristically sharp eye for details, Schopenhauer brings together a list of definitions which apparently show Kant's utter confusion as to what he meant by 'understanding' and by 'reason.' The list is rather long and, in some respects, suggestive. Reason is defined by Kant as the faculty supplying the principles of knowledge *a priori*,⁴ and is as such opposed to the understanding as the faculty of rules,⁵ a distinction which Schopenhauer, properly enough, calls "arbitrary and inadmissible."⁶ Kant, however, calls the understanding not only the faculty of rules,⁷ but also the source of principles,⁸ the "power of producing representations,

¹ G., II, p. 223; H.K., II, p. 401.

² G., III, p. 140; Hillebr., p. 145.

³ *Principles of Logic*, London, 1883, p. 533.

⁴ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 11; M., p. 9.

⁵ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 299; M., p. 243.

⁶ G., I, p. 552; H.K., II, p. 26.

⁷ *Kr. d. r. V.*, pp. 132, 302; M., pp. 108, 245.

⁸ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 158; M., pp. 129-130. There are other abstract distinctions which Kant makes and which Schopenhauer opposes for no obvious reasons. Thus Kant calls mere judging the work of the understanding (*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 69; M., p.

or the spontaneity of knowledge,¹ the faculty of judging,² the faculty of concepts,³ and the faculty of cognitions generally.⁴ Reason, again, is variously described as the faculty of judging mediately,⁵ as the constant condition of all free actions of man,⁶ as the ground of all concepts, opinions, and assertions,⁷ as the faculty which organizes and systematizes conceptions,⁸ as the faculty of deducing the particular from the general,⁹ and so forth.¹⁰

Now, from all this lack of consistency in his terminology, Schopenhauer argues Kant's utter confusion of understanding and reason. This perplexity on Kant's part Schopenhauer finds not difficult to explain, from his own point of view: neither of the two faculties is assigned a definite function, just because Kant failed to recognize their respective spheres of operation. It is in the failure sharply to discriminate between perception and conception that Schopenhauer finds the ground of that "heillosen Vermischung"¹¹ which mars the entire 'Transcendental Logic.' How do perception and conception each affect the genesis of the

57), and reason the faculty of inference (*Kr. d. r. V.*, pp. 303, 330; *M.*, pp. 246, 268). Now Schopenhauer himself regards judging as a sort of bridge between perception and conception (*G.*, I, pp. 108 ff.; *H.K.*, II, pp. 84 ff.; *cf.* also the discussion of Schopenhauer's theory of judgment in Chapter II of this monograph), and inference as the conceptual connection of judgments with each other; so that the Kantian distinction, as interpreted by Schopenhauer, would seem to be not wholly out of accord with his own position. Of course, no such abstract distinction between judgment and inference could be valid for modern logic, which insists with increasing emphasis upon the unitary character of the judgment-process, involving judgment and inference alike. It is therefore hard to see in what respect Schopenhauer's explicit separation of what, as a matter of fact, is inseparable is less open to criticism than Kant's confused and inconsistent distinction, confused because out of harmony with his own fundamentally organic conception of experience.

¹ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 51; *M.*, p. 41.

² *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 69; *M.*, p. 57.

³ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 160; *M.*, p. 130.

⁴ *Kr. d. r. V.*, II Aufl., p. 137; *M.*, p. 749.

⁵ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 330; *M.*, p. 268.

⁶ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 553; *M.*, p. 447.

⁷ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 614; *M.*, p. 494.

⁸ *Kr. d. r. V.*, pp. 634 f.; *M.*, pp. 517 f.

⁹ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 646; *M.*, p. 520.

¹⁰ Note Schopenhauer's failure to recognize here the important Kantian distinction between understanding and reason, as dealing with the conditioned and the unconditioned respectively. This point is taken up for closer consideration in the sequel.

¹¹ *G.*, I, p. 561; *H.K.*, II, p. 35.

object of experience? Kant's answer lacks all consistency: "through the whole of his theory the utter confusion of the idea of perception with the abstract idea tends towards a something between the two which he expounds as the object of knowledge through the understanding and its categories, and calls this knowledge *experience*. It is hard to believe that Kant really figured to himself something fully determined and really distinct in this object of the understanding."¹

To prove his case, Schopenhauer traces through the whole 'Transcendental Logic' Kant's treatment of the understanding as affecting the object of experience. The *Critique of Pure Reason* vacillates, he argues, between regarding the function of the understanding as perceptual and as conceptual. The understanding is called, successively, the faculty of judging, of thinking, of connecting *a priori* and bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception,² and its categories are declared not to be conditions under which objects can be given in intuition.³ And the *Prolegomena* distinguishes understanding, as the faculty of judging, from the senses, to which perception is referred.⁴ All such passages, seeming to argue for the abstractly logical character of the understanding and the mere inexplicable *Gegebenheit* of the perceptible world, are "contradicted in the most glaring manner (*auf das schreiendste*) by the whole of the rest of his doctrine of the understanding, of its categories, and of the possibility of experience as he explains it in the *Transcendental Logic*."⁵ Hence understanding is generally regarded by Kant as the organizing function within perceptual experience itself, which, by means of the categories, the *a priori* indispensable conditions of all possible experience, synthetically combines, connects, orders, and brings to intelligible unity the manifold of sensation, and thus first makes 'Nature,' *i. e.*, organic experience, possible.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Kr. d. r. V.*, pp. 67 ff.; II ed., p. 135; M., pp. 56 ff., 747.

³ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 89; M., p. 74.

⁴ *Prolegomena*, Sections 20, 22.

⁵ G., I, p. 562; H.K., II, p. 36.

⁶ *Kr. d. r. V.*, pp. 79, 94; II Aufl. pp. 126 ff, 135 f., 143 ff., 159 ff.; M., pp. 65 f., 78, 747 f., 752 ff., 762 ff.

Schopenhauer, curiously enough, interprets all such passages as meaning that the understanding is a distinctly perceptual function, as in his own theory of knowledge. But the diametrical opposition between this and the previous manner of treating the understanding, prove to him conclusively the validity of his original contention. He says: "I challenge every one who shares my respect towards Kant to reconcile these contradictions and to show that in his doctrine of the object of experience and the way it is determined by the activity of the understanding and its twelve functions, Kant thought something quite distinct and definite. I am convinced that the contradiction I have pointed out, which extends through the whole Transcendental Logic, is the real reason of the great obscurity of its language."¹ The object of the understanding is really regarded by Kant as neither a perception nor a conception, but as alone making experience possible. This is a "deeply rooted prejudice in Kant, dead to all investigation."² Schopenhauer continues: "It is certainly not the *perceived object*, but through the conception it is added to the perception by thought, as something corresponding to it; and now the perception is experience, and has value and truth, which it thus only receives through the relation to a conception (in diametrical opposition to my exposition, according to which the conception only receives value and truth from the perception)."³

This is the way Schopenhauer reads his Kant. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, he thinks, treats experience as the result of the conceptualizing of the perceptual material, by which process this material of sensation first becomes organized and real. Now he finds perception in no need of such conceptual transformation, for it possesses in itself all the concrete reality that is possible in experience. Thinking owes its whole significance to the perceptual source from which it arises through abstraction. "If we hold firmly to this, the inadmissibility of the assumption becomes evident that the perception of things only obtains reality and becomes experience through the thought of these very things

¹ G., I, pp. 563-564; H.K., II, p. 38.

² G., I, p. 564; H.K., II, p. 39.

³ G., I, pp. 564-565; H.K., II, p. 39.

applying its twelve categories. Rather in perception itself the empirical reality, and consequently experience, is already given; but the perception itself can only come into existence by the application to sensation of the knowledge of the causal nexus, which is the one function of the understanding. Perception is accordingly in reality intellectual, which is just what Kant denies."¹ What, then, is the nature of this Kantian 'object of experience,' particular and yet not in space and time, because not perceptible (thus Schopenhauer), an object of thought, and yet not an abstract conception, at once perceptual and conceptual, yet incapable of being defined in terms of either perception or conception alone?

Schopenhauer thinks that Kant makes a triple division: (1) the idea, (2) the object of the idea, and (3) the thing-in-itself. "The first belongs to the sensibility, which in its case, as in that of sensation, includes the pure forms of perception, space and time. The second belongs to the understanding, which thinks it through its twelve categories. The third lies beyond the possibility of all knowledge."² The confusion seems evident to Schopenhauer: "The illicit introduction of that hybrid, the object of the idea, is the source of Kant's errors,"³ he says. All we have in concrete knowledge and experience is the *Vorstellung*; "if we desire to go beyond this idea, then we arrive at the question as to the thing-in-itself, the answer to which is the theme of my whole work as of all metaphysics in general."⁴ With this epistemological hybrid, *i. e.*, the 'object of the idea,' "the doctrine of the categories as conceptions *a priori* also falls to the ground."⁵ Instead of assuming (as Schopenhauer thinks that Kant assumes) the existence of an intermediate world between the idea and the thing-in-itself, as the sphere of operation of the pure understanding and its twelve categories, Schopenhauer himself repudiates the entire deduction of the categories as fundamentally false, explains causality as the only valid category, and describes this

¹ G., I, p. 566; H.K., II, p. 40.

² G., I, p. 567; H.K., II, p. 41; *Kr. d. r. V.*, pp. 108 f.; M., pp. 89 f.

³ G., I, p. 567; H.K., II, p. 41.

⁴ G., I, pp. 567-568; H.K., II, p. 42.

⁵ G., I, p. 567; H.K., II, pp. 41-42.

as distinctly perceptual in character, thus referring all objective relatedness and organization to the causal space-time union in perception, and distinguishing the latter from the thing-in-itself alone. All objectivity, all real knowledge, is perceptual for Schopenhauer. A conception is a check drawn on the bank of perception: its validity stands or falls with its perceptual deposit; intrinsic reality it has none, though, as an abstraction, it may be of undeniable instrumental service.¹

Schopenhauer's argument is apparently lucid and seems to admit of no variety of interpretations. Does it, however, represent a correspondingly clear understanding of Kant's problem? What is the significance and the value of his interpretation and criticism of the fundamental method of the Critical epistemology?

It should be noted that Schopenhauer does not recognize what, after all, is Kant's real distinction between understanding and reason, the distinction, namely, between understanding as the faculty by which we deal with the conditioned and reason as the faculty which demands the unconditioned. The understanding itself Kant seems to treat in a twofold manner: (1) understanding in the wider sense, as the fundamental principle of objectivity in experience, including within itself the immanently organizing function of the productive imagination; and (2) understanding in the narrower sense, as the faculty of judgment or interpretation, operating primarily through the categories. This distinction is of great importance for the interpretation of Kant's pure concepts of the understanding; and it should be noted that Kant explicitly limits the application of the understanding to finite experience, to the sphere of the conditioned. On the other hand, Kant holds: "It is the peculiar principle of reason (in its logical use) to find for every conditioned knowledge of the understanding the unconditioned, whereby the unity of that knowledge may be completed."² The pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, find their meaning and their sphere of operation in the organic interdependence of

¹Cf., in this connection, Richter's treatment of 'Verstand' and 'Vernunft' as used by Kant and Schopenhauer, *Schopenhauer's Verhältnis zu Kant in seinen Grundzügen*, pp. 144 ff.

²*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 307; M., p. 249.

the different sides of conditioned experience. The concepts of pure reason, on the other hand, or the 'Transcendental Ideas,' as Kant calls them, are explicitly concerned with the unconditioned ground of experience; they refer to "something to which all experience may belong, but which itself can never become an object of experience."¹ In this sense the distinction between pure understanding and pure reason, in Kant's technical procedure, tends to correspond to the distinction between theory of knowledge and theory of reality.²

Whether the spirit of Kant's epistemology does actually necessitate the conception of the unconditioned, and of a corresponding faculty of pure reason to deal with it, is a problem of too weighty a character to be disposed of at the outset, and its solution cannot and need not be undertaken in this chapter. One thing, however, is certain: whether the distinction between the understanding, as the organizing faculty of experience, and reason, as the faculty of the beyond-experiential, is or is not consistent with the fundamental method of the Critical epistemology, the distinction between them as the faculties of perception and conception respectively is surely contrary both to the spirit and to the letter of Kant's procedure. In Kant's view of 'experience,' perception and conception presuppose each other in a way which makes it impossible to define knowledge in terms of either separately.

Returning to Schopenhauer, it is hardly too much to say that his whole argument is specious. The fact that in Kant's admittedly confused way of treating perception and conception he sees nothing but a solemn warning against undue adherence to an ideal of 'architectonic symmetry,' shows how hopelessly he misconceives both the aim and the fundamental trend of Kant's 'Critical' method.³ Kant's 'confusion' of the perceptual and

¹*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 311; *M.*, p. 253. Cf. the introductory sections of the 'Transcendental Dialectic,' especially *Kr. d. r. V.*, pp. 299 ff., 305 ff., 310 ff., 322 ff.; *M.*, pp. 242 ff., 247 ff., 252 ff., 261 ff.

²Kant regards speculative reason, however, as incapable of attaining knowledge of ultimate reality, and therefore he introduces the notion of practical reason. But this problem will more naturally come up for discussion in the sequel.

³Mere textual criticism of Kant's Critiques is sure to lead one astray, unless the fundamental spirit of his philosophy is kept constantly in mind. As Richter

the conceptual in experience is to be regarded, not as the failure to discriminate ultimate differences, but rather as the imperfect realization and the inadequate expression of the underlying essential unity of concrete experience, which cannot be reduced to merely perceptual or conceptual terms. Kant's confusion is the confusion of depths not yet clarified; Schopenhauer's lucidity manifests epistemological shallowness. Later idealism, of course, brought to light much that escaped Kant himself; but Kant was far more nearly right than Schopenhauer when he said: "*Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. . . . The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot think. By their union only can knowledge be produced.*"¹

The fundamental defect of Schopenhauer's epistemology is to be found in his constant endeavor to explain one abstract phase of experience in terms of another, supposedly prior, phase,—really the vice of the older rationalism,—instead of reading both into the organic unity which embraces both and derives its own meaning precisely from such systematization of aspects meaningless in abstract isolation. The relation between the organizing principles of experience is for Kant, not one of formal subsumption, but of organic interdependence. Experience involves both perception and conception, the one as much as the other; its progressive organization consists in the gradual evolution of the two, which unifies them in one concrete process. The perceptual content is essentially meaningful, and the application of the categories brings out what is implicit in it. Schopenhauer's universals are the universals of the old scholastic logic, abstractions which do not exist outside of its text-books and are alien to concrete experience. Conception, in the true Kantian sense, is no mere attenuated perception, but the significant aspect of experience. Conceptions, or, perhaps better, puts it: "Es ist wirklich nicht so schwer, wenn man sich nur an den wörtlichen Text der Kritiken hält, Rationalismus und Empirismus, Dogmatismus (im weitesten Sinne) und Scepticismus, Idealismus und Realismus aus ihnen herauszulesen" (*op. cit.*, pp. 91-92). And again, with special reference to Schopenhauer's procedure: "Kantische Elemente hat Schopenhauer aufgenommen, Kantisch fortgebildet hat er sie nicht" (*op. cit.*, p. 77).

¹*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 51; *M.*, p. 41.

meanings, are involved in experience from the very beginning; they are not merely its abstract *terminus ad quem*, as Schopenhauer would have it.¹ Universality means, not erasure of details and differences, but their gradual organization from a point of view ever growing in catholicity. The progress of knowledge is not from perception to conception, but from less concrete to more concrete organization of both.

¹G., II, p. 55; H.K., II, p. 213.

CHAPTER II.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION IN EXPERIENCE: THE DEDUCTION AND THE REAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CATEGORIES.

Schopenhauer's abstract distinction between perception and conception, and his explanation of our original cognitive experience in exclusively perceptual terms, affect most vitally his technical discussion of Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories. What is the rôle of the categories? What is their function in the genesis of experience? In what respect can we conceive of perceptual knowledge as depending for its very being upon the pure (*i. e.*, for Schopenhauer, empty) abstractions of thought, derived from the classification of judgments as found in the old logic?

Schopenhauer interprets Kant's formal procedure as follows: "Kant's only discovery, which is based upon objective comprehension and the highest human thought, is the *apperçu* that time and space are known by us *a priori*."¹ "Gratified by this happy hit,"² Schopenhauer says, Kant pursued the tactics which he had employed in discovering the pure *a priori* constituents of our unformed sensibility, in order to discover, if possible, the *a priori* basis of the 'empirically obtained' conceptions. A table of pure, logically grounded forms of conception was needed, to correspond to the intuition-forms of space and time. Kant therefore hit upon the table of judgments, "out of which he constructed, as well as he could, the table of categories, the doctrine of twelve pure *a priori* conceptions, which are supposed to be the conditions of our *thinking* those very *things* the *perception* of which is conditioned by the two *a priori* forms of sensibility; thus a *pure understanding* now corresponded symmetrically to a *pure sensibility*."³ To increase the plausibility of his

¹ G., I, p. 572; H.K., II., p. 47.

² *Ibid.*

³ G., I, p. 573; H.K., II. p. 48.

scheme as thus formulated, Kant conceived a way of connecting *a priori* the pure forms of intuition and of understanding. Hence arose the notion of the 'schemata,' or 'monograms of the pure imagination,' which, according to Schopenhauer, represent Kant's attempt to bridge over the chasm between the world of sensibility and the fundamentally disparate world of thought.

One's attitude towards the fundamental objection which Schopenhauer makes to the doctrine of the Schematism depends largely upon one's acceptance or rejection of the separation between perception and thought, between the content and the form of experience. Schopenhauer regards Kant's pure conceptions of the understanding as having no organic relation to perception, hence as incapable of involving any pure schemata or 'monograms of the imagination' corresponding to the representative conceptions or phantasms of empirically grounded thought. That Kant was led into such an illogical position,—instead of demonstrating, as Schopenhauer himself professes to do, the transformation of sensation into perception by means of the causal principle,—Schopenhauer considers sufficiently accounted for by the above psychological explanation of the 'Transcendental Logic.' And he regards this explanation as adequate to refute Kant's treatment of the categories and of the schematism.

As suggested above, Schopenhauer is not incorrect in his analysis of the technical point discussed, but he draws the wrong conclusion from it. In the 'Transcendental Æsthetic' Kant treats space and time as the pure forms of intuition or immediate experience. Hence there is no need of any chapter on the Schematism of the Pure Forms of Sense Intuition. From the point of view of the 'Analytic,' however, the content and the form of experience tend to assume a disparate, if not antithetical, character. The rationalist in Kant looks for principles that shall organize the content of perception, as it were, *ab extra*. As a result, the functions of the pure understanding tend to be presented as formal logical concepts. The error is accentuated by the notion of a definitely fixed number of fundamental functions of pure experience. In consequence of this rationalistic bias,

coupled with an all too evident fondness for abstract symmetry ("alle gute Dinge sind drei"), which Schopenhauer clearly perceives and justly satirizes, a conceptual structure is evolved, which is to condition the possibility of all objective experience and shape the pattern of its formal organization. In his attempt to connect perception with thought, Kant had swung over to the conceptual side to such an extent that he had lost contact with concrete experience. To span this gap in his epistemology, he now proposes the doctrine of the schemata, which are to serve as ladders to let the categories of the pure understanding down to concrete experience.

But this gap was the result of Kant's own too abstract formulation of the doctrine of the categories. The correct solution of the difficulty, therefore, would have been to restate the theory in a more nearly consistent, truly instrumental sense, and thus interpret the categories in their true nature as functions operative in concrete experience, immanently determining its progressive organization,—not to span the artificial gap by a still more artificial bridge. Kant, instead of rectifying his initial error, sought to extricate himself by the inadequate doctrine of the schematism. Schopenhauer, however, draws a different conclusion from Kant's unsuccessful attempt to connect the concepts of the understanding with the *a priori* perceptions. He regards the difficulty resulting from Kant's artificial procedure as fundamental and insuperable. That is to say, for Schopenhauer perception and conception can never be co-ordinate in experience; thought never plays the part of immanent organizer in the knowledge-process.

It must be frankly admitted that Schopenhauer's conclusion is quite natural, if one is satisfied with criticising Kant's artificial treatment and neglecting the deeper implications of his thought. But if modern epistemology is to find any real significance in Kant's treatment of the categories, it must draw a moral far different from Schopenhauer's free and easy one. Instead of arguing from the futility of the schematism the incapacity of thought for immanently determining the organization of experience and thus making its objectivity possible, a correct diagnosis

would locate the trouble in Kant's departing from his own ideal of the organization of experience from within and attempting to explain that organization, as it were, *ab extra*. The deduction of the categories, therefore, should be re-interpreted in the true Kantian spirit, its abstract formalism eliminated, and the immanent character of the organizing principles of experience clearly emphasized. This would obviate the difficulty by showing the irrelevancy and the needlessness of any schemata.

It may seem unnecessary to have insisted so much upon Schopenhauer's illegitimate separation of conception from perception. But the fact is that Schopenhauer himself finds all of Kant's most serious epistemological errors to be due to this one 'inextricable confusion.' Thus he writes at the beginning of his examination of the categories: "That I reject the whole doctrine of the categories, and reckon it among the groundless assumptions with which Kant burdened the theory of knowledge, results from . . . the proof of the contradictions in the Transcendental Logic, which had their ground in the confusion of perception and abstract knowledge. . . ."¹

The abstractions of science, Schopenhauer admits, have the incomparable advantage over mere perception that they enable us to comprehend, within the compass of a few clearly determined and well-defined conceptions, the manifold of phenomenal experience, and to reduce its multifarious connections to uniformities capable of being formulated. Kant's was 'a bold and happy thought,' to isolate the purely conceptual and exhibit its function in the development of abstract knowledge. But, Schopenhauer insists, Kant should have recognized the indirect character of his method. In effect, he says: In seeking the foundation-stones for his edifice of experience in the formal table of judgments, Kant "may be compared to a man who measures the height of a tower by its shadow, while I am like him who applies the measuring-rule directly to the tower itself."² The normal forms of the combinations of conceptions, schematically embodied in the Table of Judgments, are of various origin. Some are derived from the relatedness obtaining in the perceptual world of the

¹G., I, pp. 576-577; H.K., II, p. 52.

²G., I, p. 577; H.K., II, p. 53.

understanding. Others, again, are of hybrid origin, due to the intermixture of perception and conception. But for the most part the judgment-forms are deducible from the nature of reflective knowledge itself, *i. e.*, directly from reason, springing as they do from the *dictum de omni et nullo* and from the four 'metalogical truths' founded on the conditions of all thinking, to wit: the laws of identity and contradiction, and the principles of excluded middle and of sufficient reason.¹

This different origin of the various judgment-forms does not affect their invariably instrumental rôle in the process of experience. Schopenhauer's theory of judgment can apparently be stated in a few words. Judgment is the connecting link between perception and conception, "the power of rightly and accurately carrying over into abstract consciousness what is known in perception," and as such it is "the mediator between understanding and reason."² The erection of conceptual structures upon the ground of manifold perceptions necessitates a coherence of the abstract spheres of reference; and in the same way as the elementary comparison of concepts (the referring of the 'predicate' to the 'subject') yields the various logical judgments,³ just so does inference result from the interconnection of completed judgments.⁴ The judging process itself is essentially reflective. For, while the content of judgment is originally perceptual, "knowledge of perception suffers very nearly as much change when it is taken up into reflection as food when it is taken into the animal organism whose forms and compounds are determined by itself, so that the nature of the food can no longer be recognized from the result they produce."⁵ Only conceptual outlines can enter into the schematic correlations of logical thought. "An *individual idea* cannot be the subject of a judgment, because it is not an abstraction, it is not something thought, but something perceived. Every conception, on the other hand, is essentially universal, and every judgment must have a *con-*

¹ G., III, pp. 125 ff.; Hillebr., pp. 127 ff.

² G., I, p. 108; H.K., I, p. 84.

³ G., I, p. 81; H.K., I, 55.

⁴ G., II, p. 128; H.K., II, p. 295.

⁵ G., I, p. 579; H.K., II, pp. 54 f.

ception as its subject."¹ Explanatory passages of this kind serve to indicate what appears to be Schopenhauer's real theory of judgment. A 'mediator between the perceptual and the conceptual,' he calls it; but its members are abstract concepts, and the entire process involved in their manipulation is a matter of reflection, of reason.

The initial definition of the faculty of judgment might have suggested to a modern logician the possible basis for an organic theory of cognition. In the judging process one witnesses the radiating centre of the various aspects of knowledge, which here fuse into the one unity of concrete thought. But Schopenhauer treats the judgment-members as discrete in character; while he regards the copula as non-significant beyond its function of reference, he nevertheless conceives the process of judgment as the mere comparison of two concept-spheres and their consequent union or separation. The judging process, thus regarded, cannot in any intelligible sense serve as the connecting link of perception and conception, for the simple reason that no process can connect two fundamentally different spheres of reference (as perception and conception are in Schopenhauer's theory), and still remain an organic, unitary whole.

Kant's technical treatment of judgment is unnecessarily abstract, but its implications indicate his deeper realization of the concretely organizing character of the judging process. "All judgments," he writes, "are functions of unity among our representations, the knowledge of an object being brought about, not by an immediate representation, but by a higher one, comprehending this and several others, so that many possible cognitions are collected into one."² This position becomes more adequately defined, and the unitary, dynamic character of the judgment-process more consistently formulated, by later idealism. Hegel's discussion of the matter, in the lesser *Logic*, is most suggestive. In the introductory sections of his 'Doctrine of the Notion', Hegel settles once for all the question of the organic nature of thought and judgment. "It is a mistake to imagine

¹G., II, p. 123; H.K., II, p. 289.

²*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 69; M., p. 57.

that the objects which form the content of our mental ideas come first and that our subjective agency then supervenes, and by the aforesaid operation of abstraction, and by colligating the points possessed in common by the objects, frames notions of them. Rather the notion is the genuine first; and things are what they are through the action of the notion immanent in them, and revealing itself in them."¹ And again, referring more specially to the process of judgment itself, he says: "It is . . . false to speak of a combination of the two sides in a judgment, if we understand by the term 'combination' to imply the independent existence of the combining members apart from the combination. . . . To form a notion of an object means therefore to become aware of its notion: and when we proceed to a criticism or judgment of the object, we are not performing a subjective act, and merely ascribing this or that predicate to the object. We are, on the contrary, observing the object in the specific character imposed by its notion."²

This point of view has become increasingly significant in recent logical theory. Professor Bosanquet, for example, finds in judgment the epitome of the entire procedure of knowledge. The judgment-process is for him the immanent function of cognitive experience. We do not *first* have clearly delimited and defined concepts, which we *then* compare and connect or disjoin as the case may be; the delimiting and defining itself of concepts is accomplished precisely by means of this judging process, and keeps pace with its actual development. The progressive organization of the significant elements in experience corresponds to the technical perfecting of the judgmental procedure. The genesis of judgment is the genesis of organized dynamic experience. Its members are no barren abstractions deprived of all concrete meaning: they are ideas bearing the significant essence of our manifold experience. The true subject of judgment, therefore, is no mere concept: it is invariably reality itself. "The word and its reference—a reference to some continued identity in the world of meanings—are inextricably welded together."³ Judgment and experience, conception and perception, move *pari passu*.

¹ *Logic*, p. 294.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 298, 299.

³ *Logic*, Vol. I, Oxford, 1888, p. 73.

But let us return to Schopenhauer's criticism. The radical fault which he finds with Kant's deduction of the categories is its abstract character. From formal logical materials which afford no glimpse of concrete reality, Kant has fashioned a Table of 'pure concepts,' which he proffers as the functions of organization and necessity, making experience itself possible. Schopenhauer's protest against Kant's abstract formalism is most just; but his own theory of judgment incapacitates him at the very start from indicating the fundamental error; namely, the formal, abstract character of the Table of Judgments from which Kant would derive his organizing principles of experience. This should be borne in mind in the following examination of Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's categories, a criticism which is of paramount significance, although actually leading to conclusions different from those intended by the author.

1. *Quantity*.—Schopenhauer is brief in his account of the Quantity and Quality of judgments, and of the categories which Kant deduces from them. "The so-called *Quantity* of judgments springs from the nature of concepts as such."¹ The inclusion of one concept within another and the relations arising from this process he regards as purely abstract. To his mind, the difference between the universal and the particular judgment is "very slight";² it depends upon the more exact definition of the wider concept (the logical subject) in the judgment called universal. Indeed, to Schopenhauer, the distinction between 'Some trees bear gall-nuts' and 'All oaks bear gall-nuts' is a mere matter of the "richness of the language."³ In place of Kant's three categories, Unity, Plurality, Totality, Schopenhauer proposes two forms of judgment, Totality and Multiplicity, their application depending upon whether the subject-concept is taken in whole or in part. Under Totality he includes the individual judgment: Socrates = all Socrateses.⁴

Schopenhauer's revision of the Quantity of judgments, equating as it does the singular with the universal, represents a way of

¹ G., I, p. 580; H.K., II, p. 56.

² G., I, p. 581; H.K., II, p. 56.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ G., I, p. 610; H.K., II, . 88.

looking at the matter which was not unknown to Kant, but which he attempted to transcend.¹ Kant's endeavor to present Totality as the synthesis of Unity and Plurality, suggests the essentially correct solution of the problem which later Idealism formulated more adequately: Totality is not mere Unity any more than it is mere Plurality, but the concrete synthesis of the two. Schopenhauer's distinction, on the other hand, points to the abstract separation of Unity and Plurality. By the category of Totality Kant sought to express the synthesis of the manifold of differences and the universal significance which pervades them all and makes them fit material for the organizing process of thought.

Nevertheless, it is now evident that the merely quantitative aspect of thought lacks the organic individuality which Kant endeavored to represent by the category of Totality. Looked at from this point of view, Schopenhauer's criticism is not technically incorrect; that is, in the sense that merely quantitative Totality is not the synthesis of Unity and Plurality. But this only suggests the valid objections of modern logic to any arbitrary separation of the qualitative from the quantitative in experience. Every principle of organization derives its own meaning from its interrelations within the whole of experience; and the category of Totality can have the meaning which Kant would ascribe to it only when its synthetic character passes beyond the abstractly quantitative phase of experience and becomes the immanent principle of individuality in concrete experience itself.

2. *Quality*.—The Quality of judgments consists, according to Schopenhauer, in the possibility of uniting and separating the spheres of abstract concepts,² and therefore concerns merely the form and not the content of judgments. The content is perceptual in origin, and Schopenhauer finds both assertion and denial foreign to perception, which is "complete, subject to no doubt or error";³ whereas the quality-form of judgment, affirming or denying the connection of the concept-spheres in question, lies entirely within the province of reason.

¹ Cf. *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 71; *M.*, p. 59.

² Cf. *G.*, I, p. 581; *H.K.*, II, p. 57.

³ *G.*, I, p. 582; *H.K.*, II, p. 57.

The infinite judgment, and the category of Limitation deduced from it by Kant, Schopenhauer summarily rejects as "a crotchet of the old scholastics, an ingenuously invented stop-gap, which does not even require to be explained."¹ This, coupled with his protest against the unreal character of abstract affirmation and denial, is a just criticism of Kant's too formal treatment. Kant does not sufficiently recognize the inseparable character of affirmation and negation, which mutually imply and involve each other. But Schopenhauer, on the other hand, would obliterate the distinction by describing concrete reality as neither affirmed nor denied, but somehow 'being immediately present.' Affirmation and Negation are both relative to the ideal significance of experience from a certain point of view. In every negation an affirmation is implicit; and, conversely, no affirmation is mere abstract assertion but contains negative factors which delimit its sphere of reference. Thus Bradley writes: "We cannot deny without also affirming; and it is of the very last importance, whenever we deny, to get as clear an idea as we can of the positive ground our denial rests on."²

Kant's category of Limitation might well embody this qualitative relativity in experience, which both points to, and explains, its positive-negative polarity. But Kant tends to regard the logical antecedent of the category of Limitation as the infinite judgment, understood as expressing the mere absence of determination, and practically amounting to what logicians have called the 'privative' judgment. The indefinite division of the universe of discourse, by means of an arbitrarily chosen characteristic which provides no adequate basis of distinction, does not yield a new form of judgment, but indeed makes all significant judging impossible. The soul 'as a non-mortal being' (to select Kant's own example³) can be fit material for judgment, only when it is explained as a possible material for thought, by a proper understanding of the significance of mortality and immortality. But it is precisely this lack of understanding of concrete relationship which has suggested an escape from the

¹ G., I, p. 582; H.K., II, p. 58.

² *Principles of Logic*, p. 120.

³ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 72; M., p. 60.

suspense of ignorance into the abstract indefiniteness of the 'infinite' judgment, justly criticised by recent logicians.¹

The synthesis of affirmation and negation is not to be found in their confusion but in their organization. Limitation means, not indefiniteness, of course, but concrete interdependence, and the proper delineation of the sphere of reference. As Bosanquet says, "Exclusion by Privation rests on a conviction, won by persistent lack of affirmation, of the *true* negative limit and external contour of knowledge, which limit, *qua* the true limit, must be held true of reality."² Schopenhauer's rejection of Kant's 'infinite judgment' does not necessarily involve a return to the formal separation between abstract affirmation and negation, as Schopenhauer himself seems to infer. Rather should 'Limitation' be reinterpreted to mean the precise indication of the context which embodies within itself the organization of reality, positive and negative, and gives both their real meaning for experience; in the same way as, from the point of view of Quantity, abstract Unity and abstract Plurality find their basis of union in the concrete Totality of the Individual.

3. *Relation*.—In Kant's view there are three fundamental relations involved in Judgment: (*a*) relation of predicate to subject, connecting two concepts (categorical judgment); (*b*) relation of reason and consequent, involving the logical connection of two judgments, the separate validity of each remaining undetermined (hypothetical judgment); (*c*) relation of subdivided knowledge and of the collected members of the subdivision to each other (disjunctive judgment). In the disjunctive judgment, the relation is one not of consequence but of the logical opposition of mutually exclusive alternatives, on the one hand, and of the community of these alternatives, on the other hand, in that they are complementary, and, taken together, "constitute the whole contents of one given knowledge."³

The categorical judgment, according to Schopenhauer, ex-

¹See in this connection Sigwart, *Logic*, translated by Helen Dendy, Vol. I, London, 1895, pp. 127 ff.; Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, pp. 109 ff.; and especially Bosanquet's treatment of Privation, which seems to me the most suggestive, *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 332 ff.

²*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 339.

³*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 74; *M.*, p. 61; *Cf. Kr. d. r. V.*, pp. 73 ff.; *M.*, pp. 60 ff.

presses "the form of judgment in general, in its strictest sense. For, strictly speaking, judging merely means thinking, the combination of, or impossibility of combining, the spheres of the concepts."¹ But it is a misconception, Schopenhauer says, to explain the subject and predicate of judgment as having a "peculiar and special correlative in perception, substance and accident."² He adds: "I shall show clearly further on that the conception substance has no other true content than that of the conception matter."³ For a discussion of this latter point the reader is referred to the next chapter, where Schopenhauer's theory of Substance is treated at greater length.

The form of the hypothetical judgment expresses the abstract connection of the *ratio cognoscendi*, but its scope of application actually includes the entire world of ideas. The category of causality is only one of the four forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and the causal relation does not, therefore, exhaust the logical implications of the hypothetical in experience, as Kant mistakenly supposes that it does, when he derives from the hypothetical judgment merely the causal category. The hypothetical judgment is for Schopenhauer the logical expression of the dependence obtaining in experience, and formally concerns the dependence of completed judgments upon each other; but this its formal use by no means exhausts its significance.

The disjunctive form of judgment, in a similar way, expresses the incompatibility of judgments with respect to each other. Kant,—basing on the fact that the alternatives in complete disjunction, while being incompatible with and excluding each other, nevertheless, if taken together, exhaust the sphere of reference expressed by the judgment,—deduces from what he calls the 'community' of logical disjunctions the category of Reciprocity. Schopenhauer emphatically denies the validity of the deduction. In real disjunction, he insists, the affirmation of one alternative means the negation of all the rest, hence it could by no means serve as the logical basis of the category of Reciprocity, in which the affirmation of anything involves at

¹G., I, p. 583; H.K., II, p. 59.

²Cf. G., I, pp. 584; H.K., II, p. 60.

³G., I, pp. 584-585; H.K., II, p. 60.

the same time the affirmation of everything else towards which it stands in a 'reciprocal' relation. "Therefore," he says, "unquestionably, the real logical analogue of reciprocity is the vicious circle, for in it, as nominally in the case of reciprocity, what is proved is also the proof, and conversely. And just as logic rejects the vicious circle, so the conception of reciprocity ought to be banished from metaphysics."¹

Thus Schopenhauer proceeds "quite seriously, to prove that there is no reciprocity in the strict sense."² A proper understanding of the nature of causality, as "the law according to which the conditions or states of matter which appear determine their position in time,"³ a law regulating our entire perceptual world, would show clearly, Schopenhauer maintains, the empty, false, and invalid character of the conception of reciprocity. The direction of the causal succession is by no means a matter of indifference. Cause and effect are no vague, interchangeable terms. Cause is precisely the antecedent state of matter *A*, which necessarily evokes the consequent state of matter *B*. The temporal factor is of the very first importance in any causal succession, and this is just what is completely left out of account in the category of Reciprocity. For, in calling the two states *A* and *B* 'reciprocal,' Kant virtually asserts "that both are cause and both are effect of each other; but this really amounts to saying that each of the two is the earlier and also the later; thus it is an absurdity."⁴

Causality and reciprocity are thus incompatible; and, inasmuch as the entire world of perception is a causally connected world, reciprocity is inadmissible as a category of the understanding. In the realm of reason, to be sure, where nothing 'happens,' *e. g.*, in the abstract reasons and consequents of logic and mathematics, reciprocity is the ruling principle precisely *because* there causality as the category of perception is ruled out. Thus, Schopenhauer concludes, the category of Reciprocity is, in the first place, not deducible from the disjunctive judgment,

¹ G., I, p. 585; H.K., II, p. 61.

² G., I, pp. 585-586; H.K., II, pp. 61-62.

³ G., I, p. 586; H.K., II, p. 62.

⁴ G., I, p. 586; H.K., II, pp. 62-63.

but finds its logical counterpart in the vicious circle, and, secondly, it is untenable as a category of the understanding (in Schopenhauer's sense), because it is found to be incompatible with causality and causal succession.

Schopenhauer's attitude towards reciprocity is quite consistent with his interpretation of causality. Having described the perceptual order in exclusively causal terms, and having defined the law of causality itself as meaning nothing more nor less than the dependence of any state of matter *B* upon a preceding state *A* necessarily evoking it, he cannot but draw the logical conclusion that in such a perceptual world, in which such a law of causality holds complete sway, organic interaction in the broad sense, or reciprocity, is inadmissible.

Does it follow, however, that Reciprocity is inadmissible as a category of concrete experience? If the causal category is really to express the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the world of events, if one is to reduce to it all the twelve categories of the understanding, it must itself be conceived in a far broader sense than Schopenhauer allows. Concrete experience is too complex a system to be adequately dealt with from the point of view of 'causality' reduced to terms of mere temporal succession. The unitary character of experience, its essentially organic nature, means just this: that every element, every factor in it, obtains its being and its essence precisely by virtue of its relations to the rest of the system. And these relations are not of mere abstract dependence. The dependence in experience is organic interdependence: the entire process is one of constant give-and-take, a process of progressive organization. The causal category, as Schopenhauer defines it, is a correct enough statement of this interdependence regarded from one particular point of view, and, in its abstract form, it is indispensable for the procedure of physical science, though not necessarily adequate for all purposes even of physical science.¹ But this cannot be used as an argument against the category of reciprocity, for the reason that reciprocity takes a less abstract view of experience than causality does. The category of reciprocity expresses a deeper recognition of the

¹Cf. Bosanquet's pertinent remarks on the conception of 'ground,' as implied in the procedure of physical science. *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 264 ff.

concrete organization of experience; as Hegel puts it, "reciprocal action realises the causal relation in its complete development."¹

Kant's account of reciprocity is far from clear or adequate, but the principle of *interdependence* in the organization of experience is indispensable from the point of view of the Critical method, and, indeed, from the point of view of science. In taking too narrow a point of view, and failing to realize the inevitably instrumental character of all categories, Schopenhauer displays all of Kant's dogmatic tendency and carries Kant's initial error to its logical extreme.

4. *Modality*.—Schopenhauer finds Kant's reasoning much more consistent in the case of the categories of Modality. In contrast to the "willkürlichsten Zwänge"² characterizing the previous 'deductions,' the categories of Modality are really derivable from the forms of judgments corresponding to them. "Thus that it is the conceptions of the possible, the actual, and the necessary which occasion the problematic, assertatory, and apodictic forms of judgment, is perfectly true; but," Schopenhauer continues, "that those conceptions are special, original forms of knowledge of the understanding which cannot be further deduced is not true."³ The knowledge of necessity, Schopenhauer asserts, springs directly from the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the one original form of all knowledge. The conceptions of contingency, possibility, actuality, and impossibility, on the other hand, arise only through the conflict of abstract and intuitive knowledge.⁴ Schopenhauer elucidates his point of view by analyzing the notion of necessity at some length, showing it to be nothing more than the application of the general Principle of Sufficient Reason. "The conception of necessity," he emphatically declares, "contains absolutely nothing more than this dependence, this being established through something else, and this inevitably following from it."⁵ Accordingly, the four forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason manifest the four kinds of necessity in experience: logical, physical, mathematical, and moral.⁶

¹ *Logic*, p. 280.

² G., I, p. 590.

³ G., I, p. 590; H.K., II, p. 66.

⁴ Cf. G., I, p. 590; H.K., II, p. 67.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Cf. G., III, p. 171; Hillebr., p. 182.

One should keep clearly in mind that, while the Principle of Sufficient Reason itself, being a 'metalogical truth,' is axiomatic and incapable of proof, nevertheless everything which comes under its regulation, has its meaning, truth, and reality precisely in reference to something else. Hence, Schopenhauer insists, the thoroughly relative character of all necessity becomes evident. Nothing is necessary in itself, but solely by virtue of something else upon which it depends and in which it finds its meaning. Necessity is thus the general way of expressing this coherence, this multiform organization in experience, of which the Principle of Sufficient Reason is, for Schopenhauer, the most general statement. If once this relative character of necessity is comprehended, the meaning of contingency becomes obvious. Kant's confusion on this point is due to his adherence to the abstract rationalistic notion of the contingent (as that of which the non-existence is possible), opposed, on the one hand, to the necessary (that which cannot possibly not be), and, on the other hand, to the impossible (that which cannot possibly be).¹ This Aristotelian conception of the contingent² in Kant results from "sticking to abstract conceptions without going back to the concrete and perceptible."³ As a matter of fact, contingency is nothing more nor less than the denial of necessity in a particular case, *i. e.*, "absence of the connection expressed by the principle of sufficient reason."⁴

Contingency is relative, just as necessity is relative, and for the same reason. Every thing, every event in the actual world "is always at once necessary and contingent; *necessary* in relation to the *one* condition which is its cause; *contingent* in relation to everything else."⁵ The absolutely contingent would be something out of all relation: a thought as meaningless, Schopenhauer insists, as the absolutely necessary, dependent upon nothing else in particular. In both necessity and contingency the mind turns

¹ Cf. *K. d. r. V.*, II ed., p. 301; M., p. 198; G., I, p. 594; H.K., II, p. 70.

² *Ibid.* Schopenhauer refers here to *De generatione et corruptione*, Lib. II, c.-9 et II.

³ G., I, p. 594; H.K., II, p. 71.

⁴ G., I, p. 591; H.K., II, p. 67.

⁵ G., I, p. 591; H.K., II, p. 68.

back in search of explanation; the necessary and the contingent thus mean merely the relevant and the irrelevant in the process of organization. If one considers merely the given event by itself, merely the effect, without looking for the explanatory cause which necessitates it and makes it contingent with respect to everything else, then one understands the meaning of the immediately existing, the actual, the thing as directly apprehended. The actual in nature, however, is always causally related, hence also necessary here and now. If, on the other hand, the mind abstracts from this 'here' and 'now,' and presents to itself all the laws of nature and thought, physical and metaphysical, *i. e.*, known to us *a posteriori* and *a priori* respectively,¹ then the conception of possibility arises, which means compatibility with our conceptual systems and laws, without reference to any particular time and place. That which is inadmissible even from this abstract point of view, Schopenhauer calls the impossible. This development of the conceptions of necessity, actuality (existence), and possibility, showing as it does their common basis in the one Principle of Sufficient Reason, demonstrates, Schopenhauer asserts, "how entirely groundless is Kant's assumption of three special functions of the understanding for these three conceptions."²

A comparison of this outline of Schopenhauer's conclusions with Kant's summary of his own treatment of the modality of judgments, will illustrate the difference between the two positions. Kant says: "As in this way everything is arranged step by step in the understanding, inasmuch as we begin with judging problematically, then proceed to an assertory acceptation, and finally maintain our proposition as inseparably united with the understanding, that is as necessary and apodictic, we may be allowed to call these three functions of modality so many varieties or momenta of thought."³ The three characteristic stages in the logical progression might well indicate three points of view in the self-organization of experience, and in this sense Kant may be justified in distinguishing three categories of Modality. Never-

¹G., I, p. 592; H.K., II, p. 69.

²G., I, p. 593; H.K., II, p. 69.

³*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 76; M., p. 63.

theless Kant's distinctions are too sharp and abstract: while he suggests a process of logical development in the passage just quoted, he fails to explain the matter adequately and clearly to emphasize the essential interdependence of these 'momenta of thought,' which involve each other in the systematic organization of experience.¹ On the other hand, Schopenhauer is quite unable to realize the organic character of concrete experience, which implies, not the absorption of possibility and actuality into necessity, but their proper correlation in the systematic whole. In his constant tendency to make hard and fast distinctions, to the neglect of the concrete unity of the system of experience, Schopenhauer represents what Hegel called 'the standpoint of the understanding.' As Professor Bosanquet says: "The real prophet of the understanding . . . was Schopenhauer. His treatment of the principle of sufficient reason as at once the fundamental axiom of human science and the innate source of its illusions, forms an ultimate and irreversible criticism on the aspect of intelligence which consists, to sum up its nature in a popular but not inaccurate phrase, in explaining everything by something else—a process which taken by itself is necessarily unending and unsatisfying."²

The constant protest which Schopenhauer makes against "the inadmissibility and utter groundlessness of the assumption of twelve special functions of the understanding,"³ is quite modern in so far as it insists upon the unitary character of the principle of objectivity in experience. The notion of a numerically fixed table of organizing principles conditioning the possibility of experience, is diametrically opposed to any consistently organic theory of knowledge. The desire for 'architectonic symmetry' made Kant oblivious to the fact that concrete experience follows, not the formal classifications of the logician, but its own immanent principles of interdependence. The categories are nothing more nor less than the functions of thought by means of which we can recognize the objectivity or coherence of experience from the

¹ Cf. in this connection Bosanquet's analysis and criticism of Kant's treatment of Modality, *Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 377 ff.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 81-82.

³ G., I, p. 598; H.K., II, p. 75.

various points of view that have proved permanently significant in the development of the special sciences and of the various philosophical disciplines. Every clearly defined point of view from which we can study experience to permanent advantage is itself a category. The exact number of valid categories is thus a matter of vain speculation. The 'roots' of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the categories of experience, are neither twelve, nor four, nor twelve times four; their number is constantly variable and 'their name is legion.' The essentially functional character of the principles by means of which we deal with the concrete organization of experience, when duly recognized, shows the impossibility of any complete enumeration.

The categories, then, are exclusively instrumental in character; their truth is in no sense abstractly fixed and immutable. Kant's conception of their fixedness is but a relic of the 'eternal truths' of the older rationalism. Nothing is more evident in recent theory of knowledge than the tendency to realize the non-static and developing character of all categories. The proof of all principles of organization in science and philosophy, the only test of their validity, is to be found precisely in their ability to organize. Science and philosophy alike are a continuous reconstruction and restatement of categories, a perpetual striving after ever more adequate formulations of the coherence immanent in experience.

It is unfortunate, though not difficult to explain, that Schopenhauer, whose keen criticism of the doctrine of the categories had disclosed so many of its flaws, should have overlooked one of Kant's most questionable distinctions, namely, that which he makes between 'constitutive' and 'regulative' principles. This distinction is employed by Kant with little consistency, although the tendency is to discriminate between: (a) the fundamental forms of intuition, the productive imagination, and the functions of thought, which condition the possibility of all experience and 'constitute' its organization; and (b) the rational assumptions which, while not determining the actual form of experience, serve to rationalize the moral order and the æsthetic judgment. The distinction, otherwise expressed, is between the mechanical

categories of the Understanding, which Kant calls 'constitutive,' and the teleological categories, the postulates of Practical Reason and of the Æsthetic Judgment, which he regards as 'regulative.'¹

The incompatibility of this hard and fast distinction with any interpretation of experience which attempts to do justice to its organic character is amply illustrated in Kant's own technical procedure. The teleological categories are declared to be merely 'regulative,' because not 'constitutive' of experience mechanically considered. But are the mechanical (*i. e.*, 'constitutive') categories constitutive of moral and æsthetic experience? Such considerations, which Kant would have been the last to take lightly, should have warned him of the untenability of a distinction that negates the immanent unity of experience, which is the fundamental postulate of the Critical philosophy.

The 'Transcendental Dialectic' aims to show that the categories are invalid, and, indeed, without significance, if applied beyond the sphere of 'possible experience.' But Kant fails to draw the important, if, to us, fairly obvious conclusion that all categories as such, whether theoretical, practical, or æsthetic, are instrumental and essentially regulative, *i. e.*, that every valid principle is valid only within its specific sphere of application, true (in the complete sense) only from a certain definite point of view. Just because of this purely instrumental significance of all the categories, they lose all meaning if taken out of their proper context. And this is the real significance of the 'Transcendental Dialectic': it shows the futility of confusing the various aspects of experience with each other, and the necessity of rejecting all 'transcendent' principles of explanation as incompatible with the Critical theory of experience.

The elucidation and justification of this contention will be the object of discussion in the next chapter.

¹ Regarding this whole problem, *cf.* Professor Albee's article on "The Significance of Methodological Principles," in *The Philosophical Review*, 1906, pp. 267-276, esp. pp. 270 ff.

CHAPTER III.

THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF EXPERIENCE: TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.

The real distinction between Understanding and Reason which Kant makes in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and which he substantially maintains throughout the 'Dialectic', is the distinction between understanding as the faculty which deals with the conditioned and reason as the faculty which demands the unconditioned. Although, as already observed in Chapter I,¹ Schopenhauer does not at first explicitly recognize this, Kant's real distinction between understanding and reason, nevertheless, in his examination of the 'Transcendental Dialectic,' he attempts to account for the origin of the notion of the unconditioned and to point out its rôle in Kant's philosophy. "It is the peculiar principle of reason (in its logical use)," Kant says, "to find for every conditioned knowledge of the understanding the unconditioned, whereby the unity of that knowledge may be completed."² Now Schopenhauer insists that the whole plausibility of Kant's conception is due to its abstractness. Kant's argument is summarized by Schopenhauer as follows: "If the conditioned is given, the totality of its conditions must also be given, and therefore also the *unconditioned*, through which alone that totality becomes complete."³ But, Schopenhauer argues, this 'totality of the conditions of everything conditioned' is contained in its nearest ground or reason from which it directly proceeds, and which is only thus a *sufficient* reason or ground.⁴ In the alternating series of conditioned and conditioning states, "as each link is laid aside the chain is broken, and the claim of the principle of sufficient reason entirely satisfied, it arises anew because the condition becomes the conditioned."⁵ This is the actual *modus*

¹Cf. above, pp. 14 ff., 19 ff.

²*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 307; *M.*, p. 249.

³*G.*, I, p. 612; *H.K.*, II, pp. 90-91.

⁴Cf., *G.*, I, pp. 613-614; *H.K.*, II, p. 92.

⁵*G.*, I, p. 614; *H.K.*, II, p. 92.

operandi of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. "Only through an arbitrary abstraction," Schopenhauer says, "is a series of causes and effects regarded as a series of causes alone, which exists merely on account of the last effect, and is therefore demanded as its *sufficient* reason."¹

The unconditioned is unthinkable; and Kant himself, of course, does not claim objective validity for the conception. He does, however, regard the demand of reason for the unconditioned as a regulative principle, "subjectively necessary."² The employment of reason in this sense, as the faculty which demands the unconditioned, offers Kant a great opportunity for satisfying his ideal of 'architectonic symmetry.' Corresponding to the three categories of relation, Kant finds three syntheses of reason, each of which yields a special unconditioned: "First, the *unconditioned* of the *categorical* synthesis in a subject; secondly, the *unconditioned* of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, the *unconditioned* of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts of a system."³ The 'Dialectic' is thus divided by Kant into three parts, dealing respectively with the refutation of rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. Now, while it is doubtless true that these are "the three principal subjects round which the whole of philosophy under the influence of Christianity, from the Scholastics down to Christian Wolff, has turned,"⁴ Schopenhauer counts it an error on the part of Kant that he accepts without question these 'transcendental ideas' as the product of the essential nature of reason, instead of recognizing them for what they really are, the artifacts of scholastic theology. An historical investigation into the rise and extent of theistic belief, Schopenhauer maintains, would have shown Kant its actual rôle in philosophical thought, and would have indicated the artificiality of these so-called 'transcendental ideas.' As it is, Kant is now involved in "an unfortunate necessity . . . in that he makes these three conceptions spring necessarily from the nature of reason, and yet explains that they are untenable

¹ G., I, p. 614; H.K., II, pp. 92-93.

² G., I, p. 616; H.K., II, p. 95.

³ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 323; M., p. 262.

⁴ G., I, p. 618; H.K., II, p. 97.

and unverifiable by the reason, and thus makes the reason itself a sophisticator."¹

The real value and significance of Schopenhauer's rejection of the unconditioned can be better appreciated after an examination of his detailed criticism of the 'Transcendental Dialectic.' Before proceeding to this, however, mention should be made of a technical point which Schopenhauer raises in criticising Kant's use of the term 'Idea.'

Schopenhauer is doubtless right in holding that Kant's use of the term 'Idea' is essentially different from Plato's. By his 'Ideas' Plato sought to represent the unchanging, the permanent behind this our world of fleeting shadows. He regarded the 'Ideas' as the archetypes of our multiform experience, speculative and mathematical as well as practical. Kant, however, seizing upon the 'transcendent' character of the 'Ideas,' employs the term to denote his own practical 'as ifs.' But the potential perceptibility of the Platonic 'Idea' is incompatible with the meaning which Kant reads into Plato's doctrine, and in so far Schopenhauer's criticism is quite just.

This, however, does not mean that Schopenhauer's own conception of the Platonic 'Idea,' as developed in Book III of *The World as Will and Idea*, is true to the spirit of the original Platonic doctrine. If Kant unduly emphasizes the non-empirical character of the 'Ideas,' to support his own doctrine of teleological postulates, Schopenhauer, in a similarly abstract way, makes use of their archetypal character of permanence and their potential perceptibility, in order to secure the prestige of a great name in support of his endeavor to span the chasm between his two worlds of Idea and Will by means of his Theory of Art. Neither Kant's nor Schopenhauer's use of the term 'Idea' contributes in any real sense to the actual historical criticism of Plato's doctrine, although their interpretations of the term are of undeniable significance for the understanding of their own respective systems.

I. *Rational Psychology*.—Schopenhauer admits that Kant's refutation of rational psychology "has as a whole very great merit and much truth."² But he criticises Kant for neglecting

¹G., I, p. 620; H.K., II, p. 99.

²G., I, p. 621; H.K., II, p. 100.

the historical origin of the notion of the soul, in order to deduce it, for the sake of 'architectonic symmetry,' from the paralogism of substantiality, "by applying the demand for the unconditioned to the conception of *substance*, which is the first category of relation."¹

As a matter of fact, Schopenhauer says, the actual proof is based upon a pure intuition of time. The succession of time, Kant argues, is unintelligible without the assumption of an underlying permanent; change involves the changeless: "Substances, therefore (as phenomena) are the true substrata of all determinations of time."² Now "it is false," Schopenhauer says, "that in mere time there is *simultaneity* and *duration*; these ideas only arise from the union of *space* with time."³ Kant's assumption of a permanent in time through all change is a complete misconception; "a permanent time is a contradiction."⁴ Moreover, the law of causality, the principle of change, can in no way arise out of the notion of mere succession in time, as Kant endeavors to show in the 'Second Analogy.' Temporal succession need not necessarily be causal succession; phenomena may follow one another without following from one another.⁵ Kant seems to reverse Hume's conclusion by tending to identify sequence with consequence; such a view Schopenhauer finds little better than the Scholastic *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. In order that mere temporal succession may be transformed into causal connection, a union of sequence in time with permanence in space is necessary. The causal law cannot be deduced from anything else; it is merely the *a priori* certainty that we have of necessary connection in our perceptual world, which makes us ever seek the cause accounting for any perceived effect.

It is the perception of connected changes, viewed in the light of causality, which raises the question of a permanent bearer of all changes; that is, what Schopenhauer calls 'causality objectified,' 'matter.' That which in perceptual experience appears

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 188; *M.*, p. 154.

³ *G.*, I, p. 601; *H.K.*, II, p. 78.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Cf. G.*, III, p. 107; *Hillebr.*, p. 106.

as a chain of causally connected changes, when regarded from the point of view of its permanence, is what Schopenhauer calls 'matter.' He would not be understood as upholding the old doctrine of a hypothetical Substance behind experience; that is precisely the view which he combats. "Matter is never known otherwise than as producing effects, *i. e.*, as through and through causality; to be and to act are with it one, which is indeed signified by the word *actuality*."¹ In the space-time union of the perceptual order, 'causality' represents the connected sequence of changing states, that is to say, the temporal element; 'matter,' the permanent, abiding essence of the changing properties, *i. e.*, the spatial element. This shows plainly that the conception of the permanent is contributed by space, but only in its union with time. "Intimate union of space and time—causality, matter, actuality—are thus one, and the subjective correlative of this one is the understanding."²

Schopenhauer's conception of matter has been considered in this connection, partly because it leads to his view of the groundless character of the idea of soul as immaterial substance. He asks the reader to bear in mind the fact that matter derives all its real meaning from its relation to the causal order. By itself, therefore, and apart from its action in causality, matter can only be thought *in abstracto*, in conception. Now, Schopenhauer argues, from this notion of matter, when thus abstractly regarded by itself, 'substance,' hypothetically a higher genus, is abstracted by means of retaining its one predicate of permanence and ignoring its other essential attributes, *i. e.*, extension, impenetrability, divisibility, etc. Moreover, "like every higher *genus* . . . the concept *substance* contains *less in itself* than the concept *matter*, but, unlike every other higher *genus*, it does not contain *more under it*, because it does not include several lower *genera* besides matter; but this remains the one true species of the concept *substance*, the only assignable thing by which its content is realized and receives a proof."³ The real motive for this needless abstraction, however, is not far to seek. Just because

¹ G., I, p. 602; H.K., II, p. 79.

² *Ibid.*

³ G., I, p. 624; H.K., II, p. 103.

the genus 'substance' was framed, not by means of a legitimate abstraction from several lower genera, but by means of the arbitrary isolation of the characteristic of permanence of its one and only sub-species, 'matter,' a second species can now be co-ordinated with 'matter' under the concept 'substance,' *i. e.*, "the immaterial, simple, indestructible substance, soul."¹ The arbitrary and artificial character of the whole procedure seems quite obvious to Schopenhauer. The new species is obtained by the express denial of precisely those characteristics which had been tacitly omitted in the 'abstraction' of the concept 'substance' from its one valid sub-species, 'matter.' Thus the notion of the soul is shown to be "an exceedingly superfluous concept, because its only true content lies already in the concept of matter, besides which it contains only a great void, which can be filled up by nothing but the illicitly introduced species *immaterial substance*."²

Schopenhauer, accordingly, does not even discuss Kant's reasoning in the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason'; he regards his own account of the origin of the concept 'soul' proof positive that it cannot be employed legitimately in philosophy. Along with the notion of immaterial substance, therefore, "the concept substance must be entirely rejected, and the concept matter everywhere put in its place."³

This, then, is Schopenhauer's account of the real significance of 'Substance' in experience. And, while recent epistemology must take exception to many of the conclusions which Schopenhauer (in his more materialistic moments, in *The Will in Nature* and in the 'Supplements' to Book II of *The World as Will and Idea*) draws regarding the metaphysical rôle of matter in the genesis of knowledge, it must be admitted that his general conception of matter, as the permanence implied in the causal order, is, on the whole, well grounded. It rightly emphasizes the inseparable union of space and time in the world of perception, and insists upon the concreteness of causal connection. Its validity as a basis for criticism of Kant's account of causality

¹ *Ibid.*

² G., I, p. 625; H.K., II, p. 104.

³ *Ibid.*

depends to a large extent upon one's interpretation of Kant's real meaning. Kant's endeavor to treat causality in terms of objective succession may plausibly be interpreted and criticised as Schopenhauer interprets and criticises it; or, again, it may be viewed differently, more in harmony with the real spirit of the Critical method, as a recognition of the deeper significance of causality, by regarding it as the typical expression of the all-permeating coherence and objectivity immanent in all experience.

Regarding the status of the notion of 'substance' in philosophy, one thing is certain: 'substance' is emphatically not admissible in its old dogmatic sense of a transcendent substratum existent behind experience. Such a hypostatized abstraction is not only of no instrumental value for philosophy, but it makes impossible any consistent theory which shall do justice to the organic character of experience. For the more recent idealistic epistemology, experience is one and undivided, and its principles both of unity and of permanence must be in terms of itself; otherwise a dualism is unavoidable, with all its insoluble problems and hopeless surds. Schopenhauer, then, holding as he does that 'substance' is one and immanent in concrete experience, seems justified in refusing even an audience to the illegitimate concept of the immaterial soul, to which Kant devotes a whole chapter of his 'Transcendental Dialectic.'

Is Schopenhauer's own position, however, equally defensible, when he identifies his one Substance with Matter? This identification of Substance with the hypothetically permanent in physical causation involves a tendency towards a materialistic interpretation of experience; it means ignoring for the time the abiding character of the rational elements in experience. If the principle of permanence is to be immanent and unitary, experience itself must be regarded as one and undivided. The correct solution must lie in the opposite direction from the one Schopenhauer follows. The unitary character of substance can be an instrumentally valid conception only for an epistemology which recognizes its one Reality in the all-embracing, coherent, intelligible experience, in which every element is a factor in a self-perpetuating process of organization, and contributes to the permanent significance of the absolute whole.

II. *Rational Cosmology: Antinomy of Pure Reason.*—The idea of the soul was technically deduced by Kant from the categorical syllogism, but only through the most artificial manipulation. In the case of the 'Antinomy of Pure Reason,' however, Schopenhauer finds no such violence necessary, in order to discover the logical basis of the "dogmatic ideas concerning the universe, as far as it is thought as an object in itself, between two limits—that of the smallest (atom), and that of the largest (limits of the universe in time and space)."¹ These do really proceed from the hypothetical syllogism. For, as Schopenhauer says, "in accordance with that principle, the mere dependence of an object upon another is ever sought for, till finally the exhaustion of the imagination puts an end to the journey,"² and thus the real character of the Principle of Sufficient Reason is forgotten, namely, its necessary restriction to the world of representations. The 'transcendental ideas' of the hypostatized universe, therefore, do actually find their source in this application,—or rather misapplication,—of the hypothetical judgment, the logical form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

But "so much the more is sophistry required," Schopenhauer asserts, "in order to classify those Ideas according to the four titles of the categories."³ Thus he sees no reason why the 'Cosmological Ideas' concerning the limits of the world in space and time should be classed under 'quantity,' which denotes nothing more than the extent of inclusion of the subject-concept in the judgment. Even less justified is the arbitrary linking of the idea of 'matter' to 'quality.' For the notion of the divisibility of matter, Schopenhauer holds, not only has nothing to do with 'quality,' but does not even spring from the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The relation of parts to the whole, which is the real meaning of the second Cosmological Idea, is based upon the 'metalogical principle' of contradiction; for "the whole is not through the parts, nor the parts through the whole, but both are necessarily together because they are one, and their separation is only an arbitrary act."⁴ The relation of parts to the whole is

¹ G., I, p. 625; H.K., II, p. 104.

² G., I, p. 625; H.K., II, p. 105.

³ G., I, p. 626; H.K., II, p. 105.

⁴ G., I, pp. 626-627; H.K., II, p. 106.

thus one of mutual implication, not one of dependence, of reason and consequent. But Kant neglects this obvious fact; "such great difficulties are here overcome by the love of symmetry."¹ The idea of a First Cause, connected as it is with the category of causality, would naturally come under the rubric of 'relation.' But Kant assigns this to 'modality,' by making use of the 'totality of that series,' to transform the contingent, the accidental, into the necessary,² a procedure which perverts the whole meaning of 'contingent' and 'necessary,' as Schopenhauer uses these terms. For Kant's meaning becomes intelligible only when, regarding the hypothetical series as absolutely complete, we are forced to admit that everything must be in some way necessarily connected within the whole. But under such arbitrary conditions necessity and contingency alike become meaningless, and we could with perfect right reverse Kant's conclusion and say that in the 'absolute completeness of the series' everything necessary becomes contingent; and both statements would be equally meaningless. For necessity and contingency are complementary conceptions; contingency means nothing more nor less than the absence of definite dependence between two particular states in a system which is affirmed in the very notion of necessity. This is the simple meaning of necessity and contingency when applied to the empirical world, and no absolute completion of any series can identify the two conceptions.

Schopenhauer is right in insisting upon the complementary character of necessity and contingency as applied to the world of experience. Kant connects the Idea of First Cause and absolute necessity with modality by postulating the existence of a hypostatized 'complete system,' which would make the very conception of necessity meaningless. Necessity and contingency alike have significance only for coherent, dynamic experience. In taking his stand, therefore, on the inevitable distinction between the necessary and the contingent in finite experience, and in opposing Kant's transcendent transformation of the contingent into the necessary, Schopenhauer justly combats an untenable position.

¹G., I, p. 627; H.K., II, p. 106.

²Cf. *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 415; *M.*, p. 335.

"About all this, however," he says, "I find and assert that the whole antinomy is a mere delusion, a sham fight."¹ Only the antitheses remain consistently on the objective basis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The theses, on the contrary, in all four conflicts, are mere subjective assertions, resting solely upon "the weakness of the reasoning individual,"² or rather, upon the indolence of his imagination, seeking to put an end to an endless regressus. "The proof of the thesis in all the four conflicts is throughout a mere sophism, while that of the antithesis is a necessary inference of the reason from the laws of the world as idea known to us *a priori*."³ Kant succeeds in maintaining the appearance of a real conflict and a balanced antinomy in each case by the constant artifice of not showing clearly the *nervus argumentationis*, but rather confusing and complicating the argument by means of "a mass of superfluous and prolix sentences."⁴

Whether this view of the utter groundlessness of the four theses, and the consequent absence of any real antinomy, is tenable or not, can best be determined by a detailed analysis of the line of argument followed by Kant. "I assume," Schopenhauer says, "that in this examination the reader has always before him the Kantian antinomy itself,"⁵—a suggestion which may also prove helpful to the reader of the present monograph.

1. *Antinomy of Space and Time*.—In the first conflict, Schopenhauer says, the thesis, 'The world has a beginning in time and is limited with regard to space,' avoids the point at issue by a mere sophism. For, first, with regard to time, its proof applies equally well to a beginning in time and to a beginning of time, which is absurd.⁶ Again, instead of arguing against the impossibility of beginning the series of states constituting the world, it suddenly turns its proof against the conception of the endlessness (infinity) of the series; and this it shows to be incompatible with the fixed completeness of the series, which it

¹ G., I, p. 627; H.K., II, p. 107. Cf. *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 430; M., p. 346.

² G., I, p. 627; H.K., II, p. 107.

³ G., I, pp. 627-628; H.K., II, p. 107.

⁴ G., I, p. 628; H.K., II, p. 107.

⁵ G., I, p. 628; H.K., II, p. 108.

⁶ Cf. G., IV, p. 125.

takes for granted. The antithesis, however, shows that an absolute beginning of the world in time presupposes an antecedent empty time in which, it is argued, no existence can possibly have its beginning. And against this proof of the antithesis nothing whatever is advanced by the thesis. An absolute end, Schopenhauer asserts, is thinkable, but not an absolute beginning. The causal law "affords us *a priori* the certainty that no occupied time can ever be bounded by a previous empty time, and that no change can be the first change."¹ In assuming the completeness of the world as a given whole, the thesis begs the question. Thus it shows that "in order . . . to conceive the world, which fills all space, as a whole,"² we must consider it as spatially limited. But the totality of the world, in such a sense of the term 'totality,' is just what was to be proved; the rest follows logically enough. "Totality presupposes limits, and limits presuppose totality; but here both together are arbitrarily presupposed."³ Inasmuch as the causal law applies to changes in time only, it cannot prove *a priori* the incompatibility of occupied and empty space. But the mind cannot conceive of any possible relation between the two. In other words, in the case of both time and space, the antithesis proceeds on the basis of the actual world of perceptual experience, whereas the thesis assumes throughout the given 'totality' of the world, which latter is the very point at issue.

2. *Antinomy of Matter*.—In a similar way, Schopenhauer says, in the second conflict "the thesis is at once guilty of a very palpable *petitio principii*."⁴ It starts by assuming a compound substance, from the compoundness of which it proves the necessity of simple parts without any difficulty. But, he argues, the point to be proved is just this, that all matter is compound. For "the opposite of simple is not compound, but extended, that which has parts and is divisible."⁵ The thesis fails to note that the relation of parts and whole is nowise temporal, and asserts

¹ G., I, p. 630; H.K., II, p. 109.

² *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 428; M., p. 346.

³ G., I, p. 629; H.K., II, p. 109.

⁴ G., I, p. 631; H.K., II, 110.

⁵ *Ibid.*

the existence of the parts as in some sense preceding the whole; for this is the very meaning of compoundness, which asserts the existence of the parts *a parte ante*. Hence the thesis, if it is to prove its case, must show that there is necessarily a limit to the divisibility of matter. Thus, Schopenhauer insists, the arguments of the thesis evade the problem and do not even touch the proofs of the antithesis. "The infinite divisibility of matter, which the antithesis asserts, follows *a priori* and incontrovertibly from that of space, which it fills."¹ Kant says in his observations on the thesis: "we ought not to call space a compositum, but a totum."² This, Schopenhauer thinks, "holds good absolutely of matter also, which is simply space become perceptible."³ This is the real force of the antithesis: its proof rests on its realization of the concrete character of matter. In his effort to make the conflict appear as real as possible, Schopenhauer says, Kant "spoils the proof of the antithesis by the greatest obscurity of style and useless accumulation of words, with the cunning intention that the evidence of the antithesis shall not throw the sophisms of the thesis too much in the shade."⁴

Kant's 'Critical Solution' attempts to maintain the balance in the antinomies by taking sides with neither thesis nor antithesis, but, ostensibly substituting for the dogmatic *aut-ant* of the alternatives in the first two conflicts a *nec-nec*,⁵ condemning both as inadequate. As a matter of fact, however, Schopenhauer finds that the verdict is "really the confirmation of the antitheses by the explanation of their assertions."⁶ Thus, Kant's view that both theses and antitheses depend upon the dialectical argument that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions is also given, is obviously erroneous. This is assumed only by the thesis, and is exactly what the antithesis opposes, starting as it does on the basis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which is concerned only with connected conditioned and condition-

¹G., I, p. 631; H.K., II, p. 111.

²*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 438; M., p. 356.

³G., I, p. 631; H.K., II, p. 111.

⁴G., I, pp. 631-632; H.K., II, p. 111.

⁵*Cf.* Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, translated by J. E. Creighton and A. Lefevre, New York, 1902, pp. 217 ff.

⁶G., I, p. 634; H.K., II, p. 114.

ing states, and not with the series of conditions. Again, it is only the thesis that, in assuming a world in space and time, mistakenly conceives space and time as existent by themselves, and makes "the false assumption of a self-existent universe, *i. e.*, a universe given prior to all knowledge, and to which knowledge came as to something external to itself."¹ Kant's solution,—the world is neither finite nor infinite in time and space, because time and space have no meaning for the world as a whole,—does not controvert the proofs of the antithesis in the least. For the antithesis maintains that in the world with which it concerns itself, the spatial-temporal world of knowledge, no limits of time and space can be postulated; and the conclusion of Kant's own solution follows directly from this: "The infinity of the world is only *through* the regressus, not *before* it."² Thus it is seen that the antithesis does not assert, as Kant claims that it does, an infinity apart from the progress of experience, but merely refuses to admit that the progress can at any point come to an absolute stop.

The same criticism applies to the second conflict. It is the thesis that, in asserting the compoundness of substance (matter), ignores the reciprocal relation of parts and whole. The antithesis, on the other hand, in refusing to admit any limit to the divisibility of matter, simply recognizes its concrete character *in* the process of experience, and is fully conscious of the inseparableness of matter from space. When Kant maintains that "none but sensuous conditions can enter into the mathematical connection of the series of phenomena,"³ he is but re-affirming the contention of the antithesis, which is concerned throughout with the world of representations. "Indeed," Schopenhauer concludes, "if, reversing the procedure, we take as the starting-point what Kant gives as the solution of the conflict, the assertion of the antithesis follows exactly from it."⁴

This attempt to vindicate the antitheses of the several antinomies is of considerable significance in that it illustrates the

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Cf. G.*, I, p. 635; *H.K.*, II, p. 115.

³ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 530; *M.*, p. 430.

⁴ *G.*, I, p. 636; *H.K.*, II, pp. 115-116.

general character of Schopenhauer's own philosophical attitude no less than of his criticism of Kant. He seems correct in the main in his interpretation of the first two Antinomies and their solution, *i. e.*, in claiming that the assertions of the theses are utterly untenable, whereas the proofs of the antitheses are valid so far as they go. If taken in the negative sense of merely refusing to admit in the world of representations laws other than those resting on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the position represented by the antitheses is not open to attack. The vindication of the antitheses in the Antinomies would not call for criticism, if it were confined to the mere re-affirmation of the validity of the mechanical categories in experience physically considered. But it means more than that. It means the surrender of the entire world of possible experience to the mechanical categories; and in this respect Kant's 'Critical Solution' does actually lead him to the same conclusion that Schopenhauer draws from a thoroughgoing acceptance of the antitheses. Space and time are indisputably essential aspects of experience. The objectivity of the causal process, which necessitates and is actualized in the conception of matter, is fundamental to any intelligible view of our world, and is a ground of its coherence. But space, time, and matter all become meaningless, if we lose sight of the all-embracing character of the experience of which they are aspects. Space is real for experience, but it does not exhaust the reality of experience. Time is indispensable to dynamic, objective experience, but objectivity cannot be expressed in terms of time alone. The spatial-temporal factors of experience are subject to laws which cannot be set aside at pleasure; but experience is more than *merely* spatial-temporal, and its other aspects manifest uniformities which may require their own special principles of explanation.

Experience is an organic system, and no one of its significant aspects can be persistently ignored without wrecking the entire structure of knowledge. This does not mean that all phases of experience are of equal 'reality,' from the point of view of philosophy, and that time, space, and matter are no more and no less 'real' than any other aspects of experience. The degree

of reality of any phase or factor of experience must be determined in terms of its significance for the whole of experience considered in the light of its immanent organization. But this point of view is only one way of regarding the problem of philosophy. Here it is merely insisted that space, time, and matter, fundamental factors though they are in the progressive organization of experience, do not exhaust its significance. The antitheses, as Schopenhauer interprets them, refuse to admit the tenability of any philosophical theory which treats space, time, and matter in a transcendent way, out of their interrelation within concrete experience. But precisely for that reason it is philosophically inadmissible to regard space, time, and matter out of their context by ignoring other aspects of experience.

3. *Antinomies of Causality*.—The third and fourth antinomies, Schopenhauer thinks, differ only in their external form; at bottom they both concern the possibility of an unconditioned First Cause, and are thus essentially tautological.¹

The real point at issue is this: Are all changes in the world of phenomena explainable only in terms of causality, and therefore conditioned in nature according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason; or does causality presuppose the unconditioned? The thesis of the third antinomy Schopenhauer characterizes as "a very fine sophism."² It starts, correctly enough, by arguing that a cause is adequate only when it completely accounts for its consequent effect. But then it proceeds to substitute, for the completeness of the determining conditions present together in the production of a concrete effect, the completeness of the chain of causes of which the state in question presumably forms the last link. And, inasmuch as its abstract conception of completeness involves the notion of a closed system, and that, again, implies finiteness, "the argument infers from this a first cause, closing the series and therefore unconditioned."³

But "die Taschenspielererei liegt am Tage,"⁴ as Schopenhauer puts it. For the causal law means nothing more than this: that

¹ G., I, p. 633; H.K., II, p. 113.

² G., I, p. 632; H.K., II, p. 111.

³ G., I, p. 632; H.K., II, p. 112.

⁴ *Ibid.*

for every state *B*, in the world of experience, an adequate antecedent state *A* must be presupposed, which conditions it necessarily and completely. This exhausts the demand of the causal law in each specific case. The question as to how the 'cause' *A* itself came about is irrelevant to the problem raised by the consideration of state *B*; that question can concern the law of causality only when we turn to *A*, and, regarding it no longer as the conditioning cause of *B*, but as itself an effect, a conditioned state, demand an explanation of it in causal terms. The Principle of Sufficient Reason of 'becoming' proceeds throughout *from* the conditioned effect *to* the conditioning cause. It can never be used to trace chains of causes, because it can never start with a cause as such.

The successive alternation of effects and causes in the causal series is complete only in reference to the process of tracing the connection of causal dependence, and is thus inseparable from the progress of perceptual knowledge. Hence any theory of a finite causal series assumes an arbitrary cessation of the law of causality at some one point, and is due only to "the laziness of the speculating individual."¹ This, Schopenhauer argues, is the sum and substance of the law of causality, and it expresses the real argument of the antitheses, in spite of the confused language in which the latter are couched. Schopenhauer insists throughout that the Principle of Sufficient Reason in general and the law of causality in particular apply only to concrete dependence in the world of phenomena, and distinctly not to the universe taken as a hypostatized whole. The assumptions of "a primary beginning,"² "*absolute spontaneity* of causes,"³ "necessity of a first beginning of a series of phenomena from freedom . . . so far only as it is necessary in order to comprehend an origin of the world,"⁴ are all incompatible with the fundamental meaning of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

In his 'Critical Solution' of the two antinomies of causality, Kant attempts to show the partial truth of both thesis and

¹G., I, p. 633; H.K., II, p. 112.

²*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 446; M., p. 362.

³*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 446; M., p. 364.

⁴*Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 448; M., p. 366.

antithesis; but his attempt is necessarily futile. The arguments of thesis and antithesis alike concern, not any transcendent world of things-in-themselves, but only the phenomenal, the objective World as Idea. The whole force of the thesis is directed to prove that the phenomenal world itself involves unconditioned causes, and this is precisely what the antithesis denies. This is explicitly stated in the fourth conflict: the thesis demands something absolutely necessary, which nevertheless "belongs itself to the world of sense,"¹ and is "contained in the world."² The causality of freedom, the validity of which the thesis seeks to prove in the third antinomy, is no transcendent matter, but is merely the spontaneous originating of a series, which thenceforward is to operate "according to mere laws of nature."³ And it is precisely against this doctrine of the arbitrary violability of the causal law in the empirical world that the antithesis directs its proofs, depending as it does throughout upon the explicitly phenomenal Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Kant's theory of freedom, therefore, in so far as it concerns the thing-in-itself, is entirely irrelevant in this connection. For the relation of the intelligible to the empirical character, Schopenhauer insists, is nowise a causal relation, but passes beyond the phenomenal world and raises the fundamental metaphysical problem of the thing-in-itself. In so far as it concerns the present issue, however, that theory also affirms the argument of the antithesis. For, in Kant's 'Critical Solution,' it is argued that *in the phenomenal world* causality is supreme; the empirical character of man is unalterably determined. Hence man can by no means originate a causal series in the world of nature. Freedom is the principle of explanation of the world itself, which (for Schopenhauer) is in itself a manifestation of Will. But in the world,—and this is the point at issue here,—"*in the world* causality is the sole principle of explanation, and everything happens simply according to the laws of nature."⁴ Thus, Schopenhauer concludes, "the right lies entirely on the side of the antithesis,

¹ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 452; *M.*, p. 370.

² *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 454; *M.*, p. 372.

³ *Kr. d. r. V.*, p. 448; *M.*, p. 366.

⁴ *G.*, I, p. 644; *H.K.*, II, p. 124.

which sticks to the question in hand, and uses the principle of explanation which is valid with regard to it; therefore it needs no apology. The thesis, on the other hand, is supposed to be got out of the matter by an apology, which first passes over to something quite different from the point at issue, and then assumes a principle of explanation which is inapplicable to it."¹

III. *Transcendental Ideal: God*.—Schopenhauer is quite curt in dismissing the arguments of speculative theology. He thinks that Kant makes too long work of his refutation of the theological proofs. "No critique of reason was necessary for the refutation of the *ontological* proof of the existence of God; for without presupposing the æsthetic and analytic, it is quite easy to make clear that that ontological proof is nothing but a subtle playing with conceptions which is quite powerless to produce conviction."² It should be recognized for what it is, a veritable masterpiece of the monstrous productions of scholastic theology.³ This summary manner of dealing with the ontological argument exemplifies Schopenhauer's general attitude towards Kant's chapter on "The Ideal of Pure Reason." He dismisses the two other scholastic proofs without much ado: the cosmological proof, as incompatible with the law of causality; the physico-theological proof, as completely misconceiving the meaning of teleology in experience. Philosophy and theism, Schopenhauer holds, are fundamentally opposed to each other, and the conception of God is out of place in any consistent epistemology.⁴ The real basis for the notion of an Ultimate is to be sought for, not in terms of transcendent, but of immanent teleology.

The indubitable significance of the teleological categories leads Kant to the assumption of a transcendent world of Reason, and the conception of things-in-themselves inevitably introduces a line of cleavage between the theoretical and the practical, which makes consistent unity impossible in the technical formulation of Kant's theory of reality. The world of freedom remains for

¹ *Ibid.*

² G., I, pp. 648-649; H.K., II, p. 129.

³ G., I, p. 646; H.K., II, p. 127.

⁴ Cf. G., IV, pp. 128 ff., where Schopenhauer discusses further the three proofs of speculative theology, in connection with some remarks bearing more directly upon his views on the philosophy of religion.

him an 'as if,' a necessary postulate of Practical Reason; it never acquires epistemological validity for the world of possible experience. Schopenhauer's solution of this problem, on the other hand, points in the opposite direction. The world of Will and freedom is for him the absolute reality which underlies the world of cognitive experience; Kant's 'world of possible experience' is therefore regarded, from the point of view of metaphysics, as lacking in ultimate validity and truth, as an appearance, an illusion, as the veil of *Mâyâ* concealing the free Will-Reality.

In spite of essential differences in standpoint, which have been at least sufficiently accentuated in the above comparison of their treatment of the teleological principles, Kant and Schopenhauer make the same fundamental mistake. Neither fully realized the essentially instrumental character of all categories. Each and every category considers experience, all of it, from its own point of view. Experience is one, and the categories are its categories, the points of view from which it may profitably be regarded; no one of them can exhaust its meaning, nor can any truly significant category find its own meaning exhausted in any one part of experience, for the simple reason that experience is organic and is therefore not divisible into discrete parts.

Schopenhauer's failure to draw this inevitable conclusion from the results of the Transcendental Dialectic, and the consequent dualism of his own metaphysics, will be considered in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

EXPERIENCE AND REALITY: THE WILL AS THE THING-IN-ITSELF.

The Critical epistemology leads inevitably to the conclusion that all possible experience is phenomenal, *i. e.*, that it has no meaning except in terms of knowledge and in reference to the knowing subject. This realization of the fundamentally subjective character of the phenomenal 'object,' Schopenhauer regards as "the theme of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.'"¹ The organization of this subject-object world of possible experience is formulated by Kant in terms of the mechanical categories, to the exclusion of the teleological. This is the formal result of the 'Dialectic.'

The rejection of the rationalistic solution of the teleological problem does not, however, do away with the problem itself. The 'practical' can have no real application in an experience conceived in purely mechanical terms; nevertheless, Kant is deeply impressed with the undeniable significance of the moral and æsthetic phases of experience, and with the inadequacy of the mechanical categories to explain these. His vindication of the real significance of the teleological categories is intimately connected with his justification of the notion of the thing-in-itself. A change of philosophical method is to be observed at this stage of Kant's exposition, which Schopenhauer interprets as follows. Kant does not affirm, clearly and distinctly, the absolute mutual dependence of subject and object in all possible experience. "He does not say, as truth required, simply and absolutely that the object is conditioned by the subject, and conversely, but only that the manner of appearance of the object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject, which, therefore, come *a priori* to consciousness. But that now which in opposition to this is only known *a posteriori* is for him the immediate effect of the thing in itself, which becomes phenom-

¹ G., II, p. 205; H.K., II, p. 381.

enon only in its passage through these forms which are given *a priori*.”¹ And Kant fails to realize that “objectivity in general belongs to the forms of the phenomenon, and is just as much conditioned by subjectivity in general as the mode of appearing of the object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject; that thus if a thing in itself must be assumed, it absolutely cannot be an object, which however he always assumes it to be, but such a thing in itself must necessarily lie in a sphere *toto genere* different from the idea (from knowing and being known).”²

Schopenhauer criticises Kant's conception of the thing-in-itself in the same manner in which he had criticised his theory of the *a priori* character of the causal law. “Both doctrines are true, but their proof is false.”³ Kant argues that “the phenomenon, thus the visible world, must have a reason, an intelligible cause, which is not a phenomenon, and therefore belongs to no possible experience.”⁴ But this is perverting entirely the meaning of the law of causality, which applies exclusively to relations between phenomenal changes, and can therefore in no way account for the phenomenal world as a hypostatized entity. This “incredible inconsistency”⁵ was early discerned by Kant's critics, especially by G. E. Schulze.⁶ Schopenhauer explains it as due to Kant's irresistible desire to establish in some way the reality of the practical postulates, God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, which he found himself unable to establish upon the speculative basis of rationalism. Making use of the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, he now transports the machinery of rational dogmatism into the practical sphere, and thus justifies the practical validity of the Ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality in the world of possible experience, by maintaining their metaphysical validity in the supersensible world of things-in-themselves.

Kant's technical view of this problem, and his entire method

¹ G., I, pp. 638-639; H.K., II, pp. 118-119.

² G., I, p. 639; H.K., II, p. 119. ³ *Ibid.*

⁴ G., I, p. 638; H.K., II, pp. 117-118.

⁵ G., I, p. 638; H.K., II, p. 118.

⁶ Cf. G., IV, pp. 110 ff.

of dealing with it, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Schopenhauer regards as fundamentally false. His own *Basis of Morality* contains a vigorous attack upon the fundamental principles of Kant's ethical theory. According to him, Kant "founds . . . his moral principle not on any provable *fact of consciousness*, such as an inner natural disposition, nor yet upon any objective relation of things in the external world, . . . but on *pure Reason*, which . . . is taken, not as it really and exclusively is,—an intellectual faculty of man,—*but as a self-existent hypostatic essence*, yet without the smallest authority."¹ The second Critique inconsistently retains what was declared untenable in the 'Transcendental Dialectic', by the obvious subterfuge of raising the speculative reason into a genus, and then deducing from it a second species, practical reason,—a procedure similar to that accounting for the origin of immaterial substance, and as inconsistent as it is useless in the solution of the ethical problem.² Through the road of knowledge, through understanding and reason, we can arrive at perception and conception respectively; but cognition is always restricted to phenomena, the thing-in-itself is *unknowable*. The Critical account of experience as phenomenal in character, and its definition of 'phenomenal' as synonymous with cognitive experience, made possible through the mechanical categories, show that the thing-in-itself, the kernel of experience, is forever beyond the reach of knowledge.

It is at this point that Schopenhauer makes what he regards as his own great contribution to philosophical thought; here it is that Schopenhauer's philosophy joins onto the Kantian, or rather springs from it as from its parent stem.³ "Upon the path of the idea one can never get beyond the idea; it is a rounded-off whole, and has in its own resources no clue leading to the nature of the thing in itself, which is *toto genere* different

¹G., III, pp. 510, 511; *Basis of Morality*, tr. by A. B. Bullock, London, 1903, pp. 44, 45. For a fuller discussion of this problem, cf. the writer's article on "Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Ethics," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XIX, No. 5, Sept., 1910, pp. 512-534.

²G., III, pp. 511 ff.; Bullock, pp. 45 ff.

³Cf. R. Behm, *Vergleichung der kantischen und schopenhauerischen Lehre in Ansehung der Kausalität*, Heidelberg, 1892, p. 39.

from it. If we were merely perceiving beings, the way to the thing in itself would be absolutely cut off from us. Only the other side of our own being can disclose to us the other side of the inner being of things. This path I have followed."¹ Kant is correct in holding that we are unable to arrive at the ultimate reality of things by the road of knowledge; but he then proceeds to deny the possibility of all metaphysics, thus ignoring, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, the paramount ontological significance of non-cognitive experience.

Nevertheless, Kant's theory of freedom, untenable though it is in its technical form, serves to indicate his realization of the inadequate and incomplete character of his epistemology and its implications. The doctrine of the transcendental freedom of man's will recognizes implicitly, Schopenhauer maintains, that in man necessity is phenomenal only, and that in him the thing-in-itself manifests its inner nature in the form of Will. "What, then, Kant teaches of the phenomenon of man and his action my teaching extends to *all* phenomena in nature, in that it makes the *will* as a thing-in-itself their foundation."² For man is not *toto genere* different from the rest of experience, but differs only in degree. The World as Idea is, as Kant says, purely phenomenal; but it does not exhaust reality. "As the world is in one aspect entirely *idea*, so in another it is entirely *will*. A reality which is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which the thing in itself has unfortunately dwindled in the hands of Kant), is the phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an *ignis fatuus* in philosophy."³ The path of objective knowledge does not lead us to the real nature of things, and so far Schopenhauer is in thorough agreement with Kant. But "the thing in itself can, as such, only come into consciousness quite directly, in this way, that *it is itself conscious of itself*; to wish to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory."⁴ The thing-in-itself is unknowable, precisely because it is not a matter of knowledge but is in its inmost essence Will. Our consciousness of willing

¹G., I, p. 638; H.K., II, p. 118. Cf. G., IV, p. 115.

²G., II, pp. 201-202; H.K., II, p. 377.

³G., I, p. 35; H.K., I, p. 5.

⁴G., II, p. 227; H.K., II, p. 405.

is the only 'knowledge' which we can have of the thing-in-itself. But by 'will' Schopenhauer does not mean "merely willing and purposing in the narrowest sense, but also all striving, wishing, shunning, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, in short, all that directly constitutes our own weal and woe, desire and aversion."¹

Kant, then, recognized the metaphysical significance of human volition, but his perverse explanation of it in terms of Practical Reason led him to regard volition as a special prerogative of man. Schopenhauer considers it his own great achievement in philosophy to have completed Kant's idealism by indicating the ultimate character of the Will as the *Weltprincip*, as the one and only thing-in-itself. For this is the greatest truth in all philosophy: the nature of man manifests the character of ultimate reality.² "We must learn to understand nature from ourselves, not conversely ourselves from nature."³ Man is not the microcosm; nature is, rather, the macanthropos. This is the point of view from which Schopenhauer now proceeds to re-interpret the entire universe of phenomena, which, in his theory of knowledge, he had characterized as mere spatial-temporal ideas, necessarily determined by the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the subject-object world.

The consciousness of willing and striving, in which the thing-in-itself reveals itself in man, is different from the striving and willing manifest in all nature, but different only in degree. "Even the lowest forces of nature themselves are animated by that same will, which afterwards, in the individual beings provided with intelligence, marvels at its own work, as the somnambulist wonders in the morning at what he has done in his sleep; or more accurately, which is astonished at its own form which it beholds in the mirror."⁴ There is in all things a metaphysical element, ultimate and refusing further analysis, which remains after their existence as ideas of the subject has been set aside.⁵ What this metaphysical kernel is, Kant is unable to

¹G., II, p. 233; H.K., II, p. 412.

²Cf. G., I, p. 164; H.K., I, p. 143.

³G., II, p. 227; H.K., II, p. 406.

⁴G., II, p. 381; H.K., III, p. 73.

⁵G., I, p. 157; H.K., I, p. 136.

say; but he is right, Schopenhauer thinks, in stating what it is not. In excluding space, time, causality, and all the categories of knowledge from it, Kant asserts its non-cognitive character and is dimly conscious of the truth to which Schopenhauer himself first gives adequate expression. Science investigates phenomena, generalizes, systematizes our knowledge. But all science whatever finally ends in some surd or other which it is unable to solve on the basis of its own premises. "This that withholds itself from investigation . . . is the thing-in-itself, is that which is essentially not idea, not object of knowledge, but has only become knowable by entering that form. The form is originally foreign to it, and the thing-in-itself can never become entirely one with it, can never be referred to mere form, and, since this form is the principle of sufficient reason, can never be completely explained."¹ It is not capable of any abstract formulation; its non-cognitive, dynamic character is its essential characteristic. The thing-in-itself, which reveals itself in man as conscious willing, is manifest in the action of all things, assuming an infinity of forms, but remaining throughout the series a restless, endless striving, a conative flux.

In the higher grades of the manifestation of the will, individuality comes to occupy a prominent position;² but we should err if we mistook the absence of self-conscious individuality for absence of the will-reality. "If . . . I say," Schopenhauer writes, "the force which attracts a stone to the earth is according to its nature, in itself, and apart from all idea, will, I shall not be supposed to express in this proposition the insane opinion that the stone moves itself in accordance with a known motive, merely because this is the way in which will appears in man."³ That is to say, to quote a significant passage: "When in any phenomenon a *knowing consciousness* is added to that inner being which lies at the foundation of all phenomena, a consciousness which when directed inwardly becomes *self-consciousness*, then that inner being presents itself to this self-consciousness as that which is so familiar and so mysterious, and is denoted by the

¹G., I, pp. 176-177; H.K., I, p. 157.

²G., I, p. 188; H.K., I, p. 170.

³G., I, p. 158; H.K., I, p. 137.

word *will*. Accordingly we have called that universal fundamental nature of all phenomena *the will*, after that manifestation in which it unveils itself to us most fully."¹

Comparing the intellectual and the conative aspects of experience, therefore, Schopenhauer emphasizes the direct immediacy of the latter, as over against the merely presentative character of the former. The world of perception is directly apprehended by the knowing subject, through the faculty of the understanding and its one category of cause-effect, resulting from the union of space and time. Its cognitive directness is in marked contrast to the abstract character of conception, with its multitude of artificial abstractions and formal laws, lacking all application to direct experience. But perception and conception alike, Schopenhauer holds, lack the immediacy of the conative experience. In the willing consciousness the entire intellectual web of the World as Idea is swept aside; the multiplicity of things in space and time, which hides the metaphysical oneness of all reality from the knowing subject, is no more; the one ultimate condition of the possibility of consciousness alone remains,—time. This the consciousness of man cannot efface without effacing itself.

"The will, as that which is metaphysical, is everywhere the boundary-stone of every investigation, beyond which it cannot go."² No "systematically connected insight"³ into this metaphysical unity of Will is possible; the inevitably temporal character of our consciousness makes us unable to grasp the thing-in-itself once for all in its inmost nature. But, Schopenhauer frankly admits, "the question may still be raised, what that will, which exhibits itself in the world and as the world, ultimately and absolutely is in itself? *i. e.*, what it is, regarded altogether apart from the fact that it exhibits itself as will, or in general *appears, i. e.*, in general is *known*. This question can never be answered: because, as we have said, becoming known is itself the contradictory of being in itself, and everything that is known is as such only phenomenal. But the possibility of this question shows that the thing in itself, which we know most directly in

¹G., II, pp. 373-374; H.K., III, pp. 65-66.

²G., II, p. 421; H.K., III, p. 116.

³G., II, p. 379; H.K., III, p. 71.

the will, may have, entirely outside all possible phenomenal appearance, ways of existing, determinations, qualities, which are absolutely unknowable and incomprehensible to us."¹

Thus, ultimately, in its own inmost being, the thing-in-itself is for Schopenhauer also unknowable. We never can penetrate in consciousness through the last, thinnest of veils, time, and *be* the thing-in-itself; nevertheless, Schopenhauer warns us against considering will as a mere example or analogue of the thing-in-itself. Bradley's way of regarding the matter is quite different: "Thought . . . must have been absorbed into a fuller experience. Now such an experience may be called thought, if you choose to use that word. But if any one else prefers another term, such as feeling or will, he would be equally justified."² Schopenhauer would not have consented to any such generous policy. 'Will,' used in the metaphysical sense, refers not only to the fundamentally conative character of all animal beings, but also to "the force which germinates and vegetates in the plant, and indeed the force through which the crystal is formed, that by which the magnet turns to the north pole, . . . the force which appears in the elective affinities of matter as repulsion and attraction, decomposition and combination, and, lastly, even gravitation. . . ."³ Thus it would be a misunderstanding of Schopenhauer's theory, to interpret his thing-in-itself as will in the narrow sense of motivated volition. But, Schopenhauer insists, "I should be equally misunderstood by any one who should think that it is all the same in the end whether we denote this inner nature of all phenomena by the word *will* or by any other."⁴ For this would be the case only if the thing-in-itself were indirectly known, if 'Will' were its mere symbol. "But," as he says, "the word *will*, which, like a magic spell, discloses to us the inmost being of everything in nature, is by no means an unknown quantity, something arrived at only by inference, but is fully and immediately comprehended, and is so familiar to us that we know and understand what will is far better than anything else."⁵

¹ G., II, pp. 229-230; H.K., II, p. 408.

² *Appearance and Reality*, second edition, London, 1897, p. 171.

³ G., I, p. 163; H.K., I, p. 142.

⁴ G., I, p. 164; H.K., I, p. 144.

⁵ G., I, p. 165; H.K., I, p. 144.

The willing consciousness, therefore, affords us the first direct hint as to what the inner nature of reality may be. When, having thus realized our own inner nature, we look again at the world and recognize that "every kind of active and operating force in nature is essentially identical with will,"¹ that the conative is in all experience the most immediate, the prior, the ultimately unanalyzable because subject to no abstract laws, then the word 'will' acquires a new meaning. Then the real significance of the world first dawns upon us, and the metaphysical character of the ethical aspect of experience becomes evident. Then only, as Schopenhauer says, do we understand the meaning of the Kantian doctrine that time, space, and causality do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but are only forms of knowledge.² And, on the other hand, only when the solution of the metaphysical problem has disclosed to us the essential nature of the thing-in-itself as Will, does Kant's inconsistently formulated doctrine of the primacy of Practical Reason acquire a real meaning for philosophy. On Kant's basis metaphysics is impossible and the thing-in-itself unknowable. Schopenhauer proposes his theory of Will as offering an immanent solution of the problem of metaphysics: it repudiates the untenable logic of Kant's transcendent explanations, while at the same time it consistently reveals the true significance of Kant's doctrine of Practical Reason, thus supplementing and bringing to completion the Idealistic philosophy. This is Schopenhauer's estimate of his own philosophical achievement.

In his criticism of Kant's 'Transcendental Dialectic,' Schopenhauer advocates a position which, up to a certain point, is in marked agreement with recent epistemology and its interpretation of science and scientific methods. Schopenhauer constantly insists that in the World as Idea the Principle of Sufficient Reason is the sole principle of explanation. The causally connected universe discloses the operation of immutable laws, to ignore which, even in a slight degree, would make any real progress in science impossible. To offer an answer in terms of 'freedom,' when a scientific answer in causal terms is demanded, is to shirk

¹G., I, p. 164; HK., I, p. 143.

²G., I, pp. 166-167; H.K., I, p. 146.

the point at issue. If science is to remain science, it must rest all its conclusions upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason. But, for Kant, the distinction between the subject-matter of physics and that of metaphysics is identical with the distinction between what appears and what is. This Kant has "nettement établie," as Ribot puts it, following Schopenhauer.¹ And, inasmuch as all experience is 'what appears,' *i. e.*, phenomenal, the thing-in-itself, which 'is,' is unknowable; and hence metaphysics, in the strict sense of the term, is impossible.

Here it is that Schopenhauer attempts to improve upon Kant, by asserting the possibility of an immanent metaphysics, a metaphysics of experience. Philosophy, he says, begins where science leaves off, it takes things up and "treats them after its own method, which is quite distinct from the method of science."² This essential difference in method Schopenhauer indicates in no vague terms. Science is concerned with the systematic connection of differences. But in the conative consciousness the differences of the World as Idea vanish into one immediate unity, and scientific knowledge is transmuted into a consciousness of will, which demands no explanation, starts from nothing, points to nothing, but is itself an unending immediate striving. Schopenhauer, therefore, denies, on the basis of Kant's own epistemological results, the possibility of metaphysics, if by metaphysics is meant the scientific explanation of the inmost nature of the thing-in-itself as such, considered apart from its manifestation in consciousness. But he emphatically affirms the possibility of a metaphysics of experience, in terms of its completest and most immediate, *i. e.*, most real manifestation, Will.

In this sense, then, Schopenhauer asserts that his own metaphysics of Will is the key to the world-riddle. His test of the metaphysical 'realness' of any phase of experience is in terms of a unity which absorbs multiplicity. This unity, however, is not the result of the abstracting process of conception, but, in contrast to the mediate character of all thought, is concrete, *i. e.*, immediately present in consciousness. Schopenhauer seeks his ultimate reality in some specific aspect of experience, or rather in

¹ *La philosophie de Schopenhauer*, Paris, 1890, p. 35.

² *G.*, I, p. 128; *H.K.*, I, p. 107.

some one sort of experience, in which, as in the apex of the cone, all the various radii may somehow vanish and be lost in one undifferentiated unity. The 'real' is conceived by him as opposed to and contradistinguished from the rest of experience, which is thereby declared illusory. The ultimate unity is possible, on Schopenhauer's basis, only by means of the erasure of the organized multiplicity of phenomena. Reality is not truly revealed by its phenomenal appearance; rather is the World as Idea the fleeting shadow of the Real, its veil of *Mâyâ*. All the organization and coherence implied in the Principle of Sufficient Reason avail us nothing in the solution of the ultimate problems of experience. To learn metaphysics, we must unlearn science: this is the spirit of Schopenhauer's theory of reality.

The result of such a conception of metaphysics for the interpretation of the reality now recognized as Will, is not difficult to foresee. We know ourselves as willing in our separate acts of striving. But it is precisely this our *knowledge* of the conative that introduces the element of multiplicity and makes impossible the complete metaphysical unity. Our consciousness of willing is metaphysically 'real,' not by virtue of its being conscious, but in spite of it,—by virtue of its being Will. The Will-Reality as such, the metaphysical kernel of the universe, is not in time, because it absorbs all multiplicity in itself. Consciousness, inevitably temporal in character, is itself a mere accident of the metaphysical Real. The ultimate thing-in-itself is non-temporal, unconscious, irrational, free. "The will in itself is without consciousness, and remains so in the greater part of its phenomena. The secondary world of idea must be added, in order that it may become conscious of itself."¹ Will is the *prius*, the *Welt-princip*; *νοῦς* is secondary, intellect is the *posterius*, a derivation and a mere appearance of the thing-in-itself. To urge the primacy of the intellect over the will, is therefore an "enormous *πρωτον ψευδος* and fundamental *ὑστερον προτερον*."²

"It is the unconscious *will*," Schopenhauer insists, "which constitutes the reality of things, and its development must have

¹G., II, pp. 323-324; H.K., III, p. 12.

²G., II, p. 230; H.K., II, p. 409.

advanced very far before it finally attains, in the animal consciousness, to the idea and intelligence; so that, according to me, thought appears at the very last."¹ This position leads Schopenhauer to materialistic excesses. The whole world of perception and conception, of body and matter, which he formerly regarded as intellectual in character, he now describes in terms of the bodily organism.² The intellect is reduced to a tertiary position, being the instrument necessitated by a complete organism, which is secondary and is itself the embodiment of the one and only *Prius*, the blind unconscious Will. The intellect is accordingly a function of the brain, which, again, is the will-to-perceive-and-think objectified, just as the stomach is the embodiment of the will-to-digest, the hand, of the will-to-grasp, the generative organs, of the will-to-beget, and so on. "The whole nervous system constitutes, as it were, the antennæ of the will, which it stretches towards within and without."³

The relation in which the development of knowledge stands to the gradual objectification of the Will is conceived by Schopenhauer with curious inconsistency. In this respect, there are some apparent differences in point of view between certain passages in Schopenhauer's earlier and later works; but there seems to be no sufficient ground for maintaining any fundamental change of attitude on Schopenhauer's part. Schopenhauer might seem to hold two fundamentally opposite positions. On the one hand, he says: "The organ of intelligence, the cerebral system, together with all the organs of sense, keep pace with the increasing wants and the complication of the organism."⁴ This conclusion follows logically from Schopenhauer's theory of the absolute bondage of intelligence; but it does not account for the obvious facts of consciousness. Is the highest development of intelligence always accompanied by a corresponding intensity of 'will,' in Schopenhauer's sense of that term? How is the 'disinterestedness' of thought at all possible on such a basis? Scho-

¹ G., II, pp. 314-315; H.K., III, p. 2.

² Schopenhauer's 'physiological-psychological' method, which here manifests itself in terms so extreme, is nevertheless implied in his very starting-point, *i. e.*, in his distinction between perception and conception. Cf. Richter, *op. cit.*, pp. 139 f.

³ G., II, p. 299; H.K., II, p. 482.

⁴ G., II, p. 237; H.K., II, p. 416.

penhauer, evidently realizing the difficulty of the situation, seems to shift his position. The gradual objectification of the Will, he says, is accompanied by a gradual 'loosening' of the intellect from its will-ground. In the course of its development, the intelligence gradually obtains freedom from the brute will-impulse, and evolves an ideal world of its own, a world of knowledge, subject to universal laws of nature. This is the World as Idea, which Schopenhauer regards as at once the manifestation and the very antithesis of the World as Will. But the intellect "may, in particular exceptionally favoured individuals, go so far that, at the moment of its highest ascendancy, the secondary or knowing part of consciousness detaches itself altogether from the willing part, and passes into free activity for itself."¹ Thus, in the man of genius, "knowledge can deliver itself from this bondage, throw off its yoke, and, free from all the aims of will, exist purely for itself, simply as a clear mirror of the world."² This is the æsthetic knowledge of the Platonic Ideas, a unique consciousness of unity, different alike from the metaphysical unity of the Will and from the abstract unity of conception.

No discussion of the problems raised by Schopenhauer's Theory of Art seems to be called for here, inasmuch as it has no direct bearing upon his criticism of Kant. It should be noted, however, that Schopenhauer finds himself obliged to reassert the autonomy of the intellect, which his metaphysic has put under the bondage of the ultimate Will. This autonomy of the intellect, in the passionless contemplation of works of art, is, nevertheless, only a passing phase. The real solution of the world-riddle is stated by Schopenhauer, not in æsthetic, but in ethical terms. The liberation of intelligence from the tyrant Will becomes complete and final only when the will is denied in the supreme act of self-renunciation. This denial of the will, to be sure, involves the cessation of consciousness, the total effacement of all phenomenal multiplicity, and the sinking into the nothingness of Nirvana. Enlightened by intelligence, the will of man may be led to realize the brute-like character of its

¹G., II, p. 238; H.K., II, p. 417.

²G., I, p. 214; H.K., I, p. 199.

nature, and, directing itself against itself, achieve its own self-annihilation. The denial of the will is really the denial of its striving towards multiplicity; it is the denial of that impulse in it which leads to its objectification in phenomena,—the denial of the will-to-self-perpetuation, of the will-to-become-manifest, of the will-to-live. This is what Schopenhauer means when he says, at the end of *The World as Will and Idea*: “We freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky ways—is nothing.”¹

How are the seemingly incompatible elements of this many-sided philosophy to be reconciled? Phenomenalistic idealism and voluntaristic materialism, æsthetic quietism and ethical nihilism, are advocated one after another; and, while the criticism of Kant's principles often lays bare the concealed inconsistencies of the Critical system, the solutions offered are as often inadequate. Is not the real explanation of the situation to be found in the fact that Schopenhauer is *not* the true successor of Kant at all? Instead of being a neo-rationalist, as Kant, on the whole, remained, he is fundamentally an irrationalist, so far as his attitude towards ultimate reality is concerned. He is keen in perceiving and criticising Kant's confusion of various aspects and elements of experience; but, instead of tracing their immanent organic unity, which Kant imperfectly realizes and formulates, he goes so far, in almost every case, as to assert their actual separation. This was seen to be true of his treatment of perception and conception, understanding and reason. Instead of recognizing their unity in the concrete process of knowledge, Schopenhauer dogmatically separates them in a scholastic manner, thus substituting a lucidly wrong theory for Kant's confusedly right one. Similarly, in the case of the categories, Schopenhauer rightly shows the artificiality of Kant's 'deduction'; but, while correctly insisting upon the unitary character of the organization of experience, he expresses this unitary char-

¹G., I, p. 527; H.K., I, p. 532.

acter in terms of one category for every 'kind' of knowledge: *causa essendi, fiendi, agendi, cognoscendi*. He fails to realize the essentially instrumental character of all categories, and the ideal nature of the reality which they interpret. Thus, in his criticism of the 'Transcendental Dialectic,' while clearly showing the impossibility of expressing the nature of the thing-in-itself in terms of the mechanical categories, he misses what, after all, is the chief result of the 'Dialectic,'—the truth, namely, that the mechanical categories are not the only categories, that experience has phases which demand explanation in terms of teleological principles of organization. Schopenhauer points out the confusion and error of Kant's proposed transcendental solution of the problem of the thing-in-itself by means of the postulates of Practical Reason, and correctly insists on finding the solution of the problem of experience in terms of experience itself. But, instead of showing that the mechanical categories cannot by themselves embody the ultimate solution, and therefore need to be supplemented by other organizing principles, Schopenhauer declares the causally connected world to be a world of mere appearance and illusion, and proceeds to seek reality in some other sphere of experience. He finds this metaphysical Real in the conative experience. Here, again, had Schopenhauer satisfied himself with asserting the deeper significance of the conative, as compared with the merely cognitive experience, his position would have been fairly defensible. But he goes on to deny of his Will-Reality everything which he had affirmed of the World as Idea,—with the result that the conative, no longer dynamically rational, is described as ceaseless irrational striving. In short, Schopenhauer's World as Idea and World as Will are at least as incompatible philosophically as Kant's two worlds of phenomena and noumena.

Thus Schopenhauer fails to profit by his own criticism of Kant. He censures his master for attempting to explain the world of experience by reference to a transcendent world of things-in-themselves; but he does not realize that it is just as futile to attempt an ultimate explanation of experience in terms of any one of its many aspects. In what sense can the 'Will-

Reality' be consistently described as the inmost essence of experience, when it negates essential features of the only experience we know? The Will is of paramount significance for experience; no philosopher can ignore it without making his system static, fatally lacking in concreteness and vitality. But, if taken in abstract isolation as a hypostatized *Weltprincip*, it is not only incapable of explaining all the problems of experience, but is itself quite meaningless for any consistent epistemology. Experience must be interpreted in terms of its own self-organizing totality. In the solution of its problems we can ignore no one of its elements or aspects. Cognition is an essential aspect of experience, but cognition is not all; this is the lesson to be learned from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and especially from the 'Dialectic.' The same is true of Will. Will finds its meaning only in the concrete whole of experience, only in relation to the many factors which constitute its cosmic process. There are contrasts in experience, oppositions and antitheses; but ultimately these must be capable of mutual organization, ultimately experience must be unitary and intelligible. This is the only basis on which any consistent philosophy is at all possible, and this is the real significance of Kant's epistemological method. Schopenhauer's philosophy, on the other hand, represents an endless conflict, in which now one aspect of experience, now another, is unduly emphasized and set over against the rest of experience. His every problem is stated in the form of a dilemma: either Perception *or* Conception, either Understanding *or* Reason, either Knowledge *or* Will, either Egoism *or* Self-Renunciation. He never fully comprehended the immanent unity of experience, in reference to which all its various aspects must find their real significance. And this is the fundamental defect of his philosophical system, which makes him incapable of grasping the real problems of Kant's philosophy, and of indicating a consistent method for their solution.

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