




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36 Proximal self-management





THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS

AS BASED ON

THE SCIENCE OF KNOWLEDGE

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

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AS BASED ON

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BY

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE.

TRANSLATED BY

A. E. KROEGER.

EDITED BY

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
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EDITOR'S PREFACE

THE present work is a translation by Mr. A. E. Kroeger from the original edition of *Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre*, von Johann Gottlieb Fichte (Jena und Leipzig, 1798), together with an appendix containing a chapter on Ascetism, or practical moral culture, translated from the third volume of Fichte's posthumous works, published in Bonn, 1835, the same being a lecture given by Fichte in 1798 as an appendix to *The Science of Morals*, published in that year. This work, together with the *Philosophy of Right*, translated by Mr. Kroeger, and already published by Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., gives the entire system of ethics as it stood in Fichte's mind. *The Science of Morals* gives the subjective side to ethics, and the *Science of Rights* gives the objective side, or the institutions founded to realize morals and protect the individual against attacks upon his freedom. The family, civil society, and the State are institutions which make secure the moral freedom of man.

Fichte's writings form the classics of introspection. They furnish the best discipline for training in the ability to seize the activities of the mind and become conscious of their method. Anyone who reflects for a few minutes is competent to bear testimony to the difficulty in seizing the methods of mind-activity. It is comparatively easy to think of objects belonging to

nature; but the method of thinking eludes one, and it is not easy to make an inventory of the facts of consciousness. Kant made an epoch in the history of philosophy by his searching investigation into the subjective co-efficient of knowledge. He discovered what belongs essentially to the constitution of perception and thought, and by this discovery was able to make a large contribution to rational psychology. By rational psychology one understands the necessary truths which are founded on the nature of the mind itself. Fichte was singularly gifted for the work of acquiring Kant's methods and perfecting them. Almost every writing that is to be found in his complete works is an example of the Kantian method of introspection. There is everywhere an attempt at a separation of the transient and variable in the mental operation from the formal and permanent activity. This formal and permanent activity depends upon the logical structure of the mind, and does not vary: it furnishes us with the universal and necessary truths which lie at the basis of metaphysics, psychology, and ethics.

There is no possible way of giving the results of introspection in the form of objective observation. Introspection is not a substitute for objective observation, nor is the latter a substitute for the former. The two modes of thinking involve different fundamental categories. Objective observation thinks in the form of time and space and external causation. Introspection thinks in the form of self-activity, and its objects take the shape of feelings, volitions, or ideas. While objective observation sees things and dead results, introspection thinks persons and living beings. It is evident enough that a knowledge of nature as it is is not completed without introspection, for this operation enters as a factor in knowing all living beings, such as plants,

or animals, and men. But this use of introspection is unconscious. The Kantian and Fichtian introspection is conscious and systematic, and those who have used it much, or who have attained to a familiar acquaintance with it, love to speak of it as scientific in a higher sense of that word. Looking upon mathematics as systematic and strictly scientific, they would claim for the philosophic introspection a precision and strictness which exceeds that of mathematics.

To anyone who obtains a first and superficial view of the history of philosophy it seems absurd to think of introspection as affording anything approaching the character of scientific system. There seems to be endless difference of opinion. Every thinker, however, arrives at convictions of his own, although he combats the convictions of his fellows. Those who attain to any mastery of the critical system of Kant, with its higher order of introspection, reach a series of necessary truths belonging within the sphere of rational psychology. Any candid student of the *History of Philosophy*, who has given much time to understand the different systems, will testify that the agreements of these thinkers are numerous, and of such a character as to demonstrate the claims made for the scientific character of the higher introspection. In so far as the amateur follows the mathematical demonstrations of Newton or Leibnitz, he is forced into agreement; he sees the insight of the mathematical author he is studying. So it is in the higher introspection: sufficient care and attention will discover to the reader the philosophical necessity which the insight of a Kant or a Fichte had attained. But just as there comes a point in the study of mathematics where the mind of the student stops before a realm of unexplored quantity, so there comes a place in philosophical introspection where the student stops,

being unable to take the next step, until further strength comes to him by further discipline.

With philosophy, as with mathematics, it is true that the great positive results are attained in some form even in the elementary stages of thinking. God, freedom, and immortality, as objects of philosophy, are reached in the ontology of Plato and Aristotle almost with the first speculative insight; they are seen as the necessary presupposition of the world. The same results, too, are seen very soon as the logical condition for the facts of introspection. One needs only to read the first hundred pages of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* to see that his doctrine of time and space, which makes them to be subjective forms of the mind, at the same time establishes the transcendence of mind over nature; for space and time are the necessary conditions for the existence of nature, and for all material existence, and all manifestations of life in plants and animals. But space and time themselves are forms in pure mind or pure reason. Hence pure reason furnishes the ground for time and space and for the realms of nature.

Perhaps the greatest merit of the present work is Fichte's clear setting forth of the will in the first third of the book. Fichte sees clearly the autonomy and self-activity of the ego. He is able to describe this as a fact of consciousness. To him it is clear that the will can originate new determinations in the world. It is not a link in a chain of causality necessarily determined by what has gone before it. It can modify the chain of causality in which it finds itself, and initiate new forms of existence for which it alone is responsible. The idea of responsibility is the key to all questions relating to freedom. We are not responsible for that which we do not originate. Human beings are conscious that they are authors of deeds for which they are wholly respon-

sible. The institutions of civilization are founded on this fact. Even those who are agnostics or sceptics in regard to the freedom of the will, do not go so far as to act on any other principle than that of freedom and responsibility on the part of their fellow-men. They are partly of the conviction that their mental difficulties are merely subjective. They are unable to square their intellectual conviction with their common-sense conviction, and they are almost willing to admit that the practical position is the correct one, and that the intellectual scepticism is due to weakness of insight.

Kant shows in his Third Antimony that he admits equal validity to the two categories—first, that of external observation, and, second, that of higher introspection. It was only necessary for another thinker to show that the category of external observation has the foundation of its validity in the category of higher introspection to refute the Third Antimony. A causality of determination of succeeding events by prior events rests for its validity upon a higher causality of freedom. Without a causality that originates in self-determination there could be no perseverance of causal influence, and consequently no chain of causality. Everything would belong to the side of effect, and nothing to the side of cause. This would be self-contradictory, for without a cause there could be no effect.

Kant found that he was obliged to acknowledge this in his *Critique of the Practical Reason*, but he did not see that the necessity belonged quite as well to his *Critique of Pure Reason*. To Fichte this became clear, and hence the *Wissenschaftslehre*, especially in its later forms, and hence, too, these works on the science of rights and the science of morals. Fichte's insight into freedom, as the condition both of the intellect and of the will, is the foundation-stone of the subsequent

philosophies of Schelling and Hegel, in which the German movement initiated by Kant completes its union with those of Plato and Aristotle. The psychology movement comes into harmony with the ontology movement, both reach the same highest principles, namely, the personality of God, human freedom and responsibility, individual immortality in an eternal church invisible.

W. T. HARRIS.

WASHINGTON, D.C., *December*, 1896.

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N.B.—The work is translated from the edition of 1798.

INTRODUCTION

§ 1.

How an objective can ever become a subjective, or how a being can ever become an object of representation: this curious change will never be explained by anyone who does not find a point wherein the objective and subjective are not distinguished at all, but are altogether one. Now, such a point is established by, and made the starting-point of, our system. This point is the Egohood, the Intelligence, Reason, or whatever it may be named.

This absolute identity of subject and object in the Ego can be shown up only through mediation, and cannot be found immediately as part of actual consciousness. With the realization of actual consciousness, even though it be self-consciousness, we always have the diremption. Only in so far as I distinguish myself, the conscious, from myself, the object of this consciousness, am I at all conscious of myself. *The whole mechanism of consciousness rests upon the manifold views of this separation and reunion of the subjective and the objective.*

§ 2.

The subjective and objective are viewed as united, or as harmonious, in the following manner:

First, as if the subjective resulted from the objective, as if the former conformed itself to the latter. This view is called *Knowledge, Cognition*. It is the business of theoretical philosophy to show how we come to assert such a harmony.

Second, as if the objective resulted from the subjective, as if a being resulted from a conception (from the conception of a purpose). This view is that of a *moral activity*. It is the business of practical philosophy to show how we come to assert such a harmony.

The first point, namely, how we come to assert the harmony of our representations with things, assumed to have independent existence, has been entertained in previous philosophy, but not the second point, namely, how we come to think some of our conceptions as representable, and in part actually represented in this very same independent nature. It has been considered quite a matter of course that we can influence nature. Everyone knows that we do it every moment: it is a part of consciousness; so why trouble ourselves about it.

§ 3.

The doctrine of morals is practical philosophy. As it is the province of theoretical philosophy to represent the system of necessarily thinking that our representations conform to a being, so practical philosophy has to exhaust the system of necessarily thinking that a being conforms to results from our representations. Hence, it becomes our duty to enter upon this last-mentioned question, and to show, first, how we come at all to consider some of our representations as being the ground of a being; and, second, whence we get particularly that system of those conceptions from which a being is absolutely to result.

The object of this Introduction is to gather into one short statement what the subsequent investigation is to elaborate in detail concerning this matter.

§ 4.

I find myself as active in the sensuous world. From this self-finding all consciousness proceeds, and without this consciousness of my activity there is no self-

consciousness, as without this self-consciousness there is no consciousness of another, which I myself am not. Whoever desires a proof of this assertion will find it in the second book of this work. At present we merely assert it as an immediate fact of consciousness for the sake of connecting our argument to it?

What manifoldness does this representation of my activity contain, and how do I arrive at this manifold?

Even when we admit, for the present, that the representation of the *matter*, upon which my activity is directed, and which remains permanent and unchanged by this activity; and the representation of the *qualities* of this matter, which my activity changes; and the representation of this *progressive change*, which continues until that form is realised which I purposed to realise—even when we admit, I say, that all these representations, which are involved in the representation of my activity, are *given* me externally—although I confess I do not understand what this may mean—even granted that it is *empirical perception*, or whatever other words may be used to express this not-thought, it nevertheless remains quite clear that there is something else besides in the representation of my activity which cannot be externally given, but must lie in me, which I cannot empirically perceive or learn, but which I must know immediately, namely, that *I myself* am to be the *last ground* of the change which is to occur.

I am the ground of this change signifies:—that that which *knows* of the change is that which *effects* it; the subject of consciousness and the principle of causality are one. But that which I assert, at the origin of all knowing, of the subject itself of this knowing, or, in other words, that which I know because I know at all; this I can have derived from no other knowing; I know it immediately; I posit it absolutely.

Hence, as soon as I know at all, I know that I am active. The mere form of knowing generally contains

the consciousness of myself as an active principle, and, hence, posits myself as such.

Now, it might well be that the same mere form of knowing does alone—if not immediately, at any rate through the just discovered immediate—contain all the other manifold which is involved in the representation of my activity, as mentioned before. If this should turn out to be so, we should at once be relieved of the very vexatious assumption that this manifold is given to us from without, since we should be able to explain it in another and more natural manner. Such an explanation would show how we come to ascribe to ourselves a causality in an external sensuous world by deducing the necessity of such an assumption immediately from the pre-supposed consciousness.

We will attempt to decide whether such a deduction is possible. Its plan is as follows: We have just now seen what the representation of our causality involves. The pre-supposition now is that the same is contained in, and necessarily posited together with, consciousness in general. Hence we proceed from the form of consciousness in general, and commence our deduction with it; and our investigation is closed if, in the course of our deduction, we arrive again at the representation of our sensuous activity from which we started.

§ 5.

I posit myself as active, signifies according to the above: I distinguish within myself a knowing and an actual power, which, as such, does not *know*, but *is*; but, at the same time, I view both as absolutely one. How do I come to make the distinction? How to determine the distinguished in precisely this manner? Probably the second question will find its answer in the answer to the first question.

I do not know without knowing somewhat; I do not

know of myself without becoming precisely through this knowledge somewhat for myself; or, which is the same, without distinguishing within myself a subjective and an objective. If a consciousness is posited, this distinction is posited; and without it, consciousness is not possible at all. But this diremption posits immediately likewise the relation of the dirempter, of the subjective and objective. The latter, the objective, is to exist through itself independently of the subjective; whereas the former, the subjective, is to be dependent upon and receive its material determination through the latter. Being is to be through itself, whereas knowing is dependent upon being; as such the relation must appear to us, if anything appears to us, or if we have consciousness at all.

The important insight thus obtained is the following:—Knowing and being are not separated outside and independent of consciousness, but are separated only in consciousness, because this separation is a condition of the possibility of all consciousness; and it is only through this separation that both those separates arise. There is no being except through the mediation of consciousness, as there is likewise no knowing, as a mere subjective knowing having its being for its object, except through consciousness. Even if I try merely to say "I," am I already compelled to separate; but likewise also does this separation arise only through my saying thus, "I." The one, which is separated, and which is therefore at the basis of all consciousness, and in consequence whereof the subjective and objective in consciousness are immediately posited as one, is absolutely = X, and can, as such simple one, arise in no manner in consciousness.

We discover here an immediate agreement between the subjective and objective. I know of myself because I am, and I am because I know of myself. It is possible that all other agreements of both—whether the objective

is to result from the subjective, as when the conception of a purpose is realized, or whether the subjective is to result from the objective, as when the conception of cognition is applied—are but particular views of that one immediate harmony. If this could really be proven, it would also prove that everything which may occur in consciousness is posited through the mere form of consciousness, since that immediate diremption and harmony is the form of consciousness itself, and since those other diremptions and harmonies exhaust the total content of all possible consciousness. How this may be, we shall doubtless see in the course of our investigation.

§ 6.

I posit myself as active, as described above, signifies not: I ascribe to myself activity in general; but I ascribe to myself a *determined* activity, *i.e.*, this activity and no other.

We have seen how the subjective, through its mere separation from the objective, becomes quite dependent and necessitated; and the ground of this, its material determinateness, of its determinateness in regard to the *what* thereof, does not lie in itself, but in the objective. The subjective appears as a mere cognizing of a something which it perceives, but on no account as an active producing of the representation. Thus it must, indeed, be, at the origin of all consciousness, where the separation of the subjective and objective is complete. But in the progress of consciousness the subjective also appears, through the mediation of a synthesis, as free and determining, for it appears as *abstracting*; in which case it may very well at least freely describe, though not perceive, activity in general. At present, however, we stand at the origin of all consciousness, and the representation which we have to investigate is therefore necessarily a perception; *i.e.*, in this representation the

subjective appears as altogether and completely determined through an external other.

Now what does this signify? A *determined* activity. And how does it become a determined activity? Solely through opposing to it a resistance, opposing it through ideal activity; in other words, solely through thinking and imagining a resistance as opposed to it. Wherever and in so far as you perceive activity, you also perceive necessarily resistance. No appearance of resistance, no appearance of activity.

Let not this be overlooked. *That* such a resistance does appear is purely result of the laws of consciousness, and hence the resistance may properly be regarded as a result of those laws. The law itself, which gives rise to it for us, may be deduced from the necessary separation of a subjective from an objective, and from the absolutely posited relation of the former to the latter, as established previously. This is the ground why the consciousness of the resistance is a mediated, and not an immediate consciousness. It is mediated through this, that I must regard myself as merely a *cognizing* subject, and in this cognition utterly dependent upon the objectivity.

Next, let the characteristics of this representation of a resistance be developed in their genesis. This resistance is represented as the opposite of activity; hence, as something, which merely *is*, but does not *act*, as something quiet and dead, which merely strives to remain in existence, and which, therefore, does certainly resist (with a measure of power to remain what it is) all influences of freedom upon it, but which can in no wise attack freedom upon its own ground; in short, *mere objectivity*. Such objectivity is called with its familiar name, *matter*.

Again, all consciousness is conditioned by the consciousness of myself. This, again, is conditioned by the perception of my activity, and this again is conditioned by the positing of a resistance as such. Hence this

resistance, with the characteristic just ascribed to it, extends necessarily throughout the whole sphere of my consciousness, and remains along with it. Nor can freedom ever be posited as having the slightest influence over this resistance, because if it had, itself and all consciousness and all being would become annihilated.

The representation of a matter, which cannot be in any manner changed through my causality, and which we discovered above to be contained in the perception of our activity, has thus been deduced from the laws of consciousness.

One of our chief questions has been answered, namely, how we come to assume a subjective, a conception which is to result from, and to be determined by, an objective, by a being. This assumption is, as we have shown, the necessary consequence of our separating in our consciousness a subjective from an objective, and yet, at the same time, regarding both as one; and the determined relation, namely, that subjective is to be determined by the objective, and not *vice versa*, arises from the absolutely posited relation of the subjective as such to the objective as such. And thus the principle and the problem of all theoretical philosophy have been deduced.

§ 7.

I posit myself as active. We have said enough concerning the subjective and objective in this positing, their diremption, their union, and their original relation to each other. But we have not yet investigated the predicate which is attached to the one and inseparable Ego. What does it signify to be *active*? and what do I really posit when I ascribe activity to myself?

The schema of activity in general, as an agility, mobility, or whatever words you may choose to express it in, we presuppose in the reader, since it can be demonstrated to no one, who does not find it in himself. This

internal agility cannot in any way be ascribed to the objective as such, as we have just seen, for the objective is and remains only what and as it is. This agility, so far as the form of its activity is concerned, appertains only to the subjective, to the intelligence as such. I say so far as the form is concerned, for, we have shown above that the material or the content of the determinedness is to be in another relation determined through the objective. Representing, in its form, is therefore contemplated as freest internal motion. Now I, the one inseparable Ego, am to be active, and that, which acts upon the object, is doubtless this objective in me, the real power. Considering all this, my activity can also be posited as proceeding from the subjective and determining the objective; in short, as a causality of the mere conception upon the objective, which conception cannot in so far be again determined through another objective, but is determined absolutely in and through itself.

We have thus also replied to our second question—how do I come to assume that an objective results from a subjective, a being from a conception? and in doing so have deduced the principle of all practical philosophy. For this assumption arises because I am absolutely bound to posit myself as active, and because, having distinguished within myself a subjective and an objective, I cannot posit this activity in any other manner than as a causality of the conception. Absolute activity is the one predicate, which immediately and absolutely belongs to me; and causality, through the conception, is the only possible manifestation of this activity, made necessary by the laws of consciousness. In this latter form absolute activity is also called *freedom*. *Freedom is the sensuous representation of self-activity, and arises through the opposition of ourselves as intelligence to the determinateness of the object, in so far as we relate the latter to ourselves.*

I posit myself as free in so far as I explain a sensuous acting or a being through my conception, which conception is then called the conception of a purpose. Hence the fact which was assumed above, that I find myself active, is only possible on condition, that I presuppose a conception originated through myself, which my causality is to accept as a guide, and to be as well *formaliter* based upon as *materialiter* determined by. We thus obtain a new characteristic to those already mentioned as involved in the representation of our activity, a characteristic which it was not necessary to point out before, and which we have here, at the same time, deduced. But it is to be well observed, that this previous originating of a conception is only *posited*, and pertains only to the sensuous view of our self-activity.

The conception, from which an objective determination is to result, and which we call the conception of a purpose, is not itself determined again by an objective, but is absolutely determined through itself. For if it were otherwise I should not be absolutely active, nor immediately posited as absolutely active, but my activity would be dependent upon, and mediated through, an objective being, which is against our presupposition. It is true, that in the course of connected consciousness the conception of a purpose appears as *conditioned*—not determined—through the cognition of some objective being. But this view cannot be entertained here, at the origin of all consciousness, where we take our starting-point from activity, and where this activity is absolute.

The most important result of this consideration is as follows:—*There is an absolute independence and self-determination of the mere conception* by virtue of the causality, which the subjective has upon the objective; precisely as we asserted an absolute and self-positing *being* of the material substance in consequence of the causality, which the objective has upon the subjective.

Both ends of the whole world of reason have thus been connected by us.

(Whosoever has but properly seized this self-determining of the conception, has thereby attained the most perfect insight into our whole system, and, as a consequence, an unshakeable conviction of its truth.)

§ 8.

From the conception there results an objective. How is this possible, and what can it signify? Nothing, but that the conception itself should appear to me as something objective. Now the conception of a purpose, regarded objectively, is called a *willing*, and the representation of a will is nothing but this necessary view of the conception of a purpose posited, if only for the sake of becoming conscious of our activity. The spiritual within me, viewed immediately as the principle of a causality, becomes to me a will.

But it is *I* who am to have causality upon the substance or matter, which we have described in its origin; and it is impossible for me to think a causality upon that matter except through what is likewise matter itself. Hence in so far as I think, and must think, myself as having causality upon this matter, I become matter for myself, and in so far as I thus regard myself, I call myself a *material body*. I, regarded as principle of a causality in the world of matter, am an articulated body; and the representation of my body itself is nothing else than the representation of myself as a cause in the world of matter; hence mediately as simply a certain view I take of my absolute activity.

Nevertheless, the will is to have causality—and immediate causality—upon my body, and only so far as this immediate causality of the will extends does the body, as tool, or the articulation extend. Hence the will is also separated and distinguished from the body, and

appears, therefore, as not the same as the body. But this diremption and distinction is nothing but another separation of the subjective and objective, or, still more definite, a familiar view of this original separation. The will, in this relation, is the subjective, and the body the objective.

§ 9.

But what is my actual causality, what is the change which it is to produce in the sensuous world, and what is the sensuous world which is changeable through this causality?

If a subjective within me is to change into an objective, a conception of a purpose into a resolve of the will, and this again into a certain modification of my body, I evidently represent myself to myself as having changed. But my final appurtenance, *i.e.*, my substantial body, is to be connected with the whole material world, and hence, as it is regarded as having changed, the world is necessarily also so regarded.

The thing, which my causality can change, or the *qualitativeness* of Nature, is precisely the same as the unchangeable thing, or mere matter. Both are the same, only viewed from different sides, precisely as the causality which the conception exercises upon the objective appeared to us, when viewed from two sides, as will and as body. The changeable thing is Nature, when viewed subjectively, and, as connected with me, the active intelligence; the unchangeable thing is that same Nature, when viewed altogether and merely objectively.

All that was involved in the perception of our sensuous causality has now been deduced from the laws of consciousness, as was required, and we find as the last link of our conclusions the very same from which we started. Our investigation has therefore returned into itself, and is closed.

Its result is, in short, as follows:—The only absolute,

upon which all consciousness and all being is based, is pure activity. This activity appears by virtue of the laws of consciousness, and particularly of the fundamental law of consciousness, that the active can only be considered as united subject and object (as Ego). *As a causality upon something outside of me*, all which is contained in this appearance—from the end or purpose absolutely posited through myself to the raw matter of the world—are but mediating links of this appearance, and hence are themselves appearances. The only purely true is my self-determination.

PART I.

THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY

BOOK FIRST.

DEDUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY.

PRELIMINARY.

It is asserted that there manifests itself in the soul of man an impulsion to do certain things utterly independent of external purposes, merely for the sake of doing them; and, on the other hand, to leave undone other things equally independent of external purposes, and merely for the sake of leaving them undone. The condition of man, in so far as such an impulsion is necessarily to manifest itself within him, as sure as he is a rational being, is called his *moral nature*.

The power of *cognition*, which belongs to man, may relate in a twofold manner to this, his moral nature.

Firstly. When that impulsion is discovered by him in his self observation as a fact—and it certainly is assumed that each rational being will thus discover it, if he but closely observes himself; man may simply accept it as such fact, may rest content to have discovered that it *is thus*, without inquiring *in what manner* and from *what grounds* it becomes thus. Perhaps he may even freely resolve, from inclination, to place unconditioned *faith* in the requirements of that impulsion, and actually to *think*, as his highest destination, what that impulsion represents to him as such; nay, perhaps even to *act* constantly in conformity with this faith. Thus there arises within him the *common*, or ordinary, knowledge, as well of his moral nature in

general, as also—if he carefully attends to the dictates of his conscience in the particular phases of his life—of his particular duties; which common knowledge is possible from the *standpoint of ordinary consciousness*, and is sufficient for the generation of moral sentiments and a moral behaviour.

Secondly. But man may also not rest content with the immediate perception; he may desire to know the grounds of what he has thus discovered; he may not be content with a particular, but desire a genetical knowledge; or he may desire to know not only that such an impulsion exists within him, but likewise how it arises within him. If he obtains this knowledge, it will be a *speculative* knowledge, and to attain it he must rise from the standpoint of ordinary consciousness to a higher standpoint.

Now, how is this problem to be solved, or how are the *grounds* of the moral nature of man to be discovered? The only matter which excludes all asking for a higher ground is this: that we are *we*, or, in other words, our Egoness, or Rationality, which latter word, however, is not nearly as expressively correct as the former. Everything else, whether it be *within* us, like the impulsion above mentioned, or *for* us, like the external world which we assume, is only thus *within* or *for* us because we are it, as can indeed be easily proven in general, whereas the particular insight into the manner in which something connects *within*, or *for* us, that rationality, is precisely the speculative and scientific knowledge of the grounds of this something whereof we speak. The development of these grounds being deduced, as it is, from the highest and absolute principle of Egoness, and shown to be a necessary result thereof, is a deduction. It is therefore our present task to furnish a deduction of the moral nature or principle in man.

Instead of enumerating at length the advantages of such a deduction, it is sufficient to remark that only

through it does a science of morality arise. And science—no matter whereof—is end in itself.

In relation to a scientific complete philosophy, the present science of morality is connected with the science of knowledge through the present deduction. This deduction is derived from principles of the latter science, and shows how the particular science of morality proceeds from the general science of knowledge, and thus becomes a separate philosophical science.

If, as is maintained, the morality of our nature follows from our rationality, in accordance with necessary laws, the mentioned impulsion is itself primary and immediate for perception; that is to say, it will manifest itself without our interference, and we cannot change this, its manifestation, through our freedom in any manner whatsoever. In generating through a deduction an insight into the grounds thereof, we do not in any manner receive the power to change anything in it, since only our cognition, and not our power, extends so far, and since the whole relation is necessarily our own unchangeable nature itself.

Hence the deduction generates nothing else, and must not be expected to generate anything else than simply theoretical cognition. Just as we do not place things differently in time and space after we have obtained the insight into the grounds of our doing so at all, than we did previously, so also morality does not manifest itself differently in man before and after its deduction. Nor is the science of morality a science of *wisdom*—as, indeed, were impossible, since wisdom is rather an art than a science—but morality is like all philosophy—a science of knowledge. In its peculiar characteristic, however, it is the theory of the consciousness of our moral nature in general, and of our determined duties in particular.

So much concerning the significance and the object of our intended deduction. One more preliminary remark for its proper comprehension; a remark made necessary

by the general ignorance regarding the nature of transcendental philosophy.

The procedure of our deduction will be as follows:— We shall make it our problem, to think ourselves under a certain specified characteristic, and to observe *how* we are compelled to think ourselves under such condition. From our thus discovered nature we shall deduce the moral impulsion before mentioned as necessary. Now, at first, it would seem arbitrary that we think ourselves precisely under such a condition. But he who has an outlook over all philosophy, and over the connection of the several philosophical sciences in a system, knows this condition to be necessary; whereas anyone else may temporarily regard it as a mere assumption for the purpose of constructing, by its means, a science of morality. The attempt may succeed or not, and the correctness of the assumption will not have been proven until the required science has actually been established by its means. The objection, therefore, that the condition assumed is arbitrary would seem to be of little weight.

A more important objection, and more instructive in its consequences, would be the following. Some one may say, "You are going to *think* yourself. Very well; but as a critical philosopher you ought to know, or it can at least be easily shown to you, that all your thinking proceeds according to certain inner laws of this thinking that hence all that you think is modified by the manner of thinking, and that everything is for you as it is, simply because you think it thus. This, doubtless, will also be the case in the present instance; in thinking yourself you will become modified according to your thinking, and hence you cannot say: *Thus am I in and for myself*—since you never can know that unless you have some means of knowledge besides thinking—but you can merely say: *Thus must I necessarily think myself*. Now, if you always remain conscious of this true significance of your result, and limit yourself to it, no objec-

tion can be raised against your procedure, but you can see yourself how much it will be worth. You do not, however, seem to limit yourself to this, its significance. You pretend to deduce from it that moral impulsion which manifests itself in us all, hence to deduce something actual from a mere thought, or to pass from the region of thinking into the utterly different region of actual being."

To this we reply: This we pretend to do on no account. We remain altogether in the region of thinking, and the ever-continuing misapprehension of transcendental philosophy consists precisely in this: that such a transition from the region of thinking to that of being is still considered possible, is still required, and that a being in itself is still considered to be thinkable. That impulsion within us, what else is it than a thinking which forces itself upon us—than a necessary consciousness? Can we then ever proceed from a consciousness of mere consciousness to the object itself? Do we then know anything else concerning this requirement, than that we must necessarily think that there is such a requirement within us? The result of our conclusions in the deduction is a thinking; and that which is within us, independently of all conclusions as primary and immediate, is also a thinking. The only difference between this mediated and immediate thinking is this, that in regard to the latter we do not become conscious of its grounds, but find it to force itself upon us with immediate necessity, thereby receiving the predicate of reality or perceivability; while the former lies within a series of grounds, whereof we become conscious. It is the very object of philosophy to discover that within our reason which remains unknown to us on the standpoint of ordinary consciousness. We cannot speak of a being in itself, for reason cannot go beyond itself. For the intelligence there is no being; and since there is a being only for the intelligence, there is no being at all; there

is only a necessary consciousness. This necessity of consciousness forces itself *immediately* upon us on the standpoint of ordinary consciousness; on the transcendental standpoint we investigate its *grounds*. The following deduction, as well as the whole system of morality which is to be erected upon it, furnishes only a part of this necessary consciousness, and would be very incorrectly apprehended if taken to signify anything else.

CHAPTER I.

PROBLEM. To think myself as self, that is to say, apart from all which is not myself.

A. SOLUTION. I find myself, as self, only as willing.

EXPLANATION.

First. What does this mean: I find *myself*?

The easiest manner to guide anyone to the correct thinking and understanding of the conception *I* is as follows:—Think, I would say to him, any object, for instance, this wall, this desk. You doubtless assume a thinking, which thinks in this thought, and this thinking you are yourself. You are immediately conscious of your thinking in this, your thinking. But the object which you think is not to be the thinking itself, is not to be identical with it, but is to be an opposite somewhat, of which oppositeness you are also immediately conscious in this your thinking.

Now think again—not a wall, however, but yourself. As sure as you do this, you posit the thinking and the thought, not as opposites, as you did in the previous case, not as a twofold, but as one and the same; and you are immediately conscious of it in this manner. You therefore think the conception Ego or I, when the thinking and the thought are assumed in thinking as one and the same, and *vice versa*, whatever arises in such a thinking is the conception of the *Ego*.

Applying this to our case, I find myself would signify:

I assume that which I find to be the same as that which finds; the finding and the found are to be the same.

Second. What does this mean: I *find* myself?

The found is here opposed to that which is produced through our free activity; and more particularly the finding is here determined as that which finds; *i.e.*, in so far as I find I am conscious of no other activity than that of a mere taking hold of something; that which I take hold of being neither produced nor in any manner modified by my taking hold of it. It is to be, and to be precisely as it is, independently of my taking hold of it. It was without having been taken hold of, and would have remained as it was although I had not taken hold of it. My taking hold of it was altogether accidental for it, and did not change it in the least. Thus, at least, do I appear to myself in finding, and at present we are merely concerned in establishing the facts of consciousness, but not in showing how it may be in truth, *i.e.*, from the highest standpoint of speculation. In short, something is *given* to the perceiving subject; he is to be purely passive, and something is to force itself upon him, which, in our case he is to recognize as himself.

Third. What does this signify: I find myself as *willing*, and can find myself *only as willing*?

What willing means is presupposed as well known. This conception is capable of no real explanation, nor does it need any. Each one must become conscious in himself, through intellectual contemplation, as to what it signifies, and will doubtless be able to do so without any difficulty. The fact which the above words suggest is as follows:—I become conscious of a willing. I add in thinking to this willing something which exists independently of my consciousness, and which I assert to be the willing subject in this will, or to be that which is to *have* this will, in which this will is to be. *How* we come to add such a substance in thinking, and what are the grounds of it, we do not discuss here. We

merely assert here *that* it does occur, and of this each one must convince himself by self-observation. I become *conscious* of, or perceive, this will. But I also become conscious now of this consciousness, or of this perception, and relate it also to a substance; and this conscious substance is for me the same which has the will. Hence I find the willing subject to be my self, or I find *myself* willing.

I find myself *only* as willing. I have not an immediate perception of substance. Substance is, indeed, no object of perception at all, but is merely that which is added through thinking to an object of perception. I can immediately perceive only something, which is to be a manifestation of the substance. Now there are only two manifestations which can be immediately ascribed to that substance: *Thinking*, in the widest significance of the word, and *willing*. The former is originally and immediately for itself not at all an object of a special new consciousness, but is consciousness itself. Only in so far as it is related and opposed to another objective does itself become objective in *this opposition*. Hence, as original objective manifestation of that substance there remains only the latter, the *willing*; and this, indeed, remains always only objective, is never itself a thinking, but always only the thought manifestation of self-activity. In short, the manifestation which alone I originally ascribe to myself is the willing, and I become conscious of myself only on condition of becoming conscious of myself as a willing.

PROOF.

Having thus explained the above proposition, we now proceed to establish its proof. This proof is based:

First. *On the conception of the Ego*.—The significance of this conception has just been established through its genesis. That each one does truly proceed in the

described manner when endeavouring to think his self; and that, on the other hand, such a proceeding gives rise to no other thought than that of his self; this each one must find in himself, and it cannot be specially proved to him.

Second. On the necessity of the *original oppositedness of an objective and a subjective in consciousness*.—In all thinking there is a thought which is not that thinking itself, in all consciousness there is something of which we are conscious, and which is not that consciousness itself. The truth of this assertion each one also must find in the self-contemplation of his procedure, and it cannot be proven to him from conceptions. It is true that afterwards we become conscious of our thinking *as such, i.e., as a doing*, and thereupon make it an object of our thinking; and the ease and natural tendency to do this is what constitutes philosophical genius, without which no one will grasp the significance of transcendental philosophy. But even this is only possible if we imperceptibly subsume under that thinking as merely thought, for only on this condition do we really think a thinking.

Third. *On the character of the original objective*, that it is to be something existing independently of thinking, hence something *actual* and in and through itself existing. This also each one must convince himself of through internal contemplation, for although this relation of the objective to the subjective is developed in a science of knowledge, it is by no means proven from its conception, nor can it be so proven, since the latter only becomes possible through that self-contemplation.

The proof may be stated thus: It is the character of the Ego, *that the acting and that which is acted upon be one and the same*. This is the case when the Ego is thought. Only in so far as the thought is the same as the thinking do I hold the thought to be my self. But in the present case we are to have nothing to do with

thinking. It is true that, since the thinking and the thought are one, I am myself the thinking; but our present proposition asserts that the *thought*, the *objective*, is to be *Ego simply by itself and independently of thinking*, and is to be recognized in this manner as *Ego*, for our proposition asserts that it is *found as Ego*.

Hence, in the thought as such, *i.e.*, in so far as it is to be merely the objective and never the subjective, there must be an identity of the acting and that which is acted upon; which, since the thought is to be merely an object, is an *actual* acting upon itself (not a mere contemplating of itself like the ideal activity), or in other words, *an actual self-determining of itself through itself*. But such an acting we call willing, and willing we only think as such an acting. Hence the proposition, to find *my self*, is absolutely identical with the proposition, to find my self willing. Only in so far as I find myself willing do I find *myself*, and in so far as I find myself I necessarily find myself *willing*.

REMARK.

It is clear that the proposition here proved, "When I find myself I necessarily find myself willing," in order to be productive of categorical results must be preceded by another one, to wit: "I necessarily find myself, become necessarily conscious of myself." This self-consciousness is proved, not as fact, for as such it is immediate, but in its connection with all other consciousness, and as reciprocally determining it in a fundamental science of knowledge; and hence our present proposition, together with all the results which may flow from it, will itself become a necessary result as well as a condition of self-consciousness. It may be said of this proposition, and these its future results, so certain as I am I, or as I am self-conscious, so certain does this or that necessarily exist in and for me. And thus it

appears how our present science of morality is based on the common ground of all philosophy.

B. SOLUTION CONTINUED. But willing itself is thinkable only under the presupposition of a something distinct from the Ego.

PROOF.

It is true that in philosophical abstraction we may speak of a willing in general, which on that very account is undetermined; but all truly *perceivable* willing, such as we speak of here, is necessarily a determined willing, in which *something* is willed. To will something is to require that a determined object, which in the willing of it is only thought as *possible*—for if it were thought as *actual* the act would not be a willing, but a perceiving—shall become actual object of a perception. This requirement, therefore, clearly refers us to the external. Hence, all willing involves the postulate of an external object, and the conception of willing involves something which is not our self.

But more than this. The possibility of postulating in the willing an external object presupposes already within us the conception of an externality in general, and this conception is only possible through experience. But this experience likewise is a relation of our self to something outside of us. In other words, that which I will is never anything else than a modification of an object which is to be actually existing outside of me. All my willing is therefore conditioned by the perception of an external object, and in willing I do not perceive myself as I am in and for myself, but merely as I may become in a certain relation to external things.

C. SOLUTION CONCLUDED. Hence, in order to find my true essence, I must abstract from this foreign characteristic in willing. That which remains after this abstraction is my pure being.

EXPLANATION.

This proposition is the immediate result of the previous propositions. Hence, we have only to investigate what that is which remains after having undertaken the required abstraction. Willing, as such, is a first; is absolutely grounded in itself, and in nothing external whatsoever. Let us make clear this conception, upon which all depends here, and which can only be *negatively* comprehended and explained—since a first signifies merely that which is derived from nothing else, and absolutely grounded in itself signifies merely not grounded in anything else.

Whatsoever is dependent, conditioned, or grounded through another may be cognized, in so far as it is thus, *mediately*, namely, from a cognition of that upon which it depends, or in which it is grounded. Thus, for instance, if a ball is set in motion, I can certainly have immediate perception of its movement, of the point from which it starts, the point where it rests, and the celerity with which it moves; but I could likewise obtain a knowledge of all this if I were merely made acquainted with the *conditions* under which the ball rests, and the force of the stroke with which it is set in motion, although I had no immediate perception of the motion whatever. Hence the motion of the ball is considered as something dependent, or conditioned—as not primary. An absolute first, and in itself grounded somewhat, must therefore be of such a character that it cannot be cognized *mediately* through another, but only *immediately* through itself. It is what it is because it is so.

In so far, therefore, as the willing is absolute and primary, it cannot be explained in any manner from something outside of the Ego, but only from the Ego itself. This *absoluteness* it is, therefore, which remains when we abstract from all foreign elements.

REMARK.

That willing, in the significance here attached to it, does *appear* as absolute is a fact of consciousness which each one will find in himself, and which cannot be externally proved to anyone who has not this immediate knowledge of it as a fact. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that this appearance of it as absolute may be further explained and deduced, whereby the appearing absoluteness will itself be further explained and cease to be absoluteness, the appearance thereof changing into mere semblance. In a similar manner it also appears to us, as an immediate fact of consciousness, that certain things exist independently of us in time and space, and yet transcendental philosophy further explains and deduces this appearance; although it does not change that appearance into a mere semblance, for reasons not here to be stated. It is true no one will be able to furnish such an explanation of willing. Nevertheless, if anyone should say that willing has an external—and to us incomprehensible—ground, there can be no theoretical rational ground objected against the assertion, although it likewise can also prefer no ground in its favour. The truth is that when we resolve to consider this appearance as no further explicable, or, rather, as absolutely inexplicable—that is to say, as truth, and as our only truth, according to which all other truth must be judged and accepted; and upon this resolve our whole philosophy is erected. In that case, we make this resolve not from any theoretical insight, but in consequence of a practical interest. I *will* be independent: hence I resolve to consider myself independent. Such a resolve is called *Faith*. Hence our philosophy starts from a faith, and knows it. Dogmatism, which, logically carried out, makes the same assertion, starts also from a faith (in the thing in itself), but generally does not know it. In our philosophy each one makes himself the absolute

starting-point, or basis, of his philosophy: hence our system appears as without a basis to all those who are incapable of doing so. But we can also assure all these, in advance, that they will never find a basis elsewhere, unless they are satisfied with this. It is necessary that our philosophy should say this openly, so that it may no longer be called upon to demonstrate externally to men what each one must create within himself.

How do we think this absoluteness in willing?

In order to assist the reader at the very beginning in obtaining some insight into this conception (which is probably, in the abstractness it has received here, the most difficult of all conceptions in philosophy, although it will doubtless receive the highest clearness in the progress of our present science, the whole object of which is merely to further determine this conception), we make use of an

ILLUSTRATION.

Let the reader imagine a steel spring, bent together. There is doubtless in the spring a tendency to repel the pressure, hence a tendency outwards. Such a spring is the picture of an actual willing, as the *state* or condition of a rational being; but of it I do not speak here. Let me now ask what is the first *ground* (not condition) of this tendency, as a real and determined manifestation of the spring? Doubtless an inner action of the spring upon itself, a self-determination. For no one surely will say that the outward force which presses the spring is the ground of the spring's reacting against it. This self-determining is the same as the mere *act* of willing in the rational being. Both together would produce in the spring, if it could contemplate itself, the consciousness of a will to repel the pressing force. But all these moments are possible only on condition that such an external pressure is actually exercised upon the spring.

In the same way the rational being cannot determine itself to an actual willing, unless it stands in reciprocal relation with something external (for as such the rational being *appears* to itself).

But this is also to be abstracted from, and hence we do not speak here of this moment any more than of the first-mentioned one. Now if we abstract from the external pressure altogether, does there yet remain anything whereby we think the steel spring as such, and what is this remainder? Evidently that, by which I judge the steel spring to have a tendency to repel any outside pressure as soon as it occurs; hence the own inner tendency thereof to determine itself to react, or the real essence of elasticity as the final and no further explicable ground of all the appearances of the spring, whenever the conditions of its manifestation are given. (The very essential distinction between this original tendency in the steel spring, and the same in the rational being, will appear in the following investigations.)

In the same manner in which we removed all foreign elements from the conception of elasticity in the steel spring, we now proceed to remove all foreign elements in the Ego comprehended through its willing, and thus to arrive at a comprehension of its pure absolute-ness.

So far as the *form* of this problem is concerned, it is a problem to think the Ego in the required abstraction as a *permanent*, and hence that, through which it is to be comprehended and characterized in this thinking, must be an essential and permanent. Its manifestations and appearances can change, because the conditions under which it manifests itself change; but that which manifests itself under all these conditions remains always the same.

So far as the *content* of the problem is concerned, that which is to be thought is to be the ground of an absolute

essentially
the same

willing. (All willing is absolute.) What, then, is it? Each one must have truly thought, together with us, that which we required him to think; must have undertaken, together with us, the prescribed abstractions; and must now observe himself internally, and see what it is that remains, what it is that he still thinks, after having removed all those foreign elements. Only thus can the required knowledge be infused into him. A name cannot make it clear, for the whole conception has never been thought before, much less named. But to give it a name, we will call it, *absolute tendency to the absolute*; absolute undeterminability through anything not itself; tendency absolutely to determine itself without any external persuasion. It is not only a mere *power*, or *faculty*, for a faculty is not actual, but is merely that which we think in advance of our actuality, in order to be able to receive it in a *series* of our thinking; and that which we have to think here is to be something actual, is to be that which constitutes the essence of the Ego. And yet this conception of a faculty is also involved in it. When related to the actual manifestation, which is only possible on condition of a given object, it is in this relation the faculty or power of such manifestation. Neither is it an *impulse*, as one might call the ground of the elasticity in the steel spring; for an impulse operates necessarily when the conditions of its operating are given, and operates in a materially determined manner. But concerning the Ego, we know as yet nothing in relation to this point, and are not allowed to make hasty judgments in advance of the investigation.

RESULT.

The essential character of the Ego, through which it distinguishes itself from all that is outside of it, consists in its tendency to self-activity for the sake of self-activity; and it is this tendency which is thought, when

the Ego is thought in and for itself without relation to anything external.

REMARK.

It must be remembered that the Ego is here considered only *as object*, but not as *Ego in general*. In the latter case, our above result would be utterly false.

CHAPTER II.

WE have just shown what the Ego *is*, in and for itself; or, to express it more carefully, how the Ego must necessarily be *thought*, if it is thought solely as object.

But the *Ego* is something only in so far as it posits itself (contemplates and thinks itself) as such, and the Ego is nothing so far as it does not posit itself. This is a proposition taken from and proved in the science of knowledge, and which we need therefore only explain here in a few words.

A thing, and the utter opposite of a thing, the Ego, or a rational being, are distinguished by this, that the thing merely *is*, without knowing of its being in the least, whereas in the Ego, being and consciousness join together; the being of the Ego not being without self-consciousness of the Ego, and *vice versa*, no self-consciousness of the Ego without a being of that whereof it becomes conscious. All being relates to a consciousness, and even the existence of a *thing* cannot be thought without adding in thinking an intelligence which knows of this existence. But in the case of the thing this knowing is not posited in the thing, which is, but in an external intelligence; whereas the knowing of the being of the Ego is posited in the same substance, which *is*; and only in so far as this immediate connection of consciousness and being is posited can it be said the Ego is this or that.

Applying this to the present case, it follows that the Ego must know of that which we have established as the essence of the Ego, as sure as that is its essence.

Here there is necessarily a consciousness of the described absolute tendency. It may be of advantage, not merely to state this result generally, but to enter upon a particular description of this consciousness. We now proceed to undertake this task.

PROBLEM. To become definitely conscious of the consciousness of our original being.

EXPLANATORY.

It is self-evident that we are conscious whereof we speak, whether we speak philosophically or otherwise. Thus in the preceding chapter we became conscious of something. The object of our consciousness was produced through free self-determination of our thinking faculty by means of an arbitrary abstraction.

But at present we assert that the same object exists for us *originally*, *i.e.*, independent of all philosophising, and necessarily forces itself upon us as sure as we have any consciousness at all. If this is true, then an original consciousness thereof exists, though perhaps not precisely as of a single object, in the same abstraction in which we have just established it. Perhaps it may always occur in this original consciousness, in and together with another thought, as a determination of that thought.

Now let us ask—Is, then, this original consciousness differently constituted from that which we have just now produced in us through philosophizing? How were this possible, since the same is to be its object, and since the philosopher has surely no other subjective form of thinking than the common and original form of thinking of universal reason?

Why, then, do we seek what we already possess? We have it without knowing it; and at present we only want to produce this knowing of it within us. The rational being is constituted in such a manner as rarely to observe its own thinking when thinking, but only the

object of its thinking; or as usually to lose itself, the subject, in the object. Nevertheless, philosophy is, above all, anxious to know the subject as such in order to obtain a judgment concerning its influence upon the determination of the object. This can only be done if the mere reflection is made the object of a new reflection.

To the non-philosopher it may seem curious and, perhaps, ridiculous to require anyone to become conscious of a consciousness; but this would only prove his ignorance of philosophy and his inability to philosophize.

GENETICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF OUR ORIGINAL BEING.

The Ego has the absolute power of contemplation, for only through it is it Ego. This power can be no further deduced, and needs no further deduction. With the positing of an Ego this power is posited.

Again, the Ego can and must contemplate what it is. The peculiar determination of contemplation, here postulated, requires likewise no deduction or mediation through external grounds. The Ego contemplates itself because it does, so far as regards the mere fact.

Now let us proceed to determine this fact; in doing which we shall and must calculate in each reader upon his own self-active generation of that whereof we speak, and upon his close observation of that which will arise within him when he thus generates.

A. The contemplating intelligence posits the above described tendency to absolute activity as *itself*, or as identical with itself, the intelligence that absoluteness of real activity thus becomes the true essence of the intelligence, and is brought under the authority of the conception, whereby alone it first becomes true *freedom*: absoluteness of the absoluteness, absolute power to make itself absolute. Through the consciousness of its absoluteness the Ego tears itself loose from itself, and posits itself as independent.

EXPLANATORY.

Let me explain this expression: it tears itself loose from itself. All contemplation, as such, is to be directed upon something existing independently of it, and existing precisely as it is contemplated. It is the same with the contemplation whereof we speak here. The Ego as absolute is to have had existence before it was seized in contemplation, and this absoluteness is to constitute its independent being, apart from all contemplation of it. Now, where the contemplated is something outside of the contemplating, the intelligence is altogether passive in its observation. Such is not to be the case in our instance. Here the contemplated is itself the contemplating; not immediately as such, it is true, but it is the same one essence, power, and substance as the contemplating. Hence the intelligence is in this instance not merely a passive observer, but rather *becomes* for itself absolute real power of the conception. The Ego, as absolute power with consciousness, tears itself loose from the Ego, as the *given* absolute without power and consciousness.

It is well to dwell somewhat longer upon this chief thought, which may seem difficult to many, but upon the direct comprehension whereof the possibility of understanding our whole system depends.

Let the reader once more think of an elastic steel spring. It is true that the spring contains within itself the principle of a peculiar movement, which is not given to the spring externally, but which rather resists the direction given it from without. Nevertheless you will doubtless hesitate to ascribe that which you have hitherto very properly called *freedom* to the spring. Whence this hesitation? If you should say, "Because the resistance follows from the nature of the spring, and from the circumstance of an external pressure upon it with inevitable necessity," I am willing to remove this inevit-

able necessity. I will permit you to assume that the steel spring, at some time, resists the pressure from an unknown reason, and at another time from an unknown reason cedes to the pressure. Are you now going to call such a steel spring free? I do not believe it. The conception of freedom, instead of facilitating the connection of freedom with the spring, rather asks you to think something absolutely unthinkable, namely, blind chance; and you will persist in saying that although you do not know through what the spring is determined to resist, you are sure that the spring is thus determined, and does not *determine itself* to resist, and that the spring can, therefore, not be called free.

Now, let me ask you, what do you think when you think "to be determined" in opposition to "self-determined," and what is it you require for the possibility of the latter? We will try to make this clear; and since you found it impossible to do anything with the thought of a free thing as a thing dependent upon blind chance, nor found that thought to facilitate the connection of freedom with a thing, we shall commence with it. You said, then, the steel spring is *determined by its nature* to resist external pressure. What does this mean? In thus asking, What does it mean? I do not propose that you shall acquire an external knowledge, or discover new results by progressive conclusions from an acquired knowledge. That which I ask for, you think at this very moment, and you have always thought it, even before you resolved to philosophize; and I merely ask that you shall make clear to yourself what you really think, or that you shall but understand what you say. The nature of the thing is its fixed being, without internal movement, quiet and dead; and such a fixed being you posit necessarily when you posit a thing and a nature thereof, for such a positing is precisely the thinking of a thing. Now, together with this unchangeable permanency of the thing, you posit that under

a certain condition a change will result in the thing. For that which you have posited as *fixed* and *unchangeable* is the nature of the thing, which does not depend upon the thing, since the thing is itself its own nature, and its nature is the thing itself. When you think the one, you necessarily think the other also, and you will surely not say that the thing exists in advance of its own nature, and determines its own nature. But having once posited this nature of the thing, you proceed in your thinking from a being (of the nature of the thing) to another being (of the manifestation of this nature under certain conditions), and this progression of your thinking describes a steady series of being. Expressing the same subjectively, your contemplation is always tied down, is always merely passively observing, and there is not a moment in the series when it might become self-productive; and this condition of your thinking is precisely that which you call the thinking of *necessity*, and through which you deny all freedom to the object of such thinking.

We have, therefore, discovered the ground why you find it absolutely impossible to think freedom in our present case, and in all similar cases. Expressing it objectively, all being which flows itself from a being is a necessary being, and not a product of freedom. Expressing it subjectively, the conception of a necessary being arises in us through the connecting of one being with another being.

From this you will now be able to conclude, through opposition, what it is you require in order to think freedom, which you surely can think, and always have thought.

You require a being which shall have, not no ground at all—for such you cannot think—but a ground in something which is not again a being. Now, besides being, we only have thinking. Hence, a being which you may be able to think as product of freedom must proceed from a thinking. Let us see whether this pre-supposition makes freedom comprehensible.

Something which is not determined, but determines itself, is to be called force. Is this active determining comprehensible when presupposed as occurring through a *thinking*? Undoubtedly, provided we are but able to think thinking itself, and do not again make a thing out of our conception. The reason why we could not derive freedom from a being was because the conception of a being involved that of a fixed permanency. But such permanent being does not hinder us when we derive freedom from thinking, since thinking is not posited as something permanent, remaining, etc., but as agility [Agilitat = producing activity], and only as agility, of the intelligence.

To be posited as free, something must be posited as determining *itself*. Such was your assertion. (It must not only be not determined through an external other, but also not through its own nature.) What does that *Itself* mean? It doubtless involves the thought of a twofold. The free is to *be* before it *is determined*; it is to have an existence independent of its determinedness. A thing cannot be thought as determining itself precisely because it has not being in advance of its nature, or of the system of its determinedness. But the intelligence, with its conception of real being, is in advance of that real being, and the former contains the ground of the latter. The conception of a certain being precedes that being, and the latter is dependent upon the former.

Our assertion is, therefore, that only the *intelligence* can be thought as *free*, and that the intelligence becomes free only through thus seizing itself as intelligence, for only thus does it subsume its being under something which is higher than all being, namely, the conception. Somebody might object that in our own argumentation (in the preceding chapter) the absoluteness is presupposed as a being; and that the reflection which is now to achieve such great wonders is evidently itself conditioned through that absoluteness, having it for its object, and

is neither reflection in general nor this particular reflection, unless an object in general and this particular object are presupposed. To this objection we reply that it will appear hereafter how this absoluteness itself is required for, and results from, the possibility of an intelligence in general, and that hence the above proposition may also be reversed as follows: only that which is free can be thought as an intelligence; an intelligence is necessarily free.

B. The Ego, in contemplating that tendency to absolute activity as itself, posits itself as free, *i.e.*, as a power to have causality through the mere conception.

EXPLANATORY.

Freedom is, according to Kant, the power to absolutely begin a condition or being. This is an excellent nominal explanation; and yet it seems to have been of little value in effecting a better insight into freedom. For that explanation did not answer the higher question: *how* a condition or being could have an absolute beginning, or how such an absolute beginning could be thought; by which answer a genetical conception of freedom would have been generated before our very eyes. Now this we have just done. The absolutely beginning condition is not connected with nothingness—for the finite rational being necessarily thinks through mediation and connection. But it begins with *thinking* itself—not with a being but with thinking.

In order to establish the conception in this manner, it is certainly necessary to walk, and to be able to walk, the path of the science of knowledge, to be able to abstract from all being, as such (or from the fact), and to start from that which is higher than all being, from contemplating and thinking, or from the acting of the intelligence in general. The same path, which alone leads to the right end in the theoretical philosophy in

explaining being, is the path which also alone makes practical philosophy possible. This likewise makes more clear our previous expression: "The Ego posits itself as independent." The first view of this proposition, namely, "The Ego gathers up all that it originally is—and originally it is nothing unless free—in the contemplation and conception of itself" we have already explained completely. But that proposition involves something more. For all that the Ego can be in *actuality*, when the conception becomes cognition, and when the intelligence is the mere passive observer of the external world, originally depends, after all, upon the conception. Whatsoever the Ego is to become, the Ego must first make itself to be through the conception, and whatsoever the Ego will be in the future it most surely will have made itself through the conception. Hence the Ego is its own ground in every respect, and absolutely *posits itself* even in a practical significance.

But the Ego only posits itself as a faculty or power.

This must, and can, be strictly proven. For the tendency to have absolute activity comes under the authority of the intelligence, as we have seen. But the intelligence, as such, is—as each one must discover in contemplating himself as intelligence, and as cannot be demonstrated to anybody—absolutely determining itself a mere *pure activity*, in opposition to all *permanent* and *posited being*, however finely conceived; hence it is capable of no determination through its nature or essence, or through a tendency, impulse, or inclination in it. Hence also such an inclination, however finely conceived, is not possible in that power of activity which is under the control of the intelligence, in so far as it is under such control; which active power is therefore to be thought as a mere *pure faculty*, *i.e.*, as merely a conception, to which an actuality can, in thinking, be connected as to its ground, although there is not in it the least datum to show *what sort of an* actuality it will be.

CHAPTER III.

IT must have appeared strange to the reader that, in the preceding chapter, we deduced from a reflection of a tendency a consciousness, which has no similarity to a tendency at all, and that we thus appeared to lose sight utterly of the real character of this tendency. According to the principle upon which our argument, in the preceding chapter, was based, the Ego is only that as which it posits itself. Now the Ego is to be originally a tendency. The Ego must, therefore, have this character *for itself*—must become conscious of this, its character. The question is, therefore, not at all *whether* such a consciousness does occur in the Ego, but simply *how* this consciousness may be constituted in its form? We shall obtain the required insight best by causing this consciousness to form itself under our very eyes. Hence it is our

PROBLEM. To see in what manner the Ego becomes conscious of its tendency to absolute self-activity, as such tendency.

EXPLANATORY.

In our previous chapter we proceeded by absolutely postulating a reflection upon the objective Ego under consideration; undoubtedly justified in so doing, since the Ego is necessarily intelligence, and an intelligence unconditionally contemplating itself. We, the philosophers, were mere spectators of a self-contemplation on the part of the original Ego, and that which we established was

not our own thought but a thought of the Ego; the object of our reflection was itself a reflection.

In the present chapter we likewise calculate—provided we can solve our problem at all—upon arriving at such an original reflection of the Ego; but we cannot well take our starting-point from it. For the mere postulate of a reflection results in nothing further than what we have already discovered, and found to be insufficient, namely, the consciousness of a mere faculty, or power, but on no account of a tendency, or impulse. To state the distinction briefly, the reflection of our previous chapter was absolutely possible, but the one of the present chapter must first be grounded in its possibility, which grounding we now undertake through our philosophizing.

SOLUTION.

A. The posited tendency necessarily manifests itself as impulse in the *whole* Ego.

REMARKS.

A particular proof of this assertion is not needed, resulting, as it does, from a mere analysis of what has been established in our first chapter. The tendency is posited as the essence of the Ego, and hence belongs, as such, to the Ego, and cannot be abstracted from, without cancelling the Ego. But as mere tendency it is *impulse*, *i.e.*, real internal explanatory ground of an actual self-activity. Now an impulse which is posited as essential, permanent, and ineradicable, impels, and this is its manifestation: both expressions express precisely the same.

Now, if we think the Ego, in which the impulse is, *merely objectively*, then the working of the impulse is comprehensible easily enough; it will effect a self-activity as soon as the external conditions are given; precisely as was the case with the steel spring. The act will follow

from the impulse, like the effect from its cause. Nay, we may even add, in thought, the intelligence, but in such a manner as to have it dependent upon the objective qualitiveness; and the impulse will be accompanied by a yearning, or the deed by a resolve, with the same necessity—if the conditions are but given—with which the deed resulted from the impulse.

We *may* think the Ego thus merely objectively in relation to the impulse, and will be forced to think it thus hereafter; but at present this repeated separation in a conception which we have composed already would serve us nothing, and only tend to distract our attention. A systematical progression requires that we should further determine our last result as we found it, and hence we must not think the Ego here objectively, but, as we have established it in the preceding chapter, objectively and subjectively together. This is the significance of the term, the *whole* Ego, which we made use of above.

Perhaps it may be well to state this still clearer. The Egoness, then, consists in the absolute identity of the subjective and objective, in the absolute union of being with consciousness, and of consciousness with being. Neither the subjective nor the objective, but an identity, is the essence of the Ego; and we mention the former twofold only to designate the empty spot of this identity. Now, can anyone think this identity as himself? Of course not; for in order to think himself *he must make that very distinction between the subjective and objective*, which is *not* to be made in that conception of the identity. Without this distinction, indeed, no thinking whatsoever is possible. Hence we never think both (the subjective and the objective) together, but always one after the other, and through this very thinking of the one after the other, we always think the one as dependent upon the other. Hence it is very natural, to be sure, that one should ask, *am* I because *I think myself*,

or *do I think myself* because I *am*? But such a because and such a therefore does not occur here at all. You are neither of the two because you are the other; you are not twofold in any manner, but absolutely one; and you are this unthinkable one absolutely because you are it.

This conception, which is only to be described as the problem of a thinking, but which can never be thought itself, points out an empty place in our investigation, which we shall call X. The Ego cannot, for the reason stated, comprehend itself; it is absolutely = X.

Now this whole Ego, in so far as it is neither subject nor object, but subject-object, has, in itself, a tendency to absolute self-activity, which, if separated from the substance itself, and thought as ground of its activity, is an impulse which impels it. Should anyone still doubt our authority to relate this impulse to the whole Ego, we can easily remove that doubt now, by a separation of the Ego, which is permissible here. For the Ego, in reflecting upon itself, according to the preceding chapter, posits that which is involved in its objectivity, as itself, even in so far as it is reflecting or subjective. Now the objective doubtless contains an impulse, and this impulse is changed through the reflection into an impulse upon the subjective; and since the Ego consists, in the main, of both, it becomes an impulse directed upon the whole Ego.

But *how* this impulse can manifest itself in the whole Ego cannot be determined here, particularly as even that upon which it is directed is absolutely incomprehensible. We can only say negatively that it cannot manifest itself with necessity and mechanical action, since the Ego, in its subjectivity, has placed its power of activity under the authority of its thinking, and since its thinking is not determinable through anything external, but only through itself.

B. From this manifestation of the impulse there does not result a feeling.

REMARKS.

Feeling in general is the mere immediate relation of the objective, in the Ego, to the subjective in the same, of its being to its consciousness; and the power of feeling is the true point of union of both, though only in so far—as appears from our above description—as the subjective is considered as dependent upon the objective. (For in so far as the objective is considered as dependent upon the subjective, the point of union of both is the *will*.)

This can be made clearer as follows:—The objective in the Ego is determined, moved, or changed without any action of its own, and precisely like the mere thing. But since the Ego is never merely objective, the subjective always being united with it in the same one and undivided essence, there necessarily arises with the change of the objective a change of the subjective, and hence a consciousness of that change in the objective; but this consciousness appears as if it were produced in the same mechanical manner as that in which the change is produced. This is the peculiar characteristic of feeling. In representation, the representing subject is also, it is true, merely passive, *i.e.*, when the representation is directed upon any actual external being; but in *feeling* there is no consciousness on the part of the subject of any internal agility, whereas in representation this consciousness certainly arises in regard to the form of the representation. In representation, I certainly do not produce the represented, but I certainly produce the act of representing it; whereas in feeling I produce neither the felt nor the act of feeling. It is impossible to determine these distinctions more closely through conception, and even the distinctions specified here have no meaning, unless made clear by each one to himself

through contemplation of himself in these various conditions. Such descriptions as we have attempted here are not to replace but merely to guide self-contemplation.

It is true that we shall soon meet a determinateness of the merely objective Ego through the impulse of absolute self-activity, and that we shall moreover deduce also feeling from this determinateness. But at present we are not speaking of any determinateness of the merely objective, but of the *whole* Ego = X. Can a feeling result from this determinateness?

A feeling presupposes, according to our description, partly the dependence of the merely objective upon an impulse, and partly the dependence of the subjective upon the objective. In the present case, the latter dependence has not been posited at all as possible, for both the subjective and objective are not to be considered as distinct, but rather as absolutely one, and have been determined as thus absolutely one. What this one may be, and what may be its determinateness, is incomprehensible to us, as we have seen. But in order to comprehend at least something, we can only begin with one of the two parts into which we necessarily separate, or into which this one necessarily separates. Now since it is the Ego whereof we speak, in so far as its objective is to stand under the authority of the subjective, it will be most proper to begin with the subjective.

The Ego as intelligence, therefore, is immediately determined through the impulse. A determination of the intelligence is a thought. Hence:

C. From the manifestation of the impulse there results necessarily a thought.

(It has been previously stated that the intelligence, as absolute agility, is not capable of any determination whatever; that it brings forth its thoughts, but that no

thoughts can be brought forth in it. The present statement might seem to be a contradiction of that previous result, but it will be apparent hereafter that both statements may well go together.)

I. We therefore proceed to determine this thought, and in doing so first investigate it in regard to its *form*.

A *determined* thinking, such as we reflect upon at present, appears either as determined through a being—namely, when the thought is to be an actual object, in which case the thought results in our consciousness as it does simply because the thing is as it is—or as determined through another thinking; in which latter case we say it results from this other thinking, and we then attain an insight into a series of rational grounds.

Neither case occurs in our present instance. Our thought is *not determined* through a being, because we do not think an objective determinateness, not even that of the objective Ego, but of the whole Ego; and it is not determined through a thinking, because in this thought the Ego thinks itself, and thinks itself in its fundamental essence, but not with derived predicates; and because this thinking of the Ego, particularly in this respect, is not conditioned by any other thinking, but rather conditions itself all other thinking.

Hence this thought is not conditioned and determined through anything outside of it, neither through a being nor through a thinking, but absolutely through itself alone. It is a first immediate thinking. Strange as such an assertion may appear at the first glance, it follows correctly from the established premises, and is most important as well for the particular philosophical science which we establish here, as for the whole transcendental philosophy. It must be carefully noted therefore.

Through it, thinking is rendered absolute in regard to its form; we obtain a series, which absolutely commences with a thought, which itself is grounded in nothing besides, and connected with nothing else. For the fact

that we have just now in our philosophizing grounded this thought, moreover, in an impulse, has no influence upon *common* consciousness, which begins with it, and is not a consciousness of the established grounds; as, indeed, we have proven.

It is also to be remarked that this relation of the subjective to the objective is truly the original relation in the Ego; and that the opposite relation, wherein the thought is posited as dependent upon the being, is grounded in this first relation, and must be derived from it. (To establish this deduction is the business of another branch of philosophy; though we shall also have to recur to it hereafter.)

But the described thought is also absolute in regard to its content, it is thought as it is thought simply because it is thus thought. This is of particular importance for our present science, lest some should be induced, as has occurred frequently, to attempt a further explanation and deduction of the consciousness of our duties (for as such the described thought will soon show itself to be), which attempt is futile, involving an impossibility, and is also derogatory to the dignity and absoluteness of the moral law. In short, this thinking is the absolute principle of our being; through it we absolutely constitute, and in it consists, our being. For the essence of our being is not a material permanent, as that of lifeless things, but rather a consciousness, and moreover a *determined* consciousness.

That we think this thinking we know immediately, for thinking is precisely this immediate consciousness of the determinateness of ourself as intelligence; and in the present case of an intelligence, purely as such. An immediate consciousness is called *contemplation*; and since the contemplation here is not directed upon an external being by means of feeling, but rather upon the intelligence immediately as such, it is called very properly *intellectual contemplation*. It is, indeed, the only one

which *originally and actually* occurs in every man without the freedom of philosophical abstraction. The intellectual contemplation, which the transcendental philosopher requires of all students, is the mere form of this *actual* intellectual contemplation, is the mere contemplation of the inner absolute spontaneity of the same, with utter abstraction from its determinateness. Without this actual contemplation, the philosophical contemplation were not possible; our thinking is originally determined originally and not abstract.

2. We now proceed to describe that thought in regard to its content.

The whole Ego is determined through the impulse to have absolute self-activity, and it is this determinateness which is thought in our present thinking. But the whole Ego cannot be comprehended, and hence, likewise, not immediately a determinateness of the whole Ego. It is only through reciprocal determination of the subjective and the objective that we can approximate the determinateness of the whole Ego, and we shall now attempt to do so.

Let us first think the subjective determined through the objective. The essence of objectivity is an absolute unchangeable permanency. Applying this to the subjective, we arrive at a permanent unchangeable, or, in other words, at a necessary thinking, a law of thinking. Now, the determining impulse is an impulse to absolute self-activity. Hence, there results as content of the deduced thought: that the intelligence must give to itself an irrevocable law to realize absolute self-activity.

Let us now think the objective determined through the subjective. The subjective is the positing of an absolute but completely undetermined power of freedom, as described in our previous chapter. This is to determine, to produce, and condition the described objective. In other words, the thought just now established (that the intelligence must propound to itself a law to realize

absolute self-activity), is possible only on condition that the Ego thinks itself as free.

But each is reciprocally to determine the other. That is to say, the described self-legislation of the Ego occurs only when the Ego thinks itself as free, but if the Ego thinks itself as free it occurs necessarily. Thus, then, the admitted difficulty of conceiving a determinateness of the thinking is likewise removed; for the described thought does not occur necessarily, since in that case thinking would cease to be thinking (there being no freedom), and the subjective would change into an objective; but it occurs necessarily only as thinking thinks with absolute freedom that very freedom. Strictly speaking, therefore, this thought is not a particular thought, but merely the *necessary manner* of thinking our freedom. (This is very important.) It is the same with all other necessity of thinking. Such necessity is not absolute necessity, which, indeed, is not possible, since all thinking starts from a free thinking of our self; but it is merely conditioned by our thinking anything at all. If we think anything, then we *must necessarily* think in this or that manner; such is altogether the character of necessity in thinking.

It is still to be observed that this thought grounds itself upon an impulse, and hence must retain the character of an impulse, which character is that of a postulate. The content of the deduced thought may, therefore, be described, in short, as follows: We are forced to think, that we are to determine ourselves through conceptions with consciousness, and to determine ourselves thus according to the conception of absolute self-activity, and this thinking is the very consciousness of our original tendency to absolute self-activity which we were looking for.

CHAPTER IV.

STRICTLY speaking, our deduction is now ended. Its real object was, as our readers know, to deduce the thought that we are to act in a certain manner from the system of reason in general, or to show that the supposition of a rational being involves necessarily also the supposition that such a being thinks this thought. Such a deduction is absolutely required for the science of a system of reason, which science is itself its own end.

But such a deduction involves many other advantages besides. Apart from the fact that we comprehend nothing truly and well which we do not see arise from its grounds, and that hence we can attain complete insight into the morality of our being only through such a deduction, it is likewise to be considered that the comprehensibility which this deduction throws upon the categorical imperative of Kant will remove from it the appearance of an occult quality which it has hitherto borne (though without the positive fault of Kant), and will thus be the surest means to annihilate the dark region which that part of Kant's system left open hitherto for various visionary theories to take refuge in. Hence, also, it is all the more important to dissipate completely, by manifold and freer views, the darkness which may still rest upon our own deduction, but which we could not thus dissipate well so long as we were confined by the chains of systematic development.

I. The chief point of our deduction may be also stated as follows: The rational being, *considered as such*, is absolutely and independently its own ground. It is

originally (*i.e.*, without any activity on its part) absolutely nothing, and whatsoever it is *to be* it must first make itself by its own activity.

This proposition is not proven, nor can it be proven. It is absolutely demanded that each rational being should thus find and accept itself.

In this manner, therefore, does each reader think himself. Now tell me, what is it really that you do think when you think what I have required of you? For I do not ask you to go beyond that conception, but merely to make it clear to yourself by pure analysis.

The rational being is itself to bring forth whatsoever it is actually to be. Hence you must ascribe to the rational being, in advance of all actual (objective) being thereof, some sort of an existence, as, indeed, we have shown already in the previous chapter. This sort of existing can be none other than an existence as intelligence in and with conceptions. In your present conception of a rational being you must, therefore, have thought it as an intelligence. You must, moreover, have ascribed to this intelligence the power of producing a being through its mere conception, since you presuppose it as intelligence for the very sake of discovering a ground of being. In one word: in your conception of a rational being you have thought precisely what we have deduced in our second chapter under the name of freedom.

But now tell me—for upon this consideration everything depends—how much have you gained in making your conception of a rational being conceivable to you? When you thought the described characteristics, did you think self-determination as essence of the Ego? By no means; you merely thought an empty undetermined power of self-determining. This thought merely makes possible the thought of an independent self-determined being, but does not make it actual, as which you certainly thought it first. For a power, or faculty, is something to which you merely *can* connect an actual being as to

its ground—if such actual being were, for instance, externally given to you; but you are *not compelled to derive such actual being from it as its ground*. The conception of a power, or faculty, involves not the least indication that an actuality, and *what sort of an actuality*, will result from it. Perhaps that power of self-determining might never be used, or might be used only at times, in which case you would receive either no self-determination, or an interrupted self-determination, *i.e.*, which would not be permanent, would not constitute the essence.

It was not in this manner that you thought the self-determination of the rational being in the conception I have asked you to analyse. You did not posit that independence of the rational being as problematical, but as categorical, or as the *essence* of reason. What it signifies to posit something as essential has been sufficiently explained, namely, to posit something as necessarily and inseparably involved in the conception; as posited together with the positing of the conception. But if you thought self-determination as the necessary essence of reason, then you posited *self-determination* and *freedom* as *necessity*, which is a contradiction, and which you cannot, therefore, have possibly thought. In nevertheless thinking this permanent character of reason, you must, therefore, have thought it in such a manner as to make possible at the same time the thinking of freedom. Your determinateness was a determinateness of the free intelligence; but such a determinateness is a *necessary thinking* (on the part of the intelligence) of self-determination, as the rule by which the intelligence must necessarily resolve freely to determine itself.

Your conception of self-determination, therefore, involves both the power *and* the law to uninterruptedly exercise this power; and you cannot think your conception without thinking these both united. Thus it has appeared to you who freely resolved to philosophize, and thus it will appear—since you philosophize according to

universal laws of reason—to every rational being, and more especially to that rational being which we have here posited as representative of reason in general, under the name of the original Ego, and the system of thinking whereof we are about to establish. If the Ego thinks itself self-determined—and it is from this presupposition that we start—then it necessarily thinks itself as free, and—which is of chief importance to us here—it thinks this its freedom under the law of self-determination. This is the significance of our deduction.

But there are other ways of showing the necessity of our deduced thought. Let the rational being think itself free in the above merely formal significance of the word. But it is finite, and each object of its reflection is limited or determined for it through the mere reflection. Hence, also, its freedom becomes limited or determined for it. But what is a determinateness of freedom as such? We have just seen it.

Or, let me express it from the profoundest depth of the system of transcendental philosophy, and in the most decided and comprehensive manner. I am identity of subject and object= X . Now, since I can only think objects, and then separate a subject from them, I cannot think such an X . Hence, I think myself as subject *and* object. I unite both by reciprocally determining each through the other according to the law of causality. My objective, determined through my subjective, results in the conception of freedom as of a power of self-determination. My subjective, determined through my objective, results in the thought of the necessity to determine myself through my freedom only in accordance with the conception of self-determination, which thought, since it is the thought of my original determinateness, is an immediate first and absolute thought. Now, neither is to be thought alone; not my objective dependent upon my subjective, nor my subjective dependent upon my objective, but both are to

be thought as absolutely one. I think it as one by reciprocally determining the one through the other in their stated determinateness, *i.e.*, by thinking freedom as determining the law, and the law as determining the freedom. One is not thought without the other, and when the one is thought the other is also thought. When you think yourself as free, you are forced to think your freedom as acting under a law; and when you think this law you are forced to think yourself as free, since it presupposes your freedom, and announces itself to be a law for your freedom.

Freedom does not follow from the law, nor does the law follow from freedom. Both are not two thoughts, each of which were thought apart from the other, but both are one and the same thought. It is a complete synthesis (according to the law of reciprocal determination), as, indeed, was stated above. Kant, in various places, derives the conviction of our freedom from the consciousness of the moral law. This is to be understood as follows: The appearance of freedom is an immediate fact of consciousness, and is on no account derived from another thought. Nevertheless, someone might want to explain this appearance again, and thus to turn it into a mere seeming. Now, there is no theoretical, but only a practical, reason why we should not attempt any further explanation, which practical reason is the firm resolve to recognise practical reason as the superior, and the moral law as the true and final destination of our being; and not to turn this moral law again into a mere show, as is certainly possible to a free imagination. Now, by not going beyond this appearance of freedom in us, that appearance becomes reality for us. For the proposition, *I am* free—freedom is the only true being, and the ground of all other being—is a very different proposition from the one, *I appear* to myself as being free. It is, therefore, the faith in the objective validity of this appearance which is to be deduced from the consciousness of the

moral law. *I am truly free* is the first article of faith which opens us a path and transition into the world of reason, and prepares a firm basis for it. This faith is, at the same time, the point of union of both worlds, and from it our system, which is to embrace both worlds, takes its starting-point. Doing cannot be deduced from being, since the former would thereby be changed into a seeming, and *I must* not hold it for a seeming. Hence, on the contrary, all being is to be derived from doing. The reality which being gains thereby does not detract from our true destination, but is rather a gain for it. The Ego is not to be deduced from the Non Ego, and Life not from death; but the Non Ego on the contrary, is to be deduced from the Ego, and, hence, it is from the Ego that all philosophy must proceed.

2. The deduced thought has been called a *law*. It has also been called by Kant a *categorical imperative*; and the manner in which we think in this thought has been called a *shall-ing*, in opposition to being; and common sense has found itself surprisingly well expressed in these designations. We shall show how these same views proceed from our deduction.

It has been shown that we can think freedom as standing under no law, but containing in itself alone the ground of its determinedness; and we must think freedom thus if we want to think it correctly, since its essence consists in thinking, and since thinking is absolutely undeterminable through anything other than itself. Hence, we can think freedom—it being determinable in all possible manners—under a fixed rule, the conception of which rule only the free intelligence can produce in itself, and determine itself according to that rule. Thus the free intelligence might, for instance, propose to itself very different rules or maxims—as, for instance, of egotism, laziness, oppression of others, etc.—and might follow these maxims uninterruptedly and without exception, although with full freedom.

In this manner the intelligence would think a certain acting as agreeing with its rule, and another acting as conflicting with it. True, the real acting always remains dependent upon absolute freedom, since the acting of the intelligence is not *actually* determined, is not mechanically necessary, but merely determined in the necessary conception thereof. How, then, is this necessity in the mere conception to be designated, since it is no actual necessity? It seems to me that it cannot be better designated than thus: a certain acting is *proper*; is as it *ought* to be, or *should* be; whereas the opposite acting is *improper*, and *should not* be.

Now, the conception of such a rule is, as we have shown above, an absolutely first unconditioned conception, having no external ground whatever, but having its ground in itself. Hence, such an acting is not to occur from this or that reason, not because something else is willed or ought to be, but it is simply to occur because it ought to occur. It *shall* [or *ought to*] be absolutely because it shall be. Hence this shalling, this "ought" or "should," is an absolute and categorical shalling; and that rule is a rule valid without exception, since its validity is subjected to no possible condition.

So far as this absolute shalling is, moreover, thought as involving an imperative command, suppressing all other inclination adverse to it, we cannot yet explain it, since we relate it altogether to absolute freedom at present, which freedom does not involve the thought of any inclination.

3. The deduced thought has also been very properly called *autonomy*, or self-legislation. It may be called so in a threefold significance.

Firstly, because, when we presuppose the thought of the law in general, and consider the Ego merely as free intelligence, the law becomes a law *in general* for the Ego only, by the Ego reflecting upon and arbitrarily submitting itself to that law, or by actively making

that law the irrevocable principle of all its actions; and becomes a law *in a particular case* only by the Ego discovering, through its free judgment, what the law may require in that case. Thus the whole moral existence of the intelligent being is nothing but an uninterrupted self-legislating or self-determining of the same, and when this self-legislation ceases there immorality begins.

Secondly, because, so far as the content of the law is concerned, nothing is demanded but absolute independence, absolute self-determination. Hence the material determination of the will through the law is taken from out of ourselves; and all *heteronomy*—all borrowing of grounds of determination from something external—is absolutely in violation of the law.

Thirdly, because the whole conception of our necessary subjection to a law arises solely through an absolutely free reflection of the Ego upon itself in its true essence, *i.e.*, as self-determining. The deduced thought does not force itself upon us immediately, which would be absolutely incomprehensible, and would cancel the conception of an intelligence; but it is rather the condition, the necessary *manner* of thinking freely. Hence the Ego places itself in this whole relation of a lawfulness, and reason remains in every respect its own law.

At the present place, it seems to me that it also appears very clearly how reason can be *practical*, and how this practical reason is by no means the curious and incomprehensible thing as which it has sometimes been viewed, and is, indeed, not at all a second reason, but rather the very same reason which we all recognize as theoretical reason.

For reason is not a thing which *is* and *exists*, but rather a doing—pure, simple doing. Reason contemplates itself; this reason can and does do simply because it is reason, but reason cannot contemplate itself otherwise than as what it is; hence, as a doing. Now reason is *finite*, and

whatsoever reason represents becomes for reason, in so representing it, determined and finite; hence also its doing becomes a determined doing through this very self-contemplation and the law of determinedness which it involves. But the determinedness of a pure doing does not result in a being, but in an ought, in a shalling. Thus reason *determines itself its activity*; and *to determine an activity* is an equivalent term with *to be practical*.

In a certain sense of the word, it has always been conceded that reason is practical, namely, in so far as reason is *means* for realizing some external purpose, either proposed by our free arbitrariness, or by some requirement of our nature. But in this sense of the word, reason is merely *technical practical*. But we assert here, that reason absolutely out of itself and through itself proposes a purpose to itself; and in so far, reason is *absolutely practical*. The practical dignity of reason is its own *absoluteness*, its determinability solely through itself and through nothing outside of itself. Whosoever does not recognize this absoluteness—and each one can only find it in himself through contemplation—will always regard reason as merely a faculty of argumentation, which cannot put itself in motion until objects are given to it from without; and will always find it incomprehensible how reason can be absolutely practical, since he cannot cease to believe that the conditions of the executability of a law must be recognized before the law can be accepted.

REMARKS.

A. The views which present themselves from this standpoint in regard to a whole system of philosophy are of a manifold character, and I cannot refrain from mentioning at least one.

Reason determines through itself its own acting;

because it is self-contemplating or finite. This proposition has a double significance, since the acting of reason may be regarded in a twofold manner. In a science of morality it is chiefly related to the so-called acting which is accompanied by the consciousness of freedom, and which is, therefore, recognized as acting even on the standpoint of common consciousness; in other words, to *willing* and *working*.

But this proposition holds, likewise, good in regard to that acting which is discovered to be an acting only from the transcendental point of view, namely, the acting in thinking.

Now, reason does not necessarily observe the law which it proposes to itself as a moral being, because that law addresses itself to its freedom; but it does necessarily observe that which it proposes to itself as a thinking being, because the intelligence, in contemplating that law, is active but not freely active.

Hence the whole system of reason—as well in regard to that which *shall* be, and that which is postulated as being in consequence of, this *shall*, as also in regard to that which is found as immediately being—is predetermined as necessary through Reason itself.

Now, Reason ought certainly to be able to dissolve that which it has composed according to its own laws by those same laws; and hence reason necessarily can completely know itself. In other words: an analysis of the whole procedure of reason, or a complete system of reason, is possible.

Thus in our theory all parts join together, and the necessary presupposition is possible only on condition of the results arrived at. Either all philosophy must be abandoned, or the absolute autonomy of reason must be admitted. Only on this presupposition is the conception of a philosophy rational. All doubts, or all denials of the possibility of a system of reason, are grounded on the presupposition of an *heteronomy*, or on the presupposition

that reason can be determined by something outside of itself. But such a presupposition is absolutely irrational, is a contradiction of reason.

B. The principle of morality is the necessary thought of the intelligence that it ought to determine its freedom without exception in accordance with the conception of self-determination.

It is a *thought*, and not a feeling or a contemplation, although this thought grounds itself upon the intellectual contemplation of the absolute activity of the intelligence. It is a *pure* thought, with which not the least particle of feeling or sensuous contemplation can be mixed up, since it is the immediate conception which the pure intelligence has of itself as such. It is a *necessary* thought, since it is the form in which the freedom of the intelligence is thought. It is the *first* and *absolute* thought, for since it is the thought of the thinking itself, it does not ground itself upon any other thought as its sequence or as conditioned by that other thought.

The content of this thought is, that the free being *shall* act in a certain manner, for the *shalling* is the expression of a determinedness of freedom. The content of this thought is, moreover, that the free being shall determine its freedom by a *law*, and that this law shall be none other than the conception of absolute *self-determination* (absolute undeterminability through anything external); and, finally, that this law shall be valid *without any exception*, because it involves the original determinedness of the free being.

C. In our argument we proceeded from the presupposition that the essence of the Ego consists in its self-determination; or, rather, since this self-determination can be thought as actual only under certain conditions not yet established, in its tendency to self-determination. We

have investigated how, under this presupposition, the Ego must think itself. Hence, we started from an objective being of the Ego. But is the Ego in itself objective, or without relation to a consciousness? Was not the Ego whereof we commenced speaking in our first chapter related to a consciousness? We doubtless related it to our own philosophizing consciousness. But now let us relate it to the consciousness of the original Ego, for only thus do we get a correct view from the transcendental standpoint of our deduction; for our deduction is not dogmatic, but transcendently idealistic. We do not claim to evolve a thinking from a being in itself, for the Ego is only for and in the knowledge of the Ego. Our claim, on the contrary, is to establish an original system of thinking itself, an original connecting of the assertions of reason with each other.

The rational being posits itself as absolutely self-determining because it is self-determining, and it is self-determining because it posits itself as such; it is in this relation subject-object=X. Now, in so positing itself, it posits itself partly as free, in the above significance of this word, whilst partly it subordinates its freedom to the law of self-determination. These two conceptions are involved in the conception of the self-determination of the Ego, or the conception of self-determination involves these conceptions: both are one and the same.

D. Certain objections and misunderstandings may render necessary, moreover, the following:—

We do not assert that on the standpoint of common consciousness we become conscious of the connection of the deduced thought with its grounds. For it is well known that the insight into the grounds of facts of consciousness belongs to philosophy, and is possible only from the transcendental point of view. Nor do we assert that this thought occurs amongst the facts

of common consciousness in the generality and abstraction wherein we have represented it; or, in other words, that we can become *immediately* conscious of such a law for our *freedom in general*. It is only through philosophical abstraction that we arrive at this generality, and this abstraction is undertaken in order to be able to establish the problem definitely. In common consciousness there occurs only a determined and never an abstract thinking as fact, for all abstraction presupposes a free acting of the intelligence. We only assert, therefore, this: When we think *determined* actual acts as free, we feel constrained to think, at the same time, that they *ought* to be done in a certain manner. Some men may never be in a position to experience the truth of this our assertion in the thinking of their own acts, because they are actuated, perhaps, by passions and desires, and never become clearly conscious of their own freedom; but everyone will certainly discover the truth of this assertion in judging those acts of other persons which he considers to be free acts. Hence, if anyone denies the principle of morality, so far as his own person is concerned, as a fact of his consciousness, he can do so, and it cannot be proven to him, since a *universal* morality cannot exist as immediate fact of consciousness by its very conception. But if he denies the application of this moral law to separate free acts, it will be easy enough to show him, at least in his judgment of the acts of others, that he always does make use of that application. No one, for instance, gets angry at the flame which consumes his house, but he does at the man who set the house on fire. Were he not a fool to get angry at the man, unless he presupposes that the man could have acted and ought to have acted otherwise?

BOOK SECOND.

DEDUCTION OF THE REALITY AND APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALITY.

PRELIMINARY.

I. WHAT does the reality or applicability of a principle, or of a conception, signify? And what reality does attach in particular to our present conception of morality?

A conception has reality and applicability signifies: our world—*i.e.*, the world of our consciousness—is determined by it in a certain respect. It belongs to those conceptions through which we think objects, and there are certain characteristics in it for us, because we think them through this conception. To hunt up the reality of a conception, signifies, therefore: to investigate how and in what manner objects are determined by it. I will make this clearer by some examples.

The conception of causality has reality, for through it there arises in the manifold objects of my world a certain connection, by virtue of which I must proceed from the one to the other, and can conclude from the effect as to the cause, and from a known cause as to the effect: the thinking of the one always, as it were, accompanying the thinking of the other. The conception of *Law* has reality. For in the infinite sphere of freedom (*i.e.*, of *being free* as objective, for only on this condition do I occupy the standpoint of law) I necessarily think my sphere as limited, and hence think freedom, or free beings, outside of me, with whom I come in contact through

the mutual limitation of our freedom. Hence, through that conception I first arrive at the conception of a community of free beings.

But in the determination of our world through these two conceptions of causality and legality there is a remarkable distinction, to which I desire to call attention, since it aptly prepares the solution of the question we have here chiefly at heart. From these two conceptions, mainly, there flows the absolutely valid theoretical propositions that every cause has its effect and that all men, as such, have legal rights. Nevertheless, in practice, only the one is absolutely valid. For, whereas I cannot have even the desire to deprive, in practice, an effect of its cause, I can not only have the desire, but likewise the power, to treat men as if they had no rights. In other words: whereas the theoretical conviction that men have rights does not compel physical acknowledgment; the theoretical conviction that every effect has its cause does so.

At present we speak of the principle, or conception, of *morality*. This conception has been deduced as a determined form of thinking, or as the only possible manner of thinking our freedom; hence the consciousness of our freedom has certainly been already determined through this conception. But this determination was only immediate, and it is very possible that the conception of our freedom determines something else mediately.

The conception of morality, as its deduction has shown, does not relate to anything that is, but to something that is to be. It proceeds purely from the essence of reason, without any foreign mixture, and requires nothing but self-determination; it pays no attention to experience, but rather contradicts all determination through objects of experience. Hence, when we speak of its reality, we cannot mean that the mere thinking of it realises results in the world of appearances. The object of this conception, *i.e.*, that which arises in us when we think it, can

only be an *idea*; a mere thought *in us*, of which we do not at all pretend that something in the *external* world corresponds to it. The first question would, therefore, seem to be: what, then, is this idea? or, since ideas cannot be taken hold of, what is the manner in which to describe them? In popular language: "You tell us that we *shall* do something; what is it that we shall do?"

2. That which we think in virtue of the conception of morality, or the object determined by that conception, is the idea of what we shall do. But we can do nothing unless we have an object of our activity in the sensuous world. Whence this object, and through what is it determined?

I *shall* [ought to] do something signifies: I shall produce it externally, or, since it proposes to me an infinite end, as it never *is*, but always merely *shall be*, I shall in all my external actions work so as constantly to draw nearer to that end.

But I must always have an object of my activity, since I am finite, and hence I cannot produce what I am to produce out of nothing.

The sensuous world must, therefore, contain something which is to be the object of my activity in my endeavour to approach the realization of that infinite and unattainable idea. What, then, is this sphere of the sensuous world, to which the requirements of the moral law in me relate themselves? How am I to arrive at a knowledge, and particularly at a systematic knowledge, of this sphere? Moreover, how am I to know *how* this law requires me to act in regard to each special object in this sphere?

It is immediately clear that that upon which I am to act must be of such a nature that I *can* act upon it, or that I must have the physical power to mould it. Let us explain this.

The free rational being acts as an intelligence, *i.e.*, according to a conception of the effect to be produced, which conception exists in advance of the production of the effect. Hence the object of its activity must at least be of such a nature that it can be thought by the intelligence, and can be so thought as either being or not being (*i.e.*, as accidental in regard to its being), the intelligence then choosing between the being or not being thereof, by producing its conception of the end to be achieved.

Here we have immediately a limited sphere of the general sphere of sensuousness, wherein to look for that which is physically possible to our power of causality. For there is a large sphere in our world which appears to us as necessary, and which we can never think, and hence also not will—since our willing is conditioned by our laws of thinking, and is always preceded by a conception—except as necessary. Another sphere of our world, however, appears to us as accidental.

For instance: I cannot will to posit any thing out of space, since I cannot think it out of space; on the other hand, I can very well think a thing in *another place* in space than that which it occupies; hence I also can will to change its place.

A thorough and complete philosophy has to show up the ground why some things thus appear to us as accidental; and by doing this, at the same time to fix the sphere and the limits of this accidental. At present we have not even proposed these questions to ourselves, much less answered them.

In making this investigation we may, perhaps, be guided by the remark that the characteristic of accidentalness is usually a proof that we think something as product of our freedom; or, at least, that we think all the products of our freedom as accidental (a proposition established and proved in the general science of knowledge). Thus, for instance, representation, when related to the being of the represented object, is held

to be accidental. The being of the object, we judge, might well be, although there were no representation of it; and this judgment we make because we find the representation to be, in its form, a product of the absolute freedom of thinking, but in its content a product of the necessity of thinking.

Perhaps it may result, from an analogy, that *all* that is accidental in the world of appearances is to be in a certain sense deduced from the conception of freedom, and to be regarded as the product of freedom. Let us assume this proposition to be confirmed; what can it signify? Certainly not that these objects are posited through the ideal activity of the intelligence in its function as productive power of imagination; for this, in a science of morality, is presupposed as well known from the fundamental science of knowledge, and does not apply merely to the objects of our world which are thought as accidental, but also to those which are thought as necessary. Nor can it signify that they are posited as products of our *actual* practical causality in the sensuous world, for this contradicts the presupposition that they are regarded as things actually existing independently of us. Hence the assumed proposition would have to signify, perhaps, about this, *that our freedom itself is a theoretical determining principle of our world.*

Let us explain this. Our world is absolutely nothing but the Non Ego, is posited solely to explain the limitedness of the Ego, and hence receives all its determinations only through opposition to the Ego. Now the Ego is to have the exclusive predicate of freedom. If the assumed proposition should be confirmed, therefore, this same predicate of the Ego, freedom, would be a determining principle of the opposite to the Ego, the external world; and thus the conception of *being free* would furnish a theoretical law of thinking which rules with necessity over the ideal activity of the intelligence.

Examples of this sort of a determination of an object we have already met in our science of rights. Because we are free, we then posited the objects of our world as modifiable, assumed other rational beings like ourselves, and ascribed to ourselves bodies moveable through our mere will, etc., etc. But in the present instance our investigation will have to go still further back, and establish the proofs of these assertions still more exhaustively, since we have now arrived at the very ultimate and primary of all reason.

If the assumption that a part of our external world is determined through freedom as theoretical principle should be confirmed, and if it should appear that this part constitutes the sphere of the objects of our *duties*, then the law of freedom will but have continued, as a practical law addressed to consciousness, what it has itself commenced as theoretical principle without consciousness of the intelligence. It will have determined for itself, and through itself, the sphere wherein it rules; it cannot utter anything now in its present quality which it has not already uttered in its previous quality. This law of freedom has first determined somewhat in general, and has *posited* this somewhat as constituted in this or that manner; and now it also preserves this somewhat in that same qualitiveness thereof by means of our practical freedom which that law controls. Hence the content of this law in its practical function might also be thus expressed: act in conformity with thy cognition of the original determinations (of the final ends) of the external things. For instance, theoretically the conception of my freedom involves the proposition: All men are free. The same conception, regarded practically, results in the command: You shall treat every man as a free being. Again, the theoretical proposition says: My body is instrument of my activity in the sensuous world. The same proposition, regarded as practical command, says: Treat your body only as a means of realizing your

freedom and self-determination, but never treat it as an end in itself, or as object of an enjoyment.

Now if all these assumptions should be confirmed, the principle of morality would receive quite another significance yet than the one previously established; and the question which we proposed above: whence do we get the objects for the proposed activity, and how are we to arrive at a knowledge of them? would be completely answered. The principle of morality would show itself to be both a theoretical principle, which as such furnishes itself its own content (the determined content of the law), and a practical principle, which as such furnishes itself its own *form*, that of a *command*. The moral principle would thus return into itself, and stand in reciprocal relation with itself, and we should thus receive a complete and satisfactory system from one point. Something outside of us has this or that final end, because we are to treat it thus; and we are to treat it thus because it has this final end. We should thus have arrived at the desired *idea* of that which we *ought to do*, and at the same time at the *substrate, in which* we are to approach the realization of this idea.

3. What does the conception of a physical power to mould objects signify, and how does this conception arise in us?

Let us first ask: Of what are we really conscious when we believe to be conscious of our causality in the sensuous world? What can this immediate consciousness involve, and what can it not involve?

We are immediately conscious of our conception of an end, or of our real willing; of an absolute self-determining, through which our whole soul is gathered together, as it were, into one point. We, moreover, become immediately conscious of the reality and of an actual sensation of the object (which previously we only thought in the conception of the end) as a given object in the sensuous world.

(Somebody might interrupt us here and say, we are also conscious of our *labours* in the production which

occurs between the resolve of the will and its realization in the sensuous world. But I reply, that it is not a particular consciousness, but simply the already pointed out and gradually realized consciousness of our satisfaction. This consciousness begins with the forming of the resolve, and successively continues as the willing is successively continued, until the whole conception of the end is *completely* realized. Hence this consciousness is only the synthetic uniting of the two established kinds of consciousness, the willing and the willed, as an activity.)

But we are on no account conscious of *the connection* between our willing and the sensation of the reality of what we willed. According to our assertion, our will is to be the cause of this reality. How may this be? Or, transcendently spoken: how may we come to assume this conscious harmony between a conception of an end and an actual object outside of us, the ground of which harmony is to lie in the former and not in the latter?

Let me clear up this question through opposition. The conception of cognition is to be a *reconstruction* of an external somewhat, but the conception of an end, or purpose, is to be a *preconstruction* for an external somewhat. And as in the case of the former conception of cognition there arises very properly a question concerning the ground (not of the harmony *in itself*, for this would be nonsense, since unity and harmony between opposites exists only in so far as an intelligence thinks it, but) of the *assuming* of such a harmony between *the conception (as secondary)* and *the thing (as primary)*; so in the case of the latter conception of a purpose we ask for the ground of assuming a harmony between *the thing, as secondary, and the conception, as primary.*

In the case of the conception of cognition that question was answered in this manner: BOTH THE THING AND THE CONCEPTION ARE ONE AND THE SAME, ONLY VIEWED IN DIFFERENT WAYS; THE CONCEPTION, PROVIDED IT IS A NECESSARY CONCEPTION OF REASON, IS ITSELF THE THING;

AND THE THING IS NOTHING BUT THE NECESSARY CONCEPTION OF ITSELF.

How, if we were to receive the same answer in the case of the conception of a purpose, namely, THAT THAT WHICH WE BELIEVE TO HAVE PRODUCED IN THE EXTERNAL WORLD, IS NOTHING BUT OUR CONCEPTION OF A PURPOSE ITSELF, REGARDED IN A CERTAIN MANNER? with this distinction, that the harmony in this case occurs only under a certain condition, characterized in this manner: Of whatsoever stands under this condition we say, "This we *can* do"; but of whatsoever does not stand under it we say, "This we can *not* do."

That which I willed is, when it becomes real, an object of a sensation. Hence a *determined feeling* must occur, in virtue whereof it is posited, since all reality occurs for me only on this condition. My *willing*, therefore, must, in the present case, be accompanied by a *feeling* relating itself to that which I willed; and by this result we gain at least so much that the sphere of our investigation is solely in the Ego, and that we have to speak only of what occurs in ourselves, but not of what occurs outside of us.

Feeling is always the expression of our *limitedness*. But in our special case there is a transition from a feeling related to the object as it is independently of us, to another feeling related to the same object as it is to be modified through our activity. Hence, since the latter is to be a product of our freedom, there occurs a transition from a limited to a less limited condition.

We are now able to express our problem more definitely thus: *How is an actual extension of our limits connected with self-determination through freedom (or willing); or transcendently expressed: How do we come to assume such an extension?*

Every assumption of a new reality outside of me is a further determination of my world, a change of my world in my consciousness. Now, my world is determined

through opposition to myself, and my original world, *i.e.*, as I find it independently existing; through opposition to myself, as I find myself necessarily existing. Hence a change in (a changed manner of viewing) my world must have a change in (a changed manner of viewing) myself as its basis.

If I were, therefore, able to change something in myself through my will, this would necessarily also change my will; and if the possibility of the former were demonstrated, the possibility of the latter were explained at the same time. *My world* is changed, signifies: *I* am changed; *my world* is determined differently, signifies: *I* am determined differently.

The problem, at present, is to be put into this shape: What does this signify: *I* change *myself*? If we only answer this question, then the other question, How I can change the world, is answered at the same time.

Whenever I but *will*, I determine myself, concentrate my whole essence away from everything indefinite and merely determinable into one solitary determined point, as we have just stated. At present: *I* change *myself*; but not all willing results in the occurrence of the willed. Hence the Ego which is to be changed by every act of the will, and that Ego through the change whereof our view of the world changes likewise, must be different, and from a determination of the former a determination of the latter must not result necessarily. Now, which Ego is the former Ego? This we know from our second chapter, namely, that Ego which through absolutely reflecting itself has torn itself loose from itself, and posited itself as independent; or in other words, the Ego which is solely dependent upon its conception.

Now, is there still another Ego? According to what we have said undoubtedly, namely, the Ego *from* which the former Ego (wherein the intelligence has precedence) has torn itself loose in order to posit itself as independent; or, in other words, the *objective* tending and impelling Ego.

Let us assume this impelling to be directed upon a certain determined determination of the will, as it doubtless is, since it can only be thought as a determined impelling. Now let us posit a free determination of the will which does not harmonize, or is not required by this impulsion or tendency; and to posit this is certainly allowable, since the freedom of the will stands absolutely under no condition except that of thinkability, and has expressly torn itself loose from the influence of the impulse. In this case the Ego would remain, so to speak, divided; the impulse or tendency would not harmonize with the will, and I would be conscious merely of my willing, of my mere empty willing. A part of the Ego would be changed, namely, the condition of its will; but not the whole Ego, since the tendency would remain in the same condition, *i.e.*, unsatisfied, not having acquired the will which did occur, but rather an utterly different one. If we posit, on the contrary, the will determination to be in harmony with the impulse, then that separation no longer occurs; the whole united Ego is changed, and our world also is now to be determined by this change.

In order to unite all the views thus obtained, let us glance back at what we have said above. It is very possible, as we have assumed, that our world itself be determined in a certain respect, in accordance with the just mentioned original tendency of the Ego, or with freedom itself as a theoretical principle. But that in accordance with which another (the world) is to be determined must be itself determined. Hence in this connection we have freedom as objective, and therefore the original and essential tendency of all reason. Through this freedom as theoretical principle our world would, therefore, be determined, and through this principle more specially our world would receive the character of accidentalness, and hence of the possibility to change it through free resolves.

The result of all we have problematically established would, therefore, be this: the ground of the connection of the appearances with our willing is the connection of our willing with nature. We can do that to which our nature impels us, and we can not do that to which our nature does not impel us, but which we resolve to do by unrestrained freedom of imagination.

It is to be remarked that the possibility of fulfilling the moral law is here determined through the moral law itself (automatically), and not through an external principle (not heteronomically).

To remove all misapprehension, we add that this impelling of our nature which determines our physical faculties need not be the moral law itself. For we also have the physical power to execute immoral acts. Here, therefore, it will probably be necessary to draw a new line of distinction. We may say, however, so much, that the commands of the moral law must fall within the lines of our physical power; and by saying this we have at once removed the objection that it is impossible to satisfy the requirements of the moral law.

The object of these preliminary remarks was to see what our present deduction has to accomplish. This object we have attained. It is clear that our deduction must establish the proof of the following:—

A. The rational being which, according to the previous book, is to posit itself as absolutely free and independent, cannot do this without at the same time determining its world theoretically in a certain manner. That thinking of its self, and this thinking of its world, occur through the same act, and are absolutely one and the same thinking; both are integral parts of one and the same synthesis. Freedom is a theoretical principle.

B. Freedom, which our first book also showed to be a practical law, relates itself to those world-determinations, and requires their maintenance and completion.

It likewise appears from this consideration that, although we enter in the present book upon a different sphere, we do not do so by a leap, but in a gradual progression of systematic argument, and that our present book takes up the thread precisely where the first book left it. In that book the assertion was, that, as sure as we become conscious of ourselves, we ascribe to ourselves an absolute power of freedom. At present we ask: How is this possible? and thus connect the conditions about to be ascertained with the consciousness of freedom, and by its means with immediate self-consciousness, which latter connecting does in reality constitute the essence of a philosophical deduction.

It is true, as will soon appear, that the proofs about to be established in this book require the same inner contemplation of the activity whereby we originate the conceptions here investigated, which was required in the first book. Hence we might certainly have shaped the *propositions* of this book just as well into the form of problems; and our present first proposition, for instance, into the problem: To definitely think our power of freedom, etc. But apart from the intention to show the freedom of our method, and to protect our system against too monotonous an arrangement, we likewise had in view to state with precision the point upon which attention is to be directed in determining that thought, since there are various conditions and determinations of it.

EXPLANATORY.

Doubtless everyone who hears the words of the above first proposition will understand them to signify: It is simply impossible that anyone can think his power of freedom without at the same time imagining an objective somewhat upon which he acts with this freedom; although it be no determined object, but merely the form of objectivity in general. Thus, indeed, the words

CHAPTER I.

DEDUCTION OF AN OBJECT OF OUR ACTIVITY IN GENERAL.

FIRST PROPOSITION.—*The rational being cannot ascribe a power of activity to itself without at the same time thinking an external somewhat upon which that activity is directed.*

PRELIMINARY REMARK.

All the propositions advanced in our first book are merely formal, and have no material significance. We see *that* we shall, but do neither comprehend *what* we shall, nor *wherein* to represent what we shall. This arises, indeed, from the same circumstance which gives rise to all formal philosophizing; we have established abstract but not concrete thought; we have described a reflection, as such, in general, without, however, determining it, or establishing the conditions of its possibility. This was not a fault, since systematic progression compelled such a procedure, and since we were well aware all the time that the mere establishing of these formal propositions would not finish our labours, but rather compel us to proceed further.

This remark points out definitely our present task. We have now to establish the condition of the possibility of the reflection, undertaken in our first book. It will appear that the first condition we shall need is again dependent upon another condition, and that again upon another, etc., and that we shall thus arrive at a series of conditions, which we propose to gather under the form of a series of *propositions*.

are to be understood, and in this respect they need no explanation. But in another respect some explanations are certainly necessary as well in regard to the form of our assertion, or the condition under which it is to be valid, as also in regard to the content of the same.

So far as the former is concerned, someone might say: You have just now in the first book required us to think the mere power of freedom without any object, and if we were not able to do so all your teachings have been lost on us. I reply: The abstract thinking in philosophy, the possibility whereof is itself conditioned through a previous experience (for our life begins with life and not with philosophy), is quite a different thing from the original and determined thinking on the standpoint of experience. The conception of freedom, as entertained by us in the first book, arose for us through abstraction or through analysis; but we should not have been at all able thus to originate it, unless we had previously had possession of it as *given* or *found*. Now at present we are speaking of this very condition of the *primary* and not of the *philosophizing* Ego; and our meaning is, you cannot *find* yourself as free without finding at the same time in the same consciousness an object upon which your freedom is to be directed.

So far as the latter is concerned, it is to be observed that we assert an absolute synthesis of thinking, of a power and of an object, hence a *reciprocal* conditionedness of one thinking through another. Not, as if the one were in time prior to the other, for both are the thought of the same moment; nay, there is, even if we look merely to the fact that both are *thought*, no dependence of the one upon the other to be assumed, consciousness being rather irresistibly impelled from the one to the other. But if we look to *how* both are thought, then we meet this distinction, that the thinking of freedom is an immediate thinking, in virtue of an intellectual contemplation, whereas the thinking of the object is a

mediated thinking. We do not see the former through the latter, but we do see the latter through the former. Freedom is our vehicle for the cognition of objects, but the cognition of objects is not the vehicle for the cognition of our freedom.

Finally, two things have been asserted. Firstly, that an object, which is to be external to the intelligence, is thought; and, secondly, that free activity is *related* to it, and related in such a manner that the object is determined through the activity and not, *vice versâ*, the activity through the object. Our proof will, therefore, have to establish two things: 1st, the necessity of *opposition*; and, 2nd, the necessity of relation and of this *determined* relation.

PROOF.

A. The rational being cannot ascribe to itself a power of freedom without thinking at the same time many actual and determined acts as possible through its freedom.

The latter part of the proposition advances nothing further than the first part; both are identical. I ascribe freedom to myself, signifies: I think a number of different acts as equally possible through my activity. An insight into the truth of this proposition requires nothing further than to analyze our conception of a power of freedom.

A power, or faculty, is absolutely nothing but a product of mere thinking, made in order to connect with it—since finite reason can only think discursively and mediately—an actuality, not posited originally, but originating in time. To think anything else under that conception is not to understand one's self. In our present case we are, however, not to draw a conclusion from the actuality as to the power of activity, as may be well done in other cases; but thinking is rather to begin with the power as the first and immediate. Yet even under this condition the power cannot be thought without at the same

time thinking the actuality, since both conceptions are synthetically united, and since without the thinking of the latter we can neither think a faculty nor anything else. I say expressly: actuality must be *thought* (not immediately *perceived*); must be thought, *not* (if I may so express myself) as *real*, but simply as possible, through a mere ideal function of the imagination. Actuality is perceptibility, sensibility. This perceptibility is posited as necessary, not in its essence, but merely in its form. We ascribe to the Ego the power to produce sensibility, but only the power and not the actual deed. The question, how reason may originally come to this mere form, will be explained hereafter. At present it suffices to know that *we* can think this form, and by its means a mere faculty or power.

Now in the present case we are to think a *free* power of activity, and not a determined power, the manner of manifestation whereof would be involved in its own nature, as is the case in objects. How does a rational being proceed in order to think such a free power? We can only describe this procedure, leaving it to each reader to convince himself of the correctness of this our description by his own inner contemplation.

The Ego posits itself (but only *idealiter*, *i.e.*, it only represents itself as such, without actually being such or *finding* itself as such in point of fact), as choosing voluntarily amongst opposite determinations of actuality. For instance, this object = A, which we find already determined independently of us, might also be determined otherwise, for instance = X; or also still otherwise, for instance = - X; or still otherwise *ad infinitum*. Now, whether the Ego chooses either of these determinations, or none of them, leaving A as it is, depends solely upon the freedom of its thinking. But whichever I choose will surely arise for my perception in the sensuous world, provided I determine myself through the will to produce it. Only in so far as I thus posit myself, do

I posit myself as free, *i.e.*, do I think actuality as dependent upon actual power, which is controlled by my mere thinking; as each one must acknowledge, who but clearly thinks this thought.

Let it be observed that in this thinking we do not think a determined somewhat = X, which is to be produced, but merely the general form of determinedness, *i.e.*, the mere power of the Ego, to select this or that from the range of the accidental, and make it its end.

B. The rational being cannot think an act as actual without assuming an external somewhat, upon which the act is directed.

Let us once more attentively observe the just described manner of thinking freedom. We said: I think myself in this conception as choosing. Let us now direct our attention altogether to this Ego represented as choosing. It doubtless thinks, and *only* thinks; hence in choosing we only ascribe ideal activity to it. But it also surely thinks something, floats over something, which holds it enchained; or, as we usually say to express this relation: There is an *objective*, for only by means of such a relation is the Ego subjective and ideal.

This objective is not the Ego itself, and cannot be held as belonging to the Ego; neither to the Ego as *intelligence*, as such, since to this Ego it is expressly *opposited*, nor to the Ego as the *willing* and *realiter active Ego*, since this Ego is not yet in action, the Ego at present merely determining its choice and not its actual will. This objection is not the Ego, and yet it also is not nothing, but is somewhat. It is an object of representation in general, leaving undecided its reality or perceivability. In other words, it is a Non Ego, a somewhat which exists outside of me independently of my activity.

This objective somewhat is necessarily posited as continuing to exist, and as unchangeable in all these modifications, which are ascribed to the Ego through the

conception of freedom. For the conception of freedom is based upon this, that I ascribe to myself the power to realize X or -X; hence that I unite *these opposite determinations, as opposites, in one and the same thinking*. But this is not possible, unless in this thinking of the opposites we also think *the same* as that which is permanent in the opposed thinking, and to which the identity of consciousness may connect.

Now this identical somewhat is nothing but that through which thinking itself in its form becomes possible, *i.e., the relation to objectivity in general*, and hence precisely the Non Ego shown up. This Non Ego is thought as unchanged in all possible determinations through freedom, for only on this condition can freedom itself be thought. Hence there exists outside of us an *originally given (i.e., through thinking itself in its form posited) infinitely modifiable substance*, which substance is that upon which activity is directed.

Finally: This substance is related to actual activity, and actual activity is related to it; and this substance is in truth nothing but the means to think that activity. It, in fact, limits actual causality to mere forming, or modifying, and excludes it from creating or annihilating matter. Hence we ascribe reality also to this substance, just as we ascribe it to everything which limits actual causality. Here, then, exists a real object of our activity outside of us, and we have proven what we had to prove.

CHAPTER II.

DEDUCTION OF AN OBJECT OF OUR ACTIVITY IN GENERAL

(Continued).

SECOND PROPOSITION.—*Neither can the rational being ascribe to itself a power of freedom without finding in itself an actual exercise of this power, or an actual free willing.*

PRELIMINARY.

Our deduction still stands at the same point where it commenced. It has been proven that we ascribe to ourselves a power of freedom. The question at present is: How is this *ascribing* of it to ourselves possible? Its one *external* condition, namely, that an object of free activity must be posited, has just now been shown up. We have now to establish an *internal* condition of it, namely, that of our own state, wherein alone it is possible.

An explanation this second proposition does not require. Its words are clear; and should they nevertheless involve any ambiguity, that will doubtless be sufficiently removed in the proof itself. That the connection asserted in this and in all future propositions signifies a synthetical connection in one and the same thinking (the above proposition signifying, therefore, for instance, that the power of freedom cannot be thought and is never thought unless there arises in one and the same state of mind of him who thinks it an actual exercise of that power)—this is presupposed as well

known from all we have said before, and will hereafter always be presupposed by us as well known.

PROOF.

The conception of a power of freedom is, as we know, the conception or the purely ideal representation of a free willing. At present we assert that this purely ideal representation is not possible without the reality and perception of a willing. Hence we assert the necessary connection of a mere representation and a willing. Now, since we cannot well understand their connection without clearly knowing their distinction, we must above all explain the characteristic distinction between representation and willing; and next proceed, since actual willing is also to appear in consciousness, to state the distinction between the mere ideal representation from the perception of a willing. Only when we shall have done this will it be possible for us to prove that the former is not possible without the latter.

As subjectivity in general is related to objectivity, so mere representation as such is related to willing. Originally I find myself as subject and object at the same time, and what the one signifies can only be comprehended through opposing and relating it to the other. Neither is determined through itself, but that which is common to both and absolutely determined in itself is self-activity, and in so far as both are distinct, they are determinable only mediately, the subjective being that which relates itself to the objective, and the objective being that to which the subjective is attached, etc., etc. Now I am absolutely self-active, and therein does my essence consist: my free activity, immediately as such, if objective, is my *willing*; and the same free activity of mine, if subjective, is my *thinking* (taking the latter word in its widest significance as embracing all the manifestations of the intelligence as such). Hence willing can only be

described through opposition to thinking, and thinking only through opposition to willing. A genetic description of willing, therefore, as arising from thinking, can be thus given:

We think willing as preceded by free, active comprehension of its end, or as preceded by an absolute creation of this end through thinking. In this production of the conception of the end, the state of the Ego is purely ideal and subjective. The Ego represents: represents with absolute self-activity, for the conception of the end is purely product of the representation, and represents in relation to a future willing, for otherwise the conception would not be the conception of an *end*, but does only represent, and does not will.

Meanwhile the Ego *actually wills*—*wills* that end; a state, which each one easily distinguishes in ordinary consciousness from the mere representation of what he *might* will. Now what is there contained in this willing? Absolute self-activity as in thinking, but with another character attached to it. Which, then, is this character? Evidently the relation to a knowing. My willing is not itself to be a knowing, but *I am to know my willing*. Hence the distinctive character is the character of mere objectivity. That, which was previously subjective, now becomes objective, and becomes objective because a new subjective is added to it, or leaps, as it were, out of the absolute fulness of self-activity.

It is well to observe the change in the sequence of the links. Originally the Ego is neither subjective nor objective, but both. This identity of both we cannot think, however; hence we only think both in succession, and through this thinking make the one dependent upon the other. Thus in cognition, an objective (the thing) is changed into a subjective, a representation, for the conception of cognition is regarded as the reconstruction of an existence. On the other hand, the conception of an end is to be the prototype of an existence. The subjec-

tive must, therefore, change into an objective, and this change must commence in the Ego, the only immediate object of our consciousness. So much in regard to the distinction between representation and willing.

The mere representation of a willing is the same representation that we have just now produced in ourselves, *i.e.*, the representation of an absolute (through absolute self-activity effected) transition of the subjective into the objective, for this is the general form of all free willing.

How, now, is this merely ideal representation of a willing to be distinguished from the perception of an actual willing? In the former the ideal activity itself produces that form of willing through freedom; and I am conscious of the act of this producing. But in the latter the ideal activity does not posit itself as producing this form, finding, on the contrary, the willing as given in actuality and itself in its representation thereof tied to this its given form.

One more remark. The perception of the actual, *i.e.*, of the actually existing object, usually proceeds from a feeling, and it is only in virtue of this feeling that productive imagination posits something. But it is different in the case of the perception of an actual willing. I cannot say that I feel my willing, although there are philosophers who, in a careless use of language, do say so; for I only feel the limitation of my activity, but my willing is that very activity itself. What sort of consciousness is, then, this consciousness of a willing? Evidently an immediate contemplation of my own activity, but as an object of the subjective, and not as the subjective itself, which latter is, therefore, not contemplated as self-active. In short, this consciousness is intellectual contemplation.

And now we can easily furnish the proof of our second proposition.

The subjective is originally not without an objective, for only thus is the subjective a subjective, as the

conception of the Ego shows. Consciousness necessarily begins with the connection of both. But in the mere representation of a willing we only have a subjective, whereas its objective, or more definitely, the mere form of the objective, is first produced through that very subjective itself. This is certainly possible, if the intelligence reproduces one of its determined states, and hence if the actual state (existence) of the intelligence is already presupposed in philosophical abstraction; but originally it is not possible. The production must have already been accomplished, if a reproduction is to be possible. Hence the original representation of our power of freedom is necessarily accompanied by an actual willing.

Strictly speaking, our proof is now finished; but it is well to remember, lest we should lose what we have gained in our previous investigations, that, *vice versâ*, the perception of a willing is not possible without the ideal representation of a power of freedom, or, which signifies the same, of the form of willing; and that, therefore, we assert most decidedly the synthetical union of both the thoughts just now distinguished. This can easily be shown thus: I am to become conscious of a willing; but this is a willing solely in so far as it is posited as free; and it is posited as free solely in so far as its determinedness is derived from a freely-produced conception of an end. The form of all willing must be ascribed to this particular willing; for only thus am I the willing, and is the subject of willing identical with the subject of the perception of this willing.

Let no one be confused by this, that the production of the conception of an end must then be posited in a moment previous to the moment of willing, which, as we have shown, is not possible, since I have neither being nor comprehension in advance of the perception of a willing. This production of the conception is not prior in regard to time, but rather it and the willing occur in

absolutely the same moment. We only think the determinedness of the willing dependent upon the conception. There is no priority of time here, but merely a logical priority—a priority of thinking.

To state tersely all we have now explained. Originally I contemplate my activity as object, and in so far necessarily as *determined*, *i.e.*, as not all the activity I know full well I might ascribe to myself, but as merely a limited quantum of that activity. This contemplated activity is that which in all human languages is tersely called *willing*, and which is well known to all men, and from which, as the philosopher has to show, all consciousness starts, being made possible solely through it. But it is a *willing*, and *my* willing, and an *immediately* perceivable *willing* solely in so far as the contemplated *determinedness* of the activity is to have no external ground, but is to be solely grounded in my *self*. But if it is thus grounded, then it is necessarily grounded as we have shown in my thinking; since besides willing we have nothing but thinking, and since all objective can well be deduced from a thinking; and it is in this manner that the determinedness of my willing is necessarily thought, as soon as a willing, as such, is persevered in.

CHAPTER III.

DEDUCTION OF THE ACTUAL CAUSALITY OF THE RATIONAL BEING.

THIRD PROPOSITION.—*The rational being cannot find in itself an application of its freedom, or a willing, without at the same time ascribing to itself an actual external causality.*

PRELIMINARY.

Our deduction advances a step. I cannot ascribe to myself a power of freedom without finding myself as willing. Such was our first assertion. But now we add moreover: I cannot do this, cannot find myself as actually willing without finding also something else in me. Or to state it in other words: Whatsoever may be possible in the course of consciousness by means of previous experience and free abstraction, consciousness originally clearly commences no more with the representation of a mere impotent willing than with the representation of our power to will. So far as we see as yet, consciousness begins with a *perception of our actual causality in the sensuous world*. This causality we deduce from our willing, and the determinedness of this our willing from a freely created conception of an end.

Thus it appears that the conception of freedom is mediately conditioned by the now to be deduced perception of an actual causality, and since that conception conditions self-consciousness, self-consciousness must also

be conditioned by the latter. Hence all we have hitherto deduced, and may yet deduce, is one and the same synthetic consciousness, the separate parts whereof can certainly be separated in philosophical abstraction, but are on no account separated in original consciousness. It is enough to have stated this once for all.

PROOF.

I find myself willing only in so far as my activity is to be put in motion through a determined conception. My activity in willing is necessarily a determined activity, as has been sufficiently established. But in the mere activity, as such, as pure activity, nothing is distinguishable or determinable. Activity is the simplest contemplation—mere inner agility, and nothing else.

Activity is not to be determined through itself, and yet must be determined if consciousness is to be possible, signifies: Activity is to be determined through and by means of its *opposite*; hence through the mode of its limitedness, and only under this condition is a manifold of activity, or are many and particular acts possible.

But the manner of my limitedness I cannot absolutely and intellectually contemplate through myself, but only *feel* in sensuous experiences. But if an activity is to be limited, and if its limitedness is to be felt, this limitedness must have existence (of course, for me, and not in itself). Now everything that is sensuously to be contemplated is necessarily a quantum, at present only a quantum filling up a time moment. But that which fills up a time moment is itself an infinitely divisible manifold, and hence the perceivable limitedness must be itself a manifold. At present the Ego is to be posited as active. It must, therefore, be posited as removing and breaking through a manifold of limitation and resistance in a succession (for even in the single moment there is succession,

since otherwise no duration of time would arise from the mere joining together of single moments). In other words: *The Ego must be posited as having causality in an external sensuous world.*

REMARKS.

1. As part of the result of our investigation, we must also remember that the intellectual contemplation, from which we started, is not possible without a sensuous contemplation, and the latter not without a feeling. It would be, therefore, an utter misapprehension and reversion of our system to charge us with the opposite assertion. But neither is the latter possible without the former. I cannot be, for myself, without being a somewhat, and this I am only in the sensuous world; but neither can I be for myself without being an Ego, and this I am only in the world of intelligence, which opens to my eyes by means of intellectual contemplation. The point of union of both worlds lies in this: that I am, only through absolute self-activity, regulated by a conception, *for myself*, what I am already in the sensuous world. Our existence in the world of intelligence is the moral law: our existence in the sensuous world is the actual deed; and the point of union of both is the freedom, as an absolute power, to determine the latter world through the former.

2. The Ego is to be posited as actual only in opposition to a non-Ego. But a non-Ego exists for the Ego only on condition that the Ego acts, and in this its acting feels a resistance which must be surmounted, however, since otherwise the Ego would not act. It is only through the means of a resistance that the activity of the Ego becomes perceptible and of a duration in time, since, otherwise, it would be beyond all time, which we cannot even think.

3. Hence, no causality directed upon a non-Ego, no

Ego. This causality is not accidental, but necessarily belonging to the Ego, like everything else in the Ego.

Would that people were to cease combining to reason out of a number of accidentally joined forces, and were to accustom themselves to look upon it as a completed whole, as an *organised reason*, so to speak. Either the Ego is everything that it is, and as it appears on the standpoint of ordinary consciousness independently of all philosophical abstraction, or it is nothing, and is indeed not at all. Consciousness begins with sensuous perception, which is throughout determined, but on no account does it begin with abstract thinking. By trying to begin consciousness with abstraction (as philosophy, indeed, does begin), and by mistaking that which was to be explained, viz., actual consciousness, for the explanation itself, viz., philosophy, the latter science has been turned into a tissue of absurdities.

4. Only through such a statement of the matter as we have just given, is the absoluteness of the Ego, as its essential character, retained. Our consciousness starts from the immediate consciousness of our activity; and only by means of it do we find ourself passive. The non-Ego does not affect the Ego as has been generally supposed, but *vice versa*. It is not the non-Ego which penetrates into the Ego, but the Ego which proceeds out of itself into the non-Ego. Thus we have to express this relation through sensuous contemplation, whereas, transcendently, it should be expressed: We find ourselves originally limited not through our limitations drawing in upon us—for in that case the cancelling of our reality would also cancel our consciousness of it—but through our extending and in extending our limits.

Again, in order to go out of itself, the Ego must be posited as overcoming the resistance. Here, again, the primacy of reason, in so far as reason is practical, is asserted. Everything starts from activity and from the activity of the Ego. The Ego is the first principle of all

movement, of all life, of all deeds and events. If the non-Ego influences us, it does not do so within our sphere, but within its own sphere. It affects us through resisting us, and it would not resist unless we first directed our activity upon it. It does not attack us, but we attack it.

CHAPTER IV.

DETERMINATION OF THE CAUSALITY OF THE RATIONAL BEING THROUGH ITS INTERNAL CHARACTER.

FOURTH PROPOSITION.—*The rational being cannot ascribe causality to itself without determining the same in a certain manner through its own conception.*

PRELIMINARY.

Our proposition is unclear and ambiguous. The causality of the rational being in the sensuous world may well be supposed, and will shortly show itself, to stand under various restrictions and conditions; and on the first glance it is hard to say which of these is meant by the certain manner of determinedness mentioned in our proposition. But we have in our method itself the surest means against all confusion. It must be the determinedness which conditions immediately the perception of our causality, which is meant, and what sort of a determinedness this is will appear from a deduction. The conditions which again determine this determinedness we shall show afterwards.

But in order to know from the beginning, whereof we really speak, and to give a thread for the direction of our attention, let us first try to guess from common consciousness what this determinedness may be. (It is scarcely necessary to mention that this guess is not to prove anything, but merely to prepare the proof.)

It has already been stated that we cannot will or effect

something in violation of the necessary laws of thinking, since we cannot even think it, and that we cannot likewise create or annihilate matter, but merely separate and connect it, the ground whereof is also stated in its proper place. But even in this separating and connecting of matter or substance we are bound to obey a certain order. In most cases we cannot immediately realize our end through our will, but must make use of various means, existing previously and independently of us, as the only proper means to effect our purpose. Let our end be = X. Instead of directly realizing X, we are, perhaps, compelled to realize A first as the only means to get to B, and B as the only means to get to C, etc., until we arrive, through a series of mediating ends, mutually conditioning each other, at our final end X.

In fact, we *can* do all that we can *will* to do, and the only difference is that we cannot always do it immediately and at once, but in a certain order of proceeding. (It is said, for instance, that man cannot fly. Why should man not be able to do it? Of course, man cannot fly immediately as he can walk immediately; but through the means of a balloon he can certainly rise into the air, and move about with a certain degree of freedom and purpose. Moreover, shall we, because our age cannot do what it has not yet discovered the means to do, assert that *man* cannot do it? I will not suppose that an age like ours considers itself mankind!)

The assertion of common consciousness is, therefore, that in the execution of our ends we are tied to a certain order of means. What does this assertion signify, when looked upon from a transcendental point of view, merely looking to the imminent changes and appearances in the Ego, and utterly abstracting from external things?

According to previous explanations, a *feeling* always accompanies perception, and to say: I perceive changes outside of me, signifies the same as: the condition of my feelings changes. I will to have external causality,

signifies: I will that a determined feeling within me should be replaced by a determined other feeling, which I require in my conception of the end to be attained. I have become cause, signifies: this required feeling has actually entered me. Hence to say: I attain my end through a series of means, signifies: between the feeling, from which I proceeded to willing, and the feeling required by that willing, a series of other feelings enters. And to say that this relation is a necessary one, signifies: a determined required feeling follows a determined other feeling, only on the condition that a determined series of other feelings (determined in their kind, number, and sequence) enters between them.

But each feeling is expressive of my limitation, and to say, I have causality, signifies always: I expand my limits. Hence the assertion of common consciousness, transcendently expressed, signifies: that this expanding of our limits can only proceed in a certain manner of progression, our causality being limited, in the attainment of its end, to the use of certain means. It is this determination and limitation of our causality, whereof we have to treat at present, as our deduction will clearly show.

This part of the deduction is a progress in our series of conditions. I cannot posit myself as free without ascribing to myself an actual causality. Such was our last proven proposition. But under what conditions can we again ascribe causality to ourselves? This is the problem of our present investigation.

PROOF.

A. My causality is perceived as a manifold in a continuous series.

The perception of my causality, as has already been remarked, necessarily, as perception, occupies a time moment. But through the union of many moments, there arises a duration or filling up of time, and hence, each separate moment must also fill up a time, since, by the

union of many of the same kind, nothing can arise, which is not in the many as separates. What, then, does this signify; each moment *fills up* a time? Simply, that in this moment a manifold *might* be distinguished, and that this distinction *might* be continued infinitely; but, on no account, that this distinction is actually made, since, on the contrary, it becomes a moment only through not distinguishing, not separating it any further. To say that the moment is posited as filling up time, signifies, therefore, the same as: the possibility in general of making the distinction just described is posited.

That which occurs in the perception of our causality is the synthesis of our activity with a resistance. But our activity, as we have seen, is not a manifold, but rather absolute pure identity; and is itself to be characterized only through relation to the resistance. Hence, the manifold which is to be distinguished, must be a manifold of the resistance.

This manifold is necessarily a manifold separated externally, or a discrete manifold, for only on this condition does it fill up a time; it is thought as a series. How, then, is it in regard to the sequence of this manifold in a series; does this sequence depend upon the freedom of the intelligence as such, or is it regarded as determined independently of the intelligence. For instance, assuming this manifold to be *a b c*, would it be a proper matter, for the freedom of thinking, to change it for *b c a* or for *c a b*, etc., or was it necessary to put in that particular sequence, *b* following *a*, and *c* following *b*—and *b* only possible on the condition of *a* having been preposited, etc.? It is clear that the latter is the case, for the perceived causality of the Ego is something actual; but, in the representation of the actual, the intelligence is altogether necessitated, and never free so far as the context of the representation is concerned.

Indeed, looking at the matter in general, my causality necessarily happens in time, since it cannot be my

causality unless it is thought, and since all my thinking occurs in time. But time is a determined series of successive moments, wherein each moment is conditioned by another one which it does not condition, and conditions another one, by which it again is not conditioned. The thinking of our causality, however, is the perception of an actual; and in perception nothing depends upon the thinking as such. Hence my causality is represented as a series, the manifold whereof is the manifold of a resistance, the sequence of which is not determined through my thinking, but independently of it.

B. The sequence of this manifold is determined independently of me; and hence, is itself a limitation of my causality.

We have just seen that the sequence of the manifold in my causality is not determined through my thinking; but neither is it determined or produced through my activity, as is, indeed, immediately clear.

The resistance is not my acting, but the opposite of my acting. I do not produce it, and, hence, I do not produce the least of what belongs to it. That which I produce is my activity, and in it there is neither manifold nor sequence of time, but pure unity. I desire the end, and nothing but the end; and the means I only desire because the end cannot be attained except through them. This whole relation itself is, therefore, a limitation of my activity.

REMARKS.

Let us explain more clearly the result of our present investigation.

1. The idea of the deduced series is as follows: There must first be a point of beginning, wherein the Ego proceeds out from its original limitedness, and has for the first time, and immediately, causality, which point of beginning, if it should be impossible, from some reason or another, to trace our analysis back so far, might also

appear as a *plurality* of points of beginning.* In so far as these points are to be points of beginning, the Ego is in them cause immediately through its will; and there are no mediating links necessary in order to attain this causality. Such first points there must be, if the Ego is ever to become cause. These points, thought together, we call, as will appear soon, our articulated body; and this body is nothing but these points represented and realised through contemplation. Let us call this system of the first moments of our causality the system A.

With each of these points many other points connect, wherein the Ego can become cause in a manifold manner through means of the first series. I say: With *each* one *many* connect; for if from each one only *one* manner of acting were possible, that acting would not be free, and it would indeed be not a second act, but merely a construction of the first. Let us call this system the system B.

With *each* moment of this system B are again connected *many* points of a third system C, and thus—to put it in the shape of an illustration, an infinite circular space is described around a fixed central point, in which space each point can be thought as connecting with an infinite number of others.

Through this necessary view of our causality the world generally, and the world as a manifold, arises for us. All the qualities of matter—excepting those, of course, which originate from the forms of contemplation—are nothing but their relation to us, and more especially their relation to our causality, since no other relation exists for us; or to express this thought transcendently: they are the relations of our determined finity to our desired infinity.

The object X is in space *thus far removed from me*, signifies *idealiter*: in proceeding from myself to the object in space, I must first seize and posit these and these

* *Translator's Note.* Or as a plurality of first men.

objects in order to posit it; and viewed *realiter*, it signifies: I must first penetrate this and that amount of opposing space in order to be able to consider the space X, as identical with the space wherein I am myself.

The object Y is *hard*, signifies: In a certain *series of my activity* I feel between two determined links of it a determined resistance. The object is *softening*, signifies: I feel the resistance diminished in the same place of the same series. It is thus in regard to all the predicates of things in the sensuous world.

2. The *real active and feeling Ego* describes in acting a continuous line, wherein there is no disruption or anything of the kind; a line, wherein you proceed imperceptibly to the opposite, without a change appearing to occur in the next adjoining point, but only at some points' distance. The *reflecting Ego* seizes any number of facts of this continuous line as separate moments. Thus there arises for the reflecting Ego a series, consisting of points, not immediately connected. (Reflection proceeds by *leaps*, as it were, whereas sensation is *steady* or continuous.) It is true, both the extreme end-points of the successive moments (if such things could be in an infinitely divisible line, although we may well think them) imperceptibly join each other, and in so far that which is contained in both the separated moments is the same. But the reflection only seizes that wherein they are opposed, and thus they are distinct moments, and give rise to a changing consciousness; the identity of consciousness being again made possible through their likewise remaining always the same.

3. This restriction of our causality to the use of certain determined means, in order to attain a determined object, must be explained from the point of view of common consciousness, through a determined qualitateness of the things, or through determined laws of nature. This explanation, however, cannot suffice on the standpoint of transcendental philosophy, or on that standpoint which

separates all the non-Ego from the Ego, and thinks the Ego in its purity. From this standpoint it appears utterly absurd to assume a non-Ego as a thing in itself with abstraction from all reason.

How, then, is that limitation to be explained in this connection, not in regard to its *form*, (*i.e.* not why such a limitation *in general* is to be posited, for this is precisely the question we have answered in our deduction); but in regard to its content, *i.e.*, why this limitation should be thought precisely in the particular manner in which it is thought. In other words, why should precisely these and no other means lead to the attainment of this or that determined end? Now, since we are here not to assume things in themselves, nor natural laws as the laws of an external nature, this limitation can only be conceived as of this character: The Ego limits itself, not arbitrarily, however, and with freedom, since in that case we could not say, the Ego *is* limited; but in virtue of an immanent law of its own being, though a natural law of its own (finite) nature. This determined rational being is arranged in a manner that it must limit itself precisely thus; and this arrangement cannot be explained any further precisely because it is to constitute the original limitation of that rational being, beyond which it cannot proceed with its *activity*, and hence likewise not with its *cognition*. To demand such an explanation would be to contradict one's self. There are, however, other limitations of the rational being, whereof the grounds can be shown up.

Now, if these separate limitations, which as such occur only *in time*, are gathered together and thought as an original arrangement, *prior to all time and beyond all time*, then we think *absolute limits* to the primary impulse itself. It is an impulse which can only be directed upon this, only upon a causality determined in such or such a series, and upon no other causality whatever; and it is such an impulse absolutely. Our whole internal, as well

as external, world, in so far as the former is actual world, is thus *pre-established* for us throughout all eternity. I say, in so far as the internal world is actual, *i.e.*, an objective something in us. For the merely subjective, the self-determination, is not pre-established, and hence we act with freedom.

CHAPTER V.

DEDUCTION OF A DETERMINEDNESS OF OBJECTS INDEPENDENTLY OF US.

FIFTH PROPOSITION.—*The rational being cannot ascribe a causality to itself without presupposing a certain causality of the object.*

PRELIMINARY.

It has been shown already (Chapter I.) that the thinking of our freedom is conditioned by the thinking of an object. But this objectivity was in that chapter deduced only as mere raw matter. Common experience, however, teaches that we never find an object which is only matter, and which is not already formed in a certain respect. It appears, therefore, that the consciousness of our causality is conditioned not merely by the general positing of an object, but also by the positing of a determined form of the objects. But is this common experience, to which we have referred, necessary and universal, and, if so, according to what laws of reason is it thus necessary and universal? The solution of this question might have some influence upon the system.

The general proposition, that all matter is necessarily perceived in a determined form, might be proven easily enough. But we do not care for this alone, but more particularly for an insight into the *determined* form, which we must assign to the objects of our causality in advance of our causality; and to show up this may require a much profounder investigation. Even the

words of the proposition established cannot yet be explained by us, therefore, and we must wait for a complete unravelling of their meaning until we have finished our investigation.

PROOF.

Thesis.—The rational being has no cognition except as a consequence of a limitation of its activity.

This proposition has been abundantly proven by all we have previously said, and it is simply the result of our previous investigations. I find *myself* only as free, and I find myself as free only in the actual perception of a determined self-activity. I find *the object* only as limiting, and yet as overcome by my self-activity. Without consciousness of a self-activity there is indeed no consciousness at all, but this self-activity can itself not be the object of a consciousness unless it is limited.

Antithesis.—But the rational being as such has no self-activity, except as a consequence of a cognition, at least a cognition of something in that being itself.

That something is product of my self-activity, I do not and cannot perceive, but absolutely posit; and I do posit it thus absolutely in positing the form of freedom in general. But this form of freedom consists in this, that the material determinedness of the will is grounded upon a conception of an end, which conception is freely produced by the intelligence. Now, apart from the fact that the possibility of such a conception of an end seems itself to be conditioned by the cognition of an external object, and of a form thereof existing independently of us, apart from this fact of mere common consciousness, of which we do not know yet whether it will be confirmed, it is at least certain that we presuppose the cognition of such a conception of an end for the possibility of a perception of my willing. But only in so far as I perceive myself as free, willing is a causality, *my* causality.

The condition, as we see, is not possible without the conditioned, and the conditioned not possible without the condition, which doubtless is a defective circle of explanation and a proof that we have not yet explained the consciousness of our freedom, which we were to explain.

(It were perhaps an easy matter to solve this difficulty by the presumption that the first moment of all consciousness—for only the first moment presents the difficulty, since in the progress of consciousness the choice through freedom and a cognition of the end-conception in advance of the will-resolve, by means of previous experience, can easily be conceived—consists in an absolute synthesis of the production of the end-conception and of the perception of a willing of this end. That conception would thus be, not produced, but *merely thought*, as produced immediately together in and with the willing, for the sake of finding the willing itself to be free. The only question would be this: Whence, then, since no choice is to precede the willing, does the determinedness of the end or of the willing (which is here all the same) come from, and how can it be explained by the philosopher? (For we have seen that the Ego itself explains it through the thought of a previously produced end-conception.) And this is, indeed, the true solution of the difficulty, which, once obtained, will also solve the last-mentioned question. But rules of a systematic procedure, as well as other discoveries, which we apprehend, force us to seek a more thorough basis, and the present remarks are only intended to point out the direction of our investigation.

Synthesis.—According to the well-known rules of our synthetical method, the above antithesis is to be solved through a synthesis of the conditioned and the condition, both being posited as one and the same. The activity is, therefore, to be itself the desired cognition, and the cognition itself the desired activity; and all conscious-

ness must start from something, which absolutely unites in itself both predicates. Let this union be thought, and the contradiction is actually solved.

But this is the very difficulty. It is so hard to understand this thought, to think anything clearly when thinking it. According to the rules of synthetical elaboration, our task would, therefore, now be to immediately analyse the established synthetical conception until we should have succeeded in understanding it: the most difficult way of it, particularly as our established synthesis is one of the most abstract occurring in the whole science of philosophy.

There is an easier method; and, since we are at present concerned more about the results themselves than about getting a knowledge of the original synthetical procedure of reason (which, moreover, has been amply exemplified in other instances, more specially in my *Science of Rights*), we shall pursue this easier method. For we know already, from previous investigations in regard to that primary point, from which all consciousness proceeds, so much that we can very properly proceed in our investigations from these known characteristics, and ascertain whether they will also solve our present difficulty, and whether they also involve the synthesis just now established. This method is the same as the other reversed.

THE PROOF BY ANOTHER METHOD.

I.

If we think the Ego originally objective—as it is found in advance of all other consciousness—its determinedness cannot be otherwise described than by means of a tendency or impulse, as we have sufficiently established at the very beginning. The objective state of an Ego is by no means a being or permanency (for in that case it would be its opposite, a thing); but is, on the contrary, absolute activity, and nothing but activity. Now, activity, taken objectively, is *Impulse*.

I have said: if we think the Ego originally objective, for, after the subjective in the Ego has been separated and thought (according to our previous description in Chapter II., Book 1) as absolute power of freedom, the objective in the Ego, in this relation to the subjective or to freedom, is a moral law for freedom.

But the Ego is not merely objective, for in that case it would be a thing and not an Ego. Hence, its original determinedness is not only the determinedness of a being, but also of a thinking: taking the latter word in its widest significance as embracing all utterances of the intelligence. But such a mere *determinedness* of the intelligence, without any self-activity or freedom on the part of the intelligence, is called a *feeling* (as we have shown in Chapter III. of Book 1).

A thing merely *is* something or another, and that finishes the determinedness of the thing. But the Ego never *is* merely something or another; it must also know of that which it is. The being of the Ego necessarily and immediately relates to its consciousness. This mere determination of the being and the Egoness is called feeling; and, hence, if the Ego is originally posited as *being* an impulse, *i.e.*, if the original *objective* determinedness of the Ego is characterised as impulse, then it is also necessarily posited as knowing of this its being, or of this impulse; and since this immediate knowing in the Ego, as its subjective determinedness, is called feeling, it is necessarily posited as having a feeling of this impulse. And in this manner we arrive at a necessary and immediate consciousness, to which we can attach the series of all other consciousness. In other words, all other consciousness: reflection, contemplation, comprehension, etc., presupposes an application of freedom, which again presupposes many other things. But feeling does not presuppose anything. I *feel* only so far as I *am*. This feeling of the impulse is called *yearning*: an undetermined sensation of a need.

Now, this original feeling of the impulse is precisely the synthetical link, which we described above. The impulse is an activity, which in the Ego necessarily becomes cognition (feeling), and this cognition is not (like other cognition) an image of the activity of the impulse, but, rather, is that very activity itself in its immediate representation. If the activity is posited, the cognition thereof is also immediately posited, and if this cognition is posited in its form as feeling, the activity itself is also posited.

In other cognitions the objective is always still held to exist, in a certain respect, independent of its cognition or representation, whether it be so held a thing in itself, or as law of reason; for only by holding it thus does it become an objective, and distinct from the subjective. In feeling, both are absolutely united; a feeling (noun) is clearly nothing without feeling (inf. verb), and is that feeling itself, is always merely a subjective.

This original feeling solves the above difficulty thoroughly. We could not assume an activity without cognition, since all activity was found to presuppose a freely-produced conception of an end. Again, we could not assume any cognition without presupposing an activity, since all cognition was deduced from the perception of our limitedness in acting. But at present we have something, which is immediately knowable, namely, our original impulse. The first act is a satisfaction of that impulse, and in relation to it, that impulse appears as a freely-produced conception of an end; and this is very correct, since the Ego is to be regarded as the absolute ground of its impulse.

II.

In feeling I am utterly, and in every respect, enchained. I have not even that freedom which occurs in every representation, namely, that I can abstract from the object of it. It is not I, *who posit* myself when I feel, but both objectively—as *impelled*; and subjectively—as *feeling* this impulsion—*am* I posited.

Now, if only the consciously free and active is posited as Ego, as is always done on the standpoint of common consciousness, then the object and subject of the impulse does not belong, in so far, to the Ego, but is rather opposed to it; and it is only my thinking and acting which constitutes my Ego.

The ground of distinction of these my predicates in the described relation is as follows: I, in so far as I am free, am not the ground of my impulse and of the feeling exerted by the impulse. It is not a matter of my freedom how I feel or do not feel, whereas it is utterly a matter of my freedom how I think or act. The former is not product of freedom, and freedom has not the least control over it; the latter, however, is merely and purely product of freedom, and is not at all without freedom. The impulse and feeling, moreover, are to have no causality upon freedom. In spite of the impulse, I can determine myself contrary to it; or, if I do determine myself in accordance with it, it is still not the impulse which determines me, but I myself who determine myself.

The ground of relation of these predicates is as follows: Although a part of that which pertains to my Ego is to be possible only through freedom, and another part of the same Ego is to be independent of freedom and freedom independent of it, yet the Ego, to which both parts pertain, is only one and the same, and is posited as one and the same. I, who feel, and I who think; I, who am impelled, and I, who freely resolve, am the same I.

Now, although my first act, as has just been shown, can be none other than a satisfying of the impulse, and although the end-conception for that act is given through the impulse, that act is nevertheless as having such an end-conception determined otherwise than as mere impulse. For as mere impulse the act would be viewed as necessarily constituted in this or that manner, whereas with the characteristic of being directed upon an end it is viewed as an act, which *might* have been *otherwise* than

it is. To be sure, I follow the impulse; but with the thought that I also might not have followed it. It is only thus that the manifestation of my power becomes an *acting*; it is only on this condition that self-consciousness, and consciousness in general, is possible.

We have already distinguished this objective view of the Ego, in so far as a determined impulse is originally posited, and a feeling deduced from it, from another objective view of the same Ego, which appears as moral law. This distinction can be made clearer at present.

Materialiter.—Both are distinct in this, that whereas the moral law cannot be derived at all from an objective determinedness of the impulse, but simply from the form of the impulse in general, as the impulse of an Ego, or from the form of absolute independence and self-determination, the feeling of the impulse presupposes, on the contrary, a determined material need.

Formaliter.—Both are distinct in this, that whereas the moral law does not absolutely force itself upon us, is not felt and does not at all exist independently of free reflection, arising rather from a reflection of freedom, and from the relation of the above-described form of all impulse to freedom, the feeling of the material impulse, on the contrary, forces itself upon us.

Finally, so far as the *relation* is concerned, the just-described impulse does not at all relate to freedom, whereas the moral law does relate itself to freedom, since it is a law for freedom.

In what we have said above, we have established the conception of an original, determined system of our limitedness in general; the utterance or manifestation of this limitedness, and of the limited in us, being precisely feeling and impulse; and hence there exists an originally determined system of impulses and feelings. And since whatsoever is fixed and determined independently of freedom is called *nature*, according to the above, that system of impulses and feelings is to be thought as

nature. Moreover, since the consciousness thereof forces itself upon us, and since the Ego or substance, wherein this system rests, is to be the same, which thinks or wills with freedom, and which we posit as ourselves; it follows that we must think that system of impulses and feelings as *our* nature.

In other words: I myself am to a certain extent, and without an infringement upon the absoluteness of my reason and of my freedom—*nature*; and this my nature is an *impulse*.

III.

But not only do I posit myself as nature, I also assume other nature outside of my own, partly in so far as I am compelled to relate my causality in general to an external and independently existing matter, and partly in so far as this matter must have, also independently of my activity, at least that form which forces me to pass through determined links in order to attain my object. Now, in so far as both are to be nature, they are necessarily thought as *equal*; but in so far as the one is to be *my* nature, and the other an external nature, they are necessarily *opposed*. Both, therefore, are thought as mediated, *i.e.*, the one is thought through the thinking of the other, which is indeed the general relation of all opposites, which are equal in one characteristic. In other words, my nature must be originally explained, or derived from the whole system of nature and shown to have its ground therein.

Concerning this assertion, well known from and sufficiently explained in my other philosophical works, let me say a few words. We speak of an explanation and deduction, which the Ego itself produces on the standpoint of common consciousness, but not of the explanation of the transcendental philosopher. The latter explains all the occurrences of consciousness from the ideal acting of reason as such, while the posit objects outside of what is to be explained, in order to explain it.

Again: The Ego never becomes conscious of its explaining, as such, but only of the products thereof; or, in other words, it is clear that perception starts from the nature in me, and not from the nature outside of me, which latter external nature is the mediated (my own being the *mediating*), or that which is mediately cognized by means of the cognition of my own nature. Whereas the standpoint of reality proceeds reversely from external nature, which is held to determine our nature and to contain the ground, why our nature is constituted thus and not otherwise. How, then, is our nature to be explained? Or, what else does the assumption of a nature in us involve? Or, under what condition is it possible to ascribe a nature to us? This investigation we have now to undertake.

My nature is an impulse. How can an impulse as such be comprehended, *i.e.*, how is the thinking of the impulse mediated, in beings thinking altogether discursively and through mediation?

We can make very clear what we speak of here, by the opposite mode of thinking. Whatsoever lies within a series of causes and effects is easily comprehended by the laws of natural mechanism. Each link in the series has its activity communicated through it by another link external to it, and directs this its activity to a third external link. In such a series, a quantum of power is only passed over from link to link, and passes, as it were, through the whole series. Whence this power may come we never learn, being forced, at each link in the series, to proceed further upwards, and never arriving at an original source. This power, penetrating the series, is the power by means whereof we think the activity and passivity of each separate link in the series.

But in such a manner we cannot comprehend the impulse as working, and hence, we cannot think it all as a link in such a series. Let us assume an external cause directed upon the substrate of the impulse, then there

also results an external causality upon a third link; but if this external cause has no influence over the substrate of the impulse, there results nothing at all. Hence, the impulse is something, which neither comes from, nor goes into, the external world; it is an internal activity of the substrate directed upon itself. *Self-determination* is the only conception by means of which we can think an impulse.

Hence, my nature, in so far as it is to consist in an impulse, is thought as determining itself through itself; for only then can an impulse be conceived. But that an impulse exists at all, is simply fact of consciousness on the standpoint of ordinary consciousness, beyond which fact that standpoint does not transcend. It is only the transcendental philosopher who goes beyond it in order to look up the ground of this fact.

COROLLARIUM.

In the first mode of proceeding, our judgment is what Kant calls *subsuming*, and in the latter mode, what he calls *reflecting*. The distinction is this: The law of natural mechanism is nothing but the law of the successions of reflections, and of their reciprocal determination (through which alone time, and identity of consciousness in the progress of time, arises for us), transferred to external objects. The understanding, in this sort of thinking, proceeds its ordinary way mechanically; and our free power of judgment has only to reflect upon what it actually does as mechanical understanding, in order to become conscious of it. The matter is comprehended without any activity of freedom or consideration: it is comprehended through the mere mechanism of the power of cognition; and this procedure is justly called *subsuming*.

But in the second mode of proceeding the comprehending cannot at all occur in this mechanical manner; and hence, there arises a check and doubt in our minds,

accompanied by the reflection, that the comprehension cannot succeed thus. Now, the comprehension cannot be *thus* achieved, and yet must be achieved—must be embodied in the unity of self-consciousness, signifies: the mode of thinking must be reversed (precisely as the proposition: the ground of something is not to be found in the Ego, and yet there must be a ground; signifies: that ground is in the non-Ego).

This function of the reflective power of judgment arises only, however, where subsumption is not possible; and reflective judgment *prescribes itself its own law*, namely, the law to reverse the law of subsumption.

IV.

Nature—at present as yet only *my* nature, but which, in its essence, is nature—*determines itself*. But nature, as such, is characterised through opposition to freedom; or through this: that, whereas all being of freedom is to proceed from a thinking, all being of nature is, on the contrary, to proceed itself from an absolute being. *Hence*, nature, as such, cannot determine itself like a free-being, *through a conception*. Nature determines itself signifies therefore: nature *is* determined to determine itself through its essence; is determined *formaliter* to determine itself in general; or nature can never be undetermined, as a free being may well be. Again, nature is determined to determine itself *materialiter*, or *precisely in such and such* a manner, having no choice between a determination and its opposite, as a free being well has.

My nature is not *all* nature. There is nature outside of me, and this external nature is posited for the very sake of explaining the determination of my nature. Now, my nature is described as an impulse; and this impulse must, therefore, be explained, and is originally, in fact, explained from that other nature. In other words, the determinedness of my nature as an impulse, is result of the determinedness of all nature. The impulse belongs

to me in so far as I am *nature*, not in so far as I am intelligence; for the intelligence, as such, has, as we have seen, not the remotest influence upon the impulse. Hence, the conception of the impulse is synthetically united with the conception of nature, and to be explained from it; and hence, everything which is thought in the conception of nature, is thought as impulse, and hence, as self-determining.

As I must separate my nature from all other nature, so can I also, since nature is a general manifold, separate parts of that external nature from other parts. (We assert here only an ideal separation, leaving it undecided whether there may be still another ground of this separating than the freedom of arbitrary thinking; *i.e.*, undecided whether there are *actually*, and independently of our thinking, separate parts of nature.)

The part thus separated must be through itself what it is, but the whole must contain the ground of its thus determining itself. The whole, however, is nothing but the reciprocal action of the sum of all the parts upon each other.

Or still more clear: Abstract from your own nature—because your nature involves a characteristic distinction from all other nature, namely, the necessity to limit it precisely so far and no further—and reflect merely upon external nature: separate from that nature whatever part you may chose. That you happen to consider precisely this quantum of nature as a separate part, of this the ground lies exclusively in your free reflection. Call this separate part X. In X there is impulse, and a determined impulse; but that impulse is precisely a thus determined impulse, is determined through this, that outside of X there is precisely so much nature existing, which nature, through its existence, limits the impulse of that separate part to be the totality, and leaves to it only such a limited quantum of reality, and giving to it for the rest only an impulse.

Now, if we had not been forced to characterize nature as an impulse, we could have posited all that X is not in X only as negation. But at present, having posited nature as impulse, we posit all that X is not as impulse in X. For the general tendency to have reality penetrates the whole, and is in each part of the whole. But since each is only a part, each lacks all the reality of the other parts, and has only an impulse left for them. That this remainder is only *impulse*, and is precisely a thus-determined impulse, has its ground therein, because outside of the part there is still something else, and a precisely thus-determined something else.

Now at present X is a separate part for me, solely because I have made it such through freedom of thinking. Nothing prevents me from again separating from it, by the same freedom, another part—Y. In Y also there is impulse, determined through all that exists outside of it, including that which I previously called X. Again, nothing prevents me from separating from Y another part—Z. This Z will be related to Y as Y was related to X. In short, in this mode of procedure there is absolutely no primary and no ultimate. I can make each part again a totality, and each totality a part.

That which is constituted in such a manner as forces us to say of each part, that it is determined through itself, and yet likewise that this its self-determinedness *is again the result of the determinedness of all other parts through themselves*, we call an *organic whole*. Each part of the whole can again be considered as an organic whole or as a part, and only the highest cannot be regarded as a part. *Nature in general is, therefore, such an organic whole, and is posited as such.*

We can illustrate this conception in another way. According to the conception of natural mechanism, each thing is, through another, what it is, and manifests its existence in a third. According to the conception of an impulse, each thing is, through itself, what it is, and

manifests its existence in itself. Now, if a *free* being is to be thought, then this conception is valid in all its strictness, without the least modification—not as conception of an impulse, but as conception of absolute freedom. Freedom is *directly opposed* to natural mechanism, and is in no manner determined thereby. But when we speak of an impulse of *nature*, then the general character of nature, namely, as a mechanism, must be retained, together with the character of an impulse, and both characters, therefore, synthetically joined together: by which means we shall receive a mediating link between nature as mere mechanism (or the causality-relation); and freedom as the opposite of mechanism (or the substantiality-relation), which third link we, indeed, very much need to explain the causality of freedom in nature.

The conception of this synthesis is clearly the conception just developed by us. Something = A, is, indeed, through itself what it is, but that it is precisely this through itself has its ground in the other (*i.e.*, in all possible - A). Again, that the other is precisely this, and that A is precisely thus determined, has its ground in A itself, since - A on its part becomes through A what it is. Thus, necessity and independence are united, and we have no longer the simple thread of causality, but the closed sphere of reciprocal activity.

V.

I must posit *my nature* as a closed whole, to which there appertains precisely so much and no more: such is the result of our proof. The conception of this totality cannot be explained upon the standpoint of common consciousness, upon which we have placed the Ego in our whole latter investigation, from any reflection of that consciousness, as the transcendental philosopher, indeed, does explain it; but the conception is simply given. My nature is determined and fixed in this manner, and this totality itself is nature.

Let us ask first: How do I comprehend at all, and according to what law do I think something in nature as a real organic whole, since this something is itself only a part of nature in general? This question is asked very properly, for, as yet, we have only deduced the totality of nature as a real whole, but not any part thereof; and yet it is a fact that we think at least our own nature, which, after all, is only a part of the whole of nature, as a complete whole.

I have said: A *real* whole, and this determination is the chief point. Let me first explain this conception by its opposite. In the manner in which we regarded nature just now, it was completely a matter of the freedom of reflection, to grasp each part as a whole, and again to separate this part into ever so many parts, etc., I had a totality, but simply because I had made it a totality, and there was no other ground of determination for its limits than the freedom of my thinking. I had an ideal totality, a collective unity, but by no means a real totality. I had an aggregate, and not a compositum. If my whole is to be a real totality, then its parts must unite in a whole of themselves and independently of my thinking.

Reality is determined through a compulsion of reflection, whereas reflection is free in the representation of the ideal. This freedom, to limit the totality arbitrarily, must therefore be cancelled, and the intelligence be compelled to gather precisely so much and no more within it, if it is to become a real totality. Such is the case, as we have seen, with reference to the representation of my nature as a fixed whole.

Now, through what law of thinking may this necessity of a determination of the limits arise for us? Wherever we can no longer comprehend through mere subsumption, there the law of reflective judgment enters, and the latter is a mere reversion of the former. Now, it might well happen that our power of judgment, once safely

arrived within the sphere of reflection, can no longer comprehend even by means of the law which arose from a reversion of the law of subsumption; and hence it would have again to reverse that law. Thus there would arise a composite law of reflection, a reciprocity of reflection with itself. (We are to comprehend something. We cannot comprehend it by the law of subsumption, and hence we reverse that law, and obtain the law of reflection; now we are again to comprehend something else, and if we cannot even comprehend by this new law of reflection, hence we have to reverse it again.) Each part of nature is through itself, and in itself, what it is. So says the simple conception of reflection. But according to the conception, which arose by reversing the simple conception of reflection, no part of nature is through and for itself what it is, but only the totality is through and for itself. Hence each part of the totality is determined through all other parts of the same totality, and each complete totality is itself to be regarded as we regarded the whole universe, which latter, therefore, changes from a totality of parts, into a totality of totalities,* a system of real totalities.

Let us now analyze these conceptions still further, and thus connect our present argument with what we have previously said. According to our previous result, each had its measure of reality, and for all other reality an impulse. Impulse and reality were in reciprocal causality, and mutually exhausted each other. In none was there an impulse to have a reality, which it possessed, nor a lack, which it had not an impulse to replace. This mode of consideration we were able to continue or stop at pleasure; it fitted whatsoever came to our notice, and everything was perfectly uniform.

But at present a determined = X is asserted to be given, which cannot be comprehended by this sort of conception. How, then, must it be constituted? Let us consider any

* Leibnitz's *Monad.*—Tr.

particular part of X, and call it A. If in A impulse and reality could not be reciprocally explained each from the other, if the impulse did not impel to have a reality which A lacked, and which belonged to A, or if the impulse did impel to have reality which A lacked not, and which did not belong to A; then A could not be explained and comprehended through itself. My comprehending would be shut off; I should not have comprehended anything, and it would be evident that I ought not to have arbitrarily separated the part A from X.

Now let us consider the remainder of X=B. If B, considered in and for itself, were to result just as A did, so far as the relation of impulse and reality are concerned; but if it were likewise to appear that the impulse in B impels to have the reality which A lacks, whereas, on the other hand, the impulse in A impels to have the reality lacking in B: then my consideration of B would lead me back to A, in order to ascertain whether A really lacks that reality for which I discovered impulse in B, and whether there is really in A an impulse for the reality I discovered lacking in B. Thus should I be compelled to consider the matter once more, or to reflect upon, and thus limit my reflection. A composite reflection would thus arise, and, since it is governed by necessity, a composite *law* of reflection.

Moreover, since I could, in like manner, not comprehend A except through B, and *vice versa*; and since I should thus be *forced* to synthetically unite both: X would become a *real* and not merely an ideal totality.

But X generally is also organic nature, and hence, the general law of that nature must apply to it. In so far, it is infinitely divisible. Hence, I can divide A in *b c d*, and again *e f g*, etc., *ad infinitum*. Each part, as nature in general, has reality and impulse, and is, in so far, independent; but each part has this peculiarity, that the relation between its impulse and reality cannot be

explained out of itself; for, otherwise, it would not be a part of the actual totality X.

No part can be explained before all parts of X are gathered together. Each part tends to satisfy the need of all, and all, on the other hand, tend to satisfy the need of each single part. That which can only be comprehended in this manner, we shall call for the present, until, perhaps, we can find a better name for it: an actual organic whole.

I myself am at least such an organic whole. Whether there are more such outside of me, we cannot at present decide. The decision will depend upon this: whether I can comprehend myself as such an organic whole without assuming others outside of me or not? But at present, the only question is: how such an actual whole may be explained out of nature, and what new predicates may be ascribed to nature by means of this explanation.

By requiring that something shall be explained out of nature, we require that it shall be explained to us from a law of physical, and not of moral, necessity. Hence, by merely asserting the possibility of such an explanation, we assert that it is necessary for nature, and one of the qualities absolutely appertaining to nature, to organize itself into actual totalities, and that the rational being can think nature only in this manner, and not otherwise.

(Let no one, therefore, take refuge, from pure laziness of reason, in the assumption of an intelligence as the creator or architect of the world; for, amongst other things, it is—Firstly, perfectly unthinkable that an intelligence should create matter; and, secondly, it is as yet incomprehensible how reason can have any influence upon nature, which, indeed, we are at present endeavouring to explain. For, let an intelligence be ever so able to compose and connect, the result of this will merely be aggregation and alligation, but never a melting together, which latter process presupposes an internal power in nature herself. Neither let anyone attempt to explain organization from mechanical

laws. Those laws involve an everlasting repelling and moving away of matter, involve attraction and repulsion, but nothing more. The law of organism is an immanent law of nature, which rational beings must think when thinking the conception of nature, in order to be able to explain itself; but which law can itself be no further explained. To explain it would signify to deduce it from mechanism.

Of course it is only from the standpoint of common consciousness, and of common science, that this law remains a final absolute, and unexplainable. But from the standpoint of transcendental philosophy, and in the science of knowledge, it is easily explained, since that science explains all nature and deduces it from the Ego.)

The only question is, what sort of a law this may be, and what determined process of nature must necessarily be assumed in assuming it? According to our previously established law, each thing which is a thing of nature is, through itself, and for itself, that which it is; no thing is anything to another, and no other thing is anything to it. This is the principle of substantiality; whereas that of natural mechanism is the principle of causality.

Now, according to our present principle, there is no possible element, to which that principle of substantiality may apply; no element is self-sufficient, and for and through itself independent; each needs another, and this other needs it. There is in each an impulse for another.

If there is such a new principle, then the impulse thus determined rules throughout nature. Hence this law of nature may also be then expressed: each part of nature is impelled to unite its being and its working with the being and working of a determined other part of nature, and to dissolve together with it in space—if we think these parts in space. This impulse we call the *organizing* principle in the active and passive significance of the word. It is the impulse to organize and to be organized, and it is necessary in nature; *e.g.*, it is not a foreign ingredient without which nature might get along just as

well. Only let care be taken not to think the seat of this impulse as either here or there; or, still worse, to think this impulse as itself a separate part. It is no substance at all, but an accident, and an accident pertaining to all parts.

By thus positing the organization of the Ego as the result of a law of nature, we have at least gained so much that we find the organizing principle throughout all nature; for whether this impulse has causality also outside of our bodies, we are not as yet to decide.

But in me—this is our second point gained—this impulse has certainly causality. Certain parts of nature, and of the being and working of nature, have united themselves to produce one being and one causality. In this respect, that which we called an actual whole of nature may more properly be called *organized product of nature*.

There are such products, for I myself am such. We do not speak, as yet, of materiality in space, which would result in an *actual* manifold, although it might be easy to deduce it; but it is at least sure that the ideal manifold within me unites to form organization. Now this uniting is product of the organizing power of nature.

Hence the result of our present investigation is this: As sure as I am, I must ascribe causality to nature, since I can posit myself only as the product of nature.

We have therefore proven, though by no means yet completely analyzed, that which was to be proven.

CHAPTER VI.

RESULTS FROM THE FOREGOING.

I.

I FIND myself as an organized product of nature. But in such a product the essence of the part consists in an impulse to maintain certain other parts in unity with itself, which impulse, when attributed to the whole, is called the impulse of self-preservation. For since the essence of the whole is nothing but a uniting of certain parts into itself, self-preservation is simply the preservation of this uniting. To see this clearly, let the reader consider the following: Each possible part strives to unite other determined parts with itself. But this tendency can have no causality unless parts that mutually support each other are united; for only on this condition does an organized whole exist. Now, the whole is nothing but the parts taken together. Hence, nothing can be in the whole but that which is in the parts, namely, *a desire to gather certain parts into itself*; and, in so far as a complete whole is to exist, this desire must have causality. Its essence consists in a reciprocal causality between this tendency and this causality, which are mutually conditioned through another, for it is a whole, and the comprehending of the same is completed; and, in so far, the above established conception applies again to it in relation to all other nature. It preserves *itself*, signifies: it preserves that reciprocal causality between its tendency and its causality. If either is cancelled, everthing is

cancelled. A product of nature, which no longer organizes itself, ceases to be an organized product, for the character of organization consists in the continuing of the process of organization.

The tendency to self-preservation is not, as seems generally to be assumed, a tendency which desires existence in general, but which desires a particular determined existence; it is an impulse of the thing to be and to remain that which it is. For mere general existence is simply an abstract conception, and not anything concrete. An impulse having it for its object does not exist at all. A rational being never desires to be in order to be, but in order to be this or that. Neither does an irrational product of nature ever strive and work to be, but always to be precisely that which it is; an apple tree strives to be and remain an apple tree, and a pear tree a pear tree. In irrational products of nature, moreover, the impulse is, at the same time, effect; and hence, the apple tree can never bear pears, nor the pear tree apples. To change kind in this manner is a check of the whole organization, and sooner or later results in its destruction.

It is in like manner with me. There is in me an impulse, originated through nature, and relating itself to objects of nature, in order to unite them with my being; not exactly to gather them into myself, as I do meat and drink through digestion, but rather to relate them in general to my natural necessities, or to put them into a certain relation with myself. Now, this impulse is the impulse of self-preservation in the above specified significance of the word, of the preservation of myself as this particular product of nature. The relating of those means to my impulse and object is done *immediately and absolutely* without all mediating cognition, calculation, or consideration. That upon which this impulse is directed, belongs to my preservation, *because* the impulse craves it; and whatsoever belongs to my preservation the impulse craves, *because* it belongs to my preservation. The con-

nection is not made through freedom, but is involved in nature's law of organization.

Here already we meet an important fact, the results whereof extend very far, and the neglect whereof has been of great disadvantage as well to philosophy in general as to the science of morality in particular. —My impulse craves the object X. Does perhaps the attraction proceed from X, and taking hold of my nature, thus determine my impulse? By no means. The impulse solely proceeds out from my nature. This nature has already determined, in advance, what is to exist for me, and my impulses and tendencies are directed upon all that which is thus determined to exist for me, even before it actually does exist and affect me; nay, would crave it even though it could not exist for me, and would never be satisfied without it. But *it does exist* and *must exist*, by virtue of the completedness of nature as an organized totality in itself. I do not hunger because food exists for me, but certain objects of nature become food for me because I am hungry. It is the same with all organized products of nature. A plant is not impelled by the existence of substances which belong to its composition to gather them up into itself, but rather the internal construction of the plant demands the existence of precisely these substances independent of their actual existence, and if these substances did not exist in nature at all, that plant could also not exist in nature.

In short, everywhere is harmony and reciprocity, not mere mechanism, for mechanism produces no impulse! As sure as I am I, my desires and tendencies never proceed—even in my most animal needs—from the external object, but always from myself. If this remark is overlooked here, it will not be understood when it occurs again in a more important part, viz., when we come to develop the law of morality.

II.

This my impulse is, moreover, for me an object of my reflection, and this necessarily as described above. As certain as I reflect at all, am I necessitated to perceive this impulse, and to posit it as mine. I say, as certain as *I reflect*, for reflection itself is no product of nature, and cannot be such. Itself in its form occurs with absolute spontaneity, and only the object of the reflection, and the necessity to attend to this object, is an effect of nature.

Through this reflection directed upon the impulse there arises firstly a *yearning*, a feeling of a need not known to one's self. We lack we do not know what. Even through this, as the very first result of reflection, is the Ego distinguished from all other products of nature. Impulses in the latter either result in being satisfied, or result in nothing at all.

No one will seriously assert that in dry weather plants experience a yearning, caused by the absence of water. They either drink or wither, and there is no third result as the effect of their natural impulse.

III.

As intelligence, and hence as subject of consciousness, I am absolutely free and dependent only upon my self-determination. This is my character. Hence my nature also, in so far as it is assigned to me; *i.e.*, in so far as it is immediate object of consciousness, must also be dependent only upon self-determination.

But in how far is it assigned to *me*, as *subject of consciousness*? The product of the reciprocal causality of my nature is the impulse. Now this reciprocal causality is not *my* causality as intelligence; I do not become immediately conscious of it at all. The impulse itself is likewise not my product, it is *given* and does not depend upon my freedom. But the impulse enters consciousness, and all its effects in this region depends upon

me, or rather, the impulse has no effect in this region at all, it being I who do or do not effect something in it by virtue of that impulse. Here, then, lies the transition to self-determination on the part of the rational being; here lies the determined and sharpdrawn limit between necessity and freedom.

The satisfaction of the impulse in plant or animal occurs necessarily wherever its conditions arise. But man is not at all impelled by his natural impulse. Our digestion, the change of our food into nourishment, or the circulation of our blood, &c., are not matters under our control, they are the processes of nature in us, above alluded to. They are not under *our* control, as intelligence, because we do not *immediately* become conscious of them; for that which physiologists or doctors know of them they know *mediately*. But the satisfying of our hunger or thirst is under our control, since we have immediate consciousness of our desire for food and drink. Or, is there anyone willing to assert that he eats and drinks with the same mechanical necessity wherewith he digests.

In short, it is not within my control to feel or not feel an impulse within me, but it is within my control to satisfy it or not.

IV.

I reflect on my yearning, and thus raise to clear consciousness what at first was only a dark feeling. But I cannot reflect on it without determining it as a yearning, in consequence of the universally valid law of reflection; or, in other words, without distinguishing it from another possible yearning. But one yearning can be distinguished from another only through its object. Hence through this second reflection I also become conscious of the object of my yearning; concerning the reality or non-reality whereof we do not as yet trouble ourselves. We merely posit it here as an object yearned for. But a yearning determined through its object is called *desire*.

The manifold of desire united into one conception, and considered as a faculty grounded in the Ego, is called faculty of desire. If we should in the course of our investigation meet with another desire—the manifold whereof we could also unite into a faculty—it would be proper to call the present faculty, as Kant has indeed called it, the *lower desire*.

The form of this desire as such, *i.e.*, that it is an impulse accompanied by consciousness, has its ground in the free act of reflection. But that an impulse exists at all, and that this impulse or this desire is directed precisely upon such an object, has its ground in nature; not however in external nature, in the nature of objects, but in my own nature, and hence it is an immanent ground. Thus even in desire does freedom already manifest itself, since a free reflection enters between yearning and desiring.

Hence it is well possible to suppress inordinate desires, by not reflecting upon, by ignoring them, or by busying oneself, particularly with mental labour; in short, by not “giving way to them,” as the theological moralists very properly express themselves.

V.

My desire has for its object things of nature, either with a view to immediately unite them with me (like food and drink) or, to place them into a certain relation to me (like free air, fine prospect, clear weather), etc.

Now things of nature exist firstly in space for me, which we presuppose as well known from the science of knowledge; and hence that wherewith they are to be united, or to which they are to be placed in a certain relation, must also exist in space; since there is no uniting of that which has space, and no relating of it except to that which also is in space; for otherwise it would either not remain in space, which is absurd, or it would not be a relation, which is against the presupposition. Now

that which is in space and fills space we call matter. I am, therefore, as product of nature, matter, and, according to the above, organized matter, forming a fixed totality. We call this our *body*.

But it is, secondly, to be within the control of my will, whether I will unite things with me, or, place them into a relation to me, or not. Now this uniting and relation relates to parts of my organized body, and this (my body) is the immediate instrument of my will. Hence these parts must stand under the control of my will. Again, since here we speak of relations in space, these parts as parts, *i.e.* in their relation to the totality of my body, must be movable; and my body itself must be movable in its relation to the totality of nature. Moreover, since this movement is to depend upon a free produced conception, indefinitely modifiable, it must be a manifold movement. Such an arrangement of the body is called *articulation*. If I am to be free, my body must be articulated. (Compare the first part of my science of rights.)

REMARK.

We have arrived at one of those standpoints from which we can comfortably look around us, and observe whether our investigation has been somewhat cleared up.

There exists in us an impulse for things of nature, in order to bring them into a certain relation to our own nature; an impulse which has no object except itself, and which craves to satisfy itself merely that it may be satisfied. Satisfaction for the sake of satisfaction is called mere *enjoyment*.

It is of importance to us that the conviction of the absoluteness of this natural impulse should force itself upon everyone. Each organised product of nature is *its own object*, *i.e.* it organizes simply for the sake of organizing, and organizes thus, simply in order to organize thus. Not as if we wanted to say that the irrational product of

nature never *thinks* another object than itself; for this is self-understood, since it does not think at all; but we wish to say, that even an intelligence outside of such product cannot—without being illogical, and explaining utterly wrongly—ascribe any other or external object to such products. There is only an internal and absolute, but by no means a *relative*, teleological arrangement in nature; since the latter only arises through the manifold purposes which a free being may propose to itself, and, perhaps in part, execute in nature.

It is the same with the rational being in so far as it is mere nature. It satisfies itself simply in order to satisfy itself, and every determined object which satisfies it, exists simply because precisely such object was required by the nature of the rational being. Again, since the rational being becomes conscious of its yearning, it necessarily also becomes conscious of the satisfaction of this yearning; this satisfaction produces enjoyment, and this enjoyment is its last end and object. The natural man does not eat with a view to preserve and strengthen his body, but because hunger is painful, and food pleasant to him.

Several analysers of our feelings, particularly Mendelssohn, have explained the feeling of enjoyment as arising from the feeling of an improvement of our bodily condition. This is quite correct if mere sensual enjoyment is meant, and if the bodily condition is accepted merely as a state of organization. Jerusalem, in his *Philosophical Essays*, objects to this theory, that enjoyment is felt even when our bodily condition is growing worse, nay, in the immediate feeling of this growing worse, as, for instance, in the case of drunkards when they are becoming intoxicated. But in all examples of this kind it will be remarked that the growing worse has only reference to the state of articulation, whereas the state of the organization is constantly growing better at the time, the play and the reciprocal action of the several parts more perfect,

and their communication with surrounding nature more unchecked. But all sensuous enjoyment, as we have shown, has reference to the organization of the body, whereas the articulation, as such, as *tool of our freedom*, is not truly product of nature, but rather of practice through freedom; and the bad results, which the organization may be threatened with, we do not take into account, since the future is never immediately felt. Man is herein a mere plant. When the plant grows it would feel well, could it reflect. But the plant might also overgrow, and thus hasten on its destruction, and yet not be disturbed in its feeling of satisfaction.

Now, it is within our power of freedom to either follow this impulse of mere enjoyment or not. Each satisfying of an impulse, if consciously undertaken, is necessarily done through freedom, and our body is so arranged that we can work through it with freedom.

In so far as man has mere enjoyment for his object, he is dependent upon something *given*, namely, upon the existence of the object of his impulse; hence, he is not self-sufficient, and the attainment of his purpose depends also in part upon nature. But, in so far as man but reflects and thus becomes subject of consciousness—we have shown above, that he *necessarily* reflects on the impulse,—he becomes Ego, and hence, the tendency of reason to *absolutely determine itself through itself*, as subject of consciousness, will manifest itself in him.

One important question. My impulse as a being of nature, and my tendency as pure spirit: are they two different impulses? By no means. From the transcendental point of view, both are one and the same original impulse, which constitutes my being, only regarded from two different sides. For I am subject-object, and in the identity and inseparability of both consists my true being. If I regard myself as *object*, completely determined through the laws of sensuous perception and discursive thinking, then that, which is in part my only impulse, becomes my

natural impulse, because I myself am nature from this point of view. But if I regard myself as *subject*, then that impulse becomes for me a purely spiritual impulse, or a law of my self-determination. All the phenomena of the Ego are based simply upon the reciprocity of these two impulses, which two impulses are, in fact, only the reciprocal relation of *one and the same impulse to itself*: its self-relation.

This explains, at the same time, how two such utter opposites as the two impulses can occur in a being, which is to be absolutely one and the same. Both are, indeed, also one; but the whole Egoness is based upon their appearing as two opposites. The limit between both is reflection.

The reflecting, as that which contemplates in the reflection, is higher than the reflected, rises above and embraces it; hence, the impulse of the reflecting, of the subject of consciousness, is properly called the *higher* impulse, and a faculty of desire, determined by it, is called the higher faculty of desire.

Only the reflected is nature. The reflecting is opposed to it, and hence, is no nature, but raised above all nature. The higher impulse, as the impulse of the purely spiritual, is directed upon absolute self-determination to an activity for the mere sake of the activity. Hence, it is opposed to all enjoyment which is a mere passive surrendering to nature.

But both constitute only one and the same Ego; hence, both impulses must be united within the sphere of consciousness. It will appear that in this union the higher impulse must abandon its *purity, i.e.*, its non-determinedness through an object; whilst the lower impulse must abandon its enjoyment, for the mere sake of enjoyment. Hence, as result, there will appear an *objective* activity, the final end whereof is absolute freedom, absolute independence of nature. But this is an infinite, never attainable end; and hence, it can only be our problem

to state *how* we must act in order to *approach* that final end.

To take cognizance merely of the higher impulse would result in a mere *metaphysic of morals*, which is formal and empty. Only through synthetically uniting it with the lower impulse do we attain a science of morals which is *real*.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCERNING FREEDOM AND THE HIGHER IMPULSE.

I.

THE final production of my nature, as such, is an impulse. *I* reflect on *myself*, *i.e.*, on this my *given* nature, which, as immediate object of my reflection, is nothing but an impulse. Now, everything depends upon our completely determining this reflection. In order to do so, we must examine—1st, its *form*; 2nd, its *content*; and 3rd, the *connection* of both.

That the reflection occurs, or its *form*, is an absolute fact; it occurs because it does, or because I am I. So far as its content or object is concerned, we have already shown that this is our natural impulse, and the only question is, *how far* our nature may be the immediate object of that reflection. This, also, we have already answered as follows: in so far as I am *necessitated* to assign somewhat to me as the reflecting. The connection of both is, that both are to be one and the same. I, the natural being (for another I does not exist for me), am at the same time for myself the reflecting. That natural being is the substance, and the reflection is an accident of that substance; is an expression of the freedom of the natural being. Thus posits the reflection about to be described. Concerning the ground of this connection, common consciousness does not even ask. From the standpoint of common consciousness it would merely be said: "I happen to be such a being, with such a given nature, and the consciousness

thereof; and that suffices"; leaving altogether uncomprehended, which indeed that standpoint also does not propose to comprehend, how such a harmony between complete and mutually independent opposites is at all possible. That nature, on its part, determines and limits something in the manner in which my nature is determined and limited, can be comprehended; and likewise, that the intelligence, on its part, forms a certain representation and determines it in a certain manner. But how both, in their independent actions, should harmonize and arrive at *the same result*, is utterly incomprehensible, since neither the intelligence gives laws to nature, nor nature to the intelligence. The former assertion would, indeed, be Idealism, and the latter Materialism; whereas the system of fore-established harmony, as usually taken, takes cognizance of neither side, and leaves the question unanswered.

From the standpoint of transcendental philosophy we have already solved this problem. There is no such thing as nature by itself; my nature and all other nature, posited to explain mine, is merely a peculiar manner of regarding myself. I am limited only in the world of intelligence, and through this limitation of my original impulse my reflection is most certainly limited to myself, and, *vice versa*, through my reflection of myself my original impulse is limited; of course, *for me*, since we cannot speak of any other limitation of myself than for myself. On the standpoint of transcendentalism we have no independent twofold at all, but an absolute simple; and where there is no difference it were absurd to speak of a harmony, or ask for its ground.

But at present we occupy the standpoint of common consciousness, and follow its path. Through the described reflection the Ego tears itself loose from all, that is, to be outside of it, gets itself under its own control, and places itself before itself as absolutely self-sufficient. For the reflecting is self-sufficient, and only dependent upon itself;

but the reflected is the same as the reflecting. Not, as might seem at the first glance, as if we merely meant to say that the Ego, from this point inwards, simply observes itself; nay, we distinctly assert that from this point nothing can occur in the Ego without the active determining of the intelligence. Reflecting and reflected are united, and represent one single undivided person. The reflected brings the actual power, and the reflecting brings consciousness, into the person. The person hereafter can do nothing except with consciousness and according to free conceptions.

An actuality, which has its ground in a conception, is called a product of freedom. No actuality can, from the stated point, be ascribed to the Ego, except as a consequence of the Ego's own conception thereof. Hence the Ego is free from that point onwards, and all that the Ego henceforth does is product of this freedom.

This is indeed the important point, and it is our present intention to clear up at once the theory of freedom. Each link in a series of nature is a pre-determiner, be it according to the law of mechanism or of organization. Hence if we know the nature of a thing, and the law which governs it, we can tell for all time to come how the thing will manifest itself. But that which occurs in the Ego, commencing at the point where it became an Ego, and providing the Ego truly remains Ego, is not predetermined, and is absolutely undeterminable. There is no law according to which free self-determinations occur or may be calculated in advance, since they are dependent upon the self-determination of the Intelligence, which, as such, is absolutely free and altogether pure activity.

A series of nature is steady. Each link in it effects wholly whatsoever it can effect. But a series of freedom-determination consists of leaps and progresses utterly irregularly. Think one link of such a series as determined, and call it A. From A many other links are possible,

but not all possible links, only one of them = X results. Hence whilst in a series of nature all links connect closely, in such a series of freedom the connection breaks off at every link. In a series of freedom-determinations no link can be explained, for each is a primary and absolute. In series of nature the law of causality is valid; but in the freedom series the law of substantiality rules, *i.e.* each free resolve is itself substantial, is what it is absolutely through itself.

Beyond the stated reflection, natural necessity can no longer control me, for beyond it I am no longer a link of nature's chain. The last link of nature is an impulse, but only an *impulse*, having, therefore, no causality in a spiritual being; and thus we can make freedom comprehensible even from the standpoint of a philosophy of nature. The causality of nature has its limit; now if there is to be any causality beyond the limit, it must be that of another power. That which results from an impulse is not a result of nature, since nature exhausted herself in the production of the impulse. It is *I* who produce this result, true by means of a power which I get from nature, but which is no longer under her but under *my* control, since it is under the control of a principle utterly removed beyond the authority of nature, namely, of the Conception. We shall call freedom in this respect, *formal* freedom. Whatsoever I do, simply being conscious in so doing, I do with formal freedom. Hence a man might always follow merely his natural impulse, and yet, if he only acted with consciousness, and not mechanically, we should have to ascribe freedom to him in the above significance of the word, for the last ground of his act would be his consciousness of the impulse, and not the natural impulse itself. (I am not aware that any writer has as yet treated the conception of freedom in this respect, in which it is nevertheless the root of all freedom, with care and attention. Perhaps most of the errors and

complaints respecting the incomprehensibility of our doctrine have their origin in this.)

COROLLARIUM.

No opponent of the assertion of freedom can deny that he is conscious of states, for which he can assign no other ground than themselves. But the sharpwitted of these opponents say: "It does not follow from that fact that those states have no external ground at all, but merely that we are not conscious of them." And they proceed: "It does not follow that because we are not conscious of those grounds, those states have no causes." Now here they become at once transcendent. We are absolutely unable to posit causes, signifies for us, I trust: Such causes *are* not. They continue: "For everything has its cause, and hence those resolves, which we believe to be our own, have also their causes, although we are not conscious of these causes." Here they clearly presuppose what was to be proven, namely, that the Ego belongs to the series of nature and is subject to the laws of nature; their proof is, therefore, an evident circle. Of course, the defender of freedom can on his part also only presuppose that Egoness, the conception whereof involves that it does not belong to nature. But he has the decided advantage over his opponents that he is able to actually build up a system of philosophy, which they cannot do; and moreover, he has on his side a contemplation whereof they know nothing. They are only discursive thinkers, and utterly lack intuition. One must not enter into dispute with them, but one ought to cultivate them, if possible.

II.

According to the foregoing I *am* free, but do not posit myself as free; I am free, perhaps, for an intelligence outside of me, not for myself. But *I* am something only in so far as I posit myself as such.

What appertains, let us ask firstly, to this positing myself as free? I posit myself as free when I become conscious of my transition from undeterminedness to determinedness. I, in so far as I have a power of action, find myself undetermined. In the reflection on this condition it is expressed by my power of imagination floating between opposite determinations. With this commences the perception of my freedom. But now I determine myself, and the reflection is also at the same time determined. I determine myself; which is this determining I? Doubtless the one Ego, which resulted from the union of the reflecting and the reflected; and this same determining Ego is in the same undivided act, and in the same view, likewise the determined. In the consciousness of freedom object and subject are completely one. The conception (of my purpose) grows immediately into the deed; and the deed immediately into the conception (cognition of my freedom).

Those were quite in the right who denied that freedom could be *object* of consciousness; freedom is not object but subject-object of consciousness. It is true that we become immediately conscious of our freedom through the deed, by self-actively tearing ourselves loose from a state of indecision, and choosing a definite purpose, because we choose it, particularly if this purpose runs contrary to all our inclinations, and is nevertheless chosen for duty's sake. But this consciousness requires energy of will and intensity of contemplation. There are individuals, who, in point of fact, never *will*, but always leave themselves to be driven and impelled by a blind impulse, and who, for that reason, have also never clear consciousness, since they never self-actively produce, determine, and direct their representations, but merely dream a long dream, determined by the dark association of ideas. To these, of course, we do not speak, when we speak of consciousness of freedom.

Consciousness of my undeterminedness is, therefore,

the condition of the consciousness of my free-active self-determining. But undeterminedness is not merely not-determinedness = 0, but is an undecided floating between many possible determinations (= a negative), since otherwise it could not be posited, and would be nothing. At present, however, we are as yet unable to tell how freedom can be directed, and posited as thus directed upon many possible determinations. There is no other object of the application of freedom than the natural impulse. Whenever this impulse occurs, there is no reason why freedom should not follow it. And there is reason why freedom should follow it. True, it might be said, that there are many impulses working at the same time—though we have no reason to assume this on our present standpoint; but if there are, then the strongest impulse will decide, and we have again no possibility of an undeterminedness.

In so far as the free being occupies this state, which is not an *original* state, but may unhappily be too truly an acquired state, we say that the free being follows an *inclination*; and since this inclination is preceded by no reflection and no undeterminedness, we justly call it a *blind* inclination; an inclination whereof the free being as such does not, and cannot, become conscious.

But I am I only, in so far as I am conscious of this my I; that is to say, as I am free and self-determined. This consciousness of freedom is the condition of Egoness.

(It is thus that that which we are about to deduce obtains universal validity, namely, by our showing, that a rational being is not at all possible without consciousness of this freedom, and hence without the conditions of this freedom; and since the consciousness of morality belongs to these conditions, that a rational being is not at all possible without this moral consciousness. Morality is, therefore, not something accidental, nor a foreign ingredient, but it is an essential condition of rationality. That this consciousness of freedom and morality may at

times, and, perhaps, to a great extent, be clouded, and man thus sink down to be a mere machine, is certainly possible, and we shall hereafter show the reason for it. All we mean to assert, at present, is that no man can be absolutely without *all* moral feeling.)

Since all that occurs in the Ego is explained out of an impulse, there must be an impulse to become conscious of this freedom, and hence also of the conditions of that consciousness. But the condition of such a consciousness is undeterminedness. Undeterminedness is not possible if the Ego solely follows the natural impulse. Hence there must be an impulse in the Ego to determine itself, without regard, nay, in very opposition to the natural impulse. But such an impulse, since we are here speaking of the consciousness of freedom, *would be craving for freedom for the mere sake of freedom.*

I will call this freedom, to distinguish it from the previously described formal freedom, material freedom. Formal freedom arises when a new formal principle, a new power, enters, although the material in the series of effects does not experience the least change. It is not nature any longer that acts, but the free being. The free being, however, effects precisely the same as nature would have effected.

Whereas material freedom is distinguished by this, that not only a new power, but also a wholly new series of material acts, enters. The intelligence does not merely work, but works out likewise something utterly different from what nature would have worked out.

It is our next duty to deduce this impulse, to describe it, and to show how it may manifest itself.

III.

We have to deduce the impulse. In our forgoing we have proven that unless such an impulse exists self-consciousness is not possible, since the consciousness of

an undeterminedness, which is the condition of self-consciousness, is not possible. This was an indirect proof of that impulse. But for the sake—not of the certainty of the matter, but of the results which will show themselves, we must furnish this proof directly, *i.e.*, genetically, or from the conception of the Ego itself.

I have said that the Ego gets itself altogether under its own control through the absolute free reflection of the Ego on itself, as a natural being. All I need now is to make this proposition clearer, and the direct proof required will be furnished.

This self-reflection of the Ego, as a primary reflection, is an act absolutely grounded in the Ego. An *act*, I say, whereas the natural impulse upon which the reflection is directed, and which is certainly held to belong to the Ego, is a passivity in relation to that act; is a something given, and existing independent of that free activity.

Now let it be firstly observed, that in order to explain the consciousness of that first reflection as an act, we must posit a new reflection, having for its object the reflecting of the first reflection. Let us consider this second reflection. Since the object of the first reflection—the natural impulse—is abstracted from, this second reflection clearly has for its object only the pure absolute activity of the first reflection, and this activity alone is the real and true Ego, to which the impulse is opposed as something foreign, which, although it is in the Ego, is not the Ego.

Now these two reflections are not in any way to be thought as separate and distinct reflections, although we had thus to describe them, merely to make their description possible. They are, on the contrary, one and the same act. The Ego becomes immediately conscious of its absolute activity through inner self-contemplation; without which, indeed, an Ego were completely incomprehensible.

For let it be well observed, it is only through the second reflection (it seems I must continue thus to describe them as separates) that the activity, which otherwise would have remained simply the determined activity of reflecting, changes into *activity in general*, the object thereof having been abstracted from. The distinction between mere *ideal* activity, the reflection of a *given* somewhat, and the *real* absolute determining of a given somewhat, occurs later.

To state it more concisely, and thus perhaps clearer, with the reflection enters a new power, which transmits through itself the tendency of nature. This is what we have shown above. At present this new power is to enter *for me*, I am to become conscious thereof as of a particular and new power. This is only possible, if I think that power as torn loose from the hold of the impulse, *i.e.*, if I assume that it may not follow but can resist the impulse. Now this resisting is, as yet, posited as a mere power to resist; and if it is, as it must be, considered as immanent and essential in the Ego, it is posited as an *impulse*. Indeed—which throws a flood of light on this proof from another side—it is through this very impulse of resistance that the influence of nature upon us remains merely an impulse, since without it, it would be actual causality.

Now this impulse of the Ego, which merely occurs in the Ego as pure activity, we shall call, therefore, the *pure* impulse; and leave to the other impulse the name already given—natural impulse.

We only need now to consider the relation of these two impulses to each other, in order to see how both manifest themselves, but particularly how the pure impulse, the most important to our present investigation, may manifest itself.

The natural impulse, as impulse *determined in precisely such or such a manner*, is *accidental* to the Ego. Regarded from the transcendental point of view, this impulse is the

result of our limitation. True, it is *necessary* that we are limited *at all*, since otherwise consciousness would be impossible; but it is *accidental*, that we are limited in *precisely such or such a manner*.

The *pure* impulse, on the contrary, is essential to the Ego, since it is grounded in the Egoness as such. Hence the impulse exists in all rational beings, and hence its results are valid for all rational beings.

Again, the pure impulse is a higher, superior impulse—an impulse which elevates me in my pure essence above nature, and requires of me, as an empirical being in time, to elevate myself above nature. For nature has causality, and is a power in relation to me; nature produces an impulse within me, which, when directed upon my purely formal freedom, utters itself as an *inclination*. But according to the higher impulse, this power of nature has not, and shall not, have *control* over me; I am to determine myself utterly independent of the impulses of nature.

Through this higher impulse, I am thus not only separated from, but likewise elevated above nature; I am not only a link in the series of natural, but I can, moreover, self-actively interfere in this series.

In perceiving the power of nature to lie below me, that power becomes something which I no longer esteem. For I only esteem that which arouses me to exert all my energy in order merely to counterbalance it; and I do not esteem that which does not demand such energy of me. This is the case with nature; one resolve, and I stand above nature.

If, on the other hand, I should surrender myself, and become a part of that which I cannot esteem, I also can no longer esteem myself from the higher point of view. Hence, in its relation to the inclination which would drag me down into the series of natural causality, the higher impulse manifests itself as an impulse which claims my esteem, arouses me to esteem myself, and invests me with

a dignity superior to all nature. It never has enjoyment for its object, and, on the contrary, despises enjoyment. The higher impulse makes enjoyment, for mere enjoyment's sake, contemptible. It has for its object solely the maintenance of my dignity, which consists in absolute self-determinedness and self-sufficiency.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING CONSCIENCE.

IN opposition to our usual habit, it becomes almost necessary for us to step out of the systematic connection, in order to furnish a preliminary description of a conception, through which we hope to spread a clearer light over the important but difficult investigation to which we now have to pass over.

It is a fact that some events are utterly indifferent to us, while others arouse our interest; and it is to be supposed that these expressions are understood by all. That which is indifferent to me has apparently no relation—but since this is impossible, it has only a remote relation—to my impulse. That which interests me, on the contrary, must have an *immediate* relation to my impulse, and cannot be produced by any arguments. No one can cause you to rejoice or sorrow by the power of his demonstrations. All mediated interest (interest is something as a means to attain a certain object) is grounded in an immediate interest.

What does this signify: something has immediate relation to an impulse? The impulse itself is only object of feeling; hence, an immediate relation to it could also only be felt. An interest in something is of an immediate character, signifies therefore: its harmony or disharmony with the impulse is felt in advance of all reasoning, and independent of all reasoning.

But I feel only *myself*; and, hence, this harmony or

dis-harmony must be in myself, or must be simply a harmony or disharmony of myself with myself.

Let us look at the matter from another side. All interest is mediated through the interest I have in myself, and it is only a modification of this self-interest. Whatsoever interests me relates itself to me; I enjoy in all enjoyment, I suffer in all suffering. Whence arises this interest in myself? Simply from an impulse, since all interest arises from an impulse, and it arises in this manner: my fundamental impulse, as a pure and empirical being who have become one, out of these two very different components of myself, only through means of that impulse, is an impulse craving harmony between my original Ego, as determined in the mere idea, and my *actual* empirical Ego. Now this original impulse—namely the pure and the natural impulse in their union—is a determined impulse, that is to say, is directed upon something in an immediate manner. Now, whenever my actual condition agrees with this direction or requirement of the original impulse, enjoyment arises; and whenever my actual condition contradicts that requirement, dissatisfaction ensues; and both enjoyment or satisfaction, and suffering or dissatisfaction, are nothing but the immediate sensation of harmony or disharmony of my actual condition, with the condition required by the original impulse.

The lower faculty of desire arises from an impulse, which, in truth, is nothing but the organizing impulse of our nature. This impulse directs itself to the self-determined being, which is necessitated to unite that impulse with itself synthetically, or to posit itself as being *impelled*. The impulse manifests itself through a yearning. Where lies this yearning? Not in nature, but in the subject of consciousness, for it has been reflected. Yearning has for its object nothing that is not involved in the natural impulse; namely, a material relation of the external world to my body. Now, posit

that this yearning is satisfied, we will leave undecided whether by accident or through free activity. Doubtless, this satisfaction is perceived. Now, why do we not content ourselves with the cold judgment of cognition, which we should apply to a plant, and say, "Our body grows and prospers"; why do we, moreover, say, "We experience enjoyment"?

For this reason, my fundamental impulse has such a judgment for its immediate object, and hence its results. That which satisfies this impulse, and causes the enjoyment, is the harmony of the actuality with its requirements.

But it is quite different so far as the *pure* impulse is concerned. This is an impulse to be active for the sake of being active, and which arises through the Ego contemplating internally its absolute power. Here, therefore, there does not occur a mere feeling of the impulse, but a contemplation. The pure impulse does not occur as an *affection*; the Ego is *not being impelled, but it impels itself*, and contemplates itself in thus impelling itself. The pure impulse craves to find the acting Ego self-sufficient and determined through itself. It is not proper to say that this impulse is a *yearning*—like the lower one—for it is not directed upon anything which is expected as a favour from nature, or which does not depend upon ourselves. This pure impulse is rather an absolute *demanding*. It manifests itself in consciousness with all the more vigour—so to use this expression—as it is grounded not upon a mere feeling, but upon a contemplation.

Cause the Ego to act. It determines itself, of course, through itself, independently of the natural impulse, or of the requirement of the higher impulse, since it is *formaliter* free. Now there will either result a determination such as the higher impulse required, in which case both the subject of the impulse and the actually active are in harmony, and a feeling of approval results;

or the reverse results, and a feeling of disapproval will arise, combined with contempt.

But feeling arises only as the result of a determinedness or limitation. But in the present case there is nothing but activity, in the requirement as well as in the fulfilling of the same. How then, may a feeling result? Through the harmony of both, which is not an act, but a determined condition, resulting, as it does, without our active co-operation, and which, therefore, is felt. Thus it is, moreover, clear that we must not be understood as if we asserted the feeling of a contemplation, which would be contradictory. It is the harmony of the contemplation with the requirement of the impulse, which is felt.

(This is an important remark; since it explains the possibility of æsthetical feeling, which is also the feeling of a contemplation, and lies between the two feelings here described.)

Now can this approval, or disapproval, be cold—a mere judgment of cognition—or must it necessarily be connected with a feeling of interest? Evidently the latter; for that requirement of absolute self-activity, and of the harmony of the empirical Ego with this requirement, is itself *the original impulse*. Now if the latter harmonizes with the former, an impulse is being satisfied; and if it does not harmonize with it, an impulse remains unsatisfied; hence that approval is necessarily associated with satisfaction, and that disapproval with dissatisfaction. It cannot be indifferent to us, whether we must despise ourselves or not. There is, however, in this kind of satisfaction nothing which has the character of ordinary enjoyment. For the harmony of actuality with the natural impulse does not depend upon myself, in so far as I am self, *i.e.*, free. Hence the enjoyment which arises from it is of a kind which tears me away from myself, estranges me from myself, and wherein I forget myself. It is an *involuntary* enjoyment (which is, perhaps, the best characteristic for all sensuous enjoy-

ment). In the same manner it is with the opposite—sensuous pain.

In relation to the pure impulse, however, this satisfaction, and the ground of this satisfaction, is not something foreign, but something which depends upon my freedom, something which I had cause to expect in accordance with a rule. Hence it does not conduct me out of myself, but rather back into myself. It is not so much enjoyment as *satisfaction*, which never is the characteristic of sensuous enjoyment. It is not so turbulent, but more intense, and infuses new courage and new strength. Hence also the opposite of this satisfaction—precisely because it was dependent upon our freedom—produces *disgust*, self-reproach—which latter never accompanies sensuous pain, as such—and self-contempt.

This feeling of self-contempt would be absolutely unbearable, if it were not that the requirement of the moral law, continuing to be addressed to us, again would raise us in our own esteem; if it were not that this unceasing requirement of conscience, which arises out of our own self, infuses again courage and esteem in us, and if it were not that this self-contempt were lessened by the feeling that we are still capable of entertaining self-contempt.

This described feeling, which might well be called *higher* feeling, is usually named *conscience*. There is *rest* or *unrest* of conscience, *reproaches* of conscience, and *peace* of conscience; but there is no such thing as *enjoyment* of conscience. The term *conscience* is admirably chosen. It is, as it were, the immediate *consciousness* of that, without which no consciousness whatever were possible; the immediate consciousness of our higher nature and absolute freedom.

CHAPTER IX.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF AN APPLICABLE SCIENCE OF MORALS.

A. THE natural impulse is directed upon a material somewhat, simply for the sake of that material, upon enjoyment simply for the sake of enjoyment; whereas, the pure impulse craves absolute independence of the active, as such, from that natural impulse, or craves freedom simply for the sake of freedom. If the pure impulse has, nevertheless, causality, it cannot as yet be conceived otherwise than a mere negative causality, preventing the accomplishment of what the natural impulse craves; and hence, as resulting merely in a *leaving undone*, but not in any positive *doing*, except the internal act of self-determining.

All writers, who have treated the science of morality in simply a *formaliter* way, ought to have arrived at nothing but a continual *self-denial*—utter abnegation and vanishing of self, as those mystics hold, who teach that we ought to dissolve our self into God, which proposition has, indeed, for its basis something true and sublime, as will appear hereafter. But if we look closer at the requirement just now established, with a view to determine it, we shall find that it will vanish under our very hands into a nothing.

The higher impulse, which addresses itself to the subject of consciousness, requires that I shall be able to posit *myself* as free, in a reflection. Hence I am, indeed,

to *posit* my freedom, as a *positice* somewhat, as the ground of an actual doing, and not of a mere leaving undone. I, the reflecting, am, therefore, to relate a certain determination of the will to *myself* as the determining, and to be forced to attribute this will solely to my self-determination. Hence, the willing, which is to be related, is to be something objective, perceptible, in us. But everything objective belongs to us solely as sensuous and natural beings; in fact, through this mere objectivating, we are ourselves posited for ourselves in this objective sphere.

Let me state this proposition, well known in its generality, and elsewhere abundantly proven, in its special relation to the present case: All actual willing is necessarily directed upon an acting, but all my acting is an acting directed upon objects. Now, in the world of objects, I always act by means of natural force, and this force is given to me solely through the natural impulse, nay, is nothing but this impulse as it exists in me; or, in other words, is simply nature's own causality directed upon nature itself, but which is no longer within nature's own control, as a dead and unconscious nature, having passed under *my* control, as an intelligence, through means of my free reflection. Hence, even the most immediate object of all possible willing is necessarily something empirical, is a certain determination of my sensuous power, given to me through my natural impulse, and thus something required by that natural impulse, since this impulse only gives by requiring. Each possible conception of an end tends, therefore, to satisfy a natural impulse. In short, all actual willing is empirical. A pure will is no actual will, but a mere idea, a something absolute from out of the intelligible world, which we think of as the explanatory ground of something empirical.

It is scarcely to be apprehended, after all we have said previously, that anyone should understand us as asserting that the natural impulse, as such, produces the willing.

It is I who will, and not nature that wills within me; nevertheless, so far as the substance of my will is concerned, I can only will that which nature would also will, had she the power to will.

Thus, not the *impulse* to have absolute material freedom, but, at least, the *causality* of that impulse seems utterly cancelled. In truth, only *formal* freedom remains to me. Although I am impelled to do something, which might have its material ground solely in myself, I, nevertheless, do never and can never do anything, which the natural impulse does not require, since all my possible acting is exhausted through that impulse.

But the causality of my pure impulse must never be cancelled, since I posit myself as Ego only in so far as I posit such causality.

We are involved in a contradiction which is all the more remarkable since what both of the propositions, just now mentioned, establish as this contradiction, is also established as a *condition of self-consciousness*.

How is this contradiction to be solved? According to the laws of synthesis, only in the following manner: the material of the act must be at the same time, and in one and the same acting, conformable to the pure impulse, and to the natural impulse. As both are united in the original impulse, so must they be united in the actuality of acting.

This can only be comprehended as follows. The purpose, the conception which directs the act, has for its object complete liberation from nature; but that the act is, and remains nevertheless conformable to the natural impulse, is the result, not of our freely produced conception, but of our limitedness. The only determining ground of the matter of our acts is to relieve ourselves of our dependence from nature, although the required independence never results. The pure impulse craves for absolute independence, and the act is in conformity with that impulse if it also is directed upon such inde-

pendence, that is to say, *if it lies in a series, the completion whereof would result in the absolute independence of the Ego.* Now, according to the proof just established, the Ego can never become independent, so long as it is to be Ego; and hence the final end of rational beings lies necessarily in infinitude, and is an end which can never be realized completely, but to which the Ego can incessantly draw nearer by virtue of its spiritual nature.

I must here take cognizance of an objection which I would not have considered possible had it not been raised by men of good minds, and who are even well initiated in transcendental philosophy. How is it possible, say they, to draw nearer to an infinite end? does not all finite size vanish into nothingness when related to infinity? This question sounds as if I were speaking of infinitude as a thing in itself. *I draw nearer, for myself.* But I never can grasp infinitude, and hence have always a determined end before my eyes, to which I doubtless can draw nearer, although, after having attained it, I may have removed my true end just as far, partly through the greater perfection my whole being has acquired, and partly through the greater perfection of my insight; and although I may thus be as much removed as ever, in this *general* sense, from the infinite, and may never get nearer to it, my end lies in infinitude because my dependence is an infinite dependence. This dependence I never seize, however, in its infinite character, but only in its determined sphere, and in this determined sphere I doubtless can make myself more and more independent.

There must be such a series, in the continuing whereof the Ego can think itself as drawing nearer to absolute independence, for only on this condition is a causality of the pure impulse possible. This series is necessarily determined from the first point, upon which nature has placed a person, into infinity (of course only ideally), and hence in each possible case it is determined

what the pure impulse may require under such conditions. Hence we can call this series the moral determinedness of the finite rational being. Now, although this series is as yet unknown to us, we have clearly shown that it must necessarily occur. We are, therefore, safe in basing on this result, and may establish, as the fundamental principle of the science of morality, the following proposition: *Do at each time what thou art determined to do, or fulfil always thy destination, although the question, What am I determined to do, or what is my destination? is not answered.* If this proposition is expressed: Fulfil thy destination *is general*, it involves at once the infinity of the end established for us, since that end can be fulfilled in no *time*. (The error of the mystics is based on their representing this infinite, and in no time completely attainable end, as an end attainable in time. The utter annihilation of the individual, and submersion of the same in the absolute and pure form of reason, or in God, is most certainly the final end of finite reason, but it is also not possible in any time.)

The possibility to fulfil *at each time*, singly, one's destination, is certainly grounded through nature herself, and given in nature. The relation of the natural impulse to the principle here established is as follows: at each moment *something* is conformable to our moral destination, and this same something is also required at the same time by the natural impulse (provided nature is left to herself, and has not been made artificial through a corrupt imagination). But it by no means follows that *all* that which the natural impulse requires should also be conformable to our moral determinedness. For instance, let the series of the natural impulse, considered by itself, be A, B, C, etc. Now the moral determinedness of the individual may, perhaps, take and realize only a part of B, whereby the natural impulse resulting from B will certainly be altered; but even in this, its altered form, the moral determinedness of the

individual may take and realize only a part of it; and so on *ad infinitum*. But in each possible determinedness both impulses partly join. It is only thus that morality is possible in actual acting.

It is possible to explain still more clearly the mutual relation of both impulses. The higher impulse manifests itself as the just now described *moral*, and on no account as a *pure* impulse; it does not manifest itself as an impulse which craves absolute independence, but as an impulse craving determined acts, which acts, however—if the impulse craving them is brought to consciousness and they are examined closer—will show themselves to lie in that series of absolute independence of the Ego. For it has already been shown, that the impulse, as a *pure* impulse, as one directed merely upon a negation, can never enter consciousness. We never become conscious of a negation, simply because it is nothing. Experience, moreover, proves this; we feel impelled to do this or that, and reproach ourselves for having left undone this or that. All this we state here to correct those who deny consciousness of the categorical imperative (of the moral impulse), and do not admit a *pure* impulse. We show here that a thorough transcendental philosophy also does not assert such a consciousness. The *pure* impulse is beyond all consciousness, and is merely the transcendental explanatory ground of something in consciousness.

The moral impulse is a mixed impulse, as we have shown. From the natural impulse it receives the material, or its object; in other words, the natural impulse is directed upon the same act, which it craves, at least in part. But its form it has solely from the pure impulse. It is absolute, like the pure impulse, and demands, without any external end, simply because it does. It has absolutely no enjoyment of any kind for its object. In short, what it craves is absolute independence. But has this independence then no end again, no enjoyment, or

something of the kind, for its final object? No; absolutely no such end. That absolute independence is simply its own end. I am to crave it simply because I am to crave it; simply because I am I. The internal satisfaction, which accompanies its attainment, is something accidental. The impulse does not arise from it, but it arises from the impulse.

The moral impulse appeals to esteem; and obedience, or disobedience to it, excites approval or disapproval, self-satisfaction, or most painful self-contempt. The impulse is *positive*; it impels to a determined activity. It is *general*; and relates itself to all possible free acts, to each manifestation of the natural impulse, which is brought to consciousness. It is *self-sufficient*, always proposing to itself its own aim; it craves *absolute causality*, and stands in *reciprocity* with the natural impulse, borrowing from it its matter, and giving it its form. Finally, it commands categorically. What this impulse requires is imperatively required, and as a necessity.

B. The moral impulse demands *freedom* for the sake of *freedom*. Who does not perceive that the word *freedom* is used here in two different meanings? In the latter instance it is used to designate an objective condition to be produced, or the final absolute end, namely, complete independence from all externality; whereas, in the first instance, it signifies an acting as such, and not any real being, signifies, in short, something purely subjective. I am to *act free* in order to *become free*.

But even in the conception of freedom as it occurs in the first instance, a distinction is to be observed. When a free act occurs, we may ask (1) *How* it must be done in order to be a free act, and (2) what must be done to constitute it a free act. In short, we may inquire after both the form and the content of freedom.

Now the content we have already investigated, and

have found that the act must be one of a series, through the infinite continuation whereof the Ego will become absolutely independent. We have now, therefore, to look finally at the form.

I am to act *free*, that is to say, I as posited Ego, as intelligence, am to determine myself, or am to act with consciousness of my absolute self-determining character; with considerateness and reflection. Only thus do I act free as intelligence; and otherwise I act *blindly*, as chance impels me.

I, as intelligence, am to act in a determined manner; that is to say, I am to become conscious of the ground, why I act precisely in this manner. Now this ground cannot, because it must not, be another ground, because this precise act lies within the described series—or since this is a *philosophical* view and not the view of common consciousness—because this act is *duty*. I am to act solely conformably to the conception of my duty, am to determine myself solely through the thought that this act is my duty, and through no other thought or motive.

A few words concerning the last remark. Even the moral impulse is not to determine me as mere blind impulse; indeed, the very thing is contradictory, and morality can never *merely* impel. We touch here again what we have already said: when it appeared that the impulse, to be self-active, addresses itself to the intelligence as such; the intelligence is to be self-determined *as* intelligence; but an intelligence, *as such*, is only self-determined when it determines itself through conception, and absolutely not through mere impulse. The impulse, therefore, both craves and does not crave causality, and has causality simply through *not* having it, since it demands of the intelligence: *be free!* If the impulse is mere impulse it is not moral, but altogether natural impulse, for it is altogether immoral to be blindly impelled. This is, for instance, the case with the impulses of sympathy,

humanity, &c. It will appear, in the proper place, that these impulses are manifestations of the moral impulse, but mixed with the natural impulse, as indeed the moral impulse is always mixed. Now, the man who follows these impulses may act very charitably, humanely, &c., but he does *not* act morally, on the contrary, *in so far* as he *blindly* follows these impulses, he acts immorally.

Here, therefore, arises for the first time the categorical imperative, as being a *conception* and not an *impulse*. It is not the impulse which is itself the categorical imperative, but the impulse drives us to form such an imperative; impels us to say that something shall be done. It is our own product; *our* product in so far as we are intelligences, or beings capable of producing conceptions.

Thus then, the rational being, in determining its will, is, in form, torn loose from all which is not itself. Matter does not determine the rational being, nor does the rational being determine itself through the mediation of anything material, but solely through the formal, and, in itself, generated conception of an absolute imperative. And, in this manner, we indeed receive back again the rational being in its actuality, precisely as we originally posited it: namely, as the absolutely self-determined; as, indeed, everything that is original must represent itself in actuality, only with further additions and determinations. It is only in the act impelled by duty that we find such a representative of the rational being, for all other acts have a determining ground which is foreign to the intelligence as such. Hence, Kant also says that it is only through the power of morality that the rational being manifests itself as something *in itself*, namely, as something independent, self-sufficient, existing through no reciprocity with anything external, but simply existing for itself. Hence also, the inexpressibly sublime character of duty, since all that is external sinks down so low under us, and vanishes into nothingness, when compared with our destination.

From the form of morality follow these two results:

1. I am to act, *in general*, with considerateness and consciousness, not blindly and in obedience to mere impulses, and, *in particular*, with the consciousness of duty; I am never to act without first having related my act to this conception. Hence, there are no indifferent acts at all. The moral law relates to all acts—if not *materialiter*, at least surely *formaliter*—which are truly acts of the intelligent being. *Formaliter*: for we are to inquire whether the moral law relates to them or not, and this very inquiry establishes already a relation. But even *materialiter* the relation can be proven: for I am never to obey the sensuous impulse as such, but all my acts are result of that impulse; hence I must relate each act to the moral law, or I cannot act at all.

2. *I am never to act against my conviction.* To do so is completest perversity and wickedness. How it happens that such a perversity, which in itself seems impossible, is nevertheless possible, and that it loses, at least, that horrible character which it has for every uncorrupted man in its true appearance, we shall show hereafter.

Both these results gathered into one might be expressed: *Act always in accordance with your best conviction of your duty; or, act according to your conscience.* This is the formal condition of the morality of our acts, which, for that reason, has been pre-eminently called: the *morality* of those acts. We shall discuss these formal conditions of morality in the first chapter of our *Applied Science of Morals*, and establish in the second the *material* conditions of the morality of our acts.

PART II.

*SYSTEMATIC APPLICATION OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY*



BOOK THIRD.

CONCERNING THE FORMAL CONDITIONS OF THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS.

PRELIMINARY.

CONCERNING THE WILL IN PARTICULAR.

I MIGHT begin immediately with a synthetic, systematic deduction of the formal conditions of the morality of our acts. But since this formal morality, indeed, what is pre-eminently termed morality, is also called *good will*, and as I myself intend thus to characterize it, it behoves me to first give an account of my conception of the will.

True, all that which belongs to this investigation has been already said under other names, and yet, for that very reason, it is necessary to say it also under the present name, in order to connect what will follow with what has been previously established.

A willing is an absolutely free transition from undeterminedness to determinedness, with consciousness of this transition. This act has been abundantly described before. In the examination of this willing we may draw a distinction between the Ego which proceeds from undeterminedness to determinedness, and which is called the objective Ego, and the Ego which contemplates itself in this transition, and which is called the subjective Ego. But, in willing itself, both are united. The impulse, the yearning, the desire, is not the will. The impulse, to be sure, is accompanied by an inclination, and the desire, moreover, by consciousness of the object of this inclination;

but neither is accompanied by a determinedness of the Ego. Desire would well like its object to come to it, but cannot itself move hand or foot to reach it. It is only through willing that determinedness results.

If we look at the general *power* of making that transition consciously, and the laws of theoretical reason force us to *add* such a power in thinking *to the* act of transition, we shall arrive at the conception of willing in general, as *a power to will*. This is an abstract conception, nothing actually perceptible, not a fact. An actually perceptible transition gives a *willing*. But a willing is not completed, and is indeed, no willing, unless it is determined. But when it is determined it is no longer called willing, but *a will*; as, for instance, *my will*, *your will*, *this will*, etc. In common life, this distinction between this general conception of willing, as a power to will, and *a will*, as a determined expression of this general power, is never made, because it is not necessary to make it in ordinary life; but in philosophy, where it is very necessary to make this distinction, it has also never been made.

The will is free in the material significance of the word. The Ego, in so far as it wills, proposes to itself as intelligence the object of its willing, by choosing from many possible objects one particular object, and by changing the undeterminedness, which the intelligence contemplates and comprehends, into a likewise contemplated and comprehended determinedness.

The fact that the object may be given through the natural impulse does not contradict this result. For the natural impulse only gives it as an object of yearning or desire, but not as an object of the *will* or of the determined resolve to realize it. In this respect the will absolutely gives itself its own object. In short, the will is absolutely free, and an unfree will is an absurdity. If man wills, he is free, and if he is not free, he does not will, but is impelled. Nature produces no will, nay, strictly speaking, nature cannot even produce a yearning,

as we have seen before, since yearning presupposes a reflection. It is true that in this reflection the Ego does not yet become conscious of itself as of a reflecting, and hence assumes that the yearning within it is a product of nature, although external observers, and we ourselves, from the transcendental point of view, know the opposite to be the case.

Now if the will proceeds from undeterminedness to determinedness—and it has been strictly proven that this is a condition of the consciousness of freedom, and hence of the Ego itself, as such, whereby it has at the same time been proven *that there is a will*, and that the will is determined as above described—then the will must be a power to *choose*. In other words, no will without *arbitrariness*. For the will is called arbitrary when the characteristic of the will is insisted on, that it must choose from several equally possible acts.

REMARK.

Some philosophers have discovered a contradiction in the assertion that it is equally possible for freedom to seize opposite resolves; either A or $-A$; and other philosophers have been puzzled to refute this assertion of a contradiction. Let us see at once what the former presupposed, without the latter perceiving it.

Let us posit a natural force = X . Since it is a natural force, it necessarily works mechanically, *i.e.*, produces at all times only that which it can produce conformably to its nature under such condition. If the production of such a force is = A , then it is necessarily = A , and it were contradictory to assume it to be some $-A$.

Now is this law applicable to the will? Let me first state again what I have already insisted on, and which is the most important: as soon as the will, or the Ego generally, enters on the stage, natural force is utterly at an end. *What force can these produce? neither A nor $-A$; and can produce, in fact, nothing at all;* for the final

product of that force is an impulse, and an impulse has no causality. Hence it is not for nature, but for the absolute opposite to nature, namely, for the will, that both A and - A is asserted to be equally possible. For if it is asserted that the will is free, then the will is thereby asserted to be the primary or the commencing link of a series, and hence to be not determined by any previous or other link, but simply through itself. But it is also asserted that the will does not work in a mechanical manner, *i.e.*, does not effect *all* that it *can* effect, but does rather consist in a power to work or not to work, and hence is able to *limit* itself through itself to any particular work, in such a manner that if its total sphere embraces both A and - A, it may determine to effect either the former or the latter without any external grounds.

Now those who hold that it is a contradiction to assert the will to be able to work out either A or - A, ought to accept this presupposition. But, instead of doing so, they presuppose that which we deny to them, namely, that the will is a link of the chain of natural forces. They assert the will to be itself a natural force, and with this presupposition, of course, their results are correct enough. They prove, therefore, that the will is not free from the presupposition that the will is not free; and hence, to speak properly, they ought not to say "the proposition that the will is free contradicts itself," but rather "it contradicts *our* assertion that the will is *not* free," in which form their statement may well be allowed to pass.

But the true contradiction lies much higher than they believe. It is a contradiction to their whole individual power of thinking, to conceive another series than the series of natural mechanism. They have never elevated themselves to the higher manifestations of thinking, and hence their absolute presupposition which they, individually, cannot surmount. Their absolute principle is: "everything happens mechanically," for in their clear

consciousness nothing but what is merely mechanical occurs. It is thus with all fatalism; nor is the matter changed by placing the ground of our moral resolves in the spiritual world. In the latter case, the ground of our will determinations is asserted to be in something spiritual, but which determines us precisely in the same manner as a physical power, and the *effect* whereof are our will determinations. But how can a ground of distinction be applied between such effects and physical effects, when the category of causality is applied also to the spiritual world, since all to which that category applies is, according to Kant sensuous world? (By the statement that our will determinations are the effect of an influence from the spiritual world (or God), we only drag down that world to the level of the sensuous world.)

This necessary choice of the will is, moreover, determined as being a choice between the satisfaction of the Egotistic (natural) impulse, and of the unselfish (moral) impulse. Let us now examine this further determination. Freedom is not merely material, but likewise formal, according to a distinction deduced above; and I may well become conscious—not originally, but after self-consciousness has been developed, and experience been gathered—not only of the former but also of the latter. If I become conscious merely of formal freedom, I thereby, as intelligence, attain first and foremost the power to postpone the satisfaction of the natural impulse; and since the natural impulse will, during this postponement, continue to manifest itself in a manifold manner, the power I attain is one to reflect upon the natural impulse in the manifold bearings of its manifestations, and *to choose among the many possible ways of satisfying it*. I choose one of them; and in doing so act with full freedom, since I choose with the consciousness of self-determination; but I do not sacrifice, in such case, enjoyment to morality; I only sacrifice one enjoyment to another enjoyment.

“Nevertheless,” it might be objected, “in so doing you only cede to the strongest impulse, and foolishly imagine yourself free when you only follow one impulse amongst many.” Now even if this objection were true in general, I should reply: “This stronger impulse would not be, would not have entered my consciousness, had I not checked myself, postponed my resolve, and reflected with freedom on the totality of my impulse. Hence even if the objection were true, I would still have determined my will through self-determination, and thus my will would remain *materialiter* free.” But that objection is not true in general. When a certain amount of experience had already been acquired by me, I can, through imagination, represent an enjoyment which my nature does not crave at present, and can now choose to sacrifice all the present cravings of my nature to this artificial one. Formerly that craving did certainly exist in my nature, and resulted in an actual enjoyment. This enjoyment I now endeavour to reproduce through imagination. Hence mere imagination impels me to choose, and the products of imagination are surely products of freedom. I must certainly, therefore, give to myself in these cases the objects of my will. Of course I do not sacrifice my present impulses to virtue, I only sacrifice the real enjoyment, which would result from satisfying my actual impulses, to an imaginary enjoyment. (This is the usual procedure of merely *refined* men, of men who are on the way to culture. Thus the worn-out voluptuary, the miser, the coxcomb, &c., sacrifice their true physical enjoyments to merely imaginary ones.)

Indeed, only in this manner is *prudence* possible, which is nothing more than a discreet choice from amongst various means of satisfying the natural impulse. According to the above conception of will, rigorously applied, prudence were not at all possible, but the opposition would only be between morality and immorality.

CHAPTER I.

CONCERNING THE FORMAL CONDITIONS OF THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS.

A. As we have seen, the formal law of morals is as follows: Act absolutely in conformity with your conviction of your duty. We may look either at the form or the content of this law, or, which may here be a clearer expression, at the condition and the conditioned. So far as the former is concerned, it involves, as we have seen: At all times try to convince yourself as to what your duty is; in regard to the latter, it involves: Whatsoever you are convinced is your duty, do, and do it solely because you are convinced it is your duty.

But how? somebody might object. How if my conviction is a wrong one? In that case I have not done my duty, but have acted in violation of it. How can I be calm in this? Evidently only in so far as I consider it impossible that my conviction might be a wrong one, nay, impossible that I shall ever, in an infinite existence, hold it to have been a wrong one. Hence I do not apply my act merely to the conception of my present conviction, but I again apply this conviction to the conception of *all* my possible conviction—to the whole system of my conviction, in so far as I can represent it to myself in the present moment. Such a comparison and examination is a *duty*, since I am to convince myself. If it is not a matter of indifference to me, but rather the highest

subject of my life, whether I act in conformity to duty or not, then it can also not be a matter of indifference to me, whether my conviction is true or erroneous. Hence, the correctness of my conviction in any particular case is guaranteed by its agreeing with all thinkable conviction, and the investigation, whether this harmony exists or not, is itself a duty.

But the whole system of my conviction cannot be given to me in any other manner than through my present conviction of it. As I may err in judging any particular case, so may I also err in judging my judgment in general, or in my conviction of the totality of my conviction.

Hence my morality, my absolute self-sufficiency and repose of conscience, always remain dependent upon an accident. When I consider all this—and it is my duty to consider it—I must either act trusting to chance, which is against conscience, or I must not act at all, but pass my whole life in a state of undecidedness, always wavering between doing and not doing. This is the only alternative, unless there is an absolute criterion of the correctness of my conviction of duty.

(This is a very important remark, never yet sufficiently considered, it appears to me, the development whereof will bring a firm connection into our whole theory, and gain for us an easier transition from the formal to the material conditions of morality.)

B. If dutiful conduct in life is to be at all possible, there must be an absolute criterion of the correctness of our convictions respecting duty. Hence a certain conviction must be absolutely correct, and which we must accept for the sake of duty.

Let the manner of our drawing this conclusion be observed. We say, if dutiful behaviour is to be possible, then such a criterion must exist; now the moral law says such behaviour is possible: *hence* such a criterion does

exist. We therefore conclude from the existence and the necessary causality of a moral law as to the existence of something else in our power of cognition. We thus assert a relation of the moral law to theoretical reason, or the *primacy* of the former, as Kant expresses it. That without which duty in general were impossible, is absolutely true, and it is duty to consider it as true.

Lest this proposition should be altogether misapprehended, let the following be observed: the moral law assuredly requires a certain determined conviction = A, and authorizes it. But since the moral law is not a power of cognition, it cannot itself establish this conviction, but expects the power of cognition to establish and determine it through its reflecting power of judgment; and only after it has been thus established through cognition does the moral law authorize it, and make it our duty to hold to it. The opposite would indeed lead to a material belief-morality; *i.e.*, to a theory which holds that the moral law contains certain theoretical dogmas which must be accepted as true without any further examination as to whether we can or not convince ourselves of their truth. But such an assertion is partly in itself contradictory, since the practical activity of the Ego is not the theoretical activity; would, moreover, open the door to all manner of deceptions and to the suppression of conscience. The theoretical faculties pursue their even tenor until they arrive at what meets our approval; but those faculties do not contain in themselves the criterion of the correctness of their result. This criterion is to be found in the practical faculty, which is the first and highest faculty in man, constituting indeed his true essence. Our present assertion is the same as already established previously, with only a further determination added; *viz.*: the moral law is purely formal, and must receive its content from another source. But *that* something is its content, must have its ground in the moral law itself.

The much more difficult question, however, arises now: how does the confirmation by the moral law, of a theoretical judgment respecting duty, manifest itself, and how is it recognised?

The moral law, in its relation to empirical man, has a determined *beginning point* of its sphere; namely, the determined limitation wherein the individual finds himself by first finding himself: it has moreover a determined —although never to be attained—*end*; namely, absolute liberation from all limitation: and it has finally a completely determined *way* to reach this end; namely, the order of nature. Hence for each determined man there is in each point of his life a determined duty; to do something or leave something undone; and it may be said that the moral law, in its application to empirical beings, postulates this duty. Let us designate this determined doing or leaving undone = X.

Now the practical power, as has been said, is not theoretical. Hence it cannot give this X to itself. This X must therefore be discovered by the free reflecting power of judgment. Since, however, there is an impulse to act generally, and moreover to realize the determined X through this action, this impulse determines the power of judgment, if not *materialiter* to give this X, which the power of judgment cannot do, at least *formaliter* to discover it. Hence the moral impulse here manifests itself as an impulse to realize a determined cognition. Let us assume that the power of judgment finds X, which seems to depend upon chances, and the impulse to realize the cognition will agree with the fact that the cognition has been found: the original Ego and the empirical Ego will be in harmony and there results a feeling, as is always the case according to what we have said above in this circumstance.

The only question is: what sort of a feeling may this be, and how is it to be distinguished from other feelings? All æsthetical feelings are like the present one in this,

that they arise from the satisfaction of an impulse to realize a determined representation; but they are distinct from the present one in this, that the impulse which lies at their basis does not absolutely *demand* its satisfaction, but merely *expects* it as a favour of nature. But the impulse to realize a cognition, whereof we speak here, is the absolutely commanding moral impulse. Hence, there cannot arise here—as in the case of those other æsthetical feelings—an *enjoyment* which unexpectedly surprises us, but merely a *cold approval* of that which was to be expected, nay, which could not fail to manifest itself, as sure as reason is reason. That which excites this approval is called in actions *just*, in cognitions *true*.

It appears, therefore, that there is a *feeling* of truth and certainty, and that this feeling is the sought-for absolute criterion of the correctness of our conviction of duty. We shall describe this important feeling somewhat more at length.

So long as the power of judgment is still searching for the cognition, the free power of imagination floats between opposites, and there arises—from the fact that the search is undertaken at the instigation of an *impulse*, which has, therefore, not yet been satisfied—a feeling of doubt, accompanied by anxiety, because the matter is, above all other things, important. (I know, for instance, that I *doubt*. How do I know it? Surely not from the objective quality of my judgment. Doubt is something subjective, and can only be felt, like its opposite, certainty.) As soon as the power of judgment discovers the required cognition, the fact that it is the cognition which was required appears from a feeling of agreement which manifests itself. The power of imagination is now necessitated as through all reality; I cannot view the matter in any other way; compulsion, necessity, binds me, as is the case in every feeling. Thus, there results in the cognition *immediate certainty*, accompanied by *peace* and *satisfaction*.

REMARK.

Kant says (*Religion Within the Limits of Pure Reason*, § 4) excellently: "The consciousness that an act which I undertake is just, is unconditioned duty." But is there such a consciousness possible? and how do I recognize it? Kant seems to leave this to the feeling of each individual, as is, indeed, proper; but transcendental philosophy is obliged to show up the ground of the possibility of such a feeling of certainty, and this is what we have just now done. Kant, however, illustrates by an instance which is also admirably fitted to illustrate what we have said.

The judge of an inquisition, says Kant, who condemns a heretic, can never be sure that he does not, perhaps, do wrong in condemning him. Should he ask himself: "Art thou confident that, in the presence of Him who seeth into all hearts, and staking all that is dear and holy to thee, thou wouldst insist on these propositions of faith, for dissenting from which thou art about to condemn to death this heretic?" he would most surely hesitate and tremble, were he ever so zealous a dogmatist. In like manner, says Kant, those who get up and say: "Whosoever does not believe all that we tell you will be eternally damned," ought surely to have faith enough to add: "but if it is not true, we ourselves will agree to be eternally damned"; and yet how few would be willing to do it. This might convince them, indeed, that they are, after all, not so very firmly convinced of dogmas which they want to force upon others.

Using this analogy, we might say: he who is quite sure of his matter must be willing to risk eternal damnation for it, and if he is not willing to do so he betrays his uncertainty. Now, should anyone ask what this might signify: to be eternally damned? one could certainly give no other rational answer than: *to give up all one's moral improvement throughout all eternity*. This is the greatest evil, and an evil which no man can seriously entertain,

may, the serious thought whereof would annihilate everyone. Those who most wilfully sin against their own conscience comfort themselves secretly with the assurance that they intend to do it only this time, or only for so and so long a time, and that they will amend in the course of time. It is, therefore, a sure sign that one's conscience is not clear, so long as he either fixedly determines, or, at least, still considers it possible to change his mode of action at some future time. Whosoever is sure of himself, is so at the risk that he never *can* change the principles which govern his actions, that all his freedom on that point is lost, that he will be evermore confirmed in those principles. Only this is the safe criterion of true conviction.

The proof is as follows: Such a conviction places us in harmony with the original Ego. This Ego is elevated above all time and changes in time, and hence, in that harmony with it, the empirical Ego also rises above all changes in time, and posits itself as absolutely unchangeable. Hence, the unshakeableness of fixed conviction.

The result of the foregoing was this: whether I doubt, or am certain, is a matter which I become anxious of, not through argumentation—since that would need again a new proof of *its* correctness, and so on, *ad infinitum*—but through *immediate* feeling. It is only in this manner that subjective certainty, as a state of the mind, may be explained. But the feeling of certainty is always an immediate agreement of our consciousness with our original Ego, as, indeed, could not be otherwise in a philosophy which starts from the Ego. This feeling never deceives, for, as we have seen, it only exists where there is complete agreement of our empirical with the pure Ego, and only the latter is our sole true being, and, indeed, all possible being and all possible truth.

Only in so far as I am a moral being is certitude possible for me, since the criterion of all theoretical truth cannot be again theoretical. The theoretical power of

cognition cannot again criticize and confirm itself; the criterion must be practical, and it must be duty to accept it. This criterion, moreover, is universal, since it does not only apply to the immediate cognition of our duty, but to all possible cognition in general, as, indeed, there is no cognition which is not, at least, mediately related to our duties.

C. We have seen that the criterion of the correctness of our conviction is an internal one. There is no external objective criterion, nor can there be such, since the Ego here, where we consider it as moral Ego, must be utterly self-sufficient and independent of everything external. But this does not prevent us from stating what kind of convictions these will be, which this criterion will approve; and to state this is, at present, our final task.

It is only through the practical impulse that objects exist for us at all: this is a proposition which has already been abundantly demonstrated. At present, we observe the following: My impulse is limited, and, in consequence of this limitation, do I posit an object. Now, it is clear that I cannot posit and characterize the object, without definitely characterizing the impulse, which limits it; for a determined object is nothing, and cannot be described otherwise than as somewhat limiting a determined impulse. Thus, I receive the given qualities of the thing, because I place myself and the thing into a state of mutual quiet. But I may also reflect upon my freedom therein. If I do so, then the limitation through the object changes into something which may be expanded regularly and in a certain order; and such an expansion of my limits will also change the object. If I posit this modificability of the object, I determine *its usefulness: its utility for various purposes.*

Let it be well observed that this determination of the usefulness of a thing is none other than of the internal unchanging qualities of a thing, and can be none other;

the only difference is that it is regarded from a different view. In either case the object is determined through the impulse which it is to limit, but, whereas in the first case the possible liberation from its limitation is not considered, in the second case it is considered. In the former case the impulse reposes; in the second it is placed in motion. For, let it be well remembered, that I have deduced the conception of usefulness from the relation of an object to freedom in general, but not exactly to my own freedom. Something may be thought as useful, without the clear conscious additional thought that I, or some other free being, can apply this usefulness. In an unconscious way, the latter thought, of course, is at the basis of all conception of utility.

But, perhaps, I only become *partly* conscious of my impulse. In that case I have grasped only partly the utility of a thing; have not recognized its true purpose, but only some arbitrary purpose for which it may also be used. My whole impulse craves absolute independence and self-sufficiency; and, until I have apprehended it as such, I have not determined myself completely, nor—through opposition to myself—the thing, both so far as its qualities and its uses are concerned. If the latter is completely determined in the described manner, I have grasped the sphere of all its uses, or its final end-purpose. Hence, all complete cognitions, which satisfy, are necessarily cognitions of the end-purpose of objects; and conscience does not approve a conviction until this insight into the end-purpose of the thing has been obtained, and these cognitions are, at the same time, those which govern moral behaviour. The moral law, therefore, requires that each thing should be treated according to its end-purpose. This result has opened to us the easiest transition to the scientific establishment of the *material* of the moral law.

What I must, moreover, call attention to is this: we have just now established a complete finished system of cognition, a perfect synthesis. For moral impulse and

theoretical knowledge stand in reciprocal relation to each other; and all morality is conditioned through this reciprocity of both. The moral impulse, in so far as it occurs in consciousness, demands a determined conception = X—inaccessible to itself—and through this demand determines, in so far, the power of cognition *formaliter*: that is to say, it impels the reflecting power of judgment to hunt up that conception. But the moral impulse, when regarded as primary, also determines *materialiter* the power of cognition in regard to the conception X; for X arises through the completed determination of the object, by means of the whole primary impulse, as we have seen. Hence, all cognition, regarded objectively as a system, is, throughout, predetermined through the moral impulse. Hence, the rational being—even in respect to both matter and form of all its possible knowledge—is absolutely determined through itself, and through nothing external in any manner whatever. That which we have otherwise asserted as simply the result of the conception of Egoness, we here meet again, in a more determined manner, through a genetic deduction. For that in the Ego, which determines all its cognition, is its practical essence, since that is its highest. The only firm and final basis of all my knowledge is my duty. This duty is the intelligible "In itself" (thing in itself, substance, etc.), which, through the laws of sensuous representation, changes itself into a sensuous world.

On the other hand, cognition determines the moral impulse in consciousness, by giving to it its object. Thus, the moral impulse, through the mediation of cognition, returns into herself, and the reciprocity just established is, in truth, a reciprocity within the moral impulse itself, its own self-relation, which manifests itself in the feeling of certainty, as we have shown.

To state it all as concisely as possible. The formal condition of the morality of our acts, or their pre-eminently so-called morality, consists in this, that we

resolve to do that which conscience requires, solely for the sake of conscience. But conscience is *the immediate consciousness of our determined duty*. This is only to be understood as has been explained, to wit: the consciousness of a determined somewhat is never immediate, but can only be found through an act of thinking; and hence, so far as its material is concerned, our consciousness of duty is never immediate; but the consciousness *that* this determined somewhat is duty, is an immediate consciousness as soon as the determined is given. The consciousness of duty is *formaliter* immediate; and this formal part of consciousness is a mere feeling.

Kant says: Conscience is a consciousness which is itself duty. A correct and sublime statement! It involves a twofold: first, that it is absolute duty to acquire this consciousness, or, as we have stated it, that each one is bound to convince himself as to what his duty may be, and each one can so convince himself in every case. This is, as it were, the *constitutional* law of morality, namely, that law which prescribes that law shall be established. It involves secondly, that consciousness in that condition is nothing but a consciousness of duty; that is to say, conscience does not furnish the material of our duty, which it is the business of the power of judgment to furnish, and conscience is no power of judgment; but conscience furnishes the evidence, and this sort of evidence occurs *only* in the consciousness of duty.

COROLLARIA.

I. The above deduction has for ever cancelled and destroyed the subterfuge of *an erring conscience*, which most of the present systems of morality still retain. Conscience never errs, and cannot err, for it is the immediate consciousness of our pure original Ego, beyond which no other consciousness penetrates, which no other consciousness can test or correct, which is itself judge

of all conviction, but does not recognize any higher judge than itself. Its decisions are final, and admit of no appeal. To try to reach beyond it is to try to go out of oneself, to separate oneself from oneself. All material systems of morality which seek some other end for duty than duty itself, thus try to reach beyond it, and are therefore enveloped in the fundamental error of all dogmatism, which always looks for the final ground of whatsoever is in and for the Ego, outside of the Ego. Such moral systems are possible only through inconsequence, for logical dogmatism admits no morality, but acknowledges simply a system of natural laws.

Moreover, the power of judgment cannot err as to whether conscience has spoken or not. Before men are sure on this point, what obliges them to act at all? No act results through man unless he has determined himself to achieve this act. If he acts without being sure of his conscience, he acts unconscientiously; his guilt is clear, and he cannot escape the responsibility. There is no excuse for sin. Sin is, and remains sin.

I hold it important to insist on this point as well, for the sake of its importance for morality itself, as for the science of morality. Whosoever says the opposite may find a reason for it in his own heart (the fault cannot be in his understanding), but it is surprising that he should be bold enough to confess it to himself and to others.

2. Lest the word *feeling* should lead to misapprehension, I add the following: A theoretical proposition is not and cannot be felt, but the certainty and sure conviction which accompanies the thinking of such proposition is felt. We must not, when thinking, be anxious to think in such a manner as to make it conformable to conscience, for this is an illogical thinking, which has its end marked out for it in advance. Let thinking strictly proceed in its own manner, independently of conscience. The opposite were *cowardice*,

and could augur little confidence in one's conscience. The pretended objective teachings of feeling are products of disorderly imagination, which cannot withstand the tests of theoretical reason; and the feeling which unites with them is the feeling of the free self-activity of our power of imagination. It is the feeling of our self, not in our original totality, however, but only of part of our self. A proposition thus produced through feeling is to be recognized by this, that it is in opposition to the laws of thinking, which can not be the case with any conviction confirmed by conscience; and the feeling which accompanies it, may be recognised by this, that though it may not lack depth, intensity, and sublimity, it certainly lacks *sureness*. No fanatic would act on the prompting of his feelings at the risk of having a change in his convictions made impossible for all eternity.

3. The feeling of certainty arises from the harmony of an act of the power of judgment with the moral impulse: hence the exclusive condition of the possibility of such a feeling is, that the subject itself makes this judgment. Hence certainty and conviction can never relate to the judgment of others, and conscience cannot allow itself to be absolutely governed through authority. To do so were an evident, flagrant contradiction.

Hence, *the person who acts on the strength of authority acts necessarily unconscientiously*; for he is uncertain. A very important proposition, which there is great need to establish in all its strictness.

It is true, we may guide the investigations of men, and furnish them with the premises wherefrom to form their judgment, which premises they may preliminarily accept upon mere authority. This is more or less the history of all men. Through education they receive that which all previous mankind has established up to their time, and which has now become the common faith of mankind, as premises from which to frame their own

judgments. It is only the true philosopher who accepts nothing without examination, and whose thinking starts from the most absolute doubt of everything.

But before the act takes place, each man is in conscience bound to *form his own judgment* from those premises accepted upon faith; in other words, to draw *himself* the final conclusions which determine his acting. If his conscience confirms the result of those premises, it thereby mediately also establishes the *practical validity* of those premises—though, perhaps, not their theoretical validity; for the moral element in them, which shows itself in the result and is approved through conscience, may be correct, although the theoretical element be altogether wrong. If his conscience disapproves those premises, they are annihilated, and it is absolute duty to give them up. That from which no practical results follow is an adiaphoron, which may be safely left to itself. True, no knowledge whatsoever is indifferent to mankind in general, and whatsoever is true must have practical results. But for some men, in their limited condition in life, a great part of the theory may remain a matter of utter indifference all their lifetime.

For the sake of his conscience, man must form his own judgment, and compare this judgment with his feeling; for otherwise he acts immorally and unconscientiously. Hence there is absolutely no external ground and criterion of the obligatoriness of a moral commandment. No moral command; and if it were asserted to be of divine origin, is unconditionally obligatory, because this or that person utters it, or because it is written here or there; it is obligatory only on condition that our own conscience will confirm it, and only *because* our conscience confirms it. Nay, it is absolute duty not to obey it without full self-investigation. We must first test it by our own conscience, and it is absolutely unconscientious to pass over this examination. Nothing can be urged against this categorial and unexceptionally valid result of reason;

and all subterfuges, exceptions, or modifications thereof are to be invariably repudiated. It is not allowable to say, "I have found this or that to be true, and hence something else" (which occurs, perhaps, at the same place) "must also be true." For this or that was true, not because it occurred in such a place, but because it showed itself to be true, and it were unconscientious to risk something else on the mere chance that it may also be true. That which does not proceed from faith, or from the confirmation of our own conscience, is absolute sin.

CHAPTER II.

THE CAUSE OF EVIL IN MAN.

I. WHATSOEVER appertains in general to a rational being, is necessarily in its wholeness and without lack in every individual, since otherwise such individual would not be rational. It cannot be too often reiterated that a rational being is not composed arbitrarily out of foreign fragments, but is a totality; and if you cancel a necessary component thereof, you cancel it altogether.

At present we speak of the rational being as originally conceived. The moral law demands that empirical time-creatures become an exact copy of the original Ego. This time-being is the subject of consciousness, and something occurs in it only in so far as it is consciously posited in it through a free act of its own self-activity. But it is clear that this positing, this reflecting upon that which constitutes the original Ego, must form a successive series of reflections, each being limited; and that it must, therefore, require a duration of time to raise everything which constitutes an original Ego to clear consciousness. To describe this process of the reflections of the Ego in time is to furnish the history of the empirical rational being. The one thing to be observed, however, is that this will always appear as *accidentally successive* reflections or positings, precisely because these all depend upon freedom, and not upon any mechanical law of nature. *

* Hence the folly of the attempt to trace a *necessary* succession of development in human history. *Translator's Remarks.*

2. Of something man must become clearly conscious, if he is to have consciousness at all and to be a rational being. First, in time he becomes conscious of the natural impulse—the ground whereof has already been indicated—and he acts in conformity with this impulse; with freedom, it is true, in the formal significance of the word, but without consciousness of this freedom. He is free for an intelligence which is outside of him and observes him in his acts, but he is not free for himself; for himself he is only—if he can be said at all to be anything for himself on this standpoint—a mere animal.

It is to be expected that he will reflect upon himself in this condition. He then elevates himself above himself, and enters upon a higher grade. This reflection does not occur necessarily according to a law, and hence we said only that it is to be expected. It occurs through absolute freedom; it occurs *because* it occurs. It *ought* to occur, because the empirical Ego ought to correspond to the pure Ego, but it *need* not occur necessarily. (The society wherein a man moves may *occasion*, but cannot *produce*, this reflection.)

Now through this reflection the individual tears himself away from his natural impulse, and places himself independently before himself as a free intelligence; through it the individual obtains for himself the power to defer self-determination, and hence also the power to choose between various ways of gratifying his natural impulse, which manifold arises, indeed, through this very reflection and the postponement of a resolution.

Let us consider this possibility of choosing a little. The free being determines himself solely in accordance with and by means of conceptions. Hence his choice must be based upon a conception of this choice, or of what is to be chosen. A, B, or C, for instance, is to be chosen. Supposing that the free being chooses C, can it do so without any intelligible ground? Clearly not, for then the choice would be undertaken not with

freedom, but through blind chance. Freedom acts according to conceptions. Hence there must be absolutely something in C, which causes it to be preferred. We will call this something X.

But another question: how happens it that it is precisely X, and not some possible - X, which determines the choice? The ground of this can be sought for only in a general rule, of which the rational being is already possessed. There must be a *major* of a syllogism in reason, of the following nature: whatsoever is of this or this nature (= X), must be preferred to everything else; now C is of this nature; hence, etc. The major contains the rule. Such a rule is it which Kant has very happily designated as a *maxim*. (In a theoretical syllogism it would be the *major*, but the theoretical is not the highest for man, and every possible major has still a higher proposition as its ground. But the highest for man, his *maximum*, is his rule of action.)

Let us dwell a little on this conception of a maxim. Firstly, so far as its form is concerned, it is a maxim through an act of my own freedom. If it did not exist through freedom, all other freedom would be cancelled; since all other freedom necessarily and in a fixed order results from it. This is Kant's argument. But, moreover, and what I should chiefly urge, it is absolutely contradictory to hold that anything is externally given to the Ego. Whatsoever was given externally to the Ego, thereof the Ego could never have become immediately conscious. But the maxim is certainly the object of the most immediate consciousness.

Hence if an evil maxim should be discovered, it is to be explained solely from the freedom of man, and man can never remove the responsibility from himself. Moreover, a mere principle is not a maxim, and—since there is no true principle of action except the moral law—the moral law is not a maxim, since *it does not depend upon the freedom of the empirical subject*. Something becomes

a maxim for me only when I, as an empirical subject, make it through freedom the rule of my acting.

Now, what could possibly be the maxim of man on the standpoint of reflection, where we left him? Since no other impulse occurs in consciousness, as yet, than the natural impulse which only craves enjoyment, and has lust for its motive power, this maxim can only be as follows: "I must choose that which intensively and extensively promises the greatest enjoyment"; or in other words, the maxim of one's own happiness. Sometimes indeed it may happen, that through means of our sympathetic impulses we seek our own happiness in the happiness of others, but since in such cases it is after all only the satisfaction of those sympathetic impulses, which we seek, our motive power is always after all our own happiness. On this standpoint man is a calculating animal.

I have *proved*, that this must be the maxim on the present standpoint; hence I assume, that this maxim is determined by a theoretical law, and may be deduced by its means. But just now I stated that the maxim is determined solely through the absolute spontaneity of the empirical subject. How can these two assertions be reconciled? I propound this question at this early stage of our investigation, although it covers the whole ground thereof.

I said, *if* man remains on this standpoint of reflection, it cannot be otherwise than that he should be ruled by this maxim. Hence the maxim was theoretically deduced from the presupposed standpoint. But it is not at all necessary, *that* he should remain on that standpoint; nay, he *ought* to raise himself to a higher one, and *can* so raise himself. That he does not do it, is his own fault, and hence the improper maxim, which results from it, is also his own fault. It is, therefore, not to be foretold what standpoint the individual will occupy—since that does not follow from any theoretical law. Hence it is

quite right, if the conclusion runs thus: "Under such circumstances, *i.e.*, with such a character and mode of thinking, he could not act otherwise than he did." But it would be wrong to confine the conclusion to this assertion, and to deny that he could have another character than he has. He absolutely *ought* to form another one, if his present character is of no account; and he can do it, since it depends altogether upon his freedom to do so.

There is something incomprehensible here, as it could not well be otherwise, since we have arrived at the limit of all comprehensibility, at the doctrine of freedom in its application to the empirical subject. For this reason: so long as I do not yet occupy the higher standpoint of reflection, that standpoint does not exist for me; and hence I cannot have a conception of that which I ought to do, until I actually do it. Nevertheless it remains true, that I absolutely *ought* to do it; namely with reference to another observer, who knows this point, and in reference to myself, whenever I shall come to know it. For, whenever I come to know it, I cannot excuse myself with having been powerless to do it before, but shall, on the contrary, accuse myself for not having done it always. In other words: I ought to do it in respect to my original character, which, to be sure, is only an idea.

Nor could it, indeed, be otherwise, since an act of freedom is absolutely *because* it is, and is an absolute first, which cannot be connected with, nor explained from, anything else. It is solely from not considering this point, that all the difficulties arise, which strike so many, when they arrive at this point. To *comprehend* signifies to connect one thinking with another, or, to think the former through the mediation of the latter. When such a mediation is possible, then there is no freedom, but only mechanism. To desire to comprehend an act of freedom is therefore absolutely contradictory. If it could be comprehended, it would not be freedom, on that very account.

In like manner all the particular reflections, which are here required, are absolute starting-points of an utterly new series, regarding which one cannot say whence they come—since in fact they come no whither. This of itself throws much clearness upon what Kant says: that the radical evil is inborn in man, and that nevertheless it has its origin in freedom. For it may well be foreseen and comprehended, that man should remain awhile, or perhaps all his lifetime on the lower standpoints of reflection, since there is absolutely nothing which *drives* him to a higher standpoint; and experience certainly proves such to be the case. In so far, therefore, evil is inborn in man. But at the same time it is certainly not necessary, that man should remain upon this standpoint; since there is also absolutely nothing, which *keeps him back* on that standpoint. It is quite as possible for him to raise himself at once to the highest point, and if he does not do so the fault lies with his freedom, which he does not make use of, although he may not become conscious on this standpoint of this his fault. And in so far the evil has its ground in freedom.

The deduced maxim is certainly lawlessness, but is not yet positive hostility to, or corruption of, morality. It is to be hoped and expected that the man will, sooner or later, raise himself, of his own accord, to that higher point, if he is only left to himself. This is rendered a much more difficult matter if that improper maxim is raised through sophistry into a principle, as has been done by so many so-called philosophers. I do not allude to the defenders of the principle of earthly happiness and perfection amongst us Germans; for with them it is more a defect of expression and misapprehension, their meaning being usually much more innocent than their words. But I allude to the foreign materialistic and atheistic moralists, like Helvetius, who say: "Man acts only from selfish motives, and there is no other motive power in his character. This is his destination. He cannot, and ought

not to, be otherwise, and whoever pretends to be better is either a fool or a fanatic, who misapprehends the limits of his own nature." Such an argument is, of course, calculated to suppress and make impossible all desire for the higher standpoint.

But, even without such a false philosophy, this mode of thinking may be confirmed, either through general habit and through the experience, which is probably the same in all ages, that most men do not rise beyond it; which, indeed, gives rise also to the prejudice that those who, in their external acts, which alone can be observed, appear better, may, nevertheless, have in their inmost hearts the same low mode of thinking. Moreover—a not unimportant observation—it is *natural* for man to exist on this low standpoint. That is to say, without an act of spontaneity man remains upon that standpoint, borrows his maxims solely from that common—or which to him appears most common—custom, and judges of what *ought* to be done from what *is actually done*. The ground is this: it is only through *education* in the widest sense of the word, *i.e.*, through the general influence of society upon us, that we are first cultured for the use of our freedom; and we always remain on the standpoint of the culture we have thus received, unless, through a free act, we rise above it.

If Society were better we, also, should be better, though without merit of our own. The possibility, however, to have merit of our own is not cancelled thereby, but is only raised to a higher point.

3. But if man is left to himself, and not enchained through the example of his age or a corrupt philosophy, it is to be expected that he will always become more and more conscious of the impulse to be absolutely self-sufficient, which continues to manifest itself within him. He will thus elevate himself to quite another sort of freedom, for under the previously-described maxim he is only *formaliter* free, and *materialiter* altogether dependent

upon natural objects. He has no other object than the enjoyment which these objects furnish.

I have said: "If man is but left to himself he will, perhaps, rise higher." Each one sees that, from the thoughtlessness and inattentiveness wherein that impulse absolutely does not exist for us, there is no steady transition to the consciousness of that impulse. This transition occurs through a particular act of spontaneity. But, in spite of all evil examples and of all erroneous philosophizings, man is still capable of this act; he *shall* and *can* rise above his standpoint, and it is always his own fault if he does not do so. For all those external circumstances have no causality upon him; *they* do not work in and through him, but it is he himself who determines himself by means of their influence. Moreover, it is a fact that, in spite of all those obstacles, many men do so elevate themselves. The *how* remains inexplicable, *i.e.*, can only be explained through freedom. In analogy with a pre-eminent intellectual ability it might be called: a *genius for virtue*. It is not *sentimentality*, as some writer says, but *self-determination*, and he who would develop virtue must develop *self-determination*.

Now, if, in some incomprehensible manner, this impulse to be self-determined arises in consciousness—but as mere blind impulse, because the reflection of it does not occur consciously and is not undertaken intentionally—then this impulse naturally appears as something accidental; as something which happens to exist in us, and without any higher reason. It is to be foreseen that this manifestation will further and otherwise determiné the character of the individual, and it is this determinedness of character which we have now to investigate.

The distinguishing characteristics to be noticed in this investigation are as follows: The impulse appears only as a blind impulse, and not as a law, nor as obeying a law. Moreover, it appears as accidental, and non-essential to man's nature, our nature having already been determined

by the above maxim of selfishness. From these characteristics we must draw our conclusions. It is not necessary that anyone should arrive at this point at all, and it is equally not necessary that he should remain on it; but if anyone occupies this standpoint it is necessary that his character should become determined in a certain manner.

Firstly, on this standpoint, in so far as our acts must be explained from it, we do not act according to a *maxim*, but according to an impulse. Hence, there arises a mode of acting which the acting individual does not and cannot explain to himself, and which appears to be contradictory, as, indeed, the defenders of the former utterly sensuous mode of acting appeal to the contradictory character of this mode of acting, which they mistake for pure morality, and thus accuse, likewise, the latter of being absurd. This characteristic is, indeed, of itself sufficient to condemn the second mode of acting. The previous maxim of selfishness remains, also, the ruling maxim in this condition, and all conscious acts on this standpoint are done conformably to this maxim. An act which is done merely at the instigation of a blind impulse is an exception to the rule, and hence, when men seek, on this standpoint, to account for the motives of these acts, we usually seek to derive them from that maxim of selfishness, and to establish an artificial connection with that maxim, thereby, as it were, wronging ourselves.

So far as the material of the desire to will is concerned, there thus arises the—not consciously thought, but, to an observer from the higher standpoint, noticeable—maxim of the *unlimited and lawless supreme rule over all that is external to us*. Man has not the will—indeed, he has no will at all, but is blindly impelled—but he acts as if he had the will to subjugate everything external to the authority of his will, and this he does from absolutely no other possible ground than *because* he so wills. It is immediately clear that such a mode of acting must result

from the blind and lawless impulse to be absolutely self-determined.

To properly appreciate this maxim we must compare it with morality. Morality also demands freedom and independence, but desires to attain it only gradually, and conformably to certain laws. Hence, it desires no unconditioned and lawless, but a causality which remains under certain restrictions; whereas, the maxim whereof we speak now, demands unconditioned and unrestricted causality.

The easily recognizable and very common manifestations of this mode of thinking are as follows: The men who hold it, desire certainly to have a good will, and wish that all other men should let everything depend upon their good will; but they do not want to hear anything said of their duty or of law. They like to be generous and forbearing; everything but just. They are benevolently disposed towards others, but have no respect or esteem for their rights. In short, their empirical will, which again depends only upon their will, and is therefore an absolute empirical will, is to be law for all the rest of the world, both irrational and free.

Every one must see that these characteristics cannot be explained from the mere craving after enjoyment. Each such attempted explanation is forced, and does not accomplish what it purposes to accomplish, provided only, that the happiness of others is really desired, and that this improper end is not merely made a pretence to cover the still more improper end of mere enjoyment. The object of our will is not at all determined through a possible enjoyment, but is absolutely determined through the will; in form precisely like the genuinely moral mode of thinking.

However, this mode of thinking necessarily retains the character of impelling esteem. To carry it out may require no sacrifice of enjoyment, for instance, if one has no passions, or if circumstances require no sacrifices;

in which case we approve coldly. For then we believe that we had a right to *demand* that everything should submit to and obey our will; and hence nothing occurs but what was to be expected. There is no true joy and gladness connected with this mode of thinking, when it is successful, precisely because it expects no favour from nature, but merely demands that nature should do its duty. Whereas, if it is not successful, there arises—if not pain and woe, as a sorrowful depressing sentiment, at least disgust, as an active passion, for the very reason that we were impelled by the craving to be self-sufficient. We rave against God and nature, hold forth about violation of justice, and accuse particularly men of ingratitude and want of recognition.

But to carry out this mode of thinking may also require sacrifices. It is very possible to carry it out with the greatest self-denial, precisely because it is higher than the impulse to attain mere enjoyment. In this case there results *self-valuation*. This is not so much an esteeming of our free *acting* through absolute self-determination, as rather an esteeming of our character, as a permanent, reposeful *being*. We enjoy to find ourselves better and nobler than we should almost have credited. That it must be thus, appears from the following: we act in accordance with a blind impulse, and hence not properly with freedom and matureness; we did not weigh our action in advance of the acting, but now find it as a given act only by its occurrence; and the rule according to which it might have occurred, we likewise do not discover until afterward. Thus the act is and remains a given and not a self-made act, and since it is a good act the doing it remains an inborn goodness. This characteristic appears often, in ordinary life as well as in philosophical argument. For instance: the assertion of an original goodness of human nature is based on experience, and on the above kind of experience. And yet the assertion is utterly false. Human nature is originally neither

good nor bad. It becomes good or bad only through freedom.

Moreover, this self-valuation is not a cold and quiet approval like moral self-esteem, but is connected with joy, which always proceeds from the unexpected; joy over ourselves because we are so good. That it must be so, appears clearly from the following: We have acted in accordance with a blind impulse, and have not required any sacrifice from ourselves. The common line on which we place ourselves with the rest of mankind is selfishness. We have made up our mind that all men are selfish, and that nothing else is to be expected of them. But now we suddenly find ourselves raised above this common standard of humanity; we have clear merits. We do not find ourselves—as the moral law wants us to find ourselves—as *we ought to be*, but we find ourselves incomparably better than we have any need to be. For us there exist none but great, noble and meritorious acts, none but *opera superogativa*. To characterize this mode of thinking in one word: everything which God, men, and nature do for us is nothing but their absolute duty; they never can do anything more than what they are bound to do for us, and are always good-for-nothing servants; but whatsoever we do for them is graciousness and kindness. However we may act we can never act wrongly. If we sacrifice everything to enjoyment it is all right, and nothing but the exercise of our well-founded right. If we deny ourselves enjoyment but in the slightest degree, it is already a superfluous merit.

That this mode of thinking, when reduced to its principle, is irrational, will probably not be denied by anyone; and that it occurs frequently—though without clear consciousness of its character—and, moreover, in those persons who pass for very honest and virtuous men, will also be denied by no one who knows mankind and is able to penetrate into their inmost heart. We will not refer to particular individuals, but to all mankind.

Almost the whole history of mankind is simply a proof of our assertion, and history becomes comprehensible only through the present position of such a mode of thinking. Subjugation of the bodies and souls of nations, wars of conquest and of religion, all the misdeeds, in short, which have ever dishonoured mankind; how are they to be explained? What induced the subjugator to pursue his object against danger and labour? Did he hope thereby to enlarge the sources of his sensuous enjoyment? By no means. "That which I will, shall be done; what I say, shall be law!" This was the only principle which moved him.

It has already been acknowledged that this kind of character has not enjoyment for its object. The egotistic self-merit which accompanies it is based on the consciousness of sacrifices, which we need not have made in our opinion. True, the satisfaction of these sacrifices affords an enjoyment afterwards, which enjoyment is not sensual, namely, the enjoyment of these caresses which we lavish upon ourselves; but this enjoyment was not the end we had in view; not the motive power of our acts. The real object which governs our acts, although it is never clearly thought and raised to consciousness, is this, that our lawless arbitrariness may govern everything. We sacrifice our enjoyment to *this* purpose, and then flatter ourselves at our unselfishness.

If man is regarded as a natural being, this mode of thinking has one advantage over the one previously described, which estimates everything according to the sensual enjoyment which it furnishes. Viewed from this standpoint, such a character inspires admiration; whereas the man who first calculates how much enjoyment he may get out of an act, inspires contempt. For this character, after all, is, and remains, independence from all the external world; is a self-sufficiency. It might be called the *heroic* character. In fact, it is the usual mode of thinking of the heroes of history.

But when we regard this character from the moral standpoint, it has no value at all, since it does not proceed from morality. Nay, it is more dangerous than the former sensuous character. For it falsifies and soils—if not the principle of morality, since that does not exist for this mode of thinking—at least, the judgment of material acts emanating from that principle; since it accustoms men to consider that which is merely duty as something noble and meritorious. True, the publican and sinner has no more value than the self-conceited Pharisee, for both have no value at all; but it is easier to convert the former than the latter.

4. Man has nothing further to do than to raise that craving for absolute self-sufficiency, which, when working as a blind impulse, produces a very immoral character into clear consciousness, and the impulse will, through this mere reflection, change in consciousness into an absolutely imperative law, as has already been shown. As every reflection limits the reflected, thus the reflected impulse is also limited through this reflection, and in virtue of this limitedness it changes from a blind craving for absolute causality into a law of conditioned causality. Man now knows that he *shall* (ought to) do something absolutely.

Now if this knowing is to change into acting, man must make it a maxim for himself, to do always, and in every case, that which duty demands, *precisely because duty demands it*. The latter condition, indeed, is already involved in the conception of a maxim, as being the highest and absolute rule, which recognizes no higher one.

It is absolutely impossible and contradictory that anyone with a clear consciousness of his duty should, in the moment of action, *consciously resolve not to do his duty*. That he should revolt and refuse obedience to the law, and make it his maxim not to do what his duty is precisely because it is his duty. Such a maxim

were devilish; but the conception of a devil contradicts, and thus cancels itself. This we prove as follows:—

Man is clearly conscious of his duty, signifies: Man, as an intelligence, absolutely requires of himself to do something. Now, to say man consciously resolves to act against his duty, signifies: he requires of himself in the same undivided moment, *not* to do that very thing. Hence, in the same undivided moment, the same intelligence in him must require contradictory acts, which is certainly a self-annihilating proposition, and the most flagrant contradiction.

But it is very possible to *darken* in one's self the clear consciousness of the requirement of duty. For this consciousness arises only through an act of absolute spontaneity, and remains only through the continuation of that act of freedom; when we cease to reflect it vanishes. (It is the same with this consciousness as with many conceptions of transcendental philosophy. As soon as we descend from the higher standpoint, upon which alone they are possible, they vanish into nothingness.) The matter therefore stands in this shape: if we continue to reflect in accordance with the requirement of the law, and keep it in view, it is impossible for us not to act in conformity with it—impossible to resist it. If, on the contrary, we lose sight of it, it is equally impossible to act conformably to it. In either case there is necessity, and we thus seem to fall into an intellectual fatalism, but of a lower kind than the ordinary one. For according to the ordinary intellectual fatalism, the moral law which exists in man, without any co-operation of his own, causes, in one case, consciousness of itself, as well as acts in conformity with it; and, in another case, it does not produce such consciousness or such acts, and hence leaves open room for lower impulses. We have already done away with this sort of fatalism by showing that the moral law is not something which exists within

us, independently of our co-operation, being, on the contrary, first created by ourselves.

But the present kind of fatalism holds that either the moral law continues in our consciousness, in which case it necessarily produces moral acts, or it vanishes, in which case moral acts are impossible. Hence the appearance of fatalism vanishes altogether as soon as we observe that it depends upon our freedom whether that consciousness shall continue in us, or shall darken itself. It is the same with this consciousness as with the above-mentioned standpoint of reflection.

Again, let it be well noted that this act of freedom, which either retains that consciousness clear, or allows it to be darkened, is also an absolute first, and hence unexplainable act. It occurs, not according to a maxim and hence not with accompanying consciousness of what I do, and not with a consciousness of the freedom wherewith I do it. If it did, the allowing that consciousness to be darkened would be precisely that conscious revolt against the moral law, which we have shown to be a contradiction. It occurs, when it occurs, simply *because* it occurs without any higher ground. Or, to represent the matter from still another side: the vanishing of the consciousness of duty is an *abstraction*. Now, there are two very different kinds of abstraction. Either I make the abstraction with clear consciousness, and according to a rule; or the abstraction arises in me of its own account, even where I did not intend to abstract, through an *undetermined* thinking, such as, for instance, produces all formular philosophy. Now the vanishing whereof we speak here, is of the latter kind; it is an undetermined thinking, and a violation of duty *because the determined consciousness of duty is itself duty*.

It is through thoughtlessness and that inattentiveness to our higher nature, wherewith our life necessarily begins, that we grow accustomed to this thoughtlessness, and thus drift along in our usual current. But this

does not imply, by any means, that we cannot, through freedom, get out of this current. In the same manner we may, on the other hand, *habituate* ourself to mature consideration and attentiveness to the law, without this habit becoming a necessity for us. Practice and attentiveness, nay, careful watching of one's self, must be incessantly continued. No one is sure for one moment of his morality without continued exertion. No man, nay, so far as we can see, no finite being is *confirmed* in goodness.

The determined clear consciousness of the moral law vanishes. Two cases are supposable. Either this consciousness vanishes altogether and no thought of duty remains until after the act; in which case we act either according to the maxim of selfishness, or in obedience to the blind impulse to have our lawless will rule everywhere. We have already described both of these conditions.

Or there remains a consciousness of duty, but only an indistinct consciousness. Here it is important, first of all, to note how a determined consciousness may change itself into an undetermined and wavering consciousness. All our consciousness begins with undeterminedness, for it begins with the power of imagination, which is a power of floating undecidedly over two opposites. It is only through the understanding that the product of this floating, which, as yet, has no outlines, becomes fixed and determined. But, even after it has been determined, it may easily happen that the sharp outline is lost sight of, and that the object is again held merely by the power of imagination. This we do, for instance, consciously whenever we form a *general* conception in *arbitrary* abstraction; we drop the particular determinations, and thus raise the conception to a general one. True, the conception remains determined in this instance; the very fact that it is, in a certain degree, undetermined, constituting its determinedness. Unconsciously, we do it when we are thoughtless or *distract*.

By far the fewest men seize things determinedly and closely defined. Objects only float vaguely before their minds as in a dream or as covered by a fog. Now, was their understanding then altogether inactive? Certainly not, or no consciousness at all would have been possible. But the determinedness immediately escapes them again, and its passage through the region of the understanding is very quick. Even in regard to its undeterminedness, a conception held in this manner is undetermined. It wavers between more or less undeterminedness without co-operation of the power of judgment. Now, this is the presupposed case with the conception of duty; it darkens of itself simply because I do not hold it fixedly.

The conception of duty, as thought in a given case, involves a threefold determinedness which may lose its determined character. Firstly, in each special case some particular act of all possible acts is duty; and all others are absolutely not duty. It is only the conception of *this* one act, which is accompanied by the above described feeling of certainty and conviction. This determinedness of the act escapes us, although the form of the conception of duty remains. We take hold of something else as our duty, nay, perhaps even suppose this something else to be our duty, although, if we went honestly to work, we should be sure to find it impelled and determined through some inclination or another, since we have already lost the true thread of conscience. We then deceive ourselves concerning that which is our duty, and act, as is usually said, from an erring conscience. But this error is, and remains, our guilt. If we had but held firm to our insight into our duty, which we thus possessed before, we should not have erred; and thus to hold it firm was a matter of our freedom. There is a self-deception here, against which we cannot be too much on our guard. (I said above, "if we go honestly to work"; for it is very well possible that some one should only try to make others believe that he does from motives of duty, what he knows well

enough, he does only from motives of selfishness. For instance, he may be utterly indifferent as to duty, being a dogmatic unbeliever. Such a character would be that of a miserable hypocrite, and is not included in the above class.)

Secondly, there is involved in the conception this determinedness, that it is *precisely in the present case*, that we have to act in a determined manner. This determinedness of the present time may escape us, in which case the command appears as one which is not determined by time: that is as one which, though it certainly requires obedience, does not demand it precisely at the present time, and which we need not be in a hurry to obey. Hence, comes the postponement of reform; the thought, that we will enjoy only yet this or that delight, or carry out this or that reprehensible plan, and then seriously consider about reforming. This mode of thinking is partly utterly wicked, because the moral law allows no time for consideration, but demands, whenever it speaks, implicit and immediate obedience; and partly very dangerous, for if we have once learned postponing, we are very likely to continue it. The time when we shall have no more cherished plans, will never come; for man has always wishes. Such a character is lazy, and requires to be removed by some outside power from the standpoint which he occupies; but such a power does not exist. Even the Almighty cannot do what the cure of this laziness requires.

Thirdly and finally, the requirement of duty is determined in its *form, as duty*; it demands absolutely obedience, regardless of all other impulses. If we allow this determinedness to darken within us, the commands of duty will no longer appear as commands, but only, perhaps, as good advice which we may follow if we so list and if it does not cost too much self-denial, but which we may also, if necessary, trim a little. In this condition we frame for ourselves a mixed maxim. We do

not always hunt after the greatest enjoyment and care only for it, but often content ourselves with having to do our duty; nay, perhaps we even sacrifice to duty those enjoyments which are naturally not enticing for us—the spendthrift sacrificing avarice, the ambitious man lusts which might interfere with his ambition, etc.,—but we retain those enjoyments which are dearest to us. Thus, we make a compromise between conscience and lust; nay, believe to have satisfied both at the same time.

It is this mode of thinking which impudently asserts that we cannot live as the moral law requires, that the punctual practice of that law is an impossibility: an assertion which is very frequently heard in ordinary life, but which has also sneaked into philosophical and theological systems. But, of what impossibility, I ask, does this assertion speak? That we often cannot realize our firmest will in the external world on account of external obstacles, is true enough; but neither does the moral law unconditionally demand this realization. The moral law requires only that we should exert all our powers, should do all we can do; and why should we not be able to do what we can do? The moral law requires only that we should not do the opposite of our duty. And why should we not be able to leave that undone? What power can force us free beings to act?

What that assertion really means to say is: we cannot do our duty, if we want to retain this or that enjoyment, this or that possession, &c. Duty demands that we should sacrifice them. But we cannot both sacrifice and retain them.

True enough; but who has said that we ought to retain these enjoyments or those possessions? Everything, life, honour, and all that is dear to man, is to be sacrificed to duty. Such is our opinion. We have never asserted that in every case duty and the satisfaction of selfish impulses could co-exist. The latter are to be sacrificed. Hence the truth is not, we *cannot* do our duty, but we *will not* do

our duty. We cannot make up our will to make those sacrifices. It is our will, not our power to do, which is at fault.

If anything, indeed, proves the wide extent of human corruption and its shamelessness, it is this contradictory and utterly irrational subterfuge, which is put forth again and again, and put forth and defended even by the most sensible men, nay, which even teachers of morality have accepted and seriously discussed, as if there really were a grain of rationality in it.

(It is precisely the same, when men speak of impossibility in relation to what pure reason requires to be realized in a technical-practical respect. The "we cannot" always signifies the same. If, for instance, a thorough reform of State organization is demanded, men cry "those propositions cannot be realized, they are impracticable." Of course they are impracticable, *if the old abuses are to remain*. But who says that they are to remain?)

These three different modes of evading the severity of the moral law may be united, but the latter condition is undoubtedly of greatest danger to mankind. If we have once persuaded ourselves that we can make a compromise with the strictness of morality, we shall likely remain all our lifetime making such compromises, unless indeed some severe external concussion stirs us up to repent; and in so far indeed it is much easier to reform a sinner, than a conceited just man of the latter sort.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

In order to place the doctrine of freedom in the clearest light, and to prosecute fatalism into its extremest hiding-corners, we append some remarks more specially referring to Kant's assertion of *a radical evil* in man.

The existence of evil in man we have explained as follows: each one to be called a man, must arrive at

self-consciousness. Now this involves simply that he should become conscious of his freedom in the choice of his actions. This consciousness arises already, when man learns to make a choice between the manifold which the mere natural impulse demands of him. In this case he will act unconsciously and darkly—or, if his understanding is somewhat developed—consciously and clearly according to the maxim of selfishness; and in so far we may certainly, as Reinhold does, ascribe to man a selfish impulse, although it is to be remembered, that he has made himself selfish only through a voluntarily chosen maxim; for the mere natural impulse is by no means selfish or blameworthy; it being rather duty to satisfy it, as we shall show in time. Upon this standpoint man remains very readily, since nothing impels him onward, and since no necessity whatever compels him to reflect upon his higher nature.

Now if we had merely said, man *can* remain on this standpoint, there would be no difficulty about the assertion. It would be an altogether problematical statement. But how do we come to make the statement categorical and positive; how do we come to say it is certainly not necessary, but it is to be expected that man will remain on that standpoint? What is it which we really do assert in this statement, and what is the *positiveness* which we presuppose unwittingly?

It is this: man will not do anything, which is not absolutely necessary, and which he is not *compelled* by his nature as man to do. We therefore presuppose an original laziness to reflect, and what is simply the result of it, to act in accordance with such reflection. This would, therefore, be a true positive radical evil, and not merely a negative evil, as it has hitherto seemed to appear. It was indeed necessary that it should be thus. We had need of a positive, were it but to explain the negative.

Now, what justifies such a presupposition? Is it

merely experience? Kant seems to assume this, although he arrives at the same conclusion, which we shall immediately arrive at. But mere experience would never justify such a universal presupposition. Hence there must be a rational ground for it; not one which generates necessity, for then freedom would be cancelled, but one which renders explicable that universality of experience. We ascribe to nature as such a power of inertia (*vis inertiae*). This results, indeed, from the conception of the causality of a free being, which must necessarily occur in time if it is to be perceptible, and which could not so occur, were it not posited as resisted by external objects. True, the conception of a power of inertia seems contradictory, but nevertheless it is a real one; and it is only requisite that we should understand it properly.

Nature, as such, as mere Ego and Object in general, has only repose, only being; it is what it is, and in so far no active power whatsoever is to be ascribed to nature. But for the very purpose of thus remaining, or reposing, nature must have a quantum of tendency or power to remain what it is. If it has not this power, nature would not retain its form for a moment, would change incessantly and thus have no form at all. In short, nature would not be nature. Now, if an opposite power influences nature, nature necessarily resists with all its power, in order to remain as it is; and it is only now, through relation to an opposite power, that what was before *inertia* becomes activity. It is thus that both conceptions are synthetically united, and it is this synthesis which is signified by a *power of inertia*.

Now, on the indicated standpoint we ourselves are nothing but *nature*. Our powers are powers of nature, and although it is freedom which gives them vitality, since the causality of nature came to an end in the impulse, yet the direction is absolutely no other than the direction which nature itself would have taken, if left

undisturbed. Moreover, the fact that we do occupy the described standpoint, is also to be taken into consideration, since it is a necessary fact, as a result of natural mechanism. Thus we are nature in every respect. But that which appertains to all nature must also appertain to man in so far as he is nature: a reluctance to emerge from his present condition; a tendency to remain in the old accustomed pathway.

It is only thus alone that we explained a universal phenomenon amongst men, which is illustrated in all human actions: *the possibility of habit*, and the tendency to remain in the old beaten track. Each man, even the most powerful and active, has his "Schlendrian," to use a low but very characteristic expression, and will have to fight against it all his lifetime. This is the power of inertia in our nature. Even the regularity and order of most men is nothing but this tendency to repose and habit. It always costs labour to tear loose from it. Even if we are successful for once, and if the stirring up holds on awhile, we nevertheless fall back into our old laziness as soon as we cease to watch ourselves.

Let us consider man in the described condition. Since he is, in general, in his original essence, although not in actuality, free and independent of nature, he is certain to tear himself loose from this condition, and *can* do so, if we regard him as absolutely free; but he must *be* free before he can tear himself thus loose through freedom. It is precisely his freedom which is enchained; the power which is to help him is in league against him. There is no equilibrium, no balance; the weight of nature drags him down, and there is no weight of the moral law to counterbalance it. Now it is true enough that man absolutely ought to place himself in the other scale, and ought to decide that step; it is likewise true that man has the actual power within him to give himself sufficient weight to overbalance his inertia or laziness, and that he can at each moment, through a pressure upon himself

by means of the mere will, raise this power; but how is he to get this will, this first pressure upon himself? It is by no means a result of his condition, which, on the contrary, rather retards it. Moreover, this first pressure is not to arise from his natural state, but absolutely from his self-activity. But where, then, in his natural *condition*, is the point from which he might raise that power? Absolutely nowhere. If we view the matter from a natural point of view, it is absolutely impossible that man should help himself, or should grow better. Only a miracle, to be achieved by himself, can help him. (Hence those who assert a *servum arbitrium*, and characterize man as a piece of log or a stick, who cannot, through his own power, move himself, but must be impelled by a higher power, are altogether in the right, and logical, if they speak of the *natural man*.)

Laziness, therefore, reproducing itself infinitely through long habit, and soon changing into utter impotency to be good, is the true, inborn evil which has its ground in human nature itself, and can be easily enough explained from it. Man is by nature lazy, says Kant very correctly.

From this laziness next arises cowardice, the second fundamental vice of man. Cowardice is *laziness to maintain our freedom and independence in our contact with others*. Each one has courage enough when opposed to a man, of whose weakness he is already convinced; but if he has not this conviction, if he comes in contact with a man in whom he presumes more strength—no matter of what kind—than he himself possesses, he gets afraid at the exertion of power which he will need to maintain his independence, and hence gives way. Only thus is slavery, physical as well as moral slavery, amongst men to be explained: subjection and authority worship. I am terror-stricken in view of the bodily exertion of resistance, and subject my body; I am terror-stricken at the trouble of self-thinking, which somebody else

requires of me by making bold or intricate statements, and asking me to see into them; and I rather submit to his authority, so as to get soon rid of his demands upon me. (There are always men who wish to rule; we have stated the reason above. But these are the fewer and more energetic men. They have a bold, strong character. How, then, does it happen that the others, who, united, would be much stronger, submit to these few? Thus: the trouble which it would require of them to resist, is more painful to them than the slavery to which they submit, and which they hope they shall be able to bear. The least exertion of power is far more painful to ordinary man than thousandfold suffering, and he would rather bear everything than act once. In suffering he at least remains passive and quiet, and gets accustomed to it. Thus the sailor of the anecdote was willing rather to comfort himself with the hope that he should be able to stand it in hell, than exert himself sufficiently to better himself in this life. There he would only *suffer*, but here he should have to *act*.)

The coward comforts himself in this subjection, which after all is not heartfelt, by means of falseness and deception; for the third fundamental vice of man, which naturally arises from cowardice, is *falseness*. Man cannot so utterly deny his selfhood and sacrifice it to another, as he may pretend to do, in order to be relieved of the trouble to defend himself openly. Hence he only shams it in order to espy a better opportunity, and that he may oppose his oppressor when the same shall no longer have his attention directed upon him. All falseness, all lying, all cunning and treachery, arise from the fact that there are oppressors, and everyone who oppresses must expect such results. Only the coward is false. The courageous man lies not, nor is he false; if not from virtue, at least from pride and strength of character.

This is the position of the ordinary natural man. Ordinary, I say; for the extraordinary man, whom nature

has specially favoured, has a powerful character, although from a moral point of view he is no better. He is neither lazy, nor cowardly, nor false; but he tramples overbearingly upon everything around him, and becomes master and subjugator of those who choose to be slaves.

This description may appear ugly and disgusting. But let no one set up the customary groaning and ranting about the imperfection of human nature. Precisely the fact *that* these characteristics appear so disgusting to you, proves the nobility and sublime character of humanity. Do you find it disgusting if the stronger animal devours the weaker, or if the weaker animal overpowers the stronger through cunning? Doubtless not; you find this to be all in order and proper. But not so in the case of man, and precisely because it is impossible for you to consider man as a mere product of nature. You are forced to regard man as a being above all nature, as a free and supersensual being. The very fact that man is capable of vice shows that he is destined for virtue. Moreover, what were virtue unless it were the actively acquired product of our own freedom, the elevating of oneself into an altogether different order of things?

Finally, who that has remarked *the grounds we have shown up for these characteristics*, can hold them valid only for the *human* race, as if only to the human race they were foreign, having been engrafted upon it through some hostile demon, and as if they were not rather valid for *all finite*, rational beings. For these characteristics are not grounded, as we have seen, in a peculiarity of *our nature*, but rather in the conception of general finity itself. Let us ever so much try to conceive cherubim and seraphim; we may certainly conceive them as differing from man in their more particular determinations, but not as so differing in their general characteristics. There is but One who is holy, and all created being is by nature necessarily unholy

and impure, and can elevate itself to morality only through its own freedom.

But how is help to come to man, considering that this involved laziness cripples the only power through which man can help himself? What does he really lack? Not the power, for this he has; but the consciousness thereof and the impulse to make use of it. This impulse cannot come to him internally, from the reasons stated above. If it is not to arise through a miracle, but naturally, it must come externally.

In this way it can come to him only through the understanding, and through the whole theoretical faculty, which certainly is capable of culture. The individual must learn to see himself in his contemptible nature, and to experience disgust with himself; he must likewise be brought in contact with exemplary men, who would elevate him and teach him how he *ought* to be, and thus inspire him at the same time with a desire to become himself worthy of such esteem. There is no other way of culture. But this only furnishes what is lacking—consciousness and impulse. Improvement and elevation, however, depend upon our own freedom, and for the man who makes no use of this freedom there is no help.

But whence are these external impulses to be brought amongst mankind? Since it remains a possibility for each individual, in spite of his laziness, to elevate himself above it, we must assume, and very properly may assume, that amongst the whole mass of men some individuals have actually thus elevated themselves to morality. It will necessarily be the aim of such men to influence their fellow-men, and to influence them in the described manner.

Now, something like this is *positive religion*; institutions arranged by pre-eminently good men, with a view to cultivate the moral sensibility of others. Their age and general usefulness may, moreover, have invested these institutions with a peculiar authority, which may be very useful to those who need them, particularly in

exciting their attention, but anything else, such as, for instance, faith in authority, or blind obedience, those institutions cannot have in view without making mankind utterly immoral, as has been shown above.

It is very natural that those men from whose inner consciousness this moral sensibility developed itself—as by a real miracle and without any external cause—not meeting with this same sensibility in their fellow-men, should have interpreted it as having been effected in them through an external spiritual being; and if they meant *their empirical Ego* as signifying themselves, they doubtless were right. It is possible that this interpretation has descended down unto our times. It is a theoretically true interpretation, if meant to indicate what we have just stated, and even, if not exactly so explained, is utterly without danger, *provided it is not made use of to enforce blind obedience*; and each one may hold whatsoever he chooses regarding this matter; practically it is of no significance to most men.

BOOK FOURTH.

CONCERNING THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF THE MORALITY OF OUR ACTIONS.

PRELIMINARY.

A. I HAVE causality, signifies, as we know : That which I proposed to myself, as end, actually occurs. We have seen, from the transcendental standpoint, that this agreement of perception with the will is, in its highest ground, nothing but an agreement of our empirical being, as determined through absolute spontaneity, with an original impulse. If I determine myself to do something which my original impulse actually demands, I, as the empirically-determined time-being, am being placed in harmony with my original self, as it exists without any consciousness of mine. Thus there arises in me a feeling, for I feel myself *whole* ; and this feeling is a perception, as has been shown more at length above.

Now the original impulse is directed upon manifold matters, for it has been given me for all eternity, and throughout all eternity my whole existence and experience is nothing but an analysis of this, my original impulse. True, it can only be satisfied gradually, and by means of passing through various middle stages ; and even in those cases when it is satisfied, we can again, through free reflection, separate the object of the impulse into an infinite manifold. In other words: the

original impulse craves at all times a determined end = X, an X determined through all that has passed before it, and through its own nature; but nevertheless also an X, which, since it is a *quantum*, can again, through free reflection, be infinitely divided into *a, b, c*, and again into *d, e, f, &c., &c.* It is only thus that a manifold acting is possible. But since the whole X is *possible*—it being demanded by the original impulse—all parts of it are likewise possible. In each case infinitely many actions are *possible*. But in order that something should occur, it is necessary not only that it be possible, but likewise, that I determine myself to do it. That which I do not will does not occur through my impulse, and only that amongst all possible acts, which I will, does occur.

B. Let us linger over the conception of the manifold, which is possible as such; *i.e.*, let us not look at the relation of these acts to each other, whether they exclude or include each other, &c., for this does not concern us as yet. Amongst this possible manifold, absolutely only *one* (a determined part of the manifold) is conformable to duty, and all others are opposed to duty. (Let me observe here, moreover, that the command of duty always lies within the sphere of the possible, for it lies within the sphere of what the original impulse, upon which the moral law is based, demands. The impossible is never duty; and duty is never impossible.)

Now which then is this One, demanded through duty? In the previous chapter we were referred for this one to an internal feeling, called conscience. Whatsoever conscience will confirm is always duty, and conscience can never err if we only attend to its voices. This, then, would be sufficient for our actual acting, and we need nothing more to make it possible. The popular teacher, for instance, need not go any further, and can close his moral teachings at this point.

But it is not sufficient for science. Either we must be able *à priori* to determine what conscience will confirm, or we must confess that a science of morality, as an applicable science, is impossible.

Let us look at the matter from another side. Feeling decides. This decision, doubtless, bases itself on a law, *grounded in reason*, which certainly cannot be an object of consciousness on the standpoint of common understanding, since in consciousness it is only manifested as a feeling; but which may, perhaps, be disseverable from the transcendental point of view. Mere popular teaching remains in the standpoint of common consciousness, and hence everything which takes place on the transcendental standpoint does not occur for it, but philosophical teaching is philosophical or scientific only in so far as it rises beyond the former.

Reason is throughout determined. Hence whatsoever lives in reason, and as a consequence the whole system of conscience, which manifests itself in feelings, must also be determined. In the course of our investigation we shall find still other external grounds for the necessity of such a law, reason, upon which the feelings of conscience are based. If we succeed in discovering this law, we shall have, at the same time, answered in advance of the immediate decision of conscience, the question: What is our duty?

C. We might give a preliminary answer which, although it is identical, and hence not decisive, may, nevertheless, be a guide to us in our investigation.

Namely: the final end of the Moral Law is absolute independence and self-sufficiency, not merely so far as our will is concerned, for the will is always independent, but so far as our whole being is concerned. Now this end is unattainable; true enough, but, at the same time, it can be steadily and uninterruptedly approached. Hence there must be possible from the first standpoint

of every individual a steady and uninterrupted series of acts, through which he can approach that end. Conscience can always approve only those acts which occur in this series. Let us figure this in the shape of a straight line. Only that which occurs as point in this line can be approved by conscience, and nothing else. Hence our question may also be framed thus: What are the acts which occur in the described series?

To promote insight into the general connection of our method. Our investigation connects here precisely with where we dropped it, at the end of the Second Book, *concerning the applicability* of the moral principle. We were unable to see, then, how it were possible *à priori* to determine our duty, and had no other criterion than the approval or disapproval of our conscience after the deed. We should always have been forced to run the risk, and could only have collected a few moral principles through long experience and after many mis-steps. The moral law, as a law determining the acts, as an essentially practical law, would have been almost utterly done away with, and would have been changed into a mere regulative principle of judgment. We, then, in the first chapter of the Third Book found such a criterion, it is true, namely, the feeling of conscience, and thus we secured the practical applicability of the moral law. But although sufficient for acting in life, this was not sufficient for science. At present the question is, whether there is still a higher principle, if not in consciousness, at least in philosophy; a highest uniting ground of these feelings of conscience. Our investigation has, therefore, evenly pursued its course, and we may hope that it will succeed in penetrating where hitherto we have been unable to pass.

D. What then are in their *substance* these acts which lie in the series of approach to absolute self-determination? This is our present problem. We have already shown

above, that these acts are such, through which we treat objects conformably to their purpose or end. We recapitulate in a few words. It is only in consequence of a determined limitation of the impulse, and in order to explain this limitedness, that a determined object is at all posited. If this impulse itself is posited as impulse (as a yearning or desiring) and related to the object, then we have that which the Ego would like to produce in the object, or what it would like to use it for; in short, we have the originally determined, and by no means arbitrarily to be posited, final end and aim of such object. But, according to our above remark, every arbitrary purpose is also an original end and aim; or clearer, I can, at least, execute no purpose which is not demanded by an original impulse. It is, however, quite well possible that I am conscious only of a part of my original impulse as directed upon an object; in which case I also comprehend only part of the purpose of the object; but if I comprehend my whole impulse in its relation to an object, then I also comprehend the whole purpose or the final end of such object.

E. Let it be well considered what this may mean; I am to comprehend the *totality* of my impulse. Every totality is completed, hence limited. Thus an original limitedness of the impulse is asserted.

Let it be noted, however, that it is a limitedness of an *impulse* and not of an actual causality (a power to realize) that we speak here. Thus the assertion signifies, that the impulse, as original impulse, cannot crave certain things at all.

What sort of a limitedness might this be? By no means one of the impulse in its *form*, for as such it craves, as we know, absolute self-sufficiency. But this absolute self-sufficiency is an end which lies in an infinity and can never be attained, hence the impulse in itself

cannot cease throughout all infinity. Where then can the limitedness be? It must evidently be a material limitedness; the impulse must not be able to crave certain things at all.

Now this limitedness is to be an original and necessary one; hence grounded in reason itself, and by no means accidental and empirical.

But there is no other limitedness of reason through itself than the one which results from the identical proposition, that reason is to be reason, that the Ego is to be Ego. Thus it would seem that the original limitedness of the impulse which is grounded in the Ego, is the limitedness which results from the Egohood itself; and the impulse is comprehended in its totality, wherever positively no limitedness thereof occurs beyond that which results from the Egohood itself.

There can be no impulse in the Ego to cease to be Ego, or to become non-Ego; for if there were, the impulse of the Ego would be to annihilate itself, which is contradictory. But again, every limitedness of the impulse, which does not result immediately from the Ego, is no original limitedness, but simply a limitedness which we have appended to ourselves through our imperfect reflection. We have contented ourselves with so much less than we can demand.

In short, the impulse, viewed in its totality, craves the absolute self-determination of an Ego as such. The conceptions of Egohood and of absolute self-determination are to be synthetically united, and through this synthesis we shall receive the material content of the moral law. I *shall* be a self-determined Ego; this is *my* final end and aim: and whatsoever external things promote this my self-sufficiency, to that use I am to put them: such is *their* final end and aim. We have thus opened to us an even way into our investigation. We have only to establish all the conditions of the Egohood as such, to relate them to the impulse of self-determination, and to

determine this impulse thereby. When we have achieved this, we shall have exhausted the content of the moral law.

We now proceed to do so.

I.

THE BODY AS CONDITION OF THE MORAL CAUSALITY OF THE EGO.

The reflecting Ego must find itself as Ego; must, as it were, be itself given to itself. In this respect we have shown above, that it finds itself with an impulse, which impulse, precisely because it is only found as given, and evinces no self-activity in this finding, is posited as natural impulse.

That which has been thus found, being the object of a reflection, is necessarily a private and limited quantum. If the natural impulse, which in itself is one, is separated through free reflection in the before-described manner, there arises a manifold of impulses, which, however, being finite, must necessarily be a closed system of manifold impulses. I cannot look upon these impulses or this impulse as *something foreign*, but must relate it to myself and place it as an accident in the same substance, which freely thinks and wills.

For although I must relate that impulse to myself, and posit it as *my* impulse, it yet, in a certain respect, remains objective to *me*, to me *as the truly free and self-sufficient Ego*. There results from the impulse a mere yearning, which I can or can not satisfy, as I choose, which, therefore, in so far as I am free, remains always outside of and under me; in short, there results from it for me as intelligence, only the knowledge that this determined yearning is in me. As power, as motive, etc., it remains foreign to me. Now if I determine myself through freedom to satisfy this yearning, it becomes *mine* in quite another significance. It is now mine in so far as I am

free, and have appropriated it through freedom; it is assigned to me not only *idealiter*, through theoretical cognition; but *realiter*, through self-determination. Even on the standpoint of common consciousness I regard myself as double, get into dispute with myself, enter into judgment with myself, etc.

In the latter case I posit myself, and am solely that as which I posit myself. This holds good to such an extent, that I do not truly appropriate as mine that which I find in me in the first-mentioned respect, but only that which I posit in me through self-determination. Even in common life we distinguish very clearly between that which belongs to our personality, and is not ours through our own freedom, as, for instance, birth, health, genius, etc., and that which we are through freedom; for instance, when the poet says: *genus, et proavi, et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea NOSTRA puto.*

Now that, which the original impulse demands, is always, when I determine myself to do it through freedom, to occur in experience. At present this case occurs. The natural impulse belongs to the original impulse. What will be the result, if I determine myself self-actively to satisfy it? By answering this question we shall make clearer the distinction just drawn.

The result of the natural impulse is a mere working of nature, the causality of which nature is precisely at an end in that impulse, which I posit as mine; but the result of my self-determination is in truth *my* working, is grounded in me as a free being. It will occur in experience, signifies: I feel it as a tendency in nature to exercise causality upon herself.

All my power and causality in nature is nothing but the causality of nature (in me) upon herself (outside of me).

Now my nature stands under the control of freedom, and nothing can result through it without the direction of the latter. In the plant, the nature of the plant

works immediately upon itself; but in me, nature can only affect herself by passing through the mediation of a voluntarily-produced conception. Previous to the self-determining, all that which, on the part of nature, is necessary to success has been given, it is true; but nature in this region is not in itself sufficient to produce a causality. That which, on the part of the subject, is necessary to success has *not* been given previous to the self-determining. The act of self-determining supplies this, and now all that which is necessary for a causality is complete. Self-determination furnishes to the power of my nature the requisite principle, namely, the first motive power, which nature lacks, and thus it is that the doing of nature now becomes *my doing*, as actual Ego, which has made itself to be that which it is.

This is the first and primary matter on which our argumentation is based. It will be necessary, however, to call attention to something else, which is already known and proven. In consequence of the reflection, all nature is posited necessarily as contained in and filling up space, hence, as matter. Now, since we have posited the system of our natural impulses as product and part of nature, we must necessarily posit it, likewise, as matter. It is thus that the system of our natural impulse becomes a material body. In this our body is contained, and concentrates itself, that working of nature, which, however, has no causality in itself. But it has causality immediately, in consequence of our will, and thus our will becomes immediate cause in our body. We only need to will, and that which we will results in the body. The body is immediately completely in our power, and need not first be subjected to our will like all other external nature. Nature has placed the body alone in our power, without any free co-operation of our own.

Our body has sensation, *i.e.*, the natural impulse concentrated in it is necessarily posited as ours and appropriated by us, and we may satisfy, or not satisfy it, as we

choose. From this alone arises, as we have shown, the whole system of our sensuous cognition. Again: the body is placed in motion immediately through the will, and has causality upon nature. Such a body, precisely such a one, is condition of Egohood, since it results simply from self-reflection, which alone makes the Ego to be an Ego.

We develop the further results. All possible acting is, in its substance, an acting demanded through the natural impulse. For all our acting occurs in nature, and is possible and becomes actual for us in nature, but all external nature exists for us only in consequence of the natural impulse. The natural impulse appeals to me only through my body, and is realized in the world outside of me only through the causality of my body. The body is instrument of all our perceptions, and hence, since all cognition is based on perception, of all our cognition; it is instrument, likewise, of all in causality. This *relation* is a condition of Egohood. The natural impulse is directed upon conservation, culture, and the general well-being or perfection of our body, as sure as it is an impulse and is directed upon itself, for this impulse is itself our body in its materialization. But the natural impulse goes no further, for nature cannot rise above itself. Nature's end is itself. *Our* nature has our nature for its final end and aim, but our nature is encircled in our body, and hence, *our*, as well as *all*, nature has only the body for its final end and aim.

My highest impulse is to have absolute self-dependence. This I can approach only through acting, but I can act only through my body. Hence, the satisfying of that impulse, or all morality, is conditioned through the preservation and highest perfection of the body. On the other hand, self-sufficiency, or morality, is to be the only consciously posited object of my acting. Hence, I must subordinate the former end to the latter, must preserve and cultivate my body solely as tool for moral acting and

not as end in itself. All care for my body must be induced solely by the purpose to make it a proper tool for morality, and to preserve it as such.

We thus receive here three material moral commands.

1. The first one is negative in its character: our body must never be located as end in itself, or must never become object of an enjoyment for the mere enjoyment's sake.

2. The second is a positive command: the body is to be cultivated as much as possible for all possible purposes of freedom. (To kill off sentiments and desires, or to dull our general powers, is absolutely against duty.)

3. The third a limitative command: all enjoyment which may not, with clearest conviction, be related to the development of our body for moral aims, is not permitted, and in violation of the moral law. It is absolutely immoral to take care of our body without the conviction that it is thus cultured and preserved for moral activity, or, in short, for conscience' sake. Eat and drink for the glory of God. If anyone thinks this morality to be austere and painful, we cannot help him, for there is no other.

By this established condition of Egohood the *causality* of the Ego, which the moral law requires, is conditioned. We make this remark to show the progress of the method. It will appear that there is a second condition of Egohood, namely, a condition of the *substantiality* of the subject of morality; and that there is a third condition, which requires a certain necessary *reciprocity* in this subject; and thus we shall complete the *external* proof that all the conditions of Egohood have been exhausted. The *internal* proof appears from the *systematic connection* of what is to be established.

II.

THE INTELLIGENCE AS CONDITION OF THE MORAL
SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE EGO.

The Ego must find itself as Ego: such was the assertion, from which our last investigation took its starting-point. The present one starts from the same statement, but with this distinction, that, whereas, in the former we considered the passivity of the Ego in that reflection of itself, or the object of the reflection, we now view the activity of the Ego in it, or the subject of the reflection. An Ego must have a power of reflection, in order to reproduce the given internally through freedom in a conception. The activity of the Ego, in this respect, we have called ideal activity. It is at once clear that this activity is a condition of Egohood. The Ego is necessarily intelligence.

How is the impulse to be self-determined, or the moral law related, to this condition of Egohood?

The moral law appeals to the intelligence as such. Consciously, and with mature reflection, am I to approach self-determination. A moral law exists only in so far as I am intelligence, in so far as I adopt it as my law, and make it the rule of my action. The intelligence, therefore, conditions the whole being, the substantiality, of the moral law; and not merely, like the body, the causality thereof. Only when, and in so far as I am intelligence, is there a moral law: the latter extends no further than the former, and the former is the vehicle of the latter. Hence, a material subordination of the intelligence to the moral law (such as of the natural impulse to the moral law), is not possible. I must not wish not to know something, for fear it might be against my duty; as I, certainly, must not give way to many inclinations or lusts of the body, from the same fear.

Self-determinedness (morality) is our highest purpose.

Theoretical cognition is, therefore, to be *formaliter* subordinated to duty. That is to say, the final end and aim of all my cognition, of all my thinking and investigating, must be cognition of my duty.

From this result the following three moral laws:

1. The first one, negative: Never subordinate your theoretical reason as such, but investigate with absolute freedom, and without regard to anything outside of your cognition. (Do not, in advance, resolve upon an end which you would like to arrive at in theory; for where could you get this end?)

2. The second, positive: Cultivate your power of cognition as much as you can; learn, think, and investigate as much as you possibly can.

3. The third, limitation: Relate all your thinking *formaliter* to your duty. In all your thinking be clearly conscious of this purpose. Investigate from duty, and not from mere curiosity or in order to employ your mind. Do not regulate your thoughts so as to find this or that to be your duty—for how could you recognize your duty in advance of your cognition?—but always merely with the view of recognizing *what* your duty is.

III.

INDIVIDUALITY AS CONDITION OF THE EGOHOOD.

In our *Science of Rights* the proof has already been established that the Ego can only posit itself as individual. Hence, the consciousness of individuality is a condition of Egohood. But, inasmuch as the science of morality is higher than any other particular philosophical science, we must here establish that proof from a higher principle.

A. Whatsoever is object of a reflection is necessarily limited, and becomes limited by merely being such object. The Ego is to become object of a reflection. Hence, it is

necessarily limited. Now, the Ego is characterized through a free activity as such, and hence, the free activity must also be limited. Free activity is limited signifies: a quantum, thereof, is opposed to free activity in general, and, in so far, to other free activity. In short, the Ego cannot, by any manner of means, ascribe free activity to itself without this free activity being a quantum, and hence, without, at the same time and immediately together with that thinking, positing another free activity which, in so far, does not belong to it.

B. This would of itself lead to no result respecting individuality, since it is very possible that the Ego may posit that free activity outside of its own, through mere *ideal* activity, as a purely *possible* activity; as, indeed, very often happens in actual consciousness. Whenever I ascribe an act to *myself* I *thereby* deny that act to all other free beings, which are, however, not determined, but merely possible free beings.

C. But the following is decisive: Originally, I cannot determine myself through free ideal activity, but must *find* myself as determined object; and, since I am Ego only in so far as I am free, I must *find* myself free, must be given to myself as free: curious as this may appear at first. For I can posit something as *possible* only in opposition to something already known to me as *actual*. All mere possibility is based upon abstraction from known actuality. All consciousness proceeds from an actuality — this is an important proposition of a real philosophy; and hence, likewise, the consciousness of freedom.

We add the following to promote insight into our method and conviction: I find myself as object, signified above; I find myself as natural impulse, as product and part of nature. That I must reflect, or must be intelligence in order to find this, is understood; but this

reflection, when it occurs, does not enter consciousness; in fact, it does not enter consciousness at all without a new reflection directed upon it. Now I am to ascribe that natural impulse to *myself*, nay, as we have seen in § I., I am to posit it, as something which, although it appertains to me, yet does not constitute essentially *myself*. Which, then, is this *I* to whom I am to ascribe the natural impulse? The substantial, true Ego. Not the intelligence as such, as we have just shown, but rather the *free, active* Ego. As sure, therefore, as I am to find myself as natural product, I must also find myself as free active, for otherwise the first finding is not possible. The former is determined through the latter. I am to find myself generally, and hence I must also find myself as free active. What may this signify, and how is it possible?

Firstly, the real, true self-determination through spontaneity I cannot find as given to me; I must give it to myself. I can, therefore, find a certain self-determination only through ideal activity; through reproducing one which exists already independently of me. But my self-determination exists without my co-operation signifies: it exists as a *conception*; or, in short: an appeal is addressed to me to determine myself. As sure as I understand this appeal, I also think my self-determination as something given in that appeal, and thus am given to myself as free in the conception of that appeal.

As sure as I comprehend this appeal, I ascribe to myself a determined sphere for my freedom; no matter whether I use and fill it up or not. If I do not comprehend it, then there arises no consciousness; I do not find myself as yet, but will find myself at another time perhaps, although all the conditions of my finding myself exist already. For since I am free, even the existence of all the conditions of my finding myself as free, cannot compel me thus to find myself in

reflection; to make this reflection absolute spontaneity on my part is requisite. On the other hand, unless all these conditions were given, it could not make the reflection in spite of all spontaneity.

D. This requirement, or appeal, addressed to me to be self-active, I cannot comprehend without ascribing it to an actual being outside of me, which intended to communicate to me such a conception; and which is therefore capable of a conception of the conception. But such a being is a rational being, a being positing itself as Ego, hence an Ego. (This furnishes the only sufficient ground for concluding the existence of a rational cause outside of us; and such ground is not furnished merely by the comprehension of the influence exerted upon us, for that comprehension is always possible. [See *Science of Rights*.] It is a condition of self-consciousness, of Egohood, to assume an actual rational being outside of myself.)

This rational being I opposit to myself, and myself to it; that is to say, I posit myself as individual in relation to it, and it an individual in relation to me. Hence it is condition of Egohood to posit itself as individual.

E. Hence it may be strictly *à priori* proven that a rational being does not become rational in an isolated condition, but that at least *one* other individual outside of it must be assumed, through which it might elevate itself to freedom. But further influences, and more than *one* other individual, cannot be thus proven, as we shall soon see more closely.

From what we have here deduced, however, there follows already a limitation of the impulse to be self-determined, and hence a further determination of morality, which we shall state at once. Namely, my Egohood and self-sufficiency generally is conditioned

through the freedom of the other individual; hence my *craving after self-determination* cannot possibly have for its object to annihilate the *condition of its own possibility*; namely, the freedom of the other. Now I am absolutely only to act in obedience to this impulse of self-determination, and in obedience to no other impulse. Hence the present limitation of this impulse involves the absolute prohibition to disturb the freedom of the other; and the absolute command to consider the other as self-sufficient, and never to use him as means. (The natural impulse was subordinated to the self-determining impulse. The theoretical power is not subordinated to it *materialiter*; but neither is it to the theoretical power. But it is subordinate to the freedom of the other. I must not be self-determined at the expense of the freedom of others.)

F. Through my positing even but this *one* other individual outside of me, some of all my possible free acts have become impossible for me; namely, all those which condition the freedom ascribed by me to the other. But even in the progress of acting I must always choose some from all that which is possible to me, in consequence of my freedom. Now, according to our presupposition, that which I do not choose, which my freedom excludes from my actions, is taken possession of not through actual, but at least through possible, individuals; and under this presupposition I *determine my individuality still further* through each act.

(An important conception, concerning which I explain myself still clearer, since it removes a very great difficulty in the doctrine of freedom.)

Who am I, in truth? That is to say, what individual am I? And what is the ground, why I am *this* individual and none other? I reply: From the moment that I have arrived at consciousness *I am that individual*

which I make myself to be with freedom, and I am it because I make myself it.

At each moment of my existence my being is—if not in its conditions, at least in its *final* determination—a being through freedom. Through this being again is limited the possibility of my being in the future moment (that is to say, being *such* in the present moment, I cannot be certain things in the future moment); but which amongst all still *possible* things in the future I choose to be, depends again upon my freedom. But all this determines my individuality; all this makes me *materialiter* the one who I am.

But it is only under the present presupposition that there is only *one* individual outside of me, and that only one *free* influence is directed upon me, that the *first* condition, which might be called the root of my individuality, is not determined through my freedom, but through my connection with another rational being; whereas all following conditions depend absolutely upon my freedom. In each future moment I must select amongst many acts, but there is no external ground why I should not select every other amongst all possible acts.

G. But there may be *many* individuals outside of me that influence me. *À priori*, as we have seen, we cannot prove that this *must* be so; but we, at least, owe the proof that it *can* be so.

The essence of freedom itself compels me, as we have seen, to limit myself in each free act, and hence to leave to other possible free beings the possibility also to act free. Nothing prevents these free beings from actually existing. They can exist, so it appears at least at present, without detriment to my freedom, which must, as we have seen, be anyhow limited.

But can they have actual existence *for me*, *i.e.*, can I perceive them as actually existing, and how? This

question might be easily answered, according to the above principles, as follows: they can influence me as free beings influence free beings, by requiring me to be freely active.

But it is not at all necessary that they should immediately influence me. They may merely influence nature, and yet I will be able to conclude from the manner of the influence as to the existence of a rational being, *now that I have the conception of actual rational beings outside of me.* Originally this conclusion would have been impossible for me. The mode of influencing nature here mentioned, is that mode through which a work of art is produced. Such a work evinces a conception of a conception, which we have shown to be the criterion of reason. For the end and aim of the product of art lies not, as in the product of nature, in itself, but outside of itself. It is always tool, or means for an end. Its conception is something which is not involved in the mere contemplation, but can only be thought: hence a *mere* conception. But whosoever produced the work of art, necessarily thought the conception he intended to represent; hence he had necessarily a conception of a conception. As sure as I recognize something to be a product of art, I necessarily posit an actually existing rational being as its originator. It is not thus with a product of nature. True, there is a conception; but you cannot show up a conception of a conception, unless, perhaps, you presuppose it in a world creator.

I have said "as sure as I recognize it as a product of art." But this itself is only possible on condition that I think already a reason outside of me; and this latter assumption does not proceed from the perception of product of art—which would be a circle of explanation—but from the above described requirement or appeal to free activity.

It is thus on the standpoint of common consciousness,

upon which perception in us is explained through the existence of things outside of us. But that which is assumed on the standpoint of common consciousness must itself be explained from the transcendental point of view; on which it is not permitted to proceed from the assumption of anything external, but on which that which is said to be external to us must first be explained from something in ourselves. Hence the higher question is to be answered: how do we come to assume products of art outside of us?

Whatsoever is held to be outside of us, is posited through a limitation of the impulse. It is the same with the art-product, in-so far as it is object. But whence comes the particular determination of it, that it is posited as art-product? This leads us to infer a special, peculiar limitation of the impulse. Let me say it concisely: through the object in general our being is limited; or better: from the limitation of our *being* we assume an object in general; but the impulse may desire a modification of the object. In the present instance, however, there is not merely a limitation of our *being*, but also of our *becoming*; we feel our acting repelled internally; there is even a limitation of our desire to act, and hence we assume *freedom* outside of us. (Mr. Schelling expresses this excellently in the *Philosophical Journal*, vol. iv. page 281: "Wherever my moral power finds resistance, there cannot be mere *nature*. Shudderingly I stop. 'Here is *man!*' speaks a voice to me. I *must* not go further.")

This can happen, as we have seen. If it does happen, I am still further limited than through mere Egoism; for it was not involved in the conception of Egoism, as we have seen. If it does happen, I am no longer a mere rational being in general, which I could be if there existed only one other individual outside of me, and if he had only uttered himself *once* in relation to me; but I am a *particular* rational being. It is this particular limited-

ness which cannot be *à priori* deduced from the general limitedness, since in that case it were not a particular one. Upon it is based the purely *empirical*, which in its possibility, however, must also be grounded *à priori*. Nevertheless this limitedness is an original one. Let it not be supposed, therefore, that it originates in time. How, nevertheless, in a certain respect, it does arise in time, we shall immediately see.

The result of the above proposition is this: Individuality may also in its progress be determined through something else than freedom, namely, through original limitedness, which, however, cannot be deduced, but being a particular limitedness is in this respect *accidental* for us on the standpoint of experience.

It *may* be thus: With this, philosophy must content itself; and in treating a science which is influenced by this presupposition, philosophy must always establish the results derived from it as *conditioned* propositions. Such a science is the science of morality, and hence the material part of this science contains something conditioned. If we give up our claim to pure philosophy, and place ourselves on the standpoint of facts, we can, of course, say: it *is* so. For instance, I can and must not be and become everything, since there are others who are also free. But on the standpoint of pure philosophy, this and others always remain *conditioned* propositions.

Originally I am limited not merely *formaliter* through the Egohood, but likewise *materialiter* through something which does not necessarily belong to Egohood. There are certain points beyond which I am not to go even with my freedom, and this *non-shalling* evinces itself in me immediately. I explain these points to me through the existence of other free beings and their free effects in my sensuous world.

H. But this theory seems to have enveloped us in a contradiction, and led us to very dangerous results. I will enter upon their discussion, partly to promote clearness, and partly because it decides a difficult philosophical dispute, and places the doctrine of freedom, which is all-important in a science of morality, in the complete light.

The free acts of others are originally to lie within me as the limitative points of my individuality. They are, therefore, to make use of this popular expression, predestined from all eternity, and are not determined in time. But does not this cancel my freedom? By no means, if it is not at the same time predestined how I shall react upon those free acts; and the freedom of choice amongst all possible acts remains always mine, as we have fully established. But let us rise to a higher point. The other beings in the sensuous world, upon whom *I* act, are also rational beings, and the perception of *my* influence upon them is predestined *for them*, as *for me* the perception of *their* influence upon me is predestined. For me, *my* acts are not predetermined, I perceiving them as the result of my absolute self-determination, but for all others, who live together with me, they are predetermined, and, in like manner, do their acts appear to them self-determined, and to me predetermined. Hence, my free actions are certainly predestined. But how can freedom co-exist with this?

The matter stands thus: predetermination cannot be dropped, for if we drop it, the reciprocal relation of rational beings, and hence, those rational beings themselves, remain inexplicable; but neither can we abandon freedom, for if we do, free or rational beings cease to be.

The solution is not difficult. *For me* (I shall say so at present, in order to be but able to express myself, although an important remark will have to be made respecting it), *for me*, all the influences of free beings are *à priori* deter-

mined. But let us recollect what *à priori* signifies. *À priori* is no time and no succession, no *one after another*, but everything *simultaneously* (an improper but necessary expression). Hence, it is not at all determined how I cause the events to follow each other in time, how I connect this series with that other determined individual series, &c. *What* I am to experience in my life is determined, but not *from whom*. The others outside of me remain free.

In the same manner, it is certainly determined for others what influences of other free beings are to be directed upon them, and hence, likewise, those influences which *I* have exerted upon them were predetermined; but it was not predestined, by any means, that *I*, the individual which had these and those original determinations, should exercise these influences. If another one exerted them before I did, I did not exert them, and if I did not exert them, perhaps another one exerted them after me, or if they exerted it in their own freedom, to be that which I am, no one exerted such influence upon them. Who am I then, after all? We repeat again: I am only that which I make myself to be. I have now acted so or so far, and hence, I am the individual to whom appertain the acts *a, b, c, &c.* From *c*, again, an infinity of predestined acts stretch out before me, from which I can choose. The possibility and reality of all these acts is predestined, but, by no means, that precisely the one which I now choose should follow the series *a, b, c*, which constitutes now my individuality, and so on *ad infinitum*. There are first determined points of individuality, and from each of these there stretch out an infinity, and it depends altogether upon its own freedom which of all the still possible individuals it becomes.

My assertion, therefore, is this: all free acts are predestined from all eternity, *i.e.*, outside of all time, through reason, and each free individual is placed in harmony with

these acts in respect to perception. For the totality of reason there extends an infinite manifold of freedom and perception, and all individuals share in it, as it were. But the succession and content of time is not predestined, from the sufficient reason that time is not something eternal and pure, but merely a form of the contemplation of finite beings, namely, the time in which something is to occur; neither are the actors predestined. And thus, by a little attention, the apparently unanswerable question has dissolved of its own accord: predetermination and freedom are completely united.

The difficulties which might still seem to linger here are based on the fundamental defect of dogmatism, which makes all being primary and original, and hence, separates being and acting—if it does recognize acting at all—altogether from each other, giving to an individual his whole being independently of his acting. By this procedure, if one thinks determinedly enough, all freedom and all real acting are certainly cancelled. No man in the world can *act* otherwise than he does act, although, perhaps, he acts badly, being the man he *is*. There is nothing truer than this proposition, which is, in fact, merely an identical proposition. But he ought not to be this man, and could be quite another man; nay, *there ought not to be such a man in the world at all*.

Nevertheless, it is said: that a person is such a person as it is even before it is born, that its relations and fate, from the day of its birth to its death, are predestined, only not its actions. But what is our fate, and what are our relations in life, otherwise than the objective view of our acting? If our actions depend upon our freedom, surely so does our fate. I am only what I act. Now, if I think myself in time, I am, in a certain respect, not determined until I have acted in this respect. True, he who cannot cure himself of the fundamental evil of dogmatism cannot see into the theory of freedom.

CHAPTER III.

ABSOLUTE HARMONY OF ALL RATIONAL BEINGS AS CONDITION OF MORALITY.

I.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY, our final end and aim, consists, as we have often said, in this, that everything is dependent upon me, and I not dependent upon anything; that in my whole sensuous world that which I will happens simply because I will it, precisely as is the case in my body, the beginning point of my absolute causality. The world must *become* for me, what my body *is*. True, this object is unattainable, but I shall always endeavour to approach it, and hence shall always treat everything in the sensuous world, so as to make it a means for this final end and aim. This approaching is my real end.

It is no hindrance to my freedom, that I was set down upon a certain point by nature, and that nature thus, as it were, took the first step for me on this my way into infinity. Nor does it interfere with my freedom, that at the very commencement there was given to me a sphere for my possible path of freedom through another rational being outside of me; for only thus do I attain freedom, and before I have freedom my freedom cannot be interfered with. Nor does it hinder my freedom, if I am forced to assume still other free and rational beings outside of me, for their freedom and rationality, as such, is not an object of perception, which might limit me, but is altogether a spiritual conception. Finally it is no

curtailing of my freedom, if I must choose amongst many possible acts; for such a choice is the condition of the consciousness of my freedom, and hence conditions that freedom itself. Moreover, the matter of the choice is always under my control, because all possible free modes of acting are under my control; and even if other free beings should then choose amongst those possible acts which I did not choose, this would not limit my self-sufficiency. They would not limit *me* thereby, but *I* them.

If, however, in accordance with our last presupposition, and with general experience, that which falls within my path and into the world of my experience should already be modified through free beings outside of me; in that case my freedom is certainly checked, if I may no longer modify this object myself according to my purpose; and we have seen that the moral law absolutely forbids my doing so. I am not to disturb the freedom of rational beings. But if I change the products of their freedom I disturb their freedom itself; for those products are to them means for other purposes, and if I take away from them these means they cannot continue their causality in accordance with their first purpose.

Here we therefore seem to have hit upon a contradiction of the impulse of self-determination, and hence of the moral law with itself. The moral law requires (1) that I should subject whatsoever limits; or, which is the same, whatsoever lies in my sensual world, to my absolute end and aim; that I should make it a means to draw nearer to absolute self-sufficiency.

(2) That I should not subject certain things, which limit me, or which are in my sensuous world, to my absolute end-purpose, but should leave them as I find them.

Both are immediate commands of the moral law; the first, when we consider this law generally; and the second, when we consider it in a particular manifestation.

II.

The contradiction can be solved, and the harmony of the moral law with itself can be restored only, if we presuppose *that all free beings have necessarily the same final end and aim*. If this is so, then the end of the one individual is at the same time the end of the other; and the liberation of one from dependence the liberation of all others. Is this so? Since everything—particularly everything to us, namely, the peculiar characteristic of our science of morality—depends upon the answering of this question, we shall discuss it more thoroughly.

The impulse to be self-sufficient is an impulse of Egohood, and has only Egohood for its end; the Ego alone is to be the subject of self-sufficiency. Now it is certainly, as we have seen, involved in Egohood, that each Ego should be an individual, but only an individual in general, and not this particular individual A, B, C, &c. Since all the determinations, except the original and first one of our individuality, depend upon our freedom, as we have seen that A, B, &c., can only signify to me the original limitation of freedom; or, what we have called above, the root of all individuality. Hence since it is accidental to the Egohood in general, that *I*, the individual A, am precisely this A, and since the impulse of self-sufficiency is to be an impulse of the Egohood in general, *as such*, this impulse certainly does not crave the self-sufficiency of the particular individual A, but of reason in general. The self-sufficiency of reason as such, is our ultimate purpose; and hence not the self-sufficiency of our reason, in so far as it is an individual reason.

But I, this A, *am* so far as I am concerned, only in so far as I am A. Hence A is my empirical self; and only it becomes conscious of that impulse and that law of consciousness. Only through A can I work in obedience to the moral law, since I can only work through A at all.

A is for me, the exclusive condition of the causality of this moral impulse. In one word, A is not *object*, but A is for me the only *tool* and *vehicle* of the moral law. At first only the body was such tool, but now it is the *whole sensuous empirically determined man*; and thus we have here for once separated the empirical and the pure Ego in the strictest manner, which is very important for all philosophy, and particularly for the science of morals.

If the impulse of self-sufficiency craves the self-sufficiency of reason in general, and if this self-sufficiency can only be represented *in* the individuals A, B, C, &c., and *through* them; then it is necessarily altogether indifferent to me, whether A, or B, or C represents it; for, since all belong equally to the one undivided empire of reason, it is always reason in general which is represented, and hence my impulse is always satisfied. I desire morality in general *within* or outside of me; this is all the same. I desire it of myself only, in so far as it appertains to me and of others in so far as it belongs to them; my end is attained equally in the one or the other manner.

My end is attained, if the other acts *morally*. But he is free, and through freedom may also act immorally. In the latter case my end is not attained. Have I not then the right and the obligation to destroy the effect of his freedom? I do not appeal to the above negative proposition, but deduce it here anew and thoroughly, since this is the proper place for doing so. Reason is to be self-sufficient, but reason appeals with this demand to the determined individual B, C, &c., and there is no such demand at all, nor any (material) self-sufficiency in fact, except by means of the formal freedom of all individuals. Hence the latter is exclusive condition of all causality of reason in general. If it is cancelled, *all* causality, and hence also the causality to be self-sufficient, is cancelled. Hence everyone who wills the latter must also will the

former. Freedom is absolute condition of all morality, and without it no morality is at all possible. Thus the absolute prohibition of the moral law becomes confirmed, that the freedom of the free being must under no condition, and under no pretext, be disturbed or cancelled. But this leaves the contradiction unsolved, and we can say also: I desire, and can only desire, that the other should be free, on condition that he uses his *freedom* to promote the end of reason, and otherwise I cannot desire him free at all. In other words, while the freedom of the other must on no account be disturbed, I must absolutely desire to cancel any use made of freedom to cancel the moral law, and unless I do so desire, the wish that the moral law should reign supreme, is not controlling me.

Here likewise there arises the further question: What exercise of freedom is in violation of the moral law, and who can be the universally valid judge thereof? If *the other* asserts that he has acted in accordance with his best conviction, whilst *I* act under the same circumstances differently, *he* is as convinced that *I* act immorally, as I am convinced that he acts immorally. Whose conviction is now to be the rule? Neither, so long as both are in dispute, for each is to act solely according to *his* conviction, and therein consists the *formal* condition of all morality. Can we then separate, and allow each the other to pursue his own course? Absolutely not, unless we criminally renounce all our interest for universal morality and the supreme rule of reason. Hence we must endeavour to make our judgment agree. Of course, so long as each one acts at all conscientiously, each one will presuppose that *his own* opinion is the correct one, for otherwise he must have acted immorally in following it, and hence each one will endeavour to convince the other, and not to be convinced by the other. But in doing this, since all reason is the same, they must finally after all arrive at the same result; and until then it is the

absolute duty of each to respect the eternal freedom of the other. Each can and must only desire to determine the conviction of the other, but not to physically influence him. The first mode is the only permitted way by which free beings may exercise compulsion upon free beings.

We shall examine this matter more carefully.

III.

A. The final moral end of each rational being is, as we have seen, the self-sufficiency of reason in general, and hence the morality of all rational beings. We must all act in the same manner. Hence Kant's proposition: "Act in such a manner, that the maxim of your will can be thought by you as the principle of a universal legislation." Still the following is to be observed in regard to Kant's standpoint: Kant speaks only of the *idea* of a harmony, but not of a *real*, actual harmony. We shall show, on our part, that this idea has real use, that we must try to realize it, and must in part act as if it were realized. Moreover, in Kant's shape, the proposition is merely *heuristic*, *i.e.*, I can use it very well for the purpose of examining whether I have erred in judging my duty; but on no account is it *constitutive*. It is, in fact, not a principle which Kant enunciates, but merely the result of a true principle, namely, of the absolute self-sufficiency of reason. The inference does not stand in Kant: because something can be principle of a universal legislation, therefore it ought to be maxim of my will; but the very contrary, namely, because something is to be a maxim of my will, therefore it can also be the principle of a universal legislation. The judgment proceeds from *me*, as is indeed clear in Kant's proposition; for who judges whether something can be principle of a universal legislation? Doubtless I myself. But according to what principles do I form this judgment? Undoubtedly accord-

ing to those which my own reason holds. Kant's proposition has, however, a heuristic use, namely, a proposition, which results in an absurdity, is false. Now it is absurd that I, X, ought to do that, which I cannot think that all others ought likewise to do under the same circumstances; and hence, if I cannot think this, I, X, ought certainly not to do it either, and have most certainly made a mistake in concluding that I ought to do it.

B. Each one is to produce absolute harmony with himself in all others outside of him, for only on condition of this harmony is he himself free and independent. First of all, therefore, each one *shall* live in a community, for otherwise he cannot produce harmony with himself, as is absolutely commanded. Whosoever separates himself from mankind, renounces his final end and aim, and holds the extension of morality to be utterly indifferent. Whosoever wants to take care only of himself, even in a moral respect, does not even take care of himself, for his end ought to be to take care of all mankind. His virtue is no virtue, but only perhaps a slavish merit-seeking egotism. It is not made our duty to seek or create ourselves society; he, who was born in a desert, might perhaps remain there; but everyone who becomes acquainted with others is, through that very acquaintance, morally obliged to take care of them also. He becomes our neighbour, and belongs to our world of reason, as the objects of our experience belong to our world of sense. Without becoming unconscientious we cannot abandon him. This does away at once with the opinion, which manifests itself amongst us yet in various ways, that the life of a recluse, a living apart from men, and indulgence in mere sublime thoughts and speculation, is enough for the requirement of duty, nay, is a more meritorious fulfilling of one's duty. Such conduct by no means satisfies duty. It is only through acting, and not through

speculating, only through acting in and for society, that we fulfil duty.

It likewise follows, that each one will only aim to convince the other, and not to allow himself to be convinced. This is in the nature of the case. He must be certain in himself, or he would be unconscientious in not only acting himself according to his uncertain principles, but also trying to persuade others to do so.

C. This final end and aim is not the exclusive characteristic of an individual, but is common to all. Each one *shall* have this same end, and it is the duty of each, as sure as he desires to promote universal moral culture, to induce each other one to make this his end. This unites men; each only tries to convince the other of his opinion, and yet becomes himself, perhaps, convinced in this dispute. Each one must be ready to open himself to this reciprocal influence. Whosoever flies from it, perhaps lest he should be disturbed in his belief, betrays a want of self-conviction, which ought absolutely to have no existence; and which makes it, therefore, all the more his duty to enter into such discussion in order to attain this conviction.

This reciprocity amongst all rational beings for the purpose of producing common practical convictions, is only possible in so far as all start from common principles, such as necessarily exist in order to connect their further convictions to these principles. Such a reciprocity, which each one is bound to enter, is called a *Church*, an ethical commonwealth; and that about which they all agree, is called their *symbol*. Each one ought to be member of the Church. But the *symbol* must, unless the Church community is to be utterly fruitless, be constantly changed; for that, concerning which all agree, will necessarily increase as the minds continue to influence each other more and more. (The symbols of some

Churches seem rather to contain that, concerning which all are at variance, and what not a single one believes in his heart, because not a single one can even think it.)

D. The agreeing of all in the same practical convictions, and the uniformity of action resulting therefrom, is therefore the necessary end of all virtuous men.

We shall closely examine this important point, which is characteristic of our science, and which is doubtless exposed to many doubts.

The Moral Law in me, as individual, has not me alone, but *universal reason* for its object. It has me for its object solely in so far as I am one of the tools of its realization in the sensuous world. Hence all that it requires of me, as individual, and for which it holds me responsible, is that I shall become a fit tool. Concerning this culture of myself I am, therefore, referred solely to my own private convictions, and not to the common conviction. As individual, and as tool in relation to the Moral Law, I am possessed of a body and of understanding, I alone am responsible for their culture. The development of my understanding depends altogether upon my own conviction. I have absolute freedom of thinking. I must not deem it unconscientious, nor must the Church tell me it is unconscientious, to doubt everything, however holy it may appear, and to investigate it further. This investigation is absolute duty; and it is a violation of duty to leave matters of this kind undecided. In regard to my body, I have absolute freedom to nourish, cultivate, and take care of it, as I may hope, according to my conviction, best to preserve it, keep it healthy, and make it a useful and good tool. It is not duty to act in this matter as others do; nay, it is immoral to let the preservation of my body depend upon the opinions of others without conviction of my own.

That which is outside of my body, and hence the whole sensuous world, is common to all rational beings, and the cultivation thereof according to the dictates of reason, is not only assigned to me, but to *all* rational beings. I am not alone responsible for it, and in taking part in this cultivation must not proceed according to my private conviction, for I cannot influence this sensuous world without influencing other rational beings, and hence without infringing upon their freedom, if my influence does not suit their own will. That, which affects all, I positively must not do without the consent of all, and hence in accordance with principles which all have approved, and which are conformable to their common conviction. But from this it would seem to follow, that if such a common conviction and harmony of all, concerning the manner in which each may influence the sensuous world, is impossible, all acting is impossible, which is contradictory to the Moral Law. Still it is also against that Law to act otherwise than according to such universal harmony. Hence it must be an absolute command of the Moral Law to produce such a harmony. This agreement of all men, as to how each one may influence the other, that is to say, the agreement of all concerning their *common rights* in the sensuous world, is called the *State Constitution*, and the community of men which have established such an agreement, is called the State. It is absolute moral duty to unite with others into a State. Whosoever refuses to do so, is not to be tolerated at all in society, because no one can conscientiously enter into relation with him; he having refused to declare his will and his rights, is thus always exposing others to the risk of treating him against his will and his rights.

Since men, therefore, cannot act before a State is erected, and it, nevertheless, being difficult to obtain the express agreement of all, or of only a considerable portion, to a constitution; the more cultured man is

forced to take the *silence* of others to certain measures, and their submission to the same, for acquiescence. Nay, there will probably be at first many imperfections in the distribution of rights, since some will not give their consent to a system of order unless they obtain great advantages, while others will submit to all. In this manner arises, and has arisen, the compulsory need-state as the first condition of gradual progress to a legal and rational state. It is duty to submit unconditionally to the laws of one's State, for these laws contain the presumptive common will, in violation of which no one has a right to influence the other. Each one attains moral permission to influence others only through their consent as expressed in the laws of a State.

It is immoral to overthrow the State unless I am firmly convinced that the whole people desires such an overthrow, which can only be the case under circumstances we shall hereafter develop; immoral to do so, even if I am convinced of the illegality and irrationality of the greatest number of its institutions, for in this matter I do not influence myself alone, but the whole commonwealth. My conviction, concerning the illegality of the constitution, is, perhaps, very correct in itself, *i.e.*, for pure reason, if we could obtain her in visible shape. Nevertheless, it is only my private conviction, but I must not act in matters relating to the whole commonwealth, according to my private conviction, as has been shown above.

There is a contradiction here. I am inwardly convinced that the constitution is a violation of right and justice, and yet I help to maintain it, if only by my acquiescence. Nay, perhaps I even hold an office under this unrighteous constitution. Ought I not, at least, to resign the latter? On the contrary, I ought to hold it and must not withdraw from the State, for it is better that the wise and just should govern than the unwise and unjust. What Plato says about it is not correct; nay, contradictory. I am not allowed to withdraw from my country. Some

one says: "But I, at least, will commit no injustice!" But this is a selfish spirit. Will you then let others commit it? If you see that wrong-doings occur, you ought to prevent them.

"*But in that case I act against my better conviction.*" But is it not likewise your *correct and moral conviction* that in matters of common concern you should act only in conformity to the common will? Hence, it is no injustice at all to treat another as he has expressed his will to be treated in the law; and you only act according to your conviction, if you so treat him. You ask how may this contradiction be reconciled? Easily enough, if we will only look at the different kinds of conviction spoken of in both cases. You speak of the conviction of *what shall be*, of a condition to be produced; whereas I speak of the conviction of an *actuality* to which I belong myself as member of the State. Both must be united, and can easily be united. I must regard the present condition of our need-state as a means to produce the rational state, and must always act only with this view. I must not take my measures so as to let things remain as they are, but rather so as to let them get better. An acting in the State, which has not this object in view, may be *materialiter* legal enough, namely, in so far as it nevertheless promotes that object; but *formaliter* it is *immoral*. But an acting, which has the opposite object in view, is certainly both *materialiter* and *formaliter*, evil and unconscientious. If some men have, for a certain length of time, acted in accordance with these principles, it may well happen that the common will becomes utterly opposed to the government of the State, and whenever this takes place, the longer continuation of that government becomes illegal tyranny and oppression. The need-state tumbles down of itself, and a rational form of government takes its place. Each honest man, *who has but convinced himself of the common will*, may then quietly take it upon his conscience to completely overthrow it.

(I append here a remark : Some men—I will not call them unconscientious, for this they must determine in their own conscience, but, at least, very stupid men—have, of late, raised a terrible cry, as if the belief in an unmeasured perfectibility were something very dangerous, very irrational, and the source of God only knows what wickedness. Let us set our investigation in the proper point of view, so as to put for ever a stop to this idle talk. Let us observe firstly, that it is not at all the next question, whether, from merely theoretical reasons, we must decide for or against this perfectibility. We may put this question altogether aside. The infinitely extending moral law commands absolutely to treat men *as if they* were, and always remained, capable of perfection, and positively prohibits treating them in a different manner.

We cannot obey this command unless we believe in perfectibility. Hence it is one of the first articles of faith, which we cannot doubt even without renouncing our whole moral nature. Hence, if it could be proven that the human race, from the beginning of the world to the present day, has never progressed, but always retrogressed; nay, even if, from the *natural* disposition of men, the mechanical law could be shown that they must necessarily retrograde (which is certainly far more than ever can be shown), we still ought not and could not give up that faith implanted ineradicably within us. Nor is there any contradiction in this, for this faith is based not upon *natural disposition*, but upon *freedom*. What sort of people must there be, therefore, who would make us believe that it is foolishness to hold a faith which the moral law absolutely commands? But this is certainly true, that nothing is more dangerous to the tyranny of despots and priests, and more calculated to shake their empire to its very foundations, than this faith. The only plausible reason which this tyranny can assign, and which it does not tire to plead, is that men can not be treated otherwise than it treats them; that men

are as they are and must ever so remain, and that their whole position, therefore, must always remain as it is.

E. We repeat: all, necessarily, as sure as their destination is dear to them, are desirous to infuse their convictions into all others, and the union of all for this purpose is called the *Church*. Mutual conviction, however, is possible only if the disagreeing parties proceed from something wherein they agree; for, otherwise, both neither understand nor influence each other. Both remain isolated, each one speaking his part to himself without the other hearing him. Now, where there are only two or three who are to explain mutually to each other their opinions, it must be easy enough to unite on one common point, since they all occupy the same standpoint of common sense. (In the science of philosophy, which is to rise to the standpoint of transcendental consciousness, this is not always possible; and in it it is quite possible that philosophizing individuals do not agree on a single point.) But, according to our demand, each one is to influence *all* who probably diverge considerably in their individual opinions. How is he to discover what they all agree upon? Certainly not by going around and asking them. Hence, there must be something which can be presupposed and which may be regarded as the confession of faith of all, or as their *symbol*.

It is involved in the conception of such a symbol, that it should be not particularly determined, but very general in its statement, for it is precisely concerning the further determination of it that individuals disagree. But the conception likewise involves that this symbol should be proper for all, even the least cultured, and hence that it should not consist of abstract propositions, but of sensuous representations thereof. The sensuous representation is merely the hull; the conception is the real symbol. That precisely *this* representation was a matter

of necessity, since no common discussion was possible without an agreement about something, and since it was not possible to make men agree about anything higher, they not yet being able to distinguish the hull, which the conception had accidentally revived amongst them, from the essence of the conception. In so far, indeed, every symbol is a symbol of necessity (*Noth-Symbol*), and will always remain so.

I shall make this clearer through an example. The essential of every possible symbol is the proposition: there is something supersensual and elevated above all nature. Whosoever does not believe this in all seriousness cannot be member of a Church, and is totally incapable of all morality and moral culture. But what this supersensual, the true holy and sanctifying spirit, or the true moral way of thinking may be: this is precisely what the Church seeks to determine, and to agree more and more upon, through reciprocal communication. This is, for instance, likewise the purpose and content of our Christian Church symbol. But the same purpose had previously shaped itself already, as realized symbol in the sensuous world, and as confession of faith of an *actual visible* community amongst members of the Jewish nation, who had their own usages, modes of thinking, and images. It was very natural that they should shape that proposition according to these images. It was natural that they should have been able to communicate the supersensual to other nations, who, as nations—for we do not speak of their sages—were first elevated to a clear consciousness of the supersensual through the Jews, only in the same images in which they thought it themselves. Another author of a religion, Mohamed, gave to the same supersensual another form, more conformable to his nation, and he did well to do so. Unhappily the nation of his faith met the misfortune of coming to a standstill from want of a learned public.

Now what do these images say? Do they determine

the supersensual in a universally valid manner? By no means; for what need were there otherwise of a Church community, which has no other object than further to determine the same? As sure as this Church exists, and this Church exists as sure as man is finite but perfectible, so sure this supersensual is not determined, but is to be determined, and throughout all eternity to be further determined. These enwrapping symbols are, therefore, solely the manner in which the Church community, under our presumption, gives expression to the proposition: *there is a supersensual*. But since without agreement concerning something, there is not possible any reciprocal action for the production of common convictions, and since the latter as the conditioned, is absolutely commanded, so also is the condition. Hence it is absolute duty to fix at least something upon which at least the most agree, as *symbol*; or, in other words, to build up a visible Church community, as well as may be. Moreover, I cannot influence all without starting from what they all agree upon. But I shall influence them; and hence I shall start from what they are all agreed upon, and not from what they are in dispute about. This is not merely a requirement of prudence, but it is conscientious duty. As sure as I will the end, I also will the only means. He who acts otherwise does not teach for the sake of moral culture, but perhaps in order to show off his learning, and makes himself a theoretical teacher, which is quite a different business.

Let it be observed that I say: I shall *start* from it, as from something presupposed; but on no account: I shall try to *arrive* at it, as at something to be proven.

And here, indeed, appears the objection which may be raised against this doctrine. For it might be said: "Now if I am not convinced of the truth of those symbols from which I am to start, do I not then speak against my better conviction; and how can I be allowed to do so?"

But what is it really which runs against your better conviction? I hope not the conception of a supersensual, which lies at its basis. Hence it can only be this manner of *characterizing* it as a *fixed determination*. But who says that it is an actual determination? You, for your person, determine the supersensual otherwise; but you cannot, and ought not, to start from this *your* determination, since it is held *in dispute*. You are to start from what they can all agree upon with you; and this is, presumptively, the Church symbol. To raise them to your *conviction* is your end and aim; but it can be done only gradually, and by always remaining in accord with them from the first starting-point. You will always be teaching conformably to your conviction so long as you regard in your heart the symbol as a means to raise them to your conviction, precisely as our actions in the necessity-state must be regarded as means to conduce to the rational state. It is ignorance to insist that this hull shall be a determinedness. But against one's conviction to it, an object to keep others in this belief is immoral, and the true priestcraft, precisely as the endeavour to retain man in the need-state, is the true and real despotism. The symbol is the point of connection. *It* is not taught—to teach it is priestcraft—for we start from it in teaching: it is our common presupposition. If it were not necessary to presuppose it, or if there were a higher point, nearer to my conviction, from which to start, I should be more satisfied; but since there is none other I can only make use of this.

Hence it is the conscientious duty of everyone who has to work for the spreading of a common conviction amongst a Church, to treat the symbol as the basis of his teachings; not inwardly to have faith in them. We have already shown the very contrary. The symbol is changeable, and is constantly to be changed through good and proper teachings.

Let us remark here: this further progression and this elevating of the symbol is precisely the spirit of Protestantism, if this word has indeed any significance at all. The insisting upon the old, and the tending to bring universal reason to a standstill, is the spirit of Popery. The Protestant proceeds *from* the symbol into the infinite, Popery proceeds to the symbol as its ultimate. Whosoever does the latter is a Papist in form and spirit, even though the symbols which he proclaims as ultimates be genuinely Lutheran, Calvinistic, &c.

F. I am not only allowed to have my private convictions respecting State government and Church system, but I am even in conscience bound to cultivate this my conviction as much as I am able to do.

But such a cultivation is possible—at least in the course of its progress—only through intercommunication with others. The ground is the following: There is absolutely no other criterion for the objective truth of my sensuous perceptions than the agreement of my experience with the experience of others. It is different—though not much—with respect to argument. I am a rational being only through being an individual. True, I argue according to universal laws of reason, but only through the powers of the individual. Now, how can I be sure that the result has not been falsified through my individuality? True, I assert and stand up for it that this is not so, likewise from a ground involved in my nature, But, nevertheless, the fact that I am, in the inmost depth of my soul, not quite sure of my matter, betrays itself in this: if one person after another, to whom I communicate my convictions, should reject it, I would not on that account immediately abandon my conviction, it is true, but I would at least become staggered and would investigate the subject again and again. How should I come to do so, if I had been before quite certain of the matter? How could the other through his doubt,

influence, and conduct, if I were quite self-sufficient? On the other hand I am confirmed in my conviction by the honest agreement of others with it. An agreeing, when I cannot presuppose internal conviction, does not satisfy me; a proof that it is not the external mere agreeing to my views about which I care. On the contrary, it annoys me, because it makes me suspect this, the only criterion left to me to confirm my conviction.

Deep in my spirit, even though I do not become clearly conscious of it, lies this doubt, whether or not my individuality may not have influenced my conviction. To remove this doubt the agreement of all is not necessary. The sincere agreement of a single person may suffice me, and actually suffices me, for this reason: my fear was, that my individuality might have been the ground of my conviction. This fear is removed as soon as but a single other person agrees with me: for it would be very curious, if such an agreement between two individuals should happen by chance. Nor is agreement concerning *everything* necessary. If we are only agreed concerning the first principles, or respecting a certain view of matters, I may well bear it if the other cannot follow me in all the conclusions which I draw. For these are guaranteed by general logic, which no rational man will doubt being universally valid. Let us take, for instance, philosophy. It is a state of mind, so utterly contrary to nature, that the first man who rose to it surely did not trust himself, until he observed the same elevation in others.

Thus it is only through intercommunication that I attain certainty and security respecting my convictions. But if my convictions were really universally rational, and hence universally valid, the particular representation thereof remains, after all, always individual. The dress in which I clothe them is the best only for me; but even in me it would better fit the

general and common conviction, as modified by all, if it had less of an individual form. This it will obtain, if I communicate it to others, who enter upon the subject and oppose their own reasons against it, and who, if the view is correct, throw off their individual mode of thinking. I correct my conviction, and thereby make my own representation even more universally comprehensible for myself. The more extended this intercommunication is, the more does truth (objectively considered) gain, and I likewise.

It is, therefore, exclusive condition of the further cultivation of my particular convictions, that I shall be enabled to communicate them, and hence shall be allowed to *start* from them.

But according to what we have said first, I am positively not to start in the Church community from my private conviction, but only from the common symbol, and so far as the State government is concerned, I am not only to obey its laws, but even, if it is the duty of my office, help to execute them. Hence, I am also not allowed to communicate my private convictions if they are opposed to the presupposed conviction of the people at large, because in doing so I would conspire to overthrow the State. But how am I then able to cultivate and correct my convictions through communication, since I am not allowed to communicate them?

When the conditioned is commanded, the condition also is commanded. The former cultivation of my conviction is demanded of me, hence also its condition, communication. The communication of my private conviction is absolute duty.

But we have just now seen that it is contrary to duty. How can this contradiction be solved? It is solved as soon as we observe, from what we have deduced the duty, to refrain from communicating private convictions respecting Church affairs and State government. We deduce it from the presupposition that *all* had to be

influenced, and from the impossibility to obtain knowledge of their convictions by asking everyone.

Hence if we had not to influence all, but a determined, limited number, the convictions whereof it were quite possible to become acquainted with, because they also could communicate their views, it would no longer be prohibited to make them known, and to start from them. The synthetic link of union of the contradiction would be such a society. The conception of such a society involves the following: It is to be partly limited and determined, and hence not to embrace all, but a certain number chosen from amongst all, and in so far separated from them; and partly it is to *represent and externally to realize* the freedom which each one has *for himself and for his own consciousness*, to doubt everything, and to investigate everything freely. Such a society is a forum of a common consciousness, before which everything possible can be thought and investigated with absolutely unlimited freedom. As each one is free for himself, so is he free on this sphere. Finally—which indeed follows from what we have said heretofore—each member of this society must have thrown off the fetters of the Church symbols, and of the legal conceptions sanctioned by the State; not precisely *materialiter*, for he may consider much of what Church or State holds as final and highest determination of truth; but, at least, *formaliter*, e.g., he must not ascribe to these symbols or conceptions any authority, must not hold them as true and correct *because* the Church teaches them, or the State exercises them. For it is the very purpose and spirit of this society to investigate beyond these limits, but whosoever holds them to be limits does not investigate beyond them, and is, therefore, not member of such a society. We called such a society the *learned public*, or *scholars*.

It is the duty of each one, who raises himself to absolute unbelief in the authority of the common conviction of his age, to establish such a public of scholars.

For having repudiated that authority, such a man is without guidance. As sure as he thinks morally, it cannot be indifferent to him whether he errs or not; but in respect to theoretical propositions, which always influence morality more or less, he can never attain perfect certainty, as we have shown above. Add to this, that it is his duty to communicate his convictions, and thus to make them of common use, but, at the same time, must not immediately communicate them to all. Hence he must hunt up one of similar views, who like him has thrown off the belief in authority, and he cannot be quiet in his conscience until he has found this man, and has found in him a confirmation, and at the same time a means to *deposit* his convictions until he shall be enabled to make them useful to all. Others, who get into the same position, will find it their duty to join these two. They will soon find each other, and through their union establish a public of scholars. It is moral duty, as appears from the above, to communicate to these scholars all new discoveries, all particular and dissenting convictions which lie beyond the sphere of common consciousness, and which each one may believe to entertain.

The distinguishing characteristic of such a body is absolute freedom and independence in thinking, and the principle of its constitution is the rule to submit to positively no authority whatsoever, to base one's self in all matters purely upon one's own thinking, and to absolutely repudiate whatsoever is not confirmed by one's own thinking. The scholar distinguishes himself from the not-scholar in this; the latter certainly believes also to have convinced himself through his own reflections, and he has, indeed, done so; but anyone who can look further, sees immediately, that his system concerning State and Church is the result of the current opinion of his age. All that he has himself convinced himself of is, that such are the opinions of his age; his premises

are formed by his age, without his knowing it and without his co-operation; the results he may, perhaps, have drawn himself. The scholar, on the other hand, is well aware of this. Hence he looks for the premises in himself, establishes consciously, and from free resolves, his reason for himself as the representative of reason in general.

For the republic of scholars there exist no possible symbols, no prescribed direction, no withholding. The members of this republic must be allowed to discuss everything, whereof they believe they have convinced themselves, precisely as they dare to think it for themselves.

Universities are schools for the learned. Hence in universities also it must be permitted to discuss everything whereof one is convinced; and there is no symbol for a university. Those err greatly who recommend precaution, and hold that one ought not to say everything in the university rooms; but first consider well, whether it may be useful, or hurtful, or liable to misrepresentation. Whosoever is unable to investigate for himself, and incapable of learning to do so, should bear the guilt on his own shoulders, for having obtruded into universities. It is not the business of the others, for they act according to their perfect right and duty. The discussion in universities is distinguished from the discussion in learned books in nothing but in the form of the method.

As the scholarly investigations are absolutely free, so must also the attendance at those discussions be free to everyone. Whoever can no longer in his heart believe in authority, acts criminally in further believing in it, and it is his moral duty to join the scholars. No earthly power has a right to command in matters of conscience, and it is immoral to deny to anyone, whose mind fits him for it, admittance to investigation.

The State and Church must tolerate the scholars; for, otherwise, they would try to compel conscience, and no

one could any longer conscientiously live in such a Church or such a State; for there would be no remedy for him if he should begin to doubt. Moreover, progress towards perfection would be impossible in such a State; and yet it is possible. Hence Church and State must tolerate scholars, *e.g.*, must tolerate that which constitutes their distinctive essence; absolute and unlimited communication of thought. Everything, whereof each one believes to have convinced himself, must be an allowed subject of discussion, however dangerous and outrageous it may appear. For if anyone has entered upon errors, how are others to be prevented from straying into the same errors, if he is not permitted to communicate his errors?

I say: State and Church must *tolerate* scholarly culture as such. More indeed they cannot do for it, since both occupy utterly different spheres. The State as such cannot support or further scholarship as such; this is only done through free investigation, and the State is not to investigate. *Statesmen* or *State officials* may, it is true, support scholarship *as individuals*; but not the State.

The republic of scholars is an absolute democracy, or more definitely expressed, only the right of spiritual strength is valid in it. Each one does what he can do, and is in the right if he has the might to maintain this right. There is no other judge in it than time and the progress of culture.

Teachers of religion and State officials are to work in the cause of the perfectibility of men, and hence they must be more advanced than the public at large, *e.g.*, they must be scholars, and must have received a scholarly education. In so far the professional scholar is himself indirectly a State official, for he is the educator of the State's popular teachers and immediate officials. In so far alone can the scholar also receive a salary from and be under the supervision of the State. Of course the State cannot prescribe *what* he is to teach, for that were

contradictory; but the State can see to it, that he do really communicate in the best manner what he believes to know. Scholarly schools are not such wherein the future profession of the common school-teacher, or of the State official, is taught. True, these professions must also be taught, but to teach it constitutes quite another order of teaching. The State official and public school-teacher is to be not only a professional man, but also a scholar. Hence he is both, but it is his duty, according to the above principles, to separate both in his conduct. When he is public teacher or official he is not scholar, and when he is scholar he is not the former. It is an oppression of conscience to prohibit the greater from communicating his dissenting convictions in scholarly writings; but it is quite in order to prohibit him from preaching them in the pulpit; nay, if he is only well aware of what he does, he will himself know that it is immoral to do so.

The State and the Church have the right to prohibit this to the scholar, and to prevent him from realizing his convictions in the sensuous world. If he does so, if he, for instance, violates the laws of his State, he is justly punished, whatever he may think in himself about these laws; nay, he will necessarily reprove himself, for he has done an immoral action.

Thus the idea of a public of scholars alone solves the contradiction which occurs between an established Church and State, and the absolute freedom of conscience of each individual. Hence the realization of this Idea in the sensuous world is commanded by the Moral Law.

G. In conclusion, we state, in as few words as possible, the total end of man in so far as he is considered as individual.


The final end of all his working in society is: men shall all agree; but all men agree only about the purely

rational, for it is that which is common to them all. Under the presupposition of such an agreement the distinction between a learned and unlearned public falls away, Church and State fall away. All have the same convictions, and the conviction of each is the conviction of all. The State falls away as a *legislating and compulsory* power. The will of each is universal law in truth, because all others will the same, and no compulsion is needed, because each one wills of himself that which he ought to do. To this end, therefore, all our thinking and doing, and even our individual culture, ought to tend. Not we ourselves are the final end, but *all* are this end. Now if this end, although unattainable, were thought as attained, what would happen? Each one would with all his individual power, and as well as he were able, modify nature for the use of reason, according to that common will. What each one did would thus be of equal advantage to all, and what all did would in reality turn to the advantage of each; since their end is the same in reality.

It is so even now already; but only in *Idea*. Each one is to think in everything he does that it is for all; and this is the very reason why he is not allowed to do many things, since he does not know whether *they* will it also. But if this Idea were real, each one would be allowed to do everything he might will, since all would will the same.

PART II.

THE SCIENCE OF MORALS



BOOK FIFTH.

THE THEORY OF DUTIES.

CHAPTER I.

DECISION OF THE DOCTRINE OF DUTIES.

A. WE have already indicated the definite separation between the purely rational of the rational being and its individuality. The manifestation and representation of that pure reason in that being is the Moral Law, whereas the individuality is that through which each individual distinguishes himself from the others. The uniting link of both is this, that a rational being absolutely must be *an individual*, but not necessarily *this or that* individual; which latter fact is purely accidental, and hence of empirical origin. The empirical is the *will*, the *understanding* (in the widest sense of the word, as equivalent to intelligence or general power of representation), and the *body*. The object of the Moral Law, or that wherein it desires to have its end and aim represented, is absolutely nothing individual, but Reason in general; in a certain sense the Moral Law is its own end. This universal reason has been posited by me, as intelligence outside of me; and the whole totality of rational beings outside of me is their representation. Hence I have posited universal reason outside of me, in virtue of the Moral Law, as theoretical principle. Now after this externalizing of pure reason has been

achieved in me, only the empirical or individual Ego is to be called Ego, or I, in the Science of Morals. Hence, whenever I hereafter use the word Ego, it always signifies person.

(Our Science of Morals is therefore very important for our whole system, since in it is shown up how the empirical Ego arises out of the purely genetical Ego, and how the pure Ego is finally altogether externalized from the individual person. From the present point of view the representation of the pure Ego is the totality of rational beings, or the communion of saints.)

How do I, as person, relate myself to the Moral Law? It is to me that this law addresses itself, and to whom it assigns its execution; but its end lies outside of me. I am, therefore, *for myself*, or for my own consciousness, only the instrument, the tool of the Moral Law, and not its end. Impelled by the Moral Law I forget myself in acting, I am only a tool in its hand. Whosoever looks to an end sees not himself; but the end lies outside of me. As in every contemplation, so the subject loses itself here, vanishing in the contemplated, and in its contemplated end. For me, *i.e.*, for my consciousness, the Moral Law addresses itself not to other beings, but has them for its end. All others are, and only I alone am not, embraced in its end. For my consciousness all others are not means, not tools, but final end and aim.

Let us remove some difficulties which might be opposed to this proposition.

Each man is himself end, says Kant with universal approval.

This proposition of Kant agrees well enough with mine, if mine is only carried out further. For all the other rational beings, to whom the Moral Law addresses itself equally as to me, using them as tools, hold me as a member of the communion of rational beings, and hence I am to them end, as they are end to me. To

each rational being, all others outside of him are end; but no one is his own end. The point of view from which all individuals, without exception, are final end, lies beyond all individual consciousness, and is the point of view from which the consciousness of all rational beings is united, as object, into One; hence the point of view of God. For God, each rational being is absolute and final end.

But no, it is said, each one is to be end expressly for himself; and this also may be admitted. He is end as a *means* to realize reason. This is the final aim of its existence, since for this alone he exists; and if it were not for this he need not to exist at all. This does not lower, but rather elevates the dignity of man. To each one is assigned, for his consciousness, the task of attaining the universal end of reason. The whole community of rational beings becomes dependent upon his care and his labour; and he alone is independent of everything. Each one becomes like God, so far as he can become so; *i.e.*, in respecting the freedom of all individuals. Each one, precisely because his whole individuality is annihilated and destroyed, becomes a pure representative of the Moral Law in the sensuous world; becomes true pure Ego through free will, and self-determination.

It has already been sufficiently observed above, that this forgetting of self occurs only in actual acting in the sensuous world. Those who place perfection in pious meditations, and in devout brooding over their self, and who expect from such practices the annihilation of their individuality, and a flowing together with God, are much in error. Their virtue is and remains egotism; they want to make perfect only *themselves*. True virtue consists in acting, in acting for the totality, in which acting each forgets himself utterly. I shall be compelled to recur frequently to this important point.

B. I can forget myself in my labour only in so far as it stands unhindered, and as I am, therefore, truly means to accomplish the desired purpose. If it is checked, I am thereby driven back into myself and forced to reflect upon myself; and I am in this manner made my own object by means of the resistance.

The Moral Law addresses itself immediately to me, and makes me its object. I am to be means; but I am not means, because the check occurs; hence I am to make myself means.

Let the condition here established be well remarked. In the moral state of mind, wherein I am to be always and uninterruptedly, I become object of reflection and of the commanded acting, solely in so far as I can *not* be means. The care for myself is conditioned by this, that I cannot carry out my end and aim outside of me. But when this condition occurs, then this care is duty.

Thus there arises the conception of a duty—not exactly which I owe *to myself*, as is usually said; for I always remain mere means for the end outside of me; but of a duty, which I must observe *in regard* to myself, of a moral acting, whereof I myself am the immediate object. I shall call these duties, therefore: not duties to ourselves, as is the usual phrase, but *mediated* and *conditioned* duties; mediated because they have for their object the means of all our acting; conditioned because they can only be deduced from the following proposition: If the Moral Law desires the conditioned, the realization of the supreme rule of reason outside of me through me, it also desires the condition, namely, that I shall be fit and proper means for that purpose.

Since *for me* there is no other means to realize the absolutely to be realized law of reason, than myself, there can be, strictly speaking, no other mediated duties than those towards myself. In opposition to them, the duties towards the Whole, as the highest and absolutely com-

manded duties, are to be called *immediate and unconditioned* duties.

C. There is still another division of the duties from the following reason. The command to promote the independence of reason, so far as possible, is addressed to each individual. Now if each one does in this respect that which first occurs to him, or which appears to him pre-eminently necessary, many things will be done in a manifold manner, and many things will not be done at all. The effects of the acts of many will check and cancel each other, and the steady promotion of the final end of reason will not be achieved. But the Moral Law requires that it shall be achieved. Hence it is the *duty* of each one, who perceives this hindrance (and each one, who will but look close, must perceive it), to remedy it. This remedy, however, can only be effected, if many individuals divide amongst themselves the various things that must be done to promote the final aim of reason, each one accepting a certain part for all others, and in his turn surrendering to all others his part. This can only be accomplished by an agreement, through the uniting of many for the purpose of such a division. It is the duty of each one, who perceives this, to establish such an agreement.

An agreement of this kind is an agreement concerning the various vocations of all individuals. There must be various vocations; and it is the duty of each individual to labour for their establishment, and to choose a fixed vocation for himself when they are established. Each one, who chooses a vocation, chooses a peculiar manner of promoting the final end of reason.

Some labours of this kind can be transferred to others, but some can not; that which cannot be transferred, is *general* duty. That, which can be transferred, is *particular* duty of him to whom it is transferred. Hence there is, moreover, a distinction between *general* and *particular*

duties, and combining this division with the previous one we shall have to speak :

Of the general *conditioned* duties.

Of the particular *conditioned* duties.

Of the general *unconditioned* or absolute duties.

Of the particular *unconditioned* or absolute duties.

CHAPTER II.

CONCERNING THE GENERAL CONDITIONED DUTIES.

I AM tool of the Moral Law in the sensuous world. But I am tool in the sensuous world solely on condition of a continuous reciprocal causality between me and the world, the way and manner of which is to be determined through my will; and since we speak here chiefly of a causality upon the world of rational beings, on condition of a continuous reciprocal causality between me and them. (This proposition has been proven in my *Science of Rights*, and as I would have merely to repeat that proof here, I refer to it as the *proof* of what is averred here. Nor will this mere reference infringe upon the clearness and completeness of our present science, for what this postulated reciprocal causality may signify, will appear clearly enough.) If I am to be this tool of the Moral Law, then the condition under which alone I can be it, must take place; and if I think myself as under the rule of the Moral Law, I find myself commanded to realize this its condition; namely, the continued reciprocal causality between myself and the world of both rational and sensuous beings, so far as it is in my power to do so; for the Moral Law can never require the impossible. Hence all we have to do is to analyse this conception, and to relate the Moral Law to its several parts, in order to arrive at the general duty, whereof we ourselves are the immediate object, or at the general conditioned duties.

This reciprocal relation is to be *continuous*; the Moral Law commands our *preservation* as members of a sensuous

world. In the *Science of Rights*, which knows nothing of a Moral Law and its commands, but establishes only the will of a free being as determined through natural necessity, we furnished the proof of the necessity to will our continuance in the following manner: I will something (X) signifies: the existence of this object shall be given to me in experience. But as sure as I *will* it, it is not so given in present experience, and is possible only in future. Hence, as sure as I will this experience, I also will, that I, the experiencing I, shall exist as the same identical I in a future moment. From this point of view respecting my will, I will my continuance only for the sake of a satisfaction, which I expect in the future.

The will of a free being, as determined through the Moral Law, has not this ground to will the continuance of the individual. Under the direction of this law, I do not care at all that something may be given to me in a future experience. Under it, X is to be absolutely without any reference to myself; it is to be utterly indifferent to me, whether *I* experience something or not, provided it only becomes actual in general, and provided I may presuppose that it will thus sometime become actual. The above demand of the natural man, that the object be given to him, is always the demand of an enjoyment. But from the standpoint of morality, enjoyment, as such, is never end. If I were told with more absolute certainty, that which you intend is certainly going to be realized, but you will never participate in it; annihilation is awaiting you before it will be realized; I would, nevertheless, be forced to work with the same exertion for its realization. The attainment of my true end would be assured to me; and the enjoyment thereof ought never to be my end. Hence the continuance of my life, and its consequent preservation, is not a duty to me for the sake of experiencing the realization of my end and aim. How then may it become my duty?

Whatsoever I may realize in the sensuous world is never the final end of morality, for that lies in the Infinitude, but only a means to draw nearer to this end. Hence the first end of all my actions is a new acting in the future; but whoever is to act in the future must live in it; and if he is to act in pursuance of a plan traced out now already, he must be and remain the same as he now is: his future existence must regularly develop itself from the present. Inspired by moral sentiment, I consider myself solely as a tool of the Moral Law. Hence I have the will to continue, and to continue to exist solely for the sake of acting. It is for this reason that self-preservation is a duty. This duty of *self-preservation* we now have to determine more closely. The preservation and regularly progressive development of the empirical self, which is regarded both as intelligence, or soul, and as body, is required. Hence both the health and regularly progressive development of soul and body considered in themselves, and the continuation of their unchecked mutual influence upon each other, is object of the Moral Law.

The requirement of the Moral Law in this respect is to be regarded, firstly, *negatively*, as a prohibition: *Undertake nothing which, in your own consciousness, might endanger the preservation of yourself in the stated meaning of the word*; and secondly, *positively*, as a command: *Do whatever according to your best conviction promotes this preservation of yourself*.

1. The preservation and the well-being of our empirical self may be endangered, both *internally*, by checking the progress of natural development, and *externally*, through external force. So far as the former is concerned, our body is an organized product of nature, and its preservation is endangered, if checks are opposed to the regular progress of the organization. This would occur if the body were denied proper food through *fasting*, or, if the body were overfed through *intemper-*

ance, or if an opposite direction were given to the whole tendency of nature to preserve the machine, through *unchastity*. All these dissipations are in violation of the duty of self-preservation, more specially in regard to *the body*. They disturb the development of the *mind*, the welfare whereof depends upon the well-being of the body. Fasting weakens and makes drowsy the body, intemperance, gluttony, and, above all, *unchastity*, sinks the body deep into matter, and takes away from it the ability to elevate itself.

The development of the *mind* is directly disturbed through its *inactivity*; for the mind is a power, which can be developed only through practice. It is likewise disturbed through *too much exertion*, with neglect of the body, since it is the body which must support the mind. Likewise through an *irregular occupation* of the mind; as a blind indulging in irregular fancies, a mere memorizing of the thoughts of others without my own judgment; or a dry puzzling of the brain without living contemplation. The whole mind must be cultured in all directions, but on no account one-sidedly. One-sided culture is no culture, but rather suppression of the mind. All that we have here mentioned is not merely imprudent and unwise (*i.e.*, opposed to some arbitrary end), but is opposed to the absolute final end and aim of reason. It is absolutely immoral, for all who attain an insight into the end of their empirical existence, and this insight all ought to acquire. So far as the latter is concerned, namely, danger from external causes, the prohibition of the moral law is as follows: do not unnecessarily endanger your health, body, and life. Exposition to such danger is unnecessary whenever the moral law does not require it. When that law does require it, I am absolutely obliged to do so, no matter how great the danger and risk may be; for it is my absolute end to do what duty requires, and my self-preservation is only a means for this end. How such a command of duty to risk one's self-preservation may

arise, this is not the proper place to explain. We shall take up the subject on this point in the doctrine concerning absolute duties. The investigation concerning the morality of *suicide*, belongs, however, to the subject in the present place; and we shall settle it now.

I am not unnecessarily, *i.e.*, not without the command of duty, to endanger my life; it must, therefore, be still more prohibited to destroy my life with my own power, and intentionally. Somebody might add, however: "Unless, indeed, duty requires such self-destruction of one's own life; as it certainly does require, according to your own presupposition, the exposure of one's life to danger!" Hence the thorough solution of our problem rests on the answering of the following question: Is it possible that duty can ever require me to kill myself?

Let us first observe the great difference between a requirement of duty to endanger one's life, and one to take away that life. The first command only requires me to forget myself, not to esteem my self-preservation as anything to counterbalance duty. Moreover, the absolutely commanded action, in which I am to forget myself, is directed upon something outside of me. Hence there is no immediate command: endanger thyself! but only a mediated and conditioned command: do that which might endanger thyself! But an act of suicide would immediately touch myself, and hence must be based upon an immediate and unconditioned command. We shall see at once whether such is possible.

The decision rests upon the following: My life is the exclusive condition of the realization of the law through me. Now the command is addressed to me absolutely: to realize the law. Hence I am absolutely commanded to live, so far as this depends upon me. To destroy my life by my own hands is directly contradictory of this; and hence is immoral. I cannot destroy my own life at all without withdrawing myself, so far as I am concerned, from the rule of the moral law; but this that law can

never command, because it would in doing so contradict itself. If I am influenced by the moral law—and this I ought to be and must be considered as being, when my actions are judged of—then I will to live solely to do my duty. I will not live any longer, would, therefore signify: I will no longer do my duty.

An objection could only be raised against the *major* of this syllogism. It might be said: But this present earthly life of ours, of which alone we are speaking, is for me not the only exclusive condition of my duty. I believe in a life after death, and hence, by killing myself, do not end my life in general, and thus do not withdraw myself from the rule of the moral law; I only change the *manner* of my life; proceed only from one place to another, as I often do, and am allowed to do, in this earthly life. In replying to this objection, I shall adopt the simile, and ask: Does then the moral law permit you arbitrarily to change your position or place on earth, as if it were the same whether you did or did not do so; or is such a step not rather always either your duty or against your duty? Clearly the latter, for according to all our previous proofs the moral law leaves no playground for arbitrariness. Under its rule there are no indifferent actions at all; in each position of your life each act is either moral or immoral. Hence you will have to show up not merely a permission of that law to leave this life and pass into another one, but an explicit command. That this is impossible can, however, be strictly proven. For the moral law does never immediately command me to live for the sake of life, neither in this life, which alone I know, nor in any other possible life; but the immediate object of its command is always a determined action; and since I cannot act without living, it always commands me to live. (Considered as a *natural* agent I *will* to live not for the sake of life but for the sake of some determination of life; considered as moral agent, I *shall* will to live not for the sake of life.

but of an action for which I need life.) Hence the transition to another life could not be commanded of me in an immediate, but only in a mediate manner, through the command of a determined act, which would transpire in another life. In other words: I could only be permitted to leave this life—and since there are no actions merely permitted, it can never be my duty to leave this life—unless I had a determined action to undertake in the life hereafter. This, however, no rational being will be willing to assert. For we are forced by the laws of thinking to determine our duties through what is already known to us; and the state of life beyond the present is utterly unknown to us, and all our cognisable duties transpire in the present life. The moral law, therefore, far from referring me to another life, demands always, and in every hour of my present life, that I continue it, for in every such hour there is something for me to do, and the sphere, wherein I am to do it, is the present world. Hence it is not only actual suicide, but even the desire to live no longer, which is immoral, for such a desire is a wish to work no longer in the manner in which alone we can think our work; it is an inclination utterly opposed to a moral mode of thinking, it is a tiredness and a weary disgustedness, which a moral man should never allow to move him.

If the wish to leave this world signifies the mere readiness to leave life as soon as the ruler of the world, in whom we believe on this standpoint, shall so order, it is altogether a just wish, inseparable from a moral character, for life has no value in itself to such a character. But if it signifies an *inclination* to die, and to come into connection with beings of another world, then such a desire becomes an unwholesome indulgence, which paints and determines the future world in advance. But such a determining has no basis, and the data for it can only be imaginary. Moreover, it is immoral, for how can a truly moral character have time

left for visionary meditations? True virtue does every hour wholly what it has to do in that hour, and leaves all the rest to the care of him, whose care it is.

To convince himself of the correctness of these views, let the reader examine all possible grounds of an act of suicide. The first motive, of which instances are said to have occurred, is a despair to get rid of and conquer certain vices, which have become a habit, and almost our own second nature. But this very despair is an immoral feeling. If you only have the true will, there is no difficulty about the canning. What, indeed, could have compulsory power over our will? Or what could put the power wherewith we sin, in motion, except our will? Hence in this case the confession is clear that the suicide does not will his duty. He cannot tolerate life without vice, and rather would compromise with virtue by the easier means of death, than conform to its requirement of a guiltless life.

Another possible motive is that a person should kill himself to escape suffering something infamous and vicious, becoming thus the object of another's vices, but in this case he does not kill himself to escape vice, for if he only suffers in the matter, *i.e.*, if he cannot resist with the exertion of all his physical forces, that which he is made to undergo, then it is not any crime of his. He only escapes through death the injustice, violence, or disgrace, inflicted upon him, but not sin, since he does not commit any sin himself. He kills himself, because an enjoyment is taken away from him, without which he cannot tolerate life. But in that case he has not denied himself, and has not, as he ought to have done, sacrificed all other considerations to virtue.

Some men have accused suicides of cowardice, others have celebrated their courage. Both parties are in the right, as is usually the case in disputes of rational men. The matter has two sides, and both parties have only looked each at one. It is necessary to consider it from

both sides, for injustice must not be done even to what is most horrible, since thereby only contradiction is excited.

The resolve to die is the purest representation of the superiority of thought over nature. In nature lies the impulse to preserve itself, and the resolve to die is the exact opposite of this impulse. Each suicide, committed with cool considerateness—the most of suicides are committed in a fit of senselessness, and concerning such a condition nothing can rationally be said—is an illustration of this superiority, a proof of great strength of soul, and necessarily excites esteem, when reviewed from this side. It proceeds from the above-described blind impulse to be absolutely self-determined, and is only met with in an energetic character. Courage is resoluteness to meet an unknown future. Now, since the suicide annihilates all future for himself, we cannot ascribe true courage to him, unless indeed he assumes a life after death, and goes to meet this life with the firm resolve to fight or bear whatsoever that life shall have in store for him.

But whatever strength of soul it may require to resolve to die, it requires far more courage to bear a life which can only have sorrow in store for us hereafter, which we esteem as worth nothing in itself, even though it could be made the most joyous life, and to bear it nevertheless merely so as not to do anything unworthy of ourself. If in the first instance we have superiority of the conception over nature, we have here superiority of the conception itself over the conception: autonomy and absolute independence of thought. Whatsoever lies outside of the thought lies outside of myself, and is indifferent to me. If the former is the triumph of thought, this is the triumph of its law, the purest representation of morality; for nothing higher can be asked of man than that he should continue to bear a life which has grown to be insupportable to him. This courage the suicide lacks, and in so far he can be called cowardly. In comparison with the virtuous man he is a coward; but in comparison

with the wicked, who submits to disgrace and slavery merely so as to continue for a few more years the wretched feeling of his existence, he is a hero.

2. The requirement of the moral law, which relates to our self, has also, as we have seen, a *positive* character. In so far it requires of us that we should nourish our *body*, and promote its health and well-being in all possible manner—of course for no other purpose than to live and make it an able tool for the promotion of the great final end of reason. Moreover, if I am to nourish my body and promote its welfare, I must be in possession of the means to do so. Hence I must take care of my possessions, be economical, and regulate my monetary affairs with prudence and order. It is not merely advisable and prudent to do so, but duty. He who, from a fault of his own, cannot provide his own means of living, is guilty. But the requirement is also addressed to the well-being of our *mind*, and in so far it is positive duty to occupy the mind continually but regularly, of course so far as the particular duties of each permit him to do so. To this belong æsthetical enjoyments and the fine arts, the moderate and proper use whereof cheers body and soul, and strengthens them for new exertions. In regard to the uninterrupted mutual influence of body and soul upon each other, we can do nothing directly. If each is only properly taken care of by itself, this mutual influence will result of itself.

REMARK.

All the above duties are only, as we have said, conditioned duties. My empirical self is only a means for the attainment of the end and aim of reason, and is to be preserved and cultivated only as such means, and in so far as it can be such means. Hence, if its preservation conflicts with this end, it must be abandoned.

For me, for the forum of my conscience, nothing is opposed to the end of reason except my acting adverse to

an unconditioned duty. Hence, the only case wherein I can give up self-preservation, is when I can retain life only through the violation of such a duty. I must not do anything immoral for the sake of life, since life is an end only for the sake of duty, and since the accomplishment of duty is the final end of reason. It might be, and sometimes is, objected: "But how if, by making just this once an exception from the severity of the law, I can save my life, and thus preserve myself for the future achievement of much good which otherwise would be left undone?" This is the same pretext which is made use of to defend the evil, for the good which is to result from it. But those who urge this objection forget that the choice of the good works which we would like to do, and of others which we would like to leave undone, is not left to our discretion. Each person is absolutely bound to do that, and nothing else, which his position, heart, and insight command him to do; and must leave undone what they forbid him to do. Now, if the moral law takes away from me its permission for me to *live* before I can achieve certain future good actions, then those actions are assuredly not for *me* to achieve, for I shall no longer exist, at least under the conditions of this sensuous world. Nay, it is in itself clear enough, that to him who commits immoral acts for the sake of preserving his life, does not hold duty in general, nor the particular duties which he desires to do hereafter, to be the absolute final end of reason; for, if duty alone were his end, if only the moral law ruled him, it would be impossible for him to act in violation of it, just as it is impossible for the moral law to contradict itself. It was life which was his final end and aim, and the pretext that he desired yet to accomplish good works hereafter, he has only invented afterwards, to excuse himself. But on the other hand, I must also not consider and permit my death as a means for a good end. It is my life, and not my death, which is means. I am tool of the law *as active principle*, not

means thereof as a *thing*. We have already shown, in this respect, that I must not kill myself—as, for instance, the suicide of Lucretia might be considered as a means to liberate Rome—but neither must I voluntarily permit my death if I can prevent it. Still less must I seek the opportunity to die, or excite others to kill me, as is told of Codrus, though I might believe that the salvation of the world would result therefrom. Such conduct is always a kind of suicide. Let the distinction be well observed. I am not only permitted, but commanded, to expose my life to danger whenever duty requires it; that is to say, I must *forget* the care for my self-preservation. But I must absolutely never *think* my death as an *end* and aim.

CHAPTER III.

CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR CONDITIONED DUTIES.

THE particular duties are the duties of the vocation, as has been stated above, when we deduced the necessity of vocations. The particular *conditioned* duties are those duties which have our empirical self for object, in so far as we belong to this or that particular vocation. In regard to these duties, it is to be observed:

1. Wherever particular vocations have been established, it is absolute duty of every individual to have a vocation, *i.e.*, to promote, in a particular manner, the final end of reason. This we prove as follows:

If no vocations were established, it would be the duty of each who comprehended the necessity of establishing them as the exclusive condition of a complete and regular promotion of the end of reason, to establish them. Hence, it is still more duty to choose a particular vocation where they have already been established, since, where this has been done, no one can do any general work without doing what others have already undertaken to do, and thus, without either hindering them and opposing the promotion of the final end of reason, or, at least, doing something superfluous and idle, which is equally immoral. Hence, he must select a particular vocation, and make this choice known to his fellow-men in a universally valid manner.

2. It is duty to select a vocation, not according to inclination, but according to the best conviction that it is fittest for one's powers, culture, and other external conditions. For the end of our life is not to satisfy our

inclination, but to promote the end of reason. Each force in the sensuous world is to be used for this end in the most advantageous manner. It might be objected: "But the fewest men choose their own vocation, but have it selected for them by their parents, circumstances, &c., or, if they do select them themselves, they do so in advance of the proper maturity of reason, and before they are disposed to serious meditation and susceptible to the moral law." I reply, that this should not be so, and that each one who sees that it should not be so ought to work to make it otherwise. All men ought to be educated, and to educate themselves in the same manner, until humanity in general has become developed and ripe in them, and not till then ought they to choose a vocation. We do not deny that, if this is to be so, many other things in human affairs must be different from what they are. But a science of morals establishes always the ideal, even though the ideal should not be realizable under all circumstances. This, indeed, it cannot be, for, if it could, it would itself be wavering and indefinite. But neither is it to fit itself according to circumstances. On the contrary, circumstances must begin to conform to it.

Perhaps this is the place to add that the subordination and rank of vocations, although exclusively a civil institution, is also a necessary one. The manifold occupations of men are subordinated to each other as conditioned to the conditioning, as means to end; and in like manner those who carry them on must be subordinated. From a moral point of view all occupations have the same value. In each one the end of reason is promoted, from the vocation which tills the soil for the production of those fruits from which the sensuous preservation of our race depends, to that of the scholar, who thinks the future ages and works for them, or of the legislator and wise regent, who realizes the thoughts of the scholar in his institutions for the welfare of the

remotest generations. If each one does from duty all that he can do, they are all of equal rank in the court of pure reason.

3. But I cannot select a vocation without the consent of all other men. For the end of reason must be followed completely and in steady progression; and all the others having already divided amongst themselves the various labours necessary for it, it is necessary for me to inquire first whether there is still room for me, and whether my assistance is required where I intend to apply it. I have the right to proffer my services, and society has a right to reject them. If, however, no proper institution has yet been established for this purpose, I shall have to judge myself, according to my best conscience, whether my assistance is required.

Hence the vocation of each individual is determined through his reciprocity with society, which reciprocity emanates, however, from the individual. It is he who has to proffer himself.

4. It is duty to cultivate mind and body pre-eminently with a view to usefulness for the occupation chosen. The agriculturist needs, above all, strength and endurance of body; the artist dexterity and mobility of the same, and theoretical culture of mind is for their vocation only a means; whereas the scholar has universal culture of the mind for his end, and to him the body is only means to support and maintain the mind in the sensuous world. In this respect the scholars seem to have had a pernicious influence on the opinion of the people. For them it is duty to study, and to systematically cultivate their understanding; for their vocation requires this. This, the duty of one vocation, many desire to make a general duty of mankind, and the meaning of their doctrines seems to be that all men ought to become scholars. Most visible this is still the case with the theologians, who seem to like to make all men as good theologians as they are them-

selves, and who consider their science as necessary for salvation. Hence it has chanced that far too high value has been put upon theoretical culture, even when it lacked other good qualities; and that in extreme cases persons have even asserted virtue and godliness to consist in solitary meditation and speculation. In the scholar this certainly is a virtue, but even in his case only in so far as his end is to communicate his studies. Other vocations need of theoretical culture only sufficient to enable them to judge and understand what belongs to the labours of their vocation, and the perfecting of their art; but the chief point is, that they elevate themselves to moral acting; and for this, culture of the understanding is not so much necessary as culture of the will.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING THE GENERAL UNCONDITIONED DUTIES.

PRELIMINARY.

THE final end of all actions of the morally good man, generally and particularly of all their external results, may be gathered into this formula: *He desires that reason, and only reason, should rule in the sensuous world.* All physical power is to be subordinated to reason.

Now reason can rule solely in and through rational beings. Hence moral acting relates itself always, even though immediately it should be directed upon irrational nature, at least mediately to rational beings, and has only them in view. As there are no rights in regard to irrational nature, so are there no duties towards it. To act upon nature becomes duty solely for the sake of the rational beings.

Hence the morally good man desires that reason and morality should rule in the community of rational beings.

It is not merely the desire that the good and the rational should occur, but also that it should occur through freedom, in accordance with the Moral Law, or that true morality should rule. This is a chief point which is not to be overlooked, for the neglect of it has had a very pernicious and hurtful effect upon the theory of morals, and thus also upon life, as we shall instance in the proper place.

But no act is moral which is not the result of freedom.

Hence the formal freedom of all rational beings is the end of every morally good man, and we have, therefore, first of all things to speak :

A. *Concerning our duties in relation to the formal freedom of others.*

All are to be *formaliter* free, without exception. But it may happen that someone may use his freedom, which belongs to himself, with the purpose of suppressing the freedom of others. Hence it will be our next task to investigate what duty may require in such a case, and we shall, therefore, have to speak :

B. *Concerning our duties in conflicts with the formal freedom of others.*

Finally, it is the will of the morally good man, that each one should exert his freedom to do his duty ; and it is his end and aim to promote morality amongst all rational beings. We shall therefore, in conclusion, have to speak :

C. *Concerning our duties in regard to the immediate promotion and extension of morality.*

A. The formal freedom of an individual consists in the continuous reciprocal relation between his body, as a tool and a sense, and the sensuous world, determined and determinable solely through the freely-created conception of the individual respecting the manner of this reciprocal relation. This freedom involves a twofold: 1. The continuation of the absolute freedom and inviolability of the *body*, so that it cannot be at all immediately influenced by physical power. 2. The continuation of its free influence upon the whole *sensuous world*. (See the *Science of Rights*.)

1. The regulation of the moral law respecting the bodies of rational beings outside of us may be regarded, firstly, negatively as a prohibition, and secondly, positively as a command.

The regulative principle of this judgment is as follows: Each human body is for the morally-minded man a tool to realize the moral law in the sensuous world. But such a tool it can only be on the condition that it remain utterly free, and dependent only upon the free will of the person. Immediately upon perceiving a human body, the command of the moral law, respecting this determined body, is addressed to him.

I do not add this without good reason, for someone might say: "What matters it whether this or that body exist, the end and aim of reason will be realized anyhow; and one body more or less makes no difference." I reply: This does not concern us in the least, and it is not at all permitted to us to think so. It suffices, that this single body exists also, and is likewise free; and when we perceive him, the moral law commands us to regard him as such a one, who necessarily belongs to the community of rational beings, and to the tools for the realization of the moral law. (Thus even here already do we catch a glimpse of the idea of a ruling of the moral law in the nature which exists independently of us, and of an adaptability of nature for the moral law; an idea which finds its realization in the idea of a Godhead, but which we have not to discuss in this place.)

(a) Considered negatively, this regulation is an absolute prohibition, never immediately to influence the body of another rational being. A human body is to depend solely upon the will of the person, and absolutely upon no external force. Mediatly I am allowed to determine the body, *i.e.*, I may determine the person, by means of rational argument, to cause his will to produce through his body these or those modifications in the sensuous world.

But I must not use his body as a tool, as a means for my own will. I must not seek to influence his will through physical forces—blows, knocks, hunger, imprisonment, or deprivation of freedom. I am permitted to

influence him solely through rational grounds, and absolutely through no other means.

Nor am I permitted to oppose in an immediate manner physical resistance to the causality of another person upon the sensuous world. In what cases these general prohibitions cease we shall see hereafter.

I am not allowed even to kill anyone intentionally: the death of a human being must never be the object of my action. The strict proof of this is as follows: The life of each man is a means for the realization of the moral law. Now I either hold it possible, in the case of a certain man, that he still may be or become such a means, or I do not consider it possible. If I do consider it possible, how can I, without refusing obedience to the moral law and making myself indifferent to its realization, annihilate the person who is, in my own conviction, destined to assist in its realization? If I do not consider it possible, if I hold anyone to be an irredeemable villain, then my immorality consists precisely in my thus holding him. For the moral law absolutely binds me to infuse moral culture into him, and to assist in making him better. Hence when I firmly resolve in my own mind that he is irreclaimable, I abandon a work assigned to me by that law. But this I must not do, and hence I also must not thus hold him. The moral law absolutely requires the faith that each man can be bettered. Now if this faith is necessary, then the first part of our argumentation again receives validity, and I cannot destroy a human life without abandoning my end and aim, and destroying the end of reason in him as much as lies in my power. Whosoever is to become moral must live.

We have argued in this manner: it is absolutely required of me to promote morality in every individual. But this I cannot, without assuming the possibility of such morality. Hence, &c.

The *minor* of this syllogism, which alone might need a proof, can be thus proven. I make something my

end and object (here, for instance, the reform of an individual) signifies: I postulate the actuality of this reform in some future moment; but I postulate it signifies: I posit it as possible. Now the moral law absolutely requires me to have that end and object; hence it requires me to think everything involved in it. Precisely as we demonstrated above the necessity of faith in the perfectibility of the human race, so do we here prove the necessity of faith in the reform of every particular individual.

Hence, as premeditated self-murder can on no condition co-exist with true morality, so can neither the premeditated murder of another, and for the very same reason. In another case a possible tool of the moral law is being annihilated. But it is very well possible that as it might become allowable to expose one's own life to danger, so it may also become a duty to expose the life of another to danger. We shall see in what cases.

In my *Science of Rights* I have expressed myself concerning a pretended right of the State to take away the life of a criminal as follows: that the State, as judge, and as not a moral but merely a legal body, can only cancel the civil agreement between it and the criminal, thereby making the criminal an outlaw and a mere thing. Death may be the result of this annihilation of all the rights of the criminal, not however as a punishment, but as a means of security; and hence it is not at all an act of the *judicial*, but simply of the *police* power. A single individual can and ought even to expose his own security for the sake of his duty: never to attack a human life; but Government has not the same right in regard to the security of all. In the same work I have also expressed myself concerning the killing of armed enemies in times of war, which may not only be lawful, but even a duty. The object of war is by no means to kill the citizens of the hostile State, but simply to drive them away or disarm them, thus rendering

the hostile State powerless, and compelling him to enter into a legal relation with our State. In hand-to-hand combat the single soldiers kill each other, not to kill each other but each to defend his own life; and this not by virtue of a right conferred by the State to kill, a right which the State cannot confer, but in virtue of his own right and duty to defend himself.

(b) The disposition of the moral law in regard to the bodies of rational beings outside of us in its positive character, and as a command, involves the following:

The health, strength, and preservation of the body and life of others is to be an end to us. We must not only oppose no obstacle to this preservation, but must promote it in the same degree as the welfare of our own bodies. The strict proof of this is as follows: Each human body is tool for the promotion of the final end of reason. Now, if the latter is indeed my highest final end, then the preservation and highest possible adaptability of the body for that end must be also my object; for I cannot desire the conditioned without desiring the condition. The preservation of each other person must be as dear to me as my own, since the ground why I desire either, is the same: I preserve and take care of myself solely as a tool of the moral law. But each body is also such tool. Hence I must have the same care for each body, if I really am impelled only by the moral law.

Here we meet for the first time with the proposition: take as much care of the welfare of your fellow-men as of your own; love thy neighbour as thyself; a proposition which will hereafter be regulative in all positive duties against others. The ground of it has been stated: to wit, I can and am allowed to take care of myself solely in so far as I am tool of the moral law, but all others are so likewise. In this manner we receive at the same time an infallible criterion as to whether the care for ourself is a moral or merely a natural impulse. If it is moral

we shall have the same care for others ; if it is natural, it is exclusive, for the natural impulse refers only to us ; and sympathy, which is also a natural impulse exciting fellow-feeling in the fate of others, is by far weaker in its effects than the immediate natural impulse of self-preservation. In sympathizing, we always first think of ourselves, and next of our neighbours.

I am to have the same care for the welfare of others as for my own. Now according to the above I do not care for my own welfare, nor think, indeed, at all of myself, until I am reminded of myself by a feeling of weakening and losing of strength, or through some danger threatening my self-preservation. It is the same with the care for the preservation of others. It does not mean that I am to do nothing else than seek opportunities to save persons' health and life—unless, indeed, such is my special vocation. But as soon as anyone is in danger I am absolutely required to assist him, even at the risk of my own life, whether the danger comes from irrational physical power of Nature, or from the attacks of rational beings.

I say, at the risk of my own life. There occurs here no collision of duties, as might be apprehended. My preservation is conditioned through that of the other, that of the other through mine. Both are indeed altogether equal, of the same value and from the same reason. It is not my intention that either of us should perish in it, but that both should be preserved. If nevertheless one of us perishes I am not responsible for it ; I have done my duty.

(It is an idle plea to appeal to the duty of self-preservation when the other one is in danger ; self-preservation has ceased to be a duty. Correctly translated that plea means : we will save the other one if we are safe in doing it. This is certainly noble and great ! Not to wish to save a human life, where we could do so without any danger to ourselves, would be evident murder. Nor

are we in such cases first to calculate, as some moralists hold, whose life might be of greatest value, and whose preservation of most importance. Before the moral law, human life in general is of equal value, and when one human life is endangered all other human beings have no longer a right to be secure until the one is saved. It is truly a great and moral word, which the late Duke Leopold spoke, when he said, "Here a human life is at stake: what am I more here than you?"

2. The formal freedom of an individual, which the moral law requires us to respect and promote, involves secondly, the continuation of his free influence upon the sensuous world. The act of the individual is to result in that which he had in view when he began to act, for only on this condition is he free.

I. Such a causality is conditioned firstly by a correct understanding of that which the act of the individual has for its object. I cannot work on anything unless I have a knowledge of it, and the end I have in view is determined by this my knowledge of the actual being and independent quality of the thing. The end I have in view proceeds from the present quality of the thing, and governs itself according to the natural laws of the thing. If I have an incorrect conception of the object of my act, my act will result in quite a different end than that which I had in view, and hence I am not free in my causality. I must will the conditioned, the free causality of my fellow-men in the sensuous world, and hence I must also will the condition, that they shall have a correct cognition of the same, sufficient for their causality. This correctness of their practical cognition must be an object to me, precisely in the same measure as the correctness of my own practical cognition is an end to me.

a. This disposition of the Moral Law considered *negatively* results in the prohibition, absolutely not to lead the other into error, not to lie to him, or deceive

him, neither directly by categorically asserting what I myself do not consider true; nor indirectly by making ambiguous statements which I intend shall deceive him. The latter is as much a lie as the former; for not the words which I use, but the intentions, constitute the lie. If I intend to deceive I am a liar, whether I tell the lie straightway, or merely induce the other to infer it. Of course, whether I actually have or have not the intention that he should thus infer it, or whether the ambiguity of my statement may not result accidentally, I must decide before my own conscience.

In short: I positively owe every man absolute frankness and truthfulness; I must not speak anything against the truth. Whether and in how far I also owe all men openness, *i.e.*, whether I must also say all the truth which I know, we shall see hereafter.

The strict proof of our proposition is as follows: I have moral sentiment, I consider my fellow-man as a tool of the Moral Law, that is to say, as one who is always to choose after his own insight and from his own good will. Now if I produce in him an incorrect knowledge, in accordance wherewith he acts, then that which results has not been selected through himself, but he has been made a means for *my* end; and this is immoral. If thereby I induce him to commit an illegal act—which may be moral for him because he starts from incorrect presuppositions supplied by me—my guilt is evident. I had an immoral end in view, and have used the other—perhaps contrary to his own mode of thinking—as a tool. But apart even from this abuse of the other, the guilt is as much my own as if I had committed the act in person, which I induced him to commit through misrepresentation. I am the true culprit. But even if I had really calculated upon a legal act, and had attained it thus through means of the other, I should have acted immorally. The other is to do that which is right, not from error, but from love for the good. I

am not at all permitted to intend mere legality; my end should be morality, and I cannot have the former alone in view without abandoning the other, and to do this is immoral.

"But," objects a defendant of that immoral doctrine of morals, "I knew that the other could only be induced by this means to do the good deed." I reply: This you can never know, and should not believe; for such a distrust of the other's rationality is immoral. Moreover, supposing even it had happened so, and that the other had not done the good deed which you claim to have had alone in view, unless you had made the misrepresentation in question—you would be utterly innocent in the matter. For it is not at all your moral duty to realize the good without regard to the means; the good is to be realized through morality, and otherwise it is not good. Precisely by abandoning the form in which alone the essence of the good consists, and by having only the content in view, do you clearly show yourself to be actuated in that good deed, not by interest in the cause of morality, but by some advantage or another, for only the latter is satisfied by the content of the deed.

These same arguments are to be applied to him who perhaps seeks to defend a lie by the plea that he intended to prevent an evil by it. He should hate and prevent a wrong, not for the sake of the act as such, but for the sake of its immorality. If anyone asks him for the truth of a matter with evil intentions, he must not tell a lie; he may tell the truth, and if he does and knows the evil intentions of the other, he ought to convince the other of the wickedness of his intentions. He has not a right to suppose that these remonstrances will be of no avail, but even if they really do no benefit, physical resistance still remains open to him. Thus the pretext that the lie was for a good intention is for ever annulled; the results of a lie are never good.

The subject-matter of my statement may be either

nature, to which in this respect the disposition of other free beings does also belong, or my own disposition. In the latter case I make a promise; I must hold my promise, unless indeed I have promised an immoral act.

“But,” it might be objected, “I may change my opinion and my measures respecting that which I have promised.” We reply: When I have promised and thus induced another one to shape his calculations in accordance with my statement, I am no longer dependent merely upon myself, but likewise upon the other. In so far I am in his service, and I cannot withdraw my word without destroying those actions of his which he has undertaken in view of my promise, and hence without annihilating his causality in the sensuous world. I may remonstrate with, and thus induce him to relieve me of my promise; but only in so far as he thus releases me am I quit of my promise. He makes me a present of it. A good advice concerning the difficulties which arise from promises respecting matters about which one may apprehend a change of views, and which depend indeed upon future events, is this: not to make promises too easily.

I said: I must keep my word unless I have promised an immoral action. This needs a more particular specification. For everything is immoral for me, which I know to be not the best, or concerning which I am merely indifferent; hence it would seem that I must do no promised action whenever I have changed my views regarding it, or become dubious as to whether I am able to fulfil it. The reply to this is as follows: whatsoever does not absolutely contradict morality, and hence whatsoever lies on the road to the attainment of the final end of reason, I must do for the sake of the other, although I might do better for my own person. Only that which is absolutely opposed to morality must I positively not do. Hence I fulfil the promise for the other's sake, though I might do better so far as my own person is concerned.

At the same time we shall here reply to two other questions which force themselves upon us on this occasion.

Firstly: how comes it that so many men, who wish to pass for honest and not unreasonable men, defend "necessary lies," and seek up all possible arguments to gloss them over? It comes from this. In our age, the men who form their minds and their natural character in accordance with that age, are placed by this sort of culture—which, however, is not the culture through freedom—upon that standpoint which we have described more particularly above. Their empirical Ego is to rule the world without regard to the freedom of others; they want to make happy, protect, and beatify this world according to *their individual* conceptions of happiness, beatitude, and misery. This is their chief aim. But with the weakness which our age is not unjustly charged with, in their character they lack the strength of resolution to realize their arbitrary ends by force, and hence they conclude to realize them through cunning, which necessarily leads to the so-called white lies. This, their internal mode of thinking, of course determines also their theoretical system, unless they are philosophers capable of starting from the absolutely highest principles. They start from the facts within them, from their impulse to lay down the law, and their lack of courage to do so by force, and from the basis of these facts they proceed logically enough. Why, nevertheless, some of them, when it comes to carrying the theory into action, depart from it, is explained by this: something else which lies also as a fact in them, but too deeply to influence their arguing; namely, their feeling of honour prevents them from making use of their theory.

Secondly: whence comes that internal shame for one's self, which manifests itself even stronger in the case of a lie than in the case of any other violation of conscience? The ground is as follows: The liar has

the mode of thinking above described. He wants to subject the other to his views and purposes. He does this by again deceivingly and for appearance's sake subjecting himself to the purposes of the other, by seemingly entering into the other's plans, approving his views, and pretending to promote them. He thus places himself in contradiction with himself, subjects himself to the man whom he does not trust himself openly to resist, and is a coward. The lie is always and in every case accompanied by cowardice. But nothing so much dishonours us before ourselves as want of courage.

As for the rest, the defence of "white lies," or, indeed, of lies in general, no matter for what good purpose, is, doubtless, the most absurd and, at the same time, the most wicked arguing ever heard amongst men. It is the most absurd. You tell me you have convinced yourself that necessary lies are permitted. If I am to believe you, I must at the same time also not believe you; for I cannot know whether in saying so you are not prompted by some laudable purpose or another—for who can know all your purposes?—and that you do not make use of your own maxim against me, and whether your assurance, that you consider necessary lies allowable, is not itself a necessary lie. A person who really had such a maxim could neither desire to confess it, nor to make it the maxim of anyone else; but only to carefully guard it for himself. For this maxim, by being communicated, annihilates itself. Of whomsoever it is known that he possess it, rationally no trust can be any more entertained by any man; for no one can know that man's secret purposes, and judge whether he is not at the moment telling a necessary lie. But when no one has any longer confidence in him, he can no longer deceive anyone by lies. Now it is doubtless absurdity to demand belief in a maxim which, when believed in, cancels itself.

But the defence of necessary lies is also the most

wicked argument possible amongst men, for the defender thereby discovers his thoroughly corrupted mode of thinking. The true seat of your wickedness is precisely that you *could but think of* a lie as a possible means of escape in certain difficulties, and that you can now consult whether it may not be allowable so to use it. Naturally there is no impulse in man to tell a lie; nature goes straightway towards enjoyment, and a moral mode of thinking knows not lying; to think a lie it needs a positive evil, an *intentional looking-out* for some crooked road, because we do not like to go the straight one before us. An honest man does not even think of such a means of escape, and if all men were honest, neither the conception of a lie would have entered into the system of human conceptions, nor an investigation concerning the morality of necessary lies in the Science of Morals.

The customary illustration of the schools can explain our thoughts. A man, pursued by his enemy with drawn sword, conceals himself in your presence. His enemy arrives and asks you, where he is. If you tell the truth an innocent person is murdered; hence, conclude some, you must lie about it. How do those, who conclude thus, get over so many possible means which the straight way before them holds up to them, into the crooked path? Firstly: why are you obliged to tell the questioner *either* the truth *or* the *lie*? Why not the third, which lies between, that you owe him no answer, that he seems to have an evil intention, that you advise him to desist from it kindly, and that, if he will not do so, you are resolved to take the part of the persecuted, and to defend him at the risk of your own life, which latter is, after all, only your absolute duty? "But," you reply, "if I do so all his rage will turn against me!" I pray you, how does it happen, that you only consider this case as possible, whereas the second case, that your opponent, struck by the justice and

boldness of your resistance, may desist from the persecution of his enemy, may cool off and become tractable, does also belong amongst the possibilities? But let us assume even that he does attack yourself. Why do you absolutely wish to avoid that? It is anyhow your duty to defend the persecuted man at the risk of your own life, for as soon as human life is in danger you have no longer a right to think of the safety of your own life. This fact alone is enough to show that the first object of your lie was not to save the life of your neighbour, but merely to escape yourself with a whole skin; and, moreover, in a case where your danger was not even real, but merely one of several possibilities. Hence you resolved to lie merely to escape the remote possibility of coming to grief! Therefore, let him attack you! Does then this mere attack of itself overwhelm you, as you seem again to assume without regard to all possible other cases? He who was first persecuted has, as we have assumed, concealed himself within your proximity. At present *you* are in danger, and it is now his general duty, and, moreover, his particular duty as a matter of gratitude, to come to your assistance. Where do you get the decided presupposition that he will not do so? But supposing he does not come to your assistance. In that case you have gained time for assistance, and others may happen to come to your assistance. But even assuming that all this should not occur, how can you be so very sure that you will be defeated? Do you then count as nothing the power which fixed resolve to suffer no injustice, and the enthusiasm for your good cause, must infuse into your body? nor the weakness wherewith confusion and consciousness of his injustice must overwhelm your opponent? In the worst case you can die; and after you are dead you are no longer obliged to protect the life of the attacked; not to mention that death saves you from the danger of a lie. Hence death precedes the lie, and a lie is never to be spoken. You

commence with the lie because you have an eye only for the crooked path, and the straight path does not even exist for you.

b. The proposition, that the correctness of the cognition of others must be our end and aim, when applied *positively*, results in the command to promote the correct insight of others, and to actually communicate to them the truth, which we know.

We only need to point out the ground of this command in order to see at once how far it extends, since it may be well foreseen that it can be valid only within limits. I am obliged to regard the other as a tool of the Moral Law. But a result corresponding to his conception can follow only in so far as he has a correct cognition of the object of his action. I am bound to promote his causality, and hence I am bound to communicate correct knowledge to him, even without his request. To do so is, indeed, necessary end for me in myself. But in how far? Of course, in so far as his cognition has immediate influence upon his acting, or in so far as it is immediately practical to him. Hence a distinction should be made between *immediate practical* cognitions and purely *theoretical* cognitions. But all theory relates to practice, as a thorough transcendental philosophy shows, and a theory is not at all possible without such relations. Hence the distinction first made is altogether relative. 'Certain things may be purely theoretical for one individual and for one age, which for another individual or for another age is practical. Hence, to know what truth we owe to an individual, we must first be able to determine what truth is practical for such individual. How is this possible for us?

It follows immediately from the acting of each individual. The knowledge of the object of his acting is immediately practical to him, and nothing else. Hence, if I see my fellow-man act, and have reason to assume that he is not well cognizant of the state of circumstances respecting such act, or if I know for certain that he has

an incorrect view of the same, it becomes my duty, without further ado, or without awaiting his request, to dispel his error; for he is in a sort of danger to do something which will not achieve his purpose, and it is not indifferent to a moral mode of thinking whether this occurs or not. I cannot morally permit him to remain in error.

I have always spoken of immediate practical truth, and have presupposed that it is precisely because I happen to be the first and nearest, why it should be my duty to communicate it. It is, of course, not to be understood here, as has already been remarked in regard to another duty, that we should hunt up opportunities to lead erring men into the right path. To do this we have not time, if we always do what first occurs to us; and our virtue should, moreover, be natural—should always do what it is requested to do, and not, perhaps, go in search of adventures, for this is no truly virtuous sentiment.

To hunt up and make known truth, which is merely theoretical, either for the age in general or for most of the individuals of that age, is the duty of a particular vocation—of the vocation of a scholar. This theoretical truth is to become practical, but cannot become so immediately and all at once, for on the way to the perfectibility of the human race no step can be leaped over. This class of scholars works for the future ages, and stores up, as it were, treasures which can only be made use of in those future ages. Of the duties of these scholars we shall speak hereafter.

3. The formal freedom of an individual involves, as we have seen (1), the absolute freedom of the body, and (2) the continuation of its free influence upon the whole sensuous world. The latter causality we have just seen to be conditioned by correctness of cognition, which gave us the moral duties, negatively, not to lie; positively, to correct errors of practical cognition. But the latter causality has yet another condition.

If the rational being is to be free in its causality, *i.e.*, if the causality is to result in that which the rational being had intended, then the state of all that, which has reference to and which influences this causality, must continue to remain precisely as it was known to be and calculated upon in the purpose and intention of the rational being. For if it changes during the act of the individual, then the effect of that act also changes, and the result is not as had been intended. (For further proof of this, in itself, very evident proposition, I refer to my *Science of Rights*.)

That, which thus relates to my acting, and which is, as it were, the premise of all my acting in the sensuous world, can only be as part of that sensuous world, if I live amongst other free beings. This determined part of the world, thus subjected to my purpose and intentions, is called, when recognized and guaranteed by society (and this recognition and guarantee is *legally* and *morally* necessary), my *property*. Without such recognition I could never be sure that my acting did not limit the freedom of others, and hence I could never act with good conscience. Only on the condition, that *all* recognize and guarantee for me a sphere for my free acting, and thus assure me that my acting within such sphere will not disturb their freedom, can I, with good conscience, act at all. This recognition occurs immediately through the state wherein I live. How it occurs mediately from the whole human race, has been shown in my *Science of Rights*.

It is, therefore, firstly, the duty of everyone, who has reached this insight, to introduce right of property, which indeed does not come of itself, but must be introduced intentionally, and according to a fixed conception. It is, moreover, the duty of each to acquire property, for it is his duty to act with freedom; and this he cannot do, because he is not sure whether he may not disturb the freedom of others, unless he has property. This we say here preliminarily, as a closer determination of the pro-

position already established, that a state must be erected, and that each individual must become a member of it. The freedom of each individual is to me an absolute end, commanded by the moral law. This freedom is conditioned by his having property and retaining it inviolable. Hence the latter, as the condition of my end, is also itself such end.

a. This disposition of the moral law, regarded negatively, results in the prohibition: *never to injure or diminish in any manner anyone's property, nor to render more difficult its utility to the proprietor.*

Firstly: I must not use his property for my own purposes, through robbery, theft, cheating, cunning, or overreaching—all of which acts are, indeed, prohibited for the very sake of their forms; the former, because they involve an attack upon the body and life of the other, and the latter because they presuppose falseness and lying. But at present we look merely to the content of these acts, namely, that they constitute a deprivation of the other's property. They are prohibited, because they interfere with the freedom of the person thus deprived of his property. He has calculated upon its continued possession, and has taken his measures accordingly. If he is deprived of it altogether, his sphere of causality and the measure of his physical power is diminished; if he has to acquire it again, he is at least retarded in the course of his activity, and is forced to do again what he had done already once before.

That immoral doctrine of morals, which generally pretends good ends to excuse bad means, and which has been called Jesuitical morality (although we do not mean to say that all Jesuits hold to it, and that none but Jesuits hold to it), might object to the above proposition, and, in fact, does object to the following: "Provided the goods thus taken are not destroyed, but merely made temporary use of, the final promotion of the end of reason is not checked, nay, is perhaps aided; if for

instance, the party who took the goods employs them better than the old proprietor would have employed them. Supposing the one who takes them knows that the original proprietor is going to make a bad use of them, and himself intends a very laudable use to the greater glory of God and greater service of his neighbour: would he not act very morally, according to your own principles?"

I reply: To promote the good is a command addressed to me *conditionally*, namely, in so far as it comes within my sphere and stands within the power rightfully belonging to me; but to interfere with the freedom of the other I am *unconditionally* prohibited.

The reason why theft and the overreaching of the other for the sake of pretended good purposes, are not defended with the same obstinacy as "necessary lies," arises from the fact that our civil laws, which have the preservation of property at heart, above all other things, and have placed severe punishment on its violation; have differently formed our modes of thinking concerning this matter. The New Zealander, for whom civil laws have not done the same, doubtless steals for good purposes, as we live for good purposes.

Secondly, I must not *damage* the property of the other, neither intentionally, and with evil purpose in view, nor from carelessness; and from the same reason, namely, because the free use of his property, and hence his freedom generally, is thereby checked. So far as intentional damage is concerned, not even a sophistry can be produced in its defence; it is absolutely immoral. So far as damage through carelessness is concerned, it is my duty to take the same care to protect the other's property, which I take to preserve my own; for it is an end to me from the same reason as my own, namely, as a means to promote the rule of reason.

Finally, it is prohibited to render more difficult the utilizing of his property to the owner. The ground of

the prohibition is clear. The object of the property is, that the owner should freely use it to promote his ends, which I must assume as tending to realize the rule of reason. To check the free use of his property is therefore equal to cancelling the end of all property, and is, therefore, essentially the same as robbery. It is no excuse that I intended thereby to prevent an evil and injurious use of it.

To *restore* what has been taken or damaged, is always duty. Without restoration there is no forgiveness, *i.e.*, no reconciliation with myself. The strict proof is as follows: He who thinks morally does not desire to damage the other's property. But this damage continues in its consequences until the complete restoration has been accomplished. As sure as I therefore return to a moral mode of thinking, I desire to have the consequences cancelled, and thus the act annihilated; and in obedience to this desire I must do all in my power to realize it.

b. The *positive* application of the requirement of the moral law, that the property of the others shall be an end to me, because it is a condition of their formal lawful freedom, involves the following commands:

Firstly: Each man who attains the use of his reason must have property. The proof has been furnished above. He must be able to act freely.

Now the care to provide for everyone's property belongs, first of all, to the State. Strictly speaking, there is no rightful property at all in a State, where but a single individual lacks property; *i.e.*, in the truest sense of the word, as signifying the exclusive sphere for free activity, and hence not merely objects, but likewise exclusive rights, to certain arts (professions). For each one owns his property only in so far as all others have recognized it; but they cannot have thus recognized it unless he in return has recognized their property likewise. Hence they must possess property. He who has

none, has not relinquished his claim to that of the others, and therefore very justly claims it. This is the legal aspect of the case. Hence it is the first duty of anyone who has convinced himself of this truth, to do what is in his power to have it recognized and carried out in his State.

But until this is done—and why should it not be done once?—it is the duty of each one to give to him who has no property, some property; or, in other words, it is his duty to be *benevolent*. Benevolence, however, as everyone will perceive, is a conditioned duty; it would not need to act if the State did what it ought to do.

Let it be well observed: Benevolence consists in procuring property for those who have none, or in securing to them a certain and continued livelihood. We should try and help one, or many, if possible, thoroughly, and for all future time; to obtain situations for those who have none, labour for the labourless; give, or loan, to the needy so that they may again resume their work; educate, or assist in educating, orphans, &c., &c.; in short, we should do wholly as many works of benevolence as possible, and not merely put a little patch here or there. Only thus is our benevolence rational and considerate. The proof lies in the conception of benevolence; each one is to have property.

The usual giving of alms is a very doubtful good work. He who gives an alms which does not alleviate altogether, can rationally only have in mind to say: I cannot help or will not help you; hunt up others to do it; and so that you may be able to make your living until then, I offer you this gift. The duty of almsgiving results from the duty to preserve the life of our fellow-men.

The imploring of help from our fellow-men can have no other object than to find a vocation and property from individuals, since the State refused it to us. Now that men should have no other end in begging alms, and should make begging a vocation, is positively not to be tolerated;

and if the State tolerates it, it is the duty of each individual to do as much as possible to defeat this end, and by no means to promote it through inconsiderate weak-heartedness and wrongly understood duty. It is understood that each one must be sure in his conscience that he does not refuse benevolence from avarice and natural hard-heartedness, merely pretending that higher principle; and whether this is so or not will easily appear by noticing whether such a person does carry out the prescribed works of a rational benevolence, whenever an opportunity offers. How far do those depart from reason and truth who make the giving of alms a religious exercise, and who tolerate and promote beggary, so that the faithful ones may not lack opportunity to do good works! As if such opportunities could ever lack!

How far, then, does the duty of benevolence extend? Is it sufficient to practise it so far as it does not become troublesome to us at all, and to give away only that which we cannot make use of? By no means; we must take away from ourselves, retrench our own expenses, become more economical, and labour more, in order to be able to do more charity; for he who is without property has a claim upon our property.

Lest this may be turned around, and the conclusion drawn that the poor have therefore a right to compel support, I add the following. Those who are without property have certainly a right to compel it from the State, and it is the business of both poor and rich to labour and bring the State to a recognition and execution of this, its duty. But so far as individuals are concerned, the poor man can never know whether it is precisely this one's duty, or whether that one is in a position to extend charity to him, or whether higher duties may not restrain them.

Secondly. Each one must retain what is his, for otherwise his formal freedom is disturbed. Hence it is duty to protect the property of the other against every attack,

and without waiting to be requested; and so to defend it in the same measure as we would defend our own, for the defence of both is means to promote the rule of reason; and whether the attack be made by irrational forces of Nature (fire and water), or by the injustice of rational beings, and by the latter through violence or cunning. Since the safety of his property is to be as dear to me as my own, it is immediately evident that I must undertake the defence of his at the risk of my own. How far this extends, and in how far I am obliged to defend it at the risk even of my life, we shall see in the following.

Thirdly: Property is an object of duty because it is a condition and tool of freedom. It is the end and aim of a morally-minded man, that others shall have as much freedom—*i.e.*, power and causality in the sensuous world—as possible, in order thus to promote the final end of reason. Hence it is also a duty to increase the *utility* of the property of others. To accomplish much, it is not so much necessary to possess a large amount of means, as to have thorough control over those which we possess, so that we may effect by them all that we desire to effect. It is not a large, but a well-trained body, completely under the domination of the will, which makes us free and independent; and, in like manner, it is not a large property, but a well-arranged property, which is easily handled, and immediately applicable for every purpose, whereby we grow independent; and as it is our duty to bring our property into this condition, so it is now our duty to have the same intention respecting the property of others. Thus we should be ready to give advice and assistance to others, though never forcing them upon others; and also to allow to our neighbour that which will do him more good, in his position, than it would benefit us. In short, *readiness to oblige* is a duty; its motive, however, must never be inconsiderate good-heartedness, but the clearly-thought intention to promote the causality of reason, as much as possible. It is a duty

to refuse entreaties, the granting of which, according to our own best insight, would do our neighbour more injury than good; but such refusal should be accompanied by rational arguments to correct the other's conceptions, and induce him voluntarily to desist from his entreaties.

Fourthly: The whole sensuous world is to be brought under the rule of reason, and to become its tool in the hands of rational beings. But in the present sensuous world all things are connected with each other, and hence no part thereof is wholly and unlimitedly under the dominion of reason, unless all parts are so. Applying this here, it results in the command: That everything useful in the world must be put to use; and since it can be put to proper use only in becoming property, that everything must become property. It is the end of the morally good man to bring this about. As every man is to have a property, so shall also each object in this world be the property of some one man.

Particularly through the practice of these third and fourth commandments, is the dominion of reason in the sensuous world put upon the most solid basis. Through the third, that each one should care, not only for the use of his own property, and for the attainment of his private ends, but likewise for the proper utilizing of the property of all: should work for, and promote their activity as they all should promote his: Reason is united into one, and becomes one and the same will in the minds of all, however empirically different they may be. Through the fourth and last, all Nature is comprehended by, and gathered together under, this one will. Reason is a unit in itself, and the sensuous world is subordinated to it. This is the end proposed to us.

B. There is no conflict between the freedom of rational beings *in general, i.e.*, it is not a contradiction, that many beings in the same sensuous world should be free. There

is only one case, where the possibility of freedom for many, or the possibility of the co-existence of two rational individuals, is cancelled by Nature itself; and of this case we shall speak hereafter. A conflict between determined free acts of rational beings arises only when one person *uses* his freedom illegally or immorally for the suppression of the freedom of the other. All of which will appear hereafter.

All shall be free. The use of freedom in many individuals must not mutually check and contradict itself. This is absolute requirement of the moral law, and hence it is the duty of each to promote the co-existence of the freedom of all. But this co-existence is only possible through each person limiting with freedom—for each is to be and remain free—the use of his freedom to a certain sphere, which all others exclusively leave to him: and leaving on his part to the others all the rest for division amongst themselves. Thus in the same sensuous world each one is free in his part without checking the freedom of anyone else. This idea is realized in the State, which, moreover, since the good will of the individual cannot be counted upon, keeps each individual within his limits. What each one's duty is in respect to the State we have already shown. The State thus keeps us by compulsion in the order which it has established amongst the individuals. Hence if a conflict arises amongst them respecting the use of their freedom, it is the duty of the State to settle such conflict; and it is the duty of each individual to leave the settlement of such conflict to the State. Hence, for the present, it is not at all to be seen how individuals can have duties in conflicts of their freedom. It rather seems as if each one had fulfilled this duty, fully in advance, by assisting in the establishment of a State, and subjecting himself to its laws. But it happens often that the State cannot settle such conflicts immediately, and it is in such cases that the duties of the private individual arise again.

Thus we have gained for the present this proposition: all duties of which we shall speak at present can only arise in cases where the State cannot assist, and only in so far as the State cannot assist. What this may mean will appear in the separate instances.

But we must preface another remark. It is all the same whether *my own* freedom, or the freedom of one of my fellow-men, is endangered through the illegal use of freedom on the part of another; for, as has often been stated, the freedom of the other is entrusted to my care from the same ground as my own, and hence is end for me to the same degree. There is no distinction between the duty of self-defence and that of the defence of others; both are the same duty of the defence of freedom in general.

Freedom is, as we have seen, conditioned by life, body, and property. True, the use of freedom also requires cognition of truth; but there never can arise a conflict between the cognition of different persons, since truth is not divisible like bodies and goods, but is one and the same, common equally to all; and since there is not for each individual a separate truth, as there is for each an own body and separate property: hence the following cases of possible conflicts arise:

1. The preservation of the bodies and lives of different persons may be in conflict.

2. The preservation of the property of different persons may be in conflict.

3. The preservation of body and life, and the preservation of property may be in conflict.

1. Firstly. The preservation of *my own* life and the preservation of *the life of another*, it appears, in certain cases cannot co-exist together; and this not through any injustice of my own or of the other, but simply through a disposition of Nature. Nature apparently withdraws the possibility of the co-existence of both. Instances I will not cite. In the *Science of Rights*, the case has been

terated at length, and decided as follows: that in such a case the question of rights does not occur at all, and since in that science only rights are taken cognizance of, the matter is left to the arbitrariness of each.

But the moral law decides quite differently. I *shall* preserve my own life as tool of the moral law; but I *shall* likewise preserve the life of the other from the same ground. The moral law commands both equally unconditionally. We are both to be regarded as tools of the moral law, and simply, as such, objects of a duty. The natural impulse, of course, leads me to prefer myself; but that impulse is not to be counted on at all, and, according to the moral law, neither of us has advantages, since in the face of this law we are both equally means of the same reason. I cannot fulfil the command of the moral law to preserve myself, except at the expense of the life of the other, according to our presupposition; and this the moral law prohibits. I cannot save the life of the other, except at the expense of my own; and this the moral law prohibits likewise. Each command of the moral law is in this case opposed by a prohibition: hence both commands annihilate each other; the law is utterly silent, and I, who am impelled only by it, must do nothing, but must quietly await the issue.

In our proof this proposition occurs: we are both *equally* tools of the moral law. This proposition has been attacked, and the theory established that it is proper to consider, who may be the best tool of the moral law, that the older one should sacrifice himself for the younger, the less talented for the more talented, &c. I reply: It is absolutely impossible to judge from whose preservation the most good would result, for finite understanding has no possible way of deciding what may be of greatest advantage in connection with all other things. Hence this decision should be left to the world's government of reason, wherein upon this standpoint we have *faith*. The finite understanding knows only that it ought to do in

every moment of life, whereunto duty impels, without caring how much, and in what manner, good may result from it. Whosoever is preserved, from his preservation it is certain that good will result, since the world is governed by the highest wisdom and love. Whosoever perishes, to him no blame attaches; he has done what he could do, and for the rest the moral law which rules the world is responsible, if we can speak of responsibility in this connection.

“But if we both wait quietly for the result, we both shall perish, whereas otherwise one of us might be saved.” Let me tell you firstly, that this neither of us knows. Though *we* see no means of escape, such means may nevertheless appear. But secondly, supposing we both do perish, what then? Our preservation is not end and object at all, but the fulfilment of the moral law is that object: hence, if we perish, such has been the will of the moral law. It is fulfilled, and our end is attained.

Secondly. Cases may occur wherein *many* of my fellow-men are in danger of life and body. It is my duty to save; but I cannot save all, or, at least, not all at once. How am I to select?

My object is, and must necessarily be, to save all, for all are tools of the moral law, and there is herein no distinction to be made. Now if I desire to save all, I will first of all render assistance to those who are in the most immediate danger, since they cannot preserve themselves any longer without foreign assistance, whether their danger be thus most imminent from the state of matters, or from their own weakness and helplessness: as, for instance, children, sick, and old persons. If amongst them there are such, whose welfare is more specially entrusted to my individual care—who are *mine own*—then these must have the preference; but let it be well observed, not from any natural pathognomonical affection, or from care for my own happiness—such motives are to be condemned—but because their preservation is my

particular duty, and because particular duty always precedes general duty.

If no such grounds of preference exist, then I must save whomsoever I can first save, whomsoever I see first. To consider the relative importance of this or that life is, in such a case, not allowable, for I cannot know anything respecting this point.

Thirdly. Cases may arise of hostile and unjust possible attacks upon my life and body, or upon the body of someone else; for that must be the same to me. Here the question arises: In how far may I endanger the life of the aggressor in defending my own? It is absolute duty to defend the life of the attacked party, whether it be I or another; but this does not cancel the duty to spare and preserve the life of the aggressor. Hence my object can never be to *kill* the aggressor, but merely to render him *harmless*. I ought, therefore, to call for the help of others, if they are near, and thus of the State. I ought likewise only to repel the attack as well as I am able, without endangering the aggressor himself. If I cannot do this, I should rather maim or wound him; anything so that his death be not my object. If he does get killed, it results against my intention, though chance and I are not responsible for it.

It might be objected, and many moralists have objected: "But still you have exposed the life of the aggressor to danger. Now, if the matter only concerns yourself, and if yourself are the attacked, why do you not rather die than expose the other to danger?" In order to thoroughly and clearly refute this objection, I shall compare the presupposed case with the one just considered. In the latter it was my duty to preserve my life, and so it is in the supposed case; but I was not to preserve it at the expense of the life of the other. Now there is firstly this great distinction: In that case the conviction was before me that my self-preservation must entail the death of the other; but in the supposed case it

is not necessary, not proposed to kill him. In that case, moreover, the life of the other was in the hands of Nature, and would surely, in my conviction, be taken from him the moment I preserve my own. But in the supposed case this rests within my own power; a power which is controlled by my free will; and it is not my will to kill him, nor do I foresee and presuppose that he will be killed. But secondly, and which is the decisive point: the duty to act here in self-defence, is based not only upon the duty to preserve my own life, but at the same time upon the duty to prevent something evidently prohibited by the moral law, namely, murder. What the moral law absolutely forbids, the moral man cannot allow to happen at any price; for his will is the will of the moral law. Now this does not happen in the above case, where there is nothing immoral to be prevented.

As soon as the aggressor is disarmed, my defence ceases. I have nothing else for him but rational arguments. If there is anything more to be done in his case, to promote general security, to establish an example for others, or to prevent himself from doing similar things, these are matters for the State to settle, into whose hands he is now transferred. The State is his judge, not I as an individual.

2. The preservation of the property of different persons is in conflict, and seems mutually to cancel itself. My property, and the property of another, is, at the same time, in danger. In that case the preservation of mine comes first, for I naturally first observe its danger, and thus first receive the command of the moral law to save it; and whosoever has already a determined duty to fulfil, must not leave it for another. I also naturally suppose that the other will do the same in regard to his own property. Of course I must be sure, in my own conscience, that I thus prefer my own from reasons of duty, and not of selfishness. I must save mine not as mine, but as part of the common property of reason. Whether

I really do so regard it, will easily appear afterward from the fact whether I so apply it or not; whether I am ready to serve and assist my other unfortunate neighbour with it, and to divide, so far as I am able to do so, with him, that which I have saved.

The mere *possibility* that my property may get into danger, does not absolve me from the duty to save that of my neighbour which is *actually* in danger. For so long as the danger to mine is merely possible, I have nothing to do; but to do nothing and to rest, except where duty commands, is immoral.

It is absolutely immoral to protect one's own property at the expense of the other's; or to parry a danger which threatens our property, by putting it, in whole or in part, upon our neighbour's. If it had happened to him, he would have been forced to bear it, and we to help him to bear it; but now, it has happened not to him, but to us. The moral man sees in this a dispensation of providence. He grapples with the danger as well as he can, but he does not try to make another one suffer what providence sent to *him*.

Life is worth more than property; for life is the condition of property, and not property the condition of life. Hence we must save the lives of our fellow-men before saving their property, must prefer the safety of our and their lives to that of our and their property, whenever the danger to that property comes from irrational forces of Nature. How the relation may be changed, if the danger arises from the injustice of rational beings, we shall see directly.

3. The preservation of body and life may conflict with the preservation of property.

My property, or the property of the other, which ought to be the same to me, may be attacked by rational beings. For such a case it is not merely the property which is to be preserved, but an immoral and illegal action which is to be prevented. Now, the will of the moral law is the

will of the moral man, and hence he cannot permit what the moral law does not suffer. It is, therefore, absolute duty to prevent robbery, *in as much as it is absolutely against the moral law*, and as each can categorically assert it thus to be. Let not this last clause be overlooked. An attack upon the property of the other is absolutely against the moral law, solely in so far as the aggressor has recognized it as property. Hence, in so far as he is a member of the State. It is, therefore, absolutely illegal and immoral when it is committed by one citizen of a State upon a fellow-citizen of the same State, or of a State at peace with his State; but it is not absolutely illegal and immoral when committed by an avowed enemy. For in the latter case there is a law dispute between the States at war with each other, and it is problematical in law what side may be in the right; hence, no one has the power to assume the decision of this point, since the other one does not recognize his authority.

I must prevent robbery; this is an absolute command. But what means may I use for the purpose, in how far may I use force, and in how far may I expose my own life, and the life of the other, to danger?

Firstly, the case may be of a nature which permits of a remedy on the part of the State—if not at once, at least hereafter. In such a case the State can annihilate the unjust act; and it is, therefore, duty to do nothing immediately, and to expose neither myself nor the aggressor to danger, but to notify the State of the matter. This case arises when the property taken is of a nature that it can be known, and when the State has guaranteed its possession, or when the person of the aggressor is known to us. In the latter case, however, it is necessary, and hence duty, to provide proper proofs for the State.

Secondly, the case may be of such a nature that if I do not resist on the spot, the unjust act becomes successful so far as I can foresee. In such a case it is duty to resist by force; but with the same precaution enjoined in

the defence of life and body. If the aggressor resists, it becomes a fight for life and death. My life is attacked, and the matter comes under the rules established for such a case. I no longer defend my property, but my life, and at the risk of my life.

It might be objected to this that I have myself brought affairs to such a pass by offering resistance, and that I myself have changed a fight for mere property into one for body and life. I reply: Morally I was bound to resist the robbery of my property. I could not, and was not bound to assume that the aggressor would resist my attempt to drive him away, for I must always assume that the moral law will be followed, and not violated. It is, moreover, understood that I have attempted to dissuade him by rational arguments. It is altogether the fault of the aggressor that the affair has become one of life and death: he ought to have been deterred by my resistance.

Thirdly, in cases of complaints preferred before the State—and not merely in the present instance, but generally—the moral law prescribes as follows:

Whenever the State requires notification of such violence it is my duty to give it, since obedience to the State is duty. But when it is left to my free will, whether I choose to prefer such or not—and the State has its limits in this respect: for instance, in private affairs which happen in one's own house the rule is, where there is no plaintiff there is no judge—the moral law requires that I should not prefer it at once. The ground is as follows: The State does not convince. Whether we acknowledge, or do not acknowledge, the justice of its decision, we still must submit to it, and it is carried out with physical force; for the State treats man not as a rational being, but as a force of Nature which must be restricted to its limits; and the State is right in doing so, since it was established for this purpose. Now, in *private affairs* the State acts in my name when it does act, for it does not act unless I empower and call upon it

to do so, and would not act if I did not do so. Hence, what the State does is to be ascribed to me. But *I* am required to treat my fellow-man not as mere force of Nature, but as a rational being, if I can possibly thus arrange with him. I am therefore bound, before preferring suit against him, to try arguments, and see whether I cannot bring my opponent, through rational representations, to confess his injustice, and to resolve voluntarily to make it good.

If these representations are of no avail, then it becomes duty to prefer suit; for his unjust act must not succeed, but be defeated. It might be objected: "But from what point of time do I know for certain that they will be of no avail; and how can I ever know that they will be of no avail? Does it not therefore remain my duty always to presuppose that they might be successful?" I reply: The point here is to make restoration. This must be done within a certain time, hence I cannot fix a determined time either for myself or him. If my suit before the courts force him to restore and make good the damage done, I shall still be able, and it will still remain my duty, to convince him, through remonstrances, that he ought to have done voluntarily what now he is compelled to do, and thus to subject his will to the law, as well as his external action has been so subjected through compulsion.

Hence I must regard and treat, both pending and after the trial, my opponent as a rational and moral person. In the same manner I must likewise, as we have already seen, seek to preserve him as a possible tool of morality, even if I have become involved with him in a fight of life and death. This gives us occasion to speak, in the present place, about *love towards our enemies*, concerning which otherwise we should have nothing particular to say, since all that can be said about it is already involved in the previously established principles; and it is merely to remove some misunderstandings that I touch upon this point.

Pathognomonical love, or a separate inclination towards this or that person, is not moral, but merely natural. It must never be the motive power of our acts. It is generally agreed that such love towards our enemies is not commanded by the moral law; and if some say it is not so commanded simply because it is not possible, only the ground assigned is not correct. Why should it not be possible? Might we not feel a particular inclination, arising from some natural ground, towards any person that perhaps hates and persecutes us, merely because this inclination is not reciprocated? No; this love is not commanded, simply because it is not a moral love; is not something dependent upon our free will, but dependent upon a natural impulse.

Yet, on the other hand, those are also mistaken who assert that this command requires not at all any internal affection, but merely an external act; and that it is sufficient to act, *as if* we did love our enemy, no matter how much we may hate him in point of fact. This assertion is false, because no act is moral which does not emanate from an internal disposition; and because such a command would merely require legality towards our enemy, which the moral law *immediately* never commands.

The solution is as follows: From the standpoint of morality there is only one view from which to look upon our fellow-men, namely, I must regard them as tools of reason. But as such I must regard all without exception, no matter how much their present actions may lead me to conclude the contrary. Even if he is not such now, I must never abandon the hope that he may become such, as has been abundantly proved above. The same holds good of my enemy. I must love him: that is to say, must believe him capable of reforming; and this love I must evince in deed: that is to say, I must assist with all my power in his reform.

Moreover, which should be well observed, the moral man has no personal enemy, and recognizes none. Nothing,

indeed, is hateful to him, and he seeks to overthrow nothing except the evil, and this simply because it is evil. Whether such evil be directed against him or against anyone else, is all the same to him, for he holds himself as absolutely nothing more than anyone else, namely, as a mere tool of the moral law. There is no reason at all why he should think worse of the man who happens to stand in his way, and should sooner despair of him than of one who stands in the way of some good cause or another. Whoever feels an offence deeper because it has touched *him*, may be sure that he is an egotist, and is very far yet from true morality.

CONCLUDING REMARK.

Although the duty of truthfulness is not to be discussed here, since no collision can arise concerning it, something nevertheless results from it, to which we must refer in few words: *Honour and good repute*.

Honour and good repute, in a moral sense, consist in this: That others should believe us to be possibly actuated in our actions generally, and particularly in our relations to them, by a regard only for the good and the just. This opinion each one should have of the other, as we have seen, for each one should consider the other as a possible tool of morality; and should thus entertain it until the contrary is proved for the present, and even then he should not abandon the hope of future reform. This opinion which others entertain of us, conditions our influence upon them, and hence it is our duty to retain and defend it. Decided indifference to all evil reports which may be scattered against us, is indifference to, and contempt of, the men upon whom we are to work, and to our own moral destination; and hence it is a very immoral mode of thinking. It needs no particular self-control to become, in a natural way, indifferent to the judgments of others. We only need to look a little closer at the

men as they generally are, to learn not to place too great a value upon their judgments. But a moral man should not let this indifference grow upon him; he should always see in men rather that which they *shall* be, and become thus that which they actually are.

Now, if anyone has attacked this our honour, and we can only defend it by communicating of him what must hurt his character, it is our duty to do so. It is, for instance, our duty to say and to prove that the other has told the untruth. The matter stands here in precisely the relation as when we defend our life and property against an unjust attack. We must defend it even at the risk of the aggressor.

C. Hitherto we have seen that it is our duty to spare and promote the formal freedom of our fellow-men, since we are morally bound to regard each one who bears a human face, as a tool of the moral law. All men outside of us generally, and their freedom in particular, are objects of duty to us solely, in so far as we presuppose that they are such tools; for otherwise they would be merely irrational objects, to be treated according to our own pleasure, and to be subjected to our arbitrary ends. We are, therefore, bound, as sure as we act upon them, to treat them as moral beings; and only this view of them determines our manner of acting in relation to them. From this, already it is evident that we should promote the general acceptance of this view, and should aid in having their freedom applied to the promotion of the ends of reason. It is indeed easy to prove this, even in an immediate manner. The will of the moral man is the will of the moral law itself. Now the moral law wills the morality of all rational beings, and hence the moral man must desire the same. But his will cannot be an impotent, powerless will, since he is a tool of the moral law, as an individual having power in the sensuous world. He will, therefore, necessarily seek to realize this, his necessary will, with all

his power. The proof that it is absolute and general duty to promote and extend morality outside of us, offers therefore no difficulty. It is a little more difficult to state in what manner this may be possible. For that alone can be called moral which proceeds from our own free resolve without the least compulsion, and without the least external motive. It seems, therefore, impossible to communicate morality, or to furnish the least assistance in this communication. The command to extend morality seems, therefore, completely empty and impracticable, and nothing seems to remain to us but impotent wishes; for how could we promote morality except through sensuous causality, and how can sensuous causality ever awaken freedom? This is, indeed, undeniably true in many respects, which we shall proceed to state.

1. First of all, a morally-minded man can never think of bringing men to virtue by compulsory means—as threats of punishment, or promises of rewards, whether held out in the name of the State and some powerful ruler, or in the name of an Almighty Being. All acts, which are impelled by such motives, are absolutely devoid of morality. It being still customary to attempt to weaken and limit this proposition, and to hold up the system of a virtue of punishments and rewards by various pretexts, I shall prove my assertion with greatest strictness.

All impulse after happiness is based upon the natural impulse. I desire this or that object because my nature has an impulse for it, and I do not desire it because there is in my nature an aversion against it. Now if this impulse is made use of, to induce me to commit certain acts, these acts thus become conditions of the satisfying of such impulse; and in this manner the satisfying of my natural impulse evidently remains *the ultimate end* of my acts, and my acts themselves are merely the means, and are merely considered by me as means for such end. But therein consists precisely the essence of immorality,

that the satisfying of our natural impulse is the ultimate end of my acting, whereas the law requires that I utterly subordinate this impulse to a higher prompting. Hence, by inducing me to these acts, I have not been made moral; but have, on the contrary, been deplorably confirmed in my immorality, since this my immorality has been authorized and cultivated through something which has been preached to me as a doctrine of morals, and which has been held up to me as the highest and holiest. All hope of morality has been thus annihilated, by substituting immorality in its place, and all inclination and presentiment of morality has been utterly rooted out. To treat men in this manner is to treat them as brutes. We make use of the brute's instincts to develop in it the qualities we have in *view*; and, in like manner, we would *train* instead of *cultivate* man.

Let us, therefore, avoid all those equally indefinite and shallow, injurious, and all true morality-eradicating pretexts, as, "We do not want the rewards to be the only end of the virtuous, we merely want him to have it *also* in view"; or, "The reward is not to be the *chief*, but merely *one of the ends*." By no means. Reward is not to be an end *at all*. Every act done from hope of reward, or fear of punishment, is absolutely immoral.

Let it not be said, "We only want to use this means in the beginning, until we have made men more open to pure morality." By the use of such means you do not at all begin true moral sentiment, but continue the old immoral disposition, which you thus, moreover, carefully preserve and cultivate. In fact, your whole pretext, that men are not fit for pure morality in certain states, is a pure invention, and your distinction between a pure and a not pure morality is downright absurd. There are no two moralities; there is simply one morality: and that morality which is not pure, which does not proceed altogether from the idea of duty, is no morality at all. For here we speak altogether of the moral *disposition*, and not of the com-

pleteness or incompleteness of the *external realization* of this disposition in actual acting.

2. Nor can morality be compelled through theoretical conviction. For, firstly, theoretical convictions themselves cannot be compelled: a true proposition, which explains many phenomena in men, but which the professional philosophers rarely take to heart, because it would disturb them in their phantasm, that they can improve or reform men through syllogisms. No one becomes convinced unless he penetrates into himself and internally feels the agreement of his self with the truth uttered; which agreement is an effect of the heart, and on no account a conclusion drawn by the understanding. This attention to our self depends upon freedom, and hence conviction is always freely given, never forced. I do not mean to say that we can freely convince ourselves of anything we choose to, for we can only convince ourselves, and desire to convince ourselves, of truth; but it is not necessary that we convince ourselves of the truth: this conviction depends upon our free will. Conviction is an *act* of reason—reason *subjecting* herself, through an act of her self-activity, to truth—and is not a passivity of reason. To convince ourselves of propositions which check our passions, *presupposes* a ruling good will, and hence that will cannot first be produced by our conviction.

3. Since, nevertheless, we shall probably be compelled to exercise moral influence only through reasoning, which can only be done in the way of theoretical argumentation, we have, at least, gained so much for the present that this influence presupposes already the principle of good and evil in the subject to which it is addressed, and that thus all promotion of morality would be impossible, could we not everywhere confidently presuppose this principle.

It can, indeed, be shown that there is something ineradicable in human nature, with which moral culture

can always be connected. This is the sentiment of esteem. This sentiment may lie undeveloped in the soul; but it can neither be eradicated, nor directed upon an object foreign to it. We may love, seek, and desire sensuous enjoyment, and may feel delight in experiencing it, but we can never hold it in esteem; esteem does not apply to it at all! Again, wherever this sentiment finds its application it results without fail: whatsoever is esteemable is sure to be esteemed. Hence, the first rule for the extension of morality will be as follows: Show to your fellow-men esteemable things, and in this respect we can scarcely show them anything more to the purpose than our own moral mode of thinking and moral behaviour. Thus there results the duty of a *good example*, to which we shall return hereafter, at present proceeding our logical way. The first step in moral culture is, therefore, the development of esteem.

4. As soon as man is forced to esteem something outside of himself, the desire to esteem himself awakens in him. This impulse of self-esteem, as soon as it has once been awakened through some external motive, is as ineradicable from human nature as self-love. No man can bear to coldly despise himself, and quietly to regard himself as a wicked and miserable wretch. But it is equally impossible that he should esteem himself, if he is contemptible.

Of course, this does not improve the moral condition of man in the slightest degree, but often rather makes it considerably worse. For in order to escape the insufferable torture of self-contempt, man falls into two ways, and often into both together. He seeks to escape himself, because he fears himself; he takes care not to look into his inner soul, because this shows him nothing but terrific objects. In order to get rid of himself, he dissipates all the more in the object of the external world. He stupefies his conscience. But as this means is not a complete remedy, he seeks to get rid of the forced esteem of something outside of himself, and the self-contempt which

results therefrom, by trying to persuade himself that that esteem is all humbug and foolishness; that there does not exist anything that is esteemable, noble, and sublime; that it is all only appearance and deception; that no man is better than himself, and that human nature in general is no better. It is idle to try and refute this system by rational arguments, for its ground lies not in reason, but in the heart; and it would be necessary first to root out this ground in the heart, or to relieve such a man from his self-shame and self-fear. He is thus at variance with all that is good, simply because he is in conflict with himself. Let us first try and reconcile him to himself; let us show him that he himself is not so utterly devoid of all good, as he would himself believe; let us first lead him back to the good principle in himself.

Immorality is, therefore, either complete brutishness, and this must first be cultured by the above means of teaching man to esteem something outside of himself; or it is despair of one's self: and this is to be cured by showing such a man that at least others do not despair of him, by showing him confidence and making him acquainted, on particular occasions, with the hidden good in himself. He, in whom others evince confidence, will soon also have some confidence in himself; but he, of whom all others despair, must certainly begin to despair of himself.

Thus, in our theory, everything is connected, and each link attached to the other. We have already shown that it is absolutely immoral to despair internally of the reform of any man. That which we there showed to be an internal duty, and a regulative of our external acts, now again shows itself to be a means for the promotion of our ultimate end; and it becomes a duty to manifest this internal confidence likewise very decisively in external actions.

The good principle which exists in all men, and which can be eradicated in none, is precisely the possibility to

be able to esteem something unselfishly, and hence without all regard to advantages; and thus absolutely *d priori* and without any ground. It is also the impulse to desire one's self-esteem, and the impossibility to sink down to the infamy of being able quietly and coolly to despise one's self. Let men be led back to this principle. Let them be shown that it lies at the basis of all their behaviour. Let it be said, for instance, to those who absolutely deny the possibility of an unselfish impulse in man, to men like Helvetius, &c.: "You say you have discovered that men are only impelled by selfish motives; that they deceive themselves if they report otherwise. Very well, this is a good thing for you; make use of this discovery as much as you are able to do, and go your ways. But why do you communicate this matter to us? What do you gain, since all men, and you amongst them, can only act from selfish motives by communicating it to us; or what danger do you thereby turn away from your heads? If the deception to believe otherwise does produce any damage, it certainly causes none to you, since you assure us that you do not believe it. But as for our damage, what does that matter to you? What do you care whether others suffer injury? Rather be glad, and draw as much gain from it as possible. Nay, it would seem as if it must be a positive advantage to you, if all remain in this error; and if you were logical you would do all in your power to keep up and extend this error. For it affords you a means to gain us over to your secret projects, under the pretext of virtue and unselfishness; which it will not be so easy for you to do if you boldly announce your private advantage as your ultimate end. In short, since you can gain nothing by communicating your discovery, your assertion contradicts itself. Nay, what is more, you not only communicate it to us, indifferent as to whether we accept it or not, but you make it your special business to convince us of it, and defend your proposition with all possible zeal. Whence may this interest arise which you

manifest? If that belief is really so contemptible as you assert it to be, why do you oppose it with so much warmth and energy? Why not let it fall to pieces of itself? Your conduct is, therefore, absolutely incomprehensible if you are only actuated by selfish motives. What, then, may be your motive? It will not be difficult to show it to you. You are so very concerned to convince us of your opinion, not that we may govern ourselves according to it in our actions—for such would be very inopportune for you—but that our conviction may assist in supporting your conviction. You are not yourself very sure of your assertions, and desire to complete, through our agreement, the conviction which you lack yourself. And now I ask you further: Why do you desire to be so very certain of your matter? If mere selfishness is the motive of your acts, of what profit can this complete certainty be to you? You are again illogical. You want to be certain of it, because otherwise you must despise yourself; must look upon yourself as worse than other men, as more wicked and infamous than you are naturally. Hence you wish to esteem yourself, and have a higher principle upon which to act than mere selfishness; and you are better than you yourself think.

Or you others, who are not in this case, who do not openly confess your heart's opinion, but carefully lock it up in your soul, pleading esteemable intentions, which you do not possess, for your acts, why do you do this? If you merely intend to deceive your fellow-men by it, in order to be able all the more to use them for the promotion of your ends, you certainly recognize, through your acting, that there is a higher and nobler motive than selfishness, since you make use of it, calculate on it, and take your measures according to it. Here, again, your opinion that there is nothing higher in human nature than selfishness, contradicts your acting, which presupposes something higher, and fares well in such presupposition. Hence, in your acting at least—and the

inner heart of man discovers itself most surely in his actions—you cannot refrain from recognizing a higher principle in man, and this you certainly could only have discovered in yourself, and in your own sentiments, therefrom transferring it to others. Hence you also are not so empty of goodness as you have believed.

In one word: there is no man of even the least culture—I do not speak here of the original natural man, whom we have dwelt upon elsewhere already—who does not at times commit actions, which cannot be explained from the mere principle of self-love, or, from the presupposition of mere selfishness in others. Hence the necessity to call attention to such actions, and to the principle which lies at their basis.

In order that this proposition may not meet the objection which we have ourselves proved above, to wit: “that theoretical convictions cannot be compelled; and that hence it is impossible to convince the other that there is still some goodness left in him”; I add the following: In the present case we can be sure of it, because the heart of the man to be convinced is inclined in favour of us from the very beginning. Each one would like to esteem himself, if it were but possible; this may be taken for certain. Hence we may be certain of his assent if we show him that at least his dispositions are worthy of esteem. Upon such a basis a moral character can be built up gradually.

5. We return to the point which we touched above, when we said that in order to develop the sentiment of esteem in man, we must show him something esteemable; and there being no better occasion for this than our own example, we have the *duty of a good example*.

This duty has often been viewed very incorrectly, as if we could be obliged to do this or that, which otherwise we would not have needed to do for the mere sake of a good example (as, for instance, going to church, taking the Lord's Supper, &c.). For it has been already shown,

that within the sphere of morality there are no indifferent actions; the moral law embraces and determines absolutely all possible acts of freedom. That which I am commanded to do I must do absolutely for its own sake, without any regard to the example it may set; and that which I am prohibited from doing I must absolutely leave undone, likewise, without any regard to the example. Something which is not duty necessarily sets a bad example; no good can ever result from the immoral. But to do more than I am commanded to do is impossible, since duty disposes of all my strength and all my time. Hence there can be no actions, the ultimate end whereof might be to establish a good example, and which ought to be done merely for such example's sake. The duty of setting a good example has no reference to the *substance* of our acts, but only to the *form* thereof.

Namely: the moral law merely makes it my duty to do what is to be done, regardless whether publicly or privately, and whether with a statement of the principles upon which it is done or not. But if we look to the fact that we owe a good example—which truly neither can, nor is intended, to do any other good than to spread esteem for virtue—this is no longer a matter of indifference to us. On the contrary, the highest *publicity* of our acts and principles is commanded of us.

Firstly, as regards the internal character of this publicity. Its intention is to excite esteem for what is esteemable; but esteem can be neither compelled nor artistically produced, but manifests itself voluntarily and unobserved. Hence the virtuous must not suffer such an intention to be remarked in his acts; and since he is to give frank expression to whatever is in his heart, and since others are moreover likely to remark such intention if it exists, he must not cherish this intention at all in reference to particulars. He allows the inmost depth of his heart to reveal itself externally, without doing anything else to attract attention to it.

Such is the external character of the frank man. He pursues his path straightforward, talks and acts as his heart prompts him, and as he considers it to be his duty, without looking to the right or left to see whether he is observed or not, and without listening and inquiring what people may say to his actions; for he has no time to do this; his time is fully occupied by fulfilling his duty. But, for the very same reason, he does not conceal himself, for he has also no time to ponder over secrecy and concealment. So, likewise, if his conduct is subjected to criticism, does he reply to criticism—does he defend himself if he holds himself wronged. He does not try to smooth over his actions, if he has been convicted of wrong. Perhaps there is no more beautiful trait in human character than frankness, and none more dangerous than secretiveness. Frankness and openness at least lead to uprightness, if they are it not; but he who is secretive has a secret fear of truth, has some deep fault, which he would not like to have discovered, and he is not willing to be reformed before he does not cast off that fear of truth.

A pretentious man *intends* to be observed. This character can easily be distinguished in others, or—which ought to be the most important to us—in ourselves, from frankness, by the following marks. The pretentious man usually indulges in preparations, which are not at all necessary for his purpose, and which hence can only be intended to call attention to his acts; whereas the frank man does no more than is needed for the attainment of his object.

This publicity the frank man maintains both in his acts and principles. His ruling principle is, to do his duty merely for duty's sake; and he makes no secret of this motive. To be ashamed of this subjection to something higher and greater, as of a superstition, and to make oneself the God of the universe, is very contemptible. It is just as contemptible to give another



name to that which we have done merely for duty's sake, and thus to claim for it, for instance, motives of particular affection and friendship, of generosity, &c. The same publicity the frank man, of course, asserts in his acts; for principles are nothing unless realized in acts, and since we can convince no one that such principles are really ours except by realizing them in actions. Mere virtuous talking amounts to nothing; and furnishes no good, but rather a bad example, since it confirms unbelief in virtue. In this respect the frank man shows himself particularly logical. His acts are like his words.

CHAPTER V.

CONCERNING THE PARTICULAR DUTIES.

PRELIMINARY.

CONCERNING the relation of the particular to the general duties, the following is still to be said.

To promote the end of reason is the only duty of all, and this duty embraces all other duties; particular duties are duties only in so far as they relate to the attainment of that chief purpose. I am commanded to exercise the particular duties of my vocation and condition in life, not absolutely *because* I ought to do so, but for the reason that I thus best promote in my place the ultimate end of reason. I must regard the particular duty as a means to carry out the general duty of all men, but absolutely not as end in itself; and I do my duty in the fulfilment of my particular obligations, only in so far as I fulfil them for the sake of *duty in general*. The proposition that each one shall fulfil his duty through honestly fulfilling the obligations of his particular condition in life, is therefore to be understood with this restriction: that he must carry out those obligations solely from duty, and for the sake of duty. For there might be other motives inducing man diligently to practise these duties, as, for instance, a natural predilection for his vocation, fear of blame or punishment, ambition, &c. Whosoever is impelled by such motives, does certainly *what* he ought to do, but does it now *how* he ought to do it; he acts correctly, but not morally. Hence everyone can only decide before his own conscience whether he truly fulfils *his duty* in



his vocation. This remark relates to the necessary *form* of the will in the particular duties.

We have to add another remark concerning the *substance* thereof, which will, at the same time, furnish us with a criterion whereby each may recognize whether he fulfils the duties of his condition in life from love of duty or not. For, if such condition or vocation is not absolutely end in itself, but merely means for the attainment of an end, then—it being contradictory to place the means higher than the end—it is not allowable, but rather positively immoral, to sacrifice virtue to one's condition and vocation. Namely, the duties prescribed by such vocation, and the rights which may condition their possibility, can frequently be in opposition to the ultimate end of reason. Now the man to whom his vocation is his ultimate end, and who therefore fulfils its obligations from another motive than love of duty, will carry out those obligations, even if they are opposed to the ultimate end of reason, because he knows no higher standpoint than the obligations of his vocation. But the man who regards his vocation merely as a means, will, in such case, most assuredly not carry them out, because they no longer promote, but rather oppose, the ultimate end of reason. In the course of our present investigation, I shall apply this general remark to the duties of the various particular vocations, thereby placing it, at the same time, in a clearer light.

So far as the division of the particular duties is concerned, which must base itself upon a division of the various human relations, which we have called vocations, we can divide these relations into *natural* relations, which rest upon our arrangement of Nature, and *artificial* relations, which are based upon an accidental and free determination of the will. The former relations we may subsume under the general name of the natural *condition* of man; and the second under the name of the *vocation* of man.



A.

We shall speak here of the duties of man in regard to his particular natural condition.

There are only two natural conditions amongst those rational, sensuous beings whom we call men, which are based upon the arrangement made by Nature for the propagation of the race:

- 1st. The relation of husband and wife.
- 2nd. The relation of parents and children.

We have treated both relations extensively in our *Science of Rights*. At present we condense what we have there said, and refer the reader to that work for further detail.

I. *The relation of husband and wife.*

This relation is based, as we have said, on an arrangement of Nature to propagate the race in two different sexes. The means made use of by Nature here, as everywhere, to attain its object in *free* beings, is a natural impulse; and the relation of this impulse to freedom is that of all other natural impulses, sufficiently described above. The impulse itself can neither be generated nor annihilated through freedom; it is given. Only—and this rule has stricter application to the natural impulse for the union of the sexes than to any other natural impulse—only in so far as the act of the free being is immediately produced by the impulse, is the object of Nature attained. The conception can only prevent or permit the impulse to become an act; but to eradicate or put itself in its place—as if the act were *immediately* grounded in the conception of the end, and not simply



through its *mediation* in the impulse—this the conception can not do. The human race is not propagated according to conceptions and free resolves of the will.

Hence it would seem, at the first glance, as if we could say of the satisfying of the impulse nothing more than we have said concerning the satisfying of natural impulses in general. The impulse must really exist, and must not be artificially produced by the imagination. We must permit ourselves its satisfaction solely as a means for the end, which end is here the propagation of our race. This end, again, we should relate to our highest ultimate end, namely, the supremacy of reason. But we shall touch upon quite another much less physical aspect of this impulse; and hence the command to permit ourselves its satisfaction, solely as means to propagate the race, is even at this point to be restricted by the consideration that it must at least not be our fault if that end is not attained thereby.

Our investigation would be at an end, and there would be no marriage relation and no duties of such relation, if the end of Nature in the sexual union required merely *activity* of two persons. It is well known, and has just now been restated, under what conditions it is permitted to act upon an impulse of Nature; and there is just as little difficulty in thinking a free, reciprocal action of two persons permissible, provided both have consented to it.

This, however, is not the case here. The peculiar arrangement of Nature is this, that in the union of the sexes for the propagation of the race only the one sex should be active and the other altogether passive. (See my *Science of Rights*.) This simple ground gives rise to the most delicate relations amongst men.

It is impossible that in a rational being there should be an impulse to keep *purely* passive, to merely surrender itself to an external influence as the mere object of its use. Mere passivity utterly contradicts reason, and annuls it. As sure, therefore, as reason rules in woman,



and has had influence in the development of her character, the sexual impulse cannot appear as an impulse to be purely passive, but must change itself into an impulse to be likewise active. If the above arrangement of Nature is to co-exist with such an impulse, the latter can be only an impulse in woman to satisfy a man, and not herself; to surrender herself, not for her own sake, but for the sake of the other. Such an impulse is called *love*. Love is Nature and Reason in their most original union.

It is not proper to say that it is woman's duty to love, for love is mixed with a natural impulse which does not depend upon freedom; but it is proper to say that, wherever there is but the least inclination for morality, the natural impulse can appear only under the form of *love*. The sexual impulse of woman in its mere brutishness is the most repulsive and repugnant of everything in Nature; and, at the same time, indicates the absolute absence of all morality. The unchastity of the heart in a woman—which shows itself in this, that the sexual impulse manifests itself in her in an immediate manner—is the basis of all vices (even though from other reasons she may never allow that impulse to break out in acts); whereas, on the other hand, womanly purity and chastity—which consists in this, that the sexual impulse shows itself never as such impulse, but always in the form of love—is the source of all that is noble and great in woman. For woman, chastity is the principle of all morality.

When a woman surrenders herself to a man from love, the morally necessary result is a marriage.

Firstly, on the part of the woman. By giving herself, she gives herself *wholly*, with all that is hers, with her strength, her will, and, in short, with her whole empirical Ego; moreover, she gives herself *for ever*. She gives herself wholly: for she gives her personality; and if she excepted anything from her submission, this excepted something would seem to have more value in her eyes




than her own person, which certainly would constitute the utmost derogation and contempt of her person, such as could not co-exist with a moral mode of thinking. She gives herself for ever. For only on the presupposition that she has given herself without any reservation, and that she has lost her life and her will in the beloved, and that she can not be otherwise than his, can her submission arise from love, and co-exist with a moral way of thinking. But if in the hour of submission she could think herself at any future time as not his, she would not feel herself thus impelled to surrender herself, which contradicts the presupposition and annuls morality.

The mere conception of love involves that of marriage in the explained significance of the word; and to say that a moral woman can give herself up only to love is the same as to say that she can give herself only on the presupposition of a marriage.

Secondly, on the part of the man. The whole moral character of woman rests upon the above conditions. Now no man has a right to demand the sacrifice of a human character. The man can therefore accept the submission of the woman only on these conditions, on which alone woman can make the surrender; for otherwise man would treat woman not as a moral being, but as a mere thing. Even if a woman should voluntarily offer herself on other conditions, man could not accept her submission; and the rule of law *volenti non fit injuria* has here no application whatever. We cannot make use of another one's immorality—and in the present case it would be absolute corruption—without making ourselves guilty of it.

From these premises it appears that the satisfaction of the sexual impulse is permitted only in marriage, in the stated significance of the word; and that outside of marriage it involves in woman utter disregard of her moral character, and in man participation in this crime and the making use of an animal inclination. Between



persons of different sexes there is no union for the satisfaction of their impulse possible except the union of a perfect and indissoluble marriage. In marriage, moreover, the sexual union, which in itself bears the impress of coarse brutishness, receives quite another character worthy of a rational being. It becomes the utter melting together of two rational individuals into one; unconditioned surrendering on the part of the woman; pledges of intensest tenderness and generosity on the part of the man. Womanly purity remains inviolate even in marriage, and only in marriage. Woman surrenders herself always only to love, and even in man the natural impulse — which *man*, however, may well enough confess to himself—receives quite another form, and becomes *love returned*.

This relation of husband and wife extends throughout all their mutual affairs, and its intensity grows with the continuation of the marriage. The wife can never cease to utterly cling to her husband, and to be lost in him without reservation; for, if she did, she would have to give up, in her own eyes, her dignity, and would be forced to believe that her own sexual impulse, instead of love, had led her to surrender herself. On the other hand, the husband cannot cease to return to her everything and more than she has given to him, and to be esteemable and noble; for it is not only the temporal fate of the wife, but the confidence which she has in her own character, which depends upon the husband's behaviour. Moral commandments cannot be specified regarding the marriage relation. If that relation is as it should be, it is a commandment to itself; if it is not so, it is one connected crime, utterly incapable of reform through moral rules. There is only one result, which I shall point out.

It is the absolute destination of each individual of both sexes to marry. Physical man is neither man nor woman, but both; and it is the same with the moral man.

There are traits of the human character, and moreover the very noblest, which can be cultivated only in marriage, such as the surrendering love of the wife; the all-to-his-wife sacrificing generosity of the husband; the necessity to be venerable, if not for his own, at least for the wife's sake; the true friendship between both—friendship is possible only in marriage, and there it results necessarily; the parental emotions, &c., &c. The original tendency of mankind is egotistic; in marriage even Nature leads man to forget himself in the other; and the marriage union of both sexes is the only way in which man can be ennobled through Nature. An unmarried person is only half a man.

True we cannot say to any woman, You *shall* love; nor to any man, You shall be loved, and shall love in return; for this does not depend altogether upon freedom. But this absolute command can be established: it must not be knowingly our own fault if we remain unmarried. The clearly-resolved intention never to marry is absolutely immoral. To remain unmarried without one's own fault is a great misfortune; but purposely to remain so is a great guilt. It is not allowable to sacrifice this end to other ends; as, for instance, to the service of the State or of the Church, or to family considerations, or to the quiet of a speculative life; for the end, to be a complete and whole man, is higher than any other end.

B.

THE RELATION OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN TO EACH OTHER,
AND THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN.

We do not speak here of the mutual duties of parents in general towards children, as uneducated and inexperienced rational beings. Much might, it is true, be said on this subject; but what we have to investigate at present is the relation between parents and *their own* children in regard to their mutual duties. This relation between them does not result from any freely-created conception, but is based upon an arrangement of Nature, which it is necessary to show up, in order thereby to develop this moral relation.

Between *father* and child there is absolutely no conscious and freely-directed natural connection. The act of generation, from which some philosophers attempt to deduce rights and duties, occurs, as such, without freedom and consciousness; and there does not arise from it any cognition of the generated child. But there does exist such a natural connection, accompanied by consciousness, between *mother* and child. In her womb the fruit generates itself, and the preservation of her own life is connected with the preservation and health of the child; and she is conscious of this. She knows upon what object she wastes this continuous, ever returning, care, and thus becomes accustomed to consider its life as part of her own life. The child is borne by the mother at the risk of her life, and under great pain. Its birth is, for the mother, at the same time, an end to her pain; necessarily a sight to gladden her heart. The animal union of both continues even for some time after the birth; and in the mother is prepared the food of the child, which the former feels as much need to give as the latter to receive. The mother preserves her child because she needs it; and it is so even in regard to animals.

Now, it is absolutely against the dignity of a rational

being that it should, in any case, be driven by a mere natural instinct. True, this instinct neither can, nor should, be eradicated; but when united to reason and freedom it will appear, as we saw above in the case of woman's sexual impulse, in another form. What may this form be? According to the mere arrangement of Nature, the need of the child was also a physical need of the mother. But if we assume it to be a being with consciousness and freedom, the mere impulse of Nature will change into sentiment and affection; the physical now will be replaced by a need of the *heart* on the part of the mother freely to make the preservation of the child her own. This affection is the sentiment of *pity* and *sympathy*. It is just as improper to say of a mother's pity, that it is her duty, as it is to say so of a wife's love; it is rather the necessary result of the original union of the natural impulse and reason. But it is proper to say of both, that they condition the possibility of morality. Of a woman who is not capable of feeling motherly tenderness, it may doubtless be said that she does not rise above brutishness. It is only after the affection has manifested itself that freedom enters, and is accompanied by a command of duty. The mother is in duty bound to give herself up to these sentiments, to nourish them within her, and to suppress whatsoever might tend to deaden them.

The love of the *father* for his child, on the other hand—deducting everything which is the result of our civil legislation, of public opinion, or of imagination—is only a *mediated* love. It arises from the father's love of the mother. His tenderness towards his wife makes it a joy and a duty to him to share her feelings, and thus there arise within him love for his child and care for its preservation.

The first duty of both parents towards their child is care for its preservation. In saying this, I speak as to how matters would be if we were, and could be, truer to

Nature—namely, if husband and wife would always live and work together; and if, therefore, the child would always be under their eyes, and live together with them. In this case the parents—since man is but too much inclined to transfer reason and freedom to everything outside of him*—would transfer their own conceptions to the child, and would treat it accordingly. And hence it could not fail that traces of the reason assumed in the child, and demanded of it by this reciprocal causality, between itself and its parents, would soon exhibit themselves.

According to the necessary conceptions of free beings, freedom belongs to our welfare in the same way that reason is attached to it; and since the parents love their child, and desire its welfare, they cannot wish to deprive it altogether of freedom. But since, at the same time, they watch over its preservation, as over an end demanded both by Nature and duty, they can favour and admit this freedom only in so far as it is possible to co-exist with the preservation of the child.

Such is the first conception of education, or, as this first part of it might be named separately, of the *training* of children. It is the duty of parents to preserve their child; it is also their duty to spare and favour its freedom; hence, in so far as the latter might hurt the former, it is their duty to subordinate the use of the child's freedom to their highest end in the child, namely to its preservation. In other words, it is a duty to *train* children.

But soon the duty of a higher education—of an education for morality—is manifested. This for the following reason: The parents have discovered the freedom—for the present only the formal freedom—of the child; but every free being is capable of morality, and ought to be educated

* That is, to consider his own reason, when reflected from some external thing, to be the property of that externality itself—for instance, to assume reason in plants, brutes—nay, the whole world itself.—*Translator.*

to become a moral being; hence, also, the child. Now, for the sake of the physical preservation of the child, it is necessary that the child should at first live together with the parents; and hence the parents alone can educate the child into a moral being. This duty of a moral education involves the following: Firstly, the duty to develop properly the faculties of the child, with a view to enable it to become a good tool for the promotion of the ultimate end of reason, and hence the duty to produce *ability* on the part of the child. This is, indeed—we say this merely in passing, since it cannot be our purpose here to exhaust the theory of education—the true end of education, in so far as it depends upon art and rules—namely, to develop and cultivate the free faculties of the child. Next comes the duty to give to this thus cultivated freedom of the child a moral direction, which can be done only in the general manner previously indicated—namely, by leading it to work for the promotion of morality outside of itself.

Now let us ask, What is the relation of parents and children to each other in this education?

It is often the duty of parents to restrict the freedom of their children, partly for the sake of their preservation—for they cannot allow a use of freedom which would be injurious to the life and health—and partly for the sake of developing their abilities. In the latter respect they must cause the children to do what will promote this development, and prevent them from doing whatever might retard it, or, at least, whatever does not promote it, since all this would only occasion a loss of time and strength. But they must not restrict their children's freedom for the sake of morality. For actions are moral only in so far as they are done or left undone with freedom.

It is scarcely possible that a question should arise concerning the right of parents to restrict the freedom of their children. I respect the formal freedom of every

man, because I must regard him as a morally cultivated being, and must look upon his freedom as a means to promote the end of reason. I cannot be his judge, since he is on an equality with me. But my child I do not regard as a morally cultivated being. I rather regard it as a being which still has to be so cultivated; and precisely as such a being it is given to me through the duty to educate it. Hence, to accomplish the same end, for which I must respect the freedom of these who are my equals, must I restrict the freedom of the child.

It is the duty of the parents to restrict the freedom of the children, in so far as its use might be injurious to their education; but no further. Every other restriction is immoral, for it is opposed to the end of such restriction. It is their freedom which is to be cultivated; hence they must have freedom to make this culture possible. Parents must not prohibit anything to their children from mere obstinacy, or for the purpose of breaking their will, as the saying goes. Only that will, which runs in opposition to the end of education, should be broken. Will in general, the children ought to have; for they are to become free beings, and not will-less machines for the use of the first-comer who chooses to take possession of them. Concerning this, however, the parents are the only judges, and have to settle the matter with their own conscience. If no other means can be found to subject children to the end of education than compulsion, the parents have the right of compulsion; and in that case it becomes their duty to force the children, since the moral end of their education can be attained in no other manner. If the child is forced, it is, and remains, a mere object of the action of its parents. It has freedom only within the sphere where the compulsion ceases; and this freedom is to be considered as the result of the action of the parents. The acts of the children within this sphere have, therefore, no morality, being, as they are, compulsory.

Nevertheless, morality is to be developed in the child. Hence something must remain in the child as the result of its own freedom; and this something is *voluntary obedience*. This voluntary obedience consists in this—that the child does voluntarily, without compulsion, or fear of compulsion, what the parents command, and leaves, in the same manner, undone what the parents prohibit; and all this merely *because* its parents have commanded or prohibited it. For if the children themselves are convinced of the goodness and propriety of what has been commanded, and so much convinced that their own inclination prompts them to do it, then it is no longer obedience, but insight, which impels them to do it. Obedience is based, not upon a particular insight into the wisdom of what has been commanded, but upon childish faith in the higher wisdom and goodness generally of the parents.

It is as improper to say that this childish obedience is a duty, as to say that the love or sympathy of the wife is a duty. This obedience results from a moral disposition generally, and will manifest itself always under a correct treatment of children; for it is based only upon respect for, and submission to, the not clearly comprehended, but dimly felt, superiority of reason and of morality, joined to a love for the same, and a desire to participate in it likewise. This is the source of obedience; and if anything proves that goodness is inherent in human nature, it is this obedience.

When the obedience has once taken root, it may be strengthened and increased by freedom; the child may, with predilection, surrender itself to the considerations and sentiments which heighten it; and then, and in this respect only, does obedience become a *duty* which children owe to their parents. It is the only duty of children, and develops itself in advance of all other moral feelings, since it is the root of all morality. Even afterwards, when morality has become possible within the sphere

set apart by the parents for the child's freedom, it still remains the highest duty. Beyond that sphere the child should not insist on being free.

Obedience on the part of the child gives direction to its whole moral mode of thinking. Hence it is all-important. For as the cultured man is related to the moral law in general, and to its executor—God, so the child is related to the commands of its parents and to those parents themselves. It is an absolute duty to do what the moral law commands, without speculating about the consequences. But in order to be able to do so, we must necessarily assume that these results will be turned to a good account in the hands of God. In the same way the child is related to the commands of its parents. In the Christian religion God is represented under the image of the Father. This is excellent. But we should not content ourselves simply with ever and ever talking about this goodness. We should also consider our moral obedience to Him, and the childish resignation to His will, without speculation and doubt, which we owe Him and which we ought to exhibit, not in mere sentimentality and self-comforting, but particularly in courageous execution of our duty, no matter what results our shortsightedness would appear to discover in that duty. The cultivation of this obedience is the only means through which the parents can call forth a moral disposition on the part of their children; hence it is most emphatically their duty to teach their children obedience. It is a very false maxim, which, like various other evils, we owe to a prevailing *evadæmonism*, that we should make our children do our behests through rational argument and according to their own insight. Besides other reasons of its wrongness it involves, moreover, the absurdity of assuming that the child has a good deal more reason than we have ourselves; since even grown persons act mostly from inclinations and not from rational grounds.

The question still remains to be answered: How far

may the conditioned obedience on the part of the children, and its requirements on the part of the parents, extend? (Every obedience is *unconditioned* and also blind; for otherwise it is not obedience. It is blind for the *particular*. A blind obedience in general is not possible; for it is necessarily based upon our conviction of the higher wisdom and goodness of the person we obey.)

This question may signify a twofold. We may ask for the *extension* of obedience so far as relates to the sphere of acts, within which the child owes obedience to its parents; or, in other words, we may ask, *how far* does the child owe obedience? Secondly, we may ask for the *protension* of this obedience; or, *how long* does the child owe obedience to its parents? Is there not a point in time when the child becomes free? And where is this point?

So far as the first question is concerned, it may be raised either by the parents or by the children. The child must not raise this question—and this is, indeed, the solution of the problem—for the child ought to be obedient, and its very obedience consists in that it should not wish to be free beyond the sphere fixed by the parents. Only the parents can be the judges concerning the necessary limit of this obedience; and the child cannot be the judge, since it obediently submits to them. The phrase, “A child ought to obey in all things that are *fair*,” is a complete self-contradiction. He who obeys only in “fair” things, does not obey at all; for it involves that he should have a view in the matter as to what is fair. If he does only what is fair, as such, he does it from his own insight, and not from obedience. Whether it is proper in particular cases to insist upon obedience or not, the parents must settle with their own conscience; but they cannot allow themselves to be placed before the judgment-seat of their own children. “But how if the parents should command the child to do an improper action?” I reply: The immorality of the command can only

appear either after a careful investigation, or, immediately at the first glance. The first case cannot occur here, since the obedient child does not presuppose that its parents will enjoin an immoral action. If the second case occurs, the ground of the child's obedience, namely, its faith in the higher morality of the parents, falls away, and further obedience would be immoral. It is the same in regard to cases where the existing immorality and wickedness of behaviour on the part of parents becomes immediately manifest to the children. In such cases, obedience of the children, and education through their parents, are impossible.

If, as is fairer, the parents raise the above question, then the answer is this: Give no commands whereof you are not convinced before your own conscience, that they will promote, according to your best conviction, the end of education. You have no internal moral right to require further obedience.

If the second question is asked, namely, How long does the duty of obedience last? the answer is as follows:

Firstly, obedience is required for the sake of education; but education is means to an end; and the means ceases when the end is attained. The end of education is: utility of the child's faculties for the promotion of the ultimate end of reason in some specific branch and for some special department. Whether this end has been attained, the child itself cannot decide; for it acknowledges better insight on the part of the parents. Either the *parents* themselves decide, therefore, that the end is attained, and voluntarily allow full freedom to the child; or the *result* itself decides, that the end of education—utility—is attained. Externally the State is a competent judge in this matter. Hence, if the State confers an office upon a son, &c., it thereby pronounces that son's education completed; and this judgment of the State binds the parents both legally and morally—for the parents must submit themselves to the State for the sake

of duty. Or, finally, the education of the child is no longer possible; and this occurs through marriage. The daughter submits herself to her husband, upon whose will she depends, and can, therefore, no longer depend upon the will of the parents. The son undertakes to care for the fate of his wife wholly in accordance with her wishes, and hence he can no longer allow himself to be determined by the wishes of his parents.

But even after children have been set free, a peculiar moral relation continues between them and their parents. The parents—if, as we have been presupposing, they were also the educators of the children—know their whole character, for they have seen it arise under their very eyes, and have helped to cultivate it. They know the child's character better than the child itself. Hence they remain the child's best advisers; and for this reason it remains the duty of the parent *pre-eminently* and before all other men—this is the important point—for otherwise this would be no *particular* relation, but merely the *general* relation (which makes it a duty to give good advice to *all* men)—to give advice to their children; and it is the duty of the children to listen more attentively to the advice of their parents than to that of other persons, and to consider it more maturely. True, obedience is no longer a duty to them; they are released from it, and can act now according to their own convictions; but it is their duty to attentively consider and weigh such advice. The parents retain the duty to *care* for their children; the children the duty to *venerate* their parents. (Veneration consists precisely in this, that we presuppose higher wisdom in the other, and take pains to find wisdom and goodness in all his counsels. Lack of veneration consists in rejecting, without examination, what the other says.)

Finally, there remains between parents and children the particular duty to assist and support each other. The children thus preserve in their parents their guides

and advisers; and the parents preserve in their children their own work, which they have cultivated for the world in order to fulfil their duties to the world, even after their death.

We shall now speak, in conclusion, of the duties of man in his particular vocation.

It has already been explained what vocation generally means. The promotion of the ultimate end of reason involves many things; and that part of this end, the promotion whereof a single individual assumes in particular, is his vocation. It has also been stated what maxim should govern us in selecting our vocation; not inclination, but duty.

The true object of reason is always the community of rational beings. Our actions may either be directed upon them immediately, or upon Nature for their sake. An acting upon Nature, merely for the sake of Nature, does not exist; the ultimate end of all acting is always mankind. Upon this the chief division of all possible human vocation is based. We might call the former the higher vocation, and the latter the lower; and we might thus divide all mankind into a higher and lower class.

First of all: In how many ways is it possible to act directly upon man as a rational being?

The first and highest, although not the noblest, in man, and the primary substance of his whole spiritual life, is cognition or intellect. Through it are his actions directed; and the best intentions, though they retain their moral value, do not conduce to a realization of the end of reason, unless the cognition is correct. Hence the community of human beings may be acted upon, firstly, for the sake of cultivating their theoretical insight. This is the vocation of the *scholar*; and we shall therefore have to speak firstly: *Concerning the duties of the scholar.*

Nevertheless, insight is, and remains, only means for an end. Without a good will it has no internal value, and

does little good to the community of rational beings. But itself does not produce necessarily a good will; this most important proposition we have established most clearly above. Thus there remains the particular task of working immediately for the improvement of the will in the community of men. This task is the problem of the Church, which is itself this very community of rational beings, through its servants, the so-called clergymen, who should rather be called, and be, the moral instructors of the people. We shall, therefore, have to speak secondly: *Concerning the duties of the instructors of the people.*

Between both the scholar, whose duty it is to cultivate the intellect, and the popular instructor, whose duty it is to cultivate the will, there stands the æsthetical artist, whose duty is to cultivate the æsthetical sense, which serves man as a point of union for the intellect and the will. We shall, therefore, add a few words: *Concerning the duties of the æsthetical artist.*

As soon as men come together under a reciprocal influence, their legal relation must, above all, be secured. This is the condition of all society. The institution which achieves this object is called the *State*. We shall, therefore, have to speak: *Concerning the duties of State officials.*

So far concerning the higher class of mankind.

The life of man, and his causality in the sensuous world, is conditioned by certain connections of his with coarse matter. If men are to cultivate themselves into morality, they must live, and the conditions of this life, in material Nature, must be produced, so far as they are under the control of man. In this manner is the most unseemingly occupation, usually held to be the very lowest, connected with the promotion of the ultimate end of reason. It relates itself to the preservation and free activity of moral beings, and is thereby sanctified the same as the highest occupation.

In the production of that which serves to our nourishment, covering, and to tools of our activity, Nature either may be directed and assisted, which furnishes the vocation of the agriculturists, who direct organic life, and whose vocation, looked at from this standpoint, is a sublime one, or Nature may be left to herself, teaching men merely to gather and hunt up her self-produced products, which furnishes the vocation of the miner, fisher, hunter, &c. These several classes might be embraced with the agriculturists under the general name of: *The producing class.*

But the raw products of Nature must also, to a certain extent, be remoulded for the purposes of men; and thus they become products of art. This furnishes the vocation of professional men, manufacturers, artists, &c.; all of which, since they all produce works of art, I should like to call *artists*; distinguishing them, however, from the *æsthetical artist.*

Moreover, there must be amongst men an exchange of the various things which they need. It will be very expedient to establish a particular vocation of men who exclusively carry on this exchange. This furnishes the vocation of merchants.

But the duties of these various branches of the lower class are nearly the same, and hence we have to speak, in conclusion, only generally: *Concerning the duties of the lower class.*

I. *Concerning the duties of the Scholar.*

If we regard the human race upon earth, as we are bound to regard them morally, and as what they are gradually to become in actuality, namely, as a single family, it may well be assumed that, for this family, there exists also only one system of cognition, expanding and perfecting itself from age to age. Like the individual, the whole race grows wiser in the course of years, and develops itself through experience.

The knowledge of every age is to increase and mount higher; and to effect this is the duty of the scholars.

The scholars are, first of all, the depositaries, or, as it were, the archives of the culture of an age; and this they are not like the others, with reference to the mere results, but they are, at the same time, possessed of the principles. They not only know that something is as it is, but, at the same time, how man arrived at this knowledge, and how it is connected with his other knowledge. This is necessary for them, because they are to develop such cognition to a higher degree, which involves its correction; and this correction is impossible unless the principles are known from which that cognition is derived. From this there results, firstly, that a scholar should know the progress of science to his own day, and should historically know the principles it has made use of.

Again, the scholar is to further and raise this spirit of his age, either through correcting it, which is also an expansion of knowledge, since he, who has been relieved of an error, has had his knowledge increased; or through further conclusions from what is already known.

The scholar investigates, corrects, and invents, not merely for himself, but for the whole community; and it is only thus that his labour becomes a moral labour, and that he fulfils a duty; being the servant of the community in his vocation. His immediate sphere of labour is the republic of scholars; and from them do the results of his investigation spread over the community in the well-known way.

It is scarcely necessary to add expressly, that his mode of thinking can be called moral in its form only, if he pursues science truly from love of duty, and with the insight that, in doing so, he satisfies a duty to the human race. At present we only ask: *What* ought he to do? This is to be answered by what we have already stated. He is partly to know, and partly to further, the object of the culture of his age. He must really try to further it,

for only thus does he acquire a true value of his own. Should he, however, not be able to do so, the fault must, at least, not be his; he must have had the fixed will, and the zeal, and energy, to do it. Only thus has his existence not been an idle one—has he, at least, kept alive science in his age, and has been a link in the chain of the transfer of culture. To bring life into the spirit of investigation is also a true and important science.

Strict love of truth is the real virtue of the scholar. He should actually increase the knowledge of the human race, and not merely play with it. He should, like every virtuous person, forget himself in his object. What service can, indeed, be accomplished by propounding glittering paradoxes, or asserting and defining errors, which have escaped his lips? To do so would be merely to support his egotism. But this the moral law utterly condemns; and prudence likewise should condemn it, for only the true and good remains amongst mankind; and the false, however it may glitter at first, perishes.

2. *Concerning the duties of the Moral Instructor of the People.*

All men together constitute a single moral community. It is the moral disposition of each one to diffuse morality outside of himself, as well as he is able, and knows how to do it; or, in other words, to make all others of the same disposition as himself, since each one necessarily holds his own to be the best; for otherwise it were immoral to retain it. But each other one also holds his conflicting opinion to be the best, and for the same reason. Thus there results, as the collective object of the whole moral community, to produce harmony respecting moral objects. This is the final end of all reciprocal activity amongst moral beings. In so far as society is regarded from this standpoint, we call it a *Church*. The Church, therefore, is not a separate society, as is often represented, but merely

a peculiar view taken of the same one great human society. All belong to the Church, in so far as they have the correct moral disposition, and all ought to belong to it.

This general duty of all, to influence each other morally, may be transferred, and is transferred to a particular vocation. Not as if this transfer relieves anyone from the duty to work for the reform of others, if an opportunity offers; but merely that he no longer *needs to make this his particular end in life*. Those who assume this vocation are, in so far, officials, or servants, of the Church. All are to influence all; and hence those to whom this duty is transferred, educate *in the name of all*. They must start from what all are agreed upon, namely, the *symbol*, which we have already discussed when we showed its necessity from another reason. They must proceed in their teaching towards that end, concerning which all *shall* be agreed. The moral teacher must therefore see further than the others—he must possess the best and surest results of the moral culture of his age, and must lead them to it. He is therefore, and ought to be, a scholar in this particular branch of science. All are to become agreed, but they are also to remain united during their progress; and hence he must advance so that all can follow him. True, he is to rise higher as soon as possible, but not sooner than it is possible to carry along *all* with him. Whenever, in his teachings, he advances beyond the culture of all, he no longer addresses them all, and speaks no longer in their name, but rather in his own name. Now, this latter, he is certainly allowed to do as a private person, or as a member of the republic of scholars, wherein he also speaks in his own name, and propounds the results of his own reason; but where he speaks as a servant of the Church, he represents not his own body, but the community.

Morality develops itself alone, and of itself, in the heart of man, with freedom, and through the mere rational education of sociable communion. It cannot be produced

artificially, through theoretical conviction, as we have clearly seen above. Inclination for morality is presupposed in those public institutes of moral education; and the clergyman must necessarily presuppose it, since it alone makes his office possible, and has given rise to it. Immoral men have no Church, and no representative in regard to their duties to the Church. It follows from this, that it cannot be at all the intention of those public religious institutions to propound theoretical proofs, and to establish a system of morals; or, indeed, to speculate about first principles. The Church does not establish these proofs, because it believes them already, as sure as it is a Church. This faith of the Church is a fact; and it is the business altogether of the scholars (not of the Church) to develop that faith *a priori* from principles. The object of these public moral teachings can, therefore, be none other than to enliven and strengthen that already existing general inclination for morality; and to remove whatsoever might make it internally wavering, or prevent it externally from manifesting itself in acts. But there is nothing of this kind, except the doubt whether it is really possible to promote the ultimate end of morality, and whether there is really a progress in goodness, or whether this whole sentiment is not rather a phantasm; nor is there anything which can enliven and strengthen this moral disposition beyond the first faith that the promotion of the end of reason is possible, and that there necessarily results a progress in goodness. This faith, however, when more closely investigated, shows itself to be a faith in God and immortality. The promotion of the good does not progress regularly, unless there is a God; for it is involved neither in the laws of Nature, which has no relation at all to freedom, nor is it within the power of finite beings; and from the same reason—namely, because finite beings can work only with forces of Nature. To say that progression occurs necessarily, and in regular order, is to say there is a God. Again, to

say that we progress in regular order towards our ultimate end, is to say we are immortal; for our ultimate end can be reached in no time.

The moral instructor treats, therefore, more particularly of the articles of faith. He does not deduce them *a priori*, for this faith follows immediately from a moral disposition, and he presupposes the one, as well as the other; but he puts life into them precisely by presupposing them as well known, and thus referring men to God and eternity. It is a great advantage of these men, who have an external Church, that they become accustomed to relate their lowest occupations to the most sublime thoughts which man can think—to God and eternity.

In like manner it is the duty of the moral instructor to give the community instruction concerning the determined application of the conception of duty—the love whereof he very justly presupposes in them. They all would like well enough to lead a rational and moral life; but they only do not know well how they have to proceed to do it. Such is the presupposition from which the instructor starts; and he speaks in the name of all of them, as they all would speak if they could be united into one person. How must we proceed to bring ourselves into this or that disposition which duty requires of us? Such and similar questions he ought to answer. His instruction, indeed, is altogether practical, and calculated for immediate contemplation.

In short—and these are his chief rules—*he neither proves nor polemizes*; for he presupposes the articles of faith as well known and generally accepted, and a good moral disposition as already existing. To denounce infidels in the meeting of the faithful, to terrify obstinate sinners, or to address the Church as a herd of wicked men—such is utterly opposed to the end he has in view. It ought to be assumed that such people will not come to the meeting, and that everyone who appears in it does

thereby already make public confession of his faith and good will. Again, since the teacher speaks in the name of the community, and in their name—but by no means in God's name, for he is as much under God as they, and is before Him but a miserable sinner like the others—he ought to speak precisely as they speak; as an adviser, not as a lawgiver; from experience, and not from arguments.

So far as decided unbelievers are concerned, or men who do not recognize and respect duty, the moral instructor has nothing to do with them in public meeting, as has already been said. His duty with them is of a *particular* and private nature. The manner how to deal with such characters has been stated above. Let him lead them back into themselves, and teach them to esteem themselves more than they may have done before. There is always a secret self-contempt and despair of oneself at the basis of unbelief. These are to be rooted out, and with them falls what is built upon them. In such a manner should the moral instructor deal with the particular moral requirements of individuals. He should always be ready to give advice on all these matters. He should hunt up even those who do not hunt him up, but—which is the chief point—always with modesty and with respect for the dignity and self-determination of every man. To give advice in particular cases of conscience is only required when he is specially appealed to. He has no right to force himself upon others.

The essential and characteristic duty of the moral instructor is the duty of a good example. This he sets not only for himself, but for the whole community, whose representative he is. The faith of this community rests to the greatest extent upon his, and it is—when strictly taken—not much more than a faith in his faith. To them he is not this determined individual, but he is to them in truth the representative of the whole community

of men, or of the whole Church. That which he propounds he is to propound not as something which he has committed to memory or invented through speculation, but as something discovered in his own internal experience; and it is precisely in this that they have faith, because everything in this field is only result of experience. Now if his life contradicts his statements, they do not believe in his experience; and as they can only have faith in it, since he neither can, nor ought to, add theoretical reasoning, they do not believe in point of fact anything he may say.

3. *Concerning the duties of the Æsthetical Artist.*

Since I have spoken of the relation of the scholar and of the moral instructor to the culture of mankind, it is partly on my way to speak also of the æsthetical artist, who has an influence upon that culture equally great, though not so immediately perceptible; and partly it is a need of our age that everyone should do what is in his power to do to effect a thorough discussion of this matter.

The fine arts do not cultivate the head like scholarship, nor the heart like moral instruction; they cultivate the whole united man. They appeal neither to the understanding nor to the heart, but to the whole soul of man in the union of all its faculties: to a third, composed both of heart and understanding. Perhaps the best way to express the manner in which the fine arts operate, is to say: *they make the transcendental point of view the common point of view.* The philosopher elevates himself and others to this standpoint laboriously, and after a fixed rule. But the soul of the artist occupies that standpoint without determinedly thinking it; it knows no other standpoint, and elevates those who give themselves up to his influence, to it in so imperceptible a manner, that they do not become conscious of the transition.

I make myself clearer. From the transcendental point of view we make the world; from the common point of view the world is given to us; from the æsthetical point of view the world is also given to us, but only according to the view in which it is made. The world, the actually given world, *Nature* in short—for I only speak of her—has two sides; she is both product of our limitation, and she is product of our free, of course, *ideal* acting (by no means of an actual causality). From the first point of view Nature herself is everywhere limited; from the second point of view everywhere free. The first view is common; the second æsthetical. Every form in space, for instance, can be regarded as a limitation through the adjoining bodies; but it can also be looked upon as manifestation of its own internal fulness of power. Whosoever follows the first view sees only caricatures, oppressed and frightened forms; whereas he, who follows the second view, sees everywhere energetic fulness of Nature, life and growth; in short, beauty. It is the same with the highest. The moral law commands absolutely, and suppresses all inclinations of Nature. He who holds this view is related to the moral law as its slave. But the moral law is, at the same time, the Ego itself; it comes from out of the inmost depth of our own being, and when we obey it we, after all, only obey ourselves. He who looks at it thus, looks at it æsthetically. The artist regards everything from its beautiful side; he sees everything free and full of life. I do not speak here of the grace and cheerfulness which this view gives to our whole life. I here call attention only to the cultivating and ennobling effect which it has upon our ultimate end.

But where is the world of the artist? It is internally in mankind, and nowhere else. The fine arts, therefore, lead man back into himself, and make him at home with himself. They tear him loose from given Nature, and place him self-sufficient upon his own feet. And self-sufficiency of reason is our ultimate end.

Æsthetic sense is not virtue, for the moral law requires self-sufficiency obtained through thought, whereas the æsthetic sense comes to us of its own accord; but it is a preparation for virtue, and predisposes the soul for virtue, so that when the morality enters, half of its work, namely, our liberation from sensuousness, is already achieved.

Æsthetic culture has, therefore, a very effective relation to the promotion of the end of reason; and in this respect duties may be prescribed to it. We cannot make it anyone's duty to take care of the æsthetic culture of the human race, for we have seen that the æsthetic sense does not depend upon freedom, and cannot be formed through conceptions, but must come altogether of itself. But we can enjoin on everyone, in the name of morality, not to check this culture, and not to help to make it impossible by spreading a vitiated taste. For everyone can have taste. Taste can be cultivated through freedom, and hence everyone can know what is a violation of taste. By spreading a vitiated taste for æsthetic beauty, we do not leave men in that indifference wherein they await their future culture, but we misdirect their culture. Two rules can be established in reference to this subject.

Firstly, for all men: Do not make yourself an artist against the will of Nature; and you always do so against Nature if you do it without a special natural impulse, and do it simply by the compulsion of some arbitrarily-conceived notion. It is absolutely true that the artist is born. Rules keep genius in bounds, but do not themselves produce genius, precisely because they are rules, and, therefore, have limitation, and not freedom in view.

Secondly, for the true artist: Take care not to fawn upon the corrupted taste of your age from selfish motives, or desire for present glory. Rather strive to represent the ideal which floats before your mind, and forget everything else. The artist should inspire himself

by the sanctity of his vocation, and should learn that by applying his talents, he does not serve man, but duty. If he does so, he will soon look upon his art with quite other eyes; he will become a better man, and at the same time a better artist. There is a phrase injurious both to art and morality: *That which pleases us is beautiful*. It is very true that that which pleases the completely-cultivated mankind is beautiful, and alone is beautiful; but until mankind is so cultivated—and when will it ever be?—the most tasteless works may please, because they are in fashion, and the greatest work of art may not find favour, because the age wherein it was made has not yet developed the sense wherewith to seize it.

4. *Concerning the duties of State Officials.*

According to the above, a State constitution is to be regarded as the result of the common will manifested in an expressly created, or in a tacitly-understood, compact. The tacit submission to, and acceptance of, established institutions, is equal to express consent, as we have shown. Whatsoever the State permits within the common sphere of the freedom of all citizens, each one may conscientiously do, since all other citizens have agreed so far to restrict their own freedom. Unless the State had given this permission, we should have to fear, at every free act within that common sphere, that it would interfere with the freedom of the others.

The State officials—I speak here chiefly of the higher order, who participate in the legislative department, and from whom there is no appeal—are nothing but the administrators of this common will. They are elected by all citizens, and have not the right to alter the constitution one-sidedly. It is their duty to consider themselves as thus the representatives of *all*, for it is only within the sphere of this form that they can act with a good conscience. If they arbitrarily alter the constitution in

such a manner as to induce opposition to this alteration, they oppress the consciences of all citizens, and cause them to doubt whether they ought to obey the State, or obey the duty which they owe to the freedom of all others.

Now there exists an *à priori* rule of law. The positive law of the State, which officials may be appointed to administer, may be opposed to this *à priori* law, may be harsh or unfair. How has the State official to conduct himself under such a case? For the greatest part we have already answered this question.

Firstly, the official may very well undertake the administration of this positive law and constitution, although, in his conviction, it is not perfectly conformable to reason; nay, if it is his vocation, it is duty to administer it. For there must be some sort of law and constitution, since otherwise there would be no State, and no progress; for sake whereof the State exists. Now, the present existing constitution is presumptively conformable to the will of all; and each one has, moreover, the privilege to desist from the rights conferred upon him by law, if he so chooses.

Secondly, reason demands, and Nature, at the same time, has made provision, that these State governments shall, in course of time, approach more and more to the only form of government conformable to reason. Hence the State officials, who govern a State, must know this latter form. Those who rise from common experiences to conceptions, are called scholars, according to the above; and hence the State official must be a scholar in his profession. Plato says: No prince can govern who is not possessed of the ideas; and this is precisely what we say. He must, therefore, necessarily know, firstly, the constitution which he is chosen to administer, and the express, or tacit, compacts whereupon it rests; secondly, the State constitution, as it ought to be, or the ideal; and, thirdly, the way which mankind

in general, and particularly his people, must proceed to attain the latter.

Thirdly, the manner of administering government may be concisely stated as follows: Let the officials carry out absolutely, and without mildness or tenderness, that which absolute right, or natural law, demands; but that which only the written positive law requires, let them carry out only in so far as it may be considered the continuing result of the will on the part of the interested parties.

I shall endeavour to make this clearer. It is a very false proposition that government is instituted for the benefit of the governed; or, in other words, that *salus populi suprema lex est*. Law is, because it is; it is absolute; it must be carried out, and if no one were benefited by it. (*Fiat justitia et percat mundus*.) Again, it is not unlawful for anyone to desist from his rights for the benefit of another one. (*Volenti non fit injuria*.) But it is absolutely illegal to compel him thus to desist. Hence, if an unjust law exists, which could only be just if approved unanimously; and if against this law opposition manifests itself, then it is the absolute duty of the lawgivers to repeal such law, no matter how much those who derive advantage from injustice may cry about violation of contract. If no objection is raised, the officials can carry it out conscientiously.

(Since these principles are liable to misinterpretation, I propose to determine them more specifically. In a State, for instance, where the nobility is in the exclusive possession of the highest State offices, and of all landed property, the nobility hold such title almost altogether by virtue of a tacit understanding with the other citizens; for those other citizens agree to leave those offices and lands to the nobility, and to select for themselves other vocations. In this manner things remain in order; and a regent who should one-sidedly, and without request, abrogate such an arrangement, would act utterly illegally

and despotically. He is sworn to carry it out, and the nobility has submitted to him only on condition of such promise on his part. If a single citizen, having previously, through his conduct, approved of such a State government, makes an attack upon these presumptive rights of nobility, he becomes liable to punishment, and is justly punished according to the *positive law*, which he has hitherto tacitly recognized; and by no means according to the *natural law*, since he ought to have appealed to this law in advance of his act, and not afterwards. Previously he took advantage of the positive laws; how can he now appeal to a law opposed to them? But if a single citizen applies to the Government for his *natural* rights, he, by this very application, abrogates his compact with the nobility; nay, even with his own class of citizens, since they have entered into that compact with the nobility. He thus withdraws altogether from the State compact, and must be satisfied to lose all the advantages which previously it conferred upon him; as, for instance, the right to carry on trade, &c. At the same time, that which he, in point of fact, demands by making his application, namely, to be admitted into the class of the nobility, must not be denied to him. It must be permitted to the single individuals, who prefer complaint about the injustice of such an arrangement, to change their class, for this is the only means to make good to them the injustice about which they complain; and every State which does not grant this permission to change class, is absolutely illegal. Serfdom (*glebe adscriptio*), and the prohibiting certain classes of people from attending school, are absolutely illegal. But when the *whole* class of citizens arises, or, at least, a decided majority thereof, and reclaims its natural rights, then it becomes the absolute duty of the Government to alter the constitution upon this point, whether the nobility would be willing to consent or not. If the favoured class of nobles were

wise they would not await this general reclamation, but would, of their own accord, gradually give up their privileges.)

Fourthly, the continuation of such compacts has its basis in the ignorance and awkwardness of the oppressed classes; their ignorance of their rights, and their awkwardness how to exercise those rights. As culture increases and expands, these privileges cease. Both Nature and reason demand that they should cease, and that a complete equality as to *birth*—for only in this respect can equality exist, the vocation chosen in after life establishing a distinction again—should be established amongst all men. It is, therefore, duty to promote culture. Culture is the foundation of all reform; and it is, therefore, absolutely illegal and immoral to place obstacles in its way, or cause it to be checked by the classes who derive advantage from the ignorance of the masses.

Fifthly, one of the chief requirements of the rational form of government is that government should be responsible to the people; and it is precisely in this that most of the actual States deviate from the ideal of reason, lacking, as they do, this responsibility. It is true that the regent of such a State, who governs according to ideas, cannot actually acquit himself of this responsibility, there being no one to whom he can deliver this responsibility; but it is his duty to govern *as if* he were held responsible, and could always give an account of his acts, whenever required.

All that we have here said is valid only for the highest power of government, whether it be in the hands of one person, or conferred upon many. The subordinate official is strictly bound to the letter of the law. There is nothing so injurious to a State as when the sub-official assumes to be the interpreter of the law. This always results in injustice, for the losing party is thus condemned by an *ex post facto* law—by a law which the judge creates only after the fact, through his interpre-

tation of the law. It is true that laws should not be written so as to be capable of various interpretations; the indefiniteness of laws is, indeed, a great evil for the State. If objections are raised to the positive law from reasons derived from natural law, the sub-official should, it is true, not execute the former; but neither should he himself do anything at all in such a case. He ought to refer the whole matter to the highest authority, the legislative power.

In fine, every form of government is legal, and may be administered with good conscience, which does not make impossible progress, as well for the whole as for the individuals. Only that form of government is totally illegal which proposes to maintain everything precisely as it is at present.

5. *Concerning the duties of the Lower Classes.*

The lower classes have the vocation, as we have already seen, to work directly upon irrational Nature for the sake of the rational beings, in order to prepare it for the ends of the latter. According to my presupposition, I have not to deal here with those classes immediately, but with those who have to elevate them. Hence, I describe only the disposition which is to be awakened in them.

The dignity of every man—his self-esteem, and with it his morality—depends mainly upon whether he relates his occupation to the ultimate end of reason, or—which is the same—to the end which God has in view with man; and whether he is able to say to himself, It is the will of God which I do. This the lower classes of the people can say to themselves with the greatest justice. For if they are not the highest of empirical mankind, they are, at least, its support. How can the scholar investigate, the instructor teach, the State official govern, unless all of them can first of all live?

The dignity of these vocations increases when we con-

sider that upon them always has depended, and always will depend, the progress and improvement of mankind. For if mankind is to improve considerably, as little time and force must be wasted in mechanical labour as possible. Nature must become mild, matter pliable, and everything so that it needs little exertion for men to obtain what they need, and that it need no longer be the most important business of man to fight Nature.

For this reason is it the absolute duty of the lower classes to perfect their profession, because the progress of the human race is conditioned thereby. It is the duty of each individual in these classes, at least, to attempt to satisfy this requirement. Only thus can he pay his position in the ranks of rational beings, whilst otherwise he is merely a link in the chain of the history of his trade.

(Some authors have asserted that the inventor of the plough has much greater merit than, for instance, the inventor of a purely theoretical proposition in geometry. Recently, much opposition has been manifested against this proposition; but unjustly, as appears to me. In doing so, the opponents have shown themselves rather scholars than men. Both parties are equally in the right and in the wrong. Neither of the two inventions, or to what they belong—mechanical labour and science—have *absolute* value; their value is altogether *relative*, as related to the ultimate end of reason. Both inventions are, therefore, of about equal value; and so far as the inventors are concerned, their value is determined, not by the success, but by the sentiments, which actuated them.)

But the lower classes cannot well fulfil their duty—to raise their professions—unless they are directed by the higher classes; and hence *it is their duty to respect the members of the higher classes.*

I do not speak here of the submission which they owe to the administrators of the law, nor of the faith and obedience which they owe to their moral instructors as

such—for these are general duties; but of a respect which they ought to cherish for the scholar and artist generally, as men of *higher culture*, and even outside of their offices. This respect consists, not in external shows of honour, nor in a dumb and slavish veneration, but in the presupposition that these men understand more, and see further, than they do; and that the advice and suggestions of these men respecting the improvement of this or that profession, of education, of family life, &c., are probably based upon insight. It consists, not in a blind faith or dumb obedience, but in the mere attention to, and preliminary acceptance of, their counsels as probably rational, and at least worthy of further examination. In short, it is the same sentiment, only in a less degree, which we have above described as proper in grown-up children towards their parents. This veneration depends upon free conviction and reflection, and can, therefore, not be made a direct duty; although the thinking over it, which prompts this sentiment, is certainly a duty. It is very evident that if the lower classes reject, at the first notice, all propositions for reform which the higher classes suggest, they will never make great advances. Nevertheless, it is to be well considered that this reverence is denied to the higher classes almost exclusively from their own fault; and that it depends largely upon the reverence which the higher classes, on their part, evince for the lower. Let the higher classes respect the freedom of the others, since, after all, they cannot command, but only advise them, not being their lawgivers. Let them show respect for their occupation, and not seem unaware of its dignity. To influence them, the higher classes should lower themselves. There is no vanity so improper for its purpose as the desire to appear learned before the unlearned. They do not know how to value it. The rule of conduct in all conversation with them is the same which is the rule of all popular addresses—not to start from first

principles, for these they do not understand, and cannot follow; but to lead back everything to their own experience.

The true relation between the higher and lower classes is, indeed, the true basis upon which the improvement of the human race rests. The higher classes are the spirit of the one great, whole mankind, the others are its members; the former are the thinking and projecting, the latter the executing part.

That body is a healthy body wherein the determination of the will immediately results in its intended movement; and it remains healthy in so far as the understanding always takes the same care for the preservation of all members. It is the same in the community of men. If that relation between the higher and lower classes is only as it should be, the relation between these various separate classes will soon become correct of itself. If the lower classes make proper progress in their culture, as they must do if they listen to the advice of the higher classes, then the statesmen will no longer look down upon the scholar as upon an idle dreamer, for he himself will be driven, by the progress of the age, to realize the ideas of the scholar, and to find them confirmed in experience; nor will the scholar any longer look with contempt upon the statesman, as thoughtlessly empirical. Nor will scholars and the so-called clergymen be in conflict; neither in various, nor in one and the same person, for the common man will always become more able to keep pace with the culture of the ages.

I could not conclude this book well, with anything more to the purpose than this indication of the chief point upon which the improvement of our race, which is the ultimate end of a Science of Morals, is based.

APPENDIX TO THE SCIENCE OF MORALS

ASCETISM, OR PRACTICAL MORAL CULTURE.

I. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTION OF ASCETISM.

EVERY pure Science considers its object solely in regard to its *à priori* conception, without giving attention to the accidental distinctions, which are based either upon the original differences of the separate individuals, involved in the conception of the object, or upon the use and abuse of freedom on the part of those individuals, which latter uses and abuses may have been caused by certain inclinations or habits. The Science of Morality must proceed in the same manner, and our science has done so. It posits a man in general; that is, a rational being with a natural impulse acting upon it; and to this man it relates the Moral Law without assigning to him any particular disposition towards this morality, whether it be a favourable or averse disposition. Morality in the Science of Morality, posits man as coming purely from the hands of Nature.

In the same manner—to use an illustration, which is most apt to explain my conception—the *Science of Rights* proceeds. That Science assumes men to be generally mere natural beings, and asks how it is possible that they, in their relation to each other, should be able to exercise freedom. In propounding this question that Science takes no account of previous agreements, or existing institutions amongst men; and this is the reason why there arises that oft-noticed gap between theory and practice; or between theory and its immediate application in life. Pure Science—when we try to apply it—does not fit into life; life does not fit into its theoretical propositions; and thus pure Science appears to be impractical.

Now this is not in any manner derogatory to Science; and only pure unreason, which knows not what theory is, and what practice is, and which, indeed, knows nothing at all, can make this a reproach to Science. It is very true that Science does not fit into what Science did not take into calculation, and which it must not take into calculation as sure as it is Science. The theoretical teacher replies very correctly to those who complain that his results do not fit the world: "I never spoke of you and your world; for you and your world are not worth much any way. You want everything to be as it is, and to go its way as it best may; and if this is what you want, why let things go their way, and do not bother philosophers with your questions. Keep your science as a means to sharpen your wits. Since in your eyes it cannot after all serve any other use."

Nevertheless it is the desire of the true philosopher, that science should be introduced into life, and, moreover, since a pure life of Nature is perhaps nowhere to be found now—into some determined empirical condition of life. Hence it becomes a problem for the philosopher to show how the requirements of reason can be realized in a determined empirical given connection of presuppositions; and the science, which solves this problem, stands midway between pure science and mere experience or history. It is this science which fills the gap between theory and practice, in so far as it can be filled *scientifically*. I am careful in stipulating this latter condition. For that mediating science—in so far as it must retain the character of a science, and must therefore have a determined object, which its form can exhaust—can pay no attention to the accidental and the undeterminable. There is always a large field remaining open for the judgment of the practical man, whom this mediating science only guides, showing him only the bridge which leads from the world of theory to that of practice. But the gap always remaining, the practitioner must always rely on his sound judgment after all to promote culture, which artistically is precisely the problem of the theoretical and mediating science.

The science which mediates between the pure Science of Rights and existing State institutions, is called the Science of

Politics or of Statesmanship; and the science which mediates between the Science of Morality and the empirical character of the individual—in so far as this is possible—is called the Science of Ascetism. I say, in so far as this is possible; for there is a great distinction between the problem, which the Science of Politics has to solve, and that which may be attributed to the Science of Ascetism; and it is by clearly establishing this distinction, that we shall best explain our conception of the latter science.

The problem of the Science of Politics is to show how it is possible to effect the transition from a given determined State organization to that form of government which alone is rational and lawful. In the same way it would seem to be the problem of Ascetism to show how it is possible to lead a given individual character towards a moral disposition.

But here appears a great difference. For the art of statesmanship has to do, *not* with the really free will of man, but with this will as it may be impelled by natural motives; in other words, in so far as this will is, as it were, a link in the chain of natural mechanism.

If we presuppose merely that rational self-love, without which man is not capable even of living amongst others, and can certainly not be tolerated amongst them—the art of statesmanship has sufficient means in its hands—such as direct compulsion, or providing injurious results for illegal acts, &c.,—whereby to control the will of men. For it does not matter at all, from what motive a citizen acts according to law, provided he does act according to it. The art of politics seeks to establish only legality and not at all morality. There being thus possible a legal compulsion, it is also possible to calculate the means to be used in effecting it.

Quite different is it with the object of the Science of Morality. Morality has freedom as such for its object. The good is to be done absolutely for its own sake, and from no other cause whatever. Now this resolve is something absolutely *Primary*, and cannot be connected with anything, as an effect is connected with a cause. It must proceed of itself from the soul of man, and cannot be produced in it by external means; as we certainly can produce through

threats of punishment the resolve to do what the law requires, or, not to do what the law forbids. Neither can man himself produce it within himself according to a fixed rule, precisely because it is absolutely primary. Nay, man does not even know this moral resolve until he possesses it, and until then it does not even exist for him. Hence there is no straight line at all proceeding from previous conditions to a moral disposition; that disposition is attained only through a leap into an absolutely other sphere, utterly opposed to our natural disposition. In that sense, therefore, a Science of Ascetism would seem to be impossible.

Moreover, there is between the legally Right and the morally Right this great difference, that the former is a manifold and a progression from a not quite just, but rather altogether unjust, to a more just form of government, and from the latter to a still more just form; whereas the morally just is absolutely one, within which there is no distinction of a more and less just. The latter assertion needs no proof, after what has been established in our Science of Morality. To make more clear the former, I append the following remark:

Absolutely unlawful, in the legal sense, we can call only a state of things wherein there is no form of government whatsoever; and, I will add—in order to be very strict, although it has no connection here—a state of things wherein men are deprived of all their rights from no fault of their own, *i.e.*, from no commission of crime. Hence the very first requirement is, that some sort of government must be established. Under such government the law exists at least *in form*; even though, so far as conscience, such law may be the very reverse of just law. Hence the worst form of government is better than none at all; and it becomes the duty of men then to approximate it as much as possible to the only rational form of government. But this progression towards the better must never be carried on in such a manner, as to risk the overthrow of the existing government. In other words, it is legally just, that the present unjust form of government should remain.

But it is not thus in the Science of Morality. In that science there is no permission to do the worse where we know the better. Either we must be altogether moral, or we are not

moral at all. There is here no progression from the good to the better; and hence even in this respect a Science of Ascetism would seem to be impossible.

But what then remains for such a science, if we still consider it as related to Morality, similarly as the Science of Politics is related to the Science of Rights?

The question: How shall we elevate others to a moral disposition? has no meaning at all, if that moral disposition is looked upon as a product of our acting. Nevertheless we can give others assistance in attaining it; that is, we can influence them to determine themselves to rise to that moral standpoint. This we do, for instance, when we cause their feeling of reverence and esteem to turn upon themselves. But all this belongs to a pedagogical science, and not to a Science of Ascetism, and whatsoever is to be said on this point we have already stated at length in our Science of Morality.

The other question, which might constitute the problem of Ascetism: How can I elevate myself to a moral disposition? has also no meaning; and from the very same reason. He who propounds that question to himself, has already raised himself to that disposition.

But the following consideration remains, and furnishes an important and honourable place leading to the Science of Ascetism.

Whosoever fulfils his duty in life for the mere sake of duty, were it but *once*, in that one fulfilment necessarily resolves to remain true to duty for all his future existence. If he resolve never to do his duty only this time, he would not have the resolve this time, nor would he do his duty. His act could not be moral, though it might be legal.

For this reason: the motive of duty is not an empirical ground, standing under conditions of time like other sensuous motives, but is valid absolutely without relation to time. Whosoever subjects himself to duty, as such, necessarily subjects himself to duty for ever.

Nevertheless it may happen: *not*, that in future he should resolve the opposite, namely, to rebel against duty and act against it—this resolve, which characterizes only the ideal of evil, or the devil, is absolutely impossible to reason, as we have

seen—but, that he may forget this resolve in his future acts to a greater or less degree, and that his old merely empirical character, which is impelled only by sensuous motives, may again usurp the place of his moral character.

Whatsoever man is serious in the resolve to uninterruptedly fulfil his duty, and knows this danger from a knowledge of the empirical human character or from his own previous experience, must necessarily propound to himself the problem to remedy this evil; and the solution of this problem is the task of the Science of Ascetism, which we have proposed to establish.

That science will be, therefore: *A systematic establishment of the means which may tend to keep awake in us at all times the thought of Duty.*

II. MORE DEFINITE DESCRIPTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF ASCETISM.

There can in reality be only two reasons why with the firm resolve to do our duty we nevertheless may neglect it; namely, we may *either* in an immoral act not think of our duty at all, may forget that resolve altogether; *or* we may have that resolve in mind, but only in such a casual and unenergetic way, that the resolve does not become a deed, or does not prevent the immoral act.

Concerning the first case, little is to be said. A conception, which does not arise, can also not be effective; it can have no result; and hence the empirical motive, namely, the natural impulse, becomes the power, which determines the act.

But the second case must be explained; and we can definitely reorganize it only by seizing it from the transcendental point of view. From that standpoint, it is very true that we do not think of our duty; we only take hold of our duty with our imagination; only half-way as in a dream; for we always float in opposite directions. It is a cold, dead, powerless sentiment. It is an impotent thinking; but it never turns into willing; and hence the natural impulse always decides, since it is the only determining impulse.

Now, how can this state of things be remedied? The reply to this question will also solve the question, how the first case is to be remedied.

First of all: every man can know, whether or not, it was his imagination which took hold of the conception of duty. For whenever he decides himself and acts carelessly, without determined and full conviction, and without the previously described feeling of conviction, he may be certain that it was his imagination which took hold of the conception of duty. Moreover, it is altogether a matter of freedom to elevate this conception at all times to full clearness, and to refrain from acting until that conviction has arisen, which manifests itself through the above described feeling. Hence we not only ought to, but can in each particular case, elevate the conception of duty to decided and energetic consciousness; and it may, therefore, be said, that it is our *duty* to do it.

It appears, therefore, that the final ground of such immorality is the same in both cases. In both cases we forget to do our duty; we forget, either the thought of our duty, or to raise the indistinct thought of a determined duty, as it floats in imagination, to full and clear consciousness.

It would, therefore, be the more determined problem of a Science of Ascetism to *find means by which we may always remember our duty.*

Now, it is to be remembered, that in either case it is not a matter of natural mechanism, but of *freedom*, whether we thus definitely remember and cause ourselves to be determined by our conception of duty. If we think the intelligible man under time conditions, as should not be done, but as here we may well do, then each moral resolve must be something altogether new and primary; not the link of a chain, but the beginning of a new one. Hence no external means will be sufficient to make sure *that* such a resolve is determined upon; for this resolve is something absolute, absolutely entering the world of time from the world of reason, as sufficiently explained in the previous section. Hence the Science of Ascetism cannot claim to furnish such a theory, and in so far that science is still unexplained.

But the good will is always presupposed; it has arisen once forever together with the first moral resolve; and if it could vanish there would be no natural means whereby to restore it. All that is requisite is, therefore, that we should be reminded

of this moral resolve. It is not the resolution to do our duty and to do nothing before we have clearly investigated whether it is our duty or not, which is to be produced by the science we seek, but merely the *remembrance* of that resolution. When we have been so reminded, it still depends upon our freedom to make use of this remembrance or not.

Hence the question, whether a Science of Ascetism is possible, stands now thus: *Are these means mechanically operative* (we speak here of a mechanism of reason, or of compulsory consequence) *which can effect the return of a determined conception according to an internal rule?*

I reply, there is certainly such a law, equal to that of a mechanism, and this law is the law of the *association of ideas*.

I shall explain myself. There are laws of synthesis, of the necessary connection of representations. The laws of the association of ideas are different from these, and occupy a middle ground between necessity and freedom. They belong to the power of *memory*. We need not necessarily remember that which we have perceived at the same time, but we may so remember it, if we choose. Memory depends upon freedom, and hence upon practice. That which makes possible this memory we call the law of the association of ideas.

Hence the chief principle of a Science of Ascetism would be as follows: *Connect in advance with your representation of your future acts the representation of moral acting.*

By means of this rule there would arise between the conception of an acting and the thought of duty, precisely that connection which consists in the manifold of our representations when we have cultivated our memory.

But the purpose is not that man should be enabled *arbitrarily* to remember the conception of duty when reflecting upon some previous action, as suffices in the memory of representations. On the contrary, if he merely wished to recall that conception to memory, he would already have remembered it, and all *means* of assistance would be superfluous. The intention is, rather, that together with the conception of the act to be done, there should arise in man the conception of duty in general, and fill him with living power.

In short, the matter is to be thus: the conception: I will act; and the conception: I will always act morally; are to be inseparably united, as synthetical conceptions are, indeed, always united. If this is attained in any one person, then that person is governed by the moral law, and he is perfect in virtue. This is the object which the Science of Ascetism proposes to achieve in man.

But the operation of the association of ideas is not of a mechanical nature; we *may*, but we do not necessarily remember at the same time, a certain connection of thoughts. This association depends upon no determined law, but upon freedom and practice, and hence upon something which may exist to a greater or less degree, and which for that very reason can be increased. Hence it is possible only to *approximate* that described condition, wherein both of the above conceptions are synthetically united. Hence it will remain the duty of man to evermore increase the efficiency of that conception.

Stated more concisely, the problem of the Science of Ascetism is, therefore, *to associate in advance and forever the conception of duty with the conception of our actions.*

But the rule of association is, that one conception can only be connected with another determined one, and not with an undetermined conception. Determinations reproduce themselves only mutually. Hence it would be of no value whatever if a person were to resolve to discover a means whereby to remember the conception of duty in his acting generally *and in abstract*. This *generally* we never think, and by this *generally* we never remember anything!

It would, therefore, be necessary to connect the conception of duty with *determined* acts. Of course, we would connect it with such acts, of which we know that in them we are particularly exposed to forget the conception of duty. On very important occasions we are least liable to fail, since they of themselves call upon us to consider maturely and involve an exercise of power and results, such as are not usual every day. But on less important occasions there is this danger.

Hence, there would seem to be necessary: a general examination of our own character, to discover where we are most exposed to danger; and a firm and strong resolution to

think of ourselves on precisely such occasions. It will also be well to adopt fixed principles for certain cases, rules of self-examination, &c. &c. A "man of principles" will then be called a man who has developed within himself this judgment and who allows it alone to control the acts of his freedom.

But the association of ideas does not operate mechanically, and hence it always remains possible that we may forget the very best resolve, when the moment of action approaches. If this state of things continues, the man, who was already good, again becomes wholly corrupt. Hence the necessity arises to examine ourselves repeatedly, and see whether we have conformed to our good resolutions; and if not, what was the reason, and what measures will be best suited to prevent a recurrence of such a danger.

Such a self-examination is necessary, indeed, at all times, for we always get into new conditions, and, moreover, advance in cognition and in perfection of moral acting, whereby we are compelled to make higher demands upon ourselves.

The moral man will be much aggrieved to find that he gets no better, in spite of his firm resolutions. Let him surrender himself to such regrets and reproaches, for nothing stirs up memory so well as pain. Such continued self-examinations bring man always nearer to the end assigned to him. He does not become holy, for he is not infinite, and his natural impulse will always continue to move him; but he will become good.

But this determination, which provides a very worthy reality for Ascetism, as an art to be practised by every individual, seems again to annul the conception of it as a science. For how can it be *à priori* ascertained to what extent anyone is in moral danger, and through what means he can protect himself? This each one must decide for himself. Ascetism would, therefore, consist only of those three rules, and it must be left to each individual to apply them to himself through his own morally inspired judgment.

Nevertheless, there are certain general dangers, which threaten the resolve to do our duty, and certain general reasons why we forget our duty. These we can at least establish, and assign the principle through which we can protect ourselves.

This I propose to do. I shall mention not the ordinary dangers to moral acting, which may threaten very coarse and uncultured persons, but only those dangers which threaten the more cultured class. Of course, Ascetism thus loses the rank of a systematic Science, since we cannot start from a common principle, and becomes a mere aggregate of psychological remarks. Otherwise, indeed, it cannot be treated.

III. SKETCH OF THE ESSENTIAL OF ASCETISM.

Above all things, it is our task now to look up more definitely the origin of those inclinations, which put us in danger of forgetting our duty, since we can find out no remedy for an evil until we know its precise origin. I deduce inclinations, affections, passions, &c., in the following manner:

Nature produces in man a determined tendency, such as in the plants and in the animals has causality. But in man, as sure as man is free—*i.e.*, as sure as he has that freedom which in our system we have hitherto called *formal* freedom, and the neglect to distinguish which has produced so much evil in practical philosophy—it remains only a tendency. Before man is man (or free), (for instance, as an unconscious child, or an idiot, cretin, &c.) this natural tendency has causality, precisely as in animals and plants, and it has this causality until the natural impulse has been *broken* through the individual or through freedom. But the moment man elevates himself to consciousness, he tears himself loose from the chain of natural mechanism and organism: that which he does thereafter he must do altogether himself. Man as such, *i.e.*, as free, as consciousness, has no natural inclinations, affections, or passions at all. He depends altogether upon his freedom. An important proposition!

It is known to my readers what a synthetical connection in reason is. That which the synthesis involves, is not in itself developed into consciousness; we can elevate it to clearness only through analysis. Hence it is possible, that man, through the application, or non-application of freedom, may produce a connection amongst the manifold objects of freedom in himself very like that synthetical connection in

reason; and this synthesis really does occur: for instance, the representation x involves in man a whole manifold of other representations, a , b , c , as a successive series, each of which is, in this connection, in itself dependent upon freedom, and did actually depend upon freedom in this particular individual at first, but has now through repeated realization of the same synthesis become connected with x in a manner equal to the synthetical connection in reason.

For instance: when you write, you certainly do not consider every stroke of your pen and every letter separately and definitely, determining yourself to produce it thus. You merely think the word and at the same time you write it. But when you first began to write you had maturely to consider every pen-stroke and every letter, and to determine yourself to produce it thus.

This connection we have called an association of ideas, and shall hereafter so call it. Now such a connection is certainly not synthetical, for it is accidental, changeable, and individual; but neither is it a product of conscious freedom: it is association. We can illustrate it likewise by the theory of dim conceptions. Such conceptions are dim, because they are unconscious premises of our judgments; and they are conceptions because they are universal, and can be elevated to conscious universality through freedom of thinking.

Let us take an example from our own Science of Morality. The angry man soon flies into a passion, and immediately begins to scold, kick, &c. Now this scolding, kicking, &c., certainly depends upon freedom. Of course; for us others, nay even for himself it depends *in itself* upon his own freedom, or, at least, did at one time so depend; but at present he cannot well act differently. He would, however, be easily able to act differently, if he could reflect upon himself and his freedom. But this very mediating act of considerateness is what he lacks; association of ideas deprives him of that freedom. But through however long a series this association may extend, and however deeply-rooted the habit may have become, it nevertheless always starts from a first point, which man has under his free control. Hence, even if we admit to the angry man, that now when his anger deprives him of all consideration, he

cannot well act otherwise than he does, we still should say to him: you ought to have been on your guard against the first outbreak of your anger.

In short, through the passions, which have arisen in an individual previous to his reform, and rooted themselves according to the law of association, that man utterly loses his freedom and considerateness whenever at any occasion they arise in him; and in such a condition the thought of his duty cannot take hold of him. But the very first emotion, which involves irresistibly all these passions, is certainly under the control of his freedom. Hence the thought of duty can take hold of him previous to this emotion. It will, therefore, be the problem of Ascetism, *to look up these acts of freedom in their various possible emotions*, in order to connect with them a balance-weight, a means to stir up the free will, and thus to arouse a remembrance of duty.

I have said, in the various possible emotions generally. But this justifies no ground of division, and no particular and separate rules; and for that very reason only a very slim content remains for Ascetism. Principally in order to show this, and to attach some not uninteresting considerations, I have brought this matter into discussion, and have expressed myself in the way I did.

Nature produces a *tendency* in man; was our statement. Now the word *Nature* has quite another significance when we speak of human beings, than when we speak of unconscious products of Nature. The nature of man, *i.e.*, his essence or his positive character (talent, *indoles*) is twofold, whereas the nature of these unconscious products is only onefold. There is in man one nature, which is Nature as such, and one nature which exists as a *tendency* of reason (not yet elevated into consciousness); which latter tendency, in so far as it operates as a mere blind impulse, is of no more value than the first nature, which is merely Nature.

To speak plainer: Nature, as such, tends in all its products to preserve the individual through sexual propagation; and in the same manner Nature operates in man, and operates thus alone so long as man is still in the hands of Nature. But as soon as man's freedom — which here is *formal* — develops

itself—which it does (since considerateness and hence natural freedom do not rule here as yet); through an impulse or instinct of reason, the impulse of this formal freedom operates also precisely as an impulse of Nature; that is to say: lawless and under no rule; and thus it becomes an impulse towards absolute independence, and hence towards supremacy over the whole external world. (A mode of thinking which I have described at length in my Science of Morality.)

Now if man surrenders himself to these two impulses completely, there arise from them two kinds of passions: (1) *Brutal* passions, such as lubricity, gluttony, &c.; and (2) *Unsocial* passions, such as injustice, love of oppression, anger, hatred, falseness, &c. Both of these impulses—the natural impulse and the impulse of formal freedom—however unite; and may thus unite in two ways. The natural impulse may unite with habitual love of oppression, and then there arises: (3) *Oppression from selfishness*. Or the impulse of wild independence may unite with the natural impulse, and then there arise: (4) *Voluptuousness and other manifestations of brutishness*; which here are all the results of pure *vanity*.

All truly vicious inclinations belong to one of these four classes; with the exception of a certain corruption, which is not so common but all the more dangerous, and which as the fifth one completes the synthetical period. This fifth one I shall treat in a separate section.

The treatment of these passions in Ascetism is altogether the same. Each is based upon association and habit; each deprives the person given up to it of his freedom and considerateness, in which condition he is incapable of remembering his duty. Each also starts from a first act of freedom, of surrendering to that passion, in which act free considerateness is therefore still possible. Hence in each case it is our problem to connect with this state of considerateness the remembrance of duty in equally sure association. Hence we only need to answer the question in a general manner.

It seems easily enough answered. A good will is presupposed, for without it we cannot even speak of Ascetism. It is only forgetfulness, or the being dragged into a condition where considerateness is no longer possible, which is

to be feared. The chief rule would therefore be this: never give yourself up to such a condition; watch over yourself, and habituate yourself to control all your acts with considerateness.

This uninterrupted attention to ourselves is a self-observation, an act of continuous reflection, undertaken not with a view to learn, but to *hold* ourselves in our own hands. Hence: always observe yourself! Whatever you do, do resolutely, and only with considerate freedom. Such would be the chief maxim.

But this rule, if strictly applied, would be both unsafe and very dangerous. For an association, as I have shown above, is absolutely necessary in man. It is only the first impulse of this association, which our freedom controls, all the other links follow of themselves.

Now either this association remains, and then our evil habits continue, and we can never master them; or that strict considerateness enters; but it paralyzes as it were our whole mind, prevents us from all acting, and makes all our resolves unsteady and wavering. From fear of doing wrong we shall condemn ourselves to lifelessness. This is the dangerous element of pure, abstract considerateness.

But there is a middle way, very much to be recommended. Each individual in his quiet hours of necessary and continuous self-observation, which must not be neglected, since the neglect thereof will induce a reaction in goodness, will easily find what his most prominent passions are, how they become excited, and where the point lies, which must, therefore, be watched, and where he must remember himself. For instance, the man who is passionately angry, and who thereby shows a disorderly self-love and injustice towards others (empirically; for he may have the best intention), will know what excites his anger more particularly. His experience, therefore, should grow more special through self-observation, and more fruitful through practice of considerateness. He should never proceed to act, without having first considered what may happen to him, and without having made definite resolutions for such cases. In short, he should have resolved upon a definite plan of acting under all circumstances. He may then be at least sure that he will not

forget himself, and that he will remember his good resolutions; provided, of course, his will is strong and pure enough. He should enter upon no new day of life without having calculated what kinds of business he may have to settle on, and what opportunities it may bring him forth to relapse into his old faults through self-forgetfulness; and he should take precautions against such dangers. Many persons do this for the sake of mere prudence and advantage, and succeed in it: why then should it not be possible to succeed in it for the sake of duty?

The given rule remains in force; but the great question is, how to keep it effective under all circumstances. For the man, who carries on more solitarily a speculative life, it may be easy enough to adopt rules for his rare practical collisions with the world. But how does the matter stand in regard to him, who is always in reciprocal causality with others, and who has, therefore, little time to reflect upon himself; who precisely on that account is always carried away in his acting, and forgets all the excellent principles which he adopted in his hours of meditation?

I reply: firstly, everyone ought absolutely to have time enough to consider with himself, to reflect upon his moral condition, and to frame resolutions and work out plans for his reform. No amount of business will excuse a neglect to do so. No one should have so much to do as not to be able to live spiritually; for only thus will he do correctly and well what he has to do. If this is called *prayer*, with holy meditation, it is a most excellent and holy thought.

Secondly: let him connect with that impulse of passion an opposite impulse, which will prevent the former from entering his consciousness unless the remembrance of his duty enters at the same time. If this opposite impulse is to be a moral impulse, having its origin in duty, and impelling to duty, it can be none other than one taken from the contemplation of the wickedness of permitting ourselves to be impelled by passion. Every other impulse, an impulse of *sensuous* motives, would not suffice to balance that impulse of passion. For that would be merely expelling one sin through another, and the person would remain as corrupt and wicked as ever.

Every loss of freedom—which passion always produces—and a man who has once elevated himself to morality sins only from passion—is contemptible. Whoever gives himself up to self-reflection and self-punishment will experience this contemptibility strong enough. Hence, a repeated self-examination as to how we have acted up to our resolutions is absolutely necessary. Whoever has felt this contemptibility, and has given himself wholly up to this feeling, will doubtless recall the painfulness of such feeling whenever he may be again tempted to similar forgetfulness; and hence is not wholly, not undignified, but absolutely necessary to court the punishment of conscience.

This then is the only means to effect morality through means of the empirical character; as, indeed, the *impulse of self-esteem* is most surely, according to Kant's very correct discovery, the only one which induces morality from sensuous motives.

Thus the essence of Ascetism is exhausted. We have only to pay attention now to a particular state of mind, which does not fit under the above established chief rule.

IV. REMEDY AGAINST THE CORRUPTION OF A MERELY SPECULATIVE STATE OF MIND.

In our previous investigation we have always presupposed that man has an interest in realizing his wishes in the external world, whether he be utterly corrupt and without any sense for morality in general, or whether he has taken hold of the good for his whole life by a moral resolution, and is merely weak and in danger of forgetting it. In short, we have considered man altogether as occupying the practical standpoint, and as if his will and thinking had no other end in view than to realize through them something in the external world. We have argued as if man considered the internal, the theory and all mediation generally as merely means, and as if he had in view only the connecting with the external. Such a man will manifest all that is within him in his external works, and hence if he is reformed internally, the external acts will follow of themselves.

But there is another disposition, produced not through Nature, but through art and culture, which holds the internal itself, as the mere disposition of the mind to be the end in view, and which never allows this internal to manifest itself in external acts. Happily this disposition is not common to mankind; but at any rate it is possible, and is even to be found in actual life by close observers; nay, in the progress of mankind upon the road now taken it is even likely to become more and more common. Partly from this reason, and partly because no philosophical moralist has as yet taken notice of it, do I now propose to consider it.

It is the standpoint from which a person has interest only for internal reflection, for the theoretical, and from which this is the ultimate end in view. I shall call it the *speculative state of mind*.

This is no old name; and I frame it because that which it designates has never yet been designated before, so far as I know, and this word seems to me the best designation.

With such a disposition a person merely watches the internal determinations of his mind and character, without relating them to life, and without either acting much at all, or subjecting himself to strict self-examination when he does act, or, indeed, asking what may be the external results of these determinations in us. The object in cultivating this disposition may be twofold: either to attain knowledge, or to attain perfection in that art which results from this continuous and ever manifold play of thoughts. The former I shall call the pure speculative, and the latter the æsthetical state of mind. It is, however, to be observed, that even in the former case, when knowledge is not related to life as the ultimate end of all knowledge, there can be no other end in view than the enjoyment and satisfaction which result from it, and that hence both of these states of mind unite there. The latter enjoys himself in the mere looking on at the internal play of his thoughts, whereas the former enjoys himself in the knowledge and the detailed understanding of this play. Hence both have only enjoyment in view, and in so far the disposition of both is æsthetical.

It cannot be often enough reiterated, that the first interest of the investigator should be only formal. His only object is

to know thoroughly, without having any result in view, or without intending his investigation to confirm any previous opinion of his own. It would be a petty and dishonest procedure to act otherwise. But after he has once, in an impartial discovery, found the truth, this truth must also be related to life. Hence it must be equally reiterated, that knowledge is not its own ultimate end, but that the whole man in his whole culture is his own ultimate end.

Now such a man, who has acquired an excellent knowledge of all the rules of that play of thoughts, may even apply them, but he does so only for the purpose of thereby producing another play in his mind. He causes good and noble sentiments and thoughts to arise in his mind; but merely in order to observe himself in doing so, in order to make these sentiments themselves an object of his enjoyment, and to amuse himself at the appearance of harmony, of sublime emotions, &c., which they excite. But he is and remains corrupt; for the whole interests him for his own enjoyment's sake; he has no serious interest in it, no interest lying beyond himself.

Such a man may perhaps know himself thoroughly, may be thoroughly aware of his good and bad qualities and inclinations; but he neither loves the former nor hates the latter; he loves and longs for anything only in proportion as it is likely to give more satisfaction to that spiritual play within him. He may censure himself very honestly, but it is with the same æsthetical coldness with which he would censure an absurd piece of furniture or the tasteless dress of a stranger. In fact, he does not intend at all to better himself, and his self-censure has no such end in view; on the contrary: that which constitutes his character, affords to him, as it were, the greatest amusement, because it is the nearest and most attractive play-toy, which he has always under his control; and because he knows its play thoroughly through long observation.

This disposition is impossible in uncultured men, in whom the conception is always immediately related to acting. If they were not forced to act they never would think at all. But it is quite frequent amongst artists; and philosophers as well as theologians are also in very great danger of giving themselves up to it.

Now this disposition cannot be reformed by the above suggested remedy, since it calculates in all cases upon a *practical* mode of thinking, which here does not exist; nay, which such persons, as we have described, may expressly hold aloof from. Hence even the rule of that remedy and its application would become mere play to such persons. They would never ask what its results in life might be, since life is for them, indeed, nothing more than a means to promote that spiritual play, and perhaps to afford additional zest to it by furnishing a contrasting background.

Hence Ascetism would have to treat such persons in another manner. They must first be toned down to the practical standpoint; must first be infused with interest in life, and in the results of their mode of thinking. But even in their cases the good will must be presupposed; since no human art can produce it. For even if they are made to see how dangerous and corrupt their state of mind is, and made to wish for a better disposition, such an insight and wish may still co-exist with their old state of mind. It is only those, who have the good will, who will take advantage of the only thorough remedy.

This remedy is: to enter into active life, and to dive deeper and deeper into it, so that it may begin to become really interesting to them, and to claim all those energies which previously slumbered in useless play, thereby exciting in them the wish, which all ordinary men entertain, that they may succeed in what they have undertaken, which will put an end of itself to that empty self-observation. Not till then will they be in a position to apply the other rules of Ascetism to themselves; and unless they take that first step and return to the standpoint of misdirected humanity, there is no help for them.

From what we have said, the general remark may be drawn, that the contemplative life, whether it be that of a thinker or of an artist, is connected with great danger for the welfare of the soul, *i.e.*, for the virtue and honesty of those who are devoted to it. It is true, and it is the result of the quiet which it requires and produces, that speculative life is not likely to lead to great crimes, great vices and dissipations, but

it may easily lead to a deeper internal wickedness, which is all the more dangerous.

Now nothing is further from my intention than to terrify persons away from a speculative life generally, in the above general significance—for even in the present work I have shown that it is a part of the necessarily to be realized end of reason—but merely to call your attention to the care, which is necessary for those, who devote themselves to it. Either a person should devote himself not altogether to it, but carry on at the same time a practical business, taking equal interest in the latter, or, if his position in life excludes him from the latter, or if the particular branch of speculation, chosen by him, requires all his energies and time, he should at least pay uninterrupted attention to himself, and take care to carry on the speculative itself *as something practical*; in other words, to be careful that this speculation or artistic cultivation shall always be directed upon the morality and improvement of himself and of others, and that he shall always be well conscious of this his intention. He will thus preserve the purity of his character, and carry on his science or art with all the more success; whereas a character of the first description is also easily inclined to turn his speculation or art into a mere empty play, because every thing is play to him.

I could not close these lectures with a remark more important to young students and beginning philosophers and scholars: I therefore close them with it, and recommend myself to your remembrance and good wishes.

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